Sitting of 2 August 1956

Preamble
The House met at Eleven o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  SOUTH OF SCOTLAND ELECTRICITY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
  Read the Third time and passed.

  EXPERIMENTS ON LIVING ANIMALS
  Address for
  "Return of Experiments performed under the Act 39 and 40 Vict. c. 77, during 1955."—[Mr. Deedes.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  EMPLOYMENT

    Longton and Stoke
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Labour the total numbers signing at the Longton and Stoke employment exchanges, respectively; and what are the prospects in this area for employment.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service (Mr. Robert Carr): On 16th July, 272 persons were registered as wholly unemployed and 707 as temporarily stopped at the Longton Employment Exchange; the figures at the Stoke Employment Exchange were 304 and 252, respectively. Within the daily travel area there are 2,200 notified vacancies for men, and 700 for women.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Whilst thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask whether he will use his influence with his local officers to ensure that the men and women who are signing on will be invited to take employment as soon as possible? It is a terrible thing to sign on when other people are in full employment.
    Mr. Carr: We will certainly keep the position in this area closely under review because we are aware of the difficulties.

    Automation
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Labour if he will now make a full statement on the results of his consideration of automation and on the results of raising the matter at the Government Advisory Council and several joint committees.
    Mr. Carr: The question of automation was considered by the National Joint Advisory Council at their meeting on 25th July. They were in general agreement with the conclusions of the report by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research that automation has not so far caused any serious employment problems and is unlikely to create unmanageable problems in the future. The three sides of the Council are continuing their examination of the problems involved and the Council will resume discussion at a later meeting.
    My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade also discussed the question with the Engineering Advisory Council on 4th July. Members from both sides of industry welcomed a proposal to make inquiries, which are being put in hand, about the adoption of new production techniques and the availability of special equipment. Similar discussions have taken place with other advisory bodies in the engineering field.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Will the Minister convey to his right hon. Friend the information that I have heard great appreciation expressed of those joint talks; but the immediate issue is short time in certain industries which are preparing to adopt automation, so can the Minister say whether his right hon. Friend has given consideration to the document I am holding, which was published by the United States? If so, is it intended to take any action on it?
    Mr. Carr: My right hon. Friend is considering that document. However, I would like to emphasise that, in our view, the short time to which the hon. Gentleman refers is not significantly attributable to automation. I think this is the view of both sides of industry.
    Mr. Robens: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that perhaps the greatest revolution which the application of electronics to industry will make will be amongst clerical workers? Can he say

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    whether the Ministry of Labour is giving careful consideration to what steps it is likely to be able to take when many clerical workers will certainly be displaced by new machines for clerical work?
    Mr. Carr: I think there is considerable point in what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I can assure the House that we are not treating this matter with any complacency. The B.E.C. has set up a special committee to consider automation in all its aspects. The T.U.C. is working through its economic and production committees. The fact that discussions are to be resumed means that there is no laziness on the subject and that we all feel that this is a matter which ought to be looked at most carefully and thoroughly.

    D. C. Thomson Ltd. (Journalist)
    Mr. Allaunasked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that the publishing firm of D. C. Thomson, of Dundee, Salford and Glasgow, recently prohibited an employee, who was the branch secretary of the National Union of Journalists, from attending their offices even though remaining in their employment; and if he will draw the attention of this firm to the written undertaking it gave to his predecessor in the interest of good industrial relations following the trade dispute of 1952 regarding trade unionism among its workers.
    Mr. Carr: I have seen the statement made by the National Union of Journalists on this matter. What the firm said in 1952 was that they would cease to insist on their employees signing an agreement not to belong to a trade union. There is nothing in the union's statement to suggest that the firm have departed from their declared policy.
    Mr. Allaun: Is not this a deliberate breach, if not of the letter then of the whole spirit and meaning, of the undertaking given to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour—
    Mr. Ellis Smith: And the House.
    Mr. Allaun:—by D. C. Thomson on which the unions agreed to a settlement of the dispute? If this is so, can the Minister, in justice, stand aside, and do nothing, encouraging further victimisation in the future?
    Mr. Carr: It would be quite incorrect, and I do not believe it can be seriously accepted by anyone in the House, that we are encouraging victimisation. I repeat that the firm gave in writing an undertaking and, as far as the facts disclose, it is not breaking that undertaking. It is easy in these matters to condone or to ask for condemnation, but that does not always result in progress.
    Mr. J. Griffiths: Does the Minister appreciate that if this had been the other way round and one worker had sent another to Coventry, there would have been a very big outcry in the country?
    Mr. Carr: I am sure that we all deplore intolerance from whatever side it comes, but our system of industrial relations in this country is voluntary and we do not—least of all the trade unions—believe in direct Government interference. I feel certain that that is the right principle on which to conduct industrial relations.
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that the action of Messrs. D. C. Thomson and Company Limited, Dundee, in segregating a trade unionist employee from any contact with his fellow workers is a breach of the International Labour Office conventions to which Her Majesty's Government are signatories; and what action he proposes to take.
    Mr. Carr: I understand that the employee referred to is no longer with Messrs. Thomson and Company Limited. No question, therefore, arises of my taking any action in relation to this matter. I am not in a position to express an opinion as to whether anything occurred while he was in their employment which could be said to be contrary to an International Labour Office Convention.
    Mr. Thomson: Is the Minister aware that this trade unionist is a disabled ex-Service man who honoured the agreement not to be a trade unionist as long as that written document was in force but who exercised the right obtained, partly by the House, to join a trade union when the document was withdrawn? Does it not make a mockery of the undertaking given by the firm to the Government and to the House, as well as to the trade unions who were a party to the dispute, if it isolates a trade unionist in this way?

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    Do the Government intend to sit back and accept this breach of the undertaking without further action?
    Mr. Carr: As I said in reply to a supplementary on the last Question, I do not believe that direct Government intervention can serve any useful purpose in this matter. I repeat that we deplore intolerance in this sort of affair, wherever it occurs.
    Mr. Fenner Brockway: Will the Minister reconsider this matter? Does he regard it as good enough that when a firm has given an undertaking that it will employ trade unionists, it puts into action such provisions that they are even excluded from meeting their fellow workers?
    Sir T. Moore: What about the men sent to Coventry?
    Mr. Brockway: Is not that an outrage against ordinary human liberty? Surely the Government cannot stand aside and do nothing whatever?

    Earnings
    Captain Pilkingtonasked the Minister of Labour the percentage rise of earnings since 1951.
    Mr. Carr: Inquiries covering manual wage earners in manufacturing industries generally and in a number of the principal non-manufacturing industries showed that the average weekly earnings per worker in October, 1955, were about 33 per cent. higher than in October, 1951. Figures for dates later than October, 1955, are not available.
    Captain Pilkington: In view of the fact that the rise in the cost of living during this period has been 21 per cent., does my hon. Friend agree that it is the height of irresponsibility for accusations to be made against the Government that they are attacking the standard of living of the workers, as is alleged in some Trades Union Congress resolutions?

    Tottenham—Edmonton Area (Flooding)
    Mr. Albuasked the Minister of Labour how many persons have been suspended from work during this year in the Tottenham—Edmonton area due to flooding.
    Mr. Carr: There is no record in the Tottenham Employment Exchange of
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    any unemployment this year due to flooding.
    Mr. Albu: Is the hon. Member aware that every year very large numbers of man-hours are lost in the Tottenham—Edmonton area due to flooding? What reply has his right hon. Friend given to the document which he received from the Chairman of the North London Productivity Council on this matter?
    Mr. Carr: I am afraid that, without notice, I cannot answer the last part of the hon. Member's question. We know from local reports that some time was lost, for example, during July this year, owing to this cause. As my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food told the hon. Member on 19th July, the Lee Conservancy Board was aware of the urgency of the drainage scheme and the first section of the plan was in hand.

    Birmingham
    Mr. Chapmanasked the Minister of Labour whether his attention has been drawn to cases in Birmingham, and to particular examples which have been sent to him, of men who are finding it difficult to obtain employment after dismissal by the British Motor Corporation; whether he is satisfied that these are isolated examples; and if he will make a further statement.
    Mr. Carr: My right hon. Friend will write to the hon. Member as soon as he has made inquiries, but for the present he has no further statement to make in amplification of what he said on 26th July.
    Mr. Chapman: Will the Minister pay particular attention to the example which I sent him of the man who tried for 28 jobs and did not manage to get one of them? He is a very good man; I know him personally. Secondly, will he have a look at these cases in which it is alleged that certain employers are refusing to take B.M.C. men? One firm of food distributors has been mentioned. It might be advisable to look into the whole matter.
    Mr. Carr: I can assure the hon. Member that my right hon. Friend will look into it as carefully as he can and write to him. As the hon. Member knows, my right hon. Friend received these details only as recently as Tuesday.
    Mr. Simmons: How many of these men are disabled ex-Service men, as in the case of the man at D. C. Thomson's? Are the provisions of the King's Roll for the employment of the disabled applied fully both at Thomson's and in this case?
    Mr. Carr: I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Member that information without notice, but I will look into the matter and write to him about it.
    Mr. Chapmanasked the Minister of Labour what was the basis of his estimate that 10,000 vacancies exist in the immediate area of Birmingham; and if he will give a rough breakdown of the figures showing the industries needing men and the skills mainly in demand.
    Mr. Carr: The total of 10,000 is the sum of the vacancies for men verified as outstanding on 25th July at employment exchanges within daily travelling distance of the centre of Birmingham. The information desired in the second and third parts of the Question is not immediately available, but my right hon. Friend will write to the hon. Member as soon as practicable.
    Mr. Chapman: Is not the Minister aware that, until we have these figures broken down, they are totally meaningless in Birmingham? Is he aware that men sacked from engineering jobs are now finding it very difficult indeed to obtain alternative jobs and regard with derision the Minister's statement that 10,000 vacancies are sure to be available for them?
    Mr. Carr: As to the derision about the vacancies, I can only assure the hon. Member that the number of vacancies is verified every four weeks. At the end of each four-week period, all those which have been notified more than a week previously are checked. Replying about the general employment position, the unemployment register of ex-B.M.C. employees on 30th July was 1,191, which is 500 fewer than a fortnight earlier.

  NATIONAL SERVICE

    Discharged Personnel (Re-enlistment)
    Mr. Remnantasked the Minister of Labour whether he will introduce legislation to give him discretion, where a
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    man has already served part of his National Service in one arm and has been discharged, not to call him up in another arm for the remainder of his term.
    Mr. Carr: No, Sir. I am afraid my right hon. Friend cannot consider legislation on this point.
    Mr. Remnant: Is my hon. Friend aware that he is relying on the legal interpretation of the Act, the words being "liable to be called up" for the balance of the period, which must be uneconomic? The ordinary layman would understand that wording to mean "may be called up." Since it is uneconomic to call them up, will he not allow common sense to prevail over legal interpretation?
    Mr. Carr: I recognise the point which my hon. Friend has in mind, but when the National Service Act was passed, I think the House had in mind in these provisions that it would not be fair to the great majority of people having to do their full period of service to allow others to do less than their full service.
    Mr. Remnant: If a man does service for one year and ten months, is he called up for further service for another two months?
    Mr. Carr: As in all these matters, my right hon. Friend has discretion, and when a man has done most of his service, my right hon. Friend will use his discretion. In the individual case to which I expect my hon. Friend is referring, the man has done only half his normal period of service.
    Mr. Remnant: It is still uneconomic.

    Call-up (Review)
    Mr. Allaunasked the Minister of Labour to give an assurance that he will consider the effect on young workers in unskilled, office, or other jobs of not exempting them from National Service in the alternative schemes of National Service which he is at present considering.
    Mr. Carr: As my right hon. Friend indicated in the debate on 31st July, the whole pattern of National Service in the future is under active consideration.
    Mr. Allaun: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that the Prime Minister,

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    addressing the Conservative Party conference last October, said:
    "I do not believe a system of selective service or balloting would be acceptable to the people of this country."?
    If National Service is unpopular as the Minister admitted to the House on Tuesday—and as far as the conscripts and parents are concerned, that is putting it mildly—does not the Parliamentary Secretary agree that a selective call-up would be doubly resented by those not exempted and by their parents and families?
    Mr. Carr: All aspects of this difficult question are under consideration at the moment, but for the present there is nothing further I can add to what my right hon. Friend has said.

  HOME DEPARTMENT

    Ethnarchy of Cyprus (Collection of Funds)
    Mr. F. Noel-Bakerasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what restrictions have been placed upon the collection of funds by representatives of the Ethnarchy of Cyprus.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. W. F. Deedes): There is no power to impose special restrictions on such collections, although the general restrictions imposed by law on house to house and street collections would apply.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Does not that Answer, taken with the Answer which I got from the Secretary of State for the Colonies yesterday, making it clear that collection of these funds was also perfectly legal in Cyprus even under the present Defence Regulations, make absolute nonsense of the Home Secretary's excuse for deporting the Archimandrite who was supposed to be collecting these funds for shooting British Service men in the back?
    Mr. Deedes: At no time did my right hon. and gallant Friend suggest that the legality or illegality of the Archimandrite's action caused the action which my right hon. and gallant Friend took. My right hon. and gallant Friend took his action because he considered that it was not
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    conducive to the public good that the Archimandrite should be allowed to remain here. The legality of the collection did not arise.

    Visit of King of Iraq (Closure of Streets)
    Mrs. Jegerasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department which streets were closed in central London on 16th July and for how long; whether he is aware of the dislocation caused to traffic; and if he will endeavour, on future occasions, to minimise this dislocation.
    Mr. Deedes: On 16th July, on the occasion of the arrival in London of His Majesty the King of Iraq for a State Visit, 50 streets or parts of streets were closed for periods varying from 1 hour and 20 minutes to 1 hour and 55 minutes. I will, with permission, circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a list of the streets closed. The closing of streets inevitably causes dislocation of traffic, but the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, who makes Regulations for the control of traffic on occasions such as this, is well aware of the need to minimise dislocation.
    Mrs. Jeger: Is the hon. Member aware that by closing streets for more than an hour the actual delay to traffic is much more than an hour? On this occasion traffic was blocked from Trafalgar Square as far north as Holborn. Will he try to see that this is minimised in future? Perhaps some of these happy events could take place on Sundays when people would enjoy them and not have their xenophobic tendencies encouraged
    Mr. Deedes: I will consider what the hon. Lady says, but I hope that she will bear in mind that this was the occasion of a welcome to a sovereign of a friendly state.
    Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that, while it is appreciated that the presence of the head of a foreign State does create special circumstances, there is a good deal of anxiety on the part of the public at the extent to which the police are taken off their ordinary duties every time our own Queen visits a theatre or one of our main line railway stations? As this sort of

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    thing is not necessary in countries like Sweden and Holland, could the Home Office review the present system and see whether occasions of this kind could not be arranged without making a strain on police power, as is the position at present?
    Mr. Deedes: Yes, certainly, but the main answer to the hon. Member is that these occasions are very infrequent.
    Following is the list of streets closed:

    Abbey Orchard Street (immediately south of Victoria Street).

    Allington Street.

    Artillery Row (north of Howick Place).

    Ashley Place (immediately south of Victoria Street).

    Bessborough Gardens (southern arms).

    Birdcage Walk.

    Broad Sanctuary.

    Broadway (south of Caxton Street).

    Buckingham Gate (south of Spencer Street).

    Buckingham Gate (between Buckingham Palace Road and Birdcage Walk).

    Buckingham Palace Road (north of Victoria Station Yard Entrance).

    Carlisle Place (north of Ashley Place).

    Constitution Hill.

    Dean Farrar Street (south of Dacre Street).

    Downing Street.

    Ebury Street (north of Grosvenor Gardens).

    Eccleston Bridge.

    Francis Street (north of Howick Place).

    Great George Street.

    Great Scotland Yard.

    Great Smith Street (north of Abbey Orchard Street).

    Horse Guards Approach Road.

    Horse Guards Avenue (west of Whitehall Court).

    Hudson's Place.

    King Charles Street.

    Little George Street.

    Little Sanctuary.

    Lower Grosvenor Place.

    Marlborough Road.

    Old Queen Street.

    Palace Street (south of Castle Street).

    Parliament Square (north, west and south sides).

    Parliament Street.

    Ponsonby Terrace.

    Princes Row.

    Queen's Garden.

    Spencer Street.

    Spring Gardens.

    Spur Road.

    Storey's Gate.

    Strutton Ground (north of Old Pye Street).

    Terminus Place.

    The Mall.

    Tothill Street (east of Dean Farrar Street).

    Vauxhall Bridge Road (north of Gillingham Street).

    Victoria Street.

    Warwick Row.

    Whitehall.

    Whitehall Place (west of Whitehall Court).

    Wilton Road (north of Gillingham Street).

    Gramophone Records
    Mr. K. Thompsonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many prosecutions have taken place in connection with the sale and distribution of gramophone records of an undesirable character and under what statutory powers.
    Mr. Deedes: The answer is "None" according to my information. It is a misdemeanour at common law to publish an obscene libel, and if any prosecution took place it would be for that offence.
    Mr. Thompson: Is my hon. Friend aware that there is a very great and very reprehensible traffic in very undesirable gramophone records in this country at the present time? If the police are not active in the matter, will he do something about stimulating them into doing something?
    Mr. Deedes: My hon. Friend knows that the Secretary of State is not responsible for enforcing the law regarding obscene publications. Any question of prosecution or the initiation of proceedings for the destruction of obscene works is a matter for the police.

    Industrial Disputes (Police)
    Mr. V. Yatesasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what advice he has given to police authorities regarding the use of mounted police in industrial disputes.
    Mr. J. Silvermanasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what guidance he has given to chief constables with regard to the use of mounted police at the scenes of industrial disputes in view of the possibility of unnecessary provocation being caused by their presence.
    Mr. Deedes: My right hon. and gallant Friend has given no guidance to police authorities or chief constables on the use of mounted police in industrial disputes. It is for the chief officer of police concerned to take appropriate action to ensure that the law is complied with.
    Mr. Yates: While in no way wishing to cast any reflection on the police, is not the Joint Under-Secretary aware that the presence of mounted police in a dispute such as the one which occurred in the

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    Midlands causes very ill feeling? Can he give an undertaking to try to give some guidance to chief constables that only in extreme cases should such measures be taken?
    Mr. Deedes: This is not a question of provocation but of physical control. All hon. Members with experience of crowds and so on know that there are many jobs which mounted police can do more safely and more efficiently than a larger number of foot police. No doubt, that is why they were used on this occasion.
    Mr. Silverman: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that the very presence of mounted police on occasions like these offers a provocation and creates in itself ill-will and bad temper? Is he aware, that, on the whole, where mounted police have not been employed, the behaviour in industrial disputes has been very good? If he has ever been present in a crowd, especially where tempers are likely to be lost when mounted police are present, he will appreciate how the men engaged in industrial disputes feel about it.
    Mr. Deedes: I cannot accept that mounted police will create more provocation than foot police. It is a question of safety, and there are many occasions on which, for the safety of all concerned, mounted police can do a better job than foot police.
    Mr. Usborne: Does the Joint Under-Secretary not realise that there is a significant difference between controlling a crowd, say, coming out from a football match, when everybody is fairly reasonable, and the controlling of a crowd where there is an industrial dispute? That seems to be a very significant difference, and it appears that the Government have not understood that difference.
    Mr. Deedes: It is the duty of the police to enforce the law and it is the responsibility of the chief officer of police to employ the methods which he thinks will help him to do that best.
    Mr. Younger: Even if that be so, is there not a case for special instructions? Can the hon. Member give an assurance that it is normal police practice to employ not only the least force which is necessary, but also the least show of force
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    and to leave the situation as normal as possible whenever there are crowds of any kind?
    Mr. Deedes: That is obviously so. The responsibility in these matters ultimately rests, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, with the police authority and not with my right hon. and gallant Friend.
    Mr. Chapmanasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what guidance he has given to provincial police, by circular or otherwise, as to police intervention where peaceful picketing is employed as a result of an industrial dispute.
    Mr. Deedes: My right hon. and gallant Friend drew the attention of chief constables last year to a circular on the provisions of the law relating to picketing which was addressed to chief constables in December, 1925, and later presented to Parliament as Command Paper No. 2666 of 1926.
    Mr. Chapman: I am much obliged. Is the hon. Member aware that, although many of us pay tribute to the bearing and good humour of the police outside the B.M.C. factory, we were nevertheless upset by one or two of the incidents, and particularly, as my hon. Friend has said, about the use of mounted police when tempers are frayed and it seems to the men, at least, to be provocation when they are moved up suddenly? Would it be possible for the hon. Gentleman to send a further note, following his circular, drawing the attention of police authorities to this aspect of the matter?
    Mr. Deedes: I should stress that the circular to which I have referred contained no guidance on the methods to be adopted by the police to enforce the law. That is the responsibility of the police and, ultimately, of the police authority.

    Prostitutes, West End
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many prostitutes in the West End of London have in recent weeks been ordered to find a surety of £25 for good behaviour or go to prison for one month.
    Mr. Deedes: I am informed that in the nine weeks up to 23rd July the number was 11.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that, by imposing this penalty in appropriate cases, the vice racket operated by these property-owning procurers in the West End can be quickly ended? Why is not this penalty imposed in cases very well known to the police?
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Send the mounted police.
    Mr. Deedes: The answer quite simply is that some magistrates do not like to deal with prostitutes in this way, because its effect, if the surety is not found, is to send the prostitute to prison, although the offence for which she has been convicted is punishable only by a fine.

    Frith Street and Old Compton Street (Loitering and Obstruction)
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why so many people are allowed to loiter and obstruct the pavements in Frith Street and Old Compton Street, Soho; and what action is being taken in the matter.
    Mr. Deedes: I am informed by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that the police move people on where it is necessary to prevent obstruction.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that this corner, where occasional razor contests take place, is infested all day long by riff-raff and lay-abouts connected with racing gangs? If he goes along there he will see them standing there now. Why does he not instruct the police to keep them moving?
    Mr. Deedes: It is quite true that there are large crowds here. They congregate here and street bookmakers are a problem in the area. The police do take action, but if they are to prevent grounds for complaints of over-bearing behaviour—which there have been—the police have to use their discretion in moving people along.

    Police Pay Award (Back-dating)
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what the results are to date of his consultation with police authorities about back-dating to September the pay increases
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    recommended by the December arbitration award.
    Mr. Deedes: The consultations which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and my right hon. and gallant Friend are having with the police authorities are still in progress, and it would be premature for him to make a statement about them at this stage.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Can the Joint Under-Secretary say whether any police authority has yet objected to the backdating of the pay, and, in particular, what is the attitude of the police authority in London in this matter?
    Mr. Deedes: I am very anxious to say nothing which will prejudice the conduct of these negotiations, which we are anxious to terminate as quickly as possible, but I am bound to add that the assumption made that all the authorities concerned were, from the start, agreeable that the pay should be retrospective is not a correct assumption. That is why the consultations are having to take place now.
    Mr. H. Morrison: In view of the rather long-drawn-out nature of this matter, and the fact that the Secretary of State did not handle it particularly well, although I realise that consultations with the local police authorities must go on, will the hon. Member urge upon the Secretary of State that, having got so far, and it being perfectly clear that the Government are morally committed to the principle of back pay, he should do all he can to hurry this matter along, otherwise there is bound to be a sense of injustice among the police?
    Mr. Deedes: I accept the need for urgency which the right hon. Gentleman stresses, but he knows quite well that there must be consultation at this stage. The object should be to conclude it as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Anthony Greenwood: In view of the fact that members of the fire services and probation services are affected in the same way as the police, can the hon. Member say whether he proposes to hold consultations with representatives of those services as well? Will he welcome any approach from them upon this issue?
    Mr. Deedes: That is a separate question, which I should like to look into.

    Police Interviews (School Children)
    Mr. Lindgrenasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will issue a circular to local police authorities advising them to instruct police officers not to interview and take written statements from school children on school premises and during school hours without a parent of such children being given an opportunity of being present.
    Mr. Deedes: The procedure in individual forces is a matter for the chief officer of police concerned, but my right hon. and gallant Friend understands that it is the normal practice to interview children in the presence of the parent or guardian, unless there are good reasons to the contrary. He does not think that any special advice on this point is necessary.
    Mr. Lindgren: Is the Joint Under-Secretary not aware that in the county of Northampton it is common practice for the police to interview a child of 10 or 11 years of age in the company of the headmaster of the school? Does he think that a youngster of 10 or 11 years of age is competent to handle interrogation of that sort with the headmaster and the police, particularly when a written statement is taken down by the police and the youngster has then to sign it?
    Mr. Deedes: As I said, my right hon. Friend's understanding is that the normal practice is for the parent to be present, and I would say that any instance which the hon. Member has in mind is exceptional.

    Prisons (Overcrowding and Understaffing)
    Mr. K. Thompsonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that there is evidence that overcrowding and understaffing are factors in recent attacks by prisoners on prison warders; and if he will cause a prison-by-prison investigation to be made so that the load is evenly distributed until ameliorative measures can be made effective.
    Mr. Deedes: While it is true that both understaffing and overcrowding aggravate
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    the difficulties of administration, my right hon. and gallant Friend is not aware that either has directly contributed to any recent assault by a prisoner on an officer in any of the 19 cases of assaults on officers which Governors have considered serious enough to report to the Commissioners since 1st January last. If the hon. Member will let my right hon. and gallant Friend know which particular attacks he has in mind, he will be happy to look into the circumstances more closely. The allocation of prisoners and staff to prisons is under continuous adjustment to ensure an even distribution of resources.
    Mr. Thompson: Is my hon. Friend aware that discipline in an overcrowded prison is virtually impossible, and that certainly no good can be done to the prisoners in the reformative sense in a prison which is so overcrowded that the small staff has no possible chance of helping individual prisoners? Will he therefore try to arrange as even a distribution of prisoners as possible?
    Mr. Deedes: I accept that. If he will let us know which particular cases of assault he has in mind, we will be very glad to look into them.

    Prison Service (Recruitment)
    Mr. K. Thompsonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what further proposals he has for the improvement of recruiting into the prison service.
    Mr. Deedes: The issue of a new pamphlet, of which I am sending the hon. Member a copy, will be followed up by the display of posters in employment exchanges and elsewhere. Further display advertisements will be inserted in the Press. The hon. Member is no doubt aware that an increase of pay was announced four months ago.
    Mr. Thompson: All concerned with the prison services will be grateful to my hon. Friend for what he is doing to try to improve recruitment in them, but will he assure the House that he will continue this process as vigorously as he can?
    Mr. Deedes: Yes, I give that assurance.

  EDUCATION

    Essays (Political Subjects)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Education what action he has taken regarding a circular dated 12th July, 1956, issued by the Herefordshire County Council to the heads and staffs of educational institutions and youth clubs, a copy of which has been sent to him, giving particulars of the annual essay competition sponsored by the League of Empire Loyalists offering prizes of £20, £10 and £5 and a school cup for essays on subjects which are expressed in terms of political bias.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Mr. Dennis Vosper): None, Sir.
    Mr. Brockway: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this organisation is largely composed of ex-Fascists who have in turn disturbed meetings of the Prime Minister, Father Huddlestone and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)? Is he further aware that the subjects which have been distributed by the education authority include the following—"The Case Against Scuttle" and "Why Britain should Stand Firm in Cyprus, Singapore and other Places"? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Even if that is applauded by hon. Members opposite, does the Parliamentary Secretary regard those as suitable for distribution among our schoolchildren as subjects for essays?
    Mr. Vosper: The Question asked whether my right hon. Friend would interfere in this particular matter, and he feels that it should be left to the discretion of the local authority and to the good sense of the headmasters. For that reason, without commenting upon the issue involved, he does not think that he should intervene with the local authority.

    Greenwich Royal Naval School (Grant)
    Dr. Kingasked the Minister of Education whether he will increase the grant at present paid to the Greenwich Royal Naval School in order that this school may continue to provide free education for all its pupils.
    Mr. Vosper: I have nothing to add to the Answer which I gave to the hon.
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    Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) on 23rd July.
    Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that, under Section 100 of the Education Act, he can make grants to cover the whole of the fees and expenses for any education facility in the country, and that if this school had been a private school he could have made a special agreement with it, or it could have become a direct grant school or even a controlled school? If he really believes in free secondary education, will he use this Act of Parliament to save this unique free public school?
    Mr. Vosper: That is a very different question, as I think the hon. Gentleman understands. The grant which has been given to it over a number of years is really a nominal grant, and to do what he wants would mean that there would be an increase in that grant to many times its present level. This problem could not be considered in isolation from those of many other schools equally affected. For that reason my right hon. Friend considered, with reluctance, that he could not increase the grant at the present time.

    Grammar School, Feltham
    Mr. Hunterasked the Minister of Education whether he will give an approximate date when the building of a new grammar school for the Feltham area of Middlesex will commence.
    Mr. Vosper: I cannot say. The Middlesex Local Education Authority has not proposed the inclusion of such a project in a building programme.

    St. James School, Blackburn (Dining Room)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Minister of Education whether he is aware that at St. James School, Blackburn, school meals have to be served from a boys' cloakroom 9 feet by 18 feet where 75 boys have to hang their coats, that washing-up has to be done by five dinner helpers in one small sink in this same cloakroom and meals are served on the children's desk in four classrooms; and, in view of the fact that these conditions have been condemned by Her Majesty's Inspectors, why he has refused to give approval for the erection of a dining room at this school.
    Mr. Vosper: The local education authority were informed on 24th July that my right hon. Friend agreed to the provision in the 1957–58 building programme both of a kitchen and a dining room at this school.
    Mrs. Castle: I thank the Parliamentary Secretary for the concession that has been made since I raised this matter with him, but is he aware that, by still refusing to include this scheme in the current year's programme, he is forcing the staff and the children at this school to continue to live and work in these highly unsatisfactory conditions, and that these boys will still have to survive a Lancashire winter hanging up their coats in a wet kitchen?
    Mr. Vosper: I realise that. It was for that reason that, when the hon. Lady saw me on 19th July, I arranged that this project should be included in the very next programme. More than that I am afraid I cannot do.

    Works of Art (Purchase)
    Mr. Haymanasked the Minister of Education what advice he proposes to give to local education authorities on the purchase of works of art by promising young artists; and to what extent such expenditure incurred by them will rank for Government grant.
    Mr. Vosper: My right hon. Friend does not think local education authorities require any special advice from him on this matter. If they can save money in other directions, he will recognise for grant reasonable expenditure on works of art for schools and colleges.
    Mr. Hayman: I thank the Minister for that very modified sanction for local education authorities. May I ask him to bear in mind that the policy of the Minister is striking seriously at a group of highly specialised teachers, who will be thrown out of work, and will he therefore modify the policy which he has recently adumbrated?
    Mr. Vosper: We are always prepared to examine each of these cases, but I think the policy of concentrating art courses has much to commend it on grounds other than of economy. I do not think the hon.
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    Member is right in suggesting that these teachers will be unable to find other employment in the education service.

    Police Interviews (School Children)
    Mr. Lindgrenasked the Minister of Education whether he is aware of the practice in certain schools of the Northampton Local Education Authority to permit the interview of, and the taking of written statements from, children by police officers on school premises and in school hours without a parent of the children being present or being given the opportunity to be present; and whether he will advise the Northamptonshire Local Education Authority that such practices should be discontinued.
    Mr. Vosper: I am aware of one case of this kind. The circumstances were exceptional, and my right hon. Friend does not propose to issue any advice on the subject to the local education authority.
    Mr. Lindgren: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reply. With respect, may I contradict that this is an exceptional case? I agree that the case which has been under discussion with the education authority is exceptional. But, while not universal, the practice is common in Northamptonshire for both the chief constable and chief educational officer to take the view that the headmaster is the protector of the child during school hours, and is not that a fallacy in an interrogation of this kind where the parents have responsibility for a child?
    Mr. Vosper: I said that I was aware of only one case, and I should be pleased to learn of any other cases of which the hon. Gentleman has knowledge. My hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department said, in answer to an earlier Question, that it was only in very exceptional cases that the parents would not be called in. I hope that that will be so in the future.
    Mr. Jennings: Would not my hon. Friend agree that a head teacher is acting within his rights—irrespective of what is said by the local authority—in refusing permission for a policeman to interview a child under such circumstances within the precincts of the school?
    Mr. Vosper: I agree. In the case I have in mind the headmaster gave his permission.

    Farther Education (Contributions)
    Mr. E. Fletcherasked the Minister of Education if, in view of the serious effects it will have on further education, he will withdraw Circular No. 307.
    Mr. Vosper: I have nothing to add to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Dodds) on 16th July and to the statement my right hon. Friend made in the debate last Wednesday.
    Mr. Fletcher: Is the Minister aware that, apart from other objections to this Circular which have been voiced in this House, this is the first time the Ministry has issued a directive to local authorities requiring the attaching of a specific fee to a particular course? Is not that a most undesirable interference with the initiative and independence of local authorities in the field of education?
    Mr. Vosper: I cannot accept that. As I think the hon. Gentleman knows, my right hon. Friend has been prepared to discuss this with local authorities and has done so with the London County Council. As a result of such discussions certain modifications have been made.

    School of Navigation, Southampton (Ketch)
    Mr. J. Howardasked the Minister of Education if he will authorise a grant to the School of Navigation, through the University of Southampton, in order to compensate the school for the loss of the ketch "Moyana" on her return voyage from Lisbon.
    Mr. Vosper: The school receives a direct annual grant from the Ministry. The committee has not yet asked my right hon. Friend for special assistance towards the replacement of the "Moyana," but, if they do so, he will consider their request.
    Mr. J. Howard: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Is he aware that an encouraging reply would be received with great appreciation by the people of Southampton, whose mayor is launching an appeal for the replacement of the "Moyana," and by people throughout the country who have been stirred by the seamanship and discipline shown by the youthful crew?
    Mr. Vosper: I think that the whole House would wish to sympathise in the loss of this vessel and to wish every success to the appeal. If in due course the committee approach my right hon. Friend, he will see what he can do to help.
    Dr. King: For the record, may I ask whether the Minister is aware that the cadets of this School of Navigation sailed the ketch "Moyana" on the 700-mile race from Torbay to Lisbon; beat all other competitors in the race and brought the ship within an ace of home before losing it? They brought honour to British education, and is the Minister aware that if he can associate his Department with the replacement of that ship, he will be doing honour to the Ministry?
    Mr. Vosper: I accept what the hon. Gentleman says.

    Voluntary Schools (Bank Loans)
    Mr. Allaunasked the Minister of Education if he is aware of the number of bank loans refused to the country's voluntary schools since the Government's credit restriction policy began; and if he will state the approximate additional annual cost to Catholic schools in the Salford diocese resulting from the raising of interest to its present rate on loans made to them for school building under Section 105 of the Education Act.
    Mr. Vosper: My right hon. Friend does not obtain information about the number or amount of bank loans made or refused to the managers or governors of voluntary schools. He agreed to make a loan under Section 105 of the Education Act, 1944, to the managers of the only school in the Salford diocese which have applied, but they built the school without borrowing the money.
    Mr. Allaun: But is the Minister aware that the increase of ½ per cent. in the Bank Rate has meant an extra £40 a week to be raised voluntarily in a neighbouring parish? Is not the only reason this has been avoided in Salford the past exceptional efforts by the parishioners, and is it not the case that if interest keeps at its present high rate there are limits to what can be done in this respect?
    Mr. Vosper: My right hon. Friend is aware of this problem and recently received an all-party deputation. Only last week he discussed the matter again with the right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), the leader of the deputation, to see if there was anything further that he could do about it.

  SOUTHERN RHODESIA

    Land (Discriminatory Legislation)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what action has been taken by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom under Clauses 27 to 32 of the Letters Patent for the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia and under the instruction to the Governor passed under Royal Sign Manual &c, dated 1st December, 1923, paragraph 6, with regard to discriminatory legislation and amendments to the Land Appointment Act of 1930.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Commander Allan Noble): Laws passed by the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia which apply to Africans provisions different from those applied to persons of European descent, or which amend the Land Apportionment Act, contain a Section suspending their operation until the Sovereign's pleasure has been signified. The Government of Southern Rhodesia invariably consult the Secretary of State before introducing legislation of this kind and it has never been necessary to advise the exercise of the power of disallowance.
    Mr. Brockway: I thank the hon. and gallant Gentleman for that answer. Does it imply that Her Majesty's Government have never found reason to intervene in the cases of racial discrimination and land distribution in Southern Rhodesia?
    Commander Noble: The fact that consultations invariably take place before discriminatory legislation is introduced shows that the Southern Rhodesian Government recognise that safeguards still exist. I can assure the House that the procedure for prior consultations between the Southern Rhodesian Government and Her Majesty's Government provides a full safeguard against any legislation which would be injurious to the interests of the African population.

  SWAZILAND AND BASUTOLAND

    Iron Ore and Diamond Mining (Concessions)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what negotiations are in progress for the granting of concessions for the exploitation of iron ore in Swaziland and of diamonds in Basutoland; and if he will ensure that the concessions will be for a limited period, permitting subsequent public ownership, will exclude racial discrimination among the employees, and will allow for trade union organisation and recognition.
    Commander Noble: Several concerns have shown interest in acquiring rights to mine iron ore in Swaziland, but no firm proposals have yet been received by the Swaziland Government. A grant of exclusive rights to prospect for and to mine diamonds in Basutoland was made by the Paramount Chief on 9th March, 1955, and was approved by the then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
    It is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to limit the period of concessions in order to permit subsequent public ownership. Under the Basutoland diamond agreement, the company is required to employ as few Europeans and as many Basuto as possible. It is also required as far as possible to train Basuto to replace Europeans in all capacities. The laws of both Swaziland and Basutoland provide machinery for the registration and regulation of trade unions and for the ordinary settlement of trade disputes.
    Mr. Brockway: Again I thank the hon. and gallant Gentleman for that very full reply. Is he aware of the widespread uneasiness, particularly among all the population of Swaziland, regarding concessions for iron ore development, and whether, as in the case of Bechuanaland, the ownership of the mineral rights and the decision will be in the hands of the tribal authority there?
    Commander Noble: In answer to the last part of that question, I may say that I made it quite clear last night that that is the case. I think also that, from what I said last night the hon. Member and

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    the House can have no doubts that we shall do everything possible to maintain the interests of the African people.

  CENTRAL AFRICA

    Africans (Discriminatory Treatment)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations how many reports on discriminatory treatment of Africans have been made to him by the Governor-General after having been submitted by the Standing Committee of the African Affairs Board to the Federal Parliament of Central Africa since it began to function in 1953.
    Commander Noble: None, Sir.
    Mr. Johnson: Is it not a fact that earlier this year the defence regulations were a differentiating measure? Is it not a fact that Sir John Moffatt protested in the African Affairs Board against the fact that Africans could not get commissions while Europeans do have commissions? Would the hon. and gallant Gentleman care to confirm or deny that Viscount Malvern gave some partial assurance in this matter?
    Commander Noble: The hon. Gentleman is right. I understand that a few weeks ago the Committee reported that, in its opinion, the regulations to which the hon. Gentleman has referred were a differentiating measure. After discussion the Committee withdrew its report in the light of assurances which it had been given. Thus the report was not brought officially to the attention of my noble Friend.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Anglo-Egyptian Trade
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the President of the Board of Trade what estimate he has made as to how far the regulations affecting Egyptian deposits in British banks will reduce exports to, and imports from, Egypt.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): None, Sir. But the effect of these controls will clearly be to reduce trade.
    Mr. Hughes: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that these restrictions were imposed without any conception of what they mean to British trade? Is it the case that, after hearing all this Session about the need for increasing our exports, we now appear to be indifferent, and can the right hon. Gentleman tell us how the Scottish whisky exporters who do trade with Egypt are going to get the trade?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think the House generally will recognise that these controls are necessary in existing circumstances.
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he proposes to take to increase our exports to Egypt.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: None, Sir.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the Minister aware that Egypt is a valuable market and that, while we all agree that arms should not be sent to Egypt, it is essential that we should help to solve our own trade problem by increasing exports to this country?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It would be an illusion to think that our principal preoccupation at the present time is an expansion of trade with Egypt.

    Film Production (Assistance)
    Lord Balnielasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will now make a statement on the future policy of the Government towards film production.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Yes, Sir. The Government have come to certain broad conclusions, which I propose to announce now so that film producers will know what forms of assistance they can expect in the future. In the first place, steps will be taken in due course to extend the exhibitors' quota beyond its termination in October, 1958. In the second place, the powers of the National Film Finance Corporation to make loans, which expire in March of next year, will be renewed. In the third place, a statutory scheme, comparable in purpose with the British Film Production Fund, will be brought into operation when the present voluntary scheme lapses in October, 1957.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what this means so

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    far as the British Film Production Fund is concerned? Will more money be available or less?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It will be a scheme comparable in scale to the present voluntary scheme.
    Mr. Bottomley: While expressing dissatisfaction that the announcement should be made on the last day before the Recess, may I say that, as far as can be seen at the moment, we on this side of the House welcome the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman?

    Maize
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade why the duty-free entry of maize was bound at the recent tariff negotiations at Geneva in view of the fact that it was already bound by the combined effect of the Ottawa Agreements Act and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: We agreed to bind under the G.A.T.T. the existing duty-free entry for foreign maize in response to a request for this which was made in the course of the negotiations.
    Mr. Russell: Does not this make it still more difficult at any time in the future for us to give encouragement to the growing of maize in the Commonwealth, thus saving dollars by getting rid of these international complications?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It would seem to me to make very little difference, as it was effectively bound already.

    Exports to Egypt (Armaments)
    Mr. R. Harrisasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) if he will give an assurance that he has cancelled all licences for the export of war equipment and any other vehicles or machinery or spare parts, either directly or indirectly, to Egypt;
    (2) if Licence No. 17B/6431/55, issued in 1955 for the export to Egypt of Sherman tank spare parts to the value of over £300,000, is now to be withdrawn.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: All valid export licences for the export to Egypt of arms and munitions, including armoured vehicles and parts and aircraft and aircraft engines, have been revoked. No
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    further licences are being issued for supply of these goods to Egypt.
    Mr. Harris: In view of the fact that these licences very often come to life again in a rather unobtrusive manner at a later stage when things have subsided, is it possible for the Government to make some sort of announcement, either through the Press or in this House, when the licences are revived?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: These have been effectively revoked.
    Mr. Paget: Will the Minister take note that this is something which we have been asking him to do for months and that a great deal of harm has already been done?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I am not aware of any request for the revoking of these licences.
    Mr. Robens: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what is going to happen to the large pieces of armament, namely, the two destroyers in British waters?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: In the Board of Trade I do not issue any export licences for destroyers.
    Mr. Shinwell: Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously say that he was not aware of Questions being directed to many of his colleagues on this subject of the export of arms to Egypt, including spare parts? Does not he take note of what is happening in the House? Is he so isolated from events?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I merely said that on the export licences with which I have been concerned, I have not received a request from the right hon. Gentleman.

    CYPRUS (MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY)
    Mr. F. Noel-Bakerasked the Prime Minister if, in view of the overlapping functions involved, he will now transfer to himself responsibility for the administration of Cyprus and negotiations regarding its future status from the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and for Foreign Affairs.
    The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have been asked to reply. No, Sir.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: In view of the fact that there clearly are overlapping functions which have constantly obliged the Prime Minister to take most of the major decisions over this question, would not it be for the general convenience and for the convenience of his two Departmental friends if the change were made?
    Mr. Butler: No, Sir, not in the opinion of my right hon. Friend. The relationships between foreign Governments and Her Majesty's Government are dealt with by the Foreign Office. The relationships of the Cyprus Government with Her Majesty's Government, and matters relating to its internal administration, are dealt with by the Colonial Office. My right hon. Friend is satisfied with the arrangements that have been made, and he intends to continue them.
    Mr. Donnelly: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that whenever there is an important statement on Cyprus the Prime Minister comes down to the House and makes the statement? For the convenience of hon. Members, it is very difficult to follow up that statement with the Prime Minister because, whenever one attempts to do so, he transfers the Question to one of the Departmental Ministers, and Questions to the Colonial Secretary are reached on the Order Paper only about once a quarter? Can the right hon. Gentleman and the Leader of the House not do something better to make it possible for us to ask effective Questions on Cyprus?
    Mr. Butler: It has always been normal in the course of British history for the Prime Minister of England to come in on matters of grave importance. Cyprus has on many occasions assumed that character. The Prime Minister, therefore, has answered some Questions. My right hon. Friend is fully aware of the need to serve the House and hon Members in this respect. I will draw this matter to his attention, but I am not prepared to accept the proposal put by the hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker).

    MEMBERS' CORRESPONDENCE (DELAYS)
    Mr. V. Yatesasked the Prime Minister if he is aware that some Ministers are taking two and three months to
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    reply to letters received from hon. Members; and if he will give instructions with a view to establishing a more efficient system of dealing with such correspondence.
    Mr. Butler: I have been asked to reply. No, Sir. My right hon. Friend has as recently as last month reminded all his colleagues of the need to deal promptly with correspondence with hon. Members. If the hon. Gentleman will let him know of any instances of unreasonable delay, he will look into them.
    Mr. Yates: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman, may I ask him whether he is aware that on behalf of a constituent I have addressed three letters to a Minister; that he took four months to reply to the first, five months to the second, and three and a half months to the third? The result is that I have not been given a chance to raise the matter on the Adjournment. I protest and ask the Minister to have an investigation.
    Mr. Butler: I can assure the hon. Member, not only on my own behalf as Leader of the House but also on behalf of the Prime Minister, that we ourselves strongly object to such delays in answering the correspondence of hon. Members. If the hon. Member will be good enough to let me have the examples which he has just cited, I will pass them on immediately to my right hon. Friend.
    Captain Waterhouse: Does the right hon. Gentleman think the Prime Minister will use the cane on his right hon. Friends?
    Mr. Butler: It depends which right hon. Friends they are.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Retirement Benefit Schemes
    Mr. du Cannasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the number of retirement benefit schemes which have been approved by the Inland Revenue under Sections 379 and 388, respectively, of the Income Tax Act, 1952, during each of the last five years and during each month of 1956 to the latest convenient date.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): As the Answer contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. du Cann: While thanking the Financial Secretary for that information, which I shall read tomorrow morning, may I ask him to be good enough to say under which section the greater number of schemes have been approved, first during recent months and secondly during recent weeks?
    Mr. Brooke: I am afraid that I could not give an answer about recent weeks. If my hon. Friend would read the fairly extensive figures with which I am providing him and would then write to me, I would certainly endeavour early during the Recess to give him further information.
    Following is the Answer:
    I regret that figures in the precise form asked for could not be extracted without a disproportionate expenditure of time and labour. The nearest figures available are given below.

    Schemes approved under Section 379. Income Tax Act, 1952

    Year to 30th September, 1951

    …

    458

    Year to 30th September, 1952

    …

    576

    Year to 30th September, 1953

    …

    455

    Year to 30th September, 1954

    …

    404

    Year to 30th September, 1955

    …

    331

    10 months to 31st July, 1956

    …

    355

    Schemes within Chapter 11 of Part XVII, Income Tax Act, 1952
    The following figures include both (i) schemes approved under Section 388 (1) and (ii) schemes brought to the notice of the inland Revenue which, though of a similar pattern, do not require such approval, usually because the employer is not a body corporate. The latter are thought to represent a small proportion of each total.

    Schemes of the funded type to which Section 386 (1) relates

    …

    Group Schemes Schemes relating to named individuals

    Year to 30th September, 1951

    3051

    Year to 30th September, 1952

    2520

    3594

    Year to 30th September, 1953

    2637

    5255

    Year to 30th September, 1954

    2285

    5089

    Year to 30th September, 1955

    2699

    6967

    10 months to 31st July, 1956

    2263

    5562

    Under none of the above headings are separate monthly totals available.

NIGERIA (ADMINISTRATION)
Mr. Fenner Brockway: May I raise a point of order, Mr. Speaker, of which I have given notice to you and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies?
Mr. McKay: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Has Question Time ended?
Mr. Speaker: Yes.
Mr. Brockway: The Secretary of State for the Colonies has informed the House that he intends to appoint a tribunal to examine certain matters in Nigeria. I understand that he has now found that he has no powers to appoint that tribunal over the heads of the Governments in Nigeria and that, therefore, at Arundel Castle tomorrow, the day after the House rises for the Recess, he is to seek to obtain an Order in Council giving him those powers.
The point of order I am raising is whether a Minister has the right, on the day after Parliament goes into Recess, to secure an Order in Council of this kind which the House of Commons has no opportunity to discuss.
Mr. Speaker: I could not answer that as a matter of law. That was not the point of order the hon. Member put to me. I received a telegram from the hon. Member this morning asking leave to ask a Private Notice Question because, the hon. Member stated, he had received a cablegram from the Prime Minister of Eastern Nigeria saying that the Colonial Secretary intended, by Order in Council, to make an alteration of the Constitution.
When I considered that I made inquiries as to whether or not the right hon. Gentleman did intend to alter the Constitution. I was informed that there was no such intention and, therefore, the basis of fact on which the hon. Member's Question was founded did not exist and, in those circumstances, I disallowed it. The wider constitutional question was not put to me as a point of order. I should take some time to consider that.
Mr. Brockway: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. May I add that what you have said represents what I indicated to you, but it was not until subsequent to the telegram I sent last night that I discovered that a conference at the Colonial

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Office had found another way out of the difficulty than the proposal to amend the Constitution. I came up to your office then, but it was a very late hour and all I could do was to indicate that I would raise the matter as a point of order today.
Mr. Speaker: As a matter of fact, I did not hear about that at all. I acted on the information which was at my disposal.

SEYCHELLES (MEMBERS' CORRESPONDENCE AND VISITS)
Mr. F. Noel-Baker: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to raise a matter which arises out of statements made yesterday by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of which I gave you notice and which, in my submission, touches the rights and freedoms of Members of Parliament and constitutes a threat to obstruct them in their legitimate work in the service of this House. In asking for your Ruling, may I very briefly explain how this matter has arisen?
Last March, certain British subjects were deported from Cyprus to the Island of Mahe, in the Indian Ocean. No legal proceedings of any kind were taken against them, nor were any formal charges made, but at the time of their deportation an ordinance was very hastily enacted which does give a cloak of legality to almost any action, however mediaeval it might appear to some hon. Members, which the Secretary of State, through the Governor of this Colony, might like to take in regard to the unfortunate detainees.
That ordinance, which was referred to yesterday, is the Political Prisoners (Detention) Ordinance, No. 1, 1956, passed by the Legislative Council of the Seychelles Islands. The Secretary of State has said that these detainees are now on parole and are free to move about the island and to meet anyone who happens to be there in return for an undertaking not to attempt to escape.
I have two complaints to raise on this matter. The first is that there has been interference with my correspondence and, it may be, with the correspondence of other hon. Members addressed to these British subjects in the Seychelles. I am reminded of the case brought to your
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notice in this last week by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), but this is not an exact parallel because this is a case of interference with letters going from Members of Parliament. The manner in which the correspondence has been treated is a matter of uncertainty.
My greater and graver complaint is about the threat by the Secretary of State for the Colonies yesterday that unless one of the persons detained takes the action which the Secretary of State wishes to compel him to take, an hon. Member of this House will be prevented—if necessary, it seems, by force—from seeing detainees. We have the extraordinary situation that, apparently, as soon as a Member of Parliament sets foot on that particular island those detainees will be clapped behind bars. That seems to set a precedent which would permit the Secretary of State for the Colonies to put behind bars any British subject of whose political views he disapproves on the arrival of a Member of Parliament in that territory.
Some months ago I gave notice, privately first, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that it was—and it remains—my intention to go to the Seychelles during the Recess. The Secretary of State knows perfectly well with what disposition and purpose I would go out there. He knows that I, at least, have not changed my attitude to him or to anyone else since the time when he and the Prime Minister seemed very ready to make use of my services in Nicosia.
The right hon. Gentleman has not made it plain whether this ban applies to all hon. Members of this honourable House and whether it applies to his hon. Friends. What would happen, for example, if the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) were to arrive in Mahe? The right hon. Gentleman gave no answer yesterday to my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) when he asked whether these arrangements would apply to right hon. Members of the Privy Council. Nor is it clear whether it would apply to Members of another place. If the Archbishop of Canterbury were to go out—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think that we are concerned with Members of

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another place. I hope that the hon. Member will strive to put to me more briefly the point which he wishes me to consider.
Mr. Noel-Baker: Yes, Mr. Speaker. I accept what you say and will do my very best to put this point extremely briefly.
From what the Secretary of State has said, it is not clear to whom this applies, whether it applies to all hon. Members in this House or applies only to myself and, if so, why the distinction is being drawn between a Member of the House of Commons and members of the public who, apparently, are to have perfectly free access to these detainees. I respectfully suggest that this is a matter which affects the ability of Members of Parliament to carry out their work.
The only reason given for this decision was given by the Secretary of State yesterday when he said that he feared that if I went to Mahe I might become
"a genuine but rather simple bearer of ammunition."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August. 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1481.]
for the Archbishop's propaganda.
I conclude by saying that I hope that, on reflection, the Secretary of State will now think it right to withdraw that monstrously unfair, totally untrue and very ungenerous imputation.
Mr. Speaker: I have listened with great care to what the hon. Member has said and I will try to distil out of it those elements which concern me and the House. I have no concern either with the legality or the wisdom of the action taken by the Government. That is a matter which is not for me. The first complaint of the hon. Member was about the interference with correspondence from hon. Members. The law on that subject, as I understand, is that letters can be detained and opened by a warrant of a Secretary of State. There is a long series of Acts on this subject, the principal one being that passed in 1912. The fact that that Act was passed by this House, and that in it there is no exception for letters addressed either to or from Members of Parliament, shows that there can be no question of Privilege involved in that.
The second complaint of the hon. Member was that some action taken by the Secretary of State will prevent him from having an interview in Mahe with certain persons. The only question for
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me is whether or not that raises, prima facie, a case of Privilege.
I would remind the hon. Gentleman that the Privilege of the House of Commons is the Privilege of the whole House and not of the individual Members constituting it, and that this House will intervene to protect an hon. Member in his access to this place and protect him from molestation or threat in the course of his Parliamentary duties. I can find no precedent whatever for the doctrine that to prevent a Member of Parliament going, on his own volition, to see anybody who is in custody, is a breach of Privilege.
There has never been such a case. Had the House instructed the hon. Member to go out and speak to the detainees, very different considerations would arise, whether he went as an individual or as a member of a committee, with the orders of this House. I do not find that Privilege ever has extended to any obstacle put in the way of an hon. Member going to a place to which the ordinary citizen of the country may not have access, or to see persons.
While I pass no comment whatsoever—it would be improper for me to do so—on the legality or the wisdom of the action taken, I do not find that it comes within the law of Privilege. The hon. Member has not established to my satisfaction a prima facie case of breach of Privilege which would entitle him to priority for any Motion.
Mr. Noel-Baker: While thanking you. Mr. Speaker, with great respect for that Ruling, may I ask whether it is not, in fact, molesting and threatening me in the execution of my duties that this action should be taken by the Secretary of State? Have you borne in mind, in giving your Ruling, that this action is apparently a threat directed to all hon. Members of the House?
Mr. Speaker: I find nothing of a menacing character in that.
Mr. J. Griffiths: May I raise two points with you, Mr. Speaker? The first is that, as I understand, my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) has alleged that letters which he had written to an island in the Pacific, a British territory for which we are responsible, have been interfered with. Is that not an interference with a Member of

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Parliament carrying out his duty in an area in which the authority of this House runs?
The second point is whether, in the course of the debate last evening, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, unwittingly or otherwise, made a reference to my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon which can be construed as a suggestion that the purpose of his visit was to foment discord and disorder. In view of my hon. Friend's record in Cyprus, which is known to hon. Members on both sides of the House, ought not that reflection to be removed before the House rises for the Recess?
Mr. Speaker: The second point raised by the right hon. Gentleman is a matter for debate and not for me. In the interference with the hon. Member's letters there is no breach of Privilege, because the House has itself assented to the Act which gives the Postmaster-General this power, on express warrant by a Secretary of State. I cannot find any breach of Privilege in that.
Mr. S. Silverman: I would respectfully submit for your consideration, Mr. Speaker, on the point raised by my hon. Friend, this observation: it has been the habit for very many years for hon. Members of the House of Commons, and, indeed, for Members of another place, to use the long vacation for informing themselves more closely and intimately of matters with which the House of Commons is directly concerned. Many hon. Members have used the long vacation to go to places so that, when next called upon to exercise and perform their duties in this House with regard to those places, they might do so with the information so acquired.
If a Member of this House—this, I understand, to be the complaint of my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker)—announces his intention to go to the Seychelles and there to interview a man who is at this moment on that island and at liberty, free to move about and free to speak, and is told by the Secretary of State that not merely he but any other Member of Parliament—including, I gather, a Privy Councillor—would equally be prevented, even if, in order to prevent him talking, a man now at liberty would have to be imprisoned in order to prevent the conversation
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from taking place, I should have thought that that was the clearest possible indication by the Secretary of State that he proposes to prevent Members of this House from doing their obvious duty.
Mr. Speaker: As regards acts and visits by hon. Members, undertaken on their own volition, hon. Members are in exactly the same position as those citizens for whom they assist to make the laws. The hon. Member for Swindon is suggesting that the action taken against him is illegal or improper. It may be. I express no opinion on that, but it is not a breach of Privilege.
Mr. W. Griffiths: I want to return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) about the handling of letters He said in the House last night:
"A letter which I wrote to the Archbishop the other day had been forwarded to Cyprus for consideration by the authorities."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August. 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1457.]
The Minister last night did not inform the House of his point of view on this matter at all. Quite apart from any opinion about the monstrous procedure, it did remind me that in another connection you, Mr. Speaker, were good enough to consider a matter which I raised with you in 1954, whether the correspondence of hon. Members was privileged when it was divulged by a Government Department to a third party. I agree that it is not a strictly comparable position.
I want to remind the Lord Privy Seal, who took some part in those proceedings—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Wait a moment; this is relevant—that the outcome of those discussions was that, following a Question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Chetwynd) to the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), the Government gave an undertaking that in cases of this kind, before the correspondence from an hon. Member was passed to any other party, the hon. Member would be consulted before such action was taken. In my view, the Government and the Minister are in clear breach of that undertaking given to the House of Commons by the then Prime Minister.
Mr. Speaker: The two occasions are not the same at all. They raise quite

1601
different issues, The issue put to me this morning was that the opening and detention of letters either to or from Members of Parliament was a breach of Privilege and I have ruled sufficiently clearly that letters of Members of Parliament are in exactly the same position as the letters of other citizens of this country, under the Act which was assented to by this House. The other matter is entirely different.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: I would make an appeal to the House. I have ruled clearly on this matter. We have a very important debate coming on. I hope that nothing more will be said.
Mrs. Castle: I want to raise a new point with you, Mr. Speaker, arising out of your Ruling that when it is a question of a Member of Parliament paying a visit on his own volition he is in no different position from any other member of the public. Have we not in this instance a case of inverted Privilege? Is not the Colonial Secretary saying that a Member of Parliament shall be discriminated against and shall receive different treatment from a member of the public? Is not my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) claiming the same rights as any member of the public who is free to talk to the Archbishop?
Mr. Speaker: I think I have answered that. I think that the position of an hon. Member is the same as that of other citizens of the country. I can find no question of Privilege in this at all.
Mr. F. Noel-Baker: With the greatest possible respect, Mr. Speaker, there is a distinction, but as it seems plain that I cannot pursue the matter at the moment, and as I should like to meet the convenience of the House, I beg to give notice that, at the earliest opportunity, I shall put a Motion on the Order Paper, in respect of which I hope that I shall have the support of some of my hon. Friends.
Mr. Speaker: That will be perfectly proper conduct. All I have to deal with is the procedural question of whether the hon. Member's Motion should be taken now.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Heath.]

SUEZ CANAL
12.21 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): I must, first, thank the House for its consideration in postponing this debate and, indeed, hon. Members in all parts of the House for the consideration which they have shown since the recent events have taken place.
I am sorry that I am still not in a position to make the full statement that I should have liked to make, but discussions between the United States of America, France and ourselves are still proceeding. The House will understand that it is, therefore, not possible for me to declare their final outcome yet, but if it should prove possible my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary will make a statement in the concluding stages of the debate. As the House will understand, I cannot give an undertaking, but, naturally, we should wish to do so if it is possible in any way.
I am sure that the House will feel with me that it is necessary and desirable that full time should be taken with our Allies for all the aspects of this international problem to be considered and agreed while the three Foreign Ministers are in London. Meanwhile, there are certain observations which I should make to the House about the situation.
First, I think it is true to say that the cause for the anger and alarm felt, not only here but among the Governments and peoples of the democratic world, at the action of the Egyptian Government, is due to the special character of the Canal. It is right, therefore, that the House should be reminded of some aspects of this.
As the world is today, and as it is likely to be for some time to come, the industrial life of Western Europe literally depends upon the continuing free navigation of the Canal as one of the great international waterways of the world. I need give the House only one example. Last year, nearly 70 million tons of oil passed through the Canal, representing about half the oil supplies of Western Europe. Traffic through the Canal moved at the rate of 40 ships a day and amounted to 154 million tons of shipping—prodigious figures. Nor does this traffic affect the West alone. Australia, India,

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Ceylon and a large part of South-East Asia transport the major proportion of their trade, or a large proportion of their trade, through the Canal.
Therefore, it is with these reflections in mind that I must repeat the carefully considered sentence which I used in the House on Monday last, if I may quote it again:
"No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th July, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 923.]
That is still our position, and it must remain so.
However, that is not all the argument. The Egyptian Government have certain obligations in respect of the Canal. They are laid down in two principal instruments which I must mention. First, there is the Concession, which consists of a series of Agreements over the years between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company. The Concession defines the rights and status of the Suez Canal Company and the obligations of the Egyptian Government towards it. It is interesting to note that these were endorsed by the Egyptian Government as recently as 10th June this year, when a formal financial Agreement was concluded between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company.
This Agreement—made only a few weeks ago—was to continue in force until the end of the Company's Concession. That was in accord with the broadcast which was made on 17th November, 1954, by Colonel Nasser himself. He then said, according to our reports, that there remained only fourteen years until the end of the Canal Company's Concession. He added that good relations existed between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company. The Egyptian Government, he told us, had full confidence in the attitude of the Company and was sure that the latter would do everything to help the Egyptian Government in its task.
These undertakings are now torn up, and one can have no confidence—no confidence—in the word of a man who does that.
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The second instrument is the well-known Suez Canal Convention of 1888, which lays down the vital principle that the Canal should always be open in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinction of flag. The Convention was signed by nine Powers, including the Sultan of Turkey on behalf of the Khedive of Egypt.
At this point I would ask the House to note, what is not generally known, that there is a link between the Convention of 1888 and the concession of the Canal Company. The Canal Company is specifically mentioned in Articles 2 and 14 of the 1888 Convention. Article 2 deals with the engagements of Egypt towards the Suez Canal Company as regards the freshwater canal, well known to many hon. Members.
Article 3 goes on to state that the contracting parties undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings and works of the maritime Canal and of the freshwater canal. Moreover, our own Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 states that the two Governments recognise that the Canal is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance and expresses the determination of both parties to uphold the Convention of 1888. Now, Sir, I ask: how can this be reconciled with the Egyptian Government's action against the Suez Canal Company?
It is the free navigation of the Canal which is the solemn principle contained in the 1888 Convention, as the House well knows. That is not all, because free navigation does not depend only on the absence of discrimination or the absence of physical interference with the traffic in the Canal. The efficient functioning of the Canal, and its ability to deal with existing and future traffic, is also of decisive importance to us all.
The Canal is at present in need, as some hon. Members will probably know, of much new capital expenditure to enable it to cope with the increasing demands made upon it. Traffic through the Canal at present is increasing at a rate of about 7 per cent. a year. Last year, more than 10 million tons more oil went through the Canal than in 1954, and the size of the ships which are now using the Canal, as the House knows, is constantly growing.

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Therefore, the Company has, over the years, been accumulating capital to enable it to carry out the work of increasing the capacity of the Canal. That is, of course, of benefit to all of its users, and in the Company's latest programme of improvements—which has already begun—two new by-passes are to be built, and the depth of the Canal is to be increased to enable it to handle larger ships.
This action will cost about £20 million. It will greatly increase the capacity of the Canal. But even this programme will not be enough, for, in the next ten to fifteen years, a further huge expansion will be necessary, because during that period the traffic through the Canal is expected to increase several times.
Now, Sir, the reserves of the Company and the revenues from shipping would have been earmarked to finance these needs. But Colonel Nasser has now announced his intention to divert these revenues from this vital international waterway to build a dam in Egypt. He has declared that the Company is to be nationalised, and its revenues seized, because the United States and ourselves would not let him have enough money with which to build this dam. I know it is true that he has expressed his intention to compensate the shareholders on the basis of the latest valuation of the shares, but the House may well like to ask, in view of Colonel Nasser's record about some other promises, how this is to be done.
It would cost about £70 million, I am told, to carry through this compensation. The net annual revenue of the Canal, after providing for taxation and providing for reserves, as is at present done, is only about £10 million. Clearly, it would be impossible, with this sum, to compensate the shareholders, to build the dam and to develop the Canal—yet the Canal must be developed if this international waterway is to serve its purpose. Here is a situation which neither Her Majesty's Government nor, I believe, the other maritime Powers, can accept, if they are to continue to live by means of the sources of supply which come through the Canal.
And there are some other considerations which we cannot ignore. Is it possible for us to believe the word of the present Egyptian Government to the
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extent of leaving it in their power alone to decide whether these supplies shall reach the Western World through the Canal? I truly think that we have done everything in our power during the years—sometimes under criticism—by our actions and by our Treaty, to show our good will. I think that we have. Our reward has been a broken faith, and broken promises. We have been subjected to a ceaseless barrage of propaganda. This has been accompanied by intrigue, and by attempts at subversion in British territories.
Colonel Nasser's arbitrary action in breach of Egypt's solemn undertakings, many of them recently given, without previous consultation or previous notice-reveals the nature of the régime with which we have to deal; and I think that the action of the Egyptian Government in compelling the Canal Company employees to remain at their posts under threat of imprisonment is certainly, to say the least, a violation of human rights.
Sir, in these circumstances, and in view of the uncertain situation created by the actions of the Egyptian Government, Her Majesty's Government have thought it necessary—and I wanted to take this first opportunity to tell the House—to take certain precautionary measures of a military nature. Their object is to strengthen our position in the Eastern Mediterranean and our ability to deal with any situation that may arise. These measures include the movement from this country of certain Navy, Army and Air Force units, and the recall of a limited number of Section A and A.E.R. Category I reservists, and also a limited number of officers from the Regular Army Reserve of Officers.
In addition, we shall have to recall—and I regret this, but it is inevitable owing to the categories in which they fall—a strictly limited number of men who are specialists, and skilled in certain essential tasks. These men are in section B of the Regular Army Reserve and A.E.R. Category II. Their recall will necessitate the issue of a Proclamation. I repeat that I regret it. Perhaps I could say to the House that we have been considering, not at all in connection with this, whether legislation should not have been begun some time ago to put these men in the other category to which, I think, they truly belong. That has not been done

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and, therefore, I thought that I should tell the House at once what our intention was, and that we would have to do this.
Now let me state the solutions which we seek for the future of the Canal, because it is of that that the House wants to hear. Our policy, and, I think it is true to say, that of virtually all the other maritime Powers towards the Canal, has always been based on two fundamental principles: first, the freedom and security of transit through the Canal—
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Not always.
The Prime Minister:—and, secondly, the efficiency and economy of its operation. I know the difficulties that occur, but I say that the principles upon which our policy has been based—I fully understand the hon. Member's feelings on the Israel issue, but this is slightly, to put it mildly, in a different category.
Mr. Silverman: Why?
The Prime Minister: Why? This is a proposal to take over the Canal, and to make its future use entirely dependent on the Government of Egypt.
Mr. Silverman: I was not questioning that, but the right hon. Gentleman chose to use the word "always". He said that we have always said that the first principle was to maintain free transit through the Canal. I am pointing out to him that "always" is an overstatement; that there was one very important recent incident when he did not observe it, and that his position today would be a great deal stronger in the world if he had applied the principle always.
The Prime Minister: I am quite ready to argue that. It has always been our principle. It was taken, as our principle, by the then Government to the United Nations and there dealt with. The principle was not carried through. I say that this matter is of a wider and, so far as the nation is concerned, much more serious character than that one. The late Government did take the action of going to the United Nations, and made no progress. If the hon. Gentleman asks why we do not go there, perhaps he will consider what I have just said. I am quite aware of that case, but I do not think that it affects the fundamental issue of the whole future life of the Canal, with
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which we now have to deal. On that, at least, I hope we can agree.
I think it is also true to say that the level of dues, broadly speaking, charged by the Company, particularly in recent years has been closely related to the cost of the service provided—rather to the cost than to its value, if I may put it that way.
The Company, although it is registered in Egypt, is, of course, an international organisation of the highest importance and standing, and it has ensured that the Canal was administered both with regard to the interests of international shipping and to those of Egypt herself. Naturally, in any future arrangement for the Canal the legitimate interests of Egypt would have to be safeguarded. In fact, Egypt is today represented on the Board of the Company—or until a few days ago, perhaps I should say—together with us and France, the United States and the Netherlands. The extent of the Company's international character is sometimes forgotten.
The principle of free navigation in peace and war is laid down in solemn international instruments to which the Egyptian Government is a party. It has been observed, let me say, by the Western Allies even in two world wars. For instance, in the last war, when the effective control of the Suez Canal rested in the hands of His Majesty's Government alone, a search of cargoes in the Canal ports was instituted only for the purpose of ensuring that no damage was caused to the actual waterway. That was the action we took then and no attempt was made to seize cargoes in the Canal or its ports of access, even when they consisted of contraband. How could we look to the Egyptian Government alone to maintain these principles so scrupulously?—and if they are not maintained the life and the commerce of the whole free world is constantly at risk.
For all these reasons, I suggest to the House that the freedom and security of transit through the Canal, without discrimination, and the efficiency of its operation can be effectively ensured only by an international authority. It is upon this we must insist. It is for this that we are working in negotiation at this moment with other Powers deeply concerned. Nothing less than this can be acceptable to us.
12.42 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: While the House will, of course, be a little disappointed that the Prime Minister was unable to tell us about the outcome of the talks now taking place, I am sure that we all appreciate and accept the reasons why he could not do so. I think, too, that we are all grateful to him for the statement he has made about the attitude of Her Majesty's Government to Colonel Nasser's action.
For a long time, the Opposition has been critical of the Government's policy in the Middle East. We carried those criticisms so far as to divide the House on the Adjournment on 7th March, and I must say, at the start, that we do not feel that in the months that have elapsed since then there has been any great improvement in the Government's policy. We have criticised from time to time the attitude of the Government on the question of the balance of arms in the Middle East, and I think that many of us feel that in the matter of the Aswan Dam the vacillations that have taken place are certainly a subject for criticism.
But I do not propose today to develop these criticisms of the Government. May be, in the future, in a calmer situation, a further examination, a post-mortem, should take place, but I am sure that today what the country wants to hear about is the implication of Colonel Nasser's action and what should be done about it. Moreover, while I have not hesitated to express my disagreement with the Government in their policy in the past, I must make it abundantly plain that anything that they have done or not done in no way excuses Colonel Nasser's action in seizing the Canal.
I think that it is worth spending a moment or two on the question of why we do take such strong exception to this action. I know that some hon. Members may say, "It is quite simple; it is an arbitrary act, a sudden act, something that involves various dangers for us," but we have to recognise that the Egyptians are putting their point of view and that this point of view is being listened to elsewhere in the world. It is extremely important that the exact reasons why we resent and object to this action should be made clear at the start.
The Egyptian argument is perfectly clear. It is that this is an Egyptian
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company and that as the Government of Egypt they are perfectly entitled to nationalise any company they wish to nationalise, provided that they pay compensation; as regards the right of transit through the Canal they have given assurances that they regard it as necessary to observe the 1888 Convention. I should like to give my answers, as I see it, to that case put forward by the Egyptian Government.
First, so far as my hon. and right hon. Friends are concerned at any rate, we certainly do not say that the act of nationalisation in itself is wrong. Nor would we say that the act of nationalising a foreign-owned company was necessarily wrong, provided that the compensation was reasonable and fair. I must say, in passing, that I think we can have reasonable doubts about whether, in fact, the Egyptian Government, in this instance, will be in a position to pay compensation. I think that some objection might be taken to the termination of the concession prematurely. I do not know whether or not this is illegal—I am not a lawyer, and I offer no opinion—but I certainly would not even stress that as the main point to which we object, provided again that proper compensation is paid.
The real objections, it seems to me, are three. In the first place, as the Prime Minister has rightly emphasised, this is not an ordinary Company, conducting ordinary activities. It is a Company controlling an international waterway of immense importance to the whole of the rest of the world. It is, therefore, bound to be a matter of international concern when it changes hands. Hitherto, it has been under the control and ownership very largely of the States using it, of the maritime Powers, and it is quite true, as the Prime Minister has said, also, that while I think that the interests of Egypt have been considered and taken into account, and, as Colonel Nasser has recently said, relations between the Company and the Egyptian Government have been amicable, nevertheless the Company has certainly taken care of the interests of the user countries.
Now the ownership and control of the Company is to be transferred to a single Power, to the hands of one State controlling it and, therefore, in a position even more than before to decide how the

1611
Canal shall be run. It may be said there is no need for anxiety because we have had these assurances about the 1888 Convention. I am bound to say that it seems to me the strongest reason for having doubts in our minds as to whether we can accept those assurances has been the behaviour of the Egyptian Government in stopping Israeli ships from going through, and equally important—indeed, even more important—the clear defiance of the Resolution of the United Nations condemning this action, passed in September, 1951.
The second reason why I think we must take strong exception to this is that any confidence we might have had in an action of this kind was profoundly shaken by the manner in which it was carried out. It was done suddenly, without negotiation, without discussion, by force, and it was done on the excuse that this was the way to finance the Aswan Dam project. Colonel Nasser himself, at the conclusion of his speech a week ago, said:
"Thus, you will see that our wealth has been restored to us and that we shall not look forward to the Anglo-American financial aid amounting to 75 million dollars because we shall henceforth get from the profits of the Suez Canal the sum of 100 million dollars every year and in five years we shall secure 500 million dollars."
That, in effect, means that he is proposing to take the whole of the gross revenues of the Canal—almost all of them transit dues—and divert them for the purpose of the Aswan Dam. Yet he has promised compensation. How can he at one and the same time both keep the Canal going, spend the necessary money on the repairs, extensions and re-construction, pay the compensation or service the compensation loan to the shareholders, and also find money for the Aswan Dam?
Like the Prime Minister, I have tried to work out the finances of this, and I would only say that so far as I can see, looking at the figures, the most that Colonel Nasser could do, and even then at the expense of diverting reserves which ought to be used for the Canal, might amount to about £5 million a year—at any rate, quite inadequate and absurd in relation to the cost of the dam. But there is, of course, one way out for Colonel Nasser, and that is that he can put the charges up. He can increase the transit
1612
dues. So the whole implication of his speech is precisely that, that he intends to make the users pay more than they have been paying before.
I do not think one can deny that this action is, first, to some extent a threat to access to the Canal in the light of what the Egyptians have done about the Israeli ships; secondly, a warning that he may not maintain the Canal adequately; and, thirdly, a very definite implication that higher charges will be levied. As the Prime Minister has said, this is serious not only for us but for every maritime nation in the world; East and West, all are involved.
My third reason for thinking that we must object to this is that we cannot ignore—and this is a matter that the Prime Minister did not touch upon, no doubt for good reasons—the political background and the repercussions of the whole of this episode in the Middle East. We cannot forget that Colonel Nasser has repeatedly boasted of his intention to create an Arab empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The French Prime Minister, M. Mollet, the other day quoted a speech of Colonel Nasser's and rightly said that it could remind us only of one thing—of the speeches of Hitler before the war.
Colonel Nasser has certainly made a number of inflammatory speeches against us and his Government have continually attempted subversion in Jordan and other Arab States; he has persistently threatened the State of Israel and made it plain from time to time that it is his purpose and intention to destroy Israel if he possibly can. That, if ever there was one, is a clear enough notice of aggression to come.
The fact is that this episode must be recognised as part of the struggle for the mastery of the Middle East. That is something which I do not feel that we can ignore. One may ask, "Why does it involve the rest of the Middle East?" It is because of the prestige issues which are involved here. I said something about prestige when I spoke in the Middle East debate some months ago, and I must refer to it now, because prestige has quite considerable effects. If Colonel Nasser's prestige is put up sufficiently and ours is put down sufficiently, the effects of that in that part of the world will be that our

1613
friends desert us because they think we are lost, and go over to Egypt.
I have no doubt myself that the reason why Colonel Nasser acted in the way that he did, aggressively, brusquely, suddenly, was precisely because he wanted to raise his prestige in the rest of the Middle East. He wanted to show the rest of the Arab world—"See what I can do." He wanted to challenge the West and to win. He wanted to assert his strength. He wanted to make a big impression. Quiet negotiation, discussion around a table about nationalising the Company would not produce this effect.
It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war. We must not underestimate the danger of the effect which this may have on the other Arab States. Indeed, I would venture to say that this is probably the most important immediate effect that it may have, and I am thinking particularly of Iraq, whose King is, I think, still a visitor in this country, and which is, of course, an ally of this country. I am thinking of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
It has been said in many quarters that this may lead other Arab States to nationalise the oil concerns. I personally do not regard that as the major danger. As far as we are concerned, we are getting our oil chiefly from Persia and Kuwait. I do not think that there is much danger of action in Persia, and, as for Kuwait, it seems to me that, equally, an arbitrary act by the Sheikh is not a thing that we have seriously to worry about.
The danger is much more of a political kind. The danger is that a Government which is friendly to us in Iraq, and can be relied on to a very large extent to exercise restraint in the Middle East, may well be replaced by a Government of a very different complexion. I also think that in the long run this action must involve a greatly increased threat to Israel; and I must again remind hon. Members that we are pledged under the Tripartite Declaration to go to the assistance of whichever State is attacked—Israel or her Arab neighbours.
It seems to me, summing up the position, that this is really where we stand. Colonel Nasser wanted to get a loan for the Aswan Dam. Many of us have sympathy—indeed, I would go much further: I think that all of us would
1614
wish to see economic development in Egypt and energetic steps taken to raise the appallingly low standard of living in that part of the world. For what it is worth, we are told—and I am bound to say that I think there is force in this—that Colonel Nasser has pledged the cotton exports of his country to pay for arms, that because he has done that he is in great financial difficulties, and, without going into the merits of the handling of the question the loan for the dam was rejected and turned down on those grounds.
I do not think I can have much sympathy with a man who, however much one may want to help his country, as we do, spends far more than he can afford on arms which, admittedly, are for aggressive war, and then, when he is told that because of the economic situation he cannot have a loan, says to the rest of the world, "I am seizing the Canal and I am going to make you pay for the dam in that way." I am satisfied, for these reasons, that if the Western democracies and, indeed, other countries in the world, had simply accepted this and done nothing about it, highly dangerous consequences would have followed.
I turn now to consider what kind of action should be taken. I emphasize again what I have said in other speeches, namely, that this is not our affair alone. It would be ridiculous to treat ourselves as though we were the only Power involved. It is essentially a matter for all the maritime powers of the world, and we must act in concert with other nations. I warmly welcomed at the time the action of the Government in inviting the French and American Governments to discuss the matter. I mention in passing, that the United States herself depends for about 15 per cent. of her imports of oil upon the Suez Canal. All Europe is involved in this, involved in the Middle East as a whole, and involved in the Canal. India and South-East Asia are equally heavily concerned.
There has been much talk in the Press about a conference, and I myself hope that that is what these talks are going to produce. The first step is to call a conference of the nations principally concerned. The signatories of the 1888 Convention form one possible group of nations concerned. The list does, in

1615
some respects, seem to be a little out of date, including, for instance, Austria-Hungary; but, as a basis, it is a good start. I would say, at any rate, in the light of comment in the newspapers, that in my opinion it would be the most foolish step not to invite Soviet Russia to take part in this conference.
After the Prime Minister's talks with the Russian leaders and his obvious attempts to improve relations with them, I should be surprised indeed if he were to be party to a decision to exclude them from such an important conference. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that Russia herself, in 1946, declared that in her opinion the Suez Canal necessitated an international control with the participation of the Powers most concerned. That is, I think, a statement of which the Russians might perhaps be reminded.
I should like any control commission which may be set up as a result of this conference to be a United Nations agency. I am myself sure that, from the point of view of world peace and development, it is far better that it should be done under the United Nations than in some independent way. The first thing is to get the conference and prepare a plan for international control. I would say, too, in case there is any doubt about the matter, that it would, of course, be obvious common sense to invite Egypt to this conference as an ultimate signatory of the 1888 Convention.
There remains the question of what other steps can be taken. In the circumstance, and until we have, as I hope we shall have, a settlement, the economic measures taken by the Government are fully justified. I would just add one other point about them. The Prime Minister has told us—and it has been confirmed today—that all shipments of arms or war material from this country to Egypt have been suspended. But there is, of course, the possibility that arms may be going from this country to other States unfriendly to us in that part of the world. Indeed, I am told that at this moment a ship is being loaded at Liverpool with arms for the Lebanon. I would ask the Prime Minister to consider seriously whether Syria and the Lebanon at any rate, had better be covered by the same arms embargo.
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Another step which I think should be taken, and ought seriously to be considered, is to investigate what routes alternative to the Canal may be available. Here, I make a specific suggestion to the right hon. Gentleman. There has been talk of constructing a canal from the Gulf of Aqaba to Haifa. The objection has been put—I think a fairly strong objecttion—that this will take a very long time and involve very heavy capital expenditure. But there is something else which could be done along that line. It would be possible, I believe, to lay a pipeline from Aqaba to Haifa, the distance being about 250 miles, and I am told that this would take a matter of months, not years, to complete.
I should have thought that that might have been well worth considering and might be a very helpful move in all sorts of ways at the present time. The Government should, I think, also consider seriously giving assistance to ship owners to encourage them to build larger tankers which can go round the Cape. Further, though I do not want to make a great deal of this, and I am well aware of the difficulties, I do feel that the Government must once again give serious consideration to the question of arms for Israel.
Last of all, I come to a matter which cannot be ignored at this moment just before the Recess. There has been much talk in the Press about the use of force in these circumstances. First, I would say that we need to be very careful what we say on this subject. It is unwise to discuss hypothetical situations in present conditions. Obviously, there are circumstances in which we might be compelled to use force, in self-defence or as part of some collective defence measures. I do not myself object to the precautionary steps announced by the Prime Minister today; I think that any Government would have to do that, as we had to do it during the Persian crisis.
I must, however, remind the House that we are members of the United Nations, that we are signatories to the United Nations Charter, and that for many years in British policy we have steadfastly avoided any international action which would be in breach of international law or, indeed, contrary to the public opinion of the world. We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we might be denounced

1617
in the Security Council as aggressors, or where the majority of the Assembly were against us.
If Colonel Nasser has done things which are wrong in the legal sense, then, of course, the right step is to take him to the International Court. Force is justified in certain events. Indeed, if there were anything which he had done which would justify force at the moment, it is, quite frankly, the one thing on which we have never used force, namely, the stopping of the Israeli ships. We have not done that; and it would, I think, be difficult to find—I must say this—in anything else he has done any legal justification for the use of force. What he may do in the future is another matter.
I come, therefore, to this conclusion. I believe that we were right to react sharply to this move. If nothing at all were done, it would have very serious consequences for all of us, especially for the Western Powers. It is important that what we do should be done in the fullest possible co-operation with the other nations affected. We should try to settle this matter peacefully on the lines of an international commission, as has been hinted. While force cannot be excluded, we must be sure that the circumstances justify it and that it is, if used consistent with our belief in, and our pledges to, the Charter of the United Nations and not in conflict with them.
1.9 p.m.
Captain Charles Waterhouse: The House has had the privilege this afternoon of hearing two most remarkable speeches, which will be notable in the annals of this House and may have a lasting effect on the country and, in fact, on the world. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out the British case clearly. He told the House of the steps that he had already taken, which are heartening to all of us. The Leader of the Opposition, in what I think everybody will agree was an extremely courageous speech, has aligned himself with the essentials of the British attitude.
What has been said enables me to curtail a good deal of what I was going to say. There is no point in asking for fresh assurances when the assurances have already been fully given. I should, however, like to emphasise one point, which has been made clearly by both
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previous speakers, that this matter is really two-sided. There is the purely legal side and there is the other side, to which my right hon. Friend referred as human rights but which I should refer to as decency between nations.
The Leader of the Opposition said that this Egyptian action was quite different from ordinary nationalisation, and of course it is, for many reasons, but principally because this is an action taken in anger, not for any economic purpose but primarily to enhance the prestige of Nasser and to discredit Britain in the Middle East.
There are many things which are perfectly legal internally but which cannot be tolerated internationally. A quarter of a century ago, I was in the big square in Omdurman. A pedlar with only one arm—his right arm was cut off—was sitting beside the road. I was told that he had had his arm cut off as a punishment by the Khalifa in the 'nineties. Perfectly legally, of course. It was quite the right thing for a robber in those days in the Sudan to have his right arm cut off. I venture to say, however, that if Nasser today passed a decree that all Englishmen in Egypt should have their right arms cut off, we would protest very strongly and even the United States of America might send a carefully worded protest.
We are faced today with a definite challenge, and the Prime Minister and the Government have taken up that challenge in a clear and forthright way. The Prime Minister's reiterated statement that unfettered control of the Canal by Egypt or any other single Power is absolutely against the policy of this country will have complete support in every part of the House. I believe too—this is very important—that that is a condition which Colonel Nasser cannot possibly accept without complete loss of face, and this, in my view, is as it should be. There are times when one wishes to allow a strong and honourable man who has done something unwise to withdraw from that position without any loss of face. There are other times, and this is one of them, when it is necessary to show up a weak, bombastic troublemaker in his true colours before the whole world. It is not enough today that Colonel Nasser should merely withdraw his decree. By making that decree he has killed the very concession under which we have acted and under

1619
which eventually he would have come into possession of the assets of the Suez Canal.
The Prime Minister has made it very clear that there must no longer be any term of years and that for all time Britain will not tolerate the unfettered control of the Canal by any one country. That includes Egypt. How is that to be done? The Leader of the Opposition suggested one or two ways, one of which is an international conference. It is not for me or for anybody on the back benches to suggest, in detail, ways to Her Majesty's Government. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] Because we do not have the knowledge with which to do so. We can merely indicate certain thoughts.
One of the thoughts that I want to put forward is what was done by America in Panama. On either side of that waterway, America set aside a strip which was divorced from the territory of Colombia. I do not suggest that Britain or any single country should do that, but I do suggest for consideration that a strip on either side of the Suez Canal should be declared for all time to be extra-territorial to Egypt. If as a result there has to be some movement of population from that strip, although only the centres of Port Said, Port Suez and Ismailia are affected, it should be accomplished without too great inconvenience and in a reasonable time.
There is one other important point I want to raise. Colonel Nasser has asked for trouble in a big way, and an opportunity arises over this request of his for trouble to raise the important and new issue of the legal right of Egypt to be in the Sinai Peninsula. The whole of Egypt's rights in Egypt are based on the Turkish Empire. We gave Egyptian independence based on our having assumed those rights from Turkey. Under the Firman of February, 1841—it was a long time ago but it is the relevant document—a map was laid down with a clear delineation of the territory of Egypt. That map was re-published in the Italian-Egyptian Treaty of December, 1925. The Egyptian Government have since taken the precaution, I understand, of having the agreement withdrawn from their sales department in Cairo, but it exists, the map is clearly drawn, and a copy is in my hands.
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The boundary there marked is a line running north-east from Port Suez up to the Mediterranean coast just south-west of Gaza. If that line were now taken to be in fact—as, indeed, it is in law—the boundary between Egypt and Sinai it would have one very marked effect, for it would cut Egypt off completely from Israel. The effect of that on the peace of the Middle East is not to be underestimated.
I am satisfied that Colonel Nasser is on the run. He has withdrawn his threat against the liberty of foreign subjects. He has withdrawn his decree under which he would refuse permission to any ship to go through the Canal for which the dues were offered either in sterling or in francs. I am perfectly certain that he will not reimpose that condition, or try to reimpose it, this weekend.
We have got Colonel Nasser on the run and he must be kept on the run. He has hoodwinked us several times, and the consequence has not been a happy one. We are fortunate that he has been brought to book in this way, because we might easily have had this major quarrel under much worse conditions.
There are two other actions which he might have taken and undoubtedly would take if he got his way with this one. One is that he would take control of what remains of the base, on the ground that it infringed the national rights of Egypt. The other, which is, by far the most important, is that by some pretext or other he would go into the Sudan. He would get some group or small party in the Sudan to ask for his protection or help, and he would find that an excuse for going into the Sudan. It would be extremely difficult for us then to get any international support to stay him.
In my view, it is certain that Colonel Nasser's credit in Egypt must be waning today. I am positive that, as a result of this trouble, we must so play our cards that the baneful influence of Colonel Nasser disappears from the Middle East. With his plea of standing for Arab nationhood, he is in fact building up an empire for himself, or at any rate, endeavouring to do so. We have now got him on the run, and he must be kept on the run, for if we do not do so, or if we give way now at all, we shall be in for trouble far greater than that which we have faced in the past.
1.21 p.m.
Mr. Clement Davies: May I say, first of all, that we understand the limited nature of the statement made by the Prime Minister this morning, but may I also add my congratulations and thanks to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition for his speech? I find myself in almost complete agreement with everything he said. Quite obviously, he and I seem to have posed to ourselves the same questions in almost the same form. Firstly, what is the position of the Suez Canal Company? Secondly, what was the purpose and what is to be the effect of the act perpetrated by Colonel Nasser? Thirdly, what steps should be taken? Fourthly, what should be the ultimate objective?
With regard to the first question, the canal and the Canal Company are unique. This is not a case of an ordinary company holding ordinary property, nor can this therefore be regarded as a perfectly legal sovereign act by a Government in respect of property, which is undoubtedly their own or within their own territory, and which in no way affects other Governments or anybody else. Right from the outset, the canal has been regarded as an international matter. When the matter was first mooted, of course, Egypt had practically no say in it at all, because the canal was under the suzerainty of Turkey. From the moment that it was first put forward it was a matter of great international concern, because everyone realised that the whole position in the Middle East, and not only the Middle East but communications between Europe and Asia, would be affected by the canal, its ownership and use.
That being so, right from the very beginning of the negotiations, all countries, certainly all maritime countries, and particularly two of them, Britain and France, have been concerned about the making and protection of the canal, its extension and its use. Gradually, that became the concern of all the maritime countries. It was followed, as we know, in 1888 by nine of the countries agreeing to the Convention that was then made providing that this canal should be kept open, both in times of war and peace, for all shipping of whatever kind, whether war vessels or ordinary merchant vessels.
Who can therefore say that this is an ordinary property, held by an ordinary company in the ordinary way? Of course
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it is not. Therefore, one cannot regard it in the same way as it is suggested one might regard the nationalisation of the railways or anything else in this country. This was a matter of international concern throughout, and it still remains a matter of international concern.
Secondly, one poses the question what was the purpose and what would be the effect of the act perpetrated by Colonel Nasser. Was it his purpose to improve the canal and keep it open to protect the interests of all the maritime countries? Of course, it was not. His declared object is to use the revenues of the canal, not for the purposes of the canal, but for entirely different purposes. Perfectly clearly, that was his object. His object was to do as much damage, particularly to ourselves and indeed to other Western nations, as he possibly could. It was his aim to flout us in the view of the world, and particularly in the view of the Arab countries. If he is allowed to get away with it, his position will be all the greater and strengthened amongst them. Of course it will. This was not an act done to improve maritime relations or to improve the canal. Of course it was not.
The third question, therefore, is what steps should be taken. First of all, may I say that one agrees with what the Prime Minister has already done? These steps had to be taken, and any Government would have had to take these precautionary measures, but I would add to what the Leader of the Opposition has already said, namely, that one should proceed with caution in this matter. We hold a unique position in the world in our respect for the rule of law, and we, above everybody else, have insisted upon the value of international agreements and international associations.
One of the main reasons why this country went to war on 4th August, 1914, was its determination to preserve the sanctity of international agreements. That being so, we, above everybody, owe to the rest of the world a duty to respect law as much as it is possible for us to respect it and to use the ordinary international methods of settling any disputes.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I am much obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. He has cited the case of the 1914 war, and I think he is on surer ground there, but he did not mention the 1939

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war, in which we went to war, not in defence of any international agreements, because such international agreements had been repeatedly invaded by Hitler, but only when our own position, together with that of our allies throughout the world, was placed in a state of jeopardy. In other words, it was not a legalistic necessity, but a political necessity.
Mr. Davies: I quite agree with the noble Lord, but I thought it was quite enough to mention the 1914 war, because in that case there was a distinct breach of a treaty into which Germany had solemnly entered with other nations to preserve the neutrality of Belgium. That was the matter which had a very great influence on the Members of the Government of that day. However, I do not want to be drawn away from my argument. That only emphasises the position we hold in the world, in which we are expected always to respect the rule of law. I am sure that is the desire of Her Majesty's Government today, and I am equally sure that they will not take any steps which might be called aggressive, but only such steps as they possibly can take to bring this matter to a successful conclusion.
Finally, there is one other question—what should be the ultimate position of the canal? I think we are all agreed that it cannot be left to any one nation, and certainly not under the control of the Egyptian Government, with the record they already have in the flouting of the agreement made in the Convention of 1888, and the flouting of their own Agreement with us in 1954, which repeated the obligations laid down in that of 1888. Therefore, it cannot possibly be left in that way. Nor can it be left to any one country or any particular set of countries.
This is a matter which certainly should come under the control of the United Nations. It is quite possible, with the United Nations, to form a body which can administer and control this canal, so that it is not under the control of one Power and not in the interests of any particular country, even maritime countries, but so that the interests of all the world will be protected, and this international highway will be preserved for the trade of the whole world.
1.30 p.m.
Mr. Denis Healey: This has been a rather surprising debate so far. There has been an extraordinary degree of agreement between the main speakers on both sides of the House, and it has taken a rather unexpected line. I do not want to make too much of one note of criticism, but I think that although the past policy of the Government in the middle East can by no means be said to excuse the behaviour of Egypt it can do something to explain it. I think it is necessary to say a word or two about the terrible lack of policy from which this country has suffered in the Middle East for at least the last three years.
I believe Colonel Nasser and, indeed, the Arab world as a whole have some justification for being totally perplexed about what the real attitude of this country is towards them and their aspirations, because our policy has somersaulted at least twice a year and in the last year four times. The Government started by opposing the scuttle from Suez. Then they made the Suez Pact and appeared to be launched on a policy of friendly relations with the new Egyptian Government. They then made the Bagdad Pact, in the full knowledge, one hopes, that nothing would be more calculated to destroy any hope of good relations with the new Egyptian Government.
When the Bagdad Pact was followed by the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia the Government suddenly somersaulted back again, and, in the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech, served notice on Colonel Nasser that if he wished for good relations with Britain he should flirt with Britain's enemies. Following this attempt to curry favour in the Guildhall speech, the Prime Minister overrode the advice of his own civil servants and suddenly jumped in on the Aswan Dam and agreed to offer Egypt all the help she required from Britain.
Within a week of that he suddenly upset the apple cart again by trying to force Jordan into the Bagdad Pact, an act he must have known, if he was well advised, was calculated more than anything else to enrage Egypt against Britain and all her policies. Then, again, he sends General Robertson as a sort of scapegoat to attend the funeral of the British base at Suez. Then the Foreign

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Secretary came to the House last week to say that Egypt was behaving much better and could hope for friendly consideration from us in consequence, and his next words were to announce, without so much as a blush, that we were withholding the offer of aid for the Aswan Dam, which had been confirmed by the International Bank only a fortnight earlier.
I do not think that this occasion should be allowed to pass without some reference to the total confusion of British Middle Eastern policy to date, because so long as this Government's policy remains so confused we cannot expect to have serious consideration from any Middle Eastern Power. I think that the reason for this confusion is obvious enough. It is that we have not had a Foreign Secretary for some time. We have a part-time diplomatist in 10, Downing Street, but nobody across the road whatever.
Sir Robert Boothby: Does the hon. Gentleman lay no blame for the confusion of Western policy in the Middle East upon the United States? If we had had a joint policy none of this would have happened.
Mr. Healey: Certainly I do, but one thing for which I blame the Government is that when the Cyprus problem gave us the first opportunity we had had for a long time to interest the United States in the problems of the Middle East, the Government deliberately turned the cold shoulder to the American approaches on the issue. This Government have done far less than they should have done to try to achieve a common policy in the Middle East.
However, this is past history. I find myself, oddly, in agreement with the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) in saying that the seizure of the Suez Canal Company has suddenly brought everything to a head. It does at least now give us an opportunity of making a common line, and, I hope, of sticking to it.
What sort of line should it be? There has been in the Press and in speeches outside this House the impression given to the public that an enormous section of the Conservative Party is in favour of unilateral military action by Britain, to
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try to bring back the nineteenth century. I was glad to notice that even the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East did not go quite as far as that. I would congratulate the Prime Minister on standing up to the "dinosaurs" and "Teddy boys" on his own benches and making it quite clear that the solution of this issue which we are trying to achieve is an international solution by consent, by agreement with all the countries concerned, and not a national solution imposed by force of arms in direct contradiction of all the moral and legal obligations to which the Government are subject.
If we give up the idea of imposing a solution by force, a purely British solution, what alternative is there? I think it has become very clear from both the Prime Minister's speech and the speech of the Leader of the Opposition that the real problem raised by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company is not the question of the ownership of the Company, but the question of transit through the canal. The question of nationalisation in itself plays a very, very minor rôle in all this.
I think there is no doubt that this House, and, indeed, world opinion outside Britain, would fully support forceful action by this country, in conjunction with its Allies or even alone, if Colonel Nasser were to try to interfere with transit through the Canal by force, and I think this should be made quite clear. On the other hand, Colonel Nasser has said he has no intention of doing this, and I think that, provided we make the necessary military preparations, which, apparently, is being done, there is little reason to doubt his word on this. The real threat to transit through the canal—
Mr. Desmond Donnelly: Would not Colonel Nasser's position be a lot stronger if he had not flouted the 1888 Convention by denying transit to Israeli ships? That is the point.
Mr. Healey: Of course it would be much stronger, and our position would be much stronger if we had taken some action about that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) said when opening the debate for the Opposition.
There are three ways in which transit through the canal is threatened by this

1627
new Egyptian move, even if the Egyptians take no deliberate action by force to interfere with it. The first one, of which little so far has been said, is the possibility that Colonel Nasser may raise the tolls. I do not myself believe that a big increase in the tolls in itself would be likely to interfere very much with transit. I worked out the figures recently, and I came to the conclusion—and I should be glad if the Government would confirm or deny it later—that even if the present tolls were increased five times that would add only 1d. a gallon to the cost of petrol in this country.
The tolls are a very minor element in the total transit cost of petrol, and one's suspicion, looking at the figures, is that the Suez Canal Company has, in fact, unlike any other commercial company in the world, been acting exclusively in the interests of its own customers by fixing the tolls as low as possible compatible with paying the maintenance costs. The Canal tolls, unlike all other charges in the world, have been steadily reduced in the last twenty years.
Mr. Arthur Holt: I should be interested if the hon. Member could show briefly how he has worked out his calculations that this would mean 1d. a gallon on oil. I worked it out and I calculate that if the tolls were doubled it would mean about 1d. a gallon.
Mr. Healey: I have not the figures with me, and if I had it would take far too long to work out the sums in public.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord John Hope): Does the hon. Member mean oil or petrol?
Mr. Healey: I mean on a gallon of petrol.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: I agree that this is subsidiary to the argument, but does not the hon. Member agree that there is the question of availability of tankers?
Mr. Healey: That is another point. If the tolls were raised four times it would be economically just as cheap to send tankers round the Cape, but as we have not enough tankers to bring the oil we need round the Cape we are compelled to pay the toll. But, on the toll issue, the British Government and other Governments concerned have sufficient means of
1628
economic counter-measure on Egypt to avoid being completely massacred in that respect.
Much more serious is the question of maintenance costs. It is doubtful whether the Canal can be effectively maintained unless there is at least the present proportion of foreigners responsible for maintenance. Even the increase in the number of Egyptian pilots recently has involved at real risk to efficient transit through the Canal.
The overwhelming issue, however, which the Prime Minister has rightly emphasised, is the question of development. Traffic through the Canal has increased by 7 per cent. a year since the war. Oil traffic is thirteen times greater than it was before the war and twice as great as it was in 1948. Last year, 70 million tons of oil passed through the Canal and that is expected to rise to 100 million tons in a few years' time. That is the total capacity of the Canal as it is at present, yet by 1970 Western Europe may be requiring 300 million tons of crude oil through the Canal. Unless there is a tremendous investment and perhaps the building of an entirely new channel across the isthmus very shortly, the whole of Western Europe will find its industry gradually throttled by inability to move oil from its source in the Middle East to the factories gasping for it in Western Europe and Britain.
We can blame the Government for failing to do anything about this before now, because this is a problem which existed just as much before Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company. In fact, nearly all the problems, as the Prime Minister made extremely clear, are problems which would have existed and perhaps would have been even worse if Nasser had been sensible enough to allow twelve years to pass and had then taken the Company over, lock, stock and barrel, according to due process of the law.
Those who fear that his action may vastly increase Colonel Nasser's prestige in the Middle East may find that their fears are exaggerated. It is becoming increasingly clear in this discussion that Nasser's action last week is bringing international control into the Middle East in a way which would have been absolutely inconceivable if he had not done this

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And as long as we stick to an international formula for dealing with the problem we have not only a good chance of solving it, but of doing so without adding one inch to Nasser's stature in the Middle East.
Mr. R. Brooman-White: I agree with very much of what the hon. Member has been saying, and particularly with his last point, that all this may make international control easier, but I hope that in developing the point further he will not keep reiterating that the present situation calls for international control and, at the same time, castigating the Government because in past years it has not been possible to get effective international co-operation in that area. That does not mean that the Government have no foreign policy in that area and have not tried.
Mr. Healey: I hope that the hon. Member can provide some evidence that the Government made a serious attempt to deal internationally with this problem of the Canal. I am not referring to defence in the Middle East, where the Government certainly tried up to the Cyprus problem. On the whole question of oil, and particularly the transport of oil, there has been a complete vacuum in Government policy since the war.
Mr. S. Silverman: And international communications.
Mr. Healey: I believe that the only international framework in which a system can be worked out is the United Nations. This is not a problem even of the maritime nations. It is the problem of all countries which depend on products carried south to north or north to south through the Canal and not simply of the countries which own the ships that carry the products. The whole of Western Europe, Western Germany and the whole of Asia depend on traffic through the Canal, and if the desires of my hon. and right hon. Friends are carried out in years to come, and there is a great increase in Western aid to the undeveloped areas of Asia, traffic in dry goods through the Canal is likely to increase perhaps at the same sort of rate as traffic in oil has been increasing since the war.
We must get the U.S.S.R. committed up to the hilt in any discussions that go on. One thing that we ought to have learned from events in the last 12 months is that
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if the Russians want to be nasty in the Middle East they can be very nasty indeed, at little expense to themselves, and there is little that we can do about it. If we are prepared to bring them in, it will undoubtedly increase the difficulties of negotiation, but we shall have some assurance that any framework finally worked out will stand the test of experience and of time.
Finally, I think that the immediate reaction in this country to the seizure of the Company was very dangerous indeed. All the tremendous shouting and screaming in the Press about the insult to our national prestige and the possible use of force against the Egyptian Government have only raised the stakes without in any way making for a solution of the problem. We want to save face on this issue and so do the Egyptians, and we can do so only by taking things calmly and peacefully and saying that we are prepared to use force where it is justified and to pursue any other means of safeguarding our interests where other means are proper.
Let us not make a sort of Chauvinistic hullabaloo which only encourages other countries to twist the lion's tail. There is no pastime more attractive than twisting the lion's tail if one knows that it will make him roar and is almost sure that it will not make him bite.
1.49 p.m.
Colonel Cyril Banks: In my first speech in the House, in 1950, I stated my interest in the underfed populations of the world. I said also that if we continued to allow people to starve we could set a date for the next world war. It was only a matter of time.
Since then I have been one of quite a number of people who have given a considerable amount of time to endeavouring to find a solution to some of the problems and to trying to encourage people to pour aid into some of the places where it should be poured so that we might have an opportunity of living in peace. I have tried sincerely and hard and I think that all hon. Members can appreciate my disappointment at the events of the last two weeks.
The fact that one sees everything one has endeavoured to build up crash to the ground, that one sees the newspapers full of the banging of drums, with everyone wanting to go to war to put somebody in

1631
his place—that is the worst thing which can happen as far as this country is concerned. It is the worst thing that can happen for the continuation of a peaceful state of affairs in the world. Therefore, it is time that serious-minded people gave their attention to level-headed viewpoints of the problems that arise, and tried to solve those problems dispassionately.
Mr. H. Fraser: May I ask my hon. and gallant Friend a question? Does he consider the action of Colonel Nasser to be level-headed?
Colonel Banks: I do not think that the action taken by Colonel Nasser, or the actions taken by this Government have been particularly level-headed on many occasions. We have all made many mistakes.
If, however, a man in charge of a country is put on the spot because we tell him that we will give him something and then withdraw the offer ten days after he has accepted it, then I think we must expect some trouble. We must remember that it was on 9th July when an offer was made in regard to the Aswan Dam. The Egyptian representative in Washington accepted that offer and, within hours of his accepting, he was recalled to be told that it was withdrawn. What do we expect as a reaction to that type of attitude?
Mr. R. T. Paget: May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman a question? How much, and for how long, have we given to Egypt and got kicked in the teeth all the time? Does not one reach a point where one can say, "I am not going to give any more", and, if so, is there any reason for submitting to more of it?
Colonel Banks: I do not mind that interruption. If the hon. and learned Gentleman has reached the stage in his thinking where he feels that everything we have poured in is as much as we should have done, I would remind him that unless we and the United States are content to pour much more than we have ever done before into that area, we must expect trouble, and we must expect to lose a lot of what we have. A sensible approach is from the point of view that we know that the people are starving, that we know they have had a bad deal, that we know we have taken much out of the
1632
territory, and that we have not poured any profits back; and that it is time that we did.
Dr. Edith Summerskill: Before my hon. and learned Friend asks what we have given to Egypt, I would ask him to go there and examine the social conditions of Egypt, and then perhaps he would not be so proud of what we have done there.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): Order, order. Many hon. Members wish to take part in this debate, so I hope it will not be conducted by interventions.
Colonel Banks: Since I have undertaken the job that I have, I have been acceptable both to the Israeli Government and to the Egyptian Government. In the process I have actually carried, or been responsible for carrying, two sets of peace terms in an effort to establish peaceful relations on the border between the two countries. I am not pro-Israel, I am not pro-Egyptian, I am pro-peace. It is time that we started thinking in that way.
In the course of the last few years I have written reams of correspondence on what I think ought to be done. I say quite frankly from these benches that I am bitterly disappointed with the attitude of the Foreign Office towards the work that is done by people in this country. I am disappointed that they do not accept the advice available to them, not only from within this House but from many other people outside this House, who have lived for many years in the territory and have never been inside the Foreign Office. That advice is open to those in the Foreign Office if they want it, and I think that they should take it.
Everybody knows that I am very disappointed. The correspondence is there. Everybody considers, and has considered for some time, that I have taken a very gloomy view of the Middle East situation. I do take a gloomy view of it, and unless we do something other than vaccilate in our policy, we are going to be in very, very desperate straits in the Middle East. As far as the Canal Zone is concerned, and the Canal itself, let me make my position clear. I do not think that the Canal should be controlled by one country. I do not think that Egypt or the Egyptian Government should run the

1633
Canal. I think it must be an international waterway.
To that extent, I support the Prime Minister's earlier statement. But I am disappointed that the Prime Minister has not been able to get a little closer to the subject than he has done in his speech today. I deplore very much that this House is going into Recess with no knowledge of the position that will obtain tomorrow morning, and what will happen as a result of it. I hope, therefore, that it will be possible to plead with my right hon. Friend to recall the House if we start to use the Armed Forces that we are at present amassing.
1.55 p.m.
Mr. S. N. Evans: There seems to be a basic unity in the House in its approach to this problem. I think that the growing claims of Nasser to be both Pope and Caesar to the entire Arab world is the poison in Middle Eastern affairs, and that this Suez issue is a test of Western diplomatic and military solidarity.
It would ill become those whose action has largely precipitated this situation now to adopt the rôle of Pontius Pilate. I have much sympathy with those who complain of the manner in which this immediate crisis has been brought about, and I, too, want to ask the question: what happened between 9th July and 19th July to warrant the precipitate withdrawal of the promise to help build the Aswan Dam?
It is important that we should get that point established because, as I said in the Trinidad oil debate, the present dangerously disordered state of the Middle East is almost wholly due to a failure of Anglo-American co-operation. On 9th July Mr. Black, the President of the American-dominated World Bank, told Nasser that he could have 200 million dollars for his Aswan Dam. On 19th July, Mr. Dulles told Nasser that he could not have a sou.
I want to know whether the announcement on 19th July was a considered, unanimous Anglo-American policy decision, arrived at after a close appraisal of the probable consequences. After all, we were dealing with an authoritarian régime, and whatever may be said about Nasser's record in Egypt in the last four years—and I think it will bear examination—that régime has done a good deal
1634
for Egypt, and that should be freely acknowledged. Nevertheless, it is an authoritarian régime and for the last three decades we have had much experience of the violent reaction of authoritarian régimes when their prestige is threatened. Therefore we would like to be told whether the announcement on 19th July that the offer made only ten days earlier must now be considered null and void—
Mr. Gilbert Longden: Would the hon. Gentleman allow me to ask a question?
Mr. Evans: Let me finish the sentence first. I should like to be told whether that was the result of Anglo-American consultation and whether a unanimous decision was arrived at on that subject
Mr. Longden: For my information, and to get the record straight, may I ask the hon. Gentleman whether I am right in saying that the Black offer of 9th July was made conditional upon the American Government agreeing to contribute too? It was not a definite offer on 9th July.
Mr. Evans: Of course, that has always been the position. The American Government had promised to make a grant of 56 million dollars, if my memory serves me correctly, and we had promised to make a grant of 14 million dollars. The loan of 200 million dollars had been negotiated from the World Bank, and this was merely the confirmation. Mr. Black having told him in writing that he was to get 200 million dollars, Nasser was entitled to think that there had been no change in the previously announced promises of the American and British Governments to provide the 70 million dollars.
To some extent, therefore, I must say that I was not completely surprised at Nasser's violent reaction. Anyone who knows something about the nature of authoritarian régimes—and surely we all do at this stage—could have expected that there would be violent reaction and consequences which would have to be faced. One of the things which worries me is that there seem to have been no discussions at all about what the probable consequences would be, with the result that when Nasser seized the Canal and announced his intention to nationalise the

1635
Company, we had the spectacle of Mr. Murphy hurrying across the Atlantic to consult about a situation which anybody could have foreseen, having regard to the nature of the régime.
One thing this makes clear—perhaps the most important aspect of all. While the Anglo-American partnership endures, it certainly does not prosper. Unless I am greatly in error, we were dragged along like a tin can tied to a dog's tail, following the decision of 19th July. I agree that it would have been very difficult, in the light of all the circumstances, for the Government to do other than they did, but I think that this debate presents us with an opportunity to ask our American friends where they are going. There seems to be a dual standard of values at work. Our American friends lose no sleep about their own continued occupation of Okinawa, but the sight of the British Army on the Suez lay like a ton of bricks on the American conscience. With them backing Nasser, the British had to go. The Americans saw nothing wrong in the occupation of half Europe by the Soviet Army, but when it came to Japan, no Russian soldier was allowed even a toe-hold.
It is this dual standard of values which characterises American diplomacy which is so frightening, and it seems to me that we are getting it again in the prolonged negotiations which are now taking place. Having sown the wind by the announcement of 19th July, they seem to me now to be seeking to escape the whirlwind by assuming the rôle of Pontius Pilate. This is an ignoble attitude on the part of a very great nation, with whom we are associated in a crusade against totalitarianism which it seems to take even more seriously than I do. I therefore think that this moment is a test most of all of Western solidarity and that its significance is not so much the future of the Canal, although I agreed that that is important. The most important issue of all is the issue of Western diplomatic, political and military solidarity.
The history in the Middle East of the last ten years is one of the constant undermining of British interests, authority and prestige by our American friends in that part of the world. The prevailing philosophy seems to be, "If we can get the British out, we go in, and afterwards a
1636
vigorous waving of dollar bills will provide a foreign policy in itself."
I should have thought that this latest event might well cause our American friends to think again, because unless we can hammer out a Middle Eastern policy designed to achieve realisable goals and with a full recognition of each other's interest, I fear that the day is not far distant when neither of us will have any interest in that area.
Sometimes I think that we too have our share of the blame for this failure of Anglo-American co-operation. It is nothing new for those who come down in the world to look down their noses at those who have taken their place, and I sometimes feel that the Foreign Office may suffer a little from this age-old failing of mankind.
I am not one of those who think in terms of an American bus with a British driver, American strength and British diplomacy. That is not how power works, and a firm grasp of the simple essentials of power is the first necessity for any practising politician. Equally, I accept that we are a junior partner in the Anglo-American partnership. But even junior partners have their rights. I am therefore bound to say that our friends seem extraordinarily near-sighted in relation to the rights of what, in the last resort, is their only firm and dependable ally.
2.7 p.m.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans) has made an excellent speech, as he usually does. In his reference to Anglo-American relations at the present time, he has created an occasion on which I can naturally follow him, because I want to devote a few of the remarks which I shall inflict on the House this afternoon to that theme.
I wonder whether Mr. Foster Dulles, before he set out across the Atlantic in his aeroplane, studied the history of the United States at the time that the Panama Canal was opened. If not, I should like to suggest some reading to him for the return journey. It is from a volume called the Annual Register of 1903. I hope that in reading it the House will not think that I am following the example of that Archbishop of Canterbury who read heavily from the

1637
Salic Law to encourage Henry V to prosecute his wars with France. This is not the Salic Law, but American history.
As I read this, I should like the House to think of Colombia in terms of Egypt, Panama in terms of the Suez Canal, and the United States in terms of ourselves and France. The Register says:
"In September the Colombian Congress refused to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty negotiated in Washington, by which the United States was to be permitted to construct a canal through the Isthmus of Panama to link the Atlantic with the Pacific, … The Bogota Government had been warned that failure to ratify the treaty would be followed by a revolution in the State of Panama, which expected to profit materially by the canal. The Washington Government was also not unaware of the impending revolution. On November 3, Panama declared its independence of Colombia, and its existence as a sovereign State under the name of the Republic of Panama. A force of Colombian troops, some 500 in all, were at both ends of the isthmus in the principal cities of Colon and Panama. A small American gun boat, the Nashville, was in the harbour of Colon."
I am sorry for hon. Members opposite, but it was a gunboat.
"The commander of the Nashville landed a detachment of marines for the ostensible purpose of protecting the property of the railway company and keeping transit open across the isthmus, a duty devolving upon the United States under the stipulations of the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, the predecessor of Colombia. The commander of the Nashville made it known that in case the Colombian troops attacked the forces of the Provisional Government of Panama he should come to the assistance of Panama; he also announced his determination to maintain uninterrupted the railway communication across the isthmus; and, to prevent any interference with the proper running of trains, the railway could not be used for the conveyance of troops, nor would fighting be permitted along its route, or in the terminal cities of Panama and Colon. In other words, if Colombia wanted to recover its lost territory, and found it necessary to use force, it might fight, but it must not fight at the only places where fighting would be of the least material advantage.
These were bold words of the Nashville's commander, as at that time he could not put more than 40 men on shore, the Panama Government had neither troops nor arms, and the Colombian soldiery outnumbered him ten to one. For a couple of days the situation was critical, then heavy American reinforcements arrived on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the isthmus. The revolution was over. The Colombian troops sullenly permitted themselves to be deported without having fired a shot.
A provisional junta was constituted to manage the affairs of the new Republic until the election of a President and the adoption
1638
of a Constitution, and three days after the Republic came into being the United States gave it an international status by formally recognising it, and entering into diplomatic relations. Other Governments promptly followed suit, but Great Britain held off until December 22,"—
a very suitable day after the American election, which America might note—
"or until Panama had agreed to assume that portion of the foreign debt of Colombia proportionate to her population."
There are other excellent passages in this volume which I commend to hon. Members and to Mr. Dulles, but I will leave the matter at that. The quotation which I have read precedes another saying that this was all part of the Monroe Doctrine and that it formally established the United States in the hegemony of the Western world. Its hegemony has gone a good deal further than that and has now reached across the continents of the world.
The U.S.A. exemplifies and puts info effect the international theme on every possible occasion. The headquarters of the United Nations and the United Nations' Agencies reside in the United States. When it came to post-war action in Korea, the United States acted first and secured diplomatic assistance afterwards, and we ourselves were instant in our readiness to go to her aid and follow her in.
Shame on that country now, shame, I regret to say, on the country which gave my mother birth that she should be behind us by days or even months in our endeavours jointly with the French to do for the Old World what she so successfully has done in the New. I believe that when the United States looks upon the isthmus of Suez in the same way as her history must look upon the isthmus of Panama, when she looks upon the essential international theme of which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke today, supported in splendid words by the Leader of the Opposition, when she puts that in parallel with her action in the world of war in Korea and in the world of peace in the Agencies of the United Nations, she should feel herself compelled to respond and come to our aid with the least possible delay.
What the Prime Minister portrayed today was a grand design of the inter-nationalisation of the Canal for all time. I wonder whether the House realises the distance that we have gone, because much

1639
of the argument which has been used today from both sides of the House affecting the Canal Company itself, the profits, prospective and past, has been surpassed by the words that the Prime Minister himself used the other day. He said—and he reiterated it again today—that Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to allow the unfettered control of the Canal to remain with a single Power.
That means that we have passed the point of no return. It is now not a matter only of keeping the Canal clear. The right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition greatly impressed the House with what he said about the past actions of Egypt, the hegemony which she is trying to establish throughout the Middle East, and the prospective future actions of Egypt if we do not take this step now. It is, therefore, not only a question of keeping the Canal clear, not only a question of forcing Nasser into abandoning the nationalisation, if he were able to go so far, not only a question of what would happen if Nasser were suddenly to abdicate and to take flight by plane to the Soviet Union or anywhere else and of the future actions of the Egyptian Government that he would leave behind. Those words of the Prime Minister overcome all those circumstances and prospects, and lead us to the conclusion that by diplomacy and force if necessary we must establish from now on this great design, this great conception of the internationalisation of the Canal.
My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), again taking up the theme of Panama, today spoke very effectively about the provision of a five-mile or ten-mile strip on either side of the Canal. That means territory. Who is to administer it? The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said it should be the United Nations. Some of my hon. Friends would fight shy of that, but I wonder whether there is any other authority which can do it.
If it was not the United Nations, it would have to be a specially selected consortium of Powers, and immense difficulties would be encountered in deciding who had the rights, in these modern circumstances, of administration. If ownership were
1640
decided there is the question of policing. If the area were not policed by the United Nations who would do it? We already have a precedent in the United Nations observers in the Gaza area and on the borders of Israel and the Arab States. Many people may think that that kind of concept is the one that should eventually be provided for the Canal.
The Canal could then be operated by the Suez Canal Company under a concession from the United Nations, and its shares could then be internationalised and suitably dealt with. But the important thing about this grand objective is how to secure it. I say in measured words that I believe that Britain and France, with or without the United States of America, should present an ultimatum to Egypt with a time limit attached. That ultimatum must not await the outcome of the conference, because the analogy with Korea is complete, even though the aggression in Korea was far more formidable and involved the loss of lives. The idea of associating military force with diplomatic action, with the endorsement of the United Nations, was perfected and used on that occasion, and I see no reason why, in these circumstances which vitally affect an international waterway and British and other rights, we should depart from that principle.
Mr. William Warbey: The hon. Gentleman is drawing a parallel between Egypt's action and the action in Korea. Can he find any words in the United Nations Charter which would provide for such action being taken in the case of Egypt as was taken in the case of Korea?
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I am not asking for United Nations action at this stage. I am asking that Britain and France, with or without the United States, should act as individual States in close association for the purpose of achieving what will ultimately become a United Nations concept. That ultimatum should be sent now, and the date of its expiry should be governed by military considerations.
It is essential that the diplomatic and military thrusts should go hand in hand. If we merely have a conference and merely assemble the navies, air forces and armies, and hold them ready, waiting

1641
to do we do not know what, until Russia has put forward her ideas, Egypt has put forward hers, and the smaller Powers, perhaps, have been summoned to the conference and have expressed every sort of shade of misgiving, we shall lose this momentous opportunity of doing something of vital concern to us, and we shall waste precious time, during which Colonel Nasser and some of his associates in the Middle East, and possibly in other parts of the world, may begin to present a formidable front against us.
These are the policies and purposes which should be achieved. I think that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister believes that something of this order should be done now. If he does act in this way, and acts now, then his name and fortunes will rise to new heights of eminence among his countrymen, and the policies of his country will achieve world renown.
2.24 p.m.
Mr. William Warbey: I share in the reprobation expressed by all hon. Members who have spoken so far at the language, behaviour and manner of Colonel Nasser and his friends, I do not like dictatorships wherever they appear, whether they be in Egypt or Iraq, Guatemala or Czechoslovakia—and I particularly suspect dictatorships which rest upon military juntas, as in the case of Egypt.
At this stage it may be worth while to remind Colonel Nasser and his friends that the sterling balances, out of which they presumably hope to pay compensation to the shareholders in the Canal Company, were built up out of the supplies provided to British troops who defended them from Hitler's aggression during the war, and that if that aggression had succeeded and Nazi power had been established, Nasser and his friends would have got very short shrift if they had not been Quisling puppets under his Government.
Having said that to the potential new Blimps in Egypt, it is worth while saying a few words also to the old Blimps in this House, especially those on the other side of the House who have expressed themselves in the past week in words and actions—and notably in the speech we have just heard from the hon. Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinching-brooke). These old Blimps have already,
1642
by their intemperate words and actions in the past week, done incalcuable damage to the good name, prestige and well-being of our people.
That damage has been done, whatever may be the future outcome of events. They have done it because, if the outcome goes the way they want, namely, in the direction of the use of force by this country, it can result only in complete ruin and disaster for our people, and if it does not by the way they want—if, in the end we are compelled by circumstances to pursue courses of moderation, reason and the peaceful adjustment of this dispute—then, as a result of the language and behaviour of those hon. Members opposite, our country's prestige will suffer enormously because, against the background of their language and their demands, the ultimate conduct of this country will appear to be a climb-down.
That is all the more true because the Government, by their silence and their calculated leaks to the Press, as well as by their actions, have appeared to give support to the intemperate language of the hon. Members behind them. They have appeared as though they were yielding to the clamour of the yelping tall behind them.
Mr. H. Fraser: The "yelping tail"?
Mr. Warbey: It appears that the tail is wagging the dog, and as the tail is wagging the dog it certainly appears that it is the tail which is doing the yelping and the dog which is giving way to it. Hon. Members opposite should realise that the days of Disraeli, in which some of them still live, are past. They should grow up and get out of that shadow and realise that we live in a different world today.
Mr. Fraser: What about Stalin?
Mr. Warbey: In the world today we cannot behave as Disraeli did, or as the United Nations did, as shown in the very amusing account which the noble Lord read to us—that amusing episode in the history of Imperialism. That is no longer possible in the world in which we live.
People in this country still hold different views on the question whether or not take-over bids are consistent with morality and propriety, but the take-over bid which Disraeli indulged in in 1876 was in character with the behaviour of

1643
great Powers of that time. They sought, by a variety of ways, to secure power over the peoples and resources of other countries. They sought to do it by means of force and economic sanctions, or by the mere use of money power to buy up property and property rights. That was Imperialism. That age is passing. Wherever things of that character are still done in any part of the world they have the taint of the carrion of Imperialism and of the dead meat of the dinosaur.
Mr. Brooman-White: Would the hon. Gentleman make it clear that he is applying these epithets to a take-over bid in a country like Tibet, for example?

ROYAL ASSENT
2.30 p.m.
Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.
The House went; and, having returned—
Mr. SPEAKER Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Finance Act, 1956.

2. Appropriation Act, 1956.

3. Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property) Act, 1956.

4. Slum Clearance (Compensation) Act, 1956.

5. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research Act, 1956.

6. Underground Works (London) Act, 1956.

7. Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956.

8. Coal Industry Act, 1956.

9. Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956.

10. British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956.

11. Governors' Pensions Act, 1956.

12. Public Works Loans Act, 1956.

13. Sanitary Inspectors (Change of Designation) Act, 1956.

14. Road Traffic Act, 1956.

1644

15. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956.

16. Sexual Offences Act, 1956.

17. Marriage (Scotland) Act, 1956.

18. Overseas Resources Development Act, 1956.

19. Millport Piers (Amendment) Order Confirmation Act, 1956.

20. Aberdeen Harbour Order Confirmation Act, 1956.

21. Pier and Harbour Order (Great Yarmouth Port and Haven) Confirmation Act, 1956.

22. Pier and Harbour Order (Wisbech Port and Harbour) Confirmation Act, 1956.

23. Huddersfield Corporation Act, 1956.

24. British Transport Commission Act, 1956.

25. Leeds Corporation Act, 1956.

26. Croydon Corporation Act, 1956.

27. London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1956.

28. Rugby Corporation Act, 1956.

29. Chertsey Urban District Council Act, 1956.

30. Manchester Ship Canal Act, 1956.

31. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corporation Act, 1956.

32. Liverpool Overhead Railway Act, 1956.

33. Manchester Corporation Act, 1956.

34. Walthamstow Corporation Act, 1956.

35. Barnsley Corporation Act, 1956.

36. Rhyl Urban District Council Act, 1956.

37. Fylde Water Board Act, 1956.

38. Felixstowe Dock and Railway Act, 1956.

39. Heywood and Middleton Water Act, 1956.

40. Middlesex County Council Act, 1956.

41. Cammell Laird and Company Act, 1956.

42. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Act, 1956.

43. Grayson, Rollo and Clover Docks Act, 1956.

SUEZ CANAL
Question again proposed.
2.48 p.m.
Mr. Warbey: When we were interrupted, I was saying that it was time hon. Members opposite grew up and recognised some of the facts of modern life. Among those facts are that there are hundreds of millions in Asia and Africa who are now quite determined that they shall not live in the ways of imperialism, and that if we seek to contradict their will and their desires for national freedom and independence, then we are invoking disaster for this country.
We learned the lesson of that in India. Had we after the war followed the advice of many hon. Gentlemen opposite, a most disastrous situation would have arisen which would not only have led to bloodshed in India itself, but would have been fatal for this country. I should have thought that in face of that lesson hon. Members opposite might begin to think in more reasonable and rational terms about how we ought to behave in the present situation in Egypt.
We must recognise that the legitimate interests of the British people in this situation, as in other international matters can be protected now only by recognising and not over-riding the legitimate interests of the people of other countries. We have to take that as an axiom of behaviour.
Our legitimate interests in this issue are three—peace, oil and unhampered communications. Peace implies that we seek the settlement of disputes by free negotiation between equal partners and not by imposition of decision. In the long run we can have the oil which is vital for this country only if we are prepared to give goods and wealth in exchange for it. We must recognise that the vital commodities which this country needs, including oil, can be got only by a fair exchange of wealth for wealth and not by any other means, and, above all, not by fighting for them. As I said in the debate last Friday, once we have to fight for the oil we have already lost it. Thirdly, unhampered communications can be maintained in present conditions only through fair relationships between equal partners and parties, and by being prepared to pay a fair price. I want to refer to this point again in a moment.
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It is clear that we cannot safeguard these three interests of the British people by the kind of intemperate action recommended by Government supporters and their friends in the Press during the past week. The course suggested by the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South, who has now left the Chamber—[Interruption.]—I do not blame him for that. I have no doubt that he has very good reason—was the presenting of an ultimatum to Egypt in advance of an international conference. We must recognise what would happen if we followed that course.
I would advise Government supporters who doubt my words to read the very sober and rational editorial article in today's Manchester Guardian. It is far more sober and rational than The Times of yesterday. They will see the kind of thing that will happen if their advice is followed. We shall have three-fifths of the world, probably more, against us, not only the Middle East, with the possible exception of Israel, but the uncommitted nations of Asia, of course the Communist countries, and possibly the United States.
We shall have turned the legitimate nationalism of the Middle East into a thwarted, twisted and violent Chauvinism. We shall have set the whole Middle East aflame—and in those flames the oil itself will be consumed upon which this country depends for its livelihood. Therefore we have to pursue a calm and reasonable course.
That involves making a clear distinction between the issue of the ownership of the Canal and the issue of freedom of transit through it. On the issue of ownership, there is very little more to be said. No one has been able to show any reason in international law why the Egyptian Government should not nationalise the Canal. The Government have not been able to show it; The Times in an article today by its legal correspondent has not been able to show it; on the contrary, it has declared that in international law there is no reason why the Egyptian Government should not nationalise the Canal on payment of fair compensation. [Interruption.] The Egyptian Government have offered fair compensation, or what is regarded internationally as a fair basis of compensation. There is as yet no reason—[Interruption.] If Government supporters wish to interrupt and have a reasonable point to put, I shall be glad to give way.
Mr. John Hall: Would the hon. Member direct his mind to the point how Egypt will implement her promise?
Mr. Warbey: Nobody is suggesting that we should rely on promises. All I am saying is that up to this point a fair offer of compensation has been made. I want to know the Government's answer to it. Axe the Government prepared to accept that offer, or are they proposing to reject it? That is a point on which we have had no statement at all from the Government and on which we are entitled to have one. Do we, in other words, recognise the right of Egypt to nationalise the Suez Canal Company?
What is the real purpose of the economic measures which the Government have so far taken against Egypt. If their purpose is solely to ensure that the promise of compensation is carried out, I support them up to that point and that alone. If their purpose is to act as an economic sanction, to apply duress, against the Egyptian Government in order to seek a revocation of the nationalisation decree by force and outside pressure, we should be told. That is an illegitimate and illegal act, which I could not possibly support. The Government's position ought to be made absolutely clear on this question before the debate concludes.
Freedom of transit through the Canal is absolutely vital. It is a vital interest of a very large number of countries in the world. I have no doubt at all that ultimately the appropriate solution for these international waterways is to place them under a genuine international authority, but it is a little late in the day, and a curious moment, for us to come forward with this proposal when a particular British interest is threatened. Some of us advocated the internationalisation of these waterways many years ago, without much effect and without making much impression upon the Labour Government or upon the subsequent Conservative Government.
If we are now proposing the internationalisation of the Suez Canal or its international control, can we refrain from applying the same principle to the Panama Canal and other international waterways? Of course, we cannot. Otherwise we have no ground of principle whatsoever, and we are admitting that we are acting purely in a selfish national
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interest and on grounds of expediency alone. That we cannot do.
Therefore, by all means let us have international discussions about this matter. We have heard talk about an international conference, but what is to be the composition of that conference? Are the Government proposing to be so incredibly foolish as to try to exclude the Soviet Union from the conference? Russia was a signatory to the 1888 Convention. The exclusion of the Soviet Union would obviously make it impossible for the conference to succeed or come to any kind of international agreement.
Of course, Egypt must be invited to such a conference, because we must seek by every possible means to achieve maintenance of free transit through the Canal by the agreement and with the agreement of the Egyptian Government and people. Any other course is of course unthinkable. As a matter of fact, I do not believe there is any danger of the Canal being closed because, quite clearly, the Egyptian Government want the revenues from the Canal. Egypt needs the revenues from the Canal more than ever, and will need them more than ever.
If it is suggested that the Canal dues might be raised in order to increase those revenues, the Government have already admitted—in effect the Prime Minister admitted today—that the present Canal dues are too low. The right hon. Gentleman said they were only on a cost basis and not on a value basis. I hope they will not be raised, but if they were I do not think we would have very much cause for complaint, nor would they have any significant effect. The present dues on oil are 6s. 3d. a ton compared with transport costs of about 102s.
Sir R. Boothby: Does the hon. Member suggest that the doubled revenues should all go to the Egyptian Government? Is that his contention?
Mr. Warbey: All I am saying is that if hon. Members are raising a difficulty about the possibilities of Egypt continuing to maintain the Canal in a fit condition and also providing revenues for industrial development it could be done by a comparatively small increase in the Canal dues, which would not be illegitimate in view of what the Prime Minister has said and which would not do any harm of

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any significant character to this country. I see no difficulty there at all. I see no difficulty about the payment of compensation to the shareholders. If it is to be £70 million, the Egyptians have sterling balances to the extent of £110 million and, therefore, have ample funds available to pay that compensation. We must, of course, see that they do so, and we must eventually endeavour to establish effective international control of the waterway under the authority of the United Nations.
What we cannot do today in the modern world is to take up a viewpoint which says that any single nation or group of nations can arrogate to itself the right to exercise supra-national powers over any other country. That is no longer possible. That is imperialism by whatever country or group of countries it is practised—[HON. MEMBERS: "Russia?"]—whether it is done by Russia, Britain, or the United States. Therefore, I say we have to accept the principle that, if any form of supra-national power is to be exercised, it can only be exercised by a world authority.
Hon. Members who are genuinely seeking for long-term solutions of the problem of reconciling international interests with local, national interests and for a solution of the particular problems of the Suez Canal and of the Middle East, will have to recognise that in the long run that is the only approach which will get them what they want without involving this country and other peoples in disaster.
3.4 p.m.
Mr. John Hall: The speech we have just heard from the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey), I am sure, will be read with the greatest pleasure in Moscow and with some little interest, no doubt, in Cairo. I think that that speech is out of tune with the views and feelings of the great majority of hon. Members in the House, if not all. The hon. Member did back benchers on this side of the House the compliment of describing them as a "yelping tail". Perhaps he will not mind if I refer to him as the wagging mouth.
Mr. John Rankin: Is this intellectualism at its best?
Mr. Hall: The hon. Member for Ashfield mentioned one or two points to which I will refer particularly when he
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referred to the ability of Egypt to pay compensation, which he said she is willing to pay on the basis of the value of the shares on the day when nationalisation was announced, which amounts to about £70 million. He went on to say that Egypt would be quite entitled to increase the tolls payable by ships going through the Canal in order to raise increased revenue. If she is to take over a company like the Suez Canal Company as a monopoly the monopoly value which she should be prepared to pay in compensation would be far in excess of £70 million, and it would be very questionable whether the £70 million represents the value of the compensation for assets taken over on that basis.
I do not want to take up more time in dealing with points raised by the hon. Member, as I know that other hon. Members want to speak in this debate. I have the honour to represent a constituency where lived throughout the greater part of his life Disraeli, Lord Beaconsfield, who was referred to by the hon. Member. No doubt many hon. Members have visited the Manor House at Hughenden where Disraeli spent his declining years, and they will have seen there the record of the efforts which he made to acquire for this country that large block of shares in the Suez Canal Company. Disraeli realised perhaps more acutely than anyone else how important it was to ensure that the Suez Canal did not get into the hands of one Power. For that reason he persuaded the Government of this country, after first going to private enterprise to help him over the financial difficulties, to take over this block of shares in the Suez Canal Company.
Seventy-five years after Disraeli's death—the seventy-fifth anniversary was in April this year—we find a situation which would have caused him considerable pain. When he died he had won for us Cyprus, the Suez Canal shares, and had made Her Majesty Queen Victoria Empress of India. That title has gone, we are under pressure from the Greeks and hon. Members opposite—[An HON. MEMBER: "And by America."]—to get out of Cyprus and now apparently we are to lose our holdings in the Suez Canal Company. In that short period of seventy-five years a lifetime's work of a man is in process of destruction.
Something has been said about the legal position of Egypt and whether she

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is right or wrong to nationalise the company. I doubt very much whether there is any real uncertainty about her right to nationalise. After all she has had an example set her by this country and others and, not being a lawyer, I would not say that she has not the right to nationalise an Egyptian company registered on Egyptian soil—
Mr. Herbert Morrison: Is it not really unwise and rather contrary to the interests of the country to make an analogy between a Government nationalising internal domestically-owned industries in this country and an act of unilateral nationalisation of an international concern like the Suez Canal Company? Is not the hon. Gentleman running his party prejudice to a point at which it is liable to prejudice the discussions?
Mr. Hall: I thank the right hon. Member for his intervention and take the point he has made, but if he had waited until I had finished the sentence he would have seen that I was not making a party point but was going on to the actions of Egypt which I regard as illegal. I think it might be held that her action in the unilateral breaking of an agreement freely entered into was illegal. I think the lack of negotiation on the terms of compensation for those concerned would be regarded as an illegal action, and above all an attempt to retain the labour of people of all kinds in the company by force under threat of imprisonment is an illegal act because that would be introducing the principle of slave labour.
Mr. Rankin: Like conscription.
Mr. Hall: I do not think we can compare the two. It would be wrong to get involved in a discussion about the legality of the points at issue.
That sort of discussion can go on for long and weary months, and for that reason I was a little perturbed by the suggestion made by the Leader of the Opposition, in what, if he will allow me to say so, was an excellent speech, that this matter should be referred to the United Nations. I was perturbed for this reason: I understand this to be not a question of a dispute but of a matter which is likely to lead, in the well-known phrase, to a breach of the peace. As
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such, presumably it could be made subject to veto in any discussions in the United Nations.
We cannot be at all sure that the discussions in the United Nations might not give rise to many opinions, and we cannot be at all sure that the veto would not be used by one Power or another, not necessarily friendly towards our position. I think the discussions might go on for far too long, and this is an issue which must be settled very quickly. If it is not settled very quickly it can go sour on us. For that reason, I much prefer the suggestion that there should be a conference of the maritime Powers concerned, who should then be in a position to state to Egypt what Egypt should do and, if necessary, back it by the use of force.
I know that the idea of putting troops into Egypt is attractive to many people, but in my opinion it is a step which should be taken only in the last resort and only if we are quite sure that it will be successful. Nothing could be worse than threatening Egypt with an ultimatum which we were not afterwards able to support successfully. I mention that only as a warning.
Much more is involved here than merely the question of the Canal. As we know, Egypt has for some time been conducting a propaganda campaign against us in other parts of the Middle East and indeed wherever we have any sphere of influence at all. I will mention only two cases. Already we are feeling the effect of Egyptian propaganda in Northern Nigeria and the northern territories of the Gold Coast, even down on the coast strips. If we are unable to deal with Egypt at the moment, and if we give way to her, we shall have created a situation throughout the Middle East which will be of the greatest detriment to the interests of this country and the Commonwealth in the future.
Mr. Rankin: What about Cyprus?
Mr. Hall: If the hon. Member could make his own speech when he catches Mr. Speaker's eye, I think it would help the House quite a lot.
The only other comment which I have to make concerns the United States. Many of us have very friendly personal relations with citizens in the United States, and I think we all realise that it

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is absolutely essential that the unity of the Anglo-American alliance should continue and should be strengthened. Nevertheless, it is sometimes a little difficult to understand exactly what America is trying to do. I think it would be true to say that at the time we were in the Suez base and the debate was taking place whether we should leave it, America was a little unco-operative, to put it very kindly. The efforts of the American Ambassador in Cairo certainly were not the most helpful.
Even now, there seems to be a reluctance to come ungrudgingly to our support. There is this feeling of anti-colonialism—a feeling that any troops other than American troops or any sphere of influence other than an American sphere of influence, in another country, are examples of colonial expansion and imperialism. It is time that America woke up to the facts and gave us far more ungrudging and unequivocal support than she has given so far.
In some ways I was rather sorry when it was announced that we were to have this debate, because during the debate, possibly quite inadvertently, something may be said which may be misinterpreted outside the House—and the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) was quick to pick me up when I made such a remark.
We have had two first-class speeches from the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition which have placed before the world very clearly what I believe to be the united opinion and view of the House and indeed of the country. If world opinion takes note of what has been said in the House today by the two leaders, then it will be in no doubt at all about the determination of this country, supported, I hope, by France, the United States and the other Allies, to make certain that this great international waterway does not remain under the control of one Power, and that the project which Disraeli handed over to this nation when he died shall remain what he always intended it to be—a waterway open at all times for all the maritime nations of the world to use.
3.15 p.m.
Mr. Herbert Morrison: This is a debate of much gravity upon which important events may hang, and it is most unfortunate—I am not
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attacking the Government in this respect—that it should be held on the day of the Adjournment, because after 10 o'clock tonight the House has no further influence over it, just as it now has no power over it. That is a pity, but it indicates the likeness between the customs of the former dictators of Italy and Germany and those of the modern dictator of Egypt. Somehow, the decision happens late one night, towards the weekend, and towards the end of the British Parliamentary Sittings and the coming of the long Recess.
It is unfortunate, and I wish the consultations between our country, France and the United States could have moved with greater speed so that the Prime Minister might have been able to make a decisive statement this morning. We still hope that the Foreign Secretary will be able to make one, but we do not know; it would not even be fair to ask him. In any case, he cannot make it until the end of the debate.
What worries me about this situation is whether the country and hon. Members are willing to realise that this kind of event opens the issue of international cooperation another way round. I am for international co-operation. I am for the United Nations. I wish it had happened that the Canal had automatically come under the United Nations when the United Nations was formed—and possibly some other international waterways as well. Why not?
But if we are to advocate internationalism and if, as a Socialist, I am to be a genuine internationalist, then I must not only advocate that internationalism and that the United Nations should be used as an instrument for the settlement of disputes; I must equally advocate—and I beg hon. Members all equally to advocate—that no country unilaterally should do something which is calculated to upset the interests of the wider world and unilaterally upset the international applecart. It is just as much a crime against international faith and the United Nations for one country to do what Egypt has just done as it would be for other countries to retaliate by the immediate use of force.
I went through this kind of business on another occasion and in a slightly different part of the world. I heard a lot about it and a good deal has been said

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about it since. Let me tell the House right away that it is an experience that I do not look back on with any great pleasure. That was another case in which one Government—if it were a Government, which is very doubtful; more likely it was one man—unilaterally decided that an agreement which had been freely entered into between the Government of his country years before and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should be repudiated. He decided that, just out of the blue, he would repudiate it and nationalise the Company. [An HON. MEMBER: "Out of the red."] It may have been "out of the red", but Anglo-Iranian was not "in the red"—it was doing very well. Here it was unilaterally done—with no consultation.
Let it be remembered that in both cases there was no consultation with us or with our friends. There was no consultation with the citizens of the countries concerned; neither in the case of Moussadeq, who just whipped his decree out of his tail pocket, nor in the case of Colonel Nasser, who has done the same thing. There was no debate, or any effective debate, in the Parliaments of the countries concerned. There was no effective discussion among the citizens of those countries, and, after all, both these acts are calculated to damage the interests of the people within the country doing the damaging act. It was so in Persia, and it is so here.
I am bound to say that of all the uncomfortable experiences in the process of negotiation, negotiating with a man who happened to be the Prime Minister of Persia and who was utterly indifferent to the welfare of his own people—I will only say that it is a somewhat unfair form of negotiation. One does expect the man on the other side of the table to take some account of the interests of his own country, even if he does not take account of the interests of the country to which the man on the other side of the table is attached; but there it was. That was how it was in that case.
I can well imagine the discussions which this present Government are having about this present position in Egypt, because I am familiar with the other negotiations, and there are arguments both ways—indeed, several ways—as to the right thing to do, Nevertheless, there was the Persian
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oil happening, and now we have the Suez Canal happening.
What is this act? I do not, myself, follow the argument which is advanced, not only in some minority quarters of this House but in fairly respectable newspapers, that, somehow or other, Egypt is legally authorised in doing this. As to that, I cannot very well argue. I am not an international lawyer—or even a national one. I do not know about that, but the implication is that Egypt is morally justified in what she has done. With great respect, I entirely disagree—utterly disagree—with any such doctrine.
I had as big a hand in the nationalisation of British industry as had any member of the Labour Government—and I hope that the left wing of my party will always remember that. I had a bigger hand than had any other single Minister, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) ran me close, because he dealt with three industries.
Mr. E. Shinwell: I get all the blame.
Mr. Morrison: Therefore, my right hon. Friend and I are both experts in nationalisation. We know how to do it. But we were then nationalising internal British industries, after a General Election in which that issue had been debated by the people of the country. We thought we had a mandate—I still think that we had, but there may be some others who think that it is not quite so clear as that. Nevertheless, it had been debated by the country.
It had been announced in Parliament, by myself as Leader of the House of Commons, that we intended to carry this list through. I remember Oliver Lyttelton, as he then was, standing up and getting very white in the face about it. Each Measure was debated in Parliament and discussed. If there were any foreign interests involved—and I do not know that there were, except incidentally—they had every opportunity to raise their case with the Government.
That is a democratic way of proceeding with the nationalisation of a domestic, internal industry—not an industry of an international character. That is constitutionally all right. There may be objections to it as to policy but, constitutionally, that is right and correct.

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But what happens with this gentleman—this pocket dictator in Cairo? He does not consult his Parliament; in fact, I am not sure that he is permitting his Parliament to function in any effective way at all. My hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) says that he is not. I will take it from him that that is so. There is no discussion with us, no discussion with the other countries who are parties to these Conventions, and joint owners of the Canal—nothing at all. One night Colonel Nasser decides to go out and enjoy himself, and make a speech on the hustings. He makes a speech. Towards the end of his speech he whacks out a decree which he has just signed, or a declaration, that from that point the Suez Canal is to be nationalised and to become Egyptian Government property.
Sir, anybody who says that this has the slightest resemblance to the orthodox beliefs of the British Labour Party as to the process of nationalisation—why, if he said it outside, he would be guilty of a libel. This is not our way of doing things. It is not only not our way of doing things; it is not a civilised, international way of conducting public business.
Here we have the case of an existing international concern. We are in it, the French are in it, the Egyptians are in it—and now, I gather, the United States are in it, which I had forgotten, as part proprietors of the hotel—[Laughter.] I mean as part proprietors of the Canal. It is very natural that some of us should now be thinking of hotels.
This is an international concern and, therefore, I beg of my hon. Friends, and, indeed, hon. Members in all parts of the House, to remember that Colonel Nasser is not a person to be praised because he has asserted the rights of his country against this Canal, which is owned in a certain way. He is a person to be condemned, because he has acted contrary to the law of nations, of international good faith and against the principle of an institution which, while it might be more internationally owned, is, at any rate, internationally owned and held in trust for the common use of all the peoples of the world.
Therefore, I say that this action is morally wrong. It is utterly unjustified,
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and I refuse to say a single word in justification of what Colonel Nasser has done. No word of justification should be uttered. These unilateral acts, action by decree drawn in at the end of a speech—such actions can cause war just as much as can the actions of other people who may retaliate against the action which has been taken.
What is perfectly clear from the whole of this business is that the elaborate policy of the Government—and, like my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, I do not think that this is the time for us to be unduly controversial, but I must say this—the elaborate policy of the Government, an excessive policy of appeasement towards Egypt, certainly has failed. It has badly failed, and there has been no gratitude towards us for what has happened.
Now, Sir, the question which has to be considered, and I think that some hon. Members on both sides are a little in danger of by-passing it—is whether, in the light of these discussions which are going on, force should or should not be a possible element in settling the matter.
I am in favour of taking this business to the United Nations. I am all in favour of it as long as the United Nations will be expeditious and effective about it. I still say that the United Nations is the greatest instrument which we have to try to conserve. There are transitions in these things. In the case of Persia, we took our dispute to the International Court and won. Then we took it, if I remember rightly, to the United Nations, or to the Security Council, or someone there, and it was by-passed.
I say to the United Nations that if it wishes—as we would wish it—to become the great moral authority of the world and the great decisive instrument, it must stop dodging vital international issues. If our Government and France and, if possible, the United States should come to the conclusion that in the circumstances the use of force would be justified, then I think that it is up to each hon. Member of this House to tell the Government whether we would support them or whether we would not. For my own part, in principle, if, after an elaborate and proper consideration, the Government and our friends come to that conclusion, I think that in the circumstances of this particular case it might well be the duty

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of hon. Members, including myself, to say that we would give them support.
I would say just a few words to the United States. When the President of the United States decided to enter the struggle about Korea, which I think he was right to do, our Government of the day decided to back him up and we entered it as well. I must say—and I say this as a sincere friend of the United States; I have never been in any way a member of the anti-American brigade, and I believe that it is utter madness for any good British citizen to become anti-American—that our American friends, now and again, if I may say so with great respect to them, do rather try our patience. I understand their hesitancy about joining the First World War. I was an opponent of it myself. There is no need to remind the House of that; they have been reminded of it too often. But they were shockingly slow in entering the Second World War. If ever there was a war about the American way of life it was the Second World War.
About this Middle East business, the Americans have been rather unsatisfactory.
Mr. C. R. Hobson: That is putting it mildly.
Mr. Morrison: I am an ex-Foreign Secretary. They really have been unsatisfactory. They have often been badly advised, and often they would not listen to the British. After all, for one purpose or another, we have been knocking about that part of the world for a long time and we know a lot about it. The consequence is that American policy has been hesitant, rather wobbling, and not exactly sufficiently co-operative with the policy of the United Kingdom. I do not think that that is good enough.
We have our troubles there. They are not only our troubles; they will be the troubles of other people as well, including the United States, in due course. I think, with every respect to the United States with whom I want our country always to live in co-operative harmony, that they have been unsatisfactory about Middle Eastern policy and it is time that they took a clear line. I hope to goodness that, if they have not already done so with Her Majesty's Government in these discussions, they will take a clear line before midnight is reached, and that the
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world may know that Britain, France and the United States stand together.
If the United States will not stand with us then we may have to stand without them.
Mr. Ellis Smith: What about the United Nations?
Mr. Morrison: I would ask my right hon. Friend, for whom I have the greatest respect: what becomes of any of us if individual countries are entitled to take anarchic action such as this?
This was the point which I was making earlier, and I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) that we can have a situation in which the foe of genuine internationalism can be the modern nationalist, hysterical State, determined to act on its own irrespective of the interests of the rest of the world, which is so in this case.
It can be just as much an evil and a danger to world well-being as was the old imperialism and the old jingoism. I spent much of my life, when I was young, in denouncing imperialism and I have no reason to regret it; in denouncing jingoism, and I have no reason to regret it; and in denouncing excessive nationalism, and I have no reason to regret it. What worries me is the way in which some people, having spent many years in denouncing that in respect of our own country, and having enjoyed its advantages, are now spending their spare time in praising countries like Egypt, which are doing the very thing that Britain and other imperialist countries were doing a hundred years ago. I may be dull, but I just cannot understand it and I do not think that it ought to be done.
I therefore say to the Government that I wish them luck in solving this problem, but I ask them to be careful and judicious by all means and to mind how they are going; but let them not be too much afraid. This is a world in which great Powers can be a nuisance; and, by the way, the Prime Minister's cheerfulness about the Soviet Union does not quite seem to have come off. They are backing Egypt and so is China. By all means consider all the pros and cons, but I ask the Government not to be too nervous, because if they are too nervous we shall begin to evolve a situation in which countries can set themselves up against international practice, international

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morals and international interests, and, in that case, we are not helping the peace of the world; we are helping anarchy, conflict and bad conduct among the nations.
3.39 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I am intervening now, not with any idea of seeking to curtail the debate but in order that I may go as quickly as possible to resume my discussions with the two Foreign Ministers who are in London at the present time.
I regret very much that we have not been able to announce to the House during this debate the result of our discussions, but the American Secretary of State arrived here only yesterday morning. I sincerely hope, as does the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), who has just sat down, after making a remarkable speech which we all, I think, admired very much, that by midnight we shall be able to announce our decision.
I think that this debate has shown a large measure of approval and agreement in the House. The first point is that we, as a country, have done everything possible in our power to make friendly relations with Egypt feasible. We made the agreement with regard to the Sudan; we made the agreement with regard to the Suez base; we made the agreement with regard to sterling balances, which was fair and indeed liberal. We have done everything we can to promote more friendly relations. We have not succeeded, but I think that our course of conduct has the advantage that now public opinion, I believe, in this country and overseas, is united behind the Government in the attitude which has been indicated today.
The second point is that this Canal Company, as the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South has just said, is not an ordinary domestic concern which can properly be nationalised, however much we may or may not agree with the principle of nationalisation, but is a company of an international character. It has had an international character throughout the whole of its existence, and if one looks at the Convention of 1888, it is recited in the Preamble that the countries concerned wished
"to establish, by a Conventional Act, a definite system destined to guarantee at all
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times, and for all Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal …"
It was designed to establish an international system, and therefore I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the principle of nationalisation does not apply.
The next point is that the manner in which Colonel Nasser has acted has shown that in practice the Canal could not safely be left at his disposal. His method of announcing his decision, the threats to the employees who would not stay at work, the indication, with which the right hon. Gentleman dealt, about the uses to which the resources of the Canal were to be put in the future—all these things show, in my view, that apart from the judicial side of the matter, on the practical side it is not safe for this Canal to be left at his disposal. If this Canal is left in his control I think he can, and on past form will, do great harm to us or to any other country.
Mr. Warbey Mr. Warbey rose—
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I think I should be allowed to get on with my speech now.
The only acceptable solution in this present difficulty, I think, is some form of international system—an international system in which we can have confidence—and, therefore, we seek an international solution of this problem. I promise the House that. We are working at the present time for an international conference with suitable membership to meet with expedition—I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about that—to test international opinion on this matter; we are in broad agreement with our French and American Allies upon this matter, and I hope the country will hear more about it before midnight tonight.
There has been reference to the military preparations which are being made. I think they have been received with general approval. It is a very serious situation, in which many British subjects are in Egypt and many British ships are approaching the Canal, and it is a situation in which anything might happen. Therefore, I think that the Government would be failing in their duty if they did not take precautionary measures. Nevertheless, whilst taking these precautionary

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measures, we still seek and will do our best to achieve an international solution of the matter.
I think that the Government can feel that as a result of this debate they have the support or almost the whole House in what they are doing. I assure hon. Members—and this refers to what the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South said towards the end of his speech—that we intend to be absolutely firm in this matter. We are not prepared to accept the present situation. We are not going to yield on this question of principle—the principle of ensuring right of free passage through the Canal under some international system. We feel that this great international waterway must not be left at the mercy of the caprices or the spleen or the hatreds of one Power or of one man.
Mr. Warbey: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman sits down, will he answer one point which I put to him specifically—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has sat down.
Mr. Warbey: On a point of order. I was in the course of—[Interruption.]
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I understand that the hon. Gentleman wishes to raise a point of order.
Mr. Warbey: On a point of order. I was in the course of putting—[Interruption.] Will the hon. Gentleman shut up.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must withdraw that expression.
Mr. Warbey: I will withdraw that expression if the hon. Member who used it first will also withdraw it.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am not asking for a conditional withdrawal of an unparliamentary expression.
Mr. Warbey: I will withdraw unconditionally, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and now ask you to invite the hon. Member to withdraw the same expression.
Mr. H. Fraser: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I merely said that the hon. Gentleman had already spoken for an hour or nearly an hour and a half and has bored a great many of us almost sick.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If the hon. Gentleman used the same expression, I did not catch it, but it would be out of order.
Hon. Members: He did not.
Mr. Warbey: As you have not insisted upon a withdrawal by the hon. Member, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I do not intend to press that point.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I did not hear the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) use the same expression.
Mr. Warbey: Further to that point of order. I distinctly heard the hon. Member use that expression.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am not dealing with that. I said that I did not hear that expression.
Mr. Warbey: Perhaps I may conclude my point of order, namely, that I was in the course of putting a question to the right hon. and learned Gentleman before he sat down, and that before I had completed my question there was a good deal of noise from hon. Members opposite so that I do not think the right hon. and learned Gentleman heard my question.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The right hon. and learned Gentleman had resumed his seat. This is a serious debate and a very large number of Members are anxious to take part. I hope that the debate will be allowed to proceed. Mr. Paget.
3.48 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: With regard to the question of legality with which my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) has dealt, of course it would have been possible to have nationalised the Suez Canal Company in a legal way, but Colonel Nasser did not attempt to do that. Colonel Nasser did not embark upon the negotiations or the procedure which is necessary in order to deal with this matter in a legal way. He did it as an expression of power. It was a challenge of power which we should not fail to take up unless we were to abandon our position.
Colonel Nasser, having chosen how the game was going to be played, cannot now throw down his cards and say, "I want to act legally". I think it is useful

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to see how other people see the stakes for which Colonel Nasser was playing. I wish to quote from yesterday's New York Herald Tribune. According to the syndicated and well-informed article by the Alsop Brothers, this is how the Americans see it:
"American Middle Eastern oil also moves through (he canal, and will henceforth do so, if Nasser has his way, only by courtesy of the Egyptian strong man. But that is only a small part of the American stake. The biggest part is the British alliance. British prestige"—
and I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South mention that—
"influence and power have been shrinking steadily. If Egypt successfully defies Great Britain on a matter absolutely vital to British interest, then it is no exaggeration to say that Britain is through, once and for all, as a great power. The value of the Anglo-American alliance, which remains the heart and soul of Western strength, will then be sharply and disastrously downgraded. What is more, what has now happened is a very direct result of American, not British, policy."
I believe that that states the issue very well.
The stakes for which Nasser is playing are not merely control of the oil, upon which Britain and Europe depend, but control of the suppliers of that oil, because if Nasser holds the Canal he holds not only the users but he holds the producers; it means that the Middle East is in his hands, and we have seen how those hands work. That is why it seems to me that this is a challenge which we cannot fail to take up.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, in what I think we all felt was a most remarkable speech, used one sentence which I should like to amplify and perhaps qualify a little. He said that we must act with the other maritime Powers. Certainly, we desire to do so. But so often there was the tragedy in the 1930s of the words, "We must act with other Powers" meaning that we must act with the most nervous, the most doubtful, the slowest and the weakest. That is not the way to act with other Powers.
If we are to act with other Powers, and there is to be action at all, somebody has to take the lead. That "somebody" here must be this country; there is nobody else. I think it is time that the Americans recognised that. When they, having encouraged the Bagdad Pact, failed to come into it, they left us with
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the leadership of the Middle East. We must tell them that in this area they have put the burden on us and we expect to be followed. Here is an occasion when we can talk very firmly to the Americans and say, "In Korea we accepted your leadership; here you must accept ours, and we expect you, as our ally, to go along with us in what we deem necessary".
As regards what is proposed, I do not want to ask, and at this point I certainly do not want to press, the Foreign Secretary for anything specific, but the Prime Minister's words, as I took them down, were, "We must insist on control by an international authority, and nothing less will satisfy us". I hope that those words stand literally correct, and that the position here is that, if a conference is called, on whatever terms it is called, it shall be a conference the acceptance of which we shall require of Egypt, and require it by force if necessary. Does that fairly state the position of the Government?
Once one has taken steps to bring about that situation, then it is up to the Russians. If they wish to take their part in the world as a great Power, they can participate with us in requiring Egypt to go before the world in a conference of the world's great Powers sitting in judgment. If the Russians do that, they will then be participants in the international authority which is created to control the Canal. If they do not join in demanding that, then they will not be participants in that authority.
That seems to me to pose a direct choice to the Russians. It is a choice which should be placed before them. Here is their opportunity to come in as a great Power, for the satisfaction of the world, really to perform what was the function of the United Nations. The function of the United Nations was to operate as the concert of the great Powers. It has not worked because there has not been a concert; it has been but the secretariat of the great Powers. We all kept it in being, and thought it was worth keeping in being, because we hoped with all our hearts and souls that that great concert of great Powers would come into being.
Here is an opportunity to bring it into being. It is for the Russians to choose whether they will go on as they are, causing mischief round the world, being

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smart, stirring up trouble for us while we stir up trouble for them, or whether they will come in where they would always be welcome, into the concert of the world to join with us in this demand that Egypt, which claims to hold this great interest, should come before the world in judgment. If the Russians do so, then they will be within the international control which has thereby been created.
3.56 p.m.
Mr. Walter Elliot: The weight of the matters which we are debating today is being brought home to us by the more recent speeches which have been delivered, notably by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). The stakes at issue are very great indeed. While I would have every sympathy with the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) in his hope that we should secure the acceptance of Russia in the forthcoming conference, or even that we should succeed in obtaining the wholehearted support of the United States, it is in this Chamber that the responsibility lies today, and each of us must speak with a sense of that responsibility weighing on our shoulders. Here is where we can affect opinion, and here is where action, whatever action will be taken, will need to be authorised.
While we all deeply deplore the action of the Egyptian leader, we do, I think, deplore it from two separate points of view. First, there is the denouncement of the Concession in the operation of the Canal. Those of us who are interested in the development of under-developed countries particularly deplore this. Every time such action is taken, it is made proportionately more difficult to interest people in the great projects for developing the under-developed countries which have still to come along.
I am myself passionately interested in the great Volta River scheme. I want to see Africa developed, and the great rivers of Africa harnessed for the benefit of her populations. But I know, as everyone knows, that that will require vast investments from the savings of the Western World. Every time such action as this is taken, it becomes more difficult to secure the acceptance of the Western World in burying its savings in distant areas from which, perhaps, they will never
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be recouped. I say, therefore, that this action of Colonel Nasser is a betrayal of the under-developed areas and a betrayal of the hungry populations of the world.
That is not the most important issue before us today. What is more important, as was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and as was repeated by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, is the element of challenge in this action by Egypt. The right hon. Member for Lewisham spoke, with his great knowledge and authority as a former Foreign Secretary, of the occasion in which he himself had been engaged by the action of a dictator seizing a great piece of overseas investment in order to apply it solely to his own advantage. We must each speak from our own experience. I was a member of a Cabinet which had a long struggle with another dictator.
Time and again we had these questions—where do we draw the line, where do we resist—and do we use force? Because to use force is undoubtedly a terrible thing, and it was a terrible thing to determine to use force against Hitler. It involved, as we have seen, the destruction of half Europe. But there is a moment at which, for all that, force has to be envisaged or else one goes under. Not only does one go under, but all the helpless populations of the world go under too.
It may be that we delayed too long. There are many who complained bitterly of our action and said that we waited too long and appeased too much. That may well be. I make no apology for having sought to the limit, and beyond the limit, to preserve the peace of the world. But it failed. When a challenge like this is deliberately thrown down, pressed, insisted upon, hurled to the skies in radio and published and brandished about in every possible way, it is impossible simply to close one's eyes to it and to pretend that this is simply an outburst of justifiable nationalism which will soon pass away.
That was an argument which was used about Hitler, time and again. When a deliberate challenge was placed and stressed, at the end of the day it had to be withstood. The new challenge is being stressed and brandished now. It is impossible to read the speeches of Colonel Nasser—or to

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read his book—without realising that here again we have this challenge brought forward, from which there is no turning back.
When a man enters upon a course like that, he cannot withdraw from it unless he is faced with something which he cannot overcome. He will not be argued out of it simply by reason. There is a moment at which he has to be withstood, and that moment is here. That moment is now, and it is this House which will have to decide upon the withstanding.
Mr. Christopher Mayhew: Is the right hon. Gentleman arguing that the use of force is justified by what Colonel Nasser has already done or by what he anticipates he may do in the future?
Mr. Elliot: Exactly the same argument was put time and again in the case of Hitler: Do you object to Hitler taking over the Sudeten Deutsch population, who, after all, are his own blood and have voted in favour of him time and again? Are you in favour of withstanding him because of his annexation of Austria, which, after all, is a German Power and wished to come into the Reich?
Obviously, the two things go together, both the action and the philosophy upon which the action is justified. These are two inseparable parts of a single whole. It is the whole that we object to, and it is the whole that this country and the world are faced with now. It is not this or that aspect of the whole: it is the whole. Hon. Members must realise what we are faced with. That is the same philosophy and the same set of actions as we have been faced with before, and which, after a long, painful struggle for peace, we had to withstand, sometimes at terrible cost.
Many other hon. and right hon. Members wish to speak, and I do not wish to speak at length. Therefore, I only say this. It has been determined that we are to seek international control—good. It has been determined that we are to seek international control by means of a conference—good. The conference, it is said, shall meet promptly—good. But it must also decide promptly. It is useless that a conference should meet swiftly and then, as has happened in international conferences before, go on discussing for month after month without coming to any conclusion.
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The conference must meet and decide. It must also meet in some great centre, not in a remote seaside resort or small Power capital. It should meet here, in a great commercial centre of the world closely connected with the great issues which are at stake.
Furthermore, we know that, in any internal dispute, such as an industrial dispute, always as a prerequisite to negotiations the arbitrary decision of one side or the other must be withdrawn. Strike notices and lock-out notices must be withdrawn. In all cases, the action which is about to be debated should be withdrawn while the discussion about its legality goes on.
If that is impossible, active action for alternative methods of transit should be, not merely considered, but proceeded with. For instance the contracts for the pipeline across from Elath to the Mediterranean should be put out—now, this week. The Americans built a great pipeline from side to side of their Continent in a matter of months. The industrial resources of the world would be far better disposed in producing an alternative traffic route at this stage than in a great many military operations which one could suggest. After the "Big Inch", as the Americans called their pipeline, crossed the American Continent, one pipeline has crossed the Rocky Mountains. It would be child's play for the industry of the world to build a 200-mile Big Inch across from the Gulf of Akaba to the Mediterranean; and it would show that we meant business.
I have every sympathy and every agreement with the arguments which have been put forward by the two Front Benches. The only word I would add is that of urgency. Urgency is the thing which is still lacking in this debate, and the matter is urgent. If it drags on till Christmas or next spring, without any question Nasser will have won. Then, what will come is not this or that control of the Canal or anything else, but the fact that a new dictator has arisen who will draw all men unto him in the Middle East and around, because that is an area which above all areas of the world recognises success. After the resounding success of that new dictator, the whole of that world will say, "He is the man to follow," and they will follow him.

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Therefore, I stress the need for urgency. Let the action in the conference be taken with speed. Let the industrial action be taken with speed. Let it be begun now, and let us be sure that we do not let this issue slip through our fingers while we are discussing how best to avert the dangers of war. Let us not find that we have lost the peace by talking too much about it.
4.8 p.m.
Mr. Henry Usborne: Most right hon. and hon. Members in the House would, I think, agree with the right hon. Member for Kelvin-grove (Mr. Elliot) when he said with a sense of urgency that the new pipeline should be built as soon as possible and without delay. I entirely agree with him. Whatever happens to the Suez Canal, an additional pipeline is urgently needed. I do not, however, believe that that alone will suffice.
The right hon. Gentleman also said that it was the action combined with the philosophy which really was important, and I am convinced that in the problem which we now face it is the combination of these two—the action we take and the philosophy for which that action is taken—which alone will make the action successful.
All sides of the House are, curiously, agreed that the object of whatever action it is necessary to take is to get the control of the Suez Canal into international hands; that the Canal should be taken out of national hands. On that, it appears that we are all agreed. By implication also, running through all our speeches is a terrifying recognition of the fact, which was brought to the surface by my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), that we may have soon to take that action, if need be, alone. In my own view, it will not be alone, because the French, in all circumstances, will be with us, but I think it is undeniable that there is a case for action to be taken soon.
For my own part, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South, and from what I now know about the facts, I could not say that I would oppose such action, I must make it perfectly clear that the military action we may take depends, if it is to be effective, on the long-term object for which that action is
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taken. If the solution which we seek is a valid and viable one, which we and others can conscientiously support, we can not only take the action, but take the consequences of that action, for many years if need be.
I do not suppose that anyone will deny that we did not leave India because we were not strong enough to stay. We left India because we did not believe we had a right any longer to stay as bosses in India. I think we left Abadan largely because we believed that those people there had some right on their side. I do not believe that we evacuated the Suez Canal Zone because we had not enough force to stay there. We evacuated it because, again, we had doubts on the Tightness of our occupation.
I think the hub of the problem here is whether we can believe ourselves in what we are doing, and whether we continue to believe it. If we believe in it, there is much that we can do and that we can continue to do for a very long time in order to get the final solution. If we rush in and take military action in support of a solution which is half-baked and which has not been thought out, and, after a little while, perhaps a month or two or a year or two, it is seen to be untenable, shabby and selfish, once again we shall lose faith in our Tightness to be there, and once again we shall pull out. I think this faith is so important that I want to devote a minute or two to a few comments upon the kind of solution to which, evidently, all in this House are now looking.
We are agreed that this business has to be taken out of the hands of one nation. Fundamentally, we are agreed upon that, because as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has said, not only does Colonel Nasser now control the Suez Canal; he virtually controls the whole of the Middle East and the other countries of which he is not the elected president. We have therefore a very complicated problem, not only in connection with the Suez Canal. We cannot only solve the Suez Canal problem; whatever we do which is designed to solve this problem must also solve many other problems as well, or it will not solve the problem of the Suez Canal.
It is not at all a simple problem. It is the kind of thing which I have myself, with friends of mine all over the world,

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spent my spare time in the last ten or fifteen years in studying. This is just one incident in a long chain, which stems from the conflict of a contracting world upon the structure of the national sovereign State. When we talk about the imperialism and wickedness of Colonel Nasser, we must remember, in the last analysis, that the Egyptians under Colonel Nasser merely want to be like us. They want to have power. They want to be able, as they have seen that we have been able in the past to push nations around. They have been pushed around by us in the past, and now they want to do a bit of the pushing around.
In other words, they want to make plain that theirs is a sovereign nation State, and we cannot complain if we ourselves insist that Britain must be a sovereign nation State. If we cherish and maintain inviolate the theory that a nation must be a sovereign nation, that nations should properly have their own armed forces, by implication then we admit that that nation State can do what the devil it likes.
There is no such thing as international law or justice when we accept that proposition. I noticed that the Foreign Secretary said that we must set up an international system in which we have confidence. Exactly what does he mean? Does he mean that we must set up an international system which we can control for our own self-interest exactly as we wish to do? Is that the kind of organisation he envisages, and is it the only thing in which we would have confidence? But if we have confidence because we control it, those thus controlled will have no confidence. This is the snag in any system of international collaboration between sovereign nation states.
My last point is this. If we want to turn this problem over to the United Nations, if we say that Suez ought to be governed by an international convention, and under law, operated through the system of the United Nations, what is new about that? Have we not been saying this since 1945? There is the institution—the United Nations. It was set up to take care of just such problems as this. Are we now taking to the United Nations what the United Nations has in fact had in its lap all this time and has not been able to solve? By what strange reasoning should the United Nations be able to solve it now? If we do not mean that,
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if we mean to set up something that is not the United Nations but sounds as if it were, I suggest that for a while, as long as we are sufficiently indignant, we can delude ourselves; but we shall delude nobody else. It will be quite clear when we have the patience to see it, that we are merely contriving a new system by which we intend to exert an authority which we deny to Colonel Nasser.
For myself, I think we must be sure ourselves about what we mean to do. We have got to go a lot further, think a lot harder and be much more courageous than most people have attempted to be so far. The United Nations, in theory, is one thing, but, in practice, it does not work because it is not properly designed so that it can work. We know the kind of thing we want, but I think it is now necessary to think a very great deal more carefully than we have done in the past about exactly what is to be done to make an organisation that really can work.
Mr. Barnett Janner: Does not my hon. Friend think that the real difficulty and the real trouble is that the United Nations has not been properly supported by the various nations of the world, and that this is an opportunity in which the United Nations can be given the real chance of doing something which we all want to do?
Mr. Usborne: We all think that, and when we use the word "we", we mean it for two different reasons, on two different occasions and in two different ways. We are going to delude ourselves if we think that we only have to take this problem to the United Nations and we will get the solution we want. Suppose the United Nations reaches a solution that Britain does not like? Is it to be able to enforce it upon us in the same way as we hope it will now enforce on Colonel Nasser a decision which he will not like?
There is only one other thing I wish to say. I do not think it is very helpful, although it may be very exciting, when my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N Evans) criticises the United States of America. I do not think it is harmful, but it does not do much good either. The fact of the matter is that sovereign nations act that way. If we think we can change the attitude of America by criticising or correcting

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it, then for heaven's sake let someone explain how it is we have made so little impression upon it hitherto.
Mr. S. N. Evans: Surely one of the privileges of friendship is that one can voice anxieties to a friend without their being construed as the criticisms of an enemy.
Mr. Usborne: Nor am I saying that they are criticisms of an enemy. I am merely saying that they have not got us anywhere very far.
The point of what I was saying, which would have emerged if I had been allowed to complete my sentence, is this. Could it be that it is not America's fault or Britain's fault or my hon. Friend's fault? Could it be that there is something wrong with the system we are trying to work? I happen to believe there is, and I happen to believe that we have to find a supra-national system now to take care of the problem of the Suez Canal, that will also take care of the problem which Germany may present in a few years' time if Germany is united and sovereign and powerful and nationalistic again. I do not believe we can solve the one without solving the other, and I do not think we can solve either unless we are all prepared to pursue a more courageous and comprehensive policy than any of us have dared to contemplate in the past.

ARMY RESERVE (PROCLAMATION)
4.21 p.m.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I have it in command from Her Majesty to inform the House, in pursuance of the Act of Parliament in that behalf, that the present state of public affairs and the extent of the demands on the military forces for the protection of the interests of the Commonwealth and Empire constituting, in the opinion of Her Majesty, a case of great emergency within the meaning of that Act, Her Majesty deems it proper to provide additional means for the military service, and, therefore, Her Majesty is by Proclamation about to order that the Army Reserve shall be called out on permanent service.
4.22 p.m.
Mr. John Strachey: Those are formidable words which the Secretary of State for War has just read out. As I understand them, they give very wide powers indeed to the Government, which they will exercise during the long period in which Parliament will be in Recess. I understand, from the Prime Minister's speech this morning, that the intention of the Government is a much more limited one. He defined that intention clearly, as I understood him—and I hope he will correct me if I am wrong—as the intention to call out Army Reserve A and a very limited part of B, and said that it was B which required this Proclamation. This is, therefore, a very wide Proclamation indeed which will cover the calling out of many hundreds of thousands of men. It is, in fact, concerned with the calling out of only a few thousand at the most of a special category which, the Prime Minister hinted, it had been hoped by legislation to bring into category A at an earlier date.
All I would say about that is that we are not, of course, challenging the military preparations which, no doubt, are mere steps of common prudence; but to some extent the House must take note of the intention of the Government on the actual powers which are called for here. It is, I think, something of which the House ought to take the most careful account, that these very wide powers of call-up, extending to a very large section of the young men of the nation, are being asked for and will reside in the hands of the Executive during this long period when Parliament will not be sitting.
If at any time during the Recess the Government should feel it necessary to use these powers much more widely than to the extent which the Prime Minister defined this morning, we on this side of the House should feel very strongly that an occasion had arisen when those representations for the recall of Parliament, which have been referred to, should be made.
We should not think that, under a Proclamation of this wide character, brought in on the last day when Parliament is sitting before the Recess, the much wider step of what would go far towards mobilisation should be taken without further reference to the House; because the Prime Minister's definition of the much

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more limited steps which the Government at present intend to take is all, in a sense, that the House has really authorised.
Therefore, we should feel that the Government, though not, of course, formally bound, would be bound to take seriously into account the representation of the Opposition, that, if anything like the powers which are written into this Proclamation were used, Parliament would have to be recalled. I very much hope that we can have an assurance from the Government on those lines.
4.26 p.m.
Mr. George Wigg: We do not quite know—
Mr. Snow: On a point of order. Do we understand, Mr. Speaker, that the debate on Suez is now at an end?
Mr. Speaker: No. That is not the case. It may be convenient if I make a statement now on the subject.
As the House knows, the arrangements have been upset by the change of plans, both here and in another place. The result of this, coupled with the fact that two hon. Members, to whom I had allotted Adjournment subjects under the previous scheme, have withdrawn their subjects, is that now we have time in hand which will enable us to carry on this debate until 6.30 without entrenching on the rights previously announced to hon. Members who had been allotted Adjournment subjects. Therefore, it was my intention to let this debate run on until 6.30 and then, as soon thereafter as convenient, to proceed with those matters previously allotted to hon. Members.
Mr. Wigg: The Government have found it necessary to call out the whole of the Army Reserve, including the Army Emergency Reserve, a total of 400,000 men. The numbers I am giving, of course, are not the actual strength, but the numbers shown in the Army Estimates. I make no complaint that the actual numbers are not available owing to security reasons. Of course, what the Government are now after is to make sure that they have the technicians they want, and at first sight it would seem that to recall Section A of the Army Reserve would be sufficient.
The power to recall Section A without proclamation springs from an Act passed during the lifetime of the Labour Government.
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Section A covers two classes of men. First, it covers those Regular Reservists who volunteer and who by so doing accept liability for service overseas on recall without Proclamation. These men, if they are private soldiers, receive 1s. 6d. a day for accepting that liability. Those Reservists are recalled by the serving of a notice from the Record Office and, on rejoining their units, they can forthwith be sent overseas.
At that time, the Labour Government thought they could not rely exclusively on these volunteers, so they introduced what are called "designated Reservists", those men whom the Army Council think it might want to recall as if they were in Section A. The procedure is, as it were, to say, "Smith, Jones, Brown, we may want you, and we designate you, and although you have not volunteered you are liable for recall if Section A is called out."
There was a proviso in that Measure that the Government appear to have overlooked. Those powers exist only in the first year of the man's reserve service. It appears now—I should like to know from the Government whether I am right or wrong—that somebody in the Record Office has slipped up and failed to note that time has passed by, so that Smith, Jones and Brown, who were designated Section A when they came on the Army Reserve, are no longer liable for recall for they are no longer in the first year of their reserve service. Now the Government want them back, but have not the power to recall them.
I suspect that the numbers that are wanted are very small indeed, perhaps in tens or hundreds. These specialists who are required certainly do not number thousands. Yet doubt will be created in the minds of the men who will read of this Proclamation tonight. Not only Section A, but the whole Army Reserve will be wondering, "Am I going to be recalled?" If they have not been designated they do not know, and that is a degree of uncertainty which is quite unreasonable.
On all sides of the House we have been saying recently that we must look after the Regular soldiers, and if we mean that, we cannot leave 450,000 Army Reservists and their families in uncertainty. I ask the Secretary of State for a reasonable assurance. By this time

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the Records Office must know precisely the numbers, names and addresses of the men who are wanted. Will the Secretary of State say that in the next 24, 48 or 96 hours all the men in Section B or in the Army Emergency Reserve, whom the Government want virtually to designate to Section A, will be informed by telegram or registered letter so that at the expiration of perhaps a week from now every one of those 450,000 men who has not received a telegram or a registered letter will be able to go on holiday and breathe freely?
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well the effect on the Regular Army of the 1950 decision to freeze Regular discharges. Every time that we treat the Regular soldier, who, it must be remembered, is a volunteer, in an arbitrary way we pile up trouble for ourselves because the Regulars assume that, despite all the fine things that we say about them when we are faced with an emergency, their rights and feelings do not matter. I hope that in the next Session the Government will put right the administrative mistake which has now been revealed and will proceed to amend the Reserve Forces Act.
Mr. Head: I am obliged to the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for the moderate and, if I may say so, sensible way in which they have commented upon the statement which I have just made. I would agree with the right hon. Gentleman that these powers are extremely wide. I should like to make it clear that the Government's intention is, of course, not in any way at this stage to use the powers which extend over a very large number of men indeed. I entirely appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's request that if there is a considerable extension of these powers the Government should consider the whole question of information being given to Parliament about it.
I should like to make it absolutely clear that under present intentions nobody other than those in Section A and Section B of the Regular Reserve and Categories I and II of the Army Emergency Reserve is contemplated to be called up and that the numbers in Section B of the Regular Reserve and
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Category II of the Army Emergency Reserve are small.
The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of the powers of the Proclamation and has said, indeed, that a Proclamation of this seriousness was designed to be used for something equivalent to general mobilisation. It is true, as my right hon. Friend has informed the House, that we are really using very large powers to obtain a comparatively small component which we consider essential. The hon. Member for Dudley asked me about the question of designation. He asked, "Why should you not have got this comparatively small number of volunteers by designation?" As he knows, designation lasts only for one year and designation used to the full and with great prescience would not have solved the problem which we have now of a comparatively small number over a rather wide field.
The hon. Member for Dudley has said, and I am sure that many right hon. and hon. Members feel the same, that we must do everything in our power to inform these men who will be required at the very earliest opportunity. I feel very strongly that it is incumbent upon myself to ensure that the numbers to be recalled are cut to the absolute minimum. We are very well aware that it is an absolute obligation upon us to do all this as quickly as we can. I cannot give a guarantee of the number of days because, as will be appreciated, there are details which will have to be worked out, but the two principles are, first, that the numbers be cut to the minimum possible consistent with efficiency and, secondly, that every man should be notified at the earliest possible opportunity.
Mr. Strachey: Do the right hon. Gentleman's words mean that the Government have agreed that they would favourably entertain a request for the recall of Parliament if they have to go beyond the categories which he has just announced?
Mr. Head: Yes, I think the point is that if the Government, numerically and in general scope, had to go widely beyond the powers outlined to the House by the Prime Minister and myself they would then, of course, at once consider the recall of Parliament.
Sir R. Boothby: Should it be necessary to call up any part of the Naval Reserve or the Royal Air Force Reserve, will that require a Proclamation?
Mr. Head: No, Sir. That is covered under the existing Proclamation should the necessity arise.
Mr. Speaker: I think that the House should resume the general debate. Will hon. Members on my right who offer themselves to speak please stand?
Several hon. Members Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Major Legge-Bourke.

SUEZ CANAL
4.36 p.m.
Major H. Legge-Bourke: My right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) said earlier today that it was desirable that hon. Members should try to speak from their own experience on this great problem. I have two particular experiences which may be of some relevance to the debate. The first I remember all too well. I remember being in Salzburg just after the Anschluss and seeing bands of Hitler youth going round the town beating drums morning, noon and night. It reminded me of the words of John Scott of Amworth:
"I hate that drum's discordant sound,
Parading round and round and round."
I think we all hate it. None of us, least of all my right hon. Friend who had to present it, could welcome from the bottom of his heart the statement about the Proclamation which has just been read to the House, though I think that the debate has shown that the vast majority of us realise that the Proclamation is necessary.
This, therefore, is a moment of some bitter memories to some of us and of some tragic memories to many of us. Let us hope that this time the action has been taken really in time, because surely the object of this action must be the prevention of something far worse. This is not the moment to hark back to the conditions of 1954 when we debated this matter at some length, or the moment to start any form of recrimination. It is the moment to face the problem before us and to consider what we shall do about it.
We must all remember one essentially important point. I hope that those who are banging the drums loudest today are not imagining that if military action has to be taken in Egypt or anywhere in the Middle East it will be a minor, comparatively trivial affair. What we have
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to face up to in this House is our duty of telling the people what we are trying to do, why we are trying to do it, and the meaning of what we are trying to do. I believe that we should not be fulfilling our duty today if we led anyone to suppose that, should all the efforts made by our own Government and by our Allies, and by those who I hope will come along to co-operate with us in solving this great problem—if those efforts fail, it is useless to think that the military action we take can be of a limited and comparatively small character. I do not believe that it can.
I believe that if, ultimately, these negotiations fail the country ought now, and we here ought now, to make up our minds how far we are prepared to go, and what is the risk. That is not to say that I believe that the ultimate risk will materialise; in fact, I feel that the action announced today, the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the splendid speech of the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell), and of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison)—all those speeches have indicated that perhaps we have learned something from history, that perhaps we have at last acted in time. I hope so. I believe that there is a very fair chance of it, but let the country not be under any delusion that, if we are too late, the risk we are taking is not the supreme risk that any nation can take. It is not pleasant, and I do not think that any of us here can welcome this occasion in any way.
The other memory which I have of this matter concerns an incident which occurred some years ago in Egypt. I do not propose to go into any detail beyond saying that if we have to take any action in Egypt militarily, we shall have to do something else as well. We shall have to take control of her communications by land and by air, and that is a very big job. Therefore, this is a major military campaign once it is embarked upon, and it behoves us all to do everything in our power to prevent it ever getting to the stage when that action has to be taken.
I agree with everything that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said today, and with everything said by the Leader of the Opposition except one

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thing. I am doubtful whether the United Nations is the right international body for this matter. I say that for two reasons. One is that I do not think we can allow it to get into a sphere where the veto can be operated by the Soviet Union. The other reason is that although in Israel herself the reputation of the United Nations is comparatively high, the United Nations has an unfortunate association in the Arab mind by virtue of the great clash of opinion on the subject of Israel.
I believe that if we are to get a solution in this area acceptable to everybody, which will allow everyone to settle down and operate this international waterway in a peaceful manner, we ought to try to set up a body completely divorced from that unpleasant issue. If we bring the United Nations into it, I do not believe that we can do that. So I believe it would be better to have a new international consortium of some sort. However, I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) that if we wait for all the nations to come together—and we shall have to bring in the weak as well as the strong—if we let that drift on, it may come to nought.
Somebody has to take the lead, and I agree with hon. Members who say that we must take the lead in this sphere. But although we must take the lead, we must make it clear that we are prepared to take this stern action and that we all endorse what the Prime Minister says, that this international waterway can never be allowed to remain in the position where it is at the whim of a petty dictator. That is why I feel that the House should let a message go out from it today that it has weighed most carefully in the balance what are the issues, and has come down decisively in favour of taking the attitude enunciated by my right hon. Friend today.
4.45 p.m.
Mr. Frank Tomney: I think that the House, which is usually generous in its criticisms, will at least credit the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) with one thing on this aspect of world affairs, and that is his consistency on this matter.
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This has been a serious debate and a serious occasion. The most serious part of it to me was when the Foreign Secretary intervened and said that he was returning to the Foreign Ministers' conference for further consultations. It is deplorable, to my mind, that agreement has not been reached with our American Allies, even at this stage in what can prove to be a very explosive situation, because just as Great Britain was the nation of the last century, it can be truly said that the United States is the nation of this century, and she must measure up to her responsibilities. It took the United States three and a half years to go into the First World War, it took her more than two and a half years to go into the last war, and we have not that much time left in these circumstances. Time is short, and action may have to be swift to be decisive.
I would say to Nasser at this stage that he has done something which has been done before in history by people who have assumed the rôle of dictator. He has succeeded in uniting the House of Commons, which is always dangerous for anybody who takes that risk. So he should take due note of what has happened in the past to people who assumed that risk and undertook that rôle.
It is with the United States, however, that I wish chiefly to deal. It is true that she has never been a colonising Power as we were during the last century, but she is a great commercial and investing Power. She is investing millions of dollars in the British Commonwealth and in areas which will give a rich return and a high dividend for the expenditure of those dollars. In those areas the United States has not the responsibility of maintaining law and order, of keeping open sea lanes and lines of communication, of providing a base on which prosperity can be developed to enable the underdeveloped peoples to go ahead.
This is her responsibility, however. It is no use the United States deciding to put up petrol stations all over the world without being prepared to back up such a policy by diplomatic means or otherwise.
Frankly, I am sick and tired of British Service men in these last fifteen or twenty years taking the brunt all over the world, in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, Malaya and Cyprus, doing the job which should

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rightly be done by the United States. It is no consolation for any hon. Member of this House to have to speak on public platforms in his own constituency and in others, where people in the audience have had sons murdered in areas which we have had to defend, not only on our own behalf but on behalf of the free world.
The other obligation on the American people is that whilst there is an issue here for us in Europe and an issue for Nasser in the Middle East, there is also an issue for the United States. The people behind the Iron Curtain are at present held down by dictatorships, and if the United States defaults on her responsibilities here, what hope is there for them? If the United States is bound to assume obligations which are compatible with her strength in the world, then she must back Europe on this issue. I do not say Great Britain and France; I say Europe, because what is concerned here is the life-blood of Europe.
Our people in the factories and workshops should be told. I am surprised that even now the Prime Minister has not taken one or two trade union chiefs into consultation. If certain measures come into operation, sacrifices on the part of workers will be required, and they ought to have been consulted about the position and what the outcome may be.
We depend upon the oil of the Middle East, where there are terrific United States investments, to keep the wheels of industry turning, particularly in Great Britain, for it is by this means that we can export in order to earn our people's daily bread and maintain our standard of living. Anything that interferes with the free passage through the Suez Canal of essential goods and supplies for Europe is of vital concern to us. In view of the lead which we have given through the League of Nations and the United Nations, we are right on this occasion to defend our position with all the means in our power, and to let Nasser know that we intend to continue as free people living our way of life, and that, if there is a cost to be paid, we are prepared to pay it.
4.52 p.m.
Mr. John Harvey: For some months now the dilemma of dealing with Nasser has been to know quite what to make of him.
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Many of us have tried to give him the benefit of what doubts appeared to exist. We had hoped that at last someone had arrived who would provide his country with a period of stable, enlightened and incorruptible government, which would have been for the good of Egypt and for the great good of the Middle East as a whole.
However, we are now entitled to assume that his policies are too barren, his temper too impetuous, and his patience too short for so desirable an end. We are entitled to fear that his ambitions cannot be contained within the bounds of Egypt, and, if that is so, it is a grievous fault. Yet I feel that it is worth while even now trying to make it clear to Colonel Nasser that we of the Western world have no wish to bully him out of any rights that his nation may have or to deprive Egypt of its legitimate interests in an expanding Middle Eastern wealth, which will continue rapidly to expand provided that not too many spanners are thrown into the works.
Colonel Nasser should be clear about this. There are many of us who feel that the situation in which we find ourselves today is analogous to the situation which Hitler created when he marched into the Rhineland. We remember that our failure to act in the defence of, and in honour of, international agreements at that time led Hitler to imagine himself invincible and led eventually to world war. Many of us feel that Colonel Nasser's policies today are shaping much the same way, and we feel that the stake for which Egypt is gambling is para-mountcy in a militant Arab world. It is not without its touch of irony that the Jews are again being used as a catalyst in this perturbing development.
Today, with the British economy being consciously and deliberately geared to oil power, it is not too much to say that the economic activity and survival of Britain, our jobs and our prosperity, will depend in increasing measure over the coming years on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. Indeed, it is even permissible to doubt whether the Suez Canal in its present form will be able to cope with all the traffic to which it will have to give passage over the coming years. Therefore, propositions such as the one made by the Leader of the Opposition for alternative methods of

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speeding the flow of oil through that part of the world need to be given urgent consideration, not only for political and strategic reasons, but for simple economic reasons as well.
Colonel Nasser should, therefore, be asked to understand that, if his ambitions are really as boundless as he has led us now to believe, he has forced us into a position where we cannot accept a new Rhineland situation, because we know from our own bitter experience the consequences of too inexhaustible a patience, but he should also understand that he is still in a position to show us that he is big enough to have second and more sober thoughts.
The present situation has been brought to a head by the withdrawal of offers to help in regard to the Aswan Dam. Yet I have not heard so far in this debate any figures in that connection. It is relevant to notice that in the budget recently presented in Cairo Colonel Nasser has seen fit to earmark nearly £54 million for armaments expenditure while less than £4 million has been appropriated towards the Dam project, and the £54 million for arms expenditure is a considerable increase on the previous year's figure for similar purposes.
Therefore, I think we can say to Colonel Nasser from this House that, if he is prepared to spend a little more on potential welfare and a little less on potential warfare, a little more on proteins and a little less on propaganda, we would gladly echo the words of a leading article in The Times this week which said:
"On the British and American side the present withdrawal should neither be regarded as a total rejection of the Aswan scheme for all time, nor as implying any disregard of the needs of Egyptian peasants."
It is possible to make certain allowances for Colonel Nasser. He is faced with a delicate situation whichever way he turns. He is, after all, much my own age and still has a very great deal to learn. We would forgive him for having thought it possible to solve his problems quickly by playing the East against the West, but we shall not be able to forgive him if he fails to learn from his mistakes.
It is perhaps difficult for us to understand just what the establishment of the State of Israel has meant to Arab minds. It is not a subject on which they can
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reason. It is for them a subject of the greatest passion. Therefore, in seeking to defend our own vital and legitimate interests, we should not lose sight of this underlying cause of tension and trouble. The Arab refugee problem looms in my mind very prominent among such causes.
It is a short step from this problem to the consideration of the new pattern of the cold war, on which I should like to detain the House for a moment or so only. In assisting in the establishment of the State of Israel, it was no part of this country's policy deliberately to set nation against nation in the Middle East. We were concerned solely with the provision of a homeland for the much persecuted Jewish people, and yet the effect has been to inflame the Middle East.
Into the midst of what we had hoped might eventually become a better understood situation, into a situation in which we had hoped there might eventually be some easement of tension, the Communist Powers have not hesitated now, in pursuance of their own policies, to inject a policy which is obviously calculated to exacerbate the situation. There has been a great deal of talk over recent months—there has even been mention of it in the debate—about the new attitude of Communist Russia. Many hopes have been engendered about the new policies of Moscow. I find it very difficult to share those hopes when I consider that what the Soviet Union is doing in the Middle East is callously to fan the flames of Arab-Jewish hatred in the obvious hope of damaging to a greater or lesser degree the nerve-centre of our oil-based Western economy.
The Soviet Union is seeking to do this damage in the easiest possible way, by the judicious and quite unscrupulous use of economic weapons. In fact, notice has been served that from now on we can expect a new form of warfare from Moscow under a banner which the Russians appear to have borrowed from the Lord Privy Seal, bearing the strangely chosen device "Invest in Success".
We of the Western world must now concert our policies, and particularly our economic policies, as never before. The American Government can no longer afford to let the American oil companies go on manufacturing Middle Eastern policy for them. They must face up to their own responsibilities in these matters

1689
and, if Colonel Nasser has taught us that lesson, then he has done the Western world a great service.
The Middle East stands today at the threshold of perhaps the most rapid and remarkable economic transformation that the world has ever seen. The potential rate of increase of wealth throughout the Middle East over the next few years is likely to bring about for all the peoples of that part of the world an increase in the standard of their livelihood that no one has ever known before. In that it is legitimate that Egypt should hope to share, and it is legitimate that we should bear in mind that Egypt has not the same oil resources as some of its neighbours in the Middle East and will therefore want to look to the Canal as a way of increasing its own wealth.
But Egypt should also remember that the goose which is laying the golden eggs of the Middle East is not an Egyptian goose and, if Egypt tries to grab that goose, it may succeed only in killing it, to the discomfiture of all concerned. Let us hope that even at this late stage Colonel Nasser will realise that he stands to gain far more than he stands to lose from a very considerable change in the policies which he has pursued until now. He stands to gain a share in a colossal expansion of wealth, whereas the other way he stands to prejudice and even throttle the expansion of wealth not only of Egypt but of the whole Middle East, and, indeed, of the Western world.
5.2 p.m.
Mr. W. T. Proctor: We have listened to a very interesting speech with some of which I agree, but I do not come to the same unhappy conclusion about the Russians as did the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. J. Harvey). I remind hon. Members opposite that when Mr. Khrushchev was in this country he stated that had he been a British citizen he would have been a supporter of the party opposite. I hope, therefore, that hon. Members opposite will, in their speeches, try to inspire in the hearts of the Russians a love of peace.
This is a very grave moment in our affairs. No one who has been in the House for the last five hours, as most of us have been, and who has listened to the grave words of the Secretary of State for War when he read the Proclamation could have failed to realise that this is a
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grave moment for this country and the rest of the world. We are today dealing not only with the affairs of Egypt, but with those of the whole world.
We should ask ourselves, what do we want to do in the Middle East? The Middle East has two vital assets. It has a tremendous percentage of the oil resources of the world and that great international waterway, the Suez Canal. It is the desire of all hon. Members that the great wealth of the Middle East should be used for the benefit of the people of the Middle East. We should be making plans to raise the standard of living, not only of the favoured few at the top in the Middle East, but of all the people.
We should hold out to the Egyptian people, not only the construction of the Aswan Dam, but something far greater than anything which could be envisaged in any of the plans which have been brought forward by Colonel Nasser. If we can bring together the great nations of the world who are vitally concerned in this matter, we can make arrangements for immense economic changes in Egypt and the Middle East which would redound to the benefit of the people who are justly entitled to them.
Much has been said about the legal position. Talk of the legal position never impresses me very much. It is suggested that the law is on the side of Colonel Nasser. All my life I have been considering what the legal position was and if the law was wrong, then I have wanted to alter the legal position. I am not very much impressed if someone says that the legal position is in their favour. I am concerned with what is morally right. Let us consider how one wins one's legal position as the ruler of a country like Egypt at the present time.
Colonel Nasser was a colonel in the Egyptian Army. He conspired with General Neguib and others to start a revolution. He removed the King and the elected Cabinet in Egypt and then he obtained power. He obtained power on the basis of guns, bayonets, tanks and military weapons largely supplied to Egypt by this country. I remember seeing in the Daily Mirror a terrible picture of an Egyptian who had worked for the Canal Company and who was charged with having worked for the English.

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There was no other charge against him and the Daily Mirror caption was:
"A Few Minutes to Live."
That man was to be hanged for working for the British; that offence, and for nothing else.
In a dictatorship no one can express an opinion contrary to the opinion of the dictator. When Nasser reached a position of unanimity on that basis, he held an election with one candidate and made himself President of Egypt, and then the legal position was on his side. The world has to face the situation that dictators must not be allowed to gain power and arrive at the right legal position in that way.
Mr. W. Griffiths: Does my hon. Friend feel as strongly about dictatorship countries in the so-called free world, countries such as Spain?
Mr. Proctor: I feel as strongly about all of them. I am not inconsistent in the slightest degree. The great democracies of the world must take some action in some way to achieve a great international authority where this kind of thing shall not be allowed to happen, and where opinion will be a great decisive force and not the force of bayonets and guns.
As well as being a grave moment, this is a moment of great opportunity. The sovereign State as we know it is too small to deal with the great problems of the world. We cannot deal with them on the basis of complete sovereignty. I plead with the Government, the House and everyone dealing with the matter to recognise Europe as one of the great factors in this situation. I want to see us progress as quickly as we possibly can towards a United States of Europe. Let us pool our resources with Europe.
In 1940, in a grave moment, we made an offer of complete union with France. The time has arrived for some such dramatic offer as that. We should be ready to pool our resources and to give up our own sovereignty if we ask other people to give up theirs and to reach a basis of internationalism. Such a Europe would be one of the very wonderful units in the world. Instead of our going into
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Recess, I should like to see a dramatic stroke by the Prime Minister—the inviting of Members of Parliament from all the Parliaments of Europe to this country to discuss this matter to see if we cannot make this a great turning point in history.
The two matters with which the present small sovereign State is unable to deal are defence and economic planning. We are ideally suited for dealing with Welfare State matters, but for defence and economic planning we want a newer and bigger unit. That is a subject which we should consider—unite Europe, pool our resources, our skills and our statesmanship and lead the world to peace.
On the grave problem of the Suez, we must face the question of Russian intentions in this situation. The whole matter hinges upon that consideration. I believe that we can agree that the Canal should be internationalised. That would be the ideal solution. Egypt could derive all the benefits which are due to her by reason of the geographical location of the Canal. The Canal should be administered by an international authority. That solution would be in the interests of the Russians as well as of the peoples of Europe and America.
We have heard a lot about competitive co-existence. I am not in favour of competitive co-existence with the Soviet Union or anyone else. What I want is co-operative co-existence. If we can get the great nations of the earth together, and begin to consider the solution on the basis of co-operative existence, there would not be any competition as to who should build the Aswan Dam. The Russians could have their allocation of the undeveloped areas, and America and Britain theirs. Britain has done a tremendous amount for the undeveloped countries of the world. No one can go from the source to the mouth of the Nile without realising that British working people have benefited Egypt by the immense irrigation work they have carried out all the way down the river.
The British people have helped the underdeveloped areas throughout my lifetime. They have invested capital in the Argentine, and the United States should remember that when it was an undeveloped country. The capital was created by the British working people.
Mr. John Baird: Is it not a fact that the people of this country have taken far more out of those areas than they have put into them?
Mr. Proctor: In two world wars we have, in defending liberty, lost vast investments which British working people toiled to place in other countries of the world. It may be true that the capitalist classes have derived some wealth from these areas, but it was the toil and the work, for minimum rates of pay, and the misery endured by our working people, which developed the undeveloped countries—Argentine, the U.S.A. and the rest. I want to see these matters placed upon a different basis. Let us all share in this work of helping the undeveloped countries. Let America and Russia play their parts. This is the moment when that grand solution can be applied.
There is one thing which I appeal to the Prime Minister to do. Russia is essential in this matter. What she is going to do will depend upon whether we can deal with this situation peacefully, happily and co-operatively.
Mr. S. Silverman: Does my hon. Friend consider that one guide to whether we can co-operatively—by which I suppose he means in common with all nations, including, as he says, the Soviet Union—internationalise the Suez Canal, on the ground that an international means of communication of that kind is not fit to be under the sole control of a single small country, is whether or not this principle is limited to the Suez Canal; if, for instance, it were applied to the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles?
Mr. Proctor: I am not limiting my aims or desires. All the great international waterways of the earth should be included. I am not going to be caught out by being modest in my desires to put the world right.
Mr. Silverman: I assure my hon. Friend that I had no doubt what his answer would be, and I accept it as his answer and the answer of the vast majority of this party in the House and the country, but I would point out that there is a vast difference between that and the Government's proposition this afternoon.
Mr. Proctor: The Government's proposition fits in with my conception. It is
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a start. If we internationalise the control of the Suez Canal, and by doing so we can benefit Egypt and the Middle East, we shall be making progress. I do not demand that the whole lot shall be done immediately.
Mr. Silverman: Only the part that suits us.
Mr. Proctor: I have laid down the principle, and I like us to be going along the right road.
I had been dealing with the question of the attitude of Russia. I accept the view that there have been great changes in Russia. Mr. Khrushchev's speech has said everything about Stalin that I said before. I am grateful to him for making that speech because when I go to my constituency and meet some of the Communists, I can give them Khrushchev's opinion of what has been happening in Russia, and it is an answer that would not have convinced them had it come from me alone.
There are possibilities of great changes taking place in the Soviet Union. We are consulting America and France, and I have pleaded with the Government that we should consult all Europe. I believe that the Prime Minister could not do a greater service to the world than to go straight from that conference to Moscow and discuss the question of the Suez Canal and the oil resources of the Middle East, in order to ascertain the opinion of the Soviet Union on these matters, and see if we cannot arrive at a great international settlement of peace, security and friendship, instead of risking the desperate situation that might arise as a result of our taking unilateral action—and when I say "unilateral action" I mean action without the co-operation and help of the Soviet Union.
5.16 p.m.
Mr. Julian Amery: The contribution which we have just had from the hon. Member for Eccles (Mr. Proctor) widens still further the unanimity which has informed our debate so far. Indeed, the moral to the debate was pointed by another hon. Member earlier, when he said that Colonel Nasser had succeeded in uniting the House of Commons. What is perhaps more remarkable is that he has also succeeded in uniting the Assembly across the Channel, in Paris.

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There is a long gallery of tyrants, emperors and dictators who have paid with their lives for waking up and uniting the boldness of France and the determination of England. Colonel Nasser may find himself in that boat before long.
I was glad when the hon. Member for Eccles, in the earlier part of his remarks, emphasised the dictatorial character of the régime in Egypt, and how little it had done to fulfil the early promises of social reform which were so much on Nasser's lips when he came to power.
Our relations with the Government of Egypt are likely to be strained in the next few weeks, but it is very important that, during that time, we should make a distinction between the Government and the people of Egypt. I do not believe that the people are wholeheartedly behind their Government. We must not forget that there have been times of very good co-operation between us and the people of Egypt—both with the dynasty in days gone by and, more particularly in the last war, with the Government of the great Wafdist party, under Nahas, which gave us unstinted co-operation when Rommel was at the gates of Alexandria.
Mr. W. Griffiths: Did they?
Mr. S. Silverman: A new reading of history.
Mr. Amery: I was there at the time, and I remember that no British troops at all had to be engaged upon internal security in Egypt. The Egyptians took charge of that matter themselves, and stood loyally by us. We still have a great many friends in Egypt, and it is well that that fact should be emphasised.
The essence of the problem is one upon which I do not think there is much disagreement in the House at the moment. For about two generations the Canal was under the management of an international company—we might call it a high authority—and under the protection of the British Army. In the last few weeks that situation has come to an end. Six weeks ago the last British soldier was withdrawn from the Canal Zone, and one week ago Colonel Nasser grabbed the Company. We now have a situation in which the present Egyptian Government has a monopoly of the management and protection of this great waterway.
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The prospect would be daunting enough even if we lived in times of perfect international concord, if Colonel Nasser's record was as pure as driven snow, and if Egypt had shown the stability of Switzerland in recent years. As it is, I think most of us regard that prospect as one which cannot be endured.
The Leader of the Opposition catalogued at some length the bad points in Colonel Nasser's record which give us reason for not trusting him. I will not weary the House by recapitulating them; but there is one aspect of them to which I should like to draw the attention of hon. Members, because I do not think that it has been sufficiently stressed in this debate. Let us not underestimate the extent to which the military junta in Egypt has already passed under Soviet influence.
When we took our troops away, a kind of military vacuum was created, and that vacuum is already being filled with Soviet arms and instructors. A large part of the Egyptian cotton crop—the larger part, as indeed was stressed by the Leader of the Opposition—is already going to the Soviet Unions. Now, with the elimination of Western influence from the management of the Suez Canal, a further economic and technological vacuum is being created in Egypt which the Egyptians cannot fill from their own resources, and which may well be filled, as the military one is being filled, from the Soviet Union.
Nasser, in fact, has taken a giant stride towards making his country more dependent on the Soviets than it was before. I do not wish to suggest that he himself is a Communist, but there are a great many in his entourage and leadership who are. Frequently, and I think rightly, the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) reminds public opinion that one should not think of Communism too much in conspiratorial and cloak and dagger terms. But in Egypt it is precisely in those terms that we must think about it. It has not become a mass movement, but it is a conspiracy which can be most dangerous.
Mr. W. Griffiths: Is it not a fact that in Egypt the Communist Party and the Socialist Party are illegal?
Mr. Amery: The hon. Gentleman asks whether it is not a fact that the Communist Party is illegal—
Mr. Griffiths: And the Socialist Party.
Mr. Amery: A former leader of the Socialist Party is now an ambassador in Washington for Colonel Nasser. It is true that the Communist Party is officially proscribed. It was a nice way of getting dollars out of the United States. But in fact we all know—any serious student of Egyptian affairs knows—that there are a great many prominent figures in the Nasser régime who are Communists.
I was saying that we must not underestimate this danger. This is the man who holds the economic life of Europe by the throat, and we are agreed that it would be madness to leave the Canal at his mercy. We are also agreed—the point was made most effectively by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot)—that this is not only a threat to the waterway, but a challenge to the whole of Western influence in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf. If we do not meet the challenge this time, there will not be another time—at any rate, not in the context of peace.
We have, therefore, to ask ourselves what it is that should be done. On that account, I think that there is a wide measure of unanimity in the House, at any rate as regards the objectives which should be pursued. As I see it, the assumption from which we start is that we cannot accept the Egyptian monopoly of the management and protection of the Canal. We are therefore determined to place the management of the Canal under some form of international control, it may be by the maritime Powers, or the United Nations—these are points on which there may be shades of difference—but under some form of international control; and, similarly, to bring the protection of the ports and installations, and the management to which I have referred, under some form of international defence.
This is not the time to go into exact details. Indeed, I myself certainly have not enough information to do so. But clearly, the terms under which an international authority is set up must do justice to the claims of the Company, and the claims of Egypt, and must provide security for the main users of the Canal.
More controversial, but more important in the context of this debate, are the methods by which these objects are to be
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attained. We are all agreed that the economic sanctions so far imposed are justified. But most of us would agree that they will no more successful in deterring Colonel Nasser than were the sanctions which were applied during the time of the Abyssinian war in deterring Mussolini. In this context, I hope that the Government can assure us that there is no question of allowing the two Egyptian destroyers to leave this country.
Next there is the prospect of a conference to draw up a plan.
Mr. Robens: Would the hon. Gentleman suggest that we impound the Egyptian destroyers?
Mr. Amery: Yes, I would. Would the right hon. Gentleman dissent from that?
Mr. Robens: What would be the reply of the hon. Gentleman if Colonel Nasser impounded some oil tankers in the Suez Canal? How far do we get with that kind of thing?
Mr. Amery: I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that the point opens up many possibilities.
Mr. Robens: Yes, it does.
Mr. Amery: I should have thought it quite justified at a time when we are impounding war materials, I gathered with the agreement of the right hon. Gentleman—
Mr. Robens: Is not oil a war material?
Mr. Amery: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that we were wrong to ban the export of arms, or that Colonel Nasser would be right to take reprisals on our tankers for that? He cannot have it both ways.
Mr. Robens: Yes, but the hon. Gentleman has said that he would suggest some solution. We are anxious to hear what he has to say. The first proposal he makes is that we should impound the Egyptian destroyers. I am asking, what do we do when Nasser impounds British ships as a reprisal? He must carry this through to its logical conclusion.
Mr. Amery: I think that the right hon. Gentleman has put his finger on the problem. We are banning the export of arms, I gather, with the full agreement of the party opposite.
Mr. Robens: British arms.
Mr. Amery: Yes. British arms, and, of course, destroyers are arms.
Mr. Robens: But we do not own them.
Mr. Amery: Arms in this country purchased by the Egyptians are not yet Egyptian arms. That is exactly the position. These ships are here in this country. They would be delivered to the Egyptians. We are perfectly entitled to stop them. The right hon. Gentleman has argued in the same context about supplying arms in the Arab-Israeli struggle.
The question about the Canal, moreover, is the question of the freedom of the seas, and the freedom of the passage through the Canal. If the Egyptians impound tankers in the Canal, as distinct from tankers at Alexandria, they would be doing it in clear breach of the Convention of 1888.
The other suggestion put forward is that a conference should be held—and on this I think there is general agreement—to draw up a plan for internationalisation of the Canal which could then be put into force. It has been suggested by the United States—if Press reports are right-that the Soviet Union should take part in this conference. I have no inherent objection to the participation of the Soviet Union in the conference, but the fact that the United States has suggested it cannot help but awaken in our minds the shadow of Yalta and the days when Washington thought they could do a deal with Moscow at our expense. I hope I may be wrong.
However, a conference in which Russia took part would inevitably be protracted, and events will not wait on a conference for long. The countries which lie round the Suez Canal are watching what is happening with great anxiety and anticipation, and, in my view, there must be decisive interim action pending the conclusion of such a conference. I think that already while the conference is in progress steps should be taken to ensure the safety of the Company, not merely the safety of the passage through the Canal, but the safety of its installations. I think that while the conference is in progress, and before Egypt is admitted to the conference—and here I endorse what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove—Colonel Nasser must revoke his decree of nationalisation. I
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think that he should also agree to British and French units as an advance guard of the international protecting force going into the Canal Zone already, on the principle of what The Times described in an admirable leading article yesterday as having "a foot in the door".
If the Egyptians accept interim arrangements of that kind—say, the presence of some guarding forces in the Canal Zone and revocation of the decree until such time as the conference is concluded—then I think that they should come to the conference. If not, I do not think that they should, because one thing we cannot do is to pay them a price for the cessation of wrongdoing.
If one is thinking in terms of armed forces going to the Canal Zone one has to face the risks involved, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) did in a speech a few minutes ago, which I think impressed the House deeply. The risks are greater now than they were perhaps three years ago, but they are less today than they would be next year, and infinitely less than would be the risks of cowardly submission to the aggressive policy and career of the Egyptian dictator.
In all this, solidarity with France is the key. There have been comparisons, especially in the French Assembly, between this crisis and the Rhineland crisis of 1936. There are great differences too. In 1936 the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of the day in England rather poured water in the wine of the French. The French attempted to put all the responsibility on to the British. I think that we should salute the clear readiness this time of both sides to bear their part today.
This may not be the time to revive the exact proposal to France which my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) put forward in 1940, but our work should be informed by the spirit of that proposal. Our alliance with France is really the essential alliance for us in all the world. It is essential for Europe, for the Middle East and for Africa.
We appreciate, of course, the difficulties in which the United States find themselves because of their election. We hope that they may be able to help us in whatever lies ahead; we expect that at least they will not hinder. They have done us

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enough harm in the Middle East already. We must make it clear to them that if they will not or cannot join us, then we will go ahead without them. It will not be the first time. Our life is at stake, and we can do no other.
But already there is one conclusion which must be drawn—and which should be stated—as a result of the attitude of the United States in this matter. It is this. I think that inevitably there is going to be, perhaps that there should be, a slight shift of emphasis in our foreign policy, drawing us closer to our Allies in Europe in the months and years ahead.
For some years now Middle Eastern policy has been a great source of anxiety in the House and, sometimes, a source of dissension. I have not always been able to follow my right hon. Friends in the policies they have pursued. I do not want to revive all that now. I am content that history should judge which of us was right and which of us was wrong. But this I will grant. The policies which my right hon. Friends have pursued have at least proved their undoubted good will and desire to give Nasser every possible benefit of the doubt. They have gone to the last limit of concession. I, for one, only pray that this clear evidence of our unchallengeable moral position has not been too dearly bought.
Now the House separates, and the whole responsibility rests on the Government. But with the responsibility comes a gleaming opportunity, too, an opportunity to redeem what has been lost and to re-establish British influence in the Middle East on firm and permanent foundations.
5.35 p.m.
Mr. Desmond Donnelly: In a debate on Cyprus a few days ago I said that, although I did not agree with the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), I had a warm regard for the hon. Gentleman and I thought that he was much better than some of the dreary mediocrities who sat on the benches opposite above the Gangway. During his remarks today the hon. Member has made a number of comments with which we on this side of the House cannot agree. One of the things that he has not said, and for this the House will respect him, is, "I told you so", although he has considerable reason for saying that to his hon. Friends.
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There is this difference between the hon. Gentleman and me. I am one of the very few hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House who voted for the Suez Agreement; he is one of the more numerous, but still few, hon. Gentlemen opposite who voted against that Agreement. I will come to that matter in more detail in a few minutes. The remarks of the hon. Member, within the context of the background of the views that he has held, were, if I may presume to say so, moderate and responsible and far more confident of support on this side of the House than would have been believed from some of the bellicose statements that we have read in the newspapers which are alleged to support his point of view.
The hon. Member said that at least we were agreed on one thing, and that was on the objects of any action that we should take—that we should try to keep the Canal open as an international waterway. I absolutely agree. One thing I say to some of my hon. Friends. It is that I hope that they will bear in mind the importance to the future of any Labour Government in Britain of the fact that we will never be able to give any aid to the underdeveloped areas unless the Canal is available as an international waterway. I emphasise that to all my hon. Friends who have any doubts about the value of the action which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition advocated at the Dispatch Box this afternoon.
The second thing I would say to my hon. Friends who may have any doubts about this matter is this: not only are we discussing the future of this country but, in this House this afternoon, we are having to raise our voices for the people of Israel. Their lives are at stake every bit as much as our lives are at stake today. We are the only people who can take effective action on behalf of the people of Israel by the implementation of any decision which we may make here. I underline that point.
The third point is that we on this side of the House are against nationalism. We have been against it consistently in this country and we were against it when fanned by Hitler. We must be clear that we have to be against nationalism whether it is white, black or coloured in any form. It has no particular virtue about it because it happens to come from Asia or the Middle East.
Mr. Baird: Who is against it?
Mr. Donnelly: I am against nationalism. Our party has always been against nationalism.
Mr. S. Silverman: Not at all.
Mr. Donnelly: My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has been one of the most consistent internationalists in this House.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman is correct and I am grateful to him for saying so, but I never thought that there was any conflict between a wise, patriotic, normal nationalism and internationalism. It is nonsense to say that people ought to be against nationalism. It is the excesses and distortions of it that are wrong, and not the principle.
Mr. Donnelly: I should have drawn the distinction much more firmly. I say that there is a distinction between nationalism and patriotism. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I hope that hon. Members opposite will not embarrass me too much by any cheers. I am trying to put a case to some of my hon. Friends on this side of the House. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne does not like it, but he must learn to take it.
Now I come to something on which hon. Gentlemen opposite will not applaud so loudly. Having established the basis of any agreement which we may have about the objects of any action that we may take, I want to underline the fact that this House should have been discussing this matter long ago. As far back as 2nd November, 1951, the then Foreign Minister of Egypt discussed the international control of this waterway in a Press interview. I would ask the Leader of the House whether any answer was made by the British Government to follow up that proposal at that time. We should be very glad now if we had accepted that proposal from the Foreign Minister of Egypt.
In a debate on foreign affairs on 5th February, 1952, the question of the international control of the Suez Canal was raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). The present Prime Minister evaded the question in his answer. We should be very glad now to settle for my right hon.
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Friend's proposal. As recently as 4th June we should have been giving thought to this matter, because the Egyptian director on the Suez Canal Board stated that the Agreement would not be extended one minute beyond the moment when it finished in 1968, and he added that the Egyptian Government had in existence plans for taking over the Suez Canal.
That was eight weeks ago. This House cannot necessarily know about all these things, but the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have known. If I had been sitting in the Foreign Office and had heard a thing like that I should have been extremely concerned. What action did the Government take?
I have stated the background to explain why I ask why the Government were caught completely unawares in the last few days. It is clear that a great deal could have been done to forestall the situation by political action. Now I go on. I would ask the Government what on earth they have been doing to become so dependent for our oil supplies on the Suez Canal. Mr. Onassis has been talking about building larger tankers. He knows that if the Suez Canal were blocked those tankers would be of inestimable importance to the world. Why have not the Government been thinking about that? Why is the country so dependent on the oil that comes through the Suez Canal?
When the Suez Canal Agreement was made in 1954 I voted for it in perfect good faith because I thought that the British Government would be thinking about forestalling the present situation. Her Majesty's Government have let their supporters and the country down by taking no effective action of any kind to see that they were able to deal with this situation, if it arose.
My third point is to ask why we have allowed the situation to drift for so long that we are dependent so much upon the oil from the Middle East? Why is not our atomic energy programme much larger than it is? I am prepared to go to my constituents and say that we have to deny ourselves of some of the good things of life because we must be independent of this kind of blackmail. Are the Government equally prepared to say the same?

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The gravamen of the charge that I make against right hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway is not only that they have done nothing about this matter but that the proposals in the very bare statement of the Prime Minister this morning, and the announcement of the Secretary of State for War, are open to doubt on the grounds of ineffectiveness.
There is now talk of military action being prepared; what kind of action? I understand that we have two battalions of paratroops in Cyprus. That may be the case. Have we the aircraft for them? I understand that we are talking about commissioning aircraft carriers and putting troops on them, but how many troops? Where are they to go to? How are they to land? What kind of equipment is available for them to go with? At the very moment when the critical situation exists we have no information of any kind of this nature, and there is every reason to have grave doubts about the military action that the Government have been talking of today. We have every reason to be doubtful about the way in which they are conducting the affairs of the country, even supposing that their policy be right.
Let me now turn to a more constructive side of what the Government have said. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Government supporters should not be too ready to cheer. We on this side of the House have been waiting for a long time for some constructive policy from the Government, but we have not had any. I understand that there is a conflict as to whether the 1886 Powers should act, or whether the criterion should be maritime users only. I urge the Government to take note of what my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition had to say, which was that we cannot ignore the existence of Soviet Russia as a power in the Middle East. It may be, as the hon. Member for Preston, North said, that a conference must be speedy if it is to be successful. But I say that it must also be successful.
Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Is the hon. Gentleman inviting us to draw the conclusion that it is not a matter of our prestige in the Middle East and only the question of the ownership of the Canal?
Mr. Donnelly: I did not say that at all. The hon. Member must not assume that for one minute. We shall have far more prestige if we can get unanimous agreement among the great Powers of the world that the Canal shall be made an international waterway.
The fact that we have to make clear at the conference is that our American Allies, unwittingly it may be, precipitated this situation. It ill becomes them to go to an international conference with this country and to insist upon the matter being talked out or that no action shall be taken. The British Government should make it absolutely clear that the decision which precipitated the situation was theirs, and that we hold them responsible for it and expect their loyal co-operation.
Mr. Baird: I assume that the hon. Gentleman agrees that Russia should be invited to the conference. Does he expect Russia to agree to internationalising the Canal and other waterways?
Mr. Donnelly: I have said so.
Mr. Baird: What about the Dardanelles?
Mr. Donnelly: Yes, certainly. I agree.
The Leader of the Opposition said earlier that in any action the Government took following the conference they must carry support in the United Nations. I underline that too. I want to make that perfectly clear to right hon. Gentlemen opposite that otherwise they will not get the country behind them; I warn them of that.
The real solution to this problem must be peaceful. I am prepared to take a tough line to make this Canal an international waterway. I am prepared to take it to the toughest possible point short of war. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite imagine that the only kind of toughness which exists is the toughness of war, but that is not so. It is not a laughing matter to talk about war; and it would certainly not be a laughing matter for Colonel Nasser if we were to impose very tough economic sanctions.
It would be far better, if we had to come to any kind of serious political conflict, to take six months by settling with economic sanctions than to take five minutes and to precipitate a war. That

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is what hon. Members opposite have constantly to remember. When they imagine that toughness can only be military toughness they are making a very grave mistake indeed and are rendering their party an ill-service if they speak like that in public places. That is the kind of charge to which they have so often laid themselves open.
Mr. Rupert Speir Mr. Rupert Speir (Hexham) rose—
Mr. Donnelly: I think the hon. Member will agree that I have given way a number of times. I promised Mr. Deputy-Speaker that I would be very brief.
In the years since 1945 we have established ourselves in a particular position as a former imperialist nation which has now become an anti-imperialist nation in many parts of the world. We have done more than any other single country to eradicate the old scars of imperialism. It would be a great tragedy if precipitous action by the British Government, urged on by any irresponsible elements on the benches opposite, were to prejudice the position which has been built up at so much cost and with so much hope.
I want to make quite clear to hon. Members, including the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), that I am not prepared to see the golden gleam of India tarnished on the sordid shores of Suez. I want him to understand that quite clearly. Perhaps he can work that out for himself later.
The final point is, having given this qualified support to the actions of the British Government, having said to them that we are prepared to go thus far with them at this moment, I would warn them that there is also to be a reckoning on how we ever came to be in this situation.
5.54 p.m.
Mr. I. J. Pitman: The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly), in the early part of his speech, said that we ought to have been discussing much earlier the fundamental problem which we are discussing today. I agree, and is it not ironical that such fundamental points should come up over what are only secondaries and in this case only irrelevances, such as the legalities of nationalisation and the Convention? I think it was the hon. Member for Eccles (Mr. Proctor)
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who said that the legalities of this question are entirely irrelevant, and of course he was right. The Tightness or wrong-ness here is as irrelevant as it was whether the sheep was given a right answer or a wrong answer by the wolf as to the direction of the stream at which the sheep was drinking. It was the fact that the wolf was a wolf which alone was relevant.
Surely, as the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) said, the philosophy is what matters: this is the fundamental issue of anarchy and insecurity which is raised here. May we put it this way, that while it is not certain whether order is Heaven's first law, I think all of us in this nation are quite certain that a sovereignty based upon self-determination is not high up in the table of Heaven's laws and that there can be conditions such as anarchy and insecurity in which unlimited sovereignty is not justifiable merely by a claim to it based upon self-determination. This reservation upon the uninhibited abuse of sovereignty is general. We instinctively reject such a claim, whether it applies to the case of Mussolini, or that of Hitler. It is not in the case of Nasser only that we insist that the mere act of taking to oneself sovereignty based upon a claim to self-determination is no justification for the abuse of that sovereignty when taken. Surely that is the issue in this case.
Dr. Summerskill: Because this is such a very important matter, and because words spoken here go out to the world, I think the hon. Member should tell us how he can relate the word "anarchy" to the nationalisation of a canal running through a sovereign country.
Mr. Pitman: The right hon. Lady cannot have listened either to me or to her right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South who introduced the word "anarchy" and made precisely the point that the philosophy point was the main issue and that the legalistic one was irrelevant. I, too, am making the point that it is entirely irrelevant in the present case, as it was in the case of the wolf. Surely that must be so. What we are really worried about, as was said in the case of Hitler and the legality of the

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Sudetenland and of Austria, is not whether Nasser's case is legal but that his is the part of the wolf.
I should say that the whole nation is at one behind the concept that in the use of sovereignty there must be a degree of judgment, moderation and decency, an absence of anarchy and a regard for the security of others. Within the field of human rights when a young man becomes 21 years of age one does not necessarily allow him a shotgun, and if he appears not to be a fit and proper person to have one he is denied his rights in the interests of order and of security. In this case, whether it be Nasser or Neguib, Fuad or whoever may be coming along, the real issue is that they are and will be for some time as incapable as was Hitler or Mussolini of giving the world an objective Government—in this case on this important waterway of world communication. After all, the Suez Canal and everything it stands for is far more important than any shotgun.
It is in just this context that the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and a number of hon. Members on this side of the House and the other have said that, if an issue is of such great would importance, order and security are paramount, and the Canal and its zone ought to be placed under some international authority. The Leader of the Opposition used the phrase "an agent for the United Nations." The right hon. Member for Lewisham, South and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke), in a thoughtful speech, both raised the point of what sort of authority, what sort of agent that is to be. If it is a good enough authority to do the job for Suez, it is going to be good enough to do the job for all other waterways as well.
If Suez is to be given Heaven's first gift of order, and if an authority is to do away with anarchy and give security, the new authority is going to be so good that it could be applied also in the other vital world waterways, and I would not mind whether they were the Panama, the Bosphorus or the English Channel. I would say that the Americans would be the first to wish to join the strong moral background of such a new international authority to the rather weak foundation for the government of the Panama
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Canal to which the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) referred. Surely a wonderful, new and great advance has been made in the last few days in achieving this unanimous opinion that the new authority should be an international one.
We are, however, up against the difficulty of how we are to make it such a good authority that it can really do the job. That difficulty was in the mind of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South and of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely. Both distrusted the ability of the United Nations to achieve the desired solution. I would submit that it is not that the United Nations is at fault and to be distrusted but that the organisation in which the United Nations is forced to work is making it at fault.
The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) talked of international control of this Canal strip and the waterway. The United Nations is, however, not in its organisation either international or an authority, it is an inter-Governmental body for the voluntary co-operation or non-co-operation of national Governments. Moreover, its debates are necessarily national, not international, because every delegate who goes to the United Nations is sent there to represent his nation. It is merely an extension of 10, Downing Street or the Quai d'Orsay to the floor of the United Nations to achieve a subjective nationalism, not an objective and planatary humanism.
The problem that we have to face is a very difficult one: it is how to organise within the structure of the United Nations a brand new organisation which will give us the kind of forceful authority which will bring about order and security in the Suez area. It is one of the fundamental principles of organisation that if one is to have responsibilities one must have powers, and sufficient powers. Whether we look at Danzig, Trieste or even Korea, which is a very good instance of my case, we must realise that the United Nations as at present organised is entirely powerless. It is in an even worse position than the Crown was long ago in the days of the Earl of Warwick. If the Earl of Warwick walked out with his troops, the central authority did not completely cease to have any power to

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match its responsibilities. The powerlessness of the United Nations to do anything of itself is no organisation with which to guarantee security and order m these terribly important parts of the globe.
It is clear that we should today be considering how to evolve a new type of organisation around the United Nations which will guarantee security and order in the Suez Canal. If we work that out for Suez, it may well be the pattern not only of the organisation that we want for other waterways but for the one we so badly need for the control of atomic weapons. The whole of the disarmament efforts of national Governments are falling down for lack of a really effective unit with decisive power, with which to furnish some new branch of the United Nations.
We must, after all, face facts. Thirty or forty years ago a Foreign Secretary could think in terms of giving security to a nation. Twenty-one miles was the limit of the range of a gun. Now we have guided missiles ranging over 5,000 miles and able to carry the hydrogen bomb. The situation these days is that in consequence foreign policy is based not upon a hope of security but upon being able to threaten equal or even greater insecurity to somebody else. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely is right in saying that the really frightening thing at present is the sense of real all-round insecurity and the length to which war can go if anybody touches it off.
Mr. Harold Davies: Remember that today.
Mr. Pitman: The real issue is thus in Suez and in the whole realm of security that we must build up an authority based on the moral principle of its being a planetary international organisation which will be and must necessarily be also effective to give order and security. That is indeed the most important issue which faces mankind today.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): Mr. Jack Jones.
Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. It has been said repeatedly throughout the debate that the House is displaying a remarkable
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unanimity of opinion. I know that the Chair cannot possibly anticipate what line a speaker is going to take, but I venture to call your attention to the fact that all the speakers on this side of the House, except one, have been on one line and that they are not necessarily representative of all opinion on this side of the House. It would be a great pity if, on an occasion of this kind, we got an artificial air of great unanimity which does not really correspond to the feeling of the House of Commons.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: As the hon. Gentleman has pointed out, the Chair can have no knowledge at all of what hon. Members are going to say. The Chair has today followed the usual practice of the House. What the hon. Gentleman has raised is not a point of order.
Mr. Silverman: I did not want to say anything, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that might sound like a reflection upon anyone, certainly not upon the Chair in the selection of speakers. I know that it is always difficult, and in many cases impossible, to know what line an hon. Member will follow, but it is sometimes known.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is not a point of order at all.
6.5 p.m.
Mr. Jack Jones: I suggest that not even my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) could know what line I am about to take. Throughout my experience in Parliament, since 1945, I have never uttered a word on the question of foreign affairs. I intervene for only a short time to say exactly what I think, regardless of what may be thought on the subject of what line it is or what line it is not.
This morning I took a walk along the Embankment, a very long way from Egypt. I often look at the memorial to my regiment, The Imperial Camel Corps, which fought in the Sinai Peninsula for same weary years in defence of democracy. Inscribed on the memorial are the names of about 200 good men who fought and died to prevent dictatorship overrunning Egypt. If those men could be brought to life today to see the present situation, having fought to prevent Egypt and the Egyptians from being overrun by a dictator, they would wonder what had happened in the interval.

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I claim to speak with some knowledge of Egypt, and also some knowledge of Persia. I spent many weary years in Egypt and some time in the Persian area. I do not want to be Foreign Secretary. I have never even claimed to be one who can give evidence to my party's Foreign Affairs Committee, which I have never attended. I want to face facts, and the facts are brutal. The situation is very plain. The House and the country are faced once more with a grave situation, whether we shall lean over backwards to a dictator, or say that democracy, as we understand it, and our constitutional way of life, are worth defending and proceed to its defence, cost what it may.
I repeat what I have previously said, that I am proud of my country and of most of what it has done. I am ashamed of some of the things it has done, including some of the things it has done in Egypt, but, at the same time, I have some knowledge of what has been done on the credit side. The situation is plain. It is part of a big, designed plan, which has been well timed.
Mr. K. Zilliacus: The timing was done by Mr. Dulles, not by Colonel Nasser. By withdrawing the Aswan Dam offer, Mr. Dulles made it necessary.
Mr. Jones: The decision about timing rested with Colonel Nasser; he dictated the time and what the issue should be.
I want to be fair all round, as I usually try to be. Had Nasser said to this country, or to the world, "I am about to nationalise the cotton industry", I could have understood it, but even then, without the people's decision, I should not have agreed. Had he said, "I am about to nationalise the breeding of camels," I should, having ridden dozens of them, have felt that there was some importance in it and might have agreed to it.
However, Nasser made his decision without reference to his own Government, without a plebiscite of his people, without seeking the opinions of those who are against what he has decided or even the opinions of those who are in favour of it, and he made his statement at the end of the day after haranguing the mob. I disagree with that. Nasser did not make his statement as an afterthought; it was made at the end of a period of thinking and design.
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Let no hon. Members accuse the so-called simple ones among us of not being able to see what is going on around the world. There was the naïve suggestion from this side of the House that "It is, of course, their country." Of course it is. It is also said, "It is their Canal". It is not. Nobody took a bucketful of soil away from the cutting of the Canal. The earth is still there, on the embankment. I saw enough of it to appreciate that; and the water in the Canal has come from the seven seas—the Egyptians never put it there. The goodwill and asset value of the Canal has been built up by those who sought to improve particularly themselves but also to some extent the lot of the people living in the country where the Canal was built.
The Government of Egypt, through their spokesman, have made a very grave decision—if one can say that that Government have made the decision. Nasser, when he reads today's debate, and, in particular, when he reads that it has been found necessary in the present situation to declare what has been here declared—the right to call up Her Majesty's Reserve forces—will, I believe, think again.
I am all against war. Heaven knows, I myself saw too much of it. Five of my six six children served during the last war and they have seen enough of war, also. I am against war, but if it is that only the use of the sinews of war will prevent the use of the thug system there is only one issue. We have had to do it before, and the constitutional rights of democracy have been preserved by that use.
I am against war and, inside our own industrial life, I am against strikes and disputes. I come from an industry with a wonderful record of industrial contentment. I believe in round-the-table talks. In this issue, at the end of the day, someone, somewhere, must get round the table.
It may be that we should have foreseen a lot of what has happened. One of my hon. Friends has said that Her Majesty's Government should have gone ahead and built more tankers. I say to him that tankers have been built as fast as the available sheet steel has made it possible; and could we have had more coal from the mines of our country, there would have been less need for oil.

1715
Let us be fair about this. The company with which I am associated produced, in the week before last, about 10,000 tons of steel, and not one pennyworth was produced except with the use of oil. Oil has been introduced into our steel industry to the tune of about 70 per cent. The steel industry could not continue for a fortnight if supplies were stopped. I believe that it has about ten days' reserve stocks. So let us have less of this political rhetoric and internal dispute between party and party, and inside parties. The preservation of our country comes first, because unless we preserve this nation there will be no parties.
Nasser's action is part of a great plan. If I may digress, I was in East Germany a few weeks ago. The plan could be seen at work there. It can be seen in Persia and it can be seen in our own factories. I do not say that the drums will roll tomorrow, but I have said repeatedly to my constituents that, in the last resort, rather than allow the constitutional, democratic way of life of our country, and all that we who live in it believe in, to slip away as the result of the instigation of one speech by one person in the world, there is only one alternative.
It is unfortunate, and to be regretted—but there it is. I pray that Her Majesty's Ministers are, at this very moment, busily engaged in getting round the table with other nations—with any other nations, be they Russians, Communists, whatever they may be—with the Egyptians, with the Sudanese. I could make a long speech about what has been going on in the Sudan in recent months, but I promised to be brief, and I wish to be fair to other hon. Members.
I hope and trust that this very brief contribution will serve to prove that there are some of us at least who have some regard for our way of life, and will not allow any damage to be done to our industrial capacity by a cessation of the passage of oil or anything else through the Canal. Please God, we will achieve security and an honourable peace, which will be recorded in history as having arisen from the debate today in this Chamber.
6.15 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: The whole House will have listened with respect to the powerful and moving speech of the hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. Jack Jones), who is so well known to us as representing one of the heavy industries of the country. There is no question that what has emerged from this debate today is not merely this country's fear of what would happen should the Canal be blocked or endangered, but a sense of unity of purpose when the country is threatened by a man who is merely a dictator and endangers the peace, not merely of the Middle East but of the whole world by his action. Of that there is no question.
Hon. Members here who have long experience of office or of Opposition have recalled the background of events, so similar, in the late 'thirties which led to the rise of another dictator who could, at one moment, have been stopped. I think that this, as The Times newspaper and a number of speakers have said, must be for us the point of no return. If we lose out here, we lose out throughout the Middle East.
There is no question but that the steps taken by the Government today are the right ones to take in this emergency. There is little need for me to pursue further the arguments which have been adduced on all sides of the House and throughout the country as to the absolute necessity of stopping Nasser here. There is only one thing one can do as far as the question of overall direction of policy goes, and that is to recommend even more to the Prime Minister and to the Government the suggestion made by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) in an historic speech, when he spoke not for his career, not for his position in his party, but for the interests of the country, as few men have spoken before, having such a turbulent political background as his own. It was a speech of immense courage, and one which, I hope, we will all read and study.
The problem that raises itself and which must be solved in the next few days is the problem: who will bell the cat? Who will chain the mad dog in Cairo? I know that my views have been expressed forcibly in the Sunday Express newspaper. From the spirit of that article, I do not in any way retract. I believe that

1717
if other nations will not take the lead in this matter, we ourselves must take the lead. In that newspaper article I have tried to explain what might be the consequences of taking the lead. I have tried to explain the risks, the calculated risks which must be taken.
I believe that calculated risks must be taken by us now, because the alternatives are infinitely worse than the taking of those risks. I further believe that it is necessary, if we cannot get unanimity between ourselves, the Americans and the French, for us to join hands with the French on this issue. It is not joining hands with bloodstained imperialists; it is not joining hands with men who are out merely for revenge. It is joining hands with one of the most honest Socialist Governments France has ever had.
I must say that I stand completely where M. Mollet stands on this issue. I stand, as did my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, in the speech which he made today, on the fact that it is impossible to accept the unfettered control of an international waterway by one man, and especially by one man who, time and time again, has broken his pledge.
This is the point of no return. It is vital that the Middle East, and the West and the world, should know that if Nasser is not prepared to accept the principle of an international authority for this waterway, of an international agency for the carrying out of that international authority, then he must firmly be told that all means will be used to enforce our will.
Mr. Zilliacus: Will it not be difficult to convince public opinion in this country that it is necessary to take unilateral action to impose an international solution? Surely international agreement should be the condition precedent upon international solution.
Mr. Fraser: We have had, unfortunately, some experience of what international conferences tend to run into. I know that the hon. Gentleman doubtless is an immense believer in the capacity of the largest Canal user, which may well be Panama, to raise the flag in the defence of international liberty.
Mr. S. Silverman: Is not that what the hon. Gentleman is doing now?
Mr. Fraser: I am quite certain that it is the duty of a great Power, especially of a Power such as we are, with our friends in the Middle East, to move with the French alone, if we are driven to it. I think that this is essentially important when one considers the interest of our friends in the Middle East, when we consider the interests of Sudan or of Jordan, or of any of these smaller countries. We know full well that their Prime Ministers, Presidents and Kings have sent telegrams of greeting to the new Saladin in Cairo, and I must say that if I were in their place I would send reams of cablegrams because, if we and the West and the world cannot stand at this point, then they know they are doomed. They know that the Sudan will go. Even the King and the brothers of the King in Saudi Arabia must know that if there is no stand by the West now they will be engulfed as well.
This issue has a special impact on the Arab world today—the issue of this country taking a firm line. The Prime Minister this afternoon said that we could not and would not tolerate this international waterway being in the hands or under the control of one Power. That is where we stand, and that is where I believe the great majority in this House of Commons stands. Let that be known to the world, but let it also be implemented, if need be, by prompt action by ourselves and the French, because at this stage in world history action alone can achieve the necessary peace.
6.24 p.m.
Mr. Barnett Janner: I do not intend to intrude upon the time of those who wish to raise other subjects, but I am taking advantage, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, of your having called me to make one or two points about the position—one in which, obviously, I have been interested for a very considerable time and which I have raised on numerous occasions in the House.
I think that the Prime Minister himself, in a question supplementary to one raised by me, made a very strong statement about the obstruction of ships in the Suez Canal some years ago. There is one point to which I should like to reply. The suggestion was made that this situation was a matter which arises purely from the issue of the Balfour declaration. That is utter nonsense. It is perfectly clear now that the same kind

1719
of policy and tactics is being adopted by Nasser as was adopted by Hitler at the time when he used a somewhat similar type of action in order to deceive the world.
I remember that the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), in the years preceding the last war, declared time after time how he opposed the line that was being taken in respect of the attacks which Hitler was making upon the Jewish people. He realised—and if I may say so humbly I, too, realise—that that was not really the end which Hitler was seeking. What he was after was using that as a facade in order to be able to wreak his own power upon the rest of the world; and, indeed, that is what actually happened.
Those of us in the House at that time will remember how after the first attack on Jews there came the attack on the churches, on the trade unions, and so on. The dictator was merely trying to cover what he was doing by his horrific action against one section of the German community who were innocent of anything of which he was accusing them, but who were used for that particular end as victims.
The House knows that very well, and will know very well that the action being taken by Nasser today is of a similar nature. We have been exceedingly foolish in not having realised before that the prevention—I hope the House will agree with me on this; I think that we must now from what we have seen—of ships going through the Canal by Nasser was definitely contrary to international law. That has been admitted here. It was admitted by the United Nations and the Security Council passed resolutions to that effect, but nobody took very much notice of them. In this House I, with others, tried to get that point pressed forward, because we knew that it was merely the thin end of the wedge of an action similar to the one being taken by Egypt at present.
Not only this Government but my own Government, I am afraid, overlooked this and did not realise what the ultimate results of it would be. We should have enforced by some kind of economic action, long ago, the prevention of breaches of international law. Almost to this very day—it is only a few weeks ago—the
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Greek ship "Panagia" reached the Suez Canal on 25th May on her way from Haifa to Eilat. She was carrying concrete for building purposes in Eilat. That ship was prevented by the Egyptian authorities from proceeding on its lawful voyage. The captain was informed that the ship would not be allowed to go through the Canal to Eilat. That constitutes a breach of paragraph 1 of the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement. The ship is Greek and that means that over and above preventing Israeli ships from using the international waterway Egypt was persisting in holding up ships of other nations carrying goods to and from Israel.
Mr. Harold Davies: As one who has supported my hon. Friend's point of view for years, and who has even voted against my own party to support it, may I say that the very point which he makes today exposes the entire showmanship of this debate? Nothing was done about it because of the oil interests, and others and the party opposite made no protest. Today they protest, but they did not protest then.
Mr. Janner: My hon. Friend has gone on to another line.
Mr. Davies: That is the key of it.
Mr. Janner: I am doing my best to get through as much as I possibly can in a short time, and I am sure that if my hon. Friend wants to develop that line he will have an opportunity of doing so on some other occasion.
I listened with very great interest both to the speeches of the Prime Minister and of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon, and I was very impressed with what they said. I sincerely hope that the deliberations which are now going on between the three parties will result in some kind of satisfactory economic action which will prevent Nasser and others like him from violating international laws. I also hope that it will be realised that there is not only Nasser's action in obstructing the Canal which has to be considered; there are other violations of rights taking place in other parts of the world. I referred to one of them a few days ago, in a speech in the House. There is the attempt by Egypt and other countries to interfere with people trading because they are of a certain race or religion. This is contemptible and against all international law.

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Attempts are now being made by the Egyptians and others to stop trade in which Jewish people, citizens of this country, happen to be concerned purely because they are Jewish. Here is an opportunity to point out to Nasser and others that we will not stand for that kind of action, too, which is a violation of human rights. I hope and trust that an effective solution will be found to these problems and that strong economic action will be taken. I hope, also, that in future, when similar issues arise again, we shall not sit still and say, "Just because it happens to be Israel or some other country which is affected by a breach of international law, we are not going to do anything." Once we do that, we are conceding to the blackmailer, and concession to a blackmailer never pays.
Major Legge-Bourke Major Legge-Bourke indicated assent.
Mr. Janner: I have said it dozens of times in this House, and I am glad to see the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke), with whom I have often crossed swords in the past, agrees with me on this point. Concession to blackmail will never pay, and that has been going on, as far as Egypt is concerned, year in and year out.
If the welfare of the people in Egypt were at issue, the best thing which could happen would be for the invitation which has been extended by Ben Gurion to be accepted, for the differences to be settled by a meeting between the parties, and for Israel, with her tremendous experience of developing on proper lines, to pass the benefit of that experience to Egypt. That would help. If that experience were given and utilised for the benefit of the whole of the Middle East, it would do precisely what everybody in this House and in the civilised world wants.
I sincerely trust that the outcome of this unhappy incident will be that the eyes of the people in the Middle East—as well as ours and everybody else's—will be opened to what is of real benefit for the Middle East inhabitants instead of them being used as pawns to satisfy certain political desires on the part of leaders who do not know how to lead and who ought not to be allowed to try to lead.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION (STUDENTS)
6.34 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Skeffington: The time which has been allowed me on the Adjournment debate is short, so I wish to come straight to the first of the two separate but related topics that I desire to raise this evening with the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education.
I may speak with some little feeling, but I hope not irresponsibly, for I was in fact for ten years engaged in education as a lecturer and teacher, and subsequently I have seen the other side of educational problems in an administrative capacity as a member of the largest education authority in the world, and for some period as vice-chairman of the Further Education Committee of the London County Council.
I want, first of all, to raise the question of Circular 307, especially in relation to what, I am sure, will be its very damaging effect on the London County Council's evening institutes, although I am certain that Circular 307 will be a blow to learning and culture everywhere.
As the House knows, the London County Council and, I think, Londoners in general have taken great pride in the unique scheme of London evening education. It is a pride which is shared, nowadays at any rate, by all political parties. The system has a list of glorious achievements associated with the names of Sir Robert Blair, the Rev. Stuart Headlam and many others. I like to recall that Dame Edith Evans got her first insight into dramatic literature in one of the evening institutes of the London County Council not far from this building.
London's evening classes started a long time ago, long before the London School Board existed. In 1904, five years before I was born, there were 140,000 evening students in schools under the authority of the London County Council. By virtue of long service and experience, many of these evening institutes have become cultural and recreational centres, sometimes in drab areas and sometimes in anything but drab areas, and are regarded by many people as being the equivalent of social and recreational clubs.

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Gibbon and Bell's History of the London County Council has this to say about them.
"The institutes are not only places of instruction; they are clubs with a very active social life, including football and cricket teams, camping, debates, dances, whist drives, concerts, dramatic performances and a canteen or refectory. This genuine club spirit is perhaps the keynote of the most successful institutes, and this is true of those for women as well as of those for men; and it is not the least valuable service of evening education that it has provided many otherwise isolated men and women in London with means of becoming members of a community of friends with similar interests."
In fact, the evening institutes of London occupy the place of what other authorities many years later have come to call community centres.
Now comes Circular 307, which, as the House knows, directs the local education authorities to increase the fees for students over 21 attending part-time or evening courses to not less than 10s. a term. That in the case of London will be tantamount to an increase of 200 per cent.
There are two things about the circular itself to which I should like to draw attention before I refer to its effects. First of all, there is the timing. The circular was issued on 27th June, and yet local education authorities, as I understand, had to confirm their acceptance of the proposals by 31st July. Thus leaving only a month in which to consider them and to make the complicated re-arrangements. That is an extremely short time for so vast a task.
One used to hear a good deal, not from the Parliamentary Secretary but from other of his hon. Friends when they were on this side of the House, about Whitehall interference. This seems to me to be Whitehall interference with a vengeance. I am not surprised to find that, according to a newspaper of 30th July, even the Northamptonshire Education Committee—and I shall be surprised if that is a Socialist body; I should think it is almost exclusively Conservative—passed a resolution strongly protesting at the terms of the Minister's Circular and the lack of time given to local authorities to consider and implement them.
I gather that this resolution was in fact an Amendment of a much stronger one which had urged the Further Education Committee to refuse to make any revision in its present fees. I am sorry that the
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banner of revolution was not raised more resolutely in Northampton. Still, it does indicate that the time factor has made matters very difficult. Local authorities submitted their details to the Ministry many months before this, and this short time which has been allowed is something very much to be deplored. They should have been informed much earlier.
The other factor, which is perhaps even more important, is that this is, I believe, the first time that the Minister of Education has ever directed a local authority as to what fees to charge. In the past, it has asked authorities to cooperate in reaching a particular sum, but this seems to be a new departure. It is a new precedent and a further example of Whitehall interference which, I should have thought, the hon. Gentleman and his friends would have been the last to tolerate. I hope it will not be repeated.
In London, we have always prided ourselves on the fact that fees were nominal; originally, they were merely registration fees. The intention was to get people to come to the institutes. We took the view, and Londoners have taken the view over the generations, judging by the support they have given both to the institutes and to those carrying out the policy of providing this instruction, that this expenditure was an extremely fine investment for London. One got the young people off the streets and provided, as I say, clubs for instruction, for profit and for learning, for everyone.
Already, of course, the county has, as the Parliamentary Secretary knows, raised its fees a little on several occasions, but a fee of 10s., or 12s. in literary institutes, is now, under the Minister's instruction, to go up to 30s. This is bound to have a very serious effect on the cultural and recreational work in London's Further Education. Furthermore, it comes at a very strange time. The Ministry's Circular on Technical Education, in paragraph 11, talks about the need for a wide, liberal cultural education, and almost simultaneously with the issue of that circular we have this action on the part of the Minister which makes the provision of such a cultural and educational programme for a large number of citizens very difficult.
What is the effect in London likely to be? I am speaking only of the non-vocational classes at the moment. In

1725
those classes there are now about 80,000 students who would be affected. Our experience in the past has been that, whenever there has been an increase in fees—although there has never been an increase of this magnitude—there has always been a falling off of students. The best estimate that the council's officers can give is that there will be at least a falling off of between 15,000 to 20,000 students. This is serious and very much to be deplored.
I hope the Minister will not adduce as a defence of this 200 per cent. increase the suggestion that some people come to evening institutes in motor cars, or have television sets. For two large groups of students, that is not true. The young people, men and women over twenty-one, who come to these classes, some to learn how to make furniture for their homes, some to learn home decorating or to learn language or develop an interest in opera, do not have motor cars and those sorts of things. No such argument for this imposition can be adduced in their case. Nor can it be put forward in the case of the elderly people, people who have perhaps retired or lost a partner, man or woman, who come to evening institutes in great numbers to get their recreation in pleasant and cheap surroundings. They are not the sort of people who have the luxuries or semi-luxuries which are sometimes used as an argument for increasing charges.
It is tragic that this direction should be given and this imposition made on what is a quite remarkable system of continuative education. What will be the saving? In London, the collective saving in one year, even if the number of students does not fall below 60,000, will probably be only £60,000. That sum is really quite unrelated to our national economic difficulties and cannot possibly be a justification for it. The risk that we run is that the whole of this great achievement of London's evening education will be threatened.
I do very earnestly ask the Minister, even at this stage, as one who has been both student and lecturer in an evening institute, that he should think again. The right hon. Gentleman's predecessor will never, I think, live down the rather petty economy which she attempted to impose upon the Workers' Educational Association. I hope that the reputation of the Minister will not be similarly tarnished by
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what is really a gross interference with a very fine and successful educational experiment, the financial results of which are quite unrelated to the economic distress of the country.
I come now to the other matter with which I am concerned, the shortage of students for technical courses, especially in technical colleges. I believe that there is a very serious shortage. If these courses do not attract a sufficient number of students of the right type, then, as it seems to me, all the plans in the White Paper on Technical Education, Cmd. 9703, will fall to the ground. In paragraph 154 the White Paper itself says:
"Success in carrying out the plans described in this Paper depends on attracting many more students and placing them in the right courses."
Further, I agree for once with what the Prime Minister said in his speech at Bradford in January of this year, that the country which is likely to win the prizes is not the country with the biggest population but the country with the best education system. I am sure that is right.
Such figures as I have been able to collect at this stage seem to indicate that there is an alarming shortage of students for courses in technical colleges. I call in evidence the Minutes, which I have had an opportunity of seeing, of the London and Home Counties Regional Advisory Council for Higher Technological Education. This body, as the Parliamentary Secretary will know, is a very important and responsible body consisting of the chairmen of the local education authorities for London and the Home Counties, and others.
The figures which I am going to quote are figures which were revealed by various representatives in May. They are, therefore, relatively up to date. Before I come to the figures, there is one further point which ought to be made clear in regard to these figures, namely, that this particular body covers the most important region, I suppose, in the whole country; it is certainly the region with the greatest population, nearly 8 million, and containing a great many of the technical colleges. If anything, the position here will be somewhat disguised by the fact that there are so many colleges in this area, and it may be that elsewhere the situation is even more serious.
I should like to draw attention to four or five items. In part-time courses for

1727
Part III of the examination of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, the total enrolments for this region, with a population of 8 million, as I say, are likely to be not more than twelve in 1956–57! That is an estimate made by a responsible body. Enrolments for 1957–58 are not expected to exceed 60, and for 1958–59 are not expected to exceed 100. Next, for the four years diploma course in electrical engineering, the figures for the Borough Polytechnic for the four years are 10, 21, 9 and 13. For Woolwich Polytechnic, the figure is 13 in year 1. The representatives from Enfield and Kinston asked for the matter to be reconsidered in the autumn of 1956. The Northampton Polytechnic stated that there was an "insufficient response", which presumably means that there is no course at all. These are all technical colleges in an area where transport is relatively good and where there must be a great collection of potential students for these courses.
In connection with sandwich diploma courses in chemical engineering, it is stated that it
"would be advisable for one course to operate for … two years before a second course in the region is considered."
It appears, therefore, that there is to be only one course in this very important subject in the whole region. I observe that the ordinary national diploma in building course at the Polytechnic is being closed, as the course at the Southend Municipal College has already been closed.
Dealing with sandwich diploma courses in applied chemistry, an extract from the minutes states that:
"A course at Acton"—
in which I have a special interest as some of my constituents attend—
"did not start in 1955–56 owing to 'insufficient enrolments'. A course proposed at South-East Essex Technical College received 'support from industry insufficient to warrant a start in 1956–57'. Woolwich Polytechnic reported that replies received to a proposed course are 'not very encouraging' and no course is being offered. The Committee 'cannot recommend the Council to support other sandwich courses in chemical subjects at present'."
Those are random figures throughout the region but I do not think anyone could say that they are anything other than alarming, particularly against the background of the Government's own
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White Paper on Technical Education, in paragraph 56 of which, it will be recalled, we are told:
"The Government now propose to raise the capacity of advanced courses at technical colleges as soon as possible from 9,500 to about 15,000."
I am not quite sure exactly what the figure of 9,500 existing students means. It seems to me that most of them—almost 8,000, I should say—are evening or part-time students. At least, that is the Government's intention, but the figures I have given seem to show how far it has failed.
It may be that it is still too early to assess the facts and that by September we shall have a better idea of the figures. I hope, however, that if this alarming indication of shortage of students for these vital, important courses continues, the Minister will take the House and the country into his confidence. If we do not achieve better results than this, obviously the whole of the proposals must be redrawn and an entirely new start made.
I should like to suggest one or two reasons why the response may be so poor. As the Minister has recognised and as the White Paper states, we are still fighting the status bogy in that many schools and parents consider that a technical college has an inferior status and parents try to get their children to attend somewhere with a university status. It is interesting to note that of the technical State scholarships given in 1955–56, of which 103 out of 125 were taken up, only 13 appear not to have been taken up at universities. Obviously there is much to be done, but I have seen no indication of what the Minister intends to do to overcome the existing impression and to elevate the status of the technical colleges.
I am quite certain that the grant of £240 for sandwich courses is far too small. If we are to attract young men and women who have any personal financial commitment, it will only be those who are far-seeing or are prepared to make great sacrifice who will leave their jobs and undertake courses at this rate of payment. I gather that the professional civil servants have already made representations to the Minister about this and I hope that some improvement can be effected.
Thirdly, I do not know whether help could be given to small firms, who, after

1729
all, comprise 96 per cent. of all industrial establishments. There are difficulties for small firms in releasing people, and certainly in paying them during their absence. The best of the employers make some payment in addition to any award which a student may receive. Until something can be done in the direction of small firms, however, there is likely to be great difficulty in making the sandwich courses attractive.
Fourthly, I hope that the Government will encourage members of their own professional staffs to apply for and take advantage of sandwich courses. I gather that only 60 places were offered to the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and one other establishment. This does not seem to me to be setting a good example.
Finally, there is the general problem of trying to get more people to remain longer at school so that they can be qualified to take advantage or gain entry to the advanced courses. It is still a tragic fact that some 74 per cent. of our boys and girls leave school at the age of 15 and do not usually have sufficient educational requirements to gain admission to advanced courses.
Much more could be said, but I want to give the Minister every opportunity to reply. We know that the United States and the Soviet Union are making tremendous strides in training scientists and technicians. I am sure that we in Britain can do the same, but it will require a new attitude, on the part not so much of the Minister, perhaps, as of the Treasury. I hope that the Minister will be able to give some indication tonight that he is facing up to this challenge.
6.56 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Mr. Dennis Vosper): The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. Skeffington), who opened this discussion, not in the heated manner which he suggested but in a moderate and reasonable way, has raised two rather separate matters. One concerns students in technical colleges and the other the increase in fees for further education announced in Circular 307. It might at first sight appear that there was a strong connection between the two. The connection is, however, slight, because technical education means vocational courses and the impact of Circular 307 on vocational courses is negligible.
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To deal, first, with Circular 307, some hon. Members and people outside this House—I am not sure that the hon. Member is in this category—hold the view that all further education courses should be free. That is not my view, nor has it been the practice since the passing of the Education Act, 1944. As is stated in the circular, it seems reasonable that students who benefit from these courses should make a reasonable contribution to their cost.
I have told the House on a previous occasion that even after the increases referred to in the circular have been made, students' contributions will represent only one-fifteenth part of the cost of running the courses. Furthermore, it is my experience that those who make a reasonable contribution to an organisation such as an evening institute or youth club more often than not make the best members. Circular 307 continues the-practice of charging fees and it increases the fees to students over the age of 21 to the extent that they will now pay a maximum of 10d. a week.
In the limited time that remains, I do not want to repeat the arguments which have been advanced in the House by my right hon. Friend and myself, but I wish to say a word about London, with which the hon. Member is particularly concerned. During the last few days, my right hon. Friend has approved fees proposals put forward by the London County Council for classes beginning next September. Generally, the increases in the fees for students aged 21 and over will range from 2s. to 4s. a term, or 5s. to 10s. a year. So the increases will be less than those which the hon. Member mentioned.
The exception is that ballroom dancing will cost 15s. a term instead of 5s. Fees for single classes in evening institutes will go up by only 50 per cent. or thereabouts. The present arrangement for remission of fees in cases of hardship will be continued. Although I do not expect the hon. Member, any more than the London County Council, to accept this action willingly, I think he will agree that as a result of the discussions there has been some compromise as far as London is concerned.
As far as plans for 1957 are concerned, we intend to have a further discussion in the autumn of this year. Even so, I

1731
think it is inevitable, as the hon. Member said, that there will be some casualties, though I hope not of the number that he mentioned. It is fairly normal that when the price of anything rises there will be a falling-off in demand. But I hope that it will be confined to the less serious students, and that the remainder will find it worth their while to make a small sacrifice for courses which are obviously considered valuable. I hope that this will be the case and I should like to assure the hon. Member and the House that my right hon. Friend wishes to encourage the growth of this work.
If there was any doubt about that I should point out that in recent months my right hon. Friend has published, a rather valuable pamphlet entitled "Evening Institutes". I do not think that he would have published that pamphlet if, at the same time, he was out to destroy this valuable work, as has been suggested in some quarters. Both he and I have shown our interest and have apologised for the difficulties about the timing of this circular, and I only hope that, as far as the non-vocational work is concerned, the hon. Gentleman's fears will not be justified and that this work will continue in London and elsewhere. I believe that the figures will prove me to be right in this respect.
Mr. Skeffington: The figures of 2s. and 4s. which the hon. Gentleman has given are very considerably less, and I am very grateful for it. Are they per term or per year?
Mr. Vosper: These are the increases per term. The increases per year will be from 5s. to 10s., and will, as the hon. Gentleman realises, be less than was at first thought.
I should like to make it clear that this circular has little or no effect on the vocational courses, and this leads me to a further part of the hon. Member's speech. This is because either the students taking up vocational courses are under 21 and are not effected by Circular 307, or because they are already paying fees at the level mentioned in the Circular.
If I may take the case of the student in London, he would pay, according to the scales already announced by the London County Council before the publication of this circular, 50s. per session
1732
for a full degree or a professional equivalent course, and for a Higher National Certificate course, while the fee for a G.C.E. or a National Certificate course—first or second year—will be 30s. per session. Neither of them are in any way affected by the circular, and only those who were taking single subjects have to pay any more. The increase will be 4s. and 14s. per session for the subjects which I have just mentioned.
While it may be argued that all fees in any circumstances are a deterrent, surely these are small amounts to pay compared with the great value of the courses and they do make this argument somewhat ridiculous. In any event, as far as potential technical students are concerned, the recent circular cannot be considered a deterrent. Indeed, I do not think that the hon. Member suggested that it was.
Now I should like to turn to the more positive side of the hon. Gentleman's speech, concerning the provision of students for the technical colleges. I agree that it is vital that the provision of the colleges, on the one hand, and the supply of teachers and of students should keep pace one with another, and I have no evidence that the three are not, in fact, keeping pace one with another. London and the Home Counties, to some extent, are a special case, and the hon. Member produced some figures which I would not want to contradict. I have a set of figures which, to some extent, prove the opposite.
I do not want to take up time by giving many figures, but, to take eight Polytechnics in the London area mainly responsible for full-time advanced courses in engineering and science, there has, in fact, been a decrease. Between 1949 and 1950, the number was 6,307, and in 1954–55 it fell to 5,482. Part-time day courses increased from 6,888 in 1949–50 to 9,766 in 1954–55.
In the maintained technical colleges, doing mainly part-time work at senior level, it was much the same thing. There has been a small decrease in the full-time work, but a considerable increase in the part-time day release work, and also a considerable increase in the evening work. In the day colleges doing junior and preliminary courses for youngsters under 18, there is a considerable demand for building projects, and I believe that this is some indication that the numbers are increasing rather than falling off.

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When we come to sandwich courses, I find that in 1954–55 students in electrical engineering courses in London rose from 43 to 125, and that this year it is expected that they will be doubled again. In 1954–55, 170 students attended six sandwich courses in mechanical and production engineering, and the number rose last year to 249 on the same courses, and this year student numbers are expected to be doubled again.
The hon. Member may think that there is a conflict in the figures here, but I do not think that that is necessarily the case. The figures which I have given all show increases in numbers taking sandwich courses and the signs for the coming year are that there will be further increases. The drop in numbers attending full-time degree courses is largely due to the falling off in further educational training schemes and the fact that the general pressure on the universities and technical courses has decreased in recent years.
As far as the country as a whole is concerned, there are in existence today 107 sandwich courses at all levels, and my right hon. Friend has before him now applications for no less than 34 additional courses to begin next session. I hope the hon. Gentleman will find these figures slightly more encouraging than the ones he has given, but, at the same time, I do not want him or any other hon. Member to read into these figures any indication of complacency whatever. My right hon. Friend is anxious to use every possible means to stimulate recruitment for these and other courses.
I am optimistic, because certain factors, of which the hon. Member mentioned one, are moving in our favour. While, for instance, in 1957–58, the numbers attaining the age of 15 will be smaller than for a long time past, in 1960 this age group will be nearly 30 per cent. higher and, presumably, this will automatically produce a 30 per cent. increase in enrolments. In the second place, pupils are staying longer at school, and so a higher proportion of each age group is qualifying for entry to advanced courses of further education, and this should add appreciably to the numbers. The proportion of pupils taking science in sixth forms is now very high, and this must have some effect on recruitment.
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Next, there are the links with the secondary modern school which it is so important to establish, because these schools will, in the future, produce an increasing number of students for the technical colleges. I agree that it is important to establish the status and to increase the prestige of both the technical colleges and the secondary modern schools.
While all these things will help, I agree that there is no reason for not doing everything possibe to stimulate recruitment at this very moment. In addition to pursuing every possible means of publicity, and I think the hon. Member will agree that the technical education White Paper has had considerable publicity, my right hon. Friend has quite recently referred the matter of recruitment of students to the National Advisory Council on Education for Industry and Commerce for advice both on the means of stimulating recruitment in the schools and in industry. As the building programme develops and colleges and courses increase, as I believe they are doing, I think the appeal will make itself felt.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned one or two points on awards. The number of technical state scholarships has now increased to 150, which my right hon. Friend is prepared to increase further if the number of students is forthcoming. I agree that the means of financing sandwich courses at the moment is difficult, but in due course my right hon. Friend will be issuing advice about the financing of students in sandwich courses.
Finally, although there may be a difference of opinion as to the degree of success so far obtained in the recruitment of students, and, maybe, a difference of opinion in regard to the methods to be initiated, I am sure we are all agreed on the importance of this matter, and the need to do everything to stimulate demand, even if at times it threatens to overtake the provision of colleges and teachers. If that is the result of this debate I feel that it will have served a useful purpose, and the results will possibly not be as discouraging as the figures produced by the hon. Member suggest they will be.

U.N. REFUGEE FUND (UNITED KINGDOM CONTREBUTION)
7.10 p.m.
Mr. A. Blenkinsop: I must begin by offering an apology to the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for having brought him to the House on two occasions to raise with him this issue, which I believe to be one of the most important issues, of our care for refugees, particularly those refugees who are under the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner. I feel that the hon. Gentleman will agree with me, although he has been brought to the House twice about it, that the subject does warrant our very careful attention.
All of us in the House were shocked to hear of the recent and unexpected death of the High Commissioner, Dr. van Goedhardt, whom many of us had met on many occasions. I think it is the feeling of us all that his anxiety about the success of the re-establishment of the refugees in Europe must have been one of the contributory causes of his shockingly early death. It is not unfair to suggest that we may consider what action we in this country can take as a form of tribute to him and his memory. It is relatively easy for us to make speeches expressing our appreciation of his work, but it would be very much more fitting if tonight we could give in a practical way some evidence of our recognition of his work, and it is because I hope that that may be possible that I am so anxious to raise this matter now.
I wish to say something about the history of the care of this group of refugees. I am referring only to those refugees who are within the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner; broadly speaking, they are the European refugees. Their care originally was undertaken after the war by U.N.R.R.A., and then, after U.N.R.R.A. was wound up, by the International Refugee Organisation. When that in turn was discontinued in 1950 it was agreed at the United Nations organisation itself that the High Commissioner should be appointed. There were at first no facilities for raising finance for him from Governmental sources, but that was corrected later, and he was given power to make application
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to Governments for any contributions which they might make.
It is of interest that when he was appointed by the United Nations he was appointed to provide international protection and to seek permanent solutions. I would emphasise that. He was given the responsibility of helping to define permanent solutions of the problem of this category of refugees. Unlike many other refugee problems that seem to be so tangled with political issues that no constructive work is found possible, here we have, within the general category of refugees, a refugee problem on which work has proved possible, largely, I think, because of the influence of the High Commissioner, who was appointed to secure some practical results in the establishment of these refugees in Europe, and, indeed, outside Europe. I think we can say that the work which has been done has been of a really constructive character, contributing towards a real solution of this refugee problem. I only wish that that could be said of the wider problems of refugees, which, alas, seem little closer to solution.
As I say, there were originally no facilities provided for the High Commissioner to raise funds from Governmental sources; originally the funds had to come from private sources, and some foundations did make some grants originally to enable the High Commissioner to set some of his work on foot. We are very grateful to those bodies for the work which they have done.
In 1954 a four-year programme for the resettlement of these refugees was drafted and was accepted by the United Nations Assembly. I think it is a fair point to make that, although there was a good deal of discussion, of course, at the Assembly on this matter, our own representative, when the matter was finally decided, agreed—as I think I am right in saying—to support this proposal for the four-year programme. Under it those refugees who were then still in camps-some 88,000 of them at that time—would be resettled either in the countries in which they were then domiciled or elsewhere. To enable that to be done the plan provided for some contributions of about 16 million dollars to be spent over about four years; 4 million dollars a year.

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There was no provision, as there is in some of the United Nations' institutions, for automatic contributions from Governments on a fixed scale. Governments had to be approached for contributions. The tragedy has been that member countries of the United Nations, although they may have supported the setting up of the plan, have not given anything like the financial support to it that their pledge, as it were, would have warranted, and I must include this country amongst the countries which have not carried what, in my view, is their fair share of the pledge given.
Many member countries of the United Nations do not feel themselves able to make any contribution. It is not surprising, perhaps, that many of the Middle Eastern countries, which are eligible to make contributions, do not feel themselves able to do so. We may disagree about their views, but there is no doubt of the very considerable refugee problem which they have. Countries in South America may feel themselves to be some distance away from this aspect, in particular, of the refugee problem. Some of those countries are making some contribution in a practical way to permanent solutions of refugee conditions. Although it is not surprising that many of the countries that are on the United Nations' list are making little or no contribution, it does inevitably mean that a great deal of the burden of the expenditure must be borne by European members of the United Nations.
It is not surprising either that Soviet Russia has not looked with any special favour upon this proposal, because it has always regarded those who come under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner as being persons the great majority of whom ought to return to the Soviet Union or to one or another of the satellite countries. It is encouraging that the Soviet Union's original bitter opposition seems to have modified somewhat in the last year or two, so that there is not quite so much objection being taken by the Soviet Union to this work as there certainly was in the early stages.
We are, therefore, left with the sad fact to report that last year, with a target of about 4,400,000 dollars to be secured from member countries of the United Nations, there was a shortfall of 1,500,000 dollars. This country paid its contribution
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of 224,000 dollars, or £80,000, with a conditional offer of a further £20,000, which was not made available because other countries had not contributed further sums. The result is that we are faced this year with an even worse position financially than might have been hoped. Not only does the office of the United Nations High Commissioner wish to raise another 4,400,000 dollars this year, but it needs to make up the shortfall of last year, and so far the contributions from member countries have fallen even further than they did last year.
Therefore, we are almost facing the danger of a breakdown of this scheme, or its prolongation for many more years than the intended four. One of the tragedies about all this is that if it is to be continued beyond four years it will inevitably mean further expenditure, including expenditure for the maintenance of the High Commission staff, which is part of general United Nations costs at the moment, and is something about which the Foreign Office apparently, and certainly the Treasury, feel very strongly. One way of reducing the charge on Her Majesty's Government for general United Nations work is to see that this limited job is carried out within the intended period of time so that the work of this group of persons can be terminated.
Not only is there merely the danger of having to spread this programme over a longer period, with all the human tragedies that that will involve to the refugees concerned if they have to wait a further period of years for resettlement in homes or farms or possibly in light industries. We are also endangering our prospect of agreement with the countries of present domicile. Those countries have agreed at present that they will match the contributions of the United Nations countries and will make their contributions much greater than our own to secure the settlement of these cases. The United States has also made generous offers of matching contributions provided that the contributions of certain countries can be raised to a certain level. There is little or no prospect of that being done unless we can persuade Her Majesty's Treasury to take a little less skinflint attitude towards this matter than it has done up to the moment.
We have a little hope, and we grasp hope in this Chamber. We grasp at every tender little spring of hope in these

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matters. We had a slight encouragement from the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 9th July. In reply to a Question which I put to him about the extra £20,000 which was the conditional offer of Her Majesty's Government in addition to the original £80,000, the noble Lord said:
"Her Majesty's Government are considering whether the state of the Fund as set out in the High Commissioner's Annual Report warrants any alteration being made to the latter arrangement."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th July, 1956; Vol. 556, c. 23.]
By "latter arrangement" was meant the conditional character of the extra £20,000.
As to whether the condition of the Fund warrants an alteration, I should have thought there was an overwhelming reason why we should claim that the Fund now is in such a parlous situation that that very conditional pledge of reconsideration of Her Majesty's Government's position must be carried out. I hope that we shall have some further glimmers of hope from the hon. Gentleman the Joint Under-Secretary of State, otherwise we must say that the noble Lord's statement on 9th July was utterly meaningless. If the noble Lord did not mean that it was intended to make the extra contribution of even this miserably small sum of £20,000, what on earth did he mean?
It should be borne in mind that our contribution is really minute when compared with the contributions of other countries, and particularly in the relation to the kind of percentage contribution made to other Agencies of the United Nations. We are naturally proud of such contributions as we make to the United Nations, small as they are. We contribute about 9 per cent. to many of the Agencies, but in this case of help for refugees our contribution is miserable indeed. It would have to be increased possibly by a further £170,000 a year to bring it anywhere near parallel to the contributions which we make to other United Nations Agencies. For some reason which I do not understand, we do less in this case than we accept as reasonable to do in helping other work carried out by the United Nations.
We are talking about infinitesimal sums when we consider the general expenditure of Her Majesty's Government. We all appreciate the pressure on the
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Treasury of all these worthy causes and the eagerness of the Treasury to secure even the most minute savings, but we should consider in human terms the possibility of clearing away this problem, at any rate to a large extent, with reasonable promptitude. It should also be kept in mind that many of us are concerned with programmes in this country designed to give help on a voluntary basis. It is not as though we relied entirely on the contributions of Her Majesty's Government.
I would ask the Joint Under-Secretary to pay particular attention to the fact that the United Nations Association is embarking upon a very big programme to try to secure voluntary contributions towards this constructive work. It would be an enormous encouragement to the United Nations Association and to all of us if the Government could at least say that they will bear that voluntary work in mind and will make an extra contribution which will have some relation to the amount of voluntary work done by all kinds of people. A remarkable job has been done in this way in Holland. Ordinary people there have done a great deal, and their Government have made a very much larger contribution for that reason.
Whatever sort of brief the Joint Under-Secretary received from the Treasury before he came into the Chamber, I ask him to scrap the less worthy part of it and to say that, for once, Her Majesty's Government are eager to make an additional contribution, even though it be a modest one, to help solve this problem.
7.30 p.m.
Mr. Nigel Nicolson: It was only a day or two before his death that the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) and myself had lunch with Dr. Goedhardt. He was no less ebullient than usual, and I did not think that he seemed to be in poor health. But I thought that his optimism was beginning to fade. It was as if his knuckles were wearing thin with rapping on the doors of the Treasuries of the world and begging them for money to accomplish the task which the United Nations themselves had elected to do.
One of the questions which I put to him at that lunch was, why was this? How did it come about that the General Assembly could declare unanimously that

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it wished to achieve such-and-such an end—in this case to solve permanently the problem of the European refugees—and then, by a wide margin, to fail to allot the money necessary to carry out that task? Dr. Goedhardt gave me two reasons. The first of them has been mentioned by the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East. Dr. Goedhardt said that it was quite obvious that not every member nation of the United Nations could possibly interest itself in the fate of refugees who were mainly in Europe and mainly refugees from Communism. Though it is perfectly true that contributions have been received from countries as far apart as Korea and Venezuela, it is, in the main, a problem confined to the N.A.T.O. countries, and it is in Europe that the money must mainly be found.
Dr. Goedhardt's second answer was that, unfortunately, it is true that the humanitarian impulses, always strong after a war, begin to die down several years later. He put it to me that the problem of those who are homeless, stateless, and poor, and who are getting older, and are ill, is not one which appeals so strongly to peoples and to Governments as, for instance, the problem of one's own children. He said that his refugees were not trouble-makers. They roused no political problems. He compared them with the refugees in the Middle East or to the 9 million of displaced persons which U.N.R.R.A. successfully settled in the years after the war. With a little justifiable bitterness he told the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East and myself that it was rather hard for him, the High Commissioner, to see that it was not difficult to raise for the Palestinian Arabs 2 million dollars a year purely for maintaining the refugees, and a further 200 million dollars in a capital sum to place them permanently in new employment, while barely 50 per cent. of the 4·2 million dollars for which he had asked for his refugees had been found by the Governments who backed up that decision.
I would not go so far as the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East in saying that the United Kingdom contribution was quite "lamentable"—I think the hon. Member used some such word. It is not ungenerous when compared with the record of other countries. I realise that I am asking my hon. Friend for a
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gesture in excess of our duty. I am asking for a positive gesture, a positive lead, which might encourage other countries to do something for themselves. In this country we have done a great deal, not only by financial contributions. We should not forget that even since the end of the war we have accepted into the United Kingdom over 200,000 stateless persons—most of them Polish veterans from General Anders' Army—and assimilated them into our own country more successfully than any foreigners have ever been assimilated into any other country.
In support of what has been said by the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East, I put it to my hon. Friend that there are three good reasons for making this extra effort now. The first was put very well by Dr. Goedhardt himself in a speech which I heard him make in October of last year at Strasbourg to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. He told the Assembly that if we did not accomplish this task now—he was speaking of the task of resettling the European refugees—there was no certainty that we should be able to do it at all. In support of that warning he adduced the fact that at the moment countries like Western Germany and Austria, where a great many of these refugees are to be found, are enjoying boom conditions which may not continue indefinitely. At the same time in the refugee camps themselves there is, inevitably, an increasing apathy, a listlessness and sheer physical weakness among the refugees which may make it impossible for them to have any future other than that of a lingering death in an institution; and that now there is a need to put them to useful work and give them a life of which any man might be proud.
The second reason is purely financial. Last year, as has been mentioned by the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East, there was a short-fall of 1½ million dollars on the budget of 4·2 million dollars which the United Nations declared to be its contribution. This year, as a result of that short-fall, our target obviously is larger. It is 6 million dollars, and we are nowhere near attaining even half of that. In fact, the latest figure I have, which is that for May, is 1·4 million which has been pledged towards that 6 million.
The third reason is the United Nations Association appeal this year. I think it

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a remarkable fact that this country, second only to Holland—which of course is Dr. Goethardt's own country—has given a lead by raising some of the extra money required by private effort among ordinary citizens. I think it a gesture which our Government might well consider making to give some encouragement—not only encouragement in words—to that tremendous private and yet national effort which the United Nations Association will launch in the autumn of this year.
Last year we gave £20,000 conditionally, and because the target was not reached, that £20,000 was not spent. The £20,000 we are again offering conditionally this year also seems unlikely to be spent. In a supplementary question which I asked a few weeks ago, I put it to the Joint Under-Secretary that that £40,000 must have been allowable in the Treasury calculations of what we were able to afford. The hon. Gentleman did not like that argument very much, but I think it true to say that there is at least £40,000 which at one moment we were prepared to spend and which we have not spent. Therefore, I suggest that this £40,000 might well be added conditionally to the United Nations Association appeal.
I should like to see it put in a form in which, for every £1 raised by the appeal over the first £20,000, £1 from the £40,000 should be added by Her Majesty's Government. In this way we could make that money do a great deal of work. Each £1 contributed by Her Majesty's Government, over and above their £80,000 already promised, would be matched by £1 raised by the general public. Those £2 would immediately be converted into £3, because the United States Government have agreed to match at the rate of 50 per cent. Those £3 in their turn would be converted into £6, because every country in which refugees reside is more or less obliged—and they have not yet fallen down upon the obligation—to contribute 100 per cent. to what they receive from outside sources. Even that resulting £6 is not wholly and irretrievably expended, because it has been the very proper practice for most of the money spent upon refugees to be given in the form of loans and not of gifts. There is a really astonishing
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record of repayment by the refugees themselves once they have been assisted to re-establish themselves in business, in agriculture or as students.
I have a final comment to make. It is not a very agreeable thing that I wish to say, but I feel that I must say it. I am filled with sadness at the record of Her Majesty's Government in the sphere of international co-operation outside the purely political field. There are not many on my side of the House who feel like that, but I do not think it is a bad thing that some of us who do should express their views openly and frankly.
I was terribly disappointed and upset by the speech which was made by the Joint Under-Secretary at Geneva on 24th July, in which he said that unless the United Nations Specialised Agencies were able to achieve budgetary stabilisation Her Majesty's Government would be obliged seriously to consider whether we could continue to participate in the United Nations programmes on the present basis.
This is not strictly a matter of the Specialised Agencies, but I think that that speech fits in with and has some bearing upon our short debate today, because it is symptomatic of an attitude of withdrawal from these Agencies, an attitude of withdrawal from our international responsibilities. If there were any more of my hon. Friends here tonight I feel certain that they would support what was said at Geneva. I realise that I am expressing only a very personal disappointment.
We are throwing away our chances of leadership. We have had a tremendous experience in dealing with those who are poor or backward or in any way in distress. We have had a great tradition of hospitality and generosity to these people. Is this the moment when we should fall down upon that tradition? If, as I hope is not the case, my hon. Friend has come here tonight with a brief from the Treasury—it will not be his own words or his own feelings—to turn down our request, even for the £20,000 which we have not spent, I shall really feel that we have taken a step backwards. The Government might well consider having new thoughts about this subject and helping the people who so sorely need our help.
7.44 p.m.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I rise to support what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) and the hon. Member for East Bournemouth, and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson). In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to the hon. Member for East Bournemouth and Christchurch, who on many occasions has spoken with courage for expressing the views which he so rightly holds.
I have often tried, in recent years, to persuade, the Government that expenditure on the United Nations is, in the truest sense of the words, defence expenditure, and that it ought to rank in the minds of the Treasury and of the Foreign Office with the expenditure which we make upon preparation for war. It has always been true in modern times that the best defence for Britain, and for all British interests, lies in preventing war rather than in winning long and bloody conflicts that ought never to have broken out.
Today, more than ever, British interests can be defended only by establishing the rule of law, and that can be done only by building up the prestige, the authority and the success of the United Nations. It cannot be done by general phrases about co-operation and peace. The Tory Governments, before the war, were always ready to use general phrases of support for the League of Nations. The present Government are always ready to speak of their support for the United Nations, but, alas, their leading Ministers boycott the meetings of the institutions of the United Nations. They give very little moral support to much of its work.
They attack the United Nations budget, as the Joint Under-Secretary did in Geneva the other day, although it is the best vetted, most closely examined Budget in the world. If they would apply the same methods to our defence expenditure budget, they could save our contribution to the United Nations ten times over, probably with benefit to British defence.
The Government often approve of projects in the United Nations Assembly and then afterwards allow them to fail. That is not the way to build up the authority and the prestige of the United Nations, to make it an instrument which we might use in the very serious international
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situation which the House has been discussing today.
In this Fund of which my hon. Friend spoke, British economic interests are directly involved. The refugees in Europe have been a charge on the economy of Europe, and the prosperity of Europe means very much to us. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration has moved 100,000, 110,000, 120,000 Europeans a year, many of them refugees, out of Europe to countries overseas. That is helping the European balance of payments with the dollar countries, and helping in no small degree.
In five years, half a million people unemployed in Europe, consuming imports which have to be paid for with dollar and other overseas currency, who could not help to pay for those imports because they had no work, were taken from Europe's shoulders and placed in other countries where they are helping to produce the food, the raw materials and the other commodities that we need. That is a very real service to this country.
The Government have refused to join I.C.E.M. year after year although the Australians and the Canadians have made it very plain that they want us to do so. I think that they have not done right by I.C.E.M. and they have certainly not done right by the High Commissioner's Fund for the tragic hard core of refugees in Europe. The same economic interest is involved in this problem of the hard core refugees. Many of them might still be settled in productive work either in Europe or overseas. Many openings can be made by our United Nations High Commissioner if he has adequate funds at his disposal, even if they are not large sums.
I beg the Under-Secretary to believe that I know what I am talking about. For many years between the wars I did this very work with Dr. Nansen. The Government have not given proper support to this Fund. I plead with the Joint Under-Secretary of State now to throw away that part of his brief which refuses what hon. Members have asked for.
I would add one word on a rather different point. I would ask the Government to do something which will not cost them any money. They have now to help the United Nations to find a new

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High Commissioner to replace Dr. Goedhardt, to whom we all pay such a heartfelt tribute and whose tragic death I mourn. I cannot help feeling, with my hon. Friend, that bitter disappointment was one of the things that led to his untimely death.
The Government must find a new High Commissioner to take his place. There is one branch of the work of the High Commissioner which can be extremely effective and can do an immense amount for the refugees. That is their legal protection and the protection of their rights against the Governments of the countries where they happen to be. It is not easy work, and it cannot be done by a man without a big international position. It was superbly done by Dr. Nansen, because every office was always open to him wherever he went. It can be done by a United Nations High Commissioner today. I hope that the Government will impress on the new High Commissioner that they expect results in this matter. They will give him a much better chance of doing that job if he has funds from which he can help Governments to deal with the refugees who are on their hands.
Bad practice and shortsighted statesmanship generally, and supporting in the United Nations General Assembly policies which were afterwards allowed to fail, have taken place. It is bad to think of the United Nations as something about which we can afford to make fiddling economies which give no real result for our own Budget, but which damage our hopes of making the United Nations an institution to defend humanity against the hideous catastrophe of war.
7.54 p.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker): On behalf of the whole House I welcome back the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker). I think it is the first speech which he has delivered from the Opposition Dispatch Box after a considerable absence from our midst. We are delighted to have him back again with us.
I am sorry that he appeared to make party points on this issue, which is not a matter of party or Treasury, but for this country as a whole to do its best to carry on what has been achieved in the past, particularly in the years since the war. I am
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not going to take the right hon. Gentleman up on some of the points he made, such as boycotting the United Nations. I do not believe that he could put forward any substance for his charges. The subject is much wider than all that.
I am delighted also that the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) at last managed to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, for, as he said, the second time round. The hon. Member has shown great interest in this matter, as in other matters of United Nations importance in the past. I am grateful to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicholson), who spoke with such feeling about this United Nations Fund which is, after all, one of several.
Although I fear that I shall have to disappoint them this evening, I can assure hon. Members that it is through no want of advocacy on their part. Nor, as I shall explain, is it due to any lack of sympathy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, I am glad that this debate enables me to join, from the Government benches, in the tribute which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have paid to Dr. Goedhardt, and to say how much we regret his untimely death. We remember Dr. Goedhardt for his work in the Resistance, when he began by editing a clandestine newspaper. We remember him also as a Minister of the Netherlands Government in exile.
I had the privilege of a brief acquaintance with Dr. Goedhardt during the war, and again in 1953–54, when I first went to the Foreign Office, both in London and in Strasbourg. His great abilities and his personal experiences well fitted him for the work he did as High Commissioner of the United Nations Fund for Refugees. We all felt, when Dr. Goedhardt received, on behalf of his office, the Nobel Peace Prize for 1954, that that tribute was paid to the man himself as much as to all those who served his organisation. I can assure the House that his able American deputy, Mr. Reid, will have the fullest support of Her Majesty's Government in the work which he is now carrying on. I will look into the point which the right hon. Gentleman raised about Dr. Goedhardt's successor and see what we can do in support of that point.
Hon. Members have suggested that it would be a tribute to the memory of Dr. Goedhardt if Her Majesty's Government

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were to contribute now the £20,000 which they are pledged to give if the contributions of other countries reach the sum of 3¼ million dollars. Her Majesty's Government appreciate the spirit in which that proposal is made. My right hon. and learned Friend and my noble Friend have considered with great care whether we should be justified in waiving the condition which we made. I have to inform the House that, having taken every factor into consideration, Her Majesty's Government are not able to alter the terms of their offer. I think I should say, as my noble Friend informed the House on 9th July in reply to a Question by the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East, that Dr. Goedhardt himself understood our position.
Mr. Blenkinsop: Does the Joint Under-Secretary mean by that that Her Majesty's Government did not feel that the state of the Fund was such as to warrant an extra contribution?
Mr. Dodds-Parker: I am just coming to that point. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will let me explain the position. We hope that by maintaining our condition we may be doing more for the United Nations Fund, by encouraging the other Governments which have so far failed to contribute, although, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, they voted for the Fund at the United Nations. We believe that our condition is fair and that it is not only for this country and some others to be generous towards the Fund. That condition should stimulate others to make their contributions. If we agreed to give £20 000 now, it would not be a substantial addition to the Fund.
Let me assure the House that Her Majesty's Government are as anxious as anyone else that the refugee problem should be solved. We have given and are giving substantial help. Perhaps I might remind the House that our contribution to the Fund last year ranked third in the order of Governmental contributions. I was sorry that the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East used epithets like "miserable" and "minute". We can claim some credit in this matter. Our total contribution to the International Refugee Organisation in the post-war period was of the order of £22 million. After the organisation was closed down, Her Majesty's Government
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contributed £100,000 to the United Nations Emergency Fund for Refugees.
Nor have we confined our assistance to money only. This country, overcrowded as it is, has played a great part in refugee resettlement. Our record in that respect is nothing to be ashamed of. Indeed, we feel that it is quite the reverse. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch pointed out, nearly 250,000 refugees have found homes in this country since the war. Further, under the "Two Thousand Scheme", the Home Office has agreed to admit up to 2,000 selected refugees. I understand that there are still 300 vacancies under that scheme. I should also mention that the Distressed Relatives Scheme enables refugees resident in this country to arrange to bring over their relatives in cases where they can undertake to support such relatives.
At present there are over 200,000 refugees who have not yet found permanent homes; and of those some 70,000 still live in camps. But Her Majesty's Government are not in a position to carry more than a certain proportion of the burden. We have many and wide responsibilities and commitments. Hon. Members may argue, as they have done, that £20,000 is a relatively small sum, and so it may be if considered by itself. But we receive many calls for £20,000 here and £20,000 there. Taken altogether, these amount to a very substantial total.
Mr. Christopher Boyd: Although these contributions may be in proportion to what other countries are contributing, would it not be possible for the Government, in consultation with the other countries concerned, to persuade them to work towards groups of countries agreeing to increase their amounts, so that our share would be greater and their willingness to contribute would be increased? That would help to achieve a considerable increase in the total amount available.
Mr. Dodds-Parker: I am not sure whether I follow the hon. Member, but I think that is what we are trying to do. Our contribution is £80,000 and if the target is reached we shall put up a further £20,000. We believe that if we gave all these little sums without conditions and added £20,000 here and another sum there, we should add very substantially to our expenditure. We believe that other

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countries can play their part in admitting some of these hapless victims of the war and enabling them to start a new life. We believe also that the countries where the refugees are now living should assume an increasing degree of responsibility for their welfare. Indeed we consider that essential.
I sincerely believe that since 1945, the United Kingdom—and I say the United Kingdom advisedly, not merely Her Majesty's Government—has done more than its share to solve this terrible problem resulting from a war which we almost destroyed ourselves to win.
This is not only a matter for Government action. Like the right hon. Member for Derby, South, I had some personal experience dealing with refugee problems in the 1930s. I should like to join the right hon. Member in paying tribute to what Dr. Nansen and his organisation did in those days. It brought home to me how great a part can be played by voluntary social and religious organisations in relieving this distress.
I understand, and my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch has confirmed, that a public appeal is to be launched later this year under the auspices of the United Nations Association for private contributions on behalf of the refugees, and that a proportion of those contributions will go to this Fund. Attracted as we must all have been by the magic figures which my hon. Friend produced of how £1 given by the Government would produce £6, we do give great support to that Fund through the channels which have been suggested. I hope that the whole country and hon. Members on both sides of the House—who, I know, are helping this work—will give it their fullest support. I am afraid that as things stand I cannot go further than that.
Mr. Blenkinsop: That point is very important. I am grateful that the hon. Gentleman has said that Her Majesty's Government want to encourage people to make every possible contribution voluntarily to the Fund. Could he say this evening that he will consider a further approach to his right hon. and learned Friend? Will he see whether Her
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Majesty's Government could not make some form of encouraging extra contributions pari passu with what is raised in this voluntary way, and at least not close his mind to that altogether?
Mr. Dodds-Parker: I can assure the hon. Member that the minds of my right hon. Friends are by no means closed. They consider these matters although, as the right hon. Member kows, we have to be careful when saying things here, otherwise they might be interpreted as suggesting that some pledge has been given, as in the case of my noble Friend when he answered the Question on 9th July.
I would therefore urge all those concerned, and especially those hon. Members who have shown their concern in this House, to lend their energies towards persuading other Governments to be as forthcoming as we have been. Her Majesty's Government are fully aware that contributions to the Refugee Fund during its first two years have been disappointing, and that the contributions received so far this year have not nearly reached the amount required for our condition to be operative. The remedy does not lie only with us, but in a more general response to the late High Commissioner's appeal by Governments and private organisations throughout the world. We hope that hon. Members here and private organisations will be able to help.
Mr. P. Noel-Baker: I should like to thank the Joint Under-Secretary of State very much for the kind things which he said to me, and to express my regret that I was led to speak rather sharply about a matter on which, as he knows, I feel very strongly. May I reinforce what my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) said? He suggested that the Government should support the appeal. I make two practical suggestions. Will the hon. Gentleman get the Prime Minister to write a letter giving the full support of the Government to the appeal? Will he ask the Chancellor to give pound for pound, as has so often been done before in the case of private funds?
Mr. Dodds-Parker: Certainly, without commitment, I will look at those two suggestions.

LITTER
8.6 p.m.
Mr. J. E. B. Hill: After the urgent and important debate of today, it may seem rather an anti-climax to turn to the subject of litter. After all, that is more often seen than heard in this House.
The subject was last discussed as long ago as June, 1952, when my hon. Friend the Member for Wembley, South (Mr. Russell) raised it on the Adjournment. Tonight, it is topical because litter is the occupational disease of large crowds and, just before the August Bank holiday, the litter fever is at its height. Since the last debate two important developments have taken place. As a result of experience in Coronation year, the then Minister of Works set up a Committee to consider the problem of litter in the Royal Parks, under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Mr. J. Rodgers). That Committee produced its Report early last year. It is a short and interesting Report, which is well worth reading. It was a most valuable analysis of a specific and limited aspect of what is a very diffuse problem.
That brings me to the second development. Until March this year, no fewer than eight Departments were directly concerned with the subject of litter. Then, in response to many requests both within and outside this House, the Prime Minister allotted the subject to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, which has now been made primarily responsible for co-ordinating Government efforts on the litter problem. Tonight is the first time that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary has been seen out with his new baby. We hope the child will grow into a well-behaved adult.
A great effort has been made by the Government in past years. Since 1951, the Central Office of Information has run an anti-litter publicity campaign. A great effort has also been made by local authorities and their associations, and many other authorities and organisations. Some manufacturers try to package their products in such a way that the incidence of litter may be reduced. Many voluntary associations—which are most important and
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too numerous for me to mention by name—have also made a great effort.
I must refer to the wonderful work done by the "Keep Britain Tidy" Group, which has come together for the specific purpose. It is the parent association composed of many individual voluntary organisations which are well known in their own right. On top of that, a great effort is being made in the schools, in most families and by many individuals.
However, when all is said and done, it is still a moot point whether we are gaining or losing ground, whether we are swimming against an ever-growing current and not making quite enough positive progress. Certainly, without the effort being made, we should be engulfed in litter for various reasons. We are more densely populated than other countries. There has been a very great increase in movement. For example, greater motor car travel means more and more litter.
There is now a much greater litter potential. Much food is wrapped. Our very insistence upon food hygiene means more and more wrappings to be disposed of. There is also the effect of increased personal expenditure on bottled drinks, and so on. I am told that about 1 million milk bottles may disappear each day, and they have got to go somewhere. In general, a higher standard of living, as expressed in holidays, recreation and travel, adds to the problem.
There is the argument of despair, "We have done our best; we cannot do anything more about it." That is rejected on all sides by responsible opinion. It is generally agreed that we must cure what is really a shocking national habit. The arguments are conclusive. On amenity, I assume that I am talking to the converted. However, as in the case of economy, perhaps we all want it in principle, but are none too certain of making our own economies or of watching our own litter-spreading habits.
On cost, everything thrown down has ultimately to be picked up by somebody, at either public or private expense, and it certainly takes time. The estimate in respect of the five Royal Parks in London is £10,000 a year. Experts suggest that there is scope for enormous saving in such items as street cleaning. In Birmingham, for example, it costs £260,000 a year to clean the streets, and it is estimated that £34,000 of that is in

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respect of the picking up of litter which need not have been dropped in the streets.
There is a considerable indirect cost if one thinks for a moment of the drain on the National Health Service in respect of the tending of feet cut by bottles and tins on bathing beaches and so on. It is likewise in agriculture; animals suffer injury from the same causes.
The classic approach to the problem has been one of education in the right course of conduct, backed up by publicity and information, and assisted by the provision of more means, in the way of baskets and so on, to enable the public to dispose of litter.
That really leaves the hard core of the problem, the small, but possibly growing, number of people who, in ignorance or forgetfulness, and in some cases through wilfulness, just do not bother. They are known as "litter louts". They are important. Litter resembles the growth of bacteria; the first to arrive is the worst—because it encourages the spread and breeds rapidly, and secondly, a lot of it is spread unconsciously. I am reminded of the story of a little girl eating a toffee in a railway train pulling out of London. She made to throw the paper out of the window. Her elder sister said, "No, not now, Alice; wait until the train gets into the country."
The only ultimate pressure which can be brought upon the litter lout is some form of control or deterrent. There is a growing feeline that there is a lagging behind in the effectiveness of the sanctions, which thus impedes the all-important process of education. The present control by local authorities and certain organisations such as the National Trust is through byelaw procedure. There is great confusion over byelaws. They are made under many Acts of Parliament. There appears to be no uniformity, and so there is a somewhat patchwork effect. It may fairly be said that they are not working well and that they are uneven and uncertain. I would ask my hon. Friend whether it is a lack of the will to use the means, or whether the means itself is now inadequate. I doubt whether sufficient facts are at present available to enable a final judgment to be given on that point.
Also, there appears to be no effective control of litter left by members of the
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public on private land, for example by users of rights of way, private or public; by the dumping of rubbish, which is a prevalent habit, particularly at night, on empty plots of land; and also—a very important case—by the throwing on to private land of litter from laybyes on main roads. The latter problem is one upon which the Country Landowners Association is in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The Association has, I understand, today submitted photographs of what is happening for transmission to my hon. Friend. Clearly, some policy on that specific point will be needed with the new road programme.
We are, therefore, faced with a grave and growing social problem which requires investigation. The independent organisation, P.E.P., is, I understand, conducting research into the problem. I hope the Ministry will be at pains to collect all possible information and take the problem seriously. That would please the many local authorities and their associations which have written to me to express their concern. They are anxious to work out a continuing and firm policy with the Ministry, and I hope the Minister will consult them.
We are on the eve of the holidays. We want people to enjoy themselves, but in their enjoyment they should think of those who come after them. The trouble today is that our pageants are substantial, and I am afraid that when the revels end on Monday night a substantial wrack will be left behind. Litter does not vanish into thin air.
Other countries pay a great deal of attention to this problem. I do not belittle what has already been done, but, like road traffic, litter is a growing menace. I am very glad that my hon. Friend and his right hon. Friend have been put in charge of the Government effort in this direction. We look to them to show that the Government are no less anxious to clean up the ground than the air.
8.19 p.m.
Mr. Ronald Russell: I support what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill), who has done a great service in raising this matter.
As my hon. Friend has said, the problem does not seem to get any better.

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August Bank holiday will probably show that to the full in most of the Royal Parks and many of the other open spaces round London. I sometimes think that the House does not set a very good example in the matter of litter. It is a little better today than on some occasions, but I wish that we could set an example by not throwing papers on to the Floor—screwing them up and leaving the Chamber in an untidy state. It is a thoroughly bad example to the public as a whole.
There are only two ways, I believe, of solving the problem outside. One is, as my hon. Friend has said, much greater education on the subject. The other by the police fining people. I believe that action of that kind is the only way to stop some people from being careless, probably completely unconsciously. Only this morning, when I was held up in a traffic block in Oxford Street, I saw the driver of the car ahead casually throw out a cigarette packet. It contained a few pieces of paper and they came out as well. It was simply carelessness.
Until we can check that sort of thing by some kind of police action I really do not see any hope of greatly improving the situation, which is thoroughly bad and certainly needs improving.
8.21 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. Enoch Powell): I should like to begin, in discussing the subject which my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) has put before the House, with the legal aspect, and the legal powers which are available. It is true, as he said, that they consist almost exclusively of byelaws and regulations made under Acts of Parliament, but it is extraordinary how far those byelaws already extend.
Byelaws against litter, made under the Local Government Act, 1933, are already in force in 59 counties, 58 county boroughs, 223 non-county boroughs and 25 Metropolitan boroughs. It will, therefore, be clear that they cover the vast majority of the country. They relate not only to highways in the narrower sense of the term—roads and streets—but also to what is described as roadside waste on the edge of highways, to all kinds of public open spaces, and to waters and streams abutting upon roads and open spaces.
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In addition to this scope of byelaws made under the Local Government Act, 1933, there are separate byelaws which cover, or can cover, a whole range of other property. The regulations for the Royal Parks are, of course, well known to us. The National Trust makes its own byelaws for its own properties and, as a matter of fact, under those byelaws, imposes a penalty which is higher than the normal. The Forestry Commission has power to make byelaws relating to the land in its occupation. Finally, there is power to make byelaws under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, which would cover Nature Reserves, National Parks and land to which access is allowed to the public under that Act. There are, therefore, very considerable byelaw powers already widely in operation in regard to streets, open spaces and land to which the public has access.
It is quite true, as my hon. Friend said—and here he pointed to a very real problem—that these byelaws do not cover private land, other than land within the scope of the categories which I have mentioned. The only remedy which the owner or occupier of private land has is at common law, if there is damage attributable to the throwing or leaving of litter, and clearly it is a very difficult matter both to apprehend the culprit and to prove the damage. My hon. Friend is quite right in saying that, in that respect, private land is in a very different situation from public open spaces and from the highways.
There has been evidence of a recent growth of attention to the powers available to the authorities. While full statistics are not available, the evidence of Press reports shows that these byelaws are being used more widely. In a sample of three recent days, taken at random, there were reports of no fewer than six prosecutions under the litter byelaws in three of our counties; and in the same three days there was news that a further county borough—Croydon—was applying to make a new litter byelaw. I think it would be premature, therefore, to come to the conclusion that the byelaws do not afford scope for considerably tighter preventive and punitive action, and that the tendency is not towards greater interest in those powers, and a greater use of them.

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The question may be asked, indeed, whether, until we have much more experience of the working of the byelaws against a background of increased public interest in the prevention of litter, it would not be premature—as premature as it would be out of order in this debate—to consider legislation. This increase of prosecutions is only one symptom of what, I believe, is a growth of interest in the prevention of the litter nuisance.
There are many other symptoms, of a more constructive character, of that growth of interest. I think that it is not too much to claim that a contribution has been made to this change by the Government's own litter campaign, which has been in operation, as my hon. Friend said, since 1951; hitherto organised by the Central Office of Information and now to be the responsibility of my right hon. Friend. The budget on which this campaign has been conducted has been, by Governmental standards, a very modest one—something in the range of £1,500 to £2,000—but that figure gives no indication of the scope which is achieved, in practice, by the Government's campaign.
I refer to the indirect, the voluntary results which the campaign stimulates, and which are the really important ones. It has its repercussions in the Press, on the wireless and in television. It has its effect, as my hon. Friend mentioned, on the inscriptions which manufacturers may be induced to put on packages of the goods which they sell. The campaign has been maintained in co-operation with the local authorities, who, after all, have the main duty of enforcement in this matter, and it has stimulated interest on the part of schools, education authorities and voluntary bodies.
I believe that it can, therefore, be claimed that, on a very modest financial basis, the Government's campaign over the last five years has had appreciable and, I hope, cumulative results. I would join with my hon. Friend in referring to, and in praising, the effort of the "Keep Britain Tidy" Group, promoted by the Federation of Women's Institutes. I imagine that in few parts of the country, certainly not in my own, has it not been possible recently to read the local Press for many days running without coming across instances of the activity of that group and of the activities which it has stimulated.
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The Press generally have been taking a gradually increasing interest in the question of the litter nuisance. By the crude standard of column inches devoted to the subject, which does provide some means of judging Press interest, the statistics that I have show an increase from 1,100 column inches on the subject in 1952 to 14,000 in 1955; and at the rate we are going this year the total will be at least 20,000 for 1956. That is very marked evidence of increasing public interest, and no doubt this debate itself will make its own contribution to swell the publicity and the attention devoted to the subject.
All this is evidence of the most important change, the most important movement, and that is the awakening of public opinion and of public conscience in this matter. What we are seeking, whether we seek it by positive methods of education, interest, instruction or propaganda, or by the negative methods of prohibition and punishment, is a change in social habit.
In the Report of the Committee under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Mr. J. Rodgers), to which my hon. Friend referred, I was very much struck by these words:
"Changes of habit of the kind we are considering have not been unknown in recent history. Fear of tuberculosis among the general public a generation ago led to the growth of a public opinion which condemned the habit of spitting in public places, and it has virtually disappeared."
That is both very true and, for us concerned with the subject tonight very encouraging.
I do not believe that it was entirely, or perhaps mainly, fear of disease which contributed to the disappearance of that unpleasant habit; it was the growth of a public opinion against it, of a public conscience against it, and we shall only really successfully get the better of the litter menace as public opinion and public conscience against litter grow.
All the Measures which my hon. Friend has mentioned and to which I have referred are contributions, but only contributions, to this sole and simple solution. I think that we might take comfort from the thought that the growth of public interest in the litter menace is real evidence of a growth in public opinion against litter and in the public conscience which will eventualy end this social menace.

POSTAGE STAMPS (POLICY)
8.33 p.m.
Mr. John Woollam: In introducing this debate on postage stamp policy, I think that I ought to declare an interest in that I am a philatelist, and I rather thought that in the mind of the Minister there was a lurking suspicion that my real reason for precipitating this debate was to cause him to arrange for the issue of more stamps in order to render obsolete the existing issues and so increase the value of my own collection. I am sure from the smile on his face that that was the suspicion in his mind.
The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. C. J. M. Alport)The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. C. J. M. Alport) indicated dissent.
Mr. Woollam: I have been looking into debates on this matter and I find that in the post-war years this House does not seem to have considered at all postage stamp policy It would seem appropriate to consider it now, so soon after the recent announcement that national stamps are to be issued for the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. That announcement has not been greeted with quite so much public interest as one would have expected, but there has been some criticism.
For my part, I welcome the initiative, and so far as I can understand the view of the philatelic world it seems to have been withholding its opinion until it has had an opportunity to look at the designs and what the appearance will be of these national issues. I would only make this extra comment on that policy, that I hope that these designs will be in accord with what I would call the style and poise of existing Queen Elizabeth II designs and also those used during the reign of the late King George VI.
As my hon. Friend the Assistant Postmaster-General is reconsidering our British postage stamp policy, I should like him at the same time to consider some other aspects, commencing with the high values. At the moment we have high value stamps which are quasi-pictorial. They show part of a view, yet at the same time they try to achieve the object of being impressive. It is a tradition of British stamp policy that
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high values are always impressive-looking.
But the current issues fall between two stools. They are not proper pictorials, and they are not dignified high values. I regard them as a failure, and I should like my hon. Friend to consider for a few minutes, alongside the current high value stamps, those high values which were issued in the first year of the reign of the late King George VI, from 1939 to about 1942 or 1943. He would find there a classic design of real heraldic dignity—the sort of thing which I understand his Department really aspires to in the designing of our postage stamps.
The news of these national stamps to which I have referred came very soon after a debate in another place on the general idea of issuing pictorial stamps for regular daily use on our correspondence. I do not hold any firm opinions about the issue of pictorial stamps. I would rather put forward this alternative policy to my hon. Friend, that we should hold fast to the present policy of non-pictorial definitives. He is going to vary them by introducing fresh sets for other parts of the United Kingdom, but I still think that Post Office policy is the best and the most acceptable.
I should, however, like to see combined with that policy much greater liberality in the issuing of commemorative stamps. I think it is true to say that the Post Office has been more liberal of later months in considering such requests for commemorative stamps. Many hon. Members were pleased when it was announced that there was to be a commemorative issue for the Boy Scouts' golden jubilee and another issue for the Empire Games in Wales. I should like to see such regular issues two, three or four times a year. I should like to see the Post Office looking out for occasions, events and anniversaries which are—and this is the test—of world interest and renown, but which still have a uniquely British flavour about them.
I should like to suggest that we have lost two first-class opportunities in the past year. We missed the opportunity last year of the 150th anniversary of Trafalgar. We missed this year the centenary of the institution of the Victoria Cross. When we consider some of our previous issues, it is very odd to find that we should ignore those events.

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We issued special stamps for the centenary of the Great Exhibition of 1851. Yet we did not acknowledge the centenary of the Victoria Cross. I should have thought that, on balance, the Victoria Cross enjoyed much greater esteem, sentiment and affection, not only in this country but throughout the whole of the Commonwealth, which holds the Order in such high regard. A first-class opportunity was lost there.
Again we are pleased to know that stamps are to be issued for the golden jubilee of the Boy Scout movement and to the memory of the late Lord Baden-Powell. Yet how odd to ignore the 150th anniversary of Trafalgar and the memory of Nelson, his captains and his men. What it suggests is that as yet the mind of the Post Office is not quite ready for commemorative issues and, therefore, its thinking is not yet on the lines of looking for opportunities and selecting those which seem right.
Before I leave that aspect of current British postage stamp design, may I renew a plea for an issue next year to mark the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in London? That gathering of 500 Parliamentarians is coming to London in the autumn of 1957. It has always been the practice of receiving countries to issue postage stamps whenever such a gathering comes to their shores. After all, the Inter-Parliamentary Union was founded by an Englishman, and when the Conference gathers in this country, in which is situated what we like to regard as the Mother of Parliaments, it is an occasion when we should honour it with a special issue of stamps. If we can issue stamps for a gathering of athletes in Wales for the Empire Games, it would not be unreasonable to mark the gathering of Parliamentarians in this country, of all countries, when one considers our Parliamentary and democratic traditions.
Those are the major aspects of postage stamp design and policy which I should have thought needed consideration, or reconsideration, at this time.
I should like now to allude to certain minor matters. Postage-due stamps are very much the Cinderellas of the British Post Office. Their appearance and design has remained unchanged for decades. I
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know that there is quite a good answer, that it is a utilitarian stamp which has not really to be pleasing or beautiful but has merely to tell the sorter very quickly how much money is owing for postage due. But that is no good reason at all for never revising the design or appearance of what is really a fussy and ugly stamp. I should very much like to see a new set of postage-due stamps being prepared. It is long overdue, and would be a very good opportunity for commissioning British artists to provide examples of something at which they excel, that is to say, the designing of modern lettering.
Might I once again ask my hon. Friend to look at some other stamps for comparison and guidance? I would draw to his attention the current low-value issues of Holland, which comprise no more than a numeral, but which are most elegantly and simply lettered and numbered and in every way pleasing and impressive. That sort of thing should be done for our own postage-due issues.
I have in mind next those British postage stamps which we overprint for use at British post offices abroad, especially in Tangier and Morocco. I do not know whether my hon. Friend can say anything at all about the policy with regard to those stamps and those post offices. I understand that the constitutional relationship between Spanish Morocco and Spain is about to alter, and I do not know how far that affects our post offices and the British stamps used there when overprinted.
All my remarks so far have been, perhaps, on the aesthetic or sentimental aspects of British postage stamps and policy in regard to them, but I am well aware that there is a commercial side to all this. The Post Office is a trading Department, which has got to make money. It wants to make more money, and it must judge many of these pleasant ideas by a commercial test. I would seriously suggest to my hon. Friend that, in moderation, regular issues in the small values—2½d. for the letter rate and 4d. for the foreign letter rate—do not offend anyone, and they encourage and maintain interest throughout the philatelic world.
If interest in British stamps is encouraged and maintained, and really begins to grow afresh, my hon. Friend will find that his own Department is commencing to have much bigger sales of the

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other issues, including the regular definitive issues and the high values. In all countries, collectors will want to complete their collections of modern British stamps throughout the whole range of issues, and there will be increased sales, and increased revenue, which ought, within moderation, to be the objective of the British Post Office. It certainly is the objective of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, and I do not think it would be out of place in our own country.
I hope that my hon. Friend, when he replies, will have some good news, and fresh news, for those who are interested in postage stamp policy, and that he will be able to suggest to us that there is a good deal of rethinking going on, and that the fresh wind, which I think I have noticed since his and his right hon. Friend's arrival in that Department, is still blowing.
8.44 p.m.
The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. C. J. M. Alport): I am most grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Woollam) for his very well-informed and constructive speech. Perhaps I might start by trying to answer some of the questions he put to me, beginning with the question with regard to the future of the post offices in Tangier and Morocco. I am afraid I am unable to give him any information about that, but if he wishes to have it, I think a question could most properly be put to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.
My hon. Friend referred also to postage-due stamps, which are, I suppose, stamps of ill omen in a way. There would, no doubt, be a case for improving their look so as to soften the blow they carry with them to the recipient of the envelope. My hon. Friend is quite right in saying that nothing has been done to change the character of these stamps since they were first introduced in 1914. It is equally true that there is no excuse for any Government Department, whatever its character, not producing something which is up-to-date and modern and looks well in accordance with modern tastes in typography and design. Therefore, I assure my hon. Friend that we will look into this matter to see whether we can provide something that is more attractive and more up-to-date than the existing issue of postage-due stamps.
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As far as the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference next year is concerned, I cannot go further at present than say that my right hon. Friend hopes to be able to acknowledge appropriately the importance of this occasion. As it is, we have undertaken to issue a series of three stamps commemorative of the Boy Scouts' Golden Jubilee. Although there may be arguments such as my hon. Friend has put forward, for increasing the number of commemorative stamps, I think he will realise that it is a substantial undertaking, and that we could not promise to move from the very conservative approach which we have had up to now in this matter to producing, as my hon. Friend suggests, a considerable number of commemorative stamps within a year.
I was interested in my hon. Friend's suggestion that we should try to use commemorative stamps to mark great occasions of world interest and of particular British significance. I assure him that his views on this are views which we would consider with great sympathy and that we try, as far as possible, to use our stamp issues—as far as the commemorative features are concerned—to ensure that we can bring home, not only to the people of this country, but of the world, recollections of achievements which are peculiarly British but which have an interest beyond the boundaries of this country.
My hon. Friend was good enough to support the proposal announced last month by my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General that with Her Majesty's approval stamps for Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands were to be produced. This decision, as my hon. Friend said, has by some people been regarded as a revolutionary move, whereas others have said that it is a relatively insignificant departure from established forms.
When the new stamps appear, most people, I think, will realise that the change is neither revolutionary nor merely insignificant. The Queen's head will remain the dominant feature and symbolise the continuing unity and common loyalties of us all, while the background and frame will represent the diverse elements of history and culture which contribute to the richness of British life. Since the first "Penny Black" appeared, United Kingdom stamp policy, as my hon. Friend inferred, has tended to play for

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safety. Consequently, it has on occasion laid itself open to criticism of lacking enterprise and meaning.
There are arguments in favour of such a policy, as a Communist postal administration found recently when it issued a stamp to commemorate the centenary of the death of the great musician Schumann with a stamp bearing the opening bars of a symphony by Schubert. As pioneers of the postal system, I think it is right that we should from time to time strike out on a new line, while at the same time preserving the special character of our stamp issues.
There are good arguments for introducing an element of diversity which will add to the meaning, as well as the grace and dignity, of our United Kingdom stamps. I think, and I hope that you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, would personally agree, that the vast majority of the people of Britain and Northern Ireland are proud of the sense of unity which animates us and is founded upon our common national loyalty to the Sovereign, but we are equally conscious as Englishmen, Scotsmen, Welshmen or men of Ulster of the differing traditions and artistic heritage which each part of the United Kingdom contains. I suggest to the House that it is a happy thing to be able to indicate the contributions which the smaller, though none the less individual, parts of the United Kingdom, like the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, have made to our common stock of tradition and heritage.
Surely, as well, it is a good thing that this combination of unity and diversity should be symbolised in as many ways as possible. Unity does not necessarily demand uniformity, particularly in matters of art and tradition. We already have abundant evidence that my right hon. Friend's proposal has given pleasure in the various parts of the United Kingdom concerned, and I am certain that it will give equal pleasure to millions of people, of Scottish, Welsh or Ulster stock who live abroad, and for whom a letter from home is a reminder of long established ties of memory and affection. It will sustain the interests of philatelists throughout the world in British stamps, and if, as a result, the British Post Office earns additional revenue, I do not think that is an objection to our proposal.
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I think also that this proposal of my right hon. Friend will provide an opportunity to artists throughout the country who are skilled in what is a specialised but none the less delightful brand of art to show that they are as good as or better than artists overseas. We are fully conscious of the success of certain foreign issues, and my hon. Friend referred to one in Holland, yet naturally we are anxious to ensure that we do not lag behind in such matters.
I confess that, against this background, I was astonished at the petulance—I can think of no other word—shown by The Times in a leading article on 21st July. I leave it to others to decide whether they consider it appropriate to liken the proud symbols of Scottish and Welsh history to souvenirs from Brighton or Blackpool rock. I am merely happy to recall the celebrated story of the postman's hat.
Some time ago, a leading article appeared in The Times drawing attention to the fact that in those days postmen still continued to wear that curious cross between the bowler and the deerstalker which you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and, I think, many hon. Members of this House will recollect from their youth. The Times said it was disgraceful—or words to this effect—that the Post Office should lag so far behind other public services in condemning its servants to wear this type of headgear when it was clear that, both for the purpose of comfort and for other reasons, the flat peaked cap was the right headgear for the public service.
This attack, coming out of the blue as it did, caused great concern in the Post Office, and intra-Departmental discussions ensued. The file grew and grew until it became a very fat one indeed, and eventually the Postmaster-General of the day was able to announce the decision of the Post Office. The decision of the Post Office was to discontinue the issue of the bowler-deerstalker hat to postmen and to replace it with the flat hat with the peak.
The file ends with another leading article from The Times, which deplores the impetuousness and restless desire for change evidenced by the postal authorities in doing away with the well-known and long-honoured headgear of the Post Office servants, that cross between a deerstalker and a bowler, which was effective

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in keeping the rain not only off their faces but also off the backs of their necks.
Therefore, we hope that in due course we shall have the pleasure of reading the amendment in The Times of its previous attitude, the amendment in which it will congratulate my right hon. Friend upon his courageous decision to make this innovation in the stamp issue and the style of it generally.
There have also been criticisms from one of the directors of a very famous stamp company, but again we are consoled by the knowledge that in March, 1955, "Gibbons' Stamp Monthly" declared itself passionately opposed to small pictorial stamps. A year later, almost to the month, it came out equally firmly in favour of them. It shows, therefore, that even in that citadel of philatelic orthodoxy new ideas can find acceptance, and I am confident that it is only a matter of time before the Post Office is criticised not for being revolutionary but for not being enterprising enough in its whole approach to this problem of the design of stamps.
My hon. Friend has a very close and keen interest in this question of stamps. Therefore, I welcome very much his support. These matters may not appear to be of very great moment in the scheme of things, when we have been discussing in this House today matters of immense importance to everyone. Nevertheless, they are symbols in a way of the imagination and the vitality of the postal system in its approach to the administrative and other problems which face us. Our stamps have a great tradition in this country, a tradition which I can assure my hon. Friend we regard very jealously indeed. Nevertheless, it seems right that from time to time we should try something new, try a departure which, while preserving our traditions, at the same time will bring a new approach to some aspects of the design and the style of our stamps.
I am sure my hon. Friends and everybody else concerned with this problem will agree that, whatever changes may be made in their background, their framework, their colour, and so forth, our stamps should continue in all cases to bear the symbol which they have borne right from the beginning, which is, the head of the Monarch, as the dominant feature of every issue.

NIGERIA (ADMINISTRATION)
8.59 p.m.
Mrs. Eirene White: The subject which I wish to raise tonight was not among those originaly submitted to Mr. Speaker for discussion in this series of debates on the Adjournment. I am, therefore, particularly grateful to both the Colonial Secretary and the Attorney-General for being good enough to come to the House at very short notice tonight to discuss a matter which is, in its own context, of some importance.
In common with several of my hon. and right hon. Friends, within the last week or two I have received a series of telegrams from the Prime Minister of Eastern Nigeria, Dr. Azikiwe. These have all been concerned with the difficulties which have arisen in Eastern Nigeria regarding an inquiry into the affairs of the bank there and the relationship with that bank of the Prime Minister.
I will refer only to the last three telegrams which I have received within the past 24 hours. In doing so, I should like to make one preliminary comment. I should like it to be perfectly understood that we on this side of the House are entirely in favour of an inquiry being made into this matter. After such serious allegations have been made about a person like a Prime Minister, it was clear to all of us, and, I am happy to say, clear to Dr. Azikiwe himself and to the Eastern Nigerian Government that an inquiry was necessary. There have been some differences of opinion, and, I think, some confusion, as to the precise nature of the inquiry and the position of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is for that reason that I want to refer to these last recent telegrams.
The telegram which I received yesterday morning said that the Eastern House of Assembly was about to discuss a resolution welcoming the decision to appoint a Commission of Inquiry but suggesting that the Secretary of State might have appointed rather different persons to undertake it. But very late last night we were startled to receive another telegram, which is referred to in The Times this morning, in which it was suggested that the Secretary of State, in order to establish this Commission of Inquiry, had

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to amend the Constitution of Nigeria. This, naturally, was a little surprising.
The Times gives a rather shorter version of this long telegram which we received and it quotes a statement, which, I think, is quite erroneous, that the Colonial Secretary made a serious mistake in ruling that the subject matter of Mr. Eyo's recent motion was federal and not regional. Mr. Eyo was the Minister who was obliged to resign some months ago, and I am a little sorry that the Secretary of State was unable to take action in this matter earlier so that it would not appear that he was in any way associated with Mr. Eyo's charges.
The statement went on to say that the Secretary of State appeared to be obliged to amend the Constitution, which was to be done on 4th August, and that this backdoor method of circumventing the law was to be denounced in the strongest terms. I believe that this is due entirely to a misunderstanding. Therefore, it is to be welcomed that we have an opportunity of clearing up this misunderstanding tonight.
The third telegram, which I received early this morning, referred to a particular change, of course not in the Constitution of Nigeria at all, but in a particular Order in Council. I have in my hand the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance of 1940. The relevant provision is paragraph 22, which, I understand, has since been amended—at the time when the separate regions were established in Nigeria with Governors instead of Lieutenant-Governors in the regions and a Governor-General at the head of the Federation.
I believe that the difficulty has arisen owing to changes which were made in the ordinance. As far as I can understand, I do not think that there is any attempt whatever to change the Constitution of Nigeria. It seems to me that this has nothing whatever to do with whether the matter was politically regional or federal. It is a technical matter of law and that is really all that the Secretary of State has been obliged to do. As I believe that there may be a political misunderstanding about this, we should be greatly obliged if we could know tonight exactly why the Secretary of State has found himself in a position where an amendment had to be made to the law before he could properly establish this Commission of Inquiry.
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It is because I desire that this Commission of Inquiry may not only proceed expeditiously in its work, but may have the full confidence of the people of Nigeria as well as the people of this country, that I hope we may have a satisfactory explanation.
9.5 p.m.
The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): As the question raised by the hon. Member for Flint, East (Mrs. White) is purely a legal question, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who is sitting beside me, has asked me to reply. Before I deal with the purely legal matters, may I say how much my right hon. Friend welcomes the way in which the hon. Lady has raised this subject, and the opportunity which she has given for the disposal of some of the fears which obviously have been raised by the knowledge that an Order in Council may be made tomorrow.
I wish to deal in some detail with the specific point raised by the hon. Lady. She has expressed the view that, in her opinion, this proposed Order in Council, the terms of which she has seen, does not in any way amend the Constitution of Nigeria. I can assure her that in my view she is absolutely right. There is no question whatever of amending the Constituttion of Nigeria in any respect by this Order in Council. I wish to make quite clear why I say that. I also wish to say, because I think it desirable, why it is necessary that there should be an Order in Council if the Inquiry is to be of the character which the hon. Lady and other hon. Members of this House desire. Then I wish to explain precisely what this Order in Council does.
May I start by referring to the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954. In Section 1 (4) of that Order in Council power is reserved to Her Majesty,
"with the advice of Her Privy Council, to amend or revoke this Order."
That power has, I think, been exercised on two occasions. It is not proposed to exercise that power tomorrow. Subsection (5) of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council says:
"Nothing in this Order shall affect the power of Her Majesty in Council to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof."

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So it is clear that this Order in no way restricts or limits the power of Her Majesty in Council to make laws for
"the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof."
It has always been the case that that power relating to the laws
"for the peace, order and good government."
can be lawfully exercised by Order in Council. The proposed Order in Council to be submitted to Her Majesty tomorrow is an exercise of the power which Her Majesty in Council has, and which is not affected by the Constitution Order. It is not an exercise of the power under subsection (4) to amend or revoke that Order. The Order in Council submitted to Her Majesty tomorrow will not touch the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council of 1954, or the amendments made to that Order. I hope that I have made that clear.
I turn to the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, 1940, to which the hon. Lady referred. If I may say so, she referred to it very accurately. That is the Ordinance which not only gives the Governor the power to appoint a Commission, but also gives the Commissioners, when appointed, powers which are of great importance. In Section 7 of that Ordinance it is said that the Commissioners shall have the following powers:
"To procure all such evidence, written or oral, and to examine all such persons as witnesses as the Commissioners may think it necessary or desirable to procure or examine;
To require the evidence (whether written or oral) of any witness to be made on oath or declaration, such oath or declaration to be that which could be required of a witness if he wore giving evidence in a magistrates court;
To summon any person in Nigeria to attend any meeting of the Commissioners to give evidence or produce any document or other thing in his possession and to examine him as a witness or require him to produce any document or other thing in his possession, subject to all just exceptions;
To issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after having been summoned to attend, fails to do so, and does not excuse such failure to the satisfaction of the Commissioners, and to order him to pay all costs which may have been occasioned in compelling his attendance.…"
I will not read the whole of the Ordinance, but it goes on:
"To admit any evidence, whether written or oral, which might be inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings;
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To admit or exclude the public or any member of the public …"
and so on.
I think that the hon. Lady will agree, and that everyone who thinks that an inquiry should be held will agree, that the tribunal if it is to be a full inquiry must possess those powers which the Commissioners are given under paragraph 7 of the Ordinance. I have referred to that at some length and the reason I have done so will emerge later.
I now turn to Section 22 of the Ordinance, the Section to which the hon. Lady referred. That paragraph made it possible for the Secretary of State to exercise all the powers conferred by the Ordinance upon the Governor; so that the Secretary of State, under that Ordinance as it then stood, could himself appoint a commission or tribunal to inquire into a particular matter and—this is the point which is important—if he did so in the exercise of his powers under Section 22, Section 7, which gave the Commissioners powers which I have just read, would apply, and so the tribunal appointed by the Secretary of State would have those very necessary powers.
That was the scheme of the Ordinance. That was its effect, and at the time when the Ordinance was passed, there was, of course, a Governor. It was before Federation, and before there was a Governor-General and Governors of the regions. When those changes were made in Nigeria, and when a Governor-General and Governors of the regions were appointed, it followed that there had to be adaptations of the law, and an order was made in Nigeria which was called the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1954, that made some general adaptations in the laws of Nigeria and also some special amendments.
One of the general adaptations was that wherever the word "Governor" appeared in any Ordinance, it was to be read as meaning "Governor-General". If one applies that to Section 22 of the Ordinance it follows that under that Section, amended in 1954 by that Order, the Secretary of State had the powers of the Governor-General to appoint a commission or tribunal of inquiry, and the commission thus appointed would have the powers given by Section 7 of the Ordinance.
Further amendment was made in order to divide the spheres of the respective

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functions of the Governor-General and Governors under this Ordinance of 1940. The adaptation Order went on to provide:
"Except with the consent of the Governor or Governors of the Region or Regions concerned,"
the Governor-General should not exercise his powers of appointing a commission except in relation to a matter on the Exclusive Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List, as set out in the First Schedule to the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954. There was also a provision that Governors of the regions should not exercise their powers in respect of any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List. That obviously meant the separation of powers between the Governor-General and the Governors.
In this case, the matter to be inquired into clearly relates partly, but not wholly, to banks and banking. That subject is included in the Exclusive List, so on an inquiry into banks and banking alone, the Governor-General can act under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, 1940, and so, under Section 22, if the inquiry related only to banks and banking, the Secretary of State could, under the Ordinance, appoint a tribunal and the tribunal would have the powers under Section 7.
In this case it is impossible to say that the matters which ought to be the subject of inquiry are confined to banking and banks. Some of them are matters which, after this amendment, would fall within the regional sphere, and therefore it is necessary to have the terms of reference wide enough to permit of a full investigation. It would surely be most undesirable if, at the end of the day, the impression was left that this matter had not been fully investigated because of some restriction imposed and because of the manner in which the commission of inquiry had been appointed.
Bearing in mind that my right hon. Friend can, under the Ordinance, exercise the Governor-General's powers of appointing a commission, but not Governors' powers, it would follow that unless some other machinery were used to attract the powers to be given to the commission, the inquiry might well find itself handicapped to a very considerable degree. As I have indicated, my right hon. Friend, by Order in Council, under the power which was reserved when the
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Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954, was made, could provide for the appointment of a commission covering all these matters. That is what the proposed Order in Council seeks to do. There is no need by Order in Council to provide in terms for the appointment of a commission of inquiry by my right hon. Friend.
What is necessary is to ensure that the powers possessed by a commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance should be held by the Tribunal which is to be appointed by my right hon. Friend. The only way of securing that satisfactorily, in view of the particular difficulties which have arisen owing to the adaptation of the original Ordinance, this point perhaps not having been perceived at the time, is by an Order in Council merely attracting to a tribunal appointed by my right hon. Friend the powers given to the commissioners by Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, 1940.
The hon. Lady was quite right in the view which she expressed that this is really nothing more than a piece of machinery to overcome a technicality—which has inadvertently arisen, I should have thought—by amending the word "Governor" to mean Governor-General only, so as to prevent my right hon. Friend from exercising the power which he had when there was only a Governor, exercising the Governor's powers under Section 22.
So far as I can see, there can be no point and no reason for saying that my right hon. Friend can exercise the powers of the Governor-General by appointing a commission of inquiry but that he cannot exercise the powers of a Governor. I can see no reason for that whatever. I therefore think that the result of that adaptation, the unfortunate result which makes this Order in Council necessary, was purely inadvertent. As I am sure everyone will agree, it is desirable that this commission of inquiry, this tribunal, should have all the powers to get to the bottom of the matter, to ascertain the truth, that such commissions and inquiries normally have.
That is all that this proposed Order in Council will do. It is a complete misrepresentation of the case to suggest that it has anything whatever to do with the Constitution. It does not alter the

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Constitution of Nigeria one iota. All it does is to make sure, so far as can be made sure, that the Tribunal appointed by my right hon. Friend will possess, not new powers—not novel powers—but the powers that such tribunals usually possess and ought to possess if a full and proper inquiry into the matter to be investigated is to be completed.
Those are the reasons for the Order in Council, and I hope that I have said enough on a rather complicated tangle of Orders, Ordinances and matters of that sort to put at rest any fears that may be held in any quarter as to what is proposed to be done by this proposed Order in Council which will be submitted to Her Majesty tomorrow.

SEYCHELLES (MEMBERS' VISITS)
9.24 p.m.
Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: Earlier today, Mr. Speaker, you were good enough to give a Ruling about a matter to which I drew your attention and which I considered affected in some measure the rights and privileges of hon. Members of this House. You gave a Ruling which indicated that my hope of redress and hopes of redress for the House lay with making our protest to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
In doing that, I should like to start by saying to him that I know well, from having watched him at close quarters in Nicosia and from time to time in the Colonial Office, how very much overburdened with work he is. I apologise for having to bring him once again to the House of Commons. I should also like to apologise to the officials and servants of the House, who, I know, are as anxious as we are to get home as soon as possible.
I do not raise the matter as a personal grievance, because I have none whatever. I do not feel insulted, as some people have suggested I ought—I see there is a leading article about it in one of the evening newspapers—by the action of the Secretary of State or the language which he used about me.
What matters is that all of us should do what we can to promote a settlement and end the lamentable situation which is causing increasing daily loss of life in the unhappy Island of Cyprus. This afternoon I met someone who had just returned
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after having been there for a number of months, and he said it was tragic, day after day, to watch the deterioration of the situation in what ought to be a prosperous, happy and peaceful island. We must try to stop that deterioration. As the Answers by the Secretary of State to Questions by me during the last few days have shown, the situation has deteriorated in that every month more people are being killed and wounded and more damage is occurring, and the rhythm of this has steadily increased since Archbishop Makarios was deported.
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well what my motives were in suggesting that I should talk to the Archbishop in the Seychelles. Indeed, I discussed it very frankly with him. He knows that if he wanted to give me any advice, if he wanted to ask me to keep any part of my discussions private or to try to avoid publicity, as I did on many occasions when I was previously in Cyprus, I should certainly have listened to his advice. He knows very well there was no question of political propaganda by myself, the Archbishop or anybody else. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will express some recognition of that fact.
I want to ask the Secretary of State five or six specific questions to which I hope he will be good enough to reply. He indicated that it is his intention, the minute I set foot on the Island of Mahe, in the Seychelles, to put the Archbishop and his colleagues back behind the barbed wire which surrounds the rather uncomfortable villa in which they are housed, whereas at the moment they are free to walk about and to talk to anyone they happen to meet. I hope I shall be corrected if I am wrong, but I believe that they have free access to anyone they wish to meet.
Does this extraordinary ban apply to all right hon. and hon. Members of the House of Commons? Does it—my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) asked this question yesterday—cover members of the Privy Council? Does it cover Members of another place? What would happen if the Archbishop of Canterbury wanted to go to Mahe to reason with Archbishop Makarios about the use of violence? Does it apply to Lord Radcliffe, a legal figure of great eminence, who has just returned to this country from Cyprus and may well say that he wants to consult the Archbishop?

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If he wanted to go to the Seychelles, would he be prevented as a result of the Secretary of State's ban? My first question is: whom is the ban intended to cover, and why has a distinction been drawn between myself and other hon. Members and members of the general public with whom the Archbishop is free to have any contact he desires?
My second question is: why is the Secretary of State drawing a distinction in respect of political detainees against whom no legal charge has been preferred, who have had no legal proceedings taken against them, and who are guilty of no legal offence, and applying, in their case, rules which are not applied to ordinary common criminals in prisons in this country? The Attorney-General knows that if I asked, through the proper channels, to visit a prisoner in gaol in this country, whether a constituent of mine or not, whatever his crime, I should be allowed free access—
The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): The hon. Gentleman may or may not be right about that. He could not go there without permission. That permission might be withheld in certain circumstances.
Mr. Noel-Baker: I should like to take that further, but I am sure that there would be a storm of protest if permission were withheld.
The Secretary of State knows perfectly well that the detainees in Cyprus are being visited constantly. Only the other day a great party of the Press was taken to see them, to inquire into their conditions and to talk to them. Why is this distinction being made in the case of these people in the Seychelles, who are not found guilty as a result of any legal proceedings, who have committed no offence under any of the emergency regulations in Cyprus? Why the distinction in their case?
My third question may seem a simple one—the Secretary of State was good enough to give me that description yesterday. Suppose I asked to see Lord Radcliffe, who returned from Cyprus today, and who, while he was there, said that he would like to talk to anyone who could give him relevant information? What would happen if I wanted to see him to tell him what was, on the
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last occasion I saw him, the point of view of the Archbishop and of an important section of the public which he represents? Would the Secretary of State threaten to lock up either Lord Radcliffe or me?
My fourth question is this. The Secretary of State said yesterday that it was a condition of the Archbishop's being allowed to see me and, I assume, other Members of Parliament that he should make a prior denunciation of violence. In this connection, I should like to put two points. First, does the right hon. Gentleman seriously expect that the Archbishop can make any statement of any significance or influence in Cyprus while he is in detention? Does not the Secretary of State realise very well that if the Archbishop made a statement of this kind the immediate reaction in Cyprus and in other places would be either that the Archbishop had been put under such intolerable pressure by the British authorities that he had been compelled to make the statement, or that he was trying to buy his freedom?
After all, the Secretary of State told us that the main reason why he sent Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles was precisely to prevent him exercising any influence on the situation in Cyprus. Now, he tells us that it is for the Archbishop, from his place of exile, to make a statement on the use of violence. Is not the Secretary of State prepared to agree, on reflection, that that is a ridiculous expectation, something which the Archbishop could not be expected unconditionally to do?
Of course, there are ways in which his attitude to violence could be clarified, as the Secretary of State knows very well. He knows that I cannot say more on this point, obviously, in this House. He knows very well what my attitude to that subject is, and will be, when I go to the Seychelles. Perhaps I may say one word in parentheses about the Archbishop's attitude to violence. The Secretary of State has been deliberately trying to discredit the Archbishop and to build him up as a sinister bogyman ever since he was deported.
It is a natural temptation, the decision having suddenly been taken to whisk the man off to exile on very flimsy grounds, retrospectively to build up the case against him. The right hon. Gentleman

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knows as well as I do that there is no real evidence to support his case. If there is, it is his duty to produce it. A few days after the Archbishop was deported, a large number of troops searched the Archbishopric. I believe that I am right in saying that that search took 18 days.
What was found there? It was suggested that an arsenal was found in the Archbishopric, but that arsenal turned out to be a few disused electric light bulbs in a garden some distance from the building. There were said to be a lot of incriminating documents found. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to publish those documents, because they would prove conclusively the incredible moderation of the Archbishop right up to the breakdown of the negotiations.
I challenge the Secretary of State here, in this House, to produce the documents and let the world judge what they show about the Archbishop's attitude to violence. If, in the course of the sweeps that have been made against Colonel Grivas and his men in the mountains, there has been found any evidence incriminating the Archbishop, let him publish that evidence and let the House of Commons and the country judge its validity.
I say that the Archbishop is a moderate-minded man. I say—and in this I cannot be contradicted—that the evidence is that he wanted an agreement at the time the talks broke down. He expected an agreement and did not understand why the British Government did not get an agreement with him then. I talked to him the day after the talks broke down, and pleaded with him to do what he could to reopen discussions. I said that mistakes had been made all the way round. Amongst others whom I saw was the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, and before that I stopped in Athens. I pleaded with them all not to shut any doors.
They listened to me and looked very benevolent, and two days later they shot the Archbishop off into exile in the Seychelles. If the Secretary of State has evidence to substantiate the claims that he is making about the Archbishop, then, in fairness to the House of Commons, in fairness to myself, who worked with him in Nicosia at that time, he ought to publish that evidence. I repeat that I think that the evidence, if published, would
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show that the Archbishop took a far more moderate line than anybody outside could have expected.
The fifth question to which I should like to have an answer from the Secretary of State is: what is his aim in doing all this? Is he really seeking to discredit and to undermine the position of the Archbishop? Is he seeking by the things which he said about me to discredit and undermine me or anyone else who is trying to help get a solution of this situation? I do not matter, but the Archbishop of Cyprus will for a considerable time.
The Governor said the other day—and I repeat now that I have the greatest respect for the Governor; and I very much hope that anything that I say in this House will not offend him, much as he may be bound by duty to disagree with me—that it was an anarchronistic arrangement that the Archbishop should be a political leader in Cyprus. Of course it is. It is hundreds of years out of date, and the fault lies with us and with the Turkish rulers of Cyprus before us. The fact is that at the moment, because of the way we have been running the Colony since we took it over, the Archbishop is the only possible expression of the will of the great majority of the people in that island. By sending him into exile the Secretary of State has built up his position so that he has become a kind of national hero.
Nothing that the Secretary of State can do from London, until he has released the Archbishop and made possible the development of ordinary, democratic political institutions in Cyprus, will enable the Archbishop to disappear from the commanding rôle that he now occupies. I am sure that attempts to attack and discredit him without producing any evidence will only backfire on the Secretary of State and make the Archbishop's position even stronger than it is at present.
My final question is to ask the Secretary of State whether he will be good enough to clarify a remark which he made in the House last night. He said—and I quote from HANSARD:
"I was not prepared to allow anything to happen whereby the Archbishop could carry out long-range artillery. The hon. Member might be a genuine but rather simple bearer of ammunition."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1481.]

1783
I do not want to labour this point, but at the time that he and the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and I discussed the possibility of my going to Cyprus he certainly did not appear to consider that I was a genuine but rather simple bearer of the Archbishop's political ammunition.
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that that is not true, and that what I am trying to do is to help him, in spite of our political differences and in spite of the fact that most of his policy in the last few months has been quite wrong and could have been avoided. I am trying to help to get a solution to this problem. In fairness to me, to the Archbishop and other people concerned in this problem, I hope that he will clarify exactly what he meant by that remark.
I have asked the Secretary of State a number of specific questions. He has plenty of time in which to answer all six of them. I finish with this plea: I beg the Secretary of State to think again. I am not going to be scared off. My plans for the latter part of this Recess are not altered by anything that has been said in the last two days. I am doing what I intend to do because I think it right. I shall make that journey to the Seychelles, and I beg the Secretary of State to reconsider the extraordinary threat that he made yesterday and allow me to continue to do what I can—it may turn out to be tragically little—to help get this problem settled.
9.40 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): As we are on the Motion for the Adjournment, and despite the fact that we have twenty minutes before the time remaining expires, I see no reason why I need necessarily occupy all that twenty minutes. I should like to refer to the speech of the hon. Lady the Member for Flint, East (Mrs. White) and thank her for the very generous personal words which she used about me and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. Certainly any Secretary of State who hesitated to come to the House, even at this late hour and on the last day before we rise, to deal with a matter which the hon. Lady regards as important would, I think, be failing in his duty.
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The hon. Lady has for years shown a most serious interest in the more important colonial problems, and I hope I may be allowed to say so, particularly at such a moment as this. Never once have I known her put any partisan advantage before the desire to get at the truth of the problems that concern her. Tonight, as on every previous occasion, she has lived up to the reputation that she has long had among her own colleagues, and which she has certainly won since she came into the House among hon. Members whom tonight she may call her hon. Friends on this side of the House.
As to the hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker), I refuse to get indignant with him, even though he works himself up into a sort of minor frenzy with me. That is not because we are rising tonight but because I know that he genuinely wants to help in the pacification of Cyprus. But the hon. Gentleman must not take it amiss if I say that with the generous impulses that actuate him have also gone an astonishing naivety and simplicity and an inability to recognise that some of the people who appear to him to be genuine heroes and workers for national salvation are, in fact, very wicked people who have used ways and means of trying to arrive at their solution which no responsible Government could conceivably tolerate.
The hon. Member for Swindon talks about Cyprus as an unhappy island. It is an unhappy island at the moment, largely because the Archbishop, for whom he speaks so warmly, has refused to discharge his obvious responsibilities in condemning violence. I am not one of those people who are so ignorant of history as to believe that it is possible to say to the Orthodox Church of Greece that it must take no part in politics. Of course, it is a political organisation. Political instincts and political ability, far more than personal sanctity or a desire to promote the Christian faith, cause the appointments of many important members of that Church. I recognise that for centuries it has been a well-organised political body, and I do not quarrel with that, even though my own particular communion prefers to express itself in a different way.
I recognise that it is a political body. But there is all the difference in the world between being a political body anxious to promote the union with Greece of territories that have never belonged to Greece,

1785
and being ready to condone, and by silence or in other ways to encourage, active murder of people who do not support one's views. The hon. Gentleman is a politician. If he became a member of the Greek Orthodox Church and continued as a politician I would have no quarrel with him. But if, becoming a member of the Greek Orthodox Church, he thought that thereby he was entitled to go round encouraging people to shoot British soldiers in the back, I should think that I had some cause to complain.
The outrages that have been done in the name of heroism in Cyprus are so despicable that I really find it difficult, even at this late hour, to think of temperate language with which to describe the suggestions made by the hon. Gentleman. We do not ask the Archbishop to cease to be a political figure. We only ask him to say that the cowardly and wilful murders of people who are only doing their duty should at least excite his reprobation. Is this now altogether an unreasonable request, when we consider that the majority of the people murdered have been people of his own faith and of his own race—people who do not agree with him? If the hon. Gentleman really believes that the Archbishop can escape condemnation in this House because it is claimed that he is a politician, when he is also condoning murder, I think he is expecting too much of the credulity of his fellow Members of Parliament.
Mr. F. Noel-Baker: The Secretary of State really knows very well that the Archbishop was preparing to make a formal appeal for the pacification of the island the moment that the negotiations had finished: successfully, as he confidently expected. And the reason why he has not made that appeal was because the negotiations were broken off, and because the Secretary of State then sent him to the Seychelles.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I had two negotiations with the Archbishop. I know the hon. Gentleman saw him on a number of occasions, far more than I did. I came away from the last negotiation with the Archbishop quite convinced of this, that if the points of difference between us had, on that evening or within the next month or so, been resolved, long before they had been resolved other points of difference would have been created so as to spin out negotiations which, together
1786
with the continued use of terror, the Archbishop hoped would bring about the only solution which he was prepared to accept.
The hon. Gentleman is guilty also of a grotesque parody of recent development, constitutional and otherwise, in Cyprus. It is our fault, he says, that the Greek Orthodox Church is the only political leadership that the Cypriot people know. There could be nothing further from the truth. It is really not very fair on his own party, which in 1948 attempted to devise a constitution under which people who were not controlled and confined as those who follow strictly and alone the Orthodox Church are controlled and confined, might be given a chance to play a part in political leadership. That was turned down, as the hon. Gentleman knows, largely through the activities of the Ethnarchy.
The hon. Gentleman asked the question, could the Archbishop, in the Seychelles, reasonably be expected to denounce violence? Of course he could. Every possible encouragement has been given to him to do so. He could have done so long ago. In the long talks I had with him a year or so ago, and more recently, when the hon. Gentleman was there, I made it quite clear to him that if he were to do that a new situation altogether would arise.
It is perfectly clear from what he said to me—and it emerges also from the recently published statement which was written into the Congressional Record of the United States—that the Archbishop's conception of leadership and my conception of leadership are totally different. My conception of leadership is that, having arrived at a solution which one thinks is right, one should do one's best to guide one's followers to that solution. The Archbishop's conception of leadership is that if one is not quite sure that one's followers are going to follow, one must not start at all. So long as that is his conception, I see no hope whatsoever of a proper arrangement being made. The Archbishop could, of course, have denounced violence when in Cyprus; and he could equally do so in the Seychelles.
The hon. Gentleman said that he doubted whether there had been any justification for alleging the complicity of the Archbishop in this wicked business. We are now having many problems to solve, in Cyprus and elsewhere, and the

1787
hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that security and other considerations make it quite impossible to publish the evidence which we possess. He knows also—or any contact with those of his colleagues who have held responsible office would make it clear to him—that from time to time it is quite impossible, in circumstances of this kind, to get people to come forward and give evidence and appear as witnesses whose evidence and whose witness is essential if charges are to be tried in open court.
Such a situation has been, in large part, created by the Archbishop in Cyprus. That is why it has been impossible to bring him to charge. The Archbishop would have been put under detention in Cyprus, with my full authority, had he not been Archbishop of Cyprus. When I finished the talks with him in the house of the Anglican Archdeacon of Cyprus, when the hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon was present, I came away in very deep personal distress, conscious that some definite steps of a rather dramatic kind would have to be taken. I pondered all through that evening and for the next day, having told the Archbishop that I was waiting in Nicosia until midday next day, as to whether it would be possible either to detain the Archbishop in Cyprus away from political activity or, by allowing him to go to Greece and then preventing him from returning to Cyprus, to do something to prevent him from playing an active part there for the time being.
I came to the definite conclusion that the only solution was to remove the Archbishop, and the three people most closely associated with him, from the island, so that their pernicious influence could no longer be allowed to prevent the pacification of the island. The Archbishop, therefore, was removed, with my full authority, to the Seychelles—and of nothing which I have done since I have been Secretary of State am I more sure that it was right; but had he not been Archbishop, he would have been detained in Cyprus itself.
The hon. Member for Swindon wants to go to the Seychelles and to see the Archbishop. Had the Archbishop been detained in Cyprus, the hon. Gentleman could not possibly have seen him, save with the consent of the Governor, who,
1788
in a matter of this kind, would of course have referred to me, any more than the hon. Gentleman could go and see somebody detained in one of Her Majesty's prisons in the United Kingdom without the proper consent either of the governor of the prison or of the Home Office. The fact that the Archbishop, being a grand offender, had to be removed from Cyprus to the Seychelles, does not alter the position in the very least.
I said yesterday in the House:
"The Archbishop and the other detainees have given their parole, and that has enabled them to have much greater freedom to move in, the island."
I was very glad when I heard that the Archbishop had given his parole, and despite all my feelings about the mischief and wickedness he has caused, I am glad that it is possible to detain him under less severe conditions than hitherto.
I added:
"If visits are paid by them or attempts are made to pay visits to them, in circumstances which I and the Governor consider would not be in the interests of the pacification of Cyprus, steps would have to be taken to limit for the time of the visit the freedom enjoyed by the detainees. I have no intention whatever of allowing the Archbishop to resume his leadership and his association with E.O.K.A. by firing long-distance artillery from the Seychelles. If, as my right hon. Friend has said, the Archbishop denounces violence, a new situation will arise."
A few moments later in the debate last night, the hon. Gentleman appeared to take great exception to that remark of mine, if it suggested that he would only wish to go to the Seychelles, or one of the reasons why he might want to go, was to carry out long-range propaganda. I replied to the hon. Member:
"I said I was not prepared to allow anything to happen whereby the Archbishop"—
not the hon. Member—
"could carry out long-range artillery. The hon. Member might be a genuine but rather simple bearer of ammunition."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1478–1481.]
I can only repeat that observation.
I know the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman. He expressed some time ago to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself a desire to help as much as he could in person on the ground, in Cyprus in the task of pacification. Both my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself welcomed that initiative by the hon. Member. Some Governments,

1789
I suppose, might be thought to be weak if they were ready to take advantage of offers by the Opposition to help. We feel so confident of the strength of our cause that we have had no reluctance whatever in showing a readiness, and, acting on that readiness, to use any opportunity to bring about a better situation.
I think it is a little ungenerous of the hon. Gentleman to suggest that we took advantage of his offer at one moment and were ready to discard him at the next. What in fact he is doing by suggesting that we encouraged him to go and now discourage him from going is to suggest that we were ready to use him at one moment and discourage him in the next, merely because, in the changing political pattern, he no longer appeared to be of any value to us.
The truth is that as long as there was a chance of arriving at some arrangement with the Archbishop in Cyprus, the hon. Gentleman's intervention, his own friendship with the Archbishop and his own personal character and generous impulses, might well have helped to lead the Archbishop to realise the situation which had developed. When it became quite clear that, despite that extra help which the hon. Gentleman so generously brought, the Archbishop was not prepared or was not able to take an independent line on this matter, then, for the time being, the usefulness of the hon. Gentleman appeared to be at an end.
The hon. Gentleman asked me if any other hon. Members would be allowed to go. Would Privy Councillors be allowed to go and see the Archbishop? In this matter, no distinctions of any kind would be made between any hon. or right hon. Members of this House in that for everybody, whether Members of Parliament or not, permission would have to be given. As the hon. Gentleman asked me in advance whether, in his case, permission would be given to visit the Archbishop, I felt it only fair to say to him that I did not think that that would be so.
I have since then consulted the Governors in Cyprus and the Seychelles, who confirm my view, and I repeat it as my own personal decision that, if the hon. Gentleman decides to make the journey to the Seychelles during the Recess, he
1790
will not be able to see the Archbishop. I think it is fair that the hon. Gentleman should know that in advance. I trust that I shall not be accused of being anything but honest in preventing what might otherwise turn out to be a long and unnecessary journey.
I am very sorry to interfere with any plans that the hon. Gentleman may have for the Recess. I know the value of his visits to other British territories. I know and welcome his desire to get to know their problems at first hand, and I should welcome visits by him to any British Colony. Of course, he can go to the Seychelles, and I should be very glad if he did, but, if he does, he can no more expect to have the right to see a detainee in the Seychelles than, if he decided to spend his holiday in Dartmoor, he would have an absolute right which could not be taken away from him to go and see anybody detained in the prison there.
The question of Privilege was discussed this afternoon, and it is not now for me to enter into that. No question of Privilege arises here, but a question of practical administration does arise. It is for me to see that the purposes of the Government, arrived at after long and anxious consideration, and involving the deportation of the Archbishop and others, are not frustrated by manoeuvres designed by other people and carried out, I do not doubt in good faith, by the hon. Gentleman. If we have willed the original intention of moving the Archbishop out of Cyprus, then we must also take any other steps that are necessary in order to see that purpose is not frustrated.
The hon. Gentleman said that Lord Radcliffe had returned today from Cyprus, and I look forward tomorrow to a talk with Lord Radcliffe on the results of his most fruitful visit. I do not intend that the long-term policy to which Her Majesty's Government is committed, and of which Lord Radcliffe's visit is an essential part, shall be frustrated by once more enabling the Archbishop to play a mischievous part from the Seychelles in the same way in which he continued to do in Cyprus itself.
It being Ten o'clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House; without Question put, till Tuesday, 23rd October, pursuant to the Resolution of the House yesterday.
Adjourned at Ten o'clock.

HOME DEPARTMENT
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Preamble
The House met at a quarter past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
2.20 p.m.
SOUTH OF SCOTLAND ELECTRICITY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936) deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) (No. 2) BILL
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with a Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill, within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911, and read 1a.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of August 1), Bill read 2a: Committee negatived. Bill read 3a, and passed.

WELFARE FOODS AMENDMENT ORDER, 1956
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough asked me yesterday whethed I could say something more about the statutory instrument controlling the allowance of milk in day nurseries, and why the date fixed for the coming into operation of the Order was September 1. I had hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, would be here. However, perhaps I may explain that, as I understand it, this instrument has the effect of bringing the milk allowance for day nurseries into line with that for nursery schools. The choice of date, Septem-
560
ber 1, was necessary in order to fit in with the school year. On the question of praying against the Order, it is of course possible to pray against the substance of the Order, if noble Lords object to that, when we return in October.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, if, in praying against the Order, the Prayer were carried, would the Government withdraw the Order? I think the point that my noble friend was making was that it would be a farce to pray against the Order after it had come into operation and if the Order would not in due course be affected by the Prayer.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I suppose that if those who prayed against an Order carried their Prayer, then the Order would have to be withdrawn. That is a hypothetical question, and we had better wait until the day. I thought I would just make the position clear. I have told my right honourable friend the Minister of Health that this is not a very convenient practice and I hope in future, that we shall be able to avoid anything of the kind.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I think my noble friend's point, too, was, would the Prayer have retrospective effect? We shall not be coming back until the end of October, and there cannot be a Prayer until then. That will take us through till the end of November. If a Prayer were successful then, what would be the result on the people who, presumably, would either have paid extra for milk or would not have had the amount of milk that they are now getting and will get up to September 1? That was really my noble friend's point.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, no doubt my noble friend in reply will say that the milk has already been drunk.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Teviot has taken the words out of my mouth.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
2.30 p.m.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

Finance,

Appropriation,

Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property),

Slum Clearance (Compensation),

Department of Scientific and Industrial Research,

Underground Works (London),

Valuation and Rating (Scotland),

Coal Industry,

Hotel Proprietors,

British Caribbean Federation,

Governors' Pensions,

Public Works Loans,

Sanitary inspectors (Change of Designation),

Road Traffic,

Restrictive Trade Practices,

Sexual Offences,

Marriage (Scotland),

Overseas Resources Development,

Millport Piers (Amendment) Order Confirmation,

Aberdeen Harbour Order Confirmnation,

Pier and Harbour Order (Great Yarmouth Port and Haven) Confirmation.

Pier and Harbour Order (Wisbech Port and Harbour) Confirmation,

Huddersfield Corporation,

British Transport Commission,

Leeds Corporation,

Croydon Corporation,

London County Council (General Powers),

Rugby Corporation,

Chertsey Urban District Council,

Manchester Ship Canal,

Newcastle upon Tyne Corporation,

Liverpool Overhead Railway,

Manchester Corporation,

Walthamstow Corporation,

Barnsley Corporation,

Rhyl Urban District Council,

Fylde Water Board,

Felixstowe Dock and Railway,

Heywood and Middleton Water,

Middlesex County Council,

Cammell Laird and Company,

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board,

Grayson, Rollo and Clover Docks.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

THE SUEZ CANAL CONVENTION
2.46 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they recognise the validity of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 and propose to consult the present representatives of the signatories as to the matters now at issue with the Egyptian Government.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, the answer to the first part of the noble Viscount's Question is, Yes. As regards the second part of the Question, Her Majesty's Government have already been in consultation with the French and United States Governments, with the other Commonwealth Governments and with other friendly Governments. As consultations continue, I regret that I can say no more at this stage.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Marquess for his most satisfactory reply. Of course, the noble Marquess will realise that the Question is whether all signatories to the Convention are to be consulted. I hope the noble Marquess will not restrain me from raising that point in the debate this afternoon.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I quite understand the object of the noble Viscount's Question and of course it is open to be argued in the debate that as many signatories as he may wish should be consulted.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I ask the noble Viscount whether he would include the succession States of Austria and Hungary as signatories to the Convention?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, there are, of course, endless succession States, but the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party will know that I am referring to the succession States of Imperial Russia.

EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL
2.48 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN rose to call attention to the position in relation to the Suez Canal; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. In discussing this question we are under two very serious handicaps. The first is that at this moment a debate is taking place in another place on the very same subject and it is difficult to avoid a certain amount of repetition; and we have not, as we usually have, the benefit of having heard authoritatively what is being said in that other place. The other difficulty is that discussions are at this moment taking place between France the United States of America and ourselves which are not concluded, and it is obviously impossible for Her Majesty's Government to make any definite statement as to what their course of action is going to be. For both those reasons our debate is likely to be of a somewhat limited character. I imagine that if we could have postponed this debate for a week it would have been much more profitable but probably less popular. Nevertheless, we say it is better to have a provisional debate of this kind than to disperse without your Lordships having the opportunity of expressing your views on the most critical situation which has arisen since the end of the war, and one which may have far-reaching consequences.
The events of the last week in connection with the Suez Canal are sufficiently well known to your Lordships, so that it is not necessary for me to give you a detailed narrative. I will state only the facts in so far as it may be necessary to explain the outlook of my noble friends and myself on this crisis. Without any notice whatever, Colonel Nasser announced that he intended to take over the Suez Canal Company, and did so within a matter of hours. I say Colonel Nasser, rather than Egypt, because, obviously, this is not the action of a Government, as we understand it; it is the action of a dictator. Whether, in fact, he has consulted the Government, or whether, indeed, there is a Government in Egypt to consult, most of us do not know. But it is important to take into consideration, in deciding on our actions, the fact that we are dealing with one man.
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Perhaps if we had been a little more farsighted we might have anticipated that something of this kind would come along. Colonel Nasser had given a clear warning in the past in connection with his embargo on shipping to and from Israel that he would have no scruples about breaking an international convention when it suited him, and I cannot help feeling, without in the least desiring to be controversial this afternoon, that it is a great pity that we did not take stronger action at a time when it was open to us to do so. And I cannot help feeling that Colonel Nasser has had some encouragement from our silence or lack of action in the past.
He has now decided to nationalise the Suez Canal undertaking, and his reason for doing so is, obviously, in the main, his failure to secure a loan from ourselves and the United States in order to carry out the project of the Aswan Dam. I think we were probably right in refusing this loan. He had made it plain from his actions that he would not be in a position to carry out the financial terms of any such loan. Any moneys that might be available had already been earmarked for payment for arms, and it was exceedingly problematic whether any further sums would be available. Your Lordships will, no doubt, take the view—as I do—that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company will not, in fact, provide the funds except on the basis of confiscation. Colonel Nasser has stated that it is his intention to pay the market value of the shares in Paris on the day before nationalisation took place, but that remains to be seen.
There are a great many calls on the profits of the Suez Canal Company. Which, I understand, amount to about £10 million a year. There is continuous need to deepen and widen the Canal to take larger and larger ships, and in the period of about 80-odd years during which the Canal Company has been in existence the Canal has been widened on no fewer than eight separate occasions. A widening operation is actually taking place at this moment. It began last year, and the estimated cost of it is about £18 million. There is the service that will be required of the compensation fund, if Colonel Nasser decides to carry out his expressed intention and pay for the shares—which in itself will practically absorb any avail-

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able profits that may arise from the working of the Canal. There are the pension rights of British and French employees. We must not overlook the fact that a good many British and French employees have earned pension rights, and it is at least doubtful whether it is the intention of Colonel Nasser to carry out that obligation. Then, of course, there is the need for constant maintenance and improvement of the Canal. I think it is right to say that during the whole of the period of the existence of the Company they have discharged their obligations in the most meticulous manner—notably in the way in which they have carried out these improvements even though they have been aware of the fact that the term of their lease was coming to an end.
The proposed development of the Aswan Dam is not the only reason for the action that Colonel Nasser has taken. There is also the question of endeavouring to secure the leadership of the Arab Group, which has been Egypt's particular ambition in the last few years. It is very largely a question of prestige. Colonel Nasser is personally ambitious of becoming leader of the Arab world, and a dramatic and spectacular move of this kind is calculated to make a very strong appeal to the Arab world—particularly if the move succeeds. I think it is important for us, in considering the situation, to bear in mind that the position is very different indeed from what it was at the time when the Charter was granted. In 1868, when the Canal Company first opened, the amount of traffic passing through the Canal was relatively insignificant. It amounted to about 500,000 tons a year. Last year it amounted to 115¾ millions tons—an enormous increase. And it is used to a greater or lesser degree by practically every maritime nation in the world. It is, today, beyond question, the largest waterway in the world, and, no doubt, the most important.
It is used to a very considerable extent by us. We are substantially the largest users, and that explains the considerable interest we have in the Suez Canal. Indeed, looking at the figures, I should say that our use of the Canal is greater than that of the next four countries put together. So it is a very substantial interest that we have. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it is a vital interest, and we should be seriously affected
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economically if anything happened to impede the free progress of shipping in the Suez Canal. It is true that Colonel Nasser has stated categorically that he has no intention of impeding the free use of the Canal, that he will observe the Convention in detail and that no particular changes will be made to the present position. But can we believe that?
One fact which stands out is that an important aspect of this question is the need to keep the Canal going and fit for its present use. It is necessary to spend large sums of money annually on maintenance and to continue to expand it as and when necessary; and it is quite impossible to believe that within the financial ambit of what is available to him Colonel Nasser will be able to carry out these obligations or, for that matter, that he has any intention of so doing. Of course, there is scope for increasing charges, but that is a very serious matter and one that should not be entrusted to one individual. It is an international matter and it should not be in the hands of one individual to effect a stranglehold on transport throughout the world by arbitrarily increasing charges, not according to what is necessary for the maintenance of the Canal, but, in fact, to pay for arms that he has bought from some other country.
There is some doubt about the legality of what Colonel Nasser has done. I do not pretend that the matter is free from doubt. For what my opinion is worth—and I say this with all humility in the presence of far greater international lawyers than I can ever claim to be—I think that what he has done is not legal. I will not bore your Lordships by trying to give my reasons, but, to put it no higher, there is a considerable element of doubt about whether his action is legal at all. I have no doubt at all, however, that the manner of doing it constituted in itself an illegality. I feel that that is a matter on which we can all stand.
I said at the outset that Her Majesty's Government were in a difficulty in this debate—unless anything has happened since twelve o'clock, which I doubt—in making any definite statement on what the course of action will be, but we on this side cordially welcome the statement of Her Majesty's Government:
"that the freedom and the security of the Suez Canal, in peace as well as in war, is of

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world importance and cannot be entrusted to any one nation."
For that reason, we welcome the discussions that are taking place. At the moment, the discussions are between France, the United States and ourselves. Obviously, this is not a matter for Egypt alone. It is also not for ourselves alone, though perhaps that is a little more difficult to realise. It is a matter of world concern. In the view of noble Lords on this side, the more nations we can bring into the discussions, the better. I think that it was a mistake to limit these discussions to France, the United States and ourselves, unless we can regard them as merely preliminary discussions, conducted with a view eventually to bringing in others. I feel that we ought to have brought in the Soviet Union. Once before we made a great mistake in not taking the Soviet Union seriously and bringing her into discussions at an early stage. We must not make the same mistake again.
I do not know, any more than your Lordships do, what the attitude of the Soviet Union will be; but I do know that in 1946 they took the view that international control by the nations concerned through a United Nations agency was essential, and I have no reason to think that they do not take that view to-day. Indeed, it is in their own interests that that view should be taken, because I am sure that they have no greater reason to trust Colonel Nasser than we have and there is no indication that they have done so. So, at an early stage, we should bring in as many other maritime nations as we possibly can, with a view to creating a world opinion; and we certainly should bring the matter within the ambit of the United Nations. We on this side approve also the economic measures that have been taken so far, and we think that we should immediately stop supplying arms not only to Egypt—that is axiomatic—but also to any other nations that have given sympathy and approval to the action Egypt has taken. There are a number of nations who have sent encouraging Notes and whose Press is cordially in favour of what Egypt has done, and I think that that should be noted in dealing with the question of the supply of arms.
As a long-term measure, the suggestion which the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha.
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has put forward in recent days in this House is, I feel, worth considering; but he will appreciate that it is a long-term measure. The Suez Canal took twelve years to complete, I think. It may be that we move faster these days—I am not sure. But at any rate, it is a long-term measure. It is, however, possible to do something less ambitious immediately by the construction of a pipeline over the same kind of territory as the noble Lord has in mind I think that there is one thing we could do. If we are not to supply arms to the nations which are likely to be unsympathetic to us, we could supply arms to the nations that are likely to be sympathetic—I refer particularly to Israel. It may well be that if we find little positive action that we can take immediately, Colonel Nasser will be encouraged to take aggressive action against Israel; and in my view the time has arrived when Her Majesty's Government might well consider supplying Israel with those arms which they might otherwise have supplied to the unfriendly nations
That is all that I have to say We are in this dilemma: but all we can do at this moment is to put forward our own point of view and our suggestions. I would ask the noble Marquess the Leader of the House not to hesitate to call us back, if it should be necessary, in order to get the views of your Lordships' House. We are in a very grave crisis, and I am sure that no noble Lord would feel at all disturbed about having it well-earned rest interfered with if t were necessary in the interests of our nation. We shall watch with great apprehension what is taking place. It is just possible that before the debate is ended, the noble Marquess who leads the House may have a statement to make. If so, of course, he will make it. I beg to move for Papers.
3.10 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, I do not propose to follow in detail the interesting and, if I may say so, moderate and helpful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. At this stage in this affair that we are discussing to-day—and a most important affair it is—it is hardly to be expected that each member of each political Party will necessarily agree in full detail with all of his colleagues. That refers to the short-term view. But in the longer term,

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I feel that I am probably speaking for all Members, in all quarters of the House, when I say that we loyally support Her Majesty's Government in all the action they are taking and the efforts they are making at the present moment. At this stage of this difficult case one must make a little reservation about the future, because this crisis—if I may call it a crisis—is by no means resolved, and it may take one form or another before we know exactly where we are. But even though we may reserve that right of criticism, I would repeat that we support Her Majesty's Government to-day in all that they are doing.
It is regrettable to know that in this new world of ours, where young nations, and what used to be called "backward" nations are coming more to the front of that world picture in a way where inter-State independence is much more important than before, there are in those younger countries unfortunate elements of xenophobia and nationalism which do not help that quick progress, and do not really represent the best feelings of the best statesmen in those younger countries. It is particularly regrettable that this unrepresentative element, as to a large extent it is, should have reared its head in this country of Egypt, which has been our friend for so long; which has in its background a high civilisation, and which has been so near to Western culture for so many generations. Those of us who have had the pleasure of visiting Egypt have met statesmen and others there who I am sure are most uncomfortable and most unhappy that this apparent dictator is taking a line which does not represent what is in Egypt's best interests, and is known to the Egyptians as such. It is, of course, necessary that we should deal with this matter with cool heads and with meticulous examination. It is easy to be affronted by this insulting approach which has injured our amour propre, but I know that your Lordships will agree that in such cases it never pays to retaliate in the same temper.
It is difficult in this debate to go into much of the detail, because there is so much on which we still await information —information which, perhaps, is not readily available, even to Her Majesty's Government. But I hope that the noble Marquess who is speaking next for Her Majesty's Government will be able to tell us something about what led up to the
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present situation in respect of the Aswan Dam: what were the negotiations between us and Egypt and us and America; and what was the reason why we did not take the action that we might have taken when shipping to Israel was interfered with in the Canal?
Is it true that if Egypt had not taken the action she has done, the position in 1968, when the Suez Canal Company Agreement comes to an end, would have been roughly as it is now? In other words, is this a mere anticipation of what was to come? If that is so, I would join the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in saying that we agree with the Prime Minister that this international highway should not be in the hands of one nation; in fact, we think it should be looked after by the United Nations, or as many of the United Nations as can be made interested in it. That does not quite accord with the conference which existed in 1888, referred to in a Question earlier this afternoon by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, because the members of that conference did not include Russia and did not include the United States.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: They did include Russia.
LORD REA: I beg your Lordships' pardon. They did include Russia, but not the United States. If that conference is to be revived, I think it should be revived under a much wider umbrella, which would be represented only by the United Nations; and there should be no hesitation in asking, pressing and begging both the United States and Russia to come in and deliberate with us on this international question. It must be remembered that there are many maritime States who do not appear to be very important in that part of the world but who yet depend fully, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, on this international highway. It is interesting to know that Norway comes high up in the list of users, whereas Russia is low down; but both of them must be interested from the international point of view.
We are at a disadvantage, too, in that there has been no really full statement from Out Prime Minister, although some of us know something of what has gone on in another place to-day. Nor, as yet, has our Foreign Secretary given us any indication of his views. However, that is natural, because the whole situation is

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still in a state of flux. That is why I rather doubt whether it has been wise to initiate these two debates in the two Houses of Parliament at this stage. The function of debate, surely, is query and suggestion and criticism; and I doubt whether, at this stage, we can offer to Her Majesty's Government any constructive criticism, make any constructive suggestions or raise any queries which would not be normally answered if they were suitable to be answered. Therefore, I feel it is regrettable that arrangements have been made, presumably by the two larger political Parties, for this debate to take place to-day.
I feel that it should have been left until the situation had crystallised and come more into perspective, in order that the Government should have a quiet time for intense and level-headed consideration, especially if there is contemplated any question of military action which would need careful consideration. I am sure that the opinion of the people of this country would have to be sounded before any such step could even be advanced at all. Therefore, if this matter does crystallise in such a way that we can usefully help, I do beg the noble Marquess who leads the House to be good enough to remember the promise that he kindly made last night, that the House will be recalled if there is any indication that its reassembly can help in this vital, dangerous and delicate situation.
3.18 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, it will, I hope, be in accordance with the wishes of the House if I intervene at this early stage in the debate and endeavour to give some indication, as fully as is possible in the circumstances of which your Lordships are aware, of Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards, and the principles which are guiding them in, the undoubtedly grave situation that has arisen in Egypt. I regret that I am not in a position to give your Lordships any fuller information as regards the present discussions than was given earlier to-day by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place; but if there is anything that can be said at a later stage, my noble Leader, who will wind up on behalf of the Government in this debate, will, of course, include it in his speech.
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I have called it a grave situation; and such it undoubtedly is, both in its intrinsic character, and also, and perhaps even more so, in the attendant circumstances. By the recent Egyptian move the best-known and most widely used international waterway in the world, the essential traffic link between East and West, the creation of which resulted in untold saving of time and money to peaceful commerce between nations, has been abruptly snatched into the hands of one Government alone—and that a Government headed by a man who, so far as we and our friends are concerned, has now proved himself, beyond doubt, hostile, rancorous and irresponsible.
We had genuinely hoped that, with the signing of the Agreement for the evacuation of the Canal Zone, an era of cordial relations with Egypt might begin. In spite of all our efforts and our approaches, it was not to be. Colonel Nasser's own ambitions. and the seething torrent of Egyptian nationalism, which he and his associates have done so much to excite and exploit, and so little to moderate and control, have swept aside all our endeavours and all their protestations. After a series of alternations of moods, in which the angry ones grew always more angry and the calm ones less calm, Colonel Nassar has now purported to nationalise, in purely Egyptian interests, this great international shipping route, and to appropriate its revenues to internal Egyptian uses. There can scarcely be a country whose shipping benefits from that Canal which does not feel itself shocked and menaced by such high-handed action. Your Lordships may have noticed that President Eisenhower said yesterday, in this context, that the continued efficient use of the Canal was vital to the economy and future welfare of the United States —and there are many countries who would echo that sentiment from apprehensive hearts.
The Egyptian Government claim that they have taken this step by way of retaliation. Retaliation for what? Not for the withholding from them of something to which they were entitled as of right. but for the withdrawal, in changed circumstances, of an offer which they themselves had not accepted but had complicated by a whole series of provisos, qualifications and reservations; an offer to furnish them with generous financial aid.

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And because that aid is no longer to be made available, they claim to be justified in measures of retaliation. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, asked me for the circumstances in which that offer had been withdrawn. I think they were made reasonably plain at the time: that the course of the Egyptian economy which had been followed by the Government in the interval between the original offer and the time of its withdrawal was such as to shake confidence in the fabric of the Egyptian economy and to make it extremely doubtful, to put it mildly, whether it was an economic proposition to make available to them the resources which had originally been offered.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: May I ask the noble Marquess a question on that? Was the offer withdrawn by the World Bank, or was it withdrawn by the State Department?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: The offer was withdrawn by the State Department.
It may well be that the refusal to produce funds for the building of the Aswan High Dam was not the cause but the excuse for the purported nationalisation of the Canal Company. Indeed, the speed with which the intricate legal instruments necessary to carry out their purpose were sprung upon the world is at least some indication that they were already in cold storage, awaiting a propitious moment. If that is so—and I would certainly not rule it out—then it may well be that this is only a further, though a more flagrant, step in a deliberate policy to undermine and destroy by stages our whole position in the Middle East. But in either event the world cannot sit idly by whilst the Canal lies at the mercy of fitful gusts of wrath or of studied political plots.
But, say the Egyptian Government, why are you in the United Kingdom complaining, when you yourselves not so long ago nationalised your coal, iron, steel and transport? That was a very different story. These were purely British concerns, the shares in which were British-held, and their nationalisation affected no foreign country. Moreover, ample notice was given, and the principles and procedure to be followed were agreed by the then Government with those concerned. Here the Suez Canal Company have very important
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and very large foreign shareholders; and, what is still more serious, its function is to operate an international waterway which is of vital concern to many other countries.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in his speech, made some remarks in passing, if I may so characterise them, as to the legality of the Egyptian measure. I am disposed to agree with the conclusion at which he arrived, but I do not think that it would be a profitable exercise, or one perhaps easily conducted, to expound at great length the reasons; nor are they perhaps for this purpose very material.
The point is: What is the declared purpose of this nationalisation? It is to procure revenue—the declared purpose of the Egyptians—not for the more efficient operation and maintenance of the Canal but for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. It is true that the Egyptian Government have now made a feeble effort to contend that the reason lay in the fact that the Company was neglecting the Canal, but everyone, not excluding the Egyptian Government, knows that that allegation is utterly untrue. Only last year, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, remarked, a costly new scheme of enlargement was put in hand. If this was the reason—if the reason really was that the Suez Canal Company was failing in the task committed to it—why carry out the operation of nationalisation from one hour to another? Why not gradually, and by agreement? The inference is, of course, only too plain—that it was done at this moment as a vindictive challenge to the West, even if it be also part of a longer-term plan. It is a challenge to far more countries than the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France. And it is a challenge that can be neither palliated nor ignored. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin—and the noble Lord, Lord Rea, made the same point—said that our action in this matter should not be unilateral; and I am wholly in agreement with them. It is because Her Majesty's Government share that view that these present consultations are proceeding in London.
We cannot, great maritime nation that we are, accept the proposition that a vast international service, such as the Canal supplies, can be recklessly milked of its resources for the construction of a Dam for the international benefit of

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Egypt alone. What a prospect for the future of the Canal! Its relatively modest revenues are to be charged not only with the payment of compensation to shareholders, but with the cost of this immensely extensive engineering enterprise as well. And the Egyptian Government would presumably maintain that, when all this money had been earmarked for these uses, for the Dam and for the compensation, there would still be a sufficient surplus to carry out the expansion of the Canal itself for which they now try to say the Company has failed to provide: an expansion which, as has already been noted, becomes from year to year the more necessary and on a larger scale because of the increase, not only in traffic but in the size of the ships which constitute that traffic. It would be difficult to calculate the level to which the Canal dues would have to be raised if all these heavy burdens were to be discharged. No one country, certainly not Egypt in its present mood, can safely be left in what my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, recently called "unfettered control" of this indispensable artery.
Colonel Nasser announced the nationalisation in a speech in which historic distortion and political venom were nicely blended, a speech which seemed a tragic echo of styles that we knew too well in the inter-war years and had hoped would never assault our ears again. How can we and other countries confidently entrust the smooth, efficient and impartial administration of the Canal to hands already shaking with passion? How can the Canal be properly operated by men who are held to their posts by threat of imprisonment? The threat in itself is surely a breach of International Law.
If we were tamely to submit to this coup de theâtre, with the Arab nations as the audience, Colonel Nasser would not be satisfied but stimulated. No dictator can ever afford to be satisfied. What would follow? At his will, a stranglehold on our essential oil supplies; by his caprice, a stoppage of troop movements, supplies and commerce; at his word, an exhorbitant increase in Canal dues. Moreover, such examples are infectious, and there are others in his neighbourhood who are not wholly immune from a similar virus. It may have been that it
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was to a large extent a question for Colonel Nasser of increasing his prestige. We have a prestige, too, and we are determined to maintain it. In Her Majesty's Government's solemn and considered view, there is only one solution. We cannot afford to lay ourselves and our future open to such hazards. The Canal must be placed under effective and trustworthy international supervision and control. It is to secure that object that we are at this moment engaged in careful consultation with France and the United States. That is the basic decision of principle. I hope and believe that it will commend itself to the whole House. It was not lightly taken; it will be steadfastly pursued.
3.33 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I thought it would be more convenient and seemly if I spoke from this Bench, in case at any point I happened to disagree with my noble Leader on the Front Bench. I do not think I shall. I went to another place this morning and I can correctly and sincerely say that I found much more reason, common sense and conviction in the Prime Minister's speech than there was in the rather heady wine which was produced by my own Front Bench. We are all agreed that we will be firm—that is a most important thing. The Liberal Party is going to be firm; it is going to be united. Those are two most remarkable phenomena. We are all agreed that the House must rise to-day —that is very important. We are all agreed that there must be a conference and we are all rather vaguely in our minds aware that nothing much will be done. That seems to me to be the whole picture.
I admire the eloquence of the noble Marquess the Minister of State. I enjoy it but I wonder what he is going to do. If a man has committed a crime—I am not a lawyer; I hope some legal Member of your Lordships' House will speak to-day—I understand that there are three things involved. First of all, you must frame a charge; secondly, you must have a court and, thirdly, you must have a means of imposing your judgment. What is the charge? My noble friend below me, who is a lawyer, says in a vague way that he thinks, though he "will not at this moment weary your Lordships with the particulars," that there is a breach of, not the Concession,

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but the Convention. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, gave some support to that view. I hope that someone will tell us exactly what the breach is. There is an affront—there is a violent affront. There is a lot of propaganda which is very bad indeed. But I cannot discover—and I have read what the newspapers have said; there was something in The Times this morning or yesterday by a lawyer—that legally speaking Colonel Nasser has done anything in breach of the law. That is the first point. I hope that one of the Law Lords will illuminate this matter for us.
Before what court are you going to bring this man? You cannot bring him before the Hague Court, because it is not a governmental affair. You cannot bring him before the United Nations, because it concerns an Egyptian company. The only court you can bring him before is the highest Egyptian court in the land. I cannot remember all the details now, but a few years ago the British Government had a dispute with the Canal Company about whether the payment on the debentures or the ordinary shareholders should be in gold francs, or something of that kind—I did not understand it. But the British Government took the Canal Company to the Egyptian courts to have the case tried. I rather fancy that we won our case. Therefore, if you go to court, so far as one can make out from information that one can gather, the only court before which the case can be tried is an Egyptian court, and it has not been possible, except in the inferential way which my noble friend mentioned, to frame a charge.
We are all very angry about this affair; everybody is very angry about it. Colonel Nasser has behaved in an unconscionable way. If you read back a little in The Times—you need not go very far back—you come to the time when Colonel Nasser was the "blue-eyed boy" when we offered him the money; when the International Bank offered him the money, and when he felt that the conditions were too severe. It is not important, but as a matter of fact I talked to him for about an hour at Christmas-time on this point, and he said: "I am very friendly". He is a very friendly man—I am speaking in a social sense; I am speaking not in a national sense but in a personal sense. He said: "You and the Americans offer us money, but there
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are so many conditions, such as, 'You have got to make peace with the Jews', 'You have got to make an agreement with the Sudan', and 'You have got to do something about this and that.' But when the Russians make an offer, they say simply, 'There is the money'."
I said to him, "Are you not aware that it may be very dangerous to have a vast horde of Russian technicians here? You may get Communists amongst them, for I am afraid there are Communists even in engineering." He said "I do not know anything about the Russians. I want the money. I understand I can have both." I understand it is the International Bank which decides the economic points. The State Department decides the political points; Congress decides that foreign aid must stop. Your Lordships know what Congress is like at the end of a term. Suddenly their State Department gives an order "It is off", and, of course, we, the British, had to follow suit. If your Lordships will look at The Times about a fortnight ago, you will see streamlined an alleged statement by Mr. Shepilov, that the loan was "not a live affair". How we chuckled! How we rubbed our hands and said, "We will show this fellow Nasser!" Then, all of a sudden, he got the loan; all of a sudden he reared his head; all of a sudden he gave us this terrible punch on the nose which has hurt our prestige and has angered the whole of the nation. That is the situation, as I understand it.
I want to make a short interlude here, if your Lordships would be patient, about the views of the Egyptian people themselves. I know Egypt pretty well. I first went there 53 years ago. I have been there in the Services and engaged in negotiations. I was the guest of my noble friend Lord Killearn over there. I have been there in various capacities. What this country has got to understand is (because the only service we can render in this House is to produce the facts) that a complete revolution has taken place in Egypt. For nearly a hundred years, with our participation, an Albanian House which was detested by the people of Egypt was ruling Egypt. After a great deal of hesitation and misunderstanding with the French, in the 1880's we took on the job of being responsible for the stability of the régime. The Rulers did not like us but they were glad enough that we were there. I was there for five

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or six months in 1946 negotiating with King Farouk. I do not really think he wanted us to evacuate the Canal at all. But we were the backbone.
Ismail was financially, as we all know, a scamp of the worst order. People were lending money to Egypt at exorbitant rates and it was being wasted or spent on paying the Sultan to enlarge the privileges of the Pasha. Finally, we made our scoop and Mr. Disraeli—or Lord Beaconsfield, I think he then was—paid the £4 million and got the Khedive's shares. I hope your Lordships will forgive me, because I am trying to bring facts forward which must be well known to your Lordships, and to shape them into a little picture. Your Lordships must realise that this is how the Egyptian peasants look at the Canal and at us. When the Concession was given, the corvée was brought in and when Nasser speaks about the thousands of lives lost he is speaking the truth—the Egyptians know it; it was done by the corvée. To the great credit of Lord Cromer and of our intervention, we abolished the corvée in Egypt. Therefore, to the Egyptian peasant the whole transaction merely represents a foreign Power, Great Britain, supporting and manipulating an alien ruling House with the fellaheen nowhere at all. I leave the matter now. But it is very important that people should realise what the great mass of Egyptians who are going to the polls in a few weeks, really think about this subject.
Disraeli was an amusing writer and he wrote to Lady Bradford the day after he had made the great scoop—a Sunday, I think it was—when the Rothschilds got the £4 million and we bought the Khedive's shares. He wrote to Lady Bradford:
"We have had all the gamblers, the capitalists, the financiers of the world, organised, platooned in bands of plunderers."
That is what Disraeli said about the financial arrangements which launched the Canal. It is a long time ago and it is easy to say that this is all past history, but it is what the Egyptians are thinking about in regard to this talk of how much they may spend on the dam, and what right they have to the Canal and what they spend on arms from abroad, and what price they get for their cotton. To the Egyptians, all this means the return of an international control of the budget,
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and there is nothing you can do which would irritate and inflame them more than making suggestions of that kind.
I myself do not think that necessarily the situation is bad. When I said that Nasser was a friendly man it was received with derision. I do not think he wants to make trouble, but he wants to justify his revolution; and to do that he must have money, he must have the dam and he must irrigate the desert. He says that nothing in this action is an infringement of any international obligation. although politically it is a most insulting thing to do. There is nothing, he says, that is internationally illegal. I hope he will seek an interview with my noble friend below me, who can explain these doubts and fears to the President of the Egyptian Republic.
There is a simple solution available. An instrument is ready to hand. No doubt your Lordships have read it. My noble friend Lord Rea read it, because he put in the point about Hungary and Austria. This Convention is a marvel of organised machinery for controlling the international use of the Canal. Its drafting is wonderful. Not only does it lay down everything for which people are asking, but it also sets up a body that has to meet annually in Cairo to see that it is being done. It says that the agents of all the signatories are to meet in Cairo every year. I should like to ask the noble Marquess—of course, he cannot answer right off—whether he would ask the Foreign Office what happened to that Committee which was set up, I think under Article 17 of the Convention—I do not know the exact number. The Convention said that not only would this agreement be operative but that there would be a watchful body which would meet annually to see that it was operative.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Is that the Committee of Agents? That is Article 8.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes, that is right. I just wonder what happened to it. It is an Agency. The thing is all framed up. If you put in Russia, as Lord Rea wants and I think everybody wants —apparently the United States, too—then you have got your Agency and you can see that the international use of the waterway is assured and our rights are protected, and there is no need for any trouble at all, if it is agreed to. It is a practical

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suggestion, and I dare say would not be entirely unacceptable to the Egyptian Government.
Now I want to say just a word about economic measures. I am not at all a business man. I am sorry the House is rising to-night because I had it in mind to put a Motion on the Order Paper objecting to the Statutory Instruments under which these measures are taken. If I had had the chance to do that, then a Minister would have come here and explained it all to us. I suppose that it is all right. Certainly the French are in a difficult position, as they have immense assets in Egypt. As the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, knows, we ourselves have £200 or £300 million worth of property at the Base, including Centurion tanks, so that before one starts to get "rough" on money affairs one needs to look round very carefully. I do not know. but it may be all right. I am perfectly confident that Her Majesty's Government have all that in mind.
As regards the other suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, for a new canal, that may be a good idea, though I do not know whether there is anything against it in the Concession. I have read the Concession which we gave to de Lesseps. In that we said that we would not allow any other Concession on the Isthmus. Whether or not the canal proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, would be banned by the orginal Concession I do not know; but at any rate he proposed a canal which would run up some hills in Israel and down some other hills in Israel, and then land in an Egyptian lake. On the whole, it does not seem to be a very profitable or constructive idea, but no doubt the noble Lord will explain it to us later.
Speaking generally about Israel, may make a suggestion—and it is one with which, I believe, Israeli statesmen would agree: do not attempt to use Israel as a pawn in the game in fighting the Arabs. That would be a fatal mistake. The Israelis do not want it. The place for Israel is as an honoured, skilful and valued member of the Middle Eastern community—that is the real place for Israel and people who think that they will make her a fifth Dominion, or get a base at Haifa, or anything of that kind, are doing the worst possible disservice to that State. The existence and prosperity
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of Israel is, in my judgment, the most important thing in the Middle East. Anyone who has been there quite recently will have seen how these people work, how they lose their country. We need not give them aid, although they may want guns and other things to defend themselves; but everyone there is burning to defend his country. It is vital that that country should be protected. I do not want to disagree with Her Majesty's Government, but it is unfortunate that, for reasons of caution, or because we did not want to offend the Arabs, or because we thought we could play in with the Egyptians, we did nothing at all when a flagrant break of law did occur, such as has been the subject of all this eloquence tins afternoon. That in itself has "blotted our copy book"—not fatally, I agree. But at any rate it is a fact that the whole world knows we would not stop Egypt blockading Israel.
The Canal is only one instance of a world-wide anti-Semitic blockade which is going on through the Arab Bureau. Now, we ourselves are affronted on this same point. I want to ask the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, when he replies, to say something about the islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Akaba. I believe that (no doubt to keep the peace with the Arabs) we have an arrangement by which we undertake to give private notice when we are going through channels which we are entitled use without any prior notice. Something of that kind happened in Albania, and we took them to court. As a result, we got a cheque for a large sum, although of course it was never honoured. I should like to ask a question on this matter of freedom of passage (I tried to put it in a supplementary question the other day), because I believe that the freedom of water is vital and must apply to the Gulf of Akaba as well as to the Canal of Suez. I believe that we are internationally justified on that point.
We can bring into active operation the Convention of the Suez Canal; I was very grateful for the Answer which I received to my Question on that subject to-day. We can say to the Soviet Union: "You signed the Convention. You always had an interest in the Mediterranean. Join with us." After all, although we fought the Russians in the Crimea in the late 1850s, by the 1870s they were back and joining in an international Convention

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governing Egyptian affairs; so that it is not an impossible task for us to do what I am sure they themselves would wish —namely to bring them into the Great Power Group of the United Nations dealing, I should hope, with the Middle East. I do not think that means they are to be won away. I do not believe for a moment that the Russians want war. I do not believe that they want to stir up anybody else to make war; but, of course, a little trouble among other people is always a comfort to a diplomat.
My Lords, just one other point: what are you going to do? I was deeply stirred, as I always am, by the eloquence of the noble Marquess, Lord Reading. He said that when injustice is done, justice is bound to follow; and that crime will be followed by punishment. I was delighted to hear that. But what punishment? How are you going to start? Supposing this man is absolutely wicked, and says: "I do not care a snap of the fingers for you; I am going ahead."? What do you do then? In June, 1882, there was a bloody riot in Alexandria, and though we were very annoyed, we did not do anything at the time. Peace was restored through Arabi Pasha, who is the political ancestor of Nasser, who is the lineal representative of the Egyptian revolutionary of 1881. That was the affair in the Rue des Soeurs. I have read of it for, having nothing to do when the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, sent me to Egypt. I just read books.
In those days of might, when we had the spirit shown by the noble Marquess. Lord Reading, to-day, we did not like a thing like that to happen; so a month after the whole thing had been settled, mostly by the intervention of Arabi Pasha, we sent twenty-two warships. To-day, I do not think we have got twenty-two warships altogether. When we sent those warships to Alexandria, Admiral Seymour saw somebody (I do not know whom) and said, "Unless you stop building that mud fort I shall bombard it." The Egyptian said "I will not stop." So the Admiral bombarded it with his twenty-two warships. Then Sir Garnet Wolsey appeared and marched with one battalion and took Cairo. I wonder whether there is anybody who really believes that the whole of the Disraelian affair was a success? I do not
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think so. I think it was a great failure. It has all "gone to pot" now—the Indian Empire, the Suez Canal, the Sudan, the Boer War—all gone. If I were going to make a peroration (which I am not) I should suggest that we reassess our problems and look at things anew. That is what we have to do. So long as one is a Kipling man, and really believes that Disraeli was right with his methods, his bombardments and his battalions flying the flag—that Union Jack which, when I was in Cairo in 1946, still flew bravely on the tuzrrets of the Citadel—if one believes in all that, then this is the way to act. But if we do not, if we think that the British Commonwealth has a mission. then we have to look elsewhere and consider what is the effect of this.
I want to ask the noble Marquess. Lord Salisbury, when he replies, to answer some of these not very difficult general questions. Her Majesty's Government have talked about taking action. If they are not going to take action, then the sooner the House rises and we have a conference (once Luxembourg and San Marino have accepted invitations), which eventually peters out, or there is a Test Match or something like that, the better. That is the best solution of all.
Her Majesty's Government have talked very bravely about taking action. Suppose that they take some violent action, put Sir John Slessor on to it—he is "atom-happy" and believes in might—what is going to be the effect on our British Commonwealth and on the world in general? Let me catalogue the countries of the Commonwealth. Canada has not sent a note of reproof to Nasser; South Africa has not sent a note of reproof to Nasser. India—well, I do not know; but the matter was not discussed at Brioni. That is all we know from Mr. Nehru. Then, is Pakistan going to join in this great attack on Egypt? What becomes of the Baghdad Pact? Have you asked Nuri Said about it? He is in London now. What does he think of this business? What about Persia? The Shah of Persia has just paid a very friendly visit to Russia. And what about Jordan? Fifteen million pounds a year we are paying to Jordan at present. A nice friendly telegram was sent by Jordan to Nasser—at the expense of the subsidy, of course—congratulating him on what he had done.

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You may say these are just niggling little points. In a way they are details, but they are part of a bigger picture. There is a group of countries, centred on India and spreading over the Middle East, which does not desire to get involved. Like Nehru, they want a peace-loving area which will not join in the ancient Imperial fights. If Her Majesty's Government take action against Egypt I believe it is, if not inevitable, almost certain that the whole Arab League, and all their friends, will join in the other side. That is something which must not be thought of. It is all very well for the Daily Mail and the Daily News—yes, and the News-Chronicle, whose desertion of Liberal principles is one of the most shocking features of the Press to-day; but I beg Her Majesty's Government to hear these things in mind.
It is dangerous to quote poetry in this House, but there are some lines of Kipling which I should like to repeat. I detest most of Kipling's poetry, but some of it is very good. May I quote just four lines from a poem which I consider very moving and very apt in the present connection? The poem is entitled The Old Men, and I address these lines with great respect to your Lordships:
The Lamp of our Youth will be utterly out: but we shall subsist on the smell of it,

And whatever we do, we shall fold our hands and suck our gums and think well of it,

Yes, we shall be perfectly pleased with our work, And that is the perfectest Hell of it!

With those few words, I beg leave to support—I suppose that is the word—the Motion of my noble friend Lord Silkin.
4.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, we always listen with attention, if not always with agreement, to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. I cannot think of any four lines which would better epitomise his point of view or his speech than those lines of Kipling's which he has just quoted. I think it is just as well that he speaks from the Back and not from the Front Benches. I would categorise his speech in his own words—a lot of niggling little points. When I listened to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I was reminded of days before the last war when former Liberal statesmen called upon a great German dictator and fawned upon him
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In considering this subject to-day, I think it cannot be too strongly emphasised that we confront the gravest of situations which has arisen since 1939. I believe that the fate of the whole of the free world as well as of this country depends upon the actions and the policies of Her Majesty's Government in the coming days. The Suez Canal is a vital artery for the whole world, and above all for the Western Nations who, of course, own the preponderance of the maritime fleets of the world. Europe, if she is to maintain in economic progress and momentum n the face of great competition, must have oil supplies from the Middle East. I take it—and this being so my speech will be very short—that the facts are plain. They have not even been obscured by the speech of the noble Viscount. They are plain both to Europe and Asia, and I hope they are equally plain to the United Stales of America.
The facts are that if Colonel Nasser gets away with this action, in the long term he will blackmail and bleed the West of their oil supplies, nominally for the building of the Aswan Dam but primarily for the gratification of his sense of power. The Egyptian dictatorship will slip from him if he fails. But if he is successful in his present course the whole of the interests of the West in the Middle East will disintegrate. Those are the plain facts. I should welcome a world conference upon this question. But if there is to be a summons to Egypt it must be in unequivocal terms. It must ask Egypt to come on the basis of internationalisation of the Suez Canal, and not to a conference at which the internationalisation is to be discussed. That must be the summons.
Lord Stansgate was right in asking Her Majesty's Government what they intend to do. There must be an "either or". Where I differ from him is that I think we have the power and the right to insist, if necessary by force of arms, upon the proper answer to our question. There is no way round. If the matter runs into the sands, not only the fate of this country but the fate of the West, and with it the fate of the United States, will be settled and a third world war will be measurably nearer. Therefore, I welcome the speech of the noble Marquess because it was a strong speech. I hope the actions of Her Majesty's Government—for they have not

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only the right but the duty to lead in this matter—will be consequent on that speech. Colonel Nasser, I feel sure, is saying that possession is nine points of the law. We have the tenth. But it is a point which will rust if not used. I beg Her Majesty's Government not to delay but to bring these matters to an issue in the shortest possible time.
4.7 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, it would be tempting to preface my observations to your Lordships by saying "I told you so", but that would not be very helpful, although it would be completely true. I should not even have thought of mentioning the fact that I did tell you so but for one of the observations made by Lord Silkin when he opened the debate. He referred, I think, to the question of Egyptian good faith. I could not help remembering how from that Box—it was the only time I have ventured to speak from that Box—I expressed a doubt to the House on that very point. It was in regard to the 1936 Treaty of Alliance with Egypt. That Treaty was approved with acclamation by the Egyptians, and when it came to signing it they sent to this country as signatories the heads of all the Egyptian Parties. I think there were some twelve or thirteen of them. They signed with the greatest joy and acclamation. I ventured at the time of the evacuation talks to remark to your Lordships that the good will and the good faith of Egypt were not all that good, as instanced by the tearing up of the 1936 Treaty though signed by all Egyptian parties thereto.
I would now turn to the issue before us. We are all agreed that the issue which we are now discussing could not be graver. It is, in fact, a direct and deliberate challenge of the highest and most sinister political significance. Are we prepared to let Nasser get away with it? Make no mistake about it. This is a testing time. It is not a testing for Nasser alone. It is a testing for all of us. It is a testing for this country. Such at least, is my view. I feel very strongly that this is a time when we have a great opportunity, and I hope, and I believe, that we are going to take it. The issue before us, it seems to me, falls under two heads. One, the long-term, is the
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ultimate fate and the securing effectively of the rights of free navigation of the Canal as prescribed in the Constantinople Convention of 1888. There is the other and what I might call the shorter-term answer. That comes more on the political side, to which I have just alluded. So far as the long-term issue is concerned, we know that it is now actively engaging the attention of Her Majesty's Government in concert with others. I personally hope that, in pursuing it, whatever the arrangement agreed upon may be, it will take some international form—the form of an international guarantee of some sort deriving from the prescriptions which regulate this right of free navigation laid down in the Constantinople Convention
Some doubt has been expressed in certain quarters as to why we are making all this "song and dance" over the nationalisation of an Egyptian company. I disagree with that argument. I believe that we have a legal case. It is not for me to go into it, but surely when you have something—I am talking about the Canal Company—which has, as its sole object and sole subject a full-blooded international Treaty behind it, you cannot reasonably say that this is a normal question of the nationalisation of a normal national enterprise. I believe that we should have a good case if this came to law.
In another place this morning we heard some fine declarations, which have done us all a power of good. I only hope and pray that we do not get held up by technicalities and petty legal points, and so let the thing drag on; because, as I said at the beginning, this is essentially a political question, and a political question of the highest and most serious import. I repeat, it is a deliberate challenge. I have used that phrase before and I use it again. Your Lordships may remember that the day before yesterday a leader in The Times described Nasser's action as "piracy". That is a very good expression—it is piracy. Pirates are pirates, after all, and when we catch a fellow at it, he deserves short shrift. He ought to be treated like the pirate he proves himself to be. That is generally recognised as the right thing to do. Moreover, it is certain that if this is allowed to pass, the example will spread. It has already been said by one speaker to-day that this sort of poisonous example is

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bound to spread. And so it will. That is all the more reason for us to act, and act quickly.
I come back to my point, even ad nauseam: that this is primarily a political matter, as was so clearly and admirably enunciated by the Leader of the Opposition in another place to-day, in an altogether admirable speech. There are political issues of the gravest import at stake, and accordingly it is a great relief that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to be courageous, even at some risk; and, as I hope and believe, have given and are giving the nation that strong and firm leadership which the public have the right to expect and are so eagerly awaiting. With the full and unanimous support of your Lordships' House, let Her Majesty's Government act swiftly and, if necessary, drastically. In my humble opinion, we have already delayed too long.
I end as I began, with this question: are we going to let Nasser get away with it? I hope and trust the answer is, No.
4.14 p.m.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, the only useful purpose of this debate, which takes place in the middle of other and more operative discussions, could be to show our resolve and our solidarity; and I think that both have been shown, with one possible exception (though I am not sure that it is an exception): that of my noble friend Lord Stansgate.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No, my Lords. I must correct my noble friend—he is my noble friend. My only dissent was that I preferred the Prime Minister's speech to that of my noble friend Lord Silkin. That is all.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My statement has had the valuable effect of re-emphasising that opening remark of my noble friend, but I thought that in some statements which he made—I hope he will correct me here, too—he was rather presenting the point of view of Colonel Nasser; and that he did, I am sure, out of his well-known balanced sense of justice. It is important that we should have that point of view, of course, and I am sure that the noble Viscount does not completely identify himself with it, despite certain doubts which he submitted.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I do not want to interrupt my noble
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friend, but he must be well aware that it is the duty of anyone in this House to try to present the facts. If he is trying to pretend that I would support, or would have supported, the action of Colonel Nasser, he is wrong. I neither said nor did anything of the kind. If the noble Lord wishes this to be a House that hears only the side of one person, he is right. But my contention is that this House has this; wonderful feature; that people can present other people's cases in order to help. That is the whole point.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, if the noble Viscount takes that point of view, does he understand that Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister in 1882?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Viscount has found that out. Of course, he was Prime Minister—but what has that to do with it? Is he going to take strong action on that? I hope that my noble friend Lord Hore-Belisha, when he has finished with me, will give a few hints to the Government on how this "firm action" is going to take place—it ought to be this week or next. What are we going to do?
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, I think that after that elucidation I may leave the speech of my noble friend—and he is my noble friend—to speak for itself. I have no desire to misinterpret it, and, like everybody else, I enjoyed it.
I agree with the noble Viscount that this issue will be determined, not by anything which we say here to-day, but by what we do to-morrow. It is not a week since the Canal Company was nationalised. I think that the Prime Minister expressed the mind of the nation in his firm reaction. I think that he interpreted the true instincts of a maritime country. He did not take any narrow point of protest against the principle of nationalising a company. He did not dwell on any legal niceties. He did not even confine himself to insisting on free passage through the Canal. I had myself anticipated that in the first instance he would confine himself to that step, because in that he could have had no possibility of opposition from any quarter outside Egypt. But he went further and has insisted, on behalf of the Government, that the Canal shall he administered internationally. That is the clear policy enunciated by Her Majesty's Government.

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There can be no retreat from that policy without a complete loss of our respect and prestige in the Middle East. That is where we stand. The Prime Minister, in a powerful speech, has reiterated that position this afternoon.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the noble Lord is making a most interesting and constructive speech. I never realised that this international body was to take the place of the Canal Company. Is it to hold their shares? I should like more details.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, my noble friend is not quite so innocent as he sometimes pretends to be. What the Prime Minister said was that:
"No arrangements for the future of this great international highway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it for purely national policy."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is the 1888 Convention.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: Let us not put any gloss on the Prime Minister's statement. I think it is far better if, as a nation, our policy should be clearly stated and understood, as I think it is understood. I do not think it is necessary to confuse it in any particular. That is the policy of Her Majesty's Government. A conference of three of the principal Powers is being held, as I understand it, to discover a means of implementing that policy. I take it—and the country and the world have taken it—that the policy represents the fact not only that we intend to carry it out but that we have the means of carrying it out. The next step, we are told, will be perhaps a wider conference. I have complete confidence that we shall not fall into the trap of merely summoning a conference of the Powers to discuss this matter generally. Otherwise Colonel Nasser will continue to administer the Canal and the outcome of the conflict of attitudes will be postponed until the Greek Calends. It is important that any conference which is summoned should he summoned on the basis of this declaration of Her Majesty's Government, in order to establish machinery for carrying it into effect. I assume that that is what will be done; and if that be done I feel that Nasser will have his complete answer and that our prestige will he restored in the Arab world.
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There is another aspect of this matter on which I would desire to say one or two words It has been said—and it was said, I am told, by a Foreign Office spokesman—that we were taken by surprise. If that should be so, this is only the first of the surprises. There are going to be other surprises so long as Nasser is the ruler of Egypt and people of his conviction are in control. It was not a surprise to most of us, because it is in the complete logic of events. This is part of the irresistible logic of nationalism, and anybody could have seen four or five years ago that this was bound to eventuate in some form or other. I must say that I rather deplore the criticism that is sometimes made—and I do so with great respect—of any constructive suggestion of a long-term character on the ground that it does not solve our immediate difficulties. Five years ago I put forward this idea of another canal. In fact it is not my idea. It may interest the noble Viscount who has just spoken and who quoted de Lesseps to know that de Lesseps, as I have been informed, actually considered a possible route leading into the Gulf of Akaba.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes, that is so; and Sosotris constructed a canal to the Red Sea in 3,500 B.C.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: But not by the route I am advocating.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: And it was not a canal that would serve much purpose at the present time as the Suez Canal does.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: It is only a matter of history.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: What I am saying is this: that whenever we have a crisis of this kind and anyone comes forward with a long-term suggestion, which may take months or years to implement, he is told: "We cannot attend to that matter now"; and when the crisis is over or in suspense then everybody forgets about it. If five years ago we had undertaken a project such as I have been advocating, I think we should have been in a better position. The mere threat of building an alternative to the Suez Canal would have had a powerful effect on Colonel Nasser's actions. I have

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reason to know that that was the case from the reaction to the speech I made two and a half years ago, reviving this suggestion. I did not say that we should build a canal immediately. I quite recognised that that would take some time. I did, however, suggest that we should make a pipe line immediately, and that is a question of a few months' construction at extremely small cost. We have great experience of these matters and the terrain is not an obstacle. The thirty-inch pipe line which goes for 555 miles between Kirkuk and Banias was laid by the Iraq Petroleum Company in seventeen months at a cost of £41 million; and it is estimated that a medium borehole pipeline between Akaba and Haifa, which would be about 290 miles long, could be laid for somewhere between £10 million and £20 million. I feel that this matter should be considered.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, says that a canal is impracticable. That is exactly what Lord Palmerston said about the Suez Canal. Some extremely strong language was used by Lord Palmerston (I forget if he was then Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary) and I have one quotation here. He said:
"The British Government will use all the influence it possesses to frustrate the realisation of this project."
That was said of the Suez Canal on which we are told to-day we vitally depend and without which we could not exist. Lord Palmerston went on to say that the Canal
"is physically unpracticable "—
which is exactly what my noble friend Lord Stansgate was saying this after-noon—
"and would be far too costly to earn any return."
Everybody knows that the annual revenue of the Suez Canal is two or three times the original capital cost, so nobody could dispute that those who advocated that canal showed some foresight.
All I plead for—because we are not out of the wood—is that this matter should be seriously investigated. The whole tenor of the speech of the Prime Minister to-day was: "The Canal is indispensable to us; it is not big enough, the traffic on it is crowded. In the next 10 to 15 years"—and that is a long-term policy if ever there were one— "it will have to be vastly enlarged". But this Canal—the Suez Canal—will remain in
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Egypt; it will still be the sole highway; it will still be subject to sabotage, whatever new arrangements we make. And if the present legal arrangements are allowed to he fulfilled, in 1968 the Egyptian Government will become the undisputed legal owner of the Canal. I therefore plead with Her Majesty's Government to consider this matter seriously. The Shell-Dutch group announced only two or three weeks ago that they were projecting a pipeline from Marseilles to the northern ports of Europe at a cost of £100 million. What is the use of a pipeline between Marseilles and Northern Europe if the oil cannot get into the Mediterranean at all? So, without desiring to examine in detail the engineering difficulties, I plead for a serious study to be made of this subject, and I am sure that the foresight will be justified.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I do not. take the view of Lord Palmerston—but, of course. I am glad to be put in that category. However, I want to ask the noble Lord whether he will tell us if he has dealt with the free entry into the Gulf of Akaba. That is the whole point.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I am glad to have that interruption. Now we are told —and it is the sole objection raised, so far as I can understand, to the construction of a pipeline, and a fortiori of a canal—that the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba can be menaced by batteries on the Egyptian and Saudi-Arabian coastlines. The use of force on a free waterway, to prevent the right of innocent passage being exercised, is not only an act of piracy, but an act of war. Are we to be told that Britain and the whole Western world is going to submit to a threat of that kind, and allow itself to be denied access through art open waterway? It is of the nature of waterways that they are commanded by the contiguous land. We do not accept from any other Powers in the world, or any other nations of the world, threats of that kind.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The noble Lord must know that for several years we have been not only submitting, but conniving, in the imposition of this blockade.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I do not think that that is a comprehensively true statement. I think it has certain aspects of truth in it. But, as the Prime Minister

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said this morning, Israel's shipping through the Canal has been stopped, and it has also been stopped through the Gulf of Akaba. The United Nations have taken cognisance of the matter and nothing effective has been done. But this is a matter of far wider import, and if we are going to insist on the right of passage through the Canal, as we are going to insist, it will cover Israel presumably in the future, and we will also insist on similar rights in the Gulf of Akaba. The rights are there. Whether we wish to knuckle down and say to anybody who seeks to obstruct us, "All right; if you do not wish us to take this route we will go round the Cape," well and good. That would be a base surrender.
It is also said that some of the Arab countries would not deliver their oil if it had to pass through Israel territory. If suppliers of oil, on which they are entirely dependent for their welfare, are going to impose dictation upon us of the routes which our commerce is to take or not to take, it would be inconceivable that we should accept. We do not accept from suppliers of our tea and copper and all the other commodities which we use a dictation as to the routes which the goods will take after the commodity has been purchased. But I do not think for one moment that the independent sheikdoms on the Gulf would take that attitude. They are entirely dependent, as we are dependent in another sense, on this oil supply—they for selling and we for buying. If, however, we lie down before this threat from Colonel Nasser, then we shall not have any case against anybody in the future. This is a test case, as has been said by my noble friend, and I plead with the Government—while assuring them that I, amongst many millions of other people, are behind them wholeheartedly in this matter, as is the whole country and, I think, the whole of democratic Western. Europe—that we may not confine ourselves merely to a consideration of the short-term measures which could be taken, but that we should look forward imaginatively to longer and more constructive proposals which will ensure our future independence in oil supplies and, indeed, in all commodities.

MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN: THE ARMY RESERVE
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty to inform the House, in pursuance of the Act of Parliament in that behalf, that, the present state of public affairs and the extent of the demands on the military forces for the protection of the interests of the Commonwealth and Empire constituting in the opinion of Her Majesty a case of great emergency within the meaning of that Act, Her Majesty deems it proper to provide additional means for the military service, and therefore Her Majesty is by Proclamation about to order that the Army Reserve shall be called out on permanent service.

EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL
4.24 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, may I say, in the first place, how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, that the scheme which he mentioned should at least have serious study? I would go on to say, if I may, that it was a great mistake on our part, when Neguib and Nasser first brought off their coup, not to have acted then; and acted quickly. We had certain obligations which were obligations to the legitimate Government of Egypt. We had no obligations whatever to a revolutionary Government. We then had the troops on the spot, and we could have acted, and acted effectively. I think it is a great pity that we did not do so. Now, Nasser has brought off another coup—another "try-on", I should call it, because that is what it is. If, again, we do not act, further coups will be made possible—to begin with, the seizure of such installations as we have left on the Suez Canal. But certainly other coups will be brought off or attempted.
The word has gone round in the East that we are weak, and that we do nothing more than talk when we are affronted or when injuries are inflicted upon us. That is a fatal reputation to have in the East, at any rate, and the sooner we show that it is not correct the better it will be for us and our Allies. We must show that this seizure of the Canal Company

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is going beyond the limit. We must act firmly; and not only firmly but quickly, to stop it. I would say that there must be no argument as to whether there was any legal right on Nasser's side. The Suez area, prior to the formation of the Canal, was barren desert with no inhabitants. The Canal is not a natural feature of Egypt in any sort of way. Its construction is due, first of all, to the genius of M. de Lesseps and to European, largely French, enterprise, and to European skill. It is not due to Egypt in any sort of way.
The argument that the Canal Company is an Egyptian company is, I think, based on the fact that at that time in the 1860's —at the time of the Canal's formation—this was thought to be a method of internationalisation of the Company, because at that time Egyptian companies were practically unknown; there were practically no such things in Egypt at all. Nasser knows very well that this action was unjustified. Not only was it unjustified, but he knows that this country is now the largest shareholder in the Canal since the purchase of the Khedive's shares by Mr. Disraeli. I would venture to say that firm action must be taken, and taken quickly, to stop it. The right of shipping to pass through the Canal is of the utmost importance, not only to Europe but also to Australia and New Zealand, to name only two of the countries to the southward and eastward of the Canal.
Then there are the oilfields. These are of importance, not only to Europe but to America as well. If America is not ready to co-operate to the full with us, we must act without her. We know that it is the year of the Presidential Election, and that at such a time America is traditionally against strong action. But we have no such handicap, and we should act at once and, if necessary, alone, though no doubt France would be on our side. Whilst agreement amongst the Powers is highly desirable, and agreement with the United States particularly so, yet time is passing; and all delay, I would say, encourages Nasser. If we do not stop him, our interests, and Western interests in general, will suffer. All the Arab States are watching to see if we take this lying down—because that is what it comes to.
Let us have no conferences, international or otherwise; no conferences of the United Nations and no conferences of any kind. Let us act. Conferences merely
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waste time. Let us have action. If the United States will not co-operate, I suggest that we act alone, and quickly; for immediate action is necessary, with no further delay and with no concessions of any kind to Egypt. If there are any appreciable concessions to Egypt of any kind, Nasser will use them as an argument and say, "Well, at any rate, we have gained something." During the war, when we needed United States money, troops, ships and air power, we made several bad mistakes, owing to United States influence and advice. We must make no more mistakes now. Colonel Nasser must gain absolutely nothing by his action—that is very important.
I venture to say that, if Colonel. Nasser will not agree to our terms, we should treat him as we treated Arabi in 1882. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, referred to Arabi. if I may venture to say so, I think, he made one slip, at any rate, in referring to the Royal power of Egypt which Arabi was working against, because there was no Royal power in Egypt in those days. It was the Khedive of Egypt who was the Viceroy of the Sultan of Turkey. It was not a Royalty at all. We should, I think, if necessary—and I am not saying that it will he necessary—treat Colonel Nasser as we treated Arabi.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: We sent Arabi to Ceylon. How are you going to get Nasser to Ceylon?
LORD JEFFREYS: I am saying that we treated Arabi by making war against him, and, if necessary, we should make war against Nasser, if he will not come to heel. For that purpose, we should make the fullest use of our Armed Forces, on land, on sea and in the air. If anyone should ask in what manner Armed Forces could be used, my reply would be that that is a matter for the Chiefs of Staff, whose advice should be taken. The essentials are that action should be immediate and not in any way delayed, and that the forces employed should be adequate. We mast not think that, because we have, perhaps, not a very high opinion of Egyptians or their fighting power, two men and a boy, or the equivalent, will be sufficient for the purpose. I venture to urge that we should act very strongly and immediately, because every delay counts in favour of Nasser and against us.
4.42 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I feel that there is one comfort in considering the political acrobatics of Colonel Nasser to which the noble Lord, Lord Rea, has drawn attention, and that is that, with differences of emphasis, we in this country are agreed; and when the three political Parties find themselves in agreement, it somehow restores our confidence. It seems to me that on big occasions—and surely this is a big occasion—we find suddenly that we become both the servants and the masters of international destiny. It is in the light of standing up to that kind of test that we have to make our contribution. It is tempting to take the line which the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, has advocated, to react at once to injury and insult. Our instinct is to "go it alone," if necessary, while others perhaps argue and dispute. It is as making a contribution to an international settlement of an international problem that I believe that we shall be judged in future years.
In any argument I can contribute I am anxious to start by being scrupulously fair to Egypt. For example, I want to tackle the question which has been raised several times in the debate about Egypt's action in relation to Israeli ships passing through the Canal. I do not think it is entirely fair to Egypt to draw attention to a contravention of the 1888 Convention. After all, through two world wars the enemy did not observe the freedom of the Suez Canal, and if, by chance, the Germans had found themselves in the position of holding the Canal, does anybody suppose that we would have refrained from bombing the Canal in honouring the 1888 Convention? Egypt's position in relation to an armistice has always been that an armistice is a pause in a situation of war and not a step towards peace. It is no good the Security Council or anybody else lecturing Egypt. Egypt says, "It is our right to hold up ships passing through the Canal on the way to Israel." I think that is a fairer way—and I am going out of my way to be fair to Egypt—to regard Egyptian action in relation to Israeli ships passing through the Canal.
Secondly, in general terms it is strangely true that, as the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said. Egypt is still able to deny that she has broken any international agreements. I find the situation in which two companies, one in Paris and one in
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Cairo, both claim to be the Suez Canal Company extremely bewildering, but the experts will tell us that that is due to a gap in international law. Therefore, if we were to use immediate force to restore the situation, we should technically be the aggressor and the whole of the Arab world and indeed the Bandoeng world would be the first to draw attention to that position. Thirdly, in being fair to Egypt, in spite of what the noble Marquess told us about American aid, I am not entirely convinced that there is not ground to suppose that the Americans had led the Egyptians to believe that they were going to receive some 50 million dollars over several months for the first stage. I shall not stress that point, but I believe that that is the kind of attitude to which the Egyptians would draw our attention
It seems to me that the Government are perfectly right in attempting first to seek an international background to any action that is taken. Before we say more about the international content of such action, I should like to look back for a moment and try to analyse in some detail the situation to which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, referred. May I fill in the figures? In Alexandria Colonel Nasser, in taking this action, said that he was raising money towards the construction of the High Dam. The sum that Egypt would have to raise without international contribution would be in the region of £300 million to £500 million. In 1955, after meeting all costs and allowing for depreciation and new improvements in the Canal, the Suez Canal Company paid £10,704,000 to its shareholders. Therefore, that is about the sum that can be regarded as available towards the High Dam. But, as has been pointed out, compensation has to be paid at the same time to the founder shareholders, and the price of those founder shares on the Paris Exchange on July 26 was £81,724,000. To that you have to add £3 million in payment of the debentures. In all, a sum of about £85 million would have to be paid, and a rough calculation shows that the surplus profits presumably would have to be used to pay off the shareholders for the first eight years or so after nationalisation
Meanwhile, of course, improvement has to go on. The 60,000 and 80,000-ton tankers which are now going through the Canal, or are attempting to do so,

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all the time demand that the Canal should be widened and deepened. Colonel Nasser was clever enough to say that he regarded the nationalised Canal Company as a contribution towards the cost of building the High Dam. Well, you can take one Egyptian pound and put it into a High Dam account and regard it as a contribution. The deduction, surely, is, as the noble Marquess has hinted, that Colonel Nasser knew as well as anyone else that the Canal revenues could never really make any impact upon the building of the High Dam, and that the refusal of American aid was an excuse to take a step which may or may not have been contemplated, but which, as we know, represents an appeal to national hysteria such as small men thrive on in their quest for popularity
I repeat that we seem to have arrived at the position not so much of two alternative approaches, but of two aspects of the same approach. In the first place, we can "go it alone," but in the conditions which operate we may not be able to do so. We have the Commonwealth to protect, we have the oil of Europe going through the Canal, as well as the oil of the North Atlantic Powers. All this is part of the general standard of political morality which we are facing. The modification which it seems to me Her Majesty's Government are contemplating is to organise international support. Where would that first course lead us? We should be involved in a landing again—a re-occupation. It may solve the problem for a year or so. But should we not be back again in the old cycle? Suppose that such action led to the disappearance of Nasser, who would take his place—the Wafd? More emphatically, where should we then be in 1968 if, in the meanwhile, we had been unable to establish what is so urgently needed—namely, some permament international responsibility for the Suez Canal, and with it, I suggest, an international responsibility for other such waterways as the Isthmus of Kra?
I speak of an international dispensation, but I do not necessarily invoke the aid of everybody. I suggest that it is logical to suppose that the aid and interest of those who use the Canal should be invoked. We do not presume
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to tell the Soviet Union or the Soviet satellites how the Danube shall be used.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. The Danube Convention has been one of the most controverted international matters in the last twenty years.
LORD BIRDWOOD: I apologise to the noble Viscount if I have made a mistake, but I have never of recent years seen in the newspapers any reference to the Danube Convention I am not aware that any British ships use the Danube.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The Danube was internationalised after the Crimean War, and after the last war there were many discussions. I do not know what the situation is now, but the internationalisation of the Danube was one of the most debated questions in Europe.
LORD BIRDWOOD: Then I put it this way: that if there were a controversy on the Danube, I do not believe the British Government would bother very much about it. The argument has been used—and it is a forceful one—that if Egypt were in sole control, then no Middle East State with oil would escape this nationalisation infection; that the process which was initiated by Dr. Mossadeq would receive a fresh impetus. It is a logical argument. But I do not suggest that the use of force immediately is the only answer, or that force is necessarily the only limiting factor in the spread of this fever of nationalisation. For myself, I doubt whether any of the oil States would be really anxious to nationalise their oil if they knew that the only circumstances in which the oil could be nationalised were that the profits and the personnel and everything would be subject to international control. In passing, I am reminded that there is a method for dealing with Middle East oil which has, as yet, I believe, not received prominence—an alternative even to the canal which Lord Hore-Belisha has suggested. I am told that it is perfectly feasible from the technical point of view to consider the piping off of oil in the Middle East—and I think particularly of Iraqi oil—into Turkey and removing it from the Turkish port.
I have one reflection which covers all action, whether it be action by force or by diplomacy or by one Power or a number of Powers. I believe that any

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decision taken will fall down if no steps are taken simultaneously to defend and explain it before a watching Arab world. I am going to make a practical suggestion—namely, that at least one million Arabic pamphlets should be printed, telling the Arabs the truth about the Canal and its construction. This is rather a different note of truth from that to which the noble Viscount referred. It may be too late to tell Egypt and the Egyptians, but there are a few million Arabs in the surrounding countries who have never been told that, had it not been for one Frenchman and his initiative, enterprise and energy, the Canal from which Egypt hopes to gain these profits would never have been built. Why not go further while we are about it? Why not also tell them that a few Englishmen in Egypt managed to double the acreage of crops, harness the opium trade, build railways, organise the police and build the first Aswan Dam? That is only the truth.
The Egyptian Government speak direct to the people of other Governments with the language of diabolical misrepresentation. We have not yet started to speak the language of truth. I suggest that we could make a start by jamming the "Voice of the Arabs." Perhaps that is not quite the note upon which to end a plea for international intervention. Once before. in 1882, an international convention was summoned, and we and I think the Italians and the French were supposed to take action. Finally, for various reasons, we were left alone to "face the music." Let us hope and pray that that may not happen again. Certainly, so far as the French are concerned, it seems that they will stand by us. Let us regard this matter as a challenge and our chance to create and not merely accept in international affairs this international responsibility and interest. But if we fail, and if, in accommodation of international political interests, one country or another fails us, then I am sure that there would be no alternative but to act alone on behalf of an international family incapable of decision. If it came to that, I am quite certain that we should all be behind Her Majesty's Government.
5.0 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I think it is right to try to sort out, as several Lords have done in this unfor-
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tunate episode, the international and commercial aspects, and to distinguish them. But first we must all recognise—and I think in all parts of the House everyone has recognised—that this action by Colonel Nasser is a blow to good will. It is even worse than this. It is done, if not with malice aforethought, at least in utter disregard of the effects that the action may have on other peoples. In effect, Colonel Nasser says, "If I can't have what I want, then I will do as much damage as possible, irrespective of the people to whom that may bring disaster."
Now this is the kind of action which provokes war, and in terms of international morality, which the United Nations is trying to maintain. I think we should say that it is a criminal act. It is a criminal act to take action which, because of its consequences, may bring war. If such an act is deliberately done, the perpetrators have no right to complain if force is used against them. But this may not be the best way, and I believe that Her Majesty's Government are right in exploring an approach which does not involve the use of force. at any rate in the first instance.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? Would he help myself and other noble Lords on this point? Does the noble Lord argue that what has already been done is a breach of International Law?
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I think it is a breach of what I may call the international morality which we are trying to build up through the United Nations, that no-one should act in a manner likely to bring, war between peoples. If someone behaves so recklessly as to have no regard for the rights of other nations, then retaliation in the form of force is likely to be provoked. I hold that it is a criminal act to act in a way which may bring about such a state of affairs. I am looking at this action, for the moment, from the point of view not of International Law but of international morality which we are seeking to build up in our support of the United Nations Organisation. It is the purpose of that Organisation to lead the nations so to conduct their affairs that they do not act in a way regardless of the consequences upon other peoples. I believe that this act is therefore to be

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condemned on the grounds of international morality as a criminal act.
Having said that, I should like to look for a moment at the international and commercial aspects. The international obligation appears to be to maintain freedom of passage through the Canal. We may con rider that this freedom of passage through the Canal is in jeopardy, but it has not yet been stopped. I know that International Law is very different from private law, and I would ask whether, in circumstances of jeopardy, application can or cannot be made to the International Court with any prospect of success. If security is put in jeopardy in the control, for example, of a borrower, it is possible, in a national court, to plead that the security is being placed in jeopardy.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, may I ask whether the noble Lord is alleging a breach of the Convention of 1888?
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, the answer to that question is: perhaps not yet, but a breach is threatened. I want to ask if, prior to a deliberate breach, when it is thought that there is likely to be a breach of rights under an international Convention, a plea of jeopardy can be made at the International Court. If that cannot be done, I suggest that the machinery which exists for the settlement of disputes is deficient. One of the main purposes of the United Nations Organisation is to provide an alternative to violent action, and it is leaving things too late if one has to wait for a breach to occur. A breach may clearly be threatened, as in this case. Is it possible to take a case of jeopardy to the International Court? I should like to know the view of Her Majesty's Government on this matter. I should also like to bring it to the attention of those who are interested in international organisations charged with the duty of preserving peace.
Next, I should like to say a few words on the commercial aspect. Here we must emphasise—and I am very pleased to do so from these Benches—how undesirable and dangerous it often is, even if, a Government are acting within their sovereign rights, to nationalise an industrial enterprise. Immediately after nationalisation, any commercial act of buying, selling or fixing prices or charges
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for services becomes a Government act, with possible international repercussions. With all due respect to what was said by the noble Marquess in distinguishing this case from other cases of nationalisation, I think my argument applies. There is always export business to be considered. When a private person charges what is thought to be too much, that does not cause international repercussions; but when a Government charges what is thought too much, a friendly country often feels that it is being held to ransom.
It is a very topical question for, obviously, one of the possible reasons for nationalising this Canal is to put up the dues. By a company under Egyptian sovereignty that is an act which may cause international repercussions. The act of nationalisation takes it beyond the field of ordinary commercial activity. Irritation over prices can thus become an affront by one nation to another. It is a lesson which we should all be careful to learn: that it is better for Governments to keep out of business and leave it to private citizens to conduct their business on commercial principles within the law.
If the Suez Canal Company threatens to exploit its customers, those customers will soon find an alternative. It may well be that the action of the Egyptian Government has focused attention upon this desirability. It might be as well to draw the attention of the great Arab oil States to the fact that oil has an economic price in competition with other fuels. If the cost of transit is increased, those Arab States which produce oil may be faced with a fall in their revenue, if not immediately, then in the near future. If this is understood, other Arab States may well rue the day when Egypt dealt them this blow. The oil interests are resourceful and can be relied upon to take care of any commercial difficulties raised by the Egyptian action.
This does not, however, absolve successive British Governments from a charge of lack of foresight. Over a period of many years British Governments have been in negotiation with the Egyptian Government on the subject of the Suez Canal. The British Government also have a substantial direct holding in the oil industry and appoint directors to some of the most important oil companies operating in the Middle East. Being

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involved in this way, they must show reasonable business foresight, and I should like to ask what consideration has been given to the arrangements that they thought would have to be made in 1968, when the present Concession comes to an end. At least it was necessary to foresee a rearrangement of the Concession terms in 1968. I should like to ask whether it is the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to try to negotiate or to take part in negotiations, during the proposed International Conference which they are calling, for a new Concession relating to the maintenance and management of the Suez Canal, or whether the International Conference is to be concerned only with the guarantee of freedom of transport, leaving the Concession arrangements to be commercially negotiated'? I think it is important that the international aspect and the commercial aspect should be kept distinct.
One final word. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will confine their action to the international issues involved without engendering too much bitterness by action against individual private citizens in respect of their private money and accounts. I hope that, as soon as plans have taken shape and have been set in motion by Her Majesty's Government, exchange regulations applicable to private citizens will be cancelled.
5.12 p.m.
EARL DE LA WARR: My Lords, if I were an enemy of this country I should feel that the time had come for me to walk extremely carefully when I saw all three Parties in this country in complete agreement. Ours is a country which enjoys free speech and criticism, and Oppositions do not lightly give up the right to criticise Governments. What has happened means that the red light has appeared. It is evident from this debate in your Lordships' House, and from what little some of us have been able to hear this morning in another place, that the main issues are extremely plain in all our minds. It may be that neither in another place nor here have Her Majesty's Government yet been able to say very much but their attitude is clear. I know I am speaking for your Lordships in saying that we are very well satisfied and very happy about that attitude.
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We have had laid before us a picture of a threat to communications of vital importance to a great part of the world, of a threat to the lifeblood of countries living on both sides of the Canal. The threats have been both commercial and strategic in their nature. We have seen how your Lordships are most profoundly unimpressed by the promise by Colonel Nasser of free passage through the Canal and of compensation. After all, as we know. Egypt in the past has denied the right of the use of the Canal. She tore up the Treaty of 1936. She is now tearing up the Concession twelve years before it expires. We know perfectly well that she lacks the wherewithal—even if we thought for a moment that she had the will, which we do not—to pay. Finally how can we expect a decent, proper or efficient arrangement after the way in which the announcement was made in the speeches of Colonel Nasser which we have read since? There was no warning and no discussion there was insult and vituperation. It was obvious from the beginning that this was a very definite and very conscious challenge, a challenge to our prestige and to the prestige of the whole West. It is a bid—as I think the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, both said—by an Egyptian dictator for leadership, as he himself said, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf.
If this bid succeeds—let there be no illusion about it—we shall mean nothing from then onwards in the Middle East. Nor can we hope to isolate the effect upon our prestige merely to the Middle East. In addition, every oil agreement in existence will be in danger. Every trade agreement also will be in danger. Every friend of ours in that part of the world will be thinking how he can get on to the right band waggon, which he will not consider to be ours. Every enemy will be considering how he can take action with the least danger and at the greatest profit to himself at the expense of ourselves. In fact, the challenge is a challenge to our communications, to our oil supplies and to our strategical existence. Above all, in this part of the world it is a challenge to our prestige. That, I think, is quite clearly recognised. Almost every noble Lord who has spoken has emphasised it.
There is, however, one point which has not been made so far in the debate and

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which I think is worthy of your Lordships' attention and consideration. One reads that Arabs and certain colonial peoples are taking great pleasure at the present moment in what they feel to be the humiliation of the West. I am informed—I did not hear it myself—that on the radio this morning there was a report of a speech by Mr. Nehru it which he said that this is only another example of the weakening hold of the West. Do not those countries, which for the sake of brevity I will call the under-developed countries, realise that to no one more than themselves is this a greater blow? Every agreement of this character that is broken is against their interests. Every time there is an Abadan or a Suez episode. it must make it harder and harder for them to get the money and the skilled assistance they need for their development.
I am informed that, even now, it is becoming increasingly difficult to persuade financial houses, not only in the City of London but in other great financial centres also, to invest money in under-developed countries. This includes even our Colonies. This situation can become only more acute as self-government grows. How, for instance, does the Gold Coast hope to get the money it wants for the Volta scheme if confidence in under-developed countries is destroyed by actions such as that of Colonel Nasser? I hope that our information services are taking note of this matter for use in all under-developed countries. This conflict may be carried on as a cold war or as a hot war. Certainly alt of us hope that it can be settled in terms of a cold war. If so, this is a very important point, and every effort should be made to mobilise opinion in the vast mass of under-developed countries.
We shall, I hope, hear a little later of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It may be that we shall hear of it later this evening, or it may be that we shall have to wait a little longer. But I think it is clear from what the Prime Minister has already said that it can be summed up shortly in the words, "international control, in some form or another, of the Canal." There is such full agreement on that point that I will not weary your Lordships with any comments on it, but I would add that, if force is required, it is essential to exercise it. There is a general feeling in the House which the
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noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, tried to ridicule. What we are all saying is that the Government should be firm. The noble Viscount is right. We are all agreed that that is our desire. It is an easy thing to say, but no one has a right to make such a request of the Government unless he is prepared to back, the Government if they are driven to the use of force, realising that, once a start on the use of force has been made, it is impossible to say where it might stop.
Having said that, I do ask the Government to be firm, if possible in concert with the United States of America. But if the United States of America will not come with us, I trust that we shall not allow ourselves to be deflected from our right policy. Finally, may I reiterate the hope expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate to call the House back? I should like to support that plea especially if, for any reason, the Government feel driven to take a less firm line than we have to-day been given the hope that they will take.
5.23 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I should like to endorse from these Benches every word the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, has said. We are strongly behind the Government, as I think are the majority of the Labour Party, in whatever measures they may care to take. I agree with the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, when he says that this is probably the gravest event that has happened since 1938. I think that it will go a long way towards increasing tension in the Middle East, and in many ways the results in the future may be incalculable. On the other hand, it has probably done one good thing—it has opened our eyes to Colonel Nasser. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, put it very well when he said that he thought that up to this coup Colonel Nasser had been regarded as a "blue-eyed boy".
I have recently returned from a visit to Israel and I can assure your Lordships that they saw through him a long time ago. They regard him, and have regarded him for some years now, as a kind of Arab Hitler who is out to destroy them. In fact, he tells them so through his "Voice of the Arabs" almost every day. I think that the danger to Israel has increased greatly since this coup. If strong

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measures are taken against Colonel Nasser, it may be necessary for him to try to bring off another coup; on the other hand, if they are not taken, he will be encouraged all the more. Whatever happens, the danger of war in the Middle East has greatly increased. I do not want to anticipate in any way what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, will say, except to hope—if I may say so with the greatest respect—that he will say more than the noble Marquess. Lord Reading.
I think there is one thing that the Government can do: that is, to send defensive weapons to Israel. I simply cannot understand the Government, and certainly no one in Israel can, when they keep on maintaining this farce that the balance of arms is still on Israel's side. What do they mean, when enormous quantities have been sent by ourselves and by Iron Curtain countries to Egypt in particular and to other Arab States? I can only assume that they are taking into account the superior calibre of the Israeli soldier. I can think of no other reason. I think we should send Israel sufficient defensive weapons to act as a deterrent. I know that there are some people who would say that this would lead to an arms race, but we had a kind of arms race after World War Two when we formed N.A.T.O That was an arms race, but it did not lead to war; on the contrary, it preserved the peace. And this is what Israel wants at the moment—sufficient arms to deter Nasser from attacking, so that he will know that if he attacks them. he will get hit back, and hit back hard. I beg the Government to take that into account and not depend on the blood of the people of Israel, even though they may have soldiers superior to those of some of the Arab States.
I believe there is a feeling, too, that Israel herself might be aggressive. I do not know on what that feeling is based. The "Voice of the Arabs" broadcasts aggressive anti-Israel propaganda almost daily, saying frankly that they wish to destroy Israel and give the refugees back their stolen lands. In parenthesis, I would say that I have a great deal of sympathy with the refugees, although Israel's offer to give them compensation as part of the general peace settlement has never been accepted. But it is said quite categorically on the Arab radio every day, "We
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are going to attack and destroy Israel". Colonel Nasser said it the other day, as the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, pointed out. On the other hand, when has Israel said that she is going to attack one of the Arab States or that she is going to expand her frontiers? I can only think of cases when Israel sometimes strikes back, usually as a defensive measure, against these constant infiltrations across the borders. It is really a case of
"Cet animal est tres méchant; Quand on l'atttaque il se défend."
That, with due apology for my French accent, is how Israel is regarded by Her Majesty's Government. Her ships are blockaded from passing through the Canal. We are getting worried now that our ships may be stopped from going through the Canal, but it has been happening to Israeli ships and to the ships of other nations going to Israel for some years now. We did nothing about it, but when it happens to one of our own ships, it is very different. Whatever long-term action the Government may take, as their immediate policy they should try to repair this balance so that Israel is less at a disadvantage. I am glad to see that they have at last seen the light so far as Egypt is concerned and have stopped sending arms to her. But I think that it would now be a stabilising factor in the Middle East if Israel had sufficient arms to defend herself, particularly against any coup which Egypt's dictator might be planning at present.
5.30 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I doubt whether any of us has ever listened to a debate in which there was a greater unanimity of opinion. The only breach of that was the difference of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.
LORD PAKENHAM: May I interrupt the noble Lord? I have heard some observations from his own immediate vicinity which go much further than I, and I should think a good many others, would wish to go.
LORD COLERAINE: I am sorry for that, and I hope that nothing the noble Lord hears from me will prompt such an observation from him. I believe, in spite of what the noble Lord. Lord Pakenham. has just said, that there is a general feeling among your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government are

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handling the present crisis with patience, skill and steadfastness. For my part, I would go a little further than that and say—though I know that not every noble Lord would agree with me—that Her Majesty's Government have no cause whatever to stand in a white sheet for any part of their policy towards Egypt and Colonel Nasser in recent years. I do not believe that the Agreement of 1954 was a mistake: and I do not believe, for my part, that if we had 80,000 troops now beleaguered in the Zone it would have made any difference to Colonel Nasser's action. I think the only effect would have been that our continued presence in the Zone would have been a great source of irritation, not so much to Colonel Nasser, because I do not think that that matters, but to large sections of public opinion in this country, and to a great many people among our Allies abroad. Her Majesty's Government may well be disappointed in the results of the Agreement of 1954, but the fact that they sincerely endeavoured to tread the path of friendship with the Egyptian dictator has beer of great advantage to us in the new situation which faces us to-day. If it had not been for that, I very much doubt whether we should have the unity that we have to-day at home, or that degree of unity which I hope we have among our Allies.
What is the new situation that faces us? I think the first and most striking thing about it is that it is not a new situation at all; it is an old one; it is twenty years old. We have all of us been this way before; we have all of us seen these things before. We have seen the battery of microphones, the gesticulating puppet behind them, the crowds roused to frenzy and intoxication, intoxicating in their turn, until they drive beyond the bounds of reason the dictator himself. We have seen before the sudden violent act and then the soft words; the reasonable explanations. the pleas of justification and the promise how, now that this matter has been settled. everything will be all right in the future. What we are seeing to-day is the Rhineland, twenty years later.
If I say that I greatly enjoyed the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I hope he will not think it an impertinence on my part. I do not know when I 'have ever enjoyed a speech more.
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But I do not know when I have ever listened to a speech which was so unconstructive and so irrelevant to the serious problems we are discussing. I thought that the speech of the noble Viscount was wrong for two reasons. In the first place, he was examining the situation under a microscope. You can, perhaps, examine a legal situation under a microscope with profit; but I do not believe you can examine a political situation under a microscope, because you do not see it in its whole perspective.
The second reason why I found his speech unconstructive and ineffective was this: I had heard that speech, too, twenty years before. If only you transpose the name "Nasser" for the name "Hitler". and the Egyptians for the Germans, your Lordships will remember hearing that speech many times in January, 1936: "What is the charge against them? Going into their back garden. What is the court you are going to haul them before? There is none. You cannot understand Hitler unless you understand the German people and how they have been oppressed and how they have suffered." This is the Rhineland again. I think there is no doubt of this, at any rate: that if we had acted in January, 1936, with firmness. we should have avoided the Second World War. It may be that we had even more time than that, and that if we had acted later with firmness we should have avoided it but it is certain, I think, that if we had acted with firmness in 1936 we should have avoided the war. We failed to take that chance, and it was, perhaps, the last chance we had. This may be the last chance we have now of avoiding a Third World War.
To say, as the Government do, that the action of President Nasser has got to be upset is not Jingoism; it is not talking about national honour. It is true, as my noble friend Lord Reading said earlier on. that British prestige is important; but this is something far more important than British prestige. It is fundamentally and simply a question of checking, before it is too late, international anarchy; and if we do not check it we acquiesce in the destruction of Western civilisation: indeed, I believe that we promote it. The path on which we have embarked, as my noble friend Lord De La Warr reminded us, is a dangerous one; it is filled with peril and risk. But if we do not tread that path, and tread it firmly to the end,

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it is not just a question of risk but a question of suicide—suicide for the West.
I think that most of your Lordships agree that the objective of Her Majesty's Government is the right one: to put this Canal under international control. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, raised the question of the Soviet Union, and said that he would like to see the Soviet Union on the Board of Control. So would I. I have always wanted and hoped to see the Soviet Union co-operate in international bodies—in the United Nations, for example. But what we have to consider is something more than whether it would be agreeable to have the Soviet Union associated with the management of the Canal. What we have to consider, first and foremost, it seems to me, is whether the Soviet Union, associated with the management of the Canal, will co-operate to make the international venture successful, or whether they will use it once again as an instrument and a sounding board of propaganda. Unhappily there is not much comfort to be derived so far from what has been said in Moscow. If we decide that the Soviet Union would only use this new international instrument as a propaganda sounding board, then, in my judgment, it would be folly to associate them with it.
I am sure that the goal which the Government have set before themselves in this matter of international policy is the right one. I think it would have been well if we had done that, not two years ago, but when the war came to an end. I thought then that that is what we should have done. I still think that that is what we should have done. For it seemed to me, as it must have seemed to many of your Lordships at that time, that the old conceptions of the nation State were outdated; that if we did not watch out the new wine would crack the old wineskins; that a new international society was in travail, and that it was much in our interest to assist its birth.
Now much has been done since then, and the degree of international cooperation is very great. But it seems to me that the moral which Colonel Nasser points very clearly is this: Western civilisation—and I include in that term not only European peoples and peoples of European descent but peoples all over the world who have absorbed European ideas of freedom and forms of Government—
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is opposed by a vast monolithic power. It is not opposed by Colonel Nasser; it is opposed by a vast monolithic power which stretches across the world and which will use Colonel Nasser or any other puppet that it can get hold of. I do not, for my own part, believe that we are going to be able to compete with that power unless we achieve a greater degree of unity than we have to-day.
This is one of the great climacterics of history. What we know as Western civilisation has always been outnumbered in the world, but until now it has always been secure because Western techniques have assured us of our security. But now the whole world has those techniques, or is getting them. Our civilisation, which has always been outnumbered, is in danger now of being out-classed as well. And it seems to me to be absolutely vital for the future of this country, of Europe, of the United States and, as my noble friend Lord De La Warr reminded us, of India and the economically underdeveloped countries, that we should somehow achieve a degree of political unity such as, even with the great advances made since the war, we have not yet achieved.
5.44 p.m.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, at this late stage in the debate there does not seem to me to be much that I can add to it. My view has been largely expressed by my noble friend Lord Silkin and, in an admirable speech, by the Leader of the Opposition in another place. I was struck by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine; it seemed to be a forceful speech, taking a wide view; and I think that we have to take a wide view of this problem. It is part only of a very much wider problem, and I entirely agree with the view that has been expressed by the Government as to what our objective should be. Our objective should be that this great waterway should be open and free to all nations, and should not be used, as it might be used, as a method of blackmail for levying money out of other nations. I think it is worth while remembering in that respect that it is not just a matter of Britain, or even a matter of Europe. We must remember that, if we are dependent on oil coming from the Arabian States, those States, equally, are dependent on selling that oil; and a blackmail might be levied on them just as much as on us.

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What seems to me to be outstanding in this matter is that if our objective is an international waterway, our means of attaining our end must also be international. I was struck by what was said in another place. If we allowed this to be a purely British move, or even an Anglo-Franco-American move, we should lay ourselves open to the charge of carrying on what is regarded as an old Imperialist tradition in which, in the past, we had certain possessions which we kept to our own advantage. Therefore, it is essential in this matter to carry the greater part of world opinion with us, and also to see that any actions we take are consonant with world opinion.
I was a little disturbed by some of the speeches I heard, which seemed to indicate that we must take action in our own interests, regardless of International Law. The fact is, as I think has been brought out, that the mere fact of nationalisation by Nasser is not a breach of International Law, and we should be very chary of putting ourselves in a position in which we might be charged with aggression. After all, only a few years hence and this waterway would have passed to Egypt by ordinary process of law. That position would have to be faced by people in charge of our affairs at that time. How would they face it? Clearly, I think, it must be dealt with on the ground that, whatever may be the national claims of Egypt, this is a matter of such vast importance to the whole world that it cannot be left with a single Power. Therefore, we must act through the United Nations.
The one thing missing from this debate —and I think we are all conscious of it—is that we are without any knowledge of what action is to be taken, whether by us or by anybody else. It is still under discussion, and whether we shall be told at the end of this debate what is proposed, I do not know. Of one thing I am sure: that nothing would be worse than for us to plunge into this business on our own. I was struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said about the change in the world. I agree with him. Perhaps we might have acted sooner. The fact is that, much as we may object to Nasser—and I think he is a thoroughly objectionable type of dictator—we must act within the sphere of International Law. I am bound to
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say that I listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, with interest, and to his comparison with what happened twenty years ago. I could not help being reminded, also, of the debates that we had about arms for Republican Spain. There, again, we were told, You must not have a race." With regard to Israel, we have been constantly told, "You must not join in an arms race in the East." That is all very well. Of course, it is not a race if one gets left at the post because he is tied and the rest have a long start. That is exactly what is happening with regard to Egypt and Palestine.
I believe that there is a strong case now for a complete change of policy—not that we should endeavour to make Israel pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us, but that they should be in a strong enough defensive position to stand against the aggression of the Egyptian dictator. I myself think that, if we had taken a stand earlier on the question of the passage of ships through the Canal, and the tiring on our ships in the Gulf of Akaba, we might have been spared this trouble. That has not been done and we now have to face up to a worse situation, as this is. My only point would be that, without subscribing to the somewhat bellicose statements that I have seen in some papers, we support the Government in whatever action is necessary, provided that we act within the sphere of International Law, because this issue is something which transcends our British interests: it is an interest of the whole of the civilised world.
5.52 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I rise to say the last word in this important debate. At times of international tension, and especially during very delicate negotiations, I believe it is a golden rule that the less that is said the better. I shall, I hope, therefore be commendably brief. But, equally, I would freely agree that in times of national anxiety it is not unnatural—indeed, it is entirely right—that Parliament should regard it as its duty to obtain as full information as is possible on matters of grave moment to the country. And especially must this be true when Parliament is just about to rise for a long Summer Recess. In that connection,

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I should like to say immediately, in answer to a question that I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in his opening speech, that if the situation should require it Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate to recall Parliament at any time that it may be necessary. As I have said, the situation is inevitably at the present time delicate, and I am quite sure that your Lordships will understand if I appear to be particularly careful to avoid skating on too thin ice. But, within that limitation, I can assure your Lordships that I shall try, so far as I am able, to deal with at any rate some of the points that have been raised.
As to the broad facts of the situation, I think there is very little I need add to what has already been said by my noble friend Lord Reading. The action of the Egyptian Government in taking over the assets and operations of the Suez Canal Company came, I think, as a surprise and a shock to most people. I make no apology that that should have been so. It is indeed possible—in fact, I think it is probable—from the speed with which this manœuvre has been carried through, that plans for the eventual nationalisation of the Canal had been prepared some time ago—that, I think, is the conclusion that most of us will draw from what has happened—and probably they were prepared deliberately as a means, or partially as a means, of humiliating the West. But it is equally possible, if we look at the personality and character of Colonel Nasser, that he seized the issue of the Aswan Dam as an excuse for putting his plans into effect. To that extent, it probably was a sudden decision. It was, if I may put it in this way, the violent way in which a violent man reacts to unwelcome news.
In any case, whatever the explanation, if he will forgive my saying so, I could not quite accept the picture which was painted for us this afternoon, interesting though it was, by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate; and in one particular I should just like to say a word. I do not know from where he got the story, if I understood him aright, that the loan for the Aswan Dam was to be made dependent on peace with Israel. I would assure him that there is no truth whatever in any such suggestion.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No. That was what the Colonel told me. He named
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number of different reasons which he alleged were obstacles. That is where the story comes from.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Far be it from me to contradict Colonel Nasser, but I would say that it is what might be called a subjective view. In any case, whatever view anyone may hold as to these negotiations for the High Aswan Dam, I quite agree with what has been said by almost every speaker this afternoon: that no one must underestimate the gravity of the issues that have been raised by Colonel Nasser's action. He has struck a savage blow, in my view, at good faith in public engagements, which, if it were allowed to go unchallenged, would certainly be the precursor of others, possibly even more serious, either by himself or by others who sought to profit by his example. To my mind, it never has been more necessary that we should maintain a firm front. That determination, as I see it, should inform our every action at the present time.
I have been asked a number of detailed questions and I will try to answer them, though some of them perhaps are not entirely relevant to our main theme. Two questions were raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. First, he asked what had happened to the Committee of Agents which was appointed so many years ago under the 1888 Convention. I am sorry to tell him that, from inquiries I have made, the Committee may indeed have sat, but at any rate it was abrogated as far back as the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. He may tell me that that is a great pity. That may very likely be true, but I hope he will not blame the Government, or indeed his own Party, for that.
Then he asked what is the position with regard to the Gulf of Akaba. Is it an international waterway? The answer, as I understand it, is this. These Straits of Tiran have always been an international waterway, in exactly the same way as every other international waterway —that is to say, the right of innocent passage is applied to it. It is true that a practice grew up of giving notice of a passage of ships.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That practice began when the late Labour

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Government were in office: I do not know the reason. The noble Viscount is probably in a better position than I am to find out.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, spoke of the interference with Israeli ships, and there has been further reference to this matter in later speeches. As your Lordships know, that Egyptian interference began, I think, in 1948, and in 1950 the Government of the day—the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will correct me if I am wrong—put the matter into the hands of the United Nations. As we all know—or, at least, all those of us who have had anything to do with such matters—resolutions have been passed by the United Nations Organisation from time to time calling on the Egyptians to stop interfering with these ships; but no effective action, I agree, has been taken by the United Nations oil this particular matter. Perhaps I may make just this one comment —it is really a repetition of what has just been said by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Once the matter has been referred to an international body, it becomes a matter for that international body as a whole; and although all members must take their share of responsibility, the full responsibility does not rest with any particular member. Therefore, that being the case, to try to suggest, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, did, that the whole responsibility rested on the British Government was, I think, inaccurate and misleading.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess. I did not suggest that. I merely tried to point out that we did not get worried until we saw a threat impending to our own ships.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Lord says "we"; but, of course, it is in the hands of the United Nations. 'The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, usually request that this and other questions should go to the United Nations; but when the United Nations do not do what they want, they are rather inclined to throw the blame back on the British Government. That is perhaps human nature, but I felt it necessary to say just a word about it.
Then, the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, again raised the extraordinarily ingenious plan which he put forward the
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other day for the building of another Canal into the Gulf of Akaba. Whether or not that is a practical proposition I am not in a position to tell him, because, in any case, I am not an engineer. Of course, this is an immense proposal, requiring the most careful consideration; and no doubt it could be carried through, if it was carried through at all, only as an international undertaking. However, my noble friend Lord Reading told the noble Lord that the matter was under consideration with all these other and varied solutions which must come before Her Majesty's Government and every other Government in connection with this difficult position, and I can repeat that assurance to him this afternoon.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I am much obliged. Does that apply also to the pipeline?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I should think it would apply to every proposition there could possibly be in this extraordinarily thorny situation.
There are one or two other things I ought to say. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister explained in another place this morning. Her Majesty's Government have thought it necessary to take certain precautionary measures of a military nature. The object of these measures is purely and simply to strengthen our position in the Eastern Mediterranean area and our ability to deal with any situation that might conceivably arise. As my right honourable friend said, these measures include the movement from this country of certain Naval, Army and Air Force units, and the recall of a limited number of Section A, Category reservists, and also a limited number of officers from the Regular Army Reserve of Officers. In addition, we shall, I am afraid, have to recall a strictly limited number of men who are specialists and skilled in certain essential tasks. I am told that these men are in Section B of the Regular Army Reserve and in Category II of the Army Emergency Reserve. This recall necessitates the issue of a Proclamation, notice of which was given to your Lordships only a short time ago by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor.
Finally, my Lords, I was asked certain questions—or, at any rate the matter was raised frequently—about the legal position

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with regard to the Canal. As we all know, Colonel Nasser has claimed that he is acting completely within the law. I have been asked certain questions about this. Of course, the legal aspect, as nearly always happens in my experience when we touch the sphere of International Law, raises every kind of intricate consideration. My noble friend Lord Reading has already dealt with it broadly, and he is far more qualified to do so than I am, because I am not a lawyer, and I advance on such issues only with great preoccupation. But, very simply (and perhaps I may say this especially to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, who mentioned the legal aspect), the considerations present themselves to me particularly in this way. It seems to me that the sole purpose of the granting of a Concession to the Suez Canal Company—indeed, the sole purpose for which the Suez Canal Company was originally formed—was to create and to maintain a great international waterway.
As I see it, that fact was underlined and buttressed by the signature in 1888 of the Suez Canal Convention, which gave international authority and protection to its operations. It was for that purpose that capital was raised which alone made the project possible. It clearly follows, therefore—at least, it does to me—that for the Egyptian Government unilaterally, and without agreement, either with the Company or with the signatories of the Convention, arbitrarily to take over the Company for the purpose of diverting its funds—which should be used for maintaining the waterway—for completely different purposes at the whim of that Government, is entirely contrary to the basic purpose for which the Concession was granted and for which the Company was formed; and contrary, I should have thought, to every possible principle of equity, which is the basis of all the civilised life which we enjoy. To my mind, that would apply equally whether Colonel Nasser needed that money for the purchasing of arms from Russia or for the building of the High Dam at Aswan.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: This is very important. Would it be possible to submit a case to the Brussels Court, so that we may know clearly whether he is infringing International Law or not?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think the noble Viscount meant the International Court at The Hague.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: One of the difficulties is that the Egyptian Government have not signed the optional clause, so that it would be clearly in their hands as to whether they go into any International Court or not. I should think the chances of their availing themselves of the opportunity were remote.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is not so clear. The Court at The Hague is, I understand, a Court for Governments. Would not the Government be able, with the consent of the Egyptian Government, to have this important issue clarified? It is a most important issue.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think I can go any further than I have done at the moment. Moreover, to my mind—and I was saying this, too, to the noble Viscount—this does not seem to me merely a legal question; it is a political question, as has been said frequently in the debate. It might also almost be called a moral question, for what is inherent in it, in effect, as I see it, is the whole issue of international good faith. Is it to be accepted as an ordinary principle of public life that Governments can tear up agreements into which they have solemnly entered whenever it suits them, for reasons of national policy? That is a general proposition and, as we all know, this is not the only time that that particular issue has been raised in the life of most of us. We can all think of other cases, though I have mentioned only the one.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, whose thoughtful speech, I think, impressed us so much, my mind turned immediately, when I heard of the action of Colonel Nasser, to the case of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. There was a case where a Government which had solemnly undertaken not to remilitarise an area of its own territory, as soon as it was convenient, broke its word and did what it had undertaken not to do. I cannot help thinking that this, in many ways, is a similar case to-day. As I see it, if we allow that action to pass unchallenged we shall debase the whole currency of international relations. And,

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moreover, we know, from our bitter experiences in the past, where passive acquiescence is likely to lead us.
So far from disaster being averted by methods such as that, the offending Government has always merely been encouraged to worse breaches of conduct; and then, when, in due course, a stand has had to be made, there has occurred a disaster far more terrible than if we had stood firm in the earlier stages. If Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal and his breach of agreements to which his country was a party were acquiesced in now, to my mind the whole stability of the Middle East would be placed immediately in mortal peril. I have no doubt that we should see similar steps taken by other Governments, one after another; and when, ultimately, a stand had to he made, we should all bitterly regret that we had not stood firmly now. It was for that reason that, in a statement made by the Prime Minister on Monday, Her Majesty's Government made it quite clear—and I will repeat the words which have already been quoted to-day [OFFICIAL REPORT, (Commons) Vol. 557, No. 202, col. 923]:
"No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy."
By that statement we stand, and for that principle we are prepared to take all such measures as may be necessary.
As your Lordships know, that is the situation which has been under consideration during the last two days by the representatives of Her Majesty's Government and the Foreign Ministers of our two Allies, Mr. Dulles and M. Pineau, who have underlined the importance which they attach to this issue by coming themselves to discuss what should be done about it. Those talks are still going on. and I am afraid it is clear that there is nothing more I can say to-day. It is for that reason that I shall refrain from following the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, into the very interesting issues which he raised in his speech this afternoon. That does not mean that I do not agree with a great deal of what he said, but I am afraid that in such a situation I am not in a position further to develop the theme. I am sure that the noble Earl
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will understand that, and I mention it only because I am most anxious he should not feel that I am guilty of any discourtesy to him.
Then the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, delved into the future. He asked me a number of pregnant questions as to what Her Majesty's Government propose to do. I do not think the noble Viscount really expected an answer to those questions. I feel hey were what I was taught at school to call rhetorical questions, and the great point about such questions is that they do not require an answer. I do not regard the noble Viscount's questions as requiring an answer, arid I am afraid that he will not get one.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the noble Marquess has reverted to the charming badinage of his more pedestrian style. The issues I raised were what is to be the result of a conflict with Egypt with all that group of Powers in the East called the Bandoeng group. That is a question to which the noble Marquess can give a general answer and which cannot be evaded by a rhetorical flourish.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think anyone can give an answer to that question. 'The noble Viscount asked other questions about what Her Majesty's Government were going to do, and I cannot answer them either. I have done my best to answer those questions which I can. The last thing I wish to say, and one thing I would establish beyond any doubt, is that this is not a matter on which we can or will weaken; and I hope that we shall receive the support of everyone who believes, as I do most profoundly, that it is only on a broad base of good faith between nations and peoples that a new and better world can ever arise.
6.14 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the debate that we have just had was bound to be of a limited character, but has been none the less valuable for that. We have clarified our minds on a great many questions connected with this problem. Some of us have come rather fresh to it while others 'have lived with it for a long time. I believe that the result of this discussion has been that we are now all much more familiar with the situation and we have been given many facts of which we were not before aware. It is true that Her

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Majesty's Government have not been able to give the House a clear statement as to what was going to be done, but obviously they cannot, and I make no complaint whatever. They are in consultation with our friends and are not able to make a statement alone.
One of the values of this debate has been that it has enabled some of your Lordships to express your views to Her Majesty's Government. I feel we should all agree that, on the whole, the feeling of your Lordships' House is pretty solid, There has been a difference of emphasis here and there, but by and large we are all agreed on what Her Majesty's Government seek to achieve, and there has not been a great deal of difference as to the method. There I would leave it, except to congratulate the noble Marquess on having put forward to this House a legal explanation which I rather hesitated to do. If the noble Marquess does not mind my saying so, that was exactly what I had in mind; but with rather more courage than I possess he explained the legal position to your Lordships. I believe he is right. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

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