Sitting of 11 December 1956

Preamble
The House meet at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Motor Vehicles (Exports)
    Mr. Lewisasked the President of the Board of Trade why the export of vehicles in September, 1956, was the lowest for that month for six years; why car exports were 30 per cent. below the level of September, 1955, and those of commercial vehicles 28 per cent. lower than last year; and whether he will make a statement on the Government's plan to reverse this process.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): The main causes of the decline in exports of motor vehicles this year have been import restrictions in some of the industry's principal export markets. More than two-thirds of the fall in September can be attributed to the Australian and New Zealand markets alone. In addition there has been intensive foreign competition in overseas markets generally. Nevertheless, in the first nine months of this year exports of commercial vehicles were only 1·8 per cent. lower than for the first nine months of 1955. The motor manufacturers are well aware of the need to increase their exports and of the willingness of the Board of Trade to give them as much help as possible.
    Mr. Lewis: The Minister says that motor manufacturers are aware of the need for increased production. Can he tell us something tangible about what his Department intends to do? Because of petrol rationing, many hon. Members, including myself, have constituents who are unemployed. There will not be so many cars wanted on the home market. Surely that is a wonderful opportunity for the right hon. Gentleman to assist those manufacturers to increase exports.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The hon. Gentleman will recognise that selling motor cars is a matter for the motor car industry and that no amount of Government assistance is a substitute for competitiveness in overseas markets.

    Exports (Oversea Publicity)
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade what help is given by his Department to enable exporters to obtain publicity for their products abroad.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The facilities of the Overseas Information Services are freely available to all exporters who can provide the Board of Trade with material of news value. In addition, the Board and overseas posts will advise exporters about advertising agents and methods in particular markets.
    Mr. Russell: If I understand my right hon. Friend correctly, his officers provide industries with information about opportunities for their products. Cannot those officers help industries on their own initiative, without waiting for the industries to ask them?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The Overseas Information Services disseminate material of news value. On the general question of advertising, we cannot, of course, advise manufacturers how to advertise their goods. That is their own choice. We can advise them about agents and about particular problems in particular markets.

    Films and Tobacco (Imports from United States)
    Dr. Bennettasked the President of the Board of Trade under what agreements and contracts Her Majesty's Government is compelled to obtain the present supplies from the United States of America of cinematograph films and of tobacco for which dollars must be expended; and whether he will reduce the scale on which these imports are licensed.
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he is taking to reduce dollar expenditure on films and tobacco.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: There is no compulsion upon British importers to buy American films. Moreover, a special

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    limit is placed, in agreement with the American film companies, on the earnings from films which can be remitted to the United States of America. In the case of tobacco, manufacturers have already bought and paid for the American supplies they were permitted to buy from this year's crop. The question of imports from next year's crop does not arise until July, 1957.
    Dr. Bennett: While understanding that exports must provide the wherewithal to pay for the imports from any country, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether it would not be considerably helpful to our trade if we could get these not entirely vital materials from, say, Rhodesia, which can produce more, with easier terms of trade that relieve us of embarrassment for dollars?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: As my hon. Friend knows, there has been a very large-scale substitution of American tobacco by Rhodesian tobacco since the war. I am perfectly prepared to consider whether that could be carried further. However, it does not arise immediately. This year's crop has already been bought.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Now that we are scraping the bottom of the barrel for dollars, what are the Government doing to see that dollars are not wasted on inessential goods or goods obtainable from non-dollar sources? I agree that we have commitments but, subject to those commitments, what else are the Government doing about the matter?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The Question relates to films and tobacco. In regard to films, there is an agreed limit as to the amount of dollars that can be transferred across exchanges. In respect of tobacco, there has been a large-scale substitution.
    Mr. G. Jeger: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider revising the film quota so as to allow more British films to be shown?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not think that a mere alteration in the quota would of itself ensure more British films being shown. First, they would have to be produced. That is the purpose of a Bill which is shortly to be introduced.

    Packets and Bottles (Weight Fluctuations)
    Mrs. Mannasked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the economic situation, and the possible increase in the cost of living, he will take steps now, to implement some of the recommendations of the Hodgson Committee, particularly weight fluctuations in packets and bottles, and contents of all goods sold in boxes, and so achieve some stability of prices.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir.
    Mrs. Mann: Is the President aware of how disappointed I am with that reply? Does he know that there is general disappointment at the hesitation of the Government to introduce the recommendations of the Hodgson Committee? Could he say when he is likely to introduce some of the recommendations?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Not this Session, but those recommendations have nothing to do with the stabilisation of prices.
    Mr. Bottomley: Was not that Committee a very responsible Committee which did excellent work, and for the Government to ignore that work is not complimentary to those on the Committee?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Yes, the Committee has done a good job. The reason for this delay is not concerned with any question of not being complimentary to the Committee, which did very good work on complex and difficult problems; it is because there would not be time to introduce a major Bill of this character this Session.

    Middle East (Supply of Arms)
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade the present policy on granting licences for shipments of military and para-military equipment to Middle Eastern States.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The United Nations Resolution of 2nd November calls upon member States to refrain from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities. We have complied with this recommendation. The export of

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    arms and equipment is permitted to countries towards which we have treaty obligations and to other friendly States.
    Mr. Swingler: Whilst thanking the President for that reply, may I ask whether it would not be wise policy to stop shipping arms to any Middle East countries, at any rate until the situation has clarified? Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that no arms are being shipped to countries whose Governments have declared hostility to the existence of Israel?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Perhaps the hon. Member would put that question to the Foreign Secretary.

    Price Controls
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade what powers he still retains to impose price controls; and if he will use these powers to prevent profiteering from shortages, following the Suez crisis.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: There is power to control the price of a small number of commodities under Defence Regulation 55AB. I do not expect any general shortages or profiteering in the field for which I am responsible.
    Mr. Swingler: Does that mean that the President is not going to use any price control powers at all? Is it not implied from the appeal of the Chancellor to businessmen that there is profiteering, or that there is going to be profiteering? Is it not quite clear from that statement that some price increases are not now justified and, therefore, that the President should take action to stop that happening?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The price control powers which I have are limited to a small number of commodities. As the hon. Member is aware, price control is operated on iron and steel scrap and in a few cases of that kind, but I do not intend to take wider powers.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware of statements made by a number of his hon. Friends yesterday that manufacturers and traders are now tending to put up prices because of the increase in distribution charges because of the oil tax and other reasons? In view view of the appeal of the Chancellor, to
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    which my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has drawn attention, does not the President think that the best way to stop the tendency to put up prices here, there and everywhere is to use price control?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: One way to stop it will be for all of us not to exaggerate the increases of prices which have taken place or we can well create an atmosphere in which everybody will go in panic for increased prices. The movement has been quite small.
    Mr. Rhodes: Would the right hon. Gentleman get his Department to watch very closely the price of oils other than hydrocarbon oils because at the moment those oils are being chalked up at prices which can get very high indeed without being noticed? Will he watch that?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Certainly, Sir.

    Steel Plate Production (Additional Capacity)
    Mr. Albuasked the President of the Board of Trade what discussions he has had with the Iron and Steel Board on the construction of a new plate mill.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am discussing steel plate production with the Iron and Steel Board and attention is being given to effecting an expansion of capacity. The Iron and Steel Board is considering some projects for additional plate capacity, but is not yet in a position to make an announcement.
    Mr. Albu: In view of the time it will take to construct a new plate mill and the very largely increased demands there will be for plate for super-tankers, for the atomic energy programme and oil storage, does not the President think the time has come when we should introduce some method of allocation in accordance with priorities, if we are not to have very severe economic difficulties?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not think a large-scale allocation scheme would really help at present. What is important is that we should have new capacity and I am discussing that with the Iron and Steel Board, which will make an announcement when it is ready.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Is this new capacity proposed to be with an existing firm, or

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    will it be under the powers which the Minister has to set it up under his Department, if he so wishes?
    Mr. Thorneyeroft: Perhaps the hon. Member will await an announcement by the Board.

    Middle East Situation (Commodity Supplies and Prices)
    Mr. Sorensenasked the President of the Board of Trade what commodities, other than oil, are likely to be scarce or reduced in supply owing to the blocking of the Suez Canal and Middle East disturbance; to what extent this will involve increased prices of retail goods dependent on supplies of raw materials that must now be transported to this country by alternative routes.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Supplies of imported commodities, other than oil, are not likely to be seriously reduced, although there may be some delays in arrivals. The price of imported materials constitutes only a part of the final cost, and the rise in freight rates should not greatly affect retail price of manufactured goods.
    Mr. Sorensen: Has the President taken any action to see that whatever increase there may be is not exaggerated by those who have control at some intervening point?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I am grateful to the hon. Member, and I am sure he is right in sayine that we should not exaggerate these things.
    Mr. Sorensen: That is not the point at all.

    United Kingdom and Egypt
    Mr. Sorensenasked the President of the Board of Trade what trade pacts or agreements existed between this country and Egypt and Middle-East Arab countries, respectively; to what extent these have been abrogated or renounced; and to what extent, in volume and value, our export trade to that area and our import trade, particularly in raw materials, has been affected.
    Mr. P. Thomeycroft: The only trade agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the countries to which the hon. Member refers is the Anglo-Egyptian
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    understanding of 1930 on most-favoured-nation treatment, which has not been abrogated or renounced. The rest of the Question does not, therefore, arise.

    Overseas Trade Fairs (Committee)
    Mr. Bottomleyasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement about the future policy to be followed by Her Majesty's Government at world trade fairs.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir. The Exhibitions Advisory Committee, which, as I told the House on 31st October, has been reconstituted under the chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, is examining various aspects of policy on overseas trade fairs and I shall await its views before deciding on any changes that may be desirable.
    Mr. Bottomley: Cannot the President ask the Committee to expedite its decision? Trade fairs will be starting early in the New Year, and unless we have a better policy than we have had in the past, we shall do as miserably as we have done since the present Government came into power.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: We have broadly carried on the policy adopted by the right hon. Member when he was in power. I do not deny that there may be room for improvement. All I suggest is that we should await the views of this Committee before changing the policy.

    Argentine Meat Imports (New Zealand Representations)
    Mr. Bottomleyasked the President of the Board of Trade what reply he has given to the representations by the New Zealand Government concerning the importation of meat from the Argentine.
    Mr. P. Thomeycroft: We drew attention to the fact that New Zealand has now a much bigger share of our total meat imports, both by quantity and value, than before the war; and we said that we have no reason to expect any substantial change in the level of meat imports in the near future.
    Mr. Bottomley: Is not the New Zealand Government disturbed because more and more imports are coming in? The President of the Board of Trade will

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    recollect that the Australian Government made the same representations, with the ultimate bad results to our country which resulted in the new Agreement? The New Zealand Government will be taking similar steps. Cannot the right hon. Gentleman stop that now?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I am not sure what the right hon. Member has in mind, but the New Zealand share of the market, both in quantity and value, is larger than it was before the war. The Australian problem was quite a different one. It was based, not on meat, but on wheat, and the share of the market had declined, not increased.
    Mr. Bottomley: If there is an improvement in trade with both those countries, that is due to bulk purchase and longterm trade agreements under the Labour Government. May I ask the President whether he does not expect the New Zealand Government to be as awkward in the future as the Australian Government have been in the past, because of lack of action on the part of Her Majesty's Government?
    Mr. Thomeycroft: I would not accept that either of these two very friendly Commonwealth Governments have been in the least bit awkward in any way.
    Mr. Russell: Is there any reason why we should not take as much as New Zealand is able to let us have up to the limit of our consumption?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: As I said, we are taking very much more than we did before.

    Hire-Purchase Deposits
    Mrs. Mannasked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the Manchester Court decision of 5th December in which his Department was concerned, and the further evidence supplied by the hon. Member for Coatbridge that moneylenders are defeating his regulations in respect of hire-purchase deposits, he will now take steps to secure compliance with the intention of his credit restriction policy.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I propose to lay before the House shortly Orders dealing with loans made by arrangement with the dealer for the payment of deposits and advance rentals.

    Factory Building and Extensions (Development Areas)
    Mr. Willeyasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on his present policy regarding factory building in Development Areas.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The policy remains as it was at the time of the statement by my hon. and learned Friend the then Parliamentary Secretary on 5th June, when answering a similar Question by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson).
    Mr. Willey: Is the President aware that that statement caused a great deal of concern? Is he further aware that there is a general feeling in the Development Areas that there is an absolute standstill in Development Area policy at the moment? Would the President deny that?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I agree that there has been economy exercised in Government building in the Development Areas.
    Mr. Burke: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that in the north-east Lancashire Development Area sites are available, labour is available, and all that is wanting is some factory building?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I will certainly bear in mind conditions in north-east Lancashire.
    Commander Maitland: Can my right hon. Friend say how the percentage of unemployment compares with the rest of the country?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think it is 1·5 per cent. in north-east Lancashire compared with just over 1 per cent. in other areas.
    Mr. Willeyasked the President of the Board of Trade how many applications for the provision of new Government factories or extensions under the Distribution of Industry Act in the North-East Development Area have been granted in the past six months.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Two, Sir.
    Mr. Willey: Is the Minister aware that this is quite inadequate? If there is a general slow-down in building, there is a particular need for development policy. We expect him to show greater interest in this matter and to promote and encourage more building activities in Development Areas.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: At the same time, I think all forms of Government expenditure must be closely watched. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Certainly. All forms of Government expenditure need to be closely watched, and this is an expenditure which cannot altogether escape attention.
    Mr. Albu: What is the policy with respect to those factories in Development Areas which are closed down due to the Government's credit policy, with work being withdrawn into the main factories of the companies concerned?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: There is a fairly high demand for factories in the Development Areas, but if the hon. Member has a particular case in mind, I will certainly look at it.

    Industrial Output (Oil Supplies)
    Mr. Allaunasked the President of the Board of Trade by what percentage he estimates British output will be cut when oil supplies are reduced by 20 per cent. on 1st January.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The reduction in oil supplies by 20 per cent. from 1st January will apply only to gas/diesel oils. The cut on fuel oils will remain for the time being at 10 per cent. No precise estimate of the effect on industrial output of this further cut of gas/diesel oils is possible, but it is thought that the effect will not be very great.
    Mr. Allaun: Will the Minister tell the House how those firms which, for obvious reasons, are saving all the diesel oil possible, can cut their oil consumption by 20 per cent. without cutting their output and production?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: There may be some cut in output, which will vary very much from firm to firm. I understand that a questionnaire has been sent out by the Ministry of Fuel and Power to the firms concerned, so that they will have an opportunity of stating the effect in each instance.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Are not the Government being far too complacent about the effects of their policy on industrial production? Is not this a parallel to the complacency of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the economic debate five weeks ago, when he gave the impression that there was very little harm to our
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    economy, whereas now we see day by day very serious harm? Will the right hon. Gentleman not get out of his head the idea that it is possible to cut the import of raw materials without a very serious effect on production?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think we want to take a sensible position in this matter. We do not want to underestimate the problem which must arise if oil is short. At the same time, we do not want to slide into the much more dangerous opposite position of exaggerating all our difficulties, which would undoubtedly do grave harm to the economy.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Premium Savings Bonds
    Sir N. Hulbertasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the number of Premium Bonds sold up to midnight, 1st December.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): The number of £1 units sold up to the end of November was 46½ million.
    Sir N. Hulbert: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied with this very excellent result?
    Mr. Brooke: The Treasury is never satisfied, but we are very pleased.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the comment in most financial journals that a considerable part of those purchases were made by taxpayers in the Surtax class because they provide a reasonable inducement to them that they will do better out of this tax-free prize than with ordinary lending? Will the right hon. Gentleman say to what extent the Treasury estimates that these sales are mere diversions from other forms of saving and not a net increase in savings?
    Mr. Brooke: What gives me satisfaction is that these new Premium Bonds are proving popular with all classes of people and that the figure of savings remaining outstanding is higher at this moment than ever before.

    Egypt (Expelled British Subjects)
    Mr. Goughasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if Her Majesty's Government will institute a fund, out of blocked

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    Egyptian assets, to provide for British subjects taking refuge in this country as a result of expulsion by the Egyptian Government.
    The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Derek Walker-Smith): I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, South (Sir J. Lucas) on 4th December and to the statement my right hon. Friend the Chancellor made in the course of his speech on 6th December.
    Mr. Goughasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will be prepared to release the Egyptian dominated accounts in this country belonging to British subjects, normally resident in Egypt, who are now here as a result of the actions of the Egyptian Government, subject to the proviso that such sums shall only be spent or invested in the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: When these returned British subjects declare that they intend to live permanently in the United Kingdom or any country other than Egypt, their sterling assets will no longer be subject to the restrictions imposed on the accounts of residents of Egypt. Where they are not proposing to settle permanently outside Egypt, reasonable facilities for drawing on their sterling assets are allowed.
    Mr. Gough: Does my hon. and learned Friend appreciate that at the moment some of these people are suffering critical difficulties? Will he not agree to waive that rule for the time being in order to allow them, at least temporarily, to have some of this money, which is their own, in order to start in business in this country?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I am not sure whether my hon. Friend appreciates that a British subject home from Egypt who is not prepared to declare that he intends to live permanently outside Egypt is nevertheless allowed to draw on his Egyptian sterling account at the rate of up to £100 a week and, in addition, to draw for miscellaneous purchases, such as the purchase of a house in this country in which to stay for the present.
    Mr. Paget: Considering that they are innocent victims of this disaster, could not we send them to Jamaica for a holiday?
    Mr. Nicholson: In order to make the position quite clear, will my hon. and learned Friend assure the House that Egyptian assets are in no case being paid over to the Egyptian Government at the present moment?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I think that is well known, but I am grateful to my hon. Friend for mentioning it.

    Purchase Tax (Motor Cars)
    Miss Burtonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he would be prepared to consider a temporary reduction in the Purchase Tax on cars as a special measure to help the industry in its present difficulties.
    Mr. H. Brooke: No, Sir.
    Miss Burton: As the Financial Secretary himself said that the penalties which we have to bear are strictly limited and temporary, and as, furthermore, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has told us of his determination keep up industry, is it not fair to ask for something to be done for the motor car industry, which is suffering solely because of the policies of this Government?
    Mr. Brooke: I hope that the car manufacturers will take every opportunity of increasing their sales in markets which are not affected by the fuel shortage. The Export Credits Guarantee Department has been evolving new techniques specially designed to support aggressive sales campaigns and is ready to place all its facilities at the disposal of the manufacturers.
    Miss Burton: If the right hon. Gentleman's remarks do not seem to seep into the minds of the motor manufacturers and Coventry men are thrown out of work, will he be prepared to look at some alternative suggestion?
    Mr. Brooke: I am always ready to consider all suggestions, but I do not think that that contained in the Question is a good one.

    Hydrocarbon Oil Duties (Cost of Living)
    Mr. Lewisasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent his Department's estimate of 1s. 5d. per gallon on the price of petrol increasing the cost of living by one-third of one point took

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    into account the increases that will arise in distribution costs of milk, bread, coal, vegetables, and meat, the increase in the cost of bread, where this is produced by oil-fired stoves, and the increased rates of local borough councils.
    Mr. Doddsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will state in detail how he has arrived at his calculation that the increased cost of petrol will cause an increase of less than one-third of a point in the cost-of-living index.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: On 4th December my right hon. Friend gave an estimate that the increase in the duty on petrol and similar hydrocarbon oils by 1s. 0d. a gallon would increase the cost of living by less than one-third of a point. This took into account both the items in the index into which the cost of petrol and other dutiable oils enters ascertainably, that is, private motoring and travel by bus.
    It is not possible to calculate exactly what the indirect effect on the cost of living arising from increased distribution costs might be. Apart from technical difficulties of computation it would depend on the extent to which the additional costs can be absorbed without affecting retail prices. My right hon. Friend is, however, satisfied that it must be very small.
    There is, I may add, no duty on fuel oil used, for example, in bakeries.
    Mr. Lewis: That was with reference to the Is. tax. The Minister will agree that there has been a further increase of 5d. and that almost every week this year the Government have come forward with new increases and said, "This will mean only a small increase in the cost of living." That is what they have said, whether it has concerned rents, prescriptions or petrol. Surely the Minister can give some idea of what the position will be in the next two or three months?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The Question relates to the estimate of one-third of one point in respect of the petrol duty. That one-third of one point is the estimate in relation to the duty, and the duty only; and that is the basis on which my right hon. Friend made his estimate of one-third of one point. Taking into account the other matters,
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    it is increased to the neighbourhood of one-half of one point, as I think the hon. Member knows.
    Mr. Dodds: Is the Minister aware that I was present when the Chancellor made his amazing calculation. I regret that it was not possible for the Chancellor to see the pained expressions behind him. Nevertheless, the statement has been made. Can the Minister give an undertaking that if any firms make a "phoney" excuse of an increase in the price of petrol for raising prices substantially, the Government will take action against such unpatriotic firms?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I would say to the hon. Gentleman and to the House that the statistics show that the rise in the cost of living is very small, or relatively small, and includes both the increase in duty and the increase in the commercial price of petrol. I am sure that that is a consideration which will be borne in mind by all concerned.
    Mr. Jay: Does the half of a point assume that none of the traders concerned will add more to the final price than the 1s. 5d. which is strictly justified?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: It includes the 5d. increase in the commercial price for private motoring, and was based also on the hypothesis that all bus operators would raise their fares by the maximum allowed, so in that respect it is a pessimistic calculation.
    Mr. Jay: But does it assume that none of the traders will add on more than the 1s. 5d. which is strictly justified?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: It does not include any figure above that.
    Mr. Lewis: Does it include the 8d. a ton that has gone on coal today?

    Sterling Balances
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what change took place in the total figure of sterling balances in November, 1956.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The figures are not yet available; but apart from that, it has been the practice of this and previous Governments to publish these figures only half-yearly in the White Papers on the balance of payments.
    Mr. Wilson: But whatever the practice may have been, does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that a somewhat misleading picture may be derived from the publication of movements in the gold and dollar reserves in times such as the present? Might it not even be helpful to the Government and to the position of sterling to see what, if any, changes there have been in sterling balances at the same time as these devastating changes in the gold and dollar reserves?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, correct. There are considerations on both sides. After all, he, or his right hon. Friends, followed this practice when the Labour Government were in power. Sir Stafford Cripps expressly said, when asked about it in 1950, that he would not change the practice.

    Gold and Dollar Reserves
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the total loss, over the months August to November, of gold and dollars, net of the proceeds of the sale of Trinidad assets; and the proportion which these represent of the gold and dollar reserves at the beginning of that four-month period.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The figures are: 616 million dollars and 26 per cent. It is, of course, precisely because these are large totals that steps have been taken at home and abroad to strengthen our position.
    Mr. Wilson: But does not the hon. and learned Gentleman recall the very critical comments made by the Chancellor on 17th February about the fact that our gold and dollar reserves for the whole of 1955 fell by about 25 per cent.? Is he not aware that a fall of 26 per cent. in four months is extremely serious, and will not be covered merely by borrowing more money from other people?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I do not know about the last part of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, but he will appreciate that the drawings and the standby from the International Monetary Fund are, in total, just about twice the figure of the losses of reserves in the last four months.
    Mr. Nabarro: In view of the remarkably fine export figures for October and
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    November, can my hon. and learned Friend say to what extent these losses of gold and dollars are attributable to speculative elements, and to what extent they may be attributable to trading deficits or surpluses.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I think that my right hon. Friend made it clear in his statement last week that they were not attributable to any defects in our trading position. My hon. Friend may have observed that that is confirmed by what Mr. Jacobssen is reported this morning as saying.
    Mr. Wilson: While imports were bound to be severely reduced in November by lack of shipping, as we were previously informed by the Government, is it not a fact that, in addition to the speculative element mentioned by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro), there must have been a pretty substantial leakage of capital movements from the sterling area to the outside world? How far, in the view of the hon. and learned Member, is this due to the most regrettable weakening in the exchange control defences of the pound over the last two or three years.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I think that the right hon. Gentleman is now seeking an answer to which he is not entitled at this time.

    Hospital Capital Schemes (Committee's Recommendation)
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he has now reached a decision on the recommendation of the Guillebaud Committee that hospital capital schemes of less than £100,000 should no longer require individual approval by the Treasury.
    Mr. H. Brooke: Yes, Sir. Hospital capital schemes costing less than £60,000 no longer require individual approval by the Treasury.
    Mr. Robinson: Is the Financial Secretary aware that the regional hospital boards will tender to the Chancellor their half-hearted thanks for his: having gone half-way to meeting this recommendation? Can he tell the House why it has not been possible to go the whole way to meeting this very modest recommendation in the Report?
    Mr. Brooke: I had hoped that the hon. Member, as a member of a regional hospital board, would have been wholehearted on this occasion. The fact is that £60.000 is double the previous limit of £30,000, which is the limit that already applies to most other civil and defence building paid for by the Exchequer.

    Taxes
    Mr. Roy Jenkinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what changes he proposes to make in the Profits Tax, the Purchase Tax and the tobacco and beer duties in his next Budget.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I do not propose to anticipate my right hon. Friend's next Budget.
    Mr. Jenkins: In that case, can the right hon. Gentleman tell us why Income Tax is to be singled out, and why we were given last week an indication of his right hon. Friend's intention about that, and not about other taxes? Will he please explain the logical distinction which his right hon. Friend made in his mind?
    Mr. Brooke: My right hon. Friend explained that the Income Tax was the traditional first weapon first used on these occasions. I know of the Socialist devotion to high taxation, but I should not have thought that the hon. Member would wish the Chancellor to increase all these taxes simultaneously.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Is the extraordinary reference made by the Chancellor to the Income Tax—marking a very great contrast to what the Lord Privy Seal did on the eve on the last Election—in any way connected with the Financial Secretary's statement last night, when, quite suddenly, he told us that there was not to be an Election in 1957? Are we to take it, therefore, that in 1957 there will be no question of following the Lord Privy Seal's example?
    Mr. Brooke: I have already said that I do not propose to anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget, but I do not see why I should not anticipate General Election prospects.
    Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport: In view of the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer can never anticipate his Budget statement, is not the asinine Question on the Order Paper typical of the oaflike Opposition opposite?
    Mr. Brooke: I can add nothing to the cogency of my hon. and gallant Friend's question.
    Mr. Jay: Even if the Financial Secretary is unable to answer that question, can he, at least, give an assurance that, after this week, there will be no further Budget until April?
    Mr. Brooke: I am not proposing to anticipate anything, but the Financial Secretary has a personal interest in avoiding Budgets.
    Mr. Jenkins: In view of what the Financial Secretary has said, and despite the fact that it clearly contradicts everything which the Lord Privy Seal did in his last Budget, can we have an assurance that it is clearly the Chancellor's intention to consider increasing the Income Tax before he considers any changes in the taxes which I have mentioned?
    Mr. Nabarro: Certainly not.
    Mr. Brooke: My right hon. Friend the Chancellor indicated that he had reviewed the tax field. He made certain statements on Tuesday last week. I have nothing to add to them.

    International Monetary Fund (Government's Application)
    Mr. Roy Jenkinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can now give further details of the Government's application to the International Monetary Fund.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: Yes, Sir. Her Majesty's Government have applied to the International Monetary Fund for a drawing of 561·47 million United States dollars and a standby arrangement to draw currencies worth up to 738·53 million United States dollars. These requests were approved by the Executive Board of the Fund at its meeting in Washington yesterday afternoon.
    Mr. Jenkins: Can the Economic Secretary confirm that if, as we hope, our gold and dollar position begins to improve in the near future, the first claim on our reserves will then be the repayment of these drawings before we can begin in any normal sense to build up our reserves again?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: We have undertaken to repurchase the dollars obtained by the drawings within three years.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Is this not a very grave statement for the Government to have to make at this time? Does this not mean that the Government are throwing in one of our last lines of reserve to pay for the military expedition to Suez and is it not a fact that it was always envisaged that reserves as important as these might be needed in case of some worsening of world economic and financial conditions? Will the Government bear in mind what my hon. Friend has said, that they should make this a first priority of financial policy to re-establish these reserves in order that we can be fortified against any further difficulty which we may meet?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: Yes, and we shall certainly hope to do better than our predecessors in this respect. In the six months following September, 1947, the Labour Government made four drawings on the fund to the total of 300 million dollars. A repayment to the fund of 124 million dollars was made in 1954, when the present Administration was in power.
    Mr. Wilson: Surely the hon. and learned Gentleman does not want to mislead the House? The present Government have borrowed not 300 million dollars but, in various forms, 1.300 million dollars. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman inform the House by how many hundreds of millions of dollars the reserves today are below the figures when we on this side of the House left office?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The right hon. Gentleman pools these amounts together as a borrowing, but he will appreciate that the drawing is 561 million dollars. The larger figure of 738 million dollars is not a borrowing as of now, but is merely a standby arrangement.

    University Academic Salaries
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will make a statement on the working of the new procedure for regulating the salaries of university teachers.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I understand that, after discussions between the Committee of the Vice-Chancellors and Principals and the Association of University Teachers, each of these bodies has met the University
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    Grants Committee and given it a full statement of their views on the need for a review of academic salaries. My right hon. Friend now awaits a report from the University Grants Committee.
    The procedure outlined to the House on 20th July last year is, therefore, operating in the manner then envisaged.
    Mr. Robinson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is operating very slowly indeed? Is he further aware that university teachers view with concern the increases in salaries obtained recently by civil servants and by teachers in schools and technical colleges, while their own salaries lag behind? Can he give any indication that some result will emerge before very long from these negotiations?
    Mr. Brooke: The hon. Gentleman knows that we do not interfere with the affairs of the University Grants Committee. The University Grants Committee will in due course, and as soon as it is in a position to do so, be submitting a report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that is the time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer can give consideration to the matter.
    Mr. Hastings: Will the right hon. Gentleman give special consideration to salaries of professors of medicine and surgery? These compare badly with sums earned outside and tend to withdraw from professorships some of the best men in the service.
    Mr. Brooke: I realise that a number of different and sometimes conflicting views are held about the relative salaries earned by various people. I think we have got a fairly good procedure now, and in due course the Chancellor will be considering the report, when he receives it.

    Manufacturing Industries (Investment)
    Mr. Croninasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what action he proposes to take to increase the volume of investment in manufacturing industries.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: Fixed investment in private manufacturing industry has been rising quickly in the last two years. Last year the rate of increase was over one-quarter by value and about one-fifth by volume. In the first half of this year the same rate of increase was maintained. While this rapid growth of investment is

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    to be welcomed, a degree of restraint on all forms of spending at home remains necessary in order to assist the balance of payments.
    Mr. Cronin: While thanking the hon. and learned Gentleman for that somewhat complacent answer, may I ask whether he is aware that the volume of investment in manufacturing industries is dropping behind that in Soviet Russia, the United States, Western Germany, Italy, and most of our competitors?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: It is, of course, true that some countries are devoting more of their national output to investment than we are able to do, but I think that we have a good record, having regard to our defence commitments.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Is not the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that it has been the policy of the Chancellor throughout this year to try to cut down investment? Our national investment is now falling while Germany's is increasing sharply, with all that it means in the export markets. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman now consider introducing a system of control which will hold back the inessential investment in order vastly to expand the essential investment?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I know that the right hon. Gentleman has something of a King Charles' head about this, if I may so term it without disrespect, but the items which he has so much in mind really loom far less largely in this matter than he would like the House to believe.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman's original Answer mean that the Government now want investment in manufacturing industries to go up or down?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The rate of investment in the manufacturing industries is holding pretty steady. That does not mean that the pattern of it is necessarily steady because, as the hon. Gentleman knows, as a result of the measures taken, investment tends to improve in that sector of manufacturing industries which particularly contribute to exports and the balance of payments.
    Mr. Jay: Could the Economic Secretary answer the very simple question put to him? Do the Government want to see investment go up or down?
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Yes or no?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: We hope that it will continue to go up, but we want the upward trend to be without prejudice to the balance of payments position of this country.

    United States Loans, 1945 (Waiver of Interest)
    Mr. Croninasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will reconsider the decision to claim a waiver of the annual instalment of interest on the loan from the Government of the United States of America, payable on 31st December, 1956, in view of the effect that its announcement has had on foreign confidence in sterling and also the necessity for its debate in Congress.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: No, Sir. I see no reason why an application for a waiver of the annual interest on the United States loans of December, 1945, made in accordance with the intention of the Loan Agreement, should have on adverse effect on foreign confidence in sterling. Indeed, I am sure that the undertaking by the United States Administration to put the matter to Congress with a favourable recommendation has had a helpful effect.
    Mr. Cronin: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the forward premiums have moved steadily against sterling ever since his right hon. Friend made that announcement?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The official rate for sterling has held pretty steady in the last week since the statement was made.
    Mr. Peyton: Will my hon. and learned Friend agree that one of the chief reasons at the moment for lack of confidence abroad in sterling is the fear, which is of course, unfounded, that we might have the party opposite in power?
    Mr. Jay: Can the hon. and learned Gentleman say what the legal position would be if the United States Congress do not accept this request before 31st December? Should we be formally in default or not?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend made it clear that we are proposing to pay the amount of interest due, on the assumption that there is no

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    waiver, into a special account to stress the fact that in no circumstances will this country default on its obligations.
    Mr. Jay: Shall we be paying it into an account in the ownership of the American Government?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: My right hon. Friend made it clear that the question of the machinery for the payment into a special account would be gone into in consultation with the United States Government.

    National Gallery (Exhibition Space)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Secretary to the Treasury if he is aware that of the 1,960 pictures in the National Gallery only 855 were on exhibition on 26th July last, because there was not enough space to exhibit the other 1,105; if he will now state whether space has since been found to exhibit the latter; and what are his plans for relieving the National Gallery of this problem and for enabling the public to see all the pictures there that were acquired for the purpose of public exhibition.
    Mr. H. Brooke: Since 26th July the reopening of three more exhibition rooms has made it possible to hang a further 105 pictures in the National Gallery. Therefore, 960 pictures are now on exhibition in the Gallery, and a further 150 are loaned for exhibition elsewhere.
    In answer to the last part of the Question, the Trustees tell me that in their Report for 1955–56, which is to be published on Thursday, they refer to a long-term reconstruction plan which would substantially increase the exhibition space in the Gallery.
    Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister realise that both he and the Trustees are guilty of a serious breach of trust in not hanging the pictures which are entrusted to them for public exhibition, when there are other galleries ready and willing to do so? Will he take steps to see that some of the pictures are sent to appropriate galleries, for instance the Lane pictures to the Dublin Art Gallery?
    Mr. Brooke: I suspected that the Lane pictures were in the hon. and learned Gentleman's mind, but I detect no mention of them in his original Question.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    Buildings (Architectural and Historic Interest)
    Dr. Strossasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government for how many local authority districts a list of buildings of special architectural or historic interest has still to be issued; of these, how many have still to be surveyed; and when it is expected the work will be completed throughout the country.
    The Minister of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Duncan Sandys): Out of 1,480 local authorities areas, 1,071 have been surveyed. Lists, including interim lists, have been issued in respect of 1,177 areas. I cannot forecast when this work will be completed.
    Dr. Stross: While thanking the Minister for his Answer, may I ask him whether he would agree that, as so much of the work has already been done, it really is time it was completed? Will he give what encouragement he possibly can to see that it is expedited?
    Mr. Sandys: Yes, within reason; but there is, of course, a fearful amount of work involved in listing, and it does inevitably take time.

    Men's Institutes (Rates)
    Mr. Haymanasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will introduce legislation to amend Section 8 (1) of the Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, so as to permit exemption from rates of men's institutes, many of which are now in danger of closing down because of heavy increased rate burden.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. Enoch Powell): My right hon. Friend has no legislation in mind on this point at present.
    Mr. Hayman: Will the Parliamentary Secretary bear in mind that, whilst the great public schools can be granted this concession of local authorities waiving rates, since I tabled this Question a men's institute in a small village not far from my home has had to close; and will he ask his right hon. Friend to reconsider this decision?
    Mr. Powell: Section 8 of the 1955 Act does provide that non-profit-making organisations which are concerned with the advancement of religion, education or social welfare may qualify for relief. It is not for my right hon. Friend to decide whether any particular men's institute is covered by that Section or not.

    Commercial Building, Central London
    Mrs. L. Jegerasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what proposals he has for the provision of more residential accommodation in central London; and whether, in view of the housing need and the heavy demands on transport facilities, he will refuse his consent to any further business and commercial building in the central area.
    Mr. Sandys: It was in order to reduce congestion that I modified the County of London Development Plan so as to increase the area allocated for residential use and to restrain the spread of commerce in the central areas. Since then I have missed no opportunity of stressing the importance of these questions. I am hoping shortly to receive from the London County Council and the City Corporation proposals for further measures to relieve congestion.
    Mrs. Jeger: Whilst appreciating the steps which the Minister has already taken, may I ask him whether he would agree that there are indications that office building in central London is already excessive, as one can see from the number of advertisements about office space to let in many of these new, and older, office buildings? Is he not prepared to answer the specific point of my Question, as to whether he will definitely refuse his consent to any further business or commercial building, at least for the time being?
    Mr. Sandys: It is not so easy. It really would not be realistic to put a ban on all further commercial building in what is, after all, the principal commercial centre of this country; and, apart from whether it would be wise to do so, the compensation involved would run into fantastic figures. That must be borne in mind; but I am doing what I can to keep additional commercial building within bounds.

    Rolling Mill Project, Butterthwaite
    Mr. J. Hyndasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he is now prepared to give permission for
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    the erection of a rolling mill by Messrs. Joseph Gillott & Sons, Sheffield, at Butterthwaite.
    Mr. Powell: My right hon. Friend hopes to give his decision this month.

  HOUSING

    Programmes
    Mr. Awberyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government how many local authorities have notified him of their intention to discontinue building dwelling-houses.
    Mr. Sandys: I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer given to the hon. Member for Walthamstow, West (Mr. Redhead) on 4th December.
    Mr. Awbery: Is the Minister aware that it is reported that 300 local authorities are discontinuing building houses because of the abolition of the subsidy and the increase in the Bank Rate, and does he not agree that this is a retrograde step in a great social service? What is he doing to stop this step backwards?
    Mr. Sandys: I do not know about "this step backwards". First, I have asked all local authorities to let me have their estimate of the number of tenders which they are proposing to let for the erection of houses during the current financial year. As soon as the returns are complete, I shall publish them; but I think it will be found that, while there has been a switch from general needs house building to slum clearance, there is no evidence of any sharp reduction in the overall housing plans of local authorities.
    Mr. Mitchison: Does the right hon. Gentleman consider it right to make a second cut in the housing subsidies when he does not yet know the result of the first one?
    Mr. Sandys: I believe the hon. and learned Gentleman will have an opportunity of expounding his views on that subject on Thursday.

    GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION
    Mr. Lewisasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the need for national unity, he will take the necessary action to prevent controversial legislation

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    being introduced and take such action as may be necessary to suspend further progress with the Rent Bill, and take no further steps to impose the prescription charges or take any other action which will increase the cost of living.
    The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have been asked to reply.
    The Government believe that the legislation they introduce, and the policies they pursue, are in the best interests of the country. Therefore, much as we would welcome the support of the hon. Member and his right hon. and hon. Friends, we must, if necessary, press on without it.
    Mr. Lewis: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the Chancellor made an appeal only last week to the trade unions not to go forward for wage increases? In view of the fact that the trade unions have rightly condemned these suggested legislative Measures, which undoubtedly will push up the cost of living, should not the Minister, if he wants to get the co-operation and good will of the trade unions, meet them and discuss with them the possibility of implementing the suggestion contained in the Question?
    Mr. Butler: It is very important indeed for the Government that we should work with the trade unions. The reason for the Rent Bill has been explained by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government, and it will, we believe, have a good effect upon the economy, quite apart from the effect which it will have on the demand on housing. The question of the prescription charges, to which reference is made in the Question, arises because my right hon. Friend was obliged to economise in Government expenditure. There are, therefore, reasons for both these Measures, which we believe are important.
    Mr. Gaitskell: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's reply, may I ask whether it is intended by the Government that they should have formal consultations with the Trades Union Congress on the present economic situation, and, if so, whether it would not be wise, pending those consultations, for the Government to keep an open mind on this question?
    Mr. Butler: I cannot go back on the Answer I have given on these questions, but I have said before, during the Prime
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    Minister's absence, that we do attach importance to the contacts which we already have with the Trades Union Congress. In particular, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be glad to maintain contact with the Economic Committee, and we have also the committees of the Government upon which the trade unions are represented. We value these contacts and, if there is the slightest desire for an early meeting, then it will certainly be met.

    HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Prime Minister if he will now propose a meeting of heads of Governments of the great Powers for the purpose of discussing the immediate limitation and eventual abolition of hydrogen bomb tests, and the organisation of an international embargo on arms supplies to the Middle East, pending the discovery of a lasting settlement of Middle Eastern problems.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: I have been asked to reply.
    In answer to the first part, I would refer to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 15th November.
    As regards the second, the United Nations is at present making efforts to settle outstanding questions in the Middle East.
    Mr. Swingler: Is it not now six months since the Prime Minister undertook to take the initiative on the matter of hydrogen bomb tests at an appropriate time? Was it not in July that the Prime Minister gave that undertaking, and could not the acting Prime Minister now say when the appropriate time is likely to be reached? Further, could not this question be well combined with an initiative to try to reduce tension in the Middle East by an arms embargo on the part of the great Powers?
    Mr. Butler: It is true that this has taken some time. The reason it has done so is that it is very difficult to make progress with the matter. All I can do is to assure the hon. Member and the House that this will be one of the subjects which I shall discuss with my right hon. Friend on his return.

COMPLAINT OF PRIVILEGE (MR. SPEAKER'S RULING)
Mr. Speaker: Yesterday, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) raised a point of Privilege, which I have had an opportunity of considering. As the House knows, my duty on these occasions is not to say whether there has or has not been a breach of Privilege, but merely to say whether the hon. Member who raises the matter has made out a prima facie case such as would enable me to give it priority over the Orders of the Day.
I understand that the hon. Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) does not complain about the newspaper in any way. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no complaint about the newspaper—indeed, the hon. Member for Dudley said so yesterday. Nor, in what has been said, do I see any prima facie case of any breach of Privilege by the hon. Member for Lanark.
I would remark that animadversions against the conduct of Whips are common on both sides of the House. These have never hitherto been treated as breaches of the Privilege of the whole House. As for any question of breach of Privilege by the usual channels, if that be the proper term, the only hon. Member who could complain about it with real knowledge is the hon. Member for Lanark himself.
As the hon. Member for Lanark made the speech on Friday, if he wanted to complain about the subject on Friday that would have been his earliest opportunity of doing so. Therefore, I cannot see that there is a prima facie case of breach of Privilege against anyone such as would enable me to give the matter precedence over the Orders of the Day.
Mr. Wigg: Thank you for your consideration of this matter, Mr. Speaker. May I point that there is one small slip which you have made—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—one slight error of fact, which I would point out with respect. The hon. Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) did not make a speech. What he did was to give a prepared statement to the Press. Since that time, I have seen a copy of it—
Mr. Speaker: I do not think we want to hear it. If it was not a speech, it does not matter. If the hon. Member for Lanark was suffering from any sense that a breach of Privilege had occurred against the House, he had an opportunity of raising it on Friday but did not do so. What he said to the Press is, I think, irrelevant in the matter.
Mr. Wigg: I have not the slightest intention of reading the statement, Sir. I want to point out, however, that the hon. Member for Lanark did make a statement to the Press. It is quite clear that as the hon. Member does not now wish to make a statement, having fortified himself by the knowledge that he had dared to show himself in the House, the charge of a breach of Privilege lies against the Patronage Secretary. It is perfectly clear that the hon. Member for Lanark is asserting that he and 14 of his colleagues were under such pressure that they had to dare to come to the House. Therefore—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I have already taken that into account and ruled that it does not, to my mind, constitute a breach of Privilege by anyone. Therefore, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) should accept the Ruling.
Mr. Wigg: With respect, Mr. Speaker —[HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down".]—may I be allowed to conclude my submission? The hon. Member for Lanark admits the accuracy of the statement which appeared in the Press and he asserts that it was necessary for him and 14 of his colleagues to dare to show themselves in this place. The daring may be one of two kinds; it may be physical daring or moral daring, or, of course, it may be neither. The hon. Member asserted that it was necessary to show daring in order to show himself at this House. The House cannot possibly function if it is necessary to dare against the Patronage Secretary.
Therefore—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sitdown."]—it is my submission that there is a prima facie case, although I admit, Mr. Speaker, that you are in great difficulty, because the only person who can give evidence on the point is the hon. Member for Lanark, and he has not got the guts to repeat in the House what he said in Glasgow.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Dudley should not make charges of that kind against the hon. Member for Lanark. That is not the way to deal with it.
Hon. Members: Withdraw.
Mr. Speaker: Order. I am quite prepared to participate in a little harmless amusement occasionally if that be the intention of hon. Members. I would point out, however, that Privilege is a very serious thing and that, personally, I cannot find myself in the position of treating it lightly.
I have given my Ruling on this matter and I must remind the hon. Member for Dudley that if he disagrees with what I have said, he is at liberty to put dawn a Motion either saying that it is a breach of Privilege and asking for the decision of the House in the matter, or, if he thinks I am wrong in my Ruling on the matter, saying that I am wrong in not giving it priority. He can put down a Motion against my decision, but that is all he can do.
Mr. Paget: Further to that point of Privilege—
Mr. Speaker: I have already ruled on it. Does the hon. and learned Member have a substantial point?
Mr. Paget: Further to that point of Privilege, Sir. I understood yesterday that in reply to the hon. Member for
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Berwick and East Lothian (Sir W. Anstruther-Gray) you said that the hon. Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) should be given an opportunity to make a statement. Speaking for those of us here, may I say that we are very disappointed? It sounded as though it would be a most fascinating experience.
Mr. Speaker: I think the hon. and learned Member would agree that I was right in not coming to a decision without giving the hon. Member for Lanark an opportunity to make a statement if he so wished. I have, however, asked him and he has told me that has no complaint about the newspaper. That is the ground of the first part of my decision. If the hon. Member for Lanark does not wish to make a statement, I do not see why I or anybody else should press him to do so.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: In reply to the things that have been said, Mr. Speaker, I should like to say that I did not invite the protection of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mi. Wigg). He did not give me advance warning that he was raising this matter and I have nothing further to say.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Proceedings of the Committee of Ways and Means exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  GHANA INDEPENDENCE BILL
  Order for Second Reading read. —[Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.]
  3.39 p.m.
  The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Lord John Hope): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
  This is a historic day. The result of the passage of this Bill through Parliament, should it be passed, will be that we shall hail the first of the British dependent territories in tropical Africa to attain full self-government as a sovereign and independent nation.
  The introduction of the Bill marks the last stage in a process which started over a century ago. Up to the early part of the nineteenth century, English trade with the Gold Coast was conducted by a series of companies chartered by the King or set up by Acts of Parliament. From 1806 until 1900 there occurred the Ashanti wars, and it was during this period that the government of the settlements in the Gold Coast was vested in various ways in the Crown. After the last Ashanti war Britain assumed full responsibility for the government of the Gold Coast and its hinterland, and, in 1901, Orders in Council were made regularising the situation and bringing together into one unit the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories.
  The first step towards self-government may be said to have been taken in 1925. In that year a new Constitution was made which reconstituted the Legislative Council so as to include elected members. At that stage, however, the Council retained an ex officio majority and its authority was limited to the Colony. In 1946, a further advance was made when a second constitutional change introduced a non-official majority for the first time in an African colonial legislature. Representation was broadened to include Ashanti and subsequently Southern Togoland. In 1951, the third and most fundamental constitutional change was made when a large degree of internal self-government was granted.
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  The 1951 Constitution set up an Executive Council consisting of three ex officio members and eight representative Ministers approved by the Legislative Assembly on the recommendation of the Governor. The authority of the Legislative Assembly was extended to cover the whole of the country, including the Northern Territories and the whole of the Trust Territory of Togoland under United Kingdom administration. Its membership was increased to 84, of whom 75 were elected by various forms of popular franchise to represent the chiefs and peoples. Provision was made for each Minister to be responsible for a number of Government Departments.
  Early in 1952 the Constitution was further amended to provide for the appointment of a Prime Minister, Dr. Nkrumah being the first to hold this office. In 1954, a Constitution was introduced which granted virtually full internal self-government. It provided for a Legislative Assembly of 104 members chosen by direct election on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The posts of three ex officio Ministers in the previous Constitution were abolished, and the Cabinet, consisting of no fewer than eight members of the Assembly appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, became the principal instrument of policy. Responsibility for defence, external affairs, and certain matters concerned with the police were specifically reserved to the Governor, acting in his discretion, while he also retained general reserved powers.
  The 1954 Constitution marked the last stage before the assumption by the Gold Coast of full responsibility for its own affairs. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the House in his statement on 11th May:
  "The grant of such responsibility is a matter for the United Kingdom Government and Parliament and it always has been the wish of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Gold Coast should achieve its independence within the Commonwealth."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1956; Vol. 552, c. 1557.]
  The House will recall that in his statement of 11th May my right hon. Friend undertook, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, that if a General Election were held in the Gold Coast Her Majesty's Government would be ready to accept a motion calling

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  for independence within the Commonwealth passed by a reasonable majority in a newly-elected legislature and then to declare a firm date for independence.
  A General Election was held in the Gold Coast on 12th July and 17th July, 1956. It was observed by six Members of Parliament drawn from both sides of the House of Commons. As a result of the Election, Dr. Nkruma's party, the Convention Peoples' Party, was returned to power with only a slightly reduced majority, and it now holds 72 of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly, and it won 57 per cent. of the votes cast throughout the country.
  The new Legislative Assembly was opened on 31st July, and on 3rd August the Government introduced their expected motion calling for independence within the Commonwealth. The Opposition Members had absented themselves from the debate and the motion was passed by 72 votes to none. The motion was conveyed to my right hon. Friend by the Governor in a despatch dated 23rd August. On 18th September my right hon. Friend published his reply, which informed the Governor that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would, at the first available opportunity, introduce into the United Kingdom Parliament a Bill to accord independence to the Gold Coast, and that, subject to Parliamentary approval, the Government intended that independence should come about on 6th March, 1957.
  The Ghana Independence Bill is introduced to give effect to the undertaking by the Government in that despatch published on 18th September. It provides for the attainment by the Gold Coast of fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth, sometimes colloquially known as "Statute of Westminster powers"
  I should, in particular, state that the Colonial Secretary has it in command from Her Majesty to acquaint the House that she has placed her Prerogative and interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament.
  Before going any further I should like to explain the relationship between the Bill and the Constitution which the Gold Coast will inherit on the attainment of independence. The Bill does not deal with details of the Constitution of the
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  Gold Coast. Its main purpose is to confer on the new State of Ghana the basic powers necessary to give it the status of an independent country within the Commonwealth. The Bill also makes the necessary consequential amendments in the law of the United Kingdom and of Ghana.
  As is usual, the Constitution at present in force in the Gold Coast is contained in a series of Orders in Council. After the Royal Assent has been given to the Ghana Independence Bill, and before it comes into force, it will be necessary to issue a further Order in Council, to come into force on Independence Day, which will bring the existing Constitution into conformity with the new status of Ghana. The final responsibility for the Order in Council rests with the United Kingdom Ministers, but the fullest account will, naturally, be taken of the Gold Coast Government's proposals regarding the Constitution.
  The House will know that the Gold Coast Government have recently held discussions about the Constitution with the Parliamentary Opposition and with the Territorial Councils, and that, following these discussions, they have prepared revised constitutional proposals published in a White Paper, of which copies have been placed in the Library of this House.
  The final proposals of the Gold Coast Government have only recently been received and are now receiving detailed study and legal scrutiny. It is, therefore, too early to say precisely what advice will be given to Her Majesty about the detailed terms of the Order in Council. In this connection, my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary has asked me to say that he will take very careful note of any points about the Constitution which hon. Members may wish to raise in the debate.
  The National Liberation Movement, the Northern People's Party, and the Asanteman Council have recently sent formal resolutions to my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary asking for separate independence to be awarded to Ashanti and the Northern Territories and for the appointment of a Partition Commission to divide up the assets and liabilities of the Gold Coast. The Bill which we are discussing today is in itself evidence of the intention of Her Majesty's Government

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  to proceed with the grant of independence to the country as a whole.
  The House will wish to know that a formal reply has now been sent to these resolutions in the following terms:
  "Her Majesty's Government do not consider that the partition of the Gold Coast is in the interests of the Gold Coast as a whole or of any of its component parts, and cannot abandon their established policy which is directed towards the grant of independence to the Gold Coast as a whole. Her Majesty's Government are now proceeding with the preparation of the necessary constitutional instruments, having regard to the circumstances of the Gold Coast, and the efforts which were made to reach agreement locally. The grant of independence to the Gold Coast is an act of goodwill which Her Majesty's Government trust will be received by the people of the Gold Coast in a spirit of responsibility which will command the respect of the world."
  It is our view that the partition of the Gold Coast would not be in the interests of the country as a whole, or indeed of any of the component parts which during the past half-century have grown steadily and strongly into a single nation.
  Hon. Members will be aware that the different parts of the country are interdependent both politically and economically. Indeed, the North and the South are complementary to one another. To sever would be to cripple. The partition of the country at this stage in its history, moreover, would not only inhibit further development and progress, but would mean a serious falling back in the standards of life which the country has done so much to achieve during the past few years.
  I come to the main provisions of the Bill. Without wishing to go into more detail than I need, there are some points to which I must draw the attention of the House. First, there is the name "Ghana." This has been conferred on the new country in accordance with local wishes. It was the name of an ancient kingdom, in what is now French territory south of the Sahara, which has acquired great historic significance in the Gold Coast.
  Next to call for special mention is the first proviso to Clause 1. This explains that the Bill will not apply
  "in relation to Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship until Her Majesty so provides by Order in Council, which shall be made as soon as practicable after provision has been made for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for that territory upon its union with an independent Gold Coast. …"
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  For more than thirty years Her Majesty's Government have administered the Trust—formerly Mandated—Territory of British Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast, as it was entitled to do under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement.
  Two years ago, Her Majesty's Government informed the United Nations that, after the attainment of independence by the Gold Coast, this arrangement would no longer be constitutionally possible; and the United Nations accordingly agreed last year that a plebiscite should be held to ascertain the view of the inhabitants on the future status of the Trust Territory. This plebiscite, which was held under United Nations auspices in May, 1956, resulted in a clear majority vote in favour of the union of the territory with an independent Gold Coast, and in July of this year the Trusteeship Council passed a resolution noting that the will of the majority of the inhabitants was for union with an independent Gold Coast and recommending
  "… that appropriate steps be taken in consultation with the Administering Authority for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for the territory to become effective upon the attainment of independence by the Gold Coast."
  This recommendation was approved by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 5th December, and it is expected that it will be endorsed by the General Assembly during its present session, and before 6th March, 1957.
  I come now to the provisions about nationality, in Clause 2. These are consequential upon the grant of independence. In this instance, however, there is no parallel with the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947. That Ceylon Act was enacted at a time when anyone born within the Sovereign's dominions was a British subject, and the new system of each independent Commonwealth country having its own citizenship law was not then in force. In 1948, as the House will know, the British Nationality Act was passed, which created the status of a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Each Commonwealth country has enacted its own citizenship law in most cases on similar though not identical lines. Our Act provided that citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and those of other Commonwealth countries

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  should be known as British subjects or Commonwealth citizens, and provisions to a similar effect are contained in most of the Acts of other Commonwealth countries.
  The Gold Coast consists at present of a Colony, a Protectorate and a Trust Territory. Under Clause 1, all these areas are together to become Ghana, as a part of Her Majesty's dominions, after the date of independence. The published intention of the Gold Coast Government is to introduce a Ghana citizenship law applicable to all parts of the new country without distinction. But this cannot happen till after independence. We have to consider what the position will be in the meanwhile.
  Clause 2, therefore, sets out to achieve two things. First, in this nationality field, as in all others, Ghana must be treated as fully independent, and we must avoid prolonging colonial implications into the period after independence takes effect. This is achieved by Clause 2 (a), the effect of which is to include Ghana in the list of Commonwealth countries in the relevant Section 1 (3) of the British Nationality Act. This means that, when Ghana enacts its own citizenship law, its citizens will be recognised in United Kingdom law as British subjects.
  The second object to be attained is to make a purely transitional arrangement to bridge the period between independence day and the enactment by the Parliament of Ghana of a Ghana citizenship law, and to prevent large numbers of people from becoming stateless. Accordingly, the proviso to Clause 2 secures that people who were British protected persons before independence by virtue of their connection with either the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast or the Trust Territory of Togoland will retain that status until they become citizens of Ghana.
  Owing to the way the British Nationality Act operates, the same result is achieved automatically without fresh legal provision in the case of people who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of their connection with the Gold Coast Colony or Ashanti. Thus, both citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and British protected persons who possess their respective
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  status because of their connection with any part of the Gold Coast will temporarily retain their national status after independence.
  As I have explained, this is intended simply as a transitional arrangement until Ghana has created her own citizenship. The Gold Coast Government have agreed to it. We have explained to the Gold Coast Government that this transitional arrangement does not imply or carry with it any continued responsibility for the people concerned or any continued protection over them by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom after Ghana has become independent.
  Now I come to Clause 3. The provisions in the Clause about the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts must, of course, be specially mentioned. Subsections (1) and (2) provide that no further schemes shall be made for Ghana under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, 1950–55. As the House is aware, the assistance given under those Acts is far dependent territories, and I am sure that there will be general agreement with the view that Colonial Development and Welfare Funds should not be expended on Ghana after it has become an independent country within the Commonwealth.
  Subsection (3) of the same Clause has been inserted to remove any possible doubt about the future of the West African regional research organisations which are partly supported by C.D. and W. Funds. We hope that Ghana will continue to be associated with these bodies, from which great benefit can be derived by all the West African territories, irrespective of their political status. It would be wrong to exclude her from participating as a paying member, simply because there will continue to be an element of C.D. and W. assistance to these regional schemes on account of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia.
  There is one further point that I must mention in the C.D. and W. context. The Kumasi College of Technology helps to serve the vital and growing needs of Ghana in the field of higher technical education. The sum of £350,000 of C.D. and W. money had been earmarked as a contribution towards the college's capital expansion programme, but no scheme has yet been made, and there is

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  not enough time now to arrange for the money to be spent before Ghana ceases to be eligible for CD. and W. aid.
  It would have a deplorable effect on the efforts which are being made to improve the standard of technical education in the territory if this long promised aid were no longer to be available to the college. It is, therefore, proposed, subject to Parliamentary approval, that the college should receive a special grant of £350,000 from the Commonwealth Services Vote towards the cost of suitable projects in its building programme. I have taken note of the remarks of the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) during the debate on the Address, but I am advised that there is no need for special legislation to give effect to this proposal.
  The provisions about the Colonial Development Corporation similarly call for special explanation. Clause 3 (4) defines the position of the Colonial Development Corporation. Under the Overseas Resources Development Acts, the C.D.C., as it is called, is able to operate in Colonial Territories; that is, territories to which the Colonial Welfare Acts applied in 1948. This subsection provides that, after independence Ghana will no longer be covered by the Overseas Resources Development Acts and will not, therefore, be within the scope of the C.D.C. itself. Special provision is made, however, for the continuance by the C.D.C. of projects commenced in Ghana before independence.
  The purpose of the Colonial Development Corporation is to assist in the economic development of Colonial Territories for whose welfare and policy the United Kingdom is directly responsible. It would be contrary to this purpose for the Corporation to serve as an instrument of development in independent Commonwealth countries. The Government intend, therefore, that, whilst the Corporation should be able to carry on with existing activities, it should not undertake any new projects after a territory attains independence. Accordingly, this policy is being applied in the Bill to the Gold Coast.
  Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: While it is true that under the Corporation's regulations this assistance cannot be given, have the Government
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  paid attention to the Resolution, unanimously adopted by the House within the last ten days, urging that a fund for Commonwealth development should be available for these purposes?
  Lord John Hope: The Resolution urged special machinery. If the hon. Gentleman will listen to what I now have to say I think he will find that that has not been forgotten. I was about to say that I did not propose to leave this part of the Bill quite there.
  Her Majesty's Government most certainly recognise that there may well be a period, after the emergence of a new nation to independence, during which it cannot have as ready an appeal for investment purposes as it will have when it has found its feet and proved itself. Our minds are engaged on the examination of this problem now. In particular, we are to get into touch with the other members of the Commonwealth on the basis of some constructive suggestions made in this context in the debate in this House last Friday week. The suggestions were to the effect that there might be some joint Commonwealth approach to the problem.
  I think that the House will like to know, also, that the Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation is already in contact with the authorities in Ghana. This Corporation has, as well as funds at its disposal, an advisory service which is most highly thought of. Further, it is safe to say that the Corporation's decisions have a very definite influence on the market here.
  I should draw the attention of the House to Clause 5 of the Bill, which provides for the Gold Coast to become independent within the Commonwealth on 6th March, 1957, unless, before 6th March, special steps are taken by Order in Council to appoint some other day as the date of independence. The date 6th March has been selected in accordance with local wishes. It is a date of local historical significance, being the anniversary of the signing of the Bond of 1844 from which British jurisdiction generally derives.
  We cannot, however, ignore the possibility that last-minute unforeseen circumstances—for example, the illness of one of the principal participants—might make it necessary to alter a date fixed several months ahead. If this

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  should happen it would be very inconvenient, and perhaps impossible in the time, to go through the whole process of passing an amending Act of Parliament just to change the date. For this reason, powers are taken in the Bill to enable Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to name an alternative date without resorting to further legislation.
  For constitutional reasons, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom must retain the final responsibility for advising Her Majesty on the terms of any Order in Council varying the appointed day. I wish, however, to place it on record that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government that the date of 6th March, 1957, will only be varied if unforeseen and compelling circumstances should arise which necessitate such a change and then only after consultation with the Government of the Gold Coast.
  I must say a word, as I draw to an end what I have to say, on the question of Ghana becoming a member of the Commonwealth.
  Mr. George Wigg: The Minister has made no reference at all to Clause 4. I have a particular interest in the position of British forces which will serve in Ghana. I should have thought that he could have paid some attention to that very important question.
  Lord John Hope: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but perhaps he will make up for it as best he can by catching Mr. Speaker's eye during the debate. I know that my right hon. Friend will be anxious to hear the hon. Member if he has any point which he wishes to raise.
  I now come to the question of Ghana becoming a member of the Commonwealth. There is, of course, a clear distinction between the grant of responsible self-government within the Commonwealth and full membership of the Commonwealth. The first is a matter for the United Kingdom and the country concerned, and for them alone, and the second is a matter for all members of the Commonwealth. We are looking forward to Ghana becoming a full member of the Commonwealth and at the request of the present Gold Coast Government we intend to approach the other members on
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  the subject in the very near future. We have every hope that Ghana will become a full member on the same day as she becomes independent, namely, 6th March.
  When that day comes, yet another stage will have been achieved in the journey of this great Commonwealth of Nations towards its destiny. Meanwhile, we are confident that the leaders and people of the Gold Coast will rise to the opportunities which lie before them, in full awareness of the responsibilities which they are now to shoulder. We pledge to them our friendship and our support. We wish them well.
  4.11 p.m.
  Mr. James Griffiths: As the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations has said, we in the House of Commons are privileged to take part this afternoon in making history, for the Gold Coast is the first of our African Colonies to achieve democratic independence within the Commonwealth. I join with the Under-Secretary in expressing the hope that the House will not only give a unanimous Second Reading to the Bill, but that that unanimous Second Reading will carry with it the best wishes of all of us for the future of Ghana.
  I have recently read one of the latest books on the African scene, of which there are so many, one of John Gunther's books, "Inside Africa". In his first chapter he describes how he found everywhere in Africa the sense that the African people were on the march, rapidly marching towards Western standards, although often uncertain about where it would take them. Among other things, we are indicating today that our colonial policy leads towards democratic independence. We are giving a direction to this march of the Africans and proving to them that this is the best road by which to attain their independence.
  For all those reasons, I welcome the Bill on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends. Subject to the time which we shall require to consider it in detail in Committee, we shall do all we can to expedite the Bill and get it on the Statute Book as quickly as possible. Before dealing in detail with one or two of the provisions of the Bill, I want to say that none of us can escape the fact that at present there is in the Gold Coast controversy about what the Constitution should be after independence day.

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  It is my fervent hope that the people in the Gold Coast will rise to the historic opportunity which presents itself to them. I was very glad indeed to find that the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, whom many of us in the House are privileged to count as a personal friend, in his speech presenting the constitutional proposals to the Gold Coast Assembly recently, was fully conscious of the fact that in future the Gold Coast will have responsibility not only for itself, but in a way for all the African people. I should like to quote his words which deserve quoting and deserve enshrining in the HANSARD of our own Parliament.
  Speaking to his Parliament and, through his Parliament, to his people, the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast said:
  "History has entrusted us with a duty and upon how we carry out that duty will depend not only the fate of this country but the fate of many other peoples throughout the whole of Africa. We must show that it is possible for Africans to rule themselves, to establish a progressive State and to preserve their national unity."
  I hope that all the people of the Gold Coast will show that national unity which is required to make a success of this venture. It is inevitable that there should be strains and stresses when a country reaches that important stage in its constitutional advancement which the Gold Coast has now reached. After all, we ourselves did not attain our present constitutional stage without many strains and stresses and conflicts. We hope that the people of the Gold Coast will be able to avoid conflicts and that they will bend themselves to that and learn from our experience.
  I want to say a few words to the Government and Opposition in the Gold Coast. I want the Government there to realise that it is our desire that they should do all they can to allay the fears in the Gold Coast and I want the Opposition to realise that they will carry a grave responsibility if, by their action, they prevent this very great venture from coming into operation and being a success.
  It would not be wise for the House to enter into detailed controversial discussion of the detailed points about which there is not complete agreement, but there are some things which the Government can do and one or two in particular
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  which I want to indicate. I was very interested to note that in the speech to which I have referred the Prime Minister spoke of the steps which the Gold Coast Government would take to ensure that in the new Parliament the Opposition would have their full rights guaranteed within that Parliament. He was right to do that, because, rightly or wrongly, justified or unjustified, there have been fears that after independence day the Opposition would not have those rights which are a part of our democratic process.
  I was glad to note that, speaking for his Government, he proposed to ensure that there will be guaranteed opportunities for the Opposition to raise matters in the House, to challenge the Government and to initiate debates. He proposed to enshrine that in the Constitution in one form or another.
  He also proposed to ensure that the Opposition will have a guaranteed proportion of membership of Standing Committees and Select Committees. I was interested to note, further, that he said that he hoped also to establish a tradition in the Gold Coast—this is interesting in the light of recent events—by which the Prime Minister of the country will have consultations with the Leader of the Opposition on matters of grave national importance to secure, if possible, a concerted national policy. Other Prime Ministers please note!
  I should like to make some suggestions to the Government and the Secretary of State to indicate in what way he thinks that we can help in this direction. The Government of the Gold Coast have said that when they frame their Constitution after independence day they propose to enshrine in it those provisions about fundamental rights which are incorporated in the Constitution of India. I have a copy of the Indian Constitution in my hand, Part III of which is related to human rights. Of course, there will have to be obvious changes and adaptations to meet the peculiar circumstances of Ghana, but if those provisions for fundamental rights which are embodied in the Indian Constitution are enshrined in the Gold Coast's Constitution, that should go a very long way towards removing many of the fears now expressed by the Opposition in Ghana.

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  Can any steps be taken by the Gold Coast Government in advance of independence day? I take the point at once that any legislation now passed by the Gold Coast Government in the present form, as a colonial Government, may not be valid after independence day and may have to be re-enacted. In present circumstances, I would put this suggestion to the Government of the Gold Coast, and I hope that the Secretary of State will give it some consideration. Cannot these provisions for fundamental rights, which the Government have already said they will accept, be embodied either in a Bill, or, if that is constitutionally impossible, in a White Paper and be debated in the Legislative Assembly and carried by a resolution which would indicate that they proposed to enshrine them in the Constitution after independence day? If that were done, it would go a very long way. I believe, towards meeting the fears which are being expressed.
  The second problem to which I want to refer concerns the discussion in the Gold Coast about regional devolution. Speaking for myself and, I believe, for all my right hon. and hon. Friends, may I say that we are in full agreement with, and give our fullest support to, the decision of the Government—which I think they have bed wise to make plain today—that secession is not on the agenda. I beg all our friends in the Gold Coast to realise that if they now start partitioning their country they will be rendering a grave disservice to their people. The Gold Coast is only a small country of 5 million people. As the Under-Secretary of State has said, each part is supplementary and complementary to the other because of access to the sea and to communications.
  To divide this small country would be a grave disservice to their own people and they would carry a very grave responsibility if, by an action of this kind, they made it impossible for the Gold Coast to survive and to become a viable State; and a grave disservice to the people in Africa and all over the world. I join with the Government in saying that we share their view and support their decision, which they have officially conveyed in the note read to us by the Under-Secretary of State, that they do not propose to accept
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  the proposal put forward for the partitioning of the Gold Coast and the acceptance or recognition of Ashanti or any other part of it as an independent State.
  That leaves the problem of regional devolution. As I understand, the argument has been as to what power shall be vested in the regional authorities that are to be created. The Government have suggested that the regional authorities shall have the same kind of authority as is now vested in the London County Council and other county councils in this country—in other words, that there shall be a form of local government—whereas, if I understand it aright, their Opposition were thinking of powers in terms of Northern Ireland. I have myself come to the view that the Government are right. There is, I think, the strongest possible argument for regional devolution. There is no argument for the creation of separate Parliaments within this small territory. All the energies of the Government and of the Opposition should be directed to discovering ways and means by which these regional authorities can be made really effective bodies.
  First, what powers are to be given to the regional authorities and, secondly, what powers should be given particularly for the raising of finance. I do not think that any of us ought to pronounce finally about that. I see that there is a strong case for considering ways by which these regional bodies, if they are to be effective, shall have some finances of their own. We all know that in our own local authorities part of their prestige and influence is that they have available some funds which they can spend themselves, although they have to spend them on objects decided and determined by the central Government.
  Surely the same method could be adopted if only—and I make this as a suggestion—there could be included in the provisions that will be made by the legislature for the setting up of regional authorities means by which there will be guaranteed grants to them from the central Government and consideration given as to whether they can in some form or another raise some of their own funds. If we do that and provide for regional devolution by giving them some funds of their own and an effective part to play in the life of the country, I think that the Government, if they accept that

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  view and make provisions of that kind, will have gone as far as they are entitled to be asked to go by any Opposition. I hope, therefore, that full consideration will be given to these two suggestions.
  A third suggestion has been made to me which I should like to convey to the Secretary of State. Some fears have been expressed—and I think that we had better face them—about the courts. It appears that it is intended that the present judges should continue in office. The fear has been expressed that after independence day the judges will be dismissed and that there will be political appointments. I hope that something can be done by the Government between now and 6th March. either by announcing in advance that the present judges are to continue until the time of their retirement or that if there are to be any changes—and it is not for us to decide whether changes are desirable or not—the names of the judges will be announced before independence day, thereby going some way, I hope, towards allaying those fears.
  We are all very glad to note that they are to retain the provision by which there is the right of appeal to the Privy Council, and it has been suggested to me by one of my legal friends that it would be an appropriate occasion on which to appoint an African judge to the Privy Council. That would not only be a gesture; I am told that it would be of very great value and perhaps essential to the Privy Council in future, when considering appeals from the Gold Coast, that there should be an African judge on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. I hope that it will be possible for the Government to consider those suggestions.
  I think it is vitally important that the Government should adopt some such measures as I have suggested, or some other way by which it can be shown beyond a peradventure that it is their firm intention to incorporate in the Constitution a provision for fundamental rights and stand by it.
  I propose to deal with only one Clause of the Bill itself this afternoon. I have no comment at this stage—I may have in Committee—to make on some of the other provisions in the Bill. We welcome the decision of the United Nations on Togoland, and we join in
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  welcoming Togoland, in which we have responsibility as trustees, as a member of Ghana.
  I come now to Clause 3. During the debate on the Address, I asked the Secretary of State whether he would consider telling the House, before we had this Bill before us, what provisions the Government intended to make for the territories after independence day which would be excluded, as I understand, from the provisions of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and, indeed, from the possible operations of the Colonial Development Corporation. I was anxious that that should be done because we have to realise, as I am sure we do, that within the next few years we shall see a succession of Colonies becoming independent. Now it is the Gold Coast; next year it will be Malaya; and in 1958 there will be the Caribbean Federation.
  We are now at a very important turning point, and I think that it is essential that the House should consider what provisions we are to make so that our skill, knowledge and resources shall be available to them. Let us begin by saying that after independence day it is for them to decide what kind of help they require and determine in what way they want that help. We shall be making a grave mistake if we do not now begin to give serious thought to this problem. We should begin by making it clear that when Ghana becomes independent it is not our desire that we shall wash our hands of it thereafter. We cannot; it is we who are responsible for conferring this independent status upon the Gold Coast.
  This is a tremendous venture. A democratic form of government is not the easiest form to establish or to sustain. In these days democratic government has become synonymous with a welfare State. I say that with some pride, because that is one of the contributions made by the Government of which I had the honour to be a member. We know that in setting up a democratic form of government the Gold Coast and many other similar States will have to face very great difficulties.
  We have a special responsibility. In the main, the economies of all these Colonies have been shaped and patterned by us. I have no desire to raise old

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  controversies, but I must say that they have been shaped and patterned to meet not their needs, but our interests. When I became Secretary of State for the Colonies I went out to the Colonies and I found myself considering the same economic problem as that which used to face South Wales. The economy of my part of the world was designed not to meet the needs of South Wales, but to meet the country's need for coal. Its economy was on too narrow a base, and, when that went, down came the whole structure.
  In the main, the economies of our Colonies are based upon primary products, and upon very narrow foundations. That of the Gold Coast is based particularly upon cocoa and gold. In recent months, with the price of cocoa falling, we have seen the really serious consequences to the people of the Gold Coast. One of the greatest contributions that we can make towards ensuring the economic viability and success of these territories is to establish a system by which we can guarantee the price at which we buy their primary products. Stability of prices of primary products is one of the essentials for their success for many years to come. It will take many years to develop a diversified economy.
  Mr. Harold Davies: I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend make this point about the stability of prices, because he has on his side the authority of McMahon Ball, who says of South-East Asia that the stability of prices would be worth many Colombo Plans if we could find a formula for it.
  Mr. John Tilney: Does the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) agree that what we really want is stability of agricultural income throughout the farming community rather than stability of prices?
  Mr. Griffiths: When I referred to the stability of prices of primary products I realised that the standard of life and everything else depended upon that.
  In the political situation of the 1950s we simply cannot afford to go back to the economic catastrophe of the 1930s, with all its consequences upon our Colonies, all of whom are primary producers. We cannot allow that to happen
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  when all these dynamic political forces are at work in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. It is, therefore, of vital importance that there should be a form of association between us and all the other Commonwealth countries and the primary producers. Now that the Gold Coast is to become independent, I hope that that factor will be taken into consideration.
  The Gold Coast has meant a great deal to us ever since the Second World War. I speak as a member of a Government that held office for some years during that period, and I am now speaking to our temporary successors. I make the point, only in passing, that no representative of the Treasury is here. In our debates on most Bills—certainly, of this kind—it used to be a tradition of the House that a representative from the Treasury was present. This very old Parliamentary tradition seems to be falling into disuse. Gold Coast dollars have been very valuable to us; so have Malayan dollars. We could not have survived the dollar crisis without the help of the Colonies. That is the plain fact. It is not we who have been helping the Colonies since 1945; it is the Colonies who have been helping us. We have to realise what would be the effect if any of them decided to leave the sterling area, as they would be entitled to.
  This is a matter upon which our future security depends. It is very important that we should say to Ghana, "We are conferring democratic independence upon you, with the good will of all. We are glad that you are staying inside the Commonwealth and that you are adding the rich diversity of your life to the great diversity of the Commonwealth, the greatest multiracial community the world has ever known. It is our greatest desire that this democratic dependence which we are pleased and privileged to agree that you should have shall succeed." If it is to succeed, we must help the Gold Coast.
  I was glad to hear what the Under-Secretary of State said about the provisions which are already being made and which will be continued under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. They have formed one of the best instruments we have devised to assist the economic and social interests of the people in the dependent territories. The Under-Secretary of State said that it was now

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  possible to do that without legislation. Am I entitled to infer that it will now be possible, without legislation, to continue the grants, from other funds, for the same kind of purposes for which the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts were used?
  Lord John Hope Lord John Hope indicated assent.
  Mr. Griffiths: I hope that the Secretary of State himself will say more about that.
  The Bill provides that after 6th March, 1957, the Gold Coast will not rank for grants under the Acts. There are many fields in which these grants are of vital importance. Technical education has been mentioned. Another is university education and, in particular, there is adult education. Hon. Members will know what an important part adult education has played in building our democracy. I owe very much to adult education. It has done so much to train people to hold responsible posts in our democratic life and it is of immense importance. There will be very great danger unless provision is made for the expansion of adult education in the Gold Coast. There are other objects, such as research. I gather from the Under-Secretary of State that it will be possible for us to make grants of that kind without legislation.
  The purpose of the Resolution for which we all voted the other day was that we wanted a collective Commonwealth effort, as well as a United Nations effort, to help each other. I have just returned from the Caribbean. I hope that there will be a Colombo Plan for the Caribbean in which Canada will participate, as well as help being given from the United Nations agencies. Then there is the Colonial Development Corporation. Clause 3 says that the Corporation will be enabled to maintain its interest and continue its operations in established schemes, but will be prevented from entering into further commitments.
  I believe that this is the wrong way to deal with this problem. That is why, during our debate on the Gracious Speech, I pressed the Minister to consider the problem as a whole. In March, 1957, we shall cut off the Gold Coast from the Colonial Development Corporation. Some time later, in 1957, we shall cut
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  off Malaya, in which we have a much bigger interest; in 1958, we shall cut off the Caribbean Federation; and in 1959 somebody else. There is a long list on the way. This is killing the Corporation by stages. It is the wrong way to do it.
  In the debate we had the other day, the point was made with real force that the effect will be that the Corporation will lose its best personnel, and its morale, and we shall be wasting public money by handling this problem in that way.
  Mr. F. M. Bennett: I certainly do not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman's main theme upon the whole question of economic co-operation in the Commonwealth. It is a fact, however, that when the Corporation goes out of these territories they will be able to obtain benefits flowing from the colonial development and welfare funds.
  Mr. Griffiths: All I am sure about for the moment is that the Government should make up their minds now whether there is to be an instrument by and through which Government aid for economic development will be available in this country. If so, is it possible to use the C.D.C. or some other instrument? Let us make that decision rather than have this "death by a thousand cuts"— if I may so put it—which will have a disastrous effect on everyone concerned. I hope that consideration will be given to that problem.
  There are three of us here this afternoon—my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Creech Jones), the Colonial Secretary and myself—whom the House will permit to have some personal pride in this matter. At various stages we have all three had the privilege of taking part in and offering our aid during this journey towards the independence of the Gold Coast. This Bill represents journey's end. I should like to join in paying tribute to all those who have helped. I wish to pay tribute to the Colonial Service, to the people who have had to work in this transition period. In a sense they are working themselves out of a job, and it is a very great tribute to them to say that in this penultimate stage their experience and knowledge has been given so freely.
  In particular, I wish to place on record my deep appreciation of the work of the

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  Governor, Sir Charles Arden Clarke. He is a great statesman. I was in office when the 1951 Constitution came into operation and I would pay tribute to Dr. Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast. He came out of prison to become Prime Minister. He had to make the big decision which has had to be made in all the territories, but which has not always been made so wisely as he made it. The party had captured power within the limits of a Constitution which they did not altogether like. They would have preferred a Constitution more democratic and nearer to freedom.
  There were two voices within the party; there were those who said, "We have won power. Let us use our power now to get our freedom at once and not (have this half-way house." Dr. Nkrumah used his great personal prestige and influence—it was great then, and it is still great—on the side of using the limited powers of that Constitution and working their passage towards full independence by showing their responsibility. Throughout the whole period Sir Charles Arden Clarke has well served this country and the Commonwealth, and indeed the world, and I should like to pay my sincere tribute to him.
  I believe that all hon. Members will vote for the Second Reading of this Bill with a sense of pride and privilege. I shall do so. I join in sending to the Prime Minister, to the Government, to the Opposition—for the members of the Opposition have a part to play, which I hope they will play with a true sense of responsibility—and to all the people of Ghana, a message that this afternoon we look forward to 6th March not only as the day on which they will become independent within a democracy, but the day on which they will join as equal partners in the Commonwealth of Nations.
  4.44 p.m.
  Mr. John Tilney: I do not often agree with the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) but this afternoon I accept almost entirely what he has said, though I believe that my right hon. and hon. Friends will remain in office very much longer than he thinks.
  We welcome this great experiment and rejoice that the Bill granting indepen-
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  dence to Ghana is introduced by a Conservative Administration. At the time when there are so many taunts about imperialistic colonialism, especially against the Conservatives, it is splendid that a Bill of this kind should be introduced, and that the first African Dominion should be sponsored by Her Majesty's present Government. It has been possible to introduce this Measure largely because of the great responsibility shown by the present leaders in the Gold Coast Government. With many other hon. Gentlemen in this House, I am lucky enough to have a great many Ghananian friends, and I hope they will forgive me if I am a little critical of one or two statements which have been made by some of their politicians.
  The election was rightly fought on the unity of the Gold Coast. Economically it would be madness to divide the Gold Coast and to have four separate constitutions, but I must quote from one or two of the statements made by the Opposition. They say that the British Government are irresponsible and have betrayed the Gold Coast, and may cause bloodshed and suffering by not allowing a federation. They say that if they do not get their way, the Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Togoland will have no alternative but to take the standpoint that they are independent but separate entities. I deplore that statement, but I understand it, and I only hope that the great statesmanship which has, so far, been shown by Dr. Nkrumah may, in the coming months, so bring both sides together that a reasonable compromise may be achieved.
  I understand that the Opposition fears that, with the two-thirds majority the Convention People's Party have in the Assembly, the constitution, although written in various Orders in Council for all the world to see, may be swept away in the coming years. Though I agree with the right hon. Member for Llanelly that the different regional assemblies should have the power to raise a portion of their own revenue, as well as that given to them by the central Government, I should like to make a plea for a second Chamber representing the different regional assemblies, and given the power to deal with constitutional matters only. Were there a second Chamber of that kind, surely it could then deal with minor matters of

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  agreement quite easily; and if there were disagreement, it would ensure that an election would have to ensue, and that a Constitutional Bill would have to be passed in two successive Parliaments. This would be a real safeguard for the Gold Coast minority.
  Mr. W. T. Williams: The hon. Gentleman says he thinks that there ought to be a second Chamber. Has he any ideas to offer about from where the membership of a second Chamber is to be drawn? The suggestion has been made from the Opposition that it should be a regional council of chiefs. The hon. Gentleman may feel the same objection to that as I do, but can he suggest from what other sources the membership of such a Chamber could be drawn without disaster?
  Mr. Tilney: I should like it taken from the different regional assemblies. But it should be limited, and the members, senators—call them what we will—given the power to deal with constitutional matters only and not the power to deal with finance or general day-to-day administration. I believe that would be a good safeguard for the minority in the Gold Coast.
  I wish to turn to the question of trade. The British went to the Gold Coast to trade, and will remain to trade long after their political power has been handed over. I think that I ought to declare a minor interest, as I am a director of a company which operates throughout West Africa. I still maintain that it is vital to the Gold Coast and to this country to have the greatest amount of trade, for our mutual benefit.
  The right hon. Member for Llanelly was quite right to be worried about the present price of cocoa and about what may happen in the coming years to a newly-founded country that runs out of money. In the last decade the Gold Coast has been a great bulwark to the Sterling Area. It has produced about 25 per cent. of the net dollar earnings of the Colonial Commonwealth. I only hope that we can be imaginative and can hive off the Bank of England, partly into a Bank of the United Kingdom dealing with our own affairs and partly into a great Commonwealth Bank and head of the Sterling Area, on the Board of which representatives of the Gold Coast and Malaya can find a seat.
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  Now I would refer to the great scheme of the Volta. Many hon. Members have a copy of the splendid booklet about this imaginative scheme, made much more difficult now by the activities of President Nasser. If we are to extend our Commonwealth trade and the Western way of life throughout the free world it is vital that we should help under-developed territories such as Ghana. Here I put in a plea for Her Majesty's Overseas Service which up to now has done a splendid job of work but whose financial plateau of compensation has been frozen until 1959, when it will then start to descend.
  I am frightened that just at the time when ideas and help are needed, many of these people may leave Ghana, unless some arrangement that they can be kept is made by treaty between the independent Government of Ghana and the United Kingdom.
  I put in a plea also—not solely to the Colonial Development Corporation or to the Colonial Development and Welfare organisation, but to the Treasury—that private enterprise should be induced, either by Overseas Trade Corporation registration or in some other way, to go in and develop further these African territories. I note that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has already offered to help organisations such as the Pioneer Industries. But many other companies are already there and it is of mutual interest that they should stay there and expand.
  This great experiment will be watched by the whole world and it must be made to succeed. If it does not, the outlook indeed is dark. If it does, we can look forward to a period of expansion and to a world that will not be divided into camps of different colours.
  4.54 p.m.
  Mr. Roy Mason: I am in some sympathy with the fears which have been expressed by the hon. Member for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney), particularly regarding the power of the Prime Minister of Ghana and, secondly, regarding the economy of that country. I rise with some trepidation, because this is the first time I have attempted to speak in a colonial affairs debate. One of my reasons for doing so is the fact that I was a member of the Parliamentary delegation which visited the Gold Coast during the last General Election.

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  I will come straight to the point. It may surprise hon. Members that on my trip out there I was amazed that such a Colony should be on the verge of independence in its present state. I am convinced that Ghana, following independence day, will at least stand still, particularly in the Northern Territories. That opinion may be due to the fact that I spent a lot of my time in the Northern Territories, in Ashanti, and not sufficient time in the more progressive areas of the south.
  The country has a fragile economy, mainly dependent upon its cocoa crop. The trend in world prices of cocoa were unfavourable to the Gold Coast in 1955, and I do not think there will be any prospect of a return to the 1954 abnormal levels. This fact is bound to prove one of the most worrying features of the situation. In the Northern Territories, the only other industry of note is agriculture, but the surface of this has hardly been scratched in teaching the northerners a progressive method of farming. There is an appalling shortage of competent Africans to run the agricultural stations.
  Ghana is still a very much underdeveloped State. The Government are certainly investing in public services like transport and education, but there is not sufficient Government or private investment in industrial expansion. This fact may also tend to upset the economy.
  I took particular note of what the right hon. Gentleman said in opening the debate, which was that Ghana will have to prove itself before investment starts to pour in. In view of the unrest which seems to prevail at this time, so shortly before independence day, it may be some time before investors are likely to pour cash in, particularly upon industrial projects. However, we must recognise that the pace has been set. I realise, of course, the feeling in the minds of Gold Coast people. Their speed of advancement and tempo is such that independence cannot even be delayed.
  The Colonial Secretary's statement that a firm date for independence would be given following a reasonable majority in a newly-elected Legislative Assembly has been honoured. This must be recognised at all costs. If the Colonial Secretary went back on his word we would face another Cyprus. The Colonial
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  Secretary's intervention has given independence to them two years earlier than was expected. Those two years would have proved invaluable in cementing relations between the present factions and also in putting the Government and the development of the Northern Territories on a firmer basis. This is a very badly neglected area. It is still regarded by many people solely as a reservoir of labour for the south.
  The Colonial Secretary is bound to be in somewhat of a dilemma. First of all, he has granted independence. If he had not done so, an ugly situation might have arisen. Secondly, independence has been granted although the country is by no means ready as a whole to receive it. In view of this situation, I would draw the attention of the Colonial Secretary to a few points arising out of the last General Election, and to my observations on the future of Ghana.
  The General Election was held on two days, 12th and 17th July. The reasons were mainly a shortage of troops and police in the whole country, and secondly, the lack of experienced Africans and shortage of Europeans to man the polling booths and counting centres and to act as returning officers. This situation is bound now to deteriorate. Already many Europeans are planning to leave the country. It might be very helpful when the Colonial Secretary replies if he could give us an indication how many Europeans have notified that they are leaving and how that trend may develop.
  Those who are in the age 40 group, realising that they still have a chance elsewhere, are going now. As the tendency towards Africanisation develops, the number of Europeans will be whittled down to insignificance. Even at its present strength the staff available has been grossly overworked, particularly in trying to register the electorate and to organise the election. The weakness of the election was undoubtedly registration.
  I recognise that it is a very difficult job to deal with people who are totally illiterate. They cannot read or write, and in many cases they have the same Christian or surnames, were born on the same day, have the same occupation and come from the same village. When they appear to register their names on the burgess roll, they can only pronounce

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  their names. Registering people, many of whom have the same name, the same occupation and the same village, is almost an insurmountable task.
  In arty forthcoming General Election this task, without European assistance, will prove formidable, to say the least. There were more disturbances on polling day over this difficulty than over anything else. Many were turning up to vote not having registered and others, having registered, found they had not a vote because someone had voted in their name. The frustration and deep mistrust which follows in the mind of an illiterate person can result in undermining completely the effectiveness of an election and to some extent may ridicule the results. This matter is worthy of serious consideration by the Colonial Secretary before independence day.
  Secondly, there have been no local government actions during the past three years and the whole system of local government is in jeopardy. Elected representatives are out of touch with their electors, few meetings are taking place and, in some instances, councillors have left their electoral districts. I am sorry about this for two reasons. First, it shows a dangerous tendency for the Prime Minister to act in a dictatorial manner in so far as he has been primarily responsible for the postponement of those elections. Secondly, valuable opportunities have slipped by which would have proved very important for training Africans in registration and organisation of elections.
  I therefore urge the Colonial Secretary to sec that steps are taken to encourage developments of the local government system. I also urge Dr. Nkrumah to strengthen the broad base of the pyramid of his democracy. This is an essential for a true Parliamentary democracy. I hope this House and our nation are going to be proud of the Gold Coast following March next year. I honestly and sincerely hope so, but I have my fears which I feel I must express.
  First, there have been no local government elections in the last three years, which does not augur well for the future of Ghana. Dr. Nkrumah is life chairman of the Central People's Party and is feeling joyously powerful following the General Election in which it gained 71 of the 104 seats. The National Liberation Movement, which is really the heart
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  of the Opposition and is not devoid of intelligence, has been subjected to a humiliating defeat in view of the fact that it anticipated doing very well and better than in the last election. In fact, it is the third party in strength, not even an alternative to the Government, the Northern People's Party having that pride of place. The Ashanti has been weakened and, indeed, split. The C.P.P. has captured the Brong area and had 43 per cent. of the poll in Ashanti.
  Another factor which is of great importance is the growth of frustration which will be inevitable—although no one knows to what degree. There is a very large percentage of illiterates in the Gold Coast—probably 70 per cent. to 80 per cent. throughout the territories and at least 95 per cent. in the Northern Territories. They imagine freedom and independence to mean many things—that the police will wink an eye at all they do, that police are no longer needed because they are now independent. Small shopkeepers think that now they will receive loans from the Prime Minister to build big stores and so on. Frustration is hound to develop after independence day. It is understandable that the quick change of name from "The Gold Coast of West Africa" to "Ghana of the Commonwealth" will not as rapidly bring about the much needed advances in agriculture, education and industry which are so urgently desirable.
  Those frustrations may well be canalised by the National Liberation Movement into active opposition against the Government. The real danger then will be whether the Prime Minister will follow a pattern which has been adopted before with his local government elections and—sensing this growing opposition—postpone the Parliamentary election also. I hope not, but we may well have seen the last General Election in the Gold Coast. I think that is a very real danger.
  Mr. J. Griffiths: If the Gold Coast Government and Parliament enshrine these fundamental rights in their constitution, will not that be a guarantee?
  Mr. Mason: I think my right hon. Friend is correct, but there is still the danger—I would not put it higher than that, and perhaps not even as badly as that—that the two-thirds majority of the

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  Legislative Assembly can change any of the constitutional amendments we want to put in between now and independence day. Dr. Nkrumah can get that any time he requires. In view of the fact that a two-thirds majority can amend the constitution—sensing the growing opposition particularly in the district of Ashanti and so on from the Northern People's Party—Nkrumah might amend the constitution and postpone the Parliamentary election.
  The National Liberation Movement and the Northern People's Party are not pure innocents in this matter either. As a supposedly responsible Parliamentary Opposition, they have acted in a very childlike fashion by walking out and boycotting important discussions and debates—all dealing with their country's future—no fewer than seven times. They also must act in a more responsible and statesmanlike manner if a true Parliamentary democracy is to emerge. Probably, however, they have sensed a trend towards dictatorship, particularly when one of the outstanding points of difference still remains between them and the Government—that the police force should be regionalised as a check against possible dictatorship. The leaders of the Opposition, including Professor Busia, have publicly declared, also, that if there is no agreement on the constitution by independence day, Ashanti and the Northern Territories may secede from the Gold Coast. This is a most serious threat, and it too is a dictatorial attitude.
  Much yet remains to be done and, in view of these observations, fearing civil strife, and possible dictatorship, I ask the Colonial Secretary to make a visit to the Gold Coast before independence day and, out of his vast experience of colonial affairs, to help the Government and the Opposition to work out a solution of agreement, a solution which might iron out many of the differences which remain. We want a truly democratic State to emerge, one of which this nation can be proud. I urge the Colonial Secretary to act on this and to act now.
  5.8 p.m.
  Mr. Norman Pannell: I must confess that I view this Bill with mixed feelings. I associate myself entirely with the expressions of
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  good will that have been voiced by other hon. Members who have spoken, but I cannot repress certain misgivings about the future of the Gold Coast.
  I do not think my misgivings are so deep as those expressed by the hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason), but they are sincerly held. I want to emphasise that I voice them with no sense of criticism, but only in the hope that by ventilating them in this debate the cause of those misgivings might be overcome.
  I am not without some experience of the Gold Coast territory. I spent fifteen years on the West Coast of Africa prior to 1946 and have visited the Gold Coast twice in the last six months. Therefore, I have been able to assess the progress which has been made, both economically and politically, in the last ten years. I admit that it has been impressive, but it is quite clear that political advancement has outstripped economic progress. I think it would be over-optimistic to assert that in the short space of ten years the Gold Coast has emerged from a state of complete dependence on Whitehall to a position in which she can be entirely self-reliant and independent. That could not be so when she has still to rely on the services of senior British officials in every sphere of activity.
  I was very pleased that the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) voiced a tribute to the British Civil Service. The very fact that we are today granting independence to the Gold Coast is surely proof of the magnificent work which has been done by generations of British officials in bringing the country from a primitive state to its present position. That tribute does not mean that their task is at an end. For some time yet the Gold Coast will have to rely on British officials for administration and for good order and development in the country.
  Africanisation has made great progress in recent years, but it is not possible for these senior men to be replaced by Africans in the short term. Nobody who has knowledge of the territory would dispute that if there were a sudden and considerable exodus of British officials within the next year or so, there would be a virtual collapse of the economy and a breakdown of law and order. It is, therefore, very important that a nucleus should remain.

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  Unfortunately, many of them are leaving. Compensation terms have been offered by the Gold Coast Government and have been frozen until 1959, but despite that, senior officials are leaving. The guarantees are not sufficient for them to remain. The House will remember that some time ago a White Paper was introduced providing a special list to which British overseas officials could transfer if they were working in those Colonies which were moving towards independence. This would give them an umbrella of protection by the Colonial Office in order that they could be assured of continuity of career. That White Paper did not apply to the Gold Coast, which had already reached a stage of self-government which excluded it from the scope of the proposals.
  The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): The Gold Coast could, of course, be added to that list. There is nothing to prevent that.
  Mr. Pannell: I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for that statement. I will not pursue the matter further if I have an assurance that the possibility of the list being extended to the Gold Coast is being considered.
  Hon. Members have mentioned the internal dissensions in the Gold Coast. I agree that it is of the utmost importance that before independence the parties should get together and settle these differences, but I urge that we cannot do a Pontius Pilate act in this matter; we cannot dissociate ourselves from all responsibility. Her Majesty's Government have responsibility for this Colony until 6th March, and it is the Government's duty to do everything possible to ensure that when that day comes, Ghana shall not be riven by internal strife which might even lead to bloodshed.
  I believe that the Government should offer their good services to bring together the parties in this dispute to see whether some final solution can be reached. I do not think the differences are as great as has been suggested. From my contacts with the Opposition in the Gold Coast—and I wish in no sense to take sides in this matter—I do not think that its attitude is as intransigent as it may seem. A gesture is needed, and if Her Majesty's Government could bring the
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  parties together it would be an excellent thing.
  The Government have declared their intention of incorporating in the Order in Council, which has yet to be introduced, provisions relating to regional Assemblies. That, I think, is an exception. There is no intention to incorporate many constitutional provisions in the Order in Council, but I think it would help to allay the fears of the Opposition in the Gold Coast if the agreement finally reached on this matter were incorporated in the Order in Council.
  We must go further than that. Under the proposed constitution of the Gold Coast, the Government can amend the constitution any time by the decision of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. Since the Government parties already enjoy a two-thirds majority, the constitution can be changed at any moment. I honestly hold the view that there should be a delaying Clause. If there were a second Chamber, as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) has suggested, it would perhaps provide a solution, but I think there will be difficulty about the formation of a second Chamber, and if it cannot be formed, I suggest that at least there should be some provision in the constitution providing that any amendment of the constitution shall not be effective unless it is confirmed by the next General Election. Such a provision could be confined to matters of radical importance and need not include minor points.
  If Her Majesty's Government, within the limits of their responsibility, were to put these provisions into the Order in Council so that the Opposition in the Gold Coast know, not only that what has been agreed has been incorporated in an Order in Council but also that there is a delaying Clause to prevent the constitution from being brusquely overturned on the attainment of independence, that would be all to the good. We know, of course, that after 6th March, the State of Ghana will be in a position to do what it likes with the constitution. It can tear up the old constitution and provide a new constitution. That is what the Bill says. Nevertheless, it would have a great moral effect if the various Orders in Council incorporated such provisions

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  which had been accepted by the Gold Coast Government. I think they would have great reluctance about brusquely introducing new provisions contrary to them immediately after achieving their independence.
  I should like to deal with the question of investment of overseas capital in the Gold Coast. It has been suggested that C.D.C. funds should continue to be employed. In my view, the test of independence is the ability of a country to promote its own development and to attract such capital from outside as it needs. The attraction of outside capital depends on the atmosphere of confidence created by the country concerned, and no one would say, so far, that there is supreme confidence in the stability or the security of capital which may be invested in the Gold Coast in the future. There is a hope, but there can be no more than a hope until experience has proved that the State of Ghana can give security for capital investment.
  Everybody hopes that that will happen, but several years must pass before that situation arises, and it is essential that the Gold Coast should give the greatest possible guarantees for capital investment in the territory. That may be of supreme importance in the River Volta scheme, which many consider essential for the future development of the Gold Coast and which far outweighs any consideration of the use of C.D.C. funds.
  According to the Gold Coast Government's constitutional proposals, as they already appear in the Order in Council No. 36A of 1955, in the case of compulsory appropriation of property by the Government—I suppose that is a euphemism for nationalisation—there is to be adequate compensation and recourse on appeal to the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast. It is proposed to retain recourse to the Privy Council. After recourse to the Supreme Court in the Gold Coast, a dissatisfied claimant will have recourse to the Privy Council. Doubt remains whether he will have such recourse only on a point of law or on the amount of compensation, and it would be interesting if that point could be clarified.
  Here, again, any firm that thinks of investing money in the Gold Coast will look also at the constitution, and will observe this ability of a two-thirds majority
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  to amend it. This reinforces the advisability of including a delaying clause in the constitution and in the Orders in Council that will be issued up to 6th March.
  I have so far spoken of money being invested in the Gold Coast in the future, but I think there is an obligation on Her Majesty's Government in relation to the money already invested there. Such firms as the gold mining companies have sunk millions of pounds in the Gold Coast, and invested it in circumstances which gave a reasonable assurance of continued British protection. I do not think that the British Government can callously abandon such enterprises to the caprice of the successor Government. That is why I advise the Government to use what influence they can bring to bear, and to see that the safeguards are incorporated in the Orders in Council which may be issued, and which may later be honoured by an independent Ghana.
  Self-government for the Gold Coast marks the end of an aim and the beginning of a challenge. In itself, it will achieve nothing unless the new régime is as efficient as the old. I hope that the Coast Coast will face this challenge with courage and resolution, so that the new independent State of Ghana may, in due course, occupy a worthy and honoured place in the comity of nations and in the British Commonwealth.
  5.21 p.m.
  Mr. Clement Davies: I am grateful for the opportunity of being able to show my complete concurrence with what has been said by the Colonial Secretary and the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths). This is another day added to the memorable days for which this House is famous. On such occasions, we cannot help but recall a few of those past memorable days.
  There was the great day when this House decided that the responsibility for its own Government should be handed over to Canada. There was the day when it decided that self-government should be handed over to the then separate States which now form the Commonwealth of Australia. Another occasion was when it was decided that the responsibility for its government should be restored to the Transvaal and to the Orange Free State, which later led to the formation of South Africa. Much more recently, there have

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  been the cases of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. Now we are passing the responsibility for its own government to the Gold Coast.
  The step we are now taking is even more remarkable, because it starts what I am convinced is a new era in Africa. It has been said that this event will be noted outside of Africa, but, in particular, it will be noted in Africa itself. The eyes of all Africans will be upon this new independent country, watching the way in which it develops. Very rightly, one desires to congratulate the Government, and especially the Secretary of State on the part he has played. One congratulates all those who have gradually led the Gold Coast to this point, and especially whose splendid public servants, the members of the Colonial Service, either here at home or actually serving in the Colony.
  Having said that, let us also praise the people of this country. It is a wonderful thing that they have done. Only fifty years ago the idea of self-government, of democracy, was not only unknown, but unheard of in the Gold Coast. In my young days, at the beginning or just before the beginning of this century, the only book one could read about this area was one called "Through Darkest Africa", written by Henry Morton Stanley, who afterwards became a Member of this House. Yet, in half a century, this nation has had such an influence on these people—through its Government, through the officials it sent out, through its traders, its missionaries and its teachers —that they not only desire self-government but self-government in the form which has been passed on from this country. It is a wonderful tribute to our people.
  I do not think it right that we should in any way criticise what has been happening fairly recently. Many of the things which have been mentioned were not very unfamiliar in this country only fifty years ago. The responsibility now passes to those people, and I am quite sure that they will undertake it and will be able to surmount the difficulties which are bound to beset them at this early stage. The less we interfere, the better —even with advice. It is best that they should find their own way of dealing with these things.
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  I was fortunate enough to spend some considerable time on the Gold Coast in 1938 and 1939. Like other hon. Members, I formed a great regard for the people of Ashanti and of the Northern Territories. I can well understand their present ambitions. I have every sympathy with their desire to follow their own customs. They have a different tradition, a different origin, and all the rest. Nevertheless, I think that at this moment the decision is right that they should all combine together for the general common good. I am also quite sure that, as development takes place, more and more their own local councils will have to deal with their own local conditions. But this is a vulnerable new State and, therefore, the more closely they can work together the better it will be.
  Will they realise that in getting their independence, throwing away any idea of colonialism, the people of the Gold Coast are now joining that family as equal partners? That is the great thing. That being so, they can look to the other members of the family for any assistance they may require. Let us also extend to them just the same kind of privileges which we expect for ourselves.
  Reference has very rightly been made to that wonderful link there is between us which is to be found in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. These people have such confidence in us and in the administration of justice that they bring their cases here to that final tribunal. But let that tribunal also be strengthened by bringing one of their learned judges to sit with our own judges, to the advantage of the whole tribunal.
  Having spoken my words of congratulation, I finish on this note. We all wish these people well. They bear responsibility to their own country but a great responsibility also to all the other Africans, wherever they may be, throughout that great continent.
  5.29 p.m.
  Mr. Frederick Willey: I intervene very briefly, because I also had the privilege of being a member of the Parliamentary delegation which acted as observers during the General Election—a delegation, if I may say so, which was very ably led by the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson).

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  I am not quite as pessimistic as my two colleagues, and I should like to say two things which make me more optimistic than they appear to be. I was very greatly impressed by the general good-natured tolerance of the people of the Gold Coast. I think that that is really a fundamental part of democracy. I was also very impressed by the ability and integrity of many of the politicians I met, members of both the C.P.P. and the N.L.M. I believe that it is upon the integrity and the ability of the politicians that the Gold Coast experiment must depend. I was impressed by the feeling that, whatever the difficulties, they will make a serious and genuine attempt to make this experiment work.
  I should like also to join with those hon. Members who have expressed appreciation of the European Administration. I should like to give an illustration of an expression of the confidence in that Administration. I spent a good deal of my time in Kumasi, where occasionally things were quite rough and troublesome. I cannot, however, claim to have suffered any personal danger, because the advice that I was given was that at night I should turn on the lights inside my car. If I was seen to be white, I was absolutely at no risk at all. I can think of no greater tribute to the Administration, when there was overtly and patently ill-feeling and rowdyism, that in displaying oneself as a white man one was absolutely safe. This is certainly a great tribute to the white Administration.
  At the same time, I should not like to take a discouraging view of the Africanisation of the service. It has been carried out at a very rapid rate, but by and large I think it has been very successful.
  Mr. N. Pannell: I do not take a pessimistic view of it. I say that it is just not possible to produce in five years administrators with twenty years experience.
  Mr. Willey: I could not agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is not possible. I appreciate the difficulties, but the success so far attained shows that it would be wrong to describe it as unattainable and impossible. On the whole, I am heartened by the progress which has been made.
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  I do not want to say much about the difficulties which will inevitably face the Gold Coast Government. In passing, however, I would say that the difficulties of providing for a multi-racial community have been demonstrated. A multi-racial community does not only mean a community which is divided by colour. Here we have a country which has got no ethnological basis. It was created by the division of Africa by the European Powers. I am sure that we all concede now that this country must remain, but the fact that it was so created presents enormous difficulties for any Government.
  I take the view that if we believe in self-determination, in spite of the difficulties, we must entrust the solution of the difficulties to the new Government and afford it Statute of Westminster powers. We have got to hope that the ability so far displayed by the Gold Coast politicians will enable them successfully to tackle the difficult constitutional problems facing the Government.
  There must obviously be some devolution. I would express, again in passing, my opinion that politically I am more sympathetic to the London County Council than I am to the constitution of the Government in Northern Ireland, which again, if I may say so, was an attempt to meet the difficulty of providing constitutions for a multi-racial community but I think we have learned a lot since the division, of Ireland. I hope, as other hon. Members have said, that there will be a genuine effort to allay fears by trying to reach a sensible workable scheme of devolution.
  As I have said, these are not matters for us to determine. But in the light of our present experiences and difficulties now facing us with regard to the Gold Coast, I think there is something to be said for our own Government considering a constitutional way of adopting, as part of our constitution, the European Convention of Human Rights. I know that constitutional lawyers will argue till kingdom come on the advantages of a written and unwritten constitution, but as we are going to have a succession of these problems facing us as we recognise further Colonies establishing the right to self-government, I think we should realistically face the problem and see whether it

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  would be better for us to have, as part of our constitution, a declaration of rights so that we could make it quite clear that this was our view of the rights of the individual which help to bind us together in the Commonwealth.
  However difficult these constitutional problems may be—and they are inherent in the situation on the Gold Coast—we must recognise the right of the Government of the Gold Coast to try to seek the best solution they can to these problems. We can do no more than proffer them such helpful advice as they may seek.
  May I say a word or two about the economic difficulties? I think we all recognise that there is a danger of political development always outrunning economic development. I think it is correct to say that there is a connection between the welfare side of society and democracy. Again this necessarily places very real difficulties upon the new Gold Coast Government because great expectations will follow self-determination.
  We should realise, too, that this will make a heavy economic toll upon us. Just as politically we must realise that it is our conception of human rights and human dignity which binds us together, so in the Commonwealth we must recognise that there is a common duty on the different members of the Commonwealth to improve the standards of life of everyone in the Commonwealth. That is a difficult matter, and perhaps it is impossible for us to tackle alone. That is why I welcome what the Under-Secretary of State said.
  As a Commonwealth, we have to consider this problem. I am sure we are all obliged to my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson) for the proposals he has put forward. I think it is better to regard them, as I believe the Under-Secretary did, in the light of the Colombo Plan, and to say perhaps that we want a new and revised conception of the economic responsibilities of all members of the Commonwealth and the best machinery which we can formulate and fashion to ensure that aid is given where it is most required.
  I do not think, however, that we need be too pessimistic about the Gold Coast. Difficulties are arising connected with the main crop, cocoa, but, on the other hand, there are real possibilities for economic development in the Gold Coast. If we
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  can get a joint Commonwealth approach to such problems as arise, for instance, in the Volta River scheme, I think investment in that country will certainly pay for itself.
  It so happens in the nature of things in the Gold Coast that the new Government, on achieving self-determination, will face very teal and difficult problems both politically and economically. We have got to trust the Gold Coast to do its best to tackle and solve those problems, and a Commonwealth formula must be found in order to provide the utmost aid to enable the Gold Coast to seek a solution to these difficulties. Out of this joint endeavour we may maintain and vindicate the British Commonwealth of nations which is perhaps the most important factor in world peace today.
  We have said very hard things about recent events in Suez during the past few weeks. I do not wish to stir up old troubles, but I think it is fortunate that today we can, on both sides of the House, show our belief in the future of the Commonwealth. We believe that this new emergent black Dominion has an important part to play. We can agree, undivided by partisanship, and show our confidence in the British Commonwealth, a Commonwealth now being enriched by a new Dominion, and which has still a vitally important part to play in world history.
  5.40 p.m.
  Mr. John Hall: I echo the concluding words of the hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) in saying that this is one of the occasions, only too rare in the last few weeks, when there has been a great deal of agreement and accord between both sides of the House. I should like also to refer to the words of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) in drawing attention to the tremendous progress made over the last fifty years in the advance towards self-government and independence in the Colonial Territories for which we have responsibility.
  In the Gold Coast, the progress has been really quite astounding. Since the 1946 Burns Constitution—which provided for the first time for an elected majority of Africans on the Legislative Council—up to 6th March next year, independence day, there is a space of a little less than eleven years. Even when one takes into

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  account the part which Africans themselves played in their own Government in the years prior to 1946— and the name of Sir Ofori Atta should be particularly remembered in that respect—it is a very short time indeed for so much to have happened, especially when we remember the hundreds of years taken by us in building up our still very imperfect democracy.
  As the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery said, it speaks a great deal for British democracy and the British form of government that so many countries have taken it as a model, and that now the State of Ghana should wish to follow it herself. I remember one of the sayings attributed to my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill)—which I shall probably misquote—that, "Of all forms of government democracy is the worst, except any other form of government." That is very true. The fact that we have arrived at the point when we are about to see a Colonial Territory emerge into self-government is a tremendous credit to all those who have been concerned with it over the years.
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) paid a tribute to certain people who had been responsible, and I should like to add my word of praise, if I might be allowed to do so, in all humility. The work of the late Oliver Stanley should not be forgotten. The draft constitution which he approved in 1945, which was brought in by the Labour Government in 1946, laid the foundation for the rapid development of self-government we are now witnessing.
  Lord Chandos, who was at one time Colonial Secretary in this House, did great work; it was Lord Chandos who appointed Dr. Nkrumah as the Prime Minister after he came out of gaol to take that appointment. Furthermore, we must not forget the work of my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, whose patience and understanding during the negotiations which have gone on over the last year or two, culminating in the events we are now discussing, we should not under-rate.
  I am happy also to add my tribute to that already expressed on both sides to the loyalty and devotion shown by the
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  British Colonial Civil Service, the members of which have served the State of Ghana faithfully over the years, very often receiving too little credit for doing so. Their services must have been appreciated, if the efforts of the Gold Coast people to retain them in their service now are any guide at all.
  It is sometimes said that Britain acquired a colonial empire in a fit of absent-mindedness. So far as the Gold Coast is concerned, it is true to say that our prime interest there was trade; we did not want to take over the responsibility of government. When we did take it up, we accepted the responsibilities, I think we can fairly claim, to the best of our ability, and the Gold Coast would have been poorer socially and economically if we had not played our part in its administration.
  The Gold Coast is now to disappear and the State of Ghana is to emerge. I must confess that I am a little sorry to lose the name "Gold Coast". It has certain romantic associations which particularly appealed to me when I was young. It has an association also with the actual word "gold", which has almost passed into the far distance as far as most of us are concerned. It has, however, at least two links with the new State of Ghana.
  The two links which my researches have shown are these. First, the wealth of the old State of Ghana was built upon gold; indeed, I believe it was the custom for the nuggets of gold—which were very plentiful in the area at that time—to belong to the king and for the gold dust to belong to the people. That was, I believe, a custom which remained in Ashanti for very many years, until the British Administration took over. The other link is found in ancient history, which tells us that Ghana was first ruled by "white kings" who were then succeeded by negro kings—a point of some similarity, perhaps, in the history of Ghana and the Gold Coast. I can only hope that this rebirth of an old name will help the birth of a new nation.
  As many hon. Members have said, there are many problems ahead for the Gold Coast Government. As we have heard, they have not succeeded altogether in persuading Ashanti and a large part of the Northern Territories and Togoland

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  that their future and traditions are safe in the hands of Dr. Nkrumah and the majority People's Party. There have been charges of corruption, bribery and nepotism, and allegations that public funds have been used for election purposes, which have soured the atmosphere. But we must, I think, remember that these things are not taken quite so seriously in the Gold Coast area as they might be over here. People are more accustomed there to a different standard of political morality from the one we have set for ourselves over several hundred years of development.
  It has been said, and I very much regret it, that the Ashanti will secede as an independent State under the Asantehene. I hope it is not true; I hope that wiser counsels will prevail. I hope it is not true that, while Accra celebrates independence day on 6th March, the Kumasi will completely boycott the celebrations. I know that the Northern Territories, despite the fact that the C.P.P. won 11 out of the 26 seats, are still uneasy about their future under the new constitution. Togoland, if the representations made by her delegates to the United Nations Trusteeship Council are anything to go by, is uneasy too at joining a State whose constitution is still a little uncertain.
  The uneasiness, as we know, revolves around this question of devolution of power and of safeguards for the constitution. I do not want to discuss the regional assemblies and the question of how much power they should or should not have. I should, however, like to dwell for a few moments on the constitutional safeguard against an abrupt change in the constitution after 6th March.
  It is true to say that, at the moment, it would be possible for the Ghana Government, after 6th March, possessing already, as the majority party, the necessary two-thirds majority, to change the constitution within a matter of days, perhaps even overnight. This leads to a fear in the minds of the Ashanti, the Northern Territories and the Togoland peoples, and a suspicion that that is perhaps what might in fact happen.
  I wonder whether it might be possible to provide a check upon any sudden changes by having a safeguard which would impose the necessity for a two-thirds majority in each of the regional assemblies, making, it necessary for any
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  change in the Constitution to go through the regional assemblies and he passed in the same manner there as in the national Parliament. I merely throw that out as an idea. In my view, we must find some way to ensure that the Constitution can not be abruptly changed; there should be plenty of opportunity for reflection and consultation with regional opinion in the country.
  From what I can understand from the reading I have done, it seems to me that Dr. Nkrumah, the Prime Minister, has done his best to meet many of the Opposition points. I do not think that the Opposition have altogether helped by following the example of Hector, sulking in their tents and boycotting the various conferences, boycotting even the House itself.
  I do not believe that it is necessarily right or wise to write into a constitution all the safeguards which one thinks are necessary. As Dr. Nkrumah, I notice, began his speech, which I understand lasted three and a half hours, with a quotation from Edmund Burke, perhaps I might quote from the same authority. Edmund Burke once said that
  "a constitution is a vestment which accommodates itself to the body."
  That is a very good definition indeed, but it must be vestment and not a straitjacket. The Government must show the utmost good faith in dealing with the Opposition. But the Opposition also has its responsibilities, because a democracy cannot flourish and be healthy without a strong, well-supported Opposition capable of forming an alternative government if called upon to do so.
  It may well be that without the greatest efforts on everybody's part, the events after 6th March may, although we pray they will not, lead to bloodshed. The Ashanti are a proud and virile race. If they feel that they are not to be given what they regard as a reasonable share in the government of the country, there might conceivably be trouble. I would beg Dr. Nkrumah not to put too much faith in majorities. I should like to remind the House of a quotation from one of the late Dr. Inge's works, in which he said:
  "The seventeenth century, in the person of lames I and Louis XIV, taught that the king can do no wrong, and their successors lost their heads. Hegel and his disciples in Germany taught that the State can do no wrong, and

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  plunged the world into war. Our doctrinaire democrats teach that the majority can do no wrong, and they bid fair to wreck our civilisation completely."
  Mr. Wigg: Would the hon. Member be good enough to address those remarks not only to Ghana but to Jamaica?
  Mr. Hall: I am dealing with Ghana. I should be very happy to address any remarks that the hon. Member requires to Jamaica when we are debating Jamaica.
  One possible consequence of any disturbances which might arise following differences of opinion on the constitution is the question of what is to happen to the police and the army in Ghana. There are at present in Ghana. I believe, some 400 British officers and N.C.O.s. It may well be that if there are disturbances, the first thing to happen would be that the police, in many cases officered by British officers, would be called upon to deal with those riots. That in itself would be serious enough, but what would be much worse would be if the army was called upon to deal with riots and had to conduct operations against the Ashanti or any other part of the population of Ghana, officered by British officers and N.C.O.s. That would be deplorable.
  What is the position of those officers and N.C.O.s? I understand that they are seconded from the British Army to the Gold Coast.
  Mr. Wigg: If the hon. Member looks back at Questions which I have asked, he will see that the Secretary of State for War has mentioned secondment of the officer commanding but has talked about British officers and N.C.O.s being on contracts. I entirely agree that we ought to be told by the Government today what form these contracts take.
  Mr. Hall: I thank the hon. Member for making that part of my speech for me. That is precisely the question I was going to ask my hon. Friend. We would like to know what is the form of these contracts and whether, if those officers and N.C.O.s so wish, they can bring them to an end and what will be their future. Are they able to return to the British Army, or what will happen to them?
  I had intended to talk at some little length on the economy of the Gold Coast
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  after independence day, but in view of the many things which have been said already about it I will confine my remarks to drawing attention to one factor. At the moment, it is Whitehall that decides whether the Gold Coast should draw upon dollars for dollar expenditure. After 6th March, that will no longer apply and the Gold Coast will tend to buy in the cheapest market and in the market which gives the quickest delivery. As far as I can see, it will become virtually a hard currency country.
  Although a great opportunity is provided for enterprising and industrial undertakings, we cannot rely too much upon our traditional associations with that country. We must compete with many people against whom we have in the past been partly protected. On the other hand, the Gold Coast, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkdale (Mr. N. Pannell) pointed out, requires capital investment, which it can attract only if it shows to investors that it will provide a stable, sound and honest Government based on the rule of law. I should like to think that the Public Service Corn-mission and the Judicial Service Commission will be completely free from any form of political interference. It may well be that they are, but assurances on that point would be welcome.
  I do not want to weary the House any further about the many problems and opportunities which are likely to be open to Ghana after 6th March—they are well known to us. If I may adapt the words used by nearly every hon. and right hon. Member who has spoken, we are today writing the first page of a new chapter of the history of our Commonwealth, a page which will affect not only our own territory, but developing Colonial Territories both in and outside the British Commonwealth. Whether the succeeding pages of that history will be bright and glowing with the success of that act of faith or will be dark and sombre and tinged with the blood of riots, insurrections and wars, depends entirely upon the statesmanship of all men of authority in Ghana today.
  With that, I will just add my own good wishes to those that have been expressed by hon. and right hon. Members on both sides of the House and say that we must, all of us, wish all those men in authority and the new State of Ghana God-speed.
  5.57 p.m.
  Mr. R. W. Sorensen: A notable feature of this debate is that there has not been a dissenting note to the chorus of welcome with which we contemplate the prospective emergence of the State of Ghana. Therefore, amidst all our forebodings and regrets at what has been happening in recent weeks, we should at least take to heart, in contrast with what has been happening in Hungary, where a nation is struggling to get free but cannot do so because of violent repression, the fact that we have in Africa a nation which is not only struggling to get free, but is being encouraged to get free and is being welcomed into this splendid institution, the British Commonwealth. That in itself is highly significant.
  We may have our difference of opinion, as we have had serious differences regarding incidents in another part of Africa, but against that can be set the great fact that today we welcome the emergence of an independent African nation within the Commonwealth. That in itself is bound to have tremendous progressive repercussions through the whole of Africa and even further afield.
  I should like to emphasise that fact again, because I do not believe it has been mentioned before. At this very moment—dramatically, so to speak, this very day—we hear the sombre, tragic reports of what is happening in Hungary in the midst of this ancient civilisation of Europe; we are depressed and saddened by it. Let us hearten ourselves by the fact that in Africa, which used to be thought of as full of darkness and backwardness, we have the emergence of an African State based upon democratic principles and welcomed by, surely, the whole of the free world.
  This, however, imposes a very great responsibility on the prospective State of Ghana itself. I hope that there will be many in Ghana, on both the Government side and in the Opposition, who will take to heart what has been said here this afternoon about the measure of responsibility that they must not only display, but must exercise. We do not say that in any condescending way. We say it as brethren within the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, we do say, and say with all earnestness, that if Ghana in the few years immediately ahead breaks down politically and
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  economically a most serious blow will be struck at the very ideals with which, I am sure, those who have led Ghana towards its present stage began their pilgrimage some years ago.
  I beg of the Opposition in that country to appreciate that while we understand their fears and forebodings, while we can understand why it is the Ashanti people should feel they are not an integral part of the country which is about to become Ghana. nevertheless, in the interests of Africa as a whole they should try to transcend their fears and, while quite naturally and validly seeking every guarantee they can, feel that it will serve their own interests best if they accept that they, with the other African peoples, now have the tremendous obligation of working out a constitution which will triumphantly withstand the oncoming strains.
  I do not now intend to speak tonight for as long as I had wished, partly because others coming earlier can always expand the case more easily than those who cone later in the queue, but I am grateful for this opportunity to add these few words. I would emphasise what others have said when they have urged that there should be no penalising of Ghana economically because she is now about to become an independent member of the Commonwealth. I can understand why it is that for technical reasons she can no longer receive the benefits which she has been receiving through the agency of colonial and welfare development, but I earnestly hope that a means will be found speedily to ensure that she lacks none of the fulfilment of those needs which are hers, without which fulfilment she may be a free political democracy but will languish because of an unsound economic foundation.
  I would say also with others to the people of Ghana that they have got rid of imperialism and they are no longer merely subordinate people working on an imperial estate. Now they are free and equal, or about to be free and equal, with all the other partners in the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, they should appreciate that they will still need a great deal from Europe, and from this country in particular. They have got rid of imperialism and colonialism but they still need our technology, they still need our

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  administrative experience, they still need our medical knowledge, and, above all—and I say this in no presumptuous way—they still need, I believe, our administrative integrity.
  Wherever I have been in any part of the world I have been made aware of the fact that, whatever criticisms may be applied to this country, there is everywhere a profound admiration for the integrity of our Colonial and Civil Service. It is quite true that we were at one time tainted with some of the weakness which, it is alleged, affects so many peoples overseas at the present time, and by no means merely African. It is true we have moved out of that. Heaven forbid that we must anticipate as long a time for the people of Ghana to move out of whatever may be their present weaknesses as it took us to move out of our weaknesses in bygone times. They can learn from our experience, and we, out of our long experience, can do much to enable them to avoid some prolonged misfortunes which otherwise would be theirs.
  What every country needs most is the establishment of the principle of absolutely incorruptible integrity. There are many reports which lead one to believe that in some parts of Africa and elsewhere all is not as it should be. I repeat, I do not say that in any condescending way. I know full well they have to learn. I know full well our traditions are very old. I know full well there are great temptations. Nevertheless, I say again for the sake of African freedom in the days to come that I hope that the Government and Opposition parties in Ghana will unite to eradicate corruption and nepotism ruthlessly so that they can build their new constitution on a firm and enduring basis.
  I believe that Ghana has this great responsibility, and that it is a responsibility which we should do our best to assist them to fulfil; and a responsibility also to prove, in Africa of all places, that, while down there in the south of Africa African peoples are still looked upon as inferior citizens, in Ghana African peoples are first-class citizens. That is why I particularly welcome the statement by the Government that they are to move that Ghana be admitted to the high status of membership of the Commonwealth. I welcome that most heartily. Nothing I
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  have heard from the Government Front Bench has encouraged me more than what was said about that today.
  If that is done then we shall have within the Commonwealth—the Commonwealth in which I profoundly believe—not only the great coloured nations of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, not only the great white nations of New Zealand, Australia and Canada, not only the rather unfortunate nation of South Africa, but this little country—little, but of great significance, because it is an African State in the Commonwealth. Thus the Commonwealth has a chance of becoming an even greater reality than it is or has been in in the past. I believe in the Commonwealth. Though I have done what I could to liquidate imperialism, whatever I have done I have done because I hoped the whole House would do its best to realise a far nobler concept, and that is the concept of the Commonwealth.
  I trust that no discordant or disturbing note will go out from here to either the Government or the Opposition in Ghana. We say to the Government and the Opposition alike, "Go forward on your great mission, not only for yourselves but for the Commonwealth and for the world. Go forward with this great adventure. Do not fail. The whole free world wants and expects you to succeed."
  6.7 p.m.
  Mr. Graham Page: With the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen) I, too, shall welcome the introduction of Ghana as a Commonwealth nation. I hope that its status as such will be established on 6th March next. I believe that there are many points in the relationship which we foresee between Ghana and the Commonwealth at which there will be stronger links than those between some of the present members of the Commonwealth of Nations.
  As several hon. Members have said, this is an historical occasion, the introduction of this Bill to lead to the independence of the Gold Coast. It is not only an historical but, to some of us, it is also an emotional occasion, for we have known the main characters, the main actors in the dramatic events of the past ten or eleven years which have led to this Bill. We have seen their political careers develop. Through personal acquaintance with them, we have known their fears and their

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  ambitions. Thank heaven, today it is not a party matter in this House. We can all join in wishing this new Commonwealth nation well as it comes into being.
  Many hon. Members have contributed to this debate from their own experiences, which, I am sure, is the best contribution that one can offer in a non-partisan debate. I am not alone among hon. Members in having seen great works of development start and come to fruition in the Gold Coast. I have seen them in embryo on an office desk in London and I have seen them become imaginary lines on a plan. Then one has had the thrill and excitement of going to the Gold Coast and seeing these things built there—Takoradi Harbour, Tema Harbour, the railways—all these great civil engineering constructional works, starting in embryo in this country and coming into being there.
  Now, as Ghana achieves independence, the West African has to take on that responsibility and, of course, we wonder whether he is capable of doing it. Can he manage to take command of that sort of development for which we have taken the responsibility up to the present? I am extremely optimistic that he can. The West Africans, the men of the Gold Coast, can take on that responsibility and are capable of taking command now of these kinds of developments.
  But if they are to do so, there must be constitutional stability within this new nation, because without that Ghana will never obtain the skill and the finance which it needs to seek abroad. It has not entirely the skill and the finance to develop as it is capable of doing, and it will never obtain that finance if there is a doubt about its political future. I do not mean its party political future, but its constitutional future.
  I am sure that both the Government and the Opposition in the Gold Coast realise this very fully, and I think that the country itself is embarking upon independence with a full sense of responsibility. If I am wrong, we are obviously heading for a great disaster. If I am right, we are heading for a tremendous future for the Gold Coast. There are, of course, differences between Government and Opposition there. We would not expect it to be otherwise.
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  I do not take seriously the threat of secession. It is true that resolutions have been sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and have been published, but I cannot feel that there is more than a very small number who would wish to take that step. I am not inclined to take seriously, either, the threats of possible violence. I am sure that the Opposition there has realised, over the past year, that even its passive non-co-operation has not brought very much success and that it can achieve far more by co-operation with the Government party.
  If the Opposition there will realise that the Government represent the majority, and if the Government, on their side, will realise that the Opposition represent minorities and that in a young State the minorities need certain constitutional protection, there is a possibility of Teaching a settlement. The Government party there, of course, may in time be only too pleased that at an early stage it introduced constitutional protection, because it might need it itself one day. When one is producing a Constitution for a young State it is right to put in certain fundamental rights and, as the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) said, perhaps the Secretary of State could give a lead on this in the next few months and in the necessary Order in Council.
  If constitutional protection, by means of fundamental rights written into the Constitution, is necessary, then the rule of law is absolutely essential, and if the rule of law is essential then an independent judiciary is essential. I see the picture in this way. First, there is the economic problem of physical, material developments in civil engineering, and so on, dependent upon the political problem of a stable Government, which, in turn, is buttressed by the constitutional point of fundamental rights, which, in turn, are safeguarded by an independent judiciary. Therefore, I see an independent judiciary as the base of the whole structure, and a base which must be really sound.
  West Africa has produced some very fine judges in the past, but not enough to fill its whole judicial bench. It can continue to do so, provided that the Government set their face firmly against political appointments. My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) said that he hoped that the Judicial Service Commission will remain entirely

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  independent. I repeat that hope, and I hope that the appointments of judges will be based on advice from the Judicial Service Commission and will be entirely independent of politics. This sort of thing seems so fundamental to us in this country that it may seem to some hon. Members unimportant, because we do not think of our judges as anything else but independent of politics. But there must be a temptation in a new, young State of this sort to seek a politically subservient bench.
  The standard of the judiciary must, of course, depend upon the profession from which it is drawn. Only a few months ago I discussed with Dr. Nkrumah the division of the profession there. At present, it is fused. There is no separation between the solicitors' branch and the barristers. Every lawyer endeavours to be an advocate and an office worker and that does not make for proficiency in either occupation. I believe that a division of the profession would give a far better basis for an efficient, independent judiciary of entire integrity.
  I join with the right hon. Member for Llanelly and the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) in their plea for strengthening the link which Dr. Nkrumah has already said that he desires to keep with the Privy Council. The right hon. Member for Llanelly said that one of his legal friends has suggested to him the appointment of a West African judge to the Privy Council. Perhaps he had read an Adjournment debate which I initiated in the House, six months ago, in which I made that proposal.
  Mr. J. Griffiths: I give the hon. Member the entire credit for it.
  Mr. Page: I am obliged. I have urged it ever since. This link between the courts in West Africa and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is very important. Up to the present, our Commonwealth nations have been drifting away from that. Here we have an example of a new State wishing to retain that link with the Privy Council and, incidentally, saying, as has been said in the debate in the Legislative Assembly in the Gold Coast, "We want to retain that link, but we should like to strengthen it by a West African judge being appointed
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  periodically to sit on their Lordships' Board of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." I am sure that several hon. Members here know at least two judges from West Africa who would serve the Judicial Committee very well. I believe that such an appointment would be a contribution not only to the benefit of Ghana but to the benefit of the whole Commonwealth, to which we hope to welcome Ghana as a member.
  6.21 p.m.
  Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: All hon. Members who have addressed the House today have spoken with a full sense of the importance of the occasion. The hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) was no exception. Here we are assisting at the birth of the first all-African Dominion. wherein we hope there will be no grades of citizens, unlike that sad Dominion far to the South in the great African Continent which is so full of forebodings for relations between the races. In Ghana things ought to go very well, provided we make no mistakes in the initial stages, because hon. Members on both sides of the House and, as far as I am aware, everybody in the Gold Coast itself want independence for Ghana.
  The trouble lies in the fact that in the house of independence there are many mansions, and it is quite possible to imagine a form of independence which might mean the very opposite of independence for a large minority of any country. My submission is that it is the duty of the governing Power to see that independence is real before it is granted nominally.
  For excellent reasons and with the best intentions, we have placed ourselves in a position whereby independence has to be granted on a certain date. The reasons the date has been fixed are very well understood. I think almost everybody agrees that it is desirable to fix a date. We understand how it came about. The fact is that a date has been fixed. I blame nobody at all for this, because I welcome it. Nevertheless, I say that it is our duty in the days which lie between now and that date to do our utmost to see that the independence which we are granting to the Gold Coast, and which they so richly deserve, is real.
  The Secretary of State previously said that, subject to an election which would

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  take place in July. 1955, this date should be fixed. That election took place and the date has been fixed as 6th March. 1956, with, as we have been told, 57 per cent. of the votes going to the Convention People's Party and 43 per cent. to the Opposition. Even if we assume—which I do for the sake of this argument—that everything in the election was perfect. that there was no gerrymandering, no intimidation, no corruption and no improper practice of any sort which would vitiate the result, this minority of 43 per cent. is surely an extremely sizeable minority to which we should certainly pay the most serious attention. When we remember that the National Liberation Movement had a majority of votes in Ashanti and the North. surely this is reinforced.
  Unfortunately—and we need not 20 into the merits of the matter—members of that large minority fear that they will not be properly treated after independence has been granted. If they had consented to the form in which independence is to be given, they would now have nobody to blame but themselves if they did not get a fair deal afterwards; but they have not consented to the form of the independence. They consented, of course, to independence; in fact, all four diverse regions of the territory of the Gold Coast were calling —one might even say screaming—for independence. When independence became imminent, doubts began to be expressed; and it was realised that nobody had said precisely what was meant by independence.
  This seems to me to be a serious matter. It is not, in my submission, enough for the governing Power to say. "There has been a majority in favour of independence and therefore we can wash our hands of the whole situation." Let us remember what happened in the Sudetenland. Hitler wanted to annex the Sudetenland. It was perfectly easy for him to argue that he had a majority in a plebiscite—a plebiscite which was taken not only in the Sudetenland but also in the greater Reich. In the two added together there was, of course, a majority in favour of the Sudetenland joining the Reich. Is it not precisely the same in Ireland, where some argue that because a majority of the people of Ireland want to take the North into the South, therefore the North should be taken into the South? Is not the
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  essence of the matter whether a majority of the people in the part affected, in the North of Ireland, want to go to the South? Is not that the crucial matter?
  So it is, in my submission, with the Gold Coast. I feel that very great importance must be attached to the views of so large a minority. In my submission it is our plain duty to see that the minority have their rights, and to do our best to see, as far as we are able to use any persuasion at all upon them, that they realise their duties, too. Dr. Nkrumah is a most remarkable man, as anybody knows who has met him for even as short a time as I. He is a most remarkable man of great charm and great ability. I believe that he realises as much an anybody the need to obtain consent for this independence in the fullest sense of the word "consent"—consent not only to the actual fact of independence but, as far as it is humanly possible to obtain it, consent to the form of that independence. I believe he realises that there has to be an Opposition and that an Opposition is not something to be put out of sight but something to which one must pay attention if one wishes to make democracy work.
  I believe that he would welcome a move from this country in the direction of having these matters settled amicably. It is difficult to say precisely what one should do. In my submission, however, it would possibly be welcomed by him if we made even the gesture of sending a Parliamentary delegation to see whether it could not mediate and obtain the consents without which at the best there will be friction and at the worst there will be bloodshed. That is a very small suggestion to make. Doubtless Dr. Nkrumah has extremists in his own party who are difficult to control. He might find it easier to control them if the Secretary of State were prepared to make a suggestion to him on those lines.
  I ask that this suggestion and others which have been mentioned already in the debate—other suggestions intended to try to overcome the difficulties which at present the Government of the Gold Coast and the Opposition feel to be separating them—should be seriously considered by the Secretary of State before 6th March so that we may ensure that this independence, which we all wish Ghana to have, will be real and secure.
  6.30 p.m.
  Mr. Walter Elliot: As has been said in every quarter of the House, this is certainly a day of the greatest importance to ourselves, Ghana and the whole Commonwealth. Those of us who, for many years, have taken an interest in the affairs, more particularly of West Africa, feel it important beyond words, important far beyond some of the other issues, great as they are, with which the House has been dealing in recent days and in recent weeks.
  This is the birth of a State, the first of the really modern self-governing States of Africa and a State which will represent an altogether new departure in the history of that Continent. It is twenty-seven years since first I went ashore on the Gold Coast with the surf boats of that time. I have had the opportunity of visiting it for shorter or longer periods since then. For a period of two years I had the honour of being head of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa and in this current year I had the honour of leading a Parliamentary delegation which visited, among other Colonies, the Gold Coast, actually at the time when tension was very high because of the impending constitutional changes. All of us in each of those delegations looked forward to this day which we are now enjoying.
  We said in the concluding paragraphs of our report on higher education that in ten or twenty years—what is that in the life of a nation?—a new State would arise in Africa, that it would be powerful as well as new and that its voice would be heard in the New World as well as in the Old World. Now that prophecy comes to pass. As has been said by hon. Members on both sides, particularly by the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies), this is a day upon which to congratulate ourselves, because it is a day of great achievement for the Commonwealth as a whole and, more particularly, for the peoples of the United Kingdom and the Gold Coast, or Ghana, as it is now to be called.
  There are, of course, certain factors which will make it difficult for the new State, which we should frankly recognise. One of them is the fact that in West Africa the belts of climate and vegetation run transversely. The coastal
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  belt, the forest belt, the desert belt run across the Continent for 1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 miles, while the political divisions run north and south; partly because that is the way in which the European Powers drew the boundaries, and partly because that corresponds to a real economic link. the link of the coastal area, the ports, the access to the sea, with the great forest rainfall belt and that links, in turn, with the drier regions of the hinterland running up to the desert of Sahara.
  Consequently, as has been mentioned by several hon. Members, we get a diversity in the communities in the State which, partly by the action of the House, is now being brought into existence. We should not shut our eyes to that fact. It is not exactly true to say that Ghana is a nation. It is not yet a nation. It has the hope and power of becoming a nation, a group of peoples who are themselves willing and anxious to pull together for their future. The process is not yet complete and a heavy responsibility still lies on the House in the hand-over which is taking place.
  The difficulties arise out of the right and proper steps which have been taken. steps we have always desired to take, to make this a self-governing and independent territory in the fullest sense of the word—independent according to the Statute of Westminster, which is as full independence as exists anywhere in the world. They also arise from the fact that we have, rightly, had to fix a date. Without a fixed date, people never will believe that the events will actually happen. They think that it is a case of this year, next year, sometime, never. Unless a date is fixed, nobody is ever brought up against the realities of the case, and the realities of the case are certainly beginning now to emerge.
  The different communities which we are here uniting are very different indeed. The coastal belt, throughout the history of Africa, has been separate from the hinterland. This is the problem which my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary has encountered in other West African Colonies. It occurs in reverse in Sierra Leone, where the coastal people fear domination by the hinterland. Our constitution-making in Sierra Leone has had to take that into account. The coastal people there feel that the hinterland, which is more heavily populated,

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  will swamp their way of life, just as the people of the Northern Territory of Ghana fear that the more highly populous and economically more powerful territories of the coast will swamp and steamroller their way of life, to which they still rightly attach a great and traditional importance.
  Even in Nigeria, the great constitutional skill of the then Oliver Lyttelton, now Lord Chandos, had to be directed to holding together portions which might otherwise have tended to fall apart—the Moslem territories of Northern Nigeria with the well-watered fertile lands of Eastern and Western Nigeria to the south. It is, therefore, in no way detracting from the achievement which has been already secured, or the hopes which we most passionately hold for the future, to recognise these facts and to say that both sides, what is called the Government and the Opposition, or the coastal territories and the hinterland ought to recognise the facts of life and realise that they will have to come and go a great deal with each other if this new experiment is to succeed.
  Dr. Nkrumah has a Parliamentary majority and. as Parliamentarians, we must, naturally, attach the greatest importance to that. He secured it not merely in one, but in two elections. By the rules of Parliament, he is thus entitled to pass almost any legislation he wishes. However, he has also to bring along with him the other communities, powerful communities with traditions of their own which require, so to speak, to be ridden on the snaffle rather than the curb, if they are to be brought in as willing partners to the new synthesis of people which we are forming.
  This is not a matter of regimenting and pushing these people together. It is a matter of getting their good will and co-operation, and that is the task to which both this Parliament and the Gold Coast peoples must bend their minds. After all, it is almost within a lifetime, and, certainly, only a short historical time, since the Ashanti were marching to the coast and besieging the coastal towns. Their national motto, "Kill a thousand, and a thousand will come," is the motto of a very stubborn and persistent people. The Northern Territories have only newly been brought into this grouping at all.
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  An hon. Member opposite mentioned eminent judges who would certainly be an addition to any judicial bench anywhere in the world. I would certainly include Judge Coussey among that number, and there are other judges, too. When I discussed these matters with him, he told me that in the first all-African Committee of Inquiry witnesses from the Northern Territory said all the things which Africans usually say about Europeans, but with redoubled vigour, and about the Africans of the more cultivated territories.
  He said, "They told us quite bluntly that they regarded us as exploiters and employers of sweated labour. There were all the usual complaints that sources of labour are wont to launch against the more settled areas which use their labour seasonally and then return it again to the source from which it came."
  So, in the midst of our rejoicing—and this is a day of rejoicing—let us not confine ourselves solely to rejoicing because, if we do, then we neglect the duty of this House, which is to foresee dangers and to discuss them quite frankly with those on whom those dangers will impinge, much more heavily than they will upon us in this House.
  The Under-Secretary of State, in opening the debate, pointed out that this Bill is fundamentally a Bill to establish an Order in Council. Really, the gist of it will be the Order in Council transferring the powers which this House exercises, and the powers which, as the Under-Secretary of State gave us to understand, are being transferred from the Sovereign to the new Assembly which is being set up. This is an instrument of enormous and irrevocable power, and I venture to make this suggestion, that the Secretary of State might find it possible to allow a little more consideration of this instrument than is normally given in the case of an Order in Council which is brought forward under a Bill.
  The Bill itself, if it passes, is highly-technical and it will, as I say, beget an Order in Council. I would have suggested that, had the time been available, some other Parliamentary procedure might well have been adopted for the examination of the Bill in Committee and possibly of the steps which could be taken

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  as a result of it; but I think that we are held so tightly within the limits of time—the Minister and myself know what it means to find that we are beginning to run right up against the unbending limits of the Parliamentary calendar—that there is no time for further detailed examination under this Bill.
  We have the debate today and a day for the Committee stage, but I do not think that it will be possible for far-reaching Amendments to be debated, or, if debated, to be adopted, because the danger of a breach of faith might arise with the Gold Coast Government, which is the last thing that any of us desire. But I think that it might be possible for the Secretary of State, instead of publishing in draft the Order in Council—we know that this is technically impossible, because we cannot have a draft Order in Council— to publish a White Paper giving the gist of the Order in Council which it is hoped to introduce.
  I would even go further. I hope that it may be that a formal or informal council of Parliament may examine this, possibly in concert with those who can speak both for the Government and the Opposition in the new territories to which it is to apply. Some review might be made, because one of the difficulties which arise under the Statute of Westminster is the enormous power of revoking which a sovereign Assembly possesses.
  The Minister has already spoken of the two-thirds majority, but I think that if, in some way or another, a further entrenchment could be agreed to—I think that it could only be done by agreement —then many of the doubts and fears of these powerful territories, minorities within the whole area, but majorities within their own territories, might be allayed. Points which have been discussed tonight in the House, such as the position of the Judicial Commission, of the position of the Civil Service Commission, and even points as to the possibility of regional devolution, which might well be further explored in the tentative and informal way which is all that can be done now under the limits of time. This might do a very great deal to melt away the difficulties which still exist.
  It might well be that the powerful and sympathetic personality of the Secretary
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  of State himself could come into play. I am sure that the personality of a previous Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttelton, played a great part in holding together the great Nigerian Provinces when they were showing signs of flying apart. I am sure that the personality, sympathy, and enormous industry of the present Secretary of State, also, might well come in in a task like this. Because what we want is not only energy but enthusiasm.
  The new State will have the greatest trouble in surmounting its problems, and unless it is not merely acquiescent but enthusiastic about it, I think it will have very great difficulty indeed. The C.P.P. has enthusiasm and vigour. It is our task, and the task of all men of good will, to see that this enthusiasm is also evoked in the other African communities which are to form part of the new nation. Because, here, the whole future of the African race for half a century or a century ahead is at stake. A failure here is not merely a failure in the Gold Coast or in West Africa; it is a failure in Africa and all the hostile critics of Africa and the Africans will be only too ready to rush forward and say, "There you are we told you so." That is a danger that we want to avert, and, therefore, we require to take every possible step that can be taken, by conference, by discussion, and by evoking good will and enthusiasm, to avert that kind of difficulty.
  The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery said that it was desirable that the new Dominion should be accepted as a full member of the Commonwealth. I am sure that that is true. After all, it was our own poet, Shakespeare, who said these magnificent words:
  "Mislike me not for my complexion,
  The shadow'd livery of the burnish'd sun.
  To whom I am a neighbour, and near bred.
  "The shadow'd livery of the burnish'd sun"—what a glorious phrase it is. If we are to regard our new companions in the Commonwealth as bearing the shadow'd livery of the burnish'd sun—to whom they are near neighbours—and not as any kind of second-rate or number two citizens, but citizens with a message of their own to bring towards our many-coloured Commonwealth, we shall have done great work not only for ourselves but for the whole world.
  6.50 p.m.
  Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: I am sure that when the long history of this country comes to be written one of the most important things that it will show to have been developed in this country and given to the world is the English language. The last quotation of the right hon. Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) was an indication of the power and greatness of our language. Perhaps the other great thing which we have been able to give the world is the parliamentary system, which we have developed over a very long time.
  At this late hour in the debate hon. Members have to keep their speeches as short as possible and, therefore, if I do not deal with the economic future of the Gold Coast, which was to have been the principal part of my speech, it will only be because I am going to concentrate, not upon the English language, but upon the parliamentary future of Ghana.
  We have a great deal to give to the Gold Coast. We cannot just hand over a copy of Erskine May, however well bound, and a mace, however well designed, and expect a country to run a complicated system of Government which has taken us centuries to develop. It is obvious that not every aspect can be taught. But there are some. And the Gold Coast is not ashamed to realise that. For some weeks past the Clerk of the Gold Coast Assembly, Mr. Ayensu, has been working here with the Clerks of this Parliament, so that he may be fortified in his task as Clerk in Accra. He will remain here for some weeks to come.
  There is something for us to teach, but we have also something to learn. It is important to recognise that as the years pass and other Parliaments develop upon our model we may well have to learn from them. For instance, the Order Paper in the Gold Coast House of Assembly is a far more sensible document than that which we use as a so-called agenda for our proceedings. It is infinitely simpler, and is not a mass of items which are irrelevant to the day's proceedings.
  As time passes, practices and procedures more suitable to the local conditions in Ghana are bound to grow up. These grow not only out of the temperature but out of the temperament of the people who debate. A few years ago the Clerk of this
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  House wrote, in the journal of the Hansard Society, that a Member of Parliament in Ceylon had pointed to certain differences between their procedure and ours and had said that the
  "Ceylonese like their speeches Like they liked their curry—hot and in great plenty."
  Our liking for cold mutton and watery brussels sprouts is not to everyone's taste.
  Mr. James Callaghan: Speak for yourself.
  Mr. de Freitas: But there are many people in this country who like them.
  If hot curry has influenced the procedures and practices of the Ceylon House I am certain that we cannot expect, in a country where ground nut chop is a great delicacy, that they will not change their procedures to adapt them to that atmosphere. But, at heart, their Parliamentary system will be based upon our system of democracy, and they are bound to look to us—there is no evidence that they will be too proud to do so—for guidance from time to time over the years. It will be the task of organisations like the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Hansard Society to give that guidance on Parliamentary government when they are asked for it.
  Our chief duty in this Parliament is to continue to set the right example. We understand the role of vigorous parliamentary opposition, but it is not so well understood in the Gold Coast. I was sorry to see, in my visits to the Gold Coast Assembly, how few Members of the Opposition parties were present. I have read reports of important debates upon constitutional and financial matters when no Opposition Members were present. We must always set this example and show that the chief role of the Opposition is to criticise. It is more important than legislation. When new Parliaments are starting off the idea that if a law is made a problem is solved is overstressed. The principal job of Members of Parliament is to keep the Government of the day on their toes with criticism.
  Further, we must show that the majority party respects the minority. I do not know how the problem of regional differences in Ghana will be solved, but I am sure that it will be. This is a case where we may be able to help. We have

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  solved the difficult problem of Scotland. We have been able to maintain Great Britain as a unitary State without a federal structure, or even the device of Northern Ireland. Yet there is considerable administrative devolution in the affairs of Scotland. Some development of that sort may solve the regional problem in Ghana.
  Incidentally, I am sure that hon. Members have nothing to teach the Gold Coast politicians in the field of charm, good humour and the general conduct of political discussion.
  As to the future which is worrying so many hon. Members, we must remember that the Government of Ghana will know that the eyes of the world are upon them, and that there are many people—most of us regret that such people exist—who believe that the white man alone is endowed by nature with the capacity to rule. Those people will be watching every step which is made by the Government or Parliament in Ghana to prove them right and to bring discredit upon African rule. On the other hand, the Government and Parliament of Ghana know that there are millions of white people throughout the world who believe that all the African needs is to be given the opportunity to show that he can rule. These people, too, will be watching for signs that they are right in their judgment.
  I am convinced that a country which, in the political sphere, has already thrown up such outstanding men as the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, is bound to have a strong and vigorous Parliamentary future. I am confident that the Parliamentary system will flourish in Ghana, that the rights of minorities will be respected, and that the gloomy prophets will be disappointed.
  6.59 p.m.
  Mr. Richard Fort: The hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) made one very wise remark, which we would do well to remind ourselves of often, namely, that to make a law does not solve a problem. This evening we are making a law which, while it is an important step forward, will not solve all the problems of Ghana. All hon. Members who have spoken have indicated that fact with varying degrees of emphasis.
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  I want to make only two or three short points. The first is a word to our friends in Ghana. One of the great problems with which they, like us all, are confronted at the present time is a shortage of capital. I suppose that, together with technically trained staff, the world is shorter of capital than anything else. All of us may think of tremendous schemes which require vast quantities of capital—in other words, of other people's savings. But the savings just do not exist in proportion to the calls upon them.
  I hope that the Government of Ghana, and those responsible for the Ghanese economy, will remember this shortage of capital in the world; and that, in acquiring what capital is available for their country, they will find that they are more likely to get it happily, and on better terms, by following the ordinary commercial practices, built up over the years and well understood right through the civilised world—whether in Europe, North America or in Asia—than by trying in some way to play off the free world against the Communists in the manner of Nasser and suchlike people.
  The other point I wish to develop is the fact of the very sad political divisions in Ghana. Goodness knows, those of us, like myself, who have only been there for a few days, should be modest in what we say. But I consider that the whole difficulties were set out extraordinarily well in the speech of the hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason); and my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot), who has such great experience of these West African problems, felt down below the obvious constitutional problems which are now the subject of such violent discussions.
  There are two groups of people, the coastal people and the Ashanti, and during the time I was there it seemed to me that the current constitutional struggle merely reflected the historical conscience of these two groups. The coastal people never forget that the Ashanti are the inland people who, before the Europeans, and particularly ourselves, intervened, were constantly increasing their holding and building up the Ashanti frontiers nearer to the coast. The Ashanti, in turn, remember that they were a great military tribe with a long history of conquests. With that historical background, it is obvious that it will be difficult to

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  overcome these problems. Yet both peoples have an advantage over most other parts of Africa. They both have considerable cultural unity; they speak the same type of language and both are people of the Akan.
  I feel that if my right hon. Friend could find time, even with his enormous range of duties, to go to the Gold Coast himself, perhaps he alone—I do not believe that a Committee front this house could do it —with his authority, could work out the delaying clauses in the Constitution to which my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkdale (Mr. N. Pannell) referred. He might find a solution which would meet the views of the Ashanti, and persuade the Government how necessary it is—not only in the long-run, but in the immediate short-run—to have a Constitution which gives a feeling of security to the inland people, to the Ashanti and those associated with them. I am sure that Premier Nkrumah and the C.P.P. wish to set up a suitable State as an example to the whole of Africa and to the world.
  Having said that to our friends in Ghana, I would say that we here have a duty. We have welcomed this Bill with varying degrees of enthusiasm. As time goes on, difficulties will undoubtedly rise in Ghana, and I hope, when that happens, that we shall not sit around criticising ceaselessly, and saying, "We told you so". I hope that we shall not "nark" —if I may use that common or garden phrase—but will remember that things will be done in Ghana which are not in keeping with our traditions. The traditions of the Ghanese are different from ours. Assuming that we see nothing which is outrageous, such as an attack on personal liberty—that we should always condemn—I hope that we shall manage to restrain ourselves when we find things being done which are more in keeping with the traditions of Ghana than those of Great Britain.
  I should like to join with other hon. Members in saying that the Bill is yet another answer to the ceaseless and unfair charge against this country, that we are interested only in colonialism. We have plenty of examples from the past to prove that false, and we shall have some more in the future. This process for helping the Constitution of countries such as Ghana and of bringing them
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  along the road of development may not be the ideal one. There may be better ways. But the one we have chosen conforms with the long British tradition which dates back to the Minute of Macaulay on the future of India, which he wrote over a hundred years ago when he was Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office. We are bound to follow that tradition, because it is ours.
  We should all be proud to think that in this new country, which will be a member of the Commonwealth, we shall have seen, in the course of its history and ours, a relationship moving from that of master and slave to that of free man, and finally, in the happy phrase of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove, companions in the Commonwealth.
  7.8 p.m.
  Mr. George Wigg: I have been listening to speeches for four hours, and I have come to the conclusion that I am cursed with a good memory. I remember when Mr. Kwame Nkrumah was imprisoned, five years ago, and was released on winning the Election in the Gold Coast. I remember sending him a telegram which was signed by a number of people who were friends of mine and hon. Members of this House. Some of them are still hon. Members. Others, like Sir Richard Arland and Mr. Tom Driberg, have fallen by the wayside. We said to Mr. Nkrumah that as he had won the Election, we trusted that he would lead his country along the road of democracy and freedom to self-government.
  The attacks that were levied on us for this simple act of faith still burn in my memory. In the Wolverhampton Express and Star I was charged with an attempt to sabotage the defences of this country, and I was forced to bring a libel action to put the matter right. I remember that, subsequently, when Mr. Nkrumah first came to this country—when he was not quite so popular—I invited him to dine at the Palace of Westminster. Again, I was subjected to the most vicious attacks. I also remember the articles which appeared in the Daily Telegraph on the subject of the Gold Coast. I remember the speeches and writings of the hon. Member for Hornsey (Sir D. Gammans).
  I am glad that all these things are memories and I pray that they will

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  remain way back in the past. I mention them because I am a friend of the Gold Coast. I never had the good fortune to go there on a Parliamentary mission—I never shall have that good fortune. I just happen to have served there in rather less comfortable circumstances. I have memories of service in Tamule, Kumasi and Takoradi, and those memories made me wish the Gold Coast people well; and I wish them well now. It has given me an interest in the doings of the Army and the doings of the Colonial Office which leave me with no great admiration for either the Colonial Office or the present Secretary of State.
  If I had to award any marks for great work in bringing the Gold Coast from the point of rioting, with Kwame Nkrumah in prison, to the position in which he is mentioned in this debate almost in terms of veneration, I should give them to one man—Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, who has done great service for this country, after the attacks by the Conservative Party on the conception which Mr. Nkrumah sought to follow. Sir Charles Arden-Clarke has done a wonderful job and deserves well of us all. The right hon. Gentleman will understand what I mean when I say that I wish Sir Charles were Secretary of State for the Colonies.
  I am not an admirer of the colonial picture which faces us tonight. Indeed. I am full of apprehension about what will happen in the weeks and months which lie ahead. Five years ago I welcomed the prospect of self-government for Ghana. Now I believe that if the truth were told by the Secretary of State, by Mr. Nkrumah and throughout the Gold Coast, if it were politically possible, the advent of self-government would be halted.
  We are rapidly moving into a position which might result in violence and bloodshed. I hope that that will not happen, I hope that wiser counsels will prevail, I hope that minority opinion will be respected by Dr. Nkrumah and equally I hope that the minority will respect the rights of the majority; but I should have been failing in my duty if I had not remained here for several hours to say what I want to say.
  Whether there will be bloodshed or not, the effective Government in the Gold
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  Coast will not depend upon resolutions in this House; it will depend upon the police force and such armed forces as are there. Whether they are effective or not I do not know, but I am aware of their Constitution.
  Here, again, I have the curse of my memory, for my mind goes back to the first defence debate we had in 1946. If hon. Members have a taste for sardonic humour, let them read the speeches made then by the present Prime Minister and the present Leader of the House. They painted grandiose pictures of a future Colonial Army, of the vast Colonial Force which would be raised and which would come to Britain's aid.
  How well I remember all through those years from 1946 to 1951, particularly when we had a majority in the House of only about six, how the present Minister of Defence and others, in debate after debate, denounced what they described as the incompetence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Creech Jones) and the slowness. obtuseness and worse, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). Vast numbers of troops were to be raised, the defence Bill was to be cut, and only the wicked incompetence of a Socialist Government, they said, was standing between Britain and the realisation of her imperial destiny.
  Again, this memory of mine takes me back to the first debate on the Army Estimates after the new Conservative Government had come straight from the polls. The Secretary of State for War stood at the Box and said, by way of an afterthought, "I must say something about colonial defence. It costs too much and it is not 'on'."
  The story is not yet finished. In 1953, there was produced at Lagos a Colonial Paper, No. 304, the Report of the West African Forces Conference from 20th to 24th April, 1953. I congratulate right hon. Gentlemen opposite on producing that Paper. I have congratulated them many times before, and I have done what I can, with my limited influence, to try to influence hon. Members on this side of the House to understand what a great contribution to Imperial and Commonwealth stability it would make if the ideas in that Colonial Paper were put into operation. But nothing has happened —not a single thing.

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  The question of the Africanisation of West African and East African Forces depends upon the ability to recruit and retain the right material and to turn out sufficient officers and warrant officers. A proposal of the first importance is put forward in this Paper—that a Colonial and Commonwealth Sandhurst should be established. It was realised that it would be impossible for Sandhurst to train and turn out enough officers for the West African and East African Forces and thus such a proposal was essential.
  What has happened about that proposal, after three years? Nothing has been done. All that has happened is the retrograde step of introducing the effendi class in the East African Forces. We have made a cut between the warrant officer and the white officers serving in the King's African Rifles. One proposal only —and it has cost nothing either of thought or of money—has been implemented; that has been the setting up of the West African Army Advisory Council.
  Again, my memory and my interest serve me well. I watched for the first meeting of this Council. On 4th November last year the first meeting was held. I will not trouble hon. Members by reading extracts from the report, although I should have done so had I been fortunate enough to be called earlier. On 15th November last year I put a Question to the Secretary of State for War, asking him whether he would
  "make a statement on the future of the West Africa Command."
  He replied,
  "Not yet, Sir."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th November, 1955; Vol. 546, c. 196.]
  This was an astonishing reply because a very full report had appeared in the Press, both in this country and in West Africa, of the conclusions reached at the West African Council.
  Being of a patient nature, I waited to see what would happen. It is true that I had a private and confidential letter from the then Secretary of State for War. I was sorry to receive it, because it confirmed me in what I already knew but prevented me then and now from repeating it. It is a lesson learned; I do not rush to receive any more confidential letters of that character.
  I waited until 7th February, and then I asked the Secretary of State for War
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  "whether he will now make a statement on the future of West Africa Command."
  Four months had passed and the meeting had taken place which was to work out what would happen to the Army in view of the development of constitutional changes such as that which we are now discussing. Again, the reply which I received was,
  "Not yet, sir."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th Feb. 1956; Vol. 548, c. 1481.]
  I had to wait until the debate on the Army Estimates on 15th March. In that debate I went over the whole position again, and I received a reply from the Under-Secretary of State for War. Apparently the proposal for a Commonwealth Sandhurst had been dropped. It was clear that there were to be three independent commands. But what worried me then, and what worried me from the time of the first meeting of the Advisory Council and the inability of the Secretary of State for War to give an answer about the troops for which he was responsible, was this: what would happen when the constitutional safeguard of the responsibility of the Governor in the Gold Coast to the Secretary of State was cut? What would happen if British troops were to remain in the Gold Coast?
  I gave an example of what would happen if Dr. Nkrumah became Field Marshal Nkrumah and entered the field at the head of the West African forces. Were British officers and N.C.O.s to be expected to obey orders in those circumstances? I got absolutely no change at all. We had to wait until 29th June, when a statement was made setting out the future of the military commands in West Africa.
  We had, of course, known before that the West Africa Command was to be wound up, but what I did not know then, and what we have never found out from November, 1955, to the present day, is what is to be the exact position of the units in West Africa. Let me repeat that the grandiose idea of a vast West African Force, something like the 82nd West African Division which did so well in the war, has gone. I can now tell the House what forces we have in West Africa. There is one British unit, a Royal Signals unit, of two British officers and 31 other ranks. When the Government spokesman replies to the debate I should

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  like to know whether that Signals unit it to remain in Ghana after 6th March, and what its relationship will be, first to the Governor, and, secondly, to the Gold Coast Government.
  In addition to that Royal Signals unit, there are three infantry battalions of the old West African Frontier Force, now the Gold Coast Regiment, a field battery, Royal Artillery, and supporting units, a total of 184 British officers and 222 British other ranks. On subsequent occasions I questioned the Secretary of State for War to try to find out from him whether, in fact, among those officers, warrant officers, N.C.O.s and, presumably, some other ranks, there were any National Service men I should have thought that the House had a duty to find out whether there will be any National Service men serving on the Gold Coast.
  The next thing that I should like to know is whether those officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.s have been seconded. Are they volunteers, or have they been ordered there? I would remind the Secretary of State that, when I was a young soldier, when we wanted to serve in the Colonies, we volunteered. We were taken off British rates of pay, brought on to a contract, and our responsibility was to the Colonial Office. But there was this big difference. Before the war, there was an Inspector-General of West African Forces, who saw to it that the conditions under which we were serving were acceptable to the War Office.
  So far as I understand, there is no such safeguard now. What is to happen is that one senior officer is to be seconded —and here, perhaps, the right hon. Gentleman will pardon me if I refer to a letter which he sent to me last September. I was enabled to see a Mr. Campbell, a senior civil servant at the Colonial Office, and, subsequently the Colonial Secretary wrote to tell me that so far as the Government of the Gold Coast was concerned.
  "… the Governor-General would act on the advice of his Ministers. It is not, however, possible to say yet what arrangements will commend themselves to the Gold Coast Government after independence.
  As you no doubt know, the actual command of the Gold Coast military forces is in the hands of a British Army officer on secondment, and there is every expectation that he or a similar officer will remain for a considerable period after the Gold Coast
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  achieves independence. During the period between the assumption by the Gold Coast of responsibility for their own forces (which they took over on the 1st July this year) and the achievement of self-government, the Governor, acting in his discretion as part of his responsibility for defence, is ultimately in control of the Gold Coast forces. Those forces are, of course, now paid for and administered by the Gold Coast Government, and War Office control has come to an end."
  When the Under-Secretary was introducing the Bill I was astonished that he did not say anything about the position of these forces from 1st July to 6th March next, and then from 6th March onwards. I hope very much that the Secretary of State will tell not only me but the British troops now serving there and the British troops which may be called upon to serve there in the future, what the actual constitutional safeguards are to be, so that no doubt at all will remain that British troops are not to be used haphazard in what are, after all, essential duties in aid of the civil power, at a time when Her Majesty's Government have surrendered, and rightly surrendered, political control to the Ghana Government.
  While, I join in wishing this experiment well, I have certain doubts, which I hope will not become realities. If, of course, the Secretary of State rules out the possibility of those forces having any function other than the purely decorative, he can dismiss what I say. If, on the other hand, there is any possibility at all of internal security forces ever being used for the purpose for which they are provided, he has a duty to the country and to the Army to say exactly where we stand on this issue.
  As I said at the beginning of my speech, memories come back to me; memories of service in that country, and of friends who are still there. I wish this experiment well, and I agree with everything that has been said about it. It is an experiment not only for Ghana and for Britain, but for Africa and the whole world. If it fails, a great deal more than Ghana will suffer. If it succeeds, it may be a step towards making amends for the appalling happenings of the last four or five weeks.
  7.26 p.m.
  Mr. Philip Bell: My excuse for intervening is not that I have been libelled and have received great damages for being said to have said

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  something about Ashanti, nor that I have a long memory and a long list of Questions which I have put down and have not had answered. It is rather that I have a colleague who comes from Ashanti, whose uncle is a chief of the Ashanti, and my knowledge is derived from friendly conversations with him.
  The position of the so-called minorities is that there are these four regions, each proud, each looking forward to an independence which, although they believe they are fit for it, has not been offered to each. The answer, of course, is very clear: that perhaps none of those territories is itself viable and able to live alone. It has been necessary, therefore, to group them and to give this new Dominion a chance of a successful life. My friend does not greatly fear that there is likely to be violence because independence has not been granted to one particular province. He says that whatever may be the deep feelings of the people, there is a substantial chance of Ashanti and the Northern Territories giving this constitution a fair run.
  It is quite clear, however, that this is something very new in the way of granting Dominion status. It is different from the Dominion status granted to the States of Australia, which were free to combine. We know what savagery and bitterness the question of the right to secede by individual States led to in the United States, and how it is not really quite sufficient to put States together, thinking that there is not some danger of their breaking away and of there being violence.
  The moral to be drawn by us is that, having, I think properly, offered independence, not individually but to a group, we are in a special sense beholden to the individual parts to secure such guarantees for their minority rights as are possible. It is very easy to talk about guarantees and about writing things into constitutions, but when we face realism we know that those guarantees and constitutions can be broken by powerful and unscrupulous minorities. They are really nothing more than expressions of hope and faith. It was, I think, Walter Bagehot who said that the secret of successful banking was not in the banking system but in the bankers, and the secret of a successful constitution is not really in the constitution or in the guarantees but in the people themselves.
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  I listened with somewhat cynical humour to our own back-slapping about the British constitution—how fair, equitable and well advanced we are, and I thought to myself that it was not really so long ago when we were having political trials, when we were persecuting people and when we had bribery and corruption. This new Dominion will not have 400 years in which to reach the state that we have reached. We expect it to grow up almost overnight. It is a very difficult business. I do not know how one could describe what an enormous burden it is. They have got to get their independence and avoid any of the big mistakes which we made.
  Of course, they have the advantage of history. They have seen how they will delay freedom if they are too greedy about it. I am not sure that anything can be done in these circumstances except to give them trust. I should like to think that there was an opportunity for the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs to have one more round-table conference before March to allay some of the fears of the minorities and to bring them a little closer into touch with the majorities from whom they have been rather distant in the past.
  I am not going to make the usual peroration about the young nation and the good wishes with which we favour it—that has been done so much better by abler orators—but I am proud on this occasion to associate myself with the good wishes which have been expressed.
  7.32 p.m.
  Mr. Arthur Creech Jones: We have had a most interesting debate, and many valuable suggestions have been made in the hope of finding some way through our present difficulties. I sincerely hope the Secretary of State for the Colonies will give us an assurance that these suggestions will be carefully studied between now and the declaration of independence.
  It has been pointed out that this is an historic occasion in the sense that the subject before us is one of great significance and importance in the development of the Commonwealth, for this is really the first African State which is reaching responsible self-government and independence. I think all of us welcome the assurance given by the Under-Secretary that, with the declaration of independence

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  on 6th March, there will be a corresponding declaration that Ghana comes into the Commonwealth as a full member.
  We have heard a great deal today about the differences in the Gold Coast, and undoubtedly they are very real, but I think it can be said that at the moment the parties there have abandoned the idea of federation, are prepared to discuss the establishment of a unitary State, and all parties are agreed on the importance of independence and that there should be no postponement of the date. Therefore, I think all of us extend our good wishes to Ghana in the sincere hope that, whatever difficulties there are may, in the next few months, be diminished and removed altogether.
  I personally am glad to be able to take some part in these discussions because of my own personal interest over a long period in the development of political democracy in the Gold Coast. I had something to do with the initiation of the Burns Constitution, with the establishment of the Watson Commission, with the setting up of the Coussey Committee and also with the appointment of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. Therefore, because of that close association over the years with the Gold Coast, I am naturally anxious that this great experiment should succeed.
  The advance has been very rapid, and those of us who have cared about political advancement have also been concerned that social and economic developments should keep pace with the political concessions that are made, because obviously it is of little use to make political concessions unless those concessions can be sustained by economic development and by social improvement of the people.
  In the Gold Coast, as previous speakers have pointed out, we are confronted with a territory whose people are at different stages of social and economic development, and therefore when dealing with a backward people in the Northern territories, with people who have a great desire for tradition in Ashanti, with the people in the south who have been brought into close contact with another civilisation over a number of centuries, it is not easy to weld them into a system in which modern political democracy can flourish.
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  I think, however, that we had no alternative but to pursue the course we took. I well remember some of the stern criticism which was made of some of us who were anxious that political development should proceed to that as smoothly as possible. It was felt that the pace of progress was much too fast. Yet there was no alternative at all to the concessions which were demanded.
  Either we repressed and engaged in violence, which was not particularly true to the phlegm of the British people; or we made advances to try to create political institutions of a representative and responsible character and try to build up a Ministerial system and establish the foundations of a political democracy, all the time remembering the traditional structures of the Gold Coast, and hoping that somehow in that advance in the building of political democracy, we could reconcile the traditional structures with it. So we went ahead, trying to create a genuine knowledge and understanding of the ideas of political democracy in the territory.
  As is well known, our policy as a nation has not been merely to establish self-government but for that self-government to come to fruition in terms of political democracy. But if independence is to be established in the Gold Coast, it depends upon a number of fundamental principles. First of all, it cannot flourish unless there is efficient administration. I would emphasise what has already been said, that it is for us to offer and for the Gold Coast not to reject the administrative assistance, the technical aid, which has been so freely offered by the British Government.
  It would be fatal—and some of us saw it only a few months ago in the Gold Coast—if a policy were pursued by the new Government of the Gold Coast which was calculated to drive out from this important work those who had the skill and the knowledge in our Colonial service, and indeed, it should be recognised in the Gold Coast that as yet there is not the experience and the trained staff to secure that standard of efficient administration which the Gold Coast so badly needs.
  In the second place, if there is to be a sound political democracy, it must have the resources which make for economic viability. Very remarkable

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  progress has been made in the Gold Coast over the last few years, but when all is said and done, the economy is not on a very firm basis. These big extensions of public works, of utilities of all kinds, the building of hospitals, universities and so forth, involve the Territory in recurrent charges. It is, therefore, vital that there should be revenue adequate to meet existing and future charges, and that the economy should be re-adjusted so that it is a mixed economy and not one resting chiefly on revenues secured from cocoa.
  It is because I have in mind the economic problems of the Gold Coast that I very much regret that the Secretary of State has not so far put forward some constructive proposals for meeting them There will, for instance, be great liabilities in respect of the Northern Territories. How are the Northern Territories to be developed? We must remember that these are Protectorates for which we carry a responsibility, a responsibility entered into as far back as 1893, for the promotion of the welfare and happiness of the people. There are commitments already in regard to education, public health, and communications, so that the burden is now likely to become a very heavy one for the Gold Coast Government.
  I have always felt some anxiety about the transference of Protectorates to Governments which are inexperienced in the administration of backward peoples. We have just seen what has happened in the South Sudan, and we know of other instances when we have not had sufficient regard to the Protectorate status of the people we were transferring to the control of alien governments. The same considerations will apply to the case of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. In addition, the Gold Coast Government will have heavy liabilities in regard to the development of Togoland.
  There is room for some proposals to meet the heavy liabilities which will fall on the Gold Coast Government when independence comes. After all, as has been said, the Gold Coast has made in the past, and still does make, an enormous contribution to the sterling health of our country. The peoples of the Gold Coast have in the past few years, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) pointed out, helped to steer us through a
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  period of very great financial difficulty by the contribution which they have been able to make in dollars and by their willing sacrifice in diminishing their consumption of dollar commodities.
  As my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly pointed out, before long there will be other territories emerging to independence. This means that there will have to be some serious, constructive thinking on the part of the Government about the problems which will present themselves. With the withdrawal of the support of the Imperial power, there is likely to be great economic difficulty and, possibly, economic confusion. It will then become all the more important that we should not witness the disintegration of all the work that has been put into these territories in the past. We want them to survive and to go forward, not fall into chaos.
  The international Agencies have something to offer in this respect. There are organisations already which make some contribution towards assisting backward areas, but I should like to see the British Government initiating some organisation to co-ordinate the resources which can be made available to territories which are emerging, as the Gold Coast is, to independence and which will face very great practical difficulties in the days ahead.
  I feel some anxiety about the problems which will arise in running a system of political democracy in the Gold Coast. We all appreciate that the pace of political advance has been fast. Moreover, democracy is an extraordinarily complex system to introduce to a people just passing out of tribal organisation. They have had no time to learn, and little time to experiment. Let us remember that there have been many grave casualties of democracy during the last forty or fifty years, because of the difficulty of working it. It is being introduced here in a background hitherto untried, in a tropical area, where the circumstances are completely different.
  We must, therefore, be prepared for disappointments, for lapses from the high standards which we have set as a result of our own long and continuous progress. We shall see many of the values which we regard as essential to the working of democracy forgotten in the days to come. largely because of inexperience and the lack of opportunity to experiment and

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  learn. One hopes that in the Gold Coast there will be not merely a faithful copy of the Westminster Constitution. After all, our institutions and procedures have been established as a result of trial and error and experiment over a long period, whereas in the Gold Coast something has to be evolved which has relation to the traditional needs of the people, which must be developed against their background and in the light of the economic circumstances in which it will have to operate.
  We express with great sincerity our desire that, in the working of that political system, there shall be tolerance, that minority rights shall be respected, that civil rights shall be observed, and that everything possible will be done to eliminate corruption and nepotism from the political scene. One can only hope that this experiment will result in the establishment of a high set of standards which will be observed by not only the Government but all those who are privileged to carry forward this great political enterprise in the new united nation.
  I turn now to consider the present difficulties confronting the Gold Coast in the conflict and grave misunderstandings which have arisen because the respective regions do not yet feel satisfied that the constitution is one which gives them complete confidence. There is the danger that, directly the props of the Imperial system are removed, there will be a tendency towards disintegration. We had hoped, of course, that the conference between the Opposition and the Government since the General Election would produce results which would heal some of the wounds and get a closer cooperation in the political life of the territory. Unfortunately, however, to judge from the reports coming to hand from Ghana, there is not at the moment a disposition to work the constitution as it will be conceded to the Gold Coast when independence is declared.
  So far as I understand the situation, these difficulties arise from a lack of confidence in the Government by the Opposition. Perhaps it is a lack of confidence due in part to the fears that the tendency on the part of the central Government will be dictatorial, and to the feeling on the part of more liberally-
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  minded people that there will be a struggle for the preservation of some of the traditional features in the Gold Coast which are alien to democratic working.
  Be that as it may, we have to face the fact that Ashanti and the Northern Territories are profoundly disturbed in regard to the proposed constitution and that it cannot be said that there is at the moment general acceptance by people in certain regions of the Gold Coast of the proposals which will be enacted before 6th March.
  I should like to make a suggestion to the Secretary of State. My right hon. Friend has already suggested how the matter of the constitution might be handled. One of the two main problems is the devolution of responsibility into the regions. The other is the writing of safeguards, of checks and balances, into the constitution, arising from the feeling that the constitution can be immediately upset by the central Government with very little pretext because of the extremely simple manner in which the constitution can be amended.
  As I read Dr. Nkrumah's speech, I gather that there are quite a number of Amendments which the Opposition would desire if the United Kingdom Government would agree. In his recent speech, Dr. Nkrumah quoted the Secretary of State's letter to the Governor. The British Government, I understand, say that certain Amendments which are wanted can be secured after indepedence, but not before and that it is the intention of the Government to limit the drafting of the constitution to the existing constituion with a few minor Amendments but that such things as entrenchment clauses and the Declaration of Human Rights must be left until after independence has been proclaimed.
  I should like to ask the Secretary of State whether in these matters of agreement it is not possible to insert in the Constitution now being prepared these important principles and items to which the Opposition attaches so much importance. I go further and urge that before the Order in Council is issued, a White Paper, including a précis of the constitution, could be issued to Members of this House so that we may be informed of what the Order in Council is likely to contain. I appreciate that it would probably be an infringement of the Royal

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  Prerogative to submit the Order in Council to this House, but because of the great importance of the matter and our desire that the constitution should have a good start, I consider it important that this House should be informed of what the Order in Council is likely to contain.
  Dr. Nkrumah has agreed, for instance, that there should be included, even before independence, the Declaration of Human Rights, and there are other things which he has mentioned in his speech. Why not put these things in the new constitution now? They would have a tremendously reassuring effect with the Opposition.
  I and all other Members of the House welcome this great step forward which we are taking today. We as a nation are withdrawing from the tutelage which we have given the Colonies. We are withdrawing from what some people describe by the ugly word "colonialism". As a leading colonial Power, we are adjusting ourselves to relationships that fit the facts of the modern world. Ghana will join Liberia and Abyssinia, and I hope that the integrity, character and equipment of the Gold Coast will give leadership to the African Continent in the days ahead.
  As has already been said, the territory owes very much to those who in the past have devoted their service to it. I pay tribute to leaders such as Guggisberg, Burns, Korsah, Coussey, Nkrumah and Arden-Clarke and to a succession of Secretaries of State who have encouraged the political, social and economic advancement of the territory. I pay great tribute also to the Colonial Service for the great contribution it has made.
  We all hope that the present difficulties will be overcome and that the Gold Coast democracy will be activated by the highest principles of which I have spoken and will become a State renowned for its tolerance and sense of social justice, demonstrating to the Blimps and the cynics of the world that a black people is no less able than any other people to contribute to the civilisation of the world and add to the dignity of mankind.
  7.57 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): I am, I think, the eighty-fourth Secretary of State for
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  the Colonies, and it is a very great pleasure to have had speeches in this debate from the eighty-first and the eighty-second holders of that high office.
  Mr. Wigg: And the eighty-fifth.
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: If so, the age of miracles is indeed not past. I was also very glad to hear the tribute paid by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) to the memory of Oliver Stanley, whose contribution also to the evolution of the Gold Coast was a very considerable one.
  I join with the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) in congratulating all those who by long and generous service have played a part in bringing about this consummation. I know that the thanks of the whole House and of millions of people throughout the world will be with Sir Charles Arden-Clarke for his imaginative leadership. I have also been particularly glad to hear the tributes that have been paid to Her Majesty's Overseas Colonial Service. I know from first-hand experience, as do so many others, in this House and outside, of the unselfish devotion to duty that they have shown.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Kirk-dale (Mr. N. Pannell) mentioned the possibility of the application of the special list procedure for the Gold Coast. Consideration could certainly be given to the application to them of the special list, or, perhaps, what is more likely in their particular circumstances, of the other leg of the policy, the central pool.
  I, too, should like to give my hest wishes, and the best wishes of my colleagues, to the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, of Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah, and his colleagues, and to the leaders of the Opposition in Ghana and to the chiefs and people of the Territory, and I share the prayer of all hon. Members that we shall have cause to be proud of this historic step and of the independent country within the Commonwealth which is thereby emerging. They will, as has been repeatedly pointed out, need our help in many ways.
  The hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason) made a very impressive but short speech, and in the course of it he dwelt on certain thoughts he had formed from the journey he made there some little time ago. He asked me about the present

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  situation of the withdrawal of the British officers whom one has now to call the expatriate officers, though that is not the sort of word which really suits them and the romantic and devoted work which they have achieved.
  The situation is roughly as follows. When the compensation terms came into operation on 31st July, 1955, there were about 1,400 expatriate civil servants. Of those, 142 elected to retire at once, and have now gone. About another 150 were then expected to go before independence, that is, before next March, making some 300 in all out of the 1,400. In fact, the average for the last three months of nine expatriate officers leaving monthly is about the expectation. The monthly average is expected to increase between now and March. I cannot give the House any firm estimate of what will happen thereafter. It will very largely depend on the action of the responsible leaders in the Gold Coast itself.
  Help will be needed not only in the form of trusted and devoted service but in other ways as well. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly, in his interesting speech, dwelt on the need to have, as far as we can in this difficult world, economic stabilization, more stable prices for prime commodities like cocoa. Certainly a glance at the figures shows the quite astonishing importance of cocoa in the economy of the Gold Coast. I think I am right in saying that the proportion of the revenue of the Gold Coast that is drawn from the export duty on cocoa reached at one time the high figure of over 60 per cent. In the present year, 1955 to 1956, £20 million is raised from the export duty on cocoa, but that is only 38 per cent. of the revenue. The estimate for next year is that it will have fallen to 29 per cent.—from 60 per cent. some years ago to 29 per cent. next year.
  The right hon. Gentleman was quite right in saying that these are the things that really matter: and they matter very much indeed. Throughout this debate there has, I think, been a most refreshing realisation in all parts of the House of the real importance of economic advance if political and social progress is to have any basic reality.
  The United Kingdom, of course, consumes only a part of the Gold Coast production of cocoa. We cannot by our-
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  selves, however much we may wish we could, alter the cocoa prices, and we can hardly buy above the world price. I do not think anybody would suggest that we should. There must be international control. A Cocoa Study Group has recently been set up. and has held its first meeting, to see how far, if at all, production is exceeding demand. The meeting was in Brussels. The next meeting, I am glad to see, is to be in the Western Region of Nigeria. I put this in the forefront of my observations, because I want to underline the belief common to us all in the real importance of economic stability as far as it can be achieved.
  So much of this debate has turned, as it was bound to do, on the unhappy differences of opinion that exist in the Gold Coast, so shortly to be the new State of Ghana. and it would. I think, as everyone has recognised, be both very foolish and unworthy if we pretended that those differences do not exist: but we all also recognise that very genuine and vigorous efforts have been made to try to resolve those differences. I have been acutely disturbed by them ever since I had the honour of being appointed to my office over two years ago.
  I was very glad when in December last year it was possible for Sir Frederick Bourne to go out to the Gold Coast as independent constitutional adviser. I was sorry at the time—I shall not go into all the reasons, for I would not be thought unjust to the Opposition—but I was very sorry that at the time they decided not to meet him officially, although I know that a number of them met him personally and privately. As the House knows, Sir Frederick, with his great experience, came down firmly against a federal constitution.
  I do not propose tonight to talk much about the federal solution, because no hon. Member in the House has advocated it. I hope that that fact will be noted by our friends in Ghana. We are all anxious for a happy solution and a wise one and a statesmanlike one, but no voice at all has been raised in this House in favour of a federal solution because we know the facts of life, the size of the country, the geography of the country, the consequent development of the transport of the country, and the difficulties of manning a series of Parliaments.

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  Problems of that kind would make that a very poor solution.
  After Sir Frederick's visit and his report we had the Achimota Conference to discuss it. This was held in February of this year. Once more, I am sorry to say, it was boycotted. Minor modifications were introduced into Sir Frederick's report. Then the Gold Coast Government's proposals, which were a blend of Sir Frederick Bourne's Report and of the Achimota recommendations were published in April this year. Shortly after that I had the pleasure of welcoming Mr. Botsio to London, and thereafter I made a statement in the House, and gave a pledge on 11th May, saying what Her Majesty's Government would do if an election were held and resulted in a majority, and if thereafter a motion were introduced in the Assembly. A motion was introduced on 3rd August, and was passed. Then another attempt was made. The Governor saw the Northern Territories Council and asked for a list of safeguards which would help them. Then in September the National Liberation Movement representatives and the Northern People's Party and the Togo-land Congress representatives came over and saw me, and saw also the Secretary of State for War who was then Minister of State in the Colonial Office.
  Then I came to this conclusion, which, I am glad to know, has received the support of everybody, I think, in this House, not least that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot), that the best way really to bring the parties together and to bring things to a head was to announce a firm date for independence, which I did on 18th September, and the date is 6th March next. Then Dr. Nkrumah, who had previously declined to meet the Opposition leaders together, changed that view and had talks with the Opposition and with the Territorial Councils. Then revised constitutional proposals were made, and these we are now giving the very closest examination.
  I recognise, as does everybody in the House, that the Opposition leaders have their many anxieties. They have suggested, for example, a Council of State, to be formed of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Attorney-General, and the heads of the four traditional Regions. The purpose of this
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  Council of State would be to advise the Governor-General on the exercise of his prerogative powers, and on the public service and judicial appointments, and to act as a final court of appeal in local constitutional matters.
  The Gold Coast Government take the view—and I think there is some substance in this—that it is not very wise to make some of the Governor-General's functions exercisable on the advice of a body responsible neither to the Government nor to the National Assembly. They hold that a body containing political representatives is an unsuitable body to be an appeal court.
  The Opposition has also suggested a Second Chamber. The view that the Gold Coast Government have taken has been that the function of reviewing legislation could be carried out better through their own proposals for Regional Assemblies and Regional Houses of Chiefs, which would be given the opportunity to examine legislation before it is introduced into the National Assembly. So the view has been that they reject the Second Chamber unless the majority of the Territorial Councils will say that they want it as a substitute for Regional Houses of Chiefs. I hope that discussion on this and other matters can still continue.
  Another point raised by the Opposition was the question of the powers of the Regional Assemblies and whether they should be Northern Ireland powers or London County Council powers. I do not want to keep the House long, and I will not therefore develop that argument very much, except to say that from the recent White Paper of the Gold Coast Government it looks as if their view is not quite the same as that of Sir Frederick Bourne regarding the form of regional power in the field of finance. It may well be that, given goodwill on both sides, further progress in that field may be brought about.
  The Opposition bas also asked for regional control of the police. This is the only one of the nine constitutional safeguards desired by the Northern Territories, which the Gold Coast Government have not been willing to grant. The Opposition fears misuse of the police and the Government argue that a unitary force is likely to be more efficient and to attract a better type of recruit. I

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  mention these facts to show that there have been vigorous and statesmanlike attempts to bridge the gulf. It is not yet bridged, but I will do all I can to see that it is bridged before irrevocable decisions are taken.
  A number of hon. Members have referred to the question whether or not the Regional Councils should be enshrined in the Order in Council and whether they would follow the proposals of the Gold Coast Government on page 6 of their White Paper. The final conclusion as to what will be in the Order in Council must be for Her Majesty's Government to decide, though it would be unwise, and very unfair, not to pay the highest possible regard to the views of the Gold Coast Government, so recently elected by a substantial majority. But it might be desirable to define the scope and continuance of these regional bodies a little more precisely.
  A number of hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe, have raised the question of security and of the police force and armed forces in the Gold Coast. It is quite right that they should expect some answer from me. On one or two aspects of military establishments I may not he able to give all the details now, but I will see the hon. Member for Dudley is provided with the information at the earliest possible date.
  The forces available for internal security are the Gold Coast police of about 5,500 and military forces of about the same size, including the three infantry battalions. Under the present constitution, both police and military forces are under the ultimate control of the Governor. As the hon. Member for Dudley said in his very sprightly speech, the War Office relinquished control of the military forces on 1st July this year, and this will remain the situation until independence. I do not mean that the War Office will then take control but that the ultimate control of the Governor will remain until independence.
  As to the territorial composition of these forces, I would ask the House to bear with me whilst I give a few statistics, because they are very interesting and in some ways very enlightening. If we look at the armed forces or the police and take
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  a glimpse at the total proportion which each part of the Gold Coast produces, we may get rather an illusion as to the effective combatant contribution of the various parts. In the Army, the Colony produces 45 per cent. of all the other ranks, the Northern Territories produce 45 per cent., and Ashanti 5 per cent., but if we break that up between combatants and noncombatants in other ranks. the Colony produces 34 per cent., Ashanti 4 per cent. and the Northern Territories 62 per cent. It must be noted, however, that a large but unknown proportion of the 62 per cent. may be from French West Africa. It is impossible, even in order to please the hon. Member for Dudley, to be more precise than that, but these are very interesting conclusions and it is worth having them on record. As to the police, the Colony produces 45 per cent., the Northern Territories 25 per cent., Ashanti 10 per cent., and the balance probably come from French territory.
  In answer to one or two of the more detailed questions which the hon. Member for Dudley asked, there is a signal unit of two British officers and 31 other ranks in the Gold Coast. This is the only British Army unit in the Gold Coast. It is quite separate from the Gold Coast military forces, and it is not at the disposal of the Gold Coast Government for internal security duties.
  As to the military forces other than that signal unit, the facts are that there are 184 British officers in the Army in the Gold Coast, and 220 non-commissioned officers on secondment, a total of about 90 per cent. of the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers being drawn from overseas. As to the locally-recruited officers in the Army, 26 come from the Colony, 1 comes from Ashanti, and I from the Northern Territory. I do not doubt that these proportions will rise as the chances of education, for example, in the Northern Territories, improve.
  I feel sure that the forces will continue their existing tradition of impartial and loyal service to the State, and I am equally sure that Ministers will use their authority wisely and not put an unreasonable strain on the loyalty of any part of these forces. The General Officer Commanding is a British seconded major-general, and the British seconded officers will be subject, as they are now, to the United Kingdom Army Act. The ultimate

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  directives for the use of the forces would come from the Gold Coast Government after independence, and it would not be constitutionally possible for the forces to be responsible after independence to the Governor-General as they are now to the Governor.
  A number of hon. Members have asked what would happen if there should be real difficulties and if bloodshed arose. If I deal with that, I hope that it will not be thought that I imagine that such an unhappy development is at all likely. I join in the declaration made so eloquently by both right hon. Members opposite that the future of the whole democratic experiment in Africa is at the moment in the hands of the people of the Gold Coast.
  Under the terms by which their secondment is arranged. Her Majesty's Government reserve the right to withdraw British personnel from service in the Gold Coast if conditions should arise where it would be considered that such action should be necessary. I am glad to say that there has been a useful and happy development dealing with the political control of the armed forces. The Gold Coast Ministers have recently advised that an Armed Forces Council should be set up before independence on the pattern of the British Army Council. Authority would be vested in a board at the top, of which the Minister would be chairman and the General Officer Commanding would be a member. The Council would not be concerned with operational matters but with promotion and discipline. It is hoped that it would succeed, at any rate to a large extent, in keeping those important matters away from political influence.
  I have dealt with a number of the points which have been raised. If the House will bear with me a little longer, I will try to deal with one or two more.
  Mr. Wigg: As a final question after what has been a very satisfactory statement, are the officers and N.C.O.s, which the right hon. Gentleman says are seconded, serving on contracts for which they have volunteered or for which they were ordered?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: They have all been seconded. As to whether they are, strictly speaking, volunteers, the hon. Gentleman served in the Army and I served in the Navy. and we probably both
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  have our own views as to what the best answer to that question may be.
  I should now like to make brief reference to one or two very important matters to which I and Her Majesty's Government attach the very greatest importance —the independence of the Civil Service and the judiciary and the position of the Attorney-General. The right hon. Member for Llanelly asked about the judges. My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe asked about the independence of the Civil Service and the judiciary.
  There are already a Public Service Commission and a Judicial Service Commission, which are independent bodies. advising the Government. The Gold Coast Government proposed last April that these should continue, but in their November White Paper they put the final control of appointments in the hands of the Governor-General acting, on the advice of his Ministers. It seems to me and to my colleagues in the United Kingdom Government that, except for the Chief Justice and a few of the most senior Civil Service posts, the final authority after independence should lie with the respective Commissions, the Public Service Commission and the Judicial Service Commission. I very much hope that this view will be shared on reflection by the Government of the Gold Coast.
  The right hon. Member for Llanelly asked me specifically about the present judges. The April White Paper of the Gold Coast Government says that it is proposed that, on independence, judges shall be given the option—it refers to existing judges—of continuing in office. on the terms applicable to judges appointed since 4th May, 1954—that is the present terms—or of retiring on the expiration of their present tour of duty or one year after the date of independence, whichever shall be earlier. Those who elect to retire will be entitled to compensation, but those who choose to continue on the terms which have operated since 4th May, 1954, will remain on those terms. I hope that that deals with the point and sets at rest any doubt in the right hon. Gentleman's mind.
  As to the Attorney-General, the Gold Coast Government have agreed that his should remain an official appointment at least as long as the present British Attorney-General holds the office, instead

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  of becoming a political appointment. It certainly is my view that this is very wise indeed in a country which is embarking on this great experiment without being sure—as we are broadly, though our debates may sometimes suggest something else—of mutual confidence between the political parties. I am very glad that the Government of the Gold Coast have taken that view.
  I was asked a number of questions about the amendment of the constitution by the hon. Member for Barnsley, my hon. Friend the Member for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) and one or two other hon. Friends of mine. As the House knows, there has been a change in regard to the Gold Coast Government's proposals for the amendment of the constitution. They originally suggested that constitutional changes should take place with the consent of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The new proposal is that a two-thirds majority of all members is required.
  I have listened with the very greatest interest to the speeches which have been made on this subject from both sides of the House. I recognise that the Opposition parties and people are not likely to regard the two-thirds majority criterion as being of exceptional value when the Government in the Gold Coast at the moment, at the birth of the new constitution, already have a two-thirds majority of their own. I recognise the strong feelings that have been expressed that there should be some other additional safeguards. One hon. Member said that a two-thirds majority should be required in two successive Parliaments. Other hon. Members have privately suggested to me that the regional bodies ought to be brought in and should have a function in regard to revision of the constitution.
  We must, I think, beware of suggesting anything which would make the constitution too rigid. On the other hand, I understand the anxieties of hon. Members. I am sure that the Government of the Gold Coast, which has shown such statesmanship in so many fields, will ponder on this debate and read with interest all the speeches which have been made and profit from them.
  Finally, on this subject, the right hon. Member for Llanelly referred to funda
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  mental rights and quoted my statement to the Gold Coast Government that I felt that that and other things would not appropriately be included in the Order in Council. As hon. Members know, these fundamental rights—freedom from arrest, freedom of association, and things of that kind—are already implicit in the common law which extends throughout the Gold Coast, and their enunciation in the constitution would not add materially to that.
  Nonetheless, I have listened with sympathy and understanding to the arguments which have been used. I recognise that it may be that this ought to be looked at again. I will give an undertaking that I will certainly look at it again. I would emphasise that it would be unreasonable and impracticable not to take very full account also of the views of the Gold Coast Government on all these matters, though on this particular matter it is true that both the Gold Coast Government and the Opposition at one time were in agreement that this should be done.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) also asked me about Parliamentary control in the concluding stages of the hand-over of authority to the Gold Coast. I listened with very great interest to what he had to say. It is true that the Order in Council, which would be under the terms of the British Settlements Act, must be laid on the Table of this House immediately after it has been made, but there is no provision at all for an affirmative or negative procedure. I recognise that that is a considerable hardship to hon. Members and may prevent our united wisdom being brought to bear on what I recognise to be a matter of fundamental importance, the Order in Council which will shortly be prepared.
  Therefore, I should be ready to discuss with my colleagues—this involves Ministers other than myself, and not least the Leader of the House—the possibility of putting the Order in Council's constitutional proposals into a White Paper to be laid before the House. Then, after hon. Members have had time to read it carefully, we could debate it and I would listen to any comments which may be made. I would then discuss matters with the Gold Coast Government to ascertain to what extent we could meet

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  the comments which were made. I need hardly say that throughout this procedure I should always be at the service of right hon. and hon. Members on either side of the House to listen to any comment or suggestion that they might care to make in order to ensure that this shall be, as far as it possibly can be, an agreed Measure.
  Several other points were raised. One was a very big one, and that is the role of the Colonial Development Corporation in the Gold Coast and elsewhere. Perhaps it would be for the convenience of hon. Members if I dealt with this at some length on the Committee stage of the Bill, because there is a great deal that I should like to say and I should hate to do it in a hurried way, which speaking at this hour might well involve.
  Mr. J. Griffiths: I cordially agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I hope that carries with it the undertaking that we shall have reasonable and adequate time for the Committee stage.
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As I have already taken some rather firm decisions about the future Parliamentary timetable, I had better say that I will pass that to the proper quarters and say that my colleagues will not lose sight of it.
  There are two other points want to raise. My hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) referred to the possibility of a Gold Coast judge being appointed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee Amendment Act, 1895, enables provision to be extended by Order in Council to any judge of any other superior court in Her Majesty's Dominions, and I will see that my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor is
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  acquainted with the strength of the feeling on this matter on both sides of the House.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Kirk-dale asked about the security of British and other capital in the Gold Coast in the event of the Gold Coast Government in its own discretion deciding—as it would be entitled to do—to nationalise industries in the Gold Coast. The White Paper which the Gold Coast Government produced makes it clear in paragraph 27 that the existing powers of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to entertain appeals from the Gold Coast would be retained. Other provisions of the White Paper make it clear that although nationalisation as such could not be contested, those affected would have a constitutional right to adequate compensation and access to the courts to determine their rights, including the amount of compensation. I think that that meets the point that my hon. Friend raised.
  I should not like the debate to end on a note of suspicion and uncertainty. I do not believe that these things are likely, that people will find that capital in the Gold Coast is in peril, or that British officers in the Army or police force will be confronted with a choice of loyalties. I am myself a believer in this great experiment. It is an experiment, but it will be helped if we enter into it. without shutting our eyes, but in high hopes that this great and romantic conception will justify the faith which so many people have put into bringing it about.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read a Second time.
  Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Bryan.]
  Committee Tomorrow.

EGG MARKETING SCHEME
8.31 p.m.
The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Derick Heathcoat Amory): I beg to move,
That the Draft British Egg Marketing Scheme, 1956, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th November, be approved.
Agriculture is an industry with many facets. Recently, the cereal harvest, cattle and pigs have been in our thoughts. This evening, I must ask the House to concentrate its attention on eggs. This Marketing Scheme has been promoted by the three farmers' unions in accordance with the provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Acts.
Hon. Members may recall that the Government's White Paper on the Decontrol of Food and the Marketing of Agricultural Produce, in 1953. said that the present interim arrangements would be continued until more permanent marketing arrangements could be introduced. The interim arrangements were designed to leave scope for a producers' marketing board. During our talks with the unions in 1954. the Government agreed to a form in which the guaranteed arrangements could be implemented, if a marketing board with full trading powers was established. It was then for the farmers' unions to decide whether. in fact, they wished to promote a marketing scheme.
In fact, they did so and the unions' draft Scheme was formally submitted in October, 1955. Since then, it has passed through the various procedures laid down in the Agricultural Marketing Acts. There was a large number of objections and representations and the Scheme was subjected to a lengthy—rather unusually lengthy—public inquiry. I should like to pay tribute to the patience and thoroughness with which the Commissioner, Mr. G. G. Baker, O.B.E., Q.C., conducted that inquiry and to the fairness of his conclusions.
After considering the objections and the Report of the Commissioner, which was published last June as a White Paper, the agricultural Ministers decided that the Scheme should be allowed to proceed, subject to some quite important modifications. The promoters, I am glad to say,
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accepted the changes we considered necessary and we modified the Scheme accordingly. Since the Scheme relates to the United Kingdom, it was then laid before the Northern Ireland Parliament. Having been recently approved by that Parliament, it is now submitted for the approval of this House.
Before turning to the Scheme itself, I should like to say a few words about the background against which the Scheme should be seen. Egg production in this country has developed rapidly during recent years, and we are now producing nearly 95 per cent. of the eggs we eat compared with about 70 per cent. before the war. Poultry keepers all over the country are now producing over 10,000 million eggs a year. It sounds a great many but I believe that that figure is correct.
The bulk of this colossal number has to be marketed and, of course, marketed regularly and efficiently. Some are sold direct to consumers, but by far the greater number has to be collected and taken wherever the consumers need them. That means a steady flow of eggs from the country to the town, in the process of which packing stations have an important part to play.
For years brisk argument has centred round the best way of doing this, and strong and sometimes conflicting views have been passionately held. I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) will agree with me there. I saw just now my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) in his seat, and I know that the House remembers the part he played before the war in the development of agricultural marketing. The right hon. Member for Don Valley has also a wide knowledge of this subject.
There is no doubt that everyone, whatever conflicting views have been held, has been aiming at the same goal, which is to make sure that consumers, no matter where they live, shall be able to get eggs as fresh as it is humanly possible to provide them and at reasonable prices. The first thing to be done, I think it will be agreed, is to make sure that the eggs are sound and fresh when they are sent off, and the second thing, when handling large quantities of eggs, is to ensure that they shall be graded and packed so that wholesalers and retailers can order for

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their customers the size and quantity of eggs they want.
It may be argued that that is the kind of thing that traders are well-equipped to do by themselves without any other assistance. There is, however, one troublesome factor in this business, which many producers and traders with long experience of the egg market feel that it would be difficult to meet without some kind of central organisation. That factor is the fluctuating nature of both the supply of eggs and the demand for them.
Hens, like Ministers, do not lay the same number of eggs each week; but, once hens have come into lay, one cannot turn the supply off and on again or regulate it week by week to suit the needs of the market. Housewives wishes also vary, and not always, unfortunately, in line with the changes in supply. Those two fluctuating factors, supply and demand, have to be reconciled and in this case reconciled quickly enough to enable eggs to be sold fresh. As a result of these factors, the egg market is a very sensitive one.
Changes in supply and demand do not have to be very large before biggish changes occur in the price, which may have a disrupting effect and leave room for harmful speculation, with all that that entails. Today, the industry is justly proud of the reputation that British eggs have come to earn among the public. In the marketing of eggs our main concern should be to try so to arrange things as to minimise the risks of eggs being delayed in transit from producer to consumer and losing quality on the way.
It is always difficult to make arrangements to suit everyone in all possible circumstances, but in a fluctuating, sensitive market like that of eggs I am satisfied that there is scope for some central organisation which can foresee the changes in supply and demand and help, as far as possible, to even out the flow. That is not to say that I want everybody organised into one inflexible system; and when they look at the Scheme I hope that hon. Members will feel that the modifications which we have made provide the degree of flexibility at which we ought to aim.
I now want to turn to the Scheme as it has been modified. The object is to ensure workable arrangements which will
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be as widely acceptable as possible. Like the Commissioner, we felt that the Scheme as originally submitted was a little too restrictive, especially as regards sales to consumers and to retail shops. We therefore made a number of modifications, which we believe have gone a long way towards meeting the great weight of the main objections.
The first feature of the Scheme that I should mention is that it provides for a board with full trading powers. The board will have power to require that by far the great majority of eggs produced for the wholesale market will be sold by producers only to the board. In practice, it will employ packing stations as its agents to collect eggs from producers and to grade, test and stamp them. In general, eggs will continue to be distributed very much as they are today, but the board will be able to ensure the maintenance of quality standards, which are quite essential for the operation of a satisfactory wholesale market.
Every day the board will fix its selling price for eggs, and the distributive trades will be able to purchase those eggs from it at the prices settled. Any unsold eggs will be retained by the board and will be either moved to other markets or stored, for sale later. Some of the eggs which are surplus to immediate requirements may even be broken out by the board and sold, for instance, to baking establishments but, as with milk, the return from the manufacturing market is likely to be a good deal lower than for eggs sold in shell. There will be an incentive to the board to sell as many eggs as it possibly can in the fresh market. It will have no control over wholesale or retail distribution, so the normal competitive market forces will continue to be the dominating factor in selling eggs.
As I have said, the demand for eggs is a highly sensitive one, and consumers have shown quite clearly during the past year or two that they will not pay prices which they regard as too high. I am glad to say that at present the prices of eggs are extremely reasonable, and I do not think that the consumers have any view to the contrary. Under the conditions which I have described the views of consumers will be reflected back rapidly, and the board will have to pay scrupulous

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attention to them in its trading activities —and I am sure that it will readily do so.
I referred earlier to working out the guarantee arrangements which would operate satisfactorily under those conditions, and our intention is that the guarantee arrangements shall be operated by the board. These arrangements will not be part of the Scheme which we are introducing this evening. But if, as I hope, the Scheme goes through Parliament, and is finally adopted by the producers, the Government propose that the guarantee under the Agriculture Act shall be a guarantee to the board, and not to individual producers, in the same way as it is at present in the case of milk and wool.
The general form of the guarantee, however, will be different from what it is at present. Under this Scheme it will be a flat-rate subsidy for all eggs of first quality passing through the packing stations. The rate of the fiat-rate subsidy will be fixed at each Annual Price Review. The prices paid to the producers will be a matter for the board to decide, subject to the provisions of the financial agreement with the Government to which I have referred. But under that financial agreement there will also be a profit and loss sharing arrangement between the Government and the board which will provide an incentive to maximum efficiency on the part of the board.
This profit and loss arrangement will work on these lines: at each Review an estimate will be made of the average market price likely to be realised for the sale of first quality eggs during the following year. If, in the event, the actual average price realised varies within 2d. per dozen above or below the estimated figure, the board will bear the loss or retain the profit. If the realised figure is more than 2d. below the estimate, the Exchequer will make up nine-tenths of the excess deficiency. On the other hand, if the realised figure is over 2d. above the estimate, the Exchequer will receive back half of the excess. The guarantee arrangements for duck eggs will be on similar lines, though not necessarily precisely the same, as for hen eggs.
This is the framework for the operation of the guarantee by the board which was agreed in principle by the Government
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with the farmers' representatives, if such a Scheme were to be approved. When the detailed arrangements have been worked out they will be included in the financial agreement to which I have referred. I would like to say, in parenthesis, that it is the intention of the Government that producers with 50 birds or fewer will continue to get the guarantee, if they send their eggs through the packing stations.
There are one or two other important features of the Scheme to which I ought to refer. As recommended by the Commissioner, we modified the Scheme so that, by and large, it would apply only to eggs sold on a commercial scale. The qualification for exemption from registration was raised from 25 birds or fewer over six months old to 50 birds or fewer. This leaves outside the Scheme most of the backyard and domestic poultry keepers who are more concerned with supplying their own and neighbours' households with eggs.
The sales of eggs for export and for hatching will also be outside the board's marketing control. The board will also be able to exempt other types of producers, for instance, producers who live in really remote and outlying districts whose main interest will be purely in supplying the market needs of their own locality.
The provisions relating to direct sales and to retail shops constituted what might be called the storm centre of the inquiry. as I think the House will recollect. It has been very much in our minds throughout that we must see that distribution should be as quick and as free from obstacles and bottlenecks as we can possibly make it. The Commissioner devoted a lot of attention to these provisions and we accepted most of the changes he recommended, but we have gone rather further than those changes in one or two respects.
All producers who want to sell eggs direct to consumers will be able to get so-called "A" licences which allow producers to sell direct to consumers, and in that case they will not have to grade, test or stamp the eggs. I hope that the "A" licences will not be confused with the transport A licences. We ought to have called them X licences, or perhaps something else. For these eggs, that is, direct sales to consumers, there will be

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the most speedy and the most direct transaction of all. These sales are bound to depend on the good will and the reputation that has been built up by a producer, and it seems to us desirable that that direct link between producer and consumer should be preserved.
Producers who want to sell direct to retail shops—not to the consumer, but to retail shops—will be able to get a so-called "B" licence. Here we have gone somewhat further than the Commissioner did. The Commissioner recommended simply that the board should have power to exempt such sales if it wished to do so, subject to such conditions as it cared 10 impose, but we felt that a rather more positive provision than that was desirable. If there Is a demand for eggs sold in this way then we think that such sales should be allowed to take place.
We therefore modified the Scheme to entitle a producer, as of right, to a licence to sell his eggs direct to the retail shops, provided he adheres to the conditions attached. No condition is to be attached in such cases that the producer must rest or grade those eggs before sale, but he may under the modified Scheme be required to mark them so as to identify them as his eggs—that is to say, the eggs of a particular producer.
Such an identity mark, we think, is likely to be necessary for proper control, because there will be no direct link between the producer and the consumer, as there would be if he sold his eggs direct to the consumer. We also think that this identification mark will help consumers by showing that these eggs have come direct from the farm and by making it possible to identify any producers whose eggs are regarded by the consumer as not up to standard.
I know that some producers would also like to be free to sell their eggs either to other producers or direct to the wholesalers. But I believe that to safeguard the reputation and the market of British eggs, eggs for the wholesale market ought to be properly graded and tested to a uniform standard and also marked to show the size and quality. Alternatively, they must be sold in such a way as I have described so that the identity of producers can be readily established. That consideration, I think, rules out the possibility of producers being permitted to
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sell ungraded and untested eggs to other producers or to wholesale traders.
The administrative provisions and the miscellaneous powers of the board follow, in general, the usual pattern of marketing schemes, and I do not think I need go into diem in detail, but if there are any questions my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary will be glad to answer them. We have accepted the Commissioner's recommendations and also made a number of changes to ensure that the voice of minorities should be heard. For example, in the Scheme as originally submitted, it was provided that the minimum number of registered producers who could nominate a candidate for election to the board should be fixed at 50, but we have reduced this to 10. We think that this makes it rather easier for scattered groups of producers who might wish to put alternative candidates before their fellow producers for election.
As well as the detailed criticisms which arose at the inquiry, there are also objections to the Scheme in principle. Some people feel that it is wrong that producers should be given statutory powers such as are proposed for the board or they fear that the board might use such powers to hold other sections of the community to ransom. Such objectors tend to overlook two rather important factors. First, Parliament has given agricultural producers the right to promote this particular form of cooperative enterprise, designed to enable producers to help themselves to become more efficient producers and to help them towards more efficient marketing for their produce. Secondly, the Acts specifically recognise the possibility of conflicts between sectional interests over the operation of a scheme and provide a number of checks and balances to safeguard the interests which are likely to be affected.
There are safeguards for consumers, for trade interests, for producers and for the public interest generally. Some of these safeguards are in the Agricultural Marketing Acts themselves, such as the provision of powers for the Minister to intervene in the public interest and the procedure for dealing with complaints from consumers and others about the operation of schemes. There are other safeguards provided not in the Acts but in the Scheme. For instance, there is

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provision for joint consultation with the trade over policy issues and provision for an arbitration procedure for aggrieved producers.
In conclusion, I would say this. This Scheme represents, I believe, another important step forward in our task of creating permanent marketing arrangements for agricultural products. I also believe that it represents another landmark in agricultural co-operation. The promotion of the Scheme shows very clearly that egg producers are alert and keen to help themselves to raise their standards of efficiency still further.
There is no doubt that the industry, as a whole, is making very steady and satisfactory progress in increasing productivity and improving efficiency. The Government have always been in favour of producer marketing boards in every appropriate case. Whenever we find a case where this type of organisation will, in our opinion, benefit producers and consumers, we are very glad to recommend to Parliament a scheme which has been promoted by producers. I believe that that is also, broadly, the view of the right hon. Member for Don Valley.
We have to look at each case on its merits. Recently, for pigs, we decided that the balance of advantage lay against a statutory marketing scheme, but I believe that this Egg Marketing Scheme is one that we can recommend as being in the public interest. Many hon. Members will remember the egg marketing situation between the wars. Here, we have a Scheme which the promoters have worked out with very great care. and, I believe, with a great sense of responsibility. The Government have considered it in all its aspects, and are satisfied that it should lead to further progress in the efficiency both of production and of marketing. We are satisfied, also, that it maintains a fair balance between all the interests concerned, and that the safeguards in the Scheme and in the Acts together are adequate.
The Scheme, of course, is not unalterable, and if, from experience in working it, it is found that improvements are required, amendments can be promoted and will, of course, be considered. If, as I hope, it is approved by Parliament, the industry itself will have the
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final say at the initial poll. I am confident that if and when the Scheme comes into operation the board will be able to do a great deal for this important section of agriculture, and for those, consumers and others, who depend upon it for their supplies of fresh eggs. Therefore, I have every confidence in commending it for the approval of the House.
9.3 p.m.
Mr. Thomas Williams: I should, perhaps, make it clear at once that I have been a supporter of collective marketing schemes for quite a long time, and I make no apology for it. As far back as the mid-twenties I was a member of my party's agricultural advisory committee. If we knew little about the practical day-to-day operations on the farm, we all realised the hopelessness of 150,000 to 300,000 unorganised sellers facing a comparatively few organised buyers. We knew just what their chances were. As the Minister has said, quite a tiny surplus could completely knock out the bottom of any market.
In such circumstances, all the bargaining advantage goes to the middleman. The producers get a raw deal, and the consumer gets no benefit at all. Beef has recently provided a classic example of that. Another consequence of such a situation is that, when the price of any commodity slumps badly it is fairly obvious that production of that commodity will decrease in the following year. There was then no such thing, of course, as stability or efficiency. It was a case of hit or miss. This was all in favour of foreign exporters who were concentrating on the United Kingdom market. Co-operative marketing schemes were being built up abroad. Eggs—to mention one commodity in particular—were carefully tested, graded and packed, leaving the producer to devote the whole of his time to efficiency and quality production. No wonder, therefore, that they captured between 30 per cent. and 40 per cent. of our market.
Realising all this, my party came down on the side of collective marketing schemes, and it might interest the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Agriculture, who was not in the House at that time, and many other hon. Members who were not here at that time,

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that we printed the heads of our agricultural policy as early as January, 1929, and I need quote only one line—
"The development of collective marketing schemes."
That was in January, 1929. In 1931 the second minority Labour Government passed the first Agricultural Marketing Act, and in the face of very keen opposition from every hon. Member on the benches opposite. The present Prime Minister, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Health and the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) were all in the Division Lobby against marketing schemes and against that marketing Bill.
I suppose if the present Minister of Agriculture, a very loyal member of his party, had been here at that time he too would have opposed the Bill. It is true that since then we have taught them very many lessons, and we welcome their steady progress. Indeed, we watch their educational development with almost paternal pride.
In 1949 we amended the 1931 Act in the light of past experience, and we provided additional safeguards for consumers and traders against the abuse of any powers conceded to them—I ought to say powers which must be given if any scheme is going to have any chance of success.
I would commend to hon. Members Sections 1, 2 and 4 of the 1949 Act, and particularly to those who talk so glibly about monopoly, price fixing, the denial of housewives' choice and so forth Especially would I call their attention to Section 4 which, as the Minister says, gives him or any other Minister power to give a direction to the board with which the board must comply. In other word, if the board even intends to do a thing which the Minister of Agriculture thinks would be inimical to the interests of consumers or traders, the Minister of Agriculture has the power to impose a stop.
It will cause no surprise if I say that I am going to support this Scheme, believing as I do that it will be in the best interests of the producer and consumer, and indeed of the nation, by creating and maintaining a sense of stability, encouraging greater efficiency and providing a quality product that the housewife requires.
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There are, of course, others who take an opposite point of view—some at least just as sincere, and some much less sincere. I happen to have read the Commissioner's Report from end to end, including all the arguments and objections which were submitted. These objections came from all sorts of individuals, leagues, associations and federations, interested and disinterested, but when the total number of objectors is compared with the total number of egg producers they are indeed exceedingly small. A figure of 1,200 objectors has been mentioned, but the number of egg producers ranges between 700,000 and 1 million, so that they are very small indeed by comparison.
Mr. Coldrick: My right hon. Friend says that, of course. people who objected had some special interest. Is he really suggesting that the promoters of this Scheme had no self-interest?
Mr. Williams: Most decidedly, they were definitely interested in it. The objectors who do not produce any eggs are not entitled to the same interest as the man who produces them. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] In any case, what I said was that there were objectors, some of whom were interested and some of whom were disinterested. Surely, hon. Members would accept that. There is no condemnation there of any trade, or body, league, association, or what-you-will.
Some of the objectors are very interesting, if utterly unrepresentative. There is the British Housewives' League, the Hampstead Housewives' Association, the Birmingham Housewives' League, the Cheap Food League, the Society for Individual Freedom, the Land-Value Taxation League, the Proportional Representation Society, and, of course, a large number of representative associations and federations.
The Housewives' League was very active when we were in office, since when there has been a five-years' hibernation. Now it has emerged as a wholehearted opponent of this marketing Scheme, which it describes as a monopoly and conspiracy.
The Cheap Food League—all three of them—appeared as an objector, and two of them gave evidence at the inquiry. I

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notice that both these gentlemen came from London, one from S.W.9 and one from S.W.11—obviously not food producers. They stand for cheap food produced by others.
The Land-Value Taxation League and the Proportional Representation Society seemed to me to be far removed from agricultural marketing schemes, but their presence at the inquiry may have had a propaganda effect for their particular organisations.
What is most important about these objectors is the comment of the Commissioner in page 86, paragraph 158 (3), of his Report, where he says:
"The Poultry Association of Great Britain is the only objector which has proposed any alternative to the Scheme other than what the promoters describe as the return to laissez-faire."
That means, of course, that all the objectors except one opposed any marketing Scheme and prefer to go back to what the Commissioner described as the "bad old days". In page 22, paragraph 45 (1), the Commissioner said:
"The safest authority is that on which so many objectors rely, namely the Lucas Report, which speaks of the disparity in the bargaining power of the many and scattered units of primary production as against the relatively few well organised distributors and processers with their concentrations of buying power. Further, the Lucas Committee rejected a return to the policy of laissez-faire."
After reviewing all the evidence, the Commissioner summarised the promoters' case in this way, in page 16 of his Report:
"At the present day the home-produced egg is marketed in the way in which the great mass of consumers want it. It commands a premium, and the imported egg is beaten. A return to pre-war conditions would be very detrimental…to producers, who would be exposed to inadequate market information, infrequent or no collection, gambling on a rising market by traders, low prices to producers"
when there is an abundance, and
"diminishing consumer preference for home eggs".
I agree with him there. They then make it clear that a voluntary scheme would fail
"because there will always be somebody who will pay the producer more on a rising market thus depriving the packing station of supplies"
periodically; while
"On a falling market the packing station will he given the lot."
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Whatever the objectors may say, it seems obvious that a return to a "free-for-all" would mean complete chaos, particularly new when producers are supplying anything between 90 and 95 per cent. of the home market and output is still increasing. That, of course, is what some traders want. I do not put it higher than that.
The Commissioner was in no doubt about those dangers, as he made clear in paragraph 40, in which he said:
"The conclusion at which I have arrived is that I cannot disregard the promoters' evidence that there is danger of the packing station system, if I may use a comprehensive term, breaking down in a completely free market. If it does break down there could be rapid disintegration and great danger to the producer by a flood of imports on the home market."
He concludes by saying
"It is an unjustified risk."
If that is the right conclusion for the Commissioner to reach, is this the fairest scheme that can be devised to achieve the object in mind? Are the safeguards for the consumer and for the trader adequate?
A good deal has been said and written about compulsion, disciplinary powers, monopoly, lack of competition and denial of housewives' choice. On the first point, in the Commissioner's words,
"Short of the complete prohibition of sales other than through packing stations, the Scheme is probably as good a piece of machinery as the ingenuity of man can devise to force the maximum number of eggs into the packing station."
I have already mentioned the safeguards in the 1949 Act, and I emphasise that they are very real. The Minister has already outlined the amendments to the original Scheme. It seems clear enough to me, at all events, that consumers will have ample choice of British eggs; retailers will be able to sell eggs tested. graded and stamped by a packing station and will also be able to sell untested, ungraded eggs direct from the producer; consumers will be able to buy direct from farms or producer-retailers if they prefer, and they will also be able to buy from the market stalls and off delivery vans, while again, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, producers with 50 hens or less will be exempt and free to sell eggs just as they wish. There will be no lack of competition, therefore, for housewives' choice.
Mr. Arthur Holt: If these are the benefits that the consumer will derive, will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what consumers at the inquiry indicated their support of the Scheme?
Mr. Williams: The hon. Member asks me a question that he himself cannot answer. He can only tell me that the highest computation that was made was that there were 1,200 objectors. There are 50 million consumers. I cannot argue that all except the 1,200 are supporters of the Scheme any more than the hon. Member can argue that they are all against it. We have to accept the figures as they are, and the hon. Member will answer his own question to his own satisfaction.
Rather than there being no competition, denial of housewives' choice or a monopoly, I feel that both the Commissioner and the right hon. Gentleman may have opened the gate slightly too wide, so much so that they may conceivably have endangered the success of the Scheme. In any case, it is clear to me that there is no such thing as a monopoly. As to compulsion and disciplinary powers, every hon. Member must know that without such powers no scheme would have any chance of success. Not even the Milk Scheme could have succeeded without appropriate powers. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that the vast majority both of producers and consumers, if they understood the true position, would be ready and willing to support the scheme.
As the Commissioner said in paragraph 30,
"It is a surprising, but on reflection an accurate, statement…that 'as a result of the controls and the orderliness that was imparted to the egg maketing of this country during the war (there has been and remains) an enormous benefit to producers and consumers.'"
Those were the words of the Commissioner himself. With those controls and that orderliness removed the alternative is either a marketing scheme on these lines or a free for all and, perhaps, pre-war chaos.
The reintroduction of the Poultry Industry Bill of 1938 and 1939, which some objectors seem to prefer, is not before us tonight. Therefore, they are not alternatives to a marketing scheme. The only two alternatives facing the House
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at the moment are, therefore, either a marketing scheme or nothing. Speaking for many of my hon. Friends I have no hesitation at all in coming down on the side of the marketing scheme.
9.21 p.m.
Captain J. A. L. Duncan: I should like to congratulate the Minister on his explanation of the Scheme, and I have no quarrel with anything the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) has said. but I think we ought to get these marketing schemes into the right perspective. The party of the right hon Member for Don Valley, in 1931, promoted what is technically called the principal Act. This side of the House, in 1933, promoted two Acts concerning agricultural marketing. The right hon. Gentleman himself, in 1949, produced the 1949 Act. Therefore, both sides of the House are committed to the principle of agricultural marketing schemes, and I think that we ought to be quite clear that this is settled bi-partisan policy for agriculture in all suitable cases.
How do these schemes work out? Personally, I have never been entirely happy about the set-up under the 1931 Act. Under that Act the Minister has to be satisfied that when a scheme is put forward by a body of producers they substantially represent the producers of the country. That is provided for in the First Schedule to the Scheme. I think in this case that condition is amply satisfied. The National Farmers' Unions of England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland have produced the Scheme. Then, under the 1931 Act, if objection is made a competent and impartial person has to inquire into it. I think that that condition has been fulfilled, because Mr. Baker did, I think, fulfil the duties of inquirer into this Scheme with great skill and competence.
Then the Minister can modify the Scheme, and he has done so in the way he has explained, and submit it to Parliament, but under the 1931 Act he can do so on being
"satisfied that the scheme will conduce to the more efficient production and marketing of the…product."
It has nothing to do with the public interest or the consumers. I think that my right hon. Friend, in his speech tonight, has shown that he has fully considered that aspect of the matter.

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Then comes the snag. Parliament discusses it and approves it, as we have done on previous occasions and, no doubt, will tonight. The snag comes in that, Parliament having committed itself to approval of the Scheme, the producers can still throw it out. I have never liked that aspect of the thing. My right hon. Friend has committed himself wholeheartedly tonight to the Scheme, and so has the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Don Valley, yet the producers outside can throw it out.
To have the Scheme adopted by the registered producers no fewer than two-thirds of the registered producers voting must vote for it, and they must be the registered producers who can produce not less than two-thirds of the eggs. That is a very big hurdle. Therefore, my right hon. Friend has "chanced his arm" a little tonight in coming out so full-bloodedly for the Scheme when the producers may yet throw it out. The right hon. Member for Don Valley is in the same position, and we have no alternative but to do the same ourselves. We must back this Scheme because we are committed in all suitable cases, and we must hope that it will satisfy the producer.
I come now to the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1949, and to deal with the safeguards under the Acts and the Scheme which the Minister has mentioned. The Minister is to provide a list of producers. Can he produce such a list? How will he get the registered voters unless he can produce it? Secondly, it is provided that the Minister shall appoint under the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931, consumers committees which are one of the safeguards in the Act, and a committee of investigation. As the Act is apparently mandatory, I should like to ask the Minister when these committees will be set up.
Then one of the conditions under the 1933 Act is that the Minister has the power in Section 1 to regulate imports. I would like to ask him not whether he will do that, because that lies in the future, but what power the Minister has under recent legislation and under G.A.T.T., for instance, to regulate the importation of eggs and to what extent Section 1 of the 1933 Act is, in fact, applicable to importation. There may come a time, as we are now producing over 90 per cent. of home needs, when it might be necessary to give
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some protection against imported eggs, otherwise the Scheme might fail. The right hon. Member for Don Valley joked about certain Ministers opposing the Government in 1931, but the root objection in 1931, under the Labour Government's Act, was that there was no protection, and a marketing scheme without protection, in those days at any rate, might well have failed.
As to safeguards, the Minister appoints at least two and not more than one-fifth of the membership of the board to represent consumers of eggs, not traders. That is a very efficient safeguard. Under Section 2, the Minister can issue Orders if the board does anything by way of restriction of quantity or of price which he regards as not being in the public interest. This is the first time, under the 1949 Act, that public interest comes into the picture, and this is far wider than efficient production and marketing of the product. "Public interest" which nobody has ever defined is a very wide safeguard to the consumer.
Then, under Section 4, the Minister may issue a temporary order to prevent injury to the public interest. Such an order could be issued upon the complaint of anybody—the trader, the wholesaler, or anyone. That safeguard, too, is an extremely valuable one. Lastly, under paragraph 37 of the Scheme, joint consultative committees are being set up.
Having explained the powers under the Acts and under the Scheme, I am not sure that it is really necessary tonight for us to explain the Scheme. What we have to be satisfied about is that the Scheme is in accordance with the Acts, and my right hon. Friend has amply shown that it is. If we wanted to go further and criticise a certain scheme, we should be criticising the Acts, and this is not the occasion for that. If someone wanted to do that, it should be done by a Motion or in some other way.
I believe that the Scheme is completely within the Acts of Parliament to which both sides of the House are pledged. I do not propose, consequently, to go into its details. I merely conclude with this remark. The Government have got out of State trading in eggs, and that is a good thing, but we cannot leave a void. The void is being filled by this Scheme, which is in accordance with Acts of Parliament to which both sides of the

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House are committed, and, therefore, I consider that it should stand its chance in the poll of public opinion of the registered producers.
9.32 p.m.
Mr. Coldrick: I oppose the Scheme. I admired the sedulous way in which the Minister sought to find reasons to justify a policy which certainly has the commendation of the producers but has very little support from the consumers.
I was astonished to hear the hon. and gallant Member for South Angus (Captain Duncan) suggest that he would be prepared to go so far as to urge people, at the behest of the House, to join a certain association and thereby use compulsory powers in relation to the Scheme which we should not dream of employing elsewhere.
In order to be clear about the Scheme, what we, as hon. Members, have to realise is that the Minister proposes to set up a board of twenty-one people, seventeen of whom will be chosen exclusively by the producers, and four by the Minister to represent consumers and others. It is fairly obvious that the seventeen will have other business to do, and that it cannot be a full-time board devoting itself entirely to the question of marketing. The result is that the Scheme makes provision for the establishment of an executive, which will be composed of seven persons, including one representative chosen by the Minister. We are now confronted with the situation that we have seven people, six chosen by the producers, given virtually totalitarian powers in regulations dealing with the marketing of eggs in this country. I am given to understand that the seven will control the marketing of eggs to the extent of about £100 million turnover within this country. Does any hon. Member suggest that those people are sufficiently competent to be entrusted with a task of that character?
We should recognise the powers which will be conferred on it once the board is formally established with its executive. It has the power to regulate the supply of eggs to a substantial extent. It will proceed to regulate prices, because daily and weekly it will use the packing stations as an agent to prescribe the minimum charges which will be paid to
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the producer. The packing stations will know, with the subsidy provided at the taxpayers' expense plus the possibility of the consumer being fleeced, that a certain price will be raised. The executive, acting on behalf of the board, will determine what the minimum price will be.
Having given the board the power to determine prices, we will give it the power to determine how many packing stations will operate. It has sufficient power within the Scheme—apparently it does not intend to exercise it at the moment—ultimately to be able to decide where the producer shall send the eggs, whether to one particular packing station or another. The board has the power to establish packing stations. What is to prevent it ultimately coming to an arrangement whereby it will dictate to the producer the particular packing station through which the eggs shall be passed to be tested and graded and so forth?
Having been given these powers, the board will have the right to issue licences. There will be two forms of licence, licence A and licence B. Under licence A it will be possible for the producer to sell directly to the consumer, provided that he is prepared to be registered and to conform to the conditions laid down by the board. Hon. Members should not be hoodwinked by the statements which have been made. Anybody with an ounce of experience knows perfectly well that it will be possible for the board to prescribe for the producer such conditions as to make it almost impossible for the producer to continue in business, unless he exactly conforms to the behest of the board.
I am amazed at the attitude of hon. Members opposite, who are always concerned about Government regulations, about snoopers and people of that type, giving this board the Dower to determine that any producer shall keep his accounts in a manner prescribed by the board. He will have to send returns to the board in the approved fashion. I can well imagine that the ordinary producer, who is more concerned with producing eggs than with producing red tape, will curse the authors of this measure as much as hon. Members opposite have cursed the people who were responsible for State regulations and things of that nature.

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It seems that the hon. and gallant Member for South Angus is in favour of control so long as it is not State control. He is in favour of control so long as it is entrusted to a limited body of people, but he is not prepared to entrust those powers to Parliament to exercise them on behalf of people generally.
The same sort of thing happens to people licensed under licence B. They can sell to grocers and retailers and people of that nature, but the board will not trust them implicitly. In order that the board will be able to have some control over them, the board will insist that they put a stamp on the eggs to identify a person who happens to supply bad eggs. The Minister himself used a very bad analogy. He said that a Minister was like hens—he did not lay a good egg every week. It would be safe to estimate that a hen never lays a bad egg, while it is true that the Minister very often lays a bad Bill, even if he does not lay a bad egg.
I am not speaking officially on behalf of the Co-operative Movement, but my right hon. Friend, of course, made a great deal of play with the fact that there were only 700 or 1,000—whatever the figure was—objectors to this particular scheme. I happen to be a member of the Central Committee of the Cooperative Movement, which was responsible for registering a protest in the interests of 12 million consumers in this country. Believe me, that was not merely a decision of a committee. This matter went before one of the most democratic forms of assembly in this country. It was debated in the Co-operative Congress, and no matter what the Housewives' League, to which reference has been made, may think, we can rest assured that if the ordinary housewives of this country knew that this Scheme was being put forward at the behest of the producers, deliberately to benefit the producers, there would be far more objection to it than has been registered at the present moment.
Let me say in conclusion that I am not a bit interested in the pedigree of this Scheme. Hon. Members opposite may be proud that they introduced a Bill in 1931 and other people may be proud that we introduced another Bill in 1945 and another in 1949, but the plain fact
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of the matter is that all these egg marketing schemes at the present moment are a monument to the influence and power of Sir James Turner. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Do not let us be under any illusion about that. I have been with hon. Members opposite to some of the egg packing stations, and I have a great admiration for their efficiency, but members of the Farmers' Union themselves tell one very candidly that Sir James makes a proud boast of the fact that it is his policy that will be carried out in this Parliament no matter who happens to be the Minister.
Mr. Frederick Peart: Surely, my hon. Friend, with his connections with the Labour Movement, is aware of the fine work that Lord Addison did in starting schemes of this kind?
Mr. Coldrick: I am afraid that it is a long time since Lord Addison had anything to do with those schemes. Of course, the hon. Member should know perfectly well that to compare what happened between the wars with the conditions obtaining today is without relevance in any form whatsoever, because people are saying: "We do not want to go back to the chaos of marketing before the war." In the name of everything that is reasonable, do we want to go back to the conditions of unemployment among the miners, the engineers and everyone else that obtained during the inter-war period? So do not let us have any more of this argument about the conditions which obained then and which do not obtain now.
I say with great seriousness that I do not believe that one argument can be adduced in favour of compulsion being used to make the producers of eggs join an association which cannot be as validly adduced to compel every producer of coal to belong to a miners' union. [HON. MEMBERS: "They do."] If they do, it is because the miners have sufficient common sense to associate themselves with it. If any hon. Member opposite who guffaws about this matter or my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) will stand up as an ex-miner—and I speak as an ex-miner myself—and instance one occasion upon which efforts have been made in this House to confer upon a miners' union the power to compel its members to join the association in the same way as the

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farmers' union is asking us to give it statutory power to force other people to join that association, then I will readily give way.
Mr. T. Williams: If my hon. Friend does not know it, perhaps I had better tell him. Every mineworker in this country is a member of the National Union of Mineworkers.
Mr. Coldrick: That form of sophistry is not going to deceive anybody. We are virtually advocating that if two-thirds of the producers elect to enter a producers' association the organisers of that association shall receive statutory power from Parliament to compel the other one-third to join whether or not they want to.
I challenge the right hon. Gentleman once again. Never has any trade union striven to use its influence to obtain statutory power to compel the whole of its membership to join its own association. There is not a single argument which can be used in favour of the producers of eggs which could not be used in favour of the producers of other commodities, unless we are to assume that the producers of eggs are much more important than the other producers.
This is the platform from which we have to make statements on behalf of the general mass of the people, and not merely in the interests of the few. I want to make it abundantly clear that I am in favour of orderly marketing. I believe that eggs should be graded, tested, and classified, but I strongly object to a producers' board being entrusted with monopoly powers. Consequently, I see no reason at all, even in the marketing of eggs, why the board should not be constituted in such a way as to ensure that producers, distributors, and consumers are all represented on it.
If a body were constituted in that way, adequately reflecting the vital factors concerning all those engaged in this important industry, I believe that it would command public confidence, but I bitterly oppose the fact that this House, so far from exercising its own rights, should give a small body of people the inordinate powers which will be conferred on it by the Scheme and, at the same time, give it power through a disciplinary board to levy fines of up to £100 upon members who are not prepared to comply with its behest. It is
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a denial of liberty, and I am surprised that any hon. Member should be so forgetful of consumers in general that he is prepared to pander to the pressure of the people who have organised this Scheme.
9.49 p.m.
Mr. John Baldock: The hon. Member for Bristol, North-East (Mr. Coldrick) has, like many other critics of the Scheme, suggested that the great majority of consumers would be opposed to it if they knew about it. I saw a great deal of jubilation among the ranks of the Liberals whilst his speech was being made, and I felt that at the time they really thought that their ranks were going to be increased; that a new recruit was joining them, and that the clock was being put back to the nineteenth century. Other than that, I think we all enjoyed the suggestion that the 12 million co-operators were all violently opposed to any producer marketing scheme. I cannot think that the great majority of them have considered this matter very carefully, and in the end the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East admitted that. He said that if they had done so, they would have been more violently opposed than they are. I cannot agree with hint in that respect either.
There is a great deal of understanding among the urban population today of the problems of agriculture and that is a fortunate thing. The urban population do not want to see the same state of affairs existing on the land and in regard to agriculture as was the case between the wars. They have every reason to feel that the present system of egg marketing is reasonably satisfactory. They are getting a good and plentiful supply of fresh eggs at a reasonable price. They want to see that continue and the agricultural producers given a square deal.
Even were this Scheme thoroughly explained to them, I cannot agree that resistance from them would be considerable. There is no evidence of that. It seems to me that this Scheme strikes a balance very nicely. The danger of monopoly is avoided, because there will be three channels through which home-produced eggs may reach the consumer. There will be the board operating through the packing stations, direct from

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the farm gate; or the farmer with a retail round as widespread as he likes, or the farmer selling direct to the retailer. There is no question of prices being fixed by the board. The producer-retailer, or the producer who sells to a retailer, can charge any price he is able to obtain, and the normal law of supply and demand which exponents of the laissez-faire economy like so much will apply. I cannot see how it can be contended that that represents any kind of monoply; and, of course, there is always the competition from foreign eggs in the background if the price of the home-produced article gets out of line.
There is the danger, if this board is not set up—I am sure this will be appreciated by the producers when they come to the poll—that tens of thousands of small farmers will be in a weak position when they come to deal with the relatively small but powerful number of buyers, of which I suppose the Co-operative Movement is one of the strongest. I cannot see how these small farmers can hope to hold their own, any more than the milk producers did before the Milk Marketing Board was set up; and we would not wish to see a return to the state of affairs such as existed before the Milk Marketing Board was set up.
I like producer-marketing schemes. I consider they are applicable to most categories of agricultural products, however unpopular they may be with many economists and the "Cheap-Food-and-Blow-the-Consequences-League" which offered evidence before the inquiry. Nor am I ashamed to use the word "planning." Few enterprises or concerns are successful without the use of planning, and I take satisfaction from the fact that the Tories were the original planners in the political field. In the days—to which we seem to have returned this evening—of the nineteenth century, when we had a Liberal Party and a Conservative Party, it was the Conservatives who wished to introduce a measure of planning by imposing tariffs when the economists and the Liberal Party were pressing for a laissez-faire scheme of things.
I hope that the power of advertising will be used by this Board, because it should be brought home to the public more than it is at present that fresh eggs are very good food value indeed. Nothing
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will increase the sales of eggs more than knowledge on the part of consumers that those offered for sale are really fresh. That is even more important than advertising. The board should use every power it has to avoid the hoarding of eggs when prices are rising and to prevent a minority of producers and traders, the black sheep of the industry, injuring the sales of the great majority by allowing eggs which are not absolutely fresh to get through to the customer, thus giving packing station eggs literally a bad name.
The levelling up of prices over the year would be a valuable development. I do not think that the housewife likes having to pay widely fluctuating prices from month to month during the course of the year. That tends to reduce the consumption of eggs because many people stop buying when they find that prices are high, and they may not discover for some time that prices have gone down again. There tends to be a time lag and a reduction in consumption.
If there were a greater levelling out of prices there would be less temptation to hold back supplies when prices were rising steeply and a greater inducement to consumers to buy. I hope that modern methods of poultry management, with artificial lighting and so on, will help to even out the seasonal prices to make them more level throughout the year.
Also from the producers' point of view, I think that the board should do something to even out prices between grades. At the moment the producer gets the worst of both worlds. If he produces large eggs he may give away a quarter of an ounce on each egg. If an egg is one quarter of an ounce over one and seven-eighth ounces, which is the boundary line between the standard and the small egg, if an egg is a quarter of an ounce over the top, which is a 12½ per cent. increase in food value, it still goes for the same price. On the other hand, which is even worse for him, if the size of the egg is only one-thirty-second of an ounce—which is an absolutely infinitesimal amount which could not possibly be detected by any consumer—below one and seven-eighth ounces, the price falls by nearly one-third.
Obviously that is an inequitable situation. I hope that other grades will be introduced so that the price may more evenly correspond with the food value

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which the producer is selling. To have a jump of one-third in the price for one-thirty-second of an ounce difference in the egg does not seem in any way reasonable.
I believe that if this Scheme is accepted by the House and by the producers three valuable results will follow. The consumer should have a greater supply of home-produced eggs; the producer will have an expanding market with orderly selling and the advantages of advertising, of which he is deprived at present, and also greater freedom than he has now; and the Government will have a saving in foreign currency, because the very small labour content in the cost of production of eggs means that we should be able to compete with the producers of imported eggs even if they are from countries where the standard of living is considerably lower than our own, provided that we can buy feeding stuffs at competitive prices. I hope very much that the Scheme will be accepted.
9.59 p.m.
Mr. Donald Wade: I want at the outset to say that I am wholeheartedly in favour of the improved marketing of agricultural products and better distribution. I also recognise that there have been important modifications in the original Scheme. Nevertheless, in considering this and any marketing scheme one should start with the general principle that voluntary cooperation is better than compulsory co-operation. The onus of proof is certainly on those who wish to put forward a scheme which involves compulsion upon producers to enter a scheme whether they wish to do so or not.
One must also consider the interests of the consumers as well as the interests of the producers. I emphasise that the consumer is an interested party as well as the producer. It is just as well to clear up the purpose of this Scheme. I understand that it is not intended primarily to plan production over a period of years in the light of needs which the Government or some other body estimates. I gather that the Minister is not attempting to put forward the Scheme on the ground that it is part of a national plan for the production of eggs. Indeed, I very much doubt whether eggs would be suitable for that
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kind of system, whatever one's ideological views may be.
Perhaps I might remind the right hon. Gentleman of a reply which he gave to a question of mine about pigs on 17th November, 1955. I asked:
"Would the Minister agree that pigs have not proved very amenable to Government planning, and does he consider this the fault of the pigs or the planners?"
The Minister replied:
"I think that probably the fault is the principle of Government planning.—-[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th November, 1955; Vol. 546, c. 765–6.]
We are not considering the question either of Government planning or planning by a board, although I got the impression from the Minister that he appears to favour planning by a board as opposed to planning by the Government.
As I have said, we have to consider the interests of both the consumer and the producer, and in order not to be biassed I have considered the matter, first, from the producer's point of view. I do not claim to be in the business myself, nor do I claim to be a poultry farmer, but in days gone by I made a special hobby of keeping poultry. I kept 50 to 100 and I made it pay. Those were in the days when we got about 10d. a dozen for eggs.
In the light of that limited experience, I am very doubtful whether this Scheme will work. Furthermore, I foresee considerable difficulties arising, for example, in drawing the line between those who will come within the Scheme and those who will not. This does not affect very large producers, but it will be a matter of considerable concern to the small producers.
If we look at the Scheme we find in the definition paragraph, paragraph 43,
"A producer shall be exempt…if…he has in his possession in the United Kingdom not more than 50 head of live poultry over the age of six months or such larger number as may from time to time be prescribed.…"
As far as I can ascertain, "poultry" is not limited to hens in the strict sense of the word. As far as I have been able to ascertain, in the Scheme the female is deemed to embrace the male. If one is a small poultry farmer keeping 50 hens and one cockerel, one comes into the Scheme; but if one has only 50 hens, one is out of the Scheme.

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My experience reminds me that during certain parts of the year one may have 30 poultry and during other parts of the year 80 poultry. What is to happen? I suppose that during a certain part of the year one will have to apply for a licence, otherwise there will be a danger of an inspector making a visit with the result that one may be liable to a fine of up to £100. One may be fattening cockerels over six months of age for Christmas. That is the kind of practical problem which the producer will have to face.
I can understand that it would be unfair were a poultry farmer entitled to go in and out of the Scheme from time to time during the year. It would be very difficult for the packing stations were that to be the case. Personally, I would see no objection to a provision whereby any one having entered this Scheme, would have to give, say, nine or twelve months' notice before leaving it again. In my view, that would not be contrary to the voluntary principle; on the assumption, of course, that it was a voluntary and not a compulsory Scheme. That would get over the difficulty of packing stations not being able to work on any satisfactory lines if producers were free to enter and leave the Scheme from time to time during the year.
I am not at all convinced that the Scheme will work for the benefit of the go-ahead producer. A producer might work out a new scheme for the marketing of eggs which might not be in keeping with the board's ideas. He might wish to develop, as some producers already have, date stamping, and may, by that means, have worked up a very successful clientele. As I understand, it is likely that the board would be opposed to such an idea. Individual poultry keepers, or groups of them, may in time develop new and better marketing schemes, and should be free to do so. I fear that this board may retard rather than encourage developments of that kind.
I have called paragraph 81 of the Scheme the "snooping clause," and paragraph 85 deals with penalties. I remember discussing the subject of snooping when we were dealing with the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill. The President of the Board of Trade then accepted the modfications that were put forward, and
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abandoned the original proposals which would have given very wide powers of entry and so on. Here, we find the same kind of thing. Paraphrased, paragraph 81 provides that any person, on written authority from the board, may enter and inspect premises of a registered producer if he has reason to believe that the premises are being used to produce eggs. No magistrates' warrant would be required. In fact, the board would have wider powers than have the police and, as a Liberal, I cannot look on that with much favour.
Paragraph 85 provides that the disciplinary committee which is appointed by the board to enforce its own regulations can impose fines of up to £100 and, as the Minister knows, in certain circumstances, fines of up to £200 can be imposed. The general impression one gets is that the powers are very wide indeed, and a very great measure of responsibility is left with the board, from which there is no right of appeal.
Mr. Douglas Marshall: I should like the hon. Member to clear up one point which is, I think, of some importance. Has he stated that the Liberal Party, as a whole, is against any producer board which is compulsory?
Mr. Wade: I do not think that we have stated that we are against any board which is compulsory.
Mr. Marshall: But has the hon. Member stated it?
Mr. Wade: I do not think that I have stated that I am against any producer board in which there is an element of compulsion. I do say that, in examining any scheme, one should start from the general principle that a voluntary scheme is better than a compulsory one, and the onus should be on anyone putting forward a scheme to show that the advantage lies with compulsion. So far, I have not been convinced of the need for these very great compulsory powers. That is the point I am trying to make. I was referring to the penalties.
I am not sure whether there is any right of appeal at all. So far as I can see, there is no right of appeal to the court. There is provision under paragraph 97 for arbitration. That paragraph states:
"Any producer who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the Board may refer the matter to the arbitration of a single arbitrator…"

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but it is not at all clear to me whether, if a producer has been fined, that is an act or omission of the board. Perhaps that point could be clarified. It does not alter the fact that very great powers have been given to the board.
Then there is the cost of the Scheme. It is difficult to estimate what the cost is to be. I notice from the evidence before the Commission that it was estimated that the amount that would be raised by way of levy would be in the nature of £1 million. That is a large sum of money, and, directly or indirectly, it would presumably have to be borne by the consumer.
I think it is fair to say that there are many who hold the view of one of those who wrote to the Commission, and I am reading letter No. 301, which concludes as follows:
"A lot of my friends who keep poultry think the same as I do about the proposed egg scheme."
I want to be quite fair; that is the original scheme—
"We have had enough of restrictions and controls in the farming industry, and I would like to ask who is going to pay all the officials if we have a Board."
That was written by Miss L. M. Litchfield, a farmer's daughter, and Chairman of the Young Conservatives, West Haddon.
I approach this matter from the point of view of the small producers as well as the consumers, but I think that there is a further point which I might reasonably make from the point of view of the consumers alone. There is no provision, that I can see, which will ensure that retailers will not keep eggs on their premises for an unduly long time. There is no guarantee of freshness from that aspect of the matter.
I am not casting a reflection on retailers, but if it is claimed that this Scheme will ensure fresh eggs for the consumer I should like to know where it is provided that the retailer will sell the eggs within a specified period of time and what guarantee there is for the consumer. It is claimed that that is the benefit that the Scheme will bring about.
Again, the representation of the consumer on the board is, I think, quite inadequate. It is true of so many boards, and, once again, we find the consumer representation inadequate.
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Finally, I should like to know exactly what are the Minister's views on the subject of competition to which the Commissioner referred. He summed it up as follows:
"I am bound to say that, having reviewed all the evidence and thought over this matter long and cautiously, my conclusion is that the case in favour of competition is overwhelming."
I could not make out from the speech of the Minister, when introducing the Scheme, whether he had come to the same conclusion so far as the production of eggs was concerned. Until I am satisfied on that point, I must remain extremely sceptical.
10.14 p.m.
Mr. Archer Baldwin: I feel sure that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture will be disappointed if I do not make my usual protest against a compulsory marketing board. I have registered my protest on each board that has been proposed in the House, and I do so on this one.
I am glad that my right hon. Friend has modified to a large extent the original suggestions that were made, but still there is that element of compulsion to which I object. It seems rather extraordinary to me, as a Conservative, when I remember the attacks we made when we were on that side of the House against the Lucas Report, that we should now be bringing in or sponsoring a Scheme which gives just as wide powers of monopoly as the Lucas Marketing Report suggested. in fact, a year or two ago, when one of the leaders of the National Farmers' Union was advocating a marketing board, the noble Lord made the comment to me that this was "out-Lucasing Lucas".
My real objection to this board is that it is completely unnecessary. It will put another huge expense on to the producer and consumer. The hon. Gentleman the Member of Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) suggested a figure of £1 million, but I have heard it suggested that it would be £2 million. I do not regard it as necessary to bring in a Scheme which is not needed for the marketing of eggs.
Let me make it quite plain that I ant a believer in voluntary co-operatives. I am a member of a corn co-operative, a shareholder, and a strong supporter; but if people in the corn co-operative wanted

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to bring forward a suggestion, such as some members of the National Farmers' Union advanced, that there should be a cereals marketing board, I should fight them to the last ditch.
At the present moment, I get the competition which I think I am entitled to, being able to go either to the co-operative marketing board or to the trade itself for my prices. That should always obtain; we should always have competition. I agree with the remark of the Commissioner in page 2 of his Report, when he says that in his opinion competition is absolutely necessary; but he did not follow it up afterwards.
My reason for saying this Scheme is unnecessary is this. There are today some 600 packing stations. I am not attacking packing stations at all. I have recently been over two, one in Hereford and one in Maidstone, which are doing a first-class job, supplying eggs which are clean, sending them away fresh from those centres. I cannot think that anything could be done better. Why, therefore, should we have a board on top of them to try and tell them how they can market their eggs? They are finding their own market from the packing stations, and they are in competition with one another.
What I visualise is this. If a marketing board is set up, competition will finish. All these voluntary packing stations at present operating will come under one control and the Scheme will be compulsory. Farmers should think very seriously before they vote for a Scheme of this sort.
Mr. Anthony Hurd: My hon. Friend will, no doubt, have read the Scheme, and he will, no doubt, have noted in its terms that the farmers' co-operative packing stations will continue as separate entities, competing one against the other, and the one which is most efficient will be able to pay the best price to the producer.
Mr. Baldwin: They may or they may not.
Mr. Hurd: It is laid down in the Scheme.
Mr. Baldwin: They are already joining together before the Scheme comes into being, and, in any case, when the Scheme comes into being pressure will
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be brought to bear on them to come under one wing all together. Time will tell. That is my impression.
In my view, it is something which is completely unnecessary, which we ought not to support. We shall see them all swallowed up. The bogey which has been raised by the suggestion that if we do not have this marketing board we shall go back to pre-war chaos is no more than a bogey set up in an effort to frighten the producers into voting for this Scheme. If it were likely that we should go back to pre-war chaos, how is it that something like 200 packing stations before the war were running, and running well, in competition with the open market? There are now 600 packing stations, and they could still run, as did the pre-war packing stations, without any compulsory powers. The packing stations, with their improved standards and technique, are in a stronger position today to maintain themselves than were the pre-war stations. That is one reason why the board is completely unnecessary.
I know it has been said that because A and B licences will be issued to producers there is not the element of compulsion; but if a man is issued with a B licence, why should he be allowed to sell only to a retailer? Why should he not be able to sell to a wholesaler? if any producer of eggs can find his own market without claiming a deficiency payment or making any call on the Chancellor of the Exchequer or on the taxpayer, it would be all to the good to make the Scheme one in which producers who can sell their eggs should be entitled to do so without having any deficiency payments.
Mr. Hurd: So they will.
Mr. Baldwin: No, they will not. A B licence producer of eggs will not be entitled to sell his eggs where he wishes.
Mr. Hurd: Oh, yes, he will.
Mr. Baldwin: No, he will not. He cannot sell to a wholesaler. He can sell to a retailer, but possibly the terms laid down by the board will be such that he will not want to do so. That is the power that is being given to the board. I should like to see A and B licences cut out completely and producers who can find their own market permitted to do so without being compelled to obtain licences.

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That is all I want to say in general against the Scheme. I am completely against compulsory schemes. A producer should be entitled to find his own market if he can, and the bogey about the wholesomeness or purity of the egg is simply humbug. If a producer finds his own customer and sells to him eggs which are not good, he will very soon lose that customer. A producer will take good care that when he finds a market with a customer he will keep the customer by selling to him eggs of good standard and quality. Therefore, it is wrong to suggest that if a man is allowed to find his own market he will dispose of bad eggs.
I hope that before they vote for the Scheme the farmers will read particularly those parts of it which give powers of prosecution. This means the setting up of snoopers and all the paraphernalia that we, as Conservatives, say we like to avoid —and we are getting it in the Scheme. I hope that farmers will realise this and will not vote for a Scheme which might in the end lead to the nationalisation of distribution, because that is the machinery that we are setting up in this and other marketing measures. Although the right hon. Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) advocated the introduction of the marketing scheme in 1929, he did not say that at that time also he advocated the nationalisation of land. For these reasons, I hope that farmers will think seriously before voting for the Scheme.
10.24 p.m.
Mr. M. Philips Price: The hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Baldwin) is, of course, logical in his speech and represents those hon. Members on his side of the House who are against all forms of control by the State. The Conservative Party has progressed quite a lot in the last decade, but there are still some who are like the hon. Member.
The hon. Member, of course, is opposed to the whole thing. He would be opposed, no doubt, to the Agricultural Marketing Act. 1931, as his party was opposed to it. It is true that most of its members gave the reason that at that time there was no restriction of imports.
Mr. J. E. B. Hill: Hear, hear.
Mr. Philips Price: Quite rightly, that was one of the reasons. Another reason, however, was that a section of the party
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opposite, of which the hon. Member for Leominster is a good example, was opposed to any form of organised planning or marketing.
The hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade), speaking from the Liberals' bench, is in a rather different position. In 1931, when the Agricultural Marketing Act was only a Bill, I, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams), sat on the Standing Committee which considered the Bill, and then the Liberals supported Lord Addison. The hon. Member for Huddersfield, West has run away from that position, whereas the hon. Member for Leominster has been quite logical.
Mr. Baldwin: I thought I made it quite clear that I am not against organised marketing. I am against compulsory marketing. I am all in favour of the packing stations being run as they are at present.
Mr. Philips Price: I should like to know how we are to have organised marketing unless there is compulsory marketing in the sense that the majority of the producers are protected from the wrecking of the scheme by the minority. That was the whole point of the 1931 Act. So I hope that this Marketing Scheme will go through.
Farmers used to be criticised because they did not organise the marketing of their produce. I remember so well those days when the farmers of Denmark and Holland were pointed to as examples for British farmers to follow, because the Danish and the Dutch farmers organised the marketing and sale of their products. They sent their products over here, and got the best prices, because our farmers' products were not marketed in the same way. That the Danes and the Dutch were examples to our farmers was the view then of all progressive people, including Liberals in those days. The Liberals have fallen from grace. My word they have.
Mr. Holt: I was not born then, so I would not know.
Mr. Philips Price: During the last twenty-five years the British farmers have pulled themselves together and have organised the sale of their produce in a way in which it had not been done before. The difficulty all the time, of course, with voluntary marketing schemes

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has been that there is a minority who will not, for one reason or another, come in, and so they make it impossible to run organised marketing schemes.
Hence the Act of 1931, out of which we have had a number of very successful schemes. The most successful of all is the Milk Marketing Scheme. I do not think that anybody would wish now to go back to the chaotic conditions that prevailed before that Scheme was instituted, when everybody could do as he liked. Now, under that great marketing board we have every conceivable form of development in the industry. There is publicity for it there are schemes such as those for the improvement of livestock, financed out of the profits of the Scheme. Then we had the schemes for potato, hops and wool.
Now a Scheme is brought along for eggs, and at once we hear criticism, not that the British farmer is not organising himself but that he is organising himself. Loud are the complaints now of those who were once criticising the British farmers for not being like the Danes and the Dutch, and those critics complain that the British farmers are monopolistic, and are exploiting the consumers and interfering with the rights of the individual.
What are the facts? Before the war the egg industry was not properly organised, and foreign eggs which were imported were well graded and marked and were superior to ours and commanded a better price. During the war the Ministry of Food came into the market, took over the control of the purchase and the sale of eggs, and the packing stations, which had been begun before the war, were developed still further during the war, and they were worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Food.
Now packing stations. both private and producer-co-operative, cover a very large proportion of the eggs produced in the country. They have been very successful. We have one in Cheltenham which covers a large part of the egg production in Gloucestershire. The result of all this has been that as long as the Government were trading in eggs we had assured markets, and with the packing stations operating we had properly graded and marked eggs. That condition will end now with the ending of Government trad-
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ing, and if we do not have something in its place we shall have chaos once more.
As a result of what has happened in the last fifteen or twenty years, imports have fallen from 40 per cent. to 10 per cent. of our total egg production, and we now have first-class quality eggs, whereas formerly we did not and the'. foreigners had the best. The position surely is that unless we have a scheme of this kind we shall not be able to organise a proper marketing system or even to finance what money will come to the producer, according to the price of eggs, out of the deficiency payments.
An element of competition will come in here, too, because under the Scheme, as the Minister explained and I should like to confirm further, if the packing stations can get 2d. a dozen more for the eggs than was obtained up to a certain time, that 2d. will go to them. They will be on their mettle to secure better prices and to induce consumers to pay them. They will obtain those better prices only if the eggs are packed and graded in the best possible way. Therefore, an element of competition and of initiative still remains with the board and with the packing stations.
It is also the case that if prices go down the packing stations and the board will feel the effect, though not as much as they will do if prices go up. There are ample securities for the consumer under Sections 2 and 4 of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1949. If any of the packing stations, or the board, abuse their powers it will be possible for the Minister, on complaints being raised, to deal with the matter by direction. The consumers will be safeguarded in the same way as they are now safeguarded under the boards which deal with milk, potatoes, and wool. Producers will have a steady market, and the board must take all the eggs that are produced. That is another important matter. It was not the case under the voluntary scheme.
It will also be possible, under this Scheme, to finance a publicity campaign. such as that which the Milk Marketing Board has successfully carried out. There is no doubt that the Milk Marketing Board has succeeded in immensely extending the market for milk. Dairy farmers pay back a small levy of what they get and the fund so formed goes towards the encouragement and publicising of milk sales.
Mr. Holt: I understand that one of the present problems is that we have too much milk at too high a price, which consumers do not take. Is the hon. Member envisaging that when we adopt this wonderful Scheme we shall have too many eggs at too high a price for people to eat?
Mr. Philips Price: That is another matter.
I am certain that if we had not had a milk publicity campaign, the saturation point of the consumption of milk would have been reached long ago, but, because of the campaign, the consumption of milk has been expanded and the same will happen with eggs. There will no doubt come a point—and we are probably reaching it now—when, unless the retail price comes down, the sale of milk will not be as elastic as it should be.
Modern dairy farmers with their new methods of production could easily stand a lower price to a certain point because of lower costs of production. Modern dairy farmers are always facing up to the problem of reducing their costs to help to make the consumers use as much milk as possible.
I am sure that unless we have a scheme of this kind, it will be impossible to advance a scheme for publicising eggs and encouraging their purchase and boosting the fact that British eggs are the best on the market. The small producer with 50 hens or fewer will have his chance to carry on. A very large number now sell their eggs to packing stations. Those sales will continue and probably expand.
I know a Gloucestershire packing station of which I am a member. When it first started, there was great difficulty, because people sold their eggs to the packing station when eggs were cheap, and, when eggs were dear, they sold them privately and got it both ways, with the result that the packing station was hit both ways.
The tendency in the poultry industry now is for prices to even out throughout the year. There used always to be a shortage during the autumn when hens and pullets were moulting. Now, owing to the fact that there is much more hatching in January, February and March, pullets are coming into lay in the autumn. Consequently, the tendency has been for there to be less disparity in prices throughout the year. There will,
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therefore, be less reason for the small producer to want to run to the packing station at one time of the year and not at another.
Egg production is increasing all the time. The deep litter system is becoming more popular and is helping to produce more eggs and there are other systems, such as the battery system, about which I do not know so much, but which is said to be even more efficient. We shall have even greater production of eggs throughout the year and the packing stations will thus come more into their own. The first necessity is to get the Scheme through and the next thing is to see that the farmers and egg producers vote for it.
10.40 p.m.
Mr. Anthony Hurd: The hen has indeed led us into some strange ways this evening. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have been subjected to a great deal of propaganda. both for and against this statutory marketing Scheme. The objectors have been a good deal more ingenious and persistent than the sponsors of the Scheme, but hon. Members have evidently used their own judgment and thought n good deal about the pros and cons of this Scheme. It is evident from the debate that the majority of hon. Members have come to a wise conclusion.
I think that this Scheme is a wise blending of the interests of the producers, the consumers and the taxpayers. The producers will continue to have an assured basic level of price for their eggs, even though the Government goes, out of State trading in eggs, and there will be placed on the producers the direct responsibility for developing the market. I as a Conservative, believe it be very important that the producers of any kind of farm commodity should have a direct responsibility and a direct interest in the efficiency and economy of the methods by which their products reach the consumers. I say that this Scheme passes those tests. I believe that it gives a continuing price assurance and makes the producers directly responsible for the efficient and economic marketing of this product.
Consumers will be assured of continuing and ample supplies of fresh eggs. say "fresh" eggs, because a great deal of nonsense has been talked about the time it takes for an egg to be collected

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from the farm, tested, graded and packed. I wish that my right hon. Friend could get the name of the stations changed from packing stations to testing stations. After all, it is the testing and not the packing that matters to the consumer. Testing gets rid of the eggs which may have a fault, such as a blood spot or a faulty shell, or be stale. I am sure that the consumer will continue to get an ample supply of fresh eggs, and, indeed, even fresher eggs, as the testing station programme continues to expand.
Today, the British consumer is getting eggs at a cheaper price than the consumer on the Continent of Europe. Were that not the case, we should have Danish eggs coming here instead of being sent to Western Germany and Belgium. Consumers are benefiting by the present arrangements and that will continue under the Scheme.
Mr. Holt: The hon. Gentleman is not really suggesting that cheaper eggs in this country are a result of the efficiency of the producer? It is because of the subsidy.
Mr. Hurd: I stated as a fact, and it is a fact which I will confirm, if the hon. Gentleman did not hear it the first time. that eggs are cheaper in this country today than in Western Germany and Belgium. Otherwise, Danish eggs would be sent here rather than to other continental countries. That is what I said, and I repeat it for the benefit of the Liberal Party.
The taxpayer will benefit under this Scheme more than by the continuance of State trading in eggs. No blank cheque is to be given the producer. Indeed, we are in no danger of blank cheques being given to the producers either of milk or eggs. With eggs. as with the scheme for milk, the producer will have to match the market with efficiency and economy in the distribution of eggs to the consumers and by better salesmanship. If they make a good and economical job of it, they will score; if not, they will fall down. I think that that is right, and the Government will not have to underpin all the weak places in the distributive system. Part of that will have to be done by the producers themselves.
There is no question at all of a monopoly. The producer who does not want to sell his eggs through the Scheme need not do so. He can hawk them
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direct to the consumer, as I used to do before the war, or sell them to a retailer. In this Scheme there is no monopoly affecting the producers and, certainly, there is no monopoly affecting the consumers. They can buy direct from the producers, or go to a retail shop that buys direct from the producers. They need not necessarily buy eggs which have passed through what I prefer to call testing stations. On all those counts I am sure that we are right to send this Scheme on its way with our almost. if not complete, universal blessing.
10.45 p.m.
Mr. F. Beswick: My right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) amused himself by poking fun at some of the objectors to this Scheme, but the fact. is that, apart from the people whom he listed, every conceivable interest in this industry also lodged objections. They ranged from the producers, the packers and the retailers to the consumers. Interests representing more than half the total retail trade, who do know something about eggs, objected to the Scheme.
The Commissioner himself said, in paragraph 45 of the Report:
"Accepting as I do, that the absence of competition, the denial of choice to the housewife and the difficulties of enforcing the present Scheme are valid objections and are not outweighed by any of the advantages claimed by the promoters, the easy course is to report against the Scheme as a whole."
Tonight, however, we have the Scheme before us. One would have thought that, against all the conglomeration of objections, there would be some very urgent and compelling reason for the Minister to introduce the Scheme in the face of these doubts and objections. The fact is that there is no crisis facing the industry, such as those which faced other sections of the agriculture industry in the 'twenties and 'thirties, about which my right hon. Friend spoke.
The Minister himself indicated the increase in total output. Over 60 per cent. of home-produced eggs already go to the packing stations. As has been said, there are now 666 separate packing stations compared with 200 just before the war. Probably the most remarkable feature of the whole business has been the growth of the voluntary agricultural producer cooperatives, which now handle over 40 per cent. of the eggs which go from the packing or testing stations. In addition, the

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Co-operative Wholesale Society, which also knows something about this and also objected to the Scheme, handles in its own packing stations an additional 3 per cent.
The industry has faced successfully competition from abroad, and today imports are negligible. Therefore, there is no question of this being an industry in decline. This is not a matter of an industry which has to be rescued from depression. I accept the point made by the Liberal Party and by spokesmen of the Conservative Party that a voluntary organisation with self-help and initiative is better than compulsion, and in this industry self help has been going from strength to strength.
Why at this stage, therefore, do we have to bring in a Scheme which vests most extraordinary powers in the hands of this board? No indication has so far been given of the administrative expense of the structure which it is proposed to set up. We ought to have more information about that. The point I wish to make is that, on the basis of the pre-war history of the industry, we should have tried a little longer and a little harder to encourage the voluntary principle. It was the voluntary principle which existed in the agricultural co-operatives in the two countries to which one of my hon. Friends referred. He might also have mentioned, beside Holland and Denmark, New Zealand, where the voluntary agricultural principle has been encouraged and has been most successful.
Mr. Philips Price: But they were working for an export market. They had not got a market like the one we have. There is a great difference.
Mr. Beswick: I should have thought that it would have been easier to organise one's home market than to organise against competition overseas.
Mr. Philips Price: No.
Mr. Beswick: The fact is that in this country, organising for the home market, the voluntary principle has been expanding successfully, and it seems to me wrong to suggest that the alternative to the proposed Scheme is chaos. The Commissioner was quite categorical about this and said in page 19 of the Report,
"I fail to see any danger of a return to pre-war conditions if the present arrangements continue."
That seems to be the opinion of many people.
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I also speak as a member of the Cooperative Movement. I am not opposed to orderly marketing—not at all. Nor do I want to see a return to laissez-faire. I do not want to see low prices for the consumer at the expense of the producer. It seems to me that a lesson which we have learned not only in this country, but throughout the world, is that in the long run it is in the interests of the consumer equally with the producer that the producer should get a fair price. What we do not want are the booms and slumps. We want the orderly marketing of tested and graded eggs.
If it is accepted that it is in the interests of the consumer as much as the producer that these things shall be arranged, why do we want a board of this kind? Why does the Minister put forward proposals for an organisation which is to be controlled by a board of which 17 of the 21 members shall be elected by the producers themselves and only four appointed by the Minister? How can we persist in arguing that this is a national industry which has a national service to perform when it is to be controlled by a narrow sectional interest, admirable as that interest may be?
No one would for a moment seek to justify this kind of representation in a manufacturing industry. It is simply that we have a hang-over from a period when sympathies were with the depressed agricultural industry of the 'twenties and 'thirties. We are today operating in a different kind of world from the world of those days; there is a different economic situation. We should make an adjustment accordingly.
If the producers are to be encouraged and helped to organise their own industry, why arm them with these powers of compulsion over their fellows? As the Commissioner said, in page 18:
"If the packing station egg is as good as the promoters and the trade say, it is bound to succeed given the present prohibition of wholesaling, and the packers will consolidate their position and advance rather than break down."
The very fact that these powers of compulsion are needed seems to me to be a criticism of or lack of faith in the Scheme. We should be relying for some time longer, I feel, on the voluntary organisation.
Reference was made by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) to the penalties which are to be exercised

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by the disciplinary board. I cannot imagine why we made such a fuss under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act about giving power to members of a trade court to impose a fine on their fellows when here, by Statute, we are giving some producers, responsible to no one but themselves, the possibility of imposing a fine of up to £100 plus half the price of the eggs which any offending producer might have sold. These are extraordinary powers, with no right of appeal to the courts at all.
I sympathise with those independently-minded producers who also object to the Scheme but who, in seeking A licences or B licences, are still compelled to make all such detailed returns to the board, who, incidentally, are their competitors. That seems to be quite wrong.
I do not want to go into a lot of detailed criticism. One could make a lot of the difficulties of enforcement. I must say that I do not see how many people are to be required to go round checking up on this number of 50—and not just 50 birds, but 50 birds of a special age. They must be over six months old. That work will entail a lot of waste of administrative manpower at a time when we can ill afford it.
While I am on the point of administration, can the Minister give any assurance that the levy of ½d. a dozen on sales will be adequate for the future? Does he really think that that will be the maximum amount which the board will need to raise for administrative purposes? I rather fancy that before so very long it will want to increase that maximum.
Reference has also been made to the board's improving the efficiency of production, but there is absolutely nothing in the Scheme to indicate that it will engage in any sort of research. It is not, apparently, to be empowered itself to produce eggs, which would give it the facilities to carry out research. The board is empowered to do a lot of things, but the power to engage in useful and necessary research for efficient production and improvement of the quality of eggs—research which probably could not be carried out by the rest of the industry—does not seem to be vested in the board. I should like the Minister to tell us whether he envisages that the board will carry out that kind of research.
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I want to say something about the argument used against the voluntary principle. As I understand, the main argument used against continuing a voluntary co-operative system is that there would be no power to ensure a steady flow of eggs through the packing stations throughout the year. That has been answered in part by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price). Recent history has indicated that the peaks have been ironed out; that it is possible to eliminate, to some extent, the flush period. The ratio between flush and lean period is now about 2 to 1, as against the former 4 to 1.
It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that there will be this readiness to go to the packing stations in the flush period with a surplus of eggs, and then to sell outside in the free market in the lean season. But even if that is not so, can the Joint Parliamentary Secretary say whether he is quite satisfied that under the present Scheme there will not be this same problem? The A and B licence holders, I understand, can still send their surplus eggs to the packing stations in the flush period. If so, we are facing the problem of the flush period in any case, even though we do vest the board with all these powers of compulsion and consequent penalties.
I come to the initial poll. I believe that if this Scheme were put to a free vote of the House—we have had objections from the Liberal, the Conservative and the Labour benches—it is doubtful whether it would be approved. Even if it is approved, it will still have to go to the industry. Can the Parliamentary Secretary tell us the conditions under which the producers will be asked to vote? Will it be made clear to them that they are not voting for or against a guaranteed price? Will they be told what the alternative to the Scheme will be? Will the Minister assure them that the alternative to it is not the complete elimination of the guaranteed price?
If they have that assurance, I think that it is quite probable that the producers themselves will not give it the necessary two-thirds majority. As there is this doubt in the industry itself, as there have been doubts expressed by the retailers and by the representatives of the consumers, it seems to me that the

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House ought not readily to approve the Scheme in the first place.
11.0 p.m.
Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I apologise for intervening and detaining the House even for a few minutes, but there are one or two points which I should like to have clarified.
I am surprised at the speech of the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick). He did not appear to me to like anything at all under the Scheme or outside it. He hated booms and slumps. He did not seem to like any form of organisation.
Mr. Beswick: I said that I favoured the extension of the voluntary system of agricultural co-operatives. If that is not enough, I would have gone on to say, had there been time, that I prefer the independent marketing commission.
Sir I. Orr-Ewing: What we are surely doing is to examine as a House, first. whether there is anything in this Scheme contrary to the public interest. I must say, having examined this matter, and having heard all the arguments inside the House and outside, that I cannot say that I see anything within the Scheme which is contrary to the public interest. I cannot see that the consumer stands at risk. Therefore, I do not think that on that ground I could possibly oppose the Scheme.
Secondly, we have to examine whether minorities among egg producers are likely to be bullied or to find life intolerable, or whether they are likely to be enforced into a straitjacket within which they find they cannot earn a living. There again, I think the safeguards are fairly secure. Surely that is a matter upon which the producers themselves have to vote.
In principle, the machinery of this Scheme would appear to me—and I am not an egg producer—to safeguard the interests of the minority, or the small men, call them what we may. I do not think that anything that has been said or written on this matter would confound that argument.
There are two right hon. Gentlemen in the House at present who know a lot about marketing schemes. I myself was at one time in the position of what used to be described by the late Mr. Maxton as neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good red herring. I happened to be Parliamentary
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Private Secretary to a previous Minister of Agriculture. We were greatly interested in the development of improved marketing schemes. One can take it as a fairly good axiom that those schemes which have been initiated in the way that these schemes were gradually evolved, not only by Ministers but by the House as a whole, have been evolved along sane lines, and we have arrived at the position where the producer cannot hold the consumer to ransom. That was the danger about any form of marketing scheme at all, and in that respect we are fairly assured.
There is one other small point that I should like to raise. When these schemes are put before the public and appear before the House, surely they should be so devised and drafted that they can be clearly understood by everybody. The drafting of some of these paragraphs confounds my imagination. We find an alarming statement in page 14, where the sub-heading immediately above paragraph 44 has the sinister wording, "Partners, deaths. etc" That really is a most extraordinary juxtaposition of words.
Are not those words worthy of differentiation? I should have thought so. I hope that there are some hon. Members here who are partners. I hope that everybody within the Scheme will be a partner. To say "Partners, deaths, etc." seems to be a very peculiar way of describing the matter. I cannot understand it.
Then, again, there is an important paragraph at the bottom of page 22—paragraph 73 (2). I do not know whether anyone has read that carefully, but if any small producer can understand it then he deserves to be not a small producer but one of the biggest in the country—the sort of I.C.I of egg producers. This is how it reads:
"All the provisions of sub-paragraphs (2) to (8). both inclusive, of paragraph 70 shall apply to Producer's B Licences as they apply to Producer's A Licences so, however, that the Board shall from time to time prescribe the forms of application for a Producer's B Licence and for the renewal thereof which forms shall require the applicant to specify therein the names and addresses of the persons to whom at the date of the application he proposes to sell under the licence."
It is perfectly clear to anyone who drafts that, clear to the Department and to the Minister. But I hope that he will explain it to the small egg producer. It is rather a shame, because they are people for whom we have the greatest

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sympathy, and I beg that when these schemes are drafted a form of words will be devised which the lawyers will not understand but the laymen will.
11.6 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Moyle: For some years I have looked with a great deal of interest on the fights that took place between what one might describe as the "Divi." members and the other members of the Labour Party, headed by the present Lord Quibell and my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams), against the present Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough, who was then the esteemed leader of the Cooperative Party. With the legislation before us tonight, due entirely to the Minister of Agriculture, we have had a return to the conflict between the consumers' and producers' interests, represented here by the Co-operative Party and by the Minister on behalf of the Tory Party.
One of the astonishing things about this House is that one never knows what will happen. Here we have the Minister of Agriculture, with his devastating charm, selling to the Tory Party the art of snooping and the principle of the "closed shop". And the Conservative Party has swallowed it, bell, book and candle, with one or two minor exceptions, unlike the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leominster (Mr. Baldwin).
I have been an advocate of the closed shop for the trade union movement for a lifetime, yet here is the Minister of Agriculture supporting the principle of the closed shop. The only reservation he makes is that he is quite prepared to allow a few free producers to exist by means of the Egg Marketing Scheme on the clear understanding that they do not get the benefit of the subsidy—that is, those who are in receipt of or possessing 50 head of poultry. If they want to opt out they can do it, but they do not get the subsidy.
In principle, I am all in favour of orderly marketing. I have always stood for reasonable security for the producer. and a fair deal for the consumer. I do not think that I am quite as capable of pursuing the middle road, with the same arts and graces, as the hon. Member who spoke for the Liberal Party
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tonight, the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade). The way he steered between sin on one side and virtue on the other was absolutely amazing.
This Scheme has an astonishing amount of machinery about it, and I should like to know whether the Minister can bring the cumbersome machinery by which the Scheme is to be operated within something like measurable proportions. We have the board; we have the joint consultative committee; we have the advisory committees; we have a general election scheme here and we have the returning officer. We have all these officials running about for the board, the advisory committees and the joint consultative committee. I should think there must be about 400 officials provided for in this Scheme.
The Minister, who is not very keen on inspection, although he has come down 100 per cent. in favour of it tonight in this Scheme, is to provide an army of inspectors. My right hon. Friend said there were about 800,000 poultry keepers. I understand that in this Scheme there will be about 300,000 poultry keepers. It will be an arduous and costly job to go about inspecting making sure that they are all keeping their accounts and books properly and doing everything they must do to fulfil the conditions for receiving their licences under the Scheme. The job will require an army of inspectors.
Particularly in view of the appeal that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made for everybody to be engaged in productive work, I would ask the Minister to look at the Scheme again with a view to simplifying the machinery, and to making it less profitable for unproductive officials, because they constitute an on-cost upon the work of the producers. What is certain about this Scheme is that it will provide a considerable number of people with nonproductive employment.
It will certainly mean that the packing stations will be secure in their profits. In passing, I would support the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) in his suggestion that the stations should be described as testing stations and not as packing stations, because, after all, testing is the main function for which they exist.

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What do the Government get out of it? The Minister is pursuing for eggs the same policy as is pursued by the Minister of Housing and Local Government for housing. That Minister says to the nation, "Let us knock politics out of housing by foisting the responsibility for the provision of houses entirely upon the local authorities." The Minister of Agriculture says, "Let us knock politics out of the subsidy," and places the whole responsibility for administering the subsidy upon the board. Therefore, any criticism to be sustained for administering the subsidy will in future be borne by the board and not by him.
One of the defects of the Scheme is that the control breaks down at the point of the first sale. There is no further control by the board after that, though the eggs have still to pass from the retailers to the consumers. Will the Joint Parliamentary Secretary answer this question? How will the consumer get fresher eggs than now, if this Scheme is adopted? I ask because one of the leading members of the board said the other day that if the housewife knew her job she would not buy an egg that was less than ten days old. That is a reasonable paraphrase of what he said. If that is the language used by a present member of the board, it does not encourage us to expect the consumers will get fresher eggs from the producers than they do at present.
11.15 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Willey: I see that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary is anxious to reply, and I want to ask him a few questions calculated to embarrass him before he does so. First, is there any hidden significance in these proposals? The reason I ask is that, on page 31 of his Report, the Commissioner says:
"Another line of criticism is that this Scheme is merely the flag flying before the launching of a Fatstock Marketing Scheme. A statement publicised as coming from the N.F.U. since the Inquiry seems to establish that this allegation is a fact."
If we look at the statement issued by the National Farmers' Unions, we see that in answer to Question 3—
"Why have a scheme?—"
the National Farmers' Unions say:
"No scheme means … the guaranteed weekly price will go and be replaced by some form of deficiency payments to the industry as
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a whole. This is bound to be unsatisfactory for producers—look at what has happened with fat cattle."
Is this the first sound of the bugles in retreat? Are the Government admitting that their policy has been disastrous to the producers and that we are now to get a new policy with regard to the payment of the guarantees to the producers; or does the Minister find himself once again in disagreement with the National Farmers' Unions?
I ask the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to deal with another problem. What about the egg and poultry industry? The Minister mentioned the present price of eggs. What is the effect upon the subsidy? Can the hon. Gentleman tell the House the Government's attitude towards the egg subsidy? Will they allow the egg subsidy to run up to sustain a lower retail price? This is a matter of vital importance to the industry just at present.
One has only to look at the general census figures to realise that the industry may be facing difficulties similar to those now facing the milk producers. Those affected are entitled to know the attitude of the Government towards the industry and whether the Government are prepared, through the subsidy, to sustain a retail price which will enable the industry to face any difficulties it may face in the flush of next year. In view of this, I should have thought we would have heard more from the right hon. Gentleman about the problems of the egg and poultry industry, and that we might have heard something about the progress being made in the industry in technology and the economics of industry, but of that we have heard nothing.
We know that the promoters are making a point about pooled transport costs. I do not wish to discuss the merits of that proposal, but I would like to have heard the Minister's view about it. Is it his view that the outlying producer should be supported in this way, or does he believe that the time has come when we should think more broadly, perhaps, of supporting the outlying producer for social and broad agricultural reasons?
The Minister touched upon the vital question of the subsidy and referred briefly to the enabling clause. It is true that it does not appear in the Scheme as it appears before the House tonight, but we are obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for telling us what he has in

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mind. I, for one, felt that what he told us was most unsatisfactory. I can imagine that the Treasury feels some relief that it has a Scheme which can be said to provide some incentive to the packing stations to get the best out of the market, but we know how the Scheme would have acted adversely against the subsidy had it been in operation in previous years. The subsidy would, in fact, have been £6 million more in the last year for which we have the out-turn figures. I should have thought the Minister would have dealt with that point also.
Quite apart from that and the fact that the Scheme shows itself, in the light of current experience, to be expensive, I should have thought that the Minister's common sense would have told him that any subsidy payment based on this estimated realisation price over the year is a had formula and that it provides every inducement to create a pessimistic outlook on the figures for the coming year. It is a very inefficient way of calculating the subsidy.
The Minister knows that many people, in particular the Committee on Public Accounts, have criticised the present system of distribution of the subsidy. I am not criticising the packing stations as such when I join with the Committee on Public Accounts in its criticisms. But surely, in view of the constant, reiterated criticisms of that Committee, the Minister and his Joint Parliamentary Secretary would agree that it does not meet that criticism merely to preserve the status quo, for that is what the Scheme does in the system of payments. All the administrative criticisms which were made remain, because the administration remains the same. I should have thought that the right hon. Gentleman would have dealt with that cardinal point.
We all know that during the operation of the interim scheme there have been violent fluctuations in price. Does the present Scheme offer any better guarantee against those fluctuations? We all must recognise that considerable profits have been made by people who held stocks in the light of these fluctuations. The right hon. Gentleman has not told us of any way in which he will satisfy the public—for public money is involved here—that the holding of stocks shall not be used by individual packers and whole-
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salers to their great profit. I should have thought that the right hon. Gentleman, in the light of this experience, would have been bound to say that we on this side of the House have been right in our constant argument that the only way to make these guaranteed payments is by fixed floor prices, with seasonal variations, paid on grading.
I emphasise the financial side, because we ought to know that it was because of these financial arrangements that the Scheme was brought forward. We know that the Scheme did not come into being on the initiative of the National Farmers' Union. It came in reply to the Minister's proposal that there should be deficiency payments. I should have thought that the Minister would have endeavoured to satisfy the House about these financial arrangements, since they involve a very substantial subsidy.
We on this side of the House, of course, accept the packing station structure. We accept the need to improve the marketing arrangements. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) pointed out, we have been consistently in favour, and remain in favour, of producer marketing boards. This was expressly stated in our election programme at the last General Election. I would say to those of my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite who have criticised this Scheme that we should remember that it is appearing against the background of guaranteed prices. Whether there be a scheme or not, or in spite of a scheme, the producer is to be entitled to his guaranteed prices. Therefore, we should not be extravagant in making allegations against the producer in this case.
It is also a fact that the Labour Party proposed an egg commission. I again emphasise that an egg commission does not rule out a producer board. The proposal for an egg commission was made only because of the functions. An egg commission might affect the scope of the functions of a producer board, but it was proposed not because of any opposition to a producer board, but because it was thought that here were functions which could not be exercised by a producer board.
I call the attention of the House to the very wise words used by the then

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Minister of Agriculture in a debate in 1938. when he said:
"Such a large proportion of individual poultry-keepers are in a small way of business, however, that the regulation of marketing under a producers' marketing scheme would present a very formidable task; moreover, it is doubtful whether a producers' marketing scheme would be the most effective, or indeed, the most appropriate, machinery for securing, for example, the standardisation of grades. since this is an object which necessarily involves the regulation of marketing practices in the wholesale and retail distributive trades."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11 th July, 1938; Vol. 338, c. 904.]
I will at once concede that the same position does not obtain today, but those grounds are still valid.
It is for those reasons that we proposed that for certain functions a commission would be required. There is also the matter of the subsidy, about which we have had no satisfactory explanation from the Minister. I am certainly not satisfied by what has been said that this is the most efficient or effective way of administering the subsidy.
There is the further difficult question of variable supplies subject to seasonal fluctuations. I entirely accept the right hon. Gentleman's argument that the fluctuations are upon a very sensitive market. It is for that reason that we have to envisage some control over supplies, whether imported or home produced. Imported supplies have for the moment become such a minor part of our total supplies that we should be prepared to safeguard ourselves against the importation of supplies having an abnormal effect on the market at home. Home supplies pose the same problem of providing some machinery for removing temporary surpluses from the market. It is because either of those actions would affect and would be calculated to affect the retail prices that it is at any rate arguable that these are matters which would be better handled by a commission.
I emphasise that it is for those reasons that a proposal for a commission has been put forward and not because of any innate allergy towards a producer board. On the contrary, we have supported a producer board and we can envisage within the commission a place for a producer board for eggs. What we are considering, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley said earlier, is something different. We are considering the role
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of the producer board where we have no commission and where we have an utter absence of Government policy, an absolutely negative attitude from the Government showing, to quote the hon. and gallant Member for South Angus (Captain Duncan), that the Government are out of the egg business.
The Government still have a responsibility if only because of the subsidy. They have a responsibility to the producers in any case. It is because we have to face this position that we have some very real doubts about the efficacy of the present proposals. I have some very real doubts about the Commissioner's Report. I concede that it is very entertaining, but I find that on important issues it is lacking in consistency. It is unfortunate that the Government have done worse than accept the Commissioner's recommendations—they have gone further.
We have to recognise that if the purpose of this Scheme—and this is the purpose put forward by the promoters—is to encourage—we do not want to exaggerate too much the element of compulsion—the recognition and acceptance of a standardised article, the graded egg, and so encourage its consumption, it is unfortunate that the present Scheme provides for such a wide measure of exemption. After all, at present one-third of the aggs do not go through the packing stations. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro) is not present in the Chamber, but we have had the comparison, odious though it be, continually made between the fresh egg and the graded egg. This is likely to be aggravated if the number of birds is to be increased to 50 and we have A and B licences which the producer can obtain as of right.
I regret to say that I am not overenthusiastic about advertising. The milk advertising campaign has not succeeded. The consumption of milk has fallen this year. The Milk Marketing Board may say, and one cannot dispute it, that, but for the advertising campaign, the fall would have been greater. As a consumer I see appeals to eat fish, drink beer and drink milk, and now it will be to eat eggs. These appeals, as a totality, have little effect on me. Some advertisements I prefer more than others. I very much like the Milk Marketing Board's advertisement of an attractive young lady

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drinking milk, but I judge these advertisement on artistic grounds rather than on consumer merit. We can exaggerate too much the effect of advertising.
We support this Scheme, we do not oppose it. We wish the producers good luck. We hope that they can inculcate into the market a sense of greater orderliness and we hope the producers will appreciate the importance of a recognised standard egg. But at the same time we are disheartened by the fact that the Government have shown an entirely negative attitude to the problems of the industry, problems both of production and distribution. They have produced a Scheme which, to me at any rate, appears to be inadequate and not calculated to attain the object of broadly gaining the acceptance of a quality standard for eggs; nor for improving the speedy and efficient distribution of eggs.
The real failure of the Government—and it is why I began with my first question—is to do anything to restore the disturbance which has come to the agricultural industry.
Mr. Hurd: Oh, no.
Mr. Willey: That is the real failure of the Government.
I have read the long-term policy, and I can understand the relief of the members of the National Farmers' Union at being told that their income will decrease only by a certain amount each year. I should have thought that in other circumstances it would have been a statement regarded as far from encouraging. It is because it has been so regarded that we can appreciate the disturbance at present existing in this industry, and unfortunately this Scheme will do nothing to relieve it. While we accept and do not oppose this Scheme, we can only say that we are disappointed that the Government still maintain a negative attitude and have not taken a positive and strong attitude towards this vital and important industry.
11.35 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. G. R. H. Nugent): We have had a very interesting debate during which a variety of views have been put from all sides of the House. I will endeavour to pick up as many points as I can in making a reply.
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First, in replying to the hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey), I really feel that perhaps the night has been wearing on a little for him and that he has been dreaming. The agricultural industry is not in a disturbed state at the present time. It has never been more optimistic. I have no time to go far into the general picture there—and I think I might be ruled out of order if I did—but it would be one which would be entirely creditable to the Government.
The answer to the specific point which he made about payment of the deficiency payment on eggs, if the retail price runs lower than was estimated, is that we shall meet it. We are indeed doing so now, and we shall implement the price guarantee as we made it at the last Price Review. With regard to pooled transport costs, our view is neutral. That is why we agreed to the Scheme carrying a provision which leaves it for the producers to decide for themselves. If those with the lighter costs wish to help out those with the heavier costs, we feel that it is up to them to decide.
No financial agreement could be made until a Scheme has been brought into operation and a board has come into being. As soon as the board has been constituted, the details of the arrangement will be settled. My right hon. Friend gave the outline. When that is done, a Section 4 Order under the 1947 Agriculture Act will be brought before the House in order to implement that agreement, so the House will have full opportunity to debate it. The financial arrangement which my right hon. Friend outlined is really a very sound one, and I feel that the hon. Member did not give it sufficient thought. My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) referred to it. This profit-sharing arrangement is a thoroughly good one in giving the producers a direct incentive on the one hand to get the maximum efficiency in marketing and, on the other hand, to get the best they can out of the market. I think that if the hon. Member looks into it more closely he will see that it is sound.
I turn to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick), who asked a series of questions. The levy can be raised above ½d. only by the resolution of the producers

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at an annual general meeting. If they wish to spend more of their own money in that way that is up to them. I should think it is very unlikely that the board will need more, or, indeed, that the producers would be willing to vote for more. because for anything that the board has extra the producers will get less.
The board can promote research. That is provided for in the Scheme. On the question of A and B licence holders sending the balance of their eggs to the packing stations, they can do so. That answers the question of the hon. Member for Oldbury and Halesowen (Mr. Moyle). All producers can send eggs to the packing stations and get the benefit of the guaranteed price, whenever they want to. That includes those with fifty hens and under. Those with fifty and under would probably not be registered, because they do not come within the terms of the Scheme: but they could, if they wish, send their eggs to the packing stations whenever they want to.
Mr. Moyle: Not if they sell direct. They do not get the subsidy.
Mr. Nugent: If they sell direct to consumers they do not get the subsidy, but if they sell partially to consumers and send the rest to the packing stations they get the benefit of it.
Mr. Beswiek: If the A and B licence holders can send their surplus in the flush period, how will the Scheme fulfil the vital requirement of enabling a steady flow to the packing stations?
Mr. Nugent: As with any scheme of this kind, it is a matter of trying to get a reasonable balance between the technical optimum and the human optimum. One must have reasonable flexibility in the Scheme. In fact, the volume of eggs that these people handle is not so big, in our judgment, that it would seriously disturb the flow in the packing stations. We feel that in the interests of providing flexibility and giving freedom to those who wish to sell either direct to consumers or to retailers, that provision should be in. I think that it will operate satisfactorily.
Mr. Baldwin: My hon. Friend said that a producer with less than fifty hens would be entitled to send eggs to the packing stations, but surely he would have to be licensed. He could not send the eggs unless he were licensed.
Mr. Nugent: Yes he could. He would be able to send his eggs to the packing station and he would come on the books of the packing station, but he would probably not be registered and he would not be licensed. He would be outside the Scheme.
Replying to the Question concerning what the producers will be voting on, I have here a copy of the form they will be voting on; it is on the back of the draft Scheme, and I hope that it sets the matter out in a neutral fashion. I do not doubt that the promoters will handle it in a neutral way as well.
Turning to some of the remarks made earlier in the debate, the right hon. Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams) gave full and round support for the Scheme, which I welcome. I am sure that will help it on its way. His reference to the 1931 Act called to my mind a point made later by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price). If the Tories had opposed it. undoubtedly the Liberals must have supported it. It must have been embarrassing therefore to the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) and his hon. Friends this evening when they found themselves, if not opposing the Scheme, definitely out of sympathy with it. Lest they feel any embarrassment, let me remind them that in the debates on the 1931 Marketing Act, the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) voted for the Bill on Second Reading and against it on Third Reading. In the words of the hon. Member for Oldbury and Halesowen, he steered the traditional Liberal path between sin and perdition. I hope that the hon. Members now feel comfortable again.
The complaint of the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West about male birds being included in the number of 50 is not, I think, one of substance. Birds are very rarely fattened over the age of six months. if one male were there he would be there for breeding purposes; and if, as in the case quoted, he had 50 hens, he would be pretty busy, too. He would well deserve to be counted in.
The hon. Member for Uxbridge asked about the position of a producer who had been fined. He asked whether he had a right of appeal. He has a right of appeal on points of law to a court of law. On

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the amount of the fine, he has a right of appeal to arbitration. That is in the Scheme.
A number of hon. Members on both sides of the House, including my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Baldwin) and the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East (Mr. Coldrick) objected, as indeed did hon. Members on the Liberal benches, to the general structure, with inspectors, arrangements for private courts and fines. The fact is, as the Commissioner recognised, that these are essential to a marketing scheme, and if the House decided that there should be a marketing scheme, it would be inoperable without such arrangements as those, which are common to all other marketing schemes.
Mr. J. E. S. Simon: There is a reference in Clause 85 (2) to an independent person. Does my hon. Friend envisage that the independent person, as chairman, will be paid by the board or will be a really independent person?
Mr. Nugent: I am afraid that I cannot give my hon. and learned Friend immediate an immediate answer to the question, who pays the legally qualified chairman of the disciplinary committee, but I will let him know as soon as I can.
I wished to address myself briefly to the issue whether or not there is a case for a marketing scheme. The fact is that today my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is responsible for the various authorities which are controlling the marketing of eggs. Paying the minimum guaranteed price to producers, enforcing the grading and quality regulations, guiding and, to some extent, controlling the flow of eggs on to the market, trading in eggs through N.E.D.A.L., and dealing with surplus eggs—all these things are done by the Government. If they were not, the situation would be quite different. This, I think, answers the hon. Member for Uxbridge who asked: why take any action at all—there is no crisis in the industry?
There is not, it is true, but we in the Government, and, indeed, on the whole of this side, do not believe that it is the right function for Government to carry out this particular work. We believe
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that the time has come when some other arrangements should be made to put it on a permanently satisfactory basis. There is, therefore, really a necessity to put something in its place if we are to maintain the present system, which is indeed working very well. The question is, then; what are we to put in its place —a marketing authority, or what else?
My hon. Friend has referred to the very large numbers of small units—and that has been commented on on both sides of the House—and the necessity for an organisation of some kind. About one-third of the eggs are consumed locally and sold from the farms, and about two-thirds go through packing stations. That represents about 20 million eggs a day, a pretty formidable number. Those are the eggs that go to the urban populations.
To keep this operation moving smoothly certain basic things are necessary. The first and most essential is sale by description; that is to say, the eggs must be graded for weight and quality-tested, so that the wholesalers, packers and retailers can sell them over the telephone and refer with confidence to what they have, and both parties know exactly what they are dealing with. The alternative would be that they would have to buy by actually viewing each consignment. If eggs are to be sold in these very large numbers they must be quality-tested and graded for weight. If one looks back to the pre-war system where a very large number of English eggs were not so treated, one sees the highly disorganised condition and the lower price the English egg usually commanded in relation to the imported egg, which was always graded for weight and quality-tested and, therefore, made a higher price than did ours.
Second, the Government subsidy should be paid only on first-quality eggs. They must be good, wholesome eggs and of reasonable size. Once again, we must test them and weigh them in order to ensure that. Thirdly, the Government guarantee, the price paid weekly to each producer, does need some kind of long stop buying if it is to be implemented by all packing stations. There must be a central buyer willing to take off the hands of the packing stations eggs which they cannot shift, at a price sufficient to return the guaranteed price to producers. I

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therefore think the case is really unanswerable that there must be a central authority for the marketing of eggs if we are to retain a structure which is reasonably orderly and which will, on the one hand, give a fair price to producers and, on the other, a satisfactory supply to consumers.
Mr. Holt: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not leave that point without dealing with the very important matter raised, I think, by his hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Baldwin) with regard to the voluntary co-operative schemes. The hon. Member recalled that before the war there were these schemes, that they had increased in number and were working satisfactorily. Obviously, there is great advantage if they can be further increased. Have the Government not considered whether they cannot further encourage voluntary co-operative schemes, and whether they would not do the job just as well?
Mr. Nugent: I will deal with the hon. Gentleman's point in a minute. I just wanted to go on to deal with the question: why have a marketing board? But before I do so, I should like to inform my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon)— now that I have been made expert on the matter—that the chairman of the Disciplinary Committee would be paid by the board, but his appointment must be approved by the Minister. I think that I can give my hon. and learned Friend the assurance that we should certainly see that the chairman was a man of proper standing and integrity, and so would, indeed, be independent.
Returning to the general argument, the exemptions that my right hon. Friend described in his opening speech would satisfy most people, I think—although I realise not everybody—that we have made it possible for a producer, who wishes to sell retail to consumers or to retailers in his neighbourhood, to do so, and we have given a fair degree of flexibility even to the point of incurring some criticism from the hon. Member for Sunderland, North that we have gone too far. I think that as we have got criticism from both sides, we are probably about right.
Mr. Moyle: Would it be correct to say that under the Scheme the aggrieved person would have the right of choice of the
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arbitrator? Is it an agreed choice between the board and the producer?
Mr. Nugent: I think the answer is yes. If agreement cannot be reached, the arbitrator is appointed by the Minister. That is the normal machinery for arbitrations.
I think I have dealt with the questions that arose on exemptions. I would make one point on the question of licences. I rather fear that nothing that I say will completely convince the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East. Before coming to the debate this evening I read his speech in 1950 on the subject of the Tomato and Cucumber Marketing Board, and I notice that he put very similar arguments tonight, but with no less conviction.
Mr. Coldrick: I am waiting for the reply.
Mr. Nugent: The only additional thing he mentioned was an extra 1 million members of the Co-operative Movement.
Mr. Coldrick: That is correct. The Co-operative Movement is not static; it is progressive. It has increased by 1 million since that occasion.
Mr. Nugent: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on the membership increasing to about 12 million.
To return to the point of licences, he wondered whether the holder of an A or B licence would be troubled with conditions which made the licence useless to him. He certainly cannot be. The Scheme is specific there. The main conditions that he may be required to observe are, if he has a B licence, that he must mark the eggs—but not grade them—and he may be required to keep a record of his sales of eggs and some accounts. Those are perfectly reasonable things. A B licence-holder will be required to keep a record of the retailers to whom he sells. None of those things will stop a man who wishes to sell in that way.
The general arrangements that we have made follow the Commissioner's recommendations, and to some extent go further, but I think the general feeling in the House is that they are sufficiently flexible to meet all reasonable considerations.
The point at which compulsion applies is the sale to wholesalers. There were

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several inquiries about this matter, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster who asked why it was necessary. The answer is that if it is left optional to producers whether they will sell to the packing station—that is to say, to the board in future—our old friend the higgler appears. As some hon. Members have said—the bon. Member for Gloucestershire, West referred to it particularly—he offers producers a shade over the odds on a rising market. He takes the eggs to the towns, mixes them up and sells them as being full-sized eggs. He does rather well out of the retailer.
The result is that when the customer buys the eggs, she is short-weighted because she gets mixed eggs instead of full-sized eggs. Then when eggs are plentiful he does not come to collect and the producer throws the eggs back on to the packing station. The packing station, if it is a small one, is flooded with eggs which it cannot get rid of, and very soon it is out of business. One reason why there were no more than about 200 packing stations before the war was the very large number that went out of business in just that way. I can remember any number. The strong ones, in areas around London, could manage all right, but people out in the rural districts could not stand up against this competition.
I think everyone familiar with the trade will agree that if there is to be a comprehensive packing station service for all producers throughout the country it has to remain obligatory, so that all producers who are not covered by the exemptions, to which I have referred, should sell to the board and not outside it for wholesale. The hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Baldock) referred to this, I thought, most convincingly, and I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster to think again about this and to look back at the pre-war experience. I feel certain he will see that there is great weight in that argument.
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Finally, the conclusion on this must be that producers cannot be free in this respect, except on the exemptions I have mentioned. So that brings one to the marketing board, and I do not think I need go over the alternative of the prewar Commission. The reason why we think a marketing board is best today is that we have got a comprehensive system of packing stations, so that there is a completely different situation to what there was in 1939. The marketing board has an advantage, particularly in dealing with matters like advertising, referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough, and by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West. Advertising is very much needed here, for a commodity which is competing with many other things. There is great scope for extending it, and there is no doubt that the board could do a big job in advertising. It could encourage prepackaging and could give greater consumer satisfaction in that way.
The safeguards are there, written into the Acts, on the one side for the consumer and the distributor and, on the other, the safeguards for the taxpayer are strengthened. by the financial agreement, which gives an incentive for the Board to get the best out of the market.
I feel that I can confidently ask the House to approve this Scheme. A central authority is needed for the marketing of eggs, to benefit producers and consumers. A Scheme of this kind involves producers in a large measure of discipline. We believe that self-discipline is best and that a producers' marketing board is the right body. I would therefore ask the House to approve the Scheme and to give producers a chance to vote on it themselves.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Draft British Egg Marketing Scheme, 1956, copy of which was laid before this House on 8th November, be approved.

WAYS AND MEANS
Considered in Committee.
[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

HYDROCARBON OIL DUTIES (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS AS TO TAXI FARES)
Resolved,
That, if any Act giving effect to a Resolution of the Committee of Ways and Means increases any of the Customs and Excise duties on hydrocarbon oils, petrol substitutes and spirits used for making power methylated spirits, the Act may include provision relaxing, in view of the increase in the said duties, any limitations imposed by byelaw on the charges which may be made for hackney carriages.—[Mr. H. Brooke.]
Resolution to be reported.
Report to be received Tomorrow; Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

TRANSPORT (RAILWAY FINANCES) [MONEY]
Resolution reported,
That for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to make temporary provision authorising the British Transport Commission to meet interest and other revenue charges by borrowing, to authorise advances out of the Consolidated Fund of sums so borrowed, and for purposes connected therewith, it is expedient to give authority as follows:—
1. It is expedient to authorize—

(a) such payments out of the Consolidated Fund as may be required to enable the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation to make to the British Transport Commission the advances mentioned below;

(b) the payment into the Exchequer of sums received by the Minister by way of repayment of or interest on any such advances, and the re-issue of those sums out of the Consolidated Fund, and their application in redemption or repayment of debt or, in so far as they represent interest, towards meeting such part of the annual charges for the national debt as represents interest;

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(c) the raising by the Treasury in any manner in which they are authorised to raise money under the National Loans Act, 1939, and the payment into the Exchequer, of any money needed for making any such payments out of the Consolidated Fund, or for repaying to the Consolidated Fund all or any part of those payments.

The advances above referred to are (subject to the provision made below)—

(i) such advances as the Minister may be empowered to make under section forty-two of the Finance Act, 1956, by any amendment of subsection (2) of section eighty-eight of the Transport Act, 1947, extending the purposes for which the Commission may borrow so as to include the payment of interest on capital moneys borrowed by the Commission for the purposes of British Railways in the year 1956 or any of the next nine years;

(ii) such advances as the Minister may be empowered to make under the Act of the present Session of sums required by the Commission (up to a limit of two hundred and fifty million pounds) for meeting any deficit on revenue account of British Railways for the year 1956 or any of the next six years, or of sums required by the Commission for the payment of interest (accruing in or before the year 1964) on advances which the Minister is empowered to make under that Act.

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) above moneys borrowed to repay any temporary borrowing shall be treated as borrowed for the purpose and at the time of the temporary borrowing, and references in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) above to the payment of interest or to meeting a deficit include references to the repayment of moneys temporarily borrowed to pay the interest or meet the deficit.
2. It is expedient to authorize—

(a) such payments out of the Consolidated Fund as may be required to enable the Treasury to fulfil any guarantee given under section ninety of the Transport Act, 1947, in relation to any British transport stock which the Commission may be empowered to issue by any such amendment of that Act as is mentioned in paragraph 1 (i) above;

(b) the payment into the Exchequer of sums received by the Treasury by way of repayment of or interest on money paid under any such guarantee.

Resolution agreed to.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (EDUCATION BRANCH OFFICERS)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Wills.]
12 midnight.
Mr. Eric Johnson: I should not have sought this opportunity to raise the question of the promotion prospects of squadron leaders in the Education Branch of the Royal Air Force, which question I have been pursuing for about a year in the various ways open to me—and I must apologise for doing so at this late hour—had it not been for the fact that we seem to be going backwards rather than forwards in this matter.
It was as long ago as 20th January that the Under-Secretary of State wrote to me to the effect that the Committee whose task it was to consider the problems of career planning was reviewing this question and that he was very conscious of the importance, in the interests of both the officers concerned and of the Royal Air Force as a whole, of reaching a fair solution of these problems. Then, on 7th August, the Secretary of State wrote to me and said he hoped the problem of promotion to wing commander could be considered in isolation and in advance of the general study which the Committee was making of the Education Branch. However, on 28th November. in reply to a Question which I put to him, he said the Committee had not completed its study of the Education Branch. and in reply to my supplementary question he said that the problem was not one of immediate urgency.
The state of affairs to which I want to draw attention concerns a number of those squadron leaders in the Education Branch of the Royal Air Force who joined between 1947 and 1950 and who attained the rank of squadron leader between 1950 and 1954. My complaint is that when they considered joining they were given to understand that their prospects of promotion were certainly reasonable, at least to the rank of wing commander. Those officers are now people in their early forties. It was not until they had been in the Branch a little time that they discovered the real position.
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The real position is that they will have to stay on until the maximum retiring age for squadron leaders, which is 53, in order to get their retired pay, and yet their prospects of improving their position by promotion during that time are virtually non-existent.
It is, of course, perfectly true that promotion in the Education Branch is by selection after attaining the rank of squadron leader, but I think it should be remembered that those squadron leaders who were promoted betwen 1950 and 1954 and who were granted permanent commissions about 1948 were post-war candidates, and in their selection it is true to say that the highest qualifications for any part of the scholastic profession outside the universities were demanded. Indeed. Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 200 said:
"The possession of a university decree (preferably with first-or second-class honours) will ordinarily be a requirement for appointment to a permanent commission."
The result is that there are about 58 of these men in this category. who are undoubtedly men of outstanding ability, and who ought not to be passed over, and yet many, indeed most, of them will never Bain promotion to the rank of wing commander and none of them to the rank of group captain.
I believe the reason for this long delay in promotion is to be found in the history of the Royal Air Force Education Branch. Prior to 1946 the Royal Air Force Education Service, as it was then called, was a civilian branch. It was paid according to the Burnham scale with certain modifications and with conditions appropriate to the Civil Service. When the Education Service became a uniformed branch of the Royal Air Force in 1946. however, those who had been recruited before the end of 1938 and who were still serving and were granted permanent commissions—this is the important part—all retained the existing Civil Service contract whereby they could remain in the Service until they reached the age of 60, irrespective of rank. That is the reason for the block in promotion, because the compulsory retiring age of other officers in the Education Branch is 57 in the case of a group captain, 55 for a wing commander, and 53 for a squadron leader or flight lieutenant.

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On 6th February this year, my hon. Friend wrote to me and stated that no officer had been denied promotion because of the category of officers who stayed on until they were 60 years of age. That may well be, but, whatever happened in the past, it seems to me perfectly certain that in the future the presence of these officers, who can remain until the age of 60, will block promotion to the rank of wing commander for all other categories of officer.
As I understand the position from Answers given to me and to various other hon. Members from time to time, there are now 42 wing commanders serving in the Education Branch of the Royal Air Force, 41 of whom can serve until they reach the age of 60. That in itself is an obvious block to promotion. because the normal retiring age for a wing commander is not 60, but 55.
I understand that there are likely to be some 36 vacancies for wing commanders over the next twelve years, but there are 143 squadron leaders. Twenty-nine of them. of seniority between 1946 and 1950. can go on serving until the age of 60, but there are about 58 in the category of which I am speaking, of seniority between 1950 and 1954, who are in virtually the same age groups as these other people and they retire at the normal age. It seems clear, therefore, that their chance of promotion before reaching the retiring age of 53 is very slender. As I have said, they are in their early forties. They are at an age when they feel that they must either get on or get out. I assure my hon. Friend that they would all infinitely prefer to get on, but the future seems to allow them no prospect of doing either. It is a matter of both justice and immediate urgency that these people should be told exactly their position and whether their prospects are good or bad.
So far, I have been trying to show that there is a definite lag in promotion. I would now like to turn to something which seems to me in some ways to be even more serious. The conditions of service for officers accepting permanent commissions in the Royal Air Force are set out in Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 200. I have with me copies of the 1946, 1949 and 1955 editions of this pamphlet, and I agree that in all of them it is made
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perfectly clear that promotion after attaining the rank of squadron leader is by selection.
The point is, however—and I have corroborated this over and over again—that these officers, from answers to questions they put when considering joining, were led to suppose that the prospects of promotion to wing commander were much better than was the case. One expression which was used was that statistically their chances were fifty-fifty. Some were told, indeed, that their prospects were rather better than that. The later editions of the pamphlet state the compulsory retiring ages namely, 53 for a squadron leader and 55 for a wing commander. But I have looked very carefully through all of them and I cannot find in any part of them any suggestion that there is a category that can stay on until 60 years, irrespective of rank.
I have also a pamphlet entitled "Education Branch of the Royal Air Force," which I believe was produced in 1950–51. On page 26 will be found the words,
"A substantial proportion of officers are promoted by selection above the rank of squadron leader."
I understand that that pamphlet was reissued in 1953, and I should like to know whether it is still being used when the statement that a substantial number are being promoted is both misleading and indeed untrue, unless the word "substantial" has an entirely different meaning in the Air Ministry from that which it has everywhere else.
It is apparent from my inquiries that the great majority of these officers, when joining in this way, had no idea that their prospects were so bad and that promotion in the branch was in any way not normal. It is no use the Under-Secretary saying that they ought to have known and that they were over-optimistic about their prospects. I cannot accept that. If these were uneducated men I would agree that perhaps they did not understand the pamphlet and the position. But these are people of exceptional intelligence. They would not have formed the impression that they definitely formed unless it had been deliberately given to them.
I do not know whether the Education Branch was short of officers at that time. I do not know what sort of high

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pressure salesmanship was used to try to persuade people to take these commissions, but the fact remains that these people were misled. I say that deliberately. I hope that my hon. Friend will give some sort of hope to these officers and that he will agree that they have a real grievance and that something ought to be done about it.
I do not want to make any more criticisms. I should like to make three suggestions which I hope my hon. Friend will consider. The first is to allow optional retirement for older wing commanders before the age of 55 without prejudice to their pension rights. The second is what I believe is called overbearing of establishment, so as to permit promotion to wing commander of perhaps 60 per cent. of squadron leaders and to group captain of 50 per cent. of wing commanders, or some such figure. The third would be to allow officers to retire with full pension rights irrespective of age, provided that they have served for the necessary qualifying time.
I do not think I need assure my hon. Friend that I have not raised this matter from any desire to make mischief. I have raised it because I honestly feel that these officers have had a raw deal. They are not barrack-room lawyers or people who are trouble-makers and try to exaggerate imaginary grievances. They are first-class officers who are keenly interested in their jobs. They are doing it extremely well, and doing it none the less well because they feel that an injustice has been done to them.
My hon. Friend knows, as we all know. that an unrighted wrong can sometimes rankle. I appeal to him, for the good of the Service whose interests I know he has at heart, in his own sense of justice and fair play to have another look at this problem. I hope that he will be able to tell me that I am pushing at an already open door and that steps are being taken to put this whole question of promotion in the Education Branch on a fairer and more satisfactory basis.
12.15 a.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Christopher Soames): I should like to start by telling my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley (Mr. E. Johnson) that there is no question of pushing at
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an open door. On the contrary, he is pushing at a door which has never been closed. I am most grateful to him for raising this subject this evening. It is one on which he has questioned me and my right hon. Friend from time to time; but it is a detailed subject not easy to cover by question and answer, and I welcome the opportunity he has given me to deal with it at greater length. I hope that that will allow me to put the facts into proper perspective.
I know how assiduously my hon. Friend has studied the problem. He has certainly mastered his case and propounded it with great sincerity, but he will agree that a noticeable feature of his speech was that he did not quote the case of any officer whose promotion so far has been unduly blocked.
I propose to deal first with the central problem, which is the possible promotion blockage in the Education Branch in the future. I do not at all quarrel with my hon. Friend when he says that unless some action is taken there could be a blockage. Indeed, I hope we have never seemed to be guilty in any way of minimising the situation.
The questions which interest my hon. Friend are how the present age structure in the Branch has arisen, and what is being done to try to ensure that this structure does not unfairly prejudice the prospects of younger officers.
The Education Branch was formed in October, 1946, by bringing together suitable officers, a number of whom had been employed with the Royal Air Force as civilians before the war on educational duties. We are now at a stage where all the senior posts in the Branch are filled by officers who entered in that way and who are due to remain with us until they reach the age of 60. The reason for this age of 60 is either that such a retiring age has been carried over from that which they had as civilians, or that, as things now stand, they must stay for that length of time to acquire an adequate pension. These factors are peculiar to the Education Branch. Another factor not peculiar to the Education Branch, but applying to the Service as a whole, is that there are certain first-class men whom we wish to retain longer for the benefit of the Branch and of the Service.

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To what does this add up? It means that, looking ahead, there seems real danger of the promotion prospects of younger officers who entered after the war deteriorating to an unacceptable extent once they reach the rank of squadron leader. There is no problem up to that point, since the Education Branch, unlike most branches of the Service, has time promotion to squadron leader. I can well understand that some officers have been thumbing through their copies of the Air Force List wondering how they will get promoted when so many of those senior to them are due to remain in the Service for so long.
However, I must make it clear that the problem still lies in the future. No one can complain of the promotion rate up to now. Half the substantive wing commanders now serving have been promoted in the last four years. The age and seniority of squadron leaders promoted to wing commander in the Education Branch compare well with other ground branches of the Service; for example, the average length of service as squadron leader of those promoted to wing commander during, the past three years has been eight years, which is much the same as in the Equipment and Secretarial Branches.
Even if we took no action at all, we should be able to maintain a flow comparable to this without difficulty over the next two years. Any danger of a promotion blockage arises after that. I stress this because my hon. Friend has suggested on many occasions, and he did it again tonight, that we are not bringing a sufficient sense of urgency to bear upon the problem. In point of fact it is not an immediate or pressing problem. However, I do appreciate that there may be anxiety for the future among those concerned, and I welcome this opportunity of saying that we are fully alive to the fact that if this problem is left untouched it will become a real one.
I like to think that these officers do not want to leave the Service. We certainly do not want to lose them. What then are we doing about the position? Firstly, as my hon. Friend knows, we have put in hand a comprehensive survey of the Education Branch. This is being carried out by an official committee which studies comparable problems in all branches of the Royal Air Force and reports to the Air Council. It is examining
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the various tasks which fall to the Education Branch now and are likely to fall to it in the future, and is assessing the capabilities and qualifications which will be needed by the officers who are to carry them out. Once this is done we shall know how many people, with what sorts of qualifications, we should be recruiting; the conditions under which they should enter and the terms of service they should have. This study of the Education Branch will, in effect, form a new charter for the Branch. Such a long-term plan is essential if we are to reach a proper decision on what is to be done about the squadron leader—wing commander promotion problem which we are now discussing.
Besides this, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air said in a letter to my hon. Friend on 7th August of this year, we are examining the question of promotion in isolation from the general study of the Branch. I cannot now discuss the various proposals which we are considering, but let me assure my hon. Friend that I have taken note of the three suggestions which he has put forward. They will certainly be examined. I should not, however, like him to go away with the idea that they had not previously been thought of. I am quite confident that we shall find a way of maintaining a reasonable rate of promotion to wing commander for these officers. By "reasonable rate of promotion" I mean something of the same order as these officers have enjoyed up to now.
Here I must enter a caveat. I am sure that my hon. Friend would not suggest that everyone and anyone who enters any large organisation be it Service or civilian, can be given an absolute pledge of a particular chance of promotion beyond a certain point. After all, we are talking about rather senior appointments. Wing commander is a high and responsible rank, and it would be quite unusual for any organisation to tell young men on joining that they would, unconditionally and beyond question, have a fixed chance of getting such a senior position.
My hon. Friend has suggested that certain officers coming into the Branch were misled about their career prospects. The statement he quoted from an official pamphlet refers to "a substantial proportion" of officers being promoted to wing commanders; and that has in fact

403
happened up to now. These officers may also have discussed their prospects with senior officers of the Branch, and they certainly would have been told how promotion was running and the sort of chance they seemed likely to have. It would have been given quite informally as a general indication of prospects. In other words, at any such interview these officers were told the sort of thing which was likely to happen, not something which was guaranteed would happen to every officer who joined the branch.
Mr. E. Johnson: Will my hon. Friend say how he defines the word "substantial"—as one in four or one in two?
Mr. Soames: Something of the same order as has been maintained up to now. My hon. Friend has not quoted any example of a squadron leader being unfairly blocked, and he has been into this matter thoroughly. I feel that he has rather got it into his mind that this business is going terribly wrong, and he cannot be convinced otherwise. Surely, with the assiduity with which he has examined the problem, he would have found by now if there had been a great feeling within the Branch that promotion had not so far been going as it should. He has not in fact found that. When I speak of a reasonable chance of pro-
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motion to wing commander, I mean something like what has been happening over the past three, four or five years.
As I understand it, my hon. Friend has not suggested that these officers have any grievance about what has happened so far. All he is saying at the moment is that it looks as though, if nothing is done about it, they are not likely to get the sort of career which people told them they were likely to have. I do not underrate their natural concern about their prospects, but I do ask my hon. Friend to have some confidence in us. As I say, this problem will not arise for two years. I say to him, with all sincerity, that we will do everything we can to ensure that a reasonable rate of promotion is maintained within the branch.
I hope that what I have said will help to convince my hon. Friend that we are taking the problem really seriously, as indeed we take all problems affecting the welfare and careers of personnel in the Royal Air Force. We are fully aware of the problem and of the difficulties which may arise; and I assure my hon. Friend that we have every intention of seeing that the officers concerned continue to get a fair deal.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes past Twelve o'clock.

TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Export Credits Guarantees (Constructional Projects)
  Export Credits Guarantees (Constructional Projects)
  Exports to Union of South Africa
  Exports to Union of South Africa
  Commonwealth and Colonial Trade
  Commonwealth and Colonial Trade
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Petrol Tax
  Petrol Tax
  Defence Programme (Review)
  Defence Programme (Review)
  Cinemas (Duty Receipts)
  Cinemas (Duty Receipts)
  Entertainments Duty (Review)
  Entertainments Duty (Review)
  Oil Supplies (Dollar Purchases)
  Oil Supplies (Dollar Purchases)
  Income Tax and Surtax
  Income Tax and Surtax
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Reorganisation (Finance)
  Reorganisation (Finance)
  Slum Clearance (Inspectors)
  Slum Clearance (Inspectors)
  Rented Properties, Lewisham and Carmarthen
  Rented Properties, Lewisham and Carmarthen
EMPLOYMENT
  Briggs and Fords, Dagenham
  Briggs and Fords, Dagenham
  Distillery, Dumbarton (Redundancies)
  Distillery, Dumbarton (Redundancies)
  Cost of Living
  Cost of Living
SCOTLAND
  Fisheries Research Vessels (Accidents)
  Fisheries Research Vessels (Accidents)
  Teachers (Equal Pay)
  Teachers (Equal Pay)
  Smoke Nuisance, Balloch (Complaint)
  Smoke Nuisance, Balloch (Complaint)
  Road Schemes, Lanarkshire (A74)
  Road Schemes, Lanarkshire (A74)
  Police Forces (Strength and Establishment)
  Police Forces (Strength and Establishment)
  Road Programme (Technical Staff)
  Road Programme (Technical Staff)
BRITISH ARMY
  Reservists (Scottish Units)
  Reservists (Scottish Units)
  National Service Men (Release)
  National Service Men (Release)
  Mail, Cyprus
  Mail, Cyprus
  Territorial Army (Travel Allowances)
  Territorial Army (Travel Allowances)
  Learner Drivers
  Learner Drivers
  Gold Coast (Forces)
  Gold Coast (Forces)
  Hong Kong (Christmas Mail)
  Hong Kong (Christmas Mail)
  EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS (UNITED KINGDOM PARTICIPATION)
  EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS (UNITED KINGDOM PARTICIPATION)
  ECONOMIC POSITION (FRANCO-BRITISH COLLABORATION)
  ECONOMIC POSITION (FRANCO-BRITISH COLLABORATION)
  HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
  HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
  United Kingdom Bases, Ceylon
  United Kingdom Bases, Ceylon
  Hungarian Refugees (Emigration)
  Hungarian Refugees (Emigration)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Woodland Produce (Report)
  Woodland Produce (Report)
KENYA
  African Electors
  African Electors
CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES
  United States and British Firms
  United States and British Firms
BRITISH GUIANA
  Infant School, Georgetown
  Infant School, Georgetown
COLONIAL TERRITORIES
  Wage Rates
  Wage Rates
AFRICAN TERRITORIES
  Education
  Education
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Dental Hygienists
  Dental Hygienists
  Poliomyelitis
  Poliomyelitis
  Disabled Persons (Vehicle Allowances)
  Disabled Persons (Vehicle Allowances)

Preamble
The House met at two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

FUEL OIL FOR UNITED STATES COMPANIES
2.5 p.m.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether wholly-owned subsidiaries of the United States concerns manufacturing in this country and using fuel oil have been put on notice that their parent companies will be expected to find their own fuel oil or provide dollars in payment therefor.]
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (THE EARL OF SELKIRK): My Lords, it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to allocate supplies of fuel oil to wholly-owned subsidiaries of United States companies manufacturing in this country on the same basis as allocations to other companies. Successive Government have encouraged United States companies to invest in manufacturing in this country, and the subsidiaries have always been treated on the same basis as concerns which were entirely British-owned.

BLUE NILE DAM SCHEME
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether their attention has been drawn to the Blue Nile Dam Scheme at Roseires, now being sponsored by the Sudan Government; and whether they will give full support to this scheme in every way they can, particularly by sponsoring the financing of the proposal to the World Bank and by advising the Sudan Government that the £20 million
842
sterling earmarked for the Sudan in the blocked Egyptian Sterling Fund will be released for this purpose.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): Her Majesty's Government are certainly aware of the Sudan Government's intention to build a dam at Roseires, for which a British firm has been appointed as consulting engineers. The Government have not been informed how the Sudanese Government intend to finance the project. But should the Sudan decide to seek finance from the International Bank, once they have completed the formalities required for membership, only the Sudanese Government could formally sponsor the project. I think that the last point in the noble Lord's Question must refer to the entirely separate matter of securing the repatriation of the Egyptian currency at present circulating in the Sudan. It is not correct to say that any particular sum has been earmarked for this purpose.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, while thanking the noble Marquess for his reply, may I ask whether he will agree that we have many friends in the Sudan, and that our declared support of this project would probably strengthen our Sudanese friends in dealing with the tyrannical behaviour of their Egyptian neighbours?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I certainly gladly agree that we have many good friends in the Sudan. As regards support, I did not in any way suggest that support would be withheld. All I said was that the first step must come from the Sudanese Government themselves.
LORD KILLEAR: My Lords, is the noble Marquess aware that many of us who have long experience of the Sudan entirely endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson of Drumochter, has just said? Will the noble Marquess dissipate any possible fear that the Egyptians might put a spoke in the wheel of any friendly negotiations at present proceeding between this firm and the Sudanese Government?
THE MARQUESS OF READIN: My Lords, I am quite aware that the noble

843
Lord and other noble Lords have experience of that part of the world. As regards the question of Egyptian moves, we shall, of course, keep a not unwatchful eye on the progress of the situation.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I thank the noble Marquess for his "watchful eye."

HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
2.09 p.m.
THE EARL OF CRAVEN: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will supply adequate air and sea transport to take the number of Hungarian refugees, notified to them by responsible organisations connected with the relief of such refugees from Hungary, to the Dominions and Colonies willing to receive them; and if they will provide such transport free of cost.]
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships will wish me, on your behalf, to express the sympathy and admiration of this House to the Hungarians who have shown such incomparable sacrifice and bravery throughout their terrible ordeal. Her Majesty's Government wish to do all they can for those who have made their escape. So far, some 11.000 have reached these shores and arc being given food and shelter and clothing, and are being made as welcome and as comfortable as lies in our power. Your Lordships will realise that the sudden increase of immigrants has necessitated a great deal of emergency organisation and improvisation, and the first requirement has been to deal with urgent needs. In this, as usual, the voluntary organisations have risen magnificently to the occasion and have met the demands which the situation has made on them.
We are now setting about finding out what individual refugees want to do.
844
Some wish to stay in this country and some will want to go farther afield, either to some foreign country or to another part of the Commonwealth. So far, the Canadian Government have declared their readiness to provide free transport for all Hungarian refugees wishing to go to Canada, and have set no limit to the number to be admitted. Australia will take up to 5,000 New Zealand up to 1,000, and South Africa up to 500. When we know the size of the problem, we will consider what further steps are needed in respect of journeys to other Commonwealth countries, and we are in touch with the representatives of these Governments.
LORD REA: My Lords, arising out of the Question, can the noble Earl say whether Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to urge the United Nations to declare that their member nations will offer sanctuary and succour to all women and children, invalids and old people, so long as the attempted domination of Hungary by Russia continues?
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I very much hope that all members of the United Nations will feel that there is an obligation on them to help these people in their misery, so far as possible.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I say that we on this side of the House welcome with great sincerity the statement which has been made by the noble Earl about what the Government are doing? As seems likely from his statement, it may be that there are certain other avenues which have to be followed, but we welcome very much indeed what has been done by the Government in regard to this very serious and appealing matter.
THE EARL OF CRAVEN: My Lords, may I take the opportunity of thanking the noble Earl for his extremely courteous and considerate Answer to my Question.

AIR CORPORATIONS BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

EGYPT
2.13 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY) rose to move to resolve, That this House supports the policy of Her Majesty's Government, as outlined by the Foreign Secretary on 3rd December, which has prevented hostilities in the Middle East from spreading, has resulted in a United Nations Force being introduced into the area, and has created conditions under which progress can be made towards the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues. The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I rise to move the Resolution standing in my name, and in what I have to say I would assure your Lordships that I shall try to be as uncontroversial as possible on a subject which. I am afraid, has been all too productive of controversy. For I do not, personally, believe that much advantage is to he gained by a further slinging of mud, such as we have witnessed, not perhaps, indeed, in your Lordships' House, hut in some other places which I could possibly mention. We all know that the Government have clone a number of things which have deeply shocked noble Lords opposite; and we all know equally that the Party of noble Lords opposite have done a number of things which have deeply shocked us on this side of the House. We had surely better leave it at that. My object, therefore, in speaking to your Lordships this afternoon will he not so much to answer charges that have been made against us, or to make countercharges, as to tell the plain unvarnished story, as I see it. of why we did what we did, when we did, with regard to recent events in Egypt, and to suggest, very diffidently. the lessons which I believe can be learned from those events.
I think it is necessary that I should emphasise, if there is to be any true understanding of the actions of the Government, that there have been over this period not one crisis but two crises. There was the crisis of July, which resulted from Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal; and there was the crisis of October, which resulted from the Israeli attack on Egypt. Those crises, of course, are allied very closely in all our minds, for they were both concerned with Egypt and the Suez Canal. But they
846
were, in fact, different in character, and they have required different treatment.
First. I should like to say something about the crisis which arose from Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal. That, as Her Majesty's Government at have consistently maintained, was essentially an international problem. For the Canal, as me all know, is a great international waterway, and any interruption of the free navigation of the Canal was a problem not to be tackled by one or two nations alone, but by all those countries for whom, since the introduction of oil as a great industrial fuel, the Suez Canal has become essential to their very existence. That, at any rate, was the view of the British Government and the French Government last July.
In those circumstances, as we all know, they did two things. First, they sent sufficient forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to deal with any emergency that might arise—and that, I am sure, was a very proper precaution, whatever policy we proposed to adopt. From my experience in the Foreign Office (and I expect that the noble Lord. Lord Henderson, would bear this out). no foreign policy, whether a national or an international foreign policy, can be effective without material force behind it. Secondly, by agreement with the United States of America. we called a meeting of the chief users of the Canal—which was a very proper course under Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. From that meeting there emerged what have now come to be known as the 18-Power proposals, which had the support of the main users of the Canal. Those proposals were, in due course, submitted to Colonel Nasser by the Menzies Mission, and in due course they were turned down.
The subsequent events, I am sure. are fresh in the memory of us. all, and I therefore will not elaborate them. There was, first, Mr. Dulles' scheme for the Users' Association; next there was the Franco-British appeal to the Security Council, and a consideration by that Council of our resolution, which asked support for the 18-Power proposals; and finally, there was the vote on our resolution, which emerged, as your Lordships will remember, from the Security Council in two parts: one, which approved the 18-Power proposals, was vetoed by

847
Russia; and the other, which put forward six principles as a basis for negotiation, was passed unanimously. That was the position when the second crisis arose.
The negotiations on the basis of the six principles had not yet begun when the news was received of the Israeli mobilisation, which clearly portended some military action. The dangers which were likely to flow from military action by Israel, however great might have been the provocation which led up to it, must have been obvious to all. For if war broke out in that very inflammable part of the world, the Arab countries, who were allied with Egypt, were likely to be drawn in; wherever the attack took place, there would have been a general movement throughout the Arab world, and what might have started as a limited war would have been likely to spread throughout the whole of the Middle East, and possibly far beyond. On receiving news, therefore, of the Israeli mobilisation, as I think the House already knows, Her Majesty's Government urged restraint in all directions, and, in particular, gave warning, as they were bound to do, that if Israel attacked Jordan. Britain would act by virtue of our obligations under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Her Majesty's Government also took such measures as were necessary for the protection of British interests anywhere in the area. When, ultimately. Israel launched an attack on Egypt, Britain and France. in concert, sent an ultimatum to both the two Governments concerned. For in their view it was essentially a case for immediate police action, and Britain and France were the only Powers in position to take that action.
I will not trouble the House this afternoon with the whole of that ultimatum, but I think it is important to remind your Lordships of some relevant portions, for these define clearly what is now, I am afraid, often forgotten: what were the purposes, and what were the limits, of the police action which the two countries thought it proper to take. They first explained to the Israeli and Egyptian Governments that the main purpose of their intervention was to bring about an early cessation of hostilities, and to safeguard the free passage of the Canal. They then requested both Israel and Egypt, first to stop all war-like action by land, sea and
848
air forthwith, and, secondly, to withdraw all their military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. Israel accepted those conditions; Egypt refused.
Now such, and such only—and not those far wider objectives which we are now so frequently told should have been achieved—were the reasons for our landing in Egypt. I have felt it necessary to remind the House of those very simple facts because they have been the basis of all our actions throughout this difficult period. In the limited task which they set themselves, I think Her Majesty's Government and the French Government may fairly claim that their policy had a full measure of success. First, and most important, it stopped the war which, without their intervention, would, in our view at any rate, almost certainly have spread throughout the Middle East. But the policy also achieved two other results which will prove, I believe, very important for the future. First, it exposed how close was the link-up between Egypt and Russia. which we had always suspected. but the scope of which was realised only as the result of these events. The great quantity of aeroplanes which were destroyed, mostly Russian of a most modern type; the tractors and the self-propelled guns of Russian origin which have been found in Port Said without adducing the material which was found by the Israelis and which is relevant to my main argument—these were not sent there for nothing. That, then—the exposure of the long-suspected Russian infiltration in Egypt—was, I believe, the first and certainly a very important by-product of our action.
Secondly, we brought the United Nations force into the Middle East. One thing is quite certain: nothing but our action would have done that. Certain things, indeed, we did not accomplish which it is now said we should have done. We are often told that before we ceased military operations we ought to have gone to Suez or to Cairo; that we ought to have got rid of Colonel Nasser; that we ought to have enforced a long-term solution of the Suez Canal problem or the Arab-Israel problem, and so on. Your Lordships, I am sure, have either heard or read such suggestions. Those are all objects for which I am sure there is much to be said in themselves—that I am very ready to concede. But they were none

849
of them a matter for one country or two countries alone: they were matters, as we had consistently held since the seizure of the Canal in July, for international action. The most that we and the French Government could properly do was to take immediate ad hoc action of a police character to bring the war to an end and to protect the free passage of the Canal from the hazards of that war. If we failed in the second object—and we certainly did fail—it was not because the Canal was damaged by the hazards of war. We failed because the Egyptian Government itself, quite gratuitously, sabotaged the Canal—and this, by the way, is, I think, the proof, if any proof is needed, of what we had always said in connection with the earlier dispute over the nationalisation of the Canal: that Colonel Nasser would not hesitate to close the Canal whenever and for whatever reason he wished to do so.
But we did, at any rate, succeed beyond expectation in our first objective, for hardly had we landed in Port Said than both combatants agreed to an unconditional cease-fire. That, of course, was the reason why we, too, ceased our military operations. It is sometimes suggested that if we had gone on for twelve hours more, or twenty-four hours more, we could have got to Ismailia and Suez. But, my Lords, in my view, for what it is worth, we could not with any shred of honesty have gone on after the objects far which we had landed had been achieved. Morally and politically we should have put ourselves entirely in the wrong. Our main purpose had been concluded: the Egyptian-Israeli war had been brought to an end.
From the moment of the ceasefire, and the cessation of that war, the main question at issue was what were the conditions, which would justify us in concluding that our task had been completed, so that we could retire from Egypt. Over this, I think we have throughout made our position quite clear. There must be an adequate United Nations Force to take our place, and carry out the terms of the resolution of the United Nations of November 2. We steadily refused to move from that position, in spite of what I can only call virulent attacks in the United Nations and a lack of support from some of those from whom we might naturally Lave expected to get it. it was
850
only when we received ass trances which we considered adequate that we decided to withdraw our troops.
First of all, there was to be a United Nations Force in the Middle. East to take our place adequate to perform the duties which were mentioned in the resolution to which I have referred. And. that, I would repeat, was something that was never even contemplated before we welt in. Secondly, we were satisfied, by conversations which had been held with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that the clearance of the Canal would begin as soon as it was technically possible, and that it would not be dependent on other considerations. That view has since been fortified by a forthright: declaration by the United States Government on December 3 which said:
"Every day of delay in restoring the Canal to normal use is a breach of he 1888 Treaty."
From that I think that one might quite fairly assume that the whole vast weight of the United States will be thrown in against delay. Thirdly, on the future of the Canal, the Secretary-General gave an assurance that he would promote as rapidly as possible negotiations on the basis of the six principles in the Security Council resolution of October 13 and the letter of the Secretary-General of October 24 which, as your Lordships will remember, was accepted by the Egyptian Government. Here, again, the United States Government have made a public statement that they consider it essential that arrangements should be worked out without delay to ensure the operation of the Canal on this basis.
Finally, to quote once more the words of the statement of December 3. the United States Government came out with a declaration:
"That the United States is determined (through the United Nations and in other ways) to assist in bringing about a permanent settle-mom of the other persistent conflicts which have plagued the Middle Eat over recent years."
My Lords, how happy should we have been if we had got a declaration like that before the crisis began!
I have tried to tell—I hope plainly: and obiectively—the story of the actions that have been taken by Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East and the results which have flowed from those I actions. I fully appreciate that there nay

851
be criticism as to the individual steps which Her Majesty's Government took, or failed to take, at one juncture or another in that long chain of events. That, I suppose, is always true in moments of crisis. One has to act quickly, or one would be too late, and it is always possible to feel afterwards that this or that might have been done differently. But the really important consideration to my mind is should we have acted at all. It would no doubt have been very much easier for us to do nothing, and to let the Israeli attack go ahead, with all the risks to general peace which would have been involved: or, alternatively, we might have contented ourselves with bringing the matter before the United Nations and unloading our responsibilities in that way. That. I know, is a course that has been advocated by many people of deep sincerity and high integrity. They argue that by following it we should have fulfilled our obligations under International Law, and that was all that could be required of any nation.
My Lords, I wish I could take that comfortable view, but I know, and we all know, if we are frank with ourselves, what would have happened—indeed, we have a very good example at the present moment over Hungary. In that case, we and the other nations of the Western World—indeed all the other members of the United Nations—did exactly what we are now told we should have done over the Israeli-Egyptian war: we brought it before the United Nations; we asked the United Nations to take action. What has the United Nations done? It has done precisely nothing. It has passed resolution after resolution; it has made condemnatory speech after condemnatory speech. But it has not even succeeded in securing the introduction of observers into Hungarian territory, much less preventing the rape of the country. I do not think we could fairly blame ourselves, as a nation, for not having done more in the case of Hungary, for there was nothing we could do alone; but in the case of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, it so happened that we and France were in a position to perform one of the main functions for which the United Nations exists, the stopping of war.
The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in, I think, the last debate we had in this House, described our action as aggression, by which I must presume he meant unprovoked attack for the purpose of furthering national interests. That is what I understand aggression to mean. I do not believe that that will be the verdict of history. History, I believe, will recognise, as we in Her Majesty's Government have had to recognise, that the United Nations as it is to-day is in no condition to do all that its founders intended. In the Security Council it has been frustrated by the Veto; while the Assembly, I am afraid, has now become a kind of stamping ground of conflicting Power groups, some actuated by one motive and some by another, but very few concerned with the moral merits or demerits of the issue actually before it, and most of them coming to their decision merely on general considerations of national policy.
It is idle to shut our eyes to these harsh realities but, at the same time, to say that is, of course, no reason for writing off the United Nations as a dead loss. That. I believe—and here I agree with the Opposition—would be a counsel of despair. On the contrary, it seems to me a compelling reason for looking forward and not back, for getting together with other like-minded nations and seeing what can be done to give to the organisation that life and strength without which it would not be a protection but a danger to the world. That, I believe, is the first lesson that we must learn from these events.
The second, which I believe to be equally important, is the vital necessity for both countries to get closer cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That is something for which I have, as some of your Lordships know, consistently pleaded in this House ever since I have been here; and I have not changed my mind. Over this issue of the Middle East (and in saying so I do not, of course, refer only to the period since the seizure of the Canal in July last, but for many months before) the two countries—and we all know it—have not been marching in step. For this the last thing I want to do to-day is to apportion blame. There have no doubt been faults on both sides. My Lords, it is indeed

853
a thing, I think, which can always happen from time to time, even between the oldest and truest friends; but there is an old saying, which may be familiar to some of your Lordships,
"The falling out of faithful friends, Renewing is of love."
That must be the spirit which must inspire and inform us on both sides of the Atlantic from this time on. To look back, to harp on our past differences will only be to condemn our relations permanently to frustration and bitterness. It is on a better future that our eyes must be fixed, and I believe the will is there in both countries.
I think we should gratefully recognise this afternoon that our American friends have already done much, and show signs of doing more, to make clear that this is true; and we, for our part, must do the same. The times are far too dangerous for us and the United States to quarrel. I have no doubt that there are serious difficulties still facing this country, especially in the economic sphere. We live in an age of oil, and any interruption of the flow of oil is bound to affect us in many spheres of our national life, as we all know only too well But if hardships are incurred in a just cause—and I believe that this is the view of the majority of the British people—I have no doubt our people will be willing to face those hardships with the courage and cheerfulness which they always show in times of stress; and it is quite evident, I think, that it is the wish of the United States to do everything in their power to alleviate our difficulties.
That, my Lords, is the broad picture that I should like to put before you to-day of those stirring events which have occurred in the Middle East during recent months. I have tried very hard in doing so not to exacerbate feeling or to arouse controversy. Noble Lords opposite feel, I know, that the losses which have resulted from these actions which Her Majesty's Government and the French Government felt it right to take have been greater than the gain. I do not share that view. Apart from the immediate result of stopping the war in the Sinai Desert, the war between Israel and Egypt to which I have already referred, our actions have led, as I said earlier, to an exposure of the full extent of Russo-Egyptian plans in the subjugation of the
854
Middle East, and also, I believe, to the disruption of those plans.
There are those, I know, on the Benches opposite who have taken the view that, on the whole, this episode must be counted a Russian victory. I believe they would find a very different view being taken if they were in the inner counsels of the Soviet Government in Moscow. I believe they would find this episode regarded as a most unwelcome upset of their long-term schemes. Nor, I am sure, will Russia welcome the increasing evidence that statesmen on the other side of the Atlantic arc determined to concert a firmer policy for bringing about peace and stability in the Middle East, and beyond, than has ever been the case before. They will have noted the words of the Vice-President, Mr. Nixon:
"We do not want to go back to the armed truce of two years ago."
They will have seen the statement of that experienced statesman, Mr. Lester Pearson:
"The shock treatment the Western Alliance has received may in the long rim bring about an all ante stronger than ever."
I do not believe that remarks of that kind will bring much balm to Russian hearts.
What is the truth? Throughout the last years, as a result of the inaction of the Western Powers the Middle East has been slowly and steadily sliding away into the abyss of Communism and now a new chance has been given for the United Nations and the United States, for all of us who believe in freedom, to preserve it from that disaster. That is the view not only of Her Majesty's Government but of many thanking people in many lands. I should like to give only one quotation from an Austrian newspaper. This is what it says:
"It must be emphasised that under the salutary shock of events in Suez, new and quite unusual life has been injected into the United Nations. A project which has been played about with for years is at last reality—a United Nations police force. Who will deny that this is a great step forward? Who will dispute that only a force such as this can bring an end to the ceaseless massacres on Middle Eastern frontiers which altogether have cost far more sacrifice than the whole military effort of the two Western Powers?"
That, I believe, is the supreme justification for the action we have taken. It is for that reason that we offer ourselves with confidence to the judgment of this wise and experienced House. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That this House supports the policy of Her Majesty's Government as outlined by the Foreign Secretary on 3rd December, which has prevented hostilities in the Middle East from spreading, has resulted in a United Nations Force being introduced into the area, and has created conditions under which progress can be made towards the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
2.43 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the noble Marquess said in his opening remarks that he would try to be uncontroversial. Whether or not he has been successful it will be for the House to judge, but I cannot hope to follow his example. I am afraid that in what I have to say I am bound to be controversial, although I hope that I shall not say what I have to say in a manner which will offend the dignity of this House. We here are accustomed to debate our problems in a manner which is worthy of the occasion and on the highest possible level. I hope to be judged by whether or not I succeed in that objective, but not on the strength of what I have to say. I am afraid that, like the noble Marquess, I shall have to tread on well-trodden ground. After so many debates, both in this place and in another, it is going to be difficult to find anything really fresh to say. If that is my own position, I feel very sorry for the fiftieth speaker in this debate tomorrow evening. I wish the noble Earl. Lord Home, good fortune, and I hope that he will find something.
Now that we are in the process of withdrawing from Egypt, I think this is an occasion when we might try to form some kind of assessment of the gains and losses that have resulted from our action. The noble Marquess referred to this aspect of the matter and suggested that the gains were greater than the losses. I hope to prove that the reverse is the case. The Resolution before the House asks for support for the policy outlined by the Foreign Secretary on December 3, and repeated in this House on the following day, and asserts that there were three gains from that policy. The first is that it
"prevented hostilities in the Middle East from spreading";
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the second, that our action
"has resulted in a United Nations Force being introduced into the area"
and the third, that it
"created conditions under which progress can he made towards the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues."
As the noble Marquess knows by now, we profoundly disagree with, and deplore, the policy which has been carried out by the Government. We regard the month of November as one of the most disastrous and humiliating in our history. We have already expressed our opinion in several debates that our action in invading Egypt—and I hope the noble Marquess will not quarrel with the term "invading"—and in bombing their population was morally wrong and without any justification, moral, legal or otherwise.
If that is the case, the question of gains and losses becomes irrelevant. Gains and losses become relevant only if we are arguing the case for our action on the basis of expediency. I propose to deal with that aspect, too, but if our action was fundamentally and morally wrong, then the question of gains and losses is really not a relevant factor in the matter. We acted in breach of our obligations under the United Nations Charter and of our other obligations to refrain from armed aggression. We set an example which, in the months and years to come, we may well have cause to regret We created ourselves as self-appointed judges and executioners in our own dispute with Egypt, in which we were only one of many nations concerned. There are a very large number of nations that could have acted on the grounds upon which we ourselves acted. The noble Marquess merely stated that it so happened that we had our Forces conveniently available in order to take action. But, if other countries had acted in the same way as we did in July and August, they also would have had their forces conveniently available to take action, and we could have had the whole world stepping into Egypt in order to stop what we allegedly went in to stop.
But, in fact, the whole world and a great many people in this country believe that the dominating reason for our intervention was our intention to settle the dispute over the Suez Canal by force and to impose our own solution on Egypt. Incidentally, the noble Marquess has

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linked together the two crises, the crisis over Suez and the crisis that arose through the action of Israel.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: If I may say so to the noble Lord, all I said was that they were linked only by the fact Mat they both affected the same part of the world. I did not link them in any other way. I went to considerable lengths not to do so—and rightly, in my view.
LORD SILKIN: Never mind. I was not intending to misinterpret the noble Marquess: I was going a stage further. I was saying that he did link them together in the respect in which he says. I have linked them together, because I believe that the second action on our part was a direct consequence of the first. The general belief—the noble Marquess can test this all over the world, including the United States of America—is that, having been prevented, by public opinion here and abroad, from the use of force in August and September, we then seized on this occasion. We acted without consultation and without giving the United Nations any opportunity of commenting on our proposed course.
The noble Marquess may well say that nothing would have happened if we had consulted them. I do not believe that that is a justification for not having consulted them; nor does it follow that the United Nations would have taken no action. Admittedly, the United Nations is impotent when dealing with one of the great Powers; but in this case it was not, and the United Nations has frequently succeeded in dealing with troubles all over the world where one of the great Powers was not involved. It does not in the least follow that, if we had gone to the United Nations, the combined action of the whole of the world would not have been instrumental in stopping the crisis that arose in the Middle East. We did not notify the United Nations. Even worse, we failed to notify, still less to consult with, our ally, the United States of America, and with our Dominions. Indeed, we actually vetoed a United Nations resolution in the Security Council which, among other things, urged all members to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force in the area, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
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One of the reasons given (the noble Marquess did not give it, for nut informing the United States, was that there was no necessity to get their prior agreement. Let there be no misunderstanding. We on this side are not suggesting that we in this country have to follow the United States in any action that we choose to take—that we must get their prior agreement. We do not allege that. What we say is that the Government ought to have consulted our ally and taken them into their confidence I want to point out that our ultimatum to Israel and Egypt was given on October 30. On October 29, the very day before, we were in consultation with the United States of America. Noble Lords may have seen a statement in the Press yesterday, to the effect that M. Monet, the French Prime Minister, was interviewed on television in Paris by a number of American journalists, and among other things he said that the sole reason why the United States had not been consulted before the attack on Egypt was the fear that she would have prevented it. That is a statement by somebody who is in the best possible position to know; and, until the opposite is proved, I shall believe that that is the case. I should be very glad if, when he comes to speak, the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who is no doubt familiar with the position, could give us the information on M. Mollet's statement, either to confirm or to deny it.
In that connection, I should also like to ask the noble Marquess, or the noble Earl who is to reply to the debate, to say quite categorically whether or not they admit that they had fore-knowledge of the proposed attack by Israel. The statement that is going around is that there was actual collusion. In the very first debate on this question in which I took part I repudiated the suggestion of collusion—I could not believe that this country would be guilty of such an act. But since then the story of collusion has been going all round the world, and to a great extent in this country. It is due to the honour of this country that we should either have this statement completely and unequivocally repudiated, or that the facts should be staled. I think that is due to our honour, because we are alleging that we went into Egypt to separate the two antagonists and to stop

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the war, when in fact the allegation is being made that that war was actually instigated by us. That is a serious charge; and whilst I do not for a moment associate myself with it, I think our good name depends upon this statement being fully, finally and categorically dealt with.
The statement of policy which we are asked to approve says that a vitally important result of our actions has been that Russian designs have been exposed and dislocated. The noble Marquess gave information to the House as to what was found in Egypt, by Israel and by ourselves, in the way of arms. But does that come as a complete surprise to the noble Marquess? He seemed to imagine that we had no knowledge at all of the fact that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have been supplying arms to the Middle East in large quantities. We on these Benches had been stressing this for months, and advocating the supply of arms to Israel, so that they could build up their forces to the same strength as Egypt. This has been known by everybody and it should not have come as a complete surprise; certainly it should not have necessitated the invasion of Egypt in order to find out the position. In fact, we did nothing in the many months that Russia was piling up arms in Egypt. We took no action at all, either by strengthening the position of Israel or by raising the matter in the United Nations, by ventilating it there, or in any other manner.
In my opinion, it is not the fact that, by our action, we exposed and dislocated the position of the Soviet Union, and Russian designs in Egypt. I think that this matter was, if anything, exposed and dislocated by the action of Israel, and did not need any invasion on our part.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Is the noble Lord arguing that Israel was right?
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: No.
LORD SILKIN: What I am saying is that if Israel had made the claim that she had dislocated and exposed Russian designs, she would have had some justification, but I do not think that justification lies in our mouth. I have stated the reasons why we cannot support the policy
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outlined by the Foreign Secretary on December 3. The Government might conceivably have felt justified in their action, and in seeking support from this House, if their action on the ground of expediency had met with complete success—that is, if they had achieved all their objectives without undue sacrifice. But they have failed miserably, and I am going to give the House some of my reasons for saying that.
The three gains referred to in the Motion are disingenuous and, at the best, extremely debatable. We do not agree that our action prevented hostilities from spreading in the Middle East. By the time our troops had landed in Egypt, hostilities had, in fact, come to an end. Egypt was beaten. There were no Arab forces coming to the aid of Egypt, and to all intents and purposes the objectives for which Israel had attacked Egypt had been successfully achieved. Noble Lords will know that their purpose was simply to destroy the bases from which raids had from time to time been made into Israel. They had completely achieved that; they had captured a large quantity of equipment and, so far as Israel was concerned, the battle was over and it did not need our intervention, or that of the French, to separate the two.
But I am going further. I say that our intervention was a highly dangerous one and might have caused hostilities to spread. They did not spread, but only because we undertook to withdraw within a very short time. We were threatened by Russian "volunteers", and everybody knows what that means. There was quite a possibility that had we stayed on the whole of the Middle East, instigated by Russia, might have flared up. It is my sincere belief that our action in intervening, with France, might well have caused the serious war in the Middle East which we say we went there to prevent.
Another alleged gain is that our action resulted in the introduction of a United Nations Force into the area. Of course our action resulted in the intervention of a United Nations Force, just as the action of every burglar in this country results in the intervention of the police. Naturally, a police force comes into operation when there are lawbreakers about.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, does that rule hold good in Hungary?
LORD SILKEN: My Lords, it could hold good. We have made no serious effort and we are not in a position to do so because we have taken the law into our own hands. To claim credit for the fact that by our wrong action we were instrumental in introducing a United Nations Force into the area is really too disingenuous for words. It was never our original policy to withdraw in favour of the United Nations. That was not one of the aims which we set out to achieve.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I must interrupt the noble Lord. I never said what the noble Lord has said. Our policy was to stop a war and I still maintain that we stopped a war.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I hope the noble Marquess will not imagine that I am suggesting that he said these things, for I am not. He has not said that this afternoon. But I am taking the grounds on which we went to war, and I am saying that the question of a United Nations Force does not enter into it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, will the noble Lord tell me of, or give, a quotation from a Leader of the Conservative Party who has said it? The noble Lord has made this suggestion. Can he quote?
LORD SILKIN: My Lords. I cannot quote at this moment, hut the whole tenor of the propaganda about the United Nations Force is in the direction of saying: "There you are! But for us there would have been no United Nations Force. We brought it into operation." If that is not what the noble Marquess and others have been saying, I fail to understand why they: are asking for a vote of confidence in this House on the fact that a United Nations Force is in operation. Surely they are saying that they brought it about; otherwise why do they want to be patted on the back for it?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, all we said was that but for us it would not have been there. And I think everybody, in his heart of hearts, really thinks that.
LORD SILKIN: I will concede that. But I also say that, but for the murderer, the hangman would not have been there. I do not think a murderer can claim any credit—or a vote of confidence—for
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having brought into operation the activities of the hangman. As to the third ground for support of the action of Her Majesty's Government, it is quite untrue to say that we have created conditions which will facilitate a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues. I think quite the contrary is the case. I believe we have created conditions which are going to make it far more difficult to get a peaceful settlement. We have aroused the hostility and animosity of the whole of the Arab peoples in the area. We have been instrumental in giving Russia a place in the Middle East which, but for our action, she would have found it more difficult to secure. We have encouraged the Arab peoples to look to Russia as their friend and to seek Russian help; and it may well be that, far from creating conditions which are going to make it easier to effect a peaceful settlement, such a settlement will be made more difficult.
What of the other results that have followed from our action? I have already referred to the breach with the United States of America and to the fact that we have endangered the existence of the Commonwealth; and we really have. Here I will quote Mr. Lester Pearson, since the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, did so. Mr. Pearson has said that there was a time after the Anglo-French landings in Egypt when the Commonwealth was on the verge of dissolution. Am I using too strong language in saying that we have created a danger of the break-up of the Commonwealth? We have caused discussions to take place in a number of countries, members of the Commonwealth, as to whether or not they should remain. Happily they will remain, and I am delighted that it is so; but I do riot think it is a healthy thing that we should act in such a way as to give rise to these questions in the minds of members of the Commonwealth.
The fact that we have been twice condemned as aggressors, practically unanimously, by the General Assembly of the United Nations, has caused our moral position in the world to fall to zero. We have lost the good w ill that we gained by granting self-government to India and other Asian countries; and my noble friend Lord Attlee, who has recently returned from. India and Pakistan, will be able to give the House

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some information as to how those countries feel about our action. At the outset we stated, on October 30, that we had two objectives only. We said our objectives were to stop hostilities in order that free passage through the Canal should not be jeopardised, and that we were out to stop the fighting so that ships actually on passage, and their crews and passengers, might not be endangered. Those were the only two objectives that we had in mind, as the noble Marquess quite fairly said. But the result of our action has been to cause Nasser to block the Canal. Far from keeping the Canal open we have jeopardised it and have completely closed the Canal to traffic. Furthermore, we have made ourselves desperately short of oil, which we have often referred to as "the lifeblood of this country", through the destruction of a number of pipelines, and that has placed us in a grave position economically. These are some of the byproducts of our action.
And that is not all. I have no doubt that the Government will receive the support they ask for in the votes of noble Lords in this House, although I could not help sensing that a considerable part of the noble Marquess's speech was directed not to this side of the House but to his own friends. And I can well understand that they may feel somewhat apprehensive about the whole business, though I doubt whether it will be reflected in the vote, when the time comes for voting. We, of course, shall not support the Government, but I thought it right that we should state fully our reasons for our attitude to the Resolution before the House. I hope that I have done so in as restrained a manner as is possible in the circumstances. We have put down an Amendment to the Resolution and it will be moved tomorrow by my noble friend Lord Henderson—the House will, of course, be acquainted with its terms.
But before I sit down I should like to say that I think it may be possible to act with general agreement in regard to the further course to be taken. I said at the outset that I thought it right that we should assess the position as it is at this moment. But there is a future, and we have to look to the future and to see that the effects of what we have done are minimised to the fullest possible extent.
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There is no dispute as to our objectives: they are common to all parties. But whether this Government have become so divided and discredited as to be unsuited for the task of reconstruction is another matter.
First and foremost, we must restore and rehabilitate our country from the effect of the grievous blows which Government policy has inflicted upon it. I can assure the noble Marquess and the House that, to that end, we will co-operate to the fullest possible extent. We want to see created a peaceful state of affairs in the Middle East, a solution of the long struggle between Israel and the Arab States. We want to help all those States to develop their resources to the full, in order to raise the standard of living of the people in that area. We want to create a sense of independence and security and general confidence in the future, so as to distract these people from their attitude of extreme nationalism and xenophobia. We must, by agreement, if that is at all possible, secure international control over the Suez Canal while not derogating from Egyptian sovereignty. The world cannot accept the position—and here I agree fully with the noble Marquess—that the Canal can be blocked whenever Egyptian policy seems to the Egyptians to justify it. And we must restore confidence in ourselves by loyal adherence to the policy and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
We must, in addition, use our influence to strengthen the United Nations so as to make it really effective in carrying out its tasks. Here, of course, I agree with the noble Marquess, that the United Nations is at present ineffective to deal with crises of this kind. Two things are required. The first is a speedy method of resolving differences between nations—an International Court of Justice, if you like, which can give decisions binding on all parties and all nations. Secondly, there must be a strong and effective and permanent International Police Force, under the control of the United Nations, ready at all times and at short notice to step in and enforce the decisions of the International Court. This is not a time to elaborate these proposals, and I realise that they are not exactly short-term proposals. But if we decide that that is to be the policy of this country, and then work for it, I believe that, gradually, the

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good sense of the world will cause it to realise that the only hope for civilisation is some form of effective World Police Force, which can take action whenever called upon to do so, and an International Court of Justice which can settle differences between the nations in an equitable manner. As I ay, this is not the time to elaborate these proposals, but I am confident that, of peace is to be preserved in the future, the United Nations must he made to work, and to work effectively. We must give serious and urgent thought to the question, and not allow it to drift when this crisis is over.
3.17 p.m.
LORD LAYTON: My Lords, I listened to the speech of the noble Marquess with two reactions. There was, first, my reaction to the earlier part of the speech, in which the noble Marquess recounted the series of events and drew some immediate conclusion from them. Upon that part of the noble Marquess's speech, I find myself almost entirely in agreement with the comments of the noble. Lord, Lord Silkin. There followed the second part, which related to remedies—and, incidentally, remedies which find no place in the Resolution on the Order Paper. It is largely from that point of view that I wish to make some comments. Indeed it is on those aspects of the problem—which I believe to be far and away the most important aspects—that the Liberal Party have put down an Amendment on the Order Paper.
Our Amendment is the same, textually, as that put on the Order Paper by the Liberal Party in another place, and it will be moved at the proper time by my noble friend Lord Rea. But I propose to say something on the content and the idea behind that Amendment, rather than to follow in detail any of the arguments put forward by Lord Silkin in regard to the statement of the noble Marquess, because I agree that there are many Members of this House—and I think many amongst the public also—who have had enough of post mortems, and are anxious that we should, now, with the utmost vigour, set about the task of trying to regain ground lost as the result of the events of recent weeks.
The Liberal Party Amendment is placed on the Table of the House as a substitute, and not simply as an addition or a small Amendment to the Govern-
866
ment Resolution; for many of us are not prepared, for reasons which we have heard explained by the last speaker, to express unqualified approval of the policy contained in the statement made by the Foreign Secretary on December 3. It is true that there are, in that statement, some extremely important points of which we heartily approve—notably the decision to withdraw our forces without delay from Port Said. It was a right, if painful, decision. But comments which have been included in the Resolution, and which have been repeated in the speech of the noble Marquess, suggesting that the Government are entitled to the credit of having brought into being a United Nations Force, are statements which many of us cannot possibly accept. I can see no reason why these should be included in the Resolution which is, in effect, a vote of confidence.
I have little quarrel with the terms of the Labour Party Amendment, but the first part of it seems to me to be backward-looking and the second half, I suggest, is not nearly vigorous enough The Amendment invites us
"… to restore Commonwealth unity, recreate confidence between our Attics and ourselves …"
But (and this is the main point I wish to make to the House to-night) it is not nearly enough to get back to the situation as it was six months ago. We shall achieve very little if we merely do that. There will be no permanent solution of the outstanding issues in the Middle East, or anywhere else, unless the nations are prepared to undertake obligations and share commitments in a way they have never done before in history. The question is: Are we really accepting that position, arid are we prepared to act upon it? That is why the Liberal Party have asked your Lordships House to accept that. Amendment, which makes no reference to the past, but says simply that we cannot survive unless the international structure of the world is radically strengthened.
The only consolation I can gather from the sorry events of the last two months is that this truth is at last widely realised and that we are presented now—almost, in a sense, by good fortune—with a new and unique opportunity. So the question is: where do we go from here? This opportunity—which I am not suggesting has anything to do with the past events in

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relation to Egypt—is especially laid on our doorstep because of our long tradition, experience and knowledge in international affairs. In the past ten years, during which a revolutionary change has been taking place, we have put forward many ideas. And, make no mistake about it, my Lords, a revolution is taking place, from a world of many sovereign independent States to a world in which international collaboration is an imperative necessity. If, perhaps, we have done less than we might have done, I think it is due to the fact that it is not easy for a proud people who for a century have kept the Pax Britannica fresh throughout the world to accept the consequences of political interdependence. Yet we are coming to recognise that that is, in fact, the situation with which we are faced.
In the course of a recent speech a high Foreign Office official observed that:
"In this century a new conception of sovereignty has come to replace the old-fashioned thinking of the nineteenth century … There is surely nothing that any country need feel ashamed of in voluntarily surrendering a degree of sovereignty by joining in an international co-operative system which will be to the benefit of all."
These are not the words of a theorist or a dreamer. I heard them spoken by Sir Pierson Nixon, on the last day of September this year, in New York, in the opening speech he made at the World Congress on Nuclear Energy. Do we accept them? And are we really about to act on that principle? The practical task of bringing order out of confusion and correlating the scope of operations of our international institutions—and they are in confusion—is a complex one, but it is the essential. No. I task in the immediate future.
I would make this suggestion to the Government: that we ought to have a planning cell in the very centre, in the heart of the Government, to think out ways and means of developing and coordinating the apparatus of international collaboration, covering the political, economic and military fields—because these are not separate: they are all one. One of the first items on the agenda of such a body would be the question, which is not an academic one: What are we going to do about the United Nations Force. Has it got to be disbanded as soon as certain events happen or are we thinking of changing and developing it
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in some future direction? What is the relationship between such an International Force and troops of an intermediate kind—for example, the troops under the direction of N.A.T.O. The list of items on the agenda of such a body is tremendous, and I do not propose to follow that matter, though it is a fascinating subject. I want only to make one or two points on each of the aspects of this problem.
First in importance, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has said, is the question of the maintenance—the restoration, if you like․of the American Alliance. It must surely be axiomatic, in the present distribution of power throughout the world, that it is the height of folly for any country to challenge the Soviet Union unless it is assured of the support of the United States. And, just because that is the case, surely it is clearly out of order for us to take risks in some other minor way, risks which may lead to disturbance, without first informing the United States, who may be pushed into a position of the greatest gravity and importance. This doctrine does not mean that we must all become the satellites of the United States. I fully appreciate that close partnership between Britain and America may at times be a difficult art, but it can be mastered, as has been proved in two world wars and it was by no means always the American view that prevailed in that fruitful collaboration. Moreover, we may often carry a weight of authority far greater than our population and resources would suggest. It is true that if we play a lone hand, we are heavily outweighted; but if and when we are in line with the Commonwealth, and with Europe, there is a combination which is nearly equal in resources with the United States and which far outweighs it in population.
We must all rejoice, as the noble Marquess has said, at the signs following one another, in recent days, almost hours, that Washington and London are coming closer together again. To those signs which have already been mentioned, I would add, the fact that Mr. Herter has been appointed deputy to Mr. Dulles in the State Department, and that another distinguished American, General Gruenther, is now, as it were, in the precincts of the White House. So that we have in Washington to-day people

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who understand, who have learnt through their own work to understand, the situation on this side of the Atlantic. Mr. Nixon's speech in Washington the other day, in which he said that there arc faults on both sides, is a gesture calculated to bring a healing of the breach.
But what we need to remember is that the United States, who are now carrying on their shoulders a greater responsibility towards the rest of the world than any country has ever done before—and I stress those words—have put all their faith in the United Nations as the instrument with which they can carry out their task. We may think that an insufficient instrument, but, for that reason, we must bend all our energies to make the United Nations a going and efficient concern, both on its merits—and I think that most noble Lords wish to see it, on its merits, the organisation of the future—and also because it is only on that basis that we can hope to keep in step with the United States of America.
'There is one way (I cannot touch upon this matter except quite scrappily) in which we can help to strengthen the organisation at New York. Speaking in a recent debate, I think in this House, I pointed out that one of the defects in the working of the United Nations is that, whereas there are many national groupings in that Organisation—for example, the South American bloc, the Bandoeng States, the Arab League, the great monolithic Powers and so on—there has never been in New York an organisation of the European nations. We can best strengthen the United Nations by the consolidation of democratic Europe. The defect is, in part, due to lack of organisation in Europe on the political plane. In N.A.T.O. Europe possesses one of the most effective military organisations, and perhaps the most effective military organisation of its kind that has ever been known, though even N.A.T.O. has geographical limits which some of us think are too narrow—that emerged in the debates here on Cyprus.
Some progress has been made in the economic field—for example, in the liberalisation of trade under the direction of O.E.E.C.; and the discussions taking place about a common market, a free trade area and nuclear energy are a move forward in that direction. But the countries of Europe have not yet contrived to
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reach. a common policy in international political affairs. That is greatly needed; for a military alliance such as N.A.T.O. is unlikely to continue indefinitely if—and this is only one reason—the international policies of its various members are at sixes and sevens. If that state of affairs continues, the days of N.A.T.O. are numbered.
I have indicated, also, that a common policy is necessary in Europe so that. Europe may speak with one voice in the United Nations. I would suggest to our political planners, who I have indicated ought to face this great question, that they can best achieve the welding that I wish to see by setting up a top level Committee of the Ministers of Western Europe. It should have as its titular members the: Prime Ministers of the countries concerned. I believe I am right in saying that there has been no meeting of Western European Prime Ministers since the war, or indeed, since some time before the war. Some Prime Ministers have attended meetings of Foreign Secretaries when they have held the double office, but there has been no meeting of Prime Ministers.
The Prime Ministers' Committee would supersede or have the overlordship of the existing, and often competing, ministerial committees; it would, of course, meet rarely, and would carry out the direction of the various agencies through appropriate deputies. A single Committee of this kind is, I am sure, the only way to prevent overlapping and duplication. I would add, finally, that it must have as its Secretary-General a public figure of high political standing. Let me remind your Lordships of the part that is being played by M. Hammarskjoeld at the moment, and of the fact that the most permanent of many of our international organisations—for example the I.L.0.—owe an immense amount to having the right Secretary-General. I suggest that the right figure could help to create what the late Mr. Ernest Bevin described as "a Cabinet of Europe", which is what he had in mind when he signed the Statute of the Council of Europe. Finally, there is the Commonwealth. The apparatus of consultation exists, arid say nothing on that, except that I share the view of noble Lords on my left, who are urging that an early conference should be held so that the rifts that have emerged may be healed.

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My thesis is not that the Labour and Conservative Governments in the past ten years have done nothing in this field. On the contrary, there has been a surfeit of international experiments. My complaint is that the steps taken have been too timid and without proper organisation and coordination. Recent events have taught us that we are not faced with a number of separate problems for which we must provide ad hoc answers, but that our difficulties are part and parcel of one single evolutionary process which is demanding from us imagination and radical changes in our traditional methods and habits. If we agree that these changes are necessary in order to secure an ordered world, we must he prepared to pay the price. For he who wills the end must will the means.
3.38 p.m.
THE EARL OF HALIFAX: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has made, as he always does, a speech replete with thought, suggestive, and containing much that no doubt demands the assent of all your Lordships. I do not intend to follow him over much of the ground that he traversed, because my purpose is somewhat more confined and more precise than the general survey to which we have, to our profit, just listened. As to the past, I agree with my noble friend who introduced the debate this afternoon that there is little to be gained by an attempt to prove a case on the one side or the other. I reflected, as I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that probably the most ardent champion of Her Majesty's Government to-day would not be tempted to deny the grim character of the balance sheet that emerges from a stocktaking on paper of the events of recent months; indeed, to sit down and assess the different items in that account is to engage upon a study of unrelieved gloom. I do not suppose there would be any great disagreement among many of US as to that.
The only conclusion that I think many of the facts seem to support is one that comes back to me over the years. It came from an old friend of many years ago whose financial affairs were somewhat embarrassed, and who invited me to help him in an examination of them, with the object of seeing whether and where some reduction in the expenses might be possible. We went laboriously through all
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the figures of country house and agricultural estate expenditure, failing completely to find any point at which economy was possible. My friend was distressed, and we were both silent. Then, suddenly, his face lit up, and almost gaily he said, "Well there's one thing worse than having an overdraft, and that is to 'worrit' about it. Let's think of something else." I must confess that more than once during this last month I have been inclined to fall back upon the same escapist method of relief. Therefore I do not attempt to draw the balance sheet in detail—and that for two reasons. The first is that, especially after hearing my noble friend who leads the House, I doubt greatly whether anybody who is outside the Government has enough knowledge of it to draw that balance correctly. Secondly, as I hinted just now, I do not think that this measuring and calculation of loss and gain is the most immediately important thing to which we might profitably apply our minds.
May I say one word on each of those points? As against everything that has to be entered on the debit side, of which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, spoke—the blocking of the Canal, the loss of our position in the Arab world, the rupture of American-Anglo friendship, and so on—I can yet suppose, when I have said all that, that there may be real force behind what fell from the noble Marquess, who is in n a much better position to know the truth of it than most of us. He made two points. If I may repeat one of them without risk of getting into argument with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, it is: Would the United Nations ever have been able to get a start with all that it is now doing—and that may conceivably open the way to its becoming a more effective instrument of world peace; I do not put it higher than that—unless it had had this admittedly rough jar and jolt from the Anglo-French action? Secondly, if it is in fact true that, by the forcible stopping of a little war, the Government have in fact stopped a big one, then that obviously weighs heavier than anything that may be put on the other side. But that is not something which the ordinary citizen is in a position to judge.
More important, I suggest, than any attempt to measure that kind of loss and gain—certainly more important than any attempt, from which this House has been happily free, to measure Party loss

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or gain—is the task of trying to rebuild as much as we can of that Anglo-American comradeship which has been so badly shaken. It is remarkable that every speech made in this debate so far—and I have no doubt the same will he true of all the fifty speeches that will yet be made—paid tribute to the importance of that work.
I wish to say a few frank words on that topic which are the more easily said to-day because, as has been said more than once this afternoon, the last week has happily brought significant evidence from more than one direction of the start that has been made on the other side of the Atlantic with the rebuilding that is necessary. It is therefore easier to talk frankly to-day than it would have been a week ago. If things have been done or have not been done of a sort or in a way to cause deep resentment in the United States, responsible persons in the United States would have made a great mistake if they had failed to realise the counter-feeling aroused in this country by some of the things said and done on the other side of the Atlantic.
I would gloss that statement with two observations. The first is one that is really of no interest except perhaps to myself, and that is to record my own surprise that, at a moment when many of our people here—we have all heard them—were professing the greatest indignation at the attitude or action of Americans who up to then they had judged to be friends, it did not occur to them, these voluble, indignant people here, to wonder whether it might not have been partly we ourselves who were responsible for this sudden and unwelcome change of temper among the Americans. That struck me as very odd. It shows, I suppose, how egocentric we all naturally are.
The other observation is this. Perhaps it is not a had thing that the account against both countries should be thus balanced, because we can, as I think the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said, recognise that there have been faults on both sides, and it makes it easier to start building the bridge from both ends. That, of course, is the task of diplomacy, which is the recognised official instrument of civilised intercourse between nations, but which does demand a high degree both of willingness and of ability
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to understand the motives of other people. During the past weeks Anglo-American relations have been marked by an almost total breakdown of such understanding, and, in spite of competent and trusted Ambassadors in both countries, the diplomatic structure has proved barely capable of supporting the strain that political actions imposed upon it and the loss of mutual confidence which, in spite of everything we may say and do here, is going to take a long time to make wholly good.
The elements, as I see of this lack of confidence on the British side may be bluntly stated. A substantial section of British opinion has believed that the United States for a long time has been contributing to the uncertainty and, finally, to the crisis in the Middle East, by lack of a definite policy in that area, arid I think I am with those who believe that there is a good deal be said in support of that view. In addition, during these last months, when all these doubts arid difficulties have conic to a head, many here, as we all know, have found sharp fault with what they have thought to be the evasive and prevaricating tactics pursued by the official spokesman of American diplomatic policy, the Secretary of State, who has been cast for the role of principal villain. The picture was that, for one reason or another, Mr. Dulles was not too sorry to see our country in difficulties; that most of what he said or did that we disliked was inspired by domestic considerations, and that he was all the time far more concerned with the United States election than he was with anything else.
I have not doubt that Mr. Dulles has often said things that he would wish later to have expressed differently. There are not many of your Lordships, even if you sit on either of the Front Benches, of whom the same might not he said. And no doubt we shall all do it again. But, having said that, I believe that, by and large, the sort of criticism that fastened itself on Mr. Dulles was quite unrealistic and wholly unfair; and the usual conclusion that Mr. Dulles hay no love for this country f believe to he quite mistaken. I have no doubt at all that, from the start, he feared that our belligerent activities would not serve their purpose and would only exacerbate the situation; and it is very hard to claim that there is

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no substance in his doubts. I think it right to say, as far as my judgment goes—and I was glad to see Sir Roger Makins express the same view a day or two ago always—at the top of Mr. Dulles's list of purposes has been the preservation of Western unity and the co-operation of our two Governments. I have no doubt whatever that subsequent negotiations will more and more tend to confirm that view.
Anyhow, my Lords, that is the job that stands out a mile for our two Governments and two peoples to do. The channels of confidence have been blocked. The waterway between Suez and Port Said is not the only waterway that needs urgently to be cleared. As Lord Layton said, the British Commonwealth needs the United States; but the United States, in other ways no doubt, needs not less the British Commonwealth.
During the war, when I had the honour to be in Washington, my right honourable friend, the Prime Minister, came over to Washington, and that grand old man of then American politics, Mr. Cordell Hull, entertained him at a private dinner. At the end of it he used some words which I think are even more true to-day than when he used them ten or twelve years ago:
"I will not say that if our two nations are in accord all our problems can be solved; but I will certainly say that without that condition none are soluble."
3.53 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRUCE OF MELBOURNE: My Lords, it is possibly within the knowledge of some of your Lordships that in this country I have no political affiliations whatsoever. I may have had them elsewhere, but here I have none. As I propose, contrary to my usual custom, to cast a vote in favour of the Government on this issue. I thought I ought to offer some explanation. I gave some thought to what form it should take, and it seemed to me that, although it would mean painful reiteration, one had to deal with the happenings of the last three or four months. Happily, the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, has rendered us another incomparable service: he said all I wanted to say, and I am not going to deal with the past at all. I am going to deal with the present and with the future.
Obviously the greatest problem of the present moment is the one to which the
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noble Earl who has just spoken referred: Anglo-American relations. He has dealt with them in that cultured and delightful manner in which he always deals with everything. I propose to deal with them in rather a rougher and more brutal manner. My reason for doing so is that for four years, as independent chairman of the World Food Council, I went to the United States about four times a year. There seems to be something between the rough Australians and the Americans which finds a sort of touch. As a result of my meetings with the Americans, I am quite certain at this moment that if we are to get back to good relations, the last thing we should do is to stand in a white sheet and fawn upon America. What they want from us is exactly what we think and feel. They like plain speaking. So far as I am concerned, they are going to get it.
The first point that I would put to the Americans is this: "You have uttered the most virulent and violent criticism of us because we have done something—namely, going into Egypt to protect what we believe was a vital interest of ours. Have you not done it in the past, at Panama and Guatemala? Would you not do it again if you thought that one of your own vital issues was concerned?" It is essential that we should say that to the Americans.
For a considerable time we have been criticised in every way by America regarding our policy in the Middle East. I venture to say that during that period America has done everything to thwart us and make our position more difficult. I do not wish to suggest that the American policy has been influenced by the oil lobby, nor do I suggest that they had any reason other than the highest motives for the attitude they took up. The real reason is, in my view, that their policy in the Middle East has been about as inept as anything ever was. And the last result of their foreign policy has been to reinflate the bullfrog Nasser when he was hopelessly defeated and completely discredited.
The other point I want to put to them is this: "Within the record of this century, with our part in the two wars, the unfailing support we gave to you in Korea, the way we have been the best and most loyal friend that any country could have asked for, do you not think

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you might have shown a little more tolerance and understanding of the difficulties and troubles we have been up against?" And, finally, I put to them this: "You have said a good deal about us. Suppose you had taken some action you thought vital and we had said anything like as much about you as you have said about us, would you not have been consumed with anger?" I finish by saying: "Let us forget the whole business. The time is over for recrimination. We must now get together almost to save the world and preserve humanity. We must forget these things and start again."
What about the future? The present position is that Great Britain and France have withdrawn or are withdrawing from Egypt. The United Nations has sent an International Force into the Middle East and has taken over the position. Now the great and difficult problems of Egypt and the whole Middle East are "on the plate" of the United Nations. What I often wonder is, does everyone quite realise what that means? Do they really understand what are now the responsibilities of the United Nations in that area?
The first and fundamental responsibility of the United Nations is to ensure that its authority is observed. That is vital. If that is so, it is possible that force may have to be used, because the United Nations cannot take this over and then have its authority flouted. It may be that force will have to be used. Does everybody realise that fact, and that, if force is used, it must be effective force? There is this International Force in Egypt to-day, but it is a token force. Nobody pretends that it has great military value. Does anyone believe that a ruffian like Nasser, or a nation like Russia, with her record, will take any more notice of a token force than they have of the hundreds of resolutions that have been passed by the United Nations? I will return a little later to this point as to the use of force, but for the moment I want to deal with the obligations that are now "on the plate" of the United Nations and which must be dealt with.
The first one has been mentioned—to clear the Canal. In that respect, I am encouraged by some of the statements that have been made to-day; though whether they will be lived up to I do not know. The point is that the Canal must
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be cleared, by every possible method and means; and all possible equipment must be used. The United Nations must not sit down under the impertinent ultimatum of Mr. Nasser, that British and French equipment must not be used, and that the work must not even start until the last one of the French and British troops is out of the country. The Canal is blocked by Nasser's wanton, deliberate and unnecessary action, and if the United Nations are going to acquiesce in his action in telling them what they can and cannot do, it seems to me that the position is utterly impossible.
The second point is to bring about an agreement on the future of the Canal. It is perfectly clear what the basis of that agreement must be. The noble Marquess referred to the vote in the Security Council and the resolution passed on, I think, November 2. I thought it was passed by seven votes to two, but the noble Marquess said that the second Resolution—that is, the six points that were made by the Security Council as being the basis of the settlement for future agreement as to the conduct of the Canal—was carried unanimously. However, it was carried; that was the will expressed at the United Nations. Is Mr. Nasser going to be allowed to hold that up so that we cannot get an effective measure of control and conduct of the Canal? If he does again, we are simply letting this "tin-pot" dictator hold the whole world to ransom. We have seen in these last weeks the effect of the Canal not operating, and operating efficiently.
The third obligation that the United Nations have to face is the future of the Middle East. Involved in that is the control of the Russian menace, the ensuring of the security of Israel and the settlement of the refugee problem. There has been a considerable brushing aside of this Russian menace—an attitude that anyhow, if it happened we have known all about it for a long time. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, speaking from the Opposition Front Bench said, "We knew that arms were going into Egypt. We told you so and we said that you ought to send them to Israel as well to balance it." Does he suggest for one second that anybody had the faintest idea of the extent of the build-up that had gone on until we got in and discovered it there? Did he know that they had got a million blankets

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there? Did lie know any of that? Of course it was not known. That menace is there and it is no good our blinking our eyes to it. The Egyptians had also acquired £150 million worth of arms; and it is known that during the last year. £20 million worth of arms and equipment have gone into Syria. I think that is a gross understatement of the position. Syria and Jordan have now gone Communist. At any moment there might be an attack on Israel from Syria, with Russian personnel and Russian equipment helping. What are the United Nations going to do then? Are they going to sit by and let them go in? I say that it is unthinkable that they could, now that they have assumed responsibility.
The next point is the future of Israel. We have had Mr. Nasser saying that he controls the troops of Egypt, Jordan and Syria; that he was going to be the emperor of the Middle East and was going to sweep Israel off the map. But this idea that all the Arabs are working together now is really nonsense. A number of them hate Nasser. They would be quite ready to see this Communist menace in Jordan and Syria cleaned up; but the fact is that it is there. The Arabs who were bitterly hostile in the beginning to the establishment to the State of Israel have enough sense to grasp now that the Israel State is going to stay. They would welcome a settlement which defined, definitely and with certainty, the boundaries of Israel and also gave to the Arabs a reassurance against their haunting fear of the progress of expansion by Israel. I believe that a settlement is possible—but, again, that is "on the plate" of the United Nations.
Then there is the settlement of the refugee problem. That, surely, is a blot on the whole of our civilisation and an absolute challenge to the United Nations. Those are the jobs of work that now lie in the hands of the world, if I may put it that way. The point is, who is going to do the job? Will it be the United Nations, who are now in control and who have undertaken the task, or will the job have to be done by Anglo-American cooperation, the strengthening of the Baghdad Pact and other steps towards the same end?
We have to examine the United Nations position. It must be clear, from what I
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have said, that force may be necessary. The United Nations can command the force. The United States has thrown its great mantle over the United Nations, and the United States, Britain and France could provide the United Nations with all the effective force needed to tackle any situation that might arise in the Middle East. But would the United Nations allow the use of that force? Mr. Nehru has told us that his force is in the International Force only so long as Mr. Nasser desires it to be there. There may be numerous other nations in the same position. If that is so, the position might arise that the United Nations was completely impotent to do anything at all, even in this relatively small area of the world. Here I would say a word of warning. The noble Lord, Lord Layton, drew a picture of the future, in which we might have an International Court and a permanent World Force under the control of the United Nations. I agree that that is the eventual ideal of the world, but at the present moment I can think of nothing more dangerous than to have large armed forces at the control of the United Nations, as it is at present, when God knows how they would act or what they would do with them! However, that is a little aside from what I was saying.
The point is, it seems to me, that the United Nations must realise that they may have to use force. They must be prepared to use it, because I believe that if the United Nations, having assumed this responsibility, now "fall down" in an area like the Middle East, where they could handle the situation and where they could have whatever forces were necessary, then this, added to their lamentable failure in regard to a great Power, as Lord Silkin observed, and to do anything in this tragedy of Russian aggression against Hungary, will mean that we shall all have to think twice about the United Nations. We shall have to ask ourselves whether we arc going to let millions of people who still have the greatest faith in the United Nations, who believe that it is the great instrument of peace in the world, and who believe that the small nations can rest happy and content because they will have the protection of the United Nations, be disillusioned. If they have to be disillusioned that will be sad and tragic, but it would be far more

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cruel to let them go on living in a fool's paradise. If the United Nations are to be saved—because the world to-day is at the crossroads—it will be by the cooperation of the United Kingdom and the United States; and I believe that that will be forthcoming.
4.13 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I hope it may not be disagreeable to your Lordships if, on the occasion of my maiden speech, I should preface my remarks by saying that I am deeply conscious of the fact that I am following in the footsteps of one who was a Member of your Lordships' House for more than half a century. Tributes paid in this House to my father described him as
"… a House of Lords' man in the very best sense of Ale words, who served your Lordships well."
Many noble Lords, in all quarters of the House, have told me, in most kind fashion, that over that long period of time he earned for himself the reputation of a speaker of unusual eloquence, rare lucidity of expression and remarkable memory. I can, and will, attempt to emulate the example set me, but I cannot aspire to those heights of eloquence with which he was able to hold your Lordships' close attention. Therefore, at least, on this first occasion, I must humbly ask for your Lordships' rather special indulgence.
In the last few weeks and months we have heard a great deal about Afro-Asian opinion and how we have mortally offended A, not only now hut perhaps for all time. Unfortunately, this loose form of expression "Afro-Asian" conveys to many people that all African opinion is suspicious of this country and is actually hostile at this particular moment in history, whereas, in fact, the "Afro" part of this curious political agglomeration refers only to the Arabs of North Africa and not to the Africans who live south of the Sahara. I should like for a moment to consider the effects of the action of Her Majesty's Government on East and West and Central Africa.
For the last five years I have been living in Southern Rhodesia, and during that time I have interested myself in the problems of that area and travelled throughout the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and further afield into
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East and South Africa. The inhabitants of those vast regions, both black and white, believe that what happens there in the next twenty-five years will have great significance for the rest of the world and may even help to shape its future course for a long time to come. Emerging rapidly from a primitive state and reaching forward eagerly to grasp the political and economic techniques of Western civilisation, East and West and Central Africa must have the utmost tranquillity if they are to fulfil their great promise, Any alien influence which may disturb or disrupt the orderly progress of the development of those parts can spell ruin for their inhabitants. This refers particularly to the emergence of an Arab Empire dominated by an Egyptian dictator to their North.
It is true that there are African leaders who declaim loudly against colonialism and whose words occasionally lead to unfortunate incidents. Yet these same men proclaim continuously their loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen. I believe in their honesty, and I have no doubt whatever that when the time comes for them to obtain self-government and eventual independence, as in the case of the Gold Coast, whether it be under a wholly African Government or under a multiracial one, they will not wish to exchange British influence, which was once British domination for the domination any other race, whether Arab, Indian or Russian.
That this is in fact the opinion of thinking Africans is borne out by the letters I have read from Africans in the African newspapers. There is one letter in particular which your Lordships may have seen, which was written by a Nigerian in Britain and published in the Sunday Times. With your Lordships' permission I should like to read a few extracts from that letter, as follows:
"… Britain's recent action in the Middle East is justified for many reasons … it stopped between Israel and Egypt a war which might eventually have led to a world war; it gave birth to a United Nations force which is bound to be a big contribution to the maintenance of world peace. These two points, together the fact that Britain seeks no sovereignty in that area, make it abundantly clear that she not guilty of aggression The principles of the United Nations Charter could be expressed in these few words: 'To prevent another world war." That is exactly what British action has achieved. Of all the Great Powers of the

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world, Britain has always been the most sincere and helpful friend of Africa and the other coloured races."
This Nigerian ends with these words:
"If Hungary can be so brutally treated by Russia, then woe betide any African territory which has the misfortune to be under Russian domination."
By checking Colonel Nasser in his stride, by preventing a conflagration in the Middle East and by revealing the true extent of Russian involvement, Her Majesty's Government have done an inestimable service to the African people, many of whom are under our protection.
Before saying a brief word about the rest of the Commonwealth, I want to make one general observation. Ever since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, it has seemed to me that the struggle has been not as it should and could have been, between the children of light and the children of darkness: it has been between those idealists who quite sincerely believe that moral values alone are sufficient to overcome the frailties of human nature and the nationalist vices which stalk the world, and those other idealists who, equally sincerely, believe that effective action is necessary in order that these frailties of human nature and nationalist vices should not prevent the attainment of their ideals and the ideals of both groups are, of course, in the long run, the same.
In this connection, I would only say that I believe it is important to realise that this deep division of opinion is not confined to this country alone; for there have been, in this country, interests who would like to isolate Her Majesty's Government and their supporters—the majority of the nation—from the rest of the world. But there is sufficient evidence over the past month to show that there are millions of people throughout the Commonwealth, in Western Europe, and even in the United States of America, who approve and support the action which Her Majesty's Government have taken both on practical and on moral grounds.
We have had very recent statements from the Australian Prime Minister and Sir Eric Harrison, the newly-arrived Australian High Commissioner, and also from Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada. Between them they have said that they agree with these very terms which Her Majesty's Government have put down in
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this Motion: that in fact Her Majesty's Government have prevented hostilities in the Middle East from spreading and that a United Nations Force is there as a result of the Government's action. We hear from Sir Eric Harrison that the Australians believe Her Majesty's Government were quite right, and had the right, to act alone, without consultation, in a crisis of that nature. From Mr. Lester Pearson we hear that the rift in the Commonwealth is not so serious as some quarters would have us believe, and that it is confined very largely to the Asian members and particularly to India.
I believe it is a large part of the case of noble Lords on the opposite Benches that we have offended India deeply. I would suggest to your Lordships, however, that it was hardly the fault of Her Majesty's Government that that rift originally was created; for when Colonel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal it was India who supported the action of an Egyptian dictator who had flouted international law, and she was actively hostile to the rest of the Commonwealth, Western Europe and the United States of America who were attempting to reach a reasonable settlement by negotiation.
I realise that a most serious rift exists, but I find it rather hard to reconcile active hostility on the part of one member of the Commonwealth with the spirit of the Commonwealth purpose as a whole. I feel sure that if Mr. Nehru and his colleagues will do their share in healing this rift, Her Majesty's Ministers will do, and are doing, theirs, so that finally the Commonwealth may make its united effort to ensure that the United Nations Organisation shall cease forthwith from diminishing the power and influence of peace-loving nations and law-makers, and cease forthwith from encouraging the rise and continued prosperity of tyrants and law-breakers.
4.25 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, I am sure that, if nothing else that I say in the course of my speech appeals to every one of your Lordships, what I am now going to say will certainly do so. I would tell the noble Lord who has just resumed his seat how very much we have enjoyed his speech and how warmly we congratulate him upon it. We have had some of the directness and clarity which always characterised the speeches of his noble

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father, to whom we were all glad that he referred; because not only did we hold his noble father in the highest respect but I think we held him peculiarly in our affection. I am sure, therefore, that I am expressing the view of all of your Lordships when I tell the noble Lord that I hope we shall see him in his place in your Lordships' House and hear him just as often as, or even more often than, we had the pleasure of seeing and hearing his noble father.
I do not wish to follow the noble Lord in his speech, except to say that l could not altogether agree with some of the animadversions he made on the conduct of India in these recent weeks. I have not altogether agreed with what has been done there, but I cannot for a moment agree with the noble Lord when he says that the conduct of India has been hostile to the Commonwealth. As I shall, during my speech, have to make a number of observations somewhat critical of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in recent weeks, I should like to begin with a word of praise. I think that the decision of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw our forces from the Suez area was absolutely right. I feel that it required considerable moral courage on their part to take action, not only because pride was involved (and it is always difficult, and a rather humiliating business, to "climb down", especially in politics), but also because there was a very strong element within the ranks of their own political supporters which was hotly opposed to the policy of moderation. I am therefore a little sorry that the difficult position of Her Majesty's Government has not, perhaps, been properly appreciated on this side of the House, and that they have not received quite the commendation which I personally. at any rate, think is their due. What they have done, though they were a little tardy about it is in striking contrast to what has occurred over the last week or two in Hungary. There the obduracy of the Government of the U.S.S.R. has been in striking contrast to the action of our own Government.
I think it is a great pity, however, that this access of moral courage has rather tended to ooze away out of the fingertips of Her Majesty's Government when it comes to their explanations of their conduct. Instead of frankly admitting that they made a mistake, which I had hoped
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they would have done, they halve treated us to a whole set of what I can regard only as miserable excuses, excuses of the kind that psychologists call "rationalisations". I understand a "rationalisation" to he some thought-up explanations some action which one took on an emotional basis. These explanations have differed from day to day, and, indeed, from speech to speech; and they have become more unconvincing as they go on, each more unconvincing than its predecessor, and the last the most unconvincing of all.
Take the way they have been trying to "cash in" on the unpopularity which the Government of the U.S.S.R. have been earning over their conduct in Hungary, by throwing all the blame on Russia, and inventing this Russian plot for the capture of the Middle East. I cannot see that any evidence for that plot has been produced at all, apart from these sales by Czechoslovakia and Russia of arms, over the past year or so, to the Government of Egypt. And these were well known to everyone, as Lord Silk in has pointed out. Indeed, The Times military correspondent, in an appreciation of the situation a week or two ago, said that the quantities of arms which had been found in the Sinai Peninsula were a good deal smaller than estimates had indicated. I believe that one of the spokesmen of the Foreign Office in another place made a statement which was really in direct opposition to that of the Secretary of State.
I think that we ought to attempt a dispassionate appraisal of the Russian intervention in the Middle East, because it is an important matter and one which requires a good deal of attention. In the first place, any student of history is perfectly well aware that the Russians have historically a very old-established interest in that part of the world. The Communist Government, no doubt, since it carne into power, has been, on the whole, too much occupied with events at home to attempt to revive this until very recently. It is understandable that we should feel annoyed that it has been revived, but if we try to look at the situation objectively I do not think we can say that we have any genuine grounds of grievance, particularly as I think it way our own conduct in fostering, building up and eventually joining the Baghdad Pact which

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led to the Russian intervention with regard to Egypt and the other parts of the Middle East.
Before the Baghdad Pact came into being, there was little sign of any intention on the part of the Russians to intervene in that part of the world. But when the Baghdad Pact was established the Russians made it clear that there was, in fact, going to be a very great deal of difficulty and ill-will. The Pact was clearly aimed at Russia. We said it was defensive action. But to the Russians—and if one tries, as surely one should, for a moment to put oneself into the Russian shoes this must be apparent—it seemed that they had strong cause for suspicion that it was something else. To them it appeared to be nothing more or less than aggression. I do not know what happened when the Russian leaders were here in the Spring, but these matters surely must have been discussed. It is said that the Prime Minister made it clear to them that we had no intention of climbing down in the Middle East and they made it clear to the Prime Minister that they had their interests in the Middle East to which they would cling tenaciously. In April they issued a very important statement in which they offered to discuss the whole matter and to try to come to a modus vivendi. So far as I know, that offer was never taken up by our Government or by the Government of the United States. After that cold-shouldering of the proposals the situation has grown exacerbated, and it seems to me that we have only ourselves to blame.
I return to the Government's explanations which, as I have said, appeared to me to be merely rationalisations. What we really want to do, it seems to me, is to discover the emotional drive which caused the Government to take the action they took. I think they were obeying instinct. Conservative Governments tend to obey instinct. In this matter they were obeying an instinct which told them that Colonel Nasser was a danger to peace and in particular a danger to the British Empire. And they were also moved by very natural anger at Colonel Nasser's conduct in seizing the Suez Canal. But instincts are not always, a very reliable motive force for policy—in fact very often quite the reverse, though I must say that I think there was a great deal of truth in
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the Government's instinct on this particular occasion, because I agree that Colonel Nasser is a danger to the peace of the world. He has been compared with Hitler. I do not really think that he is a Hitler, but I think he is a typical military dictator and that his actions since he came into power have been the sort of actions which a typical military dictator takes.
But one ought to remember that, just as Hitler had, so did he have a number of grievances, most of them imaginary but some genuine, which enabled him to get a great deal of support in his own country, because Egyptian pride has obviously at one time or another suffered sorely at the hands of the Western Powers, and particularly at the hands of our own country. It seems to me that it was instinct which led the Government to lash out blindly at Colonel Nasser as soon as he seized the Canal. That brought their temper up to the boil. It is understandable that their temper should come to the boil, but it is very dangerous to take action in politics when one's temper is at the boil. It is often followed by disaster, as I submit it has been in this particular case.
In my view, it is never more important to keep one's temper completely than in a situation such as that which has existed in the Middle East over these last few months. That is a very old and very typical area of power politics. I remember that when I mentioned power politics some time ago, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—who is, unfortunately, not with us this afternoon—gave me a little lecture in which he said that all politics are power politics. One knows that the expression "power politics" has a certain meaning: it means politics based on power and power alone, not on justice and moderate counsels. Humanity at the present time, in my submission, is engaged on the Promethean task of attempting to put an end to, or at any rate to curb as closely as possible, the era of power politics which comes right down to the modern age. The technique which has been used is the technique of the United Nations which gives very considerable rights to small nations which in the days of power politics had no chance, except when they could tie themselves on to the apron strings of some very great Power.

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These rights which small nations have under the United Nations Charter are certainly in no sense commensurate with their power, and it is a constant temptation to them to abuse those rights. They realise perfectly well that they can play the game, so to speak, up to a considerable point; that they can commit all sorts of illegalities in the pursuit of their own objectives, about which they are often quite unscrupulous, and which the ponderous and at present imperfect machinery of the United Nations can never catch up with and never punish. I think there has never been anything more typical of this attitude, never been a more cynical "cashing in" on it, so to speak than the conduct of Colonel Nasser over the last year or so. This has been intensely galling to nations like ourselves—and not only to the Government, for we on this side have also appreciated how very dangerous it is, from the point of view of the building up of the United Nations, that this sort of thing should be allowed to go unchecked, because it leads to the attitude which was made clear in the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, this afternoon; one which is typical of the attitude of a large number of people in this and other countries.
I think that, to a considerable extent, we shall have to be long-suffering, for some years, of this sort of thing. It is a great pity, but I think the cause of progress requires that we should have to put up with a good deal of illegality and wickedness of this kind. It is to some extent to be regarded as our reparation—reparation we owe to the world for the exploitation of small nations by ourselves and other first-class Powers over a long period of time. They are now using the United Nations to get a bit of their own back; and, up to a point, we must put up with it. But I do not subscribe for a moment to the view, which has been accepted in some quarters, that unless the United Nations take action to redress a grievance, no action must be taken by any other State. So long as the United Nations have no force at their disposal to enforce their dicisions, it may from time to time become necessary for groups of member nations to assume responsibility for doing to. This is an unorthodox opinion, but it is one which I have held for some time.
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May I take an example? When Egypt disregarded the plain ruling of the United Nations that Israeli ships must be admitted through the Suez Canal, I should have been prepared to support the Government in any action they might have deemed it advisable to take to organise other nations and enforce the; decision of the United Nations. The fact that we let that wicked infringement of the legal rights of Israel pass with no more than a protest is one of the factors that have led to the present position. Since the action of the Egyptian Government did not seem then directly to damage our position we took no action against them. It is an old observation of anyone who has anything to do with the administration of criminal law that a criminal who finds he can commit his depredations without molestation from the police soon embarks on more frequent and more grievous crimes. And that is exactly what has happened with Nasser.
The Resolution which we are debating this afternoon is couched in somewhat narrower terms than those which are usual in connection with foreign affairs debates, and it restricts us, in a sense to this narrow area. I can well understand that the Government, who are pleading their case before the bar of the nation, are anxious to justify what they have clone and to make a case. I could wish that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, had dealt rather less with the past and told us rather more of hew the Government proposed to deal with the future and with the situation with which the nation is confronted, which I submit is a serious one. I understand that the Government's case is largely this that they admit that they have got the affairs of the nation into something of a mess, but the only alternative was the much worse mess of a great war, probably of a world war. I cannot see that they have made out their case, but I admit that this is a matter of conjecture. Noble Lords will have seen a remarkable article in the current issue of the American magazine Foreign Affairs, where the writer says:
"The impossibility of escaping conjecture is the tragic element in foreign policy."
That seems to me a very pertinent remark. The writer continues:
"After the objective ascertainment of fact, there always remains a residue of uncertainty

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about the meaning of events or about the opportunities which they offer."
It is because of that uncertainty which is left that we are debating these matters here this afternoon.
When it is a question of conjecture about what might have happened, there is also an element of futility in the discussion. I feel that tragic blunders have been made, particularly over these last weeks, by which we have forfeited the moral leadership of the world which we have been building up in the ten years since the end of the war. We have done so by abandoning the process of the legal adjustment of disputes, which is the whole basis of civilisation, in favour of violent remedies of self-help, which no doubt were perfectly legitimate in the past but which, since the advent of the United Nations, should be no longer maintained.
I do not wish to pursue this inquiry any further. Other noble Lords have pushed it a good way this afternoon. I want to use the rest of my time in examining the mess in which everybody agrees we are in, to discover its extent, to find out whether there are any redeeming factors and to ask the Government for assurances on how they propose to deal with it. There is not time to discuss all these points, but I should like to say something about two or three of them.
First of all, there is a matter which has not been discussed a great deal in recent debates and which I should have thought was one of the most important and deplorable aspects of this mess: namely, that the Government have made so little attempt—indeed, I think no attempt at all—to preserve what has been called bipartisanship. That is a nasty word, but I cannot think of any other which expresses what I mean. Bipartisanship was a notable element in the foreign policy of the late Mr. Ernest Bevin. The Government, in the face of what, even on their own showing, they knew to be the severe and profound opposition of a very large part of the nation, persisted in making this war in Egypt. I think that that is a serious matter. I do not believe that it is possible for political Parties whose principles are based on profoundly differing philosophies ever to agree 100 per cent. in regard to the direction of foreign policy, but I do believe that it is
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important that we should agree so far as possible.
There are many matters on which it is obvious that we should be in agreement; there are others where there is an evident necessity to secure as much agreement as possible. I submit that this position of Egypt and the Suez Canal is one in which there is obvious room for discussion and that the Government of the day ought to have paid careful attention to the sincere views of their opponents, as Mr. Bevin always did. For this it is necessary that they should be in touch with the Opposition and should have respect for their convictions. After all, we are all in this together. We shall have to help to foot the bill, just as much as noble Lords opposite. If the head of a household gambles away the family fortunes on the Stock Exchange, the other members of the family stand to lose just as much as he does. Therefore I suggest that it is a most unfortunate thing that the Government have pursued this policy in complete disregard of the profound views of a large section of public opinion and without any sort of attempt to continue the policy of bipartisanship.
Another obvious ingredient in the mess is the breakdown of our understanding with the United States—the temporary breakdown, because I am sure that that is all it is. This has been mentioned by every speaker, but I should like to say how much I appreciate what the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, said about it. What he said will carry much more weight than anything I say. I agree with everything he said on that score. I should have been glad to leave it at that, but unfortunately I do not feel it is possible. I think we should have a categorical assurance from the Government that they will not act in this way again; that is, without prior consultation with the United States. In my view, consultations are absolutely essential. As the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, said, it does not follow that we in this country shall always accept what the Americans want us to do, but it seems to me absolutely essential that we should consult with them before taking action of this important and dangerous character. The sad thing in this case is that Her Majesty's Government clearly have a conscience about it. It was not because there was no time to consult with the

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United States; it was because they knew very well that if they did so, the United States would make it clear that, in their view, Britain was doing wrong. Everybody knows that it is typical of human frailty that you do not ask the advice of an old and much respected friend when you know that he will tell you not to do what you have already made up your mind to do. I suggest that that applies to Governments as it does to ordinary individuals. I think there was a lack of moral courage on the part of the Government at that time.
One of the most upsetting aspects of this deplorable business is the complete lack of regard shown by Her Majesty's Government for General Eisenhower, who had just come back as President of the United States by the greatest majority in the history of that great country. I am sure that nobody in America has a softer spot in his heart for this country than has that great man. Some years ago, when he was still President of the University of Columbia, I had the privilege of a tête-à-tête talk with him for a few minutes, and I was impressed by the obvious affection and good will that he had for this country. We were in a difficult position at the time, and his solicitude and affection for this country was very touching. I can imagine how hurt he, the old leader not only of the American Army but of ours, too, during the most critical years in the history of this country, must have felt that he should have been flouted in this way. Fortunately, he is one of the most magnanimous men in the world, and I am sure he will not hear malice; in fact, he is already working hard on the restoration of the earlier position. Informed public opinion in the United States, as has been pointed out in several speeches, certainly blames the United States Government, to some extent, for what has gone wrong. I entirely accept the view put forward by the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, in regard to this matter: that the Americans must, as a result of their lack of a consistent and intelligent policy in the Middle East, accept a good deal of the blame for the fact that a position was reached in which Her Majesty's Government felt it necessary to take this action. So much for the United States.
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There are a number of other matters that I should like to discuss, but to which I will refer only briefly. I feel that, so far, the speeches from the Government have not been particularly constructive. They have dealt with the past. They have told us hardly anything of what they are going to do, and they have not given us any assurances about the Commonwealth. I am sure that we on this side of the House acquit Her Majesty's Government of any deliberate intention to break up the Commonwealth; obviously, nothing was further from their minds. But the way to hell is often paved with good intentions, and when a statesman such as Mr. Lester Pearson—who was referred to in eulogistic terms by the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House—makes a statement of the gravity quoted by my noble friend Lord Silkin, it shows that, whatever their intentions may have been, the Government went a good way in that direction. I refer to this matter again only because I hope that the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who is to reply for the Government, will give us strong assurances that, in future, this sort of thing will not be done without the other Commonwealth Governments being told of the action proposed and without time being taken to have effective consultations with them.
The financial and economic situation in which this conflict has plunged the country is obviously a serious one, and only in one small field has it been explored in some detail—namely, in connection with petrol economies. That is typical of the economy of this country in many other ways. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a much more realistic speech, in my submission, than that to which the other place was treated by the Foreign Secretary, indicated that the situation is a difficult one. But unfortunately he was unable to go far in showing how he intended to handle it. I suggest that a much more detailed and careful survey of the steps which must be taken, if we are to get our economy back on to a stable keel—and it has been on a knife edge, as noble Lords on both sides of the House have often pointed out in debates which we have had here in the matter—should be given. I do ask Her Majesty's Government to tell the nation, as soon as they possibly can, what they propose to do in order

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to restore the economic and financial situation.
Studying carefully the debate in another place, I felt that, here again, little in the way of constructive proposals emanated from the Government Benches. We are to have the advantage of hearing a number of speeches later in this debate from noble Lords who are members of the Government, and I hope that they will repair those omissions. From the Opposition Benches in another place a number of constructive proposals were made, some of which have been touched on this afternoon. I was in complete sympathy with that part of the speech of the noble Viscount. Lord Bruce of Melbourne, in which he referred to the position of the refugees in the Middle East. I am sure that that festering sore is one of the most important, if not the most important, of the causes of exacerbation and in the Middle East. I think that sore has had salt rubbed into it deliberately by Colonel Nasser and others of the leaders of the Arab States. It seems to me that we now have a position in which the United Nations Organisation is in a position to grasp that nettle firmly, and to deal effectively with this refugee problem. If the whole thing is allowed to slide back into its earlier state of hopeless chaos. a great opportunity will have been lost.
I suggest that the proposal which has been made, that the Gaza Strip and a substantial belt of Sinai should be taken over by the United Nations and operated for the purpose of preventing the sort of underground warfare which has been going on during the past years between Egypt and Israel, should also be taken seriously. That is a constructive suggestion. From the point of view of International Law (I wish the noble and learned Lord, Lord MacNair, who I see in his seat, would tell us about this) it seems to me that the Egyptians have no right whatever to the Gaza Strip, and that their right, in law, to the Sinai Peninsula is a dubious one. So that, in law, there would be a great deal to be said for action of this kind being taken by the United Nations.
There is also the problem of oil, because, after all, that is the reason why this matter is so important for our country. That area of the Middle East is the richest oil-bearing area in the world—
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that is well known. Would it not be a good opportunity to attempt to come to some sort of pooling arrangement in regard to these great reserves of oil in the Middle East, an arrangement which could, perhaps, be sponsored by the United Nations Organisation? These are some of the detailed constructive proposals which have been made during the course of this present crisis. I think that the Government should take them seriously. The Government should exert their influence, and should persuade the American Government to use its influence, with the United Nations to see that serious consideration is given to these proposals.
The noble Marquess the Leader of the House has admitted this afternoon that it had not been in the mind of the Government that a United Nations Police Force might come into operation as a result of their action. I thought that was a frank and honest admission on his part. It is a case of good coming out of evil. I think that in some other ways, perhaps not so important, such as I have suggested, good may also come out of evil. The situation is undoubtedly one fraught with great danger, and full of evil. But if we do our best we can, to some extent, understand each other's points of view, and we may be able to pluck some flowers out of the evil pool of despond into which we have got ourselves during these last weeks.
5.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT CHERWELL: My Lords, I should like, in the first place, to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, on his admirable speech. I say "admirable", not only because I agreed with practically everything he said, but because of the clarity and persuasiveness with which he put his thesis forward. I was also impressed by the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne. Once again I was in almost complete agreement.
I should say at the outset that I support the Motion of my noble Leader. I think I have to say this, because I intend to deal mainly with one particular matter, the United Nations Organisation, which I think ought to be analysed, and at which I shall not be able to throw quite so many bouquets as most speakers seemed to do. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, I hate living in a

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fool's paradise, and though, like everyone else, I wish U.N.O. could work, I have come reluctantly to the view that in its present form it cannot. It is composed, of course, of men full of the best intentions, and its admirers are equally well-meaning. But I cannot help feeling that people tend to overestimate its power for good and to underrate its potentialities for evil. We know all too well nowadays how easy it is for people to fall victims to phrases, to be hypnotised by slogans, and I am afraid that that is what is happening in the case of U.N.O. "Send it to U.N.O." is becoming a sort of incantation. In many quarters it seems to be treated as a shibboleth. You have only to mouth the words and go through the ceremonial, and all will be well.
There are obvious psychological reasons for this curious attitude of mind. During the war many men in the Forces positively revelled in the fact that they did not have to think out the consequences of their actions and that all they had to do was to obey. It seems to me that something similar is happening on a bigger scale. People in authority—and in a democracy we are all involved—have to take decisions, and sometimes terrible decisions. How tempting to unload this burden! If slavish obedience to U.N.O. is regarded not merely as respectable but positively meritorious, what a splendid way of escaping from these awful responsibilities! I cannot help feeling that some sort of subconscious longing of this sort may be at work in many minds.
We are often told that U.N.O. is the only hope of the world for avoiding war and, therefore, that we ought to believe that it must and will succeed in this laudable object. I wish I could see the logic of this. One might just as well say that if a man's only hope of avoiding bankruptcy is in winning a football pool, all right-thinking people ought to believe that he will do so. Somehow, the proponents of U.N.O.'s infallibility have managed to persuade themselves that anyone who does not put his complete faith in the Organisation is not anxious to maintain peace—in fact is almost a warmonger. Some of them have reached a hysterical state of mind in which merely to question whether U.N.O. will succeed in establishing peace in the world is con-
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sidered wicked. No doubt I shall incur their severe displeasure, for what I intend to do is to attempt to analyse dispassionately the utility and value of this important—I said "important" not "impotent"—organisation.
First, what is this super-body to which we are to confide our fate? U.N.O. consists of some seventy-nine nations supposed to be sovereign and independent, though in some cases this is a somewhat dubious claim. They range from the giant Powers, Soviet Russia and the United States, to tiny entities like Panama and Iceland. The population of the biggest is more than 1,000 times greater than that of the smallest. The discrepancy in wealth and power is far more than ten thousandfold. Yet in the Assembly, which is the ultimate governing body of U.N.O., each has an equal vote. Thus barely 5 per cent. of the world's population can carry the day against the other 95 per cent.; and 10 per cent. could claim a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. Or, to put it another way half the population of the world is represented by four delegates, and the other half by seventy-five delegates. What is more, these nations are represented in the Assembly by any group or body or individual which may succeed in seizing power.
There is, it is true, a so-called Credentials Committee. But it does not appear to be at all strict in making the delegates show that they represent the views of the majority or of any properly elected or selected Government. Anybody who has seized power—I believe, for instance, Mr. Kadar in Hungary—can, and does, send a delegate to vote on his behalf. In fact it is even worse than I have said, for these sovereign independent nations vary enormously in their standards of education and outlook. Some are the most highly civilised and educated countries on the planet. The inhabitants of others can scarcely read or write. Yet no attention is paid to this fact. Only recently, there was a very close vote for the Vice-Presidency of the Assembly (I think it was) between Italy and Liberia—ltaly, one of the oldest and most civilised cultures in history; Liberia, a small artificial State which has been in existence barely a hundred years, and very few of w hose inhabitants have any conception of the outside world.

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This is the Assembly, as I have said, the ultimate governing body of U.N.O. We were recently told that it is "the highest tribunal in the world", whose decisions all must obey without hesitation or question. As I have said, and, I hope, shown, the constitution of this body is utterly indefensible. If the vote of each nation were weighted in accordance with its population, there might be some semblance—though a very poor semblance—of logic in it. But this is not so, for the vote of 400 million Indians or 160 million Americans is equated to the vote of 4 million Bolivians or 100,000 Icelanders. Icelanders are admirable people, but I do not think the discrepancy between their culture and ours is as great as all that. And, of course, the 600 million inhabitants of Communist China have no vote at all. I do not suggest that weighting votes by populations would turn the Assembly into a tribunal. On the contrary, it would turn it into a sort of Volksgericht. The long and short of it is that justice cannot be found by counting the votes, however weighted, of interested parties.
This brings me to the word "tribunal," in the phrase "the highest tribunal in the world." Nothing could be more inept as a description of the Assembly. There is no pretence that it is a judicial body. No sworn evidence is taken or is obtainable; there is no judicial summing up, or any recognised body of law to which nations have an obligation to conform. The Assembly is split into a number of blocs. There are the Afro-Asian bloc, the South American bloc and the Iron Curtain bloc, the members of which tend to vote together on their likes and dislikes, in accordance with instructions from their home Government. No one pretends they are influenced by the evidence or the speeches. Practically always the repercussions it will have on the government's own position and interests decides which way a delegate votes: often votes are cast according to some bargain or arrangement; sometimes it is said they are to all intents and purposes peddled about. Judicial impartiality is the last thing that seems to matter. To describe a majority vote of such a body as "a decision of the highest tribunal in the world" is simply laughable. To pillory as criminal any nation which
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hesitates to comply with its decisions is monstrous. A judicial decision is one thing; a vote by a number of interested parties, without pretence of impartiality, without evidence or a body of laws to guide them is totally different.
Yet it is to this body that the Leader of the Opposition, only a few days ago, told us to say, "We obey you. We accept whatever you say." The absurdity of the constitution of the Assembly was, of course, recognised from the start by those framing the Charter of U.N.O. No nation could be expected to submit unquestioningly to such a body. Only if the great Powers were in agreement would there be any chance of its decisions being respected or enforced. If they were, it was hoped they could prevent small local wars among the minor Powers. If they were not, it was realised that it would be useless to expect the machine to operate.
To ensure this a sort of executive body, the Security Council, was instituted, on which the five great Powers had permanent seats. Six more seats were allocated for two years at a time to other nations, selected by the Assembly. It is perhaps typical that, at the recent moment of crisis, apparently Siam presided over the meetings of the Security Council. According to the Charter, whilst the Assembly can recommend, only the Council can act. All the signatories of the Charter undertook to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council, but not those of the Assembly. Since what were at that time regarded as the five great Powers had a Veto in the Council, obviously action could never be taken against one of them, because no nation was under obligation to obey resolutions of the Assembly. This sensible intention appears now to be cast aside.
When the Charter was concocted, the great Powers, with the exception of Germany, were allies, and it was hoped that their mutual good feeling and their common objectives would ensure that they would, in general, be in agreement. Unhappily, this idealistic hope was not fulfilled. Every time any controversial question arose, Russia interposed her Veto. Often she was alone, but usually any Iron Curtain country, which had managed to get elected to the Security Council by the Assembly, voting in the

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curious manner I have described, supported her. Russia applied her Veto, as I have said, on scores of occasions in the Security Council. No one seemed at all shocked. Our Left Wingers regarded it as a more or less amiable idiosyncracy, unfortunate but not to be taken amiss. England and France used the Veto on only one occasion, but the outcry, not only by the Fellow Travellers and Left-Wingers, but even by neutral ideologues, as Napoleon used to call them, has been deafening. There is a great deal that one could say about the special case that has caused so much stir but that would carry me too far.
In view of the persistent use of the Veto by Russia, a procedure was introduced which was not originally contained in the Charter of the United Nations. This consisted in convoking a special meeting of the Assembly and obtaining a recommendation in the desired sense by a two-thirds majority. Though no nation was, or is, under an obligation to obey such a resolution, this procedure could give a veneer of U.N.O. respectability to action which America or other nations desired to take against Russia's wishes. Now it has been invoked against us, and, of course, the considerable, and very vocal, body of people who always think England must he wrong have been howling about her delay in coming immediately to heel. Thousands of people have rushed into print parading their alleged shame because we have failed instantly to obey a resolution passed by the Assembly—a weird body voting on no known principle, actuated by the variegated principles which I have mentioned. They accuse us of breaking our word under the Charter. I do not suppose that 1 per cent. of these people have read the Charter. If they had, they would have seen that we have never undertaken to obey the resolutions of the Assembly. I have not counted on how many occasions other nations have flouted Assembly resolutions. To do it seems to be the rule rather than the exception, and no one seems to worry very much. It is only when England fails to obey that the pack gives tongue.
The Assembly's activities in recent months raise a broad question which the Government spokesmen will no doubt be able to clear up. So far as I can see, this procedural change, namely, the agreement to call the Assembly together out
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of season, on the demand of seven nations, has been used to insinuate sub silentio a very vital change into the constitution of the United Nations as laid down in the Charter. As I have said, according to the Charter the Assembly is purely and simply a deliberative body. Provided that the Council is not dealing with it, the Assembly can discuss any matter and make recommendations. But if action is required, it must be referred to the Security Council.
According to the Charter, executive functions are the province A the Security Council. So far as I know, the Charter has not been amended, and any executive powers which the Assembly claims seem to have been assigned to it by itself—indeed, in recent months it seems to have usurped functions that it was never intended to exercise. It has instructed the Secretary-General, so far as I can see, to raise a military force to negotiate with Nasser, to clear the Suez Canal, and generally to take executive action. I can find no warrant, in the Charter to which we all subscribed, for such action by the Assembly. It is as though the House of Commons were to instruct the Clerk of the Parliaments to raise a private Army, to negotiate with the Mau Mau leaders, and to settle the dispute with the Argentine about the Falkland Islands.
I now turn to the question whether U.N.O. ever could work except if the Great Powers are unanimous in enforcing their will on the smaller nations. We are told that the intention is to substitute law for war; that that is, in essence, the whole object of the United Nations. It is another of those comfortable slogans expressing a desire felt by all of us in rhyming monosyllables, which seem to have an almost hypnotic effect. Of course, we all want the rule of law amongst nations; but what are the laws which we wish to rule? Evidently, it is not the laws accepted in principle for thousands of years—the fulfilment of contracts and the sanctity of treaties. Rather it seems to be commandments promulgated ad hoc by the Assembly whenever differences arise. That is submission to an arbitrary body. It is not law.
But even if this monstrous interpretation of the word "law" were taken, how is it to be enforced? As everybody knows, law is useless unless it is backed by a police force. It is no use magistrates

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finding a man guilty if they cannot compel him to make restitution or send him to prison if he refuses. Thus even if we accepted this weird U.N.O. body, with its odd form of voting, as the ultimate tribunal, it would be no good whatever unless it had some way of enforcing its decisions. We are told that in that case all we have to do is to endow U.N.O. with a police force. Indeed, my noble Leader seems to be greatly encouraged because a beginning has been made in doing this in the last few weeks. I think, on analysis, that this also is a case of wishful thinking.
A police force can operate because, on the whole, people are more or less equally strong, so that one policeman can arrest one man, and, again, because the proportion of criminals in the country is comparatively small, so that a police force of reasonable strength can cope with any gang it is likely to have to deal with. A U.N.O. police force would have a very different situation to confront. What sort of police force would be required to turn Russia out of Hungary, or America out of Formosa, should the Afro-Asian bloc, voting with the Latin-American or the Iron Curtain countries, secure a vote to this effect in the Assembly?
We see how helpless U.N.O. is on the Suez Canal. Egypt, in flagrant breach of her Treaties, has blocked it from end to end. What has U.N.O. done about this? It has voted that Britain and France, who have troops available, should not intervene, and has sent a scratch selection of a few hundred soldiers from thirteen or fourteen different countries, speaking different languages, and without artillery or tanks, to preserve the peace. Even so, Colonel Nasser, who has refused again and again to obey U.N.O.'s behests, is allowed to dictate terms, to say what troops he will allow to form part of the police force and to decide when and where they should arrive and where they should be stationed. The so-called police force is merely a token which could be swept away by one brigade of Israelis and probably even by two or three divisions of Egyptians.
A police force, to be of any use, would have to be stronger than any nation or combination of nations. In fact, it would have to be more powerful than the Russian and American Armies combined. How, otherwise, could it impose the will of U.N.O. in case those Powers happened
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to be on the same side? To contemplate such a huge force is, of course, simply absurd. It would cost at least £10,000 million a year to maintain it would have to be backed by shipyards and factories capable of producing the fleets and aircraft the arms and ammunitions, it required, which would cost thousands of millions more; and it would have to recruit many millions of men and train and officer them. On top of all this, nobody has explained where these gigantic armies, navies and air forces would be stationed, or how they would be transported. Once the facts are faced, I do not think anybody will seriously maintain that a police force capable of imposing U.N.O.'s will on the Great Powers should they object, can be contemplated seriously. Nor, for my part, should I like to see it. For who would care to put an overwhelming military force at the disposal of an Assembly constituted and voting as I have described?
A new factor has come into the picture with the development of nuclear weapons. Any nation to-day which possesses hydrogen bombs can impose its will on any nation which has none. Though in the future there will be others, at present only two nations have a reasonable supply of these weapons, the United States and Russia. As long as they are on opposite sides, peace between them may be maintained, because each of them knows that a nuclear war would spell complete annihilation to one side or the other or, probably, to both. But if one of the two is uninterested or even lukewarm, the other can impose its will on any of the other nations of the world. For it is little use hoping the opposing possessor of H-bombs, whatever his initial attitude, will come to the rescue in due course. There will not be any due course. In the last two world wars it was possible for America to haver for years before coming to a decision. Next time, the whole thing will be settled in a matter of days, perhaps even of hours.
Thus, all the other nations, whatever they deem to be their status, must attach themselves to one or other of the H-bomb Powers. Unless they can get support from their protector, they will just have to give way. I do not think there is any means of escaping this painful conclusion. Nor is there any end in sight to this

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situation—nations glaring at one another and bluffing more or less successfully about their power and readiness to annihilate one another.
If force is ruled out, what about economic sanctions? The objection to these is that they can be applied only against some nations while others are immune. What is the use of enactments which can be enforced against one part of the community but not against the other? We, unhappily, are one of the nations most vulnerable to economic sanctions. But what would be the use of trying to impose them on Russia? Only nations which have built up an artificial economy, which depends upon the rule of law and on the observance of the sanctity of treaties as it existed throughout the nineteenth century, are vulnerable to such sanctions. Autarchic systems are immune. Cutting off their imports or exports scarcely affects them. Napoleon discovered that 150 years ago.
Finally we are told that no nation can stand out against world opinion; that we can rely upon the moral forces of the Assembly's resolution. Surely this is more wishful thinking. What is more, it is flatly contradicted by experience. For several years now U.N.O. has condemned Egypt for refusing to allow the passage of Israel's ships through the Suez Canal in direct conflict with its obligations under the 1888 Treaty. Has the moral force of this condemnation had any effect on the Egyptians? None whatever. By a huge majority U.N.O. has called upon Russia to withdraw its troops from Hungary. Has the moral force of this resolution had any effect? Ask the Hungarians. If the Russians do not comply, we are told, they will be branded by the Assembly. The trouble is, that they have been branded already, and they do not seem to mind.
But, we are told, "Look at the great triumph of U.N.O. in stopping the North Koreans over-running the South Koreans." Nothing could be more misleading. America was able to obtain U.N.O.'s blessing for warlike action on that occasion simply owing to the fluke that the Russian delegate had retired from the Security Council in a sulk, so that he could not interpose his Veto in time. What would have happened if he had been present? The use of armed force would have been vetoed. Does any
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body believe that the United States would simply have let events take their course and abandoned millions who had put their trust in them to be massacred? Of course not. With or without U.N.O.'s approval, they would have taken action; and quite right too. We should have thought less of them if they had flinched.
If all the nations in the world adopted Christian principles, of which there does not seem any immediate prospect, moral, force might become effective. But this would happen only if nations had the feeling that they were being treated with justice. How can anyone talk of justice without sworn evidence and penalties for perjury, without the possibility of testing witnesses' statements by cross-examination? Even more important is that nations would have to be convinced that their case has been heard before an impartial tribunal and that the judges had given their verdict without fear or favour. Finally, it would be essential for the nations to be convinced that they were all equal before the law and that judgment would be enforced upon everybody, great or small. Ai I have explained, none of these vital conditions is fulfilled by U.N.O. in its present form, and I question whether, in the state of mind obtaining in almost all the countries of the world to-day, with their inflamed ideas of national sovereignty and dignity, any system can he invented which would fulfil these essential conditions. My view is that it is nonsense to demand that nations should submit their vital interests to the decision of a body constituted in such an absurd manner as the General Assembly of U.N.O. Any Government which did so would be neglecting its duty. Civilisation is built up on the basis that contracts and treaties must be, and be, observed. As I have said, the United Kingdom relies for its very existence on this principle.
We depend, unhappily, to a great extent upon imports of oil. We may have been foolish to allow our industries and national life generally to develop in this way, but it has happened We cannot allow our people to go cold and hungry just because some people who claim to speak for world opinion have suddenly arbitrarily introduced some novel concept of national sovereignty which apparently permits the Government of any country,

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at its own sweet will, to repudiate its obligations and refuse to honour its promises. In the old days the victim of such maltreatment would have insisted upon its rights, if necessarily by armed force. But this, we are told, is quite out of fashion it would be "gunboat diplomacy." We must not use force: we must negotiate. You might as well say that, if someone snatches your watch in the street, you must not resist, still less take it back. You must negotiate with him. I suppose that, if you are lucky, you may recover the chain. If I believed that the Socialist leaders, who presumably one day will have charge of the nation's affairs—I hope not for a long time—could not grasp this simple train of reasoning, I should despair of the future of this country. Of course it is no doubt tempting to snatch a Party advantage by making sanctimonious speeches, and generally by taking what purports to be the high moral line in these matters; but it really shocked me that, when it was suggested in another place that the Government spokesman had in mind the protection of our oil supplies, he was greeted with boos and jeers. The Government actually, it seems, were trying to safeguard the vital interests of their country. What a terrible accusation!
It is easy for the Socialist Party, in Opposition, to take such a line. They do not seem to mind very much whether we have two or three million unemployed, and our people suffer from cold and other distresses, so long as they can blame the Government. They seem to think it quite all right that we should be at the mercy of what the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, called a "tin-pot dictator"; that he should be free to impose petrol rationing and other hardships on 200 million Europeans who have spent centuries fighting for freedom from tyranny. They say that all we should do is to chant in unison the magic syllables "U.N.O., U.N.O." although they know perfectly well that it never has availed, and never will avail, to compel a nation protected by a powerful friend, preferably with a Veto, to honour its obligations. As things have developed, U.N.O. is used as a device behind whose gimcrack facade a thief can shelter as long as he contents himself with stealing from nations which can be prevented from retaliating by one of the two great Powers.
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To sum up, I do not think that U.N.O., at any rate in its present form, can work. The governing body, the Assembly, consists of a heterogeneous collection of so-called sovereign States, some of which are thousands of times more numerous than others, and tens of thousands of times more powerful and wealthy. Some of them are highly civilised; others are all but illiterate. Yet they all have an equal vote. Their decisions are given with no attempt at impartiality. They act on no known laws and have no rules of evidence. Their decisions can be enforced only if supported by at least one of the States with a store of H-bombs, provided that it is not faced with another State with an equally devastating store of weapons. Economic sanctions can be put into effect only by certain States against certain States. Others are immune. The moral force of public opinion has been proved to be utterly ineffective, even in cases of petty States like Egypt or Albania.
In these circumstances, nations, especially those dependent upon the sanctity of treaties and contracts for their survival, cannot be expected to entrust their fate unconditionally to U.N.O. It is an organisation which can be exploited by nations who wish to break the law, provided that they have powerful friends who will interpose on their behalf. It is a conception which we all wish could work, but it is plain to see that it cannot. It is high time that these facts should be stated plainly, unhappy as they are; otherwise, we may continue to be lulled into a false sense of security and hope by the eloquent, ardent and often high-minded, but, I fear, misguided, advocates of this forlorn experiment in idealism.
What I have said will, I fear, arouse indignation in some quarters. That is always the way when comfortable emotional beliefs which cannot be sustained by evidence on logical grounds are challenged. The magic syllables "U.N.O." have acquired the status of an invocation, almost of a prayer. To cast doubt on the Organisation is considered akin to blasphemy. The rÔle of the iconoclast is always hateful, but facts and logic cannot simply be brushed aside. I therefore think it my duty, as one not linked in any way with the Government and still less with the Opposition, to refuse to foster what I believe to be a dangerous

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delusion which is rapidly becoming a snare. Noble Lords are entitled to hear the facts. I only hope that they will ponder them dispassionately. For sooner or later we shall be compelled to face them.
5.40 p.m.
EARL DE LA WARR: My Lords, I am quite sure the whole House will welcome hack to our counsels (because he has not been with us for some time) the noble Viscount, Lord Cherwell, as his old astringent self. He has that trick of gaiety, vitality arid courage that enables him to say things that many of us would not dare to say but with which most of us find it extremely hard to disagree.
I suppose we are all feeling that there is practically nothing to say about Suez that has not already been said, or is not about to be said in the speeches that arc to follow in this debate. I personally should like to take the lead given to us by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, and say that this is not the time for looking back or for recrimination. I should lice to take him so much at his word as to spend no time at all on defending the Government for taking a course with which in fact, I most strongly agree. In order to be useful we must look ahead, and I think perhaps it would be even more useful a debate where over forty of us are speaking, if, on the whole, we tried to concentrate on just one point. If therefore, I concentrate on just one point, I hope your Lordships will not think that I imagine that it is the only one. Having said, that we must look ahead, it is perhaps slightly paradoxical to say that, in my view, the first step we have got to take in looking ahead is to realise that we are now back in the cold war, and that what we have most suffered from in these unhappy last few weeks and months is the fact that many of us feel that our rational case has not been sufficiently stated to the world for men's minds in this country and in other countries.
At the present moment we are spending £1,500 million a year on defence, on providing arms that on the whole, we possibly dare not use—or, at any rate, if we do try to use them, we submit ourselves to heavy criticism from the United Nations. We are spending £12 million on propaganda, some of it, I venture to suggest, small sum though it is, a little doubtfully—as for instance, going to the trouble
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of translating Mr. Gaitskell's speech, or great portions of it, into Arabic in order to broadcast it to the Middle East.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Is the noble Earl sure that that was not Egyptian propaganda, rather than British propaganda?
EARL DE LA WARR: I know that it went out over the B.B.C., and that it was not the full speech but consisted of some of the choicest parts. But that is merely by the way. What I ask your Lordships to ask yourselves is whether at the present moment, and as things are, the balance of expenditure between £1,500 million on defence and only £12 million on the cold war is the right balance. Surely, if we look at the realities of the situation, we must realise that for some time we have been "losing our" in the cold war, and not only to Russia.
Here, if I may say so, I strongly agree with the noble Viscount. Lord Brace of Melbourne. I am going to say something about America, and I ask your Lordships to believe that if I speak frankly about America, as did the noble Viscount, it is because I believe that the only hope of our getting back into true friendship with America is that she should know what some of us think. We certainly hope that America is-and I think there is every indication that she means to try to be—our friend. But let us face the fact that, for the last few years, she has been a friendly rival; and that, however friendly she is, there has been nothing more profitable to her, or more harmful to us, than what we are asked to accept as the highly idealistic view that she takes of what she likes to call our colonialism. If I have any criticism to make of Her Majesty's Government it is certainly not on policy, but it is that I believe that they have been out-manœuvred and have allowed this country to be out-manœuvred en the statement of our case. In this connection, I am critical not only of this Government but of other Governments.
My Lords, what are the problems that are facing us in this cot text'? What must we work towards in our statement of our case? First, I think it is quite clear from what has already been said by the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, and other speakers, and from the way in which those speeches were received, that

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we are all convinced that our first task is to re-lay the foundations that are essential for rebuilding Anglo-American relations—that is vital. But the more essential we realise Anglo-American understanding to be, the more important it is that those foundations should be the right foundations. At the moment America is all friendliness; but let us face the fact that we as a country are really "done" for years if we re-start our friendship with her on the wrong basis. That is why I particularly welcome some of the things that the noble Viscount. Lord Bruce of Melbourne, said
We are not the prodigal son creeping back into the fold, ashamed of ourselves. After all, we have a long history, even in this century, of facing reality and fighting for freedom. We saw the challenge to freedom in 1914, many years before the Americans did, and we took action about it. We saw the challenge in 1939, before they did; and, again, we took action about it. We have warned them for the last seven, eight or nine years of the dangers in the Middle East; and finally, in desperation nothing being likely to happen, we took action. Forgive me if I emphasise this point rather strongly, but, as I see it, at this moment and for some weeks to come, we are in real danger of suffering damage from which we shall find it hard, if indeed it is possible, to recover. We must not submit to being labelled as having behaved in a lawless and ill-advised manner, as having been rescued from the situation by the wisdom and firmness of the United States, and of now receiving the benefits from United States magnanimity. This must not be, and it need not be, if only we can unite to state our case.
The real facts of the situation are that we have created the conditions in which America and the United Nations can now function; and without that action all of us including America, would be wallowing still in the delays and the intrigues of the United Nations. However much we value American friendship, we must not allow her to "get away with" this now; because, if we do, our prestige and influence is going to suffer for years, and, indeed, our value as an ally and a friend of America is going to suffer. Friendship can be of value only if it is between two self-respecting and mutually-respecting nations. And let us remember that this
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is a battle of time. The case has to be made now. It has to be put over now, because it may well be only a matter of weeks in which public opinion on this matter is finally formed; and once it is formed it will he very difficult to alter.
There is, surely, something else that we should "get over" to the world very much more than we have: that it is the United Nations and not ourselves that has failed in the Middle East; that it is the United Nations that for years has shelved the problem of the Middle East; that not one of the (I think it is) 200 resolutions on this very subject of the Middle East which have been before the United Nations has resulted in action, and that it is no thanks to the United Nations that forces were available in the Middle East at the time of the outbreak of hostilities which could prevent hostilities and, above all, prevent them from spreading. We and France stopped that, at any rate for the moment. Who dares to prophesy whether we have finally succeeded? We and the French—and no one else—have, for the moment, stopped the Soviet-Nasser plot.
Ministers in this House and in another place have made extremely good, clear statements on this subject; but who reads ministerial speeches? I want to ask noble Lords: where is the machine for putting our case out to the world, the kind of machine which Russia and the United States of America use and which Nasser is able to use to get his case across? There is another point with regard to what should be going over that machine—I will not stress it, because the noble Viscount, Lord Cherwell, has already made it. I was going to ask, what is being done to bring to the notice of the world the more general weakness of United Nations, which, of course, is the background of this whole unhappy issue that we are meeting here to discuss? I was particularly encouraged by something which the noble Marquess the Leader of the House said. I think I am right in believing that he did give us an indication that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to take a lead in facing this problem and persuading other nations to face it. That is important, because at the present moment it is vital that we should find ourselves on the offensive in giving the world the lead and, if possible, making

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the United Nations mare effective, rather than standing on the defensive, being lectured by appeasers, neutralists and even aggressors.
Those are only some of the points that need to be put before the world. There are countless others, like the issue which is dividing the United States of America and ourselves at the moment more fundamentally than arty other—the subject of colonialism and anti-colonialism. But, wherever we look, we seem to be playing at the whole subject of our national public relations. I have heard most distressing stories of Ambassadors and Governors who, at the time of the attack, had nothing at all in their hands from our Government to brief them. Why was that so? If we take public opinion seriously, every representative of ours, in every part of the world, ought to have had in his hand, at the time when there was even the possibility of something like this happening, a statement of what the British Government really felt about it, and what they wished to have put out to those people whom our representatives were amongst. Our neglect of this subject seems to me to be complete and utter folly. It is not as though we do not know how, for during the war it was generally admitted that we had the best propaganda of any nation.
Rightly or wrongly, immediately after the war we disbanded the Psychological Warfare Department. I must admit that at the time that did not seem to me to be wrong, but now it seems to me to have been most regrettable. Cannot we revive that Department or replace it with something of the same character? If we go on playing at this problem, I cannot believe that any millions we are likely to spend on defence, or even the best and wisest foreign policy, is going to succeed. If need be, let us transfer £100 million from defence to propaganda straight away. We live in a world where things and policies must not only be right but must seem to be right, and must be known and felt to be right by thinking men and women and, I am afraid, very often by great masses of unthinking men and women too. It is time we woke up to the problem and accepted the challenge, not; as a sideshow but as a major condition of our continued existence as an effective force in the world.
5.57 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, if I heard him aright, the noble Marquess when he opened this debate seen-led to deprecate the idea of controversy. I can well imagine that. Anyone with a bad case is always anxious to avoid controversy. But the noble Marquess was optimistic in saying that, because he then proceeded to move a most highly controversial Resolution, and the Amendment which my noble friend Lord Henderson will move to-morrow is also highly controversial. In discussing this matter there must, of course, be contra-versy, but what we are avoiding, as one would expect, is what I would describe as hysterical recrimination, which has been rather an unfortunate feature of the Suez debates. I cannot agree with the two propositions in the Resolution. We have yet to see whether we have, in fact, prevented hostilities from spreading, and we have yet to see whether the introduction of the United Nations force has created conditions in which the United Nations' objectives can be achieved. On this point, the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, has expressed doubts which I fully share.
Our relations with the United States of America have been frequently mentioned in the course of this debate so far, and I should like to say a word or two upon that matter. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is not here to-day so I will not say much but, having thought about it, I. must say that I consider his speech at Oxford a great mistake. He said some things which were very wounding to American pride. Strangely enough, he also said:
"It is easy to recriminate and to call had names. It is less easy to recognise the only by not recriminating can the human race be saved from destruction."
I thought that came very queerly, on top of the other remarks of the noble Viscount. But there was a pretty swift transition from "Philip drunk" to "Philip sober", because in his next speech he said that he did not despair about the Anglo-American Alliance. The Alliance, he said, was:
"a partnership based on solid interest and cemented by powerful ties of sympathy, law customs, language, culture and ideals."
With that statement we can agree, but it is difficult to believe that it was made by the same man who had made the earlier speech at Oxford.

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As I have referred to the change of tone on the part of Lord Hailsham, perhaps I should say that Mr. Nixon has also undergone a similar sort of conversion. Not so long ago, he was hailing the split with America as:
"An American declaration of independence from Anglo-French Colonial policies."
Recently, however, he has made a very understanding and conciliatory speech. He may have had a "rap over the knuckles" from Augusta, or a hint from Augusta—perhaps Lord Hailsham has had a hint too—but it is also the case that, apart from Mr. Nixon, we are hearing a great deal less from America about "trickery and deceit." The tone is altering, and we even hear admissions that American foreign policy has been "equivocating and fumbling." So a change of heart does seem to have taken place.
The only comment I wish to make about the anti-American Motion, which has been supported by, I think, one-third of the Government supporters in another place, is that it must surely have escaped their attention that we are relying so greatly on America to come to our financial aid and to get us out of the difficulties in which the Suez affair has landed us. For instance, we are apparently asking America to waive the current instalment of interest on the debt we owe them. So I think that an anti-American Motion at this moment is really a case of biting the hand that feeds one. Lord Hailsham also, in his later speech, spoke about a "cheap price." Referring to the financial difficulties we are in, he spoke of them as being:
"a cheap price to stop a war."
But, of course, the United Nations has never accepted the story that we were trying to stop a war, and I cannot find any concrete evidence that a war has, in fact, been stopped. But however that may be, however cheap the price may be, we cannot pay it without American aid. The noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, also in a recent speech, said that:
"We are a proud people and will be dictated to by none."
Those were resounding words, but I am afraid that we have to swallow some of our pride and accept a loan.
The last thing I should like to say on this matter is that, in spite of one or
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two rather gloomy things that have been said this afternoon, I think it is remarkable what progress has already been made towards healing the split which occurred between us and America. And the progress has really been so rapid, from the President downwards, so different is the language now used in America, that I think we can look forward with confidence to the split being fully repaired, perhaps much sooner than at one time we thought might be the case.
Now a word about this claim that our action stopped a war. There have been efforts, rather late in the day, to build up a case on that matter. Very late in the crisis, Mr. Thorneycroft and Mr. Lennox-Boyd revealed to us a Russian plot to set the Middle East ablaze. Later, Sir David Eccles said:
"The world will soon realise that the British and French have changed the course of history by exposing the Russian threat to the Middle East."
But, in spite of what he said, the world obstinately declines to realise anything of the sort. The noble Earl, Lord Home, also laid a brick, and gave some assistance. He said:
"When the Middle East was about to burst into flames, the United Kingdom used her power. A general war has been stopped, a Communist plot forestalled."
I think we should have more details about this "plot". What I find very remarkable is that, so far as I can trace, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Secretary, who one would have imagined would be the members of the Government to speak about it, and to speak about it in detail, has said anything about it. When did we first get wind of this "plot"? Surely, had there been such a plot we must have heard about it long before our intervention; and if we had heard any reliable evidence about such a plot it was our duty at once to inform our Allies and also our fellow members of the Commonwealth. It is quite a different thing from informing America and the Commonwealth about an ultimatum. I say that if such a plot really existed, and came to our notice, it was our bounden duty to inform our Allies of what we had heard.
Where is the concrete evidence that Russia had plotted to promote a war, and had prepared bases, stores and arms which necessitated our taking forestalling

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action? Mr. Thorneycroft, on November 8, said of Syria and Egypt:
"Our intervention disclosed that they had been armed to the teeth by Russia."
"Armed to the teeth," my Lords! We know about the million blankets, but "armed to the teeth" goes a great deal further than that. I must say that, if Egypt had been "armed to the teeth," the events show that Colonel Nasser does not appear to have owed anything to Russian arms. I must ask again, why did the Prime Minister, so far as I have read, give every reason for his actions but this one about a Russian plot? If it is true that there was evidence of such a plot, all I can say is that the Government were very bad foresters, because they failed to inform their Allies of the spark in the undergrowth which might grow into a forest fire. What is the truth about these arms deliveries, of which Mr. Thorneycroft spoke on November 8? A statement on Russian arms deliveries was given to the Press on November 11, and Commander Noble, Minister of Slate for Foreign Affairs, said:
"All the information given was in the Government's possession on October 29."
That was the date on which Israel attacked. So how is it that it was only our intervention which revealed these facts, as Government speakers asserted? The conclusion I have come to is that the story about this "plot," and about Syria and Egypt being "armed to the teeth" by Russia, is really too thin to tell even Lo the Marines.
But a related matter to this also raises the question of the heads of our missions, our ambassadors and ministers in the Middle East. Did any of them "get on" to this Russian plot in the areas where they are our representatives t and, if they did, did they report it? It is very curious if all this could go on with all of our representatives in the Middle East being completely unaware of it. But perhaps it is not more peculiar than the fact that, according to The Times report from Nicosia, none of these ministers arid ambassadors was informed of the action the Government intended to take. If it is really the case that they were not consulted, and not even informed, it is remarkable indeed. Certainly everything goes to show that, when our diplomatic representatives did hear of what was happening, they were aghast at the news
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and felt that it had undone all the work they had been patiently doing, year in and year out, to try to maintain our influence in the countries to which they were accredited.
As to the objectives, that is a very tangled story indeed. I think that all one can say with certainty is that the Government have been unable, in the action we have taken, to enforce our real objective. We now hear of a great many other objectives, but I think the real fact is that the two objectives were to get rid of Colonel Nasser and to establish international control of the Suez Canal. We have succeeded in neither objective. I could recount some of the objectives, which Colonel Nasser has achieved. The mischief is spreading wider and wider, for now Jordan has denounced her treaty with us, and Syria has moved into the Soviet orbit. And none of us need be surprised if we see the campaign against France in Northern Africa resumed.
I should like, in fairness, to mention one thing. I have heard references this afternoon to Mr. Lester Pearson's having said that the Commonwealth had been brought to the brink of dissolution, but Mr. Pearson has since explained that he was referring to Asian members of the Commonwealth. I believe it is right to call attention to that fact. At any rate, the Commonwealth is intact to-day. I really cannot agree with Mr. Gaitskell in saying that N.A.T.O. has been dealt a "death-blow," any more than I can agree with him that we must now take our orders from the United Nations. While I think that N.A.T.O. has no doubt sustained a shock in this matter, and will require considerable underpinning in future, it looks to-day as if that repair work has already 'been taken in hand. Certainly I should not go so far as to say that N.A.T.O. has received a "deathblow."
The Prime Minister justifies his intervention by saying that it limited a war; that it halted that war and that it gave the world a chance to work out a solution. That we halted a war is somewhat hypothetical. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has referred to the great of the situation still existing, so I think the assumption that we halted a war is a little hypothetical at the moment. And if, by his comment about our action giving the world a chance to

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work out a solution, the Prime Minister meant that the United Nations can work out a solution of the Middle East troubles, all I can say is that I very much doubt whether they can. As the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, said, that is to put more "on the plate" of the United Nations than we can expect that Organisation to be able to digest. The real truth is (the noble Viscount, Lord Cherwell, mentioned it, in his devastating speech) that the United Nations to-day, with the advent of the Afro-Asian bloc, is swayed by self-interest, not by idealism. Yet the whole basis of the Charter is idealism, and it is absurd to imagine that to-day that is the animating motive in the United Nations.
It would be interesting to know what are the precise objectives and functions of this United Nations Force. What are they expected to do, and what are the limitations under which they work? What power has Colonel Nasser to interfere and prevent them from doing the work with which the United Nations have charged them? I hope that one thing at least which the United Nations will make clear, and one thing the United Nations Force will be able to ensure, is that there is no intention whatever of letting the State of Israel disappear. We know that Colonel Nasser's intention all along has been to destroy the State of Israel. I hope that we shall be able to make it clear that that is not going to be done. In the end, we have witnessed an ignominious finish to one of the shortest wars in our history, with little to show for it. The results achieved do not justify the risks which were taken or the financial loss which has been incurred. Much more has been lost than has been gained, and if Colonel Nasser suffered a military defeat at the hands of Israel, there is no question that he has inflicted a political defeat upon Great Britain and France.
What are the lessons to be drawn? We all want to get this mess cleared up. The trouble is past; the water is over the dam. What lessons do we draw for the future? I think that the noble Lord, Lord Strang, in an article in the Sunday Times, has given us two valuable pointers along the road we must travel in future. He wrote:
"The fact to be recognised is that Great Britain and France have not sufficient strength to try to carry through a policy of armed intervention to which the United States are opposed."
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And again:
"A policy of veto and ultimatum is quite out of keeping with the behaviour we expect from the United Kingdom in these times: it is not surprising that we should have shown ourselves to be not very skilful in pursuing it."
I think that these are two extremely valuable lessons to which the noble Lord has called our attention. The facts are that the test of a specific foreign policy may be reckoned in terms of morality or in terms of success. Whichever test we apply to the Cabinet's policy, that policy has failed.
We have also gone against another old cardinal principle of foreign policy, in that we have produced a combination against us. It used to be a principle of our foreign policy to avoid raising up such a combination against us. Our failure teaches us that only a super Power can "go it alone," and, whether we like it or not, Britain and France are not such Powers. The effect of the fiasco on our status will be worldwide, and the philosophical cause of freedom has had a severe setback. The Conservative leaders may have convinced their followers—at any rate, if they did not convince them they got them into the right Lobby, from their point of view—but whom else have they convinced? In the Press, the Church, the universities, and amongst the Middle East experts they have raised up a great cloud of witnesses against them. To me, it is a tragic thing indeed.
Mr. Butler, a few days ago, trying to put a good face on it, said:
"We are on the edge of achieving a great act of international statesmanship."
And Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has said:
"We have created a situation of great opportunity."
We are on the edge of a cliff; and we have lost opportunities of which other people, some of them our enemies, have been quick to take advantage. The truth is that we are back at Dunkirk, but this time it is a moral, political and economic Dunkirk. For eleven years we have been working hard to push the stone of our economy up on to that "plateau of stability" about which the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke; and now, like Sisyphus, we see the stone rolling down again to the bottom, and the weary task of trying to push it to the top has got to begin again.

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It is, indeed, a hard task ahead of us. Some people say that only a reconstruction of the Government could give the nation the confidence needed for the toil. How do you reconstruct? Apart from The Times, which points out that everybody in the Cabinet is either too old or too young, the fact remains that the entire Cabinet went along with the Prime Minister, and, from the point of view of those who opposed the Cabinet's policy, all are tarred with the same brush. There are, of course, rumours of dissentients inside the Cabinet, but, unlike so many political commentators, I have not got a tape recorder underneath the Cabinet table, and I am unable to say anything about those rumours. All I know is that Sir Winston Churchill raised us to a great pinnacle of fame in 1945, when our name was renowned throughout the world, and now we are toppled off that pinnacle; and, by the irony of fate, which almost reminds one of a Greek tragedy, we have been toppled off that pinnacle by the successor whom he himself chose. In this task of reconstruction we must not go forward in the spirit of the Resolution that we are debating to-day, a Resolution which implies that we have won considerable victories; we have to go forward, if the job is to be done, in the spirit of learning the lessons of a great failure.
6.25 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I came down to the House this afternoon with a voluminous bundle of notes and the intention of making quite a long, reasoned and analytical speech to your Lordships. I find that I am the eleventh speaker on the list, it is now twenty minutes past six, and there are twenty more noble Lords who wish to speak to-day. One of the, perhaps, beneficial results, of that has been that I have decided to scrap what I was going to say and to say something on quite different lines and at much shorter length.
Like many other noble Lords, I have considerable searchings of the heart about the Resolution before us to-day, which is in rather positive terms. Having spent some forty years, or more, in the Government service, my natural instinct is always to back the Government of the day in their foreign policy. I have been brought up to do that it is one's instinctive reaction, and really, I think it is
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quite a good instinct to have. But in this particular case my view has never varied from start to finish. I think that we have done the right thing, in the wrong way, at the wrong time. If we could have taken action in July, when this trouble first started (just as, when the child sets fire to the curtain, you put the fire out and then you spank the child—although you may get into trouble for it) that, in try view, would have been the right thing to do. But we did not do that.
There is one point I should like to make before I continue, and I have made it before in your Lordships' House. I find it rather shocking that when this happened we were apparently caught by surprise. We should riot have been caught by surprise. In 1954, when we evacuated, it was as plain as a pikestaff that the Canal was going to be the next item on the nationalistic programme. I think I called attention to this is July, 1954, but I have not the paper by me. Two years elapsed before anything happened. What seems to me to be the most unfortunate feature of all is that two solid years have gone past and, so far as I know, and so far as the world knows, no plan was made in that two years' interval. I should not mind if a plan had been considered and turned down as not feasible. We do nut even know that. But, apparently, we were caught completely unawares. As I say, I have made that point before, but I make it again because I hope that if anything like this ever happens again we shall not be caught without a plan.
The stealing of the Canal took place in July, and then finally there were hostilities, and we got in. Quite frankly, I thought: "Better late than never". But if you get in, you have got to get on, or else you have to get out. Personally, I do not like getting out at all, but in the present situation there is no option to getting out. As I say, you get in, get on or get out. That is how this thing has ended, and I think it is unfortunate. To go back to certain aspects, we get out leaving the Canal problem, which was the original fons et origo, unsettled; and if ever there was a case of self-defence, I should have thought that that was one, as events have since proved. Another point that has come up in the last few days is that we are getting out leaving British subjects to be hounded out of

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Egypt like pariahs, and losing all their property. I think we had the figures given to us a few days ago, and they were that 8,000-odd Maltese, many of them of the third generation, have been entirely dispossessed of all they have in the world.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think the number is 6,000.
LORD KILLEARN: It may be 6,000, but I was told 8,000; at any rate, it makes little difference. Rich and poor alike have been deprived of their possessions. We have decided to get out, and we are leaving these people to the tender mercies of the Egyptians. I do not like it, and I do not think the House can like it, let alone the case I have raised lately of the poor unfortunate British subjects accused of espionage, languishing in gaol. It is not nice. I will be brutally frank. As it strikes me, we went in to do a job, and it is a bungled job, if ever there was one—"Not an impressive performance", shall we say.
On the other hand, I hasten to add that we are always told that there is a silver lining to every cloud. Well, I hope in this case there are such linings, and I believe frankly and sincerely that there are. I have listed the ones which struck me. In the first place, I am convinced that our action did avert a general Arab war. It is a matter of individual opinion, but it is a fact that the Arabs, despite all their tub-thumping, sabre-rattling and all the rest, did not move. I believe that, but for our intervention, they would have moved and there would have been a general conflagration in the Middle East I believe that is very much on the positive side. The second thing I put down is that the whole of this affair has shown up the futility of U.N.O. as at present constituted. I do not think anybody in this House will deny that. It has been positively harmful. The noble Viscount, Lord Cherwell, addressed a telling speech to us on the subject to-day. It must be inevitable that, out of this unfortunate affair, some time or other, somehow or other, the whole organisation. machinery and concept of U.N.O. will have to be overhauled. I do not quite know in what form or how it will come up; but that, of course, is a big question.
The third asset I have put down is: it unveiled a Communist plot to possess themselves of the Middle East. The
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noble Lord who preceded me poured considerable water on that. I personally believe it was so, and it has always seemed to me that there is confirmation of it in the blocking of the Canal—these forty-nine wrecks, or whatever is the number, which have been sunk. It is not an amateur's job to go out and sink forty-nine ships. Was it purely on Egyptian initiative? Was it not part of the scheme that failed, to cut our jugular vein—the oil supplies? I think it may well have been, and I suspect that it was. I differ from the preceding speaker, and I take that view very seriously. The fourth asset, to my mind, is that this affair has brought home to the world at large, and to the United States in particular, the extreme gravity of the situation. If it leads to a more positive and realistic approach to things like, for instance, the Baghdad Pact, that, in itself, is a great gain.
I have only two other points to make. One is about the status of the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt's title thereto. I had hoped to get down a Question concerning it before to-day's debate, but the Order Paper was full, so the Question appears in to-morrow's Business. As I shall then get an Answer from the Government spokesman, I had better leave that alone, except to say this. There is a general suspicion that Egypt's title to the sovereignty of the Sinai Peninsula is possibly rather doubtful. That might have various effects, legalistic and otherwise. If, for instance, the whole of this area is what I believe in legal parlance is known as res nullius, it is just the sort of place into which to put U.N.O. or some other organisation to keep the peace. Until we know the facts, I shall say no more about that.
I do not know how many of your Lordships—probably very few—have ever seen, a book written by General Abdul Nasser. It is called The Philosophy of the Revolution. I have been searching for this book in the last few days, and I have succeeded in getting a copy here. The Librarian very cleverly sought it out—I think he got it from the House of Commons, but I am not sure. It is distributed by the Press Information Office of the Egyptian Embassy. I have here a few short synopses, some of the things our friend Nasser says in this book. Like Hitler and Stalin, he has published to the

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world the essence of his idealogy. It is based on an ambitious soldier's ideas of Egypt's opportunities, on hatred of Imperialism in general and of Britain in particular, and a conviction that imperialism and Britain are on the decline. I quote:
"Imperialism is playing a one-card game in order to threaten only. If ever it knew there were Egyptians ready to shed their blood and to meet force by force, it would withdraw and recoil like a harlot."
That is on page 14. On page 41 he says:
"Our forefathers used to say 'O God Almighty! Send the Osmanly to perdition!'"
This has been changed to, "O God Almighty! Would that a calamity betake the English!"
He says, on page 66:
"Power is to act positively with all the components of power."
He explains that the components of Egyptian power are, first, as one of a group of peoples, the Arabs, closely bound together by spiritual and material bonds: secondly, Egypt's position on the map—the meeting-place, the crossroads and the military corridor of the world; thirdly, petroleum, the vital nerve of civilisation. The Egyptian policy revolves in three circles. On page 69 it says that the firs: circle is the Arab circle which I. have just mentioned. Now this is rather good:
"… we cannot, even if we wish to, in any way stand aside, from the sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the heart of Africa between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. … The people of Africa will continue to look up to us, who guard the northern gate of the continent and who are its connecting link with the world outside. We cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility in helping, in every way possible, to diffuse the light of civilisation into the farthest parts of that virgin jungle."
Then he refers to the Sudan as
"… our beloved brother, whose boundaries extend deeply into Africa and which is a neighbour to all the sensitive spots in the centre of the continent. It is a certain fact that Africa at present is the scene of an exciting ebullition. The white man, representing several European countries, is trying again to repartition the continent. We cannot stand aside in face of what is taking place in Africa … I shall continue to dream of the day when I see in Cairo a great institute for exploring all parts of this continent.…"
He then goes on to what he calls the Moslem circle on page 70:
"… the circle that goes beyond continents and oceans."
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The value of the Mecca pilgrimage is that it is to be a regular political congress and a universal Islamic Parliament. He speaks of;
"… 80 million Moslems in Indonesia, the 50 million in China and the several other million in Malaya, Siam and Burma and the 100 million or more in the Middle East and the 40 million in Russia, as well as other millions in the distant parts of the world. When I visualise these millions united in one faith, I have a great consciousness of the tremendous potentialities that co-operation amongst them all can achieve."
My Lords, those are rather telling quotations. I shall not burden you with any more. The book will be in the Library, if anybody wants to look at it.
My Lords, there are just a few words in conclusion. I am reminded of the Latin tag Quo vadis?—"where are you going?" Where are we going? It seems to me we have a long, long pull from the present dark valley, to put it figuratively. The first step is to get rid of internal bickering. It is not worthy of the British people, which still remains a great people, and if we could only pull together as a nation it would obviously be much better. I confess I find much attraction in the idea of a Commonwealth consolidation. I do not want to appear flippant, but we do not want to run the risk of a rather well-known disease, "Menon-gitis". It would be unfortunate. Surely it is essential, by straight talk and straight thinking, to concentrate on convincing Washington of the importance of a Middle East solution and to try to eradicate the suspicion that still lingers on the other side of the Atlantic. I am half American myself, and I have often wondered whether that suspicion does not date back still to the traditions and memories of the times of George III.
6.43 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, in putting forward some ideas into the wealth and welter of argument which has been lavished in this debate, and which will, of course, continue to be lavished tomorrow, I shall say little about the Canal. Instead I want to confine my remarks almost entirely to the enduring, perennial, eternal contest as between Arab and Jew which, somewhat to my surprise, I find huts hardly been touched on yet in this debate. I am assuming that we accept as a cardinal point of policy from now on that the United Nations Force is on the

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ground until it has seen this particular issue through to its logical conclusion.
In regard to the Canal, I would say only this: that if the United Nations is to be permitted to base its Force only at the behest and on the sufferance of Egypt, then a precedent will have been created of the most outrageous negation of international justice we have yet witnessed. There is not a line in the Charter of the United Nations to sanction such a monstrous proposition, and it is just this kind of collective moral ineptitude and cowardly approach which has enabled the Soviet to introduce their forces into Hungary, sheltering behind the lie that they are invited in by the Hungarian people.
Only now that we are away from the Canal, or about to go away, do I find myself able to accept the weight of the argument which says that we must from this moment onward concentrate on strengthening the United Nations. I say this in spite of the devastating and forceful attack which Lord Cherwell delivered, highlighting the many ineptitudes and anomalies of the United Nations. As I see it, we must now try to strengthen the fabric so that it may assume that authority without which justice, so far from being supported, will be defeated. It is against that kind of background that I would turn to this dark spectre of Arab-Israeli relations which for so many years now have haunted the world, and I would ask your Lordships' indulgence if I recall one or two of the landmarks in history because it seems to me that these landmarks are forgotten and they form the essential background of any effective presentation of the present case to-day.
On a recent occasion the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, forcefully reminded us that the two dominating influences in the Middle East have recently been, first, the rising tide of Arab nationalism, and, secondly, the slow and creeping encroachment of Communism inspired from Soviet Russia. It is with deep respect that I would add a third element which, as I see it, goes to the root and core of the matter. Here I realise that I run the risk of falling out with some of your Lordships who may hold very different views—falling out, I hope, only as a matter of temporary dispute. I say the third element has been
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nothing less than the creation of the State of Israel itself. I should like to make one point clear, and that is that I hold nothing but the deepest respect and admiration for the spirit that animates the State of Israel. Nevertheless, from what had been that nebulous "National Home" there emerged suddenly in 1948 a sovereign, independent State, and those who knew the Middle East saw the course was set for a long journey of darkness and despair.
May I, at the risk of labouring my point, take your Lordships back to 1917 and the momentous Declaration:
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jews; and will use their best endeavours to further the attainment of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall prejudice the existing rights and privileges of the non-Jewish communities."
Apart from noting the dishonesty in referring to the Arabs, who were at that time nine-tenths of the population of Palestine, as "non-Jewish communities," what surely bewilders us is that after thirty-nine years one still asks the question, what was meant by that term "National Home"? Some number unknown were to be moved to an area unknown over a time unknown; and during all those years between the wars we were floundering on to an unknown goal. Your Lordships will need no reminder that at the time of the Balfour Declaration the Arab world had been led to believe in its coming independence, under those commitments usually associated with the notorious McMahon-Hussein correspondence.
I am drawing attention to these landmarks in history because it seems to me that if we are now moving into an area of international dispensation, more particularly if the United States are to become the new Western heroes in the Middle East, then we can hope and expect, and perhaps make it our duty to see, that these new agencies and authorities are briefed on the past. Not without some bitterness, one wonders how many Americans to-day have ever heard of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes-Picot agreement or even of their own King-Crane Commission set up in 1919.
In our search for a way out there are certain dispensations which the United Nations and others must have before

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them. The first is that Egypt was never included that area in which Arab independence was to be recognised after the First World War. The second is that ever since 1916 Arab unity has represented the dreams and hopes of Arabs of discrimination, and that to-day one will find Arabs who regard that Arab unity in much the same sense as the Canadian or Australian looks at the British Commonwealth. Thirdly, Arabs raised in, shall we say, the tradition of King Abdullah of Jordan or King Feisal I of Iraq were never anti-Semitic. They would remind you that for centuries in Baghdad a Jewish minority of 100,000, the greatest minority of Jews in any capital city in the world after New York and London, lived in perfect peace and tolerance with their Arab neighbours at a time when Christian Europe was busy persecuting international Jewry. It is not anti-Semitism but anti-Zionism which has driven the Arab to desperation, and that distinction must be appreciated by any international dispensation if its wisdom is to be applied to finding the final solution.
May I turn, finally, to some ideas around that solution? Some of your Lordships may recall that the late Lord Davies devoted the greater part of his life to writing and thinking about an International Police Force, its composition, its location, its administration and its command. I find it rather prophetic to discover that, writing twenty-five years ago, he put his International Police Force into Palestine. I will return to that theme in a moment, but first I would ask your Lordships to note actually what has been achieved on the ground at this moment.
A Force of some 4,000 infantry, without supporting arms, organised, as one understands, in two combat brigades, has been introduced; and, not unnaturally, it has been criticised as quite inadequate to its task. Personally, I do not take quite so, gloomy a view as that. It is true that if either Egypt or Israel chose to by-pass it, to attempt to attack each other, it. would probably be unable to prevent that action. In itself this Force is certainly not sufficient to prevent Egypt from attacking Israel, or vice versa; but it is a token on the ground. It is something more than a few observers, and we surely have to believe
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that if it were flouted or ignored or ridiculed, the United Nations, to pat it quite simply, would have to do something about it. It is not therefore the Force itself, so much as the authority behind the Force, to which many of your Lordships have drawn attention. It is that authority which causes anxiety. We seem to have slipped into this curious habit of regarding the General Assembly as some kind of enlightened, objective repository of justice, whereas we all know that it is a breeding ground of intrigue and of national and regional self-interest. Yet, my Lords, we have to believe that only through experience will it, and must it, learn; and if that is true then that token party of rather bewildered bits and pieces on the ground in the Canal area at the moment will surely, if it is challenged, be forced to expand. It would be forced to expand and do what it should do now; that is, to take over the whole of the Sinai Peninsula.
There is at this moment, I believe, an all-Party Motion tabled in another place, supported by forty-six Members of Parliament from all sides, connected with the Parliamentary Group for World Government, and drafted in terms of a suggestion that the United Nations should purchase the whole of the Sinai Peninsula. There are forceful arguments behind that suggestion. There is the doubtful legal ownership of the Peninsula, to which my noble friend Lord Killearn recently drew attention; there is the construction of that second canal, which would be a concomitant of the internationalisation of the Peninsula. Perhaps the Christian world might be stirred by the reflection that the St. Catherine's Monastery, the home of the greatest of all Christian manuscripts, the Codex Sinaiaticus, would rest on international soil. From every viewpoint there is the prospect here, as I see it, of planting the seeds of a great idea.
But policemen alone, of course, will not be sufficient to solve this age-old problem of Arab and Jew if that is ever to be solved we have to face the fact that someone has got to suffer. Someone has to abandon much of claims already regarded as confirmed; and someone has to abandon claims which perhaps it is desired to confirm in the future. Once again I can

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see the answer only in terms of some long-term, imaginative, forceful planning by the United Nations. If it is true that the largest refugee community in the world arose out of the creation of the State of Israel; and if, in turn, the State of Israel derives from the suffering of world Jewry; and if that, in turn, was caused by international crime, then it must be beyond dispute that there is an international obligation not to rest until this sore is healed.
I can see no other answer save in terms of turning the whole of the present State of Israel and Jordan, west of the river, not perhaps into an international State, but into an international enclave, with self-governing cantons of Jews and Arabs, not united in common institutions as was the suggestion under the 1946 plan of the Anglo-American Commission, but responsible to an international authority, firm in Jerusalem, with, if necessary, international constabulary sprinkled over the country to support that authority. Simultaneously, there must be the settlement of every refugee who wishes to be allowed to go back to his home under the encouragement and support of international finance, coupled with the proposed development of the Jordan Valley, again under international assistance, and the reversion of the Kingdom of Jordan to the compact homogeneity which it enjoyed before 1948. If it helps to create a healthier atmosphere for that kind of drastic treatment, then by all means set up, further to the West, an International Nile Valley Authority, again with financial assistance from the World Bank.
It may be I am quite wrong about this. It may be that, if there is no further provocation, and with German reparations to Israel ceasing next year, with some of the African Jews coming in—people who speak Arabic as their mother tongue, and not Hebrew—in the distant future Israel may be regarded as more acceptable to the Arab world, in which case the chances of direct negotiation may be more real. If so, the somewhat sweeping proposals which I have put forward may prove quite unnecessary. If so, I should be the first to admit that I was wrong, and to welcome the fact that time was proving some kind of healer. The difficulty of people who study this matter in some mild spirit of inquiry is that when
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they turn to the real expert, the real Arabist, who perhaps has been a Palestinian servant and has studied it all his life, they find that he says there is no answer to this problem. So I have felt justified in advancing my own reasoned conclusion, although it may seem unconventional.
Your Lordships will note that a far wider involvement of international authority than has yet been suggested is contemplated. Many might wish that we might continue alone to shoulder the burden of this great responsibility. Had we ever felt that American aid was coming forward under that Tripartite guarantee of 1950, we might have considered remaining in the Middle East in a big way, either politically or physically. But as it is (I put this in the form of a question to Her Majesty's Government) do we quite presume that this guarantee is now dead; and, if so, would it not be just as well to say so openly? Do not many difficulties arise by leaving the loose ends of these international agreements lying about?
I have attempted to paint a picture of increasing international authority as the only logical alternative, but I feel that it would be quite wrong to watch that increasing authority in any sense of resentment from the touchline. As I see it, we shall be worthy of our past only if we set ourselves the task of strengthening and encouraging this authority in the rather hesitant start that it has made. After all, these institutions which the world erects for the better management of its own affairs do not fail: it is the people who misuse and abuse them who are the failures.
One is reminded of the young man who looks at an Italian masterpiece and offers to buy it for the price of the paint which it contains. He receives his rebuke. "Young man, when you look at that picture, it is not the picture or its painter that is on judgment; it is you who are in the dock; it is you who stand your test."
So I feel, as I think the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr said, that it is for us to look forward to our test and to see that this movement that was set afoot with the arrival the other day of a small, miscellaneous collection of contingents in the Suez Canal area blossoms into something in which we and our children may take pride. There, surely, is work well worthy of our endeavours. If we approach the

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future in the same spirit of mission which we have so often devoted to the past, I am convinced that we shall command the respect of both the Commonwealth and the world.
7.3 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, as the first speaker from this Front Bench since my noble friend Lord Silkin spoke, it falls to me to say a word of congratulation to the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, on his interesting and promising speech as a maiden effort to-day. I am sure that in the remarkably full House which he had for that maiden speech there was a good deal of interest among those who followed the career of his late father. They wondered, perhaps, how well up to that example the present holder of the title—I think the twenty-first holder of the title—would shape. Although I must say I often found myself disagreeing with the results of his mental activity in corning to his conclusions, nevertheless he made such a speech of order and presentation to the House as makes us all desire sincerely to hear him often again.
The debate to-day has been said to be just another one of those debates upon something which has been the subject of inquest several times already. I myself have no desire to prolong the proceedings of your Lordships' House at any undue length to-night by going over too much of the old ground; but, of course, the fact is that we are faced with a Motion, put down in the name of Her Majesty's Government and introduced by the noble Marquess to-day, which in itself deals with the events of the last three or four months. It is asking the House to give their approval to what has taken place, and especially to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It is obvious, from the views held by Her Majesty's Opposition, which have been so freely expressed in the Press, in the country, in all kinds of demonstrations and in meetings, there was created such a division in the country that a Motion of this kind was bound to be controversial. We shall have to go into the Lobby against it, whatever may be the fate of the Amendment or Amendments on the Paper.
I think that the noble Marquess to-day endeavoured, as far as possible, to be non-controversial. Whilst he was not
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prepared, he thought, to go into controversial questions which might be raised., he just wanted to make a statement of facts. I listened carefully to the statement of facts. In the last few days we have been presented with the bill which the nation has to pay—and, unfortunately, not only this nation bat the whole of Europe is suffering from the economic results of the action taken in Suez. When we are presented with this bill, we remain unconvinced by the Government's earnest efforts, through the Press and debates of this kind held in another place last week, to make out that instead of its being a dire defeat for this country, it has led to a series of successes which they have summed up this afternoon in three points.
I am not going to debate those three points at length. I am quite unable to bring myself in accord with the idea that these policies of the Government either have been correct or should be supported by the nation as a whole. On the contrary, I believe that they have created a division in our State which ought never to appear at all. If the Government were going to take action overseas in a warlike fashion, which they now say was attended with such grave risks, they should first have satisfied themselves that the country as a whole was likely to be behind them. Indeed, they should have gone so far as to have such consultations with the leading members of the Opposition representing as they do a substantial part of the votes cast at the last Election for representatives in the country, to make quite sure whether they were going out on a sound course. That is one of the charges that has not been answered by the Government. They moved into a position of grave risk, at any rate, without first satisfying themselves that they would have the wholehearted support of the nation.
When I look at the results, I begin to compare in my mind the circumstances which have produced these results with the sort of situation we faced in 1939–40. I remember in 1940 the attitude I the Church to the war How different is the attitude of the Church to-day to this last essay into overseas trouble by the Government! Then, the Church was able to say to the people "If God be for us, who can be against us?" Is there anybody who would say that the Church in the country to-day could have put such a position to the people regarding

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this military adventure in the Middle East? Of course not. It is on that sort of basis that many people in the country are talking to-day and considering their judgment upon the Government's policy.
I would say to the Government to-night, that, while I have been absent from the House during all the discussions, I have studied with great care the Reports of your Lordships' debates, and particularly did I study the speech which was made in September by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair. When I hear the kind of explanation which has been given by the Government to-night as to why they took their ultimate military action on October 29, I fear that the feelings of Lord McNair upon our legal sins in amassing forces near the part of the world affected by the Suez Canal seizure have come true. I particularly fastened on this passage, in which Lord McNair said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 199, col. 662]:
"In all sincerity and humility, I would beg the Government to reflect upon my attempt to state the present rules governing the threat and the use of force and to examine and to check it … I think they are … bound to come to the conclusion which I have reached, which is as follows: that so far as the events in the present controversy up to date are known to us, I am unable to see the legal justification of the threat or the use of armed force by Great Britain against Egypt in order to impose a solution of this dispute."
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Lord McNair was dealing with quite a different subject. Lord McNair was dealing with what I described as the first crisis: the question of the internationalisation of the Suez Canal. As I explained in my speech, the circumstances in which the Government took action were quite different. The noble Lord, Lord McNair, spoke before military action was ever taken.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: Yes, but I say that the fear which was being felt in peoples' minds as to the use or the threat of force were realised when events in October came to a most convenient conclusion for the Government, and they felt that they had to move, they having already assembled a force close enough to go in at once. That is just the kind of thing that countries in that area which did not hold our views have reason to complain of; and they were as much entitled as we
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were then to go to the United Nations, if they wished to do so, to complain about the use or the threat of force against them in relation to the Suez Canal. In my view, we ought to have made immediate complaint to the United Nations about the aggression of Nasser in seizing property that did not belong to him by force majeure, without notice and without negotiation.
Now, all the events that have taken place since leave in our minds certainly this thought: that, while the Government may well argue that they went in only, as the noble Marquess said to-day, to stop the spread of war, the argument of supporters of the Government up and down the country has been such that no-one has been able to dissociate the Government's action from the fact that they were seizing a convenient opportunity to try to get a clearing up of the Suez Canal position. That remains firmly fixed in the minds of a large number of people in this country and, probably, in a much wider sense, in many parts of the world as well.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I hope, at any rate, that I have managed to clear up the misapprehension in the noble Viscount's mind.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: That is just what I say the noble Marquess has failed to do; he has quite failed in his endeavour to do that. Then, instead of actually being able to protect the Canal, we have had the spectacle of ships being sunk in the Canal, to bring much greater disaster upon this country and upon the rest of Europe who rely upon supplies coming through the Canal. Those, I think, are the actual facts. I do not want to go over any of the other questions, because that would take too long, but I want to point out that the bill for this intervention in the Middle East is enormous. The figures that have already been mentioned are enormous, and in the view expressed to us by many business men in this country, who are still apprehensive as to what is going to happen in regard to its payment, the bill is a great handicap.
I think that what our country needs at the present moment is for the nation to pull together in order to retrieve the situation. How is that going to be done? It

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seems to me that we can do it only if confidence is restored in the Government of the day. That can be achieved in two ways. It can be achieved by a reconstruction of the Government—a matter upon which we have heard precious little from the Ministers themselves. On the other hand, it can be achieved by whoever remains as Leader of the Government obtaining the view of the people as to what confidence remains in the Government in leading us in one of our greatest tasks—namely, to recover from the position into which we have been placed.
We have to restore our proper relationships with the United States. I greatly regret that I did not hear the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Cherwell, and, as I am told, his strong remarks, if not attacks, upon the United Nations. If the impression of his speech which reached me meant anything at all, it is that if the United Nations is not going to be successful, is the answer to return to a purely balance of power philosophy? If so, how are you going to arrange your balance of power? Or is it intended to rely entirely upon our own judgment and, whenever necessary or when we feel it is necessary, to "go it alone"?
VISCOUNT CHERWELL: I do not know whether the noble Viscount expects me to produce, out of a hat, a blue print for the government of the world. All I am saying is that the present system is no use.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: Then we had better have a look at one or two of the other matters. The position has not changed in regard to our power quite so much as one would suppose from some of the speeches made. We still have a good deal of power.
But, as I think many people have pointed out in the past, the fact is that for 200 years we have never won a war of a really major character without allies—and powerful allies at that. In our escapade in the Middle East, we did not deal a very good blow in connection with the need for keeping a sound and working alliance with the United States and with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Those of us who were more responsible than some of those people who support the present Government for setting up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation greatly regret the
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blow which was dealt at it. We rejoice that so many Americans are not taking the view which excited such criticism in this country three or four weeks ago. But the kind of motion which was put on the Order Paper in another place by a large block of Conservative representatives was not exactly the way to get back on to an even keel with the United States of America.
I cannot understand why the Government did not consult with America; I cannot understand why they did not have better consultations with the Dominions, and, in view of what might possibly be the risks of their escapade in the Middle East, I cannot understand why they did not consult their fellow members of the Treaty organisations to which this country belongs. We are having to stand severe criticism from our other Allies, although we got a few to support us in the United Nations; but in the case of the Baghdad Pact, a Pact concerning the particular area in which we were going to make our military operations, all other members of that organisation condemned our action. Why was there no previous consultation with them before we made this essay of policy into the Middle East?
If we are going to have strength against aggression of the kind that we have been aware is possible, even probable, from certain sources in the world; if we are to be able to deal successfully with that aggression, is it not essential that we should have some means of co-operation and collaboration between the allies who have been drawn into these organisations? If not, why set them up? It is very hurtful indeed to those of us who were responsible for setting up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (we did not set up the other one; that was more a matter for the present Government) that it should have been dealt blows such as have been indicated in the last few weeks.
I am not going to say any more tonight, but I would just remind the House that on November 4 Mr. Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour Party in another place, said, I believe in a television presentation of the case, that he would be prepared to support any Prime Minister who would really seek to bring to an end the situation from which we were then suffering. It is in that spirit that I submit to your Lordships' House to-night that, if we want the confidence and support of all

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sections of the community, first in getting the restoration of our proper relationships with our allies and with other members of our Commonwealth and, secondly, in tackling the enormous economic burden that we, in common with the many other countries affected by the closing of the Suez Canal, have to face, then we need to be sure that Her Majesty's Government have the confidence of the country. We ought to be told, first, whether there is to be a reconstruction; and, secondly, that, if that reconstruction does not appear to be satisfactory to the country the present Government will go to the electors for an affirmation of their belief, or otherwise, in the Government.
7.24 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, the noble Viscount who has just sat down reminded the House that his speech was the second major speech from the Opposition Front Bench, so we have come to something of a milestone in this debate. I also gathered from the noble Viscount that this was the first time that he has addressed your Lordships' House on this subject since his return from illness, and I am sure that noble Lords on these Benches would wish me to say how pleased we are to see him back so fit and, as it appears, ready for exercise in the Lobby to-morrow afternoon.
I did not have in mind to comment in great detail upon what the noble Viscount has just said. His concluding remarks would be for the Front Bench and not for Benches behind, and I would take up only one remark which he made —that under conditions of this kind we could not go ahead without allies. Well, my Lords, it has happened in history before, and those who can cast their mind back to 1940 will remember a speech in another place, where, if my memory serves me rightly, Sir Winston (then Mr.) Churchill, just after becoming Prime Minister, said: "We will carry on and if necessary, alone." That may have been in the minds of members of the present Government when they did what they did do.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, the difference was that the Prime Minister then was already assured that the country as a whole was behind him.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, nobody can be quite certain that the country was not behind Her Majesty's Government this time. The pattern of this debate can be reduced to fairly simple terms, and I am not going to speak for a long time. Her Majesty's Government have said, and not for the first time that on the basis of the information which they had (and the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, has reminded the House that that information was likely to be more full than was possessed by other people outside of the Government) the action which they took was the only way of averting war. Those who believe that Her Majesty's Government had that information and that they acted from the motives which they have given, will accept it; but one of the features of this debate has been the persistent refusal of a number of noble Lords who have spoken either to accept that Her Majesty's Government had such information or that the motives on which they acted were right. And, of course, they are entitled to their own opinions. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who has now left the Chamber, appeared to take the line that as he and his friends did not know of the information which Her Majesty's Government said they had received therefore that information could not have been true. That is a contention which I, for one, would dispute.
The other impression which I think one can draw from this debate is that many noble Lords who have spoken, particularly those on the opposite Benches, seem to have taken the line that the issue on which we are talking is finished. I do not believe any such thing. We are actually in the middle of a volume—a particularly sticky volume if you like—of the history of the Middle East, a history which might have been called, as was another history, The Endless Adventure. We have come to the end of one chapter. This country decided to "go it alone," and now we are starting another chapter, with the United Nations having decided to assume what were, all the time, its responsibilities. But the volume is not yet finished, and I think it would be very unwise, from any point of view, to attempt to judge the success or failure of the action of Her Majesty's Government on the strength of what has happened up to the time of going to press to-day.

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What we do know is that war has not broken out, and I think that that is something about which even the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, can be pleased. He might even think that the cost to the nation, had war broken out, would have been greater than what, I admit, is the heavy cost to the nation caused by events as they have happened. However that may be, by the time we adjourn to-morrow night we shall have finished the period during which political post-mortems will be useful; or rather we shall have finished it until about fifty years' time, when statesmen will have written their memoirs, documents will have been published and someone other than ourselves will be able to judge the whole matter with all the information in front of them. But I certainly hope that, although we may put a term to political post-mortems we shall not, for the same reason, put a term to the technical, military and Service postmortems that I hope are now going on. Problems which will have to be investigated on the technical level (I am not speaking now of the political level) are very considerable.
At the risk of appearing to criticise noble Lords in front of me, I would say that the problems range from the ridiculous incident of troops in the Suez area being charged higher prices for N.A A.F.I. stores than they would have paid in Cyprus or Malta (and I am bound to say that the explanation given in another place was not convincing) to other, bigger problems which I hope are now being seriously studied. I hasten to say that I do not expect the noble Earl, Lord Home, to give me any answer on this point during this debate. For example, there must be a great many lessons about the right way to handle these problems, first at Cabinet level and then at a lower level again.
There is another question to which I should dearly love to hear the answer, but I am afraid that it must be denied to us in this debate—that is, how changes which were made recently in the Ministry of Defence by putting Sir William Dickson as Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff have worked out; whether these arrangements in practice have justified themselves, or whether they have turned out, in practice, to be not so satisfactory as the arrangements which Sir Winston Churchill, as Prime Minister, had in the last war, when the Ministry of
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Defence and the Chiefs of Staff Organisation were so largely and so successfully looked after by the noble and gallant Lord. Lord Ismay. I am not making any criticism; I am merely saying that these are points on which a great deal of experience will have been provided: that they are most important from the point of view of the direction of affairs in this country, and, I hope, are being studied.
Another problem—and it has been touched upon by the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr—is whether our defence expenditure, in which Lord De La Warr included political warfare and propaganda, is properly balanced in the sort of conditions which are likely to occur as between a hot war and a cold war and, if you like, to "put over" our national aims in peace time. All these things will have to be considered, and it is just as well that they should be, because I am certain that these problems will recur. I very much doubt whether we can safely take the view that, because we have got round the corner this time (as I think we have), we shall no: have further problems of the same sort in the future.
I am bound to say that I am still not convinced that the United Nations have learned the lessons, not merely political lessons but also technical lessons, which they should have learned from this affair. This is the point. If you wish to exercise influence you must have the means to exert pressure. I, for one, am not convinced that the collection of well-intentioned faces now representing the United Nations in the Suez Canal area are, in fact, capable of undertaking operations of war (highbrows must not mind my using that expression, for that is what they are: operations of war) which may prove necessary if at any time either of the two nations which were separated from war before, or indeed any other nation, fails to respect the authority of the United Nations despite the presence of the United Nations Force in that area. I wish that I could take a more rosy view, but I do not think it would be right, either in or out of this debate.
All of us here, I think, are engaged in trying to see—whatever our views on past affairs—how affairs can be conducted in the future. We know well that we have had lessons of the kind that I have just mentioned. We know equally well that

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our handling of Commonwealth affairs has given rise to problems quite different from the problems of twenty years ago, when Indian opinion was represented not by the Indian Government but by the India Office here, and when opinion in Ceylon was represented by the Colonial Office. It is no good deceiving ourselves into thinking that every nation of the Commonwealth, every self-governing nation, can be expected to hold identical views on every subject of this sort. We have to face the fact that they cannot, and we must adapt our handling of Commonwealth affairs so that we can learn the lessons of this time and see what improvements, if any, are necessary in the handling of Commonwealth relations so as to deal equally satisfactorily with the affairs of nations like Australia and New Zealand, who supported us so magnificently in this last crisis, and with the affairs of nations like India, Ceylon and Pakistan who have other and conflicting problems to face at a time of this sort.
Before I leave the Commonwealth points I would remind your Lordships that we shall come back again to them tomorrow, because both the Amendments deal specifically with the Commonwealth problem. I am sure it is well that they should do that, but I think it is rather a pity that the Amendments are drawn as they are. I do not think noble Lords on this side could very well accept them. I tried, in thinking of them, to cut off the head of the Amendment standing in the name of Lord Henderson, and I also tried to cut off the tail of the Amendment standing in the name of Lord Rea. Even so those two Amendments would not quite fit, though I would say that the sentiments behind them probably fit very much better than their words.
Coming now to the question of the United Nations—about which I mean to say very little, because so much has been said, and so wisely said by people like the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, and the noble Viscount. Lord Cherwell—however much we may dislike it, we are faced with the lesson that exhortation and resolutions and things of that sort will not in themselves cause United Nations policy to prevail, except possibly in very small and limited instances. Therefore the United Nations, like any other national or international body which wishes its policy to prevail,
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must have the requisite amount of "teeth." We may think that the hurriedly collected and well-intentioned United Nations Force now in the Canal area is sufficient. I sincerely hope that it is, but my training as a professional soldier leads me to doubt it very much. All the same, that is the lesson: that a United Nations Force cannot count on being able successfully to implement the policy of the United Nations, whatever it may be, unless it has "teeth." That is merely another way of saying something which one noble Lord said or implied just now, that United Nations intervention will not be successful unless it is backed by at least one of the big nations—the United States, if you like.
Under those conditions, United Nations action will be successful, but how much more successful will it be supposing that we can heal these breaches between us (I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Winster, that they are being rapidly healed) and we can all come together again on this business of restoring order in the Middle East. We know that the influence of the United States and the power that she can deploy is very great. We also know that we and France have longstanding experience in the Middle East which we can bring to bear for the good of the cause. We also have Armed Forces, which have been used once already and can be used again—this time, I hope, in support of United Nations policy. There they are. They have done the job once. They have come out at the proper time, and they are now being re-grouped. Let us hope that they are available again for use in a good cause. I should be the last to take the view, which Lord Chorley appeared to take that we have come out with our tails between our legs; that we are now something in the nature of penitents or pariahs, and that British forces—and French forces, for that matter—should never be used again in the Middle East. As I have said, the volume is not finished, and never is a long day. I would hope that, before long, British and French influence, and British and French forces, will again be used to good effect as part of the United Nations plan. In my opinion that may yet be so.
7.40 p.m.
LORD CLITHEROE: My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, who has just addressed your Lordships, always

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contributes a great deal to the value of our debates, and a little later on I should like to teach upon one or two points which he has raised. Not that I am going to detain your Lordships very long. I spent practically the whole of November in the United States of America, and travelled from the Atlantic to the Pacific Coast. In some respects I might consider myself fortunate not to have been here. I had an opportunity of meeting a great many people and finding out their attitude. I should like to stress what the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, said about the desirability of plain speaking. My outstanding impression in in the United States was that the American people had far greater sympathy with our position than had the American Government. That was my first impression, and I think that that was true not only of confirmed Anglophiles but also of the rank-and-file of Americans, even on the West Coast. I think it was generally appreciated that America had made many mistakes. I confess that for my part I did not hesitate to tell my friends what I thought of them—and they told me what they thought of us.
I think it is fair to say that there is a general desire and anxiety to repair the damage that has been done. Here I should like to say how fair and balanced the New York Times was throughout all this controversy and I noticed particularly that it said:
"The verdict of history will no doubt be fairer to Britain. France and Israel than their allies have been."
Of course, it is true, and it is no use trying to say otherwise that the general feeling in the United States was that we had made a very serious blunder, and that Britain and France were wrong to strike at the time and in the way they did. That is all 1 ant saying. I am not saying that the general opinion expressed was that it was wrong to strike, but that it was wrong to strike at that time and in that way. The Americans were, of course, critical, as were some of our Commonwealth friends, of the failure of the Government to inform the President of the United States and the leaders of the Commonwealth. Many actually felt that the President had been misled. I think that that was a matter which caused me as much distress as anything. I am sure that if he was misled, it must have been entirely unintentional.
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By the time I left America I felt that a great change had taken place in the attitude, particularly of Washington and the people closely associated with Washington. I think that the President clearly had recovered from his anger. He and many other of his colleagues were most anxious to do what they could to repair the damage, to be helpful and to begin to rebuild the alliance. When I came home at the end of last week, what struck me most was the great division of opinion here on the propriety of our actions at different stages. The differences of opinion did not appear to be based on Party lines at all. Families, households and firms were divided in their views of what had taken place. I am bound to say that I was also struck by the condemnation of the attitude of the Leader of the Opposition in another place and some of his followers, which seemed to be widespread.
I have met here no one who doubts the sincerity of purpose of the Prime Minister in issuing the ultimatum and in his strong conviction that immediate action was then necessary to stop an Arab-Israeli war and to safeguard the Canal. I have heard no reasonable person suggest that this action was in any sense an imperialist move, using that word in its current degraded and most unsympathetic sense. I am quite sure that no reasonable person suggests that it was that sort of action. But many people feel that to have taken this action without telling our Commonwealth partners and American Allies was most unwise. They criticise the way it was done rather than what was done.
I cannot conceal from your Lordships my own opinion that grave mistakes were made and that a serious under-assessment of the risks involved was made. I notice that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, referred to 1945, and that the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, challenged him, saying that at that time the people were united. That would not have been my answer to the noble Viscount. My answer would have been that at that time the Commonwealth was united.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: I agree, if you say, "Also."
LORD CLITHEROE: I think that that made a tremendous difference to the decision that was made and to the calculations which I think went awry. I will

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not dwell on the consequences of what happened, and their seriousness. That will emerge as time goes on. I have been critical of the Government's policy in the Middle East for some years. In July, 1954, when I was in another place, I took the extreme step for a very loyal Party man, which I always have been, of voting against the Government's decision to withdraw from the Canal Zone. I thought that that was wrong and I expressed my views in a speech on July 14 in that year, a week or ten days before the treaty with Egypt was made. I said then [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 530, col. 540]:
"When, the West withdraws, a vacuum is created, and into that vacuum Communism goes and will go in future. There is no doubt about that. The Communists have fairly substantial and organised influence in the Egyptian Army to-day, especially in the artillery and in the armoured units. … But the weakness shown and the concession to pressure by terrorists is bound to lead to more pressure in other places and especially in those places where our redeployment takes place, for example, in Cyprus and Libya. That is where the heat will be turned on."
I mention that, because in reply to that criticism in my speech the Prime Minister, who was then Foreign Secretary, said on July 29 [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 531, col. 811]:
"Then there was this reference to a vacuum There is no vacuum because, as a result of these arrangements, we shall be able to re-deploy our forces and make them mobile to an extent that they have not been hitherto."
Later in his speech he said [col. 814]:
"Our ability to return in the event of crisis is a strengthening element which will enable us to defend our position in the Middle East, …"
Those of us who expressed our anxieties then were assured, after the numerous and persistent representations that we made—most numerous and most persistent—that all steps would be taken in a military sense to enable us to intervene immediately should the necessity arise. When Colonel Nasser seized the Canal in July of this year, immediate action to safeguard our rights and international rights under the Convention of 1888 might have been reasonable, but apparently the necessary military arrangements for swift intervention had not been made after two years, and that is what I find very hard to understand. I think the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, touched on the point, and I should also like to ask whether the machinery of the Defence Committee is working properly—indeed, whether the
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Defence Committee is or has been working properly, or at all.
It is regrettable that after the decision had been taken, rightly or wrongly, to send forces to Egypt—and I myself complain of the way it was done rather than the fact—they had to be withdrawn, as I agree they had to be, before proper safeguards had been obtained with regard to the future of the Canal and with regard to the lives and property of British subjects in Egypt, about which I feel very deeply. This is a point which the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, referred to earlier. On balance, therefore, the history of the last few months so far as the Middle East is concerned is an unhappy one. I fully understand and agree (and I have frequently stated it in America) that American pressure was very much to blame for this. It was American pressure which persuaded our Government, more than anything, to leave the Canal Zone in 1954.
I should like here to say one thing; it seems to me that it is most unwise for the Government, and for Government speakers, to be anything other than candid at the present time. It is no use pretending that our policy over the last few years with regard to the Middle East has been wholly successful, and I regret that in the past I have been unable to support the Government's Middle East policy, a Government which, normally, I support most strongly. I believe that this country will have increased confidence in leaders who admit that there were miscalculations and who explain to the people the genuine reasons why those miscalculations were made.
I was glad to hear the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, expressing the view to-day that no doubt mistakes had been made on both sides. I feel it only fair to suggest that miscalculations were, to some degree, caused by the tremendous pressure and rush of events—at least, that is how it strikes me. With a Government that is harassed all day in the other place, and harassed all night in the United Nations, and with communications as they are, it is not surprising that Ministers were not able to find time to sleep, or to consider the facts and the implications of a situation which must have been changing like a kaleidoscope all the time. Such circumstances, I should have thought, would

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lead to the necessity of even greater caution than usual in coming to decisions. But I know that the path of duty for all who have had to bear a part in these decisions in recent weeks must have been very rugged indeed, and one cannot fail to have the greatest possible sympathy with Ministers and others in the service of the Crown who had to take part in these decisions. Though not wholly agreeing with the views he expressed in New York, I should like to say, as one who was there at the time, that I admired greatly the gallantry of our Foreign Secretary under extremely trying circumstances and conditions.
The great thing now is to restore unity at home, and in that connection I feel that a policy of frankness with the people is the most important element, though I recognise the point which the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, raised. I feel That being candid is the best way to get the confidence of the people, and it is certainly the best way to rebuild confidence with our Commonwealth partners and our allies. I am sure it is right to make admissions when miscalculations have been made, just as we want frank admissions from our allies on the other side of the Atlantic for the errors of policy they have made over recent years. I think they arc prepared to make those admissions, and it is right that they should. The problems which we face are innumerable, and I will not dilate upon them tonight. I want to close by saying that I hope that all Parties in the State will contribute in every way they can to help find solutions for these problems.
7.55 p.m.
LORD BRAND: My Lords, like other speakers, I do not intend to detain your Lordships for long; and, like the noble Lord, Lord Clitheroe, I want to talk almost entirely about our relations with the Commonwealth and the United States. I feel bound to express my opinion on these matters, because I have in the past known the United States and Canada very well indeed. I spent seven years in two wars in Washington, and I have been concerned with co-operation in the Commonwealth for nearly fifty years as a member of the Editorial Committee of the Round Table, which has groups in every Commonwealth country
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and has attempted to secure the unity of the Commonwealth throughout hose years. In a recent debate in your Lordships' House I said that I did not agree with the Government in taking action without consultation with the United States and the Commonwealth. I feel that I must express that opinion again, after all that has happened, and not-withstanding the eloquent speech of the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, at the beginning of this debate.
I am not going to discuss the economic problems raised by this action of the Government. We in this country always find the greatest difficulty in maintaining our economic balance. We are always living on the edge; we never seem able to get, our reserves up to the point to which we must get them. We had hoped that the policy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the monetary policy were going to do a great deal in this respect in the next year or so, but I am afraid that that has all more or less gone by the board for the time being. But how serious this is depends almost entirely on the opening of the Canal: how soon it is opened, or how late it is opened. Therefore, it seems to me rather useless to discuss what the effect of our action will be until we know more about this matter. The Chancellor of the Exchequer must. I feel, be suffering from bitter disappointment, so far as own sphere is concerned.
I come back to the question of consultation with the United States and the Commonwealth. I believe that everybody will agree 'with me that what has happened recently must not happen again. I do not think we can afford to take action like this again, so far as lie Commonwealth and the United States are concerned. I believe I realise fully what the consequences of consultation in this instance would have meant. Consultation would have meant considerable delay, and, on the assumption—which I think is reasonable—that the Israeli forces would have moved, anyhow, and gone on, it is quite clear that a position of great danger would have arisen. The Israeli forces might have gone far further into Egypt, or they might have been driven back. My own view is that, whichever of those two things happened, the United States would have been forced, notwithstanding the Election, or anything else, to

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have joined with us in some action to prevent anything worse happening. I believe that they would have joined with us, and I personally do not think that a Third World War would have started, if the circumstances had been these.
I feel that the consequences, not only in the Middle East, but in this country and throughout the world, indicate that our action was mistaken. One thing that looks clear is that as soon as we get separated from the United States the Soviet Government feel perfectly free to threaten us in the most violent language. They see that the United States is not by our side, and they use, to say the least of it, the most undiplomatic language in threatening to send over guided missiles, or whatever it may be, to indicate their power over us. This is unfortunate, because we are bound to consider whether they really mean what they say or not. So far as the United States are concerned, I admit that, during the last weeks before we took this action, the United States Government itself may have been almost non-existent so far as foreign policy was concerned. Mr. Dulles was ill, or away in Florida; the President was occupied elsewhere, and the State Department was very weak. Undoubtedly the Prime Minister and his colleagues may have felt almost at their wits' end to get any definite answers out of the United States Government. But still, I do not think that great statesmen can give way to exasperated feelings. They have to consider the consequences of their action.
My firm belief is that the safety of this country depends on close co-operation with all our Allies, and the frankest consultation always indeed, that is the lifeblood of the Commonwealth. I believe the custom is to tell all of them almost everything. We heard recently from the Government Front Bench how 60,000 cables arc exchanged with Commonwealth countries in one year; and I can well believe it, because it is essential to keep every one of them fully informed. I know that there are difficulties about consultation with the Asian countries, but these must be overcome. India often takes a different view from us. Nevertheless, I believe that, even in so far as the United States are concerned, it will be useful to India and to us that she remains in the Commonwealth. The United
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States is going to pay a great deal of attention to India, because they feel their weakness in relation to Communist China, and therefore are particularly anxious to make close friends of so great a State in the Asiatic Continent as India.
I believe also that the United States must, in her relations with the United Kingdom, play her part fully. She must understand—which I do not think has always been understood in Washington lately—that she cannot be our ally only in the North Atlantic and pursue any course she likes in the Middle East. She must be our ally for all purposes, whether in the Middle East or in the Atlantic. I should like, if your Lordships would allow me, to quote one or two things that a great friend of mine of forty years standing, Mr. Walter Lippmann, has recently said in one or two articles in the New York Herald Tribune which I dare say some of your Lordships have read. In the first article his subject was, "On making new friends." He said that Vice-President Nixon had given voice to a notion that the great obstacle to understanding and good co-operation with the Afro-Asian countries was "in our relations with Great Britain and France." That is to say, the further off they kept from us because of our Colonialism, the closer they might get to the Afro-Asian countries.
Mr. Lippmann went on to say:
"This notion is very misleading. To believe that it is true is to forget half the world—to forget the Far East and Pacific. The United States is present there in force. It is present in the mandated islands in Japan, in Korea, in Okinawa, in the Formosa Strait, in South Viet Nam, and in the mandated islands, the so-called Trust Territories. Mr. Nixon is deceiving himself mightily if he forgets all this and hugs the illusion that the Afro-Asians accept the position toward which we have expanded as a result of the Second World War … We should have no doubt that the Afro-Asian nations challenge our position in the Far East, and will raise the issue as and when the opportunity arises. They will raise the issue of our refusal to let the Red Chinese take the Chinese seat in the United Nations They will raise the question of the status of Formosa. They will raise the question of the detonation of big nuclear bombs in the Pacific Islands."
It is because of all this that America is looking for friends on the Asian Continent, because the American Government realise the need.
In the second article, Mr. Lippmann says how little Mr. Hammarskjoeld seems to have achieved in Cairo. Mr.

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Lippmann said that the fundamental idea was that there were great and dangerous issues in the Middle East, which had caused an explosion, and that the paramount function of the United Nations was to bring about a settlement—but the United Nations had been pushed into a position which seemed to be that of restoring conditions as they were before the explosion, and this meant that the weight of the United States had been added to that of the countries of the Soviet orbit and the Afro-Asian bloc in their unqualified support of Egypt. He went on to say:
"If anyone imagines that in supporting the Egyptian-Soviet line, we are gaining influence and prestige which can be used for a settlement he should lave been in New York"—
this is the interesting point—
"at the General Assembly at the end of last week. He would have seen there that the initiative and the power are not in our hands, and that we found ourselves doing what we did not want to do, and explaining that it was not so bad to do it, and that we could not help on-selves. … The root of the trouble is in Washington, where the fundamental decision has been fumbled—whether to treat the intervention as a case of unprovoked aggression to be repelled or as an explosion of conflicting forces that need to be pacified and reconciled. The President has said things which suggest that he was groping for the second and truly statesmanlike course. But for some reason, be it that le has lacked lucid and resourceful advisers, he has allowed us to drift into the other course. That course is proving in practice to be nothing more than to play second fiddle to the Soviet-Egyptian axis."
I think these are very interesting accounts of opinion of an expert onlooker in Washington, and show in what a bad way the American Government policy was at that moment.
I deeply deplore that this whole episode has led to the burst of anti-American feeling in sonic quarters in this country, though not, I believe, among the sensible public. I deplore, as did the noble Lord, Lord Winster, Lord Hailsham's outburst. I am bound to say that I profoundly disagree with him. I personally have the greatest regard and affection for the American people. I remember reading a comment of Professor Whitehead—the great mathematician and philosopher of Cambridge who after living years at Harvard, towards the end of his life, said that he found !he American people the most friendly and generous in the world. That is my opinion, too. In any case it is foolish to curse a whole people. I think it was Burke who said that "You
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cannot indict a nation." Americans are, of course, frail human beings, as we are; and sometimes also, as has happened to us in the past, they have Governments which function badly. I repeat, however, that, above everything else, a restoration of out ties with the Commonwealth and the United States is by far the most important objective.
I should like to add one word on a totally different matter and that is on U.N.O. I very much sympathise with the views expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, arid I must say that I. get a very cold feeling in my heart when I read of Mr. Gaitskell saying, or hear him say, that we must be obedient to the United Nations. You cannot be obedient to an institution of that kind. You must abide by whatever you have agreed to, whatever you are bound to in the Charter; whatever you have signed you must do your best to obey. You must work for the strength of the United Nations. But we are far from being able to regard it as a satisfactory Organisation. I myself have the gravest doubts—indeed complete disbelief—about the United Nations being turned into a great military Government, with air forces, armies, navies and so on. Indeed, I have very little faith in the value of the United Nations Police Force. We shall see how it works out. But the United Nations is not a Government; it will not become a Government; it is an organisation where all the nations of the world can meet and discuss and try to agree. The United Nations may possibly coerce very small nations by a Police Force; they can do nothing more by such means. It is not in the direction of giving the United Nations power to coerce nations chat we can expect the Organisation to succeed in the future.
8.13 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I feel that in the discussions in another place too much attention was paid to the military operation in Egypt and insufficient attention to the wider issues. The recent military operation has highlighted some of these wider issues. One of them, I think, arises out of the pronouncement of the Labour Party at their Blackpool Conference not to co-operate with the Government on matters of foreign policy. En view of this pronouncement, I fail to

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understand the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, earlier in this debate, on divisions in this country. I suggest that this decision not to co-operate was immediately disruptive and is likely to be more disruptive in its long-term effects upon the influence of this country than anything that has happened recently. I wonder whether, if it had not been for that decision, and if there had been consultation with the Government, and the Opposition had expressed strong views before the operation rather than after it, Her Majesty's Government, for good or ill, might have hesitated to take the action they did. I am surprised that Her Majesty's Government have not hammered home the tragedy of this decision of the Opposition to evade responsibility. I would characterise it as the most unpatriotic act of our time and the most calculated in its consequences to destroy this nation as a power and influence in the world.
A lot has been said in this debate about healing splits. I wonder whether it is not possible to heal this split. Perhaps the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, were meant to be directed to this possibility. Anyway, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government for an assurance that they will not neglect the opportunity, when important decisions on foreign policy have to be made, at least to confer with the Leader of the Liberal Party.
The recent military operation, viewed in perspective, will, I think, be seen to be but one episode in a series of major moves in the Middle East in the past ten years. An increasingly disturbing and disruptive part has been played by Russia, using hate of Israel as a lever. This Russian influence has been made more effective by the vacillating policy of the United States which has been markedly unhelpful to Britain. Most Americans one meets in the Middle East seem to assume and take it for granted that British influence should be on the wane and the major share of commercial development should be left to them. If the Atlantic Alliance is to survive, it is necessary that we should know precisely where we stand in the Alliance in relation to the problems of the world. For instance, I found during my recent visit that the failure of the Americans to
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support the Baghdad Pact was very strongly criticised. I think it is time the people of this country should know how far the American people are committed in the defence of the free world, and I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government at an early date to issue a White Paper making clear the definite commitments undertaken by the United States.
Is the position even in N.A.T.O. quite clear? Is the United States committed automatically and immediately to act if a N.A.T.O. country is attacked, or is it necessary to await a vote in Congress before American troops are committed? What is the position in relation to other free countries outside N.A.T.O.—for instance, the countries in the Baghdad Pact, where I gather there is no commitment, even if there is in N.A.T.O.?
It seems to me that our disagreement with the American Government over Suez has brought out deficiencies in the arrangements with the United States. I have referred to this matter on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House. To be sure of agreement and common action, a joint political authority is essential, and unless such a joint political authority can be established I cannot see how, in peace time, satisfactory decisions can be taken on such matters as the location of N.A.T.O. forces or other forces, or the location of American bases in territories outside American territory, or how, if there is a threat, the necessary dispositions can be taken to counter it. If the alliance is to survive as we all desire, surely we have a right to know where we stand and to be able to rely absolutely upon mutual support.
There is one other matter I should like to raise. We have an experience of many years' friendship with the Arab peoples, as the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, has said. I believe this old friendship can be maintained provided we go out to assist the Arab countries in their aim of closer integration. The future development of these Arab countries is largely dependent upon the oil supplied to this country and Europe; their oil is not of great importance to the United States. The fact that not only this country, but Europe, needs the supplies of oil, emphasises the desirability of our pressing on with European integration, as my noble friend Lord Layton has already pointed out, so that the European countries can speak with

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one voice. But in view of our past friendship with the Arab countries it is natural that they should expect us to assist them in the problems of inter-investment and development.
I suggest that the first step might be to try to get together a committee along the lines of O.E.E.C. in Europe—an "O.E.E.C." for Arab countries. I should like to see Her Majesty's Government sound the representatives in London of the Governments of the countries of the Arab League, and bring in the protected territories, Kuwait and the Trucial States. I should like to see that sounding, if it is found to be acceptable, followed by an invitation to a conference as soon as an Israeli settlement is reached; perhaps the first conference might be held in Malta. I think we miss the representative of Saudi-Arabia in London. Could not Her Majesty's Government let it be known that they would like him to resume his duties in London?
How to achieve greater unity in this country on important issues of foreign policy; how to reach a basic understanding with the United States on which both can rely, and how to further prosperous development of the Middle East: these are the great issues which must exercise our minds. The incident at Suez has highlighted these issues it did not create them.
8.23 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords. I wish to deal tonight with three topics, on all of which I think there are widespread and dangerous illusions. They are the United Nations. Anglo-American relations and the Russian assault on Hungary. First, however, I would say that I cannot agree with any of the three Motions on the Order Paper. None of them appears to me to be realistic. But I must confine myself to that which has been already moved. That Motion expresses the view that the whole policy of Her Majesty's Government has been a success, and that the United Nations Force now in the area provides some guarantee of future progress and will lead to the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues. My Lords, I cannot share this optimism. In fact I thought the most conclusive reasons against it were given in that magnificent speech of my noble friend Lord Bruce of Melbourne. Let me say at once that if there were any
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Motion on the Order Paper that enabled me to express my admiration of Mr. Menzies I should support it with alacrity.
There is, however, a second reason why the Government Motion is, in my opinion, inadequate. It does not, directly or by implication, mention Hungary. I firmly believe that what is now being done and suffered in Hungary concerns and may decide the future of the world. I shall listen carefully to the speeches of Ministers to-morrow. I have no older friend in politics than the noble Earl who is to wind up the debate for the Government, and none whom. I more respect. But am bound to say that, unless I am converted from my present view, I shah, for the reasons which I have given, abstain in the Division on the Government Motion to-morrow, though I shall, of course, vote with alacrity against the Labour Amendment.
It will be my first abstention on an important issue for nearly twelve years. I last abstained in the debates on the Yalta Conference on February 28 and March 1, 1945. I regarded the Yalta decisions on Poland as unprincipled and wrong, refused to support them and resigned my office in Mr. Churchill's Government. From that date to this have never mentioned the matter in Parliament. I do so to-night for one reason only: because I believe what there is an imminent danger of the same mistakes being repeated. In the Press, both here and in America, it is beginning to he suggested that the West should now again negotiate with Russia. But Europe cannot survive a second Yalta; nor, my Lords, would it deserve to.
The Yalta Agreement constituted one of the great blunders of history. It led quickly and foreseeably to the enslavement of Poland. This is not a case of wisdom after the event. My argument at the time is on record in a speech to the Norwich Conservatives reported in the Eastern Daily Press of April 7. 1945. In 1945, we did not have to wait long for the Russians to show their hand. The Yalta Agreement had provided that the Lublin Committee was to be reorganised by the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad. For this purpose there w ere to be consultations in Moscow. By e. trick, which then was novel but which now constitutes part of the grammar of Communist treachery, the Russians obtained

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from us the names of the Polish underground leaders whom we thought suitable candidates for the provisional Government, invited sixteen of them to Moscow under promise of safe conduct and promptly flung them into prison. This was in March, 1945. But the Russians did not disclose what they had done until the beginning of May, when they suddenly blurted it out to our representatives at the San Francisco Conference who were engaged in forming the United Nations Organisation.
What happened? Did the disclosure of this abomination cause the assembled statesmen to break off negotiations and to revise their plans? Dear me, no! Let me tell the House what happened, in the words of the News Chronicle of May 7, 1945:
"Shocked and startled though they have been by the Russians' sudden disclosure that the missing Polish leaders have been arrested, statesmen gathered here for the United Nations conference are showing to-day a general determination not to let this unhappy piece of news interfere with the work of the conference."
When I think of the folly and blindness of the statesmen described in that extract, I hope I may be forgiven if I call to mind a saying of my friend, the late Desmond MacCarthy:
"The authorities were at their wits' end, nor had it taken them long to get there."
The facts that I have related completely dispose of a widely held myth. It is not true that Western statesmen, when they formed the United Nations Organisation, believed that Russia was going to behave like a civilised Power and that her subsequent conduct disappointed them. More than two months before they signed the United Nations Charter Russia had informed them, by word and by deed, that she was proceeding to the enslavement of Eastern Europe, and she had shown exactly what use she would make of the Yalta Agreement.
There are other illusions about the United Nations which I would dispel. The first concerns the so called Veto in the Security Council. Many people imagine that the Charter mentions something called a Veto, which, for some reason, it is slightly immoral to use. The Charter does nothing of the kind. What it does is to provide by Article 27 (3) that most decisions of the Security
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Council are made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. If a permanent member does not concur, there is no decision of the Council. Whether in any particular case a permanent member is right or wrong not to concur depends, of course, on the merits of the matter on which the vote is taken. To say that it is always wrong for a permanent member not to concur is equivalent to saying that it is always wrong to be in a minority. Is there any noble Lord in any quarter of the House who really believes that?
Nevertheless, this provision of the Charter naturally caused difficulty, because it so often prevented the Security Council from reaching a decision. This caused the General Assembly in 1950 to approve the so-called "Uniting for Peace" procedure under which an emergency special session of the General Assembly can be held on short notice and make recommendations by a two-thirds majority. The Assembly has no executive power, and even a resolution of recommendation can be blocked by one vote over one-third. The position was carefully explained by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor in his masterly speech on September 12 of this year. It is under this procedure that the Assembly has recently made recommendations with which Her Majesty's Government and the French Government are complying.
I beg the House again to study that speech of the Lord Chancellor. Noble Lords will be the victims of illusion if they think that international law or the rule of law will be advanced if some great Powers treat recommendations of the Assembly with respect and obey them and others treat them with contempt and defy them with impunity. Further, the rule of law will not be advanced but will be set back if the Assembly's recommendations are used only to check the use of military force and never to remedy or prevent even the most flagrant illegalities and breaches of treaty such as Colonel Nasser's purported nationalisation of the Canal.
Since the nations in the Assembly generally vote in blocks, it may on many subjects become as impossible to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Assembly as it is to secure a decision of the Security Council. A very important thing follows

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from that. If a great Power should ever decide to proceed only within the United Nations and never outside it, it will be decreeing its own impotence. If America really makes such a decision while Russia remains free to use the United Nations or to ignore it at its pleasure, the cause of freedom will be doomed.
I turn to Anglo-American relations. For years I have done what I could by speech arid action to further Anglo-American friendship and co-operation. I believe in it both for its own sake and for the sake of human freedom, which, without it, cannot hope to survive. To-day, my Lords, that friendship has received a shattering blow, but from that blow it can certainly recover if both countries are wise. I do not believe that that friendship will recover unless each country understands how much it has shocked the other by its conduct and seeks to avoid a repetition. For more than forty years I have always had American friends, and my view entirely confirms the much more expert view given by my noble friend Lord Bruce of Melbourne and others, that you never lose an American friend by plain speaking. In my belief, we have clearly shocked the Americans by taking a step of great international importance without consulting or even informing them; and we have shocked them all the more because they believe that that step was wrongful. But the Americans must realise, if our friendship is to be repaired, that they have no less shocked our own people, both by what one of their own commentators has described as the perfidy of their conduct over Suez that preceded our action and by their actions after it.
Let me try to explain why. My task is made easier by the fact that our case has been brilliantly stated again and again by Joseph and Stewart Alsop in the New York Herald Tribune. If Americans wish to understand our indignation at their conduct preceding our action, let them study the article, "Who's to blame?" in the issue of November 7. Perhaps f may quote—because I think it will be useful to have it on the record of Parliament—an extract from that article:
"Were they"—
that is, the English and the French—
"then, justified in keeping us in the dark? The answer perhaps lies in their reason for doing so, which was their conviction that the American Government had already behaved toward them with something really very like
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perfidy. The Suez crisis itself was made in Washington, by Secretary Dulles's arrogantly brutal withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer, which he had previously pressed the British so hard to join in. The immediate responsibility for starting the trouble lay right here.
On top of this, the subsequent history of the Suez crisis has been a history of repeated British and French decisions not to take immediate steps on their own, because of American promises which were then promptly broken. At the first London conference on Suez, Secretary of State Dulles promised strong, unqualified American support for the scheme to internationalise the canal. Bur he withdrew that support as soon as the mission headed by Prime Minister Menzies ran- into trouble in Cairo.
Before the second Suez conference Secretary Dulles himself took the initiative in proposing a Canal Users' Association with teeth in it. He pointed proudly to the teeth in his first communications to Paris and London. But within four hours after his arrival in London, the teeth were thrown away, and again by Secretary Dulles himself. Finally, the salvage of the second London meeting was a residual scheme for employing the Users' Association as an instrument of gradual economic pressure on Egypt, by denying Colonel Nasser most of the Canal revenue.
Then, when this third scheme had to be implemented, Secretary Dulles explained that he would of course encourage American shippers using the Canal to pay their fees to the Users' Association․but only if the bulk of the money was then paid over to the Egyptian Government."
My Lords, those are not the words of an Englishman; those are the words of some of the best-known and respected commentators in America, in a newspaper very friendly to the American President himself.
What of American action after Her Majesty's Government took the action that is the main subject of this debate? If the Americans desire to know the cause of British indignation, again they can ascertain it from the Alsops, particularly from their article on November 26, called "Fabulous contrast." The article describes what happened when Mr. Dulles suddenly withdrew the offer to build the Aswan Darn. Like my noble friend Lord Brand, I do not wish to weary the house with extracts, but perhaps I may summarise what they said by saying this: that the State Department, at the time of the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer, gave an off-the-record talk or hand-out to the American Press, and the reason they gave, as stated in the article, was
"that Nasser and Egypt had now 'passed the point of no return' in their relations with the

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Soviet Union; and that both man and nation must therefore be considered as complete captives of the Kremlin's policy."
Having recognised, as long ago as the date when the Aswan Dam offer was withdrawn, that Nasser was completely subservient to Russia, Mr. Dulles became so anxious to injure the English and French that he went out of his way to rehabilitate Nasser and wholly ignored the world's interest in the Canal and the Russians' attempt to turn the flank of N.A.T.O. in the Middle East.
My Lords, let me record my own conviction. If Mr. Dulles wishes firmly to re-establish the Anglo-American alliance—as I hope and believe that he does—he will now certainly bring the necessary pressure to bear on Nasser in order to compel him to undo his illegal nationalisation of the Canal. This is certainly within American power, and it ought to be the American wish, if they care for the rule of law and wish to enforce it generally, and not only against Britain and France. He will also end the long-drawn-out scandal or tomfoolery which still to-day is holding up the clearing of the Canal. I believe that one thing is absolutely clear, if the fleet that this country has assembled—the most competent in the world for clearing the Canal, which is a need of the whole world—is not used, the British public will not blame Nasser, of whom it has never had any hopes, it will blame the American Government; and in my view it will be right.
My Lords, it is not only in the Middle East that Russia is striking at the West, directly and through her agents; she is striking with her usual devilish ferocity against the heroic Hungarians. Of course, there is nothing new in the action of Russia. She acted similarly against the risings in East Berlin and elsewhere; she long ago I murdered the Baltic States. What is new is the epic heroism and incredible toughness of the Hungarian people against almost hopeless odds. Are we really right to do nothing for them, beyond showing charity to those who escape and sending futile notes from the Assembly of the United Nations?
Some very strange things have been said about Hungary, particularly by Mr. Nehru in the Indian Parliament on
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November 16. Let me quote from The Times next day.
"Defending at length India's vote against the United Nations resolution on Hungary, Mr. Nehru said that the most objectionable part of the resolution had been the demand for elections under United Nations supervision. This would he contrary to the Charter and would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign state; also he declared, amid applause, it would set a bad precedent, which might be utilised in future for intervention in other countries."
I do not for one moment doubt the sincerity of his concern for his own position in Kashmir. The cruelty and infamy of the speech which I have quoted really defy comment. Not even the Dean of Canterbury has been more nauseating.
It may be asked: What more could we do? I could mention several things, but first I will mention what we should certainly not do. We should certainly not meet or talk or negotiate with the Russians about anything whatsoever until they have withdrawn from Hungary and returned all the men, women and youths they have deported. When, with their hands dripping with Hungarian blood, they put forward disarmament proposals it is wicked folly to discuss those proposals. It seems barely credible, but I believe it is true, that our Prime Minister is still due to pay a courtesy visit to Russia in 1957. I hope that it will not be long before the British public hear that this visit has been cancelled.
Like so many of your Lordships I have tried to find out what I can from those who have returned from Hungary or from the Hungarian border. The fighters for freedom in Hungary believe that we in the free world are behaving like cowards and fools—cowards because we do not help them, and fools because we do not see that it is our battle that they are fighting. Greatly as I respect the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, I disagree profoundly with what he has recently written. Let me read a few sentences:
"The united moral conscience of mankind has been more effective to aid Hungary than any armed intervention at this moment could have been. Its voice has brought comfort, encouragement and strength to the heroic people of Hungary: it has disrupted Communism in the West; it may, perhaps, even be compelling Russia to pause."
My Lords, nearly every sentence of that is, in my view, untrue. I cannot detect any evidence whatever of a "united moral

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conscience of mankind." On the contrary, many have defended Russia's action, and millions are indifferent. No comfort has been brought to those still fighting in Hungary. On the contrary, the American President coldly says that the United States of America has never advocated open rebellion by an undefended population against force over which they could not possibly prevail. It has certainly not disrupted Communism in the West, though, as on previous occasions, some have left the Communist Party and many others have been instructed to go "underground." It certainly has not caused Russia to pause.
Your Lordships will remember the parable of the Good Samaritan. The Priest, the Levite and the Good Samaritan came on the scene after the thieves had finished their horrible work. Suppose they had all arrived on the scene while the thuggery was still proceeding. What do your Lordships think that those who passed by on the other side would have done? If the free and powerful nations of the world decide to pass by on the other side, let them at least not deceive themselves about what is happening. I will not shirk the question that will be put to me. It will be asked: do I think that the Powers, perhaps the Powers of N.A.T.O., should now go to war over Hungary? No, I do not; but I think that they ought immediately to consult together to discuss what sanctions, not excluding force they should take forthwith against Russia; and they should not be deterred from so doing by the risk that this might conceivably lead to war. If, at the very outset, we say that the only help that we will give is all help short of war, we are saying, in effect, that we shall give no help at all.
I admit that these problems are problems of appalling difficulty. I think our answer must depend on our deepest conviction, what we believe about God and man and about the Divine purpose. I can only state my belief. I believe that it is wicked for the nations to stand by while Hungary is destroyed before our eyes. I believe that we should do all in our power—I repeat, power—to stop this abomination; and I believe, further, that if we do nothing we shall not avoid a Third World War. It is not true that we shall avoid war by dishonour. We may quite easily have both. I beg noble Lords
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to consider what is meant by that word "expendable" of which our American friends are so fond. Is Hungary expendable? Is all Eastern Europe expendable? In a year or two, when America has developed her longer-range missiles, will all Europe, including ourselves, in her eyes become "expendable?" I believe that the time has come to resist the enemies of mankind, even at great risk. I believe firmly in the Divine truth that "he who would save his life shall lose it."
8.58 p.m.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in moving the Motion which is now before the House, said that there are serious difficulties still facing us, especially in the economic sphere. The Times said a few days ago:
"Mr. Macmillan gave a wise lead yesterday by treating the economic consequences of the Suez affair as a grave matter."
It is from that angle that I desire to-night to approach the subject of this debate and to show Her Majesty's Government how, in some measure, they may improve the economic situation with which they are faced, by steps leading to an increase in our trade with China.
Now a few weeks ago, I asked the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, this question: whether he was not aware that it was urgently necessary that British engineering markets should be made less incalculable for buyers of British goods, particularly in view of the enormous requirements under the Chinese five-year industrial plan. To that the noble Marquess gave me a reply, and then he added this:
"I am never quite sure that it is as extensive"—
he was referring to the China market—
"as some people seem to think."
With great respect to the noble Marquess, I suggest that that is not a view held by British industry generally, and particularly by British engineering industry.
In order to support that point which I make, I must ask the House to listen to one or two quotations. In the Statist of December 1, there is an article which gives reasons for anxieties in relation to our exports to the Middle East. It goes on to say:
"Some firms in the van of our export drive are likely to be seriously embarrassed as the

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result of the Suez crisis. A month ago the outlook for 1957 was rosy after a very good year in 1956. Now it is rather bleak. Alternative markets are not easy to find. One with a large potential is China."
I come next to an article in the Electrical Review of November 23, under the headings: "Activity in China"; "Vast possibilities in an Underdeveloped Country, China". I hope that the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will note those words "Vast possibilities in an underdeveloped country, China". The article states:
"China's second Five-Year Plan affords vast opportunities for the United Kingdom electrical manufacturer, particularly in connection with the proposed multi-purpose schemes on the Yangtze, Sungari, Sinan and Yellow Rivers."
The articles goes on to point to the large market there would be for distribution and tele-communication equipment in connection with the planned electrification of the large collective farms. Then, again, the Federation of British Industries, representing a great number of important industries in this country, said two years ago, in their report on East-West trade:
"it is clear … that there are in fact considerable opportunities, especially in China, which, if neglected by the United Kingdom, will be seized by our competitors."
Now I come to the question of the competition with which we are faced, and I turn back to the Electrical Review, which says this:
"Competition in the Chinese market"—
LORD WALERAN: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Viscount to ask him whether he could confine his remarks to questions relating to the Middle East. This is a long debate and there are many noble Lords who still wish to speak.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: In answer to that, I must give an explanation. I am dealing with the economic difficulties to which the noble Marquess himself referred. If the noble Marquess will allow me, I will explain what has happened. I asked the noble Marquess whether his Motion would be framed in such a way as to allow discussion on the Far East, and he said it was extremely doubtful.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I think I said "extremely unlikely."
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: We will not quarrel about words. I think the noble
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Marquess said: "extremely doubtful," but we can find out what was actually said from the OFFICIAL REPORT. My feeling is that he said "extremely doubtful" but it does not matter—"extremely doubtful" or "extremely unlikely" is much the same thing. So when the Government Motion was put on the Order Paper and the Amendments to the Motion were put down, I looked through them and decided that I could speak of the economic difficulties arising out of the Suez crisis on the Opposition Amendment, which referred to the consequences.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: If I might interrupt the noble Viscount. I would point out that we are not discussing the Opposition Amendment at the present time; we are discussing the Government Motion.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: When I arrived at the House to-day, I found that I had been put down to speak on this Motion and not on the Opposition Amendment. I must say, as I have been held up in this way, that I wrote to the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, and said that I was going to speak on the Opposition Amendment. Finding myself put down to speak on the Government Resolution, I then went to the Secretary of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I said that I was surprised to find myself put down to speak on this Motion; would it be all right if I spoke on the Motion in relation to this subject of trade with China? I took it—I do not want to misrepresent anything that was said by one who is so highly esteemed in this House—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order! Order!
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I would only say to the noble Viscount that I am responsible for anything that happens in my private office, and I am quite ready to accept all responsibility for what was said. Actually, I do not think that the noble Viscount's speech would be in order on the Opposition Amendment, or on the Amendment of the Liberal Party. No-one, least of all myself, would wish to stop the noble Viscount from making a speech. I would only appeal to his good nature. There are still about ten speakers all of whom wish to speak on the Middle East. Would the noble Viscount not postpone the

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remainder of his remarks to a general Foreign Office debate, when everything he says would be entirely appropriate? I am not seeking to prevent the noble Viscount in any way from speaking, but I think it would be for the convenience of the House if he would do as I suggest. It is what noble Lords in all parts of the House would wish.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Naturally I should not wish to do or say anything contrary to the wishes of the House, but I hope the noble Marquess will take it from me that I felt that, as the result of what happened, I was in order.
Now may I just say this? As the result of the economic difficulties to which the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has himself referred, and looking to the very anxious time that lies ahead for the British exporters of capital goods—especially in the engineering classes—following on the Suez crisis, I urge upon the Government, first, to make much more extended use of the exceptions procedure of which the Prime Minister said, on February 13, 1956, in the House of Commons, the dominating principle was to be:
"the extent to which it served the interests of the free world".
secondly, to abolish in toto the "end-use" practice, which makes business between the British exporter and the prospective Chinese buyer of an irritatingly unpredictable character and loses business to British exporters; and thirdly, to work unceasingly towards the complete abandonment of the anachronism of the China embargo.
9.10 p.m.
LORD AILWYN: My Lords, I rise to make only two observations. In the endless discussions during the last few weeks in Press and Parliament there has been one curious omission: namely, any comment on the fact, well known but perhaps not realised in its fullest implications, that the whole economy of this country is utterly dependent on a commodity which does not exist within our own shores and the transport and delivery of which from abroad is not in our power to safeguard or guarantee—an uninterrupted supply of foreign oil. Is it not rather singular that the existence of this Achilles heel, so violently and starkly revealed by the events of these last weeks,
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has received no mention, and that nobody, so far as I know, has attempted to point a moral, which would appear to me to be that investigations should be initiated without delay into the possible ways and means of reducing this complete dependence of ours on the good will of the foreigner to supply us with the lifeblood of our industrial, defensive and domestic life.
Obviously, this is not the occasion to develop the subject and I mention it only as being an important by-product of the tribulations lately suffered by us in the Middle East. The one bright spot in an otherwise rather gloomy and lowering situation has been the courage and persistence of Her Majesty's Government in carrying out what they believed to be the correct and wisest policy for this country to pursue. If the frustrations and disappointments which have beset us in the execution of this operation lead us to examine afresh the incidence of our precarious oil situation; if it could only result in something in the nature of a "Back to the Mines" campaign, and lead us to new and fresh thinking as to the possibilities of extracting and using more British coal, stocks of which lie in inexhaustible quantities beneath our feet—that treasure upon which the prosperity of the British Empire, if such a word may be used these days, has been built—then some material benefit will nave accrued from our misfortunes. We had a number of debates in your Lordships' House on this subject before the war. At that time many people were fully seized and not a little disturbed at the potential dangers of our fuel situation. Tentative measures were taken in certain directions towards amelioration. The war came; we survived; nothing really adequate has since been done. We have been warned.
My only other observation is this. I think it would be a mistake to overstress our differences of opinion with the United States of America on this Middle East mess. I believe there is a considerable amount of sympathy and understanding with us in America; and in this connection I think the following short extract from a New York Times editorial given cause for encouragement. It says:
"It would be ridiculous to permit Colonel Nasser to pose before the United Nations or the world as the innocent victim of aggression, or to hold a protecting hand over him. On the contrary, in so far as there is any one man guilty of aggression, it is the Egyptian

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President. For he has waged war against Israel, Britain and France by propaganda, by gun running, by infiltration of murderous bands, by stirring up rebellion in French-North Africa, by seizing the Suez Canal by force and scrapping a Treaty in the same manner in which Hitler marched into the Rhineland, by blocking the Canal for Israel's shipping in defiance of the United Nations orders—finally, by his whole loudly-proclaimed programme of throwing Israel into the sea … and creating an Arab Empire under his hegemony, which would expand his influence in concentric circles to all Africa and the whole Moslem world. …"
Not a bad answer to some of the criticisms and strictures of Her Majesty's Government which we have heard in certain quarters. Perhaps there is some truth in the remark of the Washington correspondent in the Daily Telegraph that:
"There is enough blame in this Suez pot of stew for everybody to have a good helping."
Be that as it may, I shall find no difficulty in recording my own vote to-morrow in support of Her Majesty's Government.
9.17 p.m.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: My Lords, it is no pleasant task to break old political friendships, or to depart from time-honoured family associations. If it may salve in any way any bitterness that may be felt among my former friends at my action, I will say this: I took the counsel of three former Chiefs of Staff who wrote a letter to The Times newspaper urging that no steps should be taken in any way to break the national unity while the military operations were in progress. I have timed my actions accordingly.
I have thought out my own position. I have endeavoured to weigh as carefully as I might the arguments put up by Government speakers. There is only one speech that has considerably helped me to clarify my own mind, and I am glad to have the opportunity of paying tribute to it. I allude to the very moderate, very sensible, very clear speech on the first day of November by the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. I oppose Her Majesty's Government's actions on conscientious grounds, not on legal or on political grounds. Therefore, I shall say little or nothing in my speech about the United Nations. I am interested in principles. I have been taught that it is wrong to
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support a Government in an unjust war. I have come to the conclusion that our armed conflict with Egypt was an unjust war.
There are, I believe, four tests which can be applied to a nation's action to determine whether it is or is not just. I will venture to give them to the House, and I feel that they will commend themselves to most sensible men who have thought about international relations. In order that you may claim to be fighting a just war you must show that your action satisfies these four tests: first, that it has a just cause; secondly, that it has an adequate cause—in other words, that the cause should be proportioned to the war which you are likely to have to fight. The third requirement is that it is morally certain that you cannot obtain your just objective by any other means except war. The fourth test is that there should exist a real possibility of obtaining your object by war.
In my judgment—and this is a matter which every man must judge for himself—the war (may I call it by that convenient shorthand, though I know it is only an armed conflict?) against Egypt fails to satisfy the requirements of the last two tests. Let us examine the motives from which Her Majesty's Government entered this conflict. We are now told that there was only one object. A Minister (I regret he is not present to-night) has been loud in proclaiming that we sent our expedition to Suez simply and solely to stop the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. Other arguments, however, were used on November 1. We were told by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack—I do not in any way want to criticise him for saying what he undoubtedly believed at the time to be a good and valid defence of the Government's action—that we acted for three good grounds: danger to our nationals; danger to shipping in the Canal; and the danger to the enormously valuable installations of the Canal itself. It is natural enough that we no longer hear those arguments used in defence of Her Majesty's Government's action, but they were a substantial part of the reasons that led the Government into the action against Egypt.
When I knew that the noble and learned Viscount had used those words, I trembled, because at that moment our fellow subjects in Egypt were at the

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mercy of a man who had no very high reputation for moderation or for the scrupulous observance of international conventions. I wondered—and I think we must all have wondered—what was happening to our nationals. And now we know. But did we not consider, when we entered Suez, what actions would result, as regards our fellow subjects, from our intervention? I trembled, too, for the safety of the Canal. We were told that Colonel Nasser was planning to block the Canal: we knew it before we took any action against Egypt at all. We were told that there was a blockship loaded with cement ready to be sunk in the Canal. Whatever may have happened to the attempt to sink that particular blockship, surely we could credit Colonel Nasser with enough ingenuity to find other shipping, and other ways of blocking the Canal, and blocking it far more effectively and with far greater lasting effect than could possibly have been accomplished in the course of the fighting between Israel and Egypt.
I. suppose that in the course of that war a few shells, and possibly a bomb or two might have fallen on the Canal. But what damage would that have done, in comparison with the damage that has been done? Had we not enough foresight to realise that of course Colonel Nasser would take every step in his power to retaliate for our action by doing that very thing which would most annoy and trouble us? What amazes me about this affair is that no attention seems to have been given at the inception of the adventure to the courses likely to be taken by Colonel Nasser. When I was a subaltern I was taught, as all subalterns are taught, to make a military appreciation; and the one feature to which we had to devote careful attention was courses open to the enemy. If anybody in Whitehall or Downing Street was invited to make an appreciation of the courses that could be, and probably would be, taken by Colonel Nasser, his paper must have been pigeonholed in great obscurity. So far, then, as that line of defence is concerned, I would say that it fails to satisfy my fourth test of a just war. There was no possibility of obtaining our just ends as regards our subjects, or their property, or the Canal itself, by the war which we waged.
Now I come to the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government are now de-
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fending their action, and they, of course, are quite different. We are told that it was a police action, without any ulterior motive. I am not denying that there is much truth in this claim, but I am denying that it is the whole truth, and I would justify my position by making, or attempting to make, four points. In the first place, I call your Lordships' attention to the preparations involved. We have heard from the noble Marquess the Leader of the House (and I entirely agree with him) that it was perfectly natural for us to station our paratroops and bombers in Cyprus. And it was perfectly natural, in view of the danger of an explosion in the Middle East, for us to pit our landing craft and commandos on the Island of Malta. But where I think the case breaks down is in respect of the French action. Far too little attention has been paid in this country to the position of our French Allies in all this.
Let us consider what their position is—a singularly unpleasant one. France is facing one of the gravest menaces of her history, and that history has not been immune from dangers. But to-day Algeria is on the verge of armed insurrection; Egypt has been arming the rebels in Algeria, and French European citizens in Algiers are in grave danger. France has a. much stronger quarrel with Egypt than we have. Am I asked to believe that we invited the French to send their paratroops to Cyprus in a purely precautionary role? Were the French likely to lock up the flower of their army—some 6,000 men I have been told—in Cyprus, and to keep it waiting indefinitely in case some trouble arose in the Middle East which would justify armed intervention? That, my Lords, is at present beyond my powers of belief. I believe that we invited the French to send their troops there in order to take part in an expedition against Egypt, and that the Israeli-Egyptian war was merely a proximate cause, little more than the occasion for that intervention. If that is not so, let Her Majesty's Government publish the Notes that were exchanged between them and the French Government. Indeed, I should very much like to see a White Paper published on this incident.
My second point relates to a question that seems obvious to me, though it has not received much attention this after-

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noon. Why did we not invoke the Tripartite Pact of guarantee? The noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor dealt with that point in his speech on an earlier occasion, but I am afraid that I could not understand it. I could not understand why Egypt's repudiation of the benefits of that Pact should in any way invalidate it. That was what I understood the noble and learned Viscount to say. I think the better line of defence, and the one now adopted by Her Majesty's Government, would have been to explain that there was no time; that time would have been lost in summoning, and in the deliberations of, a conference between America, France and ourselves. I question that very much.
In the first place, considerable delay occurred, in any case, while our transports and landing craft ploughed their slow way from the distant island of Malta. Was there such a desperate hurry to intervene? The military situation in Sinai hardly seemed to justify such an assertion. The Israelis had made a raid in force—a little classic of military strategy it was, too—across the border. Surely, we may discount any thought that they intended to lengthen their lines of communication across a desert road and to penetrate much further than they did. Surely the Israeli strategists were satisfied with the damage they had done to Egypt, and there was every military reason to expect that there would then be a lull in the fighting while Egypt, perhaps, mounted her counter-attack.
During that time, an international conference of Britain, America and France—and how quickly these conferences can be summoned; how quickly they can reach decisions!—could have decided on a tripartite intervention. It might have been thought improbable that they would decide that our method of intervention was the best. On hearing the British and French strategic plan, America might have endorsed it, in which case we could have undertaken our intervention as agents for the Tripartite Powers, and with the full financial and moral backing of the United States. But I do not think that would have been the kind of intervention that would have appealed to America. And it may be because we calculated that America would not endorse our plan, that
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we did not summon the meeting of the Tripartite Powers.
My third point is quite simply this. Was it the duty of France and Britain to "go it alone", even with the beneficent object of stopping the war? We have described ourselves again and again as "policemen." Who made us the "policemen" of the Middle East? Might not both Israel and Egypt have replied, "Who made thee a prince and a judge over us?" That is a quotation from the second chapter of the Book of Exodus. I see that the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, recognised it.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: I did.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: That chapter contains the story of an earlier intervention in an Israeli-Egyptian quarrel—an intervention that did not turn out very happily, and did not win much gratitude from the Israelis. We should sympathise with Moses. He had to flee to the land of Midian; he had to make an evacuation.
My fourth point, which I think is most decisive, concerns the armistice terms, the cease-fire terms, which we imposed on Israel and Egypt. I asked myself whether, if we really wanted to stop the conflict, we should have imposed those terms, terms very favourable to Israel, the attacker—I will not say the "aggressor" for we could dispute for a long time what "aggressor" means. The attacker was to be allowed, having achieved what was probably her military objective, to rest on her arms, immune from fear of counter-attack, while her rear echelons completed the destruction across Sinai and destroyed the Egyptian ports. They were to be allowed to rest deep in Egyptian territory, and Egypt was to suffer the supreme humiliation of withdrawing ten miles the other side of the Canal.
Did we, in fact, expect any country in the world to accept terms like this? No, my Lords. I think that if we had been sincere, and with a single mind devoted to our policeman-like work of stopping the conflict, we should have imposed terms more like those which were suggested by the Security Council of the United Nations. In other words, we should have insisted on the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind their own armistice

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line. I cannot accept as just the action taken. Yet we are now invited by Her Majesty's Government to congratulate Her Majesty's Government on the presence of the United Nations Force in Egypt. One of the most curious features of this debate has been the number of noble Lords who attach great value to the United Nations Police Force and very little value to the United Nations. That seems to me a position that is very difficult to defend in logic. How can a United Nations Police Force be more useful than the body which controls it?
I hope indeed that all will turn out for the best, and that the United Nations Police Force will prove very valuable, but if we are going to look at results let us look at all the results—or since it is perhaps a little late at night for that, let us look at some of the results. I have been invited during the debate to look from the standpoint of fifty years hence, but I can comment only on what I read in my paper. What do I read? I read that there is some discussion going on between two parties in Libya, a kingdom which we created. One party thinks that they must repudiate their treaty with Great Britain; the other party is more moderate and insists merely that the treaty should be most drastically revised. I read that Iraq—our one friend among the Arab States, a country that has no love for Egypt, a country bound by ties of friendship and stronger ties of common interest—condemned our action in Egypt at the very height of hostilities. I read the other day—and although I cannot vouch for the truth of it, it seems likely—that in the little Arab towns on the Persian Gulf Arab shops are putting up notices: "British and French not served here."
I say that the most obvious result of our action is a terrible collapse of what remained of British prestige in the Middle East, and a considerable fall in our popularity throughout Islam. I ask myself, who will be the gainers from our loss of prestige. It seems to me that the answer is Russia. We know very well that it was a mere coincidence that we ceased our advance on Ismailia within a few short hours of the publication of the Russian Note. Of course we know they had no connection. What will be the opinion on that in the bazaars of Arabia and the Levant? Do we not know that there are plenty of agents in those place
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who will make it their duty to explain to the Arabs that Britain stopped her advance only because of Russia?
I think when Russia writes her balance sheet and profit and loss of these events, and when she writes off on the debit side the loss of some tanks and of quite a number of MiG.s shot on the ground, she will say, "There are plenty more where those came from, but there is not much more credit left to the British Government in the countries in which we are interested."
9.47 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, judgment on the Suez events is, as so many noble Lords have said, of particular worth in so far as it can teach us any lessons for the future. The debate we are having these two days end the many views that have been sincerely expressed show how extraordinarily difficult it is to judge whether the Government action was right or wrong. I say this, after listening with the greatest respect and admiration to the speech of the noble Earl. Lord Iddesleigh, who has just sat down. I realise, as I am sine your Lordships all realise, with what heartsearchings he has reached the decisions he has expressed.
For my own part, I still cannot make up my mind whether the Government were right or wrong; and if I vote against the Government Motion tomorrow it will be on one particular point which has been raised by various noble Lords and which I believe is of paramount importance, namely, that we did not do our duty towards America when we did not tell her of the ultimatum before it was delivered. This. I believe, was both wrong and unwise. It is the best way in which I can show what I sincerely believe: that relations with America are of overriding and paramount importance to this country. I say this, not only out of self-interest but also because of a deep friendship with and a deep trust in the American people.
Let me elaborate on why I fear that our action was wrong. I would refer to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which has been mentioned by several of your Lordships. In that Declaration, France, America and ourselves announced that we would together keep the peace in the Middle East within or without U.N.O.

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This was no idle Declaration, forgotten in subsequent events and developments. Rather did the Government again and again reiterate that it stood behind this Declaration and that its policy was based thereon. This being so, surely we were under an obligation at the very least to tell our American partners what we intended to do before we and France acted. I can think of many good reasons why we did not tell them; other noble Lords have also mentioned some of them—for example, that we realised that it would serve no purpose in the light of the American policy of the previous month; or again that it would have embarrassed and, indeed, have proved a disservice to the American Administration at the time of the Election. Or again, it has been argued that in some way, about which I am not very clear, the Declaration did not apply between Israel and Egypt.
My Lords, none of those reasons satisfies me, and I repeat that I believe we were bound at least to tell America, as the third partner in the Declaration, what we were going to do, even if we made it quite clear at the same time that we were going to act regardless of what they said. But I believe with Lord Brand, that if they had been put up against it in that way they would have been bound to come in with us, in some form or another, that would have been more satisfactory to us all. I fear that the action taken is indefensible, and that it may be a long time before we can re-establish the real trust and confidence of the American Administration. The implications of this, I suggest, call for much Government heart-searching.
Not only do I believe that it was wrong, but I believe it was unwise, for on our relations and friendship with America our existence and way of living depend. As an example, when Marshal Bulganin threatened us with rockets, how we all breathed a sigh of relief at the riposte of General Gruenther. Whether it was off his own bat or prompted by the American Administration I do not know, but what is quite certain is that if America had not been behind us, the statement would have had no value and we should have been in a very awkward position. The lesson must always be kept in mind that the Western world depends on America. This does not mean we must always sing
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in tune and must have no difference of opinion. But things must be discussed frankly and openly, and in an atmosphere of trust.
Now I wish to turn to my main theme—namely, that now is the time for a re-appraisal of our foreign policy and our country's position as a world Power. Foreign policy, my Lords, is like charity; it begins at home, hut must not end there. In any re-appraisal, therefore, things at home are of first importance The three ingredients, I believe, that make up foreign policy are the strength of our Armed Forces, the strength of our economic position, and the strength of our moral position. Let me take them in turn. So far as our armed strength is concerned, it is possible, for a time, to have guns and to forgo butter—but only for a time. Something will explode internally or externally. Dictatorships are apt to choose this course, but it is not necessary for us.
We should, I suggest, carefully reappraise our expenditure on our Armed Forces. We must make a proper contribution to N.A.T.O. and have over something to come to the rescue, if need arise, of our Commonwealth friends, and to act as police or to keep law and order in the Colonies of the Empire. I believe that we have been trying to do too much in the past year and that we must examine our foreign commitments, with special reference to the drain on our foreign exchange resources. Should we, for example, continue to have such a very large force in Germany?
That brings me to the second of the ingredients—namely, our economic strength. If. as I assume, there are savings from the review of the position of the Armed Forces, such savings should be used to increase our capital investment at home and our services, such as shipping. Consumption at home must, meantime, be kept in check. Our position in the world and our strength abroad, particularly within the Commonwealth, depends in large measure on the knowledge that we are prosperous at home and can and will contribute abroad. This is a hard world, and even our best friends slowly will drop us, however great the sentimental ties, if association with other areas and countries is more to their advantage. Let the Government at this time work out and make known to the

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people an economic programme, a five-year plan similar to that on which they have already worked in relation to agriculture. I will not develop this theme further to-night; it is late. But I would ask the Government to give us an early opportunity to consider the economic consequences of the events in Suez of the past month and to indicate their programme in relation to it.
The last of my ingredients is moral strength. This is difficult to define. In the eyes of the world we have recently acted wrongly—witness the United Nations vote condemning us as aggressors. I find it a hard word for our action. We should not take it too tragically, knowing that fundamentally we stand for what is right and just. Let us, however, not lose sight of the fact that world opinion is a force and a growing force. In that connection, I support all the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, said about the importance of propaganda at the present time. We must be among the leaders of the world to whom all instinctively turn for moral guidance on what is the proper thing to do. To-day, and in the foreseeable future, our enemy is Russia and Communism. This is the central fact which we must never forget, and which must dictate all our policies. The events of Suez demand of us a re-appraisal of our present position as a Power and point the need, above all else, to develop our economic strength at home. They demand the determination to rebuild the confidence of the Western Nations in us. If we, the Commonwealth and the United States fail to act together, through U.N.O. and otherwise, Russia and Communism alone will gain.
10.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I should like in the first place to associate myself fully as the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has done, with the suggestions made by the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr. I have recently been a great deal in the Middle East and I know of the difficulties under which our Information Services have been struggling. I sincerely hope that your Lordships' House will be permitted to have a special debate on that subject.
Steps really must be taken to "put Britain over" in the world, but in a debate such as this I feel that we should
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somehow contrive to step aside from the day-to-day events of the last months and try to see, as I think the noble Earl, Lord Perth, is also trying to see, how the British foreign policy should evolve in the coming years, and not be unduly influenced by the most recent earthshaking events. Without, therefore, forgetting the specific importance of the Suez crisis and of the savage Soviet coup against the Hungarian people, for whom, I might add, some young British would gladly fight, let us remember that perhaps an even more significant event was Bulganin's statement at the height of the Suez crisis that, if she wanted to, Russia could take Western Europe with ease, and he hinted that she could attack Britain with rocket missiles.
In this light, and in the light of the Soviet threat to the Middle East, let us try to perceive what are the most important basic factors upon which our foreign policy must now be based. A distinguished American senator, with whom certain distinguished noble Lords had a conversation recently, said that he did not think it profitable on either side if we examined our respective actions and policies of the last few months too closely under the microscope. If, in Anglo-American affairs, we started to do that, there would be no end to it. It was no use the Americans saying: "You did not consult us; you did not even inform us", any more than it was fruitful for us to say, "You started it all by refusing aid over the Aswan Dam", or, "You told us to leave the Canal in 1954." If we do that, we can go further back and further back in our recriminations, until we finally come to argue the merits and demerits of Lord North's policies, or lack of them, in the American War of Independence. I am not going into them tonight any more than I am going into the merits or demerits of the present Government's policy in the Middle East. I gave my reasons for supporting the Anglo-French action in our debate on November 1. As the American senator said:
"Let us now go forward together on the basis of what does still exist which holds the free world together."
What are these factor which are beginning to integrate the free peoples of the earth? They are not negligible. First of all, there is the Commonwealth.

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None of us doubts that the British Commonwealth, or a large part of it, can still be a great force if it acts, or if the greater part of it acts, in unison. In the gravest of grave crises, perhaps it might still do so; but it did not do so over Suez. If, then, we cannot be certain that the Commonwealth will always follow us, where else should we look for unity? I have no hesitation in saying that the next most important factor in our foreign policy after the maintenance of solidarity so far as possible in the Commonwealth is the development of Western unity. It seems to me that the instrument, above all, through which such unity can best be developed is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. There are other Western organisations, it is true, such as the Council of Europe and the W.E.U.—your Lordships probably know that that stands for the Western European Union and that it was formed after the demise or the stillbirth of the E.D.C. There is also the O.E.E.C., but I feel that N.A.T.O. must provide the general framework within which all these organisations should work.
As a result of the efforts of the O.E.E.C. and other agencies, there are those who believe that we in Western Europe are already beginning to achieve economic unity through the proposed common markets. This is an immense step forward and must surely be welcomed, hut, as the noble Lord, Lord Layton, implied, it is not only economic unity which we need—it looks as though we may be getting that—but political unity, too. Some might like that political unity to emerge through the W.E.U., thus creating a kind of Western European third force in the world. Personally, I feel that we have already gone beyond this. Strictly. European economic unity, I agree, is desirable, but political and military unity seems now to have become virtually indivisible in the free world. That is why I believe that N.A.T.O. is the principal instrument we should use for this purpose, and that its machinery should be strengthened on the political side.
It is excellent that the North Atlantic Council, the permanent Council, meets regularly every week on the official level and occasionally at higher levels. It met regularly even during the Suez crisis. I
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am very glad it did. It shows that the Atlantic Alliance had not completely disintegrated. But I feel that high-level meetings should be more frequent—meetings not only of Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Service chiefs, but also of Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers. I make this suggestion in all humility. Ministers of Commerce, of course, can no doubt best meet and discuss their affairs within the framework of O.E.E.C., and sometimes Finance Ministers too. I also feel that there should be further Parliamentary machinery to watch, support and discuss the work of the N.A.T.O. Council and the Secretariat.
If it is not possible—I do not believe it is—to constitute an Atlantic Consultative Assembly, perhaps merged with the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, then I believe that the Conference of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians which has now been formed should meet more frequently. So far they have met only twice—once a year in the last two years. I believe that more frequent meetings would be an immense power for good. For example, at the last meeting of these Parliamentarians in Paris which took place during the Suez crisis, it was possible for the British and French Members of Parliament fully to explain directly to American Congressmen Anglo-French points of view in 'regard to our actions in Egypt. The 'Americans were able to explain to us 'their point of view, and there is no doubt whatever that this N.A.T.O. Parliamentary meeting contributed greatly to bringing together divergent attitudes and greatly helped to hold the Atlantic Alliance together.
As a result of this meeting, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate, Senator Green, of whom I spoke before, came over to Paris and later to England. He had these useful talks with several noble Lords. As a result, Senator Green went back to America far more fully aware of British points of view in the matter of Suez than he otherwise would have been. I have a letter which I have just received from his aide saying that he has been quoting noble Lords constantly every day ever since. Had it not been for the N.A.T.O. Parliamentary conference he would never have come to this country. It was purely by chance—he had two days to spare, so he came and had lunch in the Dining Room

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here. I personally feel that this Parliamentary conference ought to meet quite as often as, if not more often than, the Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg which, through being removed from the centre of things and not including American or Canadian representatives, has become little more than a kind of European academe in which sometimes rather unreal discussions are held with only very few, if any, responsible Ministers on the Front Bench.
As the noble Marquess the Leader of the House has said, in order to conduct a successful foreign policy forces must be available to implement it. N.A.T.O. has "teeth"; Strasbourg has not. W.E.U. may perhaps he said to have "teeth"; the United Nations may be 'beginning to cut theirs—but more of that later. N.A.T.O. has the best. "teeth", and I believe that only by expanding the scope of this N.A.T.O. Parliamentary body can we make the Atlantic Alliance politically viable. Only thus, and working as far as possible with the Commonwealth and with members of the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O., can the peace of the world really be assured. I must admit that I like the idea of the Pakistan Foreign Minister, supported I think by his colleagues in the Baghdad Pact, that the three treaty organisations I have mentioned should be on the same level, so that an attack on one shall be considered to be an attack on all.
Some Englishmen, I know, mistrust all international organisations. They say that the United Nations cannot work because the Security Council is hamstrung by the Veto, and they feel vaguely that somewhat similar disadvantages are inherent in all international bodies, b including N.A.T.O. I do not believe this. N.A.T.O. has been working and the Veto is not used in that body. Moreover, all the countries which are members spring from the same civilization; they believe in the same democratic and humanitarian principles. That is not the case in the United Nations. I feel therefore that the sphere of N.A.T.O. should, either in itself or through he Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O., be extended to include all those parts of the world in which their member States have vital interests. If the N.A.T.O. area had been wider and the United States had been full members of the Baghdad Pact, I believe it might
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have been possible to agree a Middle Eastern policy with them.
I hope that Her Majesty's Government will do everything within their power to persuade the United States to become full members of that Pact. If the United States really believe in containing the Soviet Union, surely they should be willing to give full, and not merely partial, protection to their Middle East flank. What is the use of having a front in Europe if your flank is left open? American adherence to the Baghdad Pact would greatly stabilise the situation in the Middle East where, since our first withdrawal from Suez, there has been a dangerous power vacuum. However we look at it, there should, to my mind, and as the noble Lord, Lord Layton, suggested, be one main council of the principal free nations of the world, conducting a global and not a purely regional strategy.
I consider that the North Atlantic Council should be strengthened to fulfil this function. I am convinced that that is the direction in which we must work. The effect of the Anglo-French action in Egypt may not therefore merely be that it brought into being a United Nations police force, but that it will make the N.A.T.O. Powers recognise how very necessary it is to strengthen their own position in the world if some of their weaker brethren are not to fall under the kind of savage tyranny that we have seen in Hungary. That is one of the reasons why I support the Resolution moved by the noble Marquess. There must be occasions on which we must be allowed to act alone. America did in Guatemala. I believe that the Anglo-French action in Suez has brought the rest of the world to recognise the new realities. It must be largely through the three great treaty organisations that the Soviet Union is contained and the main peace preserved.
It may be—I think Lord Birdwood would agree with me in this—that at the same time a United Nations Police Force may find useful fields of action not only in the Middle East but also perhaps in such situations as Kashmir, where it may not be possible for the Commonwealth or one of the three treaty organisations to operate. But who in the long run is to give orders to the commander of the

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United Nations police force? Would it be the Security Council, hamstrung by the Veto, or the Assembly, in which a block of Powers can also render action abortive? Or is one of these bodies to delegate powers of command to a godlike Secretary-General or a restricted military committee? I do not see this happening yet. As other noble Lords have stated, Hungary has proved that the United Nations is incapable of operating in countries over which the Soviet Union wishes to retain undisputed sway. It can never act in those cases. Even United Nations observers have not been accepted there, let alone United Nations police. That is why I think we must put our faith and place our main hopes in the treaty organisations I have mentioned, and put all our weight behind them.
I hope that at the present N.A.T.O. meetings in Paris—very important meetings, I am told—something in this direction may be achieved. Strengthen N.A.T.O. geographically and politically, expand the Baghdad Pact to include the United States, and fortify S.E.A.T.O. in every way possible. I am certain that these three organisations, with the Commonwealth, can keep the peace. Everything possible must be done to increase the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Council as an instrument of common policy. That is the face of the new earth; let us not forget it. We must indeed
"find out new heaven, new earth."
My Lords, I suggest we find the new earth first, for the old earth has passed away. Therefore, while I would say as loudly as anyone in your Lordships' House, "Long live the Queen!". I would also say "Vivat pax Atlantica."
10.19 p.m.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords. I am not sure that it is either wise or seemly that at this late hour such a very Back Bencher should take part at all in this debate, which has been so enriched by so many experienced speakers, but I hope that noble Lords will bear with me while I deal briefly with one point which I feel is of some importance. One result of recent events in the Middle East has been to create a division of opinion in this country on what should be the basis of our foreign policy in the future. This cleavage of opinion has come about
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because it is alleged by some that the outcome of our intervention in Suez has shown that any independent action by this country cannot be effective. Therefore, the argument continues, we must now accept the fact that we are no longer a great Power, and we must always look to America and willingly follow her lead.
I do not for one moment subscribe to such a defeatist attitude; nor do I believe that many other noble Lords do. But, unfortunately, it is a line that is being followed by a number of leading newspapers in this country. It seems to me that it is also the logical outcome of the policy of the Opposition, though I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, deny that that was their intention. Further, as the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman said, this particular chapter of history is not yet finished, and such a policy, if it were accepted, could have a disastrous bearing on future events in the Middle East. For these reasons it cannot be dismissed as idle chatter.
It is true that we are now weaker than the United States, both physically and financially, but to argue from that that we must never again take an independent line is both unwise and dangerous. This country has far greater experience in foreign affairs than any other country in the world. Our experience and our success in world trading, in administering overseas territories, in teaching backward peoples how to stand on their own feat in the modern world, and in dealing with outbreaks of violence and fighting with a minimum of bloodshed, is unrivalled; and it would be utterly wrong for us to withdraw in favour of others with much smaller and shorter experience. In passing, may I say how deeply I agree with the noble Earl, Lord De la Warr, who pointed out that we must ensure that our case and our policy are put before the world far more clearly.
We must frankly recognise that many of the present difficulties and problems in Eastern Europe stem from errors of judgment by the American Administration at the end, and after the end, of the last war. The seeds of the present trouble in the Middle East were sown at Abadan and in our withdrawal from the Suez Canal base. Now we are reaping the harvest. Nor is there any doubt that American support for what is called anti-colonialism has stimulated an

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unhealthy nationalism, the effects of which have created a dangerous vacuum in the Middle East. To mention such facts as these is not to be anti-American; nor do I seek to show that America is always wrong. Far from it. America acted quickly and courageously in Korea. Her support for N.A.T.O., in men, equipment and money has been far-sighted, generous and effective. We in this country have much for which to be thankful, and I, for one, have the greatest admiration for the American people, for their love of freedom and their generosity. Nevertheless, such considerations as those I have mentioned indicate clearly that she is not infallible and that we still have a vital part to play in guiding and leading world opinion—if necessary, and in the last resort, by independent action.
If we abdicate our responsibilities and become virtually a "Yes man" to the United States of America, does anyone imagine that we shall gain respect or influence? No-one has much use for a man who is never prepared to back his judgment by striking out on an independent line of his own, and no-one will have much respect for this country if we become like the 49th State, expressing opinions on world affairs but never able to act independently. It cannot be denied that there are many attractions and strong logical arguments behind the case for giving up our position as equal partner in the Western Alliance, and retiring to the position of senior clerk, with no say in the determination of policy. But history would be very different if nations and individuals had always based their actions solely on logic. David would never have fought with Goliath; the British Commonwealth would never have stood alone against Germany in 1940, and certainly the miracle of Dunkirk would never have happened; and the Hungarian people would not today be defying the armed strength and barbarity of Russia. All these episodes are characterised by courage, determination and imagination, and it is these attributes that should guide our foreign policy in the future, as they have always done in the great periods of our history.
Let us not rely too much on cold logic as our guiding principle. Millions of people in this country look anxiously for a bold and imaginative policy which will fire enthusiasm and, if need be,
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encourage the acceptance of some temporary sacrifices in our way of living. If the lead is given, I do not doubt that the majority of people will support and rally behind Her Majesty's Government. If, however, we allow our defences to run down, our economy to depend more and more or, charity, and our foreign policy to drift smoothly along in the wake of America's, then indeed we shall lose all initiative and enthusiasm, all hope of ever overcoming our present difficulties, and, finally, we shall lose both our self-respect and our standard of living.
We are now at an important crossroads. Shall we turn one way and lean more and more heavily on charity, and so lose our right and ability to shape our own destiny? Or shall we take another road, and in company and in co-operation with those friends in the Commonwealth who, lei it be remembered, never deserted us in all this recent turmoil, go forward, poorer financially for a time, but infinitely richer in self-respect and influence in the world? Surely there can be no doubt which road we should take, and I hope that Her Majesty's Government will make it clear once more that they have chosen to continue straight ahead along it.
10.27 p.m.
LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, first of all 1 must say how very much I agree with the noble Viscount who has just sat down and also with my noble friend Lord De La Warr. Having said that, may I add at once that I support the policy of Her Majesty's Government, a policy which in a very short time put an end to a war which otherwise might have spread throughout the Middle East. Incidentally, the action of he British and French Governments not only stopped that war but saved the Egyptian Army from probable destruction by the Israelis.
Success means a very great deal in the East: it means much more than right or wrong, much more than justice or injustice. And as soon as it was evident that: the Egyptian Army was defeated and unsuccessful, the other Arab States which had been prepared to join Egypt abandoned their intention of coming in, whilst the Russian armaments supplied to Egypt had been largely either captured by the Israelis or destroyed by British bombing. To my mind, the unfortunate

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thing was that we had the cease-fire at the time it was proclaimed. Without the gracious permission of the United Nations we had landed a force at Port Said, given the Egyptians a nasty knock and established ourselves ashore. Why, in those circumstances, did we not go ahead and at least establish our troops in a stronger position, or, best of all, occupy the whole of the Canal Zone? Surely we ought to have done so, and surely we should have gone on the principle of "in for a penny in for a pound." In that case we could have at once got on with the clearing of the Canal.
It is not as though such action would have involved heavy losses, for the Egyptian. though a good rioter and an expert thief, is not, and never has been, a good fighting man If he were a fighting man. I wonder how this polyglot United Nations Force, unused to working together, with different patterns of arms and different types of ammunition, would have got on against him? In fact, if it had not been for the interference—and it was interference—of the United Nations, our forces and those of the French might well have established themselves and established a lasting peace in the Middle East.
As I have ventured to observe before in your Lordships' House, we ought never, in the first place, to have recognised Neguib and Nasser without a very clear understanding of all sides, a clear understanding as to, for instance, the debts which we had, in fact, incurred to Egypt. I hope we shall not pay them now. The Egyptian Government at that time were not a legitimate Government, but an illegitimate and revolutionary Government, and we should have dealt with them accordingly. It was further, in my view. a very great mistake to allow Nasser to "nationalise" the Canal, as he called it. Who is now going to see that the Canal, the property of the Canal Company, constructed by European enterprise and European skill, is cleared of obstructions at the earliest possible moment? Is it not probable that Nasser will be entirely unhelpful, as he has been in the past, and that the United Nations Force will be ineffective for the purpose of clearing the Canal? Then there is the question of using British ships and British gear.
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Surely, it would be entirely wrong if, out of some sort of consideration for Nasser, who is entirely responsible for having blocked the Canal, we did not use the British ships, British personnel and British gear which are on the spot.
It seems to me that we derive no advantages but many disadvantages from membership of the United Nations. The United Nations includes a number of what I might describe as semi-civilised States—for instance, the Afro-Asians—States without a sense of responsibility, without resources or means, excepting their tongues, which they use freely enough. We do not want advice, still less control, from such States. The United Nations, like its predecessor, the League of Nations, was the conception of a former President of the United States who knew very little of the world outside the United States. And, like the League of Nations, the United Nations is now quite discredited. No nation, if it is inconvenient, takes any notice of the United Nations. which has no force with which to enforce its wishes or directions. It was, in fact, only the action of the British and French Governments that caused the United Nations to create a so-called "Police Force" for the Canal Zone; and the efficiency of that force, even against Egyptians, remains to be proved. I wonder how long the law in this country would be enforced if there were no courts, no police, no penalties and no prisons to back it.
Moreover, no nation refers to, or takes any notice of, the United Nations if it is inconvenient to do so. Did the United 'States refer to the United Nations before 'entering Guatemala or before invading Korea? Did Nehru take any notice of the United Nations over Kashmir? And quite recently․and most scandalous of all—did Russia take the smallest notice of the United Nations, or heed what it said over this question of Hungary? No it is only poor Britain who is expected -to do as she is told by the United Nations. And the principal function of the United Nations is to waste lime by talking—they do plenty of that—when it is action that is needed. It is absurd, for instance, to talk of consulting the United Nations before taking action that we did over the Canal. That would have been giving a long notice to everyone concerned of what we were going to do,

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and it was essential, in the interests of our troops and our men, that we should act quickly and decisively once we had made up our minds to act at all.
I wonder whether the United Nations will attempt any action over the importation of arms and explosives (there has been plenty of that) into Port Said, that sink of iniquity (there is no other term for it), much of which was burned by the Australians at the end of World War I in retribution for the misdeeds of its inhabitants. And the burning was thoroughly deserved. Is there, in fact, any reason why we should continue our membership of the United Nations, from which we derive no benefit whatever, and never have done—only restrictions, questions and endless talk, and of which other nations, if affected, take no notice? I hope against hope—because we always follow the United States—that we shall leave the United Nations and have no more to do with it, for it is perfectly 'useless. There is no other word for it. Some say that this would mean a break with the United States. I do not think that it would. I agree with every word that the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, said about that a minute or two ago. We want to work with the United States, but the United States know very little about the East, arid they regard the Canal and the Middle East from totally different points of view from ours. For once in a way, they should see our point of view and work with us—not merely we work with them.
If any international organisation is required (and I think an international organisation of some sort is needed), it should be a much smaller one composed of Powers with similar aims and ideals—preferably mostly European Powers. Possibly an extension and strengthening of N.A.T.O. might be considered. The old concert of the Great Powers of Europe, which we knew more than a generation ago, was, in its day, effective. The concert did not always play in tune, but there is no question that it did play together and did produce results. And though there are few great Powers today, some concert of the major Powers might be attempted and, I think, might be of use. I support the Resolution moved by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, and I hope that the House may confirm it by a large majority.
10.40 p.m.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, at this late hour I do not propose to take up a great deal of your Lordships' time, but I have listened to a great many of the speeches, and particularly I have listened with great interest to those coming from the Benches opposite. I cannot help being somewhat amused at the way different Members are proposing to support the Government Resolution for reasons entirely different from those put forward by the noble Marquess who introduced the debate. That, it seems to me, applies particularly to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Jeffreys. During nine-tenths of his speech, he explained why he thoroughly disagreed with the policy which the Government have pursued, and he ended by saying that he was going enthusiastically to vote for them to-morrow afternoon. He is only one of several speakers who have displayed the same divergent views that were noticeable in another place. We have had Members on the Government Benches explaining that they disagreed with the Government for going into Egypt, and others explaining that they disagreed with the Government for coming out, or for not going farther in than they have done; and some of them have explained why they are going to support the policy of the Government. When the Division is taken, it will be interesting to see how many of them troop in behind the Government and cast their votes in the Government Lobby.
I am afraid that the pious wish expressed by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in opening this debate, that this would be a debate, not of controversy but of sweet reasonableness and an attempt to look at the future, cannot be Before I sit down, I shall certainly try to meet, to some extent, the latter part of his wish, but the Resolution on which this debate is taking place makes it quite impossible for it to be uncontroversial. It could not possibly be otherwise. I have no wish to tread over again the ground that has been so well covered by several speeches from this side of the House, but in winding up the debate this evening from this side of the House, I want to say one thing in general, and to pick up several little things from noble Lords' speeches.
The larger point I want to raise is this. It has been said frequently by the

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Front Bench opposite that the Government supporters are on one side of the House and the opposition comes from this side. But in fact that is not at all exclusively the case. This matter has divided the country from top to bottom. It is true that most of the opposition comes from people who think the way we do in politics in general, yet it is not solely from our side. I know members of my Party up and down the country who favour the action that the Government have taken. I also know quite a number of Conservatives, in this House and elsewhere, who take a view very different from that of the Government. This matter has divided the country and will divide the country for years to come. I do not suppose that it will be settled in my lifetime. Even the Boer War, which happened sixty years ago, and which at my age I remember quite well, divided the country and has divided the country to this day—the dispute has never been settled. The policy which the Government have adopted over Egypt will, unhappily, divide the country for years and years to come.
I propose to say two or three words about several speeches in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, put forward a sincere and powerful appeal on behalf of Hungary, but I confess that I saw little relevance in it to the subject matter of this debate. The only relevance it could have had (though this was not the noble Lord's point of view), was that the Government ought to have done something different from what they are doing. It may be my own stupidity, but I do not understanding what he really thinks the Government ought to have done.
The noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, considered that he had a complete answer to our attack on the Government's action in going into Egypt when he said that Colonel Nasser had acted illegally and improperly in seizing the Canal. I think that that is wholly irrelevant. There is no division of opinion in this House or, so far as I know, in the country as a whole about the misdeeds of Colonel Nasser. But the fact that a man is burgling your house, an improper thing to do and about which you are entitled to feel very angry, does not justify you in sending your son round to his house to burn it down. In fact, that is what the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, said in a recent debate. He said that
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Colonel Nasser had acted improperly and illegally, but that that in no way justified what the Government were doing then, which was to make a show of force in the Near East. Then I come to the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, who said that what we wanted on this side of the House was that we should always toe the line to the United States. That is entirely untrue.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, I specifically said that I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, deny that that was the intention of the Opposition.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: When the noble Viscount comes to read his speech, I am convinced that he will find something which would justify my view that that was his opinion of our position. Of course it is nothing of the kind. What we do say is that what was actually done to President Eisenhower and the State Department was a perfect insult. While Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was actually in consultation with the American Ambassador, not a word was breathed to him of the intention of putting forward the ultimatum which was issued within a few hours of that consultation. The feeble and impossible excuse was made that there was no time to inform, let alone consult, the United States. I think that that was an affront which the American people have a perfect right to resent, and it is not surprising that some of them resented it very bitterly. That is not to say that we have got to be the "Yes men" of the United States—the phrase the noble Viscount used. He said that we on this side wanted the Government to be "Yes men" to the United States. We want nothing of the kind. There have been many occasions on which my Party and I have disagreed with the actions which the Americans have taken, but that is not for one moment to suggest that the Government did right in not even mentioning to the Ambassador, when they were in consultation with him, such an important fact as the proposed ultimatum to Egypt.
I want to leave the more directly controversial issue with regard to the past and come to another aspect of the question—that is, not whether the Government were right or wrong but what are the consequences of the action that was taken. These consequences are

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many, but I am not going to deal tonight with all of them; many of them have already been fully dealt with from this side of the House, I want to take only one or two of the consequences which seem to me important at the present time. The first is the cost of what has been done. I will begin with the purely material side. It was stated in another place by members of the Government that the actual direct cost of the operations will be something in the neighbourhood of £50 million.
To that we have to add the loss of the oil profit from the blocking of the Canal, which I think may be taken to be not far short of a further £50 million. Then there is the loss of dollars we are going to suffer, which will be a considerable figure. Finally, there is the loss of potential production owing to the shortage of oil. There is no doubt whatever that all those factors, taken together, will run well into nine figures, but how far into nine figures it is much too early to say. It will certainly be well into hundreds of millions of pounds, but how many hundreds of millions I should not like to prophesy.
In the second place, apart from the direct monetary loss in that way, there is the loss of our credit and financial confidence. Sterling has been dragging along in the exchange near the bottom of its gold point, and forward sterling has gone well down. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recognises that, quite frankly, and he has proposed and taken certain steps to try to restore the confidence. Personally, I am not so sure that the steps he has taken are sound steps. He has borrowed money from the International Monetary Fund; he is going hat in hand to the United States of America to say that we are so poor that we must get a waiver of the interest that we should pay to them year by year. And he is doing that at a time when a large part of the Government Party have put forward a Resolution which, in effect, is a vote of censure on the United States of America. Ft is one thing to take such an attitude when you are standing on your own feet, but if you are going to a man to ask him for money, it seems to me an odd time to curse him for his disagreement with yourself on fundamental matters of policy. We shall see what the result will be.
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But beyond the loss of financial confidence, there is the loss of confidence in. a wider sense that has resulted owing to this action. I say that for this reason: that because the British Government have acted as they have done with regard, first of all, to the Commonwealth and then to the United States of America, in being something very much other than frank, the parties concerned never know when some future British Government may behave in the same way again. I had a good deal to do with India in the course of my political life, and I found that every single man in India who took a prominent part in opposing British rule in India had started off in that attitude because of some insult that some bad-mannered Englishman had shown to him. I never found a single case where that was not the beginning of the trouble. The man never knew, when he met an Englishman, that he would not be treated in the insulting way in which one Englishman had treated him, perhaps years earlier. That is the position in which we are putting members of the Commonwealth and the United States of America: in consequence of the action of the Government in this affair, they will never know that they are not going to be subjected to similar treatment in future. It is that sort of confidence which I think is a serious thing to lose, and much more important than the mere financial cost to which I have already referred.
How long will it be before the United Nations forgives us for having used the Veto in the Security Council? I should like to ask the Government what they really think of members of their own Party—we have had illustrations here tonight—who definitely state that they regret our position in the United Nations; who think that the United Nations ought to disappear. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, Who is looking so anxious about that matter, was, happily, absent when the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, definitely said that he wished we had no connection with the United Nations; that he thought it was a bad body, and that the sooner we were out of it the better. I hope that before this debate is over a representative of the Government—perhaps it will be the noble Earl, Lord Home, who I see sitting in his place, and who I understand is to wind up—will

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repudiate these anti-United Nations sentiments that have been expressed by some noble Lords sitting on the Benches opposite.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not know whether the noble Lord was here during my speech.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: Yes, I was.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I expressed a different sentiment from that, from the Front Bench.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: Yes; I am aware of that.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I think that ought to be the answer to the noble Lord's question.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: I think it hardly sufficient. I will go further and say that I am quite aware that the noble Marquess and I noted it with great interest—said, in defence of the policy of the Government, that he would not have supported the action of any Government if they had not ceased fire when they were instructed to do so by the United Nations. But that is not what has been said by many noble Lords who have stated that they are going into the Lobby tomorrow evening in support of the Government, and have stated, at the same time, that they thoroughly disapprove of the action of coming out and disapprove of the United Nations. The noble Marquess will have the opportunity of reading some of those speeches, and particularly that of the noble Lord who preceded me. I do not wish to pursue that point further.
The next thing I want to say is with regard to this cost, the financial cost and the cost in lack of confidence in the world. That is a tremendous price that has to be paid as a consequence of the actions that have been taken in Suez. We recognise that we who have been utterly opposed to this policy, as members of this great country that we love, shall have to take our share in paying the price. We do not resent that. As members of this country, we realise that we have to pay our share of any price exacted from us. And when it comes to asking us to combine with the Government in the future, we say. "Yes"; that
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we will fight to support sterling; we will fight to recover the confidence of the world; we will fight on the side of the Government—provided that they repudiate the kind of attitude that they took in failing to consult with the United States, and in failing to unite with the United Nations.
I do not want the Government spokesman to get up and say they are sorry for the things they have done: I want them to say that they will not do them again. If they do not say that, then, clearly, the kind of support that will be given from this side of the House to the foreign policy of the Government will be totally different from what it has been in the years gone by. I do not say that, even so, we will not do our utmost to support sterling. We will. But it was said in another place, and I repeat it here, that we cannot have anything approaching an all-Party policy with regard to foreign affairs unless the Government are prepared at least to say that our consultation with the Commonwealth and with the United States, and our attitude toward the United Nations, will be such as has been hitherto, the settled policy of this country.
There is only one thing more I wish to say, and that I address particularly to that rebel group, the Suez group, in both Houses of Parliament, who want us to do the kind of thing to which even the Government are opposed. They really are living fifty years ago. They think that we can do today what was considered right fifty, sixty or seventy years ago. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, when he was speaking in an earlier debate on Suez, said that the kind of things that are talked about were the recognised method of dealing with affairs sixty or seventy years ago, but they cannot be done today. That seems to me to be undeniable. This country was a great country in years gone by. It was great because it ruled the sea, and it gave us the Pax Britannica: it possessed a wonderful power to keep the peace throughout the world.
This country can be great today, but not by the same means by which it was great in days gone by. We have not the physical power. Our Navy, Army and Air Force are not capable of preserving the peace of the world by dictating to the other Powers. This country can be

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great today because of our wisdom, our judgment and our understanding of the laws that bind men and women together, and have made the nations in the past great nations. But the members of the Conservative Party who are asking us to go back to the policy and the methods of fifty or sixty years ago are crying for a world that has gone. It is impossible to have the sovereignty of a single country at the present time. We shall have to yield our sovereignty, and it is only if this country recognises the facts of life as they are today that we can be so great, in our own way, through our Commonwealth and through our relations with other nations of the world, that we can ever hope once again to take the place on the pedestal which we once occupied.
11.3 p.m.
LORD RENNELL: My Lords, it falls to my rather unenviable duty to be the last speaker to-night in a very long debate, which is all the more regrettable because the noble Lord who has just sat down has trailed an economic coat in front of my feet which T should dearly have loved to step on if the time had not been so late and if the subject matter of the debate had been our economic situation, which it is not. Indeed, the noble Lord, with whom I have crossed so many friendly swords in the past, and with whom I find myself usually so much in agreement, obviously tried, either from me or hereafter, to provoke some comment on the economic situation in which we find ourselves as a result of what has happened in the last six weeks. But the debate has already ranged over so many fields that have nothing to do with the Resolution moved by the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, that I will refrain from the temptation.
We have discussed China, Hungary, West European arrangements and, finally, our own economic situation in the course of two or three speeches. But the subject matter of this debate is the Motion moved by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury:
"That this House supports the policy of Her Majesty's Government as outlined by the Foreign Secretary on 3rd December"—
and then there follow three points—
"which has prevented hostilities in the Middle East from spreading, has resulted in a United Nations Force being introduced into the area,
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and has created conditions under which progress can be made towards the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues."
In the very few minutes that are left to me, I should like to address myself to the Resolution.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, at the beginning of this debate, expressed doubt about whether our intervention in the Middle East had in fact resulted in the limitation of hostilities. Other speakers have expressed the same doubt. I myself believe that our intervention in the Canal Zone and in Sinai did in fact stop the spread of hostilities. I have as evidence to produce before your Lordships a statement made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army who ought to know what he is talking about in this context. On November 30 he made a broadcast, of which I propose to read certain extracts because it seems to answer the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and many other speakers on that subject. The commander is MajorGeneral Al Hakim Amir. He said:
"During the year 1956 Egypt became bound by military agreements with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, the Yemeni Kingdom and the Syrian Republic. …."
I shall not read every sentence, although I can, if your Lordships wish, but I do not think it is relevant, and it is rather late. He wont on:
"When the Israeli aggression opened against Egypt on the evening of October 29. in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the joint Arab forces, I issued instructions to put into effect the plans prepared to meet this treacherous aggression. On the evening of October 30, Syrian armoured units began to move from their concentration points to areas allocated for their operations within the territory of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. The Saudi forces were assigned to move to the Jordanian-Israeli front to undertake a joint operation with the Arab Jordanian army and the National Guard."
You will note. my Lords, that no reference is made to any Yemeni forces or, indeed, to the Lebanon or Iraq, two other members of the so-called Arab League, to which I will come in a moment.
He went on:
"The nature of these movements required that they should he accomplished in complete secrecy and that the operations should begin as soon as the common enemy exhausted his military potentials in his attack on Egypt."
In other words, when the Israeli forces had been defeated in Sinai by the Egyptian troops, further operations on the

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Israeli border should begin by other members of the Arab League. He went on:
"… After the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt on October 30 … the Egyptian Government decided not to involve the Arab States in military operations, … Orders were therefore issued to the commands of the joint forces to avoid taking part in substantial military operations."
There then follow two other sentences about the battle against imperialism not yet being ended, and so on. The Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Forces, as he so describes himself, should presumably know what he is talking about when he says that as a result of the Anglo-French ultimatum he countermanded the operations which had been launched.
I would conclude from that that the first point in the Resolution moved by the Government can be substantiated from Egyptian sources. The second point is that a United Nations Force has been introduced into the area. I personally am glad the United Nations Force has been introduced into the area. I am delighted that the United Nations has taken positive action and not confined its activities to resolutions, as in so many other cases, and I share with the noble Lord who has just sat down his views about what the United Nations could do and ought to do. I shall, nevertheless, go into the Lobby in support of the Resolution, because I am glad that, as the Resolution says. United Nations Forces have been introduced into the area. If one is sceptical about the results that may produce, that is a matter of personal opinion, but it is, nevertheless, a good thing, to use a colloquialism, that they should be there at this moment.
The third point in the Resolution is perhaps a little more difficult to deal with in a few words. It is that the policy of the Government has created conditions under which progress can be made towards a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues. Two points here are, I think, involved, and I am afraid I must touch on both of them. The first point deals with the Arab Group. It has been customary to speak about the Arab Group and the Arab League, and of all Colonel Nasser has been trying to do to unite them, as if they were a group of Arab States. A more correct description of that Group would be that they are
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a group of Arabic-speaking States, which is by no means the same thing as a group of Arab States.
In the first place, there are many Arabs—and here I mean Arabs—'who do not consider that the Egyptians are Arabs but that they are Egyptians. They are, nevertheless, Arabic-speaking. There are, further, many people who have assumed, as Colonel Nasser wished them to assume, that the people who inhabit North Africa north of the Sahara as far as the Atlantic, are Arab States. They are, of course, for the most part, as some of your Lordships will well know, nothing of the sort; they are Arabic-speaking Berbers who were there a long time before the Arabs got there and, in many cases, still speak their own tongue as well as Arabic. In many cases they do not like the Egyptians any more than certain other Arabic-speaking people, such as those in the Sudan, like the Egyptians. The same might be said to be true of many inhabitants of the Lebanon and elsewhere.
The Arabic-speaking group, over which it is clear that Colonel Nasser has many ambitions, is a dream. It is a dream because it is not coherent. It has shown its lack of coherence by the lack of support that Egypt has had in the, happily, very short fighting which took place. The talk is of a unification of the Arabic-speaking people who in certain respects extend right up into Persia and from Persia to the Atlantic and from the Mediterranean into Central Africa. It is a dream which, as many of your Lordships will remember, at the end of the First World War certain politicians in Eastern Europe dreamt—a Pan Islamic movement. That was described by one who was possibly one of the greatest friends of the Arabs—and I mean the Arabs—that this country ever produced and whose comment on the Pan Islamic Movement was that it was the dream and the last word of a bankrupt politician when he had nothing else to talk about. That seems to be very much what has overtaken Colonel Nasser. In trying to achieve these ambitions it is. I agree, a matter of opinion how far he was supported and instigated by Russia, how far he asked for help. and how far help was thrust at him.
I do not think any of us can be dogmatic about it, and that is why I would

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not wish to be dogmatic on what is called the Russian plot. I agree there are several opinions that can be held about it. What seems now obviously to have happened is that, whether or not Colonel Nasser overran his finances or his means, he accepted help. Whether he asked for it, or whether it was proffered, I do not know, but he had forgotten the old adage that gifts can sometimes compromise the taker, and as he took he took more, and he was given more until he finally got his fingers so pinched in the Russian door that he could not get them out without losing his fingernails. Hence the trouble he has brought his country into, a trouble and tragedy that I frankly feel very much. I have been concerned with Egypt and Egyptian affairs since, I understand, the age of two weeks. I have not any clear recollection of that moment, but I understand that that is the first time I went and drank the waters of the Nile. I am resentful that people who fundamentally were, and I believe are, friendly to this country, should be so badly led and be put into a position in which they: have become a byword of odium and dislike and all too frequently contempt, which they k not deserve but which their leaders do. That is the situation which I believe should be more widely known and it is certainly one that I believe is not known in America as it should be.
The first point is that Nasser's dream of the unification of the Arabic-speaking world has evaporated with a headache after a rather "thick" night. The second point is a much more serious one: namely, that our of this has arisen a most tragic misunderstanding between the United States and ourselves. For the last thirty years, I have been intimately concerned with America and American things. I go to America frequently, and I like it. I have the greatest possible admiration for Americans' integrity of thought—not always: heir knowledge, but their integrity of thought—for their generosity, and for their desire to help and do good things for other people. Very often they do them clumsily; nevertheless, the desire is there. I bitterly regret that the situation in which we now find ourselves has led them to think evilly of us and us to think evilly of them. I agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, said and, in that context, with what the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, said. It is idle to conceal from our American
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friends today that people in this country, in all walks of life, and whether or not they agree with the policy of Her Majesty's Government, feel bitterly hurt at the treatment which they conceive we have had at the hands of the United States.
I do not believe that that treatment would have the whole support of the United States, by any manner of means, any more than I believe that the whole of this country is opposed to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, as so many people have tried to tell America. Public opinion is very difficult to gauge, even in the country in which one lives oneself; it is much more difficult to gauge in a country in which one is not living. I do not know what the majority of people in this country think. I believe—I do not know—that the majority of people in America are still friendlily disposed to us, but puzzled. I believe that a great deal of the antagonism, annoyance and exasperation which has caused the hurts which undoubtedly exist on both sides is to a large extent the product of personal feelings of pique amongst certain people, the feeling that they may not have been a success, that they may not have been understood.
I suppose that in the last month I have been as angry, as annoyed, about what the United States Government is believed to have done as anybody in this country; and yet I am convinced that the only hope for Western civilisation, for ourselves and for the United States, is that this Anglo-American alliance should be rebuilt. That does net mean that the cracks which have taken place, the fissures which have appeared, can be patched up with soft soap and plaster. They have to be recognised to be mended. The Americans must know that we are hurt, profoundly hurt, and that charity is no balm for a deep-seated and painful wound. When that is recognised, and that element of pique and of annoyance which has undoubtedly permeated and poisoned the atmosphere among people in public life, official life, Parliamentary life and elsewhere, can he overcome, let those who can forget do the rebuilding, and let those who cannot forget keep out of politics, keep out of publicity and keep their mouths shut. The rest of us will spend our time rebuilding that wall which is the bulwark upon

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which the whole of the safety of Western civilisation and freedom must depend.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Henderson, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.
Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(The Earl of Lucan.)
On Question. Motion agreed to and debate adjourned accordingly.
House adjourned at twenty-four minutes past eleven o'clock.