Sitting of 17 March 1955

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  ILFORD CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

    LUTON CORPORATION BILL (By Order)
    POOLE CORPORATION BILL (By Order)
    Second Reading deferred till Thursday 31st March.

    LEICESTER CORPORATION BILL (By Order)
    Read a Second time and committed.
    LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL (By Order)
    Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next, at Seven o'clock.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  BASUTOLAND

    Administrative Reforms (Report)
    Mrs. Whiteasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what progress has been made with the proposed constitutional changes in Basutoland.
    Mr. Fenner Brockwayasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what action Her Majesty's Government proposes to take on the recommendations for administrative changes in Basutoland made by the official committee over which Sir Henry Moore has presided.
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he is aware of the dismay in Basutoland regarding the proposed administrative reforms of the Moore Committee; and whether he will make a statement.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker): The Administrative Reforms Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Henry Moore reported in July, 1954. The Committee's Report has been presented to the Basuto in the district councils in all districts and will be discussed at an extraordinary meeting of the Basutoland National Council on 22nd March. Her Majesty's Government will then decide what action to take on its recommendations.
    Mrs. White: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there has been considerable disquiet in Basutoland about these proposals, and that, in particular, there is unrest because the provision of a legislative council is desired by a number of people in Basutoland but is said to have been outside the terms of reference of this Committee? Could the hon. Gentleman make a statement on the attitude of the Government to that matter?
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: It is outside the terms of reference of this Committee. It was laid down by the previous Government on 4th May, 1950, that it was
    "… intended that the local authorities shall progressively acquire a more representative character, and as they gather strength and experience they will be given increasing responsibilities."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th May, 1950; Vol. 474, c. 235.]
    It was in line with this policy, which the present Government have also followed, that the Moore Committee was established.
    Mr. Brockway: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind the difficulty that this Report proposes certain limitations on the powers of the chiefs but that the population will apparently be wary of such limitations until it has the rights provided by a legislative council? Will the hon. Gentleman look at that problem?
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: All these points were taken most carefully into account by the Moore Committee when it was consulting with so many local bodies before it made these recommendations.
    Mr. Wade: Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that there is not only a strong but a very representative body of opinion in Basutoland in favour of the formation of a legislative council? As that is in accordance with the traditions of British policy, can he say whether it is still under consideration?
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: That has nothing to do with the present proposals, about which Sir Henry Moore's Committee has made recommendations.

    Destitute Persons (Care and Maintenance)
    Mrs. Whiteasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what provision is made in Basutoland for old-age pensions, blind persons' pensions and grants to disabled persons.
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: The care and maintenance of persons who have become destitute from whatever cause is traditionally a matter for relatives in Basutoland, as in other African societies. No special provision is, therefore, made for the payment of pensions to the old, the blind, or the disabled as such, but where no relatives are available to maintain them, relief is given by the Basuto National Treasury.
    Mrs. White: Am I right in assuming that the Minister is no doubt aware that provision is made in the Union of South Africa, on certain conditions, for payments to the persons in the categories which are mentioned in the Question? Does he not think it very disadvantageous that in the neighbouring territory of Basutoland there is no statutory provision for such payments? Will he reconsider the matter?
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: I will look at what the hon. Lady has said, but this is essentially a matter for the local authorities to handle, and they must take some account of the current finances at their disposal. That is why we are busily building up the economic development of this territory.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Imported Goods (Marking)
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will now give a decision about the withdrawal of the option under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, which allows imported goods which are required to be marked to bear the words "Foreign" or "Empire" instead of the name of the country of origin.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): I had hoped to announce a decision before this. I will do so as soon as possible.

    Domestic Furniture (Hire Purchase)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will exempt domestic furniture from the provisions restricting the operation of hire purchase.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir.
    Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that unemployment is developing in factories which are engaged in furniture production, and that young people are finding it difficult because they are not allowed to buy their furniture on the instalment system? Will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider this matter?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I should first correct the hon. Gentleman by saying that they can buy furniture on the instalment system. All this Order does is to require 15 per cent. deposit and repayment over 24 months.
    Mr. Hall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in the first place, there is no unemployment in the Wycombe area, which has a large furniture industry? Second, is he aware that, in general, it is those who sell hire-purchase terms rather than furniture who are objecting? Nevertheless, will he look at the matter from the point of view of the deposit, because it would help home building, amongst other things, if there were a reduction of the deposit?
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: If the right hon. Gentleman cannot do anything about furniture, will he at least consider the representations that have been made on behalf of caravan purchasers, because a lot of them still cannot get houses, even though the Government are claiming to have done so much in that respect?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: That is a different question.

    Brecon and Radnor
    Mr. Watkinsasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has considered the proposals made to him by the Welsh Board of Industry for the

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    introduction of industries to the rural towns of Brecon and Radnor; and what action has been taken.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am not aware of any such proposals, but I shall be happy to examine any which are put to me.
    Mr. Watkins: Will the President of the Board of Trade ask the Welsh Board of Industry to make a special investigation of this problem in the rural parts of Wales, and not only in my constituency, without waiting for the report from the Board?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: As I told the hon. Member, if he has any proposal to put to me, I will certainly look at it.

    Anglo-Brazilian Trade
    Mr. K. Thompsonasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement about Anglo-Brazilian trade
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland), on 15th February last.
    Mr. Thompson: Yes, Sir, but is my right hon. Friend aware that, as time passes and no positive steps are taken in this matter, there is a growing concern about the situation, and will he please look at all aspects of it with a view to assisting those who want to sell to Brazil as well as those in Brazil who want to buy from us?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I am not sure what my hon. Friend means by "positive steps," but if he has any specific proposals to put to me, short of my asking the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take over all bad debts, whether the traders were insured or not, I shall be happy to look at them.
    Mr. Erroll: On a point of order. Can you, Mr. Speaker, tell the House what has happened to the Opposition Front Bench today?
    Mr. Horace E. Holmes: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman has forgotten that it is St. Patrick's Day.
    Mr. Speaker: It has nothing to do with me.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Bank Notes (Size)
    Sir T. Mooreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider reducing the size of the £5 and £10 Bank of England notes, while retaining the present type of paper, but improving its texture and quality.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): No £10 notes have been issued since 1943. The size and quality of £5 notes is a matter for the Bank of England, who I am sure will take note of my hon. Friend's suggestion.
    Sir T. Moore: While thanking my hon. Friend for that helpful reply, would he bear in mind that these notes are now happily found in most pay packets, and, furthermore, that they are sometimes found in wallets? Therefore, would it not be a good idea to suggest to the Bank of England that they should be made to a size suitable to fit both the pay packet and the wallet?
    Mr. Brooke: I am certain that the Bank takes careful note of everything that is said in this House, especially concerning Bank notes, but these matters are really not within my responsibility.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Has the Minister any idea what an Ayr bus conductor would say if offered a £10 note?

    Empire Marketing Board
    Mr. Russellasked the Chancellor of he Exchequer, in view of the great success of the former Empire Marketing Board, if he will consider, in conjunction with the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and for Commonwealth Relations, the desirability of re-establishing his organisation in order to encourage United Kingdom consumers to buy more Commonwealth produce.
    Mr. H. Brooke: Today there are other ways in which the work of the former Empire Marketing Board is being done. and, accordingly, I do not think there is a case for re-establishing it.
    Mr. Russell: Is my hon. Friend quite satisfied with the way this work is being one compared with the way in which it was done by the Empire Marketing Board many years ago?
    Mr. Brooke: The work is being done by producers' marketing organisations, by the Economic Intelligence Establishment of the Commonwealth Economic Committee and the Colonial Products Laboratory. I would say that those organisations are doing their work excellently, but if my hon. Friend has any suggestions to put to me on the subject, no doubt he will do so.

    Arts Council Permanent Assets (Expenditure)
    Miss Wardasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the total sum of money allocated to the Arts Council which has been spent in acquiring permanent assets involving capital expenditure; and if he will give a list of the projects.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The Arts Council receives a global grant from the Treasury annually, which it may use at its entire discretion for any purpose within its charter. It has acquired from time to time certain permanent assets; its latest balance sheet shows theatre and concert hall equipment, pianos, pictures, sculptures and lithographs valued at some £38,000, apart from its own office equipment, etc.
    Miss Ward: In view of the fact that the pictures purchased by the Arts Council carry an enhanced value, and in view of the fact that some of the pictures would not be acceptable to the taxpayers—some of them are appalling—would my hon. Friend consider whether it would not be a good idea for the Arts Council to pay attention to the fact that it ought to stimulate taste in art and leave our great galleries and contemporary art societies to purchase, in view of the fact that it has only a limited circle of people buying them, and that some of the purchases are most unacceptable?
    Mr. Brooke: I am sure that the Arts Council also takes note of whatever is said in this House, but I hope my hon. Friend is not suggesting that the Chancellor of the Exchequer or I should become Minister of Taste.
    Miss Ward: Better than the Arts Council.
    Mr. Brockway: In view of the declaration by the Government against the principle of the colour bar, may I ask the hon.
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    Gentleman whether he would approach the Arts Council to see that its exhibitions are not held in countries where people are excluded from such exhibitions on the ground of their colour?
    Mr. Brooke: I think that supplementary question is a considerable distance away from the Question on the Paper.

    Post-War Credits
    Lieut-Colonel Liptonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much will be refunded in post-war credits, and how much will be outstanding, by the end of the current financial year.
    Mr. H. Brooke: By the end of the current financial year it is expected that £240 million of post-war credits will have been repaid, and a further £20 million set off against arrears of tax for 1945–46 and earlier years. The amount still outstanding will then be about £540 million.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Can the hon. Gentleman say how many years, at the current rate of repayment, it is going to take before these debts are repaid, and will he tell the Chancellor that if he were a bookmaker he would long since have been posted at Tattersall's as a defaulter?
    Mr. Brooke: It was said in the House the other day that it would be about 35 years before the bulk of these post-war credits were paid off—
    Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Too long.
    Mr. Brooke: —but these are Budget matters, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not expect me to anticipate anything that my right hon. Friend might wish to say.
    Mr. Gower: Can my hon. Friend give an assurance that in future we shall never repeat the experiment of post-war credits?
    Mr. S. Silverman: Can the hon. Gentleman estimate, on the assumption that the post-war credits continue to be repaid at the same rate as they have been so far—it is said it will take another 35 years—whether, at the end of that time, they will, at the present rapidly falling value of the pound, be worth anything at all?
    Mr. Brooke: That would depend whether or not there is a Socialist Government in power.

  NON-INDUSTRIAL CIVIL SERVANTS
  Mr. G. Longdenasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how many permanent non-industrial civil servants there are over 60 years of age; and how many there were in 1952 immediately before Her Majesty's Government announced their revised policy on the Civil Service retiring age.
  Mr. H. Brooke: On 1st January, 1955, there were 34,611 permanent non-industrial civil servants over 60 years of age. The number on 1st January, 1952, was 22,099.
  Mr. Longden: Is my hon. Friend aware that his answer will give great satisfaction to those people who think that the Government should give a lead in this matter?
  Mr. Brooke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I think that this is an excellent development in the Civil Service.

  AGRICULTURE

    Horticultural Marketing (Committee)
    Mr. G. Williamsasked the Minister of Agriculture when he intends to announce the names of the committee on horticultural marketing.
    The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Mr. Heathcoat Amory): On
    behalf of the three agricultural Ministers, I have issued invitations to six persons who, we hope, will be willing to serve on this committee. The names of the members will be announced when their acceptances have been received.
    Mr. Williams: Whilst thanking my right hon. Friend for that answer, may I ask whether he will bear in mind that there is growing impatience in the country to have this announcement, and will he do what he can to hasten it?
    Mr. Amory: Yes, Sir. My hon. Friend will agree with me that this is an important inquiry and I am anxious that we should get the best people obtainable for membership of the committee.
    Mr. S. O. Davies: Can the right hon. Gentleman assure us that there will be
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    a representative from Wales on the committee?
    Mr. Amory: We seldom forget that important point, but I have not got with me the names of those whom I have invited.
    Mrs. White: Will there be any representative of the consumers or housewives on that committee?
    Miss Ward: Hear, hear.
    Mr. Amory: I am hoping that a lady will serve on the committee.

    Poultry Progeny Testing Plan
    Mr. Hurdasked the Minister of Agriculture which poultry geneticists his Department consulted in preparing the new poultry progeny testing plan; and whether the proposals have been approved by them.
    Mr. Amory: A number of geneticists and other scientists were consulted during the preparation of this plan but they were not invited to approve the proposals in detail. I am satisfied that the plan has a sound scientific basis for its purpose.
    Mr. Hurd: In developing this progeny testing plan for poultry, will my right hon. Friend take full account of the opinion of scientists in this country and also of the experience of the United States, because there appears to be a considerable difference of opinion?
    Mr. Amory: I believe that our plan is soundly based. We have taken account of the views of scientists, and shall continue to do so. I think my hon. Friend may be referring to an article by an American, but the object there may have been slightly different from our object in this case.

    Pigs (Virus Pneumonia)
    Mr. Crouchasked the Minister of Agriculture what he estimates the percentage is of herds of pigs that are free from virus pneumonia.
    Mr. Amory: I regret that I am unable to give a reliable estimate, but the disease is believed to be widespread.
    Mr. Crouch: Would my right hon. Friend agree that virus pneumonia is the most serious problem facing the pig industry at present, and that if we could

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    free our herds from this disease, by immunisation or selective breeding, it would completely revolutionise pig breeding in this country?
    Mr. Amory: Yes, Sir, I agree with my hon. Friend that this is a most important matter, and the Agricultural Research Council has the question of a possible programme under consideration.
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Willey.
    Mr. Braine: On a point of Order. May I draw your attention, Mr. Speaker, to the fact that at this early stage in Question time, 11 hon. Gentlemen and one right hon. Gentleman who have Questions on the Paper have not risen? Is this not a gross discourtesy to the House, and a great inconvenience to Ministers, and may I respectfully inquire whether the right hon. Gentleman and hon. Gentlemen concerned intimated to you in advance that they would not be here?
    Mr. Edelman: Further to that point of order. Is it not the case that those right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who are unavoidably absent are celebrating the 25th birthday of the greatest newspaper in this country?
    Mr. Speaker: There is no point of order for me to deal with in that Mr. Teeling.
    Mr. Braine: Further to that point of order—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member says "Further to that point of order," but I have already said that there was no point of order in it.
    Mr. Braine: May I, therefore, raise an additional point of order? My original point was to ask you, Sir, whether certain action was not a grave discourtesy to the House. My further point of order is whether the observation of the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) is not in itself a discourtesy to the House—to intimate that attendance at a function of a newspaper, which I believe is called the "Daily Herald," is more important than attendance in Parliament?
    Mr. Speaker: I see neither a point of order nor any discourtesy involved in that. Personally I welcome the opportunity of making rather more rapid progress with Questions.

  HOME DEPARTMENT

    James Weaver
    Mr. Teelingasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the death of Mrs. Teresa Kate Friend-Smith on 1st March, widow of Ernest Friend-Smith who was murdered on the Brighton Downs in 1928, and in view of the letter sent to him by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, he will consider re-examining the evidence in the case with a view to recommending the granting of the Queen's Pardon to James Weaver who was condemned to death for this crime, reprieved, and has now served his sentence.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Major Gwilym Lloyd-George): This case was considered with the greatest care at the time, and all the representations made by and on behalf of the prisoners, both then and subsequently, were fully examined. I have reviewed the case in the light of the representations brought to my notice by my hon. Friend, but I can find nothing in the information before me to suggest that there are any grounds for further action on my part.
    Mr. Teeling: Is my right hon. and gal-Friend aware that there has always been a great deal of uncertainty as to why this reprieve was granted at the last moment, and in view of the fact that one or two people connected with the case have in recent weeks offered to come forward and talk about it again, does he not think that it would be possible to raise the matter again—if not now, later?
    Major Lloyd-George: I do not think any useful purpose would be served because, at the time when the decision was made by the Home Secretary of the day, he stated that his recommendation cast no reflection whatever on the decision of the court.
    Mr. Teeling: In view of the fact that it is difficult to ask these questions by way of Question and Answer, I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment.

    Cross-Channel Day Trips (Passports)
    Mr. Teelingasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will make a statement about the discussions between his immigration officers and

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    the representatives of Messrs. P. and A. Campbell Limited, concerning no-passport cross-Channel day trips.
    Mr. Awberyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what answer he has given to the deputation which met his officials recently on the subject of permitting cross-Channel trips without passports when taking day trips.
    Major Lloyd-George: In the light of the discussion with my officers, Messrs. P. & A. Campbell Limited has represented that during the forthcoming season it should be permitted to operate no-passport excursions from Newhaven and Eastbourne only. In order to facilitate further consideration of this proposal, I have arranged for my officers, together with Customs representatives, to hold a further meeting with the company at Eastbourne on Monday, so that they may ascertain whether suitable accommodation could be provided on the pier for the purposes of immigration and Customs control.
    Mr. Teeling: I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for his answer, but can he tell us whether we shall get a definite answer which will make it possible to publicise these day trips in the rest of England during the next week or two?
    Major Lloyd-George: I am hopeful that, as a result of Monday's meeting, we shall come to some conclusion. I am fully aware of the need for an announcement one way or the other as soon as possible, because I know the difficulty about making arrangements.
    Mr. Awbery: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that preparations have to be made now if agreement is reached? Will he hurry the matter on in order to help the people who want to make preparations?
    Major Lloyd-George: I think I can say that no time has been lost since we started looking into the matter. As I said in the first instance, tremendous difficulties are attached to it. We are most anxious to do what we can, and we are proceeding with all possible speed.
    Mr. Fell: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that very considerable disappointment will be caused to Great Yarmouth and the people of the Midlands who use Great Yarmouth as a holiday
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    resort if the facilities do not also apply to Great Yarmouth, where they applied before the war, particularly as the facilities exist now, and there is also a shipping company to carry out the arrangements.
    Major Lloyd-George: I cannot accept that full facilities exist, because the question of personnel becomes very important, particularly in view of the very different circumstances in which immigration control has to work compared with before the war. This is an earnest endeavour to secure some relaxation, as a result of which we hope to be able to go even further later.
    Mr. Fell: Will my hon. and gallant Friend consider the possibility at Great Yarmouth?
    Mr. Rees-Davies: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend also consider the claim of Ramsgate? Ramsgate had a very substantial part of the traffic before the war. I am not quite clear whether the difficulty is that Ramsgate is not an approved port within the terms of the approved ports Order. I understand that the facilities which now exist are the same as those which existed before the war. Will my right hon. and gallant Friend give some assurance that he will bear Ramsgate in mind?
    Major Lloyd-George: I have borne in mind as many cases as there are hon. Members representing the various ports. The difficulty is that there is a limit to the staff which can be provided, especially if the trade is for a very short period of the year. I am doing everything I possibly can to make arrangements which will give the greatest possible advantage to all the ports concerned. As a result of any experience we gain if an experiment is tried, we shall see what more can be done later.

    Police Prosecutions (Costs)
    Mr. Bullardasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department in how many cases during the past 10 years the Metropolitan Police have pressed claims for costs against persons acquitted of criminal charges.
    Major Lloyd-George: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave on 18th November, 1954, to a Question by the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes).
    Mr. Ballard: As I have no knowledge of what was contained in the reply to which my right hon. and gallant Friend refers—
    Miss Ward: It is very unsatisfactory.
    Mr. Bullard: —can he give me some idea how common the practice is in England and Wales, apart from the Metropolitan area? If it is uncommon, as I hope it is, would that not be a good case for the local authority not pressing the claim in the case of Mr. Harry Fletcher, a garage proprietor in my constituency, who was acquitted of a criminal charge, and who is now being pressed for these costs?
    Major Lloyd-George: I am sure that my hon. Friend will appreciate, as I mentioned in the reply to which I have just referred, that I can speak only for the police area for which I have authority, which is the Metropolitan area. However, I am very well aware of the circumstances of the case of Mr. Fletcher. I have been giving it close consideration, but at the moment I am not in a position to make any statement.

    British Subjects (Departure and Re-entry)
    Mr. Langford-Holtasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department by what authority he prevents British citizens who do not possess passports from leaving or re-entering the United Kingdom.
    Major Lloyd-George: British subjects who establish their national status are not prevented from leaving or re-entering the United Kingdom. Under the Aliens Order, 1953, however, a British subject may be required by an immigration officer to produce either a valid passport or some other document satisfactorily establishing his identity and nationality.
    Mr. Langford-Holt: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that this Question distinguishes itself in so far as it seeks information, and that at least one hon. Member is a little bewildered why my right hon. and gallant Friend should be granting permission or otherwise for people to leave the country on trips without passports?
    Major Lloyd-George: That is one of the difficulties about the scheme with which I have dealt in replying to previous Questions. The difficulty is to get a method by which something which is equivalent to a passport can be used. That is what we are examining at the present moment. Anybody can go on a day trip if he has a passport, but there are difficulties attaching to that. Our endeavour at the moment is to find some method which will avoid that trouble.

    Miss Ursula Wassermann
    Mr. Dribergasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that Miss Ursula Wassermann, who lived in England for six years as a student and refugee from Nazi Germany, has been refused a visa to enter the United Kingdom for a brief visit to discuss with her British publisher the forthcoming publication in London of her book; and if, in view of the fact that she visited the United Kingdom without difficulty on an Israeli passport in 1951, 1952 and 1953, he will reconsider this refusal.
    Major Lloyd-George: I regret that I am not prepared to reconsider the decision to refuse a visa in this case, which was taken by my predecessor.
    Mr. Driberg: Although I know that the Home Secretary is under no obligation to explain his reasons for such action, will he agree that it does seem somewhat arbitrary and strange in the case of a person who has, as my Question states, visited this country so often with, apparently, no harmful consequences to the country? Can the right hon. and gallant Gentleman indicate at all what the background of the case is?
    Major Lloyd-George: No, Sir, I cannot go further than say that applications for visas are considered on their merits and in relation to the facts of the particular case. It would not be in the public interest to say more than that.
    Mr. Driberg: Can the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say whether there have been any representations from the State Department in Washington about the case?
    Major Lloyd-George: So far as I am aware, none. This has been done purely on the merits of the application which has been made.

  QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
  The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
  Mr. J. R. H. HUTCHISON: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been drawn to the treasonable activities of certain British nationals as revealed in the Ministry of Defence Paper on the treatment of British prisoners of war in Korea; what legislation he proposes to prevent a repetition; and whether he will make a statement.
  Mr. Speaker: Mr. Hutchison.
  Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, with regard to Question No. 35, which you have just called. There have been statements by the Attorney-General and other Ministers to the effect that in the case of two of the persons mentioned there was no evidence of any treasonable activity—
  Mr. K. Thompson: On a point of order—
  Mr. Silverman: I am addressing Mr. Speaker on a point of order—and that with regard to the other two persons, the question of prosecution was still under consideration. In those circumstances may I ask whether it is in order for this Question to appear upon the Order Paper?
  Mr. Thompson: On that point of order, Mr. Speaker, may I with great respect ask, is it not a fact that this Question has not been put?
  Mr. Silverman: That does not matter.
  Mr. Thompson: Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to refer to it at all?
  Mr. Silverman: It is on the Order Paper.
  Mr. Speaker: We are getting too many points of order. The last point of order is not correct because, if an hon. Member thinks a Question is out of order, he is entitled to raise the matter. My own view of the matter is that this Question was probably put down before the recent statements. It was in order when it was put down, and there was no reason to take it off. Mr. Hutchison. Mr. Teeling—Question No. 37. [Laughter.]
  Mr. Silverman: Further to that point of order. In view of the way in which
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  your answer was so disrespectfully received on the other side of the House, Mr. Speaker, can it be made perfectly clear that, now we have had these statements from Ministers, it would, in the light of those answers, be out of order to put down Questions in these terms?
  Mr. Speaker: I should like to see any particular question before I can state whether it is out of order. I was conscious of no disrespect in the way in which my previous answer was received. Mr. Teeling.
  The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): There seem to have been a lot of casualties. [Laughter.]
  Mr. Brockway: Is not the House entitled to know the cause of this hilarity?
  An Hon. Member: Look round.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. There seem to me to be too many points of order. I was congratulating myself, rather prematurely, on making rapid progress with Questions, but that has been frustrated. Mr. Teeling—Question No. 37.

  SOLICITOR-GENERAL FOR SCOTLAND
  Mr. Malcolm MacPhersonasked the Prime Minister, in view of the fact that there has not been a second Scottish Law Officer in this House for some time, whether he will now discontinue the appointment of Solicitor-General for Scotland, or alter its status from a political to an official appointment.
  The Prime Minister: During the last quarter of a century there have been many cases in which the Scottish Law Officers were not Members of the House of Commons, and also cases in which they did not belong to the political party in power. The present custom seems to be conveniently flexible. To abolish the office of Solicitor-General for Scotland would require legislation and Her Majesty's Government have no intention of so doing.
  Mr. MacPherson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the 45 million people of England and Wales manage somehow to struggle along with only two Law Officers, and that whatever needs Scotland may have, one of her needs is

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  not to have two Law Officers? At the moment, it is entirely out of proportion.
  The Prime Minister: I gave much attention and thought to the answer which I have just given, and I fear that I should hardly be keeping up to the level which is required if I now tried to improvise.
  Major Anstruther-Gray: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that Scotland very much appreciates the fact that she has two Law Officers?

  YALTA CONFERENCE (PUBLICATION OF DOCUMENTS)
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Prime Minister why Her Majesty's Government have declined to agree to the publication of the official record of the Yalta Conference.
  The Prime Minister: Her Majesty's Government did not decline to agree to the publication which the United States Government wished to make. It is, of course, the American version and in no sense an agreed official record of the Powers concerned. I have not myself expressed any opinion on the subject. I have not seen anything but the extracts which now appear in the Press. Even these disclose some serious mistakes.
  On general grounds Her Majesty's Government informed the United States that in their view it was undesirable that detailed records of important international discussions should be published so soon after the event. If this became the established practice, it might hamper a free exchange of views at future conferences. In any case it would seem a good thing to consult together upon the text of any publication during the lifetime of the individuals concerned.
  When the United States Government asked if we would nevertheless agree to publication, Her Majesty's Government gave their consent. This does not, however, imply that we accept responsibility for the accuracy of the American version. When we receive the full text of the United States publication we will consider whether any corrections are necessary. But as the document is reported to extend to 500 pages, I cannot promise the House any speedy decision.
  Mr. Brockway: As we have only been able to see summaries of the documents in the Press this morning, and in view of their very grave importance, will the right hon. Gentleman consider the publication of some version of these conversations which represents the point of view which he expressed at the Conference? Will he also say whether, after that, there might be some opportunity of discussion in this House?
  The Prime Minister: I think that was really contained in my answer. We will consider, when we see the document, whether any answer is necessary, and then there will be another stage in the proceedings, to consider whether, in view of that, any debate on the subject is necessary.
  Mr. Henderson: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether, in view of the fact that the United States Government thought fit to publish the documents yesterday, the time factor will so operate as to prejudice the views of Her Majesty's Government?
  Major Legge-Bourke: In welcoming the statement which my right hon. Friend has made, and especially his indication that Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to consider possible corrections, will he give an assurance that he will pay particular attention to remarks attributed to him about the Polish people, and especially that section now living in this country?
  The Prime Minister: I am very glad that that has been mentioned. As a matter of fact, I do not at all accept the suggestion which is made. I think that my record throughout the war and this period will show with what deep sympathy I viewed the fate of the people of Poland and the conditions in which they were treated after the Yalta Conference was over.
  Mr. S. Silverman: Does the Prime Minister recall that immediately after the holding of the Yalta Conference a debate was in fact held in this House on a report, made I think by himself, of what took place at the Conference? Does he not recall that there was indeed a vote of the House of Commons about it in which 20 or 25 members from both sides of the House actually went into the Opposition Lobby? I was not one of them. In view

  1451
  of the fact that, whether desirable or not, a version has now been published by the United States of America, would it not now be desirable to publish the British Government's account of what took place without waiting to see, or making it a matter of controversy between the two countries, which is the correct version?
  The Prime Minister: I certainly think that that ought to be considered, but I should first like to see the United States document.
  Mr. Alport: Does the Prime Minister consider that it would be advisable, in the event of future conferences of this type, that agreement should be reached at the time about the date at which some future publication of documents of this sort should be undertaken?
  The Prime Minister: I hope that we are not to go through another three or four years of war before we reach a similar set of circumstances.
  Mr. Daines: Can the Prime Minister convey to the United States Government the view that publication of documents of this sort should be dependent upon international necessity rather than upon the desire of one party in the United States to take advantage of another party?
  The Prime Minister: The Yalta Conference has long raised very acute party issues in the United States, whereas in this country it has not done so.
  Mr. Assheton: Does not the Prime Minister agree that all unauthorised reports of private and confidential meetings are apt to be very embarrassing?

  FORCES, KOREA (MEMORIAL SCROLL)
  Brigadier Prior-Palmerasked the Prime Minister whether he will arrange to issue to the next-of-kin of those killed on active service in Korea, some memorial document of a permanent character.
  The Prime Minister: The Queen has given Commands for the issue of a Memorial Scroll to the next-of-kin of members of the Forces who died as a result of service in Korea. The design and inscription were recommended by the Committee on the grant of Honours, Decorations and Medals, who took into
  1452
  consultation the Poet Laureate, Sir Francis Meynell, and Mr. Reynolds Stone.
  I am having a note of the text of the Scroll and of the method of distribution circulated in the Official Report. A copy of the Scroll has also been placed in the Library.
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask if he is aware of the sense of gratitude which will be felt by those who are affected by this decision?
  Following is the note of the text of the Scroll:

  E II R

    ROYAL ARMS
    This scroll keeps in honour
    who gave his life in a distant land with others of his Country in the cause of freedom and peace

    UNITED NATIONS KOREA 1950–1953
    Arrangements for issue
    The distribution of the Memorial Scroll in the United Kingdom will be undertaken by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. It will be granted to next-of-kin of deceased members of the Forces on the same terms as those adopted for the issue of the Scroll after the War of 1939–45.
    It will be issued automatically to a widow or parent in receipt of a dependant's pension from the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, in respect of service in Korea. Where next-of-kin are not in receipt of a pension, it will be necessary for them to apply for the Scroll, as there may be no certain record of their addresses.
    In the following circumstances a duplicate Scroll will be issued. If there is a widow, or if there is no widow but there is an orphan who would normally take priority as recipient, and should the parents of the deceased man also desire the Scroll, there will be a duplicate issue. It will be necessary for parents, in such circumstances, to notify the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance of their wish to receive the Scroll.

  THERMONUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (BIRDS AND ANIMALS)
  Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Prime Minister if he is aware of the concern of bird and animal lovers about the possible effects on wild life of thermonuclear explosions to be carried out by Her Majesty's Government; and if he will make a statement.
  The Prime Minister: I am aware of the concern of some bird and animal lovers on this subject, but I do not propose to make a statement.
  Mr. Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that the Secretary of State for Air has recently set a splendid example by making the decision that wild duck on the German coast shall not be bombed during the moulting season? Could not this be extended to other species, and is it not unfortunate for the human race that it does not moult?
  Captain Pilkington: Is it not a fact that there was a thermo-nuclear explosion in Committee Room 14 yesterday?

  EDUCATION

    Adult Education (Report)
    Mr. Parkerasked the Minister of Education whether he has considered the Anson Report on Adult Education; and what action he proposes to take in the matter.
    The Minister of Education (Sir David Eccles): I take it the hon. Member means the Ashby Report. I hope to meet the organisations concerned in about 10 days' time.

    Overseas Families (Boarding School Fees)
    Mr. John Hallasked the Minister of Education if he will make available boarding school facilities, either free of cost or at considerably reduced fees, for children from the age of eight years whose parents by virtue of their service in the Colonial Service, the Armed Forces, or the Foreign Service, are compelled to live in countries which, for reasons of climate or absence of adequate facilities, are unsuitable for the education of children from the United Kingdom over the age of eight years.
    Sir D. Eccles: In Administrative Memorandum No. 442, a copy of which I am sending to my hon. Friend, local education authorities were asked to pay special attention to the needs of such children and in appropriate cases to give financial assistance towards the cost of boarding education. I would also refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Dodds) on 10th March.
    Mr. MacColl: Will the right hon. Gentleman draw the attention of the authorities to the facilities of the L.C.C. school at Woolverstone Hall, and do everything he can to develop facilities there for such children?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am anxious to increase the number of places for the children of those serving overseas.

    Training College Students (Grants)
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Education the main recommendations of the Report recently submitted to him on grants to students in training colleges.
    Sir D. Eccles: As the Report will be published soon, I would ask the hon. Member to wait till he can see the whole document.
    Mr. Willey: I will certainly await the publication of the document. Meanwhile, will the right hon. Gentleman treat this as a matter of urgency, because we are anxious to get his decision upon these recommendations as soon as possible?
    Sir D. Eccles: So am I. The Report is going to the printers almost at once.

    Primary Classes (Size)
    Mr. G. Longdenasked the Minister of Education whether he is satisfied that Circular 280 has been sufficiently observed in all areas to ensure a reduction of the size of infant school classes of all local education authorities; and whether he will consider further measures.
    Sir D. Eccles: So far as I know, authorities are observing the terms of this circular. The size of primary classes is expected to decline as a result of additional teachers, more school buildings, and fewer children under 11.

  FARM TRACTOR DRIVERS (MINIMUM AGE)
  Sir R. Conantasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will amend the regulations in order that the same minimum age shall apply to the driver of a farm tractor as in the case of a motor-cycle.
  The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): No, Sir. This would, in any event, require legislation.

  MINISTRY OF FOOD

    Wheat Deficiency Payments
    Mr. Hurdasked the Minister of Food what time has elapsed between the end of each accounting period and the dispatch of wheat deficiency payments to farmers for the 1954 crop; and whether calculating machines have yet been introduced to speed up the process of payment.
    The Minister of Food (Mr. Heathcoat Amory): About 11 weeks, the first four of which are allowed for the receipt of claims. The work is fully mechanised.
    Mr. Hurd: Will the right hon. Gentleman keep as his aim the shortening of that period of 11 weeks? It is a very long time. Would it not be possible to work to eight weeks at the longest?
    Mr. Amory: My hon. Friend will remember that in the booklet on the scheme, published a year ago, we said that the period would be two to three months. We shall aim at getting it as near as we possibly can to two months. I hope that we shall be successful.

    Cereals (Subsidy)
    Mr. Crouchasked the Minister of Food the cost of subsidy on cereals for the 1953 harvest year, including cost of re-condition mills; and the estimated cost under the new deficiency payments scheme, in view of the lower world price of wheat.
    Mr. Amory: The total cost of the subsidy on cereals of the 1953 harvest was £34 million. The estimate of the cost of deficiency payments on cereals of the 1954 harvest, in relation to the latest published subsidy figure is £38·8 million.
    Mr. Willey: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the time has come when he should explain frankly to the House the purpose of these subsidies? After all, his predecessor abolished them, but now they keep increasing year by year.
    Mr. Amory: I thought the hon. Gentleman was clear about the fact that the purpose of these subsidies is to afford a secure basis and proper incentives for our agricultural industry, so that it may make the most of its opportunities and ensure that our food production shall at all times be as efficient and productive as it possibly can be.

  ARMY KINEMA CORPORATION (BRITISH FILMS)
  Mr. Swinglerasked the Secretary of State for War why cinemas owned by the Army Kinema Corporation are not subject to British quota regulations; what instructions he has issued to the corporation about the exhibition of British films; and what proportion of the films shown by the Corporation in the latest year for which figures are available was British.
  The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean): The Army Kinema Corporation is a non-profit making concern which does not carry on the business of exhibiting films to the public. It is not, therefore, subject to the British quota regulations. Nevertheless, at least 40 per cent. of the films shown at home and abroad by the Corporation during the last two years have been British. This proportion is well in excess of the quota applied to exhibitors in the United Kingdom.

  ROYAL NAVY (ESCORT VESSELS, GERMANY)
  Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what payment will be made for the three escort vessels recently built in Germany and taken over by the Royal Navy
  Mr. Fernyhoughasked the First Lord of the Admiralty why no British shipyards were asked to tender for the three armed fishing protection ships recently bought from West Germany by the Navy.
  The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Wingfield Digby): The cost of these vessels has been met from funds made available by the German Federal Government. In these circumstances they were

  1457
  acquired from German production. No payment will, therefore, be made by the United Kingdom for these vessels.
  Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: While welcoming the fact that we are not having to pay for these boats at all out of British funds, may I ask if it is not most undesirable that these vessels should be constructed in German shipyards in gross contravention of the security control which is supposed still to be operating in Germany? Will the hon. Gentleman take steps to see that we do not get any more items of this kind?
  Mr. Digby: I cannot accept the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member. It is the normal practice that vessels of this kind are paid for by the German Government. It is normal that they should be bought from German production.

  THERMO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
  Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what steps he is taking to arrange for an exchange of information on thermonuclear weapons with the Government of Western Germany.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. R. H. Turton): None, Sir.
  Mr. Hughes: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that there is considerable anxiety among the German civil population that H-bombs might be dropped on Germany from either side? Can he give the House a categorical assurance that under no circumstances will H-bombs from our side be dropped on German territory?
  Mr. Turton: The Question relates to the exchange of information, which seems to be rather a different matter.
  Mr. Hughes: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall endeavour to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Whiteley: In the absence of my right hon. Friend, may I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business for next week?
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 21ST MARCH—Second Reading: Oil in Navigable Waters Bill [Lords].
Committee stage, Money Resolution, which it is hoped to obtain by 7 o'clock:
Report and Third Reading of the three Army and Air Force Bills.
Motion to approve Fatstock (Guarantee Payments) Order.
TUESDAY, 22ND MARCH—Second Reading: Consolidated Fund Bill.
Debate on the genetic effects of nuclear explosions.
WEDNESDAY, 23RD MARCH—Committee and Third Reading: Consolidated Fund Bill.
Debate on the cost of living.
Motion to approve British Wool (Guaranteed Prices) Order.
THURSDAY, 24TH MARCH—Second Readings: Pensions (India, Pakistan and Burma) Bill.
Isle of Man (Customs) Bill.
Committee stage, Money and Ways and Means Resolutions.
Committee stage, Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Bill.
FRIDAY, 25TH MARCH—Private Members' Motions.
Mr. Whiteley Mr. Whiteley rose—
Mr. Crookshank: I think I may anticipate the question which the right hon. Gentleman is about to put, about the Adjournment for the Easter Recess. The House may like to know that it is proposed to adjourn for the Easter Recess on Thursday, 7th April, until Tuesday, 19th April, and that on that day my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget.
Mr. Whiteley: May I also ask the Leader of the House to note that on Tuesday we shall be moving a Motion during the debate on the genetic effects

1459
of nuclear explosions and that we shall take the Second Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill formally.
Mr. Renton: Has my right hon. Friend seen the Motion, signed by over 100 hon. Members, asking the Government to ease the flow of emigrants from the United Kingdom to certain countries in the Commonwealth? Will he consider giving Government time of at least half-a-day to the discussion of that Motion?
Mr. Crookshank: I am very sorry to disappoint my hon. and learned Friend, but I have not half-a-day to give him at present. If there are 100 names to the Motion, it may well be that one of those hon. Members will be lucky in the Private Members' Ballot.
Lieut-Colonel Lipton: In view of the fact that Government business seems to be petering out, will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the possibility of finding time to discuss a Motion in my name relating to a cut in the price of petrol? If he could find time for that before the Easter Recess, he might save a lot of time during the Budget debate.
Mr. Crookshank: We are far from "petering out." I do not know about hon. Members opposite.
Mr. Ian Harvey: Will my right hon. Friend consider giving time for a debate on Parliamentary absenteeism?
Mr. Roy Jenkins: Is the right hon. Gentleman expecting to complete the Committee stage of the Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Bill in half a day?
Mr. Crookshank: No, Sir; I do not think that is a very likely event, but I hope that we shall make considerable progress.
Mr. Follick: Will the right hon. Gentleman give some consideration to the Decimal Currency Bill?
Mr. Crookshank: That has already been considered.

ARMY AND AIR FORCE BILLS (PROCEDURE)
Mr. Crookshank: As I referred just now to the three Army and Air Force Bills, I should like to make a statement about them.
The Army and Air Force Bills now in progress themselves provide that they should continue in force by virtue of Orders in Council to be approved by Affirmative Resolutions for a period of five years in all. In accordance with the assurances given during the Committee stage of both Bills, the Government have looked further into the question of future reviews and amendments of the Acts. We have given careful consideration to the proposal that there should be a new Standing Order, to prevent the use of the Army and Air Force Bills for long drawn-out discussion designed to delay business and dislocate the affairs of the House.
The Government are in agreement with the intention behind this proposal, but take the view that it is impossible to foresee what may be the circumstances of the time and what may be the size of the Bill that proves necessary. A Standing Order to meet this case would have to be largely in the form of a Guillotine Motion, and that is clearly not practicable. Instead, the Government think that the matter should be one for agreement at the time between the Opposition and the Government; and the spirit in which the inquiries of the Select Committee have been pursued, and the progress made with the Bills now before the House, give grounds for hoping that a satisfactory arrangement can be achieved by these means.
The Government agree with the recommendation that the Bill to be introduced after five years should be committed to a Select Committee. This will ensure that there will be an opportunity for careful examination of the problem as it then is, but it does not imply that the Select Committee will necessarily have to give the Acts such protracted examination as has been the case on this occasion. It might then be the general opinion on both sides of the House that no major Amendments to the Acts were required, and that a simple continuing Bill would be all that is necessary; in this event the Select Committee's work would, no doubt, be quickly completed.
Mr. Wigg: Would the right hon. Gentleman accept the view, which, I am sure, will be held by hon. Members on both sides of the House, that this is a very happy solution to what was a very difficult problem?
Mr. Crookshank: I am very much obliged to the hon. Gentleman, who has had so much to do with this problem in recent months. It is obvious that none of us can bind a Parliament five years hence, but I think that the statement which I have made today, with the apparent acquiescence of the House, being on our record, should be an ample guide for those then responsible.
Mr. S. Silverman: Can the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that there is nothing in these contemplated arrangements or agreements which would take away from the time-honoured traditional practice of the House of Commons of reviewing annually, in Committee, the Army Act? It has provided the House of Commons for 200 or 300 years with an annual opportunity of reviewing in detail administration and military affairs generally, so far as personnel are concerned, and the House would part with that with great reluctance.
Mr. Wigg: With respect to my hon. Friend, may I suggest that he should read the final Report of the Select Committee?
Mr. Crookshank: That, of course, would be of assistance. All that I was going to say to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) was that, as this is a very careful statement which has been drafted after considering not only what was in the Report, but also a great many other proposals put to me, I feel that the House would be wise to leave it where it is.
Mr. Nally: The Leader of the House will recall that I troubled him before about some intimation as to what are the Government's intentions in relation to the Royal Commission on Betting and Gambling—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We have now passed from business; we are on the statement about the Army Act.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)
Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[The Prime Minister.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY
  SUPPLY
  [9TH ALLOTTED DAY]
  Air Estimates, 1955–56
  REPORT [10th March]

  VOTE A. NUMBER FOR AIR FORCE SERVICE
  Resolution reported,
  That a number of officers, airmen and airwomen, not exceeding 272,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  Resolution read a Second time.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution.
  3.32 p.m.
  Mr. Arthur Henderson: I understood, Mr. Speaker, that it was your Ruling that the discussion this afternoon should cover the whole of the field which would be covered by the Air Estimates themselves, and that we should not be confined to discussions on particular Votes.
  On the last occasion on which we discussed the Air Estimates, the Under-Secretary of State for Air, in the final speech which he made early on Friday morning, made one or two statements which I should like to examine this afternoon. I think that we were all glad to know that there had been this substantial percentage increase—I think the hon. Gentleman said 35 per cent.—in the front line strength of our fighter force. I know that the hon. Gentleman will not object to my reminding him that probably the whole of that increase is accounted for by the fact that the late Labour Government procured between 200 and 300 Sabres from the American and Canadian Governments, which have now been put into squadron service.
  The hon. Gentleman also indicated that the night fighter force had been increased by 175 per cent. That is a very substantial increase, which I am sure we all welcome, and, subject to the urgent importance of re-equipping our night fighter force with more modern machines, such as the Javelin, I for one do not seek to

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  derogate from the satisfaction which the Under-Secretary of State must feel at this improvement.
  The hon. Gentleman referred also to Bomber Command, and stated that practically the whole of that Command was now equipped with jets. Of course, those jets are Canberras. It does not signify that Bomber Command is a strategic Air Force, because I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State will agree with me when I remind him that the Canberra, as an interdictor machine, is not part of the strategic air force, and that until we get the V-bombers we must realise that the strategic air force is a matter for the future.
  While I am dealing with V-bombers, I wish to ask the Under-Secretary of State whether, in view of the fact that we are so rapidly approaching the next phase of air development, namely, the supersonic phase, we are developing a supersonic bomber. None of the V-bombers is supersonic, although these bombers are very nearly so. Are the Government developing such a bomber?
  In his speech, the Under-Secretary dealt with the problem of dispersal. Looking at it from an operational point of view, I think that it was most satisfactory to learn that the Government were attaching the highest importance to dispersing our strategic, and no doubt our light bomber, squadrons, in view of the extreme importance of preventing anything in the nature of a knock-out blow if ever we get into another war. The hon. Gentleman, however, said nothing about the bomber squadrons of the United States Air Force which are stationed in the United Kingdom.
  Do the plans which are being made for the most effective system of dispersal apply also to the United States bomber squadrons at present stationed in this country? I am quite sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree that it is just as important to prevent knock-out blows against the bomber squadrons of our ally as it is to take those precautions for our own squadrons.
  Yesterday, President Eisenhower stated that America was developing various small nuclear weapons for tactical purposes, which, he also stated, were fast assuming a conventional character. He
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  further indicated that they would only be used in a major war against strictly military targets. We have been told that the Royal Air Force will be equipped with similar weapons for tactical purposes. Can the hon. Gentleman say whether it is the policy of the Government that these tactical weapons also should only be used against military targets? I should have thought that this was the kind of problem which very strongly underlay the need for the closest form of co-ordination and joint planning between the United States and ourselves.
  Can the hon. Gentleman also say whether any provision is to be made, or is being made, for underground hangars and storage, especially at the main bases of our bomber squadrons? It seems to me very important that, as far as possible, not only should storage be placed underground, but that hangars should also be similarly constructed.
  I now turn to the question of fighters. Last year we had a discussion about the provision of light fighters for N.A.T.O., and questions upon the subject have been raised from time to time. Has any decision yet been taken about the provision of these fighters for N.A.T.O.? We know that, in addition to the British Gnat, there are at least two types being developed in France. We do not seem to be able to get any information about the present position. Has N.A.T.O. come to any decision in the matter? If so, which type of fighter is it proposing to order?
  Another question arises in connection with the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons which were formerly stationed in Egypt. There was quite a substantial number of such squadrons. What has happened to them since the agreement was made with Egypt for our withdrawal from the Canal Zone? Where are those squadrons now stationed?
  On Vote 7, "Aircraft and Stores," I wish to raise the question of ammunition. I find that during the past three years £83 million has been provided for ammunition, and that another £28 million is to be provided for the coming year. What is the explanation of such a large expenditure? There has not been war; our fighter and bomber squadrons did not take part in the war in Korea or in any other part of the world. It is true that bomber squadrons have operated

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  upon a limited scale in Malaya and Kenya, but what is happening to this vast accumulation of explosives and ammunition which has cost about £110 million over the last four years?
  Can the Under-Secretary say whether the sum of £28 million for this year includes provision for nuclear bombs with which the Royal Air Force is now to be equipped? I do not know whether he will be able to say whether the cost of the nuclear bombs is to be borne by the Air Ministry, but surely the responsibility for their storage will be that of the Royal Air Force. Assuming that that is so, I should have thought that the public was entitled to an assurance that the storage of nuclear bombs would not involve any danger of explosion, or the release of radioactive substances. Can we be assured that these bombs will be stored in such conditions as will prevent them from being in any way dangerous to public health and welfare?
  The production of atomic and hydrogen bombs, apart altogether from their possible use in war, raises questions of considerable public importance. I understand that nuclear bombs cannot be exploded by fire or spontaneous combustion. In other words, they must be detonated to cause an explosion. I should like the Under-Secretary to tell us whether that is so and, in any event, whether he is satisfied that every possible precaution will be taken in the storage of these deadly weapons so as to prevent any harm or danger to the public, even in times of peace.
  On Tuesday night, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) and my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) raised the question of the use of reservists. During the debates upon the Air Estimates last year, the Under-Secretary indicated that about 20,000 out of a total of 124,000 reservists would be called up each year for training in Reserve flights. On Tuesday he told us about those men who were to be called up for training in mobile columns, and said that there would be about 15,000 in 1955, and that that number would be increased to 30,000 in subsequent years.
  That seems to be an entirely different call-up from the one relating to training flights. What has happened to the scheme which he announced last year in respect
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  of such flights, which I understood were to be affiliated to the squadrons stationed here? I should like him to tell us whether that scheme is in operation and, if so, that it was merely through an oversight that he failed to tell us about it the other night—or whether that scheme has been scrapped because of the introduction of the new scheme in relation to mobile columns required for Civil Defence.
  In the debate upon the Air Estimates on 4th March, 1954, the Under-Secretary indicated that about 17,000 men would be called up in the first two phases of the Reserve Flight Scheme. I suppose that the balance of 3,000 would be called up under what he referred to as the R.A.F. Regiment Scheme. I should like some information on those points, because on Tuesday night he said that only 8,000 men were called up last year, and I should have thought that most of that number would have been called up for training in the radar chain. Perhaps the hon. Member will deal with these points.
  Mr. Stephen Swingler: Is my right hon. and learned Friend referring to the reservists to be trained for home defence measures, or some other body? I have been trying to follow what he has said. On Tuesday, the Under-Secretary talked about training 10,000 men a year instead of 15,000, and about having trained 8,000 last year and being able to train 7,000 this year, but these were men to be trained in fire fighting and home defence measures. Are those the same men to whom my right hon. and learned Friend is referring?
  Mr. Henderson: That is my point. First, they are Class H reservists—men who have done their two years' full-time service and then have a Reserve liability for three and a half years, with a maximum of a fortnight's training a year. What I want the Under-Secretary to tell us is whether the Government have given up the Reserve Flight Scheme and are concentrating upon providing personnel from the Class H Reserve for these mobile columns.
  It is not clear whether the 8,000 who were called up last year were in connection with the Reserve Flight Scheme or for some other purpose. I am asking the Under-Secretary to tell us why they were called up last year, and whether the 10,000 to whom my hon. Friend has just

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  referred relates to the mobile columns or whether they are to be called up for the training flights.
  The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): Perhaps I can clear up that point right away, as it may be referred to by subsequent speakers. The 8,000, which I mentioned last Tuesday, have nothing whatever to do with the Class H people who are being trained for Civil Defence. The 10,000 is the modified figure, which was originally 15,000, and the figure 7,000 is the number out of the 10,000that we have to train this year.
  Mr. Henderson: Are they to be trained in the Reserve Flight Scheme?
  Mr. Ward: No. The 7,000 will be trained in fire fighting. They are related to the original Class H Civil Defence people. The 8,000 which I mentioned on Tuesday are related to the Reservists.
  Mr. Henderson: So, to get the position quite clear, the Reserve Flight Scheme has been modified and in future, instead of the 17,000 being called up, as was suggested in March of last year, about 8,000 will be called up.
  Mr. Ward: No, that is not so. I will deal with the point fully. What has happened is that the organisation of the Reserve Flight Scheme has taken rather longer than we expected, so we have not been able to call up as many as we expected. I will cover this point in my reply to the debate.
  Mr. Henderson: Will the Under-Secretary deal also with the E reservists? Are they to be involved in any of this training? The E reservists are those who serve for three years. Instead of doing two years and 3½ on the Reserve they do three years' full time and 2½ years' Reserve liability. Are they to be called up and get any training?
  One other point seems important in present circumstances. The Government have now accepted the principle of equal pay for equal work. In the Royal Air Force, which has a large number of women members, 8,000 or 10,000, many women are serving in highly-skilled trades, but they receive only three-quarters of what their male opposite numbers receive. I find that a male junior technician receives 14s. a day and
  1468
  a woman junior technician 10s. 6d. I am not raising this point in any spirit of criticism. This was the position during the days of the Labour Government; but since then the principle of equal pay for equal work has been accepted by the Government for those who are in their employment.
  I have never been enthusiastic about this differentiation. It seemed to me that a woman in a trade doing the same job with the same skill as a man ought to be given the same rate of pay. I remember visiting, during the days of the Berlin airlift, a station in Germany, where I found a woman corporal engine-fitter. She was extremely efficient, as efficient as any of the male fitters who were working in the same hangar, yet she was receiving only three-quarters of what her male colleagues were getting. There is a story told of a Royal Air Force sergeant, who was asked by a Minister what he thought of the three women tradesmen who were working under his control. He replied that he did not think too much of them because they worked too darned hard. I do not know whether this is typical, but now that the Government have accepted the equal-pay principle it is inconsistent that such women should not receive the same pay as men.
  I would make one reference to the political angle of defence. The Royal Air Force has the primary responsibility for the defence of our country. In my view, public opinion accepts the hydrogen bomb as the basis of our policy of deterrence. I am sure the Under-Secretary will agree with me that that fact alone imposes a greater responsibility upon the Government. The fact that public opinion has accepted this new, frightful weapon of the hydrogen bomb only increases the expectation and demand that everything possible is done to secure the abolition of all weapons of war.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: What reason has my right hon. and learned Friend for saying that public opinion welcomes this weapon?
  Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: He said "accepts it."
  Mr. Henderson: I think that my hon. Friend has not listened to what I said, which was that, in my view, public opinion accepts the hydrogen bomb as the instrument, the basis, of the policy

  1469
  of deterrence. My hon. Friend is entitled to say that, in his view, public opinion does not accept it. All I am saying is that, in my view, public opinion does. It does not mean that we seek ever to drop a single hydrogen bomb. It is a misunderstanding of the policy of deterrence to suggest that this is our intention. Our hope, our aim and our policy are, not to carry out war on a more efficient or deadly basis than hitherto, but to prevent war. The sole and fundamental objective of the policy of deterrence is to prevent war. All I am saying is that this imposes greater responsibility on the Government of this country, whatever party it may represent, to secure the abolition of all weapons of war.
  Although I support the policy which is expressed in these Air Estimates I believe that defence forces constitute a negative solution of our international difficulties. The positive solution depends upon securing a settlement of the outstanding political problems that divide the world. Therefore, there is greater responsibility upon the Government to secure world-wide disarmament. I do not know what is happening in Lancaster House, but I would express my personal agreement with "The Times," which suggested the other day that the Minister of Defence should be there.
  I would like him to be there and his opposite numbers in Russia and the United States to be there. The Minister of Defence should not only be concerned with the building up of armaments but with getting agreement to remove them. If my premises are right, there is an urgent need for a political conference at the soonest possible moment and at the highest level. We cannot afford to wait too long.
  4.0 p.m.
  Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: I do not think that any of us on this side of the House will quarrel very much with what the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) has said. He commented on the subject of equal pay. I think that while we agree with him in principle, we should go very slowly and carefully on this matter because there are many aspects in Service life which are not comparable with those in civilian life, particularly when women might be involved in the front line, and
  1470
  so on. This matter needs very careful consideration, and I advise my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary not to give a hurried decision.
  I congratulate my hon. Friend on the way he has conducted his part of this debate. He has made many speeches in one day, and, as a result, there has been little time for him to answer all the questions which many of us feel should have been answered. I can fully understand the reason why he has not been able to do so.
  The other day I referred to the difficulties of educating children of Service personnel, and, unfortunately, my hon. Friend did not refer to the matter in his reply. I would ask him to give it priority consideration, because since I mentioned it in the House the other day I have received a number of letters which have indicated that there is more hardship than I at first estimated.
  I heard of a case of one officer of medium rank who is trying to educate his son, not at an expensive public school, but to give him the best education he can. He could not complete his son's education in this manner, so he retired from the Service, commuted his pension in order to continue the boy's education, and he hopes to get another job.
  Officers of all ranks and senior N.C.Os. run into debt, and have been doing so for many years, and I fail to see how we are to get the right type of men into the Service when they learn that although it offers an attractive life and that it has an element of adventure, when they are married and have families they will run into all the difficulties of movements, changing their homes and educating their children.
  The Government must appreciate the necessity for providing education allowances for personnel in the Services. There is the 1944 Education Act, but those in the Services are completely deprived of benefiting from that Act, while everybody else is entitled to benefit from it. If it is good enough for members of one service, say the Foreign Service, to receive allowances amounting to £120 a year free of tax, I fail to see why an allowance should not be given to those in the Fighting Forces who have many more moves than those in the Foreign Service. I do not expect an immediate reply, but I hope that my hon. Friend

  1471
  will, in the coming months, consult his noble Friend, go into this matter at the highest possible level, and make a statement. I am sure that that would stimulate recruiting all round.
  May we be told a little more about how the Royal Air Force Cadet College at Cranwell and the Apprentices' School at Halton are doing? Cranwell is the breeding ground for future Chiefs of Air Staff, and we should like to know what percentage of boys are passing the examinations and have been nominated, how they are progressing, and general information about Cranwell and Halton.
  Like the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, I should like to know something more about the Air Force Reserves. The other day we were told something about the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, but I do hope that in what may be a transitional stage we shall not sweep away all the Reserves, like A.A. Command, without making some use of them. Personnel who have been trained in one job may very well carry out a conversion course and be useful in another job. Many of them—not all, of course—like to do their annual training and feel that they are rendering a service to their country. No reference was made to the Royal Observer Corps, a great body of men.
  Mr. F. Beswick: It was.
  Air Commodore Harvey: I am talking about the Front Bench.
  Mr. Beswick: Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to say that no reference was made to the Observer Corps.
  Air Commodore Harvey: I meant that no reference was made by the Government. The hon. Gentleman is in opposition and he is only expressing an opinion, like the rest of us.
  I should like information about the Royal Observer Corps from the Government, because it is doing a great job of work, and if A.A. Command can be dispensed with, I am wondering, with aircraft flying at great heights of 50,000 feet and above, what use the Observer Corps will be. It may be there is some use for it, but we would like to be told.
  I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton that we must have this deterrent of the
  1472
  hydrogen bomb. Nobody likes it. It is a hideous thing, but as we are going through this transitional stage from the ordinary type of aircraft to jet propelled aircraft and hydrogen bombs, we must have this force and we have got to see that the money is well spent and that the people in the force are highly trained. The better trained they are, the greater the deterrent effect.
  Coupled with that, we must make every effort to ensure that talks take place at the highest level. Speaking for myself, I believe that we shall only get peace through strength. The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) may disagree with that point of view, but I believe that that is the only way that we shall get real peace—if we are strong enough to stand up to the other side and argue the point, knowing that none of the countries in Western Europe will be over-run. When dealing with a bully you have to be tough.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Who is the bully?
  Air Commodore Harvey: The Soviet.
  I beg my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State and the Government to go ahead with their plans. The foundations are laid. The results are coming forward very quickly, and I have every reason to hope that by this time next year the Air Force will be in a stronger position to play its part in the defence of the free world.
  4.7 p.m.
  Mr. F. Beswick: I am glad that the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) supported my plea that the position of the Royal Observer Corps should be clarified. When I mentioned this matter last Tuesday, I was speaking from memory and without figures. I have since refreshed my memory, and I see that it was promised in 1950 that 75 per cent. of the establishment of the Royal Observer Corps would be established civil servants. At that time, the total number involved was 57, of which 42 would, therefore, be established.
  But now that their importance has been recognised, to the extent that the number to be employed has increased to 83, by some sort of pettifogging process of reasoning the total number to be established was pegged to the original figure,

  1473
  although I believe that after representations were made it was agreed that seven more should be established. I am suggesting that it would be fair to adhere to the original undertaking, namely, that 75 per cent. of the personnel in the Royal Observer Corps should be established civil servants.
  I have asked once or twice in this Session about the security arrangements with regard to aircraft. I think that the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield misunderstood some of the questions I put, and suggested that I was trying to clamp down on information that was given to the public about our aircraft. Quite the contrary. I should like all the information possible to be given to the British people about our aircraft, their performance and other matters. But the fact is, as the Under-Secretary knows, that under the D notice procedure of Admiral Thomson's Press Committee a voluntary restriction is accepted by the Press in this country on the publication of classified information. What I have been submitting to the Under-Secretary, and also to the Minister of Supply, is that, whereas most of the reputable journals have abided by the regulations under the D notice procedure, there are certain magazines and newspapers that do not do so.
  I asked the hon. Gentleman whether he is satisfied that the procedure is working satisfactorily, and he told me that he was so satisfied. He paid a tribute to the editors and the journalists concerned. Although that tribute was very well deserved in the overwhelming majority of cases, it still remains the fact that the honest and reputable public-spirited editors are being penalised because one or two of their colleagues are getting away with the publication of items of information. This information almost certainly will be in the possession of others, but they loyally restrict its publication. I should like to know whether the Under-Secretary could give an undertaking to look into this matter again. I want to see as little restriction as possible, but if we are to lay down restrictions let us administer them efficiently.
  May I also point out to the Under-Secretary of State that at present a good deal of the information available to the Royal Air Force, or to the Services
  1474
  generally, is put into the common pool in Paris in the N.A.T.O. committees? The security arrangements which are maintained by the member countries of N.A.T.O. vary considerably. A good many of the leakages which have taken place originated in the Press of the N.A.T.O. countries. Information has been given by British representatives to the committees in Paris, and some of the other countries have not felt themselves bound to observe the same kind of security arrangements as we try to observe in this country. I wonder whether the Under-Secretary of State would consider it worth while to look into that aspect of the matter.
  There is one other source of leakage, and probably the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield can bear me out in this. Today, some of the British manufacturers try to sell their products abroad, and they send out performance figures to potential customers, marking such information "Secret and confidential." After a month or two, a good deal of the information so sent out finds its way into the Press of foreign countries. I have reason to believe that a good deal of the information appearing in the American Press has found its way there through that channel.
  Air Commodore Harvey: I think that the hon. Gentleman is quite wrong. In the case of civil aircraft one is entitled to send out any information one likes. So far as military aircraft on the secret list are concerned, I assure the hon. Gentleman that he is quite wrong in his suggestion, according to my knowledge of the subject.
  Mr. Beswick: I respect the hon. and gallant Member's knowledge of this matter, but it so happens that I do not believe that he is any better informed than I am on this particular point, because I have taken a good deal of trouble to get at the facts. Even in the case of civil aircraft, engines are sometimes embodied which have a military purpose and a good deal of the information relating to the engines, although used in the civil types, is restricted and the editors in this country observe those restrictions, whereas the American Press do not observe them.

  1475
  While I have the opportunity, I, too, would like to pay tribute to the Under-Secretary of State for the courtesy and good nature with which he has conducted these debates. In saying that, I should like to contract his good temper with the attitude shown by his colleague the Minister of Supply, when he was dealing with some of the criticisms made about aircraft manufacture in this country.
  I think that the Minister of Supply was arrogant in his attitude to the House when he dealt with the aircraft position. [HON. MEMBERS: "He was provoked."] It may be that he was provoked, but, even so, a Minister speaking from that Box might well set an example to the House, and I feel that on that occasion the Minister did not set an example which should be followed. Moreover, the pity of it was that a good many of the reasonable criticisms which were made did not receive the constructive consideration which, I should have thought, was owed to the House.
  The Minister of Supply made a good deal of the present day complications of aircraft. For example, he told us that the modern bomber requires 1,000 radio valves, whereas during the war only 50 were needed, and that in the modern fighter there is six miles of wiring, whereas only two miles were required during the war. All that is absolutely true. Any hon. Member who heard or read the very interesting and informative lecture by Mr. Woodward-Nutt to the Institution of Production Engineers will be able to give a good deal more evidence on the same lines.
  What we have not heard from the Under-Secretary of State or from the Minister of Supply is exactly what is being done in the rationalisation of these requirements to take into account the additional complications of the modern machine, and whether, in the future, ordering is to be done much on the same pattern as it was in the days when machines were so much simpler to construct.
  I understand, for example, that the industry now has to provide no fewer than 30 different gear boxes for the one Avon engine, so varied is the list of requirements put out, mostly by the Air Ministry. The Under-Secretary of State would be rendering us a service if he would tell us what is being done to
  1476
  rationalise even more of the requirements of his Department in the field of aircraft.
  Having paid tribute to the courtesy of the Under-Secretary, I would say that there were possibly two occasions on which he departed from the very high standard which he had set. I would not say that he came down very low beneath that standard, and it was a very high standard, but there were two occasions when I think that he failed to maintain it. One was when I asked him about the future use of the Comet aircraft. I thought that the Under-Secretary was trying to hide something.
  The hon. Gentleman said that there was nothing mysterious about the purchase of the Comet aircraft by the Air Ministry. I never suggested that there was anything mysterious, but I felt that we were entitled to know in much more detail the arrangements under which the Comets are being bought. The Under-Secretary said that he could not give this information until the aircraft had been given a certificate of airworthiness. To the best of my knowledge and belief—and again I appeal to the experience of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Macclesfield—military aircraft do not require a C of A. I feel that that must have been an excuse put forward on the spur of the moment and not provided for him after consideration by the Department.
  Moreover, the hon. Gentleman said that the machines would not be used until after they were strengthened. I understand that the machines which are going to the Royal Air Force are the eight or, at any rate, seven of the eight which have already been built as far as the fuselages are concerned. There can be no question of strengthening these eight, otherwise they might as well all be rebuilt from scratch. If they are not to be strengthened, may I again ask the Under-Secretary of State what is to be the operational use of these machines?
  While I am on this point, and lest it be thought that I am opposed to the use of jet aircraft for the Transport Command of the R.A.F., may I say this: if there is one Command whose claim for more aircraft can be justified it is Transport Command. I should have liked to hear that some other aircraft were being made available for that Command because, whatever we may think of certain

  1477
  of the tactical or strategic ideas of the present Government, mobility will be the essence of events in the future and the more transport aircraft we have available in this country the better. Whereas we have these great Blackburn Universal freighters, and the V 1,000s coming along in the future, we want machines in between—some machines with longer range and greater carrying capacity than anything the R.A.F. now have.
  I take the opportunity again to ask the Under-Secretary if it is now quite final that the Princess flying boat will not be used. Surely we could have found some use for these magnificent flying boats. We were told, in the first place, that it was a matter of engines, and I believe the manufacturers were badly let down by the engine manufacturers. We have been told that they are now to be cocooned until new engines are available. Can the hon. Member say whether any effort is being made to give any priority at all to either the Proteus engines or the B.E.25s for future use in the Princess flying boat? I am thinking especially for use by R.A.F. Transport Command.
  There was another occasion on which I thought the Under-Secretary was a little less than frank about the matters with which he had to deal, and that was when we came to the question of Fighter Command. In the defence debate there was a good deal of argument about when this country or the Western allies would use thermo-nuclear weapons. As I have previously stated in the House, I am against the use of thermo-nuclear weapons. I think that they are evil and that their use can in no instance justify the end which it is thought to attain. But, having said that, I am still entitled to discuss the policy which has been laid down by the Government.
  As I have said, there was a good deal of controversy about the circumstances in which this weapon would be used by Britain and the United States. Field Marshal Montgomery has laid it down that they would be used in any attack against any of the allies in N.A.T.O. That statement was confirmed by the N.A.T.O. Conference in December last year. When the matter came up for discussion in the House, the Minister of Defence ultimately watered it down a little. He said that not in all circumstances should we use thermo-nuclear weapons and that there may be a minor
  1478
  incident which might well be settled by diplomatic means.
  I can understand that there may well be a minor incident in some part of the world which we should try to settle by diplomatic means, but what I cannot conceive is any incident affecting the defence of this country which, in any circumstances, could be called "minor." I cannot conceive that we should ever have an attack upon these islands which we should endeavour afterwards to solve by diplomatic means. Any attack on these islands must mean an all-out attack. It must mean, therefore, an attack against which we should use thermo-nuclear weapons; otherwise, the whole policy of the deterrent goes by the board altogether.
  If I am right in what I am saying—and I invite any hon. Member to show me that I stand a chance of being wrong—and if an attack upon these islands must mean the use of the thermo-nuclear deterrent, what I now ask the Under-Secretary of State is this: what is the purpose of all these fighter aircraft? I am not saying that we should have no fighter aircraft. I am asking, what is the purpose of Fighter Command in this situation in the defence of this country?
  Various things were said both by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) and the Under-Secretary of State about the valuable purpose which even the Venom and the Meteor could serve because the Russians have only TU 4s. One of the most extraordinary things about any controversy concerning Soviet Russia is that whatever they say we say the opposite. If the Russians say that they have the hydrogen bomb, we say that they have not. If the Russians tell us that they are not arming Eastern Germany, we say that they are. We never seem prepared to accept statements made by Soviet Russia.
  If I may give an illustration of the extraordinary perversity of the Western allies in this matter, I would instance the case which was quoted by Mr. Stuart Symington in a speech which he made recently. He said that when he was Secretary of State for Air for the United States someone brought to him a photograph of the MIG.15. He had been informed by his officials that the Russians had no aircraft like the MIG.15 so he took this photograph to the defence

  1479
  chiefs-of-staff and said, "This has been secured. What have you to say about it?" They carefully and thoroughly examined the photograph and gave him the considered view that it was a fake which had been put together for propaganda purposes.
  A similar case occurred when no less a person than the Secretary of State for Defence in the United States said that the Russians had no jet bomber capable of making the two-way journey to United States soil. Two days later one of the very lively American magazines published a photograph of such a machine. Again, its existence was denied by the chiefs-of-staff—but, subsequently, the Russians flew such a machine at one of their Red Square demonstrations.
  Mr. A. Henderson: My hon. Friend has mentioned me in this connection and he might have made it clear that in the major debate I certainly did not confine my remarks to the statement that the Russians had only TU 4s. It is on record that I went on to say that not only had they TU 4s but that they had TU 39s—a twin-engined jet bomber of very great performance—and that there was reason to believe that the TU 37, which compared, as I said, with the B.52, probably the best bomber in the world, was possibly coming off the production line. I was, therefore, not postulating that the only threat with which Fighter Command had to deal was the TU 4.
  Mr. Beswick: I quite agree that my right hon. and learned Friend did not confine his remarks. He ranged over a wide field and talked of various possibilities. But he said that our fighter forces would be able to deal adequately with the TU 4, and my point is that I cannot imagine any occasion on which the Russians would make what one would call a half-hearted or half-cock attack on these islands with TU 4s. If they were to make any attack at all it would be an all-out thermo-nuclear attack against which, presumably, we should retaliate.
  The question which I ask—and I am trying to be helpful here, and I invite the Under-Secretary of State to be—is, for what purpose do we envisage the operational use of the different types of fighter aircraft in the quantities in which they are now being ordered? I cannot
  1480
  see that it is any use at all for us to think we shall be able to deal with an attack by warding off 100 per cent. of any of the Russian jet aircraft with the conventional type of fighting machine. I do not think that is within the realms of possibility.
  What annoyed me a little about the Under-Secretary's speech, if I may say so, again, I hope, in good humour, was that he said in terms that to query this policy of the R.A.F. or the words of his right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Supply was to be unpatriotic.
  Mr. Ward: No.
  Mr. Beswick: Yes. The hon. Member said that it was doing
  "unnecessary damage to the public confidence and may well undermine public support for what is now generally accepted as the most important part of our defence policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 646.]
  What does that imply? It implies that we are going contrary to public policy and that we ought not to do it. What I am saying is that the hon. Gentleman ought to treat this Assembly as being a little more adult than that.
  I will not bore the House, but I have quotations here from no fewer than three air chief marshals all saying very much the same sort of thing as I am saying. They have written in responsible journals laying it down as their view that in the present circumstances there can be no defence. Indeed, in the defence debate the Prime Minister said that we can have no absolute defence against the thermonuclear weapon. In those circumstances, what useful purpose is served by the Under-Secretary telling us in the debate on the Air Estimates that we ought not to query Fighter Command?
  Viscount Hinchingbrooke: In the light of what the hon. Member is now saying, can he explain the reason for the wholesale attack on Her Majesty's Government by the labour Party a few weeks ago for not having got the most modern fighter machines in full-scale production?
  Mr. Beswick: In the first place, the noble Lord might have noticed that I did not take part in that full-scale attack. The second point is that I can conceive of an argument for spending money and getting

  1481
  machines and of an argument for not spending money and not getting machines, but I cannot conceive of an argument for spending money and not getting machines. To that extent, I think the contributions of my hon. Friends were justified.
  I come back to the main question, which is, in what kind of circumstances does the Under-Secretary envisage us using fighter aircraft for the defence of these islands?
  Mr. Ward: Is the hon. Member saying, in effect, that if we cannot guarantee to stop 100 per cent. coming in we should have no fighter command at all?
  Mr. Beswick: I am saying, in my own words, what Sir John Slessor said, that national suicide would follow thermonuclear war. Sir Ralph Cochrane, in a most impressive letter to "The Times," put it this way—that there could be no possibility of us preventing an enemy inflicting "mortal harm" on this country in an all-out thermo-nuclear attack. In my view, an attack on this country can in no circumstances be a minor attack; it must be a major attack and must mean, therefore, a thermo-nuclear war on both sides. In that situation, I cannot conceive of the use of Fighter Command.
  As I understood the intervention of the Under-Secretary of State, he says that we might not be able to bring all of the attackers down, but should bring some down. If that is his argument, would he explain it in greater detail to the House? He has said we have an adequate defence—he has said we have machines capable of defending these islands—does he mean, when he talks of defence, that we could bring down probably 5 per cent. of the attackers, or 10 per cent.? If that is what he means he should tell the House. If he does tell the House that is what he means, I say that 10 per cent., in modern circumstances with an enemy armed with thermonuclear weapons, is no defence at all.
  Air Commodore Harvey: Will the hon. Member say what the percentage was when his party formed the Government and ordered these fighters?
  Mr. Beswick: I know that the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield can do better than that. I am trying to put some reasonable questions. The answer
  1482
  to the hon. and gallant Member is perfectly obvious because, three and a half years ago, although it was theoretically possible to manufacture the hydrogen bomb, it had not, in fact, been developed. That is the complete answer to the hon. and gallant Member.
  I was trying to make myself absolutely clear to the Under-Secretary of State, so that there could be no excuse when he replies to the debate and we shall get an absolutely complete answer. Does he mean a 5 per cent. defence, or a 10 per cent. defence? What does he imagine constitutes adequate defence in modern terms?
  Having put those questions, I end by putting this as my view. We ask questions about the Royal Air Force and I always feel some reluctance in doing so because I know there are men engaged in the Service whose job it is to do the best they can with whatever equipment is given them. I think that sometimes it rather looks as if we were criticising those men. I want to make it clear that insofar as I am in contact with the Royal Air Force at present I have never seen it in better heart. I wish the Service well. I am sure that the men in it will try to carry out whatever policy they are expected to carry out, but we are entitled to go into the policy laid down by the Government of the day.
  4.34 p.m.
  Dr. Reginald Bennett: I cannot quite follow the line of argument of the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick). He surely would agree with his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) that fighter aircraft are to be employed as best may be, no matter what the cargo of the bombers and no matter what, initially, is the percentage of bombers which can be caught and shot down. Even in the late war only a proportion was shot down, but that was no reason for us to throw in our hand.
  I cannot see the argument—whether the bombers carry atom bombs as they did when the party of the hon. Member was in power, or whether they carry hydrogen bombs from which this country would suffer far more grievous damage, or whether they merely carry high explosive, as in the late war—that we should not try to prevent them reaching their targets.
  Mr. Beswick: Whereas that is an argument which conceivably might be put by the Under-Secretary of State, the fact is that the Prime Minister has told us on his authority that in the event of an attack on this country the answer would be the deterrent of all-out thermo-nuclear attack to wipe out the enemy.
  Dr. Bennett: That makes it quite obvious, as I think it is generally agreed in this House, that there would be all-out thermo-nuclear attacks in both directions. That still does not mean that we should confine ourselves solely to counter-bombing work with thermo-nuclear bombs. It leaves us with the right, and surely the duty, to destroy, deflect and deter bombers with thermo-nuclear weapons coming to this country. If they are dropped into the sea because fighters are after the bombers, that is a part of successful fighter defence.
  The hon. Member made a point touching on a matter about which I was hoping to make a simple observation this afternoon. He mentioned the dispersal of our bomber forces. The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton also mentioned this question and the hon. Member for Uxbridge spoke of the Princess flying boats. I would hate to acquire the reputation, which, I hope, I have not already acquired, of having a "bee in my bonnet," notably about the flying boat because I have spoken about such aircraft before. But there is one role which would incorporate use of the flying boat which I do not think has been sufficiently ventilated in this House, and it does not concern the Princess.
  As a part of our defence policy the exercise of strategic air bomber power from sources which could not be easily counter-attacked should form part of the strategic bombing picture. That appears to have been applied to the Navy in the use of carriers in what I think are called battle groups to deliver nuclear attacks on enemy held territory. It seems to me that if we are accepting that point of view we are accepting something which is very far short of what there could be in offensive potential and very much over what we could possibly stand in the risk of loss.
  We must think of other ways of delivering atom or hydrogen bombs from sources which cannot be easily counterattacked. If we are to use carrier groups,
  1484
  or carriers, to attack hostile territories, we are compelled to use very small aircraft which, by their very design, must have much too short a range when carrying a bomb big enough to do any damage. We would have to have two more carriers to defend with fighters, the carrier containing those small bombers, and probably two or three more guided-weapon ships or cruisers and perhaps 17 destroyers. That would add up to about £100 million worth of equipment to deliver very small punches over a very small distance. If it is the policy of this country that such strategic action should take place from the sea, I beg the Government to think again in terms of delivering punches, and not from those exceedingly vulnerable carriers.
  I am quite convinced that flying boats of a modern type must be developed. The Americans have been making immense strides. Instead of having short, flat, squat flying boats which we are accustomed to seeing, they are making them long and narrow. The Martin Seafarer is now about to fly at about the speed of our V bombers. When we discover, as we must soon discover, the secret of applying nuclear power to aircraft it seems absolutely certain that it cannot be applied to aircraft operating off runways, but must be applied to boats. Therefore, it seems to me that there are several contributory arguments why we must give more attention to having flying boats for this strategic bombing purpose.
  Perhaps the crowning strategic point of my argument is that a large flying boat, nuclear powered, is, to a very large extent, its own base. It can hide in creeks and operate from the most remote places. Its runways certainly cannot be destroyed while it is in the air. It has all the advantages of difficulty of discovery, whereas if an aircraft, by scientific methods, can now detect a submerged submarine, surely it would not have much difficulty in finding a group of three carriers, five cruisers and 17 destroyers.
  The flying boat can operate from un-discoverable places and be the elusive dispersed strategic bomber force which seems to be envisaged in operations from the sea. Therefore, whether the Air Ministry should administer these things or not, we should now, not having done much about it in the recent past, give

  1485
  much attention to developing high-performance flying boats and, if necessary, let the Navy run them. I feel that this is a task which should supplant that of the carrier.
  4.42 p.m.
  Mr. Tom Driberg: I want to raise a matter rather different from those which have been discussed so far in this debate; but it is a matter which comes up from time to time in Parliament, and it is as well that the true position should be restated, as it has been, by successive Governments.
  I refer to the right of Service men to communicate with their Members of Parliament about Service problems and grievances. I raise the question today because it so happens that there have recently come to my notice two cases—one in the Royal Air Force and one in the Army, which I shall seek to raise later, on the Army Estimates—in which this right has been infringed and in which there appears to me to be an element of quite serious victimisation of the Service men who have sought to avail themselves of it.
  Before I deal with the specific case of the man in the Royal Air Force, I should like to make two qualifications of what I want to say. First, I fully accept the official position that it is preferable that the usual Service channels should be used, at any rate in the first instance, for raising grievances in the Services. Obviously, hon. Members of this House do not want to be flooded with all sorts of grievances, some of them, perhaps, frivolous, which could be perfectly well disposed of in the units and stations concerned.
  I accept that position, but it does seem to be necessary every now and then to reiterate that there is, despite that, this absolute ultimate right of the Service man to communicate with his Member of Parliament, because that right is so often doubted or queried. All of us will have met constituents—perhaps National Service men—who say, rather vaguely, "Well, 'they' told us we were not allowed to write to our M.P.s," or words to that effect. It is difficult to pin it down, but that idea does get around sometimes.
  My second qualification is that I want to pay a sincere and strong tribute to the Under-Secretary of State himself for the extraordinary amount of personal atten-
  1486
  tion that he has given to the particular case that I am raising.
  Mr. Beswick: Will my hon. Friend allow me to add, "and in all the other cases, too"?
  Mr. Driberg: I quite agree. This case, however, is exceptional. It dragged on for seven or eight months, in the course of which the hon. Gentleman and I exchanged perhaps dozens of letters, long and short, including two inordinately long ones from him which were very welcome.
  In the end, the hon. Gentleman actually sent a senior officer from Whitehall to the unit in the Middle East to investigate the situation regarding my constituent. I regard it as a great tribute to our system, to the Air Ministry and to the hon. Gentleman, that it should be possible for one individual airman's grievances to be investigated as thoroughly as that, and I have no hesitation in paying this tribute to the hon. Gentleman.
  As the Under-Secretary will know, the case to which I am referring is the case of Senior Aircraftman Michael Jukes. I give his name because I have his permission to do so and because, unfortunately, he is now about to leave the Royal Air Force. After all this trouble was cleared up, he recently applied for training as a pilot, which would, no doubt, have involved a commission had he been successful. His application was forwarded with a favourable recommendation from his present commanding officer, but, unfortunately, he was failed medically and so he will be leaving the Royal Air Force. This is a great disappointment to him, because he loves the Service, despite the unhappy incidents to which I shall be referring.
  Incidentally, in case hon. Members opposite may be in any doubt about the particular airman concerned, I assure them that he is not the type of man whom they would regard as a mere troublemaker or agitator, because before going into the Service he was an ardent and active member of the Young Conservatives in my constituency.
  It was in May last year that this matter was first brought to my attention, not in a letter from my constituent directly, but in a letter from his mother, who lives in my constituency, at Witham, Essex. It was brought to me in that indirect way

  1487
  because Jukes had tried to put up a number of grievances about conditions at his station in the Canal Zone; had had no success in doing so; and had then been informed by his commanding officer that he—the commanding officer—could not give him permission to write to his Member of Parliament about these grievances.
  Of course, there is a double fallacy in that statement. In the first place, such permission is not needed since there is an absolute right; and, in the second place, the commanding officer certainly had no right whatever to refuse the permission. I realised that the investigation of the other, substantive grievances would take some time, and I thought it as well to clear this constitutional point out of the way at once. Accordingly, I put down a Question, to which I got a Written Answer on 16th June, asking the hon. Gentleman whether he was aware of this refusal of permission to communicate. The hon. Gentleman replied:
  "There are recognised Service channels through which men and women of the Royal Air Force can take up their problems with higher authority. Nevertheless, it is a well-established practice that Service men are free to write to their Member of Parliament if they so wish, without seeking permission from their commanding officer, provided there is no breach of security. It is clear that in this case there was a misunderstanding and we are reminding commanding officers of the true position."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th June, 1954; vol. 528, c. 144–5.]
  That Answer was supplemented by a letter which I had a little later from the hon. Gentleman, in which he said:
  "While Jukes's commanding officer is adamant that he did not actually refuse Jukes permission to write to you but told him that he could not grant him permission, I do not think he would deny that refusal was at least implied. However, I am satisfied that there was a genuine misunderstanding on the part of the commanding officer and I think you will agree that little would be gained by pursuing the matter any further, particularly as all commanding officers have now been reminded of the true position."
  I am rather glad that the hon. Gentleman took that step of reminding all commanding officers. This does show that the gravity of the matter was appreciated by the Air Ministry.
  Unfortunately, that was by no means the end of it. From this time onwards my unfortunate constituent was subjected to what I can only describe as persecution. There was a series of quite
  1488
  trumpery charges against him, on one pretext or another. They culminated in a court-martial at the beginning of September. I shall go into the circumstances of the court-martial in a minute or two, but I may say now that Jukes was convicted at that court-martial, but that the sentence was one day's detention, and that that conviction has since been quashed. So it is evident that he was not a very heinous offender.
  However, perhaps the most disgraceful feature of the whole proceedings is that false information about what was going on in this unit was supplied—I can only conclude that it was deliberately supplied—to the Air Ministry and to the Under-Secretary of State to pass on to me, obviously in an endeavour to cover those responsible for the malpractices, for the abuses, whatever it may be, and for the persecution of my constituent, as I maintain it was.
  This is provable, I think, if one compares two letters sent to me by the Under-Secretary, one on 14th July of last year, the other on 24th December of last year. In the letter of 14th July the Under-Secretary rebutted almost all the allegations and complaints made by my constituent on major matters and on minor matters. I would not deny that some of the matters of which my constituent complained would seem to us comparatively trivial, but anybody who has been in the Canal Zone will know that in those pretty unpleasant surroundings even quite trivial irritants can be magnified and can cumulatively contribute to bad morale in a unit. Anyway, in the letter of 14th July almost everything that my constituent alleged was denied.
  There is a very different picture in the letter of 24th December, the second paragraph of which reads:
  "As you are aware, I had Juke's case completely reinvestigated. The new investigation was a very thorough one carried out by a senior Royal Air Force officer from my department. It is clear from his report that, due to a number of administrative errors, I was misinformed on two of main issues in dispute and I hope you will accept my sincere apologies for misleading you by passing on this inaccurate information."
  That was very frank and very handsome of the hon. Gentleman. It is what one would expect of him, or for that matter of any Minister who stands at that Box, whatever party happens to be in power. None the less, it is surely quite

  1489
  wrong that, even if the explanation is wrapped up in the euphemism of a "number of administrative errors," any of Her Majesty's Ministers should be put in the galling and humiliating position of having to retract in extenso previous statements made to a Member of Parliament who has raised quite serious allegations.
  I cannot possibly weary the House with a recital of all the grievances, all the complaints, all the allegations. I shall mention merely one quite minor one, because it is brief and because the comparison is easily made. In the original letter of complaint which his mother passed on to me, S. A. C. Jukes referred, inter alia, to the food, a quite frequent cause of complaint as one knows. He said:
  "The food we sniff at, nibble at and finally reject is cooked with equipment which was condemned as obsolete on all other Royal Air Force stations in pre-war years—I think, 1937."
  In his letter of 14th July the Under-Secretary said:
  "As regard Juke's allegations about the food and the equipment with which it is cooked, an examination of the minutes of recent station mess committee meetings has shown that there have been no serious complaints about the food. The equipment used in the R.A.F. mess at Ismailia and throughout the Canal Zone is standard."
  That is the letter, hon. Members will remember, which threw down most of what my constituent said. It is the letter glossing over all the complaints, the letter in which the Under-Secretary was misinformed. In the letter of 24th December, on this same point, which affords an easy comparison, the hon. Gentleman said:
  "Jukes also complained about the food and the equipment with which it was cooked. My investigating officer visited the kitchens of the Sector Operations Centre and found them to be quite efficient, although much of the cooking equipment is rather antiquated. Two excellent large electric hot-plates and three new tea urns have now been provided, with another three or four to follow, which should help to improve the service."
  Then the hon. Gentleman added, with, perhaps, a rather cautious note of optimism:
  "There was a choice of three main courses at the midday meal, which looked very good to the investigating officer."
  That is just one minor example, as I say, of the extraordinary difference between the two letters that were sent to me by the Under-Secretary in July and in
  1490
  December, and it shows how important it is that these complaints should be thoroughly investigated and thoroughly thrashed out. It is most unfortunate that when an aircraftman has the tenacity and the guts—if I may put it—to write to his M.P. he should, therefore, be victimised, as I feel certain that this man was in this case.
  It was in August that the court-martial proceedings were set in train. I was, naturally, greatly concerned to learn from my constituent—and from friends of his, other men serving with him, who also wrote to me to say that they thought that he was being victimised—that he was under close arrest, awaiting court-martial. In view of the unhappy general situation on this station, I got in touch at once with the Air Ministry and asked the Under-Secretary to make quite sure that the court-martial was conducted properly and that proper arrangements were made for Jukes to be represented adequately at it. I am glad to say that the Air Ministry did intervene energetically and ensured that he was represented by a qualified barrister, who flew out there to appear at the court-martial.
  However, there seems to have been, I am afraid, no limit to the vindictiveness with which my constituent was treated, because then another extraordinary action was taken. They actually posted home one of my constituent's defence witnesses, whom he wanted to appear on his behalf at the court-martial. I have no doubt at all that this was done deliberately in order to prevent him from giving evidence. It is a very serious statement to make, but I make it advisedly, having considered all the circumstances and having since had an opportunity of talking them over in great detail with the man concerned.
  Jukes wrote and told me this, and I again got in touch at once with the Under-Secretary. This was another point, unfortunately, at which the hon. Gentleman was misinformed by the unit, because he wrote back to me to say that Jukes had not asked for this witness until after he had left for home, being due for demobilisation. This turned out not to be true—though I have have no doubt that the fact that he was nearly due for demobilisation was made the pretext for posting the witness home.

  1491
  The matter is summed up in the Under-Secretary's letter of 24th December, in which he writes:
  "The second occasion on which Jukes thought he was being victimised was when Corporal Bee, his Defence witness, was posted to the United Kingdom before he could appear at Jukes's court-martial. You will recall that in my letter of 22nd September I said that Jukes had not asked for Corporal Bee to be called as a witness for the Defence until after Bee had left for home and that we could not therefore arrange for Bee to appear. This statement, I am sorry to say, was completely inaccurate. Corporal Bee had been asked for by the Defence and he was actually available to give his evidence on the date first set for the trial, 20th August. He was a National Service man and was due for release on the 7th September, which meant that he had to leave for the United Kingdom by the 3rd September. When Jukes's court-martial date was put back there was a discussion between the unit and the responsible Group Headquarters on the advisability or otherwise of keeping Corporal Bee back"—
  I ask the House to note this particularly—
  "As they"—
  that is, the unit and Group Headquarters—
  "thought that Bee was merely going to produce evidence which would prove that Jukes was not detailed for the specific duty, his presence as a witness did not appear to them to be essential. They finally decided that they would not be justified in keeping him in the Middle East beyond his discharge date. But Jukes, in fact, wanted additional testimony from Bee. Jukes later submitted a petition against conviction and De L'Isle"—
  that is, the Secretary of State for Air—
  "has decided that the conviction is to be quashed."
  This surely indicates a most reprehensible conspiracy against justice for this airman. Group Headquarters and the unit took the responsibility upon themselves of deciding which defence witnesses would be necessary to him. In fact, it was not even true that Corporal Bee could not have given evidence at that court-martial and still be home in time for his release. The court-martial took place four days before he was due for release. He could perfectly well have been kept back and flown home, as many men are flown home from the Middle East. I regard this as one of the two most disgraceful features of the whole case—the other being, as I said, the general policy of trying to protect those responsible by supplying false information to the Under-Secretary—
  Mr. George Wigg: Has my hon. Friend considered whether there has not been contempt of court here? It has been laid down many times that a court-martial stands in the same position as a civil court. If it can be proved that this witness was removed from the jurisdiction of the court, I should have thought that there might be at least a borderline case of contempt of court.
  Mr. Driberg: My hon. Friend suggests the possibility of a question of contempt of court here. I hope that the Under-Secretary will make some reference to that when he deals with this matter in his speech.
  However, I should explain to my hon. Friend that all this happened at the end of August and the beginning of September, and I did not know these details until I received them in the Under-Secretary's letter at Christmas time. By then, it was a little late—particularly as, in the main, my constituent had been cleared: the conviction had been quashed and the matter fairly happily cleared up, so far as my constituent was concerned. But I agree that the point made by my hon. Friend may very well be important.
  Mr. Swingler: Has the Under-Secretary reported to my hon. Friend about any action taken against the senior officers who supplied the hon. Gentleman with false information, or interfered with judicial processes by removing a witness? I understand from the letters that they admit that they supplied wrong information to the Minister and that, using their own discretion, they removed a defence witness who was known to be required. Did the Under-Secretary report that any action was being taken?
  Mr. Driberg: No, the hon. Gentleman did not, but I feel fairly certain from the terms of the letter sent to me that the matter would not have gone unnoticed. I will not say more than that. I do not know whether the Under-Secretary wants to say more when he replies. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for New-castle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler), I cannot claim that the officers concerned have admitted supplying false information. They have, in effect, been convicted of it by the results of the visit of the senior investigating officer, but that is covered by the euphemism
  "… due to a series of administrative errors.…"

  1493
  Perhaps it is thought that they were led into this series of errors by loss of memory due, perhaps, to the heat of the sun in the Middle East. It may be that the Under-Secretary will also deal with the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme.
  This case, although only an individual case, seems to me to be one of considerable gravity and to illustrate an important constitutional principle and perhaps a principle of justice. Although it has been cleared up, thanks to the Under-Secretary, and although S.A.C. Jukes is now, on the whole, happy about it again, the thing that still worries me a little is that there may be a number of similar cases in which, perhaps, the airman concerned has not the exceptional pertinacity, independence and courage which I certainly attribute to Jukes.
  I am not for a moment suggesting that this kind of thing is widespread. On the contrary, I think that it is, happily, rare in the Royal Air Force and in the Army. But I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will agree that these rare cases should be brought to light and thoroughly investigated. There may be similar cases in which the airman, having made one try at it, does not pursue the matter but merely relaxes into sullen acquiescence, when he is told by a commanding officer similar to this one that he is not allowed to write to a Member of Parliament without permission.
  Mr. Wigg: Is my hon. Friend aware that, if the facts he reveals are correct, an offence has been committed under Section 27 or 40 of the Army and Air Force Act in that an officer has knowingly and wilfully suppressed material facts? I thought it was relevant to let my hon. Friend know this, so that he can discover whether, in fact, proceedings have been taken under those Sections.
  Mr. Driberg: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend for his interjection, and I have no doubt that the Under-Secretary will deal with it.
  I merely want to add that the Air Ministry is responsible for protecting airmen in these admittedly very rare cases in which it has become necessary for a man to exercise his constitutional right; I am glad that the Under-Secretary has done so in this case, and I hope that he
  1494
  will reaffirm that right as vigorously as possible, so that it may be known throughout the Royal Air Force.
  5.11 p.m.
  Mr. P. B. Lucas: I only wish to refer very briefly to a matter which goes somewhat wider than the one with which the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) has just been dealing. I am sure he will not think it discourteous of me if I do not follow him, because he was dealing in some detail with a special case. But I should like to say to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that all the cases about which I have had to write to him on behalf of constituents serving either as National Service men or on some other engagement have been dealt with most scrupulously, most fairly and in detail by the Air Ministry. I think it is the general opinion of the House that these matters are treated carefully and properly by the Department.
  The matter I want to refer to is the new plan for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. From what I can see of it, it is probably just about the best which can be devised in present circumstances. The squadrons are going to keep their Meteors and Vampires, and they are going to be linked with Regular squadrons in the Air Force. Thus, the most proficient and experienced pilots will get experience in flying the latest types of Service aircraft.
  This scheme seems to me to be based on the premise that all the 20 Auxiliary squadrons are equal. While that may be the fairest, I am not at all sure it is the most practical assumption to work on. My view is that these squadrons vary considerably. It is probably only to be expected that they should, because some of them draw on areas of much larger population than others. It seems reasonable to suppose that there should be some variations in standard.
  But my criticism of the scheme, if I have one, is that it tends to be based on the standard of the least proficient squadron. I do not like to talk about Auxiliary squadrons in the sense of the least proficient, because they have done a wonderful job and have maintained an extraordinary standard throughout the years, winning the admiration of us all, but it does appear that the very best of them are to be kept down to the level of the least proficient.

  1495
  I am personally of the opinion—and I know this is a view shared by some in the Royal Air Force—that a few of the 20 squadrons cannot without undue risk to the pilots, fly the latest type of aircraft. With their limited experience, and particularly with the comparatively small amount of flying they are able to do, it would be open to risk and to question to let them fly the Hunter, but I am equally sure that a squadron like 601, one of the best which can draw on a much wider area of population than most, could easily manage the latest fighters. I contend that this scheme tends to be based on the principle that the speed of the convoy must be the speed of the slowest ship. I am not sure for that reason whether it will ultimately prove to be the best that can be devised; but for the moment, I agree, it probably is the most practical.
  Nevertheless, I think that in the long run it would be wrong to assume that these squadrons are going to remain equal, and that therefore we should continue to do the same for all. If in the future a commander-in-chief thinks one of these squadrons to be capable of re-equipment with the latest type of fighter, then I feel the case should be considered on its merits. It might very well set up keenness and competition among the squadrons to do so.
  I believe the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) had a very good point in the debate last week when he mentioned the light fighter. He suggested that selected squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force might very well be equipped with this aircraft. I understand that the trials which have taken place with the earlier type of light fighter reveal that it is very promising, and I think that the point could well be borne in mind by my hon. Friend.
  But the part of the scheme about which I am most doubtful is that which suggests that these squadrons should be linked with Regular squadrons. I have no doubt that on paper this is probably all right, but I believe that the serviceability of the Hunters is such that it might well prove extremely inconvenient for Auxiliary pilots to be flying them at the week-ends. I do not know what a flight sergeant would think who went on a
  1496
  week-end pass on Friday evening leaving in his flight five or six serviceable aircraft and found on his return on Monday morning that there were only two or three fit to fly. I wonder what his views would be. I do not think they would be very complimentary.
  I assume that some of the regular ground crews will have to be kept behind on Saturday and Sunday to help service these aircraft. I do not know how they will feel about that. I think it would be very unwelcome to some of them. No, I really feel there will be difficulties in this plan which perhaps cannot now be foreseen.
  However, the important thing is that these squadrons are going to be kept together with their great and enduring spirit. To my mind, it would be quite unthinkable for them to be used in any other way than in Fighter Command. The suggestion, for instance, that they should be converted into Transport Command squadrons is quite wrong and unimaginative. Their spirit is essentially the spirit of the fighter squadron and it would be wrong to misuse it. I hope this is not a rigid plan, but one which will be open to change as the months go by. If it is to be so regarded, then I think that it will prove to have been well conceived.
  5.17 p.m.
  Mr. Stephen Swingler: Like the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas), I should like to pay my tribute to the Under-Secretary for the scrupulously fair way in which he deals with personal cases. I have submitted a few to him, and I know from the way he dealt with them what great care and attention he devotes to them. It is for that reason that I hope he will be able to say something quite specific about the allegations and charges made by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg), who has quite clearly established that the Minister was supplied with a false picture of the situation in which these grievances arose, and that senior officers have admitted that they attempted to interfere with the evidence of a witness at a court-martial because they said they thought he was not required.
  As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) showed, an offence has been committed under the Army and

  1497
  Air Force Act and under the Air Force Disciplinary Code. As has been said, this is a rare kind of case, but we want to ensure that this sort of thing is dealt with properly and fairly. So I hope the Under-Secretary will be able to say that disciplinary action is being taken against those responsible so as to ensure that this kind of thing cannot generally occur.
  I do not want to take up a great deal of time, but I want to refer mainly to two matters. There has not been much reference during these debates on the Estimates to the actual matter of estimating. Last year I raised this subject on the Air Estimates, and I want to do so again because it is particularly appropriate. One of the practices which has grown up in the last few years and which ought to stop is that of over-estimating by the Service Departments, and the Air Ministry is the worst Department from that point of view.
  Hon. Members will have studied the figures in a written reply given by the Minister of Defence to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley on 28th February this year. The Minister of Defence revealed what had actually been spent by the Service Departments in the last four financial years compared with the estimating which had been presented and approved by this House. Though there was a good deal of controversy last year on the subject, we had not got accurate figures. The accurate figures have now been given by the Minister of Defence for the three financial years, 1951 to 1954, and they show that the Service Departments as a whole over-estimated their requirements by £700 million.
  The figures show that over the last three financial years the Service Departments over-estimated the production capacities of the Services by over £1,000 million. The 1951 estimate for the three-year production programme for £2,800 million and, as the Minister of Supply said last year, it was unrealistic. That was conceived principally for the Royal Air Force. At the end of the third financial year it resulted in an expenditure of £1,700 million and in the kind of chaos disclosed in the White Paper on Aircraft Supply.
  My point is that it has been continually the practice to over-estimate and that the practice has not stopped. Last Budget
  1498
  day the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to announce that the Defence Departments had over-estimated or under-spent by £132 million in that year. What do we find in the most recent Defence White Paper? We find in paragraph 55 that the Service Departments will be considerably under-spent in this last financial year. The Service Departments have still not learned the lesson and they still ask this House to approve Estimates that are quite beyond their production capacities. Only when scandals come to light and many questions are asked about the lack of aircraft are we able to discover this.
  Viscount Hinchingbrooke: But the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) has been telling us, in effect, that he is delighted that those large numbers of aircraft have not been produced because they could be of no effect against the hydrogen bomb.
  Mr. Swingler: That is the point I want to make, because it shows how wrong it was to conceive these Estimates, and how wrong it is to go on approving them. Today the noble Lord will be asked again to approve an Estimate for the Royal Air Force on the same basis and of almost the same character as we have had in the last three years. What has been the lesson of the last three years? The lesson has been that those responsible have tried to do too much and have achieved too little. It is a good thing that they have achieved too little because, if they had managed to spend all this money, a great deal of it would have been wasted. What conclusions should we draw? The conclusion we should draw is to cut down the Estimates, to stop the over-estimating—
  Mr. Beswick: Will my hon. Friend make it clear that I did not express any delight at this muddle? I simply said that in the future, with a little better planning and a little better policy, we might avoid some of it.
  Mr. Swingler: I agreewith my hon. Friend and with the comments made in the Conservative Press on the White Paper on Aircraft Supply. All those comments led to only one conclusion, that there has been a persistent attempt to spend too much money, to try to do too many things, to have a multiplicity of design, with the result that we have neither managed to spend the money nor buy

  1499
  the aircraft. If the Service Departments had estimated better and had spent a little less money, and had streamlined both estimates and production, they might have achieved much more.
  I am criticising the continuance of these Estimates because, on the surface, it does not seem to me that the Air Estimates presented to us this year are much different either in character or scale from those we have had in the previous three financial years. Therefore I suspect that next year the Chancellor will be saying precisely what he will be saying this year and what he said last year, that the Estimates have been under-spent, that once again Parliament approved Estimates although the money could not be spent because the Service authorities budgeted for too much.
  This matter should be looked at in the light of the experience gained in the last four financial years of extravagant overestimating—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Certainly, that is in the Government's own White Paper—
  Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;
  House counted, and 40 Members being present—
  Mr. Swingler: I welcome the increased interest. I was concluding—when my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) interrupted—on the point that I believe these Air Estimates should be more severely scrutinised in the light of the financial and economic experience of the last three years, because I suspect we are continuing the process of over-estimating and under-spending.
  Mr. James Hudson: May I ask my hon. Friend whether the picture he is painting of over-estimating has not taken place precisely in that period regarding which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been sending to the Departments special circulars calling attention to the necessity for care in estimating, for economy and, if necessary, for the dismissal of men engaged on important jobs, so that there should be economy in the expenditure of public money? Is it not precisely in those three years that there has been this terrible over-estimating of which we have had an account from my hon. Friend?
  Air Commodore Harvey: The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has dealt only with the last three years. Perhaps he will deal with the two previous years when the Labour Government were in control? He will find that even then, although the amounts were not so great, the money which was voted by Parliament was not spent.
  Mr. Swingler: I welcome that intervention, and I agree that I have not gone back over all those years. The hon. and gallant Gentleman may be right, in which case that reinforces my point I am making that point only in relation to the last three years, because they are an outstanding example of fantastic overestimating. Nobody can get away from that. On all sides it is now admitted that the programme devised for all the Services in 1951 was a fantastic overestimate, an over-strain of the productive system. This is a persistent tendency in the Service Departments, particularly with the increasing cost of modern weapons, and it needs to be severely criticised, because that is one of our jobs in this House. One of the themes of the Chancellor in his Budget speech was that we must have definite relief from the defence burden, and it seems to me that the Service Departments have not made their contribution.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Would not my hon. Friend agree that this huge expenditure on armaments is largely the cause of the inflation and of the economic and financial trouble which led to the recent difficulties of the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
  Mr. Swingler: My hon. Friend is constantly trying to persuade me to get out of order, but there are others who wish to speak and, therefore, I will leave it to my hon. Friend, who is well-informed and capable of answering the question which he has just posed to me. I want briefly to turn to a subject of much greater importance.
  The point is that so far in the debates on the Estimates this year the Service Ministers have produced no satisfactory answer whatsoever on the subject of conscription. We still want to know from the Government Front Bench what the arguments are now for continuing the elaborate and expensive apparatus of conscription and for not cutting down on the

  1501
  call-up. We want to know this particularly from the Royal Air Force.
  Let us take the position of the Royal Air Force. One of the great arguments for our system of conscription was that we must have masses of reservists. What is the position of the Royal Air Force in relation to reservists? The Royal Air Force does not want them; it has too many of them and does not know what to do with them. The Under-Secretary is embarrassed by the fact that the Royal Air Forces does not want to train the reservists which it ought to train under the National Service Acts. However, the Royal Air Force has no use for them and it shovels them into Civil Defence, the mobile defence columns, fire fighting and anything else which has nothing to do with the Royal Air Force.
  The elaborate training system for recruits is a millstone hanging round the neck of the Air Ministry, and it does not want it. The Royal Air Force can deal, according to the Under-Secretary, with only 10,000 in a year of the 136,000 who ought to be trained. The Reserves position is becoming an embarrassment to the Air Ministry, and it will not now argue in favour of conscription because of the need to have masses of reservists.
  The second argument relates to commitments. Where does the Under-Secretary stand on that subject? Is it the argument that the Royal Air Force has more commitments or fewer commitments since last year? Have the commitments increased or decreased over the last two or three years? Are we to take it that the tension has become greater, or has it become less? According to the defence White Paper, the commitments of the Services are alleged to have been reduced. Consequently, there should be a smaller call for conscription on the grounds of our commitments.
  The third point is that the Ministers are pledged to reduce conscription, and the pledge has become due for fulfilment since the end of the Korean war.
  Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: When?
  Mr. Swingler: We had a bit of an argument about this the other night, and so I have brought along a copy of HANSARD for 15th September, 1950, when the period of conscription was increased
  1502
  from 18 months to two years. Hon. Gentlemen opposite are in an extraordinarily partisan mood today; apparently they are concerned only with party.
  I maintain that the leaders of the two major political parties in this country are pledged now to reduce the period of conscription from two years to 18 months. The pledges were given on 15th September, 1950, at the time when the period of National Service was extended because of the Korean emergency, and they were clearly given. If hon. Gentlemen opposite doubt it in respect of their party, let them look at column 1505 of the OFFICIAL REPORT for 15th September, 1950, and read the speech of the present Lord Chancellor, then Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, who persuaded the Liberal Party to withdraw its Amendment to limit until the end of 1953 the extension of conscription to two years. He said:
  "If there were any doubt, if any great party in the State had not pledged itself to get rid of this increase as soon as possible in view of the international situation, I could understand the difficulty of the right hon. and learned Gentleman."
  He was referring to the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies).
  "But we are all agreed on this point. It is our common desire."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th September, 1950; Vol. 478, c. 1505.]
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I am not sure about this and would like some guidance. Would it require legislation to reduce the period of National Service, or would it not?
  Mr. Swingler: I understand that the period could be reduced by a statutory order, and that the passing of a Bill amending the National Service Acts would not be required.
  I could read other extracts. Hon. Members should read that debate. A pledge was given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who was then the Secretary of State for War, and that was followed up by the present Lord Chancellor who was speaking for the Conservative Party to persuade the Liberal Party to withdraw its Amendment to restrict the time during which the extension of conscription to two years would operate. Both of them pledged themselves and their parties to reduce the period of conscription in the light of the international situation,

  1503
  which at that time referred to the Korean emergency. It was the Korean emergency which was the argument for extending the period.
  Hon. Members opposite appear to forget that the reason for the extension was the Korean hostilities and the extra commitments of that time. That is why I now argue that Ministers must take the matter seriously. The Korean emergency has been brought to an end and our commitments have been reduced. Consequently, the pledges come up immediately for consideration. We require very much more serious attention by the Service Ministers during the next 12 months to the problem of how they are to reduce the length of service if the public is not to be double-crossed.
  5.38 p.m.
  Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: I want to take up the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) on two points.
  The first point concerns National Service. I feel certain that all hon. Members are anxious to reduce the period as soon as possible, but there are only two ways by which it can be done. One is by increasing the rate of Regular recruiting and the rate at which men will sign on for extended service, and the other is through a change of heart on the part of the Soviet, which would mean less anxiety in the world, fewer commitments for us to meet and, consequently, the possibility of having smaller Armed Forces.
  I would remind the hon. Member that since the debate on National Service to which he has referred, although the Korean conflict has been settled, we have had the invasion and overrunning of Tibet by the Communist forces; the Indo-China incident, with all its anxieties, and it may not by any means be over yet; we have the Formosa trouble; and we have received threats in the West as well as in the East. Until a change of heart is shown by the Soviet, not only in words but also in acts, it would be very unwise for this country to let down its defences.
  I also want to take the hon. Gentleman up on an astonishing criticism that he made of his own Government's policy. The hon. Member was not in the House at the time, but his Government—correctly, I think—after the Korean invasion placed large orders for aircraft. If those
  1504
  large orders had not been placed, we should not have had any aircraft today.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: The aircraft are obsolete.
  Mr. Orr-Ewing: It was correct at that stage to place those great orders in an effort to have this country defended. When one places orders for aircraft, and particularly for new weapons, there will always be teething troubles. Anyone who has any knowledge of industrial processes and organisation will bear me out in this. It has taken longer to bring the new, complicated aircraft into service than was anticipated, and that has meant fewer progress payments to the firms and under-spending on Estimates. It still is essential to place the orders in advance in the hope that the aircraft will be delivered in the year in which one hopes that they will be delivered.
  Mr. Swingler: Does the hon. Member agree with the "Daily Telegraph" which, in speaking about the White Paper on the Supply of Aircraft, said that the effect of the programme over the first three or four years was simply to put too great a strain on the aircraft industry and not to get the best results?
  Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am coming to that very point. If the hon. Member had been here during the debates on the Air Estimates last week, he would have heard this point being dealt with very thoroughly.
  I think that we have spread our orders too widely and that over the next few years we have to cut down the number of projects which the Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm are backing. It is not only that we have the whole of the bomber, coastal, transport and fighter aircraft programmes, but superimposed on that we have the guided missile programme, which has to be able to meet both the Navy and Air Force demands. There is also a large helicopter research and development programme which is important to all three Services.
  There is a good deal of substance in what was said this afternoon by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme. It has been said by many people with greater weight from the Front Benches in recent debates. I should like my hon. Friend to deal with this point when he

  1505
  replies, or to write to me on the subject. That is whether there is some co-ordination between the Services in the helicopter development programme and in the guided missile programme.
  We read that the Royal Air Force is to be responsible for the ground-to-air guided missiles, but these will also be badly needed by the Navy. It is obvious that we cannot have two types of guided missile. I hope that we may have some assurance that there is close liaison between the two Services so that we will have one type of ground-to-air guided missile which will be used by both the Royal Air Force and the Navy.
  Hon. Members on the other side have spoken for so long that I will not take up too much time of the House. We have had one speech of 27 minutes and others of over 20 minutes, and there were several interjections in the last speech which no doubt made it longer than the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme had intended.
  I should like to deal with one matter to which the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) referred. He thought my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Supply was too strong in his defence of the aircraft industry. I should like to point out that my right hon. and learned Friend was answering what we on this side felt to be a very irresponsible speech by the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) in winding up the debate for the Opposition on the previous evening. The hon. Member had been making statements which we did not believe to be accurate but which had received tremendous publicity in the American Press. The headlines there had said, "Ex-Minister said Royal Air Force has no fighters, or bombers, only those we have given to them." If the American Press knew him as we know him, perhaps it would not have put the same value on his statements. Since the statements had been made, it was surely up to my right hon. and learned Friend to refute them vigorously and thoroughly, and he did that from the Dispatch Box.
  Another topic I should like to raise is that we have not heard in these days of debate anything about the Air Training Corps. I hope that my hon. Friend will think it worthwhile in next year's Memorandum to deal with this very important problem. These young men
  1506
  are vitally important to the future of our Air Force. At the moment there is a dearth of Regular officers returning to act as instructors to the Air Training Corps and a lack of enthusiasm. If that situation does not improve, we will not have the enthusiasm in the schools which will stand us in good stead when pupils leave to go into the Royal Air Force.
  I ask my hon. Friend to give some direction so that we shall not be too petty in combing through allowances, travelling allowances and other small compensations which are given to instructors for the immense amount of time and enthusiasm they give. There is nothing more discouraging, if one is prepared to help, than the idea that every time one claims 2s. 6d. for a meal or transport it will be cut to 2s. 3½d. It makes one feel that the Air Ministry is not as enthusiastic about this project as one would wish.
  Finally, what is my hon. Friend doing to see that the Air Force is sold to public grammar and secondary schools so that some of the best boys will be recruited when they leave? I have said before—and I still feel it most acutely—that the best regiments in the Army have talent spotters who take the trouble to go to the schools, see the masters and ask if they have any bright boys who have not made up their minds what they will do. They encourage them to go into the Rifle Brigade, or the 60th, or the Guards, or whatever it is. Is the Air Force doing this sort of thing? The Air Force is dependent not only on Cranwell but on the public and grammar schools for its recruits. I hope that we will pay considerable attention to the A.T.C. and the schools so that we will have the leadership in the Air Force that we will require in the future.
  5.45 p.m.
  Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: I want to deal with a point made by the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) on the subject of the Auxiliary squadrons, and also to take up a point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) in the debate on the Air Estimates. I think that the Under-Secretary should give us some indication of his policy about the light fighter. We have heard very little

  1507
  about it in the debates on the Air Estimates this year.
  The light fighter is an ideal piece of equipment for the Auxiliary squadrons. Nobody has made any suggestion that the light fighter should replace other fighters in the Royal Air Force. The suggestion is that they should be in addition to the other fighters. The Under-Secretary knows that there is a good deal to be said on behalf of some of these light fighters—particularly the Folland Gnat—and that a very good case has been made for its fine performance and its air worthiness.
  Not the least important part of the case is its cheapness. Its cost is only about £25,000 compared with the £100,000 or so for the more expensive and more complicated type of fighter. Another argument is that we continue to have more and more complicated fighters and other aircraft and it will be increasingly difficult to find technicians to service and maintain these highly complicated aircraft. The great shortage in this country today is of highly skilled and qualified technicians. There is a shortage of them in the factories and in the Services.
  If we had a situation in which these fighters and bombers had to be used in war, it would be terribly difficult to find enough technicians to maintain all these highly complicated but no doubt desirable machines. We might find ourselves in difficulties, if we did not have some light fighters. I understand from those with experience in Korea that the highly complicated American fighters could not be serviced, because of the shortage of technicians. They were frequently used without making use of all their highly complicated radar equipment and so forth, because they could not be maintained. It is no good spending a vast amount of money on these very fine aircraft, if one knows one cannot maintain them in combat.
  I hope that the Under-Secretary will see to it that some sort of decision is made about the light fighter in the future. I do not think that it matters whether it is the Folland Gnat or any other type, but we should have a light fighter in reserve.
  Mr. Edward Shackleton: I should like to know why my hon. Friend thinks the light fighter is
  1508
  especially suitable for the Auxiliary squadrons. Does he think they will be easier to fly, and does he think that the Government will be able to produce light fighters when they cannot produce other aircraft?
  Mr. Wyatt: It is much easier to fly and it requires a great many less training hours to learn to fly it, so that one would get a good deal more service from it in the Auxiliary squadrons than from a more complicated fighter.
  Mr. Ward: That is not the whole point. We have not reviewed arrangements for the Auxiliary Air Force because the men are unable to fly modern aeroplanes—they are perfectly capable of flying them—but because they are not able to give enough of their time to flying those aircraft to their limit under combat conditions, and particularly when working with the extremely complex system of defence which we have now. It seems to me that that argument applies to any type of aircraft, heavy or light.
  Mr. Wyatt: Yes, I follow what the Under-Secretary is saying. I am not trying to make any attack on him this afternoon about this matter. But I think it important to arrive at a correct decision about this point.
  I understand that the amount of time one can actually fly one of these machines before it has to be serviced is greater. One can get more flying hours out of it than from the more expensive and complicated aircraft in the same period of time. Also it is easier to learn to fly, and therefore, from that point of view, more useful for the auxiliary squadrons.
  Mr. Wigg: How can my hon. Friend possibly say that, when one has not been made?
  Mr. Wyatt: It is true to say that one has not yet been made, but there is the Folland Midge which is, I think, a variation of the Folland Gnat which is coming along. Everyone who understands the conception of the light fighter says that it is much less complicated in design and structure.
  Mr. Shackleton: My hon. Friend should stick to the rifle.
  Mr. Wyatt: I thank my hon. Friend for his help, but in fact it would seem that the Under-Secretary understands the

  1509
  point that I am making a great deal better than he does, so that I do not think we need quarrel about that.
  Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: The hon. Gentleman would agree that the serviceability of a fighter must depend very largely on the engine? The Orpheus engine has not been put in the Folland aircraft, and until it has, it is not possible to say what is the serviceability.
  Mr. Wyatt: The point I am trying to make is that we should be looking to the future and not relying exclusively on the more complicated and expensive types of fighters.
  I am not saying that the Government should immediately buy 500 fighters of one particular type, but I hope we shall hear that they are looking to the future and exploring the possibility of the light fighter. I believe that at one point the Air Ministry was on the verge of ordering some prototypes. I am not saying that they should be ordered from this particular firm, or from some other firm. It does not matter from where they are ordered.
  I wish to refer to the suggestions continually made by hon. Members opposite, the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) and the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey), and the Under-Secretary himself, that we have been engaged in some malicious campaign to denigrate the aircraft industry and the Royal Air Force, and generally to run down the air defences of our country, when there has been no justification for such a campaign.
  It would seem that the Government, or the Ministers representing various Government Departments, have not been reading their newspapers. This had nothing to do with my hon. Friends and myself in the first instance. The "Daily Express," the "Daily Mail," the "Daily Telegraph," the "Manchester Guardian"—
  The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): They have no military correspondents.
  Mr. Wyatt: —have all been saying very sharp and severe things about the Government over the last few months with regard to aircraft. They have said it with vehemence and regularity. It is all very
  1510
  well for the Secretary of State for War to intervene with his sneering observation that these newspapers have no military correspondents—
  Mr. Head: They have got the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg).
  Mr. Wyatt: I quite understand the position of the right hon. Gentleman. Any newspaper which approves of Government policy at any given moment is well equipped with expert knowledge; but any newspaper which may censure the Government at any given moment has not the necessary expert advice and cannot know how good the Government are.
  It is the oldest trick in the world. When any Government's shortcomings are found out, they say that the other side is unpatriotic and is running a campaign. The Under-Secretary of State has accused me of constant assertions and re-assertions and of uttering damaging untruths and half-truths. That too is one of the oldest tricks in the world. Every Government do it. If they are caught out, and thoroughly exposed, they say, "This is a campaign of untruths—how shocking, how abominable. It is all done for party purposes." So far as I am concerned, it has not been done for party purposes at all. It has been done because the Government had fallen down on the production and supply of aircraft.
  They have made promise after promise since they came to office about the arrival date of these aircraft, but the aircraft have not been forthcoming. That is clear to everyone. The hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick has made several speeches on the subject—without being attacked by his own Front Bench—pointing out all the defects in the organisation and supply of aircraft. We have simply emphasised them, in an endeavour to wake up the Government.
  It is all very well for the Government to say that all these things are untrue; and for Ministers, armed with the briefs which they obtain from their officials—because they do not know much about it themselves—to try to blame us. We have not the advantage of official sources of information, and we have to do the best that we can to find out what is going on. It is easy for Ministers to say, "Yes, but you have forgotten about a meeting which took place on 18th May, 1949, but we have the minutes here and we are

  1511
  going to read them out to you"—or some such statement of that kind. Anyone can do that, but it does not prove their case to be substantially right.
  We have proved that our case is substantially right. Hon. Members on this side of the House have not been campaigning against the British aircraft industry or saying that it is no good. I do not say that. I think it is the finest industry in the world, and I think that we have the finest aircraft designers in the world. But the Government have not been putting the necessary energy behind securing the best types of aircraft and furthering these projects. They have not been organising their resources in the best way. I am very sorry that what I have said has pained and hurt them, but it is probable that it was a good thing to say it. I say that in the sense in which one says, "This is going to hurt you more than me."
  Mr. Harry Wallace: East): My hon. Friend means, "This will hurt me more than it hurts you."
  Mr. Wyatt: I said it in a more accurate manner.
  We have certainly wakened up the Government. They have announced several plans for reorganisation. The new Minister of Supply appears to be tackling his job with more energy and vigour than his predecessor—
  Mr. Wigg: And with more ability.
  Mr. Wyatt: Yes, and with more ability.
  He has admitted mistakes. In the defence debate he said that mistakes had been made. It is our job, as the Opposition, to point out those mistakes. I do not want to go over them all now, but it seemed one's duty to say things in public which might give rise to anxiety and alarm.
  "This may give satisfaction in some foreign countries and cause distress and want of confidence in us in others."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1282.]
  Those are not my words; they are the words of the Prime Minister when he was in Opposition, and which he used in this House on 16th March, 1950, when attacking the Labour Government for alleged shortcomings and deficiencies over defence. His voice carries far greater weight internationally than the voices of
  1512
  my hon. Friends on the back benches on this side of the House.
  When the right hon. Gentleman thought he was justified in making that attack he did it in order, as he thought, to secure some efficient system of defence. We are certainly justified in doing what we have done, and, if necessary, we shall do it again next year, if the Government have not improved.
  Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Speaking for myself and possibly for my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey), may I say that we do not resent for a moment accurate and well-informed criticism. We resent statements like the statement that we have no transport aircraft, and that we ought to have. We remember that the Government of which the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) was a member—possibly quite correctly—cancelled the order for the Vallettas and Hastings, which would have been our standard transport aircraft today. Equally, the hon. Gentleman said that the Hunters could not fly in formation, which is totally untrue. We do not resent proper criticism but these are absolutely outrageous statements with no foundation in fact.
  Then there were the allegations of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) about the Meteor, the N.F.11, being unable to fire its guns at high speed. That proved to be equally untrue, and the hon. Members surely cannot object if we resent that sort of thing.
  6.0 p.m.
  Mr. George Wigg: The hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) says that my statement about the Meteor was untrue. What did I say? I dealt with paragraph 40 of the White Paper, Command 9388. It contained the following statement:
  "This country has an effective air defence against what any potential enemy is at present able to bring against us. By night, the most likely time for attack, we have a better defence than anyone else in the world."
  Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman says, "Hear, hear," but let us examine it in detail.
  When the Minister of Supply dealt with this proposition during the Defence debate, he did not base his argument on

  1513
  the fact that we had a better defence; he based it on the fact that we had a better defence system. He brought in the question of our radar defence and of our reporting system, but he avoided the argument in paragraph 40.
  The hon. Gentleman may remember that I had a Question down about the F.86D of which, at the time that this came up, the hon. Gentleman opposite was not aware, because he asked whether I was referring to the F.86. On 10th March, the hon. Gentleman asked whether I was referring to the F.86 or to the F.86D. It subsequently transpired in answer to a question asked during the debate, that the Minister of Defence did not know that squadrons of F.86D aircraft were part of the defence of this country. He said that these aircraft were unsuitable for operating in our climatic conditions.
  I then argued, with regard to the Meteor, that there was a restriction on its speed when its guns were fired. I did not particularise, but I asserted that there was such a restriction, and that there was trouble with the Meteor if its guns were fired at top speed. Indeed, I went further and gave the actual speed. Of course, the hon. Member for Hendon, North, the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) and the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) got into the argument as well. They thought it monstrous and terrible.
  Subsequently, the Under-Secretary of State for Air had something to say about it when winding up the debate. He said:
  "I must admit that I was very disappointed by the speech of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 817.]
  I will miss out the complimentary parts, for which I am very grateful. The hon. Gentleman thought that I was schizophrenic because, on the one hand, I praised the R.A.F. and, on the other, hit out at it. That happened in the debates on the Army Estimates and on the Navy Estimates, and I regret to say that it came from the Under-Secretary of State. When one is attacking what the Government are doing, one is not necessarily attacking the Services. I pointed out then that it was far from my mind to attack the Royal Air Force. Indeed, I had striven to get it competent equipment.
  1514
  It is a clear issue. I asserted that there was a restriction on the speed of these aircraft. The hon. Member for Hendon, North and the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield attacked me then, as did the Under-Secretary of State, who has done so again tonight. Will the Under-Secretary tell the House whether I was right or wrong?
  Mr. Ward: Let us first of all get straight what the hon. Gentleman said, because he has not told us. He said:
  "I say that that Meteor night fighter is incapable of firing its guns effectively at a greater speed than 330 knots."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 702.]
  Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman cannot get away with that. I was very careful not to particularise. Of course the Meteor can fire its guns, in the same way as can the Hunter. But if the Hunter fires its guns without a basket to pick up the links, the safety of the aircraft is endangered. Therefore, there is a restriction on the speed at which its guns can be fired.
  The same is true in respect of the Meteor. When the Meteor has store tanks in the wing, there is a wind deflection, and, as a result, the Air Ministry has imposed a restriction on the speed. The hon. Gentleman knows that now, but I am not sure that he knew it at the time. When there are store tanks in the wings, the Air Ministry imposes a restriction regarding the firing of the guns. And rightly so, because when the guns are fired at top speed—I will not go so far as to say what might happen—the tanks are dented. Does the hon. Gentleman care to answer that?
  Mr. Ward: Certainly. I was going to deal with the point in my winding-up speech, but perhaps it would be as well if I dealt with it now. I will start by repeating the statement which I made the other night, that the Meteor N.F.11 is capable of firing its guns effectively at all speeds, including top speeds. Let us get that clear.
  What the hon. Gentleman is doing is to draw a wrong conclusion from a statement of the facts. In order to extend the range of the night fighter, these under-wing drop tanks can be fastened on to it, and then, if the guns are fired at very high speed, there is the possibility—and indeed there have been cases—of those tanks becoming dented. The hon. Gentleman knows that.

  1515
  There is absolutely no question whatever of the guns firing ineffectively or of the aircraft's performance being affected. It is only that the drop tanks themselves may suffer some slight damage. Therefore, purely for peace-time training purposes, and in order to prevent a lot of unnecessary expenditure on underwing drop tanks, we have told squadrons that they should not fire their guns at very high speed when these drop tanks are fitted.
  That has no operational significance at all, and if the Meteor carrying the underwing tanks were in combat at very high speed, one of two things would be done. Either the drop tanks would be jettisoned, or, if they were not, they might get dented, which has no operational consequence at all. Finally, all pilots are given practice in firing their guns at top speed without the drop tanks in the normal course of training so that, if necessary, they can do it in wartime.
  Mr. Wigg: There is no question about the aircraft not being operationally fit, except that it has not any great endurance, when it has not got the drop tanks fittted to it. But the hon. Gentleman has now cenceded what I was after the other night, that there is a restriction on the Meteor N.F.11.
  Mr. Ward: In peace-time only.
  Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman wants to climb away if he can, but tonight I have caught him out, and also his hon. Friend. I regret to say that it is as plain as a pikestaff—if only the public and hon. Members on both sides of the House will read what was said, and the reply given—that when the hon. Gentleman replied to me on that date, he did not know that this restriction existed.
  Mr. Ward: There are any amount of restrictions on the activities of all three Services in peace-time. If this sort of thing goes on, it will not be a matter of a deterrent but of a detergent.
  Dr. Bennett: Would the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) say that because motor cars are driven at 30 miles an hour in certain areas, it would not be safe to drive them at greater speed?
  Mr. Wigg: Let the hon. Gentleman keep that argument for the local Conservative club. This matter is far too serious for that sort of argument.
  1516
  We have ascertained that the hon. Gentleman, not for personal reasons, but because his brief was a bad one, misinformed the House on the previous occasion. We have established beyond a shadow of doubt that we have F.86Ds and that the Government did not know this. We have also established that the Meteor N.F.11 has limitations, and that, because of those limitations—which I agree would not be imposed operationally—there is a limit, and has been, certainly for the past two years, on the speed of these aircraft, if they are fitted with drop tanks, when firing their guns.
  I now come to the question of the difference between operational and peacetime uses of aircraft. Through the kindness of the hon. Gentleman, I was allowed to see the Hunter. It still has troubles, but I believe that it will overcome them. I was extremely impressed by what I saw—but there is no doubt that the link and the cartridge, when thrown out, endanger the safety of the aircraft, and that sooner or later baskets will be fitted to these aircraft to pick up both links and cartridges. When that is done it may be that the guns can be fired with perfect safety.
  I also agree that if it were necessary today to commit this aircraft operationally the air officer commanding would be justified in so doing, and the gallant young men who have to fly them would not dissent from the situation; they would take up the aircraft knowing the risk involved and fire the guns operationally, even though they know that when the links come out the safety of the aircraft might be endangered. It is equally certain that when the N.F.11 fires its guns while it is carrying drop tanks a number of funny things happen.
  I do not ask the hon. Members opposite to withdraw their remarks, but the hon. Member for Hendon, North has once again got caught out.
  Mr. Orr-Ewing: I do not think that an impartial umpire would have given me caught out.
  Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman pays so little regard to the rules that he would not know whether he was in or out. I dispense with him now. When I have more time in the future, I hope to deal with him in detail.

  1517
  I want to associate myself with what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), namely, that all through these Service debates our objective has been to try to get the best value for our money. We have not an unlimited amount of money, and we should be failing in our duty as an Opposition if we did not do what we have done. We have tried to do it without seeking any party advantage. What better evidence can we have of that than what has been said by the Secretary of State for War, who knows everything? He has told us that there are no votes in the subject of defence. I accept that.
  I do not want to denigrate any Service or piece of equipment; the one person I want to denigrate is the Prime Minister, because since 1945 his record on the matter of defence has been absolutely disastrous. Not only have his personal appreciations been at fault but, with the exception of the Under-Secretary of State for Air, he has made some lamentable appointments of Service Ministers. The greatest compliment I can pay to the Under-Secretary is to say that I recommend him very strongly for the post of Secretary of State for War—or perhaps he could combine the two Service Ministries. I hope that we have heard enough of this nonsense, and that he will now face up to the mess which has been left behind by the Minister of Supply.
  One of the appalling things done by the Prime Minister was to move the previous Minister of Supply before we had a chance to get at him, and to put in his place a good lawyer—who is always very good when he has a bad brief. It is true that we have punctured the Minister of Supply in various matters, but he is new to the game and he has not done too badly. He will do a little better after he has had some training from us. I hope that the Secretary of State for Air and the Under-Secretary will consult the Minister of Supply and ensure that the aircraft industry is not allowed to undertake more than it can carry. The great lesson to be drawn from the present situation is that we are trying to do too much with so little.
  I hope that the Under-Secretary will not be carried away by some of the fairy stories put out by various aircraft companies. It may be that the Victor has a great future; I hope that it has—I know
  1518
  that the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield hopes that it has. I want to be absolutely certain, however, as I hope the Under-Secretary will want to be, that these various types of aircraft are exposed to the most searching investigation in peace-time of their capabilities and performance. If there are mistakes the aircraft manufacturer pays for them in cash, but the gallant young men who fly the machines pay for them with their lives.
  We are putting a lot into this programme of aircraft production. The Air Force is now the senior Service, and it is absolutely vital that the Ministers responsible shall not be influenced by any pressure from back benchers or by hotted-up Farnborough air displays, but will be absolutely ruthless and, if they are convinced that a contract should be cancelled, will cancel it. If they do that the one thing they can be sure about is that they will have the full support of hon. Members on this side of the House.
  A few days ago I made an offer to the Under-Secretary upon the subject of security. That offer is still open. I shall go even further, and suggest to him that if he cares to ask me for names I shall give them to him—especially the name of an American gentleman into whose record it would be worth looking with very great care. It might be better for our security if he spent his time in the United States rather than making periodical visits here, because every time he comes here there always seems to be a security leak. I shall not say any more upon that subject. I referred to it in the debate the other evening. The offer I then made to supply what information I have is still open, and I shall supplement that information if the Under-Secretary wishes me to do so.
  I know that the question of security is a difficult one, but I cannot see any reason why the people of Great Britain should be denied information which is available to other countries. The Hunter is a good aircraft, and it will become a better one, I have no doubt, but at the present moment it is on the classified list. Yet plans of the Hunter have been supplied to foreign Governments. I would bet long odds that photostat copies of those plans have already reached the Kremlin.

  1519
  I do not want to particularise too much, but I must mention that we have recently sold 15 Venoms to Iraq. Two have been delivered. That aircraft is still on the classified list. I do not understand that, because if these aircraft have been exported information about them is available. We have sold the Canberra to South America, and that aircraft is also on the classified list.
  The whole question of security needs to be looked at. If planes are exported for the purpose of stepping up sales there is no need for the aircraft or engines concerned to remain on the classified list. By all means let us have security when it is essential in the interests of the country. If the Government decide that certain things must remain secret and others should be classified, let those be put on the respective lists, and let the rules be vigorously applied. For any breach, no matter whether it is on the part of a senior member of the Royal Air Force, a civil servant, a journalist, or even a Member of Parliament, there is a remedy which should be applied.
  But do not let us have half measures. At the present moment we have a great mass of information which is described as secret but which is perfectly well known. It is talked about in the American Press and is known to all the air attaches in London, and the only poor mugs who do not know the truth are the British public, who pay the bill. I do not blame the hon. Gentleman, but when that happens the suspicion is bound to occur to us—certainly to my lion. Friend the Member for Aston and myself—that security is being used, not in the interests of the country, but in the interests of the Government. I certainly make no charges in this respect against the hon. Gentleman.
  I conclude my expressing my personal appreciation for the competence and courtesy which the Under-Secretary has shown all through these debates. Although it would be much better if he were back upon the Opposition side of the House by this time next year, if he is still sitting upon the Government Front Bench I hope that he will do so as Secretary of State for War, Secretary of State for Air, or that he will hold an ever higher post.
  6.20 p.m.
  Mr. Edward Shackleton: It is, of course, a new horror that confronts the Air Ministry when it discovers that my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), in addition to spending 20 years in the Army as a warrant officer, spent three years in the Royal Air Force. If my hon. Friend continues to turn his attention to Air Force matters, it is clear that the Under-Secretary of State, in such short time as still remains for him on that side of the House, will have to be very alert indeed.
  I should like to deal with a rather important point which was referred to briefly at the end of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, relating to security. It is impossible, in a debate on the Air Estimates, to cover this subject fully. The existence of N.A.T.O. has produced a completely different situation to that which existed in the past. The last war was in many ways much simpler and easier, from the security point of view, than other wars. We worked on the idea of sharing most things with our American Allies and telling very little to the other Allies.
  Today we are part of a collective defence organisation, and it seems that even if our Allies who receive secret and classified information are continually breaching the regulations either in spirit or in fact, there is still an obligation on us, even to the disadvantage to the British people, to preserve as rigorously as we consider necessary those regulations. Once a piece of information is widely known there is clearly no point in leaving the information as "classified."
  I expect that my hon. Friend for Dudley is aware that even the internal telephone directories in the Service Departments are classified, and rightly so, yet we may see them lying around inside any of these Ministries, and anyone can walk away with one of them in his pocket. I do not doubt that certain members of those Departments do walk out with an internal telephone directory in their pockets so that if they stay at home they can find out the number of a particular extension they may want to ring up, and not to draw attention to their absence. I do not commend that practice as a justification for declassifying the internal telephone directories.

  1521
  By the same token, I am not too happy about the idea that if foreign Powers have been the source of "leaks" of classified information we should automatically assume each time that, the horse having bolted, there is no point in leaving the stable door locked. We have an obligation to set an example in these matters. I am not disagreeing with certain points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, but I urge caution about them.
  I turn briefly to some of the points that arose out of the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg). He dealt at great length with the case in which it appeared that the Under-Secretary of State had given very great satisfaction and out of which the Air Ministry came, by and large, honourably, having shown that it regarded the matter with full seriousness and a full sense of responsibility. The matter once again raises the tremendous difficulty that faces Members of Parliament on both sides of the House in dealing with cases that are brought to us, either by constituents or by people whom we know and who are serving in the Forces. Every hon. Member has such cases, sometimes from friends. Most of us do urge in the first instance that redress should be sought through the proper channels.
  It is most important that commanding officers should realise that airmen and others have a right to approach their Members of Parliament. I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State accepts that statement. In saying this I am not wanting to encourage that practice, but the position of a man in the Services is different from that of a man in civilian life. He is under discipline, is unable to change his job, and has no trade union to protect him. I am not suggesting that employers in industry, whether public or private, are necessarily better than commanding officers in the Air Force, but the position is different.
  It is obviously difficult to know just how to steer a course. If opportunity can be found, I hope that this point can be explained, not only to senior officers, but to others in the Royal Air Force. I have frequently had arguments with my friends serving in one of the Services. They have said that if any man in their command ever wrote to his M.P. they would deal with him. That is a fairly natural
  1522
  reaction, but the justification for that right is shown by the case which was raised by my hon. Friend.
  I have two other small points to make, which I will do quickly, relating to Vote I, under the subhead covering pay and conditions. I have raised this point before, but I am still told that the mess kit to be worn in different commands is extremely varied. An officer moving from one command to another is frequently put to quite unnecessary expense to suit the whims of the commander-in-chief. I urge the Under-Secretary of State to get this matter straightened out, so that officers are not put to the extra expense that many have to bear when they move from one command to another, sometimes within the same climatic region.
  It is still too often the case that, on appointment to a job overseas, the man concerned finds when he gets there that the particular job has been changed, or that the officer concerned does not like the look of his face. Some of this may be unavoidable. I had a case recently of an officer who, at enormous trouble and expense to himself, shifted his family from school and moved to a new job. He did not want to go, and he came to me and asked if I would intervene with the Under-Secretary of State. I said, "You are a Regular, and it is clear that you have to do what the Service asks you to do." When he got out to the new post he found that he was not wanted. That was the second time it had happened to that individual.
  I do not ask the Under-Secretary to reply about this specific case, but to take every possible step to prevent this sort of thing happening. At times it is quite disastrous to the lives of officers and airmen, who may find their married life subjected to a strain which is too great.
  Turning to the question of the Reserves, I want to deal with the light fighter. There is a general question involved here, which I raised on a previous occasion, when I did not get an entirely satisfactory answer. I should like to know why men who are prepared to undertake responsibility and be called up in event of war, and for whom a place can be found as a war appointment, must automatically be withdrawn from such appointments at the age of 45.

  1523
  The Under-Secretary of State says that that is the result of a provision in the last National Service Act, under which liability to call-up for Z reservists in the Army and H reservists in the Air Force, ceases at 45. The fact that the obligation ceases—I think there is no statutory bar, but that is what I would like to know—should not automatically require the Air Force to remove from the list men who may be willing to fulfil their duties in the event of war. Clearly, if they regard them as unsuitable or too old or out of date or inefficient to fill these posts, they will remove them, but there should not be an automatic statutory bar.
  I am sure we all know of people of great age who served in the last war with distinction. I know one officer in the Air Force who had the Matabele campaign medal and collected a D.F.C. in the course of the last war. He used to go to sleep in the aircraft sometimes when he flew as a special observer, but none the less he did a useful job in other rôles. Therefore, I urge that there should not be this automatic removal from the list of men who are willing to take on an obligation in war-time.
  Mr. Ward: For the purposes of the record, the hon. Gentleman is talking about class G—that is, the general Reserve?
  Mr. Shackleton: Yes.
  Mr. Ward: They have no liability to be called up in peace-time but only in an emergency. They are perfectly free, so far as I am aware, to transfer to the Volunteer Reserve, if they so wish, and then they can do training at their own request.
  Mr. Shackleton: Yes, but there are people who may not be willing to take on the specific Reserve training obligation. They may have too many personal commitments, and they may hesitate to join the Regular Reserve for fear that in a particular year the period of training will coincide with an obligation of such a nature that they cannot ignore it.
  Year after year officers have gone back to the Air Force, some of them with useful experience, and, on the whole, have probably done a useful job, but they will not assume the obligation of joining
  1524
  the R.A.F.V.R., although they are willing to do such training as they can and, if necessary, to serve in war-time. It has worked extremely well, so far as I can gather. At least, I have heard of no complaints. Of course, if it has not worked well, that may be a reason for imposing the age limit of 45. I urge that a more flexible approach be made to this subject. Perhaps I can confer with the Under-Secretary at another time and put the arguments in more detail.
  I turn to the question of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. I am in some difficulty in discussing the equipment of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and whether it should have a light fighter, because I have become increasingly doubtful of the value of fighters at all in preserving the peace of the world and the safety of this country. Incidentally, I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) did not take it amiss when I suggested that he should stick to the rifle.
  I have been interested in the light fighter for two or three years, and I believed, at the time when the matter was first discussed, that the Air Ministry made a mistake in not adopting it. But since then I have begun to have doubts, because such an aircraft is useless unless it is capable of finding its opponent. It does not matter whether we have the fastest aircraft in the world if it does not have the endurance and the capacity for hunting that a fighter must possess.
  I presume that our main obligation in fighter defence—and I think we are chasing a mirage in thinking that we are going to find the answer in speed—must be primarily concentrated on aircraft which are fully equipped with radar and capable of finding a potential enemy in conditions of bad weather or at night. I cannot think that the menace to this country will be seriously reduced by providing the Royal Auxiliary Air Force with light fighters in the next few years.
  Then there is the question of the use of fighters generally. I remarked in my speech in the main debate on the Estimates that the Air Ministry and the Government must follow the logic of their own policy, which is based mainly on the deterrent. I should like to know from the Minister—I do not expect a long answer—whether he thinks that a strong fighter force in this country would be successful in protecting this country from the drop-

  1525
  ping of the hydrogen bomb. If such beliefs are held, they are more likely to induce the type of mind which would launch this country into a war. In saying that, I am not for a moment accusing the Government of thinking that they can make this country so safe that they can safely embark on war.
  I am convinced that there is no protection against the hydrogen bomb. I am convinced that the only possibility of achieving peace—and my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) may hold this view—is either a full acceptance of the view that enslavement is preferable to death, which is a logical point of view, or the alternative point of view that we use and threaten to use the deterrent—in other words, that we threaten to blow ourselves up and the rest of the world too.
  I do not believe that the fighter, any more than I believe the aircraft carrier or the Navy or any large section of the Armed Forces, can provide protection against the hydrogen bomb. I urge the Air Ministry to concentrate on carrying out the Government's policy, which must be to make the most efficient force possible, whether it be the bomber or the guided missile, for the delivery of the deterrent.
  6.36 p.m.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: In the last sentences of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) we got to the core of the problem of these Estimates. I am not concerned about the technicalities—
  Air Commodore Harvey: For the convenience of the House, can the hon. Gentleman indicate how long he might be speaking on this occasion?
  Mr. Hughes: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman wants to go out, I should say that I shall speak for 12½ minutes and one-fifth of a second. But before he goes out, I warn him that I am going to refer to him, so he had better stay here and endure it.
  I was going to say before I was interrupted that I am not interested in the technicalities of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I do not believe this country is interested in the argument whether the Labour Government would have built far more aircraft in a shorter
  1526
  time, better guns and so on, than the Tory Government have done. If we had a Labour Government in office at the moment they would have had the same beliefs, difficulties and bottlenecks, and I believe they would have had the same experts. I do not believe that a Labour Government would have been any more efficient than the Conservative Government in the production of aircraft or guns.
  My approach to this matter is quite different. I entirely disagree with what is called the policy of the deterrent. That I believe to be fundamentally and morally wrong. It is wrong from every point of view. It is wrong for this country to build bombers to drop hydrogen bombs on the Soviet Union. I believe that the people of the Soviet Union are human beings. I do not agree with their system, but—
  Mr. Wyatt: Does the hon. Gentleman also believe that it is wrong for the Soviet Union to build bombers which may drop hydrogen bombs on us? If so, why does he not say so more often?
  Mr. Hughes: Certainly I believe it. The reason I do not say it more often is that I have to keep within the limits of order. I have to criticise the Estimates of Her Majesty's Government and not those of the Supreme Soviet. If I were lucky enough to be in the Supreme Soviet, and lucky enough to be allowed to articulate, I should endeavour to put my point of view—probably unsuccessfully. That does not do away with my responsibility here. I happen to be a Member of a British Parliament, and I believe that it is fundamentally wrong and immoral to drop a hydrogen bomb or atom bomb on the civilian population of any country. If the Soviet Union drops the first atom bomb or hydrogen bomb, it is just as guilty of a crime against humanity.
  The time has come when the hydrogen bomb is the enemy of all humanity. The development during the last few months has shown that the world's scientists, the world's politicians and the world's public men are rapidly coming to that conclusion. Much as I disagree with the Soviet Government and the Soviet régime. I believe that it is a crime against humanity to contemplate dropping a hydrogen bomb on the people of Moscow, the people of Leningrad, or the people of any part of the Soviet Union, who are the

  1527
  victims of what one hon. Member called Soviet "dictatorship."
  Now I come to the question of how that affects me. I represent a constituency which is adjacent to one of the big airports. Every time I come here on a Monday I travel from Prestwick Airport, and I have done so for years. The thought of what might happen if this policy of the deterrent gets going terrifies me. Week after week, I have seen the numbers of the American Air Force personnel at Prestwick growing, and I am told that it is one of the places in this country from which bombers will go to the Soviet Union. What does that mean to us?
  It means, whoever starts the bombing, that within 30 or 40 hours of the outbreak of war we can expect a hydrogen bomb on one of the principal targets in this country. I was told at Question time that one hydrogen bomb or one atom bomb over Prestwick would destroy everything within a radius of five miles. The Minister might have added that within a radius of ten miles there would be enormous partial destruction. That means that my constituency is likely to be wiped out.
  I am not just a theoretical observer. I represent a very large number of people who live in this area and, however much I may object theoretically to Communism—and my constituents are probably not so interested in it as I am—I believe that they would rather choose Communism than suicide.
  Dr. H. Morgan: Or murder.
  Mr. Hughes: I do not know the answer to that. When we say that this policy of the deterrent means sending bombers over there and bombers from there coming here, I say that is suicide. As a result of the policy of the deterrent and having American bombers in this area, it is now infinitely more dangerous for the people I represent than if the American bombers were not there at all. I say that, from the strategical point of view, the people in my constituency would be greatly relieved if the American bomber force were taken away from Prestwick and put in the Middle West of the U.S.A.
  When the former Secretary of State for Air tells me that public opinion accepts
  1528
  this defence by deterrent policy, I do not believe that at all. There is no sign of public opinion being in favour of suicide. Public opinion is terrified. I do not believe that if every man, woman and child were faced with the alternative of living under some other system or being obliterated in an atom war that public opinion would decide in favour of this so-called policy of the deterrent.
  Mr. Shackleton: I have followed my hon. Friend's argument very carefully. If the hydrogen bomb should prove to be instrumental by virtue of its horror in preventing world war, which is the view of a lot of people, would he still consider it a bad thing to prevent war in that way?
  Mr. Hughes: I do not accept the hypothesis put forward by my hon. Friend. If I believed that this thing would prevent war, I would have no objection to it. I believe that with both sides developing nuclear energy as a weapon, and with the enormous American Air Force, the enormous Russian Air Force and our Air Force, the world position is becoming infinitely more dangerous.
  I do not know if my hon. Friend realises that he is out of touch with the leader of his party on this.
  Air Commodore Harvey: Which one?
  Mr. Hughes: In the debate on 4th April last year the Leader of the Opposition pointed out that the policy of the deterrent was a very questionable one indeed. I certainly believe that if the world goes on at the present rate, with each side making these bombs and projector weapons, we shall reach such a stage in the world that there will be panic and that someone in the Pentagon in America or the Kremlin in Moscow, or wherever the headquarters are, will become so frightened that the whole infernal machine will go off. That to me is the greatest danger in the world at the present time.
  I only wish that the great ecclesiastics and leaders of public opinion in this country would look upon it from the moral and spiritual point of view. I know that it is not in order to discuss Christianity in this House after Prayers. but I believe that if we put into international policy the idea of overcoming evil with good we should be more nearly approaching the final solution of the arms

  1529
  race. As we are going on at present, we are to have bombers and supersonic bombers and guided missiles with such potentialities that the world is in infinite danger.
  My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) asked certain questions—first, were the Government proceeding with the development of a supersonic bomber? I am not interested in the development of a supersonic bomber.
  Mr. Shackleton: He did not ask you.
  Mr. Hughes: I know he did not ask me. He did not ask me those questions because he knows the sort of answer I should give. I cannot see that the arrival of a supersonic bomber or a super-supersonic bomber will make the position in the world any easier.
  Another question which my right hon. and learned Friend asked is one which we might pursue to its logical conclusion. He asked whether underground hangars were being developed for the Air Force in this country. I wonder what sort of public opinion would be created in Prestwick if, at the cost of a very large sum of money, we proceeded to make an underground hangar for the benefit of the R.A.F. while, at the same time, there were no underground shelters for the civilian population. If we are to have a programme of underground hangars for £400,000 bombers—bombers which are to be piloted by men whose training cost £25,000—I wonder what sort of an astronomical bill we shall have to pay for defence in this country.
  I believe that the economic arguments, the financial arguments and the moral arguments are entirely against this so-called "defence by deterrent" policy, and I believe that if we could discover what is public opinion in this country we should find that it had come to the conclusion that this country, at any rate, has nothing to gain by participating in the arms race. When the Government realise that and when the Opposition decide to bring the pressure of public opinion to this House, I believe they will find a big following of public opinion in the country which is thoroughly alarmed at the prospect which now confronts us.
  6.50 p.m.
  Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: Year after year, for nine or 10 years, in the main debate on the Air Estimates, in Committee, and on Report, except for the two years during which I was at the Home Office, it has been my pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) in these debates. My hon. Friend has been consistent; he has argued the pacifist case. It is, therefore, clear that my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), who is not in his place at the moment, completely misunderstood my hon. Friend when he made that intervention about the Russian Air Force.
  As a pacifist, my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire, of course, applies his argument as much to the Russians as he does to us, and it is a complete misunderstanding of his case and attitude and of those, fortunately few, people who think as he does to drag in the case of the Russian Air Force. I believe that, fortunately, the vast majority in this country are not pacifists. I put a Question recently to the Minister of Labour and National Service and was surprised to find that only ·2 per cent. of the National Service intake each year claimed to be conscientious objectors. That represents a very small number indeed.
  I ask my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire, and others who think like him, to remember this: those of us who support thepolicy of the great deterrent do so because we sincerely believe that it is the best means of preventing war. I will go further and say that many of us who support the policy of the deterrent believe that in doing so we remain Christians, and that it is in no way contrary to the Christian faith and belief.
  At the beginning of my speech, I shall ask the Under-Secretary some detailed questions, and I shall explain to him why I am putting them now. I want him to consider, and to give me an answer to, this question of underground storage for fuel. The consumption of fuel by aircraft today is enormous, and although we are not thinking in terms of thousand-bomber raids—those have gone for ever—we have to recognise this demand. I quoted these figures last year: a Sabre uses 400 gallons of fuel in warming up and taxi-ing, whereas a Spitfire used about 15 gallons. The fuel must be safe from knock-out attacks, and must be underground, not

  1531
  only in this country but at our overseas V-bomber bases to which the strategic bombers would go for operations.
  The second detailed point is on the World Meteorological Organisation. There is a grant for it in the Estimates. We understand that there are to be experiments in rain-making this summer on Salisbury Plain. Will observers from the World Meteorological Organisation be there? Further, if we are to have experiments in rain-making', why cannot we have them over the sea before the rain reaches this country, so that if they work, and rain is brought down, we shall have just a little sunshine, as an experiment, in the Western part of the country?
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: The Northwestern part.
  Mr. de Freitas: The prevailing wind and weather is from the South-West, and I am making it as easy as I can for the Government in this case. It is an experiment which might have a considerable future.
  I ask these detailed questions now, and I want to explain why I do so. The Committee stage of these Estimates was very short indeed, and I believe that it is our duty to ask this kind of detailed question—such as, "What about so-and-so on page 118?" I am putting the questions at the beginning of my speech because, although the Under-Secretary has been in office for a long time, and within the limits of party differences has given us a great deal of satisfaction in the way in which he has dealt with these matters. I realise that in many cases he has to obtain information in order to give the detailed answers.
  I have sought to draw attention to what I believe to be inadequacies in our procedure for discussing the Estimates. It is true that, as a result of agitation, especially by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), we have improved our procedure, and more time is being given this year to a discussion of the Air Estimates, but there is room for further improvement.
  I want to express a personal point of view, which I mentioned in other connections earlier. We ought to have a Standing Committee on defence, but not on the lines of the Estimates Committee.
  1532
  I cannot have made my suggestion sufficiently clear, otherwise it would never have been confused with the Estimates Committee. I want a Standing Committee on defence which would meet and deliberate in secret so that, over the years, a body of better-informed and, therefore, more constructive opinion on defence matters could grow up in the House.
  Secondly, without going as far as that, I believe that we can do better even within our existing procedure. Should we not think of changing our procedure and abolishing the Amendment which is moved in the middle of our debate on the Estimates? What happens is that we are having a good debate, full of cut-and-thrust, and suddenly it is interrupted, as it was last year, for a debate on pig farming in R.A.F. stations. That takes us away from a good and lively debate. Another suggestion is for dividing our Committee time between the Estimates so that we have an opportunity of paying detailed attention to all these questions.
  I recall that in the last half-hour of the debate the other day I asked why there was no indication in the Estimates of a European languages category between first-class interpreter and colloquial proficiency. That is the sort of detailed question which could not possibly be answered at the time, but we should have some opportunity of asking such questions.
  The Under-Secretary has had put to him a number of questions which are true Committee points, and I will refresh his mind on some of them. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr.A. Henderson) asked about the E Reserve and—this is more than a Committee point—about the significance to the Air Force of the Government's decision on equal pay for women. Another detailed point was on the expenditure of ammunition.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) asked further questions about Reserve liability and ages. If we had more opportunity for detailed criticism of that sort, I believe it would go a long way to meeting what my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) requested—a searching examination to allow the streamlining not only of the Air Force but of the Estimates themselves.

  1533
  I shall recall a few of the points which have been put in the last few days in the three debates on these Estimates. I think that the case of the failure of the R.A.F. on manning has been better made out than the case on aircraft failure, although they are both substantial. But I am worried that the aircraft failures have received so much more publicity that they have masked the criticism on manning.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme and others have, throughout these debates, commented on the fact that the Government appear to be accepting National Service as a permanent feature. It is so easy to fall back on the National Serviceman. I draw the attention of the House to the fact that in these Estimates, and in the speeches, it has been suggested that the Government accept that in the coming year the percentage of National Service men in the Royal Air Force will not decline, will not even stay at the same level, but will increase from 26 per cent. to 30 per cent.
  A lot of criticism has been made about the frequency of posting. I live in Cambridge, and represent the City of Lincoln. I often travel by car between Cambridge and Lincoln. There are many Air Force stations in that part of the world, and I often give airmen lifts in my car. I have no hesitation in saying that the factor which discourages these young men—who have not yet got childrens' education and other problems to consider—from engaging permanently is that they have never had the chance of settling down in a station and seeing what Service life can be like.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) drew attention to a serious matter of persecution. Certainly he made a good case for using that strong word. I think we should have that matter cleared up, because the Air Ministry has always had a good reputation for the way in which it has dealt with the complaints of Service men put forward by Members of Parliament.
  I can remember, early in my time at the Ministry, when an hon. Member wrote to me giving a man's address and a complaint. It turned out that the man was a deserter. Although we had his address my private office did not send it out of the Department because it protected a communication between a constituent and a Member of Parliament. I should hate
  1534
  to think that there is a stain on the Air Ministry in its treatment of men. There does appear to be one, and I should like the hon. Gentleman to answer the points made by my hon. Friend.
  A considerable number of hon. Members referred to a problem on which the Under-Secretary has not answered thoroughly, that of education grants. Why is the Regular Air Force man treated differently from the man in the Foreign Service and even, I understand, differently from certain civilians in the Air Ministry?
  Another failure which I think we have to recognise, and which hon. Members have recognised and mentioned, is the failure in regard to technical education. In these days, we have to reckon that we are, even with 50 million people, a small country compared with the United States and Russia. I quote them as two very large countries. We are desperately short of technicians for the Services and civilian work. Unless we can increase the numbers we have no future in defence, or even as a modern industrial country. It is no use overlooking that fact.
  I am not suggesting that we should turn out fewer people educated in the arts or the humanities, but alongside those people we must produce a vast number of technicians. We can produce Nobel Prize winners and leaders in science and engineering, but we must produce many people for the middle ranks of industry and the Service. There is no sign of our doing it.
  This is far more than an Air Ministry problem, but the Under-Secretary is a Member of the Government, and I hope that he will draw the attention of his colleagues—especially the Minister of Education—to all that has been said on the subject. I suppose that half the hon. Members who have taken part in these debates have mentioned this subject. The figures given by Sir Roy Fedden are dramatic. He said that the United States turns out each year 30 times as many engineers as we do, and Russia 100 times as many.
  When I said that the manning failures had tended to be masked by aircraft failures because they were less dramatic, I did not mean to imply that the latter were not serious. My hon. Friends the Member for Dudley and the Member for Aston have made a feature of this, and have subjected the Government to severe

  1535
  criticism. It may be that the attack on the quality of aircraft has sometimes been overstated. I am not arguing that, but surely anyone listening to these debates and studying them would admit that on many counts not only have the Government been rightly indicted, but convicted.
  I will take the example of the Swift, as everyone now admits that the Swift is no good. I asked why the Swift was not cancelled earlier, considering that the Hunter had all the makings of a first-rate aircraft. There was a substantial waste of money, I and others alleged, because the Swift was not cancelled earlier. I was told by the Minister of Defence that if the decision had been taken earlier it would have been the other way round—that production on the Swift would have been maintained and the Hunter would have been cancelled.
  I believe it is too much of a coincidence that that argument should have been used because it was exactly the same argument used last year, or the year before, when I asked for an assurance that when the Government had decided which was the best of the V-bombers they would go all-out on production of that type. It was pointed out to me that if that had happened in the case with the war-time bombers it would have meant that the Government would have concentrated on the wrong type. It seems to be a coincidence that the argument should be trotted out again to justify the delay which I believe there has been in the cancellation of the Swift.
  Many hon. Members, especially my hon. Friends, have referred to the relationship between the Ministry of Supply and the Air Ministry. I believe, especially in the case of the previous Minister of Supply, that the Government have been guilty of neglect of the aircraft side because the right hon. Gentleman was extremely busy on the ticklish job of denationalising the iron and steel industry.
  Here I shall express a personal view. I have never thought it desirable that there should be a member of the Air Council who was Controller of Aircraft at the Ministry of Supply. That tends to obscure and rather to soften the blows there should be between the Air Ministry and the Supply Department. If the Air Ministry is not getting what it sets out
  1536
  to get the blow should not be softened by reason of the fact that one of the principal members of the staff of the other Ministry is serving on the Air Council. It cuts away Ministerial responsibility when one Minister should be going after the other to see that he gets the goods.
  Even if the Ministry of Supply structure is basically right, the consumer, the operational Air Force command—especially Fighter Command—should have closer contact with the firms of manufacturers. I know that that is being done in the case of the Javelin; the Under-Secretary acknowledged that. I should like to see that, at other stages and in other types of equipment, as far as possible we bring the user into touch with the developer and manufacturer.
  There has been criticism of lack of information on guided missiles. That is very important because it touches also on security. The journal of the Air League a couple of months ago said about guided missiles that it doubted whether
  "security is the real reason for the continued silence on these matters. If such doubts are unjustified the Government has only itself to blame."
  There has been an enormous amount of unnecessary secrecy on guided missiles, and the Air Ministry should bear that well in mind, not only now, but in the future.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) and others referred to the Comet, and its future in the Royal Air Force. It is a fair point, and I hope that we can have more information about it. Are the Comets to be strengthened? If not, for what purpose are they to be used?
  I have referred previously to the Minister of Defence. Several of my hon. Friends have referred to the fact that the Prime Minister, when he took over defence, looked at it as if it were another exercise in the tactics of Omdurman, or something like that. It may be suggested that it is presumptuous for younger people, who have seen much less of the type of action of which the Prime Minister has had experience, to make such criticisms, but it is a valid criticism because the whole idea of an air force is a completely new conception.

  1537
  From the slogans that he used at the Dispatch Box, the Prime Minister gave no indication that he understood the Air Force. When he ceased to be Minister of Defence, he was followed by Lord Alexander; and now, the new Minister has not begun so very well. The hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) and my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) have referred to the Auxiliary Air Force. One of the first things that the new Minister of Defence did was to show that he had no conception of what the members of the Auxiliary Air Force stood for, and the spirit in which they serve. That was the impression that was formed, and I am not too hopeful that the right hon. Gentleman can abandon an old-world approach and face the implications of press-button warfare.
  The basic structure and organisation of the Royal Air Force has not changed very much since gallant men went up in aircraft to duel and other gallant men went up, leaned over the side of their aircraft and dropped bombs by hand. The structure and organisation stood us in good stead during the last war, but in the age into which we are moving, much more rapidly than anyone forecast only five years ago—the age of the intercontinental rocket and of the 2,000 or 3,000 miles-an-hour rocket—what sign has the Minister of Defence given that he has paid the attention that he should to the structure of the Air Force of the future? I am confident that the Royal Air Force can adapt itself to any requirement, but that calls for really modern leadership and not what it has had, so far at any rate, from Tory Ministers of Defence.
  There has been plenty of criticism—more than usual—in these debates over the past few days. There has been some praise, and it is right that we should give praise, on such matters as a reduction of the accident rate. Everyone—the Under-Secretary, the Air Council and all others—deserves the greatest credit for that. I am the last speaker in this debate on this side of the House, and all my hon. and right hon. Friends join with me in expressing our highest regard and respect for the men and women of the Royal Air Force.
  7.13 p.m.
  The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): Let me start straight away, without preliminaries, to deal with as many as I can of the points which have been raised during the debate. The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) began by speaking about the dispersal of squadrons from the Canal Zone. I said in the Air Estimates debate that from a concentrated base in the Canal Zone, the Royal Air Force were being transferred into a series of self-contained forces at important points in the Middle East area. This process is continuing, but it will not be completed for some time.
  The need to provide new accommodation in phase with the withdrawal of squadrons from the Canal Zone means that it is difficult to give a simple answer to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's question, and, of course, there are security limitations on what I am able to say. The net effect, however, will be a large increase in the strength of the Royal Air Force in Cyprus and smaller increases elsewhere—for example, in Jordan.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman raised also the question of ammunition expenditure for the last three years and quoted a figure of £83 million for ammunition and explosives. It is true that this figure is the total of the provision in the Estimates for the last three years, but, as I think the House knows, there has been a shortfall in production. Therefore, that is not an actual expenditure figure. In ammunition and explosives, the shortfall has been mainly in the newer types of weapons, but production is now picking up and we have spent about £60 million on explosives of various kinds during this period.
  The biggest items are bombs and aircraft ammunition, but the other items include rockets, light anti-aircraft ammunition, ·303, grenades, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics and even things like engine starter cartridges, on which quite a lot of money has been spent. The House will remember that in the Estimates Memorandum for 1954–55, my noble Friend said that we were allowing for the first time for atom bombs; and today the right hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether the money we had spent included atom bombs. The provision for atom bombs is included in Vote 7, but I

  1539
  cannot give details of the way in which it is included.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked about the supersonic bomber. I assure him that the Air Ministry is fully alive to the importance of developing a supersonic bomber at the earliest possible moment. However, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows, as well as I do, supersonic flight creates a great many problems, particularly in the big aeroplane. Our supersonic fighter is already well on the way and we are developing other supersonic aircraft. These are necessary stages in the evolution of a supersonic bomber and we shall apply the lessons that we learn from them when it comes to building something bigger. Meanwhile, as I said the other day in my Estimates speech, the V-class bombers now coming into service are all capable of further development.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked about arrangements made for storing atom bombs. I can only repeat the assurance, given by my noble Friend in the 1954–55 Estimates Memorandum, that the bombs are stored and transported in a partly dismantled state and there is absolutely no risk of an accidental atomic explosion at any stage.
  Mr. Beswick: The hon. Gentleman has made the interesting statement that the cost of these atomic bombs is to be found in Vote 7, although, naturally, he does not detail it. Does that mean the full cost of these bombs? When we come later to consider the report of the Atomic Energy Authority, can we take it that the economic cost, including the cost of making the material, has been paid for by the Royal Air Force?
  Mr. Ward: This is the estimate of what it will cost the Royal Air Force to take delivery of these bombs for the coming year. I cannot go further than that.
  Mr. Beswick: Is this a notional figure, or is it the estimated actual economic cost of making the bombs?
  Mr. Ward: This is the cost of these weapons which falls to our Votes—the cost of them to the Royal Air Force.
  Mr. Driberg: The retail price?
  Mr. Ward: They cannot be bought over the counter.
  Mr. de Freitas: Or even under the counter.
  Mr. Ward: The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton also asked whether United States bomber forces based in this country had dispersal plans like our own to guard against surprise atomic attack. I can say on this point only that the Air Ministry and the American authorities are in very close consultation about all that and upon strategic requirements as a whole, and we are already agreed with them about the necessary steps which we shall take, while at the same time safeguarding our own aircraft.
  The question of the light fighter for N.A.T.O. was raised both by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and also by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt). A N.A.T.O. evaluation team has been considering designs for a lightweight fighter. Naturally, we should welcome the adoption by N.A.T.O. of a British design. The reasons why the Air Ministry has not yet seen fit to order a light fighter do not necessarily apply to other forces in N.A.T.O., which may not have reached the same stage of development. I hope very much that they will order a British design, but I am afraid I have no information at the moment of what their decision is or is likely to be. It is important to remember that the Gnat has not yet flown. Much of the talk about the light fighter gives the impression that it has already flown, whereas it has not.
  The hon. Member for Aston talked about the light fighter for the Auxiliaries. I intervened to say that there was a practical difficulty there. It is this. If we are going to order a light fighter we are presumably going to have it for defence against a nuclear attack, in which case it would have to be in immediate readiness. That is the limitation of the Auxiliaries. It is not a matter of skill in flying aircraft, at which they are very good indeed and always have been. That is an important thing to remember.
  On the other hand, I should like to assure the House, and particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas), who raised the matter, too, that we shall certainly keep the whole question of the equipment of the Auxiliary Air Force constantly under review, and if at a later stage, in relation to the threat at that time, we feel that

  1541
  the Auxiliary squadrons should be re-equipped with something more modern then we shall certainly see that they are so re-equipped.
  Mr. Wyatt: The hon. Gentleman know that we on this side of the House have been attacked for having done what has been called great harm abroad to the British aircraft industry, but if the Air Ministry or the Ministry of Supply ordered prototypes of the Folland Gnat, or some other light fighter, it might be easier for the industry to get orders from overseas That would be a help to the British industry, which at the moment is handicapped in that it finds difficulty in persuading other countries with not so mud money to spend to buy it, because the) say, "Why should we buy it if the Royal Air Force does not?"
  Mr. Ward: I quite see that point. I have informed the House before, in answer to Questions, that we are interested in the development of the Gnat, which will be a supersonic aircraft, and that we are following very closely and with great interest the development of the Gnat, but the Gnat as it stands now, that is to say as a prototype, which will be flown, will not interest us as a combat aircraft. It will interest us as something to play with and to learn from, but we could not order prototypes of it as a combat aircraft. I think that that probably answers that question.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman also raised the question of equal pay for members of the Women's Royal Air Force, with particular reference to the technical trades. Perhaps I should start by reminding him of the recent decision to introduce equal pay in the Civil Service over a period of years. That applies to non-industrial staff only, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not committed himself in any way about the industrial staff, whose wages are determined by the fair wages principle. It is true, of course, that it is to civilian industrial employees that women technicians of the Royal Air Force are comparable, but even if the right hon. and learned Gentleman had raised the question in relation only to the trade of clerk, I should still have been bound to refer him back to the argument which he himself used, that Service men may in the last resort have to handle arms, whatever their trade may be. The prob-
  1542
  lem of equal pay as it affects the Services is not an easy one, and I do not want to go further into it now, but I have taken careful note of what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said.
  I come to the question of underground hangars and storage, raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and also by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas). We are putting our radar stations underground, as described by my noble Friend. That is because of the need to protect them against orthodox high explosive as well as nuclear attack; undergrounding gives useful extra protection. But hangars involve quite different problems. Underground hangars for large aircraft such as the V bombers would be prohibitively expensive and would not particularly help readiness. Dispersal seems much the better solution, because if we want aircraft available quickly we do not want to have to get them up out of underground hangars.
  As to the storage of petrol, only a comparatively small amount of petrol is stored on the airfields. The bulk of it is transported to the airfields.
  Several hon. Members have raised the question of the training of the H reservists. I should like to deal with it without being too long, for we have discussed it previously at some length. I should like to set out the position of our future plans, in order that we may have as little misunderstanding as possible in the future. Before I do that, let me just clear up the point referred to by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) on Tuesday, which caused a certain amount of confusion—I am sure, quite unintentionally. I refer to the question of the 77 men who were said by the Minister of Defence in a written reply to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dudley to have undertaken part-time training during the past year.
  I am afraid the confusion seems to have been caused by the fact that my right hon. Friend, quite rightly, set out his reply to the hon. Member for Dudley in the terms of the hon. Member's Question, but it is usual to talk about training not in terms of whole-time and part-time but, as I tried to explain the other night, in terms of continuous and non-continuous, that is to say a period of three days or more, or shorter periods such as of odd days and evenings. As far as I know, the question

  1543
  of non-continuous training for Class H reservists has not been raised before in the House. I have not raised it. I always realised that the number of people doing it was negligible, and I did not want to confuse the issue, and I have always confined myself to talking about people who come up for 15 days' continuous training.
  As I explained to the House on Tuesday, the number of National Service men taken into the Royal Air Force each year is determined by some quite clear principles, the need to keep the Force fully manned to discharge its cold war task, to mount a deterrent force, and to keep air defence ready for instant action if necessary.
  It was always foreseen that the Reserve which would be built up as the National Service men completed their service and passed into Class H would be larger—indeed far larger—than the Reserve which we should need to bring the Royal Air Force up to its war establishment in an emergency. As I have said on more than one occasion, we have set our minds firmly against the suggestion that every Class H Reservist should be called up for training purely in order to secure equality between individuals.
  Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman is repeating the cogent argument which he put forward last year. No one on this side of the House has ever suggested that we should call men up unnecessarily. Equally, if the House of Commons has passed an Act of Parliament, the Act should be enforced or else amended. What the Government are doing is getting themselves out of a difficulty by administrative action.
  Mr. Ward: If the hon. Gentleman will look at the Act carefully, he will find the word "may." It is permissive.
  Mr. Wigg: I entirely agree, for it was the Labour Government which passed the Act, but the Act was passed to fulfil a totally different purpose. The Government ought to look at the problem again. I agree that the Royal Air Force should not stuff itself up with reservists that it does not want. However, it is setting its face against a selective draft and yet having a selective draft at the same time, and we are getting the worst of both worlds.
  Mr. Ward: We cannot possibly undertake to call men up unless we can give them a useful job to do.
  Mr. Wigg: Will the hon. Gentleman at least—he will satisfy my hon. Friends if he does so—undertake on behalf of his noble Friend to represent to the Minister of Defence that there is a case for inquiry into the working of the National Service Acts?
  Mr. Ward: The National Service Acts are necessary for the reasons which I gave only two minutes ago.
  Mr. Wigg: But they are not working.
  Mr. Ward: They are working beautifully. The only thing that irritates hon. Gentlemen opposite is the fact that the Army calls up more reservists than the Royal Air Force does. I do not think that is a fault. The two Services are quite different. Because the Army calls everybody up, there is no reason why the Royal Air Force should do so.
  Mr. Swingler: Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that an essential unfairness is involved here. It is a matter of chance whether a man who is called up goes to the Royal Air Force or the Army, but so far as concerns the obligation put upon him to do Reserve training there is a great difference. The Royal Air Force does not require men for Reserve training, although that is part of the obligation, but in the Army the call to Reserve training is almost universal. It is this which makes it inequitable.
  Mr. Ward: The whole thing is a matter of chance. It is a matter of chance whether a man is medically fit to undergo National Service at all. When he goes for National Service, it may be a matter of chance whether he does his Service at home or abroad. It is a matter of chance whether he passes to the Reserve, and if he is in the Royal Air Force, whether he needs to be called up or not. There is a great deal of chance about the whole system.
  Mr. Wigg: I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about its being a matter of chance. We are a sporting nation. Let us carry this to its logical conclusion. Let the Services decide how many men they want, and then let the men draw for it.
  Mr. Ward: The hon. Gentleman's sporting instincts are well known, but I think that would be carrying things too far.

  1545
  Where a man is earmarked for a post on mobilisation and needs the training, we call him up. Where we know he will not be needed for some time after mobilisation we do not call him up because we do not feel justified in spending money and efforts in doing so. Indeed, if we called up every reservist, as the hon. Gentleman recommends, we should need several more special training establishments.
  Until 18 months or so ago, our policy was to call up individual men who were earmarked for posts in the war establishment and who needed Service training. We then decided to introduce a Reserve Flight Scheme. I announced that to the House last year. I will not worry the House with a description of it, but, briefly, the Reserve Flights are formed and trained on each operational station and members of each Reserve Flight know exactly where their war station is, and they are trained in the duties they will be called upon to perform immediately on the outbreak of war at the station where they will perform the duties. We tried this scheme first in Fighter Command, and it worked well, and it is now being extended to other operational stations.
  There are two points that I should like to make about the Reserve Flight Scheme. It is a very considerable departure from our earlier policy and its introduction has meant a great deal of work not only for the Record Office but also for all the stations at which the Reserve Flights are being formed. Moreover, the training of the Reserve Flights is linked as far as possible with major exercises undertaken every year by the R.A.F.
  The second point that I want to make is that our object is to form the most effective flight at each station, and in selecting men for each flight we want to pay regard to trade qualifications and experience and also—this is a very important point—to where the reservist lives, because we want him to be as near his home as possible. Had we done the thing in a hurry and just called up people to the Reserve Flights for the sake of calling them up, we should not have achieved this object. We should have had to take people from anywhere, and we should not have had the best possible scheme. There are people other than Class H men available in other Reserves
  1546
  who have the right qualifications and who live near these stations, and in those cases, naturally, we give them preference instead of calling up the Class H men.
  For all these reasons, the Reserve Flight Scheme has taken longer to organise than I expected. I frankly admit that the estimates which I have given in the past of the number of Class H men likely to be called up have been over-optimistic. During 1954 we called up for training some 8,000 Class H reservists either under the Reserve Flight Scheme or for individual training under the earlier scheme. We could have called up more if we had wanted to call them up during the winter; however, we felt it would be very much better not to prejudice the scheme but to wait until the following year when major exercises were taking place so that they would have a much more realistic and useful training.
  As far as I can see at present—I hope the House has not lost all confidence in my forecasts—we shall be in a position to call up about 20,000 reservists of all Classes for training in Reserve Flights during 1955–56. Of these, about 12,000 should be Class H reservists. In addition, some 6,000 Class H men may be called up for individual training outside the Reserve Flight Scheme altogether. It is important to build the Reserve Flights Scheme on firm foundations, and although I am doing all I can to get it going as quickly as possible, I do not want to prejudice the Scheme by calling up reservists before proper arrangements have been completed for their training.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman—
  Mr. Beswick: Is the Under-Secretary leaving the subject of the Reserve Flights?
  Mr. Ward: I am now going on to Class E.
  Mr. Beswick: The hon. Gentleman has not yet said what the 77 men are doing now.
  Mr. Ward: I am afraid I am taking a lot of time, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman exactly what they are doing if it will not bore the House too much. There were 67 airmen and 10 officers. Of the 67 airmen, 42, in addition to doing their evening training, also did their 15 days continuous training. The remainder of

  1547
  them did not. They did only their non-continuous training.
  Mr. Beswick: Is it not the other way round? Should he not have said that in addition to doing their continuous training the 42 did their evening training? Was that voluntary?
  Mr. Ward: It was entirely voluntary. The 42 did their liability for continuous training. The rest of them did not do their liability for continuous training because they were allocated to Reserve Flights rather too late to be included in the Reserve Flight Scheme. I do not know whether that covers the point. There were 10 National Service officers and 67 National Service airmen.
  We hope to call up 11,000 of Class E in the coming year.
  The hon. Member for Uxbridge asked about the number of established whole-time officers in the Royal Observer Corps. He has given the main figures. The scheme for the establishment of whole-time officers was introduced in 1951 when the strength was 56 and we were prepared to establish 42. Now the strength has increased to 83 and the established cadre for the present has been fixed at 53.
  Under these arrangements we have so far been able to establish all those officers who are qualified and who fulfil current conditions about age and medical standards and so forth. In fact, there are still some vacancies and, as more officers qualify, we shall consider them for establishment.
  Mr. Beswick: Has any ceiling been fixed?
  Mr. Ward: The establishment for the moment is 53, but that is not a ceiling; it is by no means inflexible.
  The hon. Member for Uxbridge also asked about security D notice procedure. I agree that the public should be told as much as possible about aircraft and engines within the bounds of security. The public has the right to know and our export trade should not be hampered in any way. But security has always to be borne in mind.
  The Press Committee which the hon. Member mentioned does not actually decide the security of equipment. It only guides the Press on what can safely be
  1548
  published and the arrangement is quite voluntary. The Press co-operate extremely well on the whole.
  Mr. Beswick: I said that.
  Mr. Ward: I know. It is true that they do. We are reviewing the scheme with the Press as it affects our Department on aircraft and engines. Of course there are mistakes, but I do not think that they are widespread, nor do I think that any one newspaper consistently disregards this scheme. If the hon. Member examines the position, he will find that the mistakes have been spread over the whole Press and no particular newspaper is guilty of consistently disregarding the scheme. If the hon. Member has any case in mind, perhaps he will let me have the details. I am also willing to investigate any leakages brought to my notice either from manufacturers' booklets, as was suggested, or from N.A.T.O. sources.
  The hon. Member for Uxbridge also said that I fell below what he was kind enough to call my normally high standard of courtesy in dealing with the Comet. I am sorry that he felt that, and I am sorry that he felt I had something to hide. I promise him that there was nothing to hide, as I said at the time. When I said that this aircraft had to have a certificate of airworthiness, I meant just that. It is true. It is true that a purely military aircraft does not normally have to have a certificate of airworthiness, but when we take a purely civil aircraft into service it is not uncommon to have a certificate of airworthiness, as we did in this case. We sent a Heron to the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington a little while ago. That was a purely civil aircraft and we got a certificate of airworthiness.
  When I said that the fuselages of the Comets were being strengthened, I meant just that. The fuselages of these aircraft are being strengthened. A number of modifications are being introduced after the recommendations of the inquiry into the Comet. I think that what is being done by these modifications can fairly be described as strengthening. It is certainly not a complete rebuilding, and when the strengthening has been completed and we have a certificate of airworthiness we shall take the aircraft into Transport Command and there will be nothing whatever to stop them from carrying passengers.

  1549
  I will not pursue the question of the gearboxes for Avon engines. My information is that there are not 30 different types of gear box but 12. If the hon. Member for Uxbridge would like more details, perhaps he will get in touch with me.
  Mr. Beswick: It was only an illustration of the general principle that the number of types we have in service are too many and the modifications are too many.
  Mr. Ward: I quite agree, and we are doing everything we can to streamline our requirements in view of the complexitiy of modern aircraft.
  I am glad that the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) raised the case of S.A.C. Jukes. We have had a lot of correspondence on this case, and this gives me an opportunity of saying what I have said before in the House about men in the Air Force writing to M.Ps. The hon. Member for Maldon referred to the normal service channels, and we hope that airmen will use them, but there is nothing to stop them from writing to their M.Ps. That is a well established practice, and we have recently circulated all commanding officers reminding them of this position. We should certainly take a very serious view of any attempt to victimise a Service man for writing to his Member of Parliament. As the hon. Member said, Jukes's case brought to light a number of unfortunate points which, with the help of the hon. Member for Maldon, we were able to clear up. I can assure him and the House that we have done all we can to prevent a repetition of this kind of case.
  The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) talked about underspending. He called attention to the under-spending of the Service Departments during the last three years. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence has already given the House an assurance in the Statement on Defence that the experience gained in the last two years of the whole range of factors which condition the rate of defence expenditure has been taken into account in preparing the Estimates for 1955–56.
  In our debates last year I pointed out that although we took every possible step to avoid setbacks in our rearmament programme, we could never hope to escape
  1550
  them entirely as long as we continued to require for the R.A.F. a wide range of equipment of the highest quality and performance. These difficulties must continue to exist as we progress to even more complex equipment.
  I should be entirely misleading the House were I to claim that it is possible to forecast before the year begins the precise amount of money which will be spent on production and works services. But for the financial year just ending, we do not expect to find that we have substantially underspent. In general, we expect expenditure will prove to be nearer the Estimates than was the case in earlier years. Moreover, I can give an unqualified assurance that in framing our Estimates we have taken account of every contingency and drawn fully upon our past experience. Our aim is to present to hon. Members the most accurate Estimates that we can of the money which we shall need in the coming year.
  The hon. Member for Dudley dealt with various matters. I will answer one, and that is the question of security. He said that security was prejudiced by the export of aircraft and the release of information about them. Before we export military aircraft or information about them, we weigh security risks carefully against the political, military and economic advantages to be gained. There are also arrangements for the security risks to be reduced as far as possible. Another factor is the time scale, and the release of information is phased so that the security risk is acceptable.
  Mr. Wigg: Can the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that when aircraft are exported they are brought into line with his classifying? Will he see to it that we shall not have aircraft classified or secret, when we know for a fact that by the next morning's post the plans have arrived at the Kremlin?
  Mr. Ward: There are, of course, various arrangements, one of which is that we do not release all the information at the same time.
  The hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) said that he had approached me before about the difference between Commands and about men getting postings overseas to jobs which had disappeared. I cannot recall any previous discussion on these points, but

  1551
  if the hon. Member will give me details I will examine them. There was also the question of finding positions in the war appointments list for the elder officers.
  Both the hon. Member and the hon. Member for Uxbridge—even if they did not actually say so—implied that it was not much good having a fighter defence any more. I cannot agree about that. If it is a waste of time to have fighters, why is it that the Americans and Russians are building up enormous fighter defences? The hon. Member for Uxbridge did not answer the question I put to him, that if we cannot shoot down 100 per cent. of the invading bombers, is it not better to shoot down as many as we can? He tried to say that I should come out with some kind of percentages of the numbers we could, or could not, shoot down. Obviously, that would be pure speculation on my part and I could not begin to do it.
  As I understand it, the criticism is not that we cannot shoot down more than a certain percentage, but that we cannot intercept them.
  Mr. Beswick: No, the criticism is that if we were intercepting or bringing down 10 per cent. or 20 per cent. of the attacking force sent over, either in one wave or as lone invaders flying at 50,000 feet—which is more likely to be the case—the 80 per cent. which got through would leave nothing to defend in this country, if they were carrying thermo-nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Ward: The hon. Gentleman is very pessimistic if he thinks that we should shoot down only 10 per cent. I will not commit myself, because that
  1552
  would be pure speculation on my part, but I think that the hon. Gentleman is being pessimistic.
  Mr. Wyatt: Is there not another point to be considered? It may well be that if a bomber with nuclear weapons got through, the fighters would become useless. But in the conditions of a cold war, such as the Korean war, must not we have a modern fighter force?
  Mr. Ward: I do not wish to pursue the point, I merely wanted to register my disagreement with the points raised by the hon. Members.
  The hon. Member for Lincoln referred to the question of language awards, which he also mentioned the other night. He said there was no award for language efficiency standards between the 1st class standard and colloquial proficiency, except for Chinese and Japanese. The present arrangements are not necessarily permanent, and we shall be prepared to re-consider them if the need arises for awards on intermediate standards. The hon. Member is not present and he will understand if I write to him in detail about the other points which he raised. He told me that he had to catch a train, and so I will write and clear up the other points he mentioned.
  May I conclude by saying how much I appreciate the far too generous things which have been said about me in this debate and how grateful I am to hon. Members for raising the many useful points which have been raised tonight. What we all wish to do is to help to improve the efficiency of the Royal Air Force.
  Question, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution, put and agreed to.

  Army Estimates, 1955–56
  REPORT [8th March]

  VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES
  Resolution reported,
  "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 523,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956."
  Resolution read a Second time.
  Motion made, and Question proposed. That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution.
  Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. I take it that on the Motion now before the House, we shall be able to have the same wide discussion as previously?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): I understand that Mr. Speaker has so ruled.
  7.57 p.m.
  Mr. F. J. Bellenger: One remark of the Under-Secretary of State for Air interested me, as it applies also to the Army. The hon. Member admitted that it was quite in order for personnel in the Royal Air Force to write to their Member of Parliament, if they felt so disposed. That principle was long resisted by the Army, and I think I can say, I hope in all modesty, that I helped to break down that opposition during the war by some of the articles which I wrote then in one of the national newspapers.
  If the Services call up National Service men for two years, they must not look upon those National Service men as the Army used to look on the Regular soldier in the old days, namely, that they had got him body and soul for the period of his enlistment. I do not wish to encourage any of my constituents, or any of the constituents of other hon. Members, to send their complaints to their Member of Parliament. But quite often a man in the Services has a sense of frustration because he feels that his officer has not dealt adequately with his complaint and at least he obtains some relief by writing to his Member of Parliament about it.
  Not all the matters which are brought to the notice of a Member of Parliament are taken up and referred to the War Office. The right hon. Gentleman will
  1554
  be glad to know that I submit only those complaints which I feel are justified. I am bound to add that the number of complaints received by hon. Members are few. That, I think, is a creditable reflection on the way in which officers are doing their duty towards their men, in attending, in the first instance, in a proper way, to their complaints.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) raised a point on the Air Estimates, and I believe that he has another point to raise in connection with Army matters. It is all to the good that these rare cases should be brought out, because, if they are justified in Parliament, it demonstrates to the public that the grievances of the soldier, airman or naval rating can be adequately dealt with by the Minister, if not by the usual channels.
  It will not be long before we come to the end of our proceedings, and then the Votes will be dealt with in a way that sometimes happens at company meetings when the chairman gives his annual report—as the right hon. Gentleman did last week—in as soothing a manner as possible, and deprives the shareholders—few in number—of many of the facts on which they can judge whether the company is doing well or not, and then, at the end, a vote of thanks is passed to the staff and the meeting disperses, as we shall tonight at a not very late hour.
  That being so, I propose to make only a few remarks about what I would call two or three salient points which have emerged during our previous debates. First, I think that the Secretary of State for War could give the House a little more enlightenment about the strategic Reserve than he has done hitherto. Reading again the remarks which the right hon. Gentleman made when introducing these Estimates in the House, I must confess that I am a little confused as to what the strategic Reserve is to consist of, and what its real rôle is to be.
  Speaking on the Army Estimates, on 8th March, the right hon. Gentleman said that by disbanding the Anti-Aircraft Command, of which the vast majority were Territorials, and by disbanding eight new infantry battalions, he had saved about 66,000 men. It looks from that remark very much as though a large part of the Territorial Army is to be disbanded.
  Mr. Head: No.
  Mr. Bellenger: Perhaps I may be allowed to develop my argument a little further, and then we shall probably get some enlightenment from the right hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. Head: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but perhaps I could help at this stage. What I think the right hon. Gentleman has left out, and which is most important, is the matter of redeployment from the Canal Zone. That is the main saving in relation to this figure of 66,000. As far as the strategic Reserve is concerned, the Territorial Army does not come into the matter at all.
  Mr. Bellenger: I was going on to explain my point further.
  We understood that in the Canal Zone there were about 80,000 all ranks; that, according to the figures given by the right hon. Gentleman last year, there were about 20,000 in the Korean area, and, as we know, there was a brigade in Trieste. Allowing for the deployment of one division in the Middle East, it seems to me that there ought to be more than 66,000 men coming into the pool, as it were, for the strategic Reserve. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can elucidate that point.
  I am not at all satisfied that the strategic Reserve which the right hon. Gentleman says he wants and must have in this country, superimposed upon 12 Reserve divisions, which we were told in the debate on last year's Estimates were in this country, will not be too much. I am inclined to think that the right hon. Gentleman is over-estimating his requirements, and is thereby depriving National Service men of a reduction in their period of service such as we on this side of the House have suggested.
  It is very difficult, in the short time that we have for our annual review, to get all these matters into their proper perspective. Therefore, I endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) has advocated on more than one occasion from this Box, that there should be some better facilities provided to this House, or to those hon. Members who are particularly interested in military matters, to obtain the information without which one cannot form a proper, reliable and responsible judgment.
  1556
  As I said a few moments ago, I think that the right hon. Gentleman is asking too much in his estimate for the strategic Reserve, on top of all the other forces which he has in this country, unless he is going to disband a large part of the Territorial force, which he seemed to indicate when introducing the Estimates. That, of course, links up with the question of National Service. We on this side of the House have advocated that the period of two years of National Service is too long for the purpose for which the right hon. Gentleman requires these men.
  What does he want them for? What is the purpose of calling up men for two years? We have already heard from the Under-Secretary of State for Air that he cannot fully utilise R.A.F. personnel in respect of their period of Reserve training. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) pointed out, that produces an inequality of liability as between the three Services.
  For what purpose does the right hon. Gentleman want these men? Is it in order to train soldiers to be ready for any emergency? If so, there is, in my opinion, no case for the ordinary National Service man to do more than 18 months' service. It is a well-known fact that if and when the German Army is constituted, the Germans are not proposing to call up their conscripts for more than 18 months. The right hon. Gentleman knows from his own experience that the German Army is a remarkable machine in its training and fighting qualities. Therefore, on those grounds, I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman can ask for more than 18 months in which to train the ordinary soldier.
  Mr. Head: Plainly, the right hon. Gentleman does not get enough information. I said very clearly and specifically in my speech on the Estimates that the reason for having two years' National Service was not for training for part-time service, but the necessity to increase the size of the active Army. I made that quite clear, so I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman can complain about that.
  Mr. Bellenger: If the right hon. Gentleman would allow me to make my points fully, then, perhaps, he would see what I am driving at. I am trying to demolish his case for having more than 18 months for ordinary training purposes. The right

  1557
  hon. Gentleman said that we required these men for our commitments, and that that was the real reason why we were calling up men for a period of two years. If the right hon. Gentleman denies that, let him say so.
  Mr. Head Mr. Head indicated assent.
  Mr. Bellenger: I see that the right hon. Gentleman agrees with me. He is calling up men for two years in order to meet our commitments.
  Mr. Swingler: No.
  Mr. Bellenger: That is what he said.
  Mr. Swingler: It has been made quite clear by the Secretary of State for War that that is not true. The right hon. Gentleman made it quite clear that the reduction in commitments has released some 70,000 or 80,000 men.
  Mr. Head: Some 66,000.
  Mr. Bellenger: That is why the right hon. Gentleman brings forward his programme for the strategic Reserve, in order to avoid reducing the period of National Service.
  Mr. Wigg: My right hon. Friend well knows the difficulty, of course. It is that the right hon. Gentleman changes his reason every year. Last year it was the commitments, and this year it is the Regular recruiting.
  Mr. Bellenger: The right hon. Gentleman said something about the call-up for the period of National Service. He said that if we did not have the two-year period it would be difficult to meet our commitments. It is true that he linked that with the strategic Reserve. He said that we had been scraping the barrel all the time, and that we could scarcely meet our commitments. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley that the right hon. Gentleman is always changing front.
  Mr. Head: The hon. Member for Dudley has a genius for making remarks which are entirely contrary to the facts. In the last debates on defence and upon the Army Estimates—and also the ones before that—hon. Members opposite were absolutely unanimous in the view that what we must aim at was a strategic Reserve.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I would remind the House that the debate should be conducted by speeches on either side.
  Mr. Bellenger: I am afraid that my hon. Friend is like a red rag to a bull; he generally gets the right hon. Gentleman to his feet. Never mind what my hon. Friend says; I say that the right hon. Gentleman is constantly changing his front, and it is very difficult for us to advance arguments which he does not find some sort of excuse for demolishing. I am putting a point to which I hope he will pay serious attention.
  Last year the excuse of our commitments was put up. This year our commitments are considerably reduced—by 80,000 troops in the Middle East, 20,000 in Korea and a brigade in Trieste—and yet, when we advance the argument that our commitments have been reduced, we are told that it does not matter, because we want men for a strategic Reserve.
  Mr. Head: Does not the right hon. Gentleman want them for a strategic Reserve?
  Mr. Bellenger: I do not think much of the right hon. Gentleman's idea of a strategic Reserve in this country.
  As I have said before, our front line is in Germany, and that is where our biggest strategic Reserve is. If the right hon. Gentleman is right in all that he prognosticates about a nuclear war, I do not believe that we should put all our eggs in one basket by loading up the already overcrowded depots and training establishments in this country with another 50,000 or 60,000 men, who are to be called a strategic Reserve. For what purpose are they to be used? They are to be sent to different trouble spots as trouble arises.
  The right hon. Gentleman, in conjunction with the other Service Ministers and the Minister of Defence, should look at the world problem and decide what can be done with our limited manpower. The right hon. Gentleman cannot have all the men he wants, and we say that in that case he should make sure that the men he gets are the best. We say that he can get them if he will concentrate upon trying to create a Regular Army, which is the only possible Army to deal with such commitments.

  1559
  We shall continue to urge upon him the necessity for an inquiry into the question of National Service. We have never denied the Government the manpower that it reasonably wants, and we do not oppose the Estimates, but we are entitled to tell the right hon. Gentleman and the Government that if they have nothing to hide they should agree to the setting up of a Select Committee or a committee of inquiry.
  They must surely want our good will. The right hon. Gentleman is constantly complaining—often using violent language—that my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley and other hon. Members on this side of the House overstate the case, but how can we put the case properly if we do not know the facts? I believe that the right hon. Gentleman is concealing a great deal from this House about the question of manpower. My view is that he has too much manpower. The only possible way to resolve the question is by agreeing to an inquiry such as the Opposition has demanded. We cannot investigate these matters properly by debate here, in the limited time available.
  In the debate on 8th March, I asked the right hon. Gentleman to tell us the size of the Regular Army at which he was aiming. He told us that he would be only too glad if he could get the required number of long-service troops. In reply to my question he said:
  "I do not want to escape the question"—
  that question being the size of the Regular Army at which he was aiming—
  "but to some extent the answer depends upon our commitments."
  There again he brought in that very convenient word. Our commitments have certainly been reduced since last year, but he still wants the men.
  He went on:
  "With our commitments as they are now, however, we could undoubtedly do away with at least 100,000 of the present force because of our saving in overheads and avoidance of waste in movements, and so forth."—[OFFFCIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 185.]
  He was very careful not to tell me what was the size of the Regular Army at which he was aiming—but how does he propose to save those 100,000 men? His argument must be based upon the size of the Regular Army at which he is aiming, otherwise he would not give a figure
  1560
  of 100,000. Perhaps he will clear up those points.
  Mr. Head: I can deal with the last point now. As I am sure the right hon. Gentleman knows, the strength of the Army today is 420,000, and by a simple process of arithmetic the deduction of 100,000 gives a Regular Army of 320,000.
  Mr. Bellenger: That is the first time that we have ever had it stated so categorically that if the right hon. Gentleman can get a Regular Army of 320,000 he will not want National Service men—at any rate for a two-year period.
  Mr. Head Mr. Head indicated assent.
  Mr. Bellenger: That is a large figure at which to aim, and I do not suppose that the right hon. Gentleman can get it under present conditions.
  I am not sure that he requires 320,000 men for his commitments. Some of those commitments are over-insured. I suggest that the way to deal with some of the trouble spots is by the use of police forces instead of Regular troops.
  Certain of my hon. Friends have tackled the Government upon the question of the recruitment of colonial forces. I am not at all sure that more could not be done to provide a greater number of colonial troops, stiffened with some British troops, in the way in which the Indian Army used to be organised. The right hon. Gentleman will know that the Indian Army had three battalions forming a brigade. One of the battalions consisted of British and other two of Indian troops.
  The right hon. Gentleman might explore the question of native manpower, and the possibility of using it to deal with various trouble spots. We had to rush out a battalion of troops to British Guiana to deal with a situation which should have been dealt with by the police. The right hon. Gentleman may dismiss this suggestion in a casual way, but he must remember that Parliament will not always continue to vote these large supplies of manpower—especially National Service manpower called up for two years as it now is.
  Will the Secretary of State tell us a little more about the Territorial Army? If he is going to maintain it at its former size—and he seems to be aiming at that, to judge by what he said in answer to my

  1561
  assertion that he was disbanding part of it—what is he going to do with it, bearing in mind that it had a mainly anti-aircraft rôle? How would it be formed in units and formations?
  What will be its new role? Will it be mainly in Civil Defence, as he seemed to suggest on 8th March, when he said:
  "If such a war occurred"—
  that is, a nuclear war—
  "then the vital and decisive factor would be the ability of the home base in these islands to struggle through… I believe that a determining or even a decisive factor in it will be the presence of a number of formations of trained, mobile, disciplined men who can be sent all over the country to help to the maximum extent in restoring order out of chaos."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 192.]
  He seemed to be saying that if such a war occurred many of the duties of the Territorial Army would be police duties and not those which we envisage as being suitable for men who have been trained for two years or more.
  The right hon. Gentleman owes it to the House to tell us what is to be the rôle of the new Territorial Army, which, I imagine, unless he is more optimistic, will take a long time to reform. I have voiced my criticism of the absence of planning which meant that this well-trained volunteer element was suddenly told that it was redundant. I should like to hear what the right hon. Gentleman proposes to put into the place of the old Territorial Army.
  Earlier this week I mentioned overseas matters, which the right hon. Gentleman dealt with; but I am not sure, in spite of what he said, that the three year's overseas service in Far Eastern stations could not be reduced. I was interested in the statement in the right hon. Gentleman's Memorandum, in page 14, that he has had two new troopships built. He has five other troopships, yet he finds that air trooping, by reducing the time spent by troops en route results in a manpower saving of one-seventh on the Far East route. So, out of 10,000 men moved in a year, we are gaining 1,400 or 1,500 effective manpower in the field. That is a very good result.
  One other good result from trooping by air is the saving in cost. The right hon. Gentleman says that air passages to the Far East and Middle East are costing less
  1562
  per head than by ship. When we reflect that the passage to Singapore by troopship takes a month we can see how economies are made in manpower by air trooping. If we increase our air trooping, as we shall have to do in the emergency of war, we shall make many such economies.
  I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman other ways in which he might be able to save manpower. I do not know how many troops go out, but if he can save 1,500 on 10,000 men, he can save 7,500 on 50,000 men. He could well afford to look into this matter to see whether he could still further increase air trooping.
  The right hon. Gentleman says that individuals are sent out mainly in units; I should like to know how many go individually as details and how many in units. I have an idea that a number of officers and other ranks are sent out individually to join units and do not go as units. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can tell us the proportion between whole units lifted and transported, and individual details.
  My hon. Friends want to raise other points, so I will not say any more than that we feel that the right hon. Gentleman should concede something to us if he wants our good will. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley told the House on one occasion that the whole question of recruiting for the Army is not a party matter and will never be settled in a party way. If we are to get the Army we want and should have, the right hon. Gentleman has to do something more than come here and make a charming speech, but putting off our serious questions as mere overstatements or something devised out of the imaginations of my hon. Friends.
  What I am saying to the right hon. Gentleman applies in greater or lesser degree to all Secretaries of State for War. There are certainly considerations such as security matters which we understand very well, but, looking at the Army Estimates that we have today, and remembering the Army Estimates as they were presented before the war, we realise that we have very meagre information on which to base our debates compared with what we had before the war.
  Mr. Head: I think we have given much more.
  Mr. Bellenger: Not about the disposition of our troops overseas.
  Mr. Head: In last year's Estimates there was a map of the whole lot.
  Mr. Bellenger: Yes, that is quite correct. I wish the right hon. Gentleman would put that map into the Estimates for every year, so that we could see where our troops are. If my memory is correct we had details of everything before the war. There may be reasons why we cannot have that information now, but the right hon. Gentleman should try to give more, as he attempted to do last year.
  We shall not oppose these Estimates. They will go through, and the right hon. Gentleman will get what he has asked for. He has complained of misinformation; whose fault is that? It is not the fault of my hon. Friends but of the right hon. Gentleman himself. If he refuses to give us the information to which we are entitled he must not be surprised if some of our shots go wide of the mark.
  Mr. Head: What does the right hon. Gentleman want to know?
  Mr. Bellenger: If the right hon. Gentleman wants to stop my hon. Friends from puttings their points—
  Mr. Head: I have not heard what information hon. Members opposite are short of.
  Mr. Bellenger: I wish the right hon. Gentleman would not be so adept at interrupting.
  I have tried to put certain points to him this evening. Let him answer those points; that is enough to go on with this evening. I am not sure that the old couplet does not ring as true today as in the days of the Charge of the Light Brigade,
  "Their's not to reason why,
  Their's but to do and die."
  We reject that principle. Army law, which remained in its ossified form for 60 or 70 years, or longer, has been altered. Why? Because of a joint operation between both sides of the House. The right hon. Gentleman will have saved himself some of the all-night sittings that we had in the past when we discussed the Army Annual Bill. We want the type of Army which I believe the right hon. Gentleman wants. The only difference between us is that he, with his military advisers, takes
  1564
  the easiest way of getting that Army, which is to call up men for two years' National Service.
  8.27 p.m.
  Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I confess I did not understand the couplet of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), unless it has relation to certain proceedings in a Committee Room upstairs yesterday morning. It has certainly no application to the matter in hand.
  The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the need for a joint inquiry into manpower, but I cannot conceive that such inquiry is necessary. All the information is now available to the Government. No outside body can discover any additional information or could come to the political decision which is now requisite. The Government will be inevitably faced with a major political decision on manpower before very long.
  I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends that it is in the least necessary or wise to reduce the two years' period of conscription, because, as I pointed out in the defence debate the other night, those last few months—the 23rd month out of the 24th, the 22nd month and so on down to 18 months—are the most valuable months, and if the conscription period is reduced by six months we take away the most expertly trained manpower.
  Mr. Bellenger: How did we manage when we had a conscription period of only 18 months?
  Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The answer must be that the 18 months' trained soldier is not a fully trained soldier judged by the two years standard.
  The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the strategic Reserve, and I have certain doubts and questions on this matter. We are told that 66,000 men are now going to be required for a strategic Reserve in this country, and they are found very rightly by the reduction of our overseas commitments. But I am not at all clear what the 66,000 men are going to do in the United Kingdom. If we are thinking in terms of providing mobile battalions for a nuclear war, they may well be needed, because we have been told of the dire rôle that they are going to perform in that ghastly eventuality.

  1565
  But I cannot conceive of the necessity for such a large number of men in purely colonial wars, which is the only other kind of war that we shall have to fight. We do not want such a large pool of men as that to reinforce our forces in Kenya or Malaya or in any Middle East activity in which we may be forced to take part. Already there is a large garrison in Cyprus for that purpose and it is not included in this home strategic Reserve.
  We are told that barrack accommodation in this country is becoming heavily overcrowded. We are told that the congestion of young men being called up for National Service is now acute, and it seems to me that the Government will shortly have to come to a major decision about the call-up.
  I suggested in the defence debate that the American system should be examined in order to try to find some scientific basis for the call-up which will take account of various factors which are not taken into account today, such as educational standards, medical standards, the need for deferment on grounds of business hardship, compassionate home postings and so on. If the Government jib at that, they are still confronted with the de facto situation of what I believe will be very severe congestion at home and the absence of suitable work for the troops—and when I say "suitable work" I do not mean just "brassing up," cleaning up and turning out smartly on the parade ground, but really doing something which will convince these young men that the whole operation is worth while.
  What will happen if the Government decide, as the American Government have decided, to postpone a single call-up for a period of six months? The Americans are able to do it much easier because they have a complicated system of deferments and exemptions. But that sort of situation inevitably confronts the Government at the moment. There would, of course, be fierce dislocation if a call-up were postponed for six months. The training schools would have to close down. Men would have to be posted away from them, and all sorts of ancillary difficulties would arise. Indeed, it would create complications immediately, because a man, instead of being called up at 17½ or 18, would be called up at 18 or 18½ and all sorts of queries would
  1566
  arise at his school or university or business that he was due to enter.
  I suggest that the scientific way to reduce the call-up is to accept those difficulties and meet them by refusing to take the men. That is perhaps an improvement on the suggestion I made the other night. Postpone the call-up for six months, and then, when the difficulties arise, meet them by exempting or deferring the men.
  I should like to know whether the Government have begun to consider questions of this kind, because I feel sure that the need to do so will arise. The desire progressively to reduce conscription is by no means confined to the opposite side of the House. We on this side are as much concerned about it as hon. Members opposite. I am provoked into these observations by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw. I rose more for the purpose of voicing the anxiety which exists among the civil technicians of Anti-Aircraft Command. I ask my right hon. Friend whether he will be good enough to say something about that tonight.
  I have had certain cases brought to my attention. They have been not only individual cases; they expressed a group anxiety. These are highly-paid men, very skilled in their work, who are entirely civilian trained and paid for out of the Service Vote. They maintain predictor equipment, radar apparatus and the various other machinery which is associated with anti-aircraft guns. If they were Service men they would probably accept the disbandment of their corps in the usual robust way in which Service men accept the charges and changes of Service life. These men are civilians with homes and families in this country. Very often they have to find their own houses, and they cannot easily get rid of them. They are worried about the future.
  They want to know what is to happen to them. We know that the general purposes of Anti-Aircraft Command in the future, as science advances, are to be taken over by the R.A.F. and the ground-to-air missiles will be under R.A.F. command. Will an invitation be given by the R.A.F. to these technicians to cross the floor, as it were, from the Army to the R.A.F. and to enlist in the new command, whatever it is, of the R.A.F. which will be developing these new techniques? If

  1567
  that is so, I hope that the invitations will be issued soon, so that the anxiety and uncertainty of these men may be brought to an end.
  8.38 p.m.
  Mr. Driberg: In the debate on the Air Estimates, I ventured to re-state the constitutional right of Service men to communicate with their Members of Parliament. I was very well satisfied with the reply which the Under-Secretary of State for Air gave me, and I hope very much that we shall have an equally satisfactory re-statement of that fundamental principle from the right hon. Gentleman, together with the assurance that there is to be no victimisation of any Service man who exercises this right.
  I must preface my remarks, as I did in the earlier debate, by the qualification that I fully accept the official position, that it is better that the usual Service channels should be used whenever possible or, at any rate, first. None of us wants to be deluged with frivolous complaints from the Services, but, as everyone knows, those Service channels do sometimes get clogged. There have been a number of occasions, both at Question Time and in debate in the House, and still more frequently by letters to the Ministers concerned, when the consequence of a letter from a Service man to his M.P. has been the useful clearing up of some difficulty.
  In the past I have often had occasion to praise the War Office for the humanity with which it deals with individual compassionate cases and other cases. I hesitate to say this, but my impression—and I do not put it higher than that—is that in the past year or two there has been a slight falling-off in comparison with the Air Ministry. In particular, I do not like the new War Office practice of refusing to investigate a case unless the hon. Member who raises it will provide the name, number and identification of the soldier concerned.
  I quite see that in many cases there may be a practical difficulty in checking and identifying the complaint unless this identification is provided, but if the unit is sufficiently identified and if the Member of Parliament makes himself responsible for the allegations contained in the letter which he sends to the Minister, I suggest that the War Office ought to go ahead
  1568
  and investigate the complaint and not insist on being provided with names.
  After all, Service men sometimes do not want their names furnished in such cases. There is a formal guarantee that there will be no victimisation. If there is victimisation, and it comes to the right hon. Gentleman's knowledge—of course I accept his bona fides—he takes severe action against those who are responsible, but there are subtler forms of victimisation which are difficult to deal with, and there is also occasionally—and I am happy to say that it is just as rare in the Army as it is in the Air Force—a serious case of quite open victimisation; and it is such a case which I want to bring to the right hon. Gentleman's attention tonight.
  In February I asked the right hon. Gentleman a Question which excited a good deal of interest, and, I am afraid, some derision from the opposite side of the House—a Question about a cocktail party at the Packway Mess, Larkhill. I am not now arguing the merits of that case, about which I am still in correspondence with the right hon. Gentleman, but, incidentally, I am still convinced that I was right on the main point which I made, that a large part of the expenses of that party were not authorised by the preliminary mess meeting.
  That, however, is not what I am arguing about tonight, nor am I making any general attack on the commanding officer concerned, although he has been quite free with his comments in the Press. So far as I know, he is in all respects an admirable and efficient commanding officer, although I believe that his old-fashioned ideas of hospitality are more agreeable to those officers who can afford to live up to them than to those who cannot.
  It was indirectly from some of those officers who cannot, and who objected to the ad hoc use of accumulated mess funds for a purpose not approved by a mess meeting, that the complaint about the cocktail party came to me. But it came to me directly from the senior chaplain of Larkhill Garrison—I name him—the Rev. J. P. Stevenson.
  In one of the letters which I have received from him he states his point of view thus:
  "Last November I was approached by members of the Packway Mess, Larkhill, who complained about the spending of a large sum out

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  of mess capital on a cocktail party, without the prior authority of a mess meeting. I had not then, nor have I now (apart from HANSARD and the Press), any first-hand knowledge of the truth or otherwise of these allegations; but I have always made it a guiding principle of my work as an Anglican priest to help those who come to me, to exercise any legal rights to which they may be entitled. It was for this reason that I passed to you the complaint…Regular officers and their wives have a deep-rooted prejudice about communicating with M.Ps., and I therefore agreed to act as broker for these unnamed clients."
  Mr. Stevenson goes on to say, in the same letter:
  "From the time the Minister's first inquiry reached Larkhill, Lieutenant-Colonel Harington (who commands the 18th Medium Regiment) began a system of intensive screening to find out which members of the mess had communicated with you."
  Mr. Stevenson, being a man of candour and courage, not wanting even to seem to be doing anything surreptitious or underhand, and out of loyalty to his own Department—the Royal Army Chaplains' Department—dropped a note to the Deputy Assistant Chaplain General, Salisbury Plain District, to indicate that he was responsible for the Question being raised.
  I am sorry to say that it was at this stage that the affair began to take a rather unpleasant turn. The D.A.C.G. came to see Mr. Stevenson on 7th February in what Mr. Stevenson has described in one of his letters to me as "a highly excited state." He added that the D.A.C.G.:
  "In the course of the next hour and a half expressed, not without repetition, his feelings."
  Among other things he said that Mr. Stevenson must think in terms of resigning his commission and, to quote again from the letter, the Deputy Assistant Chaplain General, Salisbury Plain District, said:
  "finally that I was to write a letter to you (which he would post, to make sure it went) … to say that I was 'satisfied' that all the information I had given you was untrue, and to beg you not to rise when the Question was called."
  This was just before the Question came up in this House.
  He said he was prepared, on that condition, to do nothing in the matter; "otherwise he would take such action as he thought fit." Mr. Stevenson adds:
  "I did not write the letter."
  I am very glad he did not. Quite apart from the constitutional question involved,
  1570
  it seems to me to have been a quite abominable interference with the integrity of a priest, by one of his fellow-chaplains, to suggest that he should write a letter containing what, so far as he knew, was a series of lies.
  Mr. Wigg: When my hon. Friend got that communication, why did he not go to Mr. Speaker and raise it as a matter of Privilege?
  Mr. Driberg: Because I only got it in the past day. I am not quite sure whether this would be a prima facie case of Privilege or not, but I am raising it at the earliest possible moment now.
  Mr. Wigg: As a matter of Privilege?
  Mr. Driberg: I do not know whether you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, would regard it as a matter of Privilege?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not regard it as a matter of Privilege at all.
  Mr. Driberg: The next incident after this very unpleasant visit from his senior fellow-chaplain on 7th February was on 10th March when, for reasons I really do not think I can go into, although I am quite prepared to tell the right hon. Gentleman about them privately—they are rather delicate—the commanding officer concerned visited the garrison chaplain—Mr. Stevenson's assistant, his "curate," as it were—to discuss one or two matters with him. As I say, I do not want to disclose what these matters were, but he was in a position to bring a certain amount of pressure on the garrison chaplain, and in the course of that visit the garrison chaplain confirmed to the commanding officer that Mr. Stevenson was the man responsible for communicating this matter to me.
  Two days later, on 12th March, the commanding officer telephoned to the Deputy Assistant Chaplain General, the same man who had come to see Mr. Stevenson a month earlier, and—I quote again from Mr. Stevenson's letter—
  "Without reference to me, Colonel Harington then rang up my Deputy Assistant Chaplain-General and indicated that he wanted suitable action taken against me. The D.A.C.G. came to see me … and said that I was to expect a posting away from Larkhill in about a week's time."
  This morning, I discussed the matter further by telephone with Mr. Stevenson,

  1571
  and I learned from him that the latest development is that he has been summoned for an interview either today or tomorrow—I am not quite sure which—with the Army Commander himself, the G.O.C.-in-C. Southern Command.
  The matter is obviously of rather serious importance. I maintain—and I hope very much that the Secretary of State will agree—that an officer, and even a chaplain, is just as entitled as a private soldier to the constitutional right of communicating with Members of Parliament, and to protection against victimisation if he exercises that right. I hope that the Secretary of State will tell us when he replies that he will instruct all those concerned—even, if necessary, including the Army Commander himself—that they must not take any action whatever, by way of posting or otherwise, to penalise Mr. Stevenson for exercising his constitutional right and for doing what he conceives to be his duty as a chaplain and as a priest.
  I am not arguing whether I was right or wrong about the cocktail party. It is not really relevant to my case about the main point whether the information sent me by Mr. Stevenson was correct or incorrect. He sent it in good faith. Obviously, he must be protected against victimisation.
  The only other thing that I would ask the Secretary of State to consider doing is what the Under-Secretary of State for Air told us he has done in the Royal Air Force: that is, to circularise all commanding officers to remind them of the existence of this constitutional right. It is a matter which needs reaffirming from time to time because of the constant attempts that are made, by those who forget about it, to whittle it away.
  8.53 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): A number of points have been raised in the space of time that has been available to us. As it is fresh in the memory of the House I should like first to deal, out of sequence, with the points which the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) has just raised.
  Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. Do I take it that you gave a formal Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, on the question of Privilege, or do you—
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not regard it as a question of Privilege. It cannot be raised at this stage.
  Mr. Wigg: With respect, there is a precedent for raising it at this hour of night. On 19th December, 1953, I think, I raised a question of Privilege with Mr. Speaker, in accordance with the rules of order that I should raise it at the earliest possible moment—that would be the day before the Christmas Recess—and Mr. Speaker was kind enough to hear me at about this hour of the evening, and gave his Ruling next morning.
  What is important here, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, is not to make a formal submission to you, but to take the earliest opportunity of bringing it to your notice. If my hon. Friend has received the letter only very recently, I should have thought that here was a case which required to be submitted to Mr. Speaker so that we could get his Ruling. There is a precedent for raising it at this hour.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not think it should be raised now. In any event, it has not been raised at the earliest opportunity.
  Mr. Wigg: On the evidence supplied by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon, he is raising the matter at the first opportunity. The only point which we are now submitting to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, is that there is a case here which would require to be submitted to Mr. Speaker tomorrow morning. In these circumstances it may affect what the right hon. Gentleman has to say.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I cannot accept the submission now. A submission can be made to Mr. Speaker, but not now.
  Mr. Swingler: I want to be perfectly clear about your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Are you ruling that this matter can be raised with Mr. Speaker at the next opportunity?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am ruling that it cannot be raised now. Nor do I think that it has been raised at the earliest opportunity.
  Mr. Driberg: I did explain, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that I had only just received the letter during the past day. I could not have raised the matter at Question Time today. I understand that what

  1573
  you have just ruled does not rule out the possibility of the matter being raised tomorrow?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The matter can be raised with Mr. Speaker, but not with me in the middle of this business.
  Mr. Head: I was about to say that the hon. Gentleman has brought forward what are undoubtedly very serious charges. I hope that I am not in any way prejudicing the hon. Gentleman's rights to raise this as a matter of Privilege. On his account, I would say that the situation which has been described is not the kind of situation which I or anyone connected with the Army would wish to occur. I am not in any way imputing anything against the hon. Gentleman, when I say that I hope that no one in this House or elsewhere will jump to conclusions about the matter until it has been investigated. I do not think the hon. Gentleman or any hon. Member would wish to do so.
  We know that situations arise in which, even with the best will in the world, an individual's view may become warped. A situation can obtain, as has happened on occasion since I have been at the War Office, in which the general circumstances have gradually changed or become warped in an individual's view. I am not saying that that is what has happened in this case, and I am not imputing anything against the hon. Gentleman, but I would ask the House to await an investigation. That is all.
  I cannot possibly, as hon. Members will see, comment on this matter at this stage without notice. I did not know that the hon. Gentleman was going to raise this matter. All I would say is that, in my opinion, from my knowledge of the chaplains and of the commanding officers of the Army, the kind of situation which the hon. Gentleman has described would in the British Army be extremely rare, even if this case should prove to be as he has described it.
  Mr. Driberg: I am grateful for what the right hon. Gentleman has said, but I would remind him that the complainant is, after all, a senior chaplain at the important garrison of Larkhill—a man, presumably, of considerable status.
  Mr. Wigg: I am quite sure that the right hon. Gentleman is right, and that,
  1574
  even if the facts are established to have been as described, this is not a case likely to exist, except in very isolated and special circumstances. Therefore, as the right hon. Gentleman must be concerned about the reputation of the Army, would it not be much better for him to say nothing about it now but to give an assurance to the House that he will if necessary set up a court of inquiry under the presidency of a senior officer? I would urge that course upon him very strongly, because the facts may reveal the necessity for taking disciplinary action. Therefore, it would be better for him to say nothing about the matter at the moment.
  Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is most helpful—[Laughter.] This is a serious matter, and I do not want even to seem to treat it lightly, but the hon. Gentleman is most helpful and has come almost half-way to this Box in dealing with the case. However, it would be wrong of me to give at this stage any undertakings about a court of inquiry. I have not the particulars of this case.
  All I am saying at this stage is that the hon. Gentleman has put forward serious charges, and has described a case which, from my knowledge of the Army, can be only a very rare occurrence, even if this case is as he has described it. But, as I say, at present I know nothing about it, and, therefore, I cannot usefully comment upon it. With all respect to the hon. Gentleman, it would be most unwise for me to give any undertakings about courts of inquiry or anything else. What we have to do now is to go into the matter and see what lies at the bottom of it.
  I will tell hon. Members what I am anxious about. I am particularly anxious because, during the four years that I have had experience in this office, I have found that hon. Members have got up in the House and made in good faith very serious accusations against the Army, and then, as happened some time ago—I will not mention any names—they have been entirely disproved. The fact that they are disproved is of little or no importance to the Army; the headlines are there and the bad effect on the Army's reputation remains.
  I am making this point because I think that hon. Members—again, I am not getting at the hon. Gentleman—have to be terribly careful before laying a charge

  1575
  against the Army which, with great respect to the Press, is news. Even if it is later disproved, as happened in one or two cases previously, it is then too late, for a denial is given nothing like the large headlines indicating a major scandal.
  Mr. Driberg: The right hon. Gentleman will also agree, I hope, that charges made in this House have sometimes eventually been proved correct, even when originally denied by him.
  Mr. Head: I am not denying anything. All I am pointing out—I think hon. Gentlemen will agree that it is fair—is that a charge has been made, which, if it were proved, would be a serious one, and all I am doing is asking hon. Members, and perhaps the Press, not to jump to conclusions before we have gone into the matter.
  Mr. Wigg: Surely the best way for the right hon. Gentleman to deal with the matter is to say that he will investigate it, and if, on investigation, it is necessary—[Interruption.]—The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) may not like it, but if he understood the matter he would not be in such a hurry to interrupt me. The right hon. Gentleman can say that a case has been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon, that he will investigate it and, if necessary, will appoint a court of inquiry, and, if it is necessary, when the court of inquiry reports to him, will take disciplinary action. What we want is an assurance of action, if necessary, and no whitewash.
  Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman really has an immense facility for saying the same thing twice. He has said nothing different from what he said previously. If the hon. Gentleman had been listening, he would have realised that I had said that the matter must be gone into, and that 1 cannot say at this stage whether there will be a court of inquiry or not. The hon. Gentleman has taken some time to say the same thing twice, but I am sure that he did not mean to waste anybody's time.
  I should like now to turn from that matter to deal with the general question of the Report stage and the speeches which have so far been made. During the year since the last Estimates the hon.
  1576
  Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and others have had full opportunity to criticise the Army, and during that period they have made full use of the opportunity. The same is true of the Press. That is all quite correct, and as it should be.
  During that time I have tried, as impartially as I am able, to watch for constructive criticisms as to what we ought to do. I can tell the House frankly that, with very few exceptions, I have found extraordinarily little constructive criticism about how to run the Army in a better way. That has been my experience during the year. I have heard lots of insults, and I have heard what is wrong with the Army, but I have found extraordinarily little in the way of constructive comment.
  As to comment on my Estimates speech, I have heard extraordinarily little as to how people would improve on the policy laid down in that speech. I have listened to suggestions which have been made during the debates on these Estimates—I will deal with some of them in a moment—but, without trying to be over-wise on the matter, I should like to point out that we have a problem today which hon. Gentlemen opposite have constantly stressed.
  It is a two-fold one. The first aspect of it is the recruitment of as many Regulars as possible. The second aspect of the problem is to reduce the size of the Army as much as possible in line with our commitments. Those are our two main problems.
  The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) questioned the need for a strategic Reserve.
  Mr. Bellenger: Of that size.
  Mr. Head: The right hon. Gentleman says "that size," but he also complained that I did not tell him what the size was. It is a fact that we indicated that our strategic Reserve would be around the two division mark.
  The right hon. Gentleman questioned the need for a strategic Reserve in this country, and this is the crux of the problem. Most hon. Members opposite say that without a strategic Reserve, whether in Germany or not, we could do way with National Service.
  Mr. Bellenger: Not entirely.
  Mr. Head: I wrote down the right hon. Gentleman's words. Of course we shall read his speech in the Official Report. He said that we should count on the strategic Reserve being in Germany, and that a strategic Reserve in this country was not really necessary. That is how I understand it.
  The essence of the strategic Reserve is that it is free of commitment in the event of crisis. That is to say, we have a long term commitment in Western Europe and it is there against either a major war of the conventional kind, or thermo-nuclear war. In addition we have world-wide commitments in what has come to be called the cold war. That embraces the Korean type of war, or the Malayan type of war.
  As I tried to explain in the debate on the Estimates, we consider, on past experience, that to reach a situation where there are only one or two battalions in this country is not only very bad for the Army, but very dangerous if an extreme emergency crops up. Moreover, I do not believe that one can retain an Army indefinitely with practically all of it overseas. I do not believe that the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw can ask me why people do not sign on, and why there are not more Regulars, and then expect these Regulars to stay on when 80 per cent. of the fighting units are overseas. It does not add up.
  Mr. Swingler: Germany is overseas.
  Mr. Head: I am saying that a proportion of British soldiers should be stationed in this country. I believe that there is not a single Army in the world that has such a high proportion of its units overseas as has the British Army today.
  Mr. Swingler Mr. Swingler rose—
  Mr. Head: We still have a debate on the Royal Navy before us, and we have had some very long debates, and I believe I know what the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) wants to say. This is not a contentious point. The hon. Member may disagree with me. I am stating my view, and I believe that it is shared by practically everybody who has studied the Army's affairs. Quite apart from our commitments, for which I believe a strategic Reserve to be essential, we must have a
  1578
  proportion of our Forces stationed at home.
  Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: What is the proportion?
  Mr. Head: I believe that the hon. Member has just entered—
  Mr. Thomas: On a point of order. The Minister suggests that I have just come into the House. I have listened to the whole of his speech.
  Mr. Head: I entirely withdraw that, and I say that the hon. Member was not listening, for which I do not blame him. I believe that it is within the knowledge of the House that I stated that 80 per cent. of the fighting units of the British Army have been overseas.
  Mr. Thomas: I know. But the point I am raising is—[Hon. Members: "Oh."]—The Minister has given way. What is the proportion he is suggesting should be kept at home?
  Mr. Swingler: Before the Minister answers that, will he deal with the point about Germany?
  Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has had some pretty good times in this House.
  Mr. Thomas: But—
  Mr. Head: I am answering the hon. Gentleman if he will listen. I have told him that about two divisions in this country was what we thought necessary. I have said that before.
  The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw accused us of withholding information. He said that we did not give enough information about the Army. He did not specify what he wanted to know, but I would say this to him. Since I have been at the War Office, I have been at great pains to give to the House the maximum possible amount of information. It is my belief that we are engaged in a war of deterrence. Were we engaged in a secret campaign of aggression against someone, there would be a good deal to be said for disguising the true size of our forces. But if the object is deterrence, if we are building up forces in order to prevent a war, I believe that undue security is wrong.
  When I was in Opposition, I watched closely how much we were told by the

  1579
  then Government, and I say that we have told hon. Gentlemen opposite a very great deal indeed. It is easy to complain about not receiving enough information, but I have had few specific questions about what people want to know. I think we have told hon. Members opposite as much as possible. We have given them the numbers reduced by disbanding A.A. Command, and a map of where everything is. I will seriously consider any information which the right hon. Gentleman desires to know. It has been my intention to give the House all the information possible without doing anything stupid. Although I am well aware that the complaint about lack of information is often made, I hope and believe that to a large extent it is rhetorical rather than actual.
  The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned the colonial forces, and asked why we did not build them up to a far greater size and thereby economise in our manpower. I dealt with that at considerable length during the Committee stage, and I hope—
  Mr. Bellenger: I did not say "far greater"; I suggested that we increase them.
  Mr. Head: I dealt with that at some length during the Committee stage. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman was in the House at the time, but I think it would be repetitious to say it again now.
  The right hon. Gentleman asked about the rôle of the Territorial Army in a nuclear war. I said then, and I say again now, that if a nuclear war occurred, there is nothing more to say about the role of the Territorial Army than I said in my speech on the Estimates. If thermonuclear weapons were dropped on this country, it would be a struggle for survival, and I cannot believe that the presence of disciplined, ordered, controllable and armed men would be anything but of inestimable value, and might even be a decisive factor.
  Mr. Bellenger: Is that to be their rôle?
  Mr. Head: That is the rôle, if there is a thermo-nuclear war. But there are endless permutations.
  We might have the threat of a conventional war, or even a conventional war. Or there might be a period after a
  1580
  thermo-nuclear war when we had perhaps defeated the thermo-nuclear efforts of, say, Russia, and in which we had to save the world. There are endless possibilities, and I do not think that the House would desire me to go into them at great length.
  As was said by the Prime Minister—and this interested the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes)—if we reached what is termed saturation, when neither side would dare to initiate a thermo-nuclear war, because they both had the capacity, possibly, to finish off civilisation, we should tend to get back to what I might call the pre-Hiroshima stage, when the power and the ability of one side to be stronger than the other would tend to rest once again on conventional weapons.
  If thermo-nuclear conditions got to that stage, we should tend to return again to conventional weapons. It will be some considerable time before that might happen, and I am only arguing on a hypothetical and long-term proposition. But if the right hon. Gentleman thinks it out carefully I believe that he will agree.
  I know that the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South feels strongly that we ought to think very hard about how we can reduce the period of National Service. I agree with him on that. I know that at the back of his mind, and at the back of the minds of many others, especially of hon. Gentlemen opposite, there is a feeling that the Army, in particular, and I myself, are quite prepared to say, "We have got two years' National Service. Do not let us worry about economy of manpower. We have got all we want."
  I can assure hon. Gentlemen that that is not the case. It is very hard indeed to convince hon. Gentlemen of that, and I almost feel like circulating the papers on the manpower question. We have made very close inquiries into the question of manpower and National Service. I agree with the noble Lord that to reduce from, say, two years to 18 months is very difficult. I would not deny that, as time goes by, it might be possible to make some gradual reduction in the period, not of months, but of something.
  That is the dilemma that the right hon. Gentleman opposite knows and which the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), who has been an Under-Secretary of State for

  1581
  War, knows. It might be something which would not amount to much, but which might fit into some restriction in the call-up. But there one is at once in a dilemma. We can either have a restriction on the basis of a ballot, which is really not a very good thing in a small community, or on the basis of exempting certain classes, it may be by exempting highly technical or agricultural classes. There are lots of candidates for this particular exemption.
  Partial exemption, whether by ballot or by particular classes, must present a major problem to every Government, Can the hon. Gentleman think of a class which he could exempt? He would have a fearful job with others who would have an equal claim. That is the problem. I also believe that any form of ballot for National Service is probably not worth while introducing, unless, so to speak, the bookmaker's odds against drawing a lucky ticket are fairly good. I do not think that such a ballot would be popular in this country. It would just seem to be a fluke for a very few, and would annoy people.
  I can assure the noble Lord that not only have we our eye on this matter, but that the Government have their eyes very firmly on me and on the War Office. The pressure which hon. Gentlemen opposite seek to put upon me is, I think, not half so strong as the pressure put upon me by my own Government. Anybody who thinks that the Secretary of State for War can just walk down to the House and say, "We will retain the two years' National Service," is quite wrong. That is a matter which is scrupulously examined all the time.
  I have already referred to the case mentioned by the hon. Member for Maldon. I did so before I made the rest of my speech. But the hon. Gentleman made two other points. The first was that he wanted me to reiterate the undertaking given by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air that there was no victimisation of Service men who raised matters with Members of Parliament. The hon. Gentleman also suggested that we should, perhaps, once again circularise the Army.
  I really think—and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will believe me—that, at the moment, there is no need to circularise
  1582
  the Army about this matter. We have an immense correspondence of this kind. It is only too well known among commanding officers. We have a far greater mail on these questions than the Royal Air Force has ever had.
  Mr. Driberg: There are more men in the Army.
  Mr. Head: Not only more men, but higher numbers proportionately, too.
  There is another psychological difference. Everyone who goes into the Royal Air Force is a volunteer. More people want to go into the R.A.F. than that Service can take. Therefore, there is an element of approach—I will not say of good will. The Army takes all the badboys, the Teddy boys, the Borstal boys and the approved school boys. I am not complaining; many of them make very good soldiers. But we have a very great number of them, and I can assure the hon. Member that the Army is very well used to soldiers writing to their Members of Parliament. The hon. Member would be surprised to know the great number of officers in the British Army who know him well by name, if not personally.
  He also asked why we would not take up cases when the names of the complainants were not given. I am afraid I must stand pat upon that rule. If the hon. Member tells me that the sergeant of the 20th Something Regiment, stationed at so-and-so, did something frightful, but the hon. Member does not want to give the name of the person concerned because he is afraid that he might get into trouble, I have two alternatives. I can either say that I cannot take the matter up unless the name is given, or I can take it up without knowing the name. If I take the matter up and it is found that the complaint is unwarranted, I have caused a great stir up in the unit, there has probably been a proper blowup, and perhaps the sergeant or the N.C.O. concerned has got into trouble.
  I should not blame the hon. Member, because he could not possibly know that the complaint was unwarranted, but if I once started taking up such cases when the man who makes the allegation remains anonymous I should stir up immense trouble, very often quite unfairly; and this is a rule upon which I shall stand pat. I know that the hon. Member will say, "Surely if the Member of Parlia-

  1583
  ment will guarantee that the facts are correct you will take it up?" but there again the average hon. Member has not time to visit the unit and establish that the facts are correct.
  Mr. Driberg: If one happens to have some personal knowledge of the complaint, and if it refers to such a thing as alleged bad cooking in some identified canteen—for instance, in a camp in Shropshire—why should not the matter be looked into?
  Mr. Head: I do not think that there is any valid case for withholding the name of the complainant in a case of alleged bad cooking.
  I do not want to mention my personal life in detail, but I know that many of my friends have made startling complaints, in moments of irritation and frustration which, upon investigation, have been found to be grossly exaggerated. Investigations into anonymous complaints made to Members of Parliament would lead to much trouble, and might even lead to disaffection in units, upon grounds which might not be justified. I stand pat upon that, and so long as I am here I shall refuse to investigate anonymous complaints.
  Mr. Driberg: Not anonymous to the Member.
  Mr. Head: I apologise for having reduced the Navy to such very short straits.
  I conclude by saying, just for the record, that it is my opinion that the method we have adopted this year for dealing with the Estimates has been a very considerable improvement upon that which we adopted last year, when we sat up until nearly lunch-time. I hope that, if hon. Members opposite feel the same way about it, the present system will be retained.
  Mr. Swingler: The right hon. Gentleman made a very serious statement tonight about the four divisions in Germany. He rested his case for the strategic Reserve which he required in this country upon the nature of Britain's commitments in Germany. Is he interpreting the nature of the commitment of four divisions in Germany as being such that he thinks he will not be able to move units from Germany to
  1584
  other places where they are required in an emergency? If that is his interpretation, it is a new one. So far as I understand it, the argument hitherto has been that the four divisions in Germany constitute a commitment in case of an emergency in Europe, but that does not mean that the Secretary of State is unable to move troops from Germany to other parts of the world if required. I thought that, in that sense, they formed a strategic Reserve.
  Mr. Head: That is an important point, but it has been discussed before in the House. We have a commitment in Germany, and whether or not that commitment is pinned or not is dependent upon the situation at the time. The true definition of a reserve is something which is not pinned.
  Those four divisions in Germany are there for a specific purpose. If the situation becomes more tense they are automatically committed. Therefore we have not a Reserve for other purposes. The strategic Reserve in this country is not committed. It has no specific task. That is why I differentiate between the four divisions in Germany and the two divisions to form the strategic Reserve in this country.
  9.27 p.m.
  Mr. Charles Doughty: I wish to turn the attention of hon. Members from the high matters which the Secretary of State has been discussing to one on which I feel strongly and which is of importance to the Army, namely, the question of barracks. Whether a soldier be a National Service man or a long-service soldier, he has to live in barracks or in married quarters. In raising these points, I am saying nothing against the present Secretary of State for War, because the question goes back not only for 50 years but for much longer even than that. Nevertheless, it is not one that we can pass over lightly.
  When called up, National Service men are put into barracks which, as the Secretary of State himself told us in his Estimates speech, are usually a disgrace. When long-service soldiers are moved from one station to another they are likely to be put into married quarters into which they cannot honestly and decently ask their wives to go. On page 132 of the Army Estimates a sum of £135,000 is provided for barrack services. Whether that

  1585
  is for keeping them in repair or building new ones, I do not know. On page 154, no less a sum than £2¾million is charged in respect of rent by married officers and other ranks as payment for accommodation occupied in married quarters, which are Army barracks. The sum seems quite out of proportion.
  In the very few minutes which are now available, I have not an opportunity of taking this House on a tour of the barracks within my own constituency and the constituencies of other hon. Members. Many of them were built in the year 1900. A large number of the barrack rooms have no water. The main services are quite impossible, and it is also impossible to keep the rooms clean. I have no knowledge, but I dare say that these remarks will apply equally to the Royal Air Force and to the Navy.
  The Secretary of State took on the heritage of a large number of years, but I ask him to do something in a big way to put right some of the barracks in which are obliged to live the troops about whom we have been talking. These barracks make a very bad impression on young soldiers who are called up, and a worse impression still on the long-service soldier who needs accommodation for his wife and family.
  If my right hon. Friend wants an improvement, I hope a beginning can be made by providing proper barracks for the troops in this country. Recruiting would then be made easier for the Army as well as the signing on for fresh service of married soldiers. Very often they are prevented from so doing in the present circumstances by their wives because there are no proper married quarters.
  It being half-past Nine o'clock, Mr. Speaker proceeded, pursuant to Standing Order No. 16 (Business of Supply), to put forthwith the Question necessary to dispose of the Resolution under consideration.
  Question, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution, put and agreed to.
  Mr. Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith, with respect to each of the following Resolutions come to by the Committee of Supply and not yet agreed to by the House, the Question, That this House doth agree with the Committee in that Resolution.

SUPPLY
REPORT [3rd March]
NAVY ESTIMATES, 1955–56

  VOTE A. NUMBERS
  That 133,000 Officers, Seamen and Boys and Royal Marines, who are borne on the books of Her Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine establishments, and members of the Women's Royal Naval Service and Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service, be employed for the Sea Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  Resolution agreed to.

SUPPLY
Report [15th March]
NAVY ESTIMATES, 1955–56
  VOTE 1

    PAY, &C., OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL MARINES
    That a sum, not exceeding £50,604,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c, of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
    Resolution agreed to.

  VOTE 2

    VICTUALLING AND CLOTHING FOR THE NAVY
    Resolution reported,
    That a sum, not exceeding £15,945,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of victualling and clothing for the Navy, including the cost of victualling establishments at home and abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
    Question put, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution.
    The House proceeded to a Division. Mr. Studholme and Mr. Legh were appointed Tellers for the Ayes, but no Member being willing to act as Teller for the Noes, Mr. Speaker declared that the Ayes had it.
    Resolution agreed to

  VOTE 6
    SCIENTIFIC SERVICES
    That a sum, not exceeding £15,224,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of scientific services, including a grant in aid to the National Institute of Oceanography, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 9
    NAVAL ARMAMENTS
    That a sum, not exceeding £27,845,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of naval armaments, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 10
    WORKS, BUILDING AND REPAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD
    That a sum, not exceeding £17,888,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and repairs at home and abroad, including the cost of superintendence, purchase of sites, grants and other charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 13
    NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES
    That a sum, not exceeding £16,448,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 14
    MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIR
    That a sum, not exceeding £21,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the Directorate of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs and of certain miscellaneous expenses, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 15

    ADDITIONAL MARRIED QUARTERS
    That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters at home, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
    Resolutions agreed to.

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1955–56
  VOTE 1
    PAY, &C., OF THE ARMY
    That a sum, not exceeding £119,620,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c., of the Army, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 2

    RESERVE FORCES, TERRITORIAL ARMY, HOME GUARD AND CADET FORCES
    That a sum, not exceeding £19,600,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the Reserve Forces (to a number not exceeding 310,000, all ranks, including a number not
    1588
    exceeding 300,000 other ranks), Territorial Army (to a number not exceeding 324,400, all ranks), Home Guard (to a number not exceeding 55,000, all ranks), Cadet Forces and Malta Territorial Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.

  VOTE 8
    WORKS, BUILDINGS AND LANDS
    That a sum, not exceeding £30,460,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and lands, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 9
    MISCELLANEOUS EFFECTIVE SERVICES
    That a sum, not exceeding £7,880,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of miscellaneous effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 10
    NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES
    That a sum, not exceeding £19,440,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 11

    ADDITIONAL MARRIED QUARTERS
    That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
    Resolutions agreed to.

AIR ESTIMATES, 1955–56
  VOTE 1
    PAY, &C., OF THE AIR FORCE
    That a sum, not exceeding £88,960,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c., of the Air Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
  VOTE 2

    RESERVE AND AUXILIARY SERVICES
    That a sum, not exceeding £2,709,900, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the reserve and auxiliary services (to a number not exceeding 230,000, all ranks, for the Royal Air Force Reserve, and 11,000, all ranks, for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.
    Resolutions agreed to.

SUPPLY
REPORT [16th February]
CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1954–55
  CLASS V
    VOTE 5
      NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, ENGLAND AND WALES
      That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £4,848,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955, for the provision of a comprehensive health service for England and Wales and other services connected therewith, including medical services for pensioners, etc., disabled as a result of war, or of service in the Armed Forces after the 2nd day of September, 1939, the treatment abroad of respiratory tuberculosis, certain training arrangements, the purchase of appliances, equipment, stores, etc., necessary for the services, and certain expenses in connection with civil defence.
    VOTE 11
      NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (SCOTLAND)
      That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,233,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955, for the provision of a comprehensive health service for Scotland and other services connected therewith, including medical services for pensioners, etc., disabled as a result of war, or of service in the Armed Forces after the 2nd day of September, 1939, the treatment abroad of respiratory tuberculosis, certain training arrangements, the purchase of appliances, equipment, stores, etc., necessary for the services, certain expenses in connection with civil defence, and sundry other services.
  CLASS VI
    VOTE 1

      BOARD OF TRADE
      That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £23,700, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955, for the salaries and expenses of the office of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade and subordinate departments, including assistance and subsidies to certain industries; certain grants in aid; and other services.
      Resolutions agreed to.

  SUPPLY
  REPORT [16th March]
CIVIL ESTIMATES, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1954–55
  CLASS II
    VOTE 9
      COLONIAL SERVICES
      That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £3,973,550, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955, for sundry colonial services, including grants in aid; and certain expenditure in connection with the liabilities of the former Government of Palestine.
    VOTE 4

      UNITED NATIONS
      That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955, for grants in aid of expenses of the United Nations and of technical assistance for economic development.
      Resolutions agreed to.

  AIR ESTIMATES, 1955–56
  That a sum, not exceeding £282,370,100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, for expenditure in respect of the Air Services.
  [For details see Official Report, 16th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 1423.]
  Resolution agreed to.

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1954–55
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £27,945,362, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955, for expenditure in respect of the following Supplementary Estimates.
[For details see Official Report, 16th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 1423–1426.]
Resolution agreed to.

CIVIL (EXCESSES), 1953–54
5. That a sum, not exceeding £148 7s. 11d., be granted to Her Majesty, to make good excesses on certain grants for Civil Services for the year ended on the 31st day of March, 1954.[For details see Official Report, 16th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 1425–26.]
Resolution agreed to.

WAYS AND MEANS
REPORT [16th March]
Resolutions reported,
That towards making good the supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ended on 31st March, 1954, the sum of £148 7s. 11d. be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st March, 1955, the sum of £38,323,612 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, the sum of £1,668,239,200 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
Resolutions agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolutions by the Chairman of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. H. Brooke.

CONSOLIDATED FUND
Bill to apply certain sums out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the years ending on the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-five, and one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six; presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 62.]

GUN SITES, BRECONSHIRE
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Studholme.]
9.39 p.m.
Mr. Tudor Watkins: I have listened for some time to the debate on the Army Estimates, and I apologise for taking advantage of the Adjournment in order to raise another matter with the War Office.
Since 1947, there has been the problem of gun sites in my constituency and in the county of Brecon in particular. I should like to say at the outset that I am raising this as a matter of protest against the War Office, and I am supported in my protest by such bodies as the Breconshire County Council, the Brecknock Rural District Council, and
1592
the Brecon and Radnor National Farmers' Union which has also contacted its headquarters in Bedford Square and is itself in touch with the War Office.
A large number of other local and national bodies in Wales are also interested. Incidentally, the first site which was chosen for a gun site in this area is now the reservoir which, I hope, Her Majesty the Queen will open in August next. It can, therefore, be seen how difficult it is to get a proper gun site, if such a site is required at all, in the county of Brecon. In addition to all these protests, which have been going on since 1947, there have been important conferences of interested parties in the county of Brecon at which national organisations have been represented. There have also been local meetings of the farmers concerned.
All this has to do with agriculture and food production. These local meetings of farmers and others interested in agriculture right from the commencement have said "No" to the War Office; and right up to last night they said they would not negotiate for these gun sites at all and would not allow firing rights to be exercised over the intervening land.
In this country there are not a great number of examples of inland gun sites, but in this locality it is proposed to have guns from the gun sites firing heavy shells over occupied agricultural land. That is a problem. The farmers protest, for they are opposed to the gun sites because of the experience which they have had of a gun site in the same locality. They refuse to negotiate because that is the only way in which they can bring their protest to the notice of the War Office. Although the area of the gun sites itself is not very large, the area of the land intervening between the gun sites and the large Sennybridge range is vast. The farmers refuse to participate or to sanction rights to fire over the intervening land.
The two gun sites, the problems of which I want to raise, are Llanfianghel Nantbran, which has been a temporary gun site since 1940, and Trecastle, which is a new proposal altogether. The farmers in that locality are concerned about the Trecastle gunsite, although they are interested in the first which I mentioned. Later I will give to the House information about what has happened as a result of shells falling short from the first gun site which I mentioned.

1593
In 1950 there was a local public inquiry, not only about these gun sites but also about large areas of land in Breconshire which the War Office required. Ever since I entered the House, in 1945, I have taken a definite stand about Service land requirements in Wales, and particularly in my constituency. In 1952 the then Minister for Welsh Affairs, now Lord Kilmuir, intervened on behalf of the present Government and sent his Joint Under-Secretary of State to Wales. I walked the site with him. As a result of his intervention, there was a suspension of the acquisition of this land for over 18 months. If it was suspended for 18 months, my plea to the War Office is to suspend it altogether. In view of the discussions which we have had in recent weeks about nuclear weapons, what is the use of a 25-pounder gun in the Trecastle gun site for the next war?
At the end of 1954, when everybody thought the War Office had abandoned the gun sites altogether, like a shot out of the blue I was informed by the Secretary of State that the decision had been reached by the War Office compulsorily to acquire the land which was to be used for the gun sites themselves. That was disastrous. The compulsory powers are to be taken under the Defence Acts. Our people were immediately concerned about what is to happen to the intervening land. That is where the question really arises.
The War Office has been told, not once but a few times, that there is a case for non-participation in regard to the intervening land. I have asked Questions as to when powers have been taken by the War Office to have firing rights under the Military Lands Act, 1892, and failed to get information as to when that Act has been invoked. We are not raising this question purely to put that Act into operation, but as a last means of saying to the War Office that we do not want it to take firing rights on this intervening land.
Only yesterday I had a reply to my letter of 26th January in which the Under-Secretary of State for War said that the War Office would allow a public local inquiry into the operations of that Act of Parliament, which allows a local public inquiry to be held. We do not want an inquiry into the gun sites, but into the use of the intervening land. I should like the Under-Secretary to give
1594
an assurance so that my constituents may read in HANSARD that a local inquiry into the use of intervening land required will be allowed by the War Office.
In his letter to me the Under-Secretary said that the War Office is not certain and is not yet able to define the actual area of the land required, whereas the Minister of Agriculture, in reply to me, gave the number of farms in the intervening land. I can understand the War Office being uncertain about it—as the Under-Secretary will agree, his letter says so—but how can the War Office proceed with a local inquiry unless the area is defined by the War Office? The object of holding an inquiry would be to allow objections to be made. One cannot make objections without knowing the land to be taken.
The first thing the War Office must do is to define the actual area of land required. That is essential to those who are to make objections. The Minister of Agriculture has tried to define the land, but has given the names of farms which are not involved. I know the area from personal knowledge and from the knowledge of the county secretary of the National Farmers' Union. There is a farm called Bwysfafach which has nothing to do with the intervening land; it is not near it. Therefore, the Minister of Agriculture is wrong in his definition of the land involved.
In reply to a Question the Minister of Agriculture gave to me the acreage of land. If the Under-Secretary will look at the numbers of the farms and compare them with the evidence given by the vicar of Llywel he will find that the vicar says there are 22 farms. The vicar ought to know which of his parishioners will come under fire. The vicar tells me that there are 1,525 more acres involved than the Minister of Agriculture gave in his reply in this House.
The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean): Is the hon. Member referring to the intervening land when he says that the area has not been defined? He is not referring to the area of the range?
Mr. Watkins: I am referring to the intervening land. There is not much quarrel about the gun sites, because we know that the acreage there is 188 and 390 acres. I want to stress that our people

1595
are so hard pressed and are really conscientious in their protest that they are thinking of bringing an injunction against the War Office and against the right to fire over the intervening land. That is the reaction which has been suggested to me as their Member of Parliament.
Breconshire has made a notable contribution to Service land requirements. In 1940 no less than 28,149 acres of good agricultural land were taken compulsorily by the War Office and 70 to 80 farmers left their farms. There is no sense or reason in asking for additional land and land which would be affected by firing rights in addition to that area.
Not only that, but we have in Breconshire quite a number of areas, altogether outside these ranges, which were given over as a result of the public local inquiry in 1950. But the War Office has not used the range at Sennybridge as fully as people imagined when it was required in 1940 during time of war. The War Office has even let a great part of the land to the Forestry Commission to plant trees. Why has the War Office not kept that area instead of looking for another gun site? It might be that the land is not suitable for a gun site. At any rate, that is the feeling locally.
When the Royal Air Force, through the War Office, required the Sennybridge range for a change of user—for bombing practice—only the other day, there was no opposition whatever from local people, in the hope that the gun site would be dispensed with.
Then there is the important question, on the intervening land between the gun site at Trecastle and the range, of firing over a trunk road. I wonder what other instances the War Office has of firing over a main trunk road, such as this one from London to West Wales, during the daytime. The Minister of Transport told me in answer to a Question that 1,100 vehicles use the road every day and that 10 children are either conveyed or walk to school—when the shells are whizzing over if the gun sites are being used. That is the anxiety of the people.
Despite the opposition of the county council, which acts as agent to the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Transport gave clearance for firing over the road. Despite the opposition of the
1596
county agricultural committee in Brecon, the Minister of Agriculture gave clearance for agricultural land to be used for these gun sites and for the intervening land, I suggest that at this stage there should be some recognition of local opinion.
The main opposition by the local residents is based on the effect of firing on farming operations and the physical danger to human life and livestock, which are important factors, and also because of their experience with the existing gun-site at Llanfianghel Nantbran. In a letter to me only last week, following Questions I had put in the House, the Minister of Agriculture said that the War Office, in the firing from the gun site at Trecastle to the range, would not interfere with farming operations; whereas had the Ministry cared to make inquiries, it would have ascertained the result of firing from the gun site not very far away.
Another important factor in regard to agriculture is the effect upon food production. The Minister of Agriculture recognises that these are typical upland farms engaged in the production of store cattle and sheep. He says:
"They are fully utilised for food production."
If that is so, why should there be this firing over good agricultural land? I have seen the local farmers and their work and I understand that they have increased their production threefold in comparison with pre-war; and their intention is to utilise more of the upland farms and to supply still more of the country's requirements of food.
I am very impressed by the evidence which has been given to me on the effect that the firing will have upon farming operations. Some of this evidence was given at the local inquiry at Brecon in 1950, and I should like to give one or two illustrations. David Jones, one of the farmers concerned, of Dorallt Farm, says, "Whilst guns are firing, it is impossible to work my horses."
It is impossible to shepherd the sheep because once the dogs hear the guns firing they go back to the farm and the sheep are scattered all over the place. In the lambing season especially the sheep are worried. What farmers will stay in that locality to try to rear sheep against the handicap of the firing of those guns?

1597
Mr. J. R. Price, of Rhulan Farm, Llan-fianghel Nantbran, who has been under the guns on intervening land, writes:
"It is dangerous to try to make horses work. They cannot properly shepherd the sheep, as they scatter, and the sheep dogs go home. The sheep are distressed and worried."
Not only that, but calves are born prematurely in that locality. If any evidence of the premature birth of calves is required the veterinary surgeon of the locality will be glad to supply it.
In 1942 a shell dropped 200 yards from a farmer working in his own yard, and another shell dropped only eight yards from another farmer and his workman, who was badly shaken. In 1943 a shell splinter went through a farmer's roof on Blaendyrin farm. In 1950 two shells exploded within 300 yards of the same farm, and a little boy of four was so terrified that they have had trouble with him ever since. Houses and walls are damaged, and woodwork inside the parish church has suffered. Six shells have burst in the locality through having fallen wide or short.
Imagine the effect of this firing near a school with 20 little children. Imagine the effect on farm workers. They are difficult to find nowadays, when there is such a demand for them, and no farm worker will go to work on a farm where he may be exposed to danger, or where he knows that he will have to work while shells are whistling overhead.
I have had letters from farmers who are wondering what will be the value of their farms, who are wondering whether it is worth while continuing to farm there at all. They wonder whether they will get compensation for the fall in value of their farms. They will not. I know the War Office will say, "If anything happens to them we shall pay them compensation." However, that is of no comfort to anyone who may be hurt by any of these shells.
These farms will cease to be worked as they are now. They will be ranched as they were before the war, instead of being used fully for food production.
The only access to the Trecastle gun site is by the old Roman road. Whatever may be said about the Romans, their roads in Wales are straight, they have no hair-pin bends, and they have hard surfaces. The War Office, of all people, have taken over the only access to that
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mountain. If, as was said at the inquiry, there are to be 24 guns on one site, or even 16, what hope has a farmer there of harvesting his crops while all that firing is going on? How are these people to take their stock to market? How are they to convey fertiliser to their holdings? This is the only access some of them have to their holdings—
It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Legh.]
Mr. Watkins: Twenty-one farmers use the access road to the Trecastle gun site. No suggestions have been made to the local people about how they can utilise the mountain land, how they can take their sheep there and bring them away, how they can look after the land and how they can convey fertilisers to their holdings. Transport facilities are curtailed greatly by the closing of the road when firing takes place.
If the War Office is determined to take these gun sites and the intervening land and has said its last word about it, I shall use every Parliamentary method I can to have it stopped, even if it means approaching the Prime Minister. I shall call upon my colleagues in the Welsh Parliamentary Party to support me. The War Office ought to send responsible representatives of Western Command, in whom I have every faith, to discuss the matters on which the people require assurance. The Welsh Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and the local agents of the Ministry of Transport should be called in so that exactly what is going on may be known.
The local people are at the moment getting official letters from Birdcage Walk, London, which mean nothing to them. The letters suggest that they should get solicitors and surveyors. The Welsh farmers are not familiar with solicitors. They ought to be given the information they want instead of being told to get solicitors and surveyors.
I carry from my constituents a final protest to the Mother of Parliaments. I sincerely hope the War Office will reconsider the matter. I have had a considerable amount to do with the War Office, and I take this opportunity of thanking

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it, Western Command and the Officers of the Sennybridge Artillery Range for their assistance and courtesy, but I appeal to the War Office to give up the gun sites and let us farm in peace in our own way, for I am certain that food production will then increase.
10.4 p.m.
Mr. S. O. Davies: Knowing something about the history of the War Office in relation to battle training areas and gun sites in Wales, I find it impossible to allow the occasion to pass without adding my protest to that of my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnor (Mr. Watkins), who has put his case admirably and, I hope, with effective detail.
This sort of thing is nothing new to us in Wales. I urge the War Office once again to reconsider its attitude towards Wales. This sort of thing means, and will continue to mean, more rural depopulation in Wales. It is awful that this decision should be taken against all wishes and desires of the people, with an apparent contemptuous disregard for life and limb in that beautiful county bordering upon my constituency.
It would be very interesting if the Parliamentary Secretary were to tell us the proportion of the total area of Wales being used by the War Office. We have fairly long and most unhappy memories about the War Office in our country. We remember that without consulting a single organisation, a single local government unit in Wales, the War Office claimed nearly 10 per cent. of our little country and of course claimed the parts of its own choice.
I hope that we shall not return to that state of things. As my hon. Friend has already said, and he has stated the obvious, we shall resist it. We are only too conscious of the pathetically unbalanced kind of economy which we have in our country. The War Office has substantially contributed to that unbalance and to the depopulation of rural Wales. I add my appeal to that of my hon. Friend that the War Office should take a more humane view in this latest proposal.
If my figures are correct, the War Office already has about 28,000 acres in that area. Nearby there are some bird
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sanctuaries, and the last time we went into this as a Welsh Parliamentary Party one of the things we succeeded in doing was saving these sanctuaries. I make this appeal not only as a Member of this House but as a Welshman. We Welsh people are not ashamed to admit that we have a jealous regard to our country. The War Office has taken more than enough of Breconshire for its battle training areas and for the use of guns. I hope that my appeal will find a kindly echo in the heart of the War Office so that the War Office in this case will leave us alone.
10.9 p.m
The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean): The hon. Member for Brecon and Radnor (Mr. Watkins) has spoken of the numerous protests which he has made about this whole question of ranges since 1947. Of course, nobody particularly likes having artillery ranges in their part of the country. Nobody realises that better than my right hon. Friend and myself, because we get similar reactions to that of the hon. Member from other parts of the country as well.
It is a little unfair of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. S. O. Davies) to say that we treat these protests contemptuously, and I think that the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnor will bear that out. I have given the matter very careful and very sympathetic consideration indeed. Wherever possible, we prefer to acquire amicably the land which we have to acquire for these purposes, and not use compulsory powers. Only if it is inevitable do we use them. But when we get a mass refusal to co-operate, as has been described by the hon. Members, we are put in a difficult and invidious situation.
We need these artillery ranges, because the artillery must train somewhere. It is necessary to practise long-range firing, which means firing over considerable areas of country. Naturally, we choose sparsely-populated areas as far as possible, and we try to avoid good agricultural areas. Where we are obliged to take powers to use land we try to use it intermittently, so as to interfere as little as possible with farming. Both hon. Members have suggested that we have been hard on Wales, but I would tell

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them that, proportionately, the land in Wales used for military purposes is less than that so used in England, so that in that respect they are better off than the rest of the country.
Mr. Percy Morris: It is a proportion of one horse, one rabbit, when the hon. Gentleman refers to percentages, having regard to the size of Wales and the size of England.
Mr. Maclean: I said proportionately. If the hon. Member wishes, I will write to him and give him the exact figures.
I think it would make things clearer if I dealt in order with the different areas under discussion. There is, first, the main artillery range which was bought, by agreement, by the War Office during the war, I think in 1940. The next area, for fear of mispronouncing its name, I would prefer to call the Druids Way extension. That is being used intermittently at present under Defence Regulation 52. It is used intermittently so as to allow farming in the area to proceed when firing is not actually in progress.
The hon. Member suggested that the War Office had committed a breach of faith regarding this area. We said that we would return it to the owners as soon as various preparations, in particular the building of a road, had been completed. But that may take a considerable time. It involves a large expenditure, because it is quite a large project. But we have said that once that has been done we will hand back this land. It is suggested that because we are now forced to buy that area compulsorily, instead of holding it under Defence Regulation 52 or by agreement, we are disregarding our pledge. That is not the case. Our pledge still stands.
As soon as we have this road, so that we can move our self-propelled guns inside the actual range, we are prepared to sell back the area which we are now to take over, and which is known as the Druids Way extension. Therefore, the fact that we are buying it does not alter the pledge which we have given one way or the other.
Mr. Watkins: Can the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the first chance of buying it back will be given to those people, and that we shall not have another Crichel Down?
Mr. Maclean: I think that I can give that assurance.
The next area with which I wish to deal is the Trecastle gun site. Here, again, we should prefer to negotiate a voluntary lease, but, as the hon. Gentleman knows very well, we have recently met with a non-co-operative attitude on the part of those who own the land. We are, therefore, put under the unfortunate necessity of having to purchase the land under the Defence Acts. However, should any of the hon. Gentleman's constituents change their mind, we shall be only too glad to negotiate a voluntary lease.
Finally, there remains the thorniest problem of all, which is that of the intervening land. The hon. Gentleman asked what our reaction would be to the proposal that his constituents should take legal action against us in the matter. That is a point on which I do not feel that I should offer any advice. It is a matter which the hon. Gentleman's constituents must decide for themselves, and see how they get on. I do not think that it would be proper for me to go any further than to say that I am advised that firing over land does not, as far as can be seen, involve any trespass.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the road which runs between the Trecastle gun site and the main range. He probably knows the area much better than I do, because, unfortunately, I have not yet been able to go there. However, I hope to do so before very long, and I have looked very carefully at the map. The whole question of roads is dealt with in the White Paper published by the Labour Government in 1947.
Paragraph 38 of that White Paper Cmd. 7278, states:
"Economy in the extent of training areas required can be brought about if firing across road is allowed and the proposals take account of this expedient. The Government are satisfied that, subject to certain safeguards, it can be authorised without danger to passing traffic."
Mr. S. O. Davies: Does not that imply that every case should be looked at and judged on its merits, and that the Minister should not work on a generalisation, as, apparently, he is doing in these cases?
Mr. Maclean: I am just coming to that point.

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The hon. Gentleman speaks about a generalisation, but I was asked how we regarded it. I thought that I would first quote the general authority which derives from this White Paper, and then go on to explain the situation of this road. I understand that there are hills on either side of the road, and that, in fact, the firing is from hilltop to hilltop. The result is that the shells pass over the road at the absolute minimum height of 1,600 feet, which is considerable.
It has been said that some unfortunate cases have occurred where shells have fallen short, but I think I am right in saying—it is certainly borne out by the cases quoted by the hon. Member—that all these incidents occurred during the war or between 1945 and the date of the public inquiry in 1950. Since then, I do not think that there have been any further cases of shells falling short on the intervening land. Perhaps I should explain the reason for that.
All the shells which are now fired burst upon impact, and are not fused. I understand that accidents occurred before because inexperienced officers, during or immediately after the war, put the wrong fuses into the shells, with the result that they burst too soon. Now they can burst only when they strike. I am not an expert in ballistics, but it would appear to me that, so far as anything human can be said to be bound to happen, the shells are now bound to fall inside the target area, which is abundantly hedged round by precautions to make it safe.
The hon. Member suggested that another public inquiry might be held. I am afraid that we cannot agree to that because, although the inquiry in 1950 was nominally limited in scope, the whole question was fully gone into, including the matter of the intervening land, which is obviously closely linked with the question of the Trecastle site.
Mr. Watkins: In his letter, the hon. Member says that a public local inquiry will be held into the question of the intervening land under the Military Lands Act, 1892. He said that in his letter, and now he contradicts it.
Mr. Maclean: The hon. Member must have misunderstood what was said about that. It is true that the Act of 1892 does provide for a public inquiry, where that
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Act is applied, but it is not at present my right hon. Friend's intention to apply that Act. We do not feel that there is any need for an independent public inquiry, unconnected with the Act, because the whole question was gone into very thoroughly in 1950.
The hon. Member also mentioned the question of food production. If the letter has reached him, he will now have heard from my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture that firing upon this range over the intervening land should have no harmful effect upon food production. If the hon. Member or his constituents can bring to my attention any cases in which firing has definitely affected food production—if, for instance, horses were caused to run away—we should be prepared to consider such cases carefully, in conjunction with the Minister of Agriculture. I am advised that there should be no reason for harmful effects on food production, and still less any danger to life or limb of human beings using the road or farming in the area.
Finally, I emphasise that we are not holding on to this range, or indeed to any other land in Wales or anywhere else, simply for the fun of holding on to it. It is an extremely important range, which is in almost constant use. I understand that it is used for at least half the weeks in the year, and particularly during the summer, when it is used intensively for the training of Territorials in particular.
We thoroughly sympathise with the civilian population who are disturbed or inconvenienced by these artillery ranges, which nobody likes to have near them, but which, unfortunately, we need. We choose areas where they will cause the least inconvenience, and we much prefer to come to amicable arrangements rather than use compulsory powers. I hope that the constituents of the hon. Gentleman will reconsider their position and not force us to use the compulsory powers that we possess.
10.27 p.m.
Mr. Percy Morris: I am sorry to detain you, Mr. Speaker, at this very late hour. Some years ago the Under-Secretary of State published an interesting book "Eastern Approaches," which was informative, interesting and very convincing. It was much more convincing than his totally unsatisfactory reply tonight.

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He has not replied to a single specific charge which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnor (Mr. Watkins). He made no reference at all to the danger to the school population, and gave no explanation of the confusion in figures between the Ministry of Agriculture and his own Department. My hon. Friend quoted figures of an estimate of the number of farms that were included in the various sites. The Minister has not given us the distance between the target site and the particular land. The fact of the matter is that he has generalised on a brief given to him by his Department. I do not complain about that.
The Minister has not made the slightest satisfactory reply to the appeal made by my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnor. If the claim of the War Department is so strong, what objection has it to a public inquiry? Is the Department fearful that it will meet with the same result as on the last occasion? In view of the development of nuclear weapons, and the oft-repeated claim that we shall have to recast our approaches in case of war, is there any urgency about this matter? Why not wait upon these people and reason with them and, if we can, produce the necessary evidence? I am certain that the people of Brecon and Radnor will be willing to co-operate.
The Minister may wonder why I should intervene. I happen to represent a
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neighbouring constituency which owes a tremendous lot to the Brecon and Radnor people for enabling us to have a supply of pure water. A greater proportion of land is taken in Wales by the War Department than is the case in England. If the actual acreage were examined, I think we should all be satisfied that an injustice had been done to Wales in this matter.
We ask the Minister to go back to his Department, with the request that it should examine the point made so convincingly and in such a restrained manner by my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnor, and that, in response to his appeal, somebody of high rank should go down and discuss the matter with the people on the spot. Only in that way can we get any co-operation. A disgruntled and disappointed farming community is a very bad thing for this country, especially at this juncture. Hill farming has its own difficulties, as everybody knows. It is nothing less than a tragedy if a Department like the War Office is to say to these people—
The Question having been proposed at Ten o'clock and the Debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.

  HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES (MATRICULATION SUCCESSES)
  HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES (MATRICULATION SUCCESSES)
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Monopolies Commission (Petroleum Industry)
  Monopolies Commission (Petroleum Industry)
  Trade Commission Offices, Canada
  Trade Commission Offices, Canada
  Cinemas (Film Quotas)
  Cinemas (Film Quotas)
  St Eriks Fair, Sweden
  St Eriks Fair, Sweden
  Restrictive Business Practices (United Nations Report)
  Restrictive Business Practices (United Nations Report)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Post-War Credits
  Post-War Credits
  University Grants (Teachers' Salaries)
  University Grants (Teachers' Salaries)
  Personal Incomes (Value)
  Personal Incomes (Value)
AGRICULTURE
  Pigs, Eggs and Wheat (Government Assistance)
  Pigs, Eggs and Wheat (Government Assistance)
  Tillage Area
  Tillage Area
  Milking (Hygiene Regulations)
  Milking (Hygiene Regulations)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  British Prisoners of War, Korea (Treatment)
  British Prisoners of War, Korea (Treatment)
  Immigrants (Seamen)
  Immigrants (Seamen)
  Civil Defence (Nuclear Bombs)
  Civil Defence (Nuclear Bombs)
  Remand Homes (Child Maintenance Cost)
  Remand Homes (Child Maintenance Cost)
EDUCATION
  Free Milk Scheme
  Free Milk Scheme
  Comprehensive Schools
  Comprehensive Schools
  New Schools, Cheshire
  New Schools, Cheshire
  AWARDS TO INVENTORS (CLAIMS)
  AWARDS TO INVENTORS (CLAIMS)
  DISARMAMENT SUB-COMMITTEE (BRITISH DELEGATION)
  DISARMAMENT SUB-COMMITTEE (BRITISH DELEGATION)
  SEWERAGE SCHEME, STROUD
  SEWERAGE SCHEME, STROUD
  SIERRA LEONE (DIAMOND MINES)
  SIERRA LEONE (DIAMOND MINES)
  COAL-GAS POISONING (SAFETY COMMITTEE)
  COAL-GAS POISONING (SAFETY COMMITTEE)
  ROYAL AIR FORCE (BISHOPS COURT AIRFIELD)
  ROYAL AIR FORCE (BISHOPS COURT AIRFIELD)
  COAL IMPORTS
  COAL IMPORTS
Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  WEDGWOOD BENN (RENUNCIATION) BILL [H.L.]
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to give effect to Anthony Neil Wedgwood Benn's declaration of renunciation; and for purposes connected therewith. I beg to move that this Bill be read a first time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Stansgate.)
  On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

FISHERIES BILL
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
NORTHERN IRELAND BILL
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

DEFENCE
2.38 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by Viscount Swinton: to resolve, That this House approves the Statement on Defence, 1955 (Cmd. 9391).
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY): My Lords, I have had the honour of sitting in your Lordships' House for nearly ten years and have been present or taken part in most of the debates that we have had on defence matters during that period, but I believe many noble Lords will agree with me when I say that I cannot remember a better debate on defence matters than we have had so far. Yesterday was marked by a very impor-
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tant and notable contribution from the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of York. Never have the great questions which have troubled civilised men for perhaps 2,500 years been posed in a starker or more terrible form. At any rate, after the most reverend Primate's speech, we cannot say with Milton:
"The hungry sheep look up and are not fed."
He gave us that mental and spiritual sustenance of which we all feel in such great need.
I also greatly admired the intervention of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who has sent to me his regrets that he cannot be in his place to-day. I do not think that the situation which now faces this country could have been more lucidly or cogently exposed than it was by the noble Viscount. I am particularly grateful to him for his forceful support of the Government's White Paper on Defence. He said that in the years to come both patriotism and vision would be required. I entirely agree with him. I believe that a Service Minister has a special responsibility to refrain, so far as he can, from partisan politics and to look as widely as he can to the broad, national interest. The speech from the Opposition Benches of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and the closing speech last night from the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, were both notable for their absence of partisan politics. I, for my part, will try to preserve the level of debate, if not of eloquence.
I am sure that people are not interested in recriminations. What really matters to me is whether, broadly speaking, there has been a consistency of aim and policy for the Royal Air Force, let us say, in the last ten years, irrespective of Government or Party. Looking back over that period, I think both sides of the House can fairly claim that there has been a general consistency. I regard that as highly important. It is the more important as the period of development of modern military aircraft gets longer. It is now longer than the lifetime of a Parliament or sometimes of a Government, even when Parliament runs its full term or the Government is re-elected. Therefore, if I look back-wards, it is not to quarry in the volumes of Hansard for convenient phrases used by my opponents but really to look at the lessons which we may use for the future.

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There has been a good deal of comment and criticism about the production of aircraft. Some of it I regard as having been immoderate and unfair, but a great deal of it has been both helpful and informed. We ought to try to see these things in proportion. There are in the world to-day only three comprehensive air forces—by "comprehensive" I mean air forces possessing the full range of military aircraft. We know little about the Soviet air force, but we know a great deal more about the air force of our ally the United States. If it is not the largest, it is certainly the most powerful.
Let us see what has been spent respectively by the United Kingdom and the United States on their air forces since 1947. Actual expenditure for the Royal Air Force, as nearly as I can calculate it, using the Estimates for the last year, is about £2,500 million, and if we add to that something like £300 million on research and development which can be directly attributable to the Air Force, we get a sum of £2,800 million. During approximately the same period—it is not easy to get the same comparable basis—the United States have spent £25,000 million on their air force alone. That does not include the United States naval air arm or the United States Army aircraft. I should estimate that perhaps as much as 75 per cent. has been spent by America on the strategic air command. For my part, I regard that as the best possible investment on the part of the United States. I ask, what might have happened to the free world if the United States Government had decided, eight or nine years ago, to concentrate on defence rather than on the power of the counter-offensive? The front line of the United States Air Force is perhaps four or five times that of the Royal Air Force, but, as we have seen, they have spent nearly ten times the sum of money over that period. I say that only so that we may measure our efforts against theirs in regard to what we have achieved with a much smaller sum. I believe that overall we can take pride in the fact that we have allocated our expenditure with wisdom.
The late Government considered—and I agree that they were right—that they could not afford to re-equip the Royal Air Force with medium or heavy bombers of long range immediately after the last war. I think that Mr. Shinwell, speaking
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in another place, did rather less than justice to his colleagues when he seemed to doubt whether they had a firm policy for the deterrent in those days. Certainly I think that by their action they had. But, of course, the Royal Air Force had to tread a slower and rather more cautious path than the United States Air Force, with its much more ample funds, although, as I said, I believe that the theme has been consistent.
When I first addressed your Lordships as Secretary of State three years ago, I described the violent discontinuity which the development of jet turbine engines had brought about in the design of aircraft. I said then that both the United States and Russia had been quicker than we had in exploiting the necessary advance in aerodynamics and that, as a result, the Russians produced the Mig.15 and the Americans the Sabre jet more quickly than we had produced any comparable aircraft. But Great Britain has maintained her advanced place in engine design and it was possible, as far back as 1947, to see rather further ahead in the design of engines than it was in the field of aerodynamics, especially as in those days we had narrower resources in such valuable assets as trans-sonic and super-sonic wind tunnels. But, at any rate, in 1946 we could have confidence in the successful development of the axial flow jet engine, with the Rolls Royce Avon in the Canberra, which first flew in 1949 but which, in fact, took seven years from conception to service. It has been a very good aircraft and has already a great record, in several rôoles; but our great investment in axial flow engines is now, I think, producing its reward.
It is perhaps not often realised that the Royal Aircraft Establishment first started experimenting with axial flow engines as long ago as 1937, and British development has been continuous since that time. I think we ought not to be too modest about the achievements of our scientists and engineers and manufacturers. There are nine British jet engines built under licence abroad, and four of them are being built in the United States. Engine design is the heart of the matter, and the confidence of jet engineers in their design, which has been justified by events, enabled the Air Staff in 1947 to write a specification for a long-range bomber which they anticipated would not be delivered for nine

1201
years. Taken with the associated decision to have an insurance aircraft, which turned out to be the Vickers Valiant, I believe that was the right policy. It is a misconception to say, "How inefficient to take nine years over the development of an aircraft!" I suggest that the principal question is: when the Victor and the Vulcan are delivered, will they be the most efficient high-performance aircraft of their class flying at that time? The answer to that question is, "Yes." Nevertheless, I confess to your Lordships that it was with great relief that I saw last month the introduction into the Air Force of the first Valiant bombers. During the last three and a half years, when I have watched these things month by month, I have sometimes wished that I had been Secretary of State when the design, building and putting into service of a new aircraft took from nine to twelve months. That was only twenty years ago and the aircraft was the de Havilland Comet which flew in the England to Australia race. But our natural impatience must not obscure the magnitude of the, achievement of the great firm of Vickers, or of their most talented designer, Mr. George Edwards, in delivering the Valiant on time.
The ground of the hydrogen bomb has already been traversed a good deal in this debate and in another place and I do not intend to touch upon it this afternoon. My noble friend the Leader of the House will intervene during this debate and will make some reference to that subject. I will only say that, while I cannot imagine any circumstances in which we should engage in nuclear warfare without the United States of America, I believe that, with a properly trained, organised and equipped force such as we are building up, we shall ourselves have a very formidable deterrent to aggression. The supply of aircraft, particularly fighters, has been extensively discussed. I am extremely grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, for his courteous references to his visit, with the noble and learned Earl who leads the Opposition, to Wattisham. I am glad they saw the Hunter and were pleased with it. I should like to assure the noble Viscount that the remarks of my right honourable friend the Minister of Supply, to which he referred yesterday, were accurate, and the work done on the guns of the Hunter in the last few weeks
1202
shows that the difficulties about which the noble Viscount knows (but which do not, of course, prevent the guns from being fired) can be overcome, and modifications will be installed to make the guns fully effective.
The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, referred to the flying boat, and while I do not propose to enter into a technical discussion with him, even were I qualified to do so, on the feasibility of a flying frigate, I believe that it would be a very difficult aircraft to design and I am not fully satisfied that, when designed, it would be desirable to build it. Any Government is open to contradictory criticisms, sometimes not ineffective, that it is attempting too much by spreading the jam too thinly or that it is casting away important projects, without due thought to the waste involved. To the flying boat enthusiast the flying boat is such a project. But Her Majesty's Government have thought deeply and most carefully upon this matter. It was not a decision of the Air Minister, for all the defence interests have been consulted; and in the light of defence priorities we have, with regret, come to the conclusion that we should not be justified in proceeding with the development of a replacement for the Sunderland.
The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, asked a question about the radar warning system. I know that the noble Lord feels very strongly the importance of having not only an efficient system in these islands but one linked with other systems, because the whole of the air defence system is interdependent. I agree with him that the subject is very important to our defences. We are linked with the Western European system and those links are being strengthened by various technical means as knowledge and facilities grow. I will not go wider on the further questions asked by the noble Lord, though these are very much in the mind of the Air Staff. It would be premature to make any announcement upon them.
The equipment of the Royal Air Force is complicated, and I can see no end to the increase in complications, in view of the rate of technical progress; but if the equipment is complicated, so is the trade structure. The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, in his brief but, as usual, extremely well-informed speech,

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raised the question of skilled manpower and its importance to the Services. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in replying to the debate, will deal with all inter-Service matters, but I know that The noble Viscount, with his long experience of the Royal Air Force, had prominently in mind the problems of that Service, probably because we have in it by far the widest range of trade skills of the three Services. May I again briefly glance backwards, because it is important to watch trends and, as it were, to go to the cinema instead of looking at "stills."
During the war there were one million men in the Royal Air Force; by June, 1950, the run-down had brought those numbers to 190,000. In a highly technical Service, however, total numbers are meaningless: it is the balance of skill and experience which counts. I hope that I shall not weary noble Lords by too much detail, but the interest taken by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, deserves a statistical reply. During the war there was no Regular recruiting, and by 1950 the enormous run-down caused a serious shortage of skilled men. Had it been possible to keep stable the size of our Air Force at that time, the situation, though difficult, would perhaps not have been critical; but the outbreak of the Korean war meant that a new process of expansion had to be undertaken, and by mid-1953 the total strength of the Air Force was 275,000. The increase in pay made by the late Government in 1951 was, I understand, designed to encourage Regular recruiting. In that it was largely successful, and in the Royal Air Force the strength of Regular ground airmen rose by March 31, 1954, by 43,000.
Skill must be accumulated, however; it cannot be suddenly created. The important thing is to keep in the Service those men who have undertaken Regular engagements. Thus it was logical and right for the pay increases made in 1954 to be more selective than those in 1951, giving a larger reward for higher skill. I can tell the House that re-engagements and extensions of service have been most encouraging. Even before the latest pay increases there was a rising trend, and the improvement since then has been most marked. During the past year, numbers entering on engagements of ten years or more totalled 6,500, compared with 5,900 in the year before. The total number of
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those on engagements of ten years or longer has risen from 35,000 on April 1, 1951, to 47,000 at the latest date. If we take the nine months from April 1, 1954, to December 31 of the same year, the numbers extending their service to twelve years have shown a threefold increase compared with the corresponding nine months of the previous year; and among advanced tradesmen the increases have been even more marked. In the trades of aircraft engineering, radio, armament, and electrical and instrument, the numbers extending their service to twelve years have been increased by a factor as great as eight. I know that we are dealing with fairly small numbers, but they are very important; and, although there is no ground for complacency, and while we cannot be certain that the trend will be maintained, I do affirm that there is a most encouraging rise in this very important sector which is vital to the future of the Royal Air Force.
I should like to deal now with the radio engineering trade group, to which the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, referred particularly. Our manning is now up to 90 per cent. in the advanced trades. Of course, that is due partly to this improved Regular recruiting, partly to the improved boy entry, and partly, also, to the expensive but necessary training of two-year and three-year men with suitable aptitudes. By filling the establishments as we have done, we have been able greatly to improve the standard of maintenance in the Royal Air Force. I do say that for those officers, highly skilled in these matters, who have contrived this highly complex form of training, it is a notable achievement and one upon which they deserve our warmest congratulations. I realise that this is an expedient, and our aim must always be to fill as many as possible of the vacancies with long-service Regulars, because it lowers the turnover and lessens what is called "turbulence." High though it still is, the rate of turnover is declining, and that does bring a very necessary measure of stability to stations and units upon which their contentment and general peace depends.
Of course, there is another side to the picture. I again apologise for detaining the House so long on manpower, but it is a matter of the greatest importance. It is most important that the skill which we

1205
recruit should be profitably and economically employed. Here again, there is, I think, an equally promising situation which we can exploit. Some two years or eighteen months ago an interesting experiment was made at a station in Transport Command. It was a very important experiment by which the work and the actions of men in certain selected trades were watched and recorded, in order to see how their time was spent. Those records were very carefully looked at, analysed and tabulated. It was found, as the result of the analysis, that by a small increase in the supervisory grades—warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s—a unit's task could be carried out with an appreciably smaller number of men. So successful was this pilot experiment that the investigation has now been extended to other Commands and to a wider range of trades. One must not allow optimism to carry one away into enthusiastic statements, and I cannot give precise figures, but if the trends are as we think they are, I believe that the savings which will eventuate—it will take time, of course—may be reckoned not in hundreds but in thousands.
If I may summarise the situation with regard to manpower, the position is that we are gradually overcoming the result of the rapid but inevitable run-down after the war, aggravated by the equally rapid and equally inevitable build-up after the Korean war. And we are concentrating, on the other side of the account, upon the most economical use of our manpower. For, after all, manpower is of prime importance, both for the Services and for the whole national economy; it is our most valuable and precious possession, especially that portion of it which consists of skilled men. Naturally we have not forgotten that the ideal is a long-service Regular Air Force, but I must emphasise that in the present state of affairs the National Service man and the three-year National Service Regular, as he is called, are both playing a vital part; and in last year's intake of 33,000 National Service men as many as 85 per cent. were trained in some form of technical skill or another.
I come now to what is perhaps the most important of our personnel problems—I refer to air crew. In times like these, when the immediate state of readiness is all-important, when the cost of
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training a pilot is so high, our aim must be not so much to create a large reserve of pilots as to keep as many of these valuable and highly skilled young men in the Service as possible, and to offer them a career. Cranwell is still the centre of our officer training system for the General Duties branch, but even if we could fill it to capacity—and I regret to say that it is not so filled—it could supply only a limited proportion of our officers. That is why I attach such great importance to the direct commission scheme.
This scheme, as noble Lords may know, replaces the old short-service schemes. It has two forms. First, it offers a man a commissioned career as pilot or navigator to a pensionable age, and in addition a terminal grant of £1,000 tax-free. Alternatively, a pilot or navigator can engage for twelve years Regular service, with a tax-free gratuity of £3,000. He has, as well, the option to leave after eight years, when his gratuity will be £1,500. Those who choose a twelve-year engagement can be transferred, at their option, to the pensionable engagement, and their previous service will count towards pension. They have the opportunity of reaching the highest ranks. I think that scheme is well devised to give the maximum confidence to officers coming into the Service. It is agreeable to be able to report, that, as my Under-Secretary said in another place last week, 2,000 officers have already extended their service under this scheme. And the number of air crew we now have is adequate.
I should be less than candid, however, if I did not admit that the prospect viewed for a few years ahead causes me some anxiety. Though we get a great many applications from young men who want to join the Service as air crew, we are not able to accept, after the very rigorous testing which they have to undergo, enough to fill all the vacancies which future requirements dictate. This is necessary, because experience has shown that we must not lower our standards of admission, otherwise we have a great deal of unnecessary wastage in training. In the exacting conditions of modern aviation, nothing but the best will do. I wish I could say that I had a ready-made solution to our difficulties. As with skilled manpower where the position is improving, so intense thought and the pursuit of a number of lines of action may well

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evolve a variety of solutions to mitigate this potential shortage of air crew.
Since a high state of readiness is of such importance in the modern age, and depth of reserves is proportionately less important, it might be thought inconsistent on the part of the Air Council to arrange to train as many as 300 National Service pilots each year. But the fact is that out of these 300 we get a number of very valuable young men who after their National Service take Regular commissions. By the same means we ensure a supply of pilots for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. I hope that this is at least one proof of the concern which the Air Council feel for the future welfare of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating the noble Earl, Lord Gosford, on his charming and informed maiden speech, to which we listened with so much attention yesterday. The noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, in another notable contribution to our debate, told us how intimately the history of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force is bound up with the history of the Royal Air Force. I know that he is their firm and constant supporter.
Referring to the points which the noble Earl, Lord Gosford, raised in his speech, may I take the last point first—that of alternative rôles? The Air Council have given careful consideration to the question whether Auxiliaries should go on in their present r rôles or whether they might be diverted to another. We came to the conclusion that it is in a fighter rôles that the Auxiliaries can most easily co-operate and train with Regular units. Training is much more difficult, and administratively far harder, if Auxiliaries are allowed aircraft with two or more seats.
The second point the noble Earl raised, about which I should like to reassure him, concerns transport arrangements for air crew who go home over the week-end. If necessary, these pilots will be conveyed, not in their fighter aircraft, flying themselves, but in communications aircraft, so that they will be able to get home at seasons in which weather difficulties might otherwise prohibit their travel. It is considered that in all but the worst weather this should not form an impediment to the successful working
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of the scheme. Of course, there is weekend flying now at stations, such as Biggin Hill and West Malling, where Auxiliary squadrons are stationed. The Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command, does not think that the fact that some officers and airmen on Regular stations might have to spend part of the week-ends helping Auxiliaries will be an impediment to the scheme. Indeed, the Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command, has every confidence—and I share it—that this scheme can be made to work, that the team spirit and élan of the Auxiliary Air Force will be preserved and that opportunities of flying swept-wing aircraft will not diminish but increase their enthusiasm.
The noble Earl, Lord Gosford, also asked about the future of Coastal Command. I can assure him that Her Majesty's Government have no intention whatever of changing the present organisation. As noble Lords know, there have been many inquiries over the years. During the lifetime of the present Government the matter has been considered, and it has been decided that no change should be made in the existing organisation.
I have detained the House rather longer than I ought, and I will therefore stand between the imposing list of speakers and the Despatch Box no longer. All I would add is that, although I have had the privilege of holding this office for only three and a half years, I do not believe there has been a period in which circumstances have compelled a greater measure of change than that which has taken place during that period. One thing is clear: that the responsibilities of the Royal Air Force have been immeasurably increased during that time; yet, despite difficulties and some disappointments, I believe that the structure and the equipment of the Royal Air Force have been adapted to meet modern needs. Although its shape may have been changed, and though its equipment may be more costly and more complicated, the Royal Air Force preserves the same flexibility, the freshness of outlook, the zest for adventure into new fields which has earned it the confidence of the country in two great struggles in the past. It is upon the experience, upon the organisation, but above all upon the spirit of the Royal Air Force that so much of the future of this country

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depends. I believe that it will prove itself worthy of this fearful but splendid trust.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, can he say anything About the point that I very much emphasised yesterday, about removing the grievances of the Services in the matter of the education of their families?
LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: My Lords, I am sorry if I was rather obscure, but I did say that my noble friend Lord Carrington would be dealing with all inter-Service matters.
3.16 p.m.
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, it was natural that, as Secretary of State for Air, the noble Lord should have directed his observations in the main to the Royal Air Force. I think your Lordships will agree that he made a speech which gave us a good deal of reassurance. We shall have an opportunity of examining it in more detail, no doubt, on the occasion which my noble friends will seek for a debate in your Lordships' House especially directed to the problems relating to the Royal Air Force. The speech of the noble Lord has to be set against the broader canvas, with a more sombre background, presented to your Lordships yesterday by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. I must confess that as I sat here yesterday and as the awful responsibilities enfolding us disclosed themselves, I could not get out of my head the old familiar words,
"Thus conscience doth make towards of us all."
It is still with those words in my mind that I stand here to say for my noble friends that we are at one with Her Majesty's Government in this matter, and to assert that we on these Benches are firmly resolved that the country shall have the hydrogen bomb and that if need be the bomb shall be used.
There has been a startling change since the debate upon defence last year. The hydrogen bomb is a fact. It is possessed by both sides in the cold war, and that is another fact. The desire to escape from it by turning away from it is natural enough. Heaven knows! We all agree with what was said by the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of York
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yesterday, in that eloquent and magisterial speech:
"Would to God it had never been invented!"
But the determination to see that the bomb is not used is no less natural—and much more to the point. It has to be made, as the most reverend Primate insisted:
"a shield beneath which the work of peace-making can go on."
The policy of deterrence, embracing all arms, hydrogen bomb and all, is a means, not the end. We are trying to prevent war, to save ourselves and the world by being ready. The end, as we have all concurred in this debate, is disarmament, which will require of our diplomats infinite patience and infinite wisdom, and which can come only when potential aggressors are convinced that aggression will not pay.
To be effective, the deterrent must be efficient. That is the point. Words are not enough. The deterrent must be calculated to meet all contingencies realistically—all contingencies whether all-out frontal attacks or piecemeal aggressions by infiltration, disruption or local wars. The hydrogen bomb is the essential part of the deterrent; but by itself it is dangerously insufficient, because the purpose of deterrence is to prevent great wars, not to make local wars into great wars. New model armies, air forces and navies are needed, not only to supplement nuclear power, but also to supply the flexible element in deterrence when nuclear power is inappropriate.
The first and overriding need in devising the shape and size of the Armed Forces is to face what are the likely facts. It has been obvious for a long time that the first principles in the new warfare are two: first, dispersal; secondly, a combined operation of all arms at every point. There have been some welcome words recently from the Government on the future of the Armed Forces in this new and revolutionary stage. The Secretary of State for War, for instance, the other day told us of new trial nuclear formations which are to be experimented with in Germany: lightly equipped and armed, with vehicles pruned to the utmost, with headquarters abolished wherever possible, and with their capacity to be lifted by air stepped up by every means. I am sure

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that that is right; and, in a sense, I may say that it is conversion with a vengeance, when I remember what was said by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, barely nine months ago about my proposal for swiftly moving, self-sufficient, strongly striking and airborne battle groups. In other words, the paramount importance throughout the Services of mobility and dispersal before, during and after battle is now beginning to be realised.
Signs of the welcome conversion stretch further than the Army. There is the proposal to disperse Bomber Command, and, indeed, the other air forces, to save them from sudden assault in the mass and to multiply their striking power. There is the proposal, at last, to give Transport Command some of the far-reaching and capacious aircraft it must have if it is to move not only airmen but troops, also. All this is welcome and encouraging. It is true it is a little late; it is true that it is still provisional, still tentative, still in the experimental stage. But I bear in mind what the noble and gallant Lord said in his opening observations to-day, and I do not peruse past Hansards to make a mere point. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, said yesterday [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 191 (No. 35), col. 1130]:
"We must try to build a force by land and air … which will hold the line until the full effect of the thermo-nuclear attack has been felt."
We must indeed. But what sort of force can hold the line during the bombardment and then strike back? When shall we have such a force for the counter-attack, which the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, says is our main defence? When shall we have the fighter aircraft on which, next to the counter-attack, he said Her Majesty's Government primarily rely? For time presses. We have three years at most, we are told, to make ready. And the cold war goes on all the time, and the shadow of the bomb looms larger over all we do as time passes. We must do what we have to do now, in self-defence and in the cause of peace.
The principles upon which our military revolution must be founded are not far to seek, though they may, indeed, be difficult to apply in detail. "Dispersal" is a term usually applied to the battlefield only. In fact, with the possibility of nuclear bombardment it has to be a
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guiding principle at every stage. There is a great danger of keeping all our eggs in one vulnerable basket. Dispersal of the bombing forces is only a beginning. We have many concentrated military targets in this country and elsewhere, and we have to ask whether, as well as the bomber forces, the strategic reserve and the Fleet should not be dispersed, with their ancillary services, outside the obvious target areas—which means, of course, outside this country. It has to be asked, too, whether such concentrations as the Antwerp base, to which I referred last year, and the Cyprus base are not now perilously out of date. We have to ask how we can—if indeed we can—disperse our people and our industry. And, above all, as I have insisted to-day and as I insisted last summer, the form of the Forces themselves and of their supply arrangements has to be adjusted in drastic and revolutionary fashion to this overriding need to disperse. Dispersal is the key to so much. This is the force which the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, and his colleagues are trying to build. Plainly, the principle to be followed here, and followed wherever it may lead, notwithstanding tradition and reluctance, is mobility and self-sufficiency. The battle group and the task force, living on their own, are the models. The aim is to form, train and equip forces which will be viable in a nuclear war. Any other forces would be useless.
Perhaps some may say that other kinds of forces are needed for the flexible secondary deterrent, for non-nuclear operations. This, I am convinced, is an error. Mobility, self-sufficiency, speed and striking power are precisely what are required to cope with other likely calls, such as those made in Korea, Malaya, Indo-China, Kenya and the Middle East. The old, earthbound forces with their tremendous "tail"—and the air forces and the navies have their tails as well as the armies—are appropriate to no kind of likely need in any future that we can now envisage. I do not believe that this is now a matter of trial and error; I believe it is plain fact. There is not only a scientific revolution, but there has been a revolution in warfare itself.
Among the most obvious and the most important landmarks overtaken by these changes are the distinctions, traditional and longstanding, between the separate land, sea and air forces. For any

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particular purpose there is no absolute distinction. Every operation is a combined operation, and must be planned and prepared for as such. It is no doubt futile to talk about having one Service without any distinction, and I spend no time on that subject. At best, if it is desirable, it would take a very long time. Combined operations will, I believe, serve the purpose. What is needed is that the three Services should be mixed up at every point—mixed up wherever they have to act together; and this should be done from top to bottom. It should mean that at every point of command where their duties meet and mix, however high or low, the three Services should sit and work together. There should be no more of these ridiculous controversies about who should run Coastal Command or, indeed, about who should be responsible for the Army's air. These needs should be met by the different Services acting and organising as one. Mark you, my Lords, I do not say, "acting and organised as one," I say, "acting and organising as one."
This, to my mind, is the most important single prerequisite of modernising the Forces, and without it I doubt whether we shall have modernisation. These principles of dispersal and combined operations apply with no less strength to home defence. I mention that, merely by way of parenthesis, in order to give me an opportunity of saying that home defence is not part of my theme to-day, and that I am to stake out a claim for my noble friends for a separate debate upon this crucial subject of home defence at an early date, followed by debates on Motions on each of the individual Armed Services. Therefore, at this moment I say no more about home defence, not because I think it is so little important but because I think it is so important that it must be dealt with as a subject by itself.
I return for a moment to the Army, to point out that the new Army is impossible unless it can take to the air; and it cannot take to the air without the means to do so—that is, without the right kind of helicopters, the right kind of transport planes with vertical lift, when that comes, or without the right kind of supporting aircraft to serve as cavalry. None of these yet exists, though they are, I believe, being looked for. No decision
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has yet been made about the organisation or control of the Army's air. These are the kinds of question that cannot, in these days, wait for a process of trial and error which may stretch over years. We must take a chance in deciding them now.
I have already conceded that there is something of a conversion in ideas on these various problems, but I am not so certain about performance; and it is performance that matters. It is performance that has fallen so frighteningly short in the past year, and we have to do something about that. We must either solve swiftly the problems of development and production which have held up our native supplies so far, or we must make a much closer partnership with the United States, so that, while we concentrate our resources and our skills upon the things which we can produce, we can obtain from our Allies those things which we leave to them. I ask myself anxiously and seriously (and I think the noble and gallant Lord who spoke just now referred to this as a question which might be asked, though I am not certain that he approved of its being asked): are we not, as things are, trying to do too much all at once, and so producing practically nothing? Or are we just setting about things in not precisely the right way? At any rate, the upshot in these vital new fields is that we are left disturbingly naked.
LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: May I interrupt the noble Lord? Perhaps he could specify what he means when he says that we are producing practically nothing. It is important that loose phrases should not go out from this House if they cannot be substantiated.
LORD NATHAN: I am sure the noble and gallant Lord would not think it appropriate that I should state here precisely what I mean by that, but I will willingly inform him personally. I have no wish in any way to do an injustice, and instead of "practically nothing," shall I say, "not as much as we might have hoped"?
LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: That is rather different.
LORD NATHAN: I say that in a placatory spirit towards the noble Lord. At any rate, he will agree with this comment: that in all these vital fields

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the upshot is that we are left, as I was saying, disturbingly naked or, shall I say? not fully dressed. The proper use and deployment of our skilled technicians and scientists in the new model forces and, as the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, said yesterday, in research and industry, is of fundamental importance for the whole future of the defence programme. In defence, as in trade, we live or die to-day by our skill. The test is not what we hope to have for our defence, but what we have, or what we shall quickly have. The main premises of the Defence Statement can be accepted by all those who hope to save the peace of the world by being strong against attack. But the programme which is proposed to implement it raises some points of doubt. Nothing is more perilous than a deterrent which is no deterrent at all—that would be fatal. The more encouraging words of Service Ministers in the last two weeks or so have shown them to be looking at last in the right direction, but what is needed, also, is proof that they are moving in the right direction; and this will require a much greater revolution in thought, habit and practice, not only in the Services but in the Supply Department and in the defence industries, than has yet been shown. Yet nothing less than that revolution can make us, even hopefully, safe and independent.
3.38 p.m.
LORD MOYNIHAN: My Lords, when I read of the abolition of Anti-Aircraft Command last autumn, without any alternative for those concerned, I must admit that I felt rather like a dormouse being rudely awakened out of a very comfortable sleep. It is some time since I addressed your Lordships, and I am sorry that on my reappearance I have to make a frontal attack. I have a Motion down on the Order Paper on the Territorial Army, but the points I wish to raise are relevant to this afternoon's debate, and I am therefore grateful for this opportunity of addressing your Lordships. Before I come to Anti-Aircraft Command there is just one point with regard to the hydrogen bomb upon which I should like to comment. Surely, we, as an Empire, are in a far better position than anyone else, provided we walk arm in arm with the other members of the Commonwealth.
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I do not believe it is possible, even in a hydrogen bomb war, for an attack to be made in the earlier stages of the war on all the important points of the Commonwealth. It is possible—in fact, I should say probable—that the centre would be attacked and possibly destroyed, but we should immediately retaliate from many other places. Provided we have made our plans beforehand with the other members of the Commonwealth, our organisation would be dislocated to a much lesser extent than would that of either our great ally, the United States of America, or any prospective enemy, were their countries to be attacked.
The position of the Commonwealth is laid down in paragraph 13 of the White Paper on Defence, but I feel that it does not go anything like far enough. Also, I was surprised to read that the Secretary of State for War in another place last week said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 538 (No 48), col. 192]:
"If such a war occurred"—
and he was referring to a nuclear war—
"then the vital and decisive factor would be the ability of the home base in these islands to struggle through."
I have not the slightest doubt of the determination of all of us to fight to the last inch in these islands, were war to come; but it seems to me that, with a nuclear war and the resultant dislocation to an island of this size, it would be folly to rely solely on that when we have the whole Commonwealth to help us. Therefore I would suggest that our plans should presuppose that, upon a surprise attack, our own Government and a considerable number of our personnel would be destroyed. Our answer is solely from the strength of the Commonwealth. It is a strength that no one else possesses. I suggest, therefore, that we should immediately plan to dispose our atomic plants throughout the most inaccessible parts of our Empire, and at the same time plan that a change in the centre of government could be made immediately, should that become necessary. In fact, I feel that all defence matters should now be dealt with on an Empire basis. From these beginnings—and they can be built only through strength—can arise the chance not only of an Empire Government but of a Government of all the free countries of the world, which can give us security and, finally, world peace.

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If protection against the hydrogen bomb is possible in an island of this size, so vastly populated, then it must be mainly as it was in the last war, through voluntary service. That brings me to the specific points I wish to raise regarding the Territorial Army. I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I refer briefly to the history of Anti-Aircraft organisation to stress this point. Your Lordships may remember that in 1920 there was no anti-aircraft defence at all in this country. In that year the first Regular regiment was formed, and in 1924 a Scottish medium regiment was transferred to anti-aircraft defence. Those two regiments, with some six mobile batteries throughout the Commonwealth, were all the anti-aircraft defence that we had in the Empire. In 1922, four Territorial anti-aircraft regiments were formed for the specific purpose of the defence of London. They were called county and city Territorial brigades. They were formed from the volunteers who came mainly from City of London places of work. They were not full to start with, because volunteers came as slowly after the First World War as they did in 1947; but in 1925 there was a recruiting campaign, and from that time they were up to their peace-time establishment. That meant that in 1925 there was an equivalent number of Regulars and Territorials in anti-aircraft.
Little happened for the next ten yeas, but it should be pointed out that in those ten years the personnel of those four Territorial regiments worked themselves up to a high degree of proficiency. That was proved by the positions they held in the Army as a whole in the Second World War. When, in the 1930's, war with Hitler was first a danger and then a certainty, there was a rush to join these regiments. Other anti-aircraft regiments were formed, and other regiments were transferred to the anti-aircraft rôle. In 1939, after the doubling of the Territorial Army, there were 116,000 men in Anti-Aircraft Command (as it then was), which was 28 per cent. of the whole of the Territorial Army. Meanwhile, there had been no change at all in the Regulars, who then represented a very small fraction of the total numbers in Anti-Aircraft Command. In the war there were between 250,000 and 300,000 people in Anti-Aircraft Command. They were led mainly by those Territorials who had worked during the peace-time years to equip
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themselves for the positions of senior N.C.O.s and senior officers.
The history of Anti-Aircraft Command during the war is well known to your Lordships. After the war, with the introduction of National Service, we again saw the Territorial Army building itself up with its own spirit, but helped by the National Service boys who came "unwillingly to school" but who, when they arrived, found, as most schoolboys do, that there was a great amount of amusement and interest to be had. It is no exaggeration at all to say that the camps for 1955 are being looked forward to with the same spirit as were the pre-war camps of the Territorial Army. There are not only the National Service subalterns, but the National Service men who have worked themselves up in these few years to the very fine rank of sergeant. They are going together to camp with a spirit unequalled by anything since the years when the Territorials built themselves up, in the 1920's and 1930's.
I have given your Lordships this brief history to explain the importance of the Territorial soldier to Anti-Aircraft Command and to emphasise the fact that that Command was built up purely through team spirit. Whatever our class, we are all taught from our earliest years the importance of team spirit. However good we are as individuals, we are not much use without the team. It is exactly the same in the Territorial Army. Then, four months ago, on the announcement of the abolition of Anti-Aircraft Command, the whole thing fell to the ground. Until a few weeks ago there was no alternative at all for those senior officers and N.C.O.s to whom we owed so much during the war and after the war. Even now I feel that the position is most unsatisfactory. The danger is that we shall lose the good will of these men, and that will, in itself, be a grave danger to the defence of this country. One can do almost anything with a volunteer except keep him in doubt and idleness. One can change his rôle, give him conscripts or amalgamate him; but leave him in idleness and one will lose that spirit of good will that is so important. Voluntary service has been rather belittled since the war. In my opinion it is still the mainspring of our defence, and I think we should do everything we can to en-courage it.

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I do not think anyone, particularly those who were in Anti-Aircraft Command, was in the least surprised when there came notice of the abolition of the Command. We never saw much of a future in it when science was progressing so greatly that a nuclear war became possible. But in May, 1950, when guided missiles were given to the Royal Air Force, it was surely time to think of what was going to happen to the Territorials when the abolition of Anti-Aircraft Command came. Now, nearly two years afterwards, we have no alternative to Anti-Aircraft Command—there are no guided missiles, and a great number of the men of the Command are left without anything to do. I am not in any way suggesting that we should keep Anti-Aircraft Command, but I should like to bring out two points about the anti-aircraft gun before finally we throw it into the melting pot, which I suppose is where it will go. First, I suppose there is the outside possibility that another world war might come without the use of the nuclear weapon. Gas was not used in the last war because of the enemy's fear of retaliation, but it did not stop the war. If we lose our guns we get right back to where we were in 1938, when we had all the men we wanted but no guns. In a year or so we shall still have all the men, even if they have been disbanded, with the knowledge of anti-aircraft equipment, but we shall have no guns.
But there is another job for the antiaircraft gun, apart from bringing down and dispersing enemy formations and firing against guided missiles; it has its influence on the morale of the civilians. I remember very well the autumn days of 1940, when, night after night, this great city was bombed and not a single gun was fired. We were not allowed to fire because we were supposed not to understand sufficiently about unseen targets. But we were becoming the laughing-stock of the civilians. They were getting morally depressed, and they looked at us and said, "What is the good of your guns if you never fire them?" Then suddenly one day all the group commanders were sent for by General Pile, who said, "You can fire tonight as much as you possibly can. If you have equipment for unseen targets, use it. If you have not, use your initiative." The noise of those guns on that
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night will never be forgotten. It was said that we brought down four planes. Even if that were true, it was the most expensive night's firing there had ever been, so far as rounds fired per target are concerned. But the change in the morale of the civilian was miraculous. If there is ever a war with great numbers of civilians in large cities, this point should not be forgotten.
We have now no Anti-Aircraft Command, no alternative and a number of Territorials without a job. I am certain that the alternative, the guided missile, will appear, and will presumably be controlled by the Regular Royal Air Force. But what about the Territorials? Surely May, 1953, was the time to think of what would happen to them. Yet, eighteen months afterwards no thoughts have been given to this position. Recently an offer was made to them to join the mobile defence reserve battalions. No idea of what that service requires has been given to them, and the offer is to individuals and to groups only. Why not to units? It has been said that the unit will know nothing about this job. The amount of technical knowledge gained by anti-aircraft personnel was very high. They tackled radar and other equipment, and I am convinced that they could easily tackle any other job that was given to them. Why not give them these guided missiles, even if it meant transferring them to the R.A.F.? It does not make any difference nowadays, and it would be infinitely preferable to the present position.
May I give your Lordships one example? I have said that in 1922 four Territorial regiments were raised. Only one of those now remains, and that is an amalgamation of four other regiments. All the young people are being kept and the older ones are being left out. It was these older ones who, before the war, joined as Territorials, who fought the war with the Territorials and Regulars together, and who, after the war, rejoined to bring back that voluntary spirit. Yet they are just left on the shelf. Surely there is room enough for all Territorials in Civil Defence, whether in the Home Guard, in these new regiments, or anything else—and for units and not just for individuals. It is the indecision which is going to kill the voluntary spirit. When war breaks out everyone rushes to help in every way he can—even bus drivers

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stop at "Request" stops and cars are driven by human beings and not by wild animals.
But we cannot wait until then—not because there is the immediate danger of a war, but because there is immediate danger of losing these voluntary servants. When the present Government were in Opposition we had a great deal of support from many of their members for the Territorial Army. Now, by reason of the treatment of the people in Anti-Aircraft Command, we hear from every Territorial soldier, "Is it going to be my turn next?" I apologise for taking so long on this one subject, but I believe that voluntary service should be not only encouraged but built up against an attack by the hydrogen bomb. The Territorial Army has served this country well in two world wars. Because the hydrogen bomb has come, we must not let them down—we must not say we can do without them. But in particular, let us not leave them in doubt any longer.
3.58 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down said, I think at the beginning of his speech, that he was going to make a frontal attack. I should have thought that was rather a hard description of the speech that he made, because it seemed to me that he made a number of most helpful comments, particularly on the subject of the Territorial Army, to which I will return a little later. I was in full agreement, too, with a great deal of what he said on the subject of Commonwealth co-operation. I thought that I might be right in reading a little more between the lines of the White Paper where it deals with Commonwealth co-operation, and indeed possibly reading a little between the lines of the speech made by my noble friend Lord Swinton in introducing this Motion yesterday.
We have had a great many important and interesting opinions from other noble Lords on the general question of the hydrogen bomb, and the change of attitude that it has caused to our strategy and organisation. I do not want to say much about that at this stage of the debate, because I find myself largely in agreement with what was said yesterday by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, and also with many of the things which have been said this afternoon by the noble
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Lord, Lord Nathan. Some of the wrong thinking which has occurred arises because people think war can be divided into watertight compartments and that atomic war can be divided from what is called "conventional" war. In talking of "conventional" war and weapons, we should remember that they are conventional only in the sense that they are not atomic: they are certainly not conventional in the sense that no progress is being made in their design or use, or in the tactics with which they will be employed.
As can be seen from the Service White Papers, very great changes have taken place in recent years and are still going on, both in the nature of equipment and in organisation. In studying war one can regard it only as one thing. One cannot decide in advance what the enemy will do, or what divisions one will be able to make as between atomic and conventional war. To do so is to try to make up one's mind in advance what the enemy will do; and I can imagine no worse way of planning to lose a war. It is not for us to decide the enemy's intentions; it is for us to decide what possible courses of action are open to them. At present those courses may or may not range from the launching of the atom bomb, on the one hand, to a frontier "incident" on the other. Such an incident cannot be dealt with by the atom bomb but has to be dealt with by the commander and troops on the spot.
To rely only on the atom bomb, rather than on conventional weapons, is to ignore the old and sound doctrine of economy of force, a doctrine which has been preached for many years among those who study these things and which still applies. In considering the use of non-conventional weapons let us therefore remember that doctrine of economy of force. Let us beware of the watertight compartments with which we shall be faced if we try to consider home defence as a matter for local authorities, on the one hand, and Service Departments, on the other. I will return to that point, but I mention it now because I believe that much of our wrong thinking is caused by our attempt to divide a future war into compartments of arbitrary design of our own choosing.
Since it is clear from the White Paper that the power to exercise the deterrent largely depends on the strength of the

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alliances among the free peoples, it is surely quite wrong to believe that one can pursue this objective without a complete alliance and complete inter-Governmental and inter-Services co-operation on the part of the free peoples. For that reason I was sorry to hear some noble Lords say yesterday that it was a mistake for American air forces to be stationed in this country. I take precisely the opposite view.
May I ask noble Lords to consider what effect these changes will have on the organisation which we have to maintain in order to implement this new policy? How profoundly grateful we should be that the Ministry of Defence was established back in 1946, in the time of the last Government! Think for a moment of the confusion which would by now have arisen in dealing with these problems had the Ministry of Defence not already been in existence over a number of years—the possibility baffles description. We should thank our stars that the Ministry of Defence, by its early establishment, has now had time to practise some relatively easy exercises in co-ordinating Service Departments, and is therefore, I hope, getting into training for the harder exercise of co-ordinating supply and dealing with other matters affecting all Service Departments to which it will have to address itself in dealing with home defence. A right decision was certainly taken then, and we shall now reap the benefit.
Whilst I do not want to be partisan, I feel it a pity that when the Civil Defence Act was introduced, a year later, the same broad views were not taken and that the opportunity of knocking down more watertight compartments was missed. That would have been a great convenience in the intervening period, and those compartments must certainly be knocked down now. It is interesting to look back over Defence White Papers which have appeared since the war and to see how civil defence was treated—being given, first, only a very small paragraph—and how, gradually, the writers and sponsors of successive White Papers have realised that that subject must be regarded as part of home defence. In this present White Paper, civil defence has at last come into its own and takes the place which, with the advent of the atom bomb, it was bound to take. I believe that the name "Civil Defence" is almost a misnomer. It
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was invented at a time when thought on the subject was entirely different. To my mind, and I think most, the name implies a series of activities much more related to the threat from high-explosive bombs than to the action—not before the atom bomb comes, because that is something which, even with the best will in the world, civil defence cannot tackle—to be taken after the bomb has arrived, if, unhappily, it does arrive. What is now called civil defence is certainly not civil, and probably not defence either, because its future task cannot be the prevention of atomic attack. It must deal with the situation after it has arisen.
I was glad to see from the Defence White Paper that the static part of civil defence was still based on local authorities. I am sure that this is the right course, and that local authorities will be only too eager to play their full part. Perhaps I ought to mention that up to yesterday morning, so far as I could find out, the Home Office had issued no further instructions to local authorities based on the White Paper. I am not complaining of that—I think it is probably just as well. I should not mind if Government Departments took a little time for thought and consultation with each other before issuing instructions to local authorities. But let that pass for the moment.
Let us now think of some of the other people concerned. A great deal has been said about the Auxiliary Air Force—notably by the noble Earl, Lord Gosford, to whom I should like to add my congratulations on his very useful maiden speech. I would add that I prefer the constructive proposals which he made for dealing with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force to the rather less constructive proposals which came from the noble Lord, Lord Sherwood. Not being an airman, may I leave the point at that, and come, for a minute or two to what the Lord Moynihan said about Anti-Aircraft Command? I go a good way with him in what he said, because I feel, as I am sure do many other noble Lords, that in Anti-Aircraft Command there is a tremendous reserve of patriotism and good will, and it would be the height of folly to disperse it and not to make the fullest use of it. To be as fair as I can about this, I think I must start by saying that I consider it rather a pity that when, over a year ago, it was announced in this

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House that guided missiles were to be the immediate responsibility of the Royal Air Force, more immediate steps were not taken to deal with the problem of Anti-Aircraft Command. Surely every thinking member of Anti-Aircraft Command must have realised, if that policy was right—as I am sure it was—that it was no longer possible for Anti-Aircraft Command to exist as it had done. Therefore, there was bound to be a period of doubt and despair, and that doubt and despair were likely to affect thinking members of Anti-Aircraft Command more than others—which I think was a great pity. I hope that noble Lords in front of me will not mind my saying that. However that may be, it is spilt milk, and I am not going to cry over it any more.
Now we come to the decision of, I think, December 4 last, when it was announced that Anti-Aircraft Command was to be disbanded. Here, as all your Lordships know, we are always in a difficulty, because decisions of that sort should be announced first to Parliament—and that is the practice of Governments. But it is impossible to make a first announcement both to Parliament and to the Forces—or whoever may be concerned—at the same time. There is always a difficulty in that respect. I have taken a certain amount of trouble to find out exactly what did happen after that announcement had been made to Parliament; and, without wanting to condone what happened before that, I feel obliged to say that, from all I hear, the War Office and the Territorial Associations did their best to work the matter out properly, to make the announcement at the earliest possible moment, and to arrange for interviewing those people who were surplus. Now they are faced with the business of dealing with these fourteen or fifteen units of Anti-Aircraft Command which cannot be amalgamated or absorbed in the field forces and which must be disbanded. That still has to be done.
I do not think that anyone can be surprised that that is the position. After all, the Territorial Army, like the rest of the Services, was made for war: war was not made for the Territorial Army. Every thinking Territorial knows that. Every sound Territorial will, I am certain, be anxious to adapt himself to meet the needs of modern war—as in fact he has
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done—like all his predecessor volunteers throughout the ages. There is a good deal to be done. This time efforts should be made to avoid watertight compartments. It is also a time, if I may suggest it to noble Lords in front of me, when the fullest use should be made of what I may term the negotiating machinery which already exists to deal with these things. We have the Council of Territorial and Air Force Associations; we have the Territorial Army; we have the Air Advisory Committee which advises the Secretary of State for Air. Those bodies all exist to canalise the opinion of the voluntary Auxiliary Forces and to do their best to advise the Service Departments on the best way of making full use of the good will and patriotism that exist.
I hope that people will not be in a hurry. I hope that plenty of time will be allowed for this advice to be given. It has happened before that the advice was given after the decision was taken. If I may paraphrase the old proverb: it is easy to advise after the event. I hope that that will not happen. Here, between the Forces and the static civil defence, we have this new and largely uncharted field of mobile columns—I should say mobile battalions, for I was corrected upon that point before. These mobile battalions, so far as I understand, though I am not quite sure, are to be part of the emergency reserve. Do let us make certain that we obtain for all these mobile battalions, on the most favour-able terms, the surplus personnel, the surplus men and officers in Anti-Aircraft Command. Do let us remember that they stand halfway between the Regular Forces and the local authorities. Do let us remember that the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces' associations are designed to act as a link between the Auxiliary Forces and the local authorities. That is why, whatever Lord Moynihan may say, I am just a little glad that too much has not been settled already, because I should like to see the time we have available used for a little more thinking, a little more getting together between various Departments. I think that if that can be done our friends in Anti-Aircraft Command will not grudge a little longer wait.
I hope, too, that the question of allowances will be properly gone into and brought on to the right basis. It is ridiculous, for instance, that a man who

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volunteers for local authority civil defence, and is allowed to use his motor car, should have to do it on quite different financial terms from those of the Territorial soldier in a mobile battalion. I beg noble Lords in front of me not to allow any discrepancies of that sort—and I can tell them that there are many—to persist, when these new arrangements have been thoroughly worked out. That is all I want to say, partly in support of what Lord Moynihan has said, and, partly, as an alternative approach.
I do not wish to detain your Lordships, but I should like to conclude with one general comment on this Statement of Defence. Of all the White Papers that have come out since 1946, this is by far the clearest. And so it should be, because science has now advanced sufficiently in the matter of atomic weapons to make it possible for the Government to take a view and to state a policy. Hitherto, the attitude has been, I am sure rightly, that developments were going on so fast, and that the state of development was so indeterminate, that every year when the time came to produce a White Paper, no plan could be put forward without the risk of wasting a great deal of money and effort. Now the die is cast. We have a perfectly clear policy, clearly laid down; and, as we have seen to-day and yesterday, with a great measure of support from all sides of the House. It only remains that the details should be worked out with the firmness and the broadness of mind which has been used in drawing up the White Paper.
4.21 p.m.
LORD LAWSON: My Lords, I think your Lordships will agree that it is refreshing to have such views laid before the House as have been expressed by the speakers in this debate. I refer particularly to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, who gave us his experience from what I might call the other end of the telescope. I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that the White Paper is clear, and I think it is right that in the situation which this country faces as the result of the production of the hydrogen bomb, the Government should be clear that the hydrogen bomb would be used in case we had to defend ourselves against an attack. I do not think any man or woman living in our age will forget that we gave proof
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between the wars, as perhaps no other country did, that we were ready to reduce our armaments. Indeed, we almost disarmed ourselves between the wars. No one who had responsibility for anything to do with the defence of our country in the period following Dunkirk will ever forget that experience. For my sins, I was one of two Civil Defence commissioners in Northumberland, Durham and the North Riding. It was our business to know our true responsibilities and we had to be told exactly what our defence position was—a position which the Prime Minister has revealed in his writings since. If at that time our enemy had understood how bare we were, he would have altered his tactics. I assure your Lordships that there were times when at dawn I looked out fully expecting to see the enemy arriving from the Norwegian coast.
The decision which has been taken is so grave that the Government ought to lose no time in getting together with the other great Powers to bring about some measure of disarmament. If only the world's wisdom were equal to its knowledge, then we should be living in a happy world indeed. For if we were wise, we should realise that this is the writing on the wall for all armaments. We should be happy indeed if a disarmament agreement could be worked out. The White Paper has created despondency among a great many people who want to help the country. I am glad the noble Lords, Lord Bridgeman and Lord Moynihan, brought up this matter. I have seen the effects of this despondency. Some people seem to have the idea that while we are going to manufacture hydrogen bombs, we do not need anybody to fire them. We speak about conventional weapons and atomic weapons as though they were going to fire themselves and did not need anybody behind them. There is a strange lack of understanding of the effect that this is going to have upon the men of the Forces.
The Government are again scrapping the second battalions of the county regiments. The second battalions have been scrapped, set up and scrapped again. I must say that I cannot understand why the great traditions and the comradeship, the experience and the courage, to be found in these second battalions should be so lightly abandoned with very little explanation. Perhaps your Lordships will

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allow me to speak of the first time I met the Durham Light Infantry, my own county regiment, after the war. It was in goal. I thought that would waken up your Lordships! The Durham Light infantry were billeted in Rangoon goal, after they had come out of Imphal. They were one of the battalions which had taken part in the relief of Imphal, where they had seen heavy fighting under terrible conditions. When I saw them they were billeted in the goal, so far as I could see the coolest place in Rangoon and perhaps the best possible building for billeting a great mass of men. I told them that I thought they were highly favoured, because they were the only people who had ever seen a Cabinet Minister in goal. They have to go, along with the other second line battalions. I think that is most unwise, unless some steps are being taken to use the men in another way.
It seems that behind this White Paper is the assumption that with the increased use of mechanised weapons and science fewer men are needed. But that has not been the experience of industry where mechanisation has taken place, although the industrialists and the people who had to use the machines thought it would be the case. They held that view from the nineteenth century until quite recently. It seems to me that the Government and the War Department are making the same mistake in thinking that once we have atom bombs and hydrogen bombs fewer men will be needed. So far as I can see, that is the only reason for abolishing the second battalion regiments.
When we come to Anti-Aircraft Command, as both previous speakers on this subject have agreed, there is some justification for handling the matter in the way proposed. But if Anti-Aircraft Command is to be abolished, the Government might, at least, have done it in the proper way: they might have said "Thank you" to those who have been doing the job. As Lord Lieutenant of the county, I was present at a meeting when an announcement was made about Anti-Aircraft Command, and, as a result of the statement, there were clear signs of despondency. These men, too, have their traditions and their sense of comradeship, as the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, said. After their work in the Territorials, men have been giving up their spare time. Surely,
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this could have been done in a better way. I do not know whether this has been the experience of the two previous speakers, but I think the indecision, so far as the voluntary home forces are concerned, has reached to the Territorials generally. If I exaggerate, then it is worth while, because this is a serious matter and the Government ought to take careful note of it. The Territorials should know exactly where they stand. If this does extend to the Territorials, then I think it is time that the Territorial associations are given some clear indication of the use to which they are going to be put and of the way in which they can best serve the country. They do their work, I know, and they are responsible for the training of the men. But how far that is going to operate, as it has in the past, is not quite clear.
Then there is the question of civil defence—what is called the Mobile Defence Corps. As some of your Lordships will know, the idea of mobile corps is not something new. During the last war we had mobile corps which did splendid work up and down the country and gained great experience, which experience would be most useful to the Mobile Defence Corps. I do not intend publicly to go into the steps that we usually had to take in connection with the mobile units, but those units rendered splendid service. During the war, on the radio, we used to get news every night for months of a town in the north-east that had been bombed, although the town was never mentioned by name. We know now that the town was Hull. The condition of Hull at one stage was lamentable, and we had to send a mobile unit there to help them. During the war mobile units went all over the country, and the experience they gained would be well worth using. There again, the human side has been neglected.
A good deal of attention was given at one time to civil defence. The units were kept in being, but they were not called upon to do exercises on a proper scale because nobody knew quite what they were going to do. There is a great mass of voluntary service of very fine men and women at the disposal of the, Government. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say, in spite of that, that the civil defence organisation in this country at the present time is practically

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moribund. I have taken some part in meetings and I know something of the position generally. It would be as well if those who are responsible for civil defence, for the Government and through the Government, would make an investigation into what the position is in the country, and the sooner they make use of the fine human material and experience which exists the better it will be for the country.
I will not say any more. I wanted to say those things, although probably both my predecessors said them better. But it is necessary that I should have said them after this White Paper, with the stunning effect it has had, and the steps the Government have already taken to immobilise the anti-aircraft units. I know that some batteries are still in being, but I am not quite sure whether they are going to live or die, or how they are going to be used. I hope the Government will take notice of these matters, because they are of the first importance. In spite of the hydrogen bomb, men and women will still be needed, and we have at our disposal in this country a fine body of men and women who are prepared to give their services almost without limit in any way the Government want, if the Government are prepared to use them.
4.43 p.m.
LORD STRANG: My Lords, I much regret that I was unable to be present in your Lordships' House yesterday to hear the speeches of the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, and of the other noble Lords who took part in the debate. I have done my best to repair the omission by reading the OFFICIAL REPORT, and it is in the light of the OFFICIAL REPORT and of my own reflections on the White Paper that I venture to submit to your Lordships to-day some observations on the problem of defence in its widest sense.
The problem of defence in essence is the problem of finding answers to two apparently simple questions. The first question is: What is the danger that faces us? The second question is: How best can that danger be met? Now the danger lies in the existence of a great Power with vast military resources, a dynamic creed and a policy of external expansion. That Power, in company with other like-minded Powers, controls the greater part
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of the land mass of the continents of Europe and Asia. More than this, it has outposts within the body-politic of other countries which still remain outside its control. Its self-appointed leaders look upon themselves as the agents whose mission it is, first, to maintain their absolute power at home, and, secondly, to hasten and direct the march of events, by force if necessary, along the predetermined course of history, as identified and plotted by themselves, leading to what they regard as the inevitable collapse of capitalism throughout the world and the progressive spread of their own authority.
The danger lies not only in a threat of force; it lies also in an unremitting assault upon the hearts and minds of our people. What is at stake is the future of Western civilisation, as we know it. For all its shortcomings, Western civilisation is based on the freedom of the human spirit. On the other hand, whatever merit there may be in the original conceptions of Communism, its application in practice in the Soviet Union and elsewhere has led to a denial of the freedom of the human spirit. The opposition of the two régimes, as they stand to-day, is therefore complete. Whether this will always be so, time alone will show.
That is not to say that a major assault by armed force is imminent or even probable. Western disunity or unpreparedness might indeed invite it. Unwise Western policies might provoke it. Soviet internal strains might precipitate it. But, in general, the Soviet leaders believe that history is on their side, and they may think it well to take their time, to pursue their ends with circumspection, and not to run unnecessary risks to the stability of their own internal authority, the maintenance of which is their prime overriding objective. Like other Governments, they have their own domestic difficulties. They also have their own defence problem, though, unlike ourselves, they are not required to advertise it. There is also the thought that too rapid a spread of Communism might outrun their power to control it. They may think that one China is enough for the present.
We therefore face a variety of dangers of varying degrees of probability, and we must be prepared for them all. There is first the danger of a deliberate attack by nuclear weapons. This seems at the present stage unlikely, if we in the West maintain our strength and unity. There

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is the danger of a full-dress attack with what are called conventional weapons. This is also perhaps unlikely. There is the danger of local actions with conventional weapons, which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. This is less unlikely. Here, the danger would vary with the areas in which these actions might occur. Then there is the danger of progressive infiltration or subversion under threat. This danger is ever present. Finally, there is the danger of political action upon the public mind by way of threat, exhortation. cajolery and so on. That this will go on, we may take it, is a certainty.
How are we to meet these dangers? The answer is not a simple one. It is a complex answer, for defence has many aspects. But, diverse as those aspects are, they all form part of a single whole. I propose, if I may, to pass some of these aspects under review as briefly as I can. The first point to make is this. Given the vast power of the Communist world and the relative weakness of the United Kingdom, it is clear that we cannot meet these dangers alone. All the other free nations, including perhaps even the United States, are in the same position: hence, the need for combination. Happily, the necessary associations are, being formed, and they are being formed round the periphery of the Communist land mass, or round what the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, yesterday called "the outer circle." Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, reinforced, as we hope it will be, by the Western European Union, holds the vital European front from Norway round to Turkey. On the Eastern flank is the new Balkan Pact linking Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, East of that again a new link is being formed which will join Turkey with Iraq and Pakistan.
Now, starting from the Far Eastern end of the outer circle or great defensive arc, there are the arrangements made by the United States with Japan, with South Korea, and with Formosa. There are the direct links between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. And now there has come into being the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation which brings the defensive screen round into South-East Asia. Between Pakistan and Siam there is a gap. India and Burma stand outside all these arrangements,
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though they can, and do, play a useful mediatory rôle.
We come now to the second and most obvious aspect of defence. Combination in itself is not enough. There must be armed force, and adequate armed force. Here, our new technological age has already surpassed itself. Back in the last century, Emerson said, prophetically:
"Things are in the saddle and ride man kind."
And someone has more recently said that in our time there is a growing disparity between strong physics and weak sociology. Be that as it may, the free world must possess nuclear weapons so long as there is no comprehensive and effective system of disarmament. If we in this country are to be a worthy partner in the community of free nations, we must play our part and make nuclear weapons, since it is within our capacity to do so. For reasons set out in the White Paper, the existence of nuclear weapons does not make the possession of conventional weapons any less necessary than before. The arguments for this view seem to me to be quite conclusive. But to call these weapons "conventional weapons" is not in any sense to pay them a compliment: war is a sickening business whatever weapons are used to conduct it.
I come now to the third point. It is not enough to possess arms. The value of these associations among the free peoples does not lie only in the military sphere. These associations dispel feelings of insecurity and isolation and create bonds of comradeship. This growth of collective solidarity is in itself a source of strength and is, therefore, a contribution to defence. This is so because the attack is at the present stage perhaps more likely to be by way of intimidation or subversion than by major physical assault. The chief virtue, as I see it, of the Paris Agreements is not that they will make available a few German divisions; what is more important is that they will, we hope, knit the Federal Republic closely into the Western European Community as an equal partner. In the economic sphere, too, the Marshall Plan and the Colombo Plan have both made an indispensable contribution, a contribution to defence.
In another way also—and this is my fourth point—the mere possession of arms is not enough. There must also be

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the will to use them, if need be, and that will must be made known to the adversary. It has often been said that if we had made our intentions plain in 1914 and in 1939 there would have been no war. I have always rather doubted the truth of this. In 1914, the Germans discounted what they derided as our contemptibly small army. In 1939, we did in fact make our intentions quite plain by concluding a mutual assistance Agreement with Poland. What was lacking on both occasions was not so much certainty of intention as the possession of adequate armed force to make our intervention effective. That is an error which, whether successfully or not, we and our associates are trying hard to avoid this time. By bitter experience it seems that we have learnt our lesson.
The Government have been reproached, and I think unfairly reproached, for the alleged ambiguity in the statement in the White Paper about the use of nuclear weapons in the event of aggression. If there is ambiguity—or, as I would rather say, lack of particularisation—I think this is wise. It is plain from what is said in the White Paper that in a major war nuclear weapons would be used to repel attack by conventional weapons, since only so could we counter the adverse preponderance in such weapons. It is well that this should be stated. But what is not particularised, and rightly so, I think, is the precise kind of occasion on which nuclear weapons would certainly be used, and the kind of occasion on which they would perhaps not be used. Nor is there any precise definition given of what constitutes a major war. Nor, again, is it stated where and how the nuclear reaction would fall, whether only upon the attacking forces or also upon the enemy's industrial centres. This area of uncertainty is, in itself, as I see it, a powerful deterrent. To draw aside the veil would be a clear invitation to the adversary to take action in circumstances where he could count on not promoting nuclear retaliation.
My Lords, I do not know why it should be thought that Governments will be reckless in their recourse to this terrible and devastating nuclear weapon, unless perhaps it is because too many officers in high military positions talk too much and too often about what they think is going to happen. In any event, the decisions
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will not lie—or perhaps I had better say, ought not to lie—with them, but with their Governments; and it is from their Governments that these grave statements should properly come. On this point I have much sympathy with what was said yesterday by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. And so far as Governments are concerned, I think both sides have so far been pretty cautious and self-regarding. In the last war, neither chemical nor bacteriological weapons were used. In the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 neither side resorted to force at all. In Korea, nuclear weapons were not used, and the use of even conventional weapons was geographically circumscribed. There was similar restraint in Indo-China.
The danger of the situation to-day, in contrast to the situation in the past—even the recent past—is that the margin of tolerance has become very much narrower. In the West there is, one might almost say, no margin. In the Far East there is very little. The lines which must not be overstepped by an aggressor have been more and more definitely drawn by the defence. Nevertheless, we must not think that all hope is lost, however great the peril. In the present phase, we can still trust that the deterrent will keep the peace—
"Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety."
A deterrent is indeed not a permanent solution, but we can at any rate hope that it will keep the peace until a better basis can be found. To find a better basis must be our objective; but let us realise that it may take a long time to find it.
That leads me to the fifth point, the rôle of diplomacy as part of the wider complex of defence. The quiet and patient work of Foreign Offices and Ambassadors has born its fruit in the settlements reached about Trieste, Egypt and Persia. The more spectacular journeys of our own Foreign Secretary have brought results of the highest value for the peace of the world. In a wider field still, the field of disarmament, there is hope that talks may continue; and so long as talks continue we can still work patiently, if not perhaps very hopefully, for a scheme of real and comprehensive disarmament, with secure and workable safeguards.

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It seems to me that, if war can be avoided, given time and patience all these healing processes can go on. Given a respite from major conflict, we may come to a tolerable, if still perhaps uneasy and disturbed, period of co-existence. This would be the more likely to happen if there were to be signs of a favourable evolution in fundamental attitudes in Moscow. The evidence of history (I am not here speaking of Marxist history) would suggest that in course of time this may come about. But it cannot be said with any certainty that these signs have yet appeared, and it would in any event be unwise to count on spectacular results from any new negotiations. High-level conferences held for conference's sake are apt to bring disillusion and carry danger. There is perhaps more to be hoped for from the steady play of normal and discreet contacts. There are ample means for inter-Governmental communication through the well-tried machinery of diplomacy. We have in present service Ambassadors who, in general attainments, professional skill and capacity to handle great affairs, can stand beside any we have had in the past. I am not sure that they are being sufficiently used. Certainly the prevalent assumption, fostered by the public, by the Press, and also by Parliament, that the Foreign Secretary must so often conduct negotiations in person, is tending to place on one man's shoulders a burden heavier than one man ought to be called upon to bear.
For all that, however, I think the time is approaching when a Ministerial conference with the Soviet. Union might well be held, perhaps even at the top level. Since the Potsdam Conference in 1945, repeated attempts have been made to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union, particularly about Germany; but they have all failed. There would be no harm in trying again, once the Paris Agreements have come into force, to see whether there can be some approach to an agreement on Germany—and not on Germany alone, but also on other well-defined, specific issues arising out of present tensions. It seems to me that on the strength of the Paris Agreements, on the strength of the reinforcement which they will bring to the solidarity of the Western World, on the strength of the other arrangements which have been made around the periphery of the Communist land-mass, and on the strength of
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what we are given to believe is a still substantial predominance in nuclear weapons, and a declared determination to use them if need be, the Western Powers could enter a conference with calm and confidence, and with a firm basis upon which to negotiate. The best preparation for such a conference is to attend to the business of defence in all its many aspects. This, I submit, is what Her Majesty's Government and their partners are now doing, and that, in my submission, is why the White Paper is to be commended.
Finally I should like to comment briefly on one passage which is to be found in paragraph 24 of the White Paper. It is there stated—I quote:
"In the last resort, most of us must feel that determination to face the threat of physical devastation, even on the immense scale which must now be foreseen, is manifestly preferable to an attitude of subservience to militant Communism, with the national and individual humiliation that this would inevitably bring."
This seems to be a considerable under-statement. What is at issue is not merely national or individual humiliation—that could, perhaps, be lived through. What is at stake is the future of the free world, which the adversary would like step by step to subjugate; and the future of Western civilisation, based on the freedom of the human spirit, the sanctity of the individual and the rule of law, which the adversary, as at present minded, means progressively to subvert if he can. That is why it might be necessary to take a decisive stand on what might, at first sight, appear to be a minor issue.
It is sometimes suggested that we ought to offer concessions for the sake of peace, and that we ought to be ready to give up some of our old loyalties in order to save the world from the catastrophe of nuclear warfare. But what concessions could we make? What loyalties could we surrender that would be at the same time sufficient to satisfy and buy off the adversary, and yet not so fundamental as to deliver the citadel into his hands? If once we started to surrender the essential loyalties, the loyalty of the believer to his faith; of the patriot to his country; of the scholar and scientist to their intellectual integrity; of the artist to the imperative dictates of his inspiration; and, above all, the loyalty of the common man to honour and good faith, the end would be near. But there is no need for

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us to contemplate such surrenders. If, in calmness, confidence and unity of purpose, the free peoples attend to their defence in all its various aspects, on the lines now marked out, we can have good hope that no such dire choice will be forced upon us. But if such a choice were presented, it is not to be doubted that the answer which free men would give would be in the spirit of that unbending maxim which has been called the general maxim of the laws:
"Let justice be done, though the heavens fall."
5.15 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I hope to confine my observations to some of the more evident political and moral aspects of the White Paper, and not, I hasten to add, the ethical and religious aspects. I have neither the knowledge nor the experience to follow many of the highly important technical and military arguments advanced by so many noble Lords, and with so much authority, in this debate; nor can I hope to add anything to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Strang. It is my good luck and my misfortune alike that I seem to have developed the habit of following the noble Lord in debate. It is my good luck because, like others of your Lordships, I get the advantage of the brilliant clarity of his analysis. It is my ill-fortune that I fear inevitably the poverty and confusion of my own thought must be exposed. Some noble Lords will consider that the noble Lord, Lord Strang, was unduly pessimistic. I do not consider that he was pessimistic, but what real grounds can we perceive for optimism in the human situation to-day?
I am a layman—and an ignorant one at that; but when I reflect upon the hydrogen bomb, upon the cobalt bomb which will no doubt follow, and upon other things which, in the coming years, may follow that, I should not be prepared to say with great assurance that, by the end of this century, there will be much left of civilisation, human life or any life on this planet. I see no grounds for either optimism, or despair. I hope that, in what I now say, I shall give no offence to any noble Lords whose views may differ from mine, and whose grounds for forming a judgment are at least as good as, and probably much better than, my
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own. Though I see no grounds for optimism, I see a real danger in indulging a facile optimism, the kind of optimism that supposes we shall, somehow, talk ourselves out of the tragic situation which enmeshes us; that if only we can meet the enemy at the gate, and get together round the table with the Russians, then all this terror will disappear. I can understand many good, intelligent and experienced people taking that view, but I believe that high-level talks in the foreseeable future would do nothing to avert the danger hanging over mankind, and might do something to bring it nearer.
Those who urgently seek immediate talks with the Russians on the hydrogen bomb do so because they believe that, at bottom, the Russians see in the bomb the same threat to civilisation that we ourselves see. I do not believe that. The Russians see no threat to civilisation because they do not value civilisation; and the extent to which they see the hydrogen bomb as a threat to civilisation does not prejudice them against it: if anything, that prejudices them in its favour. In every Party, and all over the land, there are those who hold the view that it should be our duty, in this country, to draw together the Soviet Union and the United States of America, nations which now are apart, to the peril of us all, because of fears, it is said, which in some way we can conjure away. I believe that that view has very dangerous implications indeed, for it ignores altogether one very important fact—that is that, by and large, and broadly speaking, the Soviet Union is determined, if it can, to bring Western civilisation, as we know it, down in ruins; and the United States is determined, in so far as it can, to preserve Western civilisation as we know it. I greatly fear that if, in those circumstances, we try to act the part of the honest broker all we shall do is to incur, on the one side, deep suspicion, and, on the other, utter contempt.
It seems to me that there is one cardinal fact that we have got to get hold of in this country, and it is one of the clues to our present difficulties. The Russians have no more the same view of life, the same standards, the same values as Western civilisation, than the Barbarians of antiquity had the same view of life, the same values, and the same standards

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as the Roman Empire. If I say that Russia is a barbarian society, I hope that I shall not be thought, either here or elsewhere, to be forgetful of the very generous hospitality which I and others of your Lordships received at the hands of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union only a short time ago. I do not forget that hospitality. I do not forget the great kindness of our hosts, and I do not forget the very great friendliness which the Russian people, wherever we met them, showed to us. If I say that the Soviet Union is a barbarian society I do not mean that the Russian people go about dressed in skins or in woad, or that they use stone implements or paint pictures on the walls of caves—of course not. They are a highly gifted people. They have great writers, great musicians, great engineers and great generals. When I say that they are a barbarian people I am using the expression not in a pejorative or abusive sense but in a classical or technical sense. I hold that—except for occasional sporadic moments—they have never been members of an international society. Their relations with other peoples have been the relations of the Barbarians with ancient Rome, or of the Red Indians with the early American settlers—sudden forays across the frontier; and that is all.
When I went with the Parliamentary delegation to the Soviet Union there were two things which, more than anything else, impressed me. One of them was the reality of the Russian feeling for security. Before I went there, I had the idea that all the talk about danger from the Germans that we heard from the Russians, all the talk about fear of invasion, all the talk about their being surrounded by American bases, was just a sort of smokescreen behind which they were hatching nefarious plots against the Western world. I came to the conclusion that I was wrong, that that feeling was perfectly genuine. The Parliamentary delegation travelled over the length of European Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and we saw for the whole thousand miles—or whatever it was—the shell craters, the wrecked tanks, the ruined villages, right away across the European Continent. And when one saw that one understood that the Russian feeling for security was as genuine as any human feeling could be.
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Unhappily, that does not get us very much further, because Russian ideas of security—ideas which derive from the fact that, as I have said, they have never belonged to an international society—are such that security for Russia means inevitably absolute insecurity for everyone else. In this country, in the United States, in France, in any Western country, we are anxious about our security; but we have to put up with 70 per cent. or 75 per cent. security. For the rest, we have to rely upon alliances, balances of power, agreements with our neighbours and so on. The Russians rely on nothing except themselves, and they do not feel secure until they hold everything. If we go to a high-level conference with the Russians in any immediate future, they will be after security. But what they will mean by security, I am certain, is that they have Western Germany where now they have Eastern Germany—under their heel; that they have 300 Communist Deputies in the French Chamber; that the United States of America withdraws altogether from Europe; that we in this island are completely isolated; and that the hydrogen bomb and thermo-nuclear warfare are banned for everybody except the Soviet Union. I am certain that if there were a high-level conference that is what the Russians would seek to get out of it.
There is just one further thing I should like to say to your Lordships. I said a moment or two ago that there were two convictions with which I came back from Russia. The second conviction, too, was one which I did not have until I went to the Soviet Union—it was that the Soviet Government are just as much afraid of the hydrogen bomb as we are, and just as little willing to be on the receiving end of it. And the fact that they may have a bomb of their own, does not, I think, necessarily alter the value, for what it is worth, of that view, because it seems to me to be one of the characteristics—a characteristic which is entirely novel—of thermo-nuclear warfare that there can arise a situation in which possession of the weapon by oneself, no matter in whatever quantities, cannot protect a nation against the consequences of thermonuclear warfare. And that, of course, I take to be the key, the central part, of this White Paper. That is why I support it.
Before I sit down, I should like to reinforce something that was said by my

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noble friend Lord Strang. He said that one day the time might come when a high-level conference would be appropriate. I agree with him, and I suggest to your Lordships that that day will come when the Russians genuinely seek that kind of conference in the same way and in the same spirit as we seek it. At present, in my view, there is no evidence whatever that any Russian approach on disarmament has contained in it any degree of sincerity. It has contained this real anxiety about Russian national security which I have tried to outline. I hold that the Russians are as afraid of the atom bomb as we are, but they do not talk about their fears quite so much. If we go to them urgently seeking a conference on the hydrogen bomb now, with our fears expressed every day from every platform and in every newspaper, we shall go in an attitude almost of supplication; and the result is bound to be disastrous. But if we have patience and if, above all, we maintain our unity, the day will come when the Russians will ask us for a genuine conference; and if on that day we are no longer in an attitude of supplication, then I think there may be some hope from it.
5.32 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, like the last speaker, I find myself in agreement with the White Paper. It must be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government that on this White Paper, which enshrines about the most important decision that ever has been taken, they are receiving the support of the whole country, with almost negligible exceptions. For them it must be a source of satisfaction. I am sure it is a source of strength to us and to our political institutions, and that is very important.
I regret the speech to which we have just listened. I differ from it profoundly. I find in it so many statements which conflict with other statements. I thought there was something for almost everybody to choose. But of this I am certain: the Party to which I belong adopted this policy when we were in office; Her Majesty's Government are adopting it today. We must negotiate with Russia when we can, but we must negotiate from strength. If we go supplicating with no strength at all, if we try to negotiate from weakness, I agree that that can do more
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harm than good. But if we negotiate at the proper moment, not from weakness but from strength, and if we show enough patience and, as the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of York said in his memorable speech yesterday, if we are prepared to put up with many rebuffs, good may come of it. I do not think it helpful or useful, or encouraging to the people of this country, to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said in one passage in his speech, that the Russians really do not mind if we destroy Russia; that they are quite determined to destroy us; or that they and we have completely different conceptions of civilisation.
I firmly believe that the policy we have to pursue at the present time is the policy stated in the White Paper. I think we have no option but to make the hydrogen bomb. The most reverend Primate put for me the moral issue, and answered it as I would answer it. I come from a Quaker stock. I can understand and respect, though I have never conformed to, the Quaker argument against any weapons of war at all. If we commit ourselves to a force using conventional weapons, I fail to see why we should not have these further weapons. I find it utterly illogical. If we are going to have bombs at all, surely we must have the most efficient bombs. What is the sense in saying that we should have bombs so long as they are not efficient? I cannot follow it. And, of course, if we have bombs, we must have the means of delivering the bombs; and that means we must have the most efficient Air Force we can contrive to have. At the pace at which we are going, I suppose that in the future the aeroplane may be completely outmoded as a means of conveying bombs. It is quite possible that in the future it will all be done by some kind of rocket, but for the present moment I understand that the only way the bombs can be delivered is by aeroplanes; and therefore we must surely have the most efficient.
I was interested and refreshed by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Strang: I thought it an admirable analysis of the whole problem. It was a speech which might well have been made in a foreign affairs debate, he will agree; but that merely illustrates the point that foreign affairs and defence are inextricably mixed up together. We cannot consider one

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without the other. And with his powerful and penetrating analysis I would respectfully express my entire concurrence. I think it is odd that until the noble Lord, Lord Strang, mentioned it, no one had raised the question of the circumstances in which it would be right and appropriate that the hydrogen bomb should be used, though, as your Lordships may remember, that caused a considerable difference of opinion, even amongst members of my own Party, in another place.
I agree with the noble Lord that it is completely impossible to try to set out a catalogue of cases in which we shall use the bomb. We cannot do anything of the sort. I think it would be very foolish to accept the proposition that we shall use the bomb only if the other side use it first, because that means that we have all the pressure of conventional weapons. We might have the Russians advancing towards the Channel ports, if they find that they can do that satisfactorily, and by our statement we should be precluded from using the bomb. It would be just as foolish not to use it in that case as it would be foolish to use it in what I might describe as a frontier incident. We cannot conceivably put out a catalogue of cases in which we are or are not going to use the bomb.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strang, in saying that the only thing we must plainly state is that the decision on whether the bomb shall or shall not be used is a decision which is to be made by the statesman and not by the soldier, however eminent the soldier may be. I hope it follows from that—and I should like to ask the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, this question—that bombs in this country, whatever the source of their manufacture, will never be used from this country save with the consent of the Government of the day. I was a member of the Government which authorised, and, indeed, invited, the American Air Force to come over here; and from the American Air Force we have derived great strength and help. It is inconceivable to me that, in the event of a war concerning Europe in which America is engaged and we are not (though at the present time it is difficult to imagine such a war), the Americans would use their Air Force situated in this country—would use this country, in short, as a kind of aircraft carrier—for their own purposes.
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I mention this matter particularly because my noble friend Lord Huntingdon, who spoke yesterday, made a thoughtful speech to which he had obviously given great care. He expressed the view that we must not be made to use the bomb in any circumstances which our Government, supported by our own people, have not determined and decided. As a corollary to that, my noble friend came to the conclusion that we ought to ask the Americans to withdraw their forces. I am quite satisfied in my own mind that there is no question whatever of the use of the American Air Force from this country, or of the delivery of bombs from this country, save with the full authorisation and consent of Her Majesty's Government in this country. I think it would be worth while if the noble Marquess would confirm me, if I am right, to put this matter beyond all doubt, because a misapprehension (as I venture to think) in the mind of a noble Lord as careful and accurate as my noble friend Lord Huntingdon may well have gone further afield. In the mean-time, we must, as the most reverend Primate said, rely on the deterrent, "frail and temporary" (to use his adjectives) as the deterrent is, until we can get something better. And for the rest, while we have a resting time (if we have) by reason of the deterrent, we must do our best, in season and out of season, at appropriate times, of course, by all the means we can, to seek a better understanding between the two peoples; and we must show that infinite patience which the late Mr. Bevin used to teach me was the one requirement of a Foreign Secretary.
That leads me to ask three questions on matters that I feel ought to be cleared up, of which I have given the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, notice. Believing as I do, contrary to the last speaker, that the more chance there is of the different peoples meeting each other, the better, I would call attention to the suggestion made in another place by the Leader of the Opposition: that there should be a meeting of the scientists, preferably from both this side and the other side of the Iron Curtain, in order that they may explore and give an authoritative statement on the nature and consequences of this bomb, and also to discuss the question whether the continuation of these experiments might in

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itself do considerable harm. The Foreign Secretary, while quite ready to state that he would not oppose such an idea—indeed, he said that he would be ready to consider it—did not, on the spur of the moment, say more than that. It may be that the noble Marquess will be able to say today whether the Government, having looked at this matter, think it a good idea; and if so, whether they will do what they can to enlarge the scope of the meeting of scientists, which I believe is to be held at Geneva shortly, so that they may consider this question. I very much hope that scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain will attend; but, even if they do not, I feel that it would be a good thing for our scientists to set out quite plainly what they believe the consequences of this bomb to be on the health and life of the people.
LORD COLERAINE: Perhaps I may interrupt the noble and learned Earl to ask a question. This is obviously an interesting idea. But assuming that scientists did come from the other side of the Iron Curtain, does the noble and learned Earl believe that we should get from them an objective and scientific report? Would there not be some danger of our getting from them, as it were, a political report?
EARL JOWITT: I have no doubt that there would be a danger of that. But they would be in contact with our scientists, and our scientists would be in a better position to give their views if they knew the views of the Soviet scientists. I believe it is a mistake, because you do not altogether trust these people, to say that you are never going to have any dealings with them.
The second question I want to ask of the noble Marquess arises out of an obscurity, at least to my mind, in what the Foreign Secretary said—it may be owing to my own lack of knowledge about these matters, or I may be probing into some point which is too delicate, and if the noble Marquess tells me that I am, I will pass from it. The Foreign Secretary was being asked in another place about the tests which are going on —it was thought that the mere number of tests might in itself be a serious danger—and he said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 538 (No. 52), col. 1077]:
"Unfortunately, an explosion is not the final … expression of what is going on. We cannot exclude the possibility of experiments being carried out now without explosions."
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Then later the Leader of the Opposition asked this (col. 1078):
"Do these other experiments which cannot be detected destroy the atmosphere, so to speak, as explosions do?"
Sir Anthony Eden then answered:
"That may not be the case. That is the other problem—the problem of the effect, and it is a very important one."
That was reported in the newspapers under the heading, "Bombs without bangs." I am at a loss to understand whether or not it means that if, as a result of a previous explosion, we have constructed a bomb, there is no need to explode it each time; we can go on and mass produce it. If that is what it means, then I fully understand. But is there something more in it than that; and, if so, can we be told the nature of these experiments and these tests? If the noble Marquess could say something about it, I should be grateful to him.
The third question I want to ask is this. It is obvious that just because we are going to make the hydrogen bomb we cannot thereupon get rid of our conventional weapons. I want to stress this danger, however—I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Strang, quite put this danger, as I see it. I believe that the danger of the spread of Communism is largely combined with poverty and lack of food. I believe that the world as it is to-day, with its teeming and rapidly increasing population, ought to devote a much larger portion of its capital resources to increasing the areas supplying food. Unfortunately, we have to devote a huge proportion of our capital resources to these weapons of destruction; and, those resources not being available twice over, they cannot be devoted to the other purpose.
Therefore, the removal of poverty and ill conditions, which I believe to be the breeding ground of Communism (we all believe that; in fact we know it), is one of the considerations which every Government must have in mind. We spent vast sums of money on rearmament in our day. There must always be the question of striking a balance: how much can we afford to spend on these things which we take away from the other? That makes me wonder whether we are not in danger of straining ourselves too much by carrying on at the present rate with both nuclear and conventional weapons. In my view, that point needs

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to be thought about. What I should like to ask the noble Marquess is whether he sees any hope at all, by reason of our possession of the nuclear bomb, that we may be able to reduce somewhat our expenditure on conventional weapons, if not in the immediate future, then in the distant future. If so, I believe that would be some message of hope. Those are the three questions I wanted to ask the noble Marquess, and I have given him notice of them.
There is one topic upon which I should like to ask a few questions of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, because when talking to people I find rather a sense of despair about civil defence. The most reverend Primate said yesterday—and I have no doubt he was correct—that if a bomb were exploded on Liverpool, not only would it destroy Liverpool but, given the right sort of wind, it would destroy all life in Manchester, Leeds, Bradford and Halifax, right across to the North Sea, provided—the most reverend Primate was careful to say—they did not take the necessary steps to protect themselves. On hearing that, many people have said to me, "What is the good of civil defence at all? If this awful bomb is to be let loose, why, trouble about it?" I believe that to be wrong, first, because it seems so entirely a defeatist point of view, and, secondly, because if we have an adequate civil defence system we shall convince everybody, including the Russians, that we are taking this matter seriously. Therefore I think we must get some good civil defence service. I do not blame the Government for not having thought the matter out fully at the present time, but I believe it is something we have to think about very fully. I assume that the most reverend Primate was approximately right in the information he gave to the House; I have no doubt he would not have made that statement without informing himself from competent sources.
I should like to ask whether the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has had his attention called to a letter which was published in the New Statesman by Professor Haldane on March 12—the White Paper was issued in February. I am not a follower of Professor Haldane, but on this particular topic I imagine he knows what he is talking about. He emphasised his view that much more might be done by shelters than the Government, from their White Paper, seem to think. I should
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like to ask whether the Government have anything more to say on that topic. Then I should like to ask them about protective clothing. I should like to know whether medical science today is able to do anything to help people who are suffering from the effects of radiation, and, if so, whether tentative arrangements are being made to try to bring that about. I should like to ask the noble Lord generally what he is doing, or contemplates doing in the future, with regard to the stockpiling of food, and so on. I think it would be useful if he said something about that in expansion of what is in the White Paper, if only to destroy the unwarranted pessimism, as I think it is, which is current about this matter.
I do not suppose the noble Lord can tell us anything about the length of war we should have to contemplate. Would it be a war that would end in an afternoon, or a war which might last for months or for years? It may be quite impossible to say, but I am sure that any help the noble Lord can give us in this debate will be of value. He must get the people on his side and tell them, by every medium of instruction—television, wireless, Press and every other way—what they can do. It is not the custom of the British people to do nothing under emergencies, but at this time they particularly want to be told what they have to do. I hope I have not kept your Lordships too long, but I should be grateful if the noble Lords, between them, could answer those few questions.
5.54 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I am afraid that your Lordships must be beginning to feel that you have had almost too much of Government speakers in this debate. You have already had a speech from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, then you had a speech by the Secretary of State for Air, now you are faced with a speech by me; and, finally, as your Lordships know, there is to be a speech by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence who is to wind up the debate.
As I think the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, very rightly pointed out, in the speech to which we have been listening, just as in every Foreign Affairs debate there is an element of defence, so in

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every Defence debate there is an element of foreign affairs. This, of course, has already been trenched upon yesterday, especially in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and the speech of the most reverend Primate, in which he gave such wise and courageous counsel to your Lordships; and it has been trenched upon again to-day by the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Strang, in particular, and the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, who speak with great authority and experience on these subjects. Indeed, I feel that on this particular aspect of our discussions very little remains for me to say. I rise merely to underline, as briefly as I can from this particular Bench on which I sit, what those noble Lords have said.
This debate has, of course, inevitably been dominated, first, by the emergence of the hydrogen bomb as a new and revolutionary factor in human affairs and, secondly, by the decision of Her Majesty's Government to manufacture that bomb. The week before last, the Prime Minister, in what I think will go down as one of the greatest of his speeches, reviewed the situation which has been created by the bomb and gave the reasons which have decided the present Government to manufacture it. I have no desire to venture far less effectively over the same ground that he so magnificently covered; but there is one thing I would say, and I think I must say it. My right honourable friend, in his speech, described the policy of the Government in this respect as the policy of the deterrent. That description has, I notice, been criticised in certain quarters as something new and inherently unsound—not in any positive sense of policy at all; rather the negation of a policy. But there is, in fact, nothing new about the policy of a deterrent—indeed, I should have thought it had been the basis of all foreign and defence policies since the beginning of time. It was certainly the basis of the policy of the balance of power which underlay our whole foreign policy up to 1914 and, equally, I would have thought, it was a main feature of the policy of the League of Nations which succeeded it, and of the United Nations which succeeded the League of Nations. All these policies aimed at convincing an intending aggressor that he could not win, and so removing his incentive to go to war. That
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was one of the main purposes for which they were framed. No doubt someone may fairly retort to me that that is no argument for the present policy, because all those past examples, as we all know to our sorrow, failed in their object.
Before we come to that melancholy conclusion, I should have thought that we ought to carry our argument just one step further, and ask: Why did those policies fail? They failed, I am pro-foundly convinced, not because the policy of deterrent was in itself a bad thing, but because the deterrent was inadequate. They failed because the aggressor still believed—as I think the noble Lord, Lord Strang, pointed out in his speech this afternoon—that he could "get away with it"; that the result of his gamble would be the aggrandisement of himself and his country, and that his country at any rate was not likely to suffer serious damage as a result of his aggression. Generally, most fortunately, that calculation has proved to be ill-founded, and I think I should be correct in saying that the great majority of the decisive battles of the world have been victories for defenders rather than for aggressors. But, of course, they were all, or nearly all, victories which were won at terrible cost, in the course of wars which previous policies had failed to prevent.
It is here that I suggest the discovery of thermo-nuclear weapons, so terrible in almost all other ways, may have introduced an entirely new element into the international scene. For instance, would Xerxes, Philip of Spain, Napoleon or Hitler have embarked on their attempts at domination if they had known that within a few days, perhaps within a few hours, their own countries would have been devastated and their populations largely obliterated by crippling retaliation which they could do nothing to prevent? In such circumstances, would they have embarked on the policies on which they did? Yet, as I see it, that is very much the position today.
The noble Lord, Lord Wise, in a speech which was delivered to us yesterday afternoon, asked me how many thermonuclear bombs would be necessary to destroy this country. For obvious reasons, I do not want to go into details on a matter of that kind, but I think I can say, broadly, that, under conditions of thermo-nuclear warfare, it really does not

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matter whether a country is big or small, whether it streches over millions of square miles, like the United States, Russia and China, or whether it is a little island like our own. These new weapons could put it, to use the Prime Minister's own phrase, "on an equality or near equality of vulnerability."
As I see it, that means, in plain words, that the same devastation, the same vast loss of life, would be common to all alike: to these great wide countries and to the smaller ones like our own—that is, of course, if the bombers and the bombs can get through in sufficient quantities. The method, in fact, already exists to produce that frightful result. It is only a question of the number and size of the bombs that are necessary, and, as I have said, of the capacity to deliver them on to the target. As I see it, that is what is new; and I think it is entirely new. The novelty resides not in the existence of a deterrent but in the nature and extent of the deterrent which is now available and which, I should hope, differentiates it from all other deterrents of the past. That is something, I suggest, which entirely transforms the situation. It is a factor which every intending aggressor will from now on have to take into account.
It may be asked (I think it was the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, who mentioned this point): if the power of this deterrent is so overwhelming, why should we continue to spend money on pre-nuclear armaments, on armies, on navies, on air forces and on the weapons which they carry? Why not scrap them all? That, at any rate, so it is argued, would be something gained. That is an argument which I know is widely, and I think not unnaturally, used among certain sections of opinion in this country; and we must admit that it has superficial attractions. But, like the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who made such a powerful speech, I thought, yesterday afternoon, I cannot help feeling that we should be extremely unwise to act with such precipitation as that before we even knew how we stood under these new and untried conditions. Russia herself has certainly not fallen into that particular error. As your Lordships know, she has, so I am told, stepped up her armed forces to nearly 5 million men, although she constantly tells us that she is well ahead of the Western world in thermo-nuclear weapons.
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Why does she do that? Very possibly, if I may diffidently suggest it, just for the reason that she hopes that nuclear weapons will be banned: so that she will have a clear way through to domination of the world. Moreover, in any case, in this, if I may so describe it, twilight period between an old and a new world, the ground forces, I should have thought, must play a vital part in marking the line beyond which Communist forces must not go without provoking a general conflict. If there are these huge forces, these millions of men, on one side of the line and none on the other, I should have thought it was almost certain that the dividing line would steadily get less clear, less defined, and that the Eastern sphere of influence would gradually, almost imperceptibly, lap forward until a point was suddenly reached where a halt had to be called; and at that point the danger of war would be very real indeed. It is far better, I suggest, that the line should be drawn now and that it should be made clear that, if that line is crossed, it will mean war, with all the new and incalculable hazards which war involves for an aggressor and for a defender. Therefore I submit to the House, without going into any further detail, that we cannot at present do without conventional forces, though the character of those forces must, of course, take account of the new situation.
There is, in addition—and this point has not yet been mentioned this afternoon—the most important work of a police character which the British Army and the British Navy are always liable to have to do, and which, as we all know, the Army is doing at this moment with extreme efficiency and devotion in places like Malaya and Kenya, and others. In these circumstances, I must say frankly to the noble and learned Earl that I do not see much chance at present of making the sort of reductions which he has in mind. But this, like all other aspects of defence, is just one of those matters that successive Governments will have to bear constantly in mind in the new situation with which we are faced.
For the same reason, the uncertainty of the position, I was very glad to hear the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, say from the Opposition Bench that he thought that we should be very unwise to pledge ourselves not to be the first to

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use the nuclear weapon. I entirely agree with him. I hope, of course, as we all do most profoundly, that we shall never be put in the position of having to use it. That is common ground in all parts of the House. But definitely to pledge ourselves not to be the first to do so would, I should have thought, largely destroy the deterrent which the possession of a weapon provides. That, I believe, is the correct answer to a point which was made yesterday by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, that Her Majesty's Government ought to tell the people, much more than they have done up to now, exactly what we intend to do in this matter.
As the House will know, the Foreign Secretary, dealing with this particular question in another place on December 22 last year, made it absolutely clear that that particular decision would be a matter for Governments when the time came. He added [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 535, col. 2763]:
"It will, for obvious reasons, not be possible to publish the detailed arrangements finally arrived at."
I think we should all understand his proviso. After all, we all wish to tell everything we possibly can, so far as we can do it without imperilling the cause of peace. But we must always remember that anything that we say publicly here in England we are saying also to our potential enemies; and that, as the noble Lord, Lord Strang, pointed out, would not necessarily serve the cause of peace. If those potential enemies, whoever they may be, could discount the possibility that a weapon would be used against them unless they used it first, there would be nothing to prevent the Communist Powers, with their vast land forces, from sweeping across Europe and Asia. The dreadful experiences of our own prisoners of war, which were published within the last few week, can show us something of what that would mean for the populations of Western Europe.
No, my Lords, if we believe, as I profoundly do, that this frightful new weapon is a deterrent such as there has never been before, I pray that we should do nothing to weaken the force which that deterrent provides. I would, however, in answer to a specific question which the noble and learned Earl put to me, say this:
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he is quite right in assuming that bombs which are based on our shores, even if they are in the hands of the American squadrons here, will not be used without our full agreement. I thought he would like to have that definite assurance. But if, for obvious reasons, we cannot define our position clearly as to the circumstances in which we should and should not use nuclear weapons, I feel it is equally important that we should do everything we can in our policy to ensure that they are never used unless it is absolutely necessary. I think everybody would accept that. To my mind, that is the supreme argument in favour of our manufacturing the bomb ourselves.
As my noble friend Lord Hailsham said yesterday, there are those who, for whatever reason, would like our country to dissociate itself as far as possible from what they call "this evil thing," and leave the full responsibility to our allies. I read a letter a few days ago in The Times which strongly expressed that view. I am not going to read the whole letter, but I should like to read two sentences to your Lordships. The writer said:
"Whether we like it or not we are already, and will continue to be, so long as the alliance lasts, shielded by the United States' possession of the bombs. A small additional stockpile accumulated at great cost in Britain adds nothing to the existing deterrent, but may increase our own danger if it attracts the enemy's bombs on Britain on the outbreak of hostilities."
That, if I may say so, is not a very heroic view. But, apart from that, and what is perhaps even more important, it is not, I believe, a very wise one. It seems that there is a rather pathetic hope, which is still hugged by neutralists in this and other countries, that, just by sitting tight and doing nothing, we can keep out of trouble. Surely, to any reasonable man that theory, that illusion, should have been finally exploded by the experience of such countries as Holland, Belgium and Norway in the last war. The truth, the hard, inescapable fact, is that no one, however passive, can keep out of modern world war; all will ultimately be sucked in, as it suits the convenience of one or other party to the conflict. In attempting to conceal that fact from oneself, one is not being fair either to one's own connection, I have no doubt that the should achieve in fact by refusing to manufacture the hydrogen bomb would

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be, as I see it, to throw away gratuitously all right to be regarded as a great nation, and with it all power to influence or control the use of the bomb by anybody else, by any of our allies.
At present, as we all know, our experience, our authority, our record of courage and resolution in the last two World Wars, has won us a position in the councils of our allies whereby what we say is bound to have a profound influence. But were we now to try to shuffle off the greatest and most dangerous of our responsibilities on our friends and allies, I am quite certain that all that we have gained by our courage and endurance would immediately and irretrievably be lost. We should sink at once to the position of a second-rate or third-rate nation, as open as we are now to the dangers of the future, but with no power to influence the course of events. It might quite fairly be said that without these weapons it is not possible in the modern world for a great country to have an effective foreign policy at all, just as in earlier days it was not possible to have an effective policy without armies and navies.
I am certain that this is a situation in which boldness will pay. We must trust that this new deterrent will give us a breathing space, and we must use that breathing space to try and find some enduring modus vivendi between the Communist and the non-Communist world. I should have liked to say, "some enduring basis for peace. "Indeed, I do not believe—I refuse to believe—that even that is yet impossible; stranger things have happened in the history of the world. After all, new situations have arisen when the circumstances in which old enmities, old rivalries—rivalries on the Continent, rivalries over Colonial possessions, dynastic issues, religious differences—have no longer existed; they have, just ceased to be. A classic example of this is that up to a hundred years ago France and this country could never agree. Yet to-day, except as an historical fact, and nothing more, that enmity is entirely forgotten. It is not impossible that what has happened once can happen again.
Peaceful co-existence, which I am sorry to say now is very little more than a synonym for cold war, can easily mean something more. It can mean two systems of government ready and prepared to
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eliminate, so far as possible, the differences that exist between them, and over the remainder to agree peacefully to differ, until perhaps those problems settle themselves, as international questions sometimes do. But that requires, as Lord Strang has said this afternoon, a change of heart on the part of Russia and China, of which at present there is no evidence. We should be foolish if we tried to blink that fact. Yet it is for that supreme aim—and here I would agree with the most reverend Primate—that we must patiently and untiringly continue to work by all and every means in our power. We should be ready to examine every plan and every device that is likely to reduce the danger of another world war.
The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, has asked me what are the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the suggestion of the Leader of the Opposition in another place that the scientists of the nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain should meet and produce an agreed statement as to the short-term and long term effects of radiation—I understand that to be the proposal. We must all recognise the right honourable gentleman's deep and genuine concern in this matter—indeed, no one in any Party, I should have thought, would wish to neglect any step that could be of any real use in reducing the dangers with which we are to-day faced. But, with all deference to Mr. Attlee, I personally do not think that it would be wise to pin too high hopes to this particular proposal. The salient facts with regard to radiation are, after all, already known and are being further studied. As I think he himself said, they are now being released to the public, both in the United States and elsewhere, as opportunity occurs. I do not believe that the scientists concerned world in fact gain much new light by joint confabulations such as the right honourable gentleman had in mind.
Moreover, all our hard experience goes to show—I am sorry that it should be so, but it is no use blinking the fact—that the scientists who come from Communist countries do not come in reality as independent scientists like ours do; they come as Government agents primed to sing the Government's song. In that connection, I have no doubt that the House will have taken full account of the

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description of the Russian mentality which was given us by Lord Strang just now. In such circumstances, I am afraid it is at least doubtful how far such a conference would help to achieve the objects which the right honourable gentleman has in mind. I believe that the primary object of those Communist scientists who are likely to come would be to get, rather than to give, information, and that it might be impossible for other scientists freely to discuss with them the effects of thermo-nuclear weapons without divulging information on the nature of those weapons which it may be extremely undesirable that they should have.
As noble Lords will know, for I have said it many times in this House, I am all in favour of the free exchange of views, so far as that can be achieved, from side to side of the Iron Curtain. I believe that, in the long run, nothing is more likely to help in ending this unhappy division of the world into two hostile camps; but, frankly, I am doubtful of the wisdom of beginning this admirable process at the present stage, by an exchange of views as to the nature and effects of thermo-nuclear weapons; nor do I think that the inhabitants of the Communist world would be allowed to hear the results of those inquiries. Yet that is the main object of the exercise. I do not want to be entirely negative. What I have said does not mean that Her Majesty's Government feel that there should not be possibly quite fruitful discussions between responsible scientists, and that people should not be told as much as is practicable about the effects of these weapons. I believe that is absolutely right. It is of no use to conceal hard facts, especially from the British people, who are well able to take them. How that can best be done must be a matter for careful thought.
I would remind the House that all these are matters not only for ourselves but for our allies also. I am not yet certain whether there will be any extension of the terms of reference of the projected conference to be held in Geneva next August. I think noble Lords will remember that the main purpose of that conference, and the reason why it was put forward by President Eisenhower and the United States Government, was the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. An extension of this kind would
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hardly be in tune with that object, but I agree that it is a matter to which further consideration must be given, and Her Majesty's Government will give it that consideration. I hope the House will allow me to leave the matter there.
During the debate there has been talk of the possibility of Four-Power top level discussions. As noble Lords will know, Her Majesty's Government have always favoured this proposal on a proper basis and have consistently advocated it; but, for reasons which I explained after my visit to Washington last year, it has not been possible to arrange such discussions. I fear the situation in that respect remains the same. I entirely agree with the noble and learned Earl that we should keep our eyes upon the possibility of such discussions, or any others, should the climate change. As the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said, the proper climate may not be there to-day, but I still feel we should watch out for it, especially after the London and Paris Agreements have been ratified. There would have been little purpose in doing so before. Were we to fail to keep our eyes open we should, as the noble Lord said, be guilty of dereliction of duty to our own people. I will say nothing upon disarmament, as the subject has already been dealt with by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton.
Finally, there is the suggestion specifically referred to by the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, that pending international agreement on thermo-nuclear weapons there should be a ban on further explosions. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary dealt with that point in a speech in another place this week. He explained that at the point which we have now reached such action might not necessarily have the effect that those who make the proposal hope. Experiments could continue to be made without, to use the noble Lord's phrase, "any bang." The noble and learned Earl asked what exactly my right honourable friend meant by that statement. The meaning is simple. When the nations first adventured into the field of atomic energy the terrain was completely unknown, and we had, therefore, to feel our way step by step by experiments which often involved explosions at every stage. Now much more is known of certain types of weapons and much can therefore be assumed which previously had to be checked by practical tests. For that reason further tests of certain types

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of weapon (though not every type) are becoming, to that extent, less necessary. I will not deceive the House: that does not mean that we can have no tests. If tests are necessary they must take place; but the area in which tests are unnecessary has no doubt been steadily extended, with our greater knowledge of the nature of these weapons. I hope I have given the noble and learned Earl the information he wanted.
EARL JOWITT: I was wondering about the odd expression, "the tests poisoning the atmosphere." Sir Anthony said this may not be the case. In view of the explanation of the noble Marquess, which is what I had anticipated, I see no question here of the "tests poisoning the atmosphere."
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think my right honourable friend had that in mind. If a test is made it has a certain effect on the atmosphere. I think my right honourable friend had in mind the fact that it is not necessary to have so many tests. Perhaps it is not entirely a good thing, because people can continue to make the bombs without other countries knowing so much about their doing so.
In conclusion, I would repeat that Her Majesty's Government entirely agree that in the present unhappy situation of the world every method of trying to improve the position must be explored; but for the success of that policy of patience a breathing space is necessary. The Lord Archbishop of York spoke of a "shield." I use the words "breathing space." In the view of Her Majesty's Government only the H-bomb can at the present time provide that breathing space which we need. Ban it, and where are we? We are back exactly to where we were between the wars, with the same deterrents that failed last time and yet with more formidable conventional forces arrayed against us. Is that a prospect which any of us would willingly face? Those are the reasons which have led Her Majesty's Government to come to their decision on this vital question on which depends the survival of all we hold dear. No thinking person could be a light-hearted optimist in the present situation, and if any noble Lord were to ask me whether this or anything else will provide us with a guarantee of absolute safety, my answer
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is bound to be that no policy will guarantee absolute safety. I submit that this policy, on a balance of considerations, gives the best hope of passing safely through the immeasurable dangers which to-day encompass us. It is for this policy, therefore, that we ask your Lordships' united support to-day.
6.30 p.m.
THE DUKE OF BUCCLEUCH AND QUEENSBERRY: My Lords, after listening to the discussion of matters of high importance I am grateful to be allowed to return to the more domestic affairs of the Territorial Army and Auxiliary Forces which have been mentioned several times. I will refer particularly to the effect of the recently announced disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command upon the voluntary element in Territorial anti-aircraft units. I think this is justified because of the major changes which affect a large percentage of the Territorial forces. Uneasiness has been expressed, here and in another place, as to the future of the Territorial anti-aircraft units and of the men in them, and there has been some rather strong criticism that the whole affair has been badly or clumsily handled, and that they have been left in unnecessary doubt as to their future. As it has been my privilege, since serving in a Territorial Army battalion, to be associated for a long time with the Council of the Territorial Army and Air Force Associations, and now, as chairman of the Council, to be much concerned in its administrative work including this particular problem, I venture to add a few remarks.
Lord Moynihan has spoken with the experience of one who has commanded anti-aircraft units and who knows the feelings of those serving in them. He has strongly impressed upon us the importance of losing no time in deciding upon fresh and suitable tasks and in assuring units to be disbanded that they are wanted, and quickly, even if in another form. In so far as there are doubts and anxiety as to the future, which to some extent is unavoidable, it is fair to say that steps were taken quickly to remove them, notably, for example, by setting up in each command representative boards to examine most thoroughly in their localities the cases of all affected units and individuals and to find the best ways of absorbing and re-employing them. If, on

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the other hand, decisions had been made hurriedly, wrong ones could easily occur, whereas what we all want is the right answer in each case, and not a wrong one.
Active consultation, in which the Mobile Defence Corps is included, is going on, and we in the Territorial Army Council realise that we must do our best to secure attractive openings for officers and other ranks. So far from its having been done carelessly, I would say quite simply that the greatest care has been taken by those concerned, from the Secretary of State downwards and at all levels, to announce and to carry out as helpfully and as smoothly as possible a big and difficult change which must tremendously affect the present and future of all those who are serving in the Territorial anti-aircraft units. This has been my experience; it has been confirmed to me by leading representatives of our Territorial Army associations, and I think it should be said here. With the regimental pride that is customary in this country, deep feeling and disappointment are natural when a sudden change of this kind is inevitable, with new methods of warfare bringing to an end our value in the form in which we have served and trained, but I feel that the Territorial Army units and all those voluntarily serving in them will recognise that it would be worse to continue to serve and to train with weapons and in ways that are out of date, and in a particular capacity which is no longer useful, and that recognition rather than criticism is due for an endeavour now to bring all these units and men again into the picture to greater advantage.
By no critic has disagreement been expressed with the actual decision to change our anti-aircraft defensive arrangements, and none has said in what better ways he could have made or announced the change. In these circumstances, it would seem a disservice to mislead volunteer members of Territorial anti-aircraft units with suggestions that their services are not valued and that something different and better could have been done. The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, in a most friendly speech about the Territorial Army, indicated, however, that there was among the men in his part of the country—the North of England—a feeling that there had been a lack of gratitude and thanks. I am sorry that that should be
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so. I do not know how it has come about. It is within my recollection that every care was taken to express high tribute to the men in the anti-aircraft units. Moreover, we should remember that no man has so far been disbanded and everyone is doing his best to find the most suitable way of re-employing them. Until a man is disbanded one cannot very well say "Good-bye" to him and thank him. More often it is our business in the Territorial Army Council to be critical of the War Office, and to press for fulfilment of our requirements and removal of grievances. On this occasion I believe it will generally be found that action has been taken with the greatest possible care in dealing with this difficult problem.
I would mention one other matter. The noble Lord, Lord Wise, yesterday, in the course of some very friendly remarks, in particular expressed his support for an increased bounty for volunteers and Territorial men, a suggestion which, as he said, is meeting with strong Treasury resistance. I should like to give a reminder of the responsibility which is placed by Parliament upon Territorial associations for recruiting and for keeping up the numbers of volunteers, and especially for meeting the need for good N.C.O.s and leaders in all ranks. Much emphasis has been placed, in recent years, upon the importance of the Territorial Army. If it is found by the War Office that something more is needed, as suggested by Lord Wise yesterday, it is very much to be hoped that they and the Treasury will lose no further time in agreeing to this proposal.
6.38 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, this has been one of the most valuable and interesting debates to which I have ever had the privilege of listening in your Lordships' House, and I imagine that every other noble Lord who has attended it will be of the same opinion. I thought that the speech of Lord Swinton set the debate off on exactly the right foot. It is the sort of speech one hopes may be read abroad, because, while it was non-provocative, it was resolute and a most clear statement of our position in this armaments matter. If I were to try to summarise that position, I would say that, while we hate the courses into which we are driven by this armaments business, at the same time the alternative to what

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we are doing is to be driven out of business; and we are not going to submit to that. We have every intention of remaining in business, and our business, in company with other free and decent nations, is that of defending liberty, freedom and decency.
I feel that the White Paper deserves the many compliments which have been paid to it, for the overriding reason that it shows a grasp—though perhaps at times a rather tentative grasp—of the mounting perplexities surrounding the armaments programme to-day, the extraordinary complexities attending the striking of a balance between conventional and thermo-nuclear weapons. Of course, there are criticisms to be made of the White Paper and of the Government on several points in matters of defence, but I feel that those criticisms will be better brought forward as each of the Service Estimates comes before the House in turn, when we can examine the relevant White Paper in detail.
However, there are three broad points that I should like to make to-night. The first concerns the proposal put forward by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, that there should be an inquiry into the expenditure we are incurring on armaments. I think it is fair to say that, so far, we have had very little value for money in the shape of armaments. I think the public require reassuring on this matter. When I think of an inquiry into expenditure the question of the cost-plus system of working comes at once to my mind. I have seen that as much as £20 million has been spent on developing one aircraft engine, and I imagine that was done on the cost-plus system. That does not hold out much encouragement for economy. I remember that when the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, was at the Admiralty, with all the stress of war upon him, he fought the cost-plus system in shipbuilding, and even at that time was able to effect great economies, with corresponding benefit to the taxpayer. I must say that I am surprised that the deficiencies which have accumulated in the three Services should nave accumulated under the present Prime Minister. I should have thought that from him, of all men, we might have expected better value for money than we have had. I feel that the Prime Minister must have run out of his "Action this day" labels,
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and if I may make a respectful suggestion it is that it might be a good thing if he gave a repeat order for them to be printed.
The second broad point I should like to mention is the integration of the three Services, with which the name of James Forrestal must always be associated. In this debate the fusion of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force has been mentioned as a start in that direction. My mind certainly runs in that direction, too. We are shortly to have a new First Sea Lord. I have not the faintest idea of how Admiral Lord Mountbatten's mind works on this subject, but perhaps it works in the direction of some measure of integration. It is certainly true that, of all our great commanders, he has had great experience of combined operations and of working with all three Services.
I fully agree with the arguments put forward by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, about the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb. Of course, it is the right decision to take, to set the manufacture of the bomb in hand. We cannot say in one breath that our security depends upon the hydrogen bomb and, in the next, that we rely upon America to make them for us and to let us have them. We must stand on our own feet and pay our own insurance premiums. Those who say that we should not manufacture the bomb should be logical and should go on to say that they would never be a party to its use or to our being defended by other people using it. Some who objected to our manufacturing the hydrogen bomb indicated that there is a moral obloquy attached to making it. I do not much admire the attitude of mind which is prepared to let another nation incur that moral obloquy while we accept the shelter which it provides.
There are two or three questions which I should like to ask in connection with the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb. The first is about the aircraft for delivering the bomb when we have it. Will the bomb be ready before we have the aircraft, or will the aircraft be ready before we have the bomb? Then there is the question of tests, about which the noble Marquess said something. I presume that if we are to manufacture this bomb, we shall want to carry out tests with a bang, and I have been wondering where these

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tests are going to take place. Already Australia has told us that we can take our tests away; that they do not want them. If we look at the globe, it is a little difficult to imagine where we shall make these tests. Naturally the thought has come to my mind that perhaps we have some arrangement with America on the subject, because, if Australia is "out." I am puzzled to know where else but in America the tests can be made. But I am certain that the Government would never have decided to manufacture the bomb unless they had cleared up the point about where they will be able to test it. I am content to leave it at that.
My third question is more important than the first two. Can we undertake the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb without dropping something else? We are taking on a tremendous amount at the present moment, and I felt there was great force in what Mr. Aneurin Bevan said in the recent debate in another place on this subject. I think I may still refer to him as my right honourable friend, because his head has not finally dropped in the sawdust. The tricoteuses have not seen that happen yet. Mr. Bevan said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 537, (No. 44), col. 2116]:
" … there was all the difference … between inserting a great arms programme into an economy … at full stretch and an American programme inserted into an economy with a surplus productive capacity. … "
Undoubtedly our economy is at full stretch and we are undertaking so much that I wonder whether the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb will involve the dropping of something else. The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, was quite right yesterday when he spoke about the shortages of scientists and technicians and of certain labour and materials. Can we really supply the scientists and technicians necessary for the manufacture of the bomb without taking them off some other work?
We have heard a great deal in this debate about "if and when" we use the hydrogen bomb. There always seems to be something rather unreal in all this talk about whether the Generals would be able to use it without the permission of their Government. I wonder whether it is part of the process of breaking it to the people gently that these weapons are here and that if ever we become involved
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in a major war, they will be used. Are we at a stage in the process of enlightening our people when we pretend that there will be a delay while the Government decide whether they are to be used or not, with, possibly, even a debate in Parliament on the subject? Some people talk as if that would be possible. It seems to me that they will certainly be used. You cannot issue weapons to armies in the field labelled: "Top secret: not to be opened until Cabinet permission has been sought and obtained."
After all, the great point about the hydrogen bomb is the speed, the result, the possible impossibility of recovering from a surprise attack by hydrogen bombs. The Government must decide; but all may be over by the time the consultation has taken place. There is an old saying:
"Twice is he blessed that hath his quarrel Just,
But thrice blessed he who gets his blow in fust."
I think that is peculiarly true of the hydrogen bomb. The General who incurred defeat by waiting about on the end of a telephone for permission to use weapons that had been issued to him to use might well find himself court-martialled. Equally, I think it is true that if two nations are involved in a major war, it may be that they will begin with a sort of agreement—as in the "phoney" period in the last war—not to use thermonuclear weapons but to fight the war with conventional weapons. But, even supposing such an unlikely thing happened, would any nation go down to defeat if it had thermo-nuclear bombs lying unused in its arsenals? Of course, no nation would go down to defeat under such conditions. Another fact that we must face is this. The secrets of the manufacture of thermo-nuclear weapons are rapidly becoming common knowledge. It will become easier and cheaper to manufacture them, and countries which feel that they want them will, in the result, be able to have them.
There is another point to which I should like to refer. The Prime Minister's last speech on the subject was most striking, but it contained nothing new, nothing that had not been said many times before. The old matter was knit together, arranged in clear perspective and forcefully presented, and it was a most valuable speech on that account. But

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many speakers and many writers on this subject seem to me to get involved in drama, and Press articles tend to become very sensational. I think that drama and sensation in regard to these weapons do a great deal of harm. We must look the thing calmly in the face. Whether we like it or not, it is the fate of our generation to be the first to have to withstand the tremendous impact of these weapons. Trotsky once said that if any man was looking for a quiet life he ought not to have got himself born into the twentieth century. Well, this is the twentieth century, and we have to face the facts of the time in which we live. We have to face the fact that these weapons are in the hands of an unfriendly nation whose leaders would not entertain one single moral scruple about using them if they thought they could do so to their advantage. Those are the facts, and the vast mass of the population can do nothing about them.
I listened to an eminent divine broad-casting on Sunday, and he said that we all ought to be doing everything we possibly can in this matter. On Monday morning, when I was dressing, I looked out of my window and I saw two gardeners sawing up a tree which had fallen in the recent winds, and I thought to myself: "I wonder what they are expected to do in this matter." The point I want to make is this. It is no good everlastingly frightening our people by talking of these matters in terms of drama and sensation. The thing to do is to tell them the truth. I do not wish to be misunderstood on this point. I am not suggesting that anything should be concealed from them. They must be told the truth, but they must be told it in unsensational terms; and at the same time they should be told what I believe to be the case, that our Government—as any Government in this country would do—are working day and night in the pursuit of peace, and they are making the hydrogen bomb as the deterrent which may prevent the bombs from ever being used. In my view, that is the way the case should be presented to our people. I am open to argument about what the people should be told on the subject of civil defence, but I got some comfort out of reading the last report of the American Commission, which indicates that, in spite of what
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has been said, a great deal can be done by efficient civil defence precautions.
The final thing I want to say on this subject of the bomb is this—and I do not know whether the noble Marquess would give me any encouragement in what I am about to say. I think it would have an immense effect at the present moment if Great Britain and the United States could announce that from now on they are keeping no more secrets from each other in regard to the development and use of thermo-nuclear weapons. In saying that, I am quite aware of certain difficulties. I know quite well American public opinion about the traitors from whom we suffered so severely, and the tremendous impact that had on the American mind, which is so security-minded; and I am also aware of the facts of American legislation on this subject. But still, I believe that those obstacles-could be overcome, and I think it would be a tremendous demonstration of unity and of common determination if an announcement could be made that henceforward we were working as one country in these matters, with no secrets of any sort whatever being kept from one another.
I want to make one point about top-level talks. I must say that I deplore criticisms which imply that something could be done if only the Government would do it. I must assume that such speakers believe what they say. But do they reflect that it implies that the Government in this country are unique in not being heart and soul for peace and for averting a nuclear war? I think at this juncture to let the idea go abroad in any way that we have a Government which is dragging its feet in this matter must give the most misleading impressions, and may even create such impressions inside the Kremlin itself. I hope that these things will no longer be said, especially after the Prime Minister has just told us of his experience with Mr. Molotov. When President Eisenhower would not see eye to eye with him about a meeting, the Prime Minister proposed that he should go alone to a meeting, and Mr. Molotov, after the usual hypocritical fair words, deliberately sabotaged the whole idea. I think that episode in itself should put an end, once and for all, to any idea that our Prime Minister is reluctant in this matter. I was struck by what the noble

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Lord, Lord Strang, said about conferences. I have never been a great admirer of conferences; I am sure they can be overdone. I echo the words of the noble Lord in that respect, and words which were used quite recently: "Fewer conferences, and let diplomacy play its part more in the future."
Another point about the incessant demands upon the Government to arrange top-level talks is that it seems to me that very often the Government are asked to do things which the United Nations ought to do and which the United Nations was organised to do. I think, also, the Government could use the United Nations more than it does in connection with important announcements. I have in mind the fact that President Eisenhower went to the United Nations to make his most remarkable proposals about "atoms for peace." In doing that, he added to the prestige of the United Nations, and if our Government could increase the prestige of the United Nations in the same way it would become a much more effective instrument for resisting aggression. My last words are these. Much has been said about conventional weapons. In the old days there was a conventional weapon called the "partisan," and there were bodies of men called "partisans" who used this weapon. In the matters which we have been discussing to-day I have no wish to be a partisan or to use a partisan. I think we had all better be bi-partisan in regard to it.
7.2 p.m.
LORD BOYD-ORR: My Lords, I think there is little difference of opinion between the two sides of this House on the important question we are considering to-day. I have listened to many interesting speeches, perhaps the most interesting being that of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, with most of whose speech I am in complete agreement. But I should like to make one or two points which might go a little further in certain directions than he would be prepared to go or, indeed, than it might be wise for him to go, in the position which he holds.
The first point is that there is a great deal of propaganda about banning the hydrogen bomb. I do not think it is very intelligent, and I am not sure that it is very honest. With so many different nations getting the thermo-nuclear pile,
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they are able to make hydrogen bombs; and with the silent method of testing them international supervision becomes almost useless. I think we must be quite clear that, if a war comes, not only hydrogen bombs but every other devilish device which modern science has created will be thrown in. I think we are agreed on that, and it would be foolish if the people of this country were allowed to delude themselves. Another point I want to make is about the fear of massive retaliation as a preventive of war. If that were the only permanent method we had, then the whole future of the human race would be in jeopardy. We have to look forward to something more than that because, with both sides piling up hydrogen bombs, neither side knowing how many the other has, one side may be afraid that, in a push-button war, the other will throw in the bombs to get a tremendous advantage at the first blow. Therefore, we must have something more than that as a long-term policy.
I am sure that your Lordships will agree that the only solution to this difficulty is the abolition of war itself. Everybody would like to see that, but that would bring about the biggest revolution which has ever taken place in the whole evolution of human society. Tribes and nations have always been accustomed, as a last resort, to settle their differences by trial by battle, and we are now faced with the fact that, with the enormous powers we have, we cannot do that. We cannot use those powers without committing suicide. It is difficult for nations to give up power. Sixty years ago, when I was a boy, we had the Pax Britannica. I was a little sorry that we should have given that up, because it would have meant safety for the world. What were at the end of the nineteenth century the six great Powers of Europe are no longer the main Powers in the world: there are two new Powers. But how long will these be the great Powers of the world? They may realise that their day will pass as Western Europe has passed. Remember how rapidly Japan, thirty years ago a poor country, rose to be a great world Power. If China, which is industrialising herself as rapidly as possible, maintains that ruthless totalitarian government with about 600 million people, in thirty years or so she will be the most powerful country in the world.

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There is a further thing to which I wonder our statesmen do not pay a little more attention—the calling by the Colombo Powers of a conference of Asian and African nations; a conference of more than half the people of the world. This is absolutely revolutionary, and it may be against the West. One of the difficulties about the Asians is not so much nationalism as racialism. They are against domination by the white man, and one of the most pleasing things that I experienced when going through many of these Asian countries was that they liked the British. They trust us because of our modern policy, and because they know that we have revolutionised our society in the last fifty years. They know that we are no longer seeking world domination. These are the conditions of our rapidly changing world, when power may shift. New scientific powers are appearing, and all the time we are under the threat that the whole human family may be wiped out.
The only solution is some form of world government, and I entirely agree with the Prime Minister who said a few years ago that, unless there is some form of world government, there is no hope for the future. To set up world government is as revolutionary as to say we will have no war. It means entirely new political and economic ideas, and the first thing the nations have to realise is that we are now in a world which is so small that their fate is linked. They have either to go to war for their mutual destruction or co-operate for their mutual benefit. We have the policy of peaceful co-existence, which is a step forward. But that will be a negative peaceful co-existence, with both sides piling up further armaments; and that will place the world in a very precarious position. What we have to do is to try and get links between warring countries.
I said earlier how things had changed. In the first war, nobody could be more evil than the Germans, and now the Germans are good people. Before that, nobody could be more evil than the French; and now nobody could be more evil than the Russians. In spite of the difficulties—and well I know them—we have to try to establish links or some points of contact. One of the best methods is to get trade going; get the business men to meet with the commissars
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for trade and make a bargain which is of mutual benefit and interest to both. Develop these lines and you make points of contact. Indeed, for this country that is our only policy, because we have to multiply world trade by four times or be in a difficult economic position.
Another method is by getting people of different countries to meet. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, spoke of getting the physicists of the world together. There may be objection to that idea, because they would give away secrets. I would say: get the medical men of the world together, and invite the Russians to come, because there are no secrets there. Get as many people as you can to come and see this country. When I was in Moscow I remember telling them how we in this country had revolutionised ourselves in the last fifty years or so, and what a wonderful country we had; that Communists were of no use to us and that we did not want to destroy them. It was all printed in the Press the next day. We need as many contacts as possible. Politicians on both sides are going to Russia and China, and talking to them; and what they say gets through. If we can get the peoples of the world to meet in trade and create links like that, then we can gradually build and replace fear and distrust by some feeling of confidence. That is the only background against which there can be a meeting of the leaders of the States.
There is one last point I should like to make. I think we should have less talk about the horrors of war and more talk about the wonderful new world we can build. If science were applied not to war but to co-operation by nations to promote good for the people of the world, we could, within ten years, and with only 10 per cent. of the money that is being spent on armaments, build a new world; we could eliminate hunger and disease in 75 per cent. of the world. If the nations would begin to co-operate, it would lead towards world government and would free the nations from the fear of war. There are only two ways. With all these powers that science has let loose—and we cannot bottle them up again—it is impossible for us to exist with both sides piling up more and more weapons. We have to get the nations ultimately to agree to co-operate and we have to get world public opinion

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behind us. I think that we in this country and Commonwealth should take the lead in that. In passing through countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia, one of the most gratifying things to do is to talk with the people there, to get done with politicians and realise the great prestige which this country has there. It does not depend upon building more hydrogen bombs. Countries in all hemispheres look to us. We have a great prestige, but we may lose it. I believe that, if we had that change in the future which we should have, it might be the destiny of this country and this Commonwealth, by preaching these ideas to the Russians until they listened, and to all countries, to lead the human race away from what the Prime Minister called "peering over the rim of hell" and to set foot on the wonderful new world which modern science can create.
7.12 p.m.
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, we have had a long and interesting debate. I shall not detain your Lordships very long, but I should like to say a few words about the Home Defence Forces. There have been suggestions—and I think they were very good ones—that the time has now come when a Director-General or a Commander of these Home Defence Forces should be set up. I suggest that the place for such a directorate would be within the structure of the Ministry of Defence. Obviously, one does not want to set up yet another directorate, but I think that would be the correct place for it. The importance of these Home Defence Forces has been explained in the White Paper, and was further explained by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, in his opening speech, and by several other speakers. It is most important that there should be a chain of command, from Director-General or Director (whatever he may be called) of Home Defence Forces right the way through, taking in all the regional parts of home defence, and the coordination of civil defence as set up by local authorities and the Home Office with that set up by the military authorities.
As I see it, if a nuclear bomb were dropped early in a war there would be at the disposal of this country several different forces or units which would be able to undertake the duties of civil defence, rescue work or whatever it may
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be. Those are normally what is still called the Civil Defence Corps (which possibly may in the future have a different name) and all its ancillaries—the civil police, the Home Guard, who would undertake, obviously, the duties of civil defence in the early stages, and the units to be newly formed, the mobile defence battalions. Besides that, there would be units of the Regular Army, who would be trying to mobilise, and units of the Territorial Army. The co-ordination, direction and control of all these forces would be most important. I feel it would be inevitable that, were a nuclear weapon to be dropped upon this country, for a short time that well-known warrior, General Muddle, might easily take command. It is only by having really good command, control and direction of these Home Defence Forces that his tenure in office can be cut down to the bare minimum. I hope that the Government will consider setting up this directorate, as I suggest, at the Ministry of Defence.
The noble and learned Earl who leads the Opposition has said that some people have said to him in despair: "What is the use of civil defence at all?" I am certain there are people who go about saying: "What is the use of any of these voluntary services?" They almost mock at those who, out of a sense of duty, take part in them. Those people, I consider, do a great disservice to this country. Moreover, it has often been said: "It will be all right on the day." I am sure that "on the day" many thousands of people will come to help; but the trouble is that surely they will then have come too late. Would it not be better for them to come now and get some training, so that their effectiveness may be doubled by their being trained when that day comes?
7.18 p.m.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, at this stage in a two-day debate, when nearly thirty of your Lordships have spoken, it is clearly the duty of a speaker to be as short as possible. In any case, it is beyond my powers to sum up a debate of the kind that we have had: it has been really a number of debates rolled into one. We have had a most effective and interesting debate on the Auxiliary Air Force, in which the contribution of the noble Earl, Lord Gosford, was particularly valuable and interesting.

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We have had a debate on the Territorial Army, again with contributions from a number of noble Lords of great experience. We have had, in addition, a small Foreign Affairs debate, while overshadowing all, of course, there is the question of the new weapon, the nuclear weapon.
The noble Lord, Lord Winster, complained that the newspapers dramatised unduly the effects of the new weapons, and said he thought the information should be given to the public in unsensational language. I am sure that in America they have succeeded in putting over the facts about the power of these weapons in conspicuously unsensational language. Nevertheless I think one cannot deny that the information itself is so full of sensation and drama that it should strike the imagination of everybody, as I believe it has struck the imagination of the general public. For unsensational language, I think one could hardly beat some paragraphs from the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, which state that
"one A-bomb of the earliest type equivalent to 20,000 tons of T.N.T. (20 kilotons) would produce a blast sufficient to destroy or damage severely residences within a radius of more than a mile."
Then, the Report goes on to say that
"The United States … has developed fission bombs many times as powerful as the first A-bombs, and hydrogen weapons in the ranges of millions of tons (megatons) of T.N.T. equivalent."
For good, sound, official English that could not be bettered; indeed, I like the sound of terms like "kilotons" and "megatons"; in relation to T.N.T. they tend to take some of the sensation away.
It is too late to go into the question of the hydrogen bomb, but I should like to mention one or two things in the White Paper that have interested me. It is good to see that Her Majesty's Government put forward so prominently their aim of "striving for a practical scheme of disarmament." But we hear constantly repeated that we must negotiate from strength. At what point do we consider we have the strength to negotiate? We are told that now we have the hydrogen bomb and the Russians have not, and that for a period—
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (VISCOUNT SWINTON): May I interrupt
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for one moment? We are negotiating now, at this particular moment, on disarmament, just as I said in my speech. We did it all last year; we did it in London and then at U.N.O. The Conference now sitting at Lancaster House is discussing how it can thresh out a scheme of disarmament. We have not waited.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: I quite agree. The noble Viscount has corrected me. There is a Disarmament Commission sitting—a United Nations body. At the same time, when any suggestion is made that there should be something out of the ordinary, something out of the routine series of talks, it is always met by the blunt reply that we do not trust the Russians, and that the Russians do not trust us. But this period of three or four years, which we are told is likely to be the time during which we have a great preponderance of power over the Russians, is surely the time when, if ever, we can come to an agreement.
Another thing in regard to disarmament has occurred to me on reading the White Paper. The conception of disarmament in paragraph 8 appears to be that the parties should achieve
"major reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces to agreed levels which would redress the present Communist superiority."
Surely it is not realistic to go into negotiations expecting that the other person is going voluntarily to give up his advantages. We should not be willing to offer to the Russians to redress the superiority which we enjoy in nuclear weapons. Why, therefore, should we expect the Russians voluntarily to give up their advantages? If that is, in fact, the aim of Her Majesty's Government in disarmament negotiations, it is hard to see how any one can hope that they will result in success.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am loath to interrupt the noble Earl, but am I to understand that he thinks that nobody should give up advantages in disarmament negotiations? If so, I do not think they can possibly succeed. The argument has always been that the Conventional and non-conventional weapons cannot be treated separately, and that everybody has a contribution to make. The contribution which the Central European Powers, the Communist

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Powers, would certainly have to make would be a great reduction in their conventional armaments.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: In their armaments. But would you expect them to give up their preponderance of armaments? It seems to me that you must expect both parties to give up some of their advantages. But put baldly, as it is in the White Paper, to expect the Russians to agree to reduce their conventional armaments to the same level as ours, does not seem to be realistic. After all, any agreement on disarmament can result only from a lessening of tension, from the lessening of fear and suspicion—the fear which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, mentioned he had detected on his recent visit and suspicion of the motives existing on both sides. I had not the extreme pessimism of the noble Lord who, I am sorry to see, has just left; I think it is the hope of us all that a lessening of tension will result in a lessening of fear and suspicion, and will enable some agreement to be arrived at.
I should like to refer now to something that my noble friend Lord Henderson said yesterday, when he advocated that greater efforts should be made to put over to the other side of the Iron Curtain more information about our weapons. After all, if the possession of nuclear weapons is to be a deterrent, the men in the Kremlin will know all about it. But I wonder whether the ordinary Russian in the street knows about it? I wonder what Her Majesty's Government are doing in the line of propaganda, in psychological warfare, to ensure that, so far as is possible, the facts about our armaments are being put over to the Russians. As has been said before in debates in your Lordships' House, propaganda or psychological warfare should be a part of our defence effort. To my mind, that is just as much the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence as any of the Fighting Services is.
There is only one other thing I want to say. I thought the White Paper exceedingly realistic, certainly in its opening parts. As the most reverend Primate said, it sets out brutally frankly the situation that faces us all; but scattered about in the White Paper are
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some terms that have what I can describe only as a slightly "olde worlde" ring about them. We read that something will enable us "to defeat the enemy." I thought "defeat" and "victory" were rather passing into the realm of obsolete terms. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, yesterday spoke about "co-destruction" and "co-annihilation" being the only alternatives to co-existence. Then in many places there is reference to a "strategic reserve." How is this strategic reserve to be moved about in conditions of nuclear warfare? There is mention of a naval striking force, with the task of containing and destroying enemy forces on the sea. How much is that going to be possible in conditions of nuclear warfare?
Then there is the phrase, in paragraph 26 of the Statement on Defence, which really gives the whole object of the maintenance of conventional arms:
"We still need troops on the ground to hold the enemy well to the East in Europe in the vital initial stages of a war. This would give time for the effects of our strategic air offensive to be felt."
That calls up the picture of two long lines of opposing armies stretching across the Continent of Europe, with the strategic air force flying over and bombing the rear areas. That happened in 1914 and again in 1944–45; but is it the picture of a major war on the Continent of Europe? We all believe that there will be nuclear attacks at the outset of another war. The Western nations have said that any major aggression will be met with nuclear counter attack. There is bound to be nuclear attack from the outset, so what grounds are there for picturing this sweeping of hordes of men across Europe from East to West, this conventional sweep that we believe the Russians will take? Surely if they want to defeat us they will use the quickest way and the most efficient weapon, the nuclear-atomic or hydrogen bomb. From a range of some 450 miles they could bombard the centre of government in this country without the need for moving a single division in Europe.
What is the object of a war? To achieve your policy you want to make your enemy change his mind. You want to impose your will upon him. You would not do that by blotting out the whole of his cities and factories. You want, by the threat of doing so, to bring his population to accept your will and

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to submit their own. For a major war conventional armies appear difficult to defend. Certainly we need armies for overseas, for the cold war; we must have an Army, and a good one; and we want a large Regular element in that Army. We on this side of the House, as my noble and learned Leader has said, support the main policy of Her Majesty's Government, to keep the deterrent hydrogen bomb and the means of projecting it, to maintain sufficient conventional forces and to ensure the civil defence of the country; but I wish that we could hear a little more to remove my doubts on some of the points I have mentioned.
7.35 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (LORD CARRINGTON): My Lords, the position of someone who winds up a two-day debate in your House, particularly a debate of this importance and length, always reminds me of the poor man who feeds on the crumbs from the rich man's table. Everybody has had a very satisfactory meal and there is not much left over for the person who winds up. But perhaps if he is not there the crumbs may litter the table and the carpet; so he performs the useful function of tidying up and preventing litter. That is what I shall try to do.
The Government's White Paper on Defence was published in the middle of last month, and since that time there has been in the Press, on the wireless, in another place and now in your Lordships' House an enormous amount of comment and argument on the decision announced in the White Paper to manufacture the hydrogen bomb. Indeed, it has been difficult to pick up any periodical without finding an article about nuclear warfare, or to turn on the wireless without hearing some expression of opinion about the rights or wrongs of the decision. It follows, I am afraid, that I do not have anything at all new to say this evening about the subject, but, in common probably with most of your Lordships, I have read and heard a great many of these opinions and wonder whether perhaps there are some who stand in danger of overlooking the real issue.
I think, however, that one of the most interesting and encouraging facts, both from the debate here and in another place, is the very large measure of agreement
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on all sides of the House in support of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Naturally the decision which the Government has announced has not been reached without most careful consideration, and the implications of it are grave. It is, therefore, all the more encouraging to know that it has the broad support of the people of this country. But, of course, having said that, I admit that there are quite a number who feel, for one reason or another, that we are doing the wrong thing. These naturally include the pacifists, who are entirely logical in their point of view. We respect their point of view, though I think they are utterly wrong. At any rate, they are logical.
There is a second class of person who objects to the announcement that we should manufacture the hydrogen bomb. They say, "Ban the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb," and yet, curiously enough, they did not say, "Ban the manufacture of the atom bomb"; they do not say, even now, "Ban the manufacture of the block buster or the rifle." Perhaps there are some who, faced with the unknown consequences of nuclear warfare, are apt to forget that conventional warfare, as we have known it in the last two world wars, is utterly degrading and horrible. What every one of us who went through the last war, or even more the 1914–18 war, has seen in human suffering and misery does not lead us to the conclusion that these were chivalrous wars whose recurrence we can view with calm acceptance.
Some people seem to hold the view that the difference between nuclear warfare and what has now been called "conventional warfare" is so great that it is utterly immoral for us take any part in it. The real issue is not whether or not we should make a bomb which does not exist. The bomb does exist. The only issue is whether or not we should join those countries which already possess the hydrogen bomb. These same people argue that the possession of nuclear weapons will in itself weaken our position in the world and that we can be of much greater service if we divest ourselves of them and retain only the ability to defend ourselves with those of the conventional type. This has been called the neutralist argument, but I think it overlooks one or two of the facts of life, the most important being that, first, we are not neutral. We

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are part of a great Commonwealth. We are allied with the United States and with all the other nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. We are committed to resisting aggression from whatever quarter it may come. We are members of the United Nations and must be prepared to accept the obligations which that membership entails.
It is perhaps natural, when faced with problems so vast and so awe-inspiring as this, to want to contract out of the argument and leave it to somebody else. But we cannot and should not do that. We are a great Power, with great interests and with a great tradition. We have declared unequivocally where we stand, and we must be prepared, whatever the consequences, to defend what we believe to be right.
Thirdly, there is a much more curious point of view. Those who hold it say, "We agree with you that it is necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons; we believe that in doing so you are right; but you must declare in advance exactly on what occasions you intend to use these weapons, and you should in no circumstances use them except in retaliation. "My Lords, I can understand the other two points of view which I have described, although I do not agree with them, but I do not understand the logic behind this argument. You put yourself at an enormous military disadvantage. If David, in his fight with Goliath, had announced beforehand that he intended to stick to conventional weapons, Goliath would have strolled over and annihilated him with one blow of his sword.
It seems, too, that if you announce beforehand what you will or will not do in a given set of circumstances, it amounts to a direct invitation to your enemy to go as far as he dares without suffering the consequences of his actions. Those who argue in this way seem to me to try to place responsibility for these decisions on the wrong people. The real responsibility rests with the aggressor. Any Power which is prepared to threaten the peace of the world by aggression runs the danger of starting a war more terrible than anything we have ever known before. It is not we who are going to start a war. Oddly enough, some of these very same people complain that we are still keeping a standing Army and Navy. "Why
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bother? Why waste money," they say, "when nuclear warfare has made all these things out of date and old fashioned?" Yet in the next breath they say that nuclear weapons should be used only in certain circumstances. With what then do they intend to defend themselves? It seems to me to be an extraordinary example of muddled thinking. And so, my Lords, the Government decided that we should manufacture the hydrogen bomb, not with the idea that the possession of it would, in a war, give us victory, or material profit, or glory or territorial gain. Words such as these have now no meaning. A nuclear war would present us and the enemy with devastation and misery on a scale which we cannot even imagine. The prevention of such a war must be the supreme objective for all of us, and it is the primary object of our defence policy to build up a deterrent against aggression and so to prevent war.
But, of course, we must and we shall continue to work for disarmament. Those of my generation, and perhaps even more those of your Lordships who are older, may give a rather disillusioned smile when we talk about disarmament. We recall the sad experiences of the 1930's and the lip service paid by everyone to the principles of disarmament, contrasting strangely with the lack of positive action. But the prospect which faces us and our children, of two sides poised ready with nuclear weapons to start a war resulting in mutual suicide, is such that nobody who has thought about the problem at all can view it with anything but horror. There is only one solution however long it may take, and however difficult it may be—and that is complete and all-round disarmament. I think it will be agreed that the Government's record of patient and hard work on this subject over the past years bears witness to our real belief in it.
I feel that the noble Earl who has just spoken did rather less than justice to our point of view on disarmament and the work we have been doing over the past three years. Always we must be realistic. It is not good enough to say, "Ban the bomb." Not only does that give overwhelming advantage to the Communists, but surely it is much the most difficult part of disarmament to achieve, both in principle and in detail. If we could

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achieve that, the rest would be relatively easy. As the White Paper says, disarmament must be real and comprehensive, and there must be secure and workable controls. Until the time comes when such a system has been secured, we must build up and maintain our strength with the emphasis on the deterrent. And science has now placed in our hands a new a ad overwhelmingly powerful weapon.
There are others who accept the decision to produce the hydrogen bomb but argue that this should lead to a more radical adjustment of our conventional forces than we have yet undertaken. The way in which these further adjustments should be made is not always clearly stated, and, if stated, is not always consistent. A great many conflicting suggestions have been made. Nevertheless, I think it is a point of view which deserves a good deal more consideration than the others I have described, and I should like to deal with it for a moment. In the first place, what have we done to adjust the shape and organisation of our forces to meet the new conditions? I think the record is good. In the Navy, plans are being made to introduce a new class of guided-weapon ships to replace the cruiser. A radical reorganisation of the Reserve Fleet is taking place which will greatly improve its state of readiness. Research and development with the application of new weapons to the war at sea is being pressed forward. Advances have been made, and more are coming. In the Army, we have abolished Anti Aircraft Command—and I will come to Lord Moynihan's speech in a moment We are building up a strategic reserve. We are experimenting with far-reaching changes in Army organisation, both in fighting units and in supporting units. A special unit is being established to investigate the use of air transport, including helicopters, for the supply of the Army in the field.
With regard to the Royal Air Force, my noble and gallant friend the Secretary of State has in his speech this afternoon announced what we are doing.
LORD SHERWOOD: The noble and gallant Lord who represents the Air Ministry did not say much about the Auxiliary Air Force. If something could be said about the future of that force. I think it would be appreciated.
LORD CARRINGTON: I listened to my noble and gallant friend's speech, and I thought he dealt very fully with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. At any rate, I am not equipped to deal with it, and my noble friend has said what he has to say.
In the sphere of home defence (I prefer to call it home defence, and not civil defence) I agree with what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, said: we have taken decisions of the greatest importance, affecting the use of the Armed Forces in aid of the civilian population in time of war. We shall train all members of the Armed Forces in civil defence duties. We are about to begin building up a Mobile Defence Corps as part of the Army and Air Force Reserve Services. The whole field of civil defence preparations—evacuation, shelter and the rest—is being urgently considered to meet the new problems.
The noble Lord, Lord Nathan, who made what I felt was a most interesting and constructive speech this afternoon, criticised us on the grounds that all this was coming along rather slowly. That raises an old problem. If you rush blindly in, you are likely to waste a lot of money without necessarily getting the right answer. If you are too cautious, you may not be ready should the need arise. We are trying to strike a sensible balance. I can assure noble Lords that the whole of our defence forces are only too anxious to adjust themselves as quickly as they can to the new and strange conditions surrounding us. That is the reason why we welcome suggestions and debates of the kind that we have had for the last two days. I can assure your Lordships that we shall study very carefully all these matters and all that has been said.
The noble and learned Earl, the Leader of the Opposition, who has apologised because he has had to leave the House, raised a number of questions about civil defence. The broad position is that until fairly recently our plans were based on certain assumptions. Recent developments have shown that many of those plans will require recasting, and this we are actively doing. The noble Lord, Lord Nathan, said that he or one of his noble friends proposed shortly to put down a Motion on civil defence. At this moment, therefore, I do not think it would be wise to attempt to go into too great detail, but

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I will try to deal with one or two questions which the noble and learned Earl asked me. First let me say a word on the affected area. This really divides itself into three main divisions, although there is no hard and fast line of demarcation between them. First of all, there is the area of total destruction; then there is the area of damage, varying from serious to slight; and, finally, there is the much larger area which may be affected by "fall-out."
The noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, when in another place, gave a good deal of information about areas of destruction, and there is little I can add to what he said. But I may perhaps remind your Lordships that with the Eniwetok bomb there would be total destruction within an area of three-mile radius, and moderate to slight damage would extend over an area of ten-mile radius. With a bomb of a thousand times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb, the corresponding figures would be five and fifteen miles. As regards "fall-out" the United States have indicated that if a thermo-nuclear device comparable with that fired at the Bikini Atoll in March, 1954, were exploded at ground level, the area of contamination down-wind would be about 7,000 square miles.
In the area of total destruction, obviously, there is little that can be done. Elsewhere—and I emphasise this, because I think it is important that we should let this be known—a properly organised civil defence can play a vital part. Considerable protection can be obtained in areas outside that of total destruction. An ordinary house gives some protection. A slit trench with adequate covering will give very good protection. There is still a good deal of research work, of course, to be done in this field. Protective clothing, which the noble Earl mentioned, is of no value against radiation. The noble Earl also asked a question about the length of time for which an area remains contaminated by radiation. This varies very much. In the area down-wind immediately beyond that of total destruction, contamination is very serious and the direct danger to human beings may last at least a week. As one gets further away, the degree of contamination diminishes and its persistence is much reduced, until at the outer limits of the affected
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area the danger period may last for only an hour or two.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, asked about the future of the Territorial Army and pointed out that in his view the way in which the disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command has been done is discouraging to potential recruits and to those who are already serving in the Territorial Army. He does not complain of the decision itself, and I have heard no criticism from any quarter. I think all your Lordships will agree that it is a right decision, in keeping with the Government's realistic approach to defence problems. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, was largely answered by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and by the noble Duke, the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry, but I feel I should say a further word. When it was decided to disband Anti-Aircraft Command, it was felt that the news of the decision should first be announced in Parliament, not only because that is the proper place for it to be announced but also because if representations and consultations had taken place before the announcement there would have been much greater uncertainty. No one but a very few people knew of the proposal until it was announced on December 2 by my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence. Immediately afterwards the first examination was carried out by antiaircraft group commanders, in consultation with Home Commands, the chairmen of Territorial associations and all honorary colonels. The first plan was submitted to the War Office and then returned to Home Commands and Territorial associations for the preparation of the official plan for reorganisation. It may be said, I suppose, that this took rather a long time, and that the decisions might have been announced earlier, but it was felt better to consider all these matters together and not announce decisions piecemeal, so that the plan could be kept as flexible as possible and changes made up to the last moment.
The essence of the plan is to keep in some form as many as possible of the Territorial Army units of Anti-Aircraft Command, and I think it has been largely successful. In spite of these efforts, obviously the disbandment has inevitably caused distress throughout the whole of Anti-Aircraft Command and to

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the Territorial associations, and a large number of men will unfortunately be rendered surplus. All possible steps are being taken to absorb every single volunteer who is willing to continue to serve. Local boards have been set up throughout the country to examine the case of each individual and it is hoped that volunteers will be absorbed into the new amalgamated anti-aircraft units or into the Army Emergency Reserve. Surplus volunteers in disbanded or running-down units will be offered the opportunity of transferring individually or en bloc to the new mobile defence battalions.
The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, touched on what I think is a very important subject. Anti-Aircraft Command has a great record, and those who serve in it are largely volunteers. When a decision of this kind is announced I think it is very important that it should be properly and decently done and that all those concerned should be thanked for what they have done in the past. A great deal of care was taken by the War Office to do this. I am sorry that the noble Lord has the impression that this was not so. Perhaps I should point out that Anti-Aircraft Command were honoured by a message from Her Majesty, thanking them for all they had done and drawing attention to their fine record. Then my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence, when he announced the decision on December 2 in another place, went out of his way to thank most warmly all ranks who had served in Anti-Aircraft Command. I am going into this question at some length because I think it is important that these things do not go out wrongly.
The General-Officer Commanding, General Chilton, circulated a letter to all units under his command for despatch immediately following the original announcement in the House of Commons on December 2. Within one week of the announcement all unit officers had been personally addressed by the G.O.C. or one of the group commanders. The G.O.C. and his group commanders have also been touring units ever since the announcement. In addition, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War in another place emphasised his regret at the winding up of a Command which had done great service for the country. There can be no need for me to
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say this evening how much we appreciate what the Command has done and how much we remember, during the blitzes of 1940 and 1941, the feeling of confidence that the guns inspired on those occasions, and the contribution they made to the flying bomb problem in 1944. Nor is there any need, I hope, for me to emphasise the importance which all of us attach to those men and women who are prepared to volunteer for the service of their country in the Territorial Army or in other branches of the Services and Civil Defence. Whether or not their rôles change and the names of the corps alter, there will still be the greatest need for volunteers willing to serve in the defence of their country. I hope no one will think that because of the reorganisation which has been announced there is no further need for an Army Emergency Reserve or a Territorial Army.
Yesterday, the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, made out a strong case for the provision of some form of education grant for Service men. If I may say so, I think he stated the problem extremely clearly and with great force, and I noticed that most of your Lordships who were here then supported him. I should not like it to be thought that we are not aware of the problem. Children's education as it affects Service parents is not one which one can discuss and solve in complete isolation from that of parents in other walks of life. We all agree that the Service man is constantly being posted from station to station, whether at home or abroad, a state of affairs with which his civilian counterpart does not have to contend. But, as all your Lordships know, in the past few years there have been increases in Service pay which have been particularly aimed at helping Service men with families. I see the noble Lord shaking his head. Perhaps I may just quote the introductory note to the White Paper of March, 1954, which reads as follows:
"In the case of officers, the increases cover the middle range and it is within this range that the present conditions of Service life press most hardly on officers, particularly those with family responsibilities."
Of course, I do not claim that these increases have solved the problem. We have evidence to show that difficulties of this kind are still a great discouragement to those who want to join the Services as

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a career. All I can say at the present time is that my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence and his other colleagues are considering it with a real sense of urgency, but I am afraid that I cannot go any further this evening
I am not trying to pretend that the changes which I have described and the picture presented in this year's White Paper is in any sense perfect or final. It is neither described as such, nor has it been presented to Parliament as such. We shall certainly see many more changes in the years ahead. What I do claim with some confidence is that at the present time, in the present conditions and with our present resources, the defence programme for the coming year is a realistic and forward-looking attempt to meet the country's present defence requirements. I hope and believe that as such it will command the general approval of your Lordships' House.
In conclusion may I come back to my main thesis? The object of defence is security. If we cannot yet obtain security by international agreement and disarmament, we must rely on the deterrent. The deterrent rests primarily on the nuclear weapon. But it is more than that; it lies in the resolution to use it if need be, in spite of its appalling consequences, in defence of our vital interests. It lies also in the unity of the free world in standing up to blandishments and threats and in actively resisting minor
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aggressions in the cold war; it lies in defensive strength which will take toll of the enemy if he attacks; it lies in realistic home defence preparations which are evidence of our intention never to give in, even if it should come to nuclear warfare. Given all this, it is surely not too much to hope that every nation and all Governments will come to realise that there is literally no future in war. Thus we may achieve security. And through security we may ultimately win peace.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE EASTER RECESS
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, before the House adjourns, I have some information I should like to give to your Lordships with regard to the Easter Recess. Parliament will adjourn for the Easter Recess on April 7, and will reassemble on Tuesday, April 19, when your Lordships might like to know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget in another place.
SAINT STEPHEN COLEMAN STREET BILL [H.L.]
Reported, with Amendments.

CORN EXCHANGE BILL [H.L.]
Reported, without amendment.
House adjourned at two minutes past eight o'clock.