Sitting of 2 November 1955

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PETITIONS (ROAD COMMUNICATIONS)
Mr. Gresham Cooke: I beg leave to ask your permission, Mr. Speaker, to present a Petition on behalf of over 1,000 persons who attended the recent Conservative Party Conference at Bournemouth, the Petition being with regard to the urgent need for a major improvement of road communications in this country. The Prayer of the Petition is as follows:
"Wherefore, your Petitioners pray that to ensure the early completion of adequate modern roads in Great Britain arrangements shall be made forthwith to raise a special road loan to provide the necessary funds during the period required to carry out this essential work under a comprehensive and scientifically planned scheme, so avoiding the delays and frustrations which have proved to be inevitable under the present system of financing road works by means of annual grants.
And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray."
Mr. Pargiter: I beg to ask leave, Mr. Speaker, to present a Petition on behalf of 1,454 people who attended the recent Labour Party Conference. It urges that delay in carrying out improvements of road communications is damaging to the progress and prosperity of the country. Except for the larger number of persons who have signed the Petition, it is in the same terms as the Petition which has just beer, read. Therefore, I will not detain the House by reading it. It concludes
"And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray."
Petitions to lie upon the Table.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  SHIPBUILDING

    South African Orders
    Mr. P. Williamsasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many orders for new naval vessels have been placed as a result of the recent agreement with the Government of the Union of South Africa.
    The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas): None, Sir. The first orders for the programme will be placed in the near future.
    Mr. Williams: Is my right hon. Friend aware that at present the shipyards, certainly those in the North-East of England, are suffering from a shortage of steel? Is it not a possibility that the present programme may be put back even further?
    Mr. Thomas: I will go into that point, but I hope very much not.
    Mr. Bottomley: Is the right hon. Gentleman now in a position to give me an answer to the question which I put to him earlier when he made his statement? Can he say what work will go to Chatham Dockyard?
    Mr. Thomas: I cannot say what work will go to Chatham Dockyard, but I can say that all shipyards and dockyards will be considered fairly so far as the orders to which the Question refers are concerned.

    Output
    Mr. Willeyasked the First Lord of the Admiralty the output of British shipyards for 1955 to the latest available date and the figure for the corresponding period last year.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: In the first nine months of 1955, 202 ships of about 957,000 gross tons were completed in British shipyards, compared with 172 ships of about 1,126,000 gross tons in the corresponding period of last year.
    Mr. Willey: In view of these figures and in view of the desire of the shipbuilding industry to speed up output, will the right hon. Gentleman use his good offices to see that they get the steel they need, which is lacking due to the current shortages?
    Mr. Thomas: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I will do everything I can and that the Admiralty will do all in their power to help over the steel question, but the present shipbuilding position is really pretty satisfactory.

    Exports to U.S.S.R.
    Mr. Willeyasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what are the restrictions upon the placing of orders in British shipyards by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other East European countries.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Apart from warships and a few types of merchant ship of particular strategic value, there is no prohibition on the export of ships to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other Eastern European countries.
    Mr. Willey: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for his explicit reply, may I ask if he would further define the particular types of merchant ships the building of which is prohibited, because there is still some confusion about this matter?
    Mr. Thomas: I think that the position is pretty well understood by those in authority. Some ships concerned are tankers, which are useful for refuelling submarines; whaling factory ships, which are used as submarine depot ships and whalecatchers, which are convertible into anti-submarine vessels or minelayers.
    Mr. Fernyhough: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that these restrictions which the British Government make in regard to Soviet orders are being complied with by every other N.A.T.O. Power and that we are not being placed in an unfair position?
    Mr. Thomas: These are not restrictions made by the British Government they are international. An international decision is taken by an international committee.

  ROYAL NAVY

    Warships (Atomic Propulsion)
    Major Wallasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what progress is being made in providing nuclear propulsion for warships.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Investigations into the use of atomic propulsion in Her Majesty's ships are proceeding satisfactorily, although some years must elapse before a warship powered in this way can be expected to be in service with the Fleet.
    Major Wall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people feel that not only the future of the Royal Navy but that of the Merchant Navy is bound up in the question of nuclear propulsion? Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that this development is receiving highest priority and that we are not falling behind the United States, as would appear from newspaper reports?
    Mr. Thomas: I assure my hon. and gallant Friend that we are pushing on with this as a question of highest priority. Of course, the United States had a three-year start on these matters, but we are making up time as best we can.

    Oil Bunkering Facilities, Gibraltar
    Mr. Doddsasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what decision has been reached in the consideration given to the allocating of oil bunkering tankerage for commercial purposes in Gibraltar.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: The technical arrangements for such a scheme are well advanced. A final decision must, however, await the recommendations of the Governor of Gibraltar on the details of the port development scheme and the means of financing it, to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies referred in the debate on the Adjournment on 31st October.
    Mr. Dodds: Will the First Lord do all he possibly can to get a decision on this matter? Does not he and the members of the Cabinet appreciate that, in the economic field, Gibraltar is fighting for its life, and that it is time something was done to assist Gibraltar to resist the blackmailing tactics of Spain?
    Mr. Thomas: I assure the hon. Gentleman that the Cabinet as a whole is well aware of the importance of Gibraltar. All I can say is that our schemes are well advanced and really we are waiting now for the report of the Governor of Gibraltar. That is a question for the Colonial Office and not for the Admiralty.
    Mr. G. Jeger: Does the Minister appreciate that the frequent changes of Governorship in Gibraltar mean that each succeeding Governor has to consider the scheme afresh? When considering the report of the present Governor, will he take into account the invariable approval of the scheme by the late Governor?
    Mr. Thomas: The question of the appointment of a Flag Officer to Gibraltar is one for me. The question of the appointment of the Governor is, as the hon. Gentleman must know, one for the Colonial Office.

    H.M.S. "Discovery" (Public Admission)
    Mr. Iremongerasked the First Lord of the Admiralty when H.M.S. "Discovery" will be open to the public.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: As from Wednesday, 16th November, Her Majesty's Ship "Discovery" will be opened to the public every afternoon, including weekends, between 1 and 4.45 p.m.
    Mr. Iremonger: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him if he is aware of the gratitude that will be felt by the public to the Admiralty for enabling this lovely and worthy monument to our national genius to continue to adorn the London scene? May I further ask if he is aware of the great satisfaction felt by many of Her Majesty's subjects that this splendid ship should once again be flying the proudest and most beautiful flag in the world, the White Ensign?
    Mr. Thomas: We are thankful for the very encouraging messages about this ship.

    Naval Mission, Athens
    Mr. Dugdaleasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will explain the reason for withdrawing the Naval Mission from Athens.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Before the termination of the tour of duty of the recent Head of the Naval Mission, the question of the appointment of a successor was taken up with the Greek Government. In compliance with their views, it has been decided that no successor shall be appointed and that the Mission as a whole shall be substantially
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    reduced. In order to maintain the cooperation between the Royal Hellenic Navy and the Royal Navy, a member of the Mission will continue as Director of Studies at the Greek Naval War College. The other liaison functions of the Mission will be taken over by a senior officer, who will shortly be appointed as Naval Attaché.
    Mr. Dugdale: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think it somewhat strange that after such a very long time the duties of this Mission should be concluded? Is it not in any way due to the deterioration in Anglo-Greek relations as a result of Her Majesty's Government's policy in Cyprus?
    Mr. Thomas: I must correct the right hon. Gentleman. It has not been concluded; it has been reduced from five officers to two. I remember dealing with this question when I was out there twoand-a-half years ago. The Mission was under discussion then, which was long before the present violent troubles over Cyprus arose.

    Naval Ratings (Prison Sentences)
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what sailors have been recently convicted for assaulting superior officers; what were their sentences; and how many are still serving sentences.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: During 1955, twelve naval ratings have been convicted by courts-martial on charges including striking their superior officers. Nine of the men concerned have not yet completed their sentences. I will circulate details of the sentences in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Hughes: Can the First Lord say whether these convicted prisoners include Mr. McSporran, who had an unfortunate difference with an admiral? Is Mr. McSporran still in prison, and what point is there in keeping him in prison when he is no longer of any use to the Navy and could be doing useful work outside?
    Mr. Thomas: The list I have mentioned does include Mr. McSporran, whose sentence on consideration I considerably reduced. I cannot agree with the hon. Member. This is a disciplined Service, and any attempt to strike a superior

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    officer is a very serious offence and must be severely punished.
    Following are the sentences:

    1 of 2 years' imprisonment, reduced to 1 year on review by the Admiralty.

    1 of 30 months' imprisonment, reduced to 20 months.

    2 of 18 months' detention.

    1 of 15 months' detention, reduced to 9 months.

    4 of 1 year's imprisonment.

    2 of I year's detention.

    1 of 9 months' imprisonment, reduced to 6 months.

    One of the men awarded 18 months' detention was subsequently sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for threatening and attempting to use violence against his superior officer while undergoing his sentence of detention.
    In every case where a sentence of imprisonment was imposed it was accompanied by a sentence of dismissal from Her Majesty's Service.

    Royal Yacht "Britannia"
    Mr. Benceasked the First Lord of the Admiralty why the Royal Yacht "Britannia" is undergoing a refit; and what the total cost of refits has been to date.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: The Royal Yacht "Britannia" is now in hand for her normal annual refit. The total cost of previous refits was £109,198.
    Mr. Bence: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that the periodical necessity for the refitting and overhaul of this ship is not due to quality of the ship when launched and when she left the Clyde, but is mainly due to the workers in Portsmouth messing about with this ship, and will not the right hon. Gentleman send her back to the Clyde?
    Mr. Thomas: It is not a question of the workers messing about with the ship at Portsmouth. These are the usual teething troubles of a new ship.
    Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Can the right hon. Gentleman state the main items comprising the £109,000?
    Mr. Thomas: I cannot give details without notice.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Is it not the fact that the construction of this ship was authorised by the Labour Government and, instead of all this talk, would it not be a good thing to leave it alone, because we are all very proud of it?
    Mr. Thomas: It is perfectly true that it was authorised by the Labour Government. I think the "Britannia" is an extremely good ship, and I should like to congratulate the constituents of the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence) on the work they put into it.

  TELEPHONE SERVICE

    Congleton Exchange
    Air Commodore Harveyasked the Postmaster-General when he is planning to install an automatic telephone exchange at Congleton.
    The Postmaster-General (Dr. Charles Hill): In 1960. The existing exchange equipment will be enlarged in the meantime.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Will my right hon. Friend say why Congleton has been left so far behind in the Post Office programme, and will he try to improve on that date?
    Dr. Hill: There are many arrears to be made up in Congleton as elsewhere, and I am afraid that Congleton cannot be dealt with in the matter of a new automatic exchange until 1960.
    Air Commodore Harvey: That is very bad.

    London Directories
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware of the inconvenience being caused to Greater London telephone subscribers by the separation of the directories for the London Postal Area from the London Telecommunications Region; and whether he will consider restoring the directories to their former arrangements when the next issues are due.
    Dr. Hill: The purpose of the issue of separate directories for the London Postal Area and Outer London areas was to reduce the weight, size and cost of the main London directory. To do as my hon. Friend suggests would defeat the object of the rearrrangement.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that subscribers in the London area who wish to telephone to exchanges only about ten miles away, such as Popesgrove and Molsey, are put

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    to the inconvenience of having to have another book, namely, the West Middlesex book?
    Dr. Hill: The suggestion of my hon. Friend would mean that they would be put to the inconvenience of having to have a vast volume. It is the case that in each area, and there are now six, the London Area and five outer areas, any subscriber, in addition to his own directory, can get any of the other directories on demand.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us the financial saving by this arrangement?
    Dr. Hill: About a quarter of a million pounds.
    Dame Irene Ward: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that people who use the telephone deserve a little consideration as well as the Post Office?

    Coloured Telephones (Cost)
    Mr. P. Williamsasked the Postmaster-General the cost to his Department of one black telephone instrument, one green telephone instrument, one ivory telephone instrument and one red telephone instrument.
    Dr. Hill: The price of a typical instrument is about £6 in black and about £1 more in the other colours.
    Mr. G. Thomas: On a point of order. This question was not called, Mr. Speaker.
    Mr. Speaker: It was called.
    Mr. Thomas: No, Sir, the hon. Member did not call it.
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member asked an earlier Question.

    Party Lines
    Mr. Russellasked the Postmaster-General what proportion of applicants for telephones who are compelled to share a party line are former subscribers transferred owing to a change of home or business.
    Dr. Hill: This information is not available and could only be obtained by special scrutiny of a large number of records.
    Mr. Russell: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that, eventually, this sharing of lines will be entirely voluntary, possibly with the addition of some substantial reduction in the telephone rental?
    Dr. Hill: It is hoped that eventually the sharing of lines may not be necessary, but, for the present, it should be borne in mind that half a million people are enabled to obtain the telephone service today by virtue of the shared line system.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is some confusion and dissatisfaction about this, that where the subscriber transfers from one house to another he is, in some cases, asked to sign a new agreement, and that when he signs the new agreement he loses the exclusive use of the line and has to share it with another subscriber? Could not the right hon. Gentleman have the matter looked at more closely to see that the undertakings given are carried out?
    Dr. Hill: I will look into the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman, but he will recall that since 1948 it has been an obligation on new and removing residential subscribers to accept sharing.

    Public Call Boxes (Fraudulent Calls)
    Mr. Iremongerasked the Postmaster-General what evidence has been given to his Department that certain members of the public have discovered a method of using public call boxes for making telephone calls without paying the charge.
    Dr. Hill: I can assure my hon. Friend that the Post Office is well informed on this problem. Several people have been prosecuted for this type of fraud recently.
    Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that the rumour that this comes from Aberdeen is quite wrong?
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what evidence he has that certain members of the public have discovered a method of using the public telephone for a whole evening for a charge of 3d.?

    Tadcaster
    Sir L. Ropnerasked the Postmaster-General how many applications for the installation of telephones there are still outstanding in the Tadcaster rural district area.
    Dr. Hill: Fifty-seven.
    Sir L. Ropner: Can my right hon. Friend say how that figure compares with the figure for this time last year?
    Dr. Hill: Yes, it is 36 less.

    Northern Ireland
    Mr. Hydeasked the Postmaster-General the number of applications for telephones outstanding in Northern Ireland; and how many of these are in Belfast.
    Dr. Hill: Seven thousand, five hundred and sixty-eight and 2,806, respectively.
    Mr. Knox Cunningham: Would my right hon. Friend bear in mind that in the Upper Cave Hill Road in Belfast there are people who have been waiting six years for the telephone, and would he see that those responsible on the spot get on with the job of giving this service?
    Dr. Hill: I realise that there are big arrears, but I can say that in Belfast alone three extensions of exchanges will take place next year, one other in the year after, and extensive cable laying is to take place next year.

  POST OFFICE

    Cable-laying Ship "Monarch" (Operations)
    Mr. Shepherdasked the Postmaster-General if he will make a statement on the last cable-laying operation of "Monarch."
    Dr. Hill: "Monarch" has recently completed the laying of 1,941 nautical miles of telephone cable, including 51 repeaters, across the Atlantic from Newfoundland to Scotland at depths reaching two-and-a-half miles. This unique operation, completed on schedule despite very difficult weather conditions at times, is the first stage in the construction of the submarine links in the joint Anglo-American-Canadian Transatlantic Telephone Cable system, particulars of
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    which were given to the House in December, 1953.
    According to present plans "Monarch" will lay a two-way cable between Newfoundland and Nova Scotia in the early summer of next year, followed by the second one-way cable between Scotland and Newfoundland; the aim is to have the whole system ready for service towards the end of 1956.
    I am sure the House will wish me to congratulate all those on both sides of the Atlantic whose skill has contributed to the successful outcome of this year's operations and to wish them continued success in 1956.

    Parliamentary Debates (Broadcast Discussions)
    Mr. Wadeasked the Postmaster-General whether he will withdraw his directive which provides that the British Broadcasting Corporation shall not, on any issue, arrange discussions or ex parte statements which are to be broadcast during a period of a fortnight before the issue is debated in either House; and whether he will withdraw a similar directive to the Independent Television Authority.
    Dr. Hill: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer given on 25th October by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) and to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond).
    Mr. Wade: Does the Minister appreciate that this ban is not the outcome of any democratic decision by Parliament, and, in view of that fact, as well as of the fact that the attempt to enforce it has become somewhat of a farce, will the right hon. Gentleman withdraw the ban, at any rate until Members of this House have had an opportunity of expressing an opinion on it?
    Dr. Hill: While I am aware of the hon. Gentleman's views, I have nothing to add to the answers given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
    Captain Orr: Could my right hon. Friend explain how the B.B.C. and the I.T.A. are expected to know the business for next week when we ourselves in this House are not likely to know for another 40 minutes?
    Dr. Hill: No doubt my hon. and gallant Friend heard the replies of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on that subject yesterday.
    Mr. Donnelly: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the significant thing about this ban is that it is not just a self-denying ordinance of Members of Parliament, but affects all people regardless of whether or not they have anything to do with this House? Is the right hon. Gentleman now prepared to say whether this was the original intention?
    Dr. Hill: The 14-day rule in its present form continues an arrangement which has been working since 1948 in the respect in which the hon. Gentleman makes his point as in other respects.
    Mr. Hirst: Will my right hon. Friend at any rate convey to his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that the House quite honestly is not satisfied with the statement which he made yesterday? The position has changed, it must be reviewed, and it is overdue for revision.
    Dr. Hill: I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will note what my hon. Friend has said.
    Mr. Grimondasked the Postmaster-General (1) what alterations in instructions were given to the British Broadcasting Corporation in relation to the 14-day ban in order to enable the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden and others to broadcast about the Budget;
    (2) if his attention has been drawn to the difference between the interpretations put upon his ban on political broadcasting by the British Broadcasting Corporation and Independent Television Authority; and what steps be proposes to take.
    Mr. Snowasked the Postmaster-General what protests he has made to the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Independent Television Authority regarding infringements of the 14-day rule in connection with televised broadcasts of 4-man panels which occurred between 28th and 30th October on the subject of the Budget, the general debate on which was not concluded until 31st October.
    Dr. Hill: As soon as the general debate on the Budget ended at about 4 p.m. on 28th October, it was in my view in order for the B.B.C. and the I.T.A. to
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    broadcast discussions about it. Both organisations were aware of this, but the B.B.C. decided not to have the matter discussed. No new instructions have been issued to the Corporation since 27th July, when I issued the direction on the 14-day rule. In the B.B.C.'s view, and my own, this rule does not affect the usual Budget talk by the Chancellor and the reply by the Opposition, or any authorised series of party political broadcasts.
    Mr. Grimond: Is the Postmaster-General aware that there was the most incredible muddle over this matter? Is he aware that neither authority knew what the position was, and that there was a censure debate—which the Chancellor surely should have noticed—on Monday? In my view, he has missed a most admirable opportunity of confining his right hon. Friend and his predecessor to the Tower of London.
    Dr. Hill: There has been no lack of clarity, except, perhaps, in the minds of some newspapers and some hon. Members. It was made perfectly plain to both the Corporation and the Authority, in response to their requests, that it was not regarded as a breach of the rule to have these Budget discussions over last weekend. I have no right or desire to instruct the Corporation to include this or that item in their programmes. I am reporting to the House what was the exact position in relation to the rule.
    Mr. Bowles: Under what authority does the Postmaster-General issue this rule?
    Dr. Hill: The 14-day rule, issued on 27th July last, was issued under Section 15 (4) of the Licence.
    Mr. K. Thompson: Can my right hon. Friend say if it would now be in order for the B.B.C. to arrange a debate upon the clarity of its understanding of the 14-day rule?
    Mr. S. Silverman: Can the right hon. Gentleman explain what are the considerations which prevent the rule limiting discussion on the radio and television from applying also to the newspapers?
    Dr. Hill: The rule which is made under Section 15 (4) of the Licence relates to broadcasting, and to broadcasting only.

    Stamp Books
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Postmaster-General if he will consider issuing books of stamps to the total value of 10s. in addition to those already issued at lower values.
    Dr. Hill: I doubt whether there would be a sufficient demand for 10s. books to justify the cost of production and stocking.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Would there not be a ready sale for these books, particularly among long-suffering Members of Parliament, who are always short of stamps?
    Dr. Hill: The sales of 5s. books of stamps are a little more than one-third of those of 2s. 6d. books, and I do not really think that there is sufficient demand for 10s. books.
    Mr. Glenvil Hall: Apart from whether or not there is a demand, can the right hon. Gentleman tell us what the actual cost would be?
    Dr. Hill: Not without notice.

    Housing Estate, Newport (Sub-Office)
    Mr. Peter Freemanasked the Postmaster-General whether he has considered a request from the town clerk of Newport for an additional sub-post office on the Gaer Housing Estate, Newport; and, in view of the large increase in population and the present inadequate service, if he will authorise its provision at the earliest possible date.
    Dr. Hill: I am having inquiries made, and I hope to reply very shortly to the letter which the hon. Member has sent to me about this matter.
    Mr. Freeman: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that at present the Post Office facilities are a very long way from the centre of this housing estate and that the only convenient place is in the middle of the shopping centre of the estate? Will he give special consideration to that point?
    Dr. Hill: The hon. Gentleman wrote to me on 17th October, and I am looking into the problem which he raised.

    Parcels Service (Northern Ireland)
    Mr. Hydeasked the Postmaster-General if he will take steps to improve the parcel post service between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.
    Dr. Hill: Improvements have been made in this service during the past few years. We are doing our best to maintain it at a high standard, though from time to time abnormally high postings and staff shortages cause some delay.
    Mr. Hyde: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the parcel post between these two parts of the United Kingdom at present is little short of a national scandal? Parcels rarely take less than three days and frequently over a week to reach their destination, and perishable goods frequently do perish. Furthermore, is my right hon. Friend aware that he is asking the public to pay more for what is a totally inadequate service, particularly for the business community of Northern Ireland which depends on it?
    Dr. Hill: I am really not aware of the kind of conditions to which my hon. Friend refers. Some two or three years ago it took two days for parcels posted in London to reach Belfast whereas now, I am advised, such parcels usually reach Belfast the next day. I do not pretend that the service is as satisfactory as we would wish it to be, but I suggest that my hon. Friend's statement is an exaggeration.

    Development and Finance
    Mr. Rossasked the Postmaster-General whether the financial situation and the proposals to deal with it, as outlined in Command Paper No. 9576, were discussed by the Post Office Advisory Council; and on what date.
    Dr. Hill: Yes, Sir. The Post Office Advisory Committee was consulted on the problem generally and on tentative proposals to deal with it on 10th February, 1955.
    Mr. Ross: Can the right hon. Gentleman make it perfectly clear that the position and the solutions were known long before the General Election and that no attempt was made to deal with the matter?
    Dr. Hill: It is also perfectly clear that in recent months there have been added problems, including increased wage awards of £14 million a year.

  ROYAL AIR FORCE

    Guided Missiles
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air when he expects to have guided missiles in operational use in the Royal Air Force.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): I am afraid I cannot reveal this information, but good progress continues to be made in developing both surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles.
    Mr. de Freitas: Is the Under-Secretary of State aware that it is only a year since the Army's Anti-Aircraft Command was wound up and its functions handed over to the Royal Air Force? Surely he will say something better than he has just said about our guided missiles service?
    Mr. Ward: I did point out, during a debate upon the Adjournment before we rose for the Summer Recess, that it was a mistake to regard these missiles as substitutes for anti-aircraft guns. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will realise that we cannot bring these missiles into use until we have carried out full tests—which we are doing; hundreds of rounds have been fired—and until we are quite satisfied that the whole system will fit our long-term needs.
    Mr. Strachey: Would not the Under-Secretary agree that the real lesson of the recent exercises was that these missiles really provide the only hope of effective interception of high-level four-engined bombers?
    Mr. Ward: No, Sir. They should be regarded as an integral part of our fighter defence, together with manned fighters.
    Mr. Burden: Does not my hon. Friend agree that the Hunter has now proved itself to be by far the best interceptor in operational service in the world today?
    Mr. Ward: It is certainly a very fine manned interceptor fighter.

    Officers' Ball, Henlow (Mess Waiters)
    Mr. D. Howellasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air why batmen serving at Halton Camp were sent, at public expense, to an officers' ball at
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    Henlow; and what action he proposes to take to prevent any repetition of such an incident.
    Mr. Ward: The summer ball at the Royal Air Force Technical College, Henlow, provides a valuable opportunity to return hospitality and to maintain contacts, not only with different branches of the Royal Air Force and other Services, but also with industry, the universities and local dignitaries. There are not enough batmen at the college to provide the waiters needed for the ball, and others were therefore brought from nearby stations.
    Because of the importance of the ball to the Service, it was considered appropriate that they should travel at public expense, although other costs were met by the officers themselves. However, I have now decided that the travelling expenses also shall be recovered from mess funds.
    Mr. Howell: I thank the Minister for that small concession, but does he still feel it to be in order that men in National Service should spend their time going from one camp to another in order to act as waiters for officers at their ball? Does not he think that if waiters are necessary upon these social occasions they should be employed from private sources, which are no doubt available? Is it not disgraceful that National Service men are used in this manner?
    Mr. Ward: No, Sir. As I told the hon. Gentleman, most of these men were volunteers, and very few were National Service men.

    Batmen (Duties)
    Mr. D. Howellasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air why batmen are still used in the Royal Air Force; whether he will take steps to prevent the use of service personnel in married quarters; and what action he has taken in respect of the details forwarded to him of the batmen at Halton Camp who were chiefly engaged in undertaking domestic chores for the wives and relatives of officers stationed at that camp.
    Mr. Ward: We need batmen for various essential duties in messes, and to provide personal service for officers, particularly in looking after their kit. I am not prepared to deny batman service

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    to officers living in married quarters, but Commands have been reminded that the service should not exceed that provided for single officers. I have also decided that no National Service batman is to be employed in an officer's married quarter unless he volunteers for this work.
    Mr. Howell: Is the Minister not aware that there is a considerable difference of definition between what the Services regard as volunteering and what other people regard as volunteering? Is he not further aware that, of the nine detailed statements of batmen at Halton Camp, which I sent him—batmen who were being asked to fetch coal, make beds, press ladies' clothes and take children to school—not one has been refuted? Is it not scandalous that three National Service men and three full-time men out of these nine should so misuse their Service time? What steps will he take to end this system of having batmen for officers' wives—a costly system, which most of the rest of the country cannot afford, and our wives and others have to go without?
    Mrs. Cullen: End National Service.
    Mr. Ward: I am sure the hon. Gentleman would agree that there is no reason why a married officer should be penalised just because he is married. Therefore, it is fair and logical that married officers should have the batman service which single officers enjoy. What we have now done is to remind commanding officers that these services should be confined to those which single officers get in mess. There have, for a long time, been perfectly workable and agreeable arrangements whereby an officer may ask his batman to undertake special extra duties in his spare time and offer to remunerate him accordingly. If the batman agrees, there is no reason why we should interfere.
    Mr. Strachey: Would not the Under-Secretary agree that, however logical these arrangements are, they do in fact have a very bad effect upon National Service and upon people's attitude towards it? Will he not look into this matter again?
    Mr. Ward: It is because such doubts have been raised that we have now said that National Service men must volunteer. I absolutely refute the allegation
    1014
    that these men will be forced to undertake this work. We are to get their agreement to volunteer in writing—and I think that we shall get plenty of volunteers.

    National Service Men (Training)
    Mr. D. Howellasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air why, during the two years' National Service performed by Mr. B. E. Holland, and others, details of which are in his possession, these airmen received only nine weeks' training during the whole of their service; and what action he proposes to take to prevent any repetition of this abuse of National Service.
    Mr. Ward: These airmen completed the full course of recruit training. They were then posted for duty as batmen and were trained as such "on the job." I cannot regard this as an abuse of National Service.
    Mr. Howell: Does not the Minister regard it as most remarkable that this man, who has completed two years' service in the Royal Air Force, did eight weeks' initial training, and for the rest of his service of one year and 10 months did only one week's ground combat training, which he himself regards as farcical? Does not the whole of this make complete nonsense of the Government's case for two years' National Service?
    Mr. Ward: No, Sir. I cannot accept that view. These boys did the normal recruits' course, and they also had trade training to fit them for a particular and necessary job. Naturally, the length of trade training must vary according to the duties which the man is to carry out, but because he is selected for a trade which calls for only limited training, or for training on the job, it certainly does not mean that he is being wasted.
    Mr. H. Morrison: Can the Under-Secretary state whether it is the case that, out of the two years, as is alleged by my hon. Friend, there were actually only nine weeks' training? Is this a fact?
    Mr. Ward: I have not checked up definitely. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I have looked into the case of Holland, and I understand that this man did eight weeks' recruits' training and a week's

    1015
    training while on the station in combat duties. That concerns Holland. Certainly I will look into all the others, if it is felt to be necessary, but the instructions are quite clear on the matter.
    Mr. Morrison: It is curious, but I was afraid the Under-Secretary was going to say that, notwithstanding the Question on the Order Paper, he did not know whether the facts were one way or the other. As he now admits that, in respect of Mr. Holland, it was eight weeks plus one week of actual training, does he really regard that as satisfactory out of two years' National Service?
    Mr. Ward: I must agree that as much general service training as possible should be given to everybody. Whether one thinks that a week would be enough or not is a matter of opinion. This is a matter which is left to the discretion of commanding officers, and the task of every station varies. I am quite prepared to look again at this matter and see whether these people who are not concerned with general service but are doing special jobs of this kind should do a little more general service, but it does mean taking them off their jobs for the time being, which means that the task they are doing has to run light to that extent.
    Mr. Strachey: Does not all this really bring home to the House and the Under-Secretary the fact that the Royal Air Force has now become so technical a Service that it simply finds the greatest difficulty in using National Service men at all and that the system really does not fit the Service any longer?
    Mr. Ward: With great respect, I think it shows exactly the opposite—that these men are kept so fully employed that it is difficult to find time for them to do general training.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Does not my hon. Friend recall that five years ago National Service men were sent to fight in Malaya with only eight weeks' training?
    Mr. Howell: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter on the Motion for the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

    Aircraft and Stores (Expenditure)
    Mr. Wiggasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air what part of the sum of £292 million estimated to be spent on the purchase of aircraft and stores in 1955–56 he now estimates will be spent; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Ward: Expenditure on the purchase of aircraft and stores in 1955–56 is likely to be below the estimate, but it is not possible at this stage of the financial year to say by how much.
    Mr. Wigg: Will the hon. Gentleman be good enough to say whether one of the reasons for the shortfall is the absence of technical staff to maintain V bombers? In other words, has the Air Ministry cut back the supply of V bombers because it lacks the technical staff to maintain the aircraft?
    Mr. Ward: I think I must refer Questions about V bombers to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply.
    Mr. Shinwell: Would the hon. Gentleman be quite frank with the House? Is it not true to say that the estimate for the Royal Air Force will not be fully used? Is it not true to say that?
    Mr. Ward: I did say that it looked at the moment as though we would be underspent, but I did not think it fair to say by how much at this stage, because there is still a lot of the financial year to go, and it might be a quite different figure by the end.
    Mr. Wigg: As the hon. Gentleman has not been as frank as usual with the House, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Motion for the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

  ROADS

    Stevenage By-Pass (Land)
    Mr. Maddanasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what progress has been made towards acquiring the land for the Stevenage by-pass.
    The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter): Land plans have been prepared and negotiations will be opened shortly with landowners for the acquisition of land on

    1017
    the three-mile length of the by-pass between Bridge Road and Broomin Green Lane.
    Mr. Maddan: While thanking the Minister of Transport for that news of progress, which will be very much welcomed by everyone living in the neighbourhood of this very dangerous road, may I ask him to press ahead with the preparation of land plans for the rest of the by-pass and the acquisition of the land with the greatest speed?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I know my hon. Friend's views, which he has expressed on several occasions, as to the importance of this by-pass, and to a very considerable extent I share them.

    Middlesex
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation why he has allocated only £290,000 in grant to the Middlesex County Council for major road improvements towards their programme of £1,984,700 for the year 1955–56.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The funds available do not permit me to authorise all the work which highway authorities would like to undertake, and I consider £290,000 a fair allocation to Middlesex, taking into account also the needs of other areas.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the average Exchequer grant to the Middlesex County Council before the war for roads was about £400,000, which today would be worth about £800,000? Does he hold out any hope of getting nearer to pre-war conditions next year?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I must not commit myself with respect to the grant to a particular county before I have considered all the applications, but I very much welcome the initiative which the Middlesex County Council is showing in getting ahead with road schemes.

    Eton and Slough
    Mr. Fenner Brockwayasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what major road improvements in the Eton and Slough areas proposed by the Buckinghamshire County Council have been included in his Department's five-year programme.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I have not been able to accept for grant this year any of the major improvements in Eton and Slough proposed by the county council, but I hope to be able to include some of them in the programme for the next three years.
    Mr. Brockway: Could the right hon. Gentleman say, in particular, when he anticipates that the southern Slough bypass section of the South Wales relief road and the Eton-Windsor by-pass are likely to be authorised by his Department, in view of their urgency?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am not able to add, with respect to major schemes of this sort, to the statement I made in the House earlier this year.

    Slough Safety Experiment
    Mr. Fenner Brockwayasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will make a statement on the progress of the Slough safety experiment, including figures regarding the number of fatal and other accidents during the period of the experiment compared with those in a similar period a year ago.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As the Answer is rather long, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Brockway: Could the right hon. Gentleman give the figures for accidents, both fatal and otherwise? While realising the devotion of those engaged in this experiment, and expressing the hope that it may be of value to the whole nation, could I ask the Minister to say whether the figures do not indicate the need for road changes, such as the Uxbridge Road, the railway and canal bridge and the Slough by-pass, to which I have referred?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I must ask the hon. Member first to study the Answer which I shall be circulating. Let me say at once that I very much appreciate the co-operation which the Slough County Council is giving in undertaking this most important experiment.
    Following is the answer:
    The Slough experiment will last two years, during which time many different road safety measures are to he studied. The main emphasis so far has been on propaganda, education and police activity. Some engineering work has already been completed, but items in the works programme are only now beginning to appear.

    1019
    During the months April to September, 1955, six fatal accidents, 63 resulting in serious personal injury and 202 resulting in slight personal injury, were reported to the police in the Borough of Slough. Corresponding figures for the same period in 1954 were five, 64 and 140, respectively. The total of fatal and serious accidents is unaltered despite a heavy increase in traffic. Fatal and serious casualties in the whole of the country have increased by 11 per cent. The increase in slight accidents may be due, in part, to an increased tendency to report minor in juries as a result both of the extra police on the road and increased public interest in road accidents.
    The behaviour of road users in Slough has been studied by the Road Research Laboratory and the Social Survey, and surveys have been carried out. Preliminary results show improvements in many aspects of road behaviour.

    Pedestrian Crossings, Cardiff
    Mr. G. Thomasasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he is aware of the sharp increase in heavy traffic using the Penarth Road, Cardiff, since the abolition of the toll; and whether he will now consent to the placing of zebra crossings at appropriate places on this road.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The Cardiff City Council has not approached me over this; I will gladly consider any suggestions that are made.
    Mr. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that at a recent public meeting of residents in this area considerable concern was expressed at the increased danger, and that if he consults the Cardiff police he will find that they support this recommendation?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As I have said, I will gladly consider any recommendation that is made, but, as I told the hon. Member, the city council, as the highway authority, has not made any recommendation to me about this.

    Accidents (Alcoholic Drinks)
    Mr. G. Thomasasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what steps he has taken to warn the public of the close relation between road accidents and the drinking of alcohol.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: By publishing the message inside the front cover of the Highway Code.
    Mr. Thomas: That is not enough. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the B.M.A. has drawn attention to the increased danger on the roads caused by
    1020
    drinking alcohol and then driving a car? Is he further aware that almost every public house in the countryside is surrounded with motor cars at night and that the danger on the roads is thereby increased? Will he give further consideration to this matter?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As the hon. Member may know, Professor Drew of Bristol University, together with the Medical Research Council, is at present conducting an investigation into this very difficult problem. I would prefer not to say anything more about it until I have his report.
    Mr. Hastings: Does the Minister realise that our hoardings are covered with advertisements saying how valuable alcohol is under various conditions? Could he not do something to counteract that?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I really have nothing to do with the advertisements that appear on hoardings.
    Mr. H. Morrison: As a member of the Government, has not the right hon. Gentleman something to do with the advertisements that appear on Independent Television?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: All sorts of things appear on television of all sorts.

    Bristol
    Mr. Awberyasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is aware that the Bristol City Council has prepared a five-year plan which is considered the minimum required to reduce the congestion of traffic on the roads in the city which amounts to £3 million; that the grant authorised by him for road improvement this year is only £41,000, and that this is inadequate; and if he will take steps to substantially increase this amount.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am aware of the plan of the city council. I am afraid I cannot increase the amount of grant this year.
    Mr. Awbery: Has the Minister estimated, as he has reduced the estimates, how long it will take the Bristol City Council to complete its five-year plan?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The estimates to which the hon. Member refers as having been reduced are, of course, the estimates

    1021
    of the council. Within the financial limits, I have done my best to meet them in respect of grant. I do appreciate that Bristol has very considerable problems.
    Mr. Awbery: Will the Minister reconsider the very substantial reduction made in the grant?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I should like notice of any allegations of reductions in specific grants.

    Parking Facilities
    Mr. Awberyasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, in view of the difficulties experienced by local authorities in finding parking places for vehicles, what methods he has considered of dealing with this problem other than those in general use.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am endeavouring to encourage the provision of off-street parking facilities both by local authorities and private enterprise and am always ready to make available to them the large amount of technical information in the possession of by Department. I would also draw the hon. Member's attention to the Road Traffic Bill now before Parliament.
    Mr. Awbery: Quite a number of schemes have been propounded for garaging cars in buildings with multi-floor space. Has the Minister considered those?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am glad to say that quite a number of local authorities are proposing and contemplating schemes of this sort. As I said in my original Answer, I am only too glad to assist them with the very large amount of technical information from the United States and elsewhere which I have at my disposal.
    Mr. Renton: As the parking-meter experiment is likely to be a complete success, and in any case can only be a partial failure, will my right hon. Friend do everything possible to expedite the passage of the Road Traffic Bill through the House and so get the experiment started?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I agree that the parking meter can help, but the passage of the Bill is, of course, a matter for Parliament.

    Traffic Congestion, Launceston
    Sir H. Roperasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what steps he proposes to take to reduce the traffic congestion during the holiday season on the A30 road in the neighbourhood of Launceston.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am afraid that it is not possible at present to authorise substantial works on this part of A30.
    Sir H. Roper: Would any right hon. Friend bear in mind the very urgent need there is to do something to relieve this congestion? Is he aware that a scheme has been submitted to him which will effect a great improvement at a modest cost?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I know that, as my hon. and gallant Friend says, there is a good deal of congestion here during the holiday season, but I must look at this scheme in competition with a good many others.

    Traffic Signs (Uniformity)
    Captain Pilkingtonasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether, in view of the increasing number of Britons taking cars abroad and of foreigners bringing cars to this country, he has considered making the new proposed traffic signs conform to those already in use on the Continent.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I have recently circulated new draft traffic signs regulations for the comments of representative bodies. The regulations set out comprehensively our present system, with a number of important changes, some of which are designed to bring us closer to Continental practice. The new regulations will lead to greater uniformity in our traffic signs generally, but I have at present no power to cause traffic signs to be illuminated.
    Captain Pilkington: Where my right hon. Friend considers that our signs are better than those of the Continent, would he suggest that the Continent changes?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am inclined to think that, in most matters, our practice is better than that in foreign countries.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Are those draft regulations available to hon. Members?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Not yet, I think, but they will, of course, have to be laid before Parliament in the ordinary way.
    Mr. Strauss: I suppose an hon. Member can get a copy if he applies to the Ministry?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I will look into it. I anticipate no difficulty.

  CIVIL AVIATION

    Aircrew (Hours of Duty)
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will introduce legislation limiting the number of hours which an air pilot may be required to be on duty.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I would refer the hon. Member to my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fare-ham (Dr. Bennett) on 26th October.
    Mr. Beswick: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his right hon. Friend was at least a little naive in that reply when he said that the only difference between himself and the British Airline Pilots' Association was that the latter required rather more detail? Is it not a fact that they require a much closer limitation of hours, and is he looking into that matter again?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As I said to the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) in the Answer to which I have referred, I shall be laying regulations on this subject before Parliament shortly, and I think it would be better to await the laying of those regulations before discussing them.

  TRANSPORT

    Road Haulage Assets (Disposal)
    Mr. Ernest Daviesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (1) what revised estimate of the loss to be incurred through the sale of vehicles he has made in view of the decision to allow the Transport Commission to retain additional vehicles;
    (2) whether, in view of the proposed retention by the Transport Commission of vehicles additional to those permitted by the Transport Act, 1953, he is now able to announce the date of termination of the Transport Levy.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I have no statement to make on these matters today.
    Mr. Davies: Would not the Minister consider that he might make a fresh estimate of the loss, in view of the fact that there has been a change in Government policy in regard to disposal since the last one was made? Is it not a fact that British Road Services is now to be allowed to retain a larger number of vehicles, and what justification has the Minister for continuing to permit this loss to mount up, in the light of the present financial situation? How can he justify the recent offer for sale of B.R.S. (Parcels) Limited, which will involve some £10 million capital, in the light of the present credit squeeze and the latest Budget proposals?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I do not think those supplementary questions arise out of the original Question or the original Answer. All I said was that, on the subject of the Levy, I had no statement to make.
    Mr. Davies: Will the right hon. Gentleman say when he will make a statement on these two matters?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Not today. Sir.

    Vehicle Testing Station, Hendon
    Mr. Ernest Daviesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation the estimated annual cost of operating the vehicle testing station at Hendon; the number of vehicles tested to date and the number of persons employed; and what further similar stations it is proposed to open.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The estimated annual cost of the station, including overheads, is about £9,000. Up to 5 p.m. last night 1,893 cars and vans and 104 motor cycles and combinations had been tested on the one inspection lane which has been in use since 12th October. At present one supervisor and ten inspectors are employed. At present I have no plans for opening further similar stations.
    Mr. Davies: Does not this very useful experiment show that compulsory inspection of private vehicles is possible? Can the Minister explain the change of Government policy in this respect? He will recollect that in the original Road Traffic

    1025
    Bill there were proposals for the compulsory inspection of private vehicles. These proposals were dropped in the second revision of the Bill and the Minister is now introducing this voluntary scheme.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: So far as compulsory inspection is concerned, I have nothing to add to the Answer which I gave when the hon. Gentleman raised precisely that point during at least two debates on the subject in this House. The present experiment started on 12th October, and I prefer to see it worked out before drawing any conclusions.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: The right hon. Gentleman, or his Joint Parliamentary Secretary, told the House at an earlier date that inspection of vehicles was contrary to public opinion, but does the fact that so many people have volunteered to have their vehicles inspected not make him modify his previous statement?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: No. What my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary said was that compulsory inspection of vehicles was contrary to public opinion. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, this scheme is wholly voluntary. That is the difference.
    Mr. Strauss: According to newspaper accounts it was found, on inspection, that the Minister's own car was defective in some respects. The Minister is so careful in such matters, yet a defect was found. Is it not therefore clear that the cars of those who are less careful probably have many defects which make them a danger on the roads?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I think that the station will bring out things even more important than the defective handle on the left-hand door of my car.
    Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Would my right hon. Friend consider making a nominal charge for this excellent service, so that it could pay its way and not be a charge on the taxpayer?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The object of this station is that we may learn certain
    1026
    lessons in the operation of such stations. To put it on a payment basis might prevent our getting the data and experience we want, and I prefer to keep this station, at any rate, on a free basis. I may add that I think it is the best free value in London.

    Goods Vehicle Licences
    Mr. Blenkinsopasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation how many goods vehicle licences have been cancelled, and how many have been suspended, by the Northern Road Traffic Commissioner during the last 12 months.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: None, Sir.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: In view of the repeated breaches of the Act by private hauliers in relation to hours worked, does not the right hon. Gentleman think it is high time that more vigorous action is taken? Does he not realise that the small fines imposed by the courts are of no avail whatever, and that it is only if licences are withdrawn by the commissioners that something may result?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In this respect the commissioners can only deal with specific cases and not with general allegations. The Northern Road Traffic Commissioner did, in fact, hold a public inquiry in August into a particular case in which, having heard the evidence, he decided that revocation was not the proper course to take.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Does the Minister not realise that in a recent case—of which I can send him information if he desires—some ninety cases of breaches were made clear in the court? Is it not obvious that breach of the regulation by hauliers in this regard results in a positive danger to the public on the roads?
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I would gladly consider any case which the hon. Member is good enough to send to me, but the Question relates to specific action by a specific official over a particular period, and I have given my answer to it.

  BALLOT FOR NOTICES OF MOTIONS
    EXPORT TRADE
    Sir C. Taylor: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 18th November, I shall call attention to the need to increase our export trade, and move a Resolution.
    LABOUR ATTACHÉS
    Mr. Moyle: I beg to give notice that, on Friday, 18th November, I shall call attention to the need to appoint more labour attachés in the Foreign Service, and move a Resolution.
    UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
    Mr. Usborne: I beg to give notice that, on Friday, 18th November, I shall call attention to the need to revise the Charter of the United Nations, and move a Resolution.

NATIONAL SERVICE
3.32 p.m.
The Minister of Defence (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I beg to move,
That this House approves the policy on National Service set out in Command Paper No. 9608.
The need for National Service and the length of that service must depend upon the commitments of the Armed Forces, both actual and foreseeable. I think it is agreed that the purposes of this country are defensive. Our interest is peace and stability. We seek to prevent global war, to resist infiltration and subversion, to win a limited war should another like Korea be forced upon us, and to survive global war should that catastrophe take place. The pattern of our defence effort must be planned so that we may have the best possible chance of accomplishing these purposes.
Therefore, we are building up a medium bomber force armed with the necessary weapons to enable us to play a part in providing the nuclear deterrent, the supreme deterrent, to war. An adequate control and reporting system is a consequential necessity to safeguard that force against surprise attack. We have to help to man the N.A.T.O. screen of armed forces in Europe. These forces have a definite purpose, even in a thermonuclear age. They contribute to the deterrent, and if they did not exist the aggressor might from time to time be tempted to pinch off, by surprise attack, a country or territory and then to face us with that as an accomplished fact and gamble on the chance that, so placed, we should shrink from a nuclear conflict. These forces therefore constitute a subsidiary deterrent. To be that, in reality, they must be known to be capable of giving a good account of themselves at short notice.
We also require substantial forces in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to enable us to carry out our Treaty obligations and international responsibilities and those, at the present time particularly, are well enough known. We require forces to prevent infiltration and subversion, for example, in Malaya and Kenya. We need forces distributed throughout the world to protect British

1029
interests. A case in point is the necessary naval force to give protection to our ships sailing in the China Seas. We need certain active reserves so that we can take up our share of the burden of a limited war, if another should be launched against us, and so that we can deal with emergencies.
With regard to the dreadful contingency of global nuclear war, we have to make preparations to try to mitigate the consequences for this country and to give as much of the country as possible the best prospect of survival. That involves air defence, including the development of guided missiles, and the maintenance of certain reserve forces in these islands.
That, broadly speaking, is the picture which confronts me, as Minister of Defence, and the Government. I believe that a large majority will accept it as a realistic description of the present situation. At the same time, I readily acknowledge that when we are considering the size of the forces required for these purposes any Government must bear in mind the national economy and the demands being made upon the nation's pool of manpower by the Armed Forces.
Taking all these factors into account, Her Majesty's Government have decided that the size of the Armed Forces should be reduced to 700,000 by 31st March, 1958. Of these, about 680,000 will be men. That figure is a reduction of about 100,000 upon the present figure and of 170,000 in the period between March, 1953, and 31st March, 1958. That is a reduction of 20 per cent. over five years, and an important release of manpower for civilian purposes.
Mr. George Craddock: It is not a reduction in personal service.
Mr. Lloyd: It is a reduction of the demand made by the Armed Forces upon the manpower pool of the country. However people may try to describe it, that is the fact. The number of people in the Armed Forces will have been diminished in the period by 170,000. When other countries are lauded for their reductions, and for declarations of intention, the fulfilment of which cannot be verified, from totals which can never be ascertained, I
1030
hope that our action will not pass unnoticed and uncommended.
We propose to come down to 700,000 by 31st March, 1958. I do not believe that anyone in my position could come to this Box and honestly defend a lower figure in present circumstances. This large and significant reduction has one inevitable consequence; the more you reduce, the greater the need for what is left to be as efficient as possible. Remembering that fact, let us examine and consider the way in which the reduction should be effected.
First of all, a word about the Regular element. I think it would be agreed by most hon. Members in the House that we want the Regular element to be as large as possible. The Service Ministers and I would willingly do without conscription tomorrow if we could get the necessary number of Regulars. The idea that the miltary like conscription is absolute nonsense. At present, there are about 66,000 Regular officers and 270,000 Regular men serving on engagements for more than four years. Her Majesty's Government want to get that last figure as high as possible. We are attacked because it is not higher already, but it has to be remembered that to attract men to the Armed Forces at a time of full employment we must be able to offer rewards and conditions which compare fairly with those in civil life, and which take account of the uncertainties and discomforts of Service life. Our proposals will be put forward by the time of the next Estimates.
In the meantime, I am able to announce one improvement. The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Dodds) asked me a Question about this the other day. The Government have decided to inaugurate, as from 1st September, 1955, a system of education allowances for officers and other ranks. Putting it shortly, officers and other ranks serving overseas and those serving at home who are subject to frequent postings will receive an allowance of £75 a year for each child between the ages of 11 and 18 who is at a boarding school, and of £25 for each child between the ages of 11 and 18 lodged with relatives or guardians in order to ensure continuity in day school education. When the officer or other rank is serving overseas, the allowances will not be subject to tax. I believe that these new arrangements will be a real help to all concerned.

1031
I acknowledge the interest which has been shown in this matter on both sides of the House. One of the great anxieties in the minds of many parents has been the fact that between the ages of 11 and 18 the child may have had to go to six or seven different schools.
Mr. F. Beswick: While welcoming that announcement, may I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether he can say how this compares with the highest rate in the Foreign Service?
Mr. Lloyd: I think the hon. Gentleman had better put down a Question about that.
Mr. Beswick: The Foreign Service man gets £150.
Mr. Lloyd: I think that this will be a substantial improvement.
Important as the Regular element is, we cannot, within the period under review—that is to say, within the next two years or so—do without the National Service men or, indeed, without very substantial numbers of them, and, at the same time, meet our military commitments. I want to make clear again one point about which there still seems to be misunderstanding. When National Service was instituted, it was said that the primary purpose was to provide trained reserves to be available in an emergency. The secondary purpose was to supplement the Regular element of the active forces. That situation has now changed. Indeed, it has been changed for some time. At present, except to a very limited extent, the primary purpose of National Service is not to provide trained reserves. It is to fill up the numbers currently required in forces which must be capable of giving a good account of themselves at short notice.
May I make that point clear and illustrate it? In the Army, the National Service element is about 200,000. Of those, 6,000 are officers, 27,000 are N.C.O.s, and out of the total of other ranks some 88,000 are tradesmen. Of all the tradesmen in the Army, about half are National Service men, and in some highly skilled trades the percentage is higher. Of line mechanics in the Royal Signals, 85 per cent. are National Service men. Of radio mechanics in the Royal Signals, 66 per cent. are National Service
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men. In the Royal Air Force, of the 69,000 National Service men, 45,000 are in advanced or skilled trades. One-quarter of all the trained ground tradesmen are National Service men, and in the important radio engineering group, for example, the proportion of the advanced tradesmen, the most highly skilled group of all, is one-quarter. These figures show the extent to which the Armed Forces at present depend upon the National Service men for their efficiency. That is the fact.
Mr. George Wigg: The information which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has given about the National Service men is very valuable indeed. Would he be kind enough to give us the same information for the other half of the Army, the Regulars, giving us the breakdown of N.C.O.s, tradesmen, and so on?
Mr. Lloyd: I cannot do that without notice, but I will see that the hon. Gentleman gets that information if it is within my power to give it.
We now come to the question of training—the period of training taken before these men can become really useful. There are various descriptions of training differing between the Services—basic and continuation recruit, basic and continuation. The test which I have taken is the length of time before a man can be posted to a unit. In the Army, in the Royal Signals, this is on an average about six months. In the Ordnance Corps it is about nine months, and in the R.E.M.E. in certain trades it is about twelve months. For officers it is over six months, and considerably over for those in specialised arms.
In the Royal Air Force the period for mechanics is about six months, for fitters about nine months and for certain advanced tradesmen about twelve months. These periods do not include the time during which the men have to be absorbed into units—in other words, the time when they are learning to serve as members of a team. That must take time, because until it has taken place they cannot be said to be operationally useful or fit, and the safety of their comrades is bound up in all this. A high standard of unit efficiency must, after all, be the aim. Therefore, I submit that the obvious conclusion is that it would be a serious waste of manpower to train these men

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for these long periods and yet to be able to make little use of them when they had been trained.
That is not the end of this aspect of the matter. Those periods are not the only ones which have to be taken into account. There are the inevitable periods for leave, posting, time in transit, and those all absorb further time. On an average, for a man in the Army this amounts to about seven weeks out of his two years. For men posted further afield than Europe it may be twelve weeks. For a man in the Royal Air Force the average is five-and-a-half weeks. For men posted elsewhere than Europe it amounts to as much as nine or ten weeks. Strenuous efforts have been made to cut down these training periods and yet to maintain the standard, and steps have been taken to reduce the time in transit and some progress has been made.
When thinking about this matter of the length of time spent in training, the other day I looked up what the right hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Isaacs) said when, as Minister of Labour, he moved the Second Reading of the National Service Bill, in 1947. This is what he said:
"Primarily, the reason for the 18 months' full-time service is determined by two factors. First, thre must be an adequate period of initial training. That is not to say that the full 18 months will be taken up by training. Many of the forces, or sections of the forces, may be able to complete sufficient training by the end of 12 months and the young men may then do a bit of soldiering."
Mr. E. Shinwell: Six months?
Mr. Lloyd: No, twelve months. I am quoting from the right hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, reported in the OFFICIAL REPORT of 31st March, 1947. He went on to say:
"Men may finish training, and then go to do garrison duty or some other work to take the place of some of the men coming out at the end of their normal time of service. Whilst the period of 18 months may not be required for complete training, it is required for service."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st March, 1947; Vol. 435, c. 1677.]
The reason that I read that quotation was to show that it was thought that the greater part of eighteen months would be spent on training, and even in those
1034
comparatively quiet days there would not be very much time left for active service.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Some of us remember that the extra period of six months was introduced during the Korean war as an emergency, with a pledge that it would be removed after the emergency. Is the Minister now telling us that as long as we have National Service there must be at least a two-year period?
Mr. Lloyd: No. I am not dealing with that position at all. I am dealing with the present, and I am dealing with the most efficient use of manpower at the present time. I am pointing out the length of the period of service of two years which is taken up in training, in the absorption of men into units and the time used by leave and postings. I am pointing out that in the present circumstances the best way to tackle this matter of ensuring the most economical use of manpower is to reduce the total number of people in the Services and not to reduce the period.
Mr. Crossman: I asked whether I should be right to conclude from the Minister's statement that, in view of the period which it takes to train a man for the use which we want to make of him, it would be illusory to believe that National Service could ever be reduced below two years without, in the Minister's view, a gross waste of trained manpower. Is that his view?
Mr. Lloyd: No. I have already stated that the obvious purpose of us all must be to abolish National Service altogether, and that depends upon the international situation. What I am saying is that under present circumstances we have taken the most economical course in reducing quantity but striving to maintain quality.
Mr. Shinwell: One of the points which the right hon. and learned Gentleman made ought to be clarified for the benefit of hon. Members. Do I understand his view to be that a soldier cannot undertake active soldiering until he has been trained for twelve months? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] That is what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said and presumably he knows more about it than do his hon. Friends. Is that his view—that it requires twelve months before a man can undertake active soldiering? If so, why is it

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that after six months, or even less, men are sent to Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus to undertake active soldiering?
Mr. Lloyd: What I said applies to the particular categories which I mentioned. I have been careful to indicate category by category the length of the period of training. The right hon. Gentleman also knows that although some men are sent out to Malaya after a lesser period, there is a further period of training in Malaya.
My point is to indicate that it was contemplated in 1947, and is necessary now, that a very considerable part of this period has to be spent on training. It was contemplated then, I repeat, that most of the eighteen months would be taken up with training.
I think that a moment's consideration of the figures which I have given to the House must show that a cut to twelve months would destroy altogether the military value of our forces, as at present deployed. In my view, in present circumstances a cut to eighteen months would diminish their efficiency at least by half. That is a risk which Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to take. If the Opposition had the responsibility of office, I do not believe that they would take it, either.
There is another aspect—the effect of a reduction in the period of service for National Service men upon the Regular element. A reduction at the present time would add to the strain upon the Regulars. Even with twenty-four months' National Service, a battalion on an ordinary three years' overseas tour changes 55 per cent. of its National Service men twice and the remaining 45 per cent. once—and its National Service content is three-fifths of the total. That turnover means a very heavy load of responsibility for the Regulars. A reduction in the period would affect the balance between service at home and overseas for Regulars which we have been trying to create. It would be a further discouragement to Regular re-engagements and another obstacle to what we are all trying to do.
For those reasons, I believe that we have taken the most prudent and economical course in reducing quantity but, nevertheless, trying to preserve quality. We owe it to those who serve and to their families that the forces in which they serve should be reasonably efficient.
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I know that cases are brought up from time to time in which it is stated that men are wasting their time. The Service Ministers and I welcome such cases being brought forward. We recognise that in any organisation improvements are possible, and we certainly promise to investigate those cases thoroughly, but I remind the House—I do not want to do it at great length—that in the speech which I made in April on this subject I went at some detail into these matters. Very many inquiries have taken place since the war concerning particular aspects of the use of manpower, some of them inaugurated by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. Particulars have been given to the House from time to time and many savings have been made. For example, at present there is a committee under Air Chief Marshal Hollinghurst examining arrangements for the servicing and repair of aircraft and procedure and methods relating to the holding and distribution of equipment.
Mr. R. R. Stokes: A Service committee?
Mr. Lloyd: No. It is under Air Chief Marshal Hollinghurst, but there are civilian members.
We shall certainly continue further inquiries if we think they will fulfil a useful purpose.
There is frequently talk about the size of the tail of the Army. In 1950, the manpower per division was 51,000. In 1955, it has been reduced to about 38,200, the actual strength of the division itself remaining at about 12,500. I can assure the House that the business of combing the tail proceeds all the time.
My attention at the moment is also directed to the civilians employed in the Services to make certain that there is no waste in that field. Of course, there may be occasional cases of the misuse of manpower, but I am sure that it is not on such a scale as to vitiate the conclusion that for the present it is necessary for us to stick to twenty-four months.
Various methods were open to the Government by which numbers could be reduced but the period retained at twenty-four months.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman comes to that part of his speech, may I

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point out to him that a great deal of interest is taken, and will be revealed in the debate, in the fact that this country apparently requires to have far more training for its National Service men than do the Allies or the Commonwealth. What he has said so far appears to be a reproach to them. Would he tell us why we cannot train people in a lesser period—in the same period which others seem to require?
Mr. Lloyd: Our commitments throughout the world are much more widespread. What I have said is not intended to be a reproach to anybody, but is a statement of what we regard to be the minimum necessary to be fair to the men themselves.
We considered the various ways whereby the total could be reduced but the period retained. We rejected as unsuitable the method of selective service upon the United States pattern—that is to say, calling upon districts to supply quotas from those available. We felt that we are too closely knit a country for that to work satisfactorily here.
The Government rejected the idea of a ballot. In some circumstances a ballot might be acceptable, but a system whereby, according to the luck of the draw, a man would do twenty-four months or nothing seemed to us not tolerable. An extension of the present system of indefinite deferments was considered. I do not say that it would be impossible to work out such a system, but it is extremely difficult to fix the criteria or to know where to draw the line or how to control such a system.
If we were to say, for example, that men with particular skills primarily engaged in the export trades were not to be called up, what about the men working for sub-contractors, or the men working for the producers of the raw materials or of the semi-finished goods? It would be impossible to draw the line. Such a system would also deprive the forces of the type of man for whom they must to some extent rely upon National Service. It would be a further breach in the principle of universality.
Mr. Wigg: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is now dealing with the proviso in paragraph 4 of the Command Paper which states that the Government refuse to reject the principle of universal liability. Has he overlooked that for years
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past a man called up into the Royal Air Force has had practically no chance of doing part-time training while a man called up into the Army has done such training? I think that the figures for part-time training were 8,000 out of 150,000. Is not that a departure from the principle of universality?
Mr. Lloyd: I do not think that anybody could suggest that the present system is one of absolute universality. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Of course it is not, because there are different circumstances and conditions. What I am saying is that to have extended the system of indefinite deferments would have been a further breach in the principle of universality. Therefore, the Government decided to allow the age of call-up to rise. As long as we continue this method the age will rise by about three months each year; that is to say, it will reach 19 by 31st March, 1958.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service will deal later with the industrial consequences of this change. Our conclusion was that, on balance, it would not be harmful, but rather the reverse, provided always that the option for early call-up for special reasons is retained, and we propose to retain it. In the White Paper we have tried to be as definite as possible about the time a young man can expect to be called up. We cannot be as definite as we should like to be because it is important to keep freedom of choice of Service and unit for the man called up when practicable.
We hope that the White Paper will help so far as 1956 is concerned, and notice will be given as soon as possible of the plans for 1957. As will be seen from the White Paper, the Government have decided to make a further contribution towards the solution of our manpower difficulties by the reduction of the requirement to do part-time service from sixty days to twenty days. That will be a substantial relief to industry.
In 1954, reserve training of National Service men represented a loss to industry of half-a-million man weeks; next year under the new arrangements, the loss is likely to be about 180,000 man weeks. This reduction is made possible because of the changing role of the reserve forces. The idea that in a global war it would be

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possible to send forth from these islands a series of fully equipped divisions with their appropriate corps and army troops is no longer realistic. There will have to be found from the reserve forces people for the control and reporting system of the Royal Air Force, men for the Mobile Defence Corps and for fire fighting duties at home. The reserve forces will still have to provide certain specialists who cannot be recruited in sufficient numbers on a regular basis. The Territorial Army, which we believe to be the best reserve Army in the world, will still have an essential role to play, but it will be a different one from that previously conceived.
With our limited resources we cannot give high priority to possible needs in the later stages of a global war. The two divisions committed to N.A.T.O. will continue to be trained and equipped for this role. As regards the remaining divisions, their role and organisation is being reconsidered. It seems to me that the first task of most of them would be to help to maintain organised society in these islands as far as it can be done. They would have to deal with raiders and saboteurs. They must continue to be organised as military forces with a fighting capacity, but changes in their organisation, equipment and training will certainly be necessary.
The Territorial Army, however, with divisions based on groups of counties or similar areas, will remain. The volunteer will still provide the essential backbone of the reserve forces. The diminution of the requirement for compulsory reserve training will improve the balance between the volunteer and the conscript. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War is meeting representatives of the Territorial Forces Association in about a fortnight's time to discuss these problems with them.
The country is entitled to expect that the Armed Forces should make the smallest possible demand upon manpower. The figure of 700,000 by March, 1958, is, I believe, the smallest possible demand. The country is entitled to expect the most efficient use of the men taken. Our course of action certainly provides for this. We will willingly investigate specific allegations of misuse of manpower. The country is also entitled
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to expect that the general system of command and control, ministerial and military, is the most efficient possible.
From my own rather brief experience as Minister of Defence I am sure that the decision to create the post of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is a wise one. One of the Chiefs of Staff has to act as chairman at their regular meetings; there is an extra burden of preparatory and consequential work involved in this. The Chiefs of Staff have also to find the Military Adviser to go with Ministers to international conferences such as the N.A.T.O. meetings, and to provide a representative to take part in meetings with Commonwealth or Allied Chiefs of Staff. For these two reasons alone, I believe that the new post is necessary. But I am certain that to have the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee working in close association with me will ease my task.
Accordingly, I ask the House to accept the Motion. Those who attack it must specify, if there is to be any substance or reality in their attack, what commitments should be abandoned, what level of forces they advocate, and how they propose to get useful service from the officers and men whose training necessarily takes so long. It was said by no less a person than the Leader of the Opposition, that the course we recommend means the worst of both worlds. In fact, it means reduced forces, but efficient forces.
If the period of service were at this time to be reduced, I believe that it would mean maintaining our forces at a higher level than that which we propose but at the same time it would mean a less efficient level. That would indeed be the worst of both worlds. I am absolutely convinced that the course which I have recommended to the House is the right one in the national interest.
4.7 p.m.
Mr. R. R. Stokes: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
"regrets that no provision is made in Command Paper No 9608 for an immediate reduction in the length of National Service."
I must say at the outset that we are greatly disappointed with the case which the Minister has made today. The whole of our National Service and its continuation directly depend on our commitments

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abroad. I should have expected that in a debate of this calibre the Minister of Defence would himself have given us an outline of how he viewed those commitments and what they are. I shall certainly say something about them in a moment. May I also say that any discussion of manpower which is divorced from a complete picture of defence is both difficult and unrealistic. I realise that today we are not having a general debate on defence and I do not intend to embark on a wide survey, but I should have expected the Minister to say a great deal more than he has as a lead.
I propose to confine my time to an examination of some of the points in the White Paper, to make some proposals for improving Regular recruitment—which seems to me to be admitted on all sides as the keystone of the whole problem with which we are confronted—and to consider certain practical steps, particularly with the background of an industrialist, which might lead to real economy in manpower in the Services and so help with our economic situation in the country, which we all know is fairly difficult at present.
I hope to show that within the commitments that we have, as I understand them, and about which the Minister said nothing, it would then be possible immediately—accepting "immediate" in the term which is understood in the cycle of the call-up under National Service—to make a reduction in the length of National Service. I hope to develop that as I go on.
I should like to say this about National Service, to put the House in memory of its history. It was introduced by the Labour Government in 1947 to meet the then threatening situation. The length of service was increased to two years in 1950 because of the Korean conflict. It was never meant either that the two years should be a permanency or that conscription should be a permanency. We on this side of the House for the most part—I cannot say "all," because that is always a dangerous thing to say—hate conscription; I do not know anybody who does not hate it. At the same time, we have full regard for our responsibilities.
We know that the cause of freedom certainly has to be defended if it is to survive; and, the situation being what it
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is and what it has been in the past few years, National Service is the fairest way of sharing the burden. But having said that, it is all the more incumbent upon us to see that it is administered as efficiently as possible and kept down to the absolute minimum of time.
The first thing I want to deal with, quite shortly, because I do not know all the commitments—only Her Majesty's Ministers can really understand the details of that—is that we accepted the two-year period of National Service and it never would have been granted by Parliament or accepted by the country but for the Korean outbreak. The situation has changed since then. I have said all this before and other hon. Members have said it, too.
We are out of Korea, we are out of Egypt, and we are out of Italy and Austria. We are out of the Sudan. By that I mean that we have no forces in those countries. There may be some still in Egypt, but they are mostly on the way back. We have got further help from the Dominions—Australia and New Zealand—in Malaya. We have abolished the Anti-Aircraft Command.
When one looks back and compares the strength of the Army pre-war and today, the Regular Army is approximately the same. But before the war we had other commitments, and despite the asset of the Indian Army—I am not belittling the Indian Army; it was first-class—we had the added responsibility in those days that in addition to the officers and men who were seconded to the Indian Army, we kept about 57,000 troops in India itself. That liability has gone, too. I fail to understand, and I cannot see how the man in the street can be expected to understand, with all this change since the National Service period was put up to two years, why it is not possible now to bring down the period of National Service by at least six months, hoping for something better in the not-too-distant future.
Looking at the White Paper, however, I see what has happened. Manifestly, a period of two years is more attractive to the Defence Staff. The admirals, the generals and the air marshals have been plugging this and the Government have given in. In fact, when I got my copy of the White Paper and read it, I wrote across the front, "The Government have

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surrendered to the generals." [An HON. MEMBER: "Unconditional surrender."] "Unconditional surrender" is not a term I enjoy, having regard to my experience of it in the Second World War. And my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, although he had not seen the White Paper at the time when its substance was aired by the Prime Minister at a notable conference, described it as "dodging the issue and getting the worst of both worlds."
I want to deal with some of the points in the White Paper. The first concerns the change of function of the National Service men. As the Minister rightly pointed out, the original intention was to build up reserves. Now that intention has been dropped and the men are really wanted to supplement the Regular Army. Some of the generals have told me that the last six months of the two years is the only part of the two years that is worth while. I do not believe that for a single moment. [An HON. MEMBER: "Ask the commanding officers."] I have been a commanding officer myself. If it is to be claimed that the last six months is the only part that is of any use, then, as some of my hon. and right hon. Friends have just been asking in interruptions, what is the explanation of sending men out on active service with very much less training than that?
I remember perfectly well, although I agree that things were quite simple in those days, that I was a full-blown gunner in the front line after less than six months' training. When I look back on some of the things in which I was trained, I realise that a great part of my time in training might have been done away with and I might have got out there in three months, which I was anxious to do, because I was afraid the war would end before I had a go at a German. I believe it to be the same today.
If it is a fact that all that the Government really want is people to be useful as soldiers—this is the great point—for the period of two years from the inception of their training until its completion and that they are not then thereafter to be expected to be used as a general reserve, surely to goodness it ought to be possible to simplify their training and cut a great deal of it out. I do not see any sign of that in anything
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that the Minister has said or in anything that is written in the White Paper.
This is the second point I want to tackle. It is claimed, in paragraph 9 of the White Paper, that there will be a substantial relief to industry, that
"There will be an accession of manpower to industry of 20,000 by next March and of an additional 80,000 by March, 1958."
In the name of all that is serious in the industrial field, whoever put that into the noddle of the nincompoop who wrote this White Paper? It does not make any sense at all. It is true, of course, that if one counts the heads there will be more of them, but they are right down at the wrong end. What the industrialist wants is his manpower when the men have finished with the Armed Forces, and not before. It is just drawing wool over the eyes of the public to write that sort of nonsense into a White Paper. Actually, of course, it is the worst possible period. It comes at a time between the ages of 16 and 18 or 17 and 19 and there really is no industrial accession of manpower which is useful economically at all.
My third point is this. In paragraph 10, the White Paper states:
"A higher age of call-up does, however, bring some advantages, perhaps not in every individual case, but certainly in the majority, from the point of view both of the man and of the employer."
The Government could not sell that one to a mothers' meeting! It really is ridiculous. The real trouble, above all, is that it will not be of any advantage to anybody who does not have an advantage already, if hon. Members understand what I mean. [Laughter.] I am really meaning to be serious in dealing with this in a jocular vein.
What happens today is that apprentices and those whom I call the student variety already get full-time exemption. They already do their call-up service after they have finished their training, so it does not apply to them. Of the last call-up—the 1955 age group—28·2 per cent. of the young men came within that category; 22·9 per cent. were either exempted persons or medically unfit; and just under one-half—48·9 per cent.—of the call-up were this class of people who were to be advantaged in being allowed to hang around for another six to nine months doing absolutely nothing and wondering when they would be allowed to start getting down to the job. I am surprised that

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any responsible Minister should have allowed that nonsense to be written into a White Paper. I speak from experience on this and I assure my right hon. and hon. Friends—and enemies—that any responsible personnel manager or industrialist would say that that was simply poppycock.
Now I come to the fourth point of my criticism, which, again, has to do with the individual. According to paragraph 14 of the White Paper:
"This means, in practice, that the Ministry of Labour and National Service cannot say precisely when a man will be called up until some time after completion of his medical examination."
While I appreciate that in the White Paper there are suggestions which will help both to minimise and to assist young men at this awkward period of their lives, it seems to me to be fantastically inefficient that there is so much messing about.
I do not understand—perhaps I do not understand the mechanics of National Service at all—why there must be such a long period between registration and medical examination. Once this business of filling in forms and registration starts, it unsettles young people. They want to be left alone as long as possible. I should have thought that it was possible to arrange for their registration and medical examination in a far shorter period.
The White Paper admits that after registration men are messed about for another eight weeks. If we add it all together, the amount of time wasted before they get into the forces from the time they register about equals the useful life which the generals say that they have in the forces, namely, six months.
Minister after Minister, in the various HANSARDS which I have tried to study in the last ten days, has said, "I am always trying to do something to make the Services efficient"; and Minister after Minister has done nothing, and one is thrown back on to the old conclusion, that the Ministers do not know how to do it. It is too sad that the young people of the country should be messed about in this way and submitted to this unsettling condition for far too long a time.
I have one or two good general observations to make about the White Paper. The first is that it practically gives
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us our point. It says, in fact, that had there been an inquiry there would have been a reduction in the period of National Service long before this, otherwise what does it mean by saying that it is possible to reduce by 100,000 people the size of the forces in the course of the next two years?
The second thing that it does is to prove the complete failure of the Government in their recruiting programme for the Regular Army, which is the key to the situation. The Secretary of State for War said in the debate on the Army Estimates at the beginning of this year, "Of course we should not have a call-up if we had more Regular troops. If the whole Army were Regular we could do with 100,000 men less." What has he done to encourage Regular recruiting since then?—nothing.
We have had one or two suggestions come out today. Gracious me, the right hon. and learned Gentleman is an ex-Service man and knows this problem, and he ought to have bullied his Cabinet colleagues into doing something about it, instead of allowing them to sit about doing nothing, which is what they have done. At any rate, I am going to make a few proposals, even though the Minister cannot.
First, I want to emphasise that it is not merely a question of pay and pensions, although it is vitally important that the men in the forces should be paid on terms equal to what they would get in civilian life—[Interruption.] I do not know that I can face interruptions from behind as well as in front of me. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] It is not only a question of pay and pensions. The fact is that Her Majesty's Government have never faced up to the problem of long-term service in prosperous times and full employment. That is the real trouble. I suggest that what is really wanted is this. Young men should understand before they are invited to enlist that they really have a prospect of a good career in the forces. I am sure, from the reports which have come back to me, that there is a feeling that shortly after entering the Regular Services they are channelled into one channel or another, and they have very little chance of getting out of it, or of substantial promotion. If something could be done on those lines, I am sure that it would be a big help.

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Secondly, something ought to be done about barrack conditions. The Secretary of State said, in one debate, that nothing had been done to some of the barracks since 1900. I should think that he was dead right. [An HON. MEMBER: "Earlier than that."] Perhaps it dates back to the Crimea. We all know from our own experience that conditions are not what they ought to be, and that men will not be attracted by the sort of early Victorian surroundings and conditions which one finds in so many barracks in this country. Better married quarters are also important.
Another thing to which I would pay attention—some of my hon. Friends say there is not much in this, but I think it is important; I do not know why the Minister is laughing, because I am trying to put a serious case for improving Regular recruitment—is the difficulty that people now retire earlier than they used to. While it may be true that in a period of full employment men coming out of the forces at 40, 45 or 50, or whatever it may be, have no difficulty in getting employment, should the economic situation change—and, goodness knows, it will if this Government stay in power much longer—the men retiring will be in difficulties.
I should have thought we might have a scheme to correspond with the King's Roll, which we had after the First World War, whereby industrial concerns were obliged to keep jobs for people who had served their country in one form or another. That is difficult to carry out, but it is a suggestion, and running parallel with that is the fact that these men should get some priority of housing; otherwise they may find that they cannot get anywhere to live, in spite of their having done a good job and a proper job for us.
Another thing has always irritated me. I hope that the Minister will pay some attention to what I call the petty and irritating way in which discipline is sometimes administered, because I am sure it puts people off.
Finally, I put forward the point that it is most important that during their period of service men should have opportunities of training which is suitable to the jobs which they propose to take up when they come out of the forces at the end of their
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time. I am sure that would make an enormous difference. I give this credit to the Minister for tackling the school situation. I have not studied what he said very carefully because I did not make a note of it, but it sounded as if he were aware of the difficulty in which Regular Service men find themselves when dealing with the education of their children. So much for the White Paper itself.
I now want to say a few words about two or three other things. The first is, why two years? I have made a study of the period of service in other armies in the Western orbit, so to speak, and except for Greece and Turkey no army has as long a term of service as we have. That surely implies one of two things. Either we are less efficient, with less good men or less good equipment, or the other people are not doing their job. It means one or the other, and, in the latter case, they are not bearing their fair burden. It seems to me to be absurd to say that the rest of N.A.T.O. forces can get on with eighteen months, and yet we must have two years. We shall find ourselves in an extraordinary position in Germany. The victorious British soldier will be conscripted for two years, while the defeated German is doing only eighteen months. That is one point which I should have thought would give people cause for irritation.
I want to ask, why the sudden enthusiasm for a strategic Reserve now? We have got along without a strategic Reserve for about four years. [An HON. MEMBER: "Did the right hon. Gentleman advocate it?"] I was not asking what I advocated, but I advocated a cut in service. What the right hon. and learned Gentleman said in the debate of 28th April was that we could, of course, have cut it if we did not have a strategic Reserve. As far as I understand things from reading the newspapers, a major war is less imminent now than it was then and I do not see why the building of the strategic Reserve need be hurried on at this moment. However, if it must be hurried on, could not the numbers involved be very greatly reduced if arrangements were made so that, for example, a complete division could be airlifted at any moment from anywhere in this country or from wherever the strategic Reserve be situated? It would be a help if it could be, and that might halve the size of the strategic Reserve.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: The reduction of 100,000 to which I referred will involve cutting to some extent the strategic Reserve.
Mr. Stokes: It is very nice of the Minister to tell me that. That is one of the many things he left out of his speech. He did not say much about the airlift, either. I came here thinking that we should hear a lot about commitments. Now we know that some calculations have been made and some points have been taken care of.
I am told that in the pipeline of men going to and fro at any one time there may be between 20,000 and 30,000 people. That could be improved, the number reduced, if air travel were used more. In industry today, if one can avoid it, one does not send anybody otherwise than by air. Worn-out members of the executive travel by sea, so that they can have a rest before they reach their destination. Generally speaking, what one does is to send people by air because that saves time and money and is very much more efficient, and the cost does not work out at more. I have just been round the world, and the cost worked out at 5d. a mile—far cheaper than any other method of travel. [An HON. MEMBER: "And feeding?"] Oh, no, it did not include board and lodging as well.
One more proposal, and then I shall come to my conclusion. It is this. During the Second World War—I have forgotten now which year it was, but I think it was 1941 or 1942—Mr. Ernest Bevin organised from the Ministry of Labour teams of competent people who went round industry, whether one liked it or not, and combed out the manpower, examined the manpower situation, to see whether more men could be got off the production line, to see whether they were being wasted, and, if they were, to have them put where they would be more useful, or, if necessary, into the forces. Even the most efficient of us found that those teams managed to turn something up. Very surprised I was, very surprised.
I suggest that the process in the reverse order should be undertaken now, that we ought to have a team of competent people to see whether the manpower in the forces is being usefully engaged. In attendance on the team there could be some Service personnel, for I quite see the difficulty of
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the forces; and the pure amateurs would not do entirely, although certainly purely professional soldiers, sailors and airmen will not do, for they would only open their ugly maws wider and swallow more. What we want is a lay team, a civilian team with assistants, if the Government like, to comb right through the Armed Forces to see what can be done to obtain greater efficiency and a lesser demand for manpower in the Armed Forces, and, in consequence, more men free to go to the industrial production line, which is so essential, more particularly in the face of our balance of payments position.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I think the right hon. Gentleman would like to know that the Services—although I am speaking for my own—invited Sir James Reid Young, who, until recently at least, was the managing efficiency expert of Vickers, to carry out an inquiry of this nature, which he did. There was an efficiency expert engaged by the Royal Air Force recently, too. That kind of experiment has been tried, and has resulted in considerable savings.
Mr. Stokes: I am delighted to hear it, but in the absence of any precise knowledge all I can say is that we heard some very funny stories at Question Time today. Perhaps I should have said curious rather than funny. Pathetic; but very curious. I do not know how those teams work, but I am glad to hear that something is being done, and now I know that they exist I will have another look at the matter.
When I was a Minister I used to keep coming across dumps of machine tools and machines in "moth balls," as the Americans say. It appears now, having regard to nuclear warfare, that we do not want military reserves, and even if there is a need for a reserve there will be no time to get this sort of stuff out of the moth balls into the production line, so why not free all the manpower now being wasted in maintaining and guarding it? And why could not that material be sent overseas to help capital investment in backward countries, or to help with our balance of payments?
I come now to my conclusion. It is this: after two years or more during which we pressed for an inquiry and a reduction in the term of National Service

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all we have got is a miserable document which does not get us very far. There is no doubt that had there been an inquiry there would have been a reduction in the length of service.
Mr. J. Enoch Powell Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Wolverhampton, South-West) rose—
Mr. Stokes: I was trying to conclude my remarks.
Mr. Powell: But before he does so there are words in the Amendment the right hon. Gentleman has moved which I should like him to be kind enough to explain. Does
"… an immediate reduction in the length of National Service"
mean that men now serving with the Colours would have their period of service reduced—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—or that those about to enlist would serve for a shorter period?
Mr. Stokes: Whatever some people may mean, I do not mean that. I mean an immediate decision now that in the next cycle of National Service operations there will be a reduction.
Mr. Powell: In eighteen months' time?
Mr. Stokes: That is what it comes to. It ought to become effective in eighteen months.
Mr. Powell: In eighteen months' time?
Mr. Stokes: Yes. The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well from his experience in this House how difficult it is to put a qualitative adjective or adverb into a Motion and have it properly understood. There was a recent occasion when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) said that if only we on this side had not included the word "immediate" in a Motion of ours he would have agreed with it. The Motion was:
"That this House, recognising that the hydrogen bomb … constitutes a grave threat to civilisation … would welcome an immediate initiative by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a meeting between the Prime Minister and the heads of the Administrations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th April, 1954; Vol. 526, c. 36.]
The right hon. Gentleman said:
"We shall not divide against this Motion provided that it is clearly understood that the word 'immediate' does not commit us to
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action at an unsuitable time …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th April, 1954; Vol. 526, c. 58.]
In other words, we submit that there is, within reason, a case for a reduction now, that it ought to be declared now and become effective within eighteen months. That is what I mean by the Amendment.
The White Paper gives no indication of what the Government are going to do in 1958, whether they will put off the call-up until the young man gets to the age of 20 and his age just about matches up with that of the people finishing their time, or whether they will reduce the period. It ignores the vital need of industry for more manpower. The Government have given way to the insatiable maws of the generals. We cannot afford to carry as much as we are, and in view of the general ineptitude of the Government, their failure to face the facts, it is for Parliament to say, "This is all you can have and no more. Make the most of it"; and to insist on a reduction now.
4.38 p.m.
Mr. Anthony Kershaw: In addressing you for the first time, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I am conscious of the feelings of trepidation which, no doubt, many hon. Members arid, perhaps, even some right hon. Members as well will remember from the days when they made their first speeches here, and I must ask for the indulgence of the House.
It is particularly a pleasure to me to intervene for the first time in a debate of this sort, because my predecessor in representing the Stroud division, Sir Robert Perkins, very often spoke in such debates, for he interested himself especially in the problems of the Air Force and of the Territorial Army. I have a special pleasure also in following the right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), because, during my time in the Forces during the war I used to read with considerable interest of his efforts to make life safer for me.
I welcome the fact that it has proved possible to lighten to some extent the burden of National Service on the country. I do not believe that the call-up actually bears hardly on individuals, especially those who are lucky enough to go abroad and serve with units on active service. I believe that the Report which the Ministry of Labour and National Service published recently proves that the

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call up, however unwelcome personally, does not actually do very much harm to the individuals concerned.
It is, of course, otherwise for the nation as a whole. The very large military establishments and the large number of Regulars tied down in training National Service men and the comparatively short time of the military efficiency of National Service men, even with two years' service, must mean that, militarily speaking, this is an inefficient way of protecting the country.
I also welcome the methods which are now to be employed. I am quite certain that it is essential at present that the two-year period should be continued, because almost half of every active unit, at least in the Service which makes greatest use of National Service men, is based on officers, N.C.O.s and men who are completing the last six months or so of their service. If they are taken away, the efficiency of the Army certainly will be affected.
It is also mathematically clear that the present system proposed by the Government cannot indefinitely continue, because in two or three years' time the age of those called up under the system of three call-ups a year rather than four will rise to an unacceptable height. It will be necessary to adopt some other solution unless the numbers in the Forces are to be allowed to rise to their present level.
It is not appropriate to speculate now on what will happen in two or three years' time. It is certain that if we can increase the number of Regulars we shall very largely remove some of the most difficult problems. I should like to consider for a moment whether enough use is made of the existing manpower in the Regular Forces.
It is common ground, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence said so today, that we cannot look forward to transporting, and if we could transport we probably could not maintain, massive divisions, armed with the most modern weapons, for a long period in a foreign land. Therefore, some of our troops would have to be more lightly equipped than has hitherto been thought necessary for first-line troops. It seems to me, therefore, that the administrative tail can be easily cut, and that a
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little more can be done in that direction than has been done hitherto.
If the equipment is to be lighter and more easily transportable it should also be very much simpler, and that should enable us to cut the number employed on maintaining equipment. Nobody who has had experience of trying to make military wireless sets work, in places where they are expected to work, and has had experience of trying to teach people to make them work, would disagree that if years ago we had had push-button wireless sets such as the Americans had had for a long period, the time employed in training men would have been much shorter and the work much simpler.
I think that civilian employees could also be used less wastefully than they are at present. The Minister said that he was looking into that matter. I hope that he will also consider handing over suitable dumps and depots to civilian contractors, who are better equipped to handle labour and other problems than are the Services themselves.
Are the war establishments of the fighting units pruned down as much as possible? I well remember that during the war it was my duty as a staff officer to recommend from time to time an increase in establishment—an officer here and two or three men there—and I scarcely remember a time when I did not write an extremely convincing brief which obtained the results that were sought. It is much easier to argue for one's own unit than to criticise from outside, but at the end of the war all who had been doing that had brought about the result that establishments generally were far too lavish and bigger than they should be, perhaps not on the American scale but very like it.
I remember that the unit in which I served took prisoner the opposing German formation. Our unit was commanded by a major who had the captains, lieutenants, second-lieutenants and sergeants and even the batmen that their ranks demanded. The opposing unit was commanded by a sergeant-major, and observing from the opposite side of the hill I never noticed that their performance was less efficient than ours.
I am aware of the danger of having expensive aeroplanes lying about for a long time doing nothing whilst waiting to be used for air trooping, and it might

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well be considered whether, in conjunction with air charter companies, something might be done so that aeroplanes might be used by civilians when they are not required by troops.
Increasing the Regular members of the forces is perhaps a more stubborn problem. Pay and allowances have been mentioned and are under consideration at present. I am sure that the education allowance will be of benefit but I feel that any increase in pay must be substantial, otherwise the forces will feel only that they have been brought back to parity with those in industry.
On the question of conditions generally and accommodation in particular, I agree respectfully with the right hon. Member for Ipswich. In many cases accommodation is deplorable. I know that there have been difficulties in the past but I do not know that a great deal is now being done. One must expect conditions to be uncomfortable in small stations abroad, but I was recently in Malta which has been a military station for over 150 years and I found that the married quarters there were quite insufficient in number and lower in quality than they should be.
Recently a famous regiment went to a very deserted part of the world. I am told that it had ninety-seven married families, and that when it arrived at the station it was found that only six married quarters were provided. It was hardly surprising that a great many wanted to give up and refuse to go out. I am sure that the Secretary of State for War recognises the regiment to which I am referring.
It is necessary to consider money, of course, in this matter of providing quarters, but could we not use the breathing space which the atom bomb has given us to divert money from making conventional weapons to improving accommodation and bringing the conditions in which our troops are required to live up to modern standards of comfort? One could hope in this way to maintain and increase the numbers in the Regular Forces, and perhaps in two or three years' time, when this question is considered again, it might be found less intractable than it is this afternoon.
I should like to say a few words about the Territorial Army. I speak as a present serving member with my yeomanry
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regiment in Gloucestershire. I welcome wholeheartedly the Government's proposal for a very large measure of voluntary service for the Territorial Army. This proposal came in the nick of time.
I do not want to fight too long a battle already won, but in case the policy is reversed at any time I want to go on record as saying that, in the country, where establishments are small and widely scattered, the Territorial Army was on the point of breaking down. We had not the instructors and accommodation required, and the system was not working. If the prevailing conditions had continued for three or four years more, the Territorial Army in the country districts might have been killed stone dead. There is still an obligation to serve twenty days, and I ask with some temerity whether that requirement is really worth while.
We understand that it is not the primary purpose of the Territorial Army to produce reserves for the Regular Army at the present time and twenty days is not very long. It amounts only to one camp and two weekends. I presume that the year chosen will be the year after the National Service man has been discharged from the Forces. If that is so, it is the wrong year to choose because that is probably the only year in his whole career in which he does not need a refresher, whereas three years later it might be of great value.
There are one or two other considerations. It is natural that a National Service man who comes for a short time to a unit where he has never been before and probably never will be again, should not have much loyalty or esprit de corps. It may also be the case that as a stranger he will have to perform in those fourteen days the less agreeable jobs which are not necessarily military but have to be done. Hon. Members know the kind of jobs I mean. So he may get an even worse impression from his fourteen days than he might otherwise have got.
Also I believe that the expense, the paper work and the kitting out involved in that fourteen days might be considerable, and I wonder whether it would not now be better to make a clean sweep. Of course the sixty days' service obviously produces more valuable results, and I dare say that ought to stay.

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I venture to suggest that the proposals of the Government represent an important step forward in the efficiency of the forces and in relief of our industrial manpower, and in the light of the foreign situation today I do not think the country can ask for more.
4.51 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: It is customary in this House to congratulate a new Member on the occasion of his maiden speech. The hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) has more than earned the indulgences for which he asked and I offer my congratulations to him without hesitation and with all sincerity. The hon. Gentleman speaks with almost impeccable confidence for a new Member—long may it continue. Moreover, he has displayed a sense of independence in his observations which will make a useful contribution on his side of the House. You would hardly expect me, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, to accept the main argument of the hon. Gentleman because it appeared to me, that in the first part of his speech, at any rate, it was contrary to the Amendment which we have ventured to submit to the Motion of the Government. But, after all, one expects differences of opinion in this Assembly and one must make the best of it or the worst of it.
There is one matter upon which I am in complete accord with the Minister of Defence. National Service—length of service, the number of men required and the like—cannot be considered in isolation. It is closely associated with our entire defence organisation. I shall have to ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman a few questions and, as I speak early in the debate, it will suit the convenience of the Government because they can reflect upon those questions, obtain the information, and enlighten our minds at the end of the debate.
I should like to make this preliminary observation which may not be agreeable to everybody in the House. Whatever we do, we must adopt no measure or measures calculated to weaken our defence organisation. Recently there have been manifestations of charm, good will and apparent readiness for co-operation in certain quarters. I speak of the international sphere. We welcome those manifestations. Nevertheless, let us not be wholly deceived. After all, there have
1058
been incidents recently in the Middle East and during the conversations now proceeding in Geneva which, if they do not create suspicions in our minds, at any rate lead us to the conclusion that we must exercise very great caution in dealing with matters of defence. I put it no higher than that.
Having said that, I proceed to disagree fundamentally with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. It seemed to me that what his speech amounted to was an argument not for a reduction in the period of National Service in the foreseeable future or at any time in the future, but rather in the direction of fastening a two-year period of National Service permanently on the youth of this country.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman began by telling the House that what with the economies already effected—the reduction in the Regular element, due to wastage no doubt, perhaps to other causes, and to the reduction in the numbers of National Service men—and the reductions contemplated we should save by 1958 about 170,000 men. But, said the right hon. and learned Gentleman, we do not seek quantity; it is quality we are after, and for what reason? To promote greater efficiency in the forces. When he said that a query immediately came to my mind which I venture to put to the right hon. and learned Gentleman now.
If it is efficiency the Government are seeking, what has been happening in the last three and a half years? Because if we are now seeking efficiency and are adopting these new measures in order to promote it, that, in my judgment, constitutes a harsh indictment—I will not say of the Minister of Defence, who has only recently occupied his high position, but of the Secretary of State for War. Indeed, I would say to the Secretary of State for War not that he is dishonest—that is a much abused term—but rather that his principal success is that he has achieved a series of miscalculations.
Some of us can recall those flamboyant speeches made by the Secretary of State for War when he sat on this side of the House: how he demanded Commonwealth defence, how he insisted that we should prop up the colonial forces, how we should seek to increase the Regular element in the forces by providing them with more emoluments—all that and

1059
much else. Well, where is Commonwealth defence? We hardly hear a word about it nowadays. Indeed, at the last conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers we understand that the subject of defence was not considered.
If the facts were established—presumably, for various reasons, they are not to be established—we should discover that the contributions from the Commonwealth, apart from the Mother Country, are almost negligible. I know there are a few contributions here and there, but they are really of little value. However, there is not a word from the Members of the Government, although they had a great deal to say when they were on this side of the House.
It is the same in respect of colonial forces. Practically nothing has been done in that direction. The Secretary of State for War has remained silent on these matters, no matter how vocal he was when he spoke from this side of the House.
It seemed to me that the argument of the Minister of Defence was illogical. I would recall to the House what transpired when the demand for a review of the National Service Acts was made by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House nearly four years ago. First of all, there was a demand for an inquiry, and then the demand was related to a possible reduction in the period of service. The Government's reply was that it would be impossible to cut the period of service because of our commitments.
Everybody knows—I think Government spokesmen will readily admit it—that our commitments have been substantially reduced during the past three or four years. We are out of Korea or practically out. Indeed, if we have any men in Korea, we ought to know the reason why and should be told what they are doing there. We have a certain number of men in Malaya. It is no use retailing the figures; they are familiar to some of us. We have a number of men in Kenya, and now a number of men in Cyprus. Taken altogether, however, they are far fewer than the number of men who were in the Canal Zone before the decision was taken to evacuate it. Therefore, if our commitments have been so substantially reduced, the argument that we could not cut the period of service
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because of our commitments now falls to the ground. That is the first point.
The Government have always said that it is quite impossible for us to cut the period of service because of those commitments and because we are in a more vulnerable position in contrast with other countries associated with N.A.T.O. Let us take the case of France and consider the substantial commitments which have been imposed on her because of events in North Africa and previously in Indo-China. She had to make severe inroads into her forces in order to deal with those situations—I am not discussing the merits or demerits of them; the facts are well known—yet in spite of these substantial commitments France, who is associated with us in N.A.T.O., occupies the time of her conscripts for not twenty-four months but only eighteen months. Indeed, it has been alleged against the French that they do not call upon the men to serve the whole of the eighteen months. However, I will let that pass; let us assume that the period is eighteen months. That is six months less than in this country in spite of all France's commitments.
Mr. Douglas Glover: Would it not be true to say that the French Government have also called up, as an emergency measure, 100,000 reservists who have gone to North Africa and have also withdrawn one division from their defence commitments under N.A.T.O.?
Mr. Shinwell: That may well be so. I do not disagree with that. If it be true, I accept it; but I do not see that it affects my argument at all. The fact remains—this will not be disputed—that although the French have far greater commitments thon ours at the present time, their period of service is eighteen months only. Indeed, that applies to nearly all the N.A.T.O. countries, the exceptions being those referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), Turkey and Greece, and even there the facts are not well established.
Incidentally, might I, in passing, congratulate my right hon. Friend upon his very able and witty speech on the occasion when he has been assigned the duty of dealing with defence matters from the Opposition Front Bench. I can only hope that he will not prove as unpopular as I proved to be in certain quarters because

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of having occupied that position at one time.
Let us consider something else that was said by the Government when we made our first demand. They said, "You want an inquiry, but surely we could not allow an independent body to deal with matters which involve security." So it has been left to the generals, the air marshals, the admirals and the rear-admirals to deal with the subject of waste and the other matters. Does anyone expect a general to agree to a reduction in the number of men under his command if he can possibly help it? We would not expect him to do so. There is a general, a lieutenant-general, a major-general, a number of brigadiers, a number of majors, a number of captains, and so on, and if the number of junior officers is reduced, there is no reason why there should be such a large array of senior officers. This is a vested interest, one which has got to be broken down sooner or later.
If the Government had agreed to our request for an inquiry three and a half years ago, and if the facts had been established about waste, the relationship of the National Service men with the Regular element in training and the like, and, in particular, in relation to the emergence of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, by this time there would have been a substantial reduction in the period of service. There is no doubt about it at all. The fact is that the Government were afraid to have the inquiry.
We still demand an inquiry. Let the Government reject our Amendment—as, indeed, they will do because they have the majority—but let them institute an independent inquiry, perhaps a Select Committee of this House. Let the facts be established and let nothing be concealed, and I will guarantee that the Report of that Select Committee or committee of independent persons with no vested interests will conclusively demonstrate that there is no reason why we should continue with a period of twenty-four months.
What is really at the back of the trouble? As my right hon. Friend rightly said, it is the Regular element. Who is responsible for the present position in respect of the Regular element? It is hon. Gentlemen opposite. After all, the Government have now had four years in office. I remember how hon. Gentlemen opposite attacked us when they sat on
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this side of the House. Nevertheless, the Labour Government raised pay on one occasion by £55 million. I can tell hon. Members that that was not an easy thing to do, because we had tussles with the Treasury, but we succeeded. I was very much in favour of it because when I went to the War Office and was asked what I intended to do, I said, "I want to do for the soldiers what I have tried to do for the miners."
I see no reason why a Regular soldier should not be provided with pay commensurate not necessarily with his task—in view of there being periods of peace and periods of war, it is very difficult to analyse it—but with his needs, not as a Regular soldier but as a citizen of the country. Surely there is no logical argument against it. I would pay the Regular soldier as much as the country can afford; and, in my judgment, the country can afford much more than it is paying the private soldier at this time. I would go so far as to say that there are many junior officers who require more remuneration, and I would not object to that at all. The more concessions we provide for the Regular element, the more likely we are to build up that element and so make it unnecesary to have a 24-month period of National Service.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich that better conditions are necessary. I remember that when I went to the War Office and made a fuss about barrack conditions I was told not to make too much fuss, because that only denigrated the Army and men would not join if we said that barrack accommodation and conditions were bad. We went on saying it and eventually we put some substance into the financial arrangements for the provision of married quarters; but much more requires to be done.
I want to come to the point of real substance. For what do we want twenty-four months' service? The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister for Defence said—and I thought that this was the most illogical part of the argument which he deployed—that twenty-four months was needed because the men had to be trained. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If he does not agree with me, the Minister of Defence will not rely on hon. Members opposite, but upon himself. I ventured then to intervene and I now put the point again. The right hon. and learned

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Gentleman said that twenty-four months' service was required, because it took at lease twelve months to undertake the task of training certain categories. I interjected to point out that for the purposes of actual fighting no more than six months was required. Will anybody deny that? I stand by the facts. The Labour Government sent men to Malaya and Korea after six months' training. I disliked it intensely.
Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that the reason for sending those men to Malaya was that they could get further training in local conditions when they got there and they got considerably more from their training there than at home. That is the truth.
Mr. Shinwell: It is no use the hon. and gallant Member telling me about these matters, because I had to deal with them. I was very conscious of what was required. I had to deal with them both as Secretary of State for War and as Minister of Defence. We had to send men out. Questions were asked in the House, particularly by hon. Members on my own side. It was a very difficult situation, but because of the emergency the men had to go. Undoubtedly there was some training when they arrived in Malaya, because they were not acquainted with jungle training and had to gain the experience.
But after a few weeks of jungle training they were pitch-forked into battle and the same has applied elsewhere. I am not asking, I merely tell the right hon. and learned Gentleman that men are being sent to Cyprus with no more than six months' military training and they will be expected to engage, I will not say in major operations, but in minor operations which can involve them in serious trouble. If the House could be told how many National Service men, after six, seven or eight months' training, were killed in Malaya, Korea and elsewhere, it would be startled.
I believe that my argument is sound. It is that after a short period of training men can be pitch-forked into the struggle. I therefore contend that no more than that is required. I take into account the period of leave, the time it takes to send men out and the time it takes for them to come back. Nevertheless, they under-
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take the fighting they were called upon to do. What about men in special categories? I have always been ready to make a distinction between the ordinary combatant soldier, who after a period of training is thrown into the struggle, and the technical branches.
The men who have a knowledge of signals, electronics, the repair of vehicles, and the like—I need not go into details—N.C.Os., and so on, obviously require a longer period of training. The Minister of Defence said that it requires twelve months and I stand by what he said. He talked about eight, nine, or twelve weeks' leave and the time to send them out and bring them back. How long are they occupied in the forces after having this specialised training? Is it worth while having them for three, four, or five months? It is not worth while and we have to come back to the Regular element.
If I understood the Minister of Defence aright, his argument meant that because of the need for specialised training, these special categories need not two years of National Service, but three years. Indeed, generals have often asked for that and speeches to that end have been made. It is not a reduction they want, but an increase, because it is now recognised that it is unlikely under present conditions of pay and so on that we shall be able to prop up the Regular element and thus reduce the period of National Service. I recognise the difficulty. I believe that if we had tackled it three and a half years ago, we would have made an advance. It is not so easy now.
When my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich was catechised about whether he wanted an immediate reduction, there seemed to be some dubiety on both sides of the House. It seemed to me that the right answer to give—I venture to give it, even if I speak for myself—is that if we do not ask for an immediate reduction, but leave it to the Government, they will take full advantage of that, because they will never do it. If we ask for an immediate reduction, we do not mean that it can be done tomorrow, or next week, or before Christmas. We ask for a plan now for reorganising the forces and deploying them properly and efficiently—if I may use that expression—so that it can be done in a few months.

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What would remain? National Service men would then be much more contented. I do not disagree with the hon. Member for Stroud. I do not accept the view that fellows do not like being National Service men. But I know from my experience that many of them would rather work in the mines and get the pay, or work on the surface, or be carpenters, joiners or engineers, or continue their apprenticeships. I know that they would rather do that than have 4s. a day as National Service men with the prospect of getting 7s. a day for the last six months of the two years' National Service. Nevertheless, although that is true, we have to consider the point not so much from the standpoint of the individual as in the best interests of the country.
That brings me to what is perhaps the most important consideration. We have had a debate on the Budget. I listened very intently to all that was said, and what I did not hear I read. But last year, when the Chancellor deployed his Budget arguments, among other things he said that we must cut defence costs. I know from behind the scenes—[An HON. MEMBER: "How?"]—that he has been concerned about this matter. I should not be asked how I know; I do know. He has been very much concerned and perturbed about rising defence costs which are a burden on the whole nation, as finance costs are a burden on other nations some of them more able to endure it than are we. How are defence costs to be cut down? It can be done only by reducing manpower and that may be one of the reasons why the Government have now decided to reduce manpower.
Is it a question of reducing manpower, because we do not need the men—or what is the reason? Are the Government sure this will not weaken defence? But if defence costs are to be reduced, I suggest that they can be reduced even more rapidly by reducing the period of National Service. From my own experience—and the Secretary of State for War should know this, even if he will not admit it—the reason is that not so many men, N.C.Os., and so on, would be needed to train the others. That is very important. It takes too long to train some of them. The methods are not speeded up and very often training itself is wasted, because the men are trained in methods that may never be
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used in actual warfare. I do not blame the Army, the Air Force or the Navy for that, but it happens. It is unavoidable in the Services.
The way in which to tackle the job is to cut down the period of National Service. The Government should tackle the whole question of manpower in our forces. They should really tackle it—I do not mean by Hollingshurst inquiries, and the rest of it; I know what they are only too well. That sort of thing will not make any substantial change. I am not attacking these people. I do not say that they are evil minded, or anything of that sort; it simply happens that they have vested interests.
The Government will not cut down the period in that way. If the Government were forced to cut the period they would revise, reorganise and review in relation to nuclear strategy, and the result would be that we should be far better off within the next twelve months or so. Recently, there was an exercise under S.H.A.P.E. in Germany which was conducted by General Richard Gale, a very fine soldier and administrator with modern ideas about strategy. What was the conclusion? It was that we could operate with smaller divisions. He is fortified in that view by the declarations repeated so frequently by Field Marshal Montgomery, who has been saying this for a couple of years. Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, and others, have been saying it. The size of divisions can be reduced substantially.
I recall a discussion at Fontainebleau five years ago, when many admirals, generals and marshals were present from the N.A.T.O. countries. We discussed the question and they rejected the idea. But now the conception of a division of 18,000 or 22,000 men with supporting forces—a divisional slice of 40,000 men, with a vast array of vehicles many of which will never be used but which will encumber the roads in the event of war—is Alice in Wonderland.
Mr. Head: The right hon. Gentleman's description of the size of the tail of a division is a little out of date. When he was at the War Office Field Marshal Montgomery was C.I.G.S. and the size of the tail was almost exactly double what it is today. I thought I ought to bring him up to date.
Mr. Shinwell: I am only too willing to be brought up to date. If my conception of a divisional slice is extravagant and it has been reduced by a few thousand men, nevertheless my argument is sound enough. When we have large unwieldy divisions we are bound to have a fairly large divisional slice. That is unavoidable.
The French have adopted a different system, a system of combat groups. The Germans have now decided to have smaller divisions, if ever German re-armament comes to fruition. Some of us are a little doubtful whether German re-armament is altogether desirable in view of what is happening in N.A.T.O. The French are out; they have withdrawn some of their divisions because of circumstances in North Africa. If the Germans should arm, as they may do, they may become the predominant force in N.A.T.O. We had better watch our step, because some of them are not altogether praiseworthy. However, I do not want to embark on a discussion about that. I merely mention it. What have the Germans decided to do?
Mr. Ian Harvey Mr. Ian Harvey (Harrow, East)rose—
Mr. Shinwell: Do not bother me.
The Germans have decided to have divisions of no more than 12,000 men. If the size of divisions is reduced we can reduce the numbers of men not only for combatant purposes but for maintenance, and all the rest of it, and the Government can reduce the period of National Service. There would be no difficulty about that.
I beg the Government to be a little more advanced in their ideas. Let them get the right concept. Nuclear methods have emerged, and they have come to stay until the world is less crazy and we promote total, or, at any rate, partial, disarmament. In the context of nuclear strategy it is absurd to have large ground forces. The Russians have reduced their land forces by 600,000 men. The Americans contemplate a reduction of 300,000 men. [HON. MEMBERS: "From what?"] I agree that it does not mean a great deal. The Russians still have a substantial number of men. Let us take note of that.
My final point is that by all means we should have our defence organisation. Let it be efficient and well based,
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strategically and otherwise, but do not employ vast numbers of men for long periods of time if it is unnecessary. Promote efficiency, by all means. Step up the training. If we had a period of eighteen months instead of two years we should accelerate the training methods, and that is the best way of tackling the problem. The Government have not gone far enough. They have rejected over and over again our demand for an inquiry. Now they reject our demand for an immediate reduction, which means a reduction after planning has taken place.
In consequence, they will not reduce defence costs which is essential if we are not to burden the economy. The Government have failed, and no one more so than the Secretary of State for War. I say that in a most friendly fashion. We are much more gentlemanly than hon. Members opposite. I recall what he has said about me and the statements inspired about me in the newspapers and elsewhere and how the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford put him in his place. He will remember the occasion. When I think of all those things I realise how tolerant, decent and humane we are. If I may be permitted to indulge in a vulgarism, we ought to take their trousers off. I do not mean the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister of Labour. He is a noble and honourable exception, but that only proves the rule.
The Government have not gone far enough. We will keep at them until public opinion forces them to take the requisite action, just as it has compelled them to produce the White Paper.
5.27 p.m.
Mr. Richard Wood: The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) implied, and his right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) stated explicitly, that the White Paper on National Service represented a surrender by the Government to the generals. I seriously ask the right hon. Member for Easington to consider whether, even if that were an apt description of the Government's action, it was not better to surrender to the generals than to surrender to other forces, details of which no doubt he will remember better than me, because I was not in the House before 1950 and I gather that he was quite intimately concerned with that other

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surrender. I think that the right hon. Gentleman will know the surrender about which I speak.
The right hon. Gentleman suggested that the Government wish to make the two-year period of service a permanency. I must choose my language extremely carefully, but he must realise that that is not true. The White Paper itself is, by its very nature, a temporary solution to the problem. Within two or three years the Government will again have to face the issue of the two-year period. Therefore, no suggestion that we are making an attempt to make the two-year period a permanency can carry very much weight.
I am very glad that we are again having a re-examination of this subject. The problem of how best we can deploy our manpower for purposes of defence has been with us for fifteen or sixteen years already, and no doubt will be with us for some time to come. It seems to me that there are two very important points of agreement between the two sides of the House; first, that National Service must continue—the right hon. Member for Ipswich said so in his speech—and, secondly, if I may put it in this cumbersome way, that National Service man-hours must be decreased. On the other hand, there is the important point of disagreement as to the methods by which this reduction should be achieved.
I am bound to say that if we could view all these matters in a vacuum, I should feel that there were many real and solid advantages in the Opposition case for a reduction in the term of National Service rather than in the Government plan to restrict the call-up. But in fact we cannot look at this matter in a vacuum. We cannot ignore the facts put before us by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence. We cannot ignore the commitments, about which I should like to say a little later on.
Mr. Bevan: The Minister of Defence said nothing at all about that.
Mr. Wood: I said I should like to say something about it.
We cannot ignore the changed purpose of National Service and the part at present being played by National Service men. So far as I could understand the right hon. Member for Ipswich, although he talked about a reduction in the past
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of our commitments throughout the world, he did not adequately face the situation of the necessity of building and maintaining a strategic reserve. He merely said that we had managed, a few years ago, to get along without one.
I would make the point that at any rate there does not seem much doubt as to which of the two methods, the reduction in the length of the period, or the restriction of the call-up, would be more popular in the country. There is no doubt in my mind about it. My right hon. Friends have been criticised recently for doing what they thought to be popular—I certainly must not pursue that argument or I shall very quickly be out of order. But I am told that the Opposition are alert and ready to appreciate all points, and I am sure that this fact will not have escaped the lively intelligence of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) who is to speak. It seems quite clear to me that in this case, whatever may be the case about other matters, the Government have steadfastly refused to yield to what they believe to be popular pressure. In my opinion, and perhaps in the opinion of other hon. Gentlemen, when a Government refuse to yield to popular pressure there are at least grounds for suspecting that the reasons for their policy are even better than usual.
The other difficulty I find—and I am bound to say the right hon. Member for Easington made me more confused than ever—is about the behaviour of the Opposition over the last six months. At the General Election, five months ago, there was, so far as I remember, no campaign for a cut. There was a good deal of talk, was there not, about the need for an inquiry? But on 28th April, which was only one week before the Dissolution, the right hon. Gentleman himself moved a Motion calling for a committee, preferably of this House, to consider the whole question of National Service.
On that occasion my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence moved an Amendment which spoke about the declared intention of Her Majesty's Government to lighten the existing burden of National Service as soon as circumstances permitted. That intention was unanimously approved by the House, and I wonder perhaps whether it was not a relief to the Opposition that their Motion

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calling for an inquiry did not command the vote of one single hon. Member of this House. I say that because it certainly seems to me a most odd constitutional device and if hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite again become responsible for the Government of the United Kingdom they might find their position extremely difficult were they pressed for an inquiry into matters which are properly the exclusive responsibility of the Government of this country.
At any rate, whatever may be the inconsistencies of the Opposition's attitude in the past, we are having a debate on what appear to me to be much more realistic grounds. There is, or was, no reference in the Amendment to an inquiry. The right hon. Gentleman talked about the possibility of an inquiry, but it seems to me that if the Amendment is taken as being the substance of the Opposition's case, then for some reason the Opposition have thrown away caution and come to the conclusion—presumably based on new information not available in April—that there is an irrefutable case for the reduction of the period of two years by several months. I think that we should know—and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale will tell us—what is that new information.
Mr. Bevan: I should have thought the exact opposite was the case; that the onus is on the Government to prove that there is a case for having a two-year period. Surely we do not start with the assumption that we ought to have conscription? We should start with the assumption that conscription must be justified and its length established.
Mr. Wood: Of course, the right hon. Gentleman and I are not likely to see eye to eye on that. I believe that the Minister of Defence has put up an irrefutable case, and may I say that if there are any doubts in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman, I have no doubt that they will be answered by the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Labour?
What the Opposition were doing six months ago was to ask for an inquiry, which to some of us might suggest that at least there was a doubt in the minds of hon. Gentlemen opposite about whether the period could be reduced.
Mr. Shinwell Mr. Shinwell indicated dissent.
Mr. Wood: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but if there was not why did they want an inquiry?
Mr. Shinwell: I am not sure which Motion the hon. Member is referring to, but I can recall one Motion, moved not so very long ago from this side of the House, in which we asked for an inquiry with a view to a reduction in the period of National Service.
Mr. Wood: I have no doubt that that was the purpose of the inquiry and I grant that, but in fact it was thought on 28th April that an inquiry was necessary. Now it is thought—except in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman—that an inquiry is not necessary and that there should be an immediate cut in the term of National Service. That is the only point I am making.
Mr. Shinwell: It is obvious that the Government are not prepared to accede to our demand for an inquiry and in order to force the Government to face up to the reorganisation required, we are saying that there ought to be a cut in the period of service.
Mr. Wood: The Opposition have in fact come to the conclusion that without an inquiry there should be a cut.
It seems to me that if we are not convinced of the wisdom of cutting the period of National Service now, we should make a full examination of the means by which that period can possibly be cut at the present time. There seem to me to be five of those means. The first is the more efficient employment of National Service men; the second, the attraction of more Regulars to the Forces; the third, the abandonment of any hope of a strategic reserve; the fourth, a change in the international situation, and, lastly, a deliberate reduction in our present commitments.
Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman has forgotten the sixth and most important of all. One can get as many Regulars as one likes, but the important problem is to keep them once they have been obtained. That is where the Secretary of State for War has gone wrong. He has played around with the Regular engagement and has in consequence reduced many Regular units to little more than a rabble.
Mr. Wood: I think that the hon. Gentleman, whose mind is extremely agile, should realise that one has to get the Regulars before one can keep them.
Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman has come a little late to this subject. If he had taken the trouble to examine the debates which have taken place during the last year and the Questions put to the Secretary of State for War he would realise that the Secretary of State estimated that he would get prolongation in respect of 33 per cent. He has got it only in respect of 6 per cent., and that is why we have the crisis in manpower.
Mr. Wood: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I read the debates and paid particular attention to the times when he managed to catch Mr. Speaker's eye. Therefore, his views are certainly well known to me.
To continue, I would emphasise that we must get Regulars before we can keep them, and, therefore, I think I am right in saying that one of the methods by which National Service can be reduced is by getting more Regulars.
Now, a word or two about the five methods I have mentioned. We have all heard complaints of wasted time, and not one of us would seek to deny that. Indeed, many of us have made those same complaints ourselves. The easy conclusion which follows from such complaints is that, if there were a shorter period of National Service, the Services would be compelled to avoid all waste.
I was much encouraged the other day by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Poole (Capt. Pilkington), who asked about the cutting out of waste. I hope that that matter will be pursued with all the energy that the Government can command. The difficulty, as I see it—a difficulty even in time of war—is to prevent all idle hours for National Service men or for anyone else in the forces. Even if all hours were fully occupied, it would be impossible at the present time, so long as National Service men form such a high proportion of our Armed Services, to meet our obligations if the two-year period were reduced.
I am encouraged by what my right hon. and learned Friend has said this afternoon, by what the Government have put
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in the White Paper and by what, I hope, they are going to do early next year in their efforts to increase the Regular content of the forces. We would probably all agree, and I think that I should even carry the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) with me in this, that this problem can be finally solved only if we succeed in getting more Regulars. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is important, having got them, to keep them.
Mr. Wigg: What the hon. Gentleman cannot see, and what has been put over and over again to the Secretary of State for War—it took him ten years to learn it—is that the number of Regulars who present themselves has always remained constant. The figure does not vary by 1 per cent., as the Secretary of State pointed out in his last speech. The problem, therefore, is to secure as long engagements as possible, and, having got them, to prolong them. The Secretary of State for War has done exactly the opposite.
Mr. Wood: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman and I shall take up a great deal of time if we argue like this. I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that the hon. Gentleman should catch your eye and make his own speech in his own time.
The third possibility which I mentioned was that of abandoning the strategic reserve. I do not think that I can say very much about that except that, to my mind, it would be fatal if we went back to the position of two or three years ago, when we were stretched to our utmost limits and had no leeway at all and scarcely any troops for the defence of this country itself.
I now turn to the international situation. I cannot see that that, at the moment, gives us much hope for a reduction in the term of National Service. It seems to me a sensible view to take that as atomic war becomes less likely, because all the great Powers possess large stocks of atomic weapons, a limited war is likely to become more possible, and therefore the need for National Service men is increased. How, if we decrease the period of National Service, can we fulfil our commitments in Europe, in the Middle and Far East, in Africa and, indeed, all over the world?

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The only remaining solution is deliberately to reduce our commitments throughout the world. We could certainly do that tomorrow, but we could not do it without reducing our influence, and we could not withdraw from the strategic strong points of the world without, at the same time, ceasing to be a world Power.
Any of us who has visited the United States of America, either recently or some time ago, must have been impressed by the extent and weight of British influence in the affairs of the world as seen through American eyes. I am one of those who think—and I am sure that there are many similarly-minded people in this House—that the bond between two of the world's great Powers is the most important reality of today. I am quite certain that if we decided to reduce the period of National Service we should seriously jeopardise that alliance. And whether it was jeopardised or not, it would, I suggest, no longer be an alliance of equals. It would be extremely dangerous for us to run that risk at the present time.
Finally, it seems to me that in the cold war we have already had to face and bear a great many strains and burdens. and that we are going to have to continue to bear them. Very often we shall be tempted to ask whether it is worth the price that we are asked to pay. I suggest that it is extremely important in this matter to try to keep a sense of proportion. However frustrating this continuance of National Service must be at the present time to the individual, to the family, to industry and to our economy—and, goodness knows, I realise how frustrating it must be because we have all heard about it and seen it for ourselves—I suggest that it is a small price to pay for the attainment of objectives which are common to us all.
5.50 p.m.
Mr. George Thomas: The hon. Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) always makes a contribution worth listening to, even when we disagree with his conclusions. I was surprised that he should feel that to alter and reduce the period of National Service might endanger our alliance with America and with our other friends, particularly since our other friends do not have conscription for as long a period as we do.
If we scoured the British Commonwealth we should not find any other boys
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who are required to bear the military burden and to make the personal sacrifice which our young people are called upon to make. My hon. Friend the Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) informs me that his grandson was called up in Brisbane, Australia, and will serve for a period of only three months. Much nonsense is talked of the equality of sacrifice amongst the Allies, but British youth is called upon to bear a heavier burden than the youth of any other country in the world at the present time.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Except the Russians.
Mr. Bevan: Then they might be even more stupid than we are.
Mr. Thomas: I do not like interfering in this private party, but I will continue.
I rose because I feel that the nation has no right simply to accept conscription as necessary, just because it is the easiest, the cheapest and the laziest way of solving our present military difficulty. It is much cheaper than doing the right thing, which is to get a sufficiently-manned Regular Army. The House should consider the fact that we have now had sixteen years of conscription, and its effect upon the national character is beginning to reveal itself. We cannot expect a major social change of this sort to be brought about without it having an effect upon our way of life.
I want to examine some of the effects which I trace to conscription, but before doing so I would make the point that middle-aged and elderly people have no right to expect youths of under 21 to carry a major burden to ease their problems. We are too fond of shuffling on to youth the responsibility for the mistakes of middle-age and old age, as it is reflected in positions of responsibility. After sixteen years of conscription—ten of which have been years of peace—we may well ask whether there are any ways in which its effect is being revealed upon the community.
As far as I can understand it, one of the major complaints of the conscripts is that they waste the greater part of their time; that they learn to look busy when they are doing nothing. It is very amusing, but it is a very serious thing when it is reflected in the national character, as it is later. The very language of these islands is changing. The word

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"fiddle" is known and accepted in all parts of the islands after sixteen years of conscription.
If people can get away with doing less than they should be doing they think that they are very smart and clever. No hon. or right hon. Gentleman can deny that this spirit has grown in recent years within these island shores of ours. I trace it to the fact that we are taking our young people, at the age of 18—in the days of their early enthusiasm—making them break their associations with youth clubs, churches and social organisations at home; making them anonymous amongst a crowd wearing the same uniform; removing them from the restraints of home, and teaching them that as long as they look as if they are doing something and keep quiet they are satisfying the military machine.
As the "Manchester Guardian" says this morning, when military establishments are visited by generals, if those generals are received by a smart guard, with a smart salute; if they see plenty of whitewash and polish about the place, and everything is clean, they are satisfied that it is a good place—especially if they also have a good time in the mess. I am now paraphrasing the editorial in this morning's "Manchester Guardian." We all know that time is wasted and, therefore, that there is an undermining of the character of the young people. This is a serious national problem, about which old people have no right to shrug their shoulders.
Not one hon. Member in this House had to serve under peace-time conscription in his day, and yet we calmly shrug our shoulders and say, "Well, it is necessary for the defence of the island." The strange thing is that our commitments have never been so small from the beginning of British history, with the possible exception of the "press gang" period. To my mind conscription is merely a refinement of the press gang. With the possible exception of that period, throughout our history we have managed to meet our world commitments and defend these islands without taking away the freedom of British youth to decide where or if it wanted to volunteer to serve. Today, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) indicated, with far fewer troops and with fewer commit-
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ments we saddle youth with this burden, which it is so easy for us to push on to it, regardless of the influence which it is bound to have.
There is another matter to which I want to draw the attention of the House. The Home Office has published figures revealing an increase in the amount of drunkenness among young people under the age of 21. I do not care whether or not people share my views upon the question of drink; nobody can fail to be disturbed by that trend.
Mr. Head: I am sure the hon. Member would be interested to know that in the Army there has been a very marked decrease in the number of cases of drunkenness during the last five or six years.
Mr. Thomas: I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman should think that that answers this problem. Does he believe that when a man takes off his uniform after having worn it for two years he takes off at the same time all the habits he has learned during those two years? Does he think that they have no effect in after years? Does not he think that the restlessness caused by the call-up has any effect upon youth?
I regard the defence of the British character as being of equal importance to the defence of these islands, and conscription is revealing itself to be a grave danger to that character. I am not alone in holding this opinion. If right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite will read the opinion of responsible church and youth leaders they will find that I am in harmony with what almost all these distinguished people have been saying.
Within the last few years we have noticed a trend for people to be more indifferent to social problems. Hon. Members on both sides of the House will agree that there has grown up a neutrality upon moral issues. It is difficult to stir up people; it is difficult to get a meeting upon issues which would have set our fathers on fire. Hon. Gentlemen keep grinning and smiling as if this were not of some importance, but it is a serious matter, for this House is the custodian of the well-being of these islands.
I trace this moral neutrality on the part of so many people to the fact that, unlike our fathers, who had developed their own sturdy initiative, we are taking

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young people at a critical age in their lives and teaching them to obey rather than to think. For two years, their business is to do what they are told. We talk about initiative in the Armed Forces, but if they show any initiative, they get fourteen days. It is not initiative, but obedience, which is the important thing to a military character. "Always obey anyone who has a pip more than you have," we are told, "and you will get on all right." That is the philosophy which underlies this system, and I say that it may well be damaging the fibre of the national character, whereas the sturdy independence for which our fathers were known, without, be it acknowledged, the conscription of all the youth of these islands, earned for us that recognition abroad of which we are all' so proud.
Ere I resume my seat, I want to acknowledge that we all have a responsibility here for the defence of these islands. It is said by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides that if we end conscription our defence fails and falls to the ground. It so happens, as the House will know from previous occasions when I have had the honour of addressing it, that I believe that conscription is morally wrong. It is a denial of liberty to one section of the community imposed by another section which will never have to give up that liberty itself. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman seems to be suffering from something.
Mr. C. J. M. Alport: I only wish to ask the hon. Gentleman whether he thinks that principle applies in war as well as in peace-time?
Mr. Thomas: I am talking about peacetime. I think that war is entirely different, but we are not at war, and all hon. Members on the other side of the House, and indeed my hon. and right hon. Friends here, take the view that things are quieter now. Who believes that there is any danger of a major war in the next ten years? There is no one in this House who believes in the danger of a major nuclear war in the next ten years. "There ain't gonna be no war," said the Foreign Secretary, in terms hardly worthy of his office, if I may speak as a schoolmaster for a moment.
Bearing that in mind, and accepting the cold military considerations, there are
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generals and high officers in the Air Force and in the Navy who say that they do not want conscripts. An unwilling servant does not make the best sailor, soldier or airman, and the majority of these conscripts have one idea in their minds from the minute they go in—and that is to get out. We all know that that is perfectly true.
Therefore, we ought to ask, "How did we get our soldiers before? How did we have our Armed Forces without conscription, and will it work now?" It was unemployment before the war. [Interruption.] If the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) does not accept that, I hope he will have a chance to advance his point of view, although I am not canvassing in his favour.
I believe that it was unemployment which drove many of my own compatriots, who would be ready enough in time of war, but who went in time of peace into the Regular Forces. That compulsion has gone. We are now competing with high earnings, though not high wages, in the field of industry, and because we are faced with high earnings, we are making the youth of the country, who are unable to hit back at us, bear the burden of conscription.
The Armed Forces of the Crown ought to be placed in the same position as the great industries of the nation, which have to compete for its manpower. We should give youth the chance to decide whether it wants to go into the Armed Forces or into industry for a career.
I feel that we, who have the privilege of being Members of this House, have a moral responsibility not to accept conscription with a shrug of the shoulders and complacently to believe that it is here to stay in our lifetime. If it is, we shall be the generation which altered the British way of life, and we should not be thanked for it by history.
6.6 p.m.
Commander J. W. Maitland (Horn-castle): I think the whole House always believes in the sincerity of the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas). My criticism of his speech, however. would be this. He began by telling us that he did not want we older people to impose too many commitments or place too much pressure on the young, yet he himself criticised them and put down their

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present bad manners—to try, in one expression, to cover what he said—to their service in the Armed Forces. I must frankly say that if ever I have noticed it, I have not noticed it in people who, in particular, have served in the Armed Forces. I think it is due to something else. Both the hon. Gentleman and I are older, and I can remember people older than myself thinking the same way about us when we were young.
It may be so, but if there is any failure in good manners on the part of the rising generation, I certainly do not think it is due to service in the Armed Forces. On the contrary, I have known many cases in which young men have been considerably improved by their service by the very fact that they have had a little discipline in a good unit, and have returned home far better citizens than they were before their service. My experience is perhaps somewhat different from that of the hon. Gentleman.
I was much interested in the speech of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), because he quoted with great vigour Field Marshal Lord Montgomery in so far as the latter had advocated that the size of divisions should be reduced; and there was no stauncher supporter of the Field Marshal than the right hon. Gentleman. At the same time, when that same Field Marshal advised us, as he did in a recent speech to the United Service Institution, that the length or period of the call-up should remain at two years, he was thrown on one side.
In my view, the most important point in the White Paper is its opening remarks to the effect that we are proposing to reduce the numbers of the Armed Forces. I believe that in a nuclear age that is a very proper advance, but I should have thought that if a reduction is made it would underline the need for a longer period of service—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—to keep the period of service as it is, which is what I mean. The argument between the two sides of the House seems to be whether there should be short individual terms of service or whether there should be a general reduction in numbers.
I compliment my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence on his White Paper and I would draw attention to what I think was the most important
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statement he made in his speech. He said decisively that it was the object of all of us in this House to abolish conscription as soon as possible. I stress that point. Our defences could be improved by the comparatively rapid abolition of conscription.
Let me go through some of the points which affect this argument. The first is in relation to reserves. When we last debated defence we took an all-important step in this House; we plumped for atomic preparation. That obviated the necessity for the type of reserves which we built up with National Service. We shall need an entirely new type of reserves to cope with an atomic age, so in this respect the necessity for National Service can to some extent be written off.
There is the far more important need arising from our international obligations, such as those under N.A.T.O. Surely the great decision which was taken last year must entail changes in the whole concept of N.A.T.O. We want small forces in a high state of readiness, but vastly expensive. Let nobody think that if we pin our faith to atomic weapons they will be cheaper for the taxpayer. They certainly will not. They will be vastly more expensive. I have a feeling that the leaders of N.A.T.O. are preparing not only for an atomic war but for conventional war at the same time. One great nation, Russia, is certainly doing that. I think it will be put that Russia is the only nation which is preparing for both kinds of warfare.
It would be the greatest folly and foolishness if we were to be tempted to follow her example. Possibly Russia is getting tired of the cold war, but she could gain no greater victory if the N.A.T.O. countries tried to compete with her in counting heads. In that way lies disaster. I cannot help feeling doubt about the need for the great masses of men in Europe which the N.A.T.O. leaders tell us are necessary, but perhaps I am being controversial about technical matters.
It is an amiable characteristic of the British way of life that we do not like giving up traditional methods. In the Navy we hated giving up the battleship, which was the most beautiful instrument of destruction ever built. The soldier did not like giving up his horse if he was a cavalry man. Even the Labour Party

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may have to give up the idea of nationalisation. That amiable characteristic of the British is, I cannot help feeling, being reflected in the attitude of N.A.T.O. at the present time.
In our great bid for peace we shall underline the fact that we are determined to use thermo-nuclear methods, if necessary. I believe we could underline it by reducing as soon as possible our commitments under National Service. I cannot believe that it is not now possible to make considerable reductions in manpower in National Service. If we pin our faith to the thermo-nuclear deterrent we have undoubtedly to spend just as much as we have ever spent, and possibly more if we are to be safe. The one economy we can make is in manpower. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]
I think I carry the whole House with me when I say that our object, expressed in one way or another, is to try to get back to full reliance on Regular Services to build up the Army, Navy and Air Force into happy, contented and efficient Regular Services. It is paradoxical that we cannot do away with National Service until we have adequate Regular Services, but that neither can we get adequate Regular Services until we have done away with National Service.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, West, brought out in his speech the dislike that is felt for the Services. I do not believe what he said, but many people do. National Service is bringing the Regular forces into contempt and suspicion. That is one of the great reasons why people are not prepared in peace-time to spend their lives in the Services. In war-time we shall always get people to join, but if the Services are held to some extent in the contempt which the hon. Member obviously holds them we cannot expect to get our full quota of men ready and willing to spend their lives in the Services.
This situation places a great obligation on the Government and on the House to improve the terms of service in the Regular forces both as to pay and pension, and to bring them to an exact relativity with the conditions of people who work in industry. We should, in addition, compensate the Regular Service men for the disturbance in their lives. That is absolutely essential. I do not agree with the hon. Member for Cardiff,
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West, that that is the most expensive way of doing it, but that in a nuclear age and in the long run it would be far the most economical.
The real problem discussed in the debate is not to decide how to shorten National Service and produce a system which will not worry the country unduly, but how eventually to abolish it. The White Paper proposes what seems to be far and away the best method of setting about it. It gives the Minister of Defence two and a half years in which to decide the next step. In two and a half years he must make a change either for the worse or for the better. The Government must make it perfectly plain that their object is to abolish conscription as soon as they can—and I would be the last to say that it could be abolished now—and since I believe that the White Paper is the right way to go about it I shall support the Government with every confidence.
6.20 p.m.
Mr. Victor Yates (Birmingham, Lady-wood): The speech which we have just heard from the hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) is one of the most amazing to which I have listened in the last ten years. He was extremely illogical. He asked—and I fully support him in his request—for a rapid abolition of conscription, but did not seem to realise that the White Paper accepts, and is asking the House to depend upon, the principle of conscription.
Commander Maitland: Can the hon. Member tell me how it does that?
Mr. Yates: Whatever happens in two or three years' time, the White Paper merely delays the calling up of the men at present.
Commander Maitland: And reduces the numbers.
Mr. Yates: Over a certain period it reduces the numbers, but at present it merely delays the calling up of the men. It still imposes a two-year conscription period.
I entirely endorse what the hon. and gallant Member said about the present system of National Service bringing the Regular Army into sheer contempt. If that is true—and I shall probably submit some examples to prove it—I should have thought that the best thing to do was to

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reduce the period of the National Service man's experience of that contempt.
This debate marks a difference in the attitude towards conscription. I am pleased to note that, particularly as the hon. and gallant Member has asked the Government to say that they will abolish conscription at the earliest possible moment. Some of us on this side have signed a Motion in which we have said that the period of service should be reduced by twelve months as a first step to total abolition. The overwhelming mass of our people want abolition.
Nine years ago I moved an Amendment to the King's Speech. It was in that Gracious Speech that compulsory National Service was first brought to the notice of the House as a peace-time measure. The House then rejected my view. I was called a pacifist and a starry-eyed idealist, a person who was refusing to face facts. I should like to quote one sentence from what I then said:
"No battleship could stand a "near miss" from an atomic bomb, and no plane could last in a sky filled with atomic anti-aircraft shells. No, the future war—and we pray that it will never come—will be won or lost in the laboratories of the country."
Then I quoted from an article written in "Reynolds' News" by Mr. Brailsford, in which he said:
"Modern warfare is a struggle of wits between scientists, technicians and highly-trained mechanised troops. Numbers and massed formations are useless against either rockets or atom bombs."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th November, 1946: Vol. 430, c. 595.]
That was nine years ago. Now I read in the White Paper that
"… in a nuclear age the conception of reserve forces waiting to take part in large-scale conventional war is out of date."
What happened in the nine years? If the advice of many of my hon. Friends on this side had been accepted by the previous Government and by those which followed, we should have been able to prevent the waste of the precious energies of the nation. We should have made a vast contribution to our economic position, and we should not have had last week's Budget. We could have reduced enormously Government expenditure but, more important, we could have used the energy of the nation in a very constructive effort.
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My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. George Craddock) and I recently had an opportunity to see Service camps both at home and in Germany. We spoke to many hundreds of men, individually and in groups, and I am sure that my hon. Friend would agree that we were able to gain a general impression of some of those considerations in the minds of both National Service men and Regulars which are contributing to the dilemma in which they, and we, find ourselves today. If the Government are interested in a Regular Army, I tell them that there are conditions in some of the camps at home —leaving out, for the moment, those abroad—so appalling that they do nothing but give National Service men an intense hatred of Army life.
One camp which has been very much in the news is that at Catterick, in Yorkshire. The military authorities there received us courteously, but we found that on some occasions they were not anxious to bring us into close contact with the men. They were always very pleased to show us canteens that were empty, but we preferred to see where the men were, what they were doing, how they were living, and what they were thinking. The Secretary of State for War interrupted a little earlier in the debate on the subject of drunkenness. I am pleased, of course, to have noted many improvements in the Army, but I know that the men just cannot afford to drink any more than they do at present. If the right hon. Gentleman had gone into the Salvation Army canteen in Catterick on a Tuesday—two days before pay day—he would have seen men so short of money that they were returning their empty mineral-water bottles to get the refund, while the N.A.A.F.I. canteen was practically empty. From that he will understand that pay is a very important factor in connection with the drink issue.
I do not believe that pay is the overriding and most important of the issues. I had a letter from a man of 80 years of age who was born in my constituency. He wrote of Catterick as "the cold hell hole with the lid off, 1914–18." Apparently he had been in Catterick Camp during the 1914–18 war. He is now living in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. He said:
"I was there during 1916–17. The winter was the bitterest for 20 years. The conditions

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caused more than one man to commit suicide. I dread to think what the boys will be like this winter."
When I went into those huts, which are still there, with the cold stone floors and brickwalls, with leaking roofs and no toilet facilities within the huts, I realised how horrible that must be for the men. I asked for certain information and I received a letter from a corporal, a National Service man. He told me that some of the conditions there were quite unbearable. The men are expected to be clean, yet in his section it was not possible even to flush the lavatories. I went there to find out, and I found that it was absolutely true. In a hut housing more than 20 men there was not a lavatory in order. I went to each one, and apparently they had been in that condition for some time.
The conditions in some of the cookhouses are a positive disgrace. The Secretary of State for War knows this, as I understand that he has been around this camp. It is the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South to submit to the Secretary of State for War more details of these causes for severe complaint. I had a letter from another corporal. This man wrote to me of a cookhouse which I later inspected and, therefore, I could verify what he said. There were no means of draining water from the floor.
This is one of the old cookhouses which were built during the First World War. They are most antiquated and out-of-date. The men have to queue with their knives, forks, mugs and plates, and dip them into various pails of water heated by steam. Just imagine what an absurd arrangement that is, and how the men feel about it.
This corporal is a Regular soldier and he will be demobilised on 14th November. He writes to tell me why he would never consent to sign on again. He says there are five cooks and two N.C.O.s in charge, and they have over 500 men to cook for. It is impossible to keep the cookhouse clean, and it is impossible to cook a decent meal in such conditions. He says that they tend to develop a "don't care" attitude, and adds:
"In fact I myself have come into the cookhouse first thing in the morning and have seen as many as five cats chewing at the meat."
I shall be very pleased to give more details about this matter to the Secretary of State for War. This man says that he has seen chops all over the floor. The
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hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Glover) may smile about it, but there are 19,000 men at Catterick and the overwhelming majority of them, especially the National Service men, who are confined to barracks for the first month of their service, do not smile about it. It is a disgrace to think that this House should permit these conditions to exist. That is one of the reasons why we shall always find it difficult to get men to join the Regular Army.
Mr. Head: I have seen Catterick and I have never said other than that it was unsatisfactory. What the hon. Gentleman has not mentioned is that the accommodation that he is describing comprises one-third of the total amount. It is regrettable. But he has not mentioned that building is going on to get the men out of that very unsatisfactory one-third, and it is going on quite fast.
Mr. Yates: I am very pleased that some rebuilding is going on. Nevertheless, the men write to me and keep complaining of the long time that they have been promised this better accommodation. I am not saying that the whole of the accommodation is as bad as this, but I do say that in many of the camps the arrangements are not at all satisfactory.
Then, having got our National Service man, we post him as far away from home as possible. Is this a general principle? I have met men from Aberdeen, Glasgow, and Edinburgh who were stationed in Devonshire, and men from the south of England who have been posted to Catterick. These men get only 4s. a day. They cannot have a 48-hour leave. Why should they not be allowed to have a 48-hour leave occasionally? Over and over again we get this answer from the men, "No, if you paid us more money we would not volunteer."
There is an outmoded discipline which is a lot of absolute and utter nonsense. The leading article in the "Manchester Guardian" this morning is quite correct on this point. My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South and I have seen a brigadier demonstrating how efficient the camp can be. Everything is bright and shiny and, therefore, he feels that all is well. But we find that many men in the camp are very unhappy. When we ask them what the trouble is, we find that a certain lieutenant-colonel has said, "If you are one minute late you will be on a

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charge," and it means 14-days C.B. I will concede that another officer may be a little more lenient, but my hon. Friend and I found a case in which a number of men had been given 14-days C.B. because they were late returning to camp after going to the town to celebrate with a National Service man who had become a father.
As I say, there are other officers who have a different attitude. One has said, "I feel that we are making criminals of people to insist upon a rigid form of discipline." Why cannot these things be inquired into? I have no doubt that if the Government had conceded an independent inquiry or an inquiry on which both sides of the House could have been represented, they would have found that the overwhelming mass of the men are totally dissatisfied.
We have examined the figures to ascertain how long it takes to train men. The majority of the men will say that they do nothing useful after the first six months. Some are doing nothing useful beyond the first three months. It is not that they are all doing domestic work. They are forced to brush and blanco in order to try to keep themselves busy. In Germany it is even worse. There is a tyranny of boredom due to the circumstances and the fact that the men have not enough money.
There are many other points I could make, but other hon. Members wish to take part in the debate and I will, therefore, conclude. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite are nothing short of hypocritical when they talk about setting people free. If they want to set people free they ought to do something to set the youth of the nation free so that their careers are not interrupted to this extent and so that they can continue in their jobs, working in a constructive manner and helping to lift up the nation's economic fortunes. The present service is a waste of time and of manpower and this White Paper on Defence is nothing but a lot of nosense.
When he opened the debate my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) said the White Paper was a surrender to the generals. I do not know to whom the Government surrendered, but I know this: these Service men, the non-commissioned officers, the captains
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and the majors, are, in the main, strongly opposed to the present organisation. It was only with the high-ranking military officers, those with the special red caps, that my hon. Friend and I found disagreement—and they were certainly in disagreement, and we had many arguments about it.
I found only one high-ranking general who admitted to me that discipline could be relaxed in the interests of a better Army and who told me that, unlike some officers, he would make his friends not sideways in his own rank but up and down the ranks of the Army. I daresay that he is a popular high-ranking officer. There is far too much snobbery and too little understanding of the position of those occupying the lower ranks. Until we have solved those problems we shall not solve the problem of the Regular Army. It is time we ceased to impose this unfair burden on the youth of the country.
6.42 p.m.
Sir Ian Fraser: May I offer my congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw), who made a maiden speech earlier in the debate? I feel sure that other hon. Members who heard him will agree with me that we look forward to hearing him again.
I do not have the honour and pleasure of knowing the hon. Member for Lady-wood (Mr. Yates). I wonder whether he is an ex-Service man. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] There are a good many non-ex-Service men such as the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas), whose views I respect very much, but he is a man of sensibility who, deeply as he feels his words, weighs them carefully. The hon. Member for Lady-wood gave me the impression that his inquiry would have been much more valuable if he had had any experience of the Army himself.
Mr. Yates: I have a good deal of personal experience in as far as I had six brothers, five of whom were in the Armed Forces and two of whom were, killed in war.
Sir I. Fraser: That is a fine family record which, I am sure, is emulated by many.
I think the hon. Member did much harm to the Armed Forces of the Crown,

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and I suspect that that is what he meant to do. He set out to find every dirty lavatory he could—and there are many in the Army. There are many in civil life, too. Is it not remarkable? There are many in ordinary houses.
Mr. Stokes: Tory landlords.
Sir I. Fraser: The right hon. Member would know. He has been such an important landlord in Ipswich.
Mr. Stokes: I own no houses in Ipswich.
Sir I. Fraser: I did not say that the right hon. Gentleman did. I only said that he knew of this. However, I promised to be brief, and I must not be diverted.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, West, said that the burden was unfairly divided between the old and the young. I do not think that that is so. The older people have borne their share in earlier generations and earlier times. Not one of we older men wants to send men to war to be killed. We did our bit, most of us, in our time. For my part, I would rather my son, or my grandson who is now growing up, did two years' service under compulsion than that we ran into another war and he had to do six years' fighting. To maintain our Armed Forces at a proper level now may be a way of ensuring that we shall not have another war. that seems to me to be one way of looking at it.
It seems to me, from the White Paper, and after listening to the debate, that, as so very often, the House has been most shrewd. It has discerned that the White Paper is an intermediate document, filling a gap. I may be wrong about that and I do not imagine that the Government are disposed to tell us today, otherwise they would have told us already. But it seems to me that they must be filling a gap in point of time because the proposals which they are now putting before the House and the country would be nonsense in two or three years' time. If they continued for two or three years and then nothing else followed, we should be calling up just as many men in the third or fourth year as we are calling up now.
I am quite sure that the Government are wise and sensible men and are well advised, and I therefore do not believe
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that they are presenting us with something which will be nonsense in two or three years' time. It is obvious that they are preparing the way for something else. The question which we must put is: what is that?
This is a most valuable debate and I think that the Opposition do their proper duty in bringing this matter forward and in giving it the importance which attaches to a full day's debate. In so far as hon. Members opposite take advantage of the occasion to try to smear the Army, they render a bad service to the country; but in so far as they use the occasion to compel the Government to justify the continuance of two years' National Service, and to make the whole nation aware of what National Service means. then the debate is abundantly justified.
National Service is an interruption of young life. It takes men away from their families, their education and their jobs, and checks their prospects and their careers. It should not be tolerated or prolonged for a moment longer than is absolutely necessary. It is in the Government's mind to bring it to an end as soon as they possibly can and if, as I suspect, this White Paper is an interim arrangement, I am very glad.
But let us not exaggerate the pros and cons of National Service. I meet a great many young men, and very fine young men they are. They have not been tainted, as apparently have some who met the hon. Member for Ladywood at Catterick. The hon. Member makes me very cross. The great majority of them are decent, honest, hard-working boys who are enjoying their Army service and are anxious to get back to civil life. Any suggestions that they are all tainted or losing their morality or their judgment because of their service seems to me to be utmost nonsense. It is certainly not my experience, and I have seen as many ex-Service men as most people.
In my opinion, two years' service for the time being is inevitable. The Minister has made out a case and I have not the slightest hesitation in supporting him on it. It would clearly be exceedingly wasteful to continue with the present system and to let the present men go out at eighteen months. That would be wasting the most valuable six months of their time and, with our burdens all over the world,

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it seems to me that that cannot be afforded.
I do not believe that the country or the House has been given enough information to enable us to judge about this matter. I listened to the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) and thought he made a good, classic case against an inquiry. He said that this is a matter for which the Government must take responsibility, not a Select Committee or some other body of inquiry. I think that is true, but nevertheless, there is a great deal the Government could do to inform sensible people of some of the facts which we cannot know. I suppose that if Members of Parliament set about putting down one Question after another for weeks at a time we might get the sort of information we ought to have. Between now and the end of the next two or three years we want to know what it really would cost if we could succeed in getting enough Regulars by raising their wages very considerably, giving them the priorities they should have in housing, and so on, and a guarantee of a job when they leave the Service. Most of them leave at an early age. I believe that that would not be a more expensive way of providing the Forces we need.
When we consider that from six months to a year—half the whole of the militia man's service—is spent in learning the elements of his job—and then he does not know it so well as a professional—it must clearly be wasteful to have men in for two years; they ought to be in for seven and twelve years. I should like to know what it would cost to make the Service so attractive that they would come in for a longer period.
There are in this country 10 million old soldiers, sailors and airmen. The great majority of them—the overwhelming majority—look back on their Service with pleasure, a little wistfully, especially the older ones. They have a patriotic outlook and tend to encourage the good name of the Armed Forces and be proud of the regiment, the ship, or the unit in which they served. Many of them are very sensible chaps and, if they knew more about the facts, they might be more convinced in supporting the policy of the moment and in helping to determine the public opinion that will make the policy of the future. I do not demand an inquiry
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of the formal kind, but I ask the Government to consider whether a great many more facts could be given—not facts which expose our weakness to the enemy or anything of that kind, but economic facts as to the burdens the country bears now and would bear were we to make the remuneration in the Armed Forces really comparable with what it is in business for the manual worker, for N.C.O.s, young officers, middle range and senior officers as well.
Finally, I should like to thank the Government for having ameliorated the conditions of call-up for agricultural workers. The concessions made recently will strike a great many farmers and farm workers as fair and sensible. Anyone who knows remote parts of the country as I do knows of the conditions where one farm may be five or ten miles from the next and where either there is no housing, all the workers live in the farm, or there is only one house. There is a special case there because when a man is called up he is absolutely irreplaceable. It may be hard to replace people in other districts, but in remote districts they are absolutely irreplaceable. Yet farming must go on even from the point of view of defence.
Will the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Defence consider whether it is possible to allow those who work in agriculture and rural industry generally to do their full military service, but to do it locally? There is a very good reason for that. I am not asking for a special bonus to people in that particular work, nor trying to get a favour for one constituent at the expense of another. The reason is that it is very important that people who have a stake in the land, or live on the land, should stay on the land.
There are times of the year when to be able to go in and lend a hand on the family farm on a Saturday night or over Sunday is a most useful service. It provides a most valuable increment to the man's income and a way of keeping his love of the land alive. Moreover, we have been told that the new way of war, the atomic way, will lead to great changes in home defence. We shall not rely on old forms, but have mobile semi-professional or professional units. I ask why the rural district men should not do their full service—when they are not eligible to be deferred—in some service of that

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kind, especially bearing in mind that, should war come, they would be the first to be kept on the land and not allowed to go to their units.
I repeat once more the hope that the Government—obviously not today, but at some time during the following months —may give us very much more information about this matter so that we may help to form a non-party, patriotic public opinion to sustain such form of military service as is necessary for the defence and safety of our country.
6.57 p.m.
Mr. Michael Stewart: The hon. Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Sir I. Fraser) complained that in his view there are not sufficient facts before us to judge this question. If the Government had conceded our earlier request for an inquiry the hon. Member would not have needed to make that complaint.
One thing at least is clear from the first paragraph of the White Paper, which says that the size of the Armed Forces is to be reduced by a reduction of the National Service content. The Government propose to do that by the method of deferring call-up. That will have the effect of reducing by 20,000 in the next six months and 100,000 in the next two and a half years. A reduction of call-up by six months would have the effect of reducing by 70,000 and, of course, a reduction of three months would mean reducing by 35,000 and the time at which that took place would be very much within the discretion of the Government.
If one were to say, "Every man who comes into the forces the day after tomorrow will serve for eighteen months" we would feel no effect until eighteen months from now; the Government could have a considerable range of period for introducing the proposal according to what seemed most convenient. I press these points to show that the Government admit that they can and ought to do with fewer National Service men in the forces.
If we look first at the pure question of numbers of National Service men in the forces we find that on that ground there is no justification for opposing a reduction in the period of National Service. Arguments may be advanced on other grounds, but on that ground it is quite clear in face of the Government White
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Paper that we cannot say it is impossible to reduce the numbers. The whole structure of argument set up by the Secretary of State for War in March when, despite the fact that the ending of the Egyptian commitment freed 65,000 men, he still argued that it was not possible on mere numbers to think of reducing the National Service content of the Armed Forces, is thrown overboard by the Government themselves. I am well aware that it is not purely a question of numbers, but I emphasise the point because the arguments we have heard have been based solely on that premise. If one is to support our Amendment, it is not necessary to show that there are further commitments that ought to be cut beyond what are cut already, because if we are thinking of mere numbers there is no ground for preferring what the Government propose to what is proposed by this side of the House.
Let us look, then, at the second argument that is advanced against cutting the period of National Service. It is argued that it is in the last six months of men's service that the real value is derived from them and that that is when they are experienced soldiers. Lovers of history will be reminded that when the Ten Hours Act in factories was opposed, it was argued by the famous economist Nassau Senior that it was in the last half hour that all the profits were made. It is worth while paying attention to this argument because the Minister of Defence himself laid great stress on it. He was very much of the view that the Services would be throwing away valuable time which was spent in training if the National Service men were kept only for eighteen or even, I suppose, twenty-one months.
There are five points I want to mention very briefly about this argument. First, it is an argument of comparatively recent creation. From 1947 to 1950, it was accepted that the men could be trained to give sufficient service as trained soldiers along with the Regular component of the Army for us to be able to discharge our commitments at that time, which were greater than those we have at present. It was not argued by competent military advisers that it was necessary on that ground to increase the period of training. Now that the period of service has been increased, first owing to the Korean emergency, this argument about training

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has been produced, now that the argument of numbers no longer holds good, to find fresh reason for avoiding the plain case for cutting the period of call-up.
Secondly, if it is said that the last six months is so important, why is it that better and fuller use is not made of it? Hon. Members may have studied the Report of the King George Jubilee Trust on some of the problems facing our young people. One of the many interesting things that the Report says is this:
"A recent survey within the Army itself states that the greatest enemy of healthy attitude towards National Service is boredom, wasted time and idleness. Wasted time is alleged to occur chiefly during the last six months."
That is very often quite true. The period of training is strenuous and vigorous, but most of the men, whatever they feel about it, do go in prepared to make a go of it if they are given any reasonable encouragement, yet it is in the last six months, which, we are told, is so important, that so much wasted time occurs.
My third observation on this argument is that with the recent decline in our commitments, it is, in general, the more distant commitments that have declined. It was argued, and there was some force in the argument, that since we had to make use of men in areas at great distances from this country, there would be a real problem if the men were kept in the forces for only eighteen months. But when we have had recently a reduction of commitments—and commitments rather those further from this country than those near at home—that argument has much less validity.
The fourth comment I would make about this contention of the special value of the last six months and the whole line advanced by the Minister of Defence would be this. If that contention is valid now, it has always been valid in the past and it always will be valid in the future. It was an argument that if there was to be National Service, a period of two years was needed to make it worth while. If that is the Government's present view, why have they on several occasions, not very long ago, said over and over again, both Front benchers and back benchers, that they are anxious to reduce the period of National Service as soon as it can be done? Now it is being contended that it is a necessary condition of useful National Service that a man must serve for two years. If that argument is valid
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now, some future Minister of Defence could make exactly the same speech when in two-and-a-half years' time, as was rightly pointed out by one hon. Member opposite, this policy ceases to have effect and the Government have to think of what they will do next.
My last observation on this argument is that it is quite true that an Army needs an experienced element of long experience, both for its tradesmen and for its N.C.O.s, but it is no good trying to rely to any great extent on the National Service element to get that experienced part of the Army. It must be obtained by encouraging and maintaining a flow of Regular recruits into the Army and, as my hon. Friend for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has so often pointed out, encouraging them, once they are in, to stay in for long periods. The Government's own White Paper emphasises this in its second paragraph.
We have been told that the period of National Service cannot be cut because there is not enough Regular content in the Army. The Secretary of State for War himself produced that argument in March this year. But if there is not enough Regular content in the Army, the Government cannot proceed with this policy either, and they admit as much in paragraph 2 of the White Paper. So that is not an argument for preferring the Government's White Paper to a reduction in call-up.
It might be an argument for arguing that both policies were impossible, but the Government, I trust, are not yet reduced to a position of saying, "We have produced a policy and if an alternative is put up our reply will be that both our policy and the alternative are equally impossible." We must suppose that the Government believe that they can make a useful contribution towards the problem of getting a bigger non-service Regular content into the Army. If they think that that can be done, it destroys the objection to cutting the period of National Service.
Certain social and political objections can be made against the way that the Government have endeavoured to deal with the excess of National Service men in the Armed Forces. The political objection is that the real issue is postponed. By going on and on. raising the

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age of call-up half year after half year until finally the age of call-up reaches the maximum age under which men can be legally called up for National Service, the Government will merely have the problem piled up on them. In the first six months in which the Government stop pushing up the age of call-up a bit more, they merely have to face the problem then and the problem which they previously postponed when adopting the device of deferment of call-up.
It has been apparent from the speech of the Minister of Defence that when that situation arises, he really has no idea what to do. The hon. Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale said he was sure it must be all right, because the Government would never have introduced a policy like this if they did not know what to do when the situation arose. It is indeed a faith which neither we on this side nor, I think, a good many more critical Members on the other side would be able to share. I believe that the faithful are sometimes asked to say, "Credo quia impossibile"—"I believe because it is impossible." We have not yet reached the position where we have to say of Governments that their policy is so incomprehensible that we are bound not to be critical of it.
Not only is there political objection, but there is social objection to the prolongation of the call-up. It will add to the amount of uncertainty which National Service already creates. The White Paper talks about the fact that the man going to a university and the man going into an apprenticeship will be able to manage all right. It even, in an outburst of optimism, suggests that he might possibly benefit from the proposal. I do not think the Government really believe that, but it is a plausible case. Let us face the plain fact. The majority of our young men do not enjoy those advantages. The majority of our young men, those not blessed with either more than average luck in the circumstances into which they were born, or more than average intelligence and skill, go into unskilled or semiskilled occupations. What about them?
I believe that the person who is luckier or more gifted than the average of his fellows will not find this too much trouble. He has probably decided by the time that
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he is 17 or 18 the plan of his life for the next few years. He sees a definite objective ahead of him and that with a certain amount of patience he can put up with this extra inconvenience which the Government are to impose upon him.
What of the other man, for whom life does not present such an attractive picture and for whom so definite a plan is not possible? He is given an added reason for having an aimless and drifting attitude towards life. But do not let us forget how much the country is indebted to hundreds and thousands of young men like that—men without special gifts with either brains or hands. We cannot manage without them. Does the Minister of Defence, who previously occupied a position in the Foreign Office and who has often spoken of Western defence and the need to defend our threatened values and civilisation, realise that so much depends on the valour and discipline of young lads in their early twenties, without particular gifts either in intelligence or skill, but putting all they have at the service of their country, and that if their valour and discipline fails the whole structure of Western defence and all that we talk about in foreign affairs debates would come down like a pack of cards?
It is young men like those who will suffer most from the policy that the Government have adopted. They have adopted it because of their continual inability to face an issue when it arises and because of their tendency to adopt a live-for-the-day policy and to hope that, somehow, the ugly difficulty will fade away. That is what they have done in their handling of Cyprus and the handling of this problem also. They ought to have taken earlier far more seriously the problem of getting the Regular to stay on. There have been the questions of pay, discipline, housing and education, and, at long last, today we have had a statement about education.
It was a simple and straightforward statement that could easily have been made when we had this matter before us six months ago on the Army Estimates, instead of the lamentable oration delivered on that occasion by the Under-Secretary of State for War. If it takes the Government that time to settle that comparatively simple problem, how much longer will it take them to deal with the many other complex factors that determine Regular recruitment? And so we

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have planted upon us a policy that is politically evasive and socially harmful, and which is the fruit of neglect and vacillation.
7.14 p.m.
Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: We always listen with great respect to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart), who was in the War Office in the former Administration. As is well known in this House—and I have said it over and over Again—I am one of those who want to see National Service abolished, and who want to see a strong, standing Army of volunteers.
I have pressed from this side of the House very strongly for no niggling increases in pay, but for a really thumping increase, not only in pay but in pensions, and in the rehabilitation of people when they leave the Services. I believe that is the only way in which we can encourage more people to join the Army as volunteers.
I am not over-optimistic about this. It is an astonishing fact that the number of volunteers prepared to join the Regular Army, whether unemployment has been rife or whether it has not, has remained practically static since 1920. Whether these methods which I have advocated in the House will result in the recruitment of sufficient Regulars in order that National Service may be abolished altogether, I do not know. At least it is worth trying, and I hope that the Government will very soon come forward with some proposal of that nature.
As one who raised originally the matter of the education of children of men serving in the forces, I am delighted at last to have heard the announcement which has been made today. I fully realise what the opposition to it has been and from which quarter it has come. It has always come from the same quarter. It has always come from the Treasury—the nigger in the woodpile—so far as the forces are concerned, and we all know the tremendous vested interests that there are in the Treasury from the Civil Service angle to see that no one else gets the same sort of parity as they do in conditions and pay. I have suffered from that throughout the whole of my military career.
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We have heard a great deal about commitments. The hon. Member for Fulham has made one false statement. I am sure that he did not do so deliberately; he must have been misinformed. He said that our commitments today are less than they were at the time of Korea. That is emphatically not so. They are slightly more today than they were then. We have not reduced our commitments in Malaya as popularly supposed at all, and we have had many other commitments thrust upon us since those days.
The whole of this problem of the reduction of National Service depends on our world-wide commitments. Whatever word we use—if we dislike the word "Empire"—we have colonial responsibilities far wider than any of those countries which have been mentioned as having a shorter period of National Service than we have. Those commitments have to be fulfilled.
I want to make one remark about the speech of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). When he quoted the French, I recollected that I was informed by a high-ranking French officer, who is also a politician, that it was his considered opinion that if France had had two years' national Service, the disaster at Dien Bien Phu would not have occurred. They were unable to send their national service men as far as that, and they had to rely entirely on their regulars; and they had not enough of them.
Mr. K. Zilliacus: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that the French did not use conscripts in Indo-China at all, and that according to French military service they may only use them in exceptional circumstances?
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: if the hon. Gentleman had not been so interested in what he was going to say and had listened to what I was saying, he would have realised that I said precisely that. They did not and could not send their conscripts to Indo-China because the conscripts served for only eighteen months, but if the French had had two years' service they would have been able to send conscripts to Indo-China. That is what I was told by a high-ranking French officer who may know a little more about his own country than does the hon. Gentleman.

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There is the argument about the last six months of a National Service man's period in the Army. Do let us keep our feet on the ground about this. I spoke to many commanding officers in Germany when I was there, and every one of them said the same thing. First, let us realise this, that of their N.C.O.s one-third of their corporals and one-half of their lance-corporals in any given unit are National Service men. Many National Service men are used as instructors of the new intake coming into the regiment from the depot. If we take away six months of the National Service men's period of service, those battalions will simply fall. They will simply cease to be fighting units any longer. [Interruption.] It is said they have no one to fight. I think that observation comes very ill at this moment, when the Russians are pouring technicians and arms into the Middle East.
Is there anybody in the House who would say that we might not be faced with a very serious situation there in the near future? Is this the time to encourage that sort of thing by reducing our period of National Service? It is one of the most irresponsible things the Opposition have done at this juncture—to have clamoured for a reduction of National Service now. The situation in the Middle East is red hot, and if we want to encourage people to make it so, then let us reduce our National Service. The Middle East provides us with one of the most potent arguments against reducing it.
There is another point which those who have not been in the Army do not seem to understand: we cannot run a battalion like a factory. There are of necessity long periods when training is taking place, especially training at the higher level, at brigade and division level, when there is nothing to do, when one simply has got to sit and wait. There is nothing one can do with some people at times on those occasions. One cannot go round the lorry lines or the gun lines and tell the men to do something else, because they are on exercise and are learning what war is about, and we know and agree that, fortunately, nine-tenths of war is sheer boredom, although the other tenth is sheer terror. It is lucky that it is in that proportion. So there are times when
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men and officers cannot be asked to do anything at all but wait.
I am not saying one cannot cite examples of wasted time in the forces. There have been examples of that. We have been talking mostly about the Army today, and nobody seems to have mentioned the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. Only a day or two ago, however, I heard of an instance of the most disgraceful waste of time in the Air Force, and I have forwarded the case to the proper quarter, and if his Lordship refuses to take any action in the matter I shall raise it in the House, as I have told him I shall.
I do not believe in raising a matter like that in the House at an early stage, because I hope that it will be put right. I disagree with the hon. Member for Lady-wood (Mr. V. Yates), whose speech will do nothing but harm to recruitment and can only have the exactly opposite effect to that which he wants. He can prevent volunteers from joining the Army, and so make conscription inevitable for an indefinite time.
I was approached in all seriousness and sincerity the other day by somebody on the other side of the House who said to me "What you have to do in the Army is to accept reduced efficiency." That is attractive, is it not? Really, the Army is not like industry, in which one may merely lose a little money. Reduced efficiency in the Army means the loss of men's lives. We pay in lives for reduced efficiency in the Army, and I hope that we shall not allow the efficiency of the British Army to be reduced in order to reduce the length of service.
I am glad that the tour abroad of the Regular Service men is only three years. I had to do eight without coming home at all. That is fine and is as it should be, but if we reduced National Service the Regular element would have to serve for a longer period abroad, five years possibly, or even six. The result of that would be a greater run out of the Regular element, which would make the continuation of National Service even more certain.
There is an enormous number of men in the pipeline. Unfortunately I have not that figure here, though I had it. I think it is 30,000. It is just about time we started to modernise our air trooping, not only to reduce the number of men in

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the pipeline but so that we may have "fire brigades" which could be taken out at short notice to areas of the world where trouble is likely to brew up quickly.
Mr. Head: One or two other hon. Members, besides my hon. and gallant Friend, have mentioned air trooping and stressed the necessity of extending it. I should like to tell them that at the present time, except for unit moves, all postings and replacements for the Middle East, the Caribbean, Kenya and the Far East are done by air—all except for unit moves in Germany, where it is not worth while to do it by air.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I am very thankful to hear that, and I hope that it means that the number of people in the pipeline is or will be very considerably reduced. It should certainly relieve the shortage of men in our out stations.
In my view—and this has been said on both sides of the House—provided, and always provided, that we do not lower our guard the risk of a thermo-nuclear world war is practically negligible. That does not mean that we are not to have a far more difficult situation to face than we have now, because I am quite convinced by what I saw in Russia when I was there that Communist world domination is still the pillar of the Russians' foreign policy. The question for them is which is the shortest cut to it. There was a time when global war was considered to be the shortest cut, and that was when we were weak in Europe. Since the buildup of N.A.T.O. and the advent of the thermo-nuclear weapon, that danger has receded. If we lower our guard that danger will come again.
Always, however, there is the danger of a minor war, even a major minor war, on such a scale that the N.A.T.O. forces would have a very difficult problem in making up their mind whether or not it was large enough for the use of the thermo-nuclear weapon to prevent it from happening. It is for that sort of war, it is to deal with subversion in those Dependencies for which we are responsible, to which we are trying to bring self-government, that for a considerable time to come we shall need forces, and need to train men for them, as well as for the eventuality of a global war.
For the training of our men, especially for global war, we have our divisions in Germany, where they can practise normal
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training with heavy weapons, heavy armaments and all the equipment we knew in the last war. Here in England we want a big mobile reserve of men, trained in jungle warfare, trained in the use of light weapons, light artillery, light equipment, which can be transferred to any part of the globe at short notice.
I should like to see this sort of exercise carried out—two divisions flown from America, and two divisions flown from Britain, into a part of the desert of North Africa, for exercises for six weeks or so, and then flown back again. I think that would give pause to people who are thinking of making trouble in those areas.
It is for troubles of that sort we ought to be training, and I know from my own experience that with 80 per cent, or 60 per cent. of National Service men in a given unit, that unit cannot prepare and train if those National Service men are taken away from it in what are now the last six months of their training and service.
I have been talking, as others have, mainly of the Army. I want to make one constructive suggestion. In the Navy, National Service men are not relied upon to anything like the extent that they are relied upon in the Army. Almost all the men in the Navy are Regulars. I wonder whether, just as an experiment, the Minister of Defence would consider abolishing National Service in the Navy. It might be worth doing it. I believe that the Navy could probably carry on without the National Service men. It might be well worth thinking about also in connection with some elements of the Royal Air Force. Judging by what I have seen of the way in which the R.A.F. deals with part-time training, it might be as well to abolish it altogether in that connection.
As a start to the complete abolition of National Service I suggest, therefore, its abolition in the Navy and careful consideration of the question whether something should not be done about it in the R.A.F. as well. I hope and pray that we shall have an announcement very soon about pay, pensions and the re-engagement of soldiers in order that we may try to recruit a few more men into the Regular Forces. I admit that I am not optimistic about this, for the simple reason that the number who volunteer has remained apparently static since 1920, irrespective of unemployment or anything else.

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Let us not have a niggling solution to this problem. It must be something really big. The difficulty of the problem is so great that the whole matter must be looked at with reason and without emotion. I find it difficult to make up my mind without the secret top-level knowledge which is at the disposal of the Cabinet and the Minister of Defence. I should like to see the secret reports that must be coming in from the Middle East before I began to suggest any reduction in the national burden. I support the Government in what they have done, but I shall continue to press for the reforms in the Services for which I have pressed in the past.
I plead with the Government that somebody should go round our training depots in Britain like an East wind and blow out what is wrong. Too many disquieting reports are coming in. These things do not occur in the good regiment. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with them. They happen in training depots. I believe that regiments, instead of sending their best men to the training depots, get rid of those whom they do not want by sending them there. That is a pernicious policy, and I hope that the Minister will do something about it.
7.33 p.m.
Mr. James Simmons: I must express regret at the first part of the speech of the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Sir I. Fraser). I know him in the ex-Service men's community, in which he is highly respected, and it came as rather a shock to me that he should attack, by innuendo, my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood (Mr. Yates). One does not have to have served in any one of the Services to have some regard for the well-being of the people who are today serving. The hon. Member's innuendo about lack of service in the Armed Forces was an attempt to hit below the belt.
Mr. Glover: As my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Sir I. Fraser) is not in the House, I should like to inform the hon. Member that he was not making a personal attack on the hon. Member for Ladywood (Mr. Yates). He was attacking what the hon. Member for Ladywood had been saying about camps.
Mr. Simmons: If the impetuous hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Glover) had not been so impetuous, I was about to come to that point.
The complaint of the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale and of the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) is that these conditions have been exposed and that, having exposed them, my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood has done nothing but harm. I ask the House how harm can be done if harm is not there to be done. It is rather amusing to see the embattled forces of Toryism in the House complaining when the fruits of Toryism in the shape of out-dated barracks and insanitary camps are exposed by hon. Members in pursuance of their public duty. Instead of complaining about those who expose the evils, hon. Members opposite should be helping to get rid of those evils.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I do not think that the hon. Member could have heard what I said. I welcomed the fact that people expose these things, but I said that I thought the better way of doing it was to write a letter to the Minister and say that if something is not done the matter will be raised in the House. I said that, otherwise, it did harm to recruiting and, therefore, was apt to extend the period of National Service.
Mr. Simmons: I fully accept the hon. and gallant Member's explanation, but he did say that my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood did more harm than good by exposing these things publicly. If one does not expose them publicly one stands very little chance, with the present Government, of ever having them remedied.
There is on the Order Paper an Amendment in my name and in the names of some of my hon. Friends to a Motion asking for a reduction in the period of compulsory National Service. Our Amendment asks that as a preliminary to the reduction there should be an inquiry and that the Government should submit their proposals to the House. It is apparent from the Government's White Paper that, without inquiry, the Government have come round to the view that a reduction is desirable in the numbers of National Service men needed for our defence requirements. The proposals

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contained in the White Paper have already been considerably riddled this afternoon.
In my view, the Government proposals are obviously of a very makeshift character and are evidence of very sloppy thinking and indecision. The Government do not know where they want to go, according to the White Paper. Even hon. Members opposite say that this is only a temporary measure, a little patching up and holding things over until the Government can make up their minds what to do. They say, in effect, "As long as we can give the House of Commons something to discuss while we are making up our minds they will not worry us too much. That is the best way out of it."
The alternative to the proposals in the White Paper is an immediate reduction of the period of service as a first instalment towards eventual abolition, and an inquiry by competent non-Service persons into the whole question of recruitment for the Services and the use of the manpower so obtained. Post-war National Service, accepted by the majority of us as only a regrettable necessity, is in danger of becoming a permanent feature of our defence plans. This is a very serious matter which we must consider.
We never intended to have compulsory military service as part of the defence plans of this country or as part of our way of life. At the end of the First World War it was abolished. At the end of the Second World War it was continued—I agree because of certain necessities. When one talks about abolition, the majority of people with whom I come into contact, say, "Do not stress abolition at this stage. Talk about reduction in the period of service. It is not expedient to stress eventual abolition at the moment." That is a view I do not share, believing that the road to hell is paved with actions designed in deference to expediency.
I believe that we have to be very wary when everybody speaks with the same voice. Tonight, everybody here is saying that nobody wants National Service, that we all want it abolished, that this is the ultimate aim of both sides of the House. There has been a great upsurge of good will, a great emanation of brotherhood from the other side of the House. I would like to believe that hon. Gentlemen
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mean what they say, but I have yet to meet the leopard who changes his spots.
My opposition to conscription is no new-found principle. In 1910, I helped to organise a meeting in the Birmingham Town Hall against compulsory military service where, out of 2,000 assembled citizens, only 30 voted for it, and they were prominent Conservatives. In 1918, I organised a campaign in Birmingham for the repeal of the Military Service Acts and I was supported by three persons who either were then, or who became, Members of this House. They were Noel-Buxton, Lees-Smith and Dick Wallhead. We conducted a strenuous campaign throughout the City of Birmingham and we were heckled at our meetings by members of the Conservative Party. I wonder, therefore, how much reliance can be placed upon this penitential attitude of the majority of the Tory Party, when hon. Gentlemen opposite say, "We were wrong, we are sorry about it, we do not believe in National Service," when for years and years it has been part of their doctrine.
I carried my principles against conscription into the Army during the First World War and, by oral and written words, opposed the conscription proposals of the Government. Those were exciting, but exacting, days. Facing brigadiers and colonels in this House is nothing to facing, as I did, an enraged commanding officer who had me before him on the charge of being guilty of the horrible crime of being a private who was thinking for himself. I was requested by my commanding officer most solemnly to promise not to write any more letters to my political friends about conscription. Because I would not do so, he decided that I was mentally unbalanced and sent me to the medical division. The medical division refused to concur in his view, so I was transferred to another battalion —in order that the contamination which had already taken place in one battalion could be spread to another.
In view of that murky past it is not surprising that I am still opposed to conscription in principle. I assert, however, that one can be opposed to conscription and at the same time recognise the need for maintaining our national defences. I would underline that it is just because I am concerned about our national defences that I am opposed to compulsory military service. So long as the War Office bevy

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of "brass hats" can rely for their raw material for defence upon an unlimited supply of National Service men, they will be content to hibernate in Whitehall until something catastrophic overtakes them.
We must face the fact, disclosed by experience, that the National Service scheme does not, in the main, provide good soldiers. I am referring to the majority of young men called up. Just imagine their position. They have an unprofitable and uncomfortable time between leaving school and being called up. They are at a loose end. Employers do not want them. If they find employment it is more or less blind-alley employment. Their plan of life has been upset by the call-up for two years military service and they regard it at the best as something to be done as quickly as possible and at the worst as something to be resented, with its obligations either dodged or resisted. Those who resist perhaps go absent without leave and end in the guard room. Gradually their moral fibre is undermined through the unequal struggle between the individual and the military machine.
The net is wide. All sorts and conditions are ensnared by it. No attention is paid to inclination, aptitude or ability. What I am saying is perfectly true, and hon. Members know it. Questions are asked in this House about people who have dodged military service. If they are undesirable persons why is the net still being held out for them? What good will they be when we get them?
I will give two examples of the type of young men that we get in the military dragnet. There is the young man who, by reason of temperament and training, will never make a good soldier although he would probably be a good citizen if he were let alone. If he were allowed to live his own life, he would probably be brilliant. We do not ask whether he is fit to be in the Army. We give him a medical examination to find out that he is physically fit to be in the Army, but is being physically fit the only thing that matters? Should he not also be mentally and spiritually and psychologically fit to be in the Army?
We have to look at this matter from every point of view. If we take young men into the Army who have no aptitude for soldiering, and whose training and tradition is against the kind of discipline
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there is in the Army, we may be injuring and destroying brains which might be of great value to the nation in future years had those men been able to live the kind of life they were intended to live by their Creator.
That is one side of the picture. On the other side there is human material which could be used to produce good soldiers but which becomes "browned off" in various ways and so is repelled from service in the Regular Army. This means that we are trying to construct the machinery of national defence from unsuitable and inferior raw materials. This is wrong and dangerous. It will not only weaken our defences, it will also endanger our national security.
That is why the War Office is afraid of an independent inquiry. It knows that it is doing the job in a slipshod way, that it is not thinking through the problem. No business executive would conduct his firm on the lines applied by the War Office. Business firms have personnel managers who choose staff with some regard to suitability for the job. Does the Minister of Labour do that in the case of the National Service men who come for their call-up? Unemployed officers are specially vetted by the Ministry of Labour and National Service before they are sent out to apply for jobs—incidentally, this applies only to officers and not to private soldiers. This happens when we have finished with them, but what about when we take them into the Services? Should there not be some system of personnel managers to find out whether a man is likely to be of any use in the Army before taking him in?
Business firms have buyers to select raw materials to enable their craftsmen to produce machines which will stand the test of competition in world markets. Those engaged in aircraft or motor car production would not dream of using inferior raw materials and unskilled labourers to do a job which calls for quality and skill. Why should we be satisfied with makeshift materials and outmoded methods in the construction of the machinery of national defence? That is what we are getting today under our system of conscription.
Those who run the War Office—I give this to them, and I give it freely, because I do not give much to the War Office; it never gave me much—are Britishers, and it is generally accepted that when he

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has his hack to the wall and is faced with overwhelming odds the Britisher pulls something out of the bag and scores a resounding triumph. I urge the Government to take away the regular flow of conscripts and bring the War Office chaps right up against it, for then we shall see what they can pull out of the bag, what they are made of and what they are going to do about organising national defence upon a more efficient basis by means of a voluntarily recruited Army.
It must continually be stressed that the only real alternative to this half-baked White Paper is efficient tackling of the problem of voluntary recruiting. Better pay and bigger posters alone will not solve the problem. That is the easy way. The best advertisement would be soldiers who were not only satisfied with life in the Army but enthusiastic about it. If the men who go on leave or leave the Service after five or seven years are not only satisfied but enthusiastic about the Army, we shall then get recruits. Contact with men who have personal experience of the Army and are enthusiastic about it will bring more recruits than posters will. If National Service men had been assimilated into the Army to such an extent that they captured the spirit of service within its ranks they would today be taking Regular engagements in greater numbers. The fact that they are not doing so is a measure of the failure of the War Office.
What incentives in addition to pay are necessary? I would again underline that one is proper housing for the married soldier during and after his service and adequate accommodation for the single soldier. We have today had an instalment in the educational field, and I should like to know more about this. There are not many private soldiers whose children go to boarding schools. A grant of only £75 for a boarding school education will not attract the recruits we want into the ranks. I urge the Minister to extend the grant to all ranks and not confine it to officers, for the ordinary soldier must be able to give his child a decent education.
Another incentive to voluntary recruiting which we must demand is full employment on useful projects when serving, so that a soldier does not feel that he is wasting his time. There are many jobs to be done, including mechanical jobs. I am not talking about picking up bits of
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paper on the barrack square. I have done that; that is "jankers." I am referring to real productive jobs. I am certain that the Army could organise real productive jobs and so make the men feel that they are not wasting their time.
I give highest priority among the incentives to the man's retention of his status as a full human being during service. What does that mean? It means no possessivly paternal C.Os. It means no petifogging restrictions on normal human activities. It means ceasing to apply to grown men rules designed for adolescents. When the Army learns that lesson, it will have learnt a big lesson. The voluntary recruit for the Regular Army should be able to retain his full citizen rights, and consideration at least should be given to trade union membership and protection for mechanics while they are in the service. Ability, aptitude and efficiency ought to count for more than family background, and proficiency in technical education rather than the old school tie should be the passport to promotion.
These are revolutionary suggestions. They are designed to shock the Service Ministers and their advisers, who include the "brass hats." Shock treatment is necessary to shake them out of the complacency which sees in the White Paper a solution to our problems and a "fiddle" with recruiting figures as a substitute for actual bodies.
Let the Defence Services cease to lean on the broken reed of National Service. Let the Ministers responsible go forward boldly in step with modern conditions and developments to the task of constructing a machine which is capable of producing adequate security for the nation. Let them withdraw the White Paper and stop playing with our National Defence.
7.56 p.m.
Mr. John Hall: We have listened, as we always do, with a great deal of interest to the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) because he always speaks with considerable sincerity. Although we may not agree with some of the things he says, he nevertheless speaks from the depths of his heart. Although I found myself agreeing with him from time to time, there were occasions when I found it a little difficult to detect a direct link between the brain and

1115
the voice. No doubt that will catch up with me later on.
One or two of the things that he said about the War Office interested me a little. He reminded me of a story which I heard during the war. An American soldier walking down Whitehall stopped a Tommy to ask him on which side the War Office was, and the Tommy replied "Well, ours, I think." I rather fancy that is the reaction of the hon. Member.
I would not altogether go along with him in stigmatising the "brass hats" in the way he did. My experience of brass hats on the whole is that they have been first-class men with the interests of the Army and, indeed, the Services and the country very much at heart, and they have given their problems very grave and careful consideration. On the whole, they are extremely able and very well informed. I should not like it to be felt that we had the general view about "brass hats" which the hon. Member seems to have.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the Tory attitude to conscription and his realisation that during the debate there has been a great deal of unanimity about the various matters that we have been discussing. We have agreed that we want more pay, better educational facilities, better housing, some improvement in methods of discipline, and so on. The only real disagreement between us is not on whether National Service should be cut but the timing and method of cutting it. That is the main point of difference; on everything else there has been a tremendous, most unusual, degree of agreement.
The hon. Member for Ladywood (Mr. V. Yates) gave the House the benefit of some of his experiences during the Recess. Unfortunately, I heard only the last part of his speech. I have had an opportunity to investigate the problem of National Service and also Army training in general, not only during the last Recess but in Recesses during the previous three or four years, as an officer in the Army Emergency Reserve responsible each year for training a certain number of National Service men. Perhaps I may be allowed to give the House the benefit of my own researches into the problem.
In the first place, I found that there was a very large majority opinion in favour of cutting and, indeed, of abolish-
1116
ing National Service, but that reaction came almost entirely from National Service men themselves and was hardly surprising. On the other hand, the reaction of those responsible, not only for the training, but for the efficiency and fighting efficiency of the Forces, was very much against a cut in time, and the reasons given have been advanced by various speakers during the debate.
The hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) threw doubt upon the statement that the value of the National Service man lay very largely, if not entirely, in the last six months of his service and he gave various reasons why he doubted that. These are some of the problems which occur when the time is reduced. First, the turnover is increased, with a very disruptive effect on unit life and unit efficiency; secondly, it reduces the number of N.C.O.s and instructors and National Service officers available to the Army as a whole; thirdly, it does a lot to jeopardise the three-year engagements. Whereas a man might be persuaded to do three years if he already has to serve for two years, if he has to do only eighteen months it is very unlikely that he will sign for double that time.
The various methods of reducing National Service all have many disadvantages, and the Government have chosen the one with the least number of disadvantages, although I would be the first to agree with some of the social and political objections that have been mentioned on both sides of the House. The name of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery was mentioned with approval by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), and it is well worth reminding ourselves of what he said recently in a very excellent lecture. He said:
"I do not know if the Services can do with less men, but the men they get need to be kept for two years."
I confess to some prejudice in favour of the Field Marshal's statements, because I served under him during the war and have a bias in his favour. He is an extremely able and outstanding man, and I support his view.
I want to go further than just looking at the question of whether we can cut National Service, or how or when. I want to see whether it is possible to abolish it. This is not a sudden conversion, but something which I and others

1117
have been looking at and discussing for a considerable time. Until recently National Service has been necessary, and it has been necessary to have it for the period of two years and necessary to have it in the form in which we had it. However, I wonder whether what is described by General Horrocks in his recent article in the "Sunday Times" as "pax atomica defence" has not changed the situation very considerably and whether we ought not to look at this problem again.
We first have to review the defence cost and to review it against the background of the recent Budget, with all the measures to stop inflation. Government expenditure, especially non-productive expenditure, is, of course, the greatest fundamental cause of inflation. At the moment defence expenditure for the current year will be well in excess of £1,500 million, about one-third of the total Government expenditure. In the next financial year we shall have to bear the bulk of the cost of maintaining our forces in Germany, and I do not think that I am being over-pessimistic when I say that had we not introduced the cut to which the White Paper refers, by 1958 we might have been facing a defence cost running to more like £2,000 million.
That is something which our economy could not bear with ease. It has been estimated that about 10 per cent. of our national production is absorbed by defence expenditure. What is more important than that is that our metal-using industries will produce for defence purposes during the current year between £500 million and £600 million worth of goods. In manpower in industry and the professions we are losing about 285,000 men who are absorbed into National Service, a number which the present proposals will reduce, we hope, by 100,000 over three years.
All these considerations, the economic considerations, this burden on our economy, are all important, because we have to remember that we can be defeated on the economic front while we are diverting resources to meet a military threat. If the present expenditure of men and materials is essential for our defence and is essential to enable us to play a really effective part in the defence of these islands and in our efforts to preserve the peace of the world, then I am sure that
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the nation will accept it, as we have done in the past, and look elsewhere for economies, or ways of adjusting ourselves to the tremendous and increasing burden that it means.
I want to pose the question whether we cannot look forward to a time in the comparatively near future when the advent of the pax atomica age makes it possible for us to abolish National Service altogether, and there is a great deal of unanimity of opinion on both sides of the House about the need for the abolition of National Service. What form will a future war take? There has been much argument and debate about that. All the time major Powers retain the hydrogen weapons and the power to deliver them, a major world war is an improbability, if not an impossibility. But we shall still be faced, as has been said on several occasions, by the localised, perhaps large-scale localised, wars which will be fought with limited forces and conventional weapons.
What sort of forces and what size of forces do we want to meet that situation? What size of forces do we need to ensure that we can make the most valuable use of the deterrent effect of nuclear fission weapons available to us? What forces do we want to enable us to be able rapidly to deploy in sufficient numbers to deal with localised outbreaks wherever they may be? What forces do we require to have enough either to deploy, or to be available for rapid deployment, to deal with any attempts by a country with large land forces to seize territory rather in the Hitler fashion?
If we have not forces available, we may well find ourselves faced with a fait accompli, when part of a territory can be seized and we shall find it impossible to move the invading forces out of it without entering on large-scale and possibly nuclear war. I suggest that if the Services are integrated in the way in which Field Marshal Montgomery indicated in his talk; if we had sufficient airlift to make our forces really mobile so that we could rapidly deploy up to at least a division to where it is wanted at any particular time; if we again turned our attention to the tail which we are told is always being pruned, but which my personal experience year by year makes me wonder whether it is being pruned enough—for example, in the large number of vehicles which still clutter up

1119
rear areas and the supply and recovery organisation of the Army, which is still too large and complicated—if we examine such problems as the vast-scale, large tanks which we have, with massive transporters which have to be used to carry them and which are of doubtful value, there are methods by which we can prune a certain number of people out of the Services. If, in addition, we relieve the Regular forces of the National Service training commitments, I estimate that we can probably reduce our Regular forces of all three Services to about 600,000, or even perhaps 550,000.
Our Regular forces today number about 518,000, so that, depending on what size we eventually decide these Regular forces should be, we should initially have to recruit another 30,000 to 80,000 men. That would give us a net saving in manpower of between 110,000 and 160,000 men, with the very important additional saving throughout the whole of industry geared to the supply and maintenance of military forces.
We always come up against this problem. It is said, "It is all very well to talk about increasing the Regular Army but how are we to do it?" We have tried; both Governments have tried to increase recruiting and to some extent have failed. Pay increases have been given and have had a very short-lived effect. They have had no real effect upon the problem as a whole.
As a matter of fact, we have never really given increases in pay. We have brought up the pay of the forces to something approaching the national industrial average, but it has soon been left behind. We have never, so far as I know, tried to make the pay of the forces higher than the normal average civilian pay. If we are to attract troops in sufficient numbers we have to recognise that, in the first place, we must pay the soldier, sailor or airman more than he would get in civilian life because his life is subject to interference and sudden movement and he has not the stability and the stable family background of the civilian. We must give him something to compensate him for the loss of those amenities. Pay in itself is not sufficient.
There is the question of education. I am one of those who have been pressing
1120
the Ministers concerned to do something about it, and I was very glad to hear the announcement of the grant. Why only £75? So far as I know, that is very much below what we give to the Foreign Service. Why are the Armed Forces to get less than the Foreign Service? I welcome that addition as a contribution, but I hope that it will be looked at again to see whether it can be increased.
Housing has been mentioned. It is a very important matter. We must have improved barracks, and provide more housing for married people in different parts of the country.
Another point which has been mentioned by one or two hon. Members, and which is most important, is the provision of suitable employment on retirement. What happens in the Army at the present time—to take the Service that I know best? A man might be called upon to retire at any time from the age of 45 to 55. Generally speaking, unless he is very lucky, he will probably retire when his age is nearer to 45 years than to 55. He comes out with a pension which would be generous if it were given to him at 65, but at an earlier age, when he is near his maximum earning capacity, it is not sufficient.
A retired Service man has the greatest difficulty in finding other employment at that age. It should be possible to make opportunities for employment in various Government Services, for example in the ordnance depots or the R.E.M.E. workshops. The right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) thought there should be the equivalent of the old King's Roll in industry to absorb a certain number of people as they came out of the forces. Such schemes would give a reasonable guarantee of suitable employment for those having to retire between the ages of 45 and 55, and it would be one of the greatest encouragements to recruiting for the forces.
If we are to do this, it is no use adopting half-measures. It has been suggested that there is to be an announcement about increased pay, but to increase pay by a few shillings is no use. There must be a really bold effort. It is no use going to the Treasury and asking for a really adequate sum only to say in the end, "We will take half as a compromise." I had experience during the war of negotiating with Treasury officials

1121
about Army war establishments, and I discovered the lines on which that Department works. I was not as fortunate as an hon. Member who spoke earlier today. When I wanted a sergeant I was asked to accept a lance-corporal. The schemes must be imaginative and bold. We must accept the idea that for the first two or three years the cost of our Army is likely to rise considerably in order that we might build up Regular forces which would enable us to dispense with National Service.
What will happen if we dispense with National Service? We shall have no trained men coming to the reserves, except Regulars at the end of their normal term of engagement. That brings me to a problem that arises out of present circumstances. What is to happen to the mobile defence battalions? There arc supposed to be forty-eight of them in process of formation, and National Service men coming out of the Army were to be fitted into them. How will they be affected now by the reduction in Reserve training? There are only twenty days of training, except for certain selected personnel, such as some of the Class H reservists. When are they to take their twenty days' training? Are we to recast our ideas about the construction and development of these mobile defence battalions?
What is to happen to them if we dispense with National Service altogether? We shall have to rethink the organisation of these Civil Defence units, which is what they are. We shall either have to depend upon volunteers or to accept National Service for part-time or very short periods of service in units of that kind for home service and Civil Defence only.
There is the other reserve force, the Army Emergency Reserve, about which I know a little. It can serve no useful purpose in the future. I cannot see why we retain its twenty-day reserve training. The problems of mobilising it are considerable, and we shall never be able to mobilise it in any large-scale nuclear-fission hostilities, and it will not be required for localised wars.
The Territorial Army is different. It is most essential to maintain the Territorial Army, for two reasons. The first is to build up divisions some of which may
1122
be required at any time, without general mobilisation, to reinforce Regular troops who might be engaged in very large-scale localised warfare. The second possibility is in the event of the improbable happening, the outbreak of nuclear-fission warfare. We should then want the Territorial Army units which can be mobilised very quickly from areas very close to the points of mobilisation for the duties of maintaining order, restoring services, etc., during the period of dislocation immediately following a hydrogen bomb attack.
Let me sum up. If the present rate of defence expenditure is necessary we have to accept it and the possibility that it will jeopardise our economic development. I am not convinced of its necessity. If we reorganise the defence forces in the light of the present situation and can stimulate recruiting, we can, within a very short time, find ourselves able to dispense with National Service altogether. We can only do it if we really "go to town" on the idea of attracting people into the Forces.
We have to make the three Services a corps d'élite to which people are proud to belong, so proud that it will be difficult to get into it. We have to be selective in getting recruits, making entry so hard that a man will always boast with pride that he is a member of one of the three Services. If we can get to that stage we shall not only find that the fighting forces are efficient but they will be efficient without being the appalling size of our present forces. There will be a twofold advantage, not only the saving of money but, what is more important, the saving of our real and only wealth, our manpower.
8.19 p.m.
Mr. H. Boardman: I wish briefly to raise two points. In February, I was privileged to be a member of a small party of Members from this House which visited our troops in B.A.O.R. It was pleasing to hear senior officers give very fulsome praise to our National Service lads. I was also agreeably surprised that our National Service lads had so few complaints about their Army service. They took it quite philosophically. They made it perfectly clear that they never wanted to be soldiers, but that since the obligation had been thrust upon them they would make the best of it and look forward to the day of their release. That, I thought, was quite reasonable.

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At the same time, there was one universal complaint among those boys—that they were not being usefully or fully employed at any time of their service and would be glad to be commanded to do anything for the sake of doing something. Because of that—and probably because of that only—they were suffering from terrible boredom and frustration. When I raised this with more senior officers they made no attempt to rebut it. They said, "You have come at the wrong time—in the winter. It is not possible for us to carry out our normal field exercises now. If you would only come back in the spring or summer you would see an entirely different picture." That, I thought, was a case not of the "lost weekend," but of wasted winters. What impressed me, in talking both to men and to officers, was the very urgent need there was—in the interests of the men and of industry over here—to substitute an intensive training which would concentrate into a shorter period the training necessary for the national need.
Despite the maintenance of full employment, and so on, there have always been some very serious pockets of unemployment in the old distressed regions—the Development Areas. A very good deal has been done by the erection of new factories, but I found that to be not the principal problem. The principal problem was recruitment of trained staff in those areas which had been largely denuded of skilled labour in pre-war days. Some of those firms have done remarkably well, not only in the recruitment but in the training of staff. Having achieved a large measure of success there, they are being greatly handicapped by the incidence of National Service on their staffs.
Perhaps, I may give an instance. In the Merseyside Development Area there is a factory which has done extremely well in its foreign exports. It has successfully faced very keen American competition. In 1950, that firm had a staff of 8,000 and because of its success in the foreign markets it decided on quite a long-term plan of expansion. It decided that, instead of having a staff of about 8,000 it should, within five years, have about 14,000. It had the buildings; it got the plant. It started a new system of recruitment for apprentices. It stepped up the annual intake of apprentices to 150 and planned that that figure should be
1124
750 in five years. Facilities were created for training the apprentices so that at the end of a five-year training period they would be first-class, key, skilled workers.
The first of those men are just coming out of the apprenticeship training school. But what is the result? The result is that, because of National Service, in the twelve months from August last year to September of this year this firm has lost 109 of those trained, skilled people. In another twelve months it will lose another 150—in two years 260 skilled, key people will be lost. That will prevent the firm employing a further 1,800 people, because in those works they depend upon one key worker supporting the labour of seven other people.
When this firm went to Merseyside—and particularly when it started getting orders from the American market—it was doing a great thing for the country. By looking forward to expansion, and by proposing to engage another 6,000 people it was making a great social contribution to that area. It seems to be one of the tragedies of National Service that industries are going to be denuded of skilled people in those areas which suffered so much in the years before the war. In Liverpool, 1,200 will not be employed because those 260 will have been taken away—and this at a time when on Merseyside there are 12,000 unemployed.
In a period of full employment, when the value of every man's labour becomes increasingly important, I believe that we must ask the Government to forget this White Paper, to think again and to do something to stop the shameful waste of the nation's most valuable asset.
8.26 p.m.
Mr. Ian Harvey: This debate has been on an Amendment which has not always featured very largely in some of the arguments. The Amendment is to the effect that the White Paper should be rejected on the grounds that it makes no provision for an immediate —an immediate—cut in National Service. Of the arguments deployed from the other side there have been a number to which we have listened with sympathy, and they have been made on behalf of those who do not believe in National Service on principle. If I may say so, those speakers have been the most logical in their opposition to this case; if they do not believe in it on principle they have

1125
every right to move for its rejection at any time on any grounds.
But those who have not argued in that way seem to me not to have proved their case, and if I may take some of their arguments I hope that it will be agreed that I have been reasonably fair in assessing them. The one most usually employed is that, as our commitments have been reduced since the proposals were first tabulated, it is, therefore, only reasonable that the Government should reduce conscription. I do not think that it has been proved today that our commitments have, in fact, been reduced.
Our potential commitments are dictated by the foreign situation. If hon. Members can honestly look at the situation in the Middle East today and say that they believe, without any doubt at all, that our commitments there have been reduced—despite the actual physical commitments which may have been eliminated for the time being—they have greater faith in those matters than I have, and they have greater faith in them than the situation really justifies. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about Korea?"] Exactly. Korea has been eliminated, but it is in the power of those who created Korea to create another Korea. The hon. Gentleman must remember the policy of Adolf Hitler, who created one potential Korea after another. I would have thought that my point had been proved because, had we not been able to prevent affairs in Korea from developing, the world might have been in a major conflagration today.
Mr. H. Hynd: As I understood, the hon. Gentleman was arguing that our commitments had not been reduced recently. Surely they have been reduced since the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
Mr. Harvey: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has brought that point up, because that is the difference between us. Our commitments do not consist necessarily of definite geographical physical commitments on the ground. They consist also of potential commitments. It is essential that we should be able to deal with any other potential commitment that may arise so long as it appears to us that the situation which caused Korea still prevails.
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The hon. Gentleman must be well aware of the complications which confront us today. If we regard defence as an instrument of foreign policy, as it is, we must take that matter into consideration. I am certain that the Government are justified in the policy that they are following at the moment, in not making an immediate reduction merely because political and public pressure may have been brought upon them.
Let me deal with the next argument, namely, that National Service can be cut because so many people are wasting their time in the Services. That point was made by several hon. Members on the opposite benches. I thought my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) was right and frank in this matter. These men are being trained for an eventuality which we all hope will not arise. They are being trained in the Services, and those who have experience of the Services know that, by the very nature of the operation, there are bound to be periods of boredom. But there are also periods of quite the reverse. That is inevitable owing to the way in which the operation works. I am sure that we would all like to change it, but we cannot.
The amount of time wasted is not nearly so considerable as public outcry would have us believe. I think hon. Members must admit that those who complain are often in the minority compared with those who play a very full and vigorous part in the operation of National Service. I have had my own experience of these matters, and I have not found, particularly in Germany, where the National Service men were very happy on the whole—
Mr. V. Yates: Oh!
Mr. Harvey: I know that the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. George Craddock) went around looking for trouble because they wanted to find it. I went around trying to assess the situation in a just way. I found certain cases of dissatisfaction but, on the whole, I found that the position was very reasonable.
Mr. Yates: I do not think it is quite fair to make that sort of remark. My hon. Friend and I went to the trouble of spending six weeks studying the camps in this country and abroad, and it is not fair that we should be dismissed merely

1127
as if we were looking for trouble. When the hon. Gentleman sees the report which I hope we shall produce, he will see some of the good as well as the bad.
Mr. Harvey: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has said that, and I hope that we shall see some of the good; but one cannot escape the fact that during the hon. Gentleman's speech this evening we heard only of the bad and nothing of the good.
Let me deal with the next argument, that other countries do not have such a long period of National Service. That may well be the case, but I would not have said that is a very encouraging attitude to leadership in foreign affairs. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but if a strong lead is not given now, it may be too late to give a strong lead later. We believe in ensuring the peace of the world while it is within our power to do so, and not waiting until the situation gets out of hand. There may be people who would like to see our defence system break down. They may have friends here, but I am not one of them and I shall oppose them with all the strength that I have.
A very reasonable demand has been made that we should look at the system of training and see whether it can be simplified. I think that is right, and I am satisfied that those who are responsible for training have done so. But during the course of this debate the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who, I am glad to see, has now returned to the Chamber, admitted that when he was in office men were sent after a very short period of training to Korea and Malaya, to deal with situations in which they were confronted with actual service conditions. I would have said that it is a very poor argument to admit that in an emergency one has to undertake a certain policy and then to argue that that policy should, therefore, continue when that emergency has ended. The right hon. Gentleman has made a very serious admission of what he actually did in those circumstances when he was in power. I see no quick simplification of the training system at the present time.
The right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) argued that our contribution was greater because Germany and other European countries were not making a
1128
sufficiently great contribution. Many of us have seen the rearmament of Germany with the greatest misgivings and I think it would be a very unwise policy if we were to say that we would reduce our commitments provided the Germans increased theirs.
If we accept the Amendment, on the National Service system as it stands, without question the Regular element will be less effective. The reasons have been very well deployed during the debate. I am certain that if we are aiming, as we have all argued in the debate, to strengthen the Regular element, there could be no worse policy to adopt at present than that of the Amendment. We have to ensure that when National Service men do their duties they make the best use of their time, and it has been shown that under the present system, unless they have the last six months' service, their time will not be used to the greatest benefit of themselves or the nation. To move for an immediate reduction in the period of National Service, as has been moved by hon. Members opposite, is to waste the taxpayers' money and to waste the time of the National Service men very much more than it is wasted at present.
I join with my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) in urging the Government to look at the problem in a longer perspective, but that has nothing to do with the Amendment. I take the same view as do many hon. Members—and I think the Government take this view, too — that this White Paper is an interim measure, but that has nothing to do with the Opposition's Amendment. The ultimate change which may be possible has nothing to do with the White Paper.
The Government must look very carefully at a completely new plan. Indeed, I think they are doing so now and that the White Paper is an indication of it. But that has nothing to do with the immediate issue, which is a call upon the Government without further ado to adjust the period of service in a way which could not provide a more effective system of defence.
I believe that to be totally lacking in responsible judgment, I believe it to be designed for party political purposes and I believe that it would do no good to our defence system. I am sure that, having

1129
heard the arguments which have been developed, the House will reject the Amendment.
8.38 p.m.
Mr. George Wigg: If there is one thing about the speech of the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) which is clear it is that it was a political speech. He defended the Government on three grounds, but he knows enough about the subject to realise that there is another charge, which he did not mention but which could be brought.
Let me deal, first, with the three points which he used to attack my hon. Friends. He said that it was no good raising the argument about other countries, but that is where we came in, for, three-and-a-half years ago, at Whitsun, in a House with not many hon. Members present, my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) and myself developed this very argument in an Adjournment debate—not that it was possible to cut National Service immediately, but that we were the only country in the Commonwealth with two years' military service. In the first defence debate after the war the present Prime Minister and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer advanced the theory that there must be a Commonwealth conception of defence: if there must be a Commonwealth conception of defence, there must be a Commonwealth sharing of the burden; Great Britain would find it impossible to hold its position as the keystone of a world-wide Commonwealth if we asked our young men to bear the burden of two years' service indefinitely. We went on to argue that what was true of the Commonwealth was also true of N.A.T.O.; there had to be a sharing of the burdens. The fact that that problem has not been tackled does not only lie with the present Government, but it is fair to point out that hon. Members on the Government benches are saying something different now from what they said in opposition.
The second point made by the hon. Member was on the question of National Service wastage. I entirely agree that that is a problem which is far too serious for the approach to be based on the journeyings of a couple of my hon. Friends from camp to camp. I recall that a lady pre-
1130
pared a report for the late Mr. Ernest Bevin at the end of the war, when we wanted an inquiry into the working of the A.T.S. She said something which was quite profound, that in dealing with the Services it was quite clear that virtue had no publicity value. As soon as one can find something wrong with the Services it hits the headlines. Well, a "B.F." is born every minute and the Army has its share; and the Air Force has its share, also. This problem cannot he approached in that way.
I come to the question of commitments, which has acted as a political flypaper and, I regret to say, has caught a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends. The commitment aspect of National Service is only half the story. It is just as if the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Budget day dealt only with what was to be spent on the Departments, but did not say how he would raise the money. One cannot spend money until one has raised it. [An HON. MEMBER: "Yes."] One cannot do that and remain solvent. One cannot do that indefinitely, even the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. The point is that we cannot send out divisions which exist only on paper.
The hon. Member for Harrow, East has been rather artful on the question of commitments. Some of my hon. Friends have not been strictly accurate in assessment of commitments, but when will the day come when commitments are normal'? When in this century could a Foreign Secretary or a Minister on behalf of any Government say on the question of defence, with his hand on his heart, "Of course all the commitments have been liquidated"? There is always one going over the horizon, another ahead and one coming up. The problem cannot be assessed. It is far too short-term to try to assess the problem in terms of commitments. I can give hon. Members an example from my experience. Between the wars on every occasion when the Government got into trouble they called up Section A of the Army Reserve, called out the Navy, or the Marines. To put this question of National Service right we have to look at it from the long-term angle.
I can only apologise for again saying what I have said on a dozen occasions. It does not matter who sits opposite. Take my right hon. Friend the Member

1131
for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), my right hon. Friend the Member for Basset-law (Mr. Bellenger) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and put them on the benches opposite—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] They were infinitely better Service Ministers than the Conservative Party has ever had. I am always prepared to debate that because, during the war, in an emergency, with 400 Conservatives to choose from, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) took the unprecedented step of choosing a civil servant as Secretary of State for War. Let hon. Members opposite put that in their pipes and smoke it.
The Conservative Party's record in the Service Departments is intolerably bad and I regret to say that in the present Administration it has not found an exception. Yes, there is one exception, the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Ward), who I think has done a useful job at the Air Ministry. The Secretary of State for War has done for the British Army something which Napoleon could not do, something which the Kaiser could not do and something which Hitler could not do—he has turned it into a jelly, an amorphous mass. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh. They come here, not very interested in the question of defence, but take it for granted when, in the Defence White Paper, they see that vast sums of money have been spent. They see, for example, that we have considerable numbers of men serving in the Armed Forces, but they mistake the numbers on the ration strength for the real strength. In the parts of the world where these things can be assessed, that sort of mistake it not made. The Russians, I am sure, are under no illusions as to the effective strength of this country's forces.
We have heard much talk today about the Army, but let us for a moment look at the Air Force. The test of an air force is the number of swept-wing fighters that it possesses. What is the total number of swept-wing fighters that this country has that makes people talk about peace through strength? I will tell the House, and the Under-Secretary can deny it if it is wrong; but it is true—we have 600, 300 less than Sweden. What has the U.S.S.R. got? Five thousand. And America? Five thousand in the U.S. Air Force, plus 1,000 in the U.S. Navy.
1132
Despite the fact that we have spent £6,000 million on defence, we are a second-rate Power and are still behaving as though we were a first-class Power. We are like the old genteel figure in the back street of a suburb who cannot even feed the canary but who keeps the curtains clean and up at all costs. That is what we are doing. It is largely pretence.
Today, I asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air a Question which has a great bearing on this debate. I asked whether the £292 million voted for aircraft and stores would be spent in the present year. He replied, "No." Last year, many hon. Members opposite cheered about our vast V-bomber force. What does it consist of? It consists of 11 Victors, 4 Vulcans and 15 Valiants. We have even had to slow down the delivery of V-bombers because we do not have the technical staff to maintain them. That is the kind of bottleneck that arises when the Government fail to grapple with this problem. It is not an easy problem to solve. It was evident three and a half years ago and that is why I do not apologise for repeating that the problem is incapable of easy solution. It is a long-term problem and can be solved only on an all party basis.
What I am saying is particularly applicable to the Army. If I may tell the story again for the twentieth time, on 1st November, 1951, the Secretary of State for War, when he had not been Secretary of State for more than five minutes, introduced a new Regular engagement for the Army, three years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve. Of course, he got a tremendous rise in recruitment. Being the kind of mug that he is he thought that this was due to his policy, on the one hand, and to the policy that he and his party had advocated when in opposition. They have advocated, as we have heard today from both sides of the House, that increased pay would do the trick. The curious thing is that it never does the trick.
What increased rates of pay will do—and I shall tell this to the Government next year when they introduce it again—is to borrow from the future. When rates of pay are increased, young men who contemplate enlistment will surge in, but six months later the Government run into the trough; they borrow from the

1133
future. What the Secretary of State did not understand, and what the country did not understand either, was the important thing that my much-maligned right hon. Friend the Member for Easington had introduced the differential. It needed political guts to do that, particularly with the kind of party that we are. [Laughter.] Yes, that is why I am proud to be a member of it, because it has a strong non-militarist tradition.
My right hon. Friend introduced the differential of 4s. a day for the National Service man for eighteen months, and 7s. for the last six months. And so the young man, faced at the pay table with the choice of 4s. or 7s. a day, said "Give me the 7s." and took the three-year engagement.
Now the test was going to be, how many of these men would prolong their service? If hon. Members will look at this in the way in which a staff officer will look at it, they will find that the present Government have recruited, at much greater expense, fewer man years than we did. Man years is the test and not the number of men. The Secretary of State for War is on record as saying—I am sorry he is not here; he will love to read this in HANSARD—OR 9th March, 1953, in HANSARD:
"We should be all right if 33 per cent. of the three-year men stay for six years, and if something like 50 per cent. of those who stayed on extended for nine years. That would give us an adequate, regular basis for the Army as it is organised at the present time."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 855.]
It has taken me a long time to get the figures from the Secretary of State for War. I eventually got them from him in the form of a letter. We have now dragged out of him what is the rate of prolongation of that first batch of three-year men who completed their three-year engagement from 1st November, 1954, to 31st March, 1955. It was less than six per cent.
I tabled a Question during the Recess, and the Minister of Defence was kind enough to write to me to say that the information for the next six months would be available in November. I put down that Question on 1st November to the Secretary of State for War. That was before I knew that there was to be a debate. I received a letter from the Secretary of State for War asking me to
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transfer my Question to 15th November. At once I knew that there was to be another debate, and, of course, the figures are no better. That is why we shall get the answer after this debate.
There is no argument about it. The Government have got themselves into a hopeless jam. They have got 6 per cent. prolongation where they estimated, or perhaps hoped, to get 33 per cent. prolongation. What are we going to do about it? They cannot do it themselves. That is why I have said, in speech after speech that we do not want an inquiry to get the facts. All the facts about National Service are to be found in HANSARD.
It took the Secretary of State for War, who, I am glad to see, has come back into the Chamber, ten years of hard study —and hard slog by us—to convince him of one simple fact. Of course he came along, as if he had come down like Moses from Mount Sinai, to tell us that for the period of three years, the number of men for enlistment remained constant at 180,000. I then put this to him:
"I want to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon having learnt lesson No. I after 10 years, but why does not he see the logic of the matter? If it is true that a constant number of men join the Regular Army, and that whatever one does will not affect the total number of men who will do so, why does not he appreciate that the question of paramount importance is for how long they will join and whether they will stay in after they have joined?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 185.]
That seems to me to be simple. If one of my daughters did not understand that, I would send her to bed for being stupid. But the right hon. Gentleman still does not appreciate that simple fact, and the result is that we get this White Paper.
One of the odd things about the White Paper is that the Minister of Defence really believes in it. He is far too nice and far too honest a person not to—and that also goes for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister of Labour, but not further along the Front Bench opposite. They produced this White Paper, and they say, and really believe it:
"It would infringe the principle of universal liability for national service."
Was there ever such tommy rot as that? Does any hon. Member believe in the universality of National Service. If I were

1135
to ask any hon. Member opposite whether the length of Colour Service is the same for the three Services he would say, "Yes," but he would not be telling the truth.
I have elicited during the summer months that each of the Services has a different system of release. In the Navy, for example, a man who joins on 1st January will be out again two years later on 31st December, and his leave is counted as part of his two years' service. What happens in the Air Force? I have asked the Secretary of State for Air, and I learn that no fewer than 96 per cent. of Royal Air Force men do their two years plus their leave period.
Of course, those in charge of the jolly old Army do not care two hoots. They apply the whole of the National Service Acts, so far as the period of service is concerned. Universality has never been effective. It has never been applied. Miners get away with it; agricultural workers get away with it; merchant seamen get away with it. The principle of universality does not apply.
An interesting thing about the White Paper is that Ministers are naive enough to publish it, but there is another matter that needs to be looked at, and it has a great deal to do with this debate. Any hon. Gentleman who cares to look at "The Times" for the day when the Prime Minister made his announcement about National Service will find that there was a lead story about it. "The Times" is always respectable and generally accurate. That morning, against the opinion expressed by all the other informed newspapers—because "The Times" correspondents are on visiting and drinking terms with Ministers—that newspaper carried the story that National Service was to be cut by six months.
The event was quite different, and I believe that the story of the difference was this. I believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he made plain in his Budget speech in 1954, in order to balance the national accounts, had to get a cut, so there was a fight inside the Cabinet. Up to the last moment the Chancellor of the Exchequer was probably leading, and he thought that there would be a cut of anything up to six months. It did not come off. Now we have this White Paper as a substitute.
1136
It is important to understand that when the vote is taken tonight it will not settle anything, because in a year's time—I make this speech every time we discuss the Army Estimates—the Army will be weaker than it is today. The rate of prolongation will not be any bigger. The number of men who will have enlisted will not be greater than it is today. If the country cannot face up to the realities of National Service now, in November, 1955, we can be absolutely sure that when the time comes for the policy adumbrated in the White Paper to be judged the country's military position will be weaker than it is today.
8.58 p.m.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: The Minister of Labour and National Service, who is to follow me, and I have agreed to split the last hour of the debate between us, and I hope, with the assistance of the House, to give him even more than 50 per cent. of it, because, having listened to most of the debate, I think that almost every aspect of it has been covered and almost every argument has been exhausted. We are quite clear where we are. A less complicated subject the House has not discussed for some time. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who has just sat down, and who has an unrivalled knowledge of the matter, has said, the facts are perfectly clear.
There has been a disposition on the part of some hon. Members to ask us to justify our Amendment, but I beg them to realise that that is not the position. The actual position is that the Government have to justify the White Paper and, so far, we have had no real justification for it. I would remind the House—I know that I am only refreshing its mind when I say it—that we could not be discussing a more serious matter, because conscription is the final and most absolute exercise of State power over the individual citizen. It reaches out to the homes of the land and seizes hold of young men and takes them into its service without any excuse whatsoever except the general policies agreed to by the House.
It is. therefore, the supreme exercise of the civil authority, and that is all the more good reason why the Minister who has to answer the debate is the Minister of Labour and National Service, who exercises this power on behalf of the

1137
State and takes the young men and hands them over to the military authorities. When he has done that he has finished with them. He has not very much to do with the matter afterwards. He is, as it were, merely a sort of conduit pipe, sending the young men, through his agencies, into the Services themselves.
It therefore seems to me to be perfectly proper that if the House of Commons is going to exercise this power, if it is going to take young men and hand them over to the military authorities, it should justify the action. It is not enough to ask us to try to prove that the State ought not to do it. The State has a continuing obligation to prove that it is necessary. As a matter of fact, we attempted to assert that principle in 1953.
The hon. Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) tried to put us into a dilemma. He said that we had asked for an inquiry, and obviously we should not have asked for an inquiry if we had known the facts. Therefore, we asked for an inquiry in order to find out the facts. The Government then refused that inquiry and therefore, apparently, we have no right now to demand a reduction in the period of National Service. That is a curious kind of reasoning.
It is only necessary, apparently, from that reasoning, for the Government to refuse an inquiry to shut us up permanently, and the hon. Member for Bridlington too, because he would not know either. Therefore, according to the reasoning of the hon. Member, who always speaks with very great persuasiveness, it is only necessary for a Government to refuse an inquiry into anything and, because we do not know the facts, we are mum from then on. The true position is, and the House of Commons must always hold to it, that before the civil authority exercises the State power to take young men and hand them over to the military authorities, the case must be made out.
It was in order that we should try to keep this under review, in order that we should revive the right of the House to review the situation from time to time, that the Opposition on 16th November, 1953, moved a Motion—
"That this House, whilst accepting the necessity for National Service in present circumstances, nevertheless considers that the time has now arrived when the period of service should be determined by Parliament on Affirmative Resolution, not less frequently than once a
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year."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 16th November, 1953; Vol. 520, c. 1403.]
That, of course, was defeated, but it was a most unfortunate thing that it was defeated—unfortunate for the Army and unfortunate for the country.
The evidence that it was unfortunate is before us today, because this White Paper would never have been produced had there not been an agitation for a review of National Service. That is why it was produced. There was a discussion in the newspapers. There was a resolution at the Trades Union Congress. There was a discussion at the Labour Party Conference. There have been large demonstrations in different parts of the country and the Government have been made aware of the fact of there being a rising tide of indignation about this matter, and that at any rate the time had come to Parliament to review the situation. No one denies that, I hope.
As a consequence of that, the Government have found it possible—or the Services have informed the Government that they find it possible—to do without another 100,000 men in the next three years. That is the first point established. In other words, if the Motion of the Opposition had been carried in 1953 this reduction might have taken place then: so we have already drawn a little blood —not much—and we hope to go on until hon. Gentlemen opposite are looking pallid and defeated.
It has been said in the course of the debate by some people that of course the experts know all about it; that because Field Marshal Montgomery has said that they must have the young men for two years then, of course, laymen like ourselves who are ignorant about these matters must accept what the experts say. I have never taken that view, and I am sure that hon. Members on all sides of the House will not take it, because if there is one thing that the experts are not expert about, it is war.
In fact there have been some remarkable changes in the last few years. Weapons are changing so rapidly, and the conditions under which a third world war might be fought are so unpredictable that no one can offer himself as an authority on the subject. When we instituted National Service in the first instance there were two main reasons. One was to have a large number of trained reserves

1139
and the other was to try to provide for manpower in substitution of the shortage in the Regular forces. But the trained reserve has now gone. Nobody defends that now. Nobody wants it. We are told now that in a nuclear war the war might be over before the trained reserves could be mobilised. So that argument has gone.
The argument was put forward at the time with almost Papal authority. It was said, "This is the last word, we must have these young men trained ready in order to mobilise them for a war." That argument has gone. It was only, I think, in March, 1953, that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir. W. Churchill) gave us his advice—and no one would suggest that he would regard himself as being otherwise than a great authority on war matters. The right hon. Gentleman was so knowledgeable about the nature of the next war, and what was required for our defence, that he said:
"However, it seems to me at the moment that one of the really vital processes of national survival is the development and expansion of the Home Guard. So far its growth has not been in any way adequate to our needs or our dangers."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 576.]
So we had the Home Guard. It was estimated that we should require 170,000 men in the Home Guard. I am not suggesting for a moment that the right hon. Gentleman was necessarily wrong; all I am saying is that these were the predictions and the advice of people who regarded themselves as experts. We got, I think, about 26,000 instead of the 170,000, and 9,000 of them were officers. The Home Guard has gone—another discard, another piece of expertise gone with the wind.
It was only a little later that we were told that it was necessary for us to fling masses of warriors across the Channel in order to stem the Red flood from the East. We are now informed by all the experts that such masses would themselves be in great danger, and that instead of having a great wall of men we now require to have highly organised pockets —mobile pockets. How a pocket can be mobile I do not know. Then there is another phrase; we are told that we must have "hedgehogs" situated at different points on the Continent. It is no longer
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a question of masses of men, no longer the huge divisions which we were told by the experts only a few short years ago were absolutely essential. That is all gone, and we are now to have an Army organised on an entirely different basis.
I appreciate this. I do not blame the military authorities because they are attempting to adjust their ideas and plans to a very rapidly changing situation. I am not saying this in a spirit of censoriousness or facetiousness—[Laughter.] —funny though the facts may, in retrospect, appear.
What I am saying, therefore, is that we ought not at this stage merely to accept the position that because the Army thinks it ought to have these men for two years we should sit down and give them to it. The point that I am making is that the experts now have no authority. They must justify themselves to the lay mind in language and with arguments which the lay mind can understand, because their authority has now been undermined by the passage of events. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman who is to reply to the debate will give us rather more substantial arguments than we have had so far.
I should like to say this about the Minister of Defence. I was a little late arriving, but he had not been speaking very long when I entered the Chamber. I thought his speech was quite perfunctory. I did not think it was the kind of speech which he had really prepared. No, I think it had been prepared for him. I think he had prepared another but he was not allowed to deliver it. I thought he was going to tell us something about commitments, but he said he had just mentioned them at the beginning in a long string. He must remember that a catalogue is not a description and that we expected to hear from him something rather more, because if we are going to call up young men, presumably because the country is in danger or our interests have to be defended, then we must be told what the case is.
Where are the commitments? We have been told that our commitments today are greater than they were when the period of National Service was extended from eighteen months to two years. That is rather a grim statement to hear. We had been under the impression that there had been a relaxation of world tension.

1141
In fact, the Prime Minister has taken very considerable credit for it. But now we have been informed, only a few minutes ago, that the period was extended because there was an emergency and now it is to be continued because there might be an emergency. So whatever happens we just get the two-year period. At no time is it to be reduced.
I was a member of the Government when the period was extended to two years, and I take my share of responsibility for the act, but we understood that the two years was to be temporary, for the period of the crisis, and that when it was over we should revert to the reduced period. But now it is being continued. Now we arc told that our commitments are still very extensive and, of course, most of our commitments for which the National Service men are necessary, because of the smallness of the Regular Army, are in the Colonies. If any Government in pre-war days had dared to suggest that this country was to have conscription to fight colonial wars, it would not have lasted five minutes.
I agree that there are circumstances which are exceptional, but can anybody seriously suggest that a great deal of the responsibility for some of these commitments does not rest on Her Majesty's Government? Does anybody seriously suggest that Cyprus has been handled intelligently? Is it not a fact that we are having to send far more men than we expected to have to send to Cyprus to meet the opposition of an indignant local population? Does not everybody on the other side of the House secretly believe that the whole thing has been wickedly mishandled? They say it privately, but they will not say it publicly, but we know very well that we might have got the Cyprus base peacefully if the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been less traditional.
Instead of that we are now in Cyprus in the same unhealthy and unwholesome social and political climate as we had in the Canal Zone. In passing, I may say that the same thing is partly true about Malaya.
The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): We inherited it.
Mr. Bevan: Certainly, but it is clear that a great deal of the trouble in Malaya is connected with the position of the
1142
Peking Government. The hon. Member for Gravesend (Mr. Kirk), on 21st June, said:
"It has been clear for some time now that the emergency can only be ended in one of two ways. The simplest way would be a broadcast over Peking radio. That would solve the problem overnight."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st June, 1955; Vol. 325, c. 1188.]
When we were in Peking last year—this is a very serious matter; many of our lads have lost their lives in Malaya and we have troops there now—we told the leaders of the Peking Government at the time that in our judgment they must realise that when Chinamen went overseas, the Chinese flag ought not to follow them or there was bound to be trouble, and that the Chinese in Malaya should accept assimilation into the Malayan population. We said the same thing in Singapore. I honestly believe that our difficulties in Malaya would have been solved some years ago if the United States could have been brought to agree with us to take the Peking Government into the United Nations.
Here is policy making necessary the use of British Service men overseas. That is why on this side of the House we say that this argument cannot be entirely divorced from the behaviour of the Government. The same thing was true about the Canal Zone. The Prime Minister knows much better than I that had we cleared out of the Canal Zone some years earlier, if he had been able to resolve his differences with his hon. Friends earlier, recruitment into the Regular Army would have been much better. These are the policies that lie behind our discussion of National Service.
I know it can be argued, and it has been argued with considerable force, that the reason the Government find it necessary to retain two years of service is the run-down in the Regular content of the three Services, especially the Army. That is true, but it illustrates the failure of the Government. They have been in office now for four years, and should have been able to build up the Regular content of the Forces before now. They say, "If we reduce the two years to a shorter period the Army will be completely disorganised." Well, the late David Lloyd George used to tell me that whenever he had arguments with the Services, the stage was always reached when he used to shut his ears, shut his

1143
eyes, open his mouth, and say, "No, no, no, no." That is the position which my hon. Friends and I take up today.
We say that there is only one way in which the Services can be made to adjust their plans to reduced manpower and that is by refusing them so many bodies. It is the only way. We know of no other way. It has been suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) that we ought to have an investigation into the Services' use of manpower. Why not? Why should it not be a civil investigation? What is wrong with that? After all, we are the civil authority being asked to provide the men and the money. Why should we not satisfy ourselves that the men are being intelligently used? There is grave suspicion that they are not being intelligently used. There is a great deal of evidence that manpower is being wasted, so why should we not investigate it?
The Government say, "Let the Services investigate it themselves. They will tell us." I remember immediately after the war a committee of investigation about the psychiatrists who were in imminent danger of demobilisation. There was an investigation into whether they could not be usefully employed in civil life; the psychologists made an investigation into the value of the psychologists. To my astonishment they recommended that they were invaluable. Therefore, if the Army makes an investigation into itself the Army will recommend that there is nothing wrong with the Army.
There seems to us nothing infra dig. about it, nothing derogatory to the forces or denigrating to their status, if the House of Commons decides to have an investigation into how the Services are using the manpower with which the House of Commons provides them. There is no reason, so far as I can see, why an investigation could not be carried out by a Select Committee of the House. After all, it was a Select Committee of this House that, after a great deal of controversy, did a most remarkable piece of work on reforming the Army Code—
Mr. Head: Which the right hon. Gentleman opposed.
Mr. Bevan: On the contrary. The right hon. Gentleman is going slightly ga-ga.
Mr. Head: I remember this particularly well, because I suggested it to the House as a compromise, and the right hon. Gentleman opposed it, as he will find if he will look at HANSARD.
Mr. Bevan: The right hon. Gentleman will remember that he and I had another little argument at that time on an entirely different issue. He will discover that we had an argument about the invasion of the Leader of the House into the Opposition's time. The right hon. Gentleman has, I think, got things a little mixed up; but if he is correct, I will apologise. I can make the offer and not be very likely to have to redeem it.
The suggestion we also make from this side of the House is that one of the causes of the Regular Army not being built up is conscription. It is a serious argument. I have heard it put to me by men of great experience in the Services. I heard to my astonishment—I never thought that it was the case—that over a period of thirty or forty years the same number of men offered themselves for Regular service each year. It used to be an article of faith with us that the Army was very largely recruited as a consequence of unemployment. I hear now—and I accept it—that the fact is that there seems to have been a regular pool of individuals who wished to join the Regular Services, and who normally offered themselves at a rate of 170,000 to 180,000 a year. The numbers that were taken in depended, of course, on the physical fitness of those offering themselves. That number has fallen, and the curious thing is that the fall seems to have synchronised with the coming in of conscription.
Mr. Wigg: If my right hon. Friend will allow me to say so, that is not quite correct. The remarkable thing is that the 180,000 has remained constant from the 'twenties to the present time.
Mr. Bevan: But the fact is that we are not getting into the Regular Army at the moment the number that we were—
Mr. Wigg: Yes, we are.
Mr. Bevan: —and it has been put to me that the status of the Regular Army has been reduced as a result of conscription. We suggest that it might easily happen that as conscription is reduced Regular recruitment might grow. The two might go hand in hand.

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We appreciate the difficulties that the Government have, and that if there is an immediate reduction in the period of National Service there is bound to be some disorganisation, there is bound to be some difficulty—there will have to be some readjustment—but we honestly and seriously believe that we shall not get that reduction if the Army is left to its own devices, and unless the civil authority is resolute enough to say, "These figures must now be reduced, you must make your plans accordingly, do as you have done before and cut your coat according to the cloth, and we are proposing to reduce the size of the cloth."
9.28 p.m.
The Minister of Labour and National Service (Sir Walter Monckton): In the course of this debate I have been treated with the courtesy which I have always received. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), in commenting on the drafting of the White Paper, made some reference to the nincompoop who might have dealt with the industrial part, but I did not take that as too personal a reference.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) was good enough to leave me—I think alone among my colleagues—if not with my trousers at any rate with a kilt, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) has referred to my task in this sphere as that of a conduit pipe through the course of which the men are found to go into the Services. During the debate a good many things have been said and argued which are rather wide of the stream which normally goes through the conduit pipe of No. 8 St. James's Square.
At the outset I would say with what pleasure, for my part, I heard the maiden speech of the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw). The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington at once singled out—and, I think, rightly—the independence of the approach which the hon. Member made to this problem. I would say that the critical, but constructive, support of the type he gave is very welcome not only on this side but in the House altogether. We shall look forward with interest to his interventions in our future debates.
1146
The first thing I want to say to the House about National Service is that nobody wants compulsory military service if it can be avoided. Certainly, I do not. But, as things are now, we cannot possibly do without it. Forces composed solely of Regulars, as has been said in many parts of the House, would be preferable. They would be preferable on many grounds—economy, efficiency, and so forth—but the Minister of Defence, when he opened this debate, quoted figures which showed that without any question a considerable National Service element is essential in addition to the Regular component if we are to meet our obligations.
The point that I draw from that is that when we face this question, which we ultimately do, of how reductions should be effected, we cannot avoid some interruption in the civilian lives of the men who have to accept National Service. In present circumstances, on any view, we cannot avoid a considerable interruption of their civilian lives.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Defence, in the course of his speech today, said that a cut of twelve months could not be contemplated because it would destroy altogether the military value of our forces as they are deployed at present. It is quite clear that a cut of six months would still leave a considerable interruption. That does not mean that it is not possible, in present circumstances, to effect any reduction in the forces. The Minister of Defence today pointed out the size and character of that reduction. It will mean that we shall have available to industry men who are not available now.
A number of questions have been asked in relation to our commitments. I was impressed by what fell from the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), when he spoke of the uncertainties and emergencies which are inevitable. Our commitments over the world are wide enough. We all know our commitments to N.A.T.O.—four divisions. We know our commitments in the Commonwealth and the Colonial Empire. We have heard Malaya, the Middle East, Kenya, all mentioned as examples. I do not take the gloomy view that we ought to regard ourselves, or that it would be good for the world if we regarded ourselves, as having fallen to the level of a second-class Power. If we are going to maintain

1147
the level of a first-class Power and meet those commitments it is extremely hard to put into figures what is necessary for that purpose.
We have reduced our forces which are necessary for the commitments as they go along, and by the policy of the White Paper we are continuing the process of reducing them. If we look at the figures in March, 1953, there were 870,000 people in the forces. The figure is now down to about 800,000, and if the policy in the White Paper is adopted it will be down to 700,000 in March, 1958—a drop of 170,000 since March, 1953.
As I see it, this is the approach to the question. The National Service part of the forces that I have mentioned is a necessary ingredient to make up the total which the Regulars could not provide by themselves. One cannot realistically suppose that we have for our present commitments enough in the Regular Forces, and, therefore, one cannot realistically contemplate getting rid of National Service at this time. We have introduced, and the White Paper carries forward, a policy of reduction of the forces as the commitments have narrowed, and the question before the House is not whether there ought to be a reduction and whether we should reduce, but by what method in present circumstances the reduction ought to be effected.
No doubt, there are various methods by which it could be done. The first of them is the method which I gather is suggested in the Amendment—a cut in the period of service. I will deal with that in greater detail, if I may, a little later, but I want to observe now that the objection which has been urged against it is its effect upon Service efficiency—and those arguments have been deployed by the Minister of Defence. As I understood it, my right hon. and learned Friend was not suggesting to the House that the last six months of a National Service man's service was the only period during which he was of use. He was saying that it was the period in which his efficiency was most valuable to the Services. That is something which no doubt is agreed on all sides.
The second method has not been recommended from any quarter in the House today, and that is a system of a selective service either by extensive exemptions or by ballot. I will not
1148
trouble with that because it has not been recommended. The third alternative, which has been adopted by the Government and is in the White Paper, is a cut in the forces to be achieved largely by a reduction in the National Service element. How is it to be done? By the method of spacing out registrations and intakes and thereby, it is true, allowing the age of call-up gradually and not very substantially to rise.
As was pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) and others, a process of that kind is not one which can be adopted for all time. It cannot be continued indefinitely. It is a method which is suggested on this occasion to meet the immediate circumstances. It is the way the Government recommend we should go at present. It does not in the least preclude consideration of a cut in the period of service if and when circumstances justify that.
The method which we have adopted is not something new. It is nothing for which I can claim the charm of novelty or the brilliance of invention, for it has been done before. It was done in 1948, in circumstances which were no doubt different.
Mr. Shinwell: For only one registration.
Sir W. Monckton: It was done once, but the point is that this is not a principle which we have invented. It was not only thought of, but was acted upon in 1948. The object then was a reduction in the National Service component in the forces and the step which was taken had the same result—that it raised the age at which the interruption of National Service occurred.
Mr. George Isaacs: The reason then was that the Army could not take the men who had been provided for them. They did not want them.
Sir W. Monckton: I am not disputing the reason. I tried to be fair to the House and I was careful to say that the circumstances were different. I simply said that the object was the same and the result was the same. The object was to reduce the National Service intake and the result was to make a slight increase in the age.
I want now to deal with what I gather were the principal criticisms of the

1149
method which the Government have suggested. The first was that the method increases the disadvantages of the gap in a young man's life by increasing the gap itself. I think I am stating that as hon. Members would wish it to be stated and I want to come to an examination of it after this preliminary observation: without the policy in the White Paper there is now, inevitably, a gap between 15, the school-leaving age, and 18, when the boy can be called up. One cannot avoid the existence of that gap. We cannot call up boys of 15. In general, we cannot call them up before they are 18.
If the House got down to the problem which lies behind this I think they would see that it is a much more positive problem; it is not how to close the gap, because we cannot close it, but how to fill the gap. The problem is: what ought to be done to put to the best advantage a gap which is inevitable between school-leaving and National Service?
Mr. Stokes: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that it is not desirable to keep that gap as small as possible, and that what he would endeavour to do is to make it as large as possible, because that is where we differ from him?
Sir W. Monckton: I fully appreciate what the right hon. Member says. I am sure he would not think that I intend to leave this question at this point.
Mr. Stokes: I do not know.
Sir W. Monckton: The right hon. Member may not know, but he does know me. I do not make a habit of avoiding difficulties.
The first thing is that the gap is there and cannot be avoided. The difficulty I am coming to—I promise not to leave it out—is whether a slight and gradual increase of the gap is a disadvantage, or may be an advantage, or does not make much difference either way. I will come to that, but, first, I wish to say, because I think the House should have it in mind, how important it is that, whatever we do about the length of the gap—whether it gets a few months longer or stays at three years—we should do our best, in every Department, to see that it is properly filled.
Many hon. Members have said critical things about the Services. No doubt it is the duty of the Services—here the con-
1150
duit pipe may be allowed to speak—to use the men, when they are in, in the most sensible and efficient manner and with maximum opportunities—to this I attach importance—to use them, wherever possible, in their own trades and in all cases in the best interests of their future civilian careers, so far as is compatible with their service.
I know that from time to time there must be criticism of the way in which that is done, or the way it is attempted to be done. We do well to keep the Services alive to that, but we must have some sense and measure of degree in all this. It is clear that some chores are inevitable and, if a unit has to go out on service, it has to go out as a self-sufficient unit and must have the people capable of doing the necessary chores. So there must be a measure, in our criticism, of the use of men for purposes of that kind.
So, also, there must be some limit to the demands we put on the Services to use civilian labour for the purposes for which from time to time members of the forces are used. That is because the element of expense enters into all this and there are limits to what one can expend on the civilianisation of labour. I am sure that many of us would wish to say of the Regular Forces—whatever criticism there may be from time to time of officers, senior officers and others—that we have an admiration on the whole for the way in which the Regular Army has managed to absorb and to train the National Service elements that have been added to it.
So much for the duty of the Services; there is also an opportunity for the Ministry of Labour. The Youth Employment Service does a great deal by advice to the boys before they leave school. We try also to help with problems which arise in preparing young men for service and also to help them to get resettled on their return from service. There is something more which can be done. It can be done by industry and by the trade union movement. It is to keep in touch with the men while they are away on service.
I have seen the effects of that in a number of firms. When they have done that the men come back in much greater proportions than they do otherwise and I know from reading the recent Report of King George's Jubilee Trust how much they emphasise the importance of getting

1151
men resettled after their service by keeping touch with them while they are on service. I should like to see a wide extension of that,
The tasks I have been talking about are tasks which have to be carried out whichever of the two methods, which I have been discussing, of effecting a reduction is adopted. I have said, and agree with the right hon. Member for Ipswich, that the present proposal would gradually and slightly increase the age of call-up, but there is nothing magic about the age of 18. Eighteen is an early age for call-up. In 1947, it had to be 18 because the 19-year-olds were already in the forces or in essential civilian employment. In 1939, when the Military Training Act was passed, and when there was complete freedom of choice, the age chosen for call-up was 20. So we may say that there is nothing inherently absurd in lifting the age a little from 18.
I will come back to the advantages and disadvantages of our method, but I want to deal now with the criticism that the policy we have adopted increases the uncertainties which a young man has to face in his call-up, by lengthening the interval between registration and actual enlistment.
I do not minimise the uncertainties which a man has to face in that respect, but this proposal does not increase the uncertainty. The important thing for a man is to forecast when he will actually go into the Forces. Under this plan, he will know.
Mr. Stokes: What about his job?
Sir W. Monckton: I am considering the position of a man who is in a job already. He wants to know when he will reach the Forces. Under this plan, he will know that the likely date is between six and eight weeks after his medical examination. The fact that his medical examination may be about a month later than under the arrangements hitherto does not introduce a new uncertainty; he knows about it. He can find out his registration date also from the programme of registrations, which, up to the end of next year, are given in the White Paper. Therefore, he knows when he is likely to register, when his medical examination is likely to be and then, after that, his six to eight weeks will elapse and he will be enlisted.
Mr. Bevan: The main trouble is that it increases the period of disturbance. The man has the certainty of the call-up all right. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has a large number of advisory committees advising him in industry, both on the trade union side and on the employers' side. Has he consulted them and, if so, what is their advice?
Sir W. Monckton: On all these stages concerning National Service, not over this policy in particular, we are in constant touch with the advisory bodies. I am not suggesting that anyone but we are responsible for this policy; it is the Government's policy.
I want now to deal with the question of uncertainty about the date of call-up, and to ask the House to understand that it cannot be wholly eliminated. After all, the number of National Service men required by the Services at any time is a balancing figure. One cannot forecast it with absolute precision. We have to know, first, the number recruited to the Regular service and then the wastage in the Regular service. Then, that gap has to be filled as it becomes necessary.
Another element which introduces uncertainty and cannot be avoided is that a man has a right, and often uses it, to express a preference for a particular Service or unit. Where possible, we and the Services take that into account. This may mean waiting for a vacancy in a man's trade or for the next intake into a particular regiment, which, in the case of most infantry units, involves a six weeks' interval.
Of course, we could eliminate that uncertainty without any great difficulty. It would be easy to say that we would post the first hundred men available to the next hundred vacancies, but to ignore individual preferences and aptitudes would not be in the best interests either of the men or of the forces, nor would it accord with the degree of consideration that ought to be given to the men who come into National Service.
Those who have read the White Paper will have seen that we have suggested methods of limiting that uncertainty. I shall not take the House through them, but they are there and their reality will have been obvious to the right hon. Gentleman. At the present stage, even

1153
without those additional safeguards, certain steps are taken. Registrations are announced in advance and at registration men are warned that after their medical examination from four to six weeks will elapse before they get an enlistment notice, and then not less than fourteen days will elapse before their enlistment.
The provisions which exist for early call-up from l7½ to 18 years, Where good cause can be shown, is a method by which we try to reduce the burdens which uncertainty may bring if a man has a good case. If he says that he cannot get employment because of his impending National Service, or for some other good reason, we call him up earlier if he wishes it. Similar facilities are given to men over 18 who are waiting for call-up.
I do not think that I need trouble the House by referring to the passage in the White Paper which explains the further steps that we are to take, but I think the House should appreciate that they are genuinely made in an effort to relieve those who become liable for National Service of the burden of some of the uncertainty which we would avoid altogether if we could do so without damage to the Services.
Now I want to turn to the question of whether there are advantages or disadvantages in the method proposed in the White Paper. First of all, by this means we get for industry an immediate accession of manpower. It will amount, by March, 1958, to 100,000 men. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ipswich drew attention to paragraph 9 of the White Paper, which states:
"The decision to achieve these reductions—largely as a result of reducing the number of National Service men in the Forces—will provide substantial relief to industry."
It goes on to say that there will be an accession of manpower to industry of the order described. The right hon. Gentleman described this as poppycock, and said that it could only have been drafted by a nincompoop.
I would only like to say that in the bulletin published by the British Employers' Confederation, of 19th October, which does, after all, include a number of industrialists, this passage occurs.
"When there is an acute labour shortage as now, the addition of 100,000 men to the labour
1154
force even though not fully effective for three years will be very valuable to industry, as will the reduction in part-time training."
Now I go on—the passage I want is coming now:
"There will also be advantages to industry in the later age of call-up. The apprentice who has served three years of his apprenticeship is more likely to apply for deferment to complete his training than one who has served only two years and, therefore, there should in time be some accretion to the number of skilled men that would not otherwise have occurred."
The change which is contemplated in the age of call-up is, after all, gradual. It will only be a few months in the near future, and it is unlikely, in the average case, to make a fundamental difference to the man. I submit to the House, that it has some advantage in the majority of cases, although not in every individual case. Not only does it give a man a chance to get settled in a job or occupation to which he can come back—it does that—but where there is a man who, because of imminence of National Service, did not take apprenticeship, he may now do so. There are men engaged in part-time courses, for example for the ordinary National certificate in Commerce or for the Royal Society of Arts Certificates in bookkeeping, shorthand and similar subjects who do not qualify for deferment, but I think that they will get advantage from the fact that they now have a bit longer before call-up. I do not leave out of account that it is not a bad thing that a man should be a little older and little more mature, physically and mentally when he is called up.
It is quite clear that we cannot get these men into industry by any other method equally quickly. If the period of service were cut, it would not be practicable to release immediately those now who have done eighteen months; we could only cut the period for those who come after, and I do not think that anything else was suggested by the right hon. Gentleman. That would cause disproportionate dislocation of Service units and loss of efficiency which no one would tolerate. So, what we have to do is to do what was planned at an earlier stage—much earlier and not in this Government's time —taper off the period of service of the people already doing their National Service.
That would result in getting the number of people that we are doing, but it

1155
would not get the people as quickly as under our method so industry will have the advantage of these men in the way it wants. I think that we are entitled to claim, also, that the White Paper, in what it does in the way of limitation of part-time service, is of first-rate importance. I can put it in a sentence, that whereas industry was losing 500,000 man-weeks in 1954 through part-time service, in the year to come that loss will be reduced to 180,000 man-weeks, which is a substantial difference to the advantage of industry.
As to the Services themselves, I think enough has been said to demonstrate that the last six months of a man's service are the most valuable that he can offer. [Interruption.] The last six months of a trained man's service are the most valuable he can offer. The suggestion which the right hon. Gentleman puts to me jocularly is that we should chop off the first six months. If we could, we would.
I always pay attention to what is said by the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas), who pointed out the dangers which he thought inherent in National Service as a whole. I do think that any view of National Service which regards it as merely an interruption in the working life, the education, or the professional training of the young men of the country, is incomplete. There is another side to it which we should neither exaggerate nor leave out of account. Anyone who has read, as obviously, judging
from their speeches, some hon. Members have read, the King George's Jubilee Trust's Report on this matter will have seen that it concludes among other things that physical advantages have come to a great number of men through their service, and advantages in self-confidence and initiative. Nobody suggests that it is enough to leave it at that. The important thing is to see to it that in those respects every improvement that can be made is made.
I hope I have acknowledged that National Service must cause some disturbance to civilian careers, but I also hope hon. Members will read, if they have not read, the report which was prepared in my Ministry and which shows that there is no grave problem of resettlement or employment for the men coming back. I shall not trouble the House with it now.
I will only say that the suggestion I am making to the House, the decision I am asking it to take, is not one for all time. All I am hoping to satisfy it of is this for the present, that in an atmosphere in which uncertainties in forecast and calculation are inescapable this flexible method combines best the advantage of a rapid increase in manpower available to industry with the most efficient use of the men left in the Services.
Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—
The House divided: Ayes, 326; Noes, 263.

Division No. 35.]

AYES

[10.0 p.m.

Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

Aitken, W. T.

Bishop, F. P.

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Black, C. W.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Alport, C. J. M.

Body, R. F.

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Boothby, Sir Robert

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Bossorn, Sir A. C.

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hn. H. F. C.

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Arbuthnot, John

Boyle, Sir Edward

Crouch, R. F.

Armstrong, C. W.

Braine, B. R.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Ashton, H.

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Cunningham, Knox

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. w. H.

Currie, G. B. H.

Atkins, H. E.

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Dance, J. C. G.

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Davidson, Viscountess

Baldwin, A. E.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Balniel, Lord

Bryan, P.

Deedes, W. F.

Banks, Col. C.

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Barber, Anthony

Burden, F. F. A.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Barlow, Sir John

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. MsA.

Barter, John

Butler, Rt. Hn. R.A.(Saffron Walden)

Doughty, C. J. A.

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Campbell, Sir David

Drayson, G. B.

Beamish, Maj. Tufton

Carr, Robert

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Cary, Sir Robert

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Channon, H.

Duthie, W. S.

Bennett, Dr. Reginald

Chichester-Clark, R.

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir A.(Warwick & L'm'tn)

Bidgood, J. C.

Cole, Norman

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Kerr, H. W.

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Errington, Sir Eris

Kershaw, J. A.

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Erroll, F. J.

Kirk, P. M.

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Lagden, G. w.

Profumo, J. D.

Fell, A.

Lambert, Hon. G.

Raikes, Sir Victor

Finlay, Graeme

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Ramsden, J. E.

Fisher, Nigel

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Rawlinson, P. A. G.

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Leather, E. H. C.

Redmayne, M.

Fletcher-Cooke, C,

Leavey, J, A.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Fort, R.

Leburn, W. G.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Foster, John

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Renton, D. L. M.

Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe & Lonsdale)

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Ridsdale, J. E.

Freeth, D. K.

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Rippon, A. G. F.

Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Gammans, L. D.

Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

Robertson, Sir David

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

George, J. C. (Pollok)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (Sutton Coldfield)

Robson-Brown, W.

Glover, D.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Godber, J. B.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Roper, Sir Harold

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Gough, C. F. H.

Longden, Gilbert

Russell, R. S.

Gower, H. R.

Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Graham, Sir Fergus

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Sharples, Maj. R. C.

Green, A.

McAdden, S. J.

Shepherd, William

Gresham Cooke, R.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

McKibbin, A. J.

Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R, G.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Soames, Capt. C.

Gurden, Harold

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Spearman, A. C. M.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Speir, R. M.

Hare, Hon. J. H.

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Harris, Reader (Heston)

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Stevens, Geoffrey

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Macpherson, Nial (Dumfries)

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

Maddan, Martin

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Storey, S.

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Hay, John

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Marples, A. E.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Heath, Edward

Marshall, Douglas

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Mathew, R.

Teeling, W.

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Maude, Angus

Thomas, Rt. Hn. J. P. L. (Hereford)

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Mawby, R. L.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

Hirst, Geoffrey

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Hope, Lord John

Molson, A. H. E.

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry

Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Moore, Sir Thomas

Touche, Sir Gordon

Horobin, Sir Ian

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Turner, H. F. L.

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Nabarre, G. D. N.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Nairn, D. L. S.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Neave, Airey

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Howard, John (Test)

Nicholls, Harmar

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Vosper, D. F.

Hudson, w. R. A. (Hull, N.)

Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Nield, Basil (Chester)

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Nugent, G. R. H.

Wall, Major Patrick

Hurd, A. R.

Nutting, Rt. Hon. Anthony

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Oakshott, H. D.

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Hutchison, James (Scotstoun)

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Hyde, Montgomery

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Watkinson, H. A.

Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Webbe, Sir H.

Iremonger, T. L.

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

Whitelaw, W.S.I. (Penrith & Border)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Osborne, C.

Williams, Gerald (Tonbrdge)

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Page, R. G.

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

Partridge, E.

Wills, C. (Bridgwater)

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Peyton, J. W. W.

Wood, Hon. R.

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Woollam, John Victor

Jones, A. (Hall Green)

Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Pitman, I. J.

Kaberry, D.

Pitt, Miss E. M.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Keegan, D.

Pott, H. P.

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn and

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Powell, J. Enoch

Mr. Studholme.

1158

1159

NOES

Ainsley, J, W.

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Albu, A. H.

Greenwood, Anthony

Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

Allaun, F. (Salford, E.)

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Mort, D. L.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Grey, C. F.

Moss, R.

Allen, Soholefield (Crewe)

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Moyle, A.

Anderson, Frank

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Mulley, F. W.

Awbery, S. S.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Bacon, Miss Alice

Grimond, J.

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Baird, J.

Hale, Leslie

O'Brien, T.

Balfour, A.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Oliver, G. H.

Hartley, P.

Hamilton, W. W.

Oram, A. E.

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Hannan, W.

Orbach, M.

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Oswald, T.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

Hastings, S.

Owen, W. J.

Benson, G.

Hayman, F. H.

Padley, W. E.

Beswick, F.

Healey, Denis

Paget, R. T.

Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

Blackburn, F.

Herbison, Miss M.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Blenkinsop, A.

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Blyton, W. R.

Hobson, C. R.

Pargiter, G. A.

Boardman, H.

Holman, P.

Parker, J.

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Holmes, Horace

Parkin, B. T.

Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

Holt, A. F.

Paton, J.

Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

Houghton, Douglas

Peart, T. F.

Bowles, F. G.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Boyd, T. C.

Hoy, J. H.

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Hubbard, T. F.

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Brockway, A. F.

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Probert, A. R.

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Proctor, W. T.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Pryde, D. J.

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Hunter, A. E.

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Burke, W. A.

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Rankin, John

Burton, Miss F. E.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Reeves, J.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Reid, William

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Rhodes, H.

Callaghan, L. J.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Carmichael, J.

Janner, B.

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Champion, A. J.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena(Holbn & St. Pncs, S.)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Panoras, N.)

Chapman, W. D.

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Chetwynd, G. R.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Ross, William

Clunie, J.

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Royle, C.

Coldrick, W.

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Collins, V. J.(Shoreditch & Finsbury)

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Short, E. W.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Cove, W. G.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Kenyon, C.

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Cronin, J. D.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Skeffington, A. M.

Crossman, R. H. S.

King, Dr. H. M.

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Lawson, G. M.

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Daines, P.

Ledger, R. J.

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Sorensen, R. W.

Davies, Rt. Hon. Clement (Montgomery)

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Sparks, J. A.

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Steele, T.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Lewis, Arthur

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Deer, G.

Lindgren, G. S.

Stones, W. (Consett)

do Freitas, Geoffrey

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Dodds, N. N.

Logan, D. G.

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Donnelly, D. L.

MacColl, J. E.

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

McGhee, H. G.

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Dye, S.

McGovern, J.

Swingler, S. T.

Ede Rt. Won J. C.

McInnes, J.

Sylvester, G. O.

Edelman, M.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

McLeavy, Frank

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Nest (Caerphilly)

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Thomas, George (Cardiff)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Mahon, S.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Mainwaring, W. H.

Thornton, E.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Timmons, J.

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd. E.)

Tomney, F.

Fernyhough, E.

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Turner-Samuels, M.

Flenburgh, W.

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Fletcher, Eric

Mason, Roy

Usborne, H. C.

Forman, J. C.

Mayhew, C. P.

Viant, S. P.

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Mellish, R. J.

Wade, D. W.

Freeman, Peter

Messer, Sir F.

Warbey, W. N.

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mitchison, G. R.

Watkins, T. E.

Gibson C. W.

Monslow, W.

Weltzman, D.

Goosh, E. G.

Moody, A. S.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

1160

1161

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Willey, Frederick

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

West, D. G.

Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

Vates, V. (Ladywood)

Wheeldon, W. E.

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don valley)

Vounger, Rt. Hon. K.

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Williams, W. R. (Openehaw)

Zilliacus, K.

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Wigg, George

Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Wilcook, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Mr. Popplewell and Mr. Pearson.

Wilkins, W. A.

Winterbottom, Richard

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House approves the policy on National Service set out in Command Paper No. 9608.

WOOD WOOL (DUTY)
10.10 p.m.
The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. A. R. W. Low): I beg to move,
That the Additional Import Duties (No. 1) Order, 1955 (S.I., 1955, No. 1433), dated 16th September, 1955, a copy of which was laid before this House on 20th September, be approved.
The Order to which the Motion relates, and about which I have been asked to give some information, is one which seeks to increase from £1 5s. per ton to £2 15s. per ton the import duty on wood wool. The Order was made on 16th September, and came into operation six days after that.
Wood wool is a general purpose cushioning material made from soft wood logs, used mainly—that is, as to about 80 per cent. of total United Kingdom consumption for packing, and it is also used for the production of building slabs.
The previous duty of £1 5s. a ton had remained unchanged since 1933. Since then the average import price per ton of wood wool has increased considerably—I think, by about six times—and the Association of British Wood Wool Manufacturers asked in 1952 that the duty should be increased.
Immediately after the war the import of wood wool, in common with the bulk of our imports, was strictly limited for balance of payments reasons. Quotas were, however, gradually increased, and in 1951 imports reached over 16,000 tons costing nearly £400,000. Since 1952, when quotas had to be reduced, imports have been running at a level of approximately 13,500 tons a year. It is reckoned that the home industry has been meeting between 60 and 70 per cent. of the home demand.
At the time of the application for an increase in the tariff in 1952 it could be foreseen that in due course import restrictions, at least from Western Europe,
1162
which is the main source of supply, would be removed as balance of payments considerations permitted. The time did not come to consider the removal of these import controls on wood wool until a year or so ago, by which time the tariff inquiry was well advanced.
It seemed right in those circumstances not to push forward with the removal of this control until the tariff decison had been made. But now that it has been made, it is right to end the restrictions on imports of wood wool from Western Europe and most other countries excepting the dollar area and the Soviet bloc. This has been done from today.
After the application had been made for the increase in the tariff, full opportunity was given in the normal way to all interested parties to make known their views to the Board of Trade. A number of representations were received from representatives of importers, of the manufacturers of wood wool building slabs, of general packers, and of the industries which use wood wool for packing. Meetings were held with the applicants, with the importers' associations and with the representatives of the users.
There is, of course, as the House will appreciate, an export point in this matter. It affects packing materials. Special consideration was given to the objections raised by users for export packing since even the smallest increases in export costs may be of the very greatest importance. But it is clear that any increase in costs which might result from this increase in the tariff will be very small indeed compared with the total value of the goods being exported—considerably less than 1 per cent. even in the case of the most fragile goods that require a lot of packing material, and in many cases less than 0·01 per cent. In the end it was decided that the duty should be increased, as proposed in the Order, by £1 10s. per ton to £2 15s.
We have been able to take advantage of the waiver negotiated two years ago by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade under G.A.T.T. This enables us to increase a most-favoured-nation rate of duty without im-

1163
posing a corresponding duty on Commonwealth goods in cases where the resultant increase in preference is not likely to lead to a substantial diversion of trade from foreign to Commonwealth suppliers.
Very close consideration was given to all the conflicting arguments in this matter. There was obvious strength in the case of the manufacturers that the 1933 level of specific duty gave them much reduced protection now in view of the considerably increased prices. On the other hand, it is quite clearly in the United Kingdom interest that other countries should not be encouraged to raise their tariffs against our exports by increases in our tariff, except for very strong reasons. I understand that the manufacturers in this case are well satisfied with the way in which the inquiry was conducted.
I hope that with that short explanation the House will give its approval to the Order.
Mr. H. Rhodes: Is the Minister prepared to accept the principle which he has just expounded as covering all imported goods? It was that the ad valorem duty on a commodity being the same now is less protection than it was before the war. If that is the case, I can bring to his notice a lot of commodities to which that applies. If he will say that that is the principle on which he has come to this conclusion, we shall have something to say about other articles in the future.
Mr. Low: The hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Rhodes), who knows the Board of Trade very well, has misunderstood what I have said. I am not talking about an ad valorem duty at all. It is a specific rate of duty. I have laid down no principle. If the hon. Member will study my words carefully, he will see that I told the House of the considerations which applied to this case. Of course the application in this particular case was examined on its merits now and not on its merits comparing now with 1933. All I have told to the House has been the considerations which we had in mind.
10.18 p.m.
Mr. A. G. Bottomley: We are obliged to the Minister for his explanation, but there are one or two other points upon which I should
1164
like answers. First, I imagine that it was a slip when he said the tariff would be raised from £1 10s. to £2 15s. It is in fact from £1 5s. to £2 15s.
Mr. Low: I said from £1 5s., by £1 10s. to £2 15s. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman misheard.
Mr. Bottomley: Before the war there was the Import Duties Advisory Committee which was a body for suggesting adjustments in the tariff. For war-time purposes that procedure was not followed and subsequently the Board of Trade took upon itself, with Parliamentary approval, the opportunity of adjusting the tariff. I think that the horticultural tariff increase was the first that was carried through under the new procedure, and I believe that the one before the House tonight is the first of an industrial character which has been presented.
Would it be possible for the Minister to tell us what machinery is used and how one proceeds to bring about this increase in tariff? He has explained that the various interests were interviewed, but to some extent this is a quasi-judicial procedure and the House ought to be told more clearly about how it is possible, by the Board of Trade machinery, to adjust a tariff. Would he further tell us, if the tariff is adjusted and price controls are abolished, whether there is any way of being sure that there are no controls by rings? It would be wrong to give an increased tariff to an undertaking that was to have a monopoly. If other firms are interested, it would be more reasonable, because there could be fair competition.
Perhaps the Minister will tell us how this adjusted tariff squares up with G.A.T.T. He indicated that we did not want to impose too high an increase for fear of reprisals from other quarters. What are our powers under G.A.T.T.? Are we clearly within the rules and regulations, and not likely to incur greater pressure upon us in due course by tariffs in other countries being adjusted against us?
My last point is whether the Government are using this increase only in the way in which the past Government did. We heard references earlier to a past Prime Minister, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, and I was then reminded of the words which he used upon an occasion when an economic crisis was confronting the country.

1165
He said that the best and shortest way of dealing with the adverse balance of trade, the restriction of imports and the stimulation of exports, was to put on a tariff. I think the Minister now agrees that this would be wrong procedure in trying to correct our present balance of payments difficulties. I accept what he says, that it is right to restrict imports made for balance of payments reasons, and that when a tariff is increased it is right that those restrictions should be removed.
If this change goes beyond that, the Minister ought to tell us that a new policy is being introduced and that he is not merely, as the Order says, following the practice adopted by Governments since the end of the war.
10.22 p.m.
Mr. Archer Baldwin: First, I must declare an interest in this matter, which is that my father and my uncle were the pioneers who started this industry fifty years ago. The industry has grown up and is now of considerable importance to this country.
I would thank my right hon. Friend and the Department for giving us this slight increase in tariff duty. At one time, since the war, wood wool was being imported into this country at a lower price per ton than English firms had to pay to buy the wood from Finland. It was essential that some protection should be given. During the war the firms making wood wool were working night and day to provide wrappings for the munitions industry. It is, therefore, essential that the industry should be kept in being so that, in the event of any other hostilities, it will be available to continue the good work it did during the war.
I can assure the right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley) that this is only a slight increase in duty and does not imply any sort of protection to enable rings to operate. It is a very small increase and, as the Minister said, amounts only to between 34 per cent. and 0001 per cent. The increase is, therefore, very small.
There is another very useful purpose which the manufacturers of wood wool perform. They use up all the odd pieces of pit props from the National Coal Board. When the Board tried to buy props of a particular length, the sorting
1166
of the props in the country of production meant a considerable increase of price when the props were finally landed here. The wood wool industry therefore takes from the Coal Board all the odd lengths which are cut off the pit props and which cannot be used by the Coal Board, except as firewood.
I thank my right hon. Friend for having given consideration to the representations which were made to him to help this vital industry.
10.24 p.m.
Mr. H. Rhodes: May I return to the point I made earlier? The Minister, at the end of his speech, said that one of the reasons the Government were making this increase was the advance in prices since the tariff was originally put on. It was not as powerful a deterrent as it was then. Is that one of the principles on which the Minister has granted this increase in tariff?
10.25 p.m.
Mr. Low: If I am in order in speaking again, perhaps I can deal first with the matter raised by the hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Rhodes). I did not recite any principle to the House. From my notes I will repeat what I said, which was that there was obviously strength in the case of the manufacturers that the 1933 level of specific duty gave them much reduced protection now in view of the increased prices. That was certainly something to be taken into consideration, but it was by no means the final argument. If the hon. Member will look at the figures he will see how the final decision works out, bearing in mind that consideration.
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Baldwin) for the thanks he has given to me and to the Board of Trade for the care which was taken over this inquiry. I can assure him that we are well aware of the good work done by this industry, and I am delighted to know of his personal connection with it. I did not expect, in my present capacity, to take part in a debate in which my hon. Friend, with his great knowledge of agriculture, would intervene. I am very glad that he has been able to do so.
I now come to the remarks of the right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley). I think

1167
that he was trying to get out of me a general statement on Board of Trade tariff policy. I can only say that I do not think that this is a suitable occasion for such statements. He also mentioned monopolies and price controls, but those are quite irrelevant to our present discussion. In my opening remarks I said that the home industry was responsible for only 60 to 70 per cent. of British consumption. There is, therefore, quite clearly competition from abroad.
Mr. Bottomley: Is not there only one firm?
Mr. Low: No, there are 11 firms in the association, and I think that those 11 firms have 12 factories. There are some other producers of wood wool outside that association. They make wood wool for their own use, and also make building slabs of that material.
Mr. Gerald Nabarro: Is it not a fact that in this industry, small though it is, there are hundreds of firms engaged in the machining of timber who use their waste for the production of wood wool? That being so, there can be no question of any monopoly there. Those firms are putting to a useful purpose material which would otherwise be wasted.
Mr. Low: I do not know about the hundreds of firms, but I am aware that there are 11 firms specialising in making this wood wool, and they have been concerned in this matter. But I am interested in my hon. Friend's remark about their relevancy of talk of monopolies and price control. There is no question of price control or anything in connection with it. I merely close by saying that this is an Order relating to the increase of the tariff on wood wool, and I think that it would be out of order were I to reply to the right hon. Gentleman opposite about general tariff policy.
Mr. Bottomley: The Minister has not answered this question. How is it decided in the Board of Trade? Does someone of assistant secretary rank say that there
1168
must be an adjustment in the tariff—or how is it done? I think that the House should have that. Is it a Ministerial duty? That leads to the major question that I raised. We are entitled to know the tariff policy of the Board of Trade when such Orders as this are put forward by it. Such Orders may make major policy. That is wrong procedure. We shall have to look at these Orders much more carefully, because if they go against the policy followed since the war we cannot co-operate.
Mr. Low: I really do not think that this increase in the wood wool tariff raises all these great issues introduced by the right hon. Gentleman. If he will carefully examine the details I have given him he will see the justification for our action in this instance, and that is what I think it is my duty to put to the House tonight.
What we are here considering is the responsibility and machinery for the increase of this tariff, because my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade is responsible for the decision and makes the decision. Of course, he has the advice of officials from his own Department and from other Departments concerned, and, as I indicated in my opening remarks, full opportunity is given to all concerned, both applicants and those who might wish to oppose the application, to put their representations to the Board of Trade; these are fully considered, sometimes at meetings with the interests concerned, and I think there is no doubt in the minds of anybody involved in this tariff application that the investigation was properly carried out. Perhaps the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster is some evidence of that. The right hon. Gentleman can take it from me that the manufacturers who made the application were satisfied with the way in which the inquiry was carried out.
Resolved,
That the Additional Import Duties (No. 1) Order, 1955 (S.I., 1955, No. 1433), dated 16th September, 1955, a copy of which was laid before this House on 20th September, be approved.

PRISON OFFICERS (SHORTAGE)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Godber.]
10.32 p.m.
Mr. James Callaghan: Some weeks ago the very energetic and able officials of the Prison Officers Association were in touch with me and drew my attention to the shortage of prison officers. I therefore venture to detain the House this evening in order to put some considerations to the Joint Under-Secretary and to ask for his views on one or two matters. I am very grateful to him for coming here, and I hope the result of it will be of benefit to the prison service.
The first effect of the approach of the prison officers was the sending to me of the Report of the Prison Commissioners for the year 1954, which was published during the Recess, so it is appropriate that some attention should be paid to it now that the House has reassembled. I have also been very impressed—having now studied it in detail, I regret to say for the first time—with the excellent work done by the Select Committee on Estimates on this matter, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood (Mr. V. Yates) in the 1951–52 Session.
The prisons are today faced with a serious shortage of prison officers—a shortage which seems, on balance, to be getting worse. If it is not getting worse it can certainly be said that the reforms which the Joint Under-Secretary and the Prison Commissioners themselves hoped to introduce cannot be introduced because of the shortage of staff. This, of course, has a primary effect upon the prisoners themselves.
I should like to say at this stage how impressed I am by the Prison Commissioners' Report. I assumed it would be an added waste of statistics that I should find extremely dull indeed, but I have been very impressed by its content and by the lively imagination that has clearly gone into its compilation. Much of the work that has been done by the Prison Commissioners is reproduced in this Report, which I assume is quite accurate, and much of the work that is being done
1170
is of a standard that the general public cannot and obviously does not know about, and I hope the Joint Under-Secretary will do all he can to publicise much of the work of reform that is being carried out by the Prison Commissioners today under extremely difficult conditions. I am very glad that I have been brought into contact with it.
But that raises the first point that I wish to ask the Joint Under-Secretary about. If his aim and ambition, as was that of previous Governments, is to reform rather than to punish, and as it is clearly the policy of the Prison Commissioners to reform and not to punish, I ask the hon. Gentleman what energetic steps he is taking to give the Prison Commissioners sufficient staff to enable them to carry out their job. I do not think he will feel like claiming, even if I do not examine the statistics in detail, that the Prison Commissioners have anything like the staff necessary to do the job to which Parliament has set its hand.
I have here a welter of statistics, and I do not want to go into them in great detail, but the basic figures seem to me to be these. If we are to achieve in the prison service the reforms that are necessary to enable the work of reformation to go on, as distinct from the work of punishment, a thousand more officers are needed. As far as I can see, whatever other statistics may be produced, there was a net increase in the established staff to December last, in a period of twelve months, of twenty-one, and I am told that from January to September this year—nine months—there has been a net increase in the established staff of thirty-one. Towards the thousand that are needed, therefore, we have in terms of established staff about fifty-two in a period of nearly two years. The effect of that is shown in the work that is not being done.
I understand that the basis of the reformation—namely, that the prisoners should be put to work—is what in the prison service is called a three-shift system; the warders work on a three-shift rota. This was put into operation in Dartmoor and Parkhurst. But in paragraph 6 of their Report, the Prison Commissioners say:
"… unfortunately a sharp fall in recruiting made it impossible to extend the programme further."

1171
That is a matter for great regret. Indeed, I am told that the situation is worse than that. I understand that at Dartmoor today the prisoners are kept at work, and the work of reformation is going on, only because the warders themselves—a group of them, at any rate—are working or on duty from 6.30 in the morning until 9.30 at night. These are no conditions in which to employ warders, and I hope the Under-Secretary will look into that matter and, if my information is correct, will see what can be done. It would be a tragedy if the work of reformation at Dartmoor broke down because of this.
The other point that emerges from the same paragraph of the Report follows logically from the figures which I have given. The Prison Commissioners say:
"… we do not at present expect that any extension of the three-shift system will be possible in 1955."
I do not suppose that they do, on the basis of the small number of additional staff that they are getting. The Under-Secretary, therefore, has a duty to tell us now what is his approach to this problem. What help will he give to the Prison Commissioners to enable them to overcome the staffing difficulties and to get ahead with this very desirable work of reform?
There is no doubt that the giving to prisoners of a sense of social purpose, as is revealed by some of the most illuminating passages in the Report, is one of the best investments we can make, and yet we do not seem to be doing it, at any rate with sufficient energy, at the present time. It is not unfair to say that to the Under-Secretary, because it is about three years since the present Home Secretary's predecessor came down to the House and told us he was ready to take any measures that were necessary to put this situation right.
The plain truth, I am afraid, is that we are going back in some ways to the old days of the turnkeys. Prisoners are being locked in their cells for long periods. There are sometimes two of them in a cell, and sometimes, I believe, even three in a cell, although I understand that that is not very common at the moment. That, at least, has been overcome. The prisoners are locked away in their cells for long hours, with all the opportunities for mischief that Satan finds for idle
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hands. I understand that the ideal working day in which these men are engaged upon normal civilian occupations of a useful character is about 7 hours. The average now is anything between 3½ to 5 hours. Indeed, that average is slightly less than it was pre-war.
I say, as a layman coming fresh to this subject, that in those circumstances, with men doubled up in the cells, idle and isolated for long hours, with an inadequate number of warders to look after them, I am not surprised at the incidence of escapes and disturbances to which the Prison Commissioners draw attention in their Report. There have been the incidents in Wandsworth, Cardiff, Manchester, Holloway, and Norwich. I am not seeking sensation in this debate. I am not going to recount the whole of the details, which should be well-known to the Under-Secretary, but I think that I should say this. The Under-Secretary is not being fair to the prison warders who are trying to do this job at present in these conditions.
One warder has said to me,
"It is true to say that we are living on the good will of the prisoners. An officer told me that the position was like living on top of a volcano; one day it will erupt with tremendous repercussions."
That is a serious suggestion to be made, and it is clear that only more warders will solve the problem.
Sir Lionel Fox, when he was addressing the Annual General Meeting of the National Association of Prison Visitors, on 25th June, had something to say on this subject, replying to criticisms by the prison visitors about lack of training among the prisoners. He said:
"I do not deny that probably something more could be done in principle than has been done in the past, but it must be remembered that we have been hampered by under-staffing. It has been extremely difficult to do all the things we might have wished to do in some of the bigger prisons. We have only single shift staff instead of the three shift staff, so that you have only half a working day instead of a whole working one. I think a large part of this problem would he solved if we had full staff in our local prisons, and all prison officers worked the eight hours a day."
The answer to the shortage of warders is simple. It lies in the miserably inadequate rates paid by the Prison Commissioners. Their rates of pay for doing this unpleasant duty is £7 17s. at the

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minimum rising to £9 16s. a week, and after twenty years if they have put in long, faithful and efficient service and have kept their buttons clean, they rise to £10 4s. a week. The average earnings in industry today are £10 17s. 5d. a week. The average earnings in manufacturing industries are £11 4s. 7d. a week. How can we expect to get sufficient warders when we offer them £7 17s. a week, when, if they go into manufacturing industries, they can get about £3 5s. a week more? The Government have a responsibility here which I do not think has been properly carried out.
Paragraph 38 in the Prison Commissioners' Report says that the staff put in a claim for an increase of 17s. 6d. a week. They were offered, instead, 7s. 6d. a week, and, after all the negotiations were completed, they could not get more than 7s. 6d. a week. They went to the arbitration tribunal and the tribunal awarded an increase of 15s. a week—double what the Government were prepared to offer.
The Under-Secretary cannot claim that he has a realistic appreciation of what are proper rates of pay if a staff side putting in a claim can get double what the Government offer by going to arbitration. His first and major job is to get proper, adequate rates of pay and conditions of service, and decent hours for these men, and then we shall be well on the way to recruiting the warders whom we need and concluding the work of reform which I find so excellently described in this pamphlet.
10.45 p.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth): I am sure that the House will be grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) for raising this matter, and certainly I am, because it is one which will only be helped by being given publicity. I am grateful to him also for the way in which he has raised it.
In a way, it seems paradoxical to be talking of shortage of prison staff at a time when the service is more numerous than it has ever been before, and also at a time when the prison population is falling and, indeed, has fallen by about 3,000 from the peak figure of 24,000 which it reached in 1952. I quite agree with the hon. Member that the position is not satisfactory, and I agree with him
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further that it has recently shown some deterioration.
The House will, of course, be aware of the general background to this question. There has been an immense increase in the prison population. It doubled in 1952 by comparison with pre-war. There has been some increase in the number of prisons and Borstals. Notwithstanding that increase in accommodation there has been terrible overcrowding in prisons. Moreover, the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, required new methods of treatment and new types of establishment—quite rightly. That threw further pressure upon both accommodation and the staff.
Nevertheless, the Prison Service has built up a staff which is double that at the end of the war. The number of male officers of the basic grade on 1st January, 1947, was 1,750; on 1st October of this year the figure has reached 3,600. It has been possible to man the new establishments, to increase the staffs of all the establishments to some extent, and to restore the shift system, of which I shall say something more in a minute, in all except the local prisons, but we are still a long way short of what we should like to see. Reasonable progress was being made, but this progress has recently been brought to a halt, as the hon. Member indicated, by the shortfall in recruitment, and particularly this year.
I can tell the House the extent of the shortage. The authorised establishment of male officers in the basic grade is 3,922. There are in post at the present time 3,686; that is including temporary officers but excluding those in training. That is a deficiency of 236, or 6 per cent. That deficiency is spread fairly uniformly everywhere. In Cardiff, I can tell the hon. Member, there are only two night patrols short of establishment. Perhaps I should say that the establishment in the higher grades is about 650, and there is no deficiency in those higher grades except for casual vacancies which, of course, there must always be pending promotion. The position of 6 per cent. shortage is serious.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Gentleman said he would return to the three-shift system. I should like to get the picture clear. Is it true to say that if it is desired to introduce the three-shift system the shortage would not be a little over 200 but over 1,200?
Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: No, the figure that the hon. Gentleman gave was correct; that is to say, if there were to be a three-shift system in every prison the present deficiency would be about 1,000. The 1,000 includes the figure I have given. The deficiency I mentioned is the deficiency on the present establishment.
The present position is serious, but the future gives more cause for concern owing to the sharp fall in recruitment which has taken place. In 1953, 384 new officers were accepted as established after passing their training. In 1954, that number had fallen to 218. In the first nine months of this year the figure was only 166 out of 380 who joined for training. To make up for wastage and to maintain the reasonable rate of progress which we would like to see, we would like to have 360 this year. That is the order of deficiency at the present time.
This unfortunate trend is still continuing and it is true, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, that the total strength may soon begin to decline. There are thirty-two establishments on the single shift system. Those are all the local gaols. It has been a great disappointment to my right hon. and gallant Friend and to the Prison Commissioners that we have not been able to reduce that number this year. I agree with the hon. Gentleman on that score. Perhaps I should add here that the women's side is no better.
Of course, the reasons for the setback in recruiting are not easy to ascertain and I will try to deal with the points made by the hon. Gentleman. First, pay and conditions. It is correct that pay starts at the figure of £7 17s. 6d. a week on appointment. In addition, there are free quarters and free uniform. That rate of pay rises to £10 4s. 0d. If the officer is promoted he can earn as chief officer £13 13s. a week. That is the maximum chief officer's rate. On top of that there is specialist pay which may be £1 a week or something of that order.
The hours are an 84-hour fortnight, and if overtime is worked it is either paid for or time off is given in lieu. This is, of course, a Government service. In that respect these figures are better than the ordinary wage packet because they carry a pension. In the case of the prison
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officers an officer is eligible for pension at the age of 55, and in reckoning service for pension every year after his twentieth counts as two years, which is a special feature of this service. Besides that, the officer is entitled to three weeks paid leave a year and nine days public holidays. I should add that equal pay has been agreed in principle and that it will be brought into operation with effect from 1st January this year.
I do not believe—and here I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman—that it is the financial conditions which are proving unattractive in this service. The fact is that it is the conditions in industrial employment which are drawing men from this service, just as they are drawing men from all other services. That is not a special feature of the prison service. On the other hand, I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that we have got to do what we can to correct the matter. We cannot just accept that position.
Pay has been raised. In fact, it was raised in 1950, in 1952, in 1953, and again in October, 1954. Further pay claims were tabled by the Prison Officers' Association in September last, and they are now under consideration by the Whitley Council. As the hon. Member indicated, if agreement is not reached, the matter can go, and will no doubt go, to arbitration. I do not think he would suggest that it would be appropriate either to discuss these matters in the House or to interfere with that proper method of arriving at an appropriate rate of remuneration.
Just under 2,000 new houses and flats have been provided for the service since the war. There are 1,500 pre-war quarters still in use. I agree that some of them are not good, but we are going ahead and between 225 and 250 new houses and flats are being provided every year. At present, eight out of ten of all officers are provided with married quarters; the remaining two-tenths, of course, include bachelors and those who have houses of their own, and so on.
I agree with the hon. Member, too, that it is important that we should do what we can to publicise the merits of this service. In fact, the Prison Commissioners have put advertisements in the national and provincial daily newspapers, in the weeklies and in service periodicals.

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We have had publicity on the B.B.C., and we get all the assistance that is possible through the employment exchanges.
The fundamental difficulty is to give people outside the prison service a fair picture of what conditions are like inside the service. The nature of the job makes it sound forbidding. It is not so. On the contrary, I believe that the service provides a very satisfying career for those who enter it. I was very glad that the hon. Member really implied that in what he said about the Report of the Prison Commissioners. It is a fascinating job, and the moment a person goes into it he appreciates that here is something which is, in fact, a great social service.
Prison discipline is not based on repression or brute force. It certainly has not been since the time of the Gladstone Report, towards the end of the last century. A succession of Home Secretaries and Prison Commissioners, splendidly supported by the staff, have based prison discipline on the principles of leadership and trust, and those principles call for fine qualities in those who are to exercise them.
There is much specialised work for those who enter the prison service, and that specialised work is increasing with
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the new types of prison which have been developed since the war. The specialised work, as I have already said, carries additional financial advantages.
From what I myself have seen in prisons, I can say that those who are engaged there, in particular those who are instructing, display the same pride in their work and the same pride in teaching those who are learning as one will find in instructors anywhere else.
The work of a prison officer is exacting, but it is not dull and it is not depressing. On the whole, those who enter the service tend to stay in their job. It is true that we have had resignations; in fact, there were 60 last year from all causes. But that represents, on the whole, a small proportion, I believe, compared with those in other similar services.
I hope that the hon. Member's action in raising this matter will give some publicity to the need for and the value of this work, and that it may result in reversing that unfortunate decline in recruiting which, I agree with him, has been deplorable.
Adjourned accordingly at Eleven o'clock.

POST OFFICE
  Independent Television Authority (Prizes)
  Independent Television Authority (Prizes)
  Telephone Service, Feltham
  Telephone Service, Feltham
ROADS
  Tyne Tunnel
  Tyne Tunnel
  Expanded Programme
  Expanded Programme
  Improvement Schemes
  Improvement Schemes
  Dartford—Purfleet Tunnel
  Dartford—Purfleet Tunnel
  Improvement Scheme, Leyton
  Improvement Scheme, Leyton
  Eastern Avenue, Leyton (Extension Scheme)
  Eastern Avenue, Leyton (Extension Scheme)
  Bath Road, London Airport
  Bath Road, London Airport
  Traffic Light Crossings (Police Control)
  Traffic Light Crossings (Police Control)
  A83, Argyll (Classification)
  A83, Argyll (Classification)
CIVIL AVIATION
  Blackbushe Airport (Waiting-Rooms)
  Blackbushe Airport (Waiting-Rooms)
  Aircrew (Hours of Duty)
  Aircrew (Hours of Duty)
TRANSPORT
  Railways (Modernisation Programme)
  Railways (Modernisation Programme)
  Goods Vehicles (Carriers' Licences)
  Goods Vehicles (Carriers' Licences)
  Motor Cars (Windscreen Pennants)
  Motor Cars (Windscreen Pennants)
SHIPPING
  Microwave Harbour Beacon
  Microwave Harbour Beacon
    MICROWAVE HARBOUR BEACON
    MICROWAVE HARBOUR BEACON
    s.s. "Tresilian" (Lifebelts)
    s.s. "Tresilian" (Lifebelts)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  Cyprus (Military Installations and Buildings)
  Cyprus (Military Installations and Buildings)
  Widows' Pensions
  Widows' Pensions
  WEST INDIES (EMIGRATION)
  WEST INDIES (EMIGRATION)
  CYPRUS (GOVERNOR'S POWERS)
  CYPRUS (GOVERNOR'S POWERS)
MALAYA AND SINGAPORE
  Political Situation
  Political Situation
  Strikes
  Strikes
  SARAWAK (CONSTITUTION REVISION PROPOSALS)
  SARAWAK (CONSTITUTION REVISION PROPOSALS)
EAST AFRICA
  Game Preservation (Poaching)
  Game Preservation (Poaching)
  Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (Working)
  Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (Working)
  Kenya (Kaman Case)
  Kenya (Kaman Case)
  Zanzibar (Proposed Constitutional Changes)
  Zanzibar (Proposed Constitutional Changes)
  SEYCHELLES (TURTLE MEAT PRICE)
  SEYCHELLES (TURTLE MEAT PRICE)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Runciman Committee
  Runciman Committee
ROYAL NAVY
  Ships (Visits to Seaside Resorts)
  Ships (Visits to Seaside Resorts)
EDUCATION
  Blue Coat School, Birmingham
  Blue Coat School, Birmingham
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Tuberculosis Patients (Sanatoria Beds, Switzerland)
  Tuberculosis Patients (Sanatoria Beds, Switzerland)
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Monopolies Commission (References)
  Monopolies Commission (References)
Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord Forteviot—Took the Oath.

TANK SUPPLIES TO EGYPT
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask whether any tanks have recently been sent from this country to Egypt, whether any are now due and, if so—seeing the dangerous xenophobia now fostered by the Egyptian Government—whether delivery will be suspended.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, it is contrary to the Government's normal practice to disclose details or quantities of military equipment supplied to foreign Governments. But I cart say that no tanks have been supplied to Egypt since the middle of August. No further deliveries are at present due, and there is therefore no question of suspending them.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I am much relieved by the noble Marquess's Answer; and having had two good Answers in two days, there is nothing more for me to say.

HOME DEFENCE
2.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF LUCAN THE EARL OF LUCAN rose to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the problems of Home Defence, including Civil Defence; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Nathan I rise to move the Motion standing in his name. My first words must be of apology on his behalf for being unable to be here. The day before yesterday he rang me up to say that an operation which he had hoped could be postponed until after
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Christmas had now to take place this week, and his medical advisers told him that it could not safely be postponed beyond to-day. So I begin by expressing his apologies to your Lordships, and my own apologies for being a substitute in a subject which I am sure he would have dealt with far more effectively and far more in the manner that a subject of this importance deserves. Lord Nathan has done a great deal of work on this subject in the last few months. I can only say that I have had the benefit of consultations with him, and I hope that what I have to say will be broadly in line with the speech he would have delivered had he been here.
I do not think any apology is needed for raising this subject at the present time. For a long while Civil Defence has been, if not uppermost in people's minds, at least not far below the surface, and if of recent months the international relaxation of tension has given us rather more relief from anxiety, that does not mean that the subject can be altogether dismissed. At the same time, the first thing to be said on the subject, as has been said by Her Majesty's Government in the last, if not the last two, Statements on Defence, is that the only real defence against nuclear warfare is the avoidance of war. In that, Her Majesty's Government will naturally have the support of everyone in the country.
In the Statement on Defence issued in February of this year Her Majesty's Government devoted a certain amount of space to the subject of Home Defence, and perhaps this would be the point to mention that there tends to be some confusion between "Horne Defence" and "Civil Defence." My noble friend put down the Motion in terms of Home Defence, but he later added the words "Civil Defence" so that there should be no doubt that he intended to cover the whole field. I think Section VIII of the Statement on Defence makes it clear that the Government regard the whole field as one—in other words, what in the last war we called passive air defence, or air raid precautions, or civil defence are regarded as one with the defence of the United Kingdom against attack.
A number of headings were given in that Statement—the Civil Defence Services, the Armed Forces, the Mobile Defence Corps, Evacuation and Shelter,

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Casualties and Homeless, and so on. We were told that the situation "calls for a complete overhaul of our home defence plans," but almost every paragraph in that section contained a clause to the effect that no decision had yet been reached; that the situation was still under review for re-examination, and that it was not possible to assess the full results of nuclear attack. Since the publication of the Statement, eight or nine months have passed and nothing further has come from Her Majesty's Government. It was for that reason that my noble friend thought fit to put down this Motion. What are Her Majesty's Government waiting for? If they are waiting for finality in weapon development, they will wait for ever, because one can never afford to wait for the final assessment of a new development in weapons of war. Meanwhile, there reigns in the field of Home Defence what I think can only be called stagnation.
Some six months ago the Labour Party brought out their own pamphlet on Civil Defence. It was a pamphlet written with no access to official or secret information, but at the same time it summed up the risks and the dangers of nuclear attack; it examined the possibilities of defence and protection and made recommendations as to the action required. That pamphlet was entirely objective in its approach; it was full of common sense, and it made use of the best scientific and other information available at the time. Surely Her Majesty's Government might do the same—they might take the best available information and say what their intentions are. Before I leave that matter perhaps I had better say that it must surely he quite clear that there is no Party capital to be made in this country out of the subject of Defence, whether Home or Civil Defence, or any other form of defence. Any action taken by the Opposition is intended to induce Her Majesty's Government to give a lead and thereby improve the state of the preparations for Civil Defence.
The problem of nuclear warfare has been widely discussed in the Press and in many publications which have come from the United States. A number of varying estimates of the likely damage has been made, but it seems that the following is roughly the effect that is to be expected from an attack on this country by nuclear
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weapons. A bomb exploded over London would destroy all buildings, other than those specially strengthened, within a radius of five miles. It would severely damage all buildings within a radius of fifteen miles. It would cause fatal burns to persons in the open up to twelve miles away. It would cause fires in buildings up to the same distance. Finally, it would contaminate by radioactive fallout an area extending some 200 miles down wind on a width of about 40 miles—that is, some 8,000 square miles would be covered. The fall-out would be fatal to human beings and animals caught unprotected in the open and exposed for a certain period to the rays. The length of fatal exposure would, of course, vary with the distance from the point of explosion, known as "ground zero." The Statement on Defence was guilty of no exaggeration when it said that such weapons would cause destruction, human and material on an unprecedented scale.
There are two measures which, in conjunction, could reduce the loss of life in such conditions. One is the digging of underground shelters. It appears that underground shelter gives a fair degree of protection against radioactivity anywhere except in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. Against the fall-out we are told that trenches with a small amount of head cover will give adequate protection; but one has only to think of the populations of our big cities spending a night in slit trenches in the countryside to realise that such a policy is quite impracticable. Then there is the question of the provision, or the strengthening, of basement and underground rooms in existing or new buildings. We should like to know what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Are they going to urge that all new construction should contain underground rooms to provide shelter?
Dispersal is another question. What was known as "evacuation" in the last war was a simple matter compared with this, for, in a nuclear war, where, in these islands, would be a safe area? Moreover the conduct of the war, when a war broke out, or, indeed, the continuance of civilised life in the country, would necessitate large numbers of the population—probably millions—remaining in the cities at their work. So dispersal on an ideal scale to minimise casualties is also out of the question, more especially

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as we know that a dozen hydrogen bombs, suitably placed, would cover with their fall-out area almost the whole of these islands. Nevertheless, with some degree of protection against fall-out there is a possibility of moving numbers of people from more densely populated areas into other parts of the country. Her Majesty's Government were thinking of that at the time that the Statement on Defence was written, and they said in that Statement that they were reexamining policies of dispersal and shelter. I wonder how far that reexamination has progressed. We cannot afford to wait till the emergency is upon us before beginning the planning for an evacuation scheme; that must be done months or years beforehand, and the authorities who will have to carry it out must have warning so that they can start making their plans. I heard that when one local authority recently asked whether further information could be given by the Government they were told that nothing could be published. I would urge upon Her Majesty's Government that time is slipping by, and some indication must be given if an effective scheme is to be put in train. Only when they know the intentions of the Government can local authorities start planning.
There are numerous other matters upon which the Government doubtless have plans, yet nobody except the Government know about them. It would take far too long to go into the full list, but what, for instance, is being done about emergency hospitals, the care of the sick and casualties? What about essential services, fuel and power supplies, drainage and particularly water, which is so easily contaminated? What about food supplies, livestock, crops and emergency foodstocks? Frankly, unless Her Majesty's Government can give positive assurances on these crucial matters, one can only assume that there is no practical Civil Defence scheme in being. Moreover, there is another effect of the lack of information: unless the public can be given some inkling of the intentions of the Government they will not volunteer for the Civil Defence Services in the numbers required. We know that since November, 1949, some 338,000 men and women have joined the Civil Defence Corps, in addition, I think, to about 100,000 in the Auxiliary Fire Service, the
214
National Hospital Service Reserve and the Special Constabulary. No-one can claim that that is a very encouraging total of recruitment. And is it, in fact, merely a deception? Does that figure represent trained people or simply the total of enrolment? If it is only the total of enrolment can the Government tell us what is the number of men and women who are fit and trained for their jobs?
Lastly, there is the subject of the greatest importance—command and organisation of the Civil Defence Services. The Government have decided that all the Armed Forces are in future to receive elementary Civil Defence training as part of their normal training. They are also to form a mobile defence corps for fire-fighting, rescue and ambulance services. Can the Government tell us a little more about that? They said in the Statement on Defence that some forty-eight battalions would be organised over the next three or four years, and that it was hoped that the first intake for training would be going to their training depots towards the end of this year. We are now in November, and we should like the Government to give us some progress report on this scheme.
Then what about other branches and departments of the Armed Forces? I think it is accepted by good authorities that mobilisation and the transport of Armed Forces across the Channel to the Continent is an operation that cannot take place in a nuclear war. In a war that opens with nuclear weapons—as Her Majesty's Government definitely think it will—we cannot carry out that long, intricate and complicated operation of reservists travelling to their depôts, being medically examined, being equipped, being formed into units, going to their ports, being embarked, and so on. In the conditions which Her Majesty's Government envisage that would be quite out of the question. Therefore the Armed Forces, surely, will find their first duty in the protection of their own country, and the citizens of their own country, against enemy attack by nuclear weapons. What is to be the system of command? We are to have military forces, organised, armed and disciplined forces, under their own commanders. We are to have volunteer services under their own civilian authorities. What is to be the chain of command both before an emergency—in

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peace time, that is—and during an emergency? That is one of the most important questions to be settled.
I notice that the Prime Minister recently said that arrangements are being made:
"to co-ordinate, under the Ministry of Defence, planning and training for the joint action of civil and military forces in home defence."
It is good to know that arrangements are being made, but above all things there must be a proper system and chain of command laid down in an emergency. Remember the Regional Commissioners organisation that was set up in the last war. The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, knows much more about that than I do because he was himself a Deputy Regional Commissioner. Mercifully, in the last war we never came to the point where the Government had to decentralise command, but in conditions of nuclear attack one of the first things likely to happen will be that central control will break down. Therefore the Regional Commissioners organisation and machinery, if it is not in existence now, must be set up at once—in skeleton if necessary; but it must be in being. There must be a working system long before there is any question of an emergency.
I should like to utter one word of warning to Her Majesty's Government. I hope they remember that traditionally the people of these islands do not look with favour on any suggestion of military control over civilians, and I am quite sure that any system of command must make it absolutely clear—it must be known without a shadow of doubt—that the control and government of the people or areas in this country is vested ultimately in a civilian Minister. A subject such as this can be dealt with only very sketchily in a short speech such as the one I am making. I should like to sum up by saying that we feel that what has been lacking, and is still lacking, is a lead from Her Majesty's Government. Local authorities cannot plan, and the volunteers on whom Civil Defence will ultimately depend will not come forward for training, until the Government show much more frankness and take the country into their confidence. On behalf of my noble friend Lord Nathan, I beg to move for Papers.
2.58 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (LORD CARRINGTON): My Lords, I should like first of all to join with the noble Earl who has just sat down in saying how sorry we are that the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, has been unable to move his Motion in the House this afternoon. I hope that it will not be long before he is well again and able to take his place in your Lordships' House. All of us who have heard speeches which he has made on Defence matters and on Service matters generally in the last few years will know that we have missed a most helpful and constructive speech. In his Motion, the noble Lord expressly used the words "Home Defence" as well as "Civil Defence," and the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, who has taken his place, has ably and widely ranged over this subject. No one, I am sure, will complain of this, since it is a very long time since we had in your Lordships' House a debate on Civil Defence and Home Defence. I looked it up, and I think that the last occasion was in October, 1950—that is, five years ago—on a Motion introduced by my noble friend Lord Teynham. We are grateful, therefore, to the noble Earl for giving us this opportunity of discussing this important subject.
I did have a word a week or two ago with the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, who was kind enough to give me some indication of the broad lines of his approach to this subject. For the convenience of your Lordships, it was decided that I should get up at this stage and give the House an indication of the lines on which the Government are thinking so that the debate which follows will be the more informed. Lord Nathan, was kind enough to send me a copy of what he would have said. He professed to find in the fact that my noble friend Lord Mancroft and I were both to speak in this debate, something (and these are the words in his speech)
"that was mildly symptomatic of the confusion, uncertainty and indecisiveness which lingered in our arrangements for Home Defence."
Nothing could be farther from the truth. Neither my noble friend nor I is confused, uncertain or indecisive.
The responsibilities for Civil and Home Defence are clearly laid down. I would remind the noble Earl, who quoted

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a little of the speech, of the words of the Prime Minister at Bournemouth on October 8. He said this:
"As I have said, this decision with regard to the reserve forces links them with the work of Civil Defence. It is obvious with the development of nuclear weapons there are new problems to be faced, and we are at work on these. In the first place, we must think of this question as one problem of Home Defence, which is a better term than Civil Defence, a defence in which both civil and military forces have to take part. I have made certain arrangements within the Government to co-ordinate planning and training for this purpose under the Minister of Defence. A full-time Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, will be appointed in the near future."
This statement shows that the Minister of Defence, as Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee, is charged with planning the part which the Armed Forces would play in Home Defence in war, and with co-ordinating the plans of the military authorities with those of the civil authorities.
The Home Secretary is charged by the Civil Defence Act, 1948, with responsibility for Civil Defence—that is, for the tasks that would be carried out in war by the civil authorities, except in so far as other Ministers have been designated by Order in Council as responsible for specific tasks. For example, the Minister of Health is, naturally, responsible for measures to deal with casualties and diseases; the Minister of Housing is responsible for the maintenance of water supplies, and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for feeding services. The Home Secretary retains responsibility for co-ordinating this civil planning. Home Defence plans as a whole, like other elements of the defence programme, are discussed by the Defence Committee, of which the Prime Minister is the Chairman and the Minister of Defence Deputy Chairman. Other machinery exists for consultation where it is needed.
The background of any discussion of Home Defence must be, of course, that of thermo-nuclear warfare, and it is in that fact that our debate this afternoon on this subject must be so radically different from those of past years. Your Lordships may not remember that yesterday was the third anniversary of the first megaton explosion in the world's history. This event constituted a scientific development of another order of magnitude over and above that already reached at Hiroshima and Nagasaki only seven years
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earlier. It is impossible, when an event of this kind occurs, to appreciate at once all the lessons, scientific and otherwise, which can be learnt. Therefore, it is important to recall that, apart from the Russian explosion in August, 1953, from which naturally we were not in a position to learn many lessons, the only other megaton explosions which have occurred were those in the United States in the spring of 1954. It is from what the Americans have been able to say of this series of trials that we have learnt, and are still learning, the lessons that will enable us to make any sensible judgment on the Civil Defence measures necessary in the event of an attack by megaton weapons on this country. So it will be seen that it is only during the past eighteen months that we have had any kind of opportunity to study the many problems which arise. In the Defence White Paper of February this year a very rough description was given of the effects of such weapons, based on the scientific deductions from the evidence then available.
I do not propose to offer any comment on the Civil Defence measures taken by previous Governments. I will only say that, however effective they may have been against the kind of threat with which they were designed to compete, it must be perfectly clear that the situation was completely and entirely altered by the arrival of the megaton weapon. In the months following the American trials of 1954 our scientists were busy forming conclusions about the effects and attempting to apply their conclusions to the quite different kind of conditions which would occur in this country should such explosions take place. American explosions were carried out in the Pacific on coral rock. Our scientists had to form their views of what might be likely to happen if such explosions occurred on the ordinary land surface in this country, which is of entirely different composition from coral rock.
It was not until December, 1954, that the scientific conclusions were sufficiently firm to enable the Government to consider what might be the result. I want to emphasise that in a matter of this kind there are a vast number of unknowns. We have in this country as good nuclear scientists as anywhere else in the world, but many of the conclusions which have to be drawn from events

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of this kind are not quite matters of fact. Scientific theories have to be formed, and, so far as possible, tested against what is known to have happened. But the knowledge of what happened is in the nature of things singularly incomplete. For instance, it will be remembered that the American series of experiments were carried out in the Pacific Ocean, and it is much more difficult to obtain a continuous picture, which involves measurements and so on, over large areas of the surface of the sea than it is over land.
I think it is obvious that only broad conclusions could be drawn from the information available and that there was a most urgent need to amplify our knowledge. Steps have therefore been taken to obtain this knowledge, and this work is being intensified as it becomes clearer which particular lines are likely to be the more profitable to follow.
Nevertheless, several things which do follow as a result of the megaton bomb, are abundantly clear, even to the layman. In the days of ordinary high-explosive bombs or of kiloton atomic bombs, it was reasonably certain that any enemy attacking this country by air would go for specific targets. Those targets might be docks, they might be cities or towns; but they would certainly not be open country, since bombs dropped in open country would be completely wasted effort. A megaton bomb exploded on the ground anywhere not only destroys completely an area immediately surrounding the point of impact, but, in addition, lets loose a cloud of radioactive dust which, sooner or later, comes to earth over a wide area. The effect of this fall-out, as it is called, can quite easily be fatal over large areas if nothing is done about it. As a matter of fact, there is only one thing that can be done about it and that is, get under cover and stay there—perhaps for days on end—until the intensity of the fall-out has faded to a safe enough level to come out. Fall-out would cause a complete disruption of the ordinary life of the country throughout the area in which people will have to take cover.
One thing we can tell is that at the point where an H-bomb explodes there will be a central area that will be completely destroyed. But farther out there will be a zone where damage is lighter,
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where there will be fires to put out, where people must be rescued from damaged buildings, and where there will be many injured and homeless who will need help and guidance. And over-shadowing all that will be the grim, invisible danger of fall-out. We are considering (my noble friend Lord Mancroft will develop this aspect at the end of the debate) the situation which arises with regard to shelter and evacuation.
Great problems arise in almost every part of the very wide field covered by Civil Defence. For instance, the existence of large concentrated stockpiles of food or other materials is not the right approach to this problem. Not only would such stockpiles be destroyed in the event of a direct hit, but the real difficulty in the aftermath of a megaton bomb attack is going to be communication and movement. We have, therefore, got to see what steps are needed to provide small stockpiles which are very widely scattered. Similarly, we have to see what is needed to avoid contamination of our agricultural produce. Here again, we have put in hand the necessary research.
Then there is the problem of protecting the importing capacity of this country—a matter on which the Government have been working for some time. The major ports of this country are vulnerable to nuclear attack, and plans have been made for the provision of alternative port facilities. The advent of the megaton bomb has, of course, made this more necessary than ever. These plans have gone beyond the paper stage; in suitable places additional quays and jetties are being built, and disused ones restored. Dredging inside some of our smaller harbours and in their approaches is being put in hand. Equipment has been provided, including a reserve of mobile cranes and plant for handling grain. Attention is also being paid to the special problems of rehabilitating ports after attack, and plans are being made for the provision of a pool of mobile equipment, such as generators and pumps, which would be stored away from target areas until it was needed.
I hope that I have said enough to convince your Lordships that the Government are following the right policy by not committing themselves to large and wholesale expenditure until that expenditure can be based on proper scientific

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knowledge. The Statement on Defence, 1955, shows that the Government are well aware of the sort of problems the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, has mentioned. Indeed, he may remember the phrase used: that thermo-nuclear warfare would result in a struggle for survival of the grimmest kind, and that we went on to explain, in Part VIII of the Statement, to which he referred, how the problems of Home Defence were to be tackled. Work on this is proceeding and when the Defence Estimates and the annual Statement on Defence are published in February next year they will naturally deal with Home Defence as well as other types of defence and will explain what progress has been made.
It is not difficult to think of ways of spending very large sums of money on Home Defence. For example, last weekend I re-read the Labour Party's pamphlet on Civil Defence which was mentioned earlier, and although we do not accept all its conclusions, by and large it seems quite sensible. Naturally, it does not go into full details of statistics, but it outlines proposals which might involve anything between £2,000 million and £3,000 million in capital expenditure.
Defence, whether it be civil, home or purely money spent on the Services, costs a great deal of money, and it will not have escaped the attention of the noble Earl that the Chancellor of the Exchequer found it necessary to introduce a Budget last week—a Budget in which he announced certain economies in Government expenditure. The Government have therefore to be absolutely certain that the direction in which the limited amount of money for defence is spent is the right one. The Government believe that the consequences of nuclear war are so frightful that even more than before it is necessary to ensure that war does not break out. We believe that while working for peace in the United Nations, and at such conferences as are now going on in Geneva, the best possible means of preventing a nuclear war is by providing and maintaining a sufficient deterrent. We therefore think that the deterrent should have priority in our defence policy.
Unfortunately the cold war is still with us and there is the possibility that limited wars may break out, and we must have adequate forces to deal with these. In
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these circumstances and with these commitments, the Government's policy in the field of Home Defence is to press on with research, training and planning and with measures to enable the Armed Forces to make a maximum contribution. As the Prime Minister said, all these matters are much more important than the provision of large material resources, although some material preparations will be necessary. It is certain that to throw all our resources into massive and costly preparations carried out at the maximum speed would lead to ruin and would not serve the overriding object of making war unlikely.
I come now to the question to which the noble Earl devoted a great part of his speech, that of command and control; but first of all, perhaps I should explain exactly what forces there are to command and control. We may think of them as divided into three echelons. The first echelon consists of the local voluntary Civil Defence Forces. They will be supplemented by R.A.F. reservists who will be trained during their National Service as fire-fighters to reinforce the regular fire services of the country. The second echelon is the forty-eight battalions of the Mobile Defence Corps, specially trained in first aid and rescue and, in the case of twelve battalions, in fire-fighting for Home Defence purposes. The noble Earl asked me how the mobile Defence Corps was getting on. There are twenty-five battalions in course of being raised and those National Service men who are earmarked for the battalions are attached during the last month of their whole-time service to one of the War Office depots for training in Civil Defence.
Then there is the third echelon, consisting of all Armed Forces, whether Regular or Reserve, in the country at the time with the exception of those engaged in, or supporting, combat operations. In a future global war the comparatively leisurely mobilisation on the pattern of 1914 and 1939 will no longer be possible. The Service Departments are therefore engaged in revising their mobilisation plans to meet the new conditions. Should there be little or no warning before attack develops, many Serious difficulties will arise to interfere with mobilisation. Areas of the country suffering from direct nuclear attack may contain, as the noble Earl said, active or reserve units and Reservists needed for the mobilisation of

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the Forces. Communications, including roads, railways and ports will be severely disrupted, whilst effective central control of the country may be reduced. Ways of lessening the effect of these difficulties are being studied and consideration is being given to mobilisation on a regional basis during the period when control and movement are reduced to a minimum by enemy attack.
The concept of reserve forces ready to take part in large-scale conventional warfare is out of date. In a nuclear war the primary rôle of the reserve army would be to help to maintain the life of the nation and to deal with raids and sabotage. The Territorial Army must continue to be organised as a military force, capable of fighting, but changes in its organisation and training will be necessary. There will, therefore, be available to support the civil authorities the Regular Army formations and units remaining in this country; the bulk of the Territorial Army; and those elements of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force not engaged in, or supporting, the battle.
These are very substantial and very valuable resources; and the Government have been giving much thought to the question of their training and their organisation so that they could make the greatest possible contribution to the Home Defence if war should break out. The training syllabus for the Armed Forces for some years past has included basic instruction in methods of rescue and first aid—two of the most likely tasks to be performed by Armed Forces in the third echelon of Civil Defence. Such instruction is now being extended to cover the additional problems from radioactive fall-out. Considerable numbers of Class "H" Reservists of the Royal Air Force are to undergo specialised training as fire-fighters in order to provide reinforcements for the regular fire-fighting services of the country. All those destined for the Mobile Defence Battalions will receive one month's intensive training in their rôle during whole-time service, and up to twenty days during their part-time service.
Careful studies of the conditions that may be encountered in nuclear warfare and the action to be taken in meeting them are being carried out at the Civil
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Defence Staff College. Members of the Civil Defence organisations, staff of the public utilities and Government Departments, and officers of the Armed Forces all take part in this. It is hoped that the first major joint exercise in this country, with military headquarters, troops, and regional and local civil authorities, will be held next year.
Then I come to the chain of command. The degree to which Regional Commissioners will have to assume control within their areas will depend directly on where the attack has fallen and its severity. Those areas in which there has been heavy damage, or which find their communications to central Government cut, must be controlled and administered by the Regional Commissioner until more normal conditions can be restored. It is intended to nominate the Regional Commissioners in sufficient time for them to be at their posts when war breaks out, with full powers for the tasks they may have to perform. Each Regional Commissioner will have among his advisers, and in the same joint headquarters, first, the Regional Director of Civil Defence, already appointed to each region in England and in Wales, who will have planned and trained his Civil Defence resources during peace for their tasks in war; secondly, the Army District Commander, who also exists in peace time, and who will have trained his forces jointly with the regional civil authorities for tasks in war. Naval and Air Force liaison officers with full knowledge of the Service manpower and equipment available within the regional area will be attached to the joint headquarters in war.
Civil or military staffs for communications, transport and administration will be provided and, as your Lordships know, for the most part the civil regional boundaries coincide almost identically with those of the Army districts. The Regional Commissioner will be in charge, but will have alongside him his military and civil advisers to control their resources within his area. It should be possible for the central Government to continue to control and issue policy decisions, but the extent to which this is practicable will obviously depend upon the degree of damage to communications and upon the degree of information received. The rôle of the central Government will be to co-ordinate and adjust

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the resources available to the country between the regions—for example, restoring communications and transport and reinforcing the worst damaged regions from those not so seriously affected.
On the Service side, the overall control will be exercised by the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, who will be in close touch with civil authorities and with the central Government. The Armed Forces are in no sense a substitute for civil administration, and the aim will be to support the normal administration by all possible means and to make the fullest use of surviving civilians and resources. It will be one of the first tasks of the Commander-in-Chief, U.K. Land Forces, on appointment, to examine, in conjunction with the civil authorities, the ways in which the Armed Forces can best assist the civil authorities, and to make plans accordingly.
The re-modelling of our defence organisation to meet the new conception of warfare is a gigantic task. Much planning, much research, and much hard work is necessary. It is essential, if we are to survive in any future war, that we find the correct solution. Sometimes, as we imagine the destruction and misery which a nuclear war would bring on this and other countries, we are filled with a feeling of horror that men could be so foolish as to contemplate it. But though we may be filled with horror, we in this country are certainly not filled with despair. Though the difficulties of Home Defence may be enormous, the Government will do its best to make it sound and practicable, and I hope from what I have said this afternoon, your Lordships will agree that we are proceeding soundly and sensibly and doing the right things in the right way.
3.25 p.m.
LORD LAWSON: My Lords, I think your Lordships will agree, in view of the statement we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that my noble friend has rendered a service to the House in raising this subject this afternoon. I listened with great interest to the noble Lord who told us what the plans of the Government are said to be and informed us that next year there are going to be exercises on a large scale in Civil Defence. I think that is what the noble Lord said. But, as one who had something to do with Civil Defence in
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the last war, I have been deeply concerned at the almost total lack of interest in this subject in the country. That lack of interest has been reflected in the silence of the Government upon the subject. What has struck me much more is the lack of conviction that anything at all could be done about it. To some extent the noble Lord's statement reflects that temper to-day.
We are told that the defence forces are to be co-ordinated with a view to helping in the event of an attack upon this country. Co-ordination is a useful word, but it is also a dangerous word, and it sometimes covers a multitude of sins. As to the Civil Defence forces that are available at the present time, we have not been told much by the noble Lord who has just spoken. I was glad to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, is to speak later on. He may be able to tell us the number of volunteers for Civil Defence, what exercises are being held, and where troops have at any time been co-ordinating in those exercises. As soon as war comes, if unfortunately it ever does come again, inevitably the civilian organisations will be driven to co-operate with the Service organisations. I cannot see how the Territorials in peace time can take steps to co-operate with the civil forces of Civil Defence, because it is very difficult in the present circumstances, apart from the National Servicemen, to get men to volunteer for the Territorial organisation. When they do, the short time they can spare from their ordinary employments and avocations to do the normal exercises of the Territorial organisation makes it difficult, in peace time at any rate, to co-operate with the Civil Defence forces. The consequence is that we are compelled to depend upon the actual existing Civil Defence forces for exercises and for a knowledge of the job that has to be done.
I have heard a good deal about the lire services and about the Air Force (I think it is) being used for fire service purposes. We seem to forget that the splendid rational organisation of fire services in this country as it is to-day was born of the experience of the last war. Some of us had the pain of seeing how insufficient the fire services were in the early stages of the war and how they had to be built up and strengthened. Out of them has come a great national fire service. That, as I say, was born of

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experience during the war and during the operations of the Civil Defence organisation. I should have thought that some steps would be taken to co-ordinate, if there had to be co-ordination, the national fire services, so that somebody would be ready, when the call came, to give guidance and so that they would have some knowledge of the services that were likely to be needed.
I am pleased that the Government have made up their minds about the appointment of the Commissioners for Civil Defence. The noble Lord's statement is about the first statement that has been made about that; at any rate, I have not heard it before. The Civil Defence Commissioners ought to know their respective areas, too, because those of us who have been engaged in this business, and particularly when we have been remote from the centre, have seen how greatly dependent the civil organisation soon came to be upon the military, air and naval defence forces.
It would be unfair to say of those who are serving, who have volunteered in the country and who are doing splendid work, that nothing is being done; but it would be right to say that there is not the slightest sense abroad in the country of the need for building up the Civil Defence organisation. A few weeks ago I saw a large exercise that was very well done indeed. The Government stand on the brink and all the experts say: "Well, what can we do?" If in one part of the country there has been a refusal to face these facts and to do anything about Civil Defence, I say that the inaction of the Government themselves has been responsible for a situation like that. It is foolish because even those who say: "We will do nothing about it; we can do nothing about it," would be the first to give their services if ever the call came.
It is true that there are very fine men and women up and down this country who are giving their time, attending lectures and trying to understand and visualise something of what might happen, the call that would be made upon them and the kind of thing that could be done. It is most important that the Government should concentrate upon the volunteers for the Civil Defence forces. In the main, of course, the only exercises they can do—and I must say that I watched
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them recently—are those with a view to keeping the troops on their toes. The training of a soldier, an airman or a sailor sometimes seems stupid to people who stand on the outer ring and watch it, but everybody knows it is fitting them for the job, physically and mentally, and that it is necessary to keep them at it in order that the man or the officer will be ready for his job when the time comes. So far as I can see, pretty much the same exercises are being practised now, although more efficiently, as were practised before the last war. It is a question of going through the ordinary routine to keep men and women on their toes.
But the main thing is that the Government should not only manifest interest in this matter but should show to the country that they are deeply concerned about the need for men and women who will be ready to give their services if unfortunately that call should come. There are men and women who are giving their spare time freely. This country has a splendid spirit of service, operating to a greater extent than most people know—a many-sided service, freely given by splendid men and women in the spare time they have at their disposal from their work. I am sure that, if the Government could manifest sufficient interest in the matter and really show that they meant business, if the call had to go out the men and women would be there.
I must tell your Lordships frankly that I do not think you will get this from the Home Office. It is no reflection upon the Home Secretary: but is it not a fact that the Home Office has gradually come to be considered the kind of department upon which you dump some organisation that you do not know what to do with? It is true that the Home Office had experience in the last war. I am not making any personal reflections upon the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft—
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MANCROFT): Thank you.
LORD LAWSON: He certainly does not look that type, at any rate. But it is a fact that over the greater part of a century we have formed the habit of dumping on the Home Office any organisation that we did not know what to do with. The Home Office, of course, has experience from the last war. But I think

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the Government are doing right in deciding to appoint a civilian organisation—I do not know whether it is to be at an early date or before any war comes. I think that that is what was said about the Civil Commissioners. It is not a matter of explaining what the atom bomb will do, or how wide will be its range of destruction, or even what immediate steps are to be taken for safety purposes. I have my own views. I think that we shall have to get underground. If anything is to be done to save particularly young life and the women, I think that deep subterranean passages will have to be built, though there is always the danger of wanting to stay there once you get there. I am sure that if the Government make their appeal and show that they are really concerned about this matter there will be a better response. I think that there is a lack of conviction about the appeals of the Government. If they make a convincing appeal I am sure that plenty of citizens in this country would give their time and their services, when they are told just what they can do.
It is a good thing that this debate has been held to-day, because we have had the statement of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the debate will show just how much the Government intend to do and what they intend not to do. Like most noble Lords here, I have been in public life nearly all my life. I thought I knew something about this country, but I may say that in recent years the thing that has astounded me has been the multitudinous number of organisations formed by men and women, who give their services freely and who are ready to give their services if they are called upon I am sure that my noble friend and members of this House will agree that we wish we had not to talk about these things. We pray that there may never be any need for this organisation. But if there is need, whether in regard to fire or flood (because flood can be envisaged, too), or death or disaster, then the men and women who are needed for that purpose ought to be trained.
3.45 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I too should like to express my regret that the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, has been unable to be here to move the Motion which stands in his name. May I add my wishes for his speedy recovery, and
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say how glad I was fiat the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, was able to address us on a subject on which he is well qualified to speak? In the course of his speech the noble Earl said that there had been no lead from the Government. If he had amplified that and had said that there had been no lead from any of Her Majesty's Governments from 1945 until recently, I should have agreed with him.
ram certain that Home Defence, in all its aspects, has been in a fairly sorry mess since the end of the war, and so far as I can see (I speak from such slight experience of these matters as I had in the last war) that has been because there was what might almost have been called a conspiracy in ignoring every possible lesson of the war. It is not merely that we ignored the lessons of Hiroshima—though the atom bomb is a dwarf compared to the thermo-nuclear bomb. At the same time, I have never held the view that we were justified in waiting, after the lessons of Hiroshima, to see what the thermo-nuclear bomb produced, because in regard to many aspects of Home Defence the lessons of Hiroshima were a perfectly good signpost to the lessons which we are being taught by the thermo-nuclear bomb. But it was not merely the lesson of the atom bomb which was disregarded; there were all sorts of minor administrative and humdrum lessons which were disregarded at the same time. There were any number of lessons to be learned in matters of control of manpower and liaison, of communications, and of flexibility of control in command of those national forces necessary to deal with the various kinds of emergency with which we are likely to be faced.
This question of command was mentioned by Lord Lucan, and I feel that it is one of the problems which needs most urgent study. I almost agreed with what he said about taking care that civilians were in ultimate control. I do not feel so worried as he does because, thinking back quickly, I cannot remember any instances in history since Cromwell's Major-Generals, when the civilians were not ultimately in control of this country, certainly in regard to Home Defence, never mind who is in control of operations overseas. I think the real answer (I believe Lord Lucan was really thinking of this as well) is to have properly integrated staffs—that is to say, staffs in

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control of the different echelons, containing staff officers of different varieties and representing different services, very much on the lines of the sort of staff that General Eisenhower created at S.H.A.E.F., without its being necessary to dress up administrative and transportation experts in the uniform of a full colonel. There I entirely agree with what has been said from the other side.
However that may be, the time has now come when the thermo-nuclear bomb has forced common sense on us; and in my humble opinion we are now, for the first time, beginning to prepare for the sort of war that we are bound to expect and not for the sort of war which would suit Government Departments. There is no need for them to wait any longer for anything. I was delighted to hear what my noble friend Lord Carrington said. It was the first indication that I have seen for a long time that anything was likely to happen on the Home Defence front. One major point strikes me clearly—namely, that it will be quite hopeless to expect any real or worthwhile progress unless at the same time there is to be progress in establishing a greater measure of overall control at Ministry of Defence level.
I know that my noble friend Lord Swinton has put down a Motion for debate next week, and as we shall discuss the Fighting Services then, I do not propose to go any further in that direction to-day—and I am sure that no one in your Lordships' House would wish me to do so. But when we listen to what my noble friend Lord Swinton says we should have in our mind the ways in which his proposals, whatever they may be, can be applied to Home Defence; and, equally, we must consider Home Defence against the background of the overall control of defence as the main problem. It was certainly a good thing that the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, decided to put down a Motion on Home Defence and not on one of the particular aspects of Home Defence, such as Civil Defence or the Home Guard. As the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, said, there is a good deal of confusion, and that confusion will continue if people try to differentiate between different kinds of Home Defence, instead of looking at Home Defence as one problem and one operation of war. I thought that the Labour Party pamphlet on Civil
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Defence had a great deal to commend it. If I said that I agreed with it more than I have ever agreed with any publication of their Party perhaps that would not be saying very much; but if I put it in another way and say I hope that the objective view which that pamphlet takes of a number of Civil Defence subjects may commend itself to the rank and file of that Party, as well as to other people, perhaps that will mean more. At any rate, that is my view.
I come now to some of the relatively minor points, some of those things which I believe are causing, and have caused, hold-ups in Civil Defence for the last ten years. A good deal of trouble on the Civil Defence side has been caused by the failure of those planning Civil Defence to give proper value to the leadership factor or to give proper powers to leaders. A great deal of the frustration and minor trouble and uncertainty that has arisen has been due to this sort of failure in regard to the leadership factor, either deliberate or accidental. If one finds that there are gaps in the Civil Defence service in what ought to be the national pattern of rescue or welfare services, one of the reasons is that there is no real machinery whereby one can get over the rather unenterprising or backwoods rural districts—and there are other inhabitants of backwoods besides your Lordships. There is no machinery by which one can get an apathetic minor local authority to get on with the job, and there is certainly no machinery whereby, even if they want to, they can appoint leaders who will get on with the job and bear the same measure of responsibility for dealing with local Civil Defence services as the commander of a Territorial or Supplementary Reserve unit bears for the command and administration of his unit.
This applies equally to the Wardens' Service. The appointment of wardens is entirely in the hands of the local chief constable. I am not suggesting that anything has gone wrong, but I do not think that is a very satisfactory piece of machinery because one ought not to be dependent on the particular attitude that any one man may take on a particular problem. For this purpose a chief constable is entirely independent of the Standing Joint Committee, so far as I know. I have no particular case in mind where this arrangement has gone wrong,

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but I say that this is not the kind of machinery that is calculated to produce the best results. Then we have the Regional Directors, who have recently been appointed. I consider that their appointment is a welcome and advantageous step, and in all cases where I have personal knowledge of the people appointed I would say that they are thoroughly good and that the best results can be expected from them. But if one is going to appoint Regional Directors and expect good results, one should take care to see that it is possible for them to direct somebody or something. I am not quite sure how far that problem has been tackled, and I hope that it will be looked at again. I am quite certain that, at some time or other, the Civil Defence Staff College must have had exercises in connection with those problems and must have got down to them; therefore I would think that a solution exists, if only on paper.
May I turn for a moment to mobile Civil Defence and the forty-eight battalions of the Supplementary Reserve which my noble friend, Lord Carrington mentioned. Here, I fear, I shall again be slightly critical. I am bound to say, as I have said before, that I believe the decision to disband territorial A.A. units without making use of them for building the forty-eight mobile defence units was a most serious and ill-starred decision to take. I believe that it lost us a great deal of good will, and I also believe, from such experience as I have, that no Supplementary Reserve unit of that size can reach efficiency unless it has an out-of-camp life and existence and the backing of the county association. We have been told that it was pure coincidence that disbandment of the A.A. and the decision to form these Supplementary Reserve battalions came at the same time. Even so, it makes no difference: one does not throw away an asset, for whatever reason, if one can possibly make use of it, as I am certain could have been done on this occasion. Even now, I do not think it is too late to make alterations in the scheme and to bring in the Territorial associations—whether or not the name of units is changed to the Supplementary Reserve I do not mind.
I suggest that if some alterations are made on the lines I have suggested an immense and immediate improvement will
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be found. A great deal of morale can be got back and a great deal of support can be given to these battalions. Support which they are not getting now they would be able to get under a proper system. Let us not forget the county associations. If my memory serves me right (and I think it does) these associations were designed by Lord Haldane partly to act as a link between the local military authority and the county council or other local authority. What better task could there be for the associations than this, where liaison between the military and the local authority must be developed to the greatest possible extent?
We are still in a certain amount of confusion, too, over the Territorial Army itself. I am not blaming anyone for that, because one knows that this is a problem which is connected not only with Home Defence but with N.A.T.O. requirements; and it has not been easy to find a solution. But at the moment, unless I am wrong, we have a certain number of T.A. divisions committed as part of the N.A.T.O. forces. Having read the lecture of the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery, at the Royal United Services institution recently, I am not quite sure how much importance he attaches to the inclusion of T.A. or, indeed, whether he is reasonably certain that those T.A. formations will be there in their proper place when the time comes.
I confess that I myself am not really certain, even supposing that the equipment for those divisions was already in the place where it was wanted, whether they could be got overseas. But I cannot go so far as the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, who considered it out of the question that T.A. formations should be sent overseas in a future war. I certainly think they should be. It would be a great pity if we broke up the divisional organisation of the T.A. to meet the needs of Home Defence; because whereas a T.A. division, as a division, can help with Home Defence or support Civil Defence while organised as a division, and if the opportunity offers can go overseas, the converse is not the case. So I hope that so long as there is any possibility of using T.A. formations overseas we shall keep the T.A. organised in field formations.
When we come to the Home Guard I am afraid that uncertainty gets even

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greater. I hope that before long we shall be told what is to be the rôle of the Home Guard under present conditions of thermo-nuclear warfare. Are they to guard vulnerable points? Are they to deal with sabotage? I would say here that I think the problem of anti-sabotage has been a good deal underplayed; I believe it to be quite a sizeable threat. Can we treat the problem of shooting a saboteur in isolation from the problems of the Wardens' Service in scattered districts? I doubt it. I am not going to say anything about the National Fire Service or the National Hospital Service Reserve because I believe the problems that exist there are relatively minor. I think I am right in saying that plans exist to exercise national control over fire services in war-time, and that the only trouble with regard to the National Hospital Service Reserve is the general uncertainty. This brings me once again to the question of manpower. I am afraid I have done it often in this House, but I again press for some Government measure whereby the Minister of Labour takes control of part-time manpower as he did in the war, and Departments which wish to employ part-time manpower in Home Defence make their bids to him and he judges upon them, subject to advice he gets from the Minister of Defence or indeed, from the Cabinet itself
Lord Carrington said a good deal about the present shelter policy, and I agree with him in what he said. After all, any widespread policy of shelters will divert an immense amount of steel, cement and labour at a time when we can ill spare it from the social jobs and the export jobs for which we now need it. Here is a case such as one often finds when dealing with an operation of war where it may be necessary to take a calculated risk. And if we are going to take a calculated risk in not implementing a widespread and expensive policy of shelters, I, for one, would agree with that. But implementing a widespread policy is one thing, and research and planning is quite another. I think that, whether or not the Government's present shelter policy includes the implementation of a widespread policy of making shelters at the present time, it certainly should include a determined policy of improving essential things that are going to be
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wanted in any case—communications, research, the testing of prototypes and all the other things which Lord Carrington mentioned, such as protection of ports which we cannot do without and which cannot be improvised in the way that deep shelters often can be.
My Lords, I do not want to keep you any longer. I would end by saying, once again, let us look at this matter objectively and plan for the war we want to prevent. If we do so—and this, I think, has already been said by Lord Lawson—all those engaged in Home Defence, or whom we want to be engaged in Home Defence, will begin to understand and will, therefore, co-operate in a way which they have not done in the past—and I do not blame them. Lord Lawson said, in effect, if not in so many words: "If the people do not understand, how can you expect them to play?", and I entirely agree with him. And I would add one thing. I hope that in the plans that are going to be made the secrecy fiends will not be allowed to keep the upper hand. Of course, one wants to have certain secrets. But in the matter of secrecy for security reasons, the best is always the enemy of the good. Here, again, if the Government want to take a calculated risk, then let them take the risk of telling the people perhaps more than strict secrecy officers would want them to know. If you do that you will get increased co-operation from all sections of the community.
It was good to hear from Lord Carrington that he and Lord Mancroft are not confused, uncertain or undecided. I am sure, therefore, that their colleagues are not, and I hope that their attitude will have the same effect on the officials who advise them. I wish them a lot of practice in blowing their trumpets with no uncertain sound, and I can assure them that if they do that the country will soon begin to prepare for the battle. In fact, sooner than some people expect.
4.8 p.m.
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, as so often happens in your Lordships' House, a speaker has to follow another who has already spoken on certain subjects upon which he would wish to speak. As most of your Lordships know, I am particularly concerned with the Home Guard, and my noble friend who has just sat down has touched on it. I believe that the Home Guard embodies the spirit, as the noble

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Lord, Lord Lawson said, of all the workers in voluntary services in this country. Members of the Home Guard do not consider that they are at this moment a fighting force. What they do consider is that they are going to be ready to train others who will go along with them when they are needed, and, to my mind, that is one of their most important functions—training people to be ready to take their part. I am certain that all members of all voluntary services—I know more about the Home Guard than about what are called Civil Defence services, which I think we are going to call the Home Service forces, with whom we work extremely closely—are willing to take their part.
But I believe that the nation as a whole—as stated by previous speakers—does not realise how important it is to have a cadre and a teaching system for voluntary workers. Voluntary workers are very important indeed, and they can do a lot of work when and if any emergency arises. One has been told that in an emergency a third force is desperately important to keep the home front going. What does that mean? It really means a great deal. It means keeping the factories going and transport services running so that people are able to get to the factories. These are all jobs which the voluntary service can do and which I believe are most important. I should like to acid here that nothing like this could possibly be done by the Home Guard without the assistance which has always been so willingly given by the Regular Army and Territorial Army to Home Guard associations and units. We are very grateful for that.
I would ask Her Majesty's Government to consider the psychological point of view of members of the Home Guard and Civil Defence who are willing to give up their time to do drills, attend lectures and train themselves. We must give them something; and from the Home Guard point of view that something is the weapons they will be called upon to use in time of emergency. We have some good weapons, not ultra-modern ones, but modern enough. I heard only the other day that we are going to get wireless sets instead of having to signal by flag across London—a subject I have mentioned before in your Lordships' House. We must give the men and women in Home Defence a chance of
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using modern weapons, because they enjoy that.
Any member of the Home Guard, and possibly any Member of your Lordships' House, who fires a two-inch mortar and is given a high explosive bomb which goes off with a great "Boomph" and lands down at the other end—so long as there is no wind and it does not land in the opposite direction or on top of his head—can go back to his family or to the local "pub" feeling he is a terrific chap, letting off a two-inch mortar and the bomb going off with a "crump." We have discussed before the idea that if fie were not allowed to use the real thing it would be just as good. But it does not mean the same thing. We are all like schoolboys in some ways. If you give a schoolboy a modern train to play with, what happens is that you probably play with it yourself and he never gets a chance. It is the same with grown-up people. If we give them the weapons which they know and the proper ammunition and facilities for training, they will always come along. The other side, the Civil Defence and Home Guard social clubs, is very important. After training people can all get together in a social club, something which in many cases they would not be able to afford. To my mind, this is really important.
The total cost of the Home Guard is about £1,300,000, for 37,000 people. If we take that out of the total defence cost, it seems almost a fleabite. I know that my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is trying to cut down on all expenditure, but I believe that this expenditure is worth while. As I have said to your Lordships before, we all know that people will come along on the day; but if that day comes quickly, as it might do, then we should not have a trained personnel. I am delighted that my noble friend Lord Carrington has given us so much encouragement. If given encouragement and directive, then these voluntary workers will go on, and they will form the basis of a force which, if needed, will be ready. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will give encouragement to Civil Defence workers and the Home Guard.
4.17 p.m.
LORD HADEN-GUEST: My Lords, I wish to ask the Government to reply as definitely as possible about the way in which they propose to tackle certain

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immediate problems which will come, not with the outbreak of war, but with the threat of war. The first question is one which has been asked by everyone who has had anything to do with Civil Defence. In the event of a future war there must be a large dispersal of population all over the country. To allow any large number of people to remain in great cities like London and Manchester or in any of the industrial towns in England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, is simply inviting destruction, because one of the aims of any attack would be to disable us within the shortest possible time. And the time from the beginning of attack until the end might not be a question of weeks or days; it might be a question of hours, if that. The Hiroshima attack was rapid, and any attack by atomic weapons is bound to be quick in its effects. I hope that our Intelligence is so good that we shall warn ourselves—nobody else will—of any impending attack. I hope the Government will be able to say what plans they have for the dispersal of the population over the country. It is no use leaving a plan of this kind until a war has begun.
What is going to be the chain of command? Communications will very likely be broken, and what method is to be adopted to replace the normal telegraphic and telephonic communications? We must lay down a chain of command, and we must give it the means of giving the command. It will be necessary to plan dispersal, as I have already said. The big towns and many small towns will be uninhabitable. This means organisation in every town, city, and, indeed, large business establishment to ensure the possibility of what was called prior to the last war evacuation—which, incidentally, was very successful—and which is now referred to as dispersion. It will be essential to have that over a large part of the country.
What is to happen to doctors and local government representatives? You badly need doctors when you are being severely attacked. How are they to be given definite duties; and what is their training to be? Then there is the difficult question—and I hope the Government speaker will be able to assist us with information on this matter—of how we are to maintain some places, which will have to be at great depth underground, so that
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observers can remain in cities if they are destroyed. It is not easy to contemplate the conditions under which such people will have to live. Those are some of the questions which I believe need answering. I am speaking like this, because I know from my own experience when lecturing on this subject, which used to be called "air raid precautions," the kind of questions anyone giving instruction will be asked. I want to know the answers to those questions, and, if I get them, I shall then be glad to do more instruction in the future.
4.22 p.m.
VISCOUNT LONG: My Lords, I do not intend to keep your Lordships for more than a few minutes, but, as your Lordships know, I have for many years had the honour to be closely connected with the Territorial Army. I was glad to note what my noble friend Lord Carrington had to say about the Territorial Army. I do not want to go into too much detail, but my noble friend Lord Bridgeman raised a point—it came out also in the speech of my noble friend Lord Carrington—about these twenty-five battalions. We want every volunteer we can get, and it appears to me that Her Majesty's Government have taken away a great deal of our ammunition for getting volunteers by doing away with some of the oldest Territorial Regiments, those with great traditions in this country, which I should have thought could have been maintained under the new system of mobile columns or regiments. Apparently that was not to be.
The regiment of the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, the Royal Fusiliers, which had great traditions, although it was a gunner regiment in A.A. Command, has gone. The Hampshire Yeomanry, which was commanded by that great statesman and soldier the late Lord Mottistone, has gone, too. That is a great pity, especially since many of these regiments were based on centres where volunteers are now being called for. Eight years have passed, but in my opinion we are now back in 1948 and have an added burden and responsibility, inasmuch as some of our volunteers have already been taken by the Government for the twenty-five mobile battalions for Civil Defence. What is the rôle of these other regiments to be? We hear of the regiments within the Territorial divisions that may have to

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go abroad. I do not want to deal with that matter in my speech, because more than one noble Lord has raised the problem of how those divisions are to be transported. What is to be the rôle of these other organisations? Not far from me is a distinguished regiment: two-thirds of it carry out one rôle, and the other third carries out a totally different rôle. I was talking to the adjutant of this regiment over the week-end, and he knows no more than anybody else about the future.
The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, will remember the great difficulty we had in getting volunteers to start us off again in 1948 and 1949. I do not think your Lordships, or anyone else, could accuse those of us who were then interested, and still are, in the Territorial Army of not playing our part up to the limit of human endurance: to be pulled clown and howled down in uniform, as I was, at a certain big stadium by 8,000 people when I was recruiting, and to get a wet mop in your face from the mother of a boy you particularly wanted to join up, though vastly different experiences, were both far from pleasant. However, we are back where we were, and that leads me to ask a question. The National Servicemen who completed their term and drills this last summer will now have left the regiment. From a regiment of, say, 460 men who went out for training last year, there will probably be fewer than 100 who will be able to take the field next year. That is not an isolated case; owing to the new plan and scheme of Her Majesty's Government it must be general. How is it proposed to increase those numbers over the next two years? There will be a dribble, I suppose, of a few National Servicemen. I believe that the new scheme was necessary, but from our point of view in the Territorial Army it was unfortunate. The National Serviceman who had been encouraged to take on his obligations as a volunteer has gone. So we not only lose the three years of the National Serviceman, but we have lost these men who have elected to go back into National Service in order to get out of it. How is it hoped to increase the numbers of these regiments under those conditions? I point this out merely because these are conditions which have been pointed out to me by commanding officers and adjutants within the last five weeks.
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Then we come to the cost of this very costly Territorial Army now. In each unit to-day there are no fewer than four or five, if not six, Regular officers and warrant officers drawing large sums of money to train the men. When you have 600 to 700 men that is all right; but when you have only 100, do the Government not think that a good deal of money would be saved if those excellent officers and warrant officers were sent back to their own regiments to train the National Servicemen? I put that suggestion forward because I think it is an important point from the point of view of administration.
I should like to put this further point. I do not know how these circumstances have arisen, but one particular unit is based in a big city in the West of England, and between fifteen and twenty men living in that city are taken fifty to sixty miles away to Cardiff to do their annual training, whereas exactly the same form of training takes place in that city. The cost of taking those men by rail falls upon the country. Another fifteen or twenty men to bring up the strength are brought from another eighty to 100 miles away. If the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, wants to know the name of that unit and the full details, I shall be only too delighted to give them to him. I have mentioned the case in all sincerity, and I do not know that the noble Lord, or even the Minister, knows anything about it at all.
Lastly, may I come to the question of camps. I know that this is only a small detail, but the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, who I am sorry cannot be here to-day, will remember that in 1947 we were given a definite undertaking that all that could be done would be done to see that the cooking arrangements were right for the troops. I will speak about only one camp, although I could give plenty of examples. I do not want to exaggerate, because we all know that "Tommy Atkins" and the Territorial Army have a right to air a grievance if they want to. During a hot summer there was a tin cook-house at Windmill Camp. I know that camp very well. I have manœuvred all round it, and have also camped there. Although this is a permanent Territorial camp, no effort has ever been made to spend a little money on seeing that the kitchen and cook-house were properly established, with the result that not only

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was it impossible for the cooks to cook the food but before it even reached the troops it was two-thirds "overseas" and had to be destroyed.
Those are small details of instances where I think an improvement in the situation can be made. I ask, once again, that the question I have raised about the arrangements should be gone into. As my noble friend Lord Bridgeman truly said, it is not too late to reinstate these regiments in their original position and under the Territorial Association; and if that were done I believe that it would provide us with the ammunition once again to go forward and do our utmost to see that Her Majesty's Government's scheme is a success.
4.33 p.m.
THE EARL OF LIMERICK: My Lords, may I first add a word of thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, in his absence, for raising this subject at so opportune a moment. I regret that he cannot be here. The time, of course, is opportune because it is one of change, which is incessant. It is expected to be incessant, and it is quite essential that it should be so. Anybody who remembers only the past is, of course, quite unfitted to conceive the future, and the past now, with the rapidity of change in technical achievement, dies far more quickly than ever before in history. I hope that in a very short time—perhaps not to-night—Her Majesty's Government will be able to lighten in our minds many places which at the moment are rather obscure. I think most of us appreciate the colossal difficulties of thought, of planning and of reorganisation which precede any pronouncement, and most of us will even hope that it will not be thought right to hold against the Government at any time any pronouncement as being a definite pronouncement, but that it will be held to be an interim stage in a constant growth. Although, therefore, I am not in agreement, as I will explain, with all that has been done in the recent past, yet I feel at the same time only too grateful that it does not fall upon my shoulders to try to be wise at this particular time.
As this wide field has been so admirably covered this evening by many noble Lords, I propose to concern myself only with the Territorial Army, with which many of your Lordships and I
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have been connected for a good many years; and, in particular, I am going to put in a special plea for the maximum integration of civil and military effort and experience through consultation. That sounds rather trite. Most of us will think "That has been part of the set-up for years." My noble friend Lord Bridgeman referred to it, and, indeed, it was the great Lord Haldane, in his 1908 Act for what was then the Territorial Force, who foresaw and provided for that consultation. It was stressed by the former Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, in 1919, and it was mentioned in your Lordships' House not long ago, in March, 1951, by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. So there is nothing fresh in that principle, nor is there any point about it which may at first sight seem worth stressing just now. But, as I shall hope to show a little later on, I am not satisfied that in the recent changes that principle has been used to the full and in a way which could to the utmost have kept the country reasonably informed on forthcoming changes; nor am I satisfied that those changes have taken place after the necessary consultation with those on the civil side who, by reason of their incessant personal touch with every aspect of civilian effort, are thought best able to advise the Service Ministers through the appropriate channels.
Command Paper 9608, in paragraph 3, refers to the changing rôle of the National Service men. The Command Paper is indeed about National Service. With your Lordships' permission, I will read four lines of paragraph 20. That says:
"These decisions do not in any way detract from the essential part which the reserve and auxiliary forces will be called upon to play in the event of a nuclear war. Their training may need to be modified but will continue to be important. It will offer full scope for voluntary service."
Both those paragraphs imply the maximum co-operation with and help from the civil side, and the insistence on voluntary service, which many noble Lords have touched upon this evening, stresses the duty which is laid by statute on County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations in respect of recruiting.
This aspect has an importance which in the future it will be difficult to exaggerate. But, by reason of the period of national service, that duty has been

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rather cloaked and it may be that not all of us on the civil side—at any rate, all of us who have no experience from years before the National Service Act—are fully aware of our incessant duties for recruiting. They are and will become very important and, with respect, I suggest that nowhere is it possible to find instruments so well accustomed and so well suited to marry up the good will and the efforts of civil and military—if indeed there is much cleavage now—as the bodies set up by Statute for that purpose, the County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association.
We know that peace and war are now relative terms, but, in the past and in the old definition of "peace," experience has taught us that we could count on approximately 140,000 volunteers as being the strength of the old Territorial Army. If I had been asked my opinion, as I was quite a few years ago, as to whether that was a safe figure to bet on, I should have still said "Yes." If I were asked now, I would say: "That is much more difficult to answer. I do not know the answer." Conditions have been so proloundly modified by all the changing and incessant needs of Home Defence which, though equally important, is less alluring to ardent young spirits and which, as at present organised, has no equal attraction of organised life—if you like, the aspect of club life and so forth. It is more on an A.E.R. basis than on a T.A. basis, and I for one regret that. So although I feel this great doubt and could not answer now with any certainty, the question which was put to me a few years ago, it is right to add that, whatever the organisation of the future, one thing is sure from our civil side, and that is that the country can always rely on the maximum co-operation from the county associations and on advice tendered in a co-operative spirit and with the best good will. They are instruments which have stood the test of time and have shown their public worth. They are the cheapest instruments that the public can use, and I trust that, as my noble friend Lord Bridgeman remarked, it is not too late now to reconsider the organisation of those forty-eight units of the Mobile Defence Corps so that they may have the chance of a corporate life and of the close link with civil activities through associations which they used to enjoy in their old rôles.
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I know, of course, that this is no easy question. Many Ministries are involved in Home Defence. But at the same time I was struck by the remark of the noble Earl, Lord Lucan (from whose distinguished father, I might add in parenthesis, I learned a great deal of my Territorial work) that in a nuclear war a great many of these Ministries might quickly cease to exist. I am wondering whether it would not be fair to raise the picture of a lot of broken eggs but no recognisable or edible omelette. Now we want a conception of the organisation of these units, whether they concern our associations or not, to which we can turn and with which we can co-operate. It is not possible for us, with all the good will in the world, to co-operate with six or more Government Departments.
Summarising these remarks, I would say that my plea, therefore, is for maximum consultation between military and civil effort at an early stage. That implies a high degree of confidence between Service Ministries and the appropriate advisory bodies on the civil side which sit in the War Office and the Air Ministry. If I may add a purely personal opinion—and it is a very strong one—it is that in order that those advisory bodies may pass their mixed views (for they are bound to be mixed occasionally) in a balanced form to the appropriate Minister, those committees should be under the chairmanship of the appropriate Under-Secretaries of State. They used to be. Finally I remember—or I do not quite remember; I only think—that it was Clemenceau who remarked:
"War is too serious for soldiers to meddle with."
I have far too many friends among soldiers and I have far too great a respect for their physical powers to associate myself quite fully with that statement; but I would add that in modern conditions that can remain true if one adds some such words as "unless with the full knowledge and support of civil representatives."
4.48 p.m.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this has been an interesting and helpful, though not perhaps a very jolly, debate. I, too, much regret the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, and the reason for it. I am grateful to him for having given me notice of one or two points that he would have raised, all of which have

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been mentioned by noble Lords speaking in this debate. I think the debate, if it has shown nothing else, has shown one point perfectly clearly. We are now perfectly clear in our minds what are the three courses open to us who are considering the problems of Home and Civil Defence.
The first course is that we do nothing. We say when we speak of war: "It may never come: this horror may never be upon us." Or "If it does come, it will be too great a disaster for us to cope with," so we adopt a defeatist attitude, throw up our hands and let fate take its course. I think it is now perfectly clear to everybody that that policy is wholly unacceptable, both to the country and to the Government. It is out of the question politically, militarily and morally. I believe that noble Lords opposite share this view with equal strength—indeed, their pamphlet, to which several noble Lords opposite have referred, takes this view, and the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, endorsed it in the course of his interesting speech. That is the first course.
The second course is that we exist in a state of advanced preparedness, a sort of constant tenth or eleventh hour state of readiness, with our finger always on the shelter door. I think we agree that the burden and cost of that would be out of proportion and quite impossible for a country in our condition. So we come to the third course which is the course which the Government are seeking to adopt—that is, to attempt to steer a realistic middle course between hysteria and inertia. That is the course which the Government have been trying, with all the conviction in their power, for the last two or three years to bring earnestly to the attention of the people of this country. I would repudiate at once any suggestion that the Government have been lacking in conviction or in energy in the way they have attempted to awaken the people of this country to the facts and to the courses open to them. Their attitude is elaborated in paragraph 101 of the Statement on Defence, 1955. Perhaps I may just remind your Lordships what that paragraph says:
"Home defence measures, by demonstrating the country's determination to resist aggression in all its forms, buttress the resolution needed to sustain an effective deterrent policy. Against the thermo-nuclear attack of the future the best defence of the civil population in this
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small, crowded and vulnerable island is to try to ensure that it never materialises. But we must also in common prudence continue to provide financial and other resources for a measure of insurance in case we should fail in our main aim of averting war."
It is with some of those measures of insurance that I should like to deal, and in so doing I will try to answer some of the many questions that have been put to me in the course of this debate.
I should like to agree straightaway with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Limerick, to whose speech we have just listened with interest, when, broadly, he said that some of these problems have no final solution. We are trying to work out what can be done to meet the likely effect of weapons that might be used against us, and we are trying to decide what proportion of the national resources can be allocated to meet this threat. It is easy enough in all conscience to talk in general terms about this matter; what is much more difficult is to particularise.
That brings us straight up against two problems which I think have been touched on more than any others in the course of this debate—the problems of dispersal and shelter. It was the theme of much of what the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, and the noble Lord. Lord Haden-Guest, had to say—and quite naturally so. They would agree, I think, that the question of dispersal, which includes evacuation plans, is fundamental to Civil Defence—indeed, to all Home Defence plans. It differs from many other aspects of Civil Defence in that until it had actually to be put into operation the working out of a scheme of evacuation and dispersal would not involve much expenditure. However, some of your Lordships have pointed out that detailed planning would be required in order to enable a scheme to be put into operation at short notice.
Before we embark on this detailed planning, I am sure the House will agree with me, it is essential that we should be, as in other fields, as certain as we can be that we are on the right lines. If it were now only a question of the well-tried system of limited evacuation of certain priority classes, as we all remember so well in 1939, the way would be clearer, although everybody knows what immense difficulties emerged in practice even with that comparatively limited scheme. But the whole question has had to be looked at afresh in the light of the new forms of attack that we may have to meet. Here

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we have to plan in terms of millions. We have to make the best estimate we can of the time we might have to carry out the operation and to form a picture of the degree of dislocation to the economy that the nation could stand.
Even in advance of an attack, once this has been done, the gigantic problems of transport and of accommodation have to be faced, as well as those of the machinery that can be relied on to carry out whatever plan was eventually adopted. This is one of the many Civil Defence matters in which, as I say, it is comparatively easy to talk in general terms about the way to organise a scheme, but very difficult to formulate detailed assumptions which are sufficiently safe to warrant going ahead with detailed planning. I can assure the House that progress has been made with the review of this difficult subject which would involve the whole national life in war time. I hope the House will forgive me if I say that I am not yet in a position to tell your Lordships that it is possible to announce the Government's intentions in this matter.
On the question of shelters, which marches with dispersal, I am glad to hear my noble friend Lord Bridgeman express approval of what has so far been the policy. Your Lordships who have spoken on this matter have indicated that the question of shelters, together of course with the question of dispersal, is probably our main basis of survival. As your Lordships realise, the two are interdependent. For instance, there is not much point in putting a larger shelter policy into operation in a certain area only to find later that it is intended to be made an area of evacuation. The two obviously march together.
Many speakers this afternoon have spoken of the problem of the colossal work and expense which might be involved in making a realistic policy. Even with unlimited funds, protection against a direct hit or near-miss from a hydrogen bomb is not really "on." But a great deal can be done. We have also to bear in mind the difficulties of prolonged occupation of shelter habitation in fall-out conditions and that relatively safe areas are no longer immune. It sounds a rather defeatist thing to say; but I must agree with noble Lords who suggest that a hole
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in the ground is probably the best protection we can think of. We are examining this problem most carefully, but in view of the heavy demands which the programme would entail. I am sure your Lordships will agree that it is essential that we should make up our minds correctly on this and on the question of dispersal. I am sorry—I am being quite frank with your Lordships—that I cannot give a more definite answer. Those of your Lordships who have considered this problem will realise that it is being particularly well thought about, a little more so than have many problems.
Now may I turn to some of the matters which your Lordships have raised and upon which I am able to report more obvious progress. There is the important question of the monitoring system for radioactive fall-out—that is, the more advanced type of warning to which one or two speakers have referred. Steps have now been taken to implement the Government's plans for setting up a national monitoring organisation to give warning and to measure radioactivity in the event of air attack. In June my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced in another place that the Royal Observer Corps, in conjunction with the Home Office Air Raid Warning Organisation, had undertaken this important new function in addition to their existing duties. Since the announcement was made, all full-time officers of the Royal Observer Corps concerned with training have attended special courses of a week's duration at a Home Office Civil Defence School, and on October 3 the training of the Royal Observer Corps in the use of the radiac instruments began. Sufficient instruments for training have been issued, and substantial numbers of post observers will be trained in the use of monitoring instruments during the course of the winter.
In September, the Royal Observer Corps and the Air Raid Warning Organisation held a full-scale trial of reporting procedures, from which valuable lessons have been learnt, and it is proposed to hold further trials next spring. Experiments have also been conducted during this summer to test the efficiency of additional siren signals. Three trials have been held: one in London, which some of your Lordships may have heard and been puzzled by, a second trial at Potter's Bar, and a third at Uckfield. The object

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of these trials was to test the possibility of obtaining distinctive siren signals which might be used to give warning of the threat of radioactive fall-out. We have not yet had the final results of these experiments, but I am told that they have produced valuable data, not only upon the possibilities of using additional siren signals but on other matters connected with the efficiency of the existing warnings. I hope your Lordships will agree that good progress has been made in a short time, both in regard to the setting up of a monitoring organisation and the means by which the public can be warned of this new threat.
My Lords, I turn now to a subject touched upon by several noble Lords, notably by Lord Lawson and Lord Bridgeman—namely, the development of the war-time fire-fighting organisation. As previous speakers have pointed out, thermo-nuclear war would bring fire on an absolutely unprecedented scale. Devastation would obviously be much more widespread than in the war of 1939–45, because of the hazards of firefighting in fall-out conditions. Obviously, that means that operations must involve the bringing of appliances from outside the danger area. So the whole fire services of the country will be under central control. The bulk of resources available will be organised in mobile columns, each consisting of thirty main pumping appliances, together with ancillary equipment. The strength of each will be about 600 men and they will be situated outside built-up areas. The need to conduct firefighting operations over wrecked roads and away from water obviously poses new problems from the point of view of equipment. Great ingenuity has been shown in designing and producing suitable equipment for this task. Nearly 3,000 special self-propelled appliances for this particular object will be available by the end of this year.
An experimental training school has been set up at the headquarters of the Surrey Fire Brigade at Reigate. One hundred volunteers from various fire brigades are attending for a period of six months and good results in new techniques and controls have already been achieved. Some form of standard control is now in course of preparation and, as my noble friend Lord Carrington indicated, satisfactory progress in training
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Class H Reserves in fire-fighting has been made. This is done at Washington Hall, at Chorley, in Lancashire, which has been designed to accommodate about 10,000 reservists a year for basic training in fire-fighting. Already some 2,250 reservists have been trained. This scheme has worked remarkably well, despite the pessimism displayed by many people when the scheme was initially launched, and a great deal of keenness has been shown by those participating in it. A second establishment is to be opened next year at the former R.A.F. Station. Moreton-in-the-Marsh, for advanced training on a scale not hitherto possible.
On the subject of training plans generally, about which several noble Lords have expressed some little anxiety, I may say that the whole of the training machinery has now been completely overhauled. The old system was criticised by some people because training of individuals took too long and, so it was alleged, was insufficiently co-ordinated. Frankly, some of it was rather dull. It was decided last year that individual volunteers should be trained by section instructors who could carry through the whole training relating it all the time to the specialised needs of the Civil Defence Corps. The new system had to be instituted and instructors qualified to give the new type of instruction. I am glad to say that excellent progress has been made with this large-scale reconversion. Since the beginning of 1955 nearly 2,000 instructors have passed through the three Home Office schools, and I think I can say that there have been noteworthy improvements all round. I readily admit that complaints are still received about the type of training given by individual instructors. I will admit that it is not possible entirely to remove the grounds for such complaints, but great progress has been made and there has been substantial overall improvement.
There have also been courses for senior officers—that is, those responsible for Civil Defence at local authority level—which have been running at the Staff College since it was first set up; and they have been kept up to date on new developments. There has been a new course this year at Sunningdale for sector controllers, the men who would be actually in control at the scene of damage and who would be responsible for the conduct

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of operations over an area of up to, perhaps, one and a half square miles. My noble friend Lord Bridgeman spoke of leadership and the high calibre of leadership required in Civil Defence, as in all other forms of national service. We could not agree more wholeheartedly, but one cannot get leadership by White Papers or Acts of Parliament: something more tangible is wanted. So far, we have had about 500 of these people who require to show leadership of the highest calibre, but we can do with a great deal more of them. These courses are going on and we attach the utmost importance to them.
I should like here to add a word on a matter of rather technical importance which I think will interest those noble Lords who have been worrying about control at regional level—I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Haden-Guest was more worried than most noble Lords. I readily agree that this is a matter of great importance. As soon as the full effects of the hydrogen bomb had been weighed up it was clear that the system of operational control which had been in existence was no longer adequate to meet the new conditions, and local authorities have had to mark time as regards the necessary recasting of their control system while a careful and thorough survey of the situation was carried out in the light of the greater degree of damage and of the effects of radioactive fall-out. No Civil Defence scheme can hope to be effective without an efficient control structure, and great care has been taken in working out a new system which will carry with it a much greater increase in mobility, although mobility cannot be the whole answer. I am glad to say that it has now been possible to complete the working out of this new scheme and an outline of it will be communicated to local authorities in the near future so that realistic planning can be resumed. We can reasonably expect that this will have a most salutary effect in giving realism to local authority preparations—for realism is, of course, most important—even though it will necessarily take some time to apply the general lines of the new system to the different conditions of each area.
Several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Bridgeman, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen (who himself commands a Home Guard unit), the noble Lord, Lard Limerick, and my noble
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friend Lord Long, have raised the question of the rôle of the Home Guard and the Territorial Army. I was very glad to hear Lord Long say such kind things about the death of my own regiment and was also grieved to hear him tell that story about a lunatic "general post" amongst a unit in the West Country. I will certainly have that matter looked into. All I can say is that it does not look as though the, Army has changed very much since my day. The whole question of the rôle of the active Army, the Territorial Army and the Home Guard in Home Defence has been most carefully reconsidered, and this examination is very near completion. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that the future of the Home Guard forms part of the whole pattern of Home Defence, and they will therefore not expect me to be in a position to make an announcement in isolation. I must ask them on this occasion to be patient, but I assure them that a full statement will be made in the near future.
My Lords, we have another debate of interest to follow, and therefore I will weary you no longer. I have tried to be as frank as I can with the House. There are important aspects of Civil Defence in which we are not yet ready to announce plans—not because we have been in the least unwilling to grapple with the problems involved, but because those problems have proved so intractable. We shall persevere with them, but I am sorry to say that I can see no prospect of our being able to make any comprehensive statement about the progress made and conclusions reached—which even then may have to be provisional in some respects—before the issue of the next White Paper early in 1956. I should be lacking in candour if I did not make that statement to the House now.
LORD HADEN-GUEST: In 1956?
LORD MANCROFT: The next White Paper. In the meantime, as I hope I have been able to show, we have reached decisions and made advances wherever and whenever it has been possible to do so; and action has followed speedily upon decision. As compared with this time last year we have arrangements in train, not simply in general terms for the allocation of such help from the Fighting Services as might be available, but for trained assistance from specially trained units and for the addition of trained manpower to the specialist Fire Service.

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We have laid the foundations of a nationwide scheme for reporting radioactive fall-out and for making operational use of the information made available. We have strengthened the regional Civil Defence organisation and have reached conclusions about the formidable problem of control of Civil Defence operations which will, we hope, soon enable local planning to start again.
These are only examples. I hope the House will agree that the sum total of the steps forward marks a quite significant achievement. Let me assure your Lordships as strongly as I can that we are far from being satisfied or complacent. There can never be any finality about plans for anything so imponderable as Civil Defence. We realise as well as anybody how much there is still to do and what an enormous field has to be covered before we can express the slightest degree of satisfaction with the progress made; the problem is too vast and too grim for that. But I ask your Lordships to accept the fact that we are realistically and anxiously aware of the problems to be solved and of the need to push on and find practical answers to them.
5.10 p.m.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Man-croft, will forgive me if I point out that between inertia and hysteria there are a great many steps. In spite of the news that he has given us, I cannot help thinking that Her Majesty's Government have still not convinced people, and have not given a sufficient lead to arouse that enthusiasm which is required to get volunteers. I believe there are just two points that may have been misunderstood. I certainly did not advocate a wholesale policy of shelters the cost of which I think Lord Carrington calculated at some £2.000 million.
LORD CARRINGTON: No; I think the noble Earl has misunderstood me. I said that if all the proposals advocated in the Labour Party pamphlet on Civil Defence were actually put in train they would probably cost something between £2,000 million and £3,000 million.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: I thank the noble Lord for that clarification. I think there are varying shelter policies. There are great deep-shelter policies which no-one outside Sweden has contemplated.
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There is also a policy rather like that of the Anderson and Morrison shelters which we had in the last war and which would be capable of adaptation to the problems here. A number of useful points, I think, have come out in the course of the debate. Her Majesty's Government have given us news of some small steps, and I would only say that I agree wholeheartedly with what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, has said about secrecy. Do not let secrecy stop any Government announcement. It is important to get something, even if it is only provisional, that will give the public the idea of how the Government view the problem. May I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

AGRICULTURE (IMPROVEMENT OF ROADS) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
5.15 p.m.
LORD RAGLAN LORD RAGLAN rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can make a statement on the situation in the Southern Sudan; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, your Lordships may have seen in the Press recently reports of serious disturbances in the Southern Sudan. The most serious of these disturbances are reported from a district of which I was for two years in charge. I left that district nearly forty years ago, and since then, so far as I can learn, it has remained in a state of complete tranquility, as, with trifling exceptions, has the whole of the Southern Sudan. The Southern Sudan is a country of very different character from the Northern Sudan. The Northern Sudan is an arid country inhabited by Moslem Arabs. The Southern Sudan is a country of swamps and forests, inhabited by pagan Negroes. To use a colloquialism, the two regions are as different as chalk from cheese, and up till recent times the only contact between the Northern Sudan and the Southern Sudan was that the Northerners used to raid the Southerners for slaves. These slave raids went on until the time of the Battle of Omdurman —that is well within living memory—

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and it is reported that the disturbances to which I allude were caused by the fact that those concerned believed they were to be carried off to Khartoum to be sold into slavery.
The history of the Sudan (I will not trouble your Lordships at any great length about it) is this. In the middle of the last century Egypt extended her hold over the Sudan. Various European adventurers in the employment of the Egyptian Government annexed, in a loose sort of way, parts of the Sudan to the Khedivate of Egypt. Of course, the connection with Egypt came to an end with the murder of General Gordon. After that date, slave raids were resumed with renewed vigour until the time of the battle of Omdurman, when they were put an end to. But when the battle of Omdurman was won it was found that a French force under a very brave and adventurous officer, General Marchand, had marched right through Bahr El Ghazal Province into the Upper Nile Province and had established itself at Fashoda which had been the centre of the slave trade. Fashoda is a place of very great strategic importance. Its occupation practically cut the Northern Sudan off from the South.
The British Government in power was then headed by that very great statesman the grandfather of the noble Marquess who leads this House to-day, and he insisted on the withdrawal of General Marchand from Fashoda. The French Government, very unwillingly, withdrew him at the request of the then British Government. They would certainly not have done so at the request of the Egyptians or of the Northern Sudanese. And if they had not done so those two provinces, which make up about half of the Southern Sudan, would have formed part of the French Colonial Empire. A year before that the Belgians had moved South down the Nile and had occupied what is now the Western part of the Equatorial Province; and there they remained until 1910 when, at the request of the British Government—again the Egyptians and the Sudanese had nothing to do with it—they withdrew. Up till that time—from 1897 to 1910—that region formed a part of the Belgian Congo. And I may say that from that region, also, serious disturbances have recently been reported. As for the frontier between the Sudan and Kenya and Uganda, that was a line drawn in White-
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hall, and it was drawn long before the frontier was administered—certainly on the Sudan side, and I think on the other side as well.
My object is to show your Lordships that the Sudan, as it exists now, is an artificial creation of the British Government. It is really a great chunk of Africa, and it happens that the inhabitants of the Southern half are totally different from the inhabitants of the Northern part. There is no good reason why, without their consent, they should be placed under the domination of the North. The Government were informed that if these people were placed under the domination of the North without adequate precautions there would be trouble, but they chose to ignore this warning completely. They had apparently decided upon a policy of "scuttle," and they proceeded to scuttle without the least regard for the consequences. All I can say is that I hope to hear from the noble Marquess who is to reply on behalf of the Government that the Government have taken some steps to repair the damage which was caused by their obvious neglect of duty. I beg to move for Papers.
5.20 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, who was responsible for this Motion, has asked for a statement of policy on behalf of the Government in the terms of the Motion. Therefore I think it would be for the convenience of the House if I were to make that statement at this early stage and leave it to other noble Lords who may desire to contribute to the debate; and if the House is willing that it should be so arranged, after other noble Lords have spoken I will endeavour to make some reply. I am grateful to the noble Lord for having put down the Motion because it gives me an opportunity to describe, in as brief terms as I can, recent events in the Southern Sudan and to remove some misapprehensions about the present conditions there. In view of what the noble Lord said in moving his Motion, I would point out that, whatever the situation might have been in the somewhat remote past into which he led us in his opening speech, it is now covered by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan which was entered into in 1953. The terms of that Agreement now regulate the position in

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the Sudan and events in the Sudan have to be looked at in the light of that existing and binding Agreement.
Perhaps, I should first remind your Lordships of the more recent political developments which have brought about the present state of affairs. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February, 1953, on the Sudan provided, amongst other things, for the Sudanisation (I cannot get rid of that objectionable word) of the Administration before the Sudan could proceed to the actual processes of self-determination. In accordance with this provision all British administrators had left the Southern Sudan by the end of August, 1954, and for the most part they were replaced by Northern Sudanese, many of whom were men of considerable ability. I agree that from some points of view this replacement by Northerners may have been unfortunate, since it served to revive the traditional enmity of the South towards the North which sprang from the slave-trading days of the last century. The noble Lord was quite right in saying that that was the main source of the feud between North and South. The position in regard to the appointment of Northerners to duties in the South was largely inevitable since the South had very few men capable of conducting the administration and it would probably have been a long time before enough Southerners could be trained to take over the quite considerable responsibilities.
Since the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed, the Sudan has moved steadily towards self-determination on the basis, laid down in the Agreement, that the Sudan's future status should be decided as one integral whole; and on August 16 of this year the Sudanese Parliament passed a resolution to ask the Co-domini —the United Kingdom and Egypt—to set the process of self-determination in motion. But, unhappily, matters were not progressing so favourably in the South, and only two days after Resolution Day a mutiny of elements of the Equatoria Corps of the Sudan Defence Force broke out at the garrison town of Torit, which is situated in the extreme South close to the Uganda frontier.
The immediate cause of the mutiny seems to have been the decision to remove some companies of the Equatoria Corps from Torit to Khartoum to take part
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in the ceremonies preceding the withdrawal of British and Egyptian troops from the Sudan. But the underlying causes of the mutiny are undoubtedly more deep-seated. They lie in differences of race, religion and cultural and economic development.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Certainly they do. As regards responsibility for these tragic events, it would clearly be wrong to attempt to prejudge the findings of the Commission of Inquiry which the Sudan Government has set up. This Commission, which is still in the process of taking evidence, consists of a Christian-Arab Judge, a Northern Sudanese whose career has been in the police and who was formerly Assistant Sudan Agent in London, and a Chief of the Lokoya, a tribe who live in the neighbourhood of Torit.
The mutiny quickly spread from Torit to the other centres of Equatoria Province and the mutinous soldiers were joined by police and prison warders and in some cases by local tribesmen, whose part was chiefly in looting. It is sad to have to record that altogether about 450 Northerners, officials, teachers and merchants included, lost their lives. A state of emergency was declared in the three Southern provinces, although it was only in Equatoria Province that most of the trouble took place. Troops were rushed to Juba, many of them in R.A.F. planes, in order to restore the situation. Before military action was taken against the mutineers they were given adequate time to surrender. Rather than surrender, most of them fled into the bush and it has been an extremely difficult job to round them up. More than 700 have now surrendered and a further 150 are interned in Uganda. The rest, about 400, are at large but are not in organised bodies.
The House may well be concerned about the effect which these events may have on those parts of the Uganda Protectorate which border the troubled areas of the Sudan. In addition to the troops of the Sudan Defence Force at present interned in Uganda, it is estimated that between 2.000 and 3.000 civilian refugees have crossed the border since the mutiny began. It has proved possible to absorb these refugees without difficulty among members of their own tribes who live in Uganda or to find a livelihood for them elsewhere in the Protectorate. However,

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the Uganda Government are carefully watching the situation across the border and are fully aware of the possible repercussions that any worsening of the situation in Southern Sudan might have on the inhabitants of the Protectorate.
Discussions have taken place between representatives of the Sudan Government and the Uganda Government about the future of those mutineers who are interned in a camp at Gulu in Uganda. The Sudanese representatives returned to Khartoum to ask their Government to try to collect evidence which could be used in asking the Uganda authorities to extradite the men. The Uganda Government made it clear that they can only return to the Sudan those who are prepared to go (no one has so far volunteered) and those against whom charges can be substantiated of committing crimes not connected with, or arising out of, the mutiny. The remainder have to be treated as political refugees under International Law, since they were involvd in a mutiny with a political objective.
The Sudan Government have taken steps to restore order in Equatoria Province, and Northern administrators are now present at all the main centres, although they rely for their safety upon the support of detachments of Northern troops. The troops have been given strict orders to observe good behaviour, and our information is that they have for the most part done so, particularly in those centres where the troops are commanded by responsible officers. It is, however, more difficult to keep a close watch on the activities of small detachments of troops in outlying areas, and there have certainly been cases of ill-treatment and illegal methods of extracting evidence. The only really serious trouble which has occurred since the mutiny was at Yei, near the Uganda border, when Northern troops shot dead seven Southern policemen who were trying to escape capture. The policemen were all, it is believed, deeply involved in the mutiny. It is, however, clear that the Sudan authorities will not tolerate conduct of this sort since the officer commanding the troops involved has been removed.
All my information indicates that reports about the situation in the Southern Sudan which have recently appeared in certain sections of the Press are greatly exaggerated. There is a danger that the food and medical situa-
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tion may deteriorate further and that many more refugees will cross the border, but there are signs that in other respects the situation in Equatoria Province is returning to normal. Juba airport is now open again to traffic and the Nile steamer service between the Sudan and Uganda is about to be resumed. The Equatoria Projects Board factory at Nzara is due to be reopened on November 15 and a new Northern manager has been appointed.
Although many people are reported to have fled into the bush, we know that many of them are sufficiently confident to continue to gather together for church services, and at one place in Equatoria Province since the mutiny took place 666 Southerners were confirmed by the Southern Anglican Bishop on one day. There are no secret courts: civil courts are trying cases and appear to be acting legally. The inaccuracy of some Press reports has undoubtedly been caused in part by the fact that they have been written chiefly from outside the Sudan, because until recently the Sudan Government have refused to allow any correspondents into the South. The Sudan Government are now beginning to relax these restrictions and this change of policy will help towards obtaining a more objective view of the situation.
Although the Governor-General has, under the Self-Government Statute, a special responsibility to ensure fair and equitable treatment to all the inhabitants of the various provinces of the Sudan, it is obvious that he can exercise it effectively only with co-operation of the Sudan Government. So far, the Sudanese Prime Minister has shown by the restraint which he has observed that he is aware of the dangers of the situation and of the need for a constructive solution of the Southern problem. The administration of the South is now entirely in the hands of the Sudan Government, and we as a co-dominus can only advise.
A number of suggestions have recently been made as to how the present situation in the Southern Sudan should be dealt with. It has been proposed, for instance, that an International Commission should be sent to the South, possibly under the auspices of the United Nations, to see that the Southerners get fair play. Other suggestions have been made that the International Red Cross or the World Health Organisation should send a mission

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to the South. Either of these measures could be taken only with the agreement of the Sudan Government, who would probably regard such proposals as a sign of lack of confidence in them and therefore as calculated to weaken their position. The despatch of United Nations observers would almost certainly revive and strengthen the movement for some sort of self-rule in the South, thus widening the gap between South and North and running counter to the declared intention of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, that the future of the country should be decided as one integral whole. Moreover, these observers would at best be only a palliative. What would happen after their withdrawal?
Her Majesty's Government are strongly of the opinion that the future interests of the Sudan can be served only if the authority of the Sudanese Government is maintained and strengthened. Other countries, at a similar stage on the road towards self-government, have in the past been faced with tragic and complex internal difficulties and their patience and resource in overcoming them has done much to reconcile and unify the various elements. The present difficulties in the Southern Sudan can be solved only if the Sudanese Government themselves earnestly seek a solution by consultation with all parties; and I am glad to say that there are signs that they realise the necessity for such a step.
5.36 p.m.
EARL WINTERTON: My Lords, I always feel that if one is privileged to take part at a comparatively early stage in one of your Lordships' debates one should not strain the patience of your Lordships by speaking too long, and I wish to put my points in tabloid form. I should like first to make one personal observation in general. I am a great admirer of the conduct of foreign affairs since 1945, by both the Labour and the Conservative Governments and by the many distinguished Ministers in office and their advisers who have been responsible for that conduct. But I am certainly not an admirer of the method in which the Sudan has been dealt with. I should like to thank my noble friend Lord Raglan for having raised this matter. Of course, he is absolutely right in making a point with which the Minister never dealt in his speech. He is quite right in saying
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that the Sudan was never a national entity, but was purely a geographical expression. It was obvious that there was no sort of compatibility between the comparatively sophisticated and mainly Moslem and partly Arab North and the primitive, mainly negroid tribes of the South, with their memories of Northern slave raids. The difference goes deeper than the memories of slave raiding, and the two parts of the country are completely incompatible.
When Her Majesty's Government announced that they were going to bring about self-government I was the only Member of your Lordships' House who ventured to express some doubt. My noble friend made his usual courteous reply and said that he would take note of my warning. I would challenge any noble Lord, including members of the Government, to deny what I am about to say—namely, that the country was rescued from the bloody chaos of the past, and enabled to reach a progressive standard of prosperity, only by sixty years of British guidance and superintendence; and in the whole of our history there has never been anything which did more credit to British rule than what we did in the Sudan during that sixty years. It was as clear as it could be to everyone, except, apparently, members of the Government, that the removal of that guidance and superintendence would lead to trouble and possibly to the chaos of over sixty years ago before Lord Kitchener's victory.
I ask: Why did we do it? It was no doubt mainly in order to try to conciliate Egypt—whether we were successful in that the noble Marquess and members of Her Majesty's Government will be able to tell, but we do not seem to have been very successful in getting Egypt on our side in other respects—and partly because we have persuaded ourselves (this applies to all Parties) as a nation that self-government is more desirable than good government. I suggest that the real motive behind that assumption is a desire to appease the opponents of colonialism, for reasons that one can appreciate, because we must work with our American friends, and the wish to avoid trouble, since we already have enough on our hands in Malaya and elsewhere. So we cheerfully, at short notice, divest ourselves of our responsibilities, allowing the inhabitants to murder each other, as they did on a tremendous scale in the Indian Peninsula in 1945.

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I well recollect the speech of Sir Winston Churchill in another place—one of the most formidable of the speeches that even he has made—criticising His late Majesty's Government for what they did when they got out of India. Fortunately, what has happened in the Sudan has not been as bad, though it is had enough. Politically we may be quite right, but whether we are morally justified is a different thing. Of course, at the moment we could not be in a more unfortunate position than we are in the Sudan. We have a British Governor and we have British planes there, but we have no sort of executive authority whatever. Therefore, we are being accused by our numerous enemies in the Middle East of being responsible for the trouble or for doing nothing about it, as the case may be.
We could not be in a weaker or a worse position. I understand that we use British planes to convey some of the troops from the North to the South which of course will make the Southerners—those who are in revolt against the Sudan Government—think that we are in some way on the side of the North. I can only say that the least we can do—and I was glad to hear my noble friend's remarks in that connection— is to let these Southern refugees enter British territory, and to refuse to agree to the proposal which was made by the Sudan Government that they should be returned as criminals. The noble Marquess told us—and I am sure all your Lordships were delighted to hear it—that the atrocities on both sides had been exaggerated owing to the lack of information. For that, the Sudan Government are entirely responsible. There were a number of correspondents, including a war correspondent of great ability of the Daily Telegraph, who endeavoured to get permission to go to the South to see things on the spot, but the Sudan Government refused permission to do so.
My last point is this, and I think it is one which is worth making. I have always felt that the weakness of the British character is that they appear to do things which may look in the eyes of the world rather hypocritical; and here is an instance of something which other nations would describe as hypocrisy. When the Central African Federation Bill was before Parliament, some Members of your Lordships' House, as well as
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of another place, and at least two important organs of the Press, showed intense solicitude for the welfare of Africans in the territories concerned, and great apprehensions as to what might happen to them after federation. None of their fears, incidentally, was justified, and my noble friend the Leader of the House, very properly if I may say so, castigated some Members of your Lordships' House who expressed these fears. The Southern Sudanese strongly objected, so for as they were able vocally (most of them, of course, being illiterate), to the removal of our power to protect them; and the dreadful events which have resulted show that their fears were justified.
The pro-native African party, as represented by those who spoke in your Lordships' House and in another place, and who wrote in the Press, have been almost completely silent on this issue. Instead of using, as they did at the time of the federation, even the pulpit of St. Paul's in order to propound their political views on the subject, not a word has been said, so far as I know, on this subject by anybody of those who objected to federation. I suggest that we are owed some explanation. They were right to express concern for native Africans, which is a very proper thing to do. It should be a general concern.
I say only this in conclusion—I must apologise to your Lordships for speaking somewhat strongly, but I feel very strongly on this matter, having myself in the past had some knowledge of the country. I cannot help thinking that if some distinguished past Members of your Lordships' House—infinitely more distinguished than I can ever be—like Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, Lord Derby and the grandfather of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, had been present in this debate, they would have had a certain sympathy with what I have said. In their day we showed frankness and directness of approach towards international affairs, because, as a nation, we believed alike in our mission and in our rights in the world—two very important things. It is a state of feeling, a climate of opinion, which, both for good and ill reasons, we have discarded as a nation. Of course, our influence is still enormous, but we use it to-day in quite a different connection. I cannot help thinking—and this is my last word

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—what would have happened in the 'eighties. Suppose that a Liberal Government had done what the present Conservative Government did in the Sudan. We can guess what would have been said by the Conservative Party. We know what the Conservative Party did say about Mr. Gladstone's betrayal of General Gordon. I think they would have been very critical. We can only hope that things will improve, that the noble Marquess's hopes will be justified; and, however critical we may be of what has taken place in the past, all of us can wish that the Sudanese Government will meet with success in governing this country and that there will be a hopeful future for it.
5.46 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWELL: My Lords, I had to speak once before immediately after the noble Earl, Lord Winterton. At that time he violently disapproved of what I said, and I hope I shall not be quarrelling with him this time. I ask to be allowed to add a few words on this extremely important and delicate subject. I think something ought to be said from the Bishops' Bench, because our sympathies are deeply engaged in what concerns the welfare of the Sudan, and we may be able to make some small contribution.
The Church authorities do not command the Intelligence of the Foreign Office—I mean, of course, the Intelligence Service of the Foreign Office—but information does come to us, and perhaps sometimes we know things that some Government officials do not. When we remember the great servants that this country has given to the Sudan, both in Church and State, it is tragic to think that these troubles should have arisen so early in the new experiment, just when all the work of these great servants has been carried out and while the new régime is still so inexperienced. But the tension between North and South, as the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, pointed out, is nothing new. It has always been inherent in the contrast between the Moslem North, with its relatively higher standard, and the pagan and primitive societies indigenous in the equatorial provinces. They are totally unequal in material power, and they are living in different universes of spiritual and cultural development. Does not the weak
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always fear the strong, and does not the more advanced always tend to despise, if not actively to exploit, the more backward?
As has been already hinted, the South has a long and bitter memory, and the more we know about the earlier history of Equatorial Africa the more shall we understand and be able to sympathise with the fears and apprehensions of the Southern people. But the balance was being rapidly redressed. It is only fifty years ago since that great apostle of the Sudan, Bishop Gwynne, whom I have heard described in Khartoum as the second founder of the country, General Gordon being, of course, the first, led the first Anglican missionaries down to the help of the primitive tribes of Equatoria who were then untamed, naked and near savages. In that short time of fifty years a church has developed, drawn from four or five Southern tribes. It has grown to such an extent that during his recent visit to Uganda the Archbishop of Canterbury consecrated a Southern Sudani priest as assistant bishop in that area. And as many of your Lordships know, Southern Christians are already sitting as members of the Legislative Assembly. Schools have been built, health services established and a whole network of social services, some Government sponsored and some mission sponsored, has been initiated and spread throughout the country. It is wonderful what has been done in so short a time. It is a thrilling story, full of hope.
Of course, the Christianised, the educated and the politically informed or conscious are a tiny minority, a sort of little clearing in a vast jungle. The dark gods still reign in the jungle and ancestral voices prophesy disaster, because, behind all these tragic events, there lies a deep and inarticulate terror. All this development has grown up with the help of British officials and administrators in half a century. What is going to happen to these people now? I am sure there is fear and terror in their hearts of what may happen when the last foreigner has been withdrawn. That fear lies behind the scene. This outbreak, apparently, has been far more deliberate and widespread than we realised from the original report. As the noble Marquess appears to confirm, it seems to have been something far more than mutiny that had to be reckoned with.

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Surely we can understand and, however much we deplore the actions to which it has driven people, can sympathise at least with their spiritual predicament and their mental bewilderment and distress.
The situation is delicate in the extreme and full of grim and dangerous possibilities. It seems to me that there are a lot of things that many of us would like to say which are far better left unsaid. Of course, there is the fear that there may be demands for retaliation and revenge. Juba is a long way from Khartoum and the central Government may not always be able to control its representatives in remote places. In connection with that, there are two things that ought to be said. One is that, on the evidence of European witnesses and spectators, the behaviour of the Northern troops of occupation has been quite impeccable. Though there have been occasional incidents and excesses, as there are almost inevitably in situations of this kind, as we ourselves know in other parts of Africa, nevertheless, when such abuses did occur, the Khartoum Government at once dealt swiftly and drastically with offenders. Therefore there is every ground for hoping that the Northern Government may be able to deal with the situation.
The other point is that one of the strongest grounds for hope is the personal character and wisdom of the Prime Minister himself. The noble Marquess has referred to him already. I should like to say from another angle that all the information at our disposal bears witness to the firmness, the moderation and the liberal statesmanship with which he has handled the crisis, refusing to yield to any demands for a vindictive witch-hunt. It might help a little if mention were made of this in your Lordships' House, confirmed as it is by non-political information. It may help to strengthen his hand a little. Of course, there is danger from, the other end: there may be more provocation from the South. But as to that it ought to be on the record that, in spite of everything and amid all the fearful difficulties and demoralised atmosphere, the Christian leaders, both English and Sudani, have been able to wield a calming and restraining influence. They themselves have been instrumental in saving the lives of a number of Northern officials and their families. That fact has been gracefully acknowledged in Khartoum.
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I have only a word more to add. Over and beyond the political problem there is a vast human problem. When the troubles broke out, the crops had not been harvested. The rains have come since then and it is now too late. I am told that in some areas the sleeping sickness controls have broken down and famine and epidemic on a big scale threaten. If ordered government should break down, if the social and welfare services should be completely disrupted, the whole area might easily revert to primitivism. Therefore the human and political problems coalesce at this point, and those who care most for the Southern people will surely hope that they will understand that the only result of further political provocation must be to increase their social and economic distress. Whether Her Majesty's Government can do anything at all to alleviate that, without being invited to by the Sudan Government, I understand to be extremely doubtful; but I know that they will do anything they can. Inside the situation as it is, and looking at the facts as they are and not at the facts as we might wish they were, surely the South will best serve its own true and permanent interests by trying to come to terms with the Northern Government in a constructive spirit of conciliation and co-operation and working together wish them for sudanese unity.
5.59 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, the hour is late and I shall certainly try to be brief. We all owe a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, who, from his great personal experience, painted a picture of the conditions, racial, historical end social, which give the Southern Sudan a completely different identity from that appertaining to the North. I myself have no personal experience of the Sudan; I speak only as a student of international affairs, and if at the close of my remarks I offer suggestions which may appear revolutionary I ask the noble Marquess to believe me when I say that I regard them as coming within the context of the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, which he referred to as both existing and binding.
It is, of course, no comfort to those of us who predicted this tragic story to know that we were right. I can recall a friend of mine, back after many years of faithful service in the Sudan, telling me three years ago that already in the North

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they were talking of the spoils which would come from the South when the day of self-determination arrived. And reinforcing these crystal-clear divisions which we have all known divide the two Sudans have lately come intrigue and bribery from outside. The amount of damage done by the Minister of so-called National Guidance, consistently misguiding both the Sudan and his own country over the last three years, will take a long time to repair. Your Lordships may recall the story of a humble medical dresser at Torit who, in his innocence, firmly believed that he was going to receive the appointment of Director General of Medical Services when the great day of Utopia promised by this Minister arrived.
In assessing the present situation it is important that we should be quite fair to the Northern Sudan. I was glad to hear the tribute of the right reverend Prelate to Sayed Ismail el Azheri. Those of us who met him when he came to this country last year were impressed by his sincerity, his balance and, above all, his complete integrity; and if any dim suggestions of a way out which I may offer appear revolutionary, they are made in the belief that it is our duty to help the Sudan as a whole in its predicament. The present situation seems to me difficult to assess. In spite of the noble Marquess's assurances, on October 24 The Times representative in Kampala gave us a tragic picture of conditions. It is true that only yesterday, from the distance and point of control at Khartoum, their representative gave us a slightly more optimistic picture. But whatever the truth as to the conditions, I would agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, that there is no reason to believe that the new administrators from the North who have replaced in the South their British predecessors were not honestly making a brave effort to get on terms with the South and to identify themselves with the interests and lives of the Southerners. Indeed, there is a story of a certain attempt to present an anticolonial front against their less enlightened colleagues in the North.
What about the sentiments of the Southerners? I stand open to correction, but I understand that the Constitution, which was worked out by a Sudanese Commission in 1953, was agreed on by
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the Condominium Powers and gave the South about one-quarter representation in the Legislative Assembly, with two Cabinet Ministers. Years previously to that, I think at Juba, a conference had been called at which Southern representatives had opted for union with the North. But was that a free choice? Did those who made that choice have the slightest conception of the nature of the issues about which they were asked to choose? Certainly, at the time a Mr. Martin Parr, who had spent eight years as Governor of the three Southern Provinces, gave us to believe that, so far as a choice was made, it was meaningless. In any case, at this moment I should like to know to what extent the representatives from the South are in any way in touch with the people they represent.
My Lords, I presume that there is a purpose in these debates. It is not merely to enable us to ventilate our views, but that we may put forward positive lines of approach which Her Majesty's Government may either refuse or accept, may follow up or not. Therefore, I am allowing myself the luxury of what might be called a little "thinking aloud." I can see nothing revolutionary in the nature of a proposal which would ask the Northern Sudan to grant to the Southern Sudan just that freedom of choice which they themselves have been granted and from which they will derive their new nationhood.
Before I elaborate that point, however, I should like to say a word about the constitutional position as I see it—of course, I stand open to correction. As the noble Marquess reminded us, in 1953 a draft Statute was prepared by the Sudanese themselves, which gave the Governor General special responsibility for the South. Later, those terms were broadened to include all people in all provinces. It is important to note that at the time the Foreign Secretary made that announcement in another place, on February 12, he referred to the broadening of those terms in this way:
"This wording includes the Southern Provinces."
I think there is still a Governor General's Commission which sits at the elbow of the Governor General and acts as a brake, if not as a veto; but I would urge that the mere fact that the Governor General's powers in relation to these unprotected minorities were considered at the time, and that statutory arrangements were made, and that the Governor General is

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still in Khartoum, should not be overlooked.
All that may sound like a threat. I quite realise that to-day threats are not popular in international negotiations. So I would put forward, not perhaps so much an alternative remedy as a modification which, on a long-term view, I believe would be to the benefit of all. At this last moment, cannot the Northern Sudan be persuaded to turn back to Her Majesty's Government and ask us to reassume responsibility, at least for the Equatoria Province to be administered as a trust—if necessary, as a United Nations Trust? That is an extension of the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. Could it not be a Trust which would harness the existing talent which is already in the North in partnership with Great Britain? I cannot believe that, if that kind of proposal were put carefully to the Sudan Government, they would be so unintelligent as to regard it as completely outrageous.
Of course, I anticipate the immediate objection—that Egypt would make obvious charges. As I see it, so far as Egypt is concerned, much hangs on the good will of the Sudan, particularly in relation to such dreams and schemes as the "High Dam" project; and yet so long as doubt and instability reign in Southern Sudan, the South will surely remain the breeding ground for friction and intrigue as between the Sudan and Egypt. And before Egypt would condemn out of hand such a development, she would do well to pause and to consider whether security in the far South is not also a guarantee of her own security at her own back door.
My Lords, that is really all I have to suggest. The poet talked, I think, of "craven fear of being great." That is a line of approach which many of those who have themselves served in the Sudan would support. I claim that a former "greatness" yields to a new "wisdom." "Pray God that justice may not fail through craven fear of being wise!" might govern a new hope for the Southern Sudan.
6.11 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, as the only member of your House present tonight who held the office of High Commissioner for the Sudan when it still existed, your Lordships might perhaps take it amiss if I held my peace and said nothing in the present debate. In any
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case, having listened to the debate I feel moved to get up and say one or two things. I suppose there is nobody in this House—there can be nobody—who does not deplore what has happened in the Sudan. I will go further and say that few of us are really surprised that things have gone wrong. When the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan and other matters were being discussed, most of us, I believe, felt strongly that, whatever might be said or however it might be wrapped up, the South were in fact being "thrown to the wolves." That may be a rather strong and not very tactful way of putting it, but that is what it really comes to. Anybody who knows anything of this subject at first hand knows that there is this inherent difference between the South and the North which has been well explained to-night. We were really expecting much if we believed that things could work there without friction.
There were discussions about safeguards for the South but I do not think that anybody could be surprised at the way things have worked out, though the trouble has perhaps come rather earlier than I thought it would. Most of us in our hearts were afraid that ultimately there would be trouble as between the South and the North. Now it is upon us. We have no particular reason to be proud of ourselves, for we must have known that something of this kind would happen, though perhaps not of so violent a nature, for there was something in the situation which was unwholesome. It is no good for anyone to say, "I told you so," even though some of us did tell you so; for saying that now helps nobody. The real question is: what, if anything, can be done about it? I was greatly relieved to hear from the noble Marquess that those people who have crossed the frontier are not to be returned but treated as political refugees. I am thankful for that, though I suppose we could not have done anything else.
We are largely dependent for information on what we read in the Press. Khartoum is to blame for not allowing Press representatives to go down and give us the picture; but there have been unpleasant stories of shootings and retaliations. I did not know, until the noble Marquess made his statement, that there had already been a suggestion for an international inquiry under the United Nations or the Red Cross which apparently has been ruled out. It may be

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difficult, but we cannot just let things go like that. The noble Lord who has just spoken had a proposal which was rather a root-and-branch policy and I doubt whether it could be done; but I cannot help feeling that this House should take the view that we cannot let this situation go by default. Whether it be an international commission or a Red Cross inquiry or something else, the Sudan Government would have to agree.
Mention of self-determination was made by my noble friend on my left. I should have thought the people there were hardly ripe for that at the moment, but I do not know why it should be indefinitely ruled out for the Southern Sudan, though it would be no solution of the present trouble. I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government whether some form of inquiry might not be possible or desirable. We have, or we had, a certain responsibility to these people. I believe we still have an implicit responsibility for the results of our actions, as we have handed these people over. Even if there cannot be an international inquiry, something should be done. The reasons we have heard against an international inquiry do not appear to me to exhaust the possibilities.
6.17 p.m.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, before the noble Marquess replies, I should like to ask him one question. I understand that certain responsibilities were placed upon the Governor-General by the Agreement of 1953. I understood the noble Marquess to say just now that the Governor-General could not do anything because he had no power. Is it really the case that responsibility without power is imposed on a Governor-General? If so, it is sheer lunacy.
6.18 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I can only intervene in the debate again with the permission of the House, but, as I indicated at the beginning, I rather assume that it will not he unwelcome to the House if I endeavour to deal with some of the matters which have been discussed. This has been in many ways a useful discussion, though, frankly, there seems to he some misapprehension about the Sudan itself. To begin with, the Governor-General has not the status of a British official: he is the servant of the Condominium. It happens that he is
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a British retired Foreign Service official, but he was appointed by the Egyptian Government on the proposal of the British Government. If I may use the term, he is not the "exclusive preserve" of the British Government in this matter; he is the Governor-General, still on behalf of the Condominium.
The other point that has repeatedly been made here is the great distinction that has been made between North and South. In the statement I made earlier I made no attempt to deny that. I pointed out that there were between them these great divergencies of race, religion, culture, economy and so forth. It was said that the Sudan is a great block of territory which has been carved out, more or less arbitrarily, in the past: but it was in the past. It is not new that North and South are being treated alike. The North and the South have been treated as one Sudan during all the period of sixty years to which the noble Earl, Lord Winterton, referred. That has been the structure of the country. I agree with the point the noble Earl made. The difference is that the British service has withdrawn. That may lead to great stresses and strains between the North and the South without any third party to take the weight off the two—I do not like to use the word "opponents." but let me say the two different parties in the country. That is quite true.
But we have to contemplate the situation, not as it was sixty or twenty or even ten years ago, but as it has arisen with the coming into force of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement which dated from 1953. That was on the basis that the Sudan should continue to consist of these two halves—the North and the South—and the whole endeavour should be to mould those two halves into one coherent, united country. That was the basis of the Agreement, and that is still the best hope, in my view, for the future of the Sudan. If that object is to be attained, it is no good considering what someone would have said in 1880 or what the situation might have been at the beginning of this century. We have to confront the situation as it is to-day. Some of your Lordships have said that you did not want in any way to say, "I told you so," but at the same time have continued your speeches by saying, with ill-concealed relish, almost exactly those words, "I told you so."
LORD KILLEARN: Not relish at all—disappointment, sadness. It was certainly not relish on my part, if the noble Marquess is referring to me.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Here is the situation as it arises under this Agreement. What is the best hope of carrying out that basic principle of the Agreement that the Sudan shall form one coherent whole? The best hope of achieving that—indeed, the only really promising and constructive hope—must be to give every strength and confidence to the present Prime Minister of the Sudan, to do everything we can, although the matter is in the hands of the Sudan Government; to advise if requested but, at the same time, to see that we do not interfere in ways in which we are no longer entitled to interfere in that country. As for the Prime Minister—and your Lordships are aware of all that has been said about him to-day, the confidence he created in those who met him when he was over here, and the tribute which the right reverend Prelate has paid to him in the course of his interesting and valuable speech this afternoon—it is his task to see that every effort within his power is made to bring these two halves into one harmonious whole. Some of your Lordships have said that you expected this trouble to arise but it has come earlier than you thought. That, I confess, rather surprises me. Although it is a matter for infinite regret that it came at all, I should have thought, first, it was more likely to come at the early stage, and, secondly, that there was more hope for the future in the prospect of this particular trouble coming at that early stage and being dealt with—as has been said—up to date with restraint, with a minimum of reprisals and with a desire not to break off but to continue the policy by uniting the two halves.
EARL WINTERTON: May I ask the noble Marquess this, question? This is really the gist of the whole matter. I understood him now, speaking on the authority of Her Majesty's Government, to say that this insurrection, or whatever you call it, has been put down with the minimum of reprisals. He is speaking, of course, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. That is not the information we have generally received and it suggests that the Press reports are all false.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not think that anything that has been said to-day—certainly anything said by me—suggests that there have been unjustified, widespread reprisals, by the North on the South. The right reverend Prelate who spoke bore witness to the impeccable behaviour of the Northern troops who had been sent down to the South, and to the state of affairs which, according to his information, there prevailed. I have said, and I say again, that I think much of the reporting of what has taken place down there has been substantially exaggerated, and I did add, when I was originally addressing your Lordships, that, certainly in part, that exaggeration was likely to have come from the fact that reporters had not been able to give first-hand accounts of what they had seen on the spot but had been obliged to write accounts from outside the area.
LORD KILLEARN: Could the noble Marquess give us any information about the report in the paper this morning of forty sentences of death?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I cannot give any precise information about a number of sentences of death; but what I have said, and what I believe to be true, is that courts are operating down there, and we have no reason to think that they are not operating legally. They are not special military courts or emergency courts; they are civil courts. As to what sentences they may have passed, I have no precise information.
LORD KILLEARN: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess again but will these sentences have to be confirmed by the Governor-General?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Yes, they will. I have no reason to think that these courts are operating in any way illegally in the work which they are doing now. A certain amount has been said about an inquiry. As regards the suggestion which the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, made of sending down some sort of an international inquiry, as he said, that could only go with the assent of the Sudanese Government, and, for reasons which I tried to indicate earlier on, it seems to me improbable that they would agree to that. What noble Lords did not take into account, I think, was something which I also said earlier—that the Sudanese Government themselves have appointed what appeals to be an authori-

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tative and impartial committee of inquiry which is still operating on the spot.
LORD KILLEARN: How can it be impartial?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I told the noble Lord the position. It is impartial in the sense that there is no reason to think it cannot produce an objective and acceptable report. The fact that people may have a particular interest does not mean that if they are serving upon an inquiry they are not capable of putting that interest aside and reaching an objective conclusion. Certainly, I am not going to prejudge either the Commission itself or the Report which the Commission may issue until that stage is reached.
The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, had another suggestion, which I am afraid would be equally impracticable, as it appeared to consist of an attempt to persuade the Sudanese Government in Khartoum to return to the United Kingdom a portion of the South in the Equatorial Provinces.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, may I correct the noble Marquess? I did not intend to suggest in any way that the South should be returned to the United Kingdom but that it should be held in trust for some period, during which stability might return to the South, with a view to its possible reunification in the future.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Again the suggestion seems to be that Her Majesty's Government in this country can act by themselves in these matters. Not only are the Sudan Government concerned, but the Egyptian Government are concerned, and would presumably have to give their assent to such a proposal. Again, I cannot really think that an attempt to reopen the whole situation, which has been based upon the position created by the 1953 Agreement, would either have any chances of success or in itself be desirable.
I come back to what I said at the beginning: that no one wishes to depreciate in any way the value of the work that was done by this country on behalf of the Sudan in the past. The situation we now have to meet is the situation created by the 1953 Agreement, and although some noble Lords may dislike and deplore that Agreement, it is the governing factor as regards the status of
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the North and the status of the South in relation to one another. Our best hope of seeing these two halves coalesce is not to emphasise and insist upon the differences, but to point out ways of making the similarities increase and thus to assist the present Government of the Sudan in any way we can to carry on the policy, which is the policy of the Agreement accepted by them, and which, in my submission, maintains the best hope for the future development of the country.
EARL WINTERTON: My Lords, may I ask this question before the noble Marquess sits down? I am in some doubt, as I am sure other noble Lords must be, about the position in international law of the use of British planes to carry troops to the Southern Sudan. We were told that R.A.F. planes were used to fly troops from the North to the South. The noble Marquess has told us that the Governor-General is a Condominium official and not a representative of Her Majesty's Government. If that is so, why were these planes used? What concern is it of ours to fly troops to Southern Sudan?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Troops were flown down at the request of the Sudanese Government, which is responsible for keeping order not only in the North but in the South. They had no other means of getting troops readily and effectively to the spot. I do not quite understand the criticism of that action, because surely it was in the interest of everybody that troops should be moved into the area and that the state of affairs which had arisen in the South should be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment. It seems to me that by flying troops there and by giving consent for R.A.F. planes to be used for the purpose, those who gave that consent were doing a service to all concerned.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

POLICE (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Joint Committee, with Amendments, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before seven o'clock.