Sitting of 17 February 1955

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION BILL (BY ORDER)
  Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next, at Seven o'clock.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  FISHING INDUSTRY

    Distant-Water Vessels (Costings Investigation)
    Mr. Doddsasked the Minister of Agriculture if he will make a statement showing what progress has been made by the White Fish Authority in its costings investigation into distant-water fishing.
    The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Mr. Heathcoat Amory): The White Fish Authority has received completed questionnaires covering the great majority of distant-water vessels. The Authority is analysing these returns and hopes to publish a summary of the results in its next Annual Report.
    Mr. Dodds: In the Report of the White Fish Authority, 1952, the promise was made to get something out about this disparity in prices between what is paid at the ports and in the shops. Why has it taken this length of time, until 1955, to obtain this information?
    Mr. Amory: The hon. Member knows that the White Fish Authority has already made investigations over quite a wide field. This is the distant-water section about which we are now talking, and the answer which I have given shows him, I think, that investigations there are very well advanced.
    Major Wall: Would my right hon. Friend agree that the willingness to produce accounts shown by the distant-water section of the industry has not been followed by the retailers?
    Mr. Amory: The British Trawlers' Federation offered to provide information about costs and earnings on every one of its vessels, and that information has been obtained in respect of 273 vessels.
    Mr. T. Williams: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether any costings have been received from any section of the retailers?
    Mr. Amory: That is rather a different question, and I should like notice of it.

    Prices and Profits Investigation
    Mr. Doddsasked the Minister of Agriculture for what reason powers under Section 11 of the Sea Fish Industry Act, 1951, were used in connection with the investigation into the prices and profits in the fish industry.
    Mr. Amory: These powers have not yet been used for this purpose but are available to the White Fish Authority, which is preparing a sample investigation.
    Mr. Dodds: Is the Minister not aware that the Report of the White Fish Authority dated 31st March, 1953, makes it clear that catchers and traders are not supplying the information that is required, and that there is need to have some compulsory methods? In view of that, why have the powers not been used? Why are we so kind to the people who are refusing to give this information?
    Mr. Amory: I think it quite likely that the White Fish Authority may decide to invoke Section 11 in connection with its present sampling arrangements.

  AGRICULTURE

    Myxomatosis
    Mr. Doddsasked the Minister of Agriculture the present situation with regard to myxomatosis among rabbits.
    Mr. Amory: An account of the spread of the disease during 1954 was published in the Second Report of the Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis. The disease continues to spread steadily.
    Mr. Dodds: Has the Minister heard of the many reports that foxes are now raiding poultry runs? Can he say whether foxes are now creating a big problem in poultry keeping or whether this is merely a rumour?
    Mr. Amory: I think the hon. Member will recollect that I answered a Question on that point last week. Additional damage from foxes was to be expected. What has surprised us is how little positive evidence we have had that the additional damage has been as widespread as we expected.
    Mr. G. Williams: Can the Minister tell us whether it is intended to have definite clearance areas to exterminate this pest altogether in certain parts of the country?
    Mr. Amory: I think my hon. Friend is referring to rabbits. If he is referring to rabbits, that is the intention following the passage of the Pests Act.
    Mr. Hurdasked the Minister of Agriculture whether the cases of hares dying of myxomatosis in Britain have been investigated and confirmed by his Department.
    Major Anstruther-Grayasked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been drawn to the case of a hare contracting myxomatosis; and whether he will have this case investigated and confirmed.
    Mr. Amory: The Veterinary Laboratory at Weybridge has confirmed that the car case of a hare recently found in Northern Ireland was affected with myxomatosis.
    Mr. Hard: Have there been any cases in England, Wales, or Scotland which have been confirmed?
    Mr. Amory: I know of no confirmed cases of myxomatosis in hares other than this one in Northern Ireland, except on the Continent.
    Major Anstruther-Gray: May we take it from my right hon. Friend's reply that his Department will follow up any reports of this kind, so that they may be confirmed or denied?
    Mr. Amory: Yes, with the greatest interest and vigour.
    Mr. Usborne: Have there been any cases in this country of other animals
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    besides rabbits having myxomatosis? One hears that badgers sometimes get it. Is that true?
    Mr. Amory: No. There has been no case, to our knowledge, involving any animals other than rabbits and this one hare in Northern Ireland.

    Sugar Beet Factory, Southern England (Decision)
    Mr. Morleyasked the Minister of Agriculture when he will give sanction for the construction of a sugar-beet factory for the use of Hampshire and adjoining counties.
    Mr. Amory: I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) on 24th November last.
    Mr. Morley: Is the Minister aware that his answer of 24th November was found by the National Farmers' Union to be very unsatisfactory? Would not the erection of such a beet factory improve the fodder situation and also the rotation of crops, secure a lessening of transport charges and a saving of dollars? In view of those facts, will the right hon. Gentleman look at the matter again?
    Mr. Amory: If the hon. Member looks back to the answer which I gave on that occasion, I think he will find that I did say I was sorry to have to reach this decision, but I also gave the reasons why I felt I had to reach it, and I am afraid that those reasons still hold good.

    Marketing Acts (Reports of Inquiries)
    Mr. Simonasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he will publish, or make available to interested parties, the reports of commissioners appointed to conduct public inquiries under the Agricultural Marketing Acts.
    Mr. Amory: It has always been the practice for these reports to be confidential.
    Mr. Simon: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that, unless the reports are made available to the parties, they cannot be satisfied that the facts and arguments put forward by them have been correctly appreciated; secondly, that the authoritative Donoughmore Committee recommended that this type of report should be

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    made available, and that to withhold it would be a denial of natural justice; thirdly, that the present system causes profound dissatisfaction among those affected by the inquiries? Will he look again at this matter?
    Mr. Amory: I will bear in mind the points made by my hon. and learned Friend.
    Mr. T. Williams: Have any representations been made to the right hon. Gentleman, either from the National Farmers' Union or from any consumers' organisation, requesting the publication of these reports?
    Mr. Amory: To the best of my knowledge, I believe not.

    Egg Marketing Scheme
    Mr. Hurdasked the Minister of Agriculture if he will now outline the arrangements agreed between the Government and the National Farmers' Union for financing the price guarantee if farmers proceed with an egg marketing scheme.
    Mr. Amory: It has been agreed that if an egg marketing scheme providing for a board possessing full trading powers were established, the price guarantee would take the form of a flat-rate subsidy payable on eggs sold through packing stations at a rate per dozen determined in the light of each year's Annual Review. The subsidy would be varied only if producers' average returns were appreciably different from those expected when the subsidy was fixed, and in that case the excess or deficiency would be shared between producers and the Exchequer.
    Mr. Hurd: As the British housewife now relies on the home poultry industry for four out of five eggs in the shops, and imports are running at a low level, will my right hon. Friend say whether this proposal allows for the maintenance of a high level of egg output here and scope for increase?
    Mr. Amory: I should be very disappointed indeed if the effect were not to encourage the continuation of a high level of home production of eggs.
    Mr. Smithers: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication of the probable time-table which may be followed in the production of this scheme?
    Mr. Amory: I am afraid I cannot because it depends, at first, on whether producers decide to promote a scheme. If so, the ordinary procedure laid down under the Marketing Acts would have to be gone through.
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Agriculture what further progress has been made in the discussions regarding a permanent scheme for the marketing of eggs.
    Mr. Amory: As I said in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Aitken) on 26th January, discussions have led to agreement on financial arrangements for implementing the Agriculture Act guarantees on eggs through a marketing board. It is now for representatives of producers to decide whether they wish to submit a scheme under the Agricultural Marketing Acts, and I understand that proposals are under consideration by the farmers' unions.
    Mr. Willey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his predecessor at the Ministry of Food abolished the egg subsidy, that in spite of this the Supplementary Estimate shows that the present subsidy is running at over £2 million above the record level of last year, and that when the egg subsidy was abolished the Minister dismantled the machinery for administering it? Will the right hon. Gentleman do something to save us from the awful mess in which his predecessor left us, and will he expedite the orderly marketing and administering of the subsidy for eggs?
    Mr. Amory: I am not aware that I am under any handicap whatever in administering satisfactorily the present deficiency payment and support-price arrangements for eggs.
    Mr. K. Thompson: Will my right hon. Friend try to find out from hon. Members opposite whether they like subsidies or whether they do not?

    Agriculture and Food (Ministerial Committee)
    Mr. Peartasked the Minister of Agriculture when he will attend the Special Ministerial Committee of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Agriculture and Food.
    Mr. Amory: I hope to attend the Committee's first meeting on 8th March.
    Mr. Peart: Will the right hon. Gentleman inform me if we are to have a special representative on the committee of deputies which will assist the Committee?
    Mr. Amory: As the hon. Member knows, this matter has only reached a very early stage yet and the first meeting will be of the Ministers concerned.

    Farmers (Credit Facilities)
    Mr. Peartasked the Minister of Agriculture his proposals to provide adequate credit facilities for farmers.
    Mr. Amory: I am ready to consider most carefully any suggestions put to me, but so far I am not satisfied that a case for new proposals in this field has been made out.
    Mr. Peart: Is the Minister aware that in the miserable document, the Tory "Agricultural Charter," specific proposals were laid down, and it was said that a Tory Government would provide special cheap credit facilities for farmers? The Chancellor of the Exchequer—at a farmers' dinner three years ago—just before his Budget, also promised action. When are we to have some action?
    Mr. Amory: I am quite sure that if we were satisfied that the present facilities were not adequate action would follow. It is just that point about which I am far from satisfied at present. The facilities available at the moment are quite varied.
    Mr. Peart: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that small farmers are facing great difficulties through increases in the price of machinery, spare parts, fertilisers, and so on? There is hardship. Ought not the Government to look at this matter very quickly?
    Mr. Amory: I should be very grateful if the hon. Member would bring to my attention any case in which he feels that facilities are not available.
    Mr. T. Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in 1931 I made a proposal in this House for an agricultural credit bank, which was supported by some hon. Members of the Tory Party?
    Mr. Amory: I had not the good fortune to be present in this House at that time.
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Minister of Agriculture if he will consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer with a view to advice being issued to the banks for the provision of credit facilities for small farmers.
    Mr. Amory: No, Sir. I am sure the banks do not need such advice.
    Mr. Johnson: Is the Minister not aware that the Government's dear money policy has borne hard upon small farmers and still does so? Will he consult the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation to give farmers easier and cheaper facilities in what is becoming a difficult time for small farmers?
    Mr. Amory: I am keeping, and will keep, in very close touch with the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. If we can find anything further that we can usefully do to extend the Corporation's activities, I shall give the matter very careful consideration.
    Sir W. Darling: Has my right hon. Friend any evidence whatsoever that any difficulty is experienced by worth-while farmers in getting all the credit they require from the banks?
    Mr. Amory: I should be very disturbed if I thought there was.

    Imports (Tariffs and Restrictions)
    Mr. Peartasked the Minister of Agriculture if, in view of the Government's support of the decisions of the Paris Conference, July, 1954, on agricultural marketing, he will make a statement of British agricultural policy towards tariffs and import restrictions on agricultural imports.
    Mr. Amory: The policy of this Government, as of the last, on tariffs and import restrictions on agricultural products must continue to be related to our obligations under the G.A.T.T., which is at present under review by the contracting parties.
    Mr. Peart: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the British representative at the Paris Conference in July last year, when this new organisation was set up, supported a resolution which laid down that the organisation would seek to create a common market? Indeed, in all the interim discussions there was British support, I assume by this Government, to seek the ideals of a common market. Are

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    we to take it that the Government believe in that policy? Are they going to let down the farmers again, as they have done before?
    Mr. Amory: I think the hon. Member must agree that this country has a good record in recent years on liberalisation of imports.
    Mr. Renton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a European conference two years previously decided that horticultural growers were entitled to protection in their own markets, and that was a growers' conference? Will he state the policy of Her Majesty's Government that our own growers are entitled to such protection?
    Mr. Amory: I think my hon. and learned Friend will agree that what we did about a year ago in that respect is evidence of our interest.

    Carrots
    Mr. Collinsasked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that his Department's Report on the production and marketing of home-grown carrots reveals that 80 per cent. of the supplies marketed were below the recommended grading standard; that, largely because of better quality and grading, Dutch carrots were sold here at average prices nearly double those obtained for home-grown supplies; and if he will assist growers to improve grading and quality and find other outlets for sub-standard produce.
    Mr. Amory: Four-fifths of the consignments inspected were below the recommended grades but many could have been brought up to grade by removing a small proportion of the carrots. My Department is always ready to help growers with advice on quality and grading. An alternative use for sub-standard carrots is stock feeding and I have no reason to think that any further outlet is necessary.
    Mr. Collins: Is the Minister aware that a great deal of that waste could have been saved by pre-packaging and processing? Is he further aware that this valuable report refutes the suggestion which is often made that the poor prices to home growers are the direct result of imports. Also, on behalf of the housewife, will he bear this important factor in mind when any future question of tariffs arises?
    Mr. Amory: I could not follow the whole argument of the hon. Member, but I agree with the first part of his supplementary question that, with a little more care in grading, we could have a higher proportion of first grade carrots.

    Pig Progeny Testing Stations (Governing Body)
    Mr. Bullardasked the Minister of Agriculture which of the directors of the National Pig Breeders Association Progency Testing Research Company Limited he intends to appoint to be members of the independent authority which he is setting up to control the pig progeny testing stations.
    Mr. Amory: The method of constituting the governing body of the progeny testing stations is at present being discussed with representatives of producers, breeders, and others concerned. Decisions have not yet been reached.
    Mr. Bollard: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication as to what position this company is likely to occupy in the scheme of things? There is a feeling among breeders that the way in which the company was set up by the National Pig Breeders Association was rather secretive. Can my right hon. Friend say whether it will have a part to play in the scheme of things, or not?
    Mr. Amory: The company which I am talking about is the new company to be set up to run the progeny testing stations. It will be a non-profit-making company, and there will be representatives of the various interests concerned, including representatives appointed directly by the Ministers, on the governing body.
    Sir L. Plummer: When the Minister is discussing with the N.P.B.A. the constitution of this board, will he also discuss the possibility of appointing pig producers to the committee which is to advise him on bacon production, which at present has on it no representative of the N.P.B.A.?
    Mr. Amory: I will look into that point, but it is a separate question.

    Concrete Roads, The Fens (Maintenance)
    Mr. Bullardasked the Minister of Agriculture if he will consult with the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation

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    with a view to devising a scheme which would enable the war-time concrete roads in the Fens to be taken over by the highway authority.
    Mr. Amory: With my right hon. Friend's agreement, I am in touch with the County Councils' Association on the problem of the maintenance of these roads.
    Mr. Bullard: While it is very welcome news that at least a move is being made, will my right hon. Friend remember that this is a long-standing problem, that these roads are deteriorating rapidly, and that an urgent move is required? Will he particularly consider whether it is possible to classify any lengths of these roads so that help may be given to get them maintained?
    Mr. Amory: I agree with my hon. Friend that this is a difficult problem and that it has been with us for some time. I will look into the point which he raised in the second half of his supplementary question.

    Machinery (Cost)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Minister of Agriculture the estimated percentage increase in cost of farm machinery replacements for 1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955, respectively.
    Mr. Amory: I regret that I am unable to give exact figures but such information as is available indicates that there has been very little change in the prices of tractors and other farm machinery over the period in question.
    Mr. Johnson: Is the Minister aware that farmers in the county of Warwickshire find that these costs are a heavy burden, and form a large part of the year's overheads? Will he do something on the lines of forming an agricultural credit bank, as suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams), to help the farmers in these difficult times?
    Mr. Amory: On the question of the price of this machinery, my information is that since 1952 prices have increased by only about 1 or 2 per cent.

    Special Price Review (Farming Efficiency)
    Mr. Collinsasked the Minister of Agriculture what allowance was made for increased farming efficiency in connection
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    with the Special Price Review necessitated by the recent increase in the minimum wages of farmworkers.
    Mr. Amory: The recent Special Review added some £4 million, on account of wage changes, to the guarantees originally determined at the 1954 Annual Review, when account was taken of the relevant efficiency changes. The assessment of changes in farming efficiency that have taken place during the current year is a matter for the Annual Review now proceeding, which relates to the 1956 crops and to livestock products during 1955–56.
    Mr. Collins: Is the Minister aware that the present award is apparently full recoupment for the wage increase? If it were to be thought that there was to be automatic recoupment for wage increases, it would react very much against the men when they apply to the Wages Board for further wage increases. Will the Minister make it clear, therefore, that in no case can recoupment of wage increases in this way be regarded as automatic?
    Mr. Amory: I do not disagree in general with what the hon. Member has said. In this case, full recoupment was given because the rising efficiency factor had been taken into consideration in the Annual Review.

    Horticultural Marketing Committee
    Mr. Haymanasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he will include in the committee to be set up by his Department to inquire into horticultural marketing someone fully conversant with the needs of the Cornish industries of broccoli, new potatoes, and flowers.
    Mr. Amory: The committee will, of course, be concerned with the needs of the Cornish industries, but the members will be independent persons of general experience and will not be appointed for their connection with any particular aspects of horticulture or horticultural trades.
    Mr. Hayman: Will the Minister bear in mind that his reply will be very disappointing to horticulturists in Cornwall, because at the moment they are facing extreme difficulty, and there is danger of these important and independent small

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    producers being forced out of production altogether? Will the right hon. Gentleman really do something about it?
    Mr. Amory: I am sure that when the hon. Member's Cornish friends consider the matter they will not be at all disappointed with what I have said, because this inquiry is being appointed for exactly that kind of reason.

    Lime
    Mr. Hurdasked the Minister of Agriculture how the amount of lime applied to farm land during the past year compares with the use in previous years; and how far the results of soil tests made by the National Agricultural Advisory Service show that, generally, enough lime is being applied where it is needed on tillage ground and grassland.
    Mr. Amory: Liming materials used on farmland in the United Kingdom averaged about 5½ million tons in the five years 1949–53. In 1953, nearly 6½ million tons were used, and in 1954 nearly 5 million tons. There is still a considerable lime deficiency taking the country as a whole, but progress is being made in reducing it.

    Pigmeat Production
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Minister of Agriculture the estimated current rate of pig production compared with last year.
    Mr. Amory: Forthe year ending 31st May, 1955, it is estimated at 720,000 tons of pigmeat compared with 606,000 tons a year earlier. These estimates, which relate to the United Kingdom, include production for domestic consumption.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Are we to take it from that reply that the present state of pig production is not, in the Minister's view, excessive, although it has meant a big Supplementary Estimate? Will the Minister also say that it is not his intention, by cutting the subsidies, to penalise these pig producers for producing more pigmeat? I ought to add that I have an interest in this matter.
    Mr. Amory: I too have a very great interest in this matter. I repeat what I have said several times in the last six months—that the number of pigs produced during the latter part of last year were not more than I was glad to see in
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    the country as a whole, but that any further increase in the numbers must be accompanied by some reduction in costs.
    Mr. de Freitas: What is the Minister doing to encourage an increase of curing capacity to meet the increased number of bacon pigs available this year?
    Mr. Amory: I think that the industry concerned is well able to assess that position and to take whatever action is necessary.
    Air Commodore Harvey: How does my right hon. Friend expect prices to go down when the cost of feedingstuffs is constantly increasing?
    Mr. Amory: Feedingstuffs are not the only factor in the situation. If my hon. and gallant Friend looks at the position, I think that he will be quite impressed by the variation in the cost of production between one producer and another.

  TIDE, LINCOLNSHIRE
  Commander Maitlandasked the Minister of Agriculture by what amount the recorded height of the tide on 13th January, 1955 in the vicinity of Chapel St. Leonard's, Lincolnshire, exceeded the expected height; to what cause he attributes the heavy wave action on this occasion; and what action is being taken to investigate the cause of these phenomena which are becoming increasingly common on the Lincolnshire coast.
  Mr. Amory: I understand that the morning tide along the Lincolnshire coast on 13th January last was about 3½ft. higher than expected. The wave action probably resulted from strong north winds in the North Sea on previous days. An expert Advisory Committee to coordinate research on oceanographic and meteorological matters in relation to sea defence was set up recently.
  Commander Maitland: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the "yellow" warning was not given on that occasion? Does he also realise that, although during the last 100 years the average of phenomenal tides has been once in five years, in the last two years on the Lincolnshire coast there have been 22 occasions of phenomenal tide?
  Mr. Amory: I am informed that the tide on 13th January was not a phenomenal tide but in fact was 2½ feet below the danger level. That was why the "yellow" warning was not sent out. As to what my hon. and gallant Friend said about the behaviour of tides on the East Coast, that is the kind of matter which no doubt the Advisory Committee will be looking into very carefully.

  EMPLOYMENT

    Manpower
    Mr. Leeasked the Minister of Labour his estimate of the increased manpower necessary to carry out the modernisation of the railways, the increase in school and hospital building and the completion of the new road schemes, all of which projects will run concurrently; and how he proposes to obtain such manpower.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service (Mr. Harold Watkinson): In view of the increasing efficiency of the building and civil engineering industry, I see no reason to suppose that the programmes referred to, which will be spread over a period of years, will impose any undue burden on the industry. As regards demands for electrical equipment and diesel locomotives, the Transport Commission has announced that it will give advance notice of its annual programmes, and if it should appear that the labour requirements may be difficult to meet, my Department will be glad to co-operate with the employers' and workers' organisations concerned in considering any measures that may be necessary.
    Mr. Lee: Is the Minister aware that, in addition to the projects which are mentioned in the Question, the Chancellor has now told us that we must step up our exports pretty drastically, and that there has also been an announcement on atomic energy stations? If we cannot know at this stage, when there is a shortage of manpower, how it is planned to carry out these projects simultaneously, is the hon. Gentleman aware that there may be people who will think that all these things are mere kite flying for the next General Election?
    Mr. Watkinson: We are looking into this matter very carefully. One example
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    of how modern machinery affects this kind of problem is that after looking very carefully into the road programme we take the view that it will need only about 16,000 men out of the 1,200,000 employed in the building and contracting industries.

    Remploy Scheme
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Minister of Labour (1) to make a statement about future policy in relation to the Remploy Scheme;
    (2) the estimated number of new entrants to Remploy factory employment in the current financial year, and the number he expects will be admitted in the financial year 1955–56.
    Mr. Watkinson: The policy in relation to Remploy is that it should be given time to consolidate its trading position, and reduce the loss per head, before embarking on further expansion. In the current financial year, 812 severely disabled workers were taken on. For next financial year I fear that the number taken on will have to be smaller if the company is to have the chance to consolidate its position and to provide a sound basis for future expansion within reasonable limits of expenditure.
    Mr. Wilson: Is the hon. Gentleman seriously telling the House that in this time of much-vaunted Tory prosperity we cannot afford to maintain as many disabled men in employment under the Remploy Scheme next year as we have in employment at present? Would he tell us why this quite obviously new change of policy in refusing to take new entrants has not been announced to the House before, in view of the great interest which the House has taken in this matter ever since the pioneering work of the late Mr. George Tomlinson?
    Mr. Watkinson: I quite agree that the whole House takes great interest in the very human problems with which Remploy is concerned. I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising this matter and thus affording me an opportunity to give some information to the House. The job of Remploy is to employ as many severely disabled persons as it possibly can. Last year, in the course of this laudable ambition, it seriously outran its expenditure. I want to make it plain that there is no question of cutting down the amount of money spent on Remploy. All that is happening at the

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    moment is that the normal wastage of about 600 to 700 a year is allowed to go on, to run down the numbers slightly so that Remploy can get into a reasonable financial balance.
    Hon. Members: Shocking.
    Mr. Isaacs: Is this not a retrograde step? Are we boggling at the cost of giving some humane treatment to these men, when at the time the Act was passed during the war it was understood that it was going to cost money but that it was obviously a gain to the welfare of the men, in making them self-reliant, and a satisfaction to their families? Is the argument now that we cannot afford to do this?
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman at all, but perhaps I can give two other facts. The first is that the policy which I have now enunciated was not taken by this Administration. It was quite rightly taken in 1949 by the right hon. Gentleman himself. The second point is that the present loss per head per week on every severely disabled man employed is nearly £8, or £400 a year. What we, or rather Remploy, hoped was that the increased activity which Remploy has undertaken would bring that loss down. If the loss were brought down, more men could be employed. Unfortunately, the loss has not come down, and that is why this quite temporary adjustment is to take place until we get into a fair balance again.
    Mr. Bevan: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that every contribution that a Remploy person makes towards production is a net contribution to the resources of the State, and that if the disabled worker is idle, doing nothing at all, we lose the benefit of that contribution? Is he not also aware that every Minister of Labour has always had to resist the Treasury in this respect, and that we regret very much that the present Minister has not resisted Treasury pressure more successfully?
    Mr. Watkinson: I know that the right hon. Gentleman took great interest in Remploy, as did his predecessors, and as his successors have done. There is no question of reducing the amount spent on Remploy. In fact, next year it will be larger than it is this year, but there must
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    be an attempt, for the sake of the men themselves, to try to get this thing on a reasonable balance. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] A loss of £8 per man per week is a very large loss and is one which the Board itself hoped to be able to reduce last year.
    Mr. J. T. Price: As it must be perfectly obvious to any businessman, let alone to a politician, that nobody can hope to run Remploy on strictly commercial lines, could not a great deal more be done to have the production of Remploy absorbed by Government and civil departments?
    Mr. Watkinson: That is a very good suggestion. I can add—and Remploy has authorised me to say this—that Remploy has itself asked the Organisation and Methods Division of the Treasury to see if it can help it.
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons declared redundant in Remploy factories since 1st January.
    Mr. Watkinson: No severely disabled production workers have been declared redundant by the Board of Remploy Limited, but as a result of steps taken to reduce overheads 226 administrative and staff workers not engaged on production have been declared redundant: 11 of these are severely disabled and have been offered employment on production.
    Mr. Willey: Will the hon. Gentleman agree that, as a result of these redundancies, there will be considerable subsequent redundancies among disabled workers, and that this declaration of a change of policy will decrease the numbers by probably as many as 750 during the coming year? Would the hon. Gentleman not look at the other side of the organisation of Remploy, and pay attention to the Report of the Select Committee, and also in particular to the sales side of the company? Will the hon. Gentleman accept this as a social service to provide the largest possible amount of employment for disabled people?
    Mr. Watkinson: Later, I am answering a Question on sales, but perhaps I might tell the hon. Gentleman that in the year March, 1953, to April, 1954, Remploy took on an extra 270 fit men, so it is not actually discharging all the extra men it took on last year.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Why does not the hon. Gentleman "come clean" to the House and admit that he was not willing to state, until pressed in the House this afternoon, that the policy of the Government is to employ about 750 fewer disabled workers next year as compared with this year? If he wants some help in cutting down administrative overheads he should consult the union most concerned, and it will tell him how to do it.
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not know which union that would be. I do not think it would be A.S.S.E.T. if that is the union the right hon. Gentleman has in mind, but we should be delighted to have any help from anyone who can give it.
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Labour by how many the number of disabled persons employed at Remploy factories will be reduced during 1955.
    Mr. Malcolm MacPhersonasked the Minister of Labour, how many key workers are being dismissed by Remploy Limited; and for what reason.
    Mr. Watkinson: While I understand that Remploy Limited expects to employ an average of about 6,000 severely disabled workers during 1955 in its factories and as home workers as compared with the present number of about 6,380, this will be achieved by the non-replacement of wastage and not by the discharge of disabled workers.
    Mr. Willey: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that the estimate I have received is between 700 and 900, but in any case, whether it is 400 or 700, will he or his right hon. and learned Friend, in view of the interest that has been shown in this subject, undertake to review and reconsider it?
    Mr. Watkinson: Certainly. I met the board of Remploy only last week to discuss this matter, and we shall keep it most closely under review.
    Sir F. Messerasked the Minister of Labour how many disabled persons who have received training are on the waiting list for admission to Remploy factories; how many vacancies there are at present for such persons; and the usual waiting period.
    Mr. Watkinson: Severely disabled persons are not given training as a preliminary to admission to Remploy factories.
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    Vacancies at a factory are filled as they arise from among the severely disabled registered at employment exchanges in the district concerned, and no waiting lists are compiled.
    Sir F. Messer: If there are any vacancies will it not be a fact that those vacancies will represent an increase in overheads and, therefore, more costly production?
    Sir F. Messerasked the Minister of Labour the proportion of able-bodied workers, exclusive of instructors and fore man, to disabled people employed at Remploy factories; and how far disabled people are occupying the positions of instructors or foremen.
    Mr. Watkinson: I cannot separate the figures for foremen and instructors but only those for all the supervisory, maintenance, and auxiliary staff. Of these, 260, or 16 per cent., are disabled. All workers not in these classes are severely disabled.
    Sir F. Messerasked the Minister of Labour whether the demand for Remploy products is increasing or decreasing; and if he will give the reason for the change.
    Mr. Watkinson: I understand that Remploy sales are likely to be at a higher rate in this financial year than in earlier years. It is difficult to forecast whether the level of future demand will keep pace with the increased costs of expanding production.
    Mr. Bing: Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that, for example, paper box and cardboard manufacture is carried on by Remploy at a profit? Why is it not possible to develop this side of the work, and continue to employ large numbers of ex-Service men who are anxious to obtain employment with Remploy?
    Mr. Watkinson: The difficulty really is that unfortunately the more men Remploy employs and the more business it does, the greater the loss that is made.

    Cadmium Poisoning, Prescot (Precautions)
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Minister of Labour, in view of the disclosures in the Medical Research Council Report on the lethal effects of cadmium poisoning in a factory at Prescot, Lancashire, what

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    urgent steps he will now take to protect the workers at that and associated factories from further cases of poisoning.
    Mr. Watkinson: The conclusions in this Report are at present being studied on my behalf by Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Factories. At the factories concerned measures, which include improvements to exhaust ventilation and closer medical supervision have already been taken with the advice of the Factory Inspectorate to protect the workers against possible harmful concentrations of cadmium fumes. The effect of these precautions will continue to be carefully watched.
    Mr. Wilson: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that statement, might I ask him if he is aware that it is more than three years since I drew the attention of the Minister to this serious problem, and during that period three or four of my constituents have died as a result of cadmium poisoning, and probably a dozen in all over an earlier period; and will he intensify his efforts to make sure that no more of them die?
    Mr. Watkinson: I certainly agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this is a most important matter. I should like to say, however, that only 14 such cases have been reported in the years 1938 to 1954, and all workers so reported recovered. But I am not trying to minimise the matter. It is most important, and I know that the right hon. Gentleman has read the valuable Report on it as I have. We will try to get some cure as quickly as we possibly can.
    Mr. Sevan: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that if this has been going on for three years and was not discovered by the inspectors in his Department it reveals a very lamentable state of affairs, and that it ought to have been followed up long before this? Has he no other explanation to give to the House except that three years afterwards there is now to be a report on the matter?
    Mr. Watkinson: That is not the position at all. The point is, as the right hon. Gentleman who raised this question knows, that there is no doubt about the toxic nature of the fumes. The difficulty is how to get an effective and reasonable cure.
    Mr. Wilson: On a point of order. The Parliamentary Secretary replied to my
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    right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) and quoted me as being in support of the statement he made. I think that in fairness I ought to make it clear that that statement is not correct, and it is quite incorrect to say that I knew and could confirm what he said.
    Mr. Watkinson: I am sorry if I misquoted the right hon. Gentleman. What I said was that I thought that we were both agreed about the importance of the toxic nature of these particular fumes.

  COST OF LIVING
  Captain Pilkingtonasked the Minister of Labour what changes he intends to make in the present reckoning of the cost-of-living index.
  Mr. Watkinson: The method of calculating the Interim Index of Retail Prices was revised early in 1952, on the basis of recommendations made by the Cost of Living Advisory Committee. This Committee also recommended that a comprehensive inquiry into household expenditure should be undertaken in order to provide information to serve for an up-to-date weighting basis for a more permanent index. This inquiry was carried out over a period of 12 months ending early in 1954. The many thousands of household budgets obtained in the course of this inquiry are now being summarised, and I hope that during the latter part of this year it may be possible, with the help of the Cost of Living Advisory Committee, to carry out a further revision of the existing index on the basis of this information.

  NATIONAL SERVICE (GERMAN REARMAMENT)
  Mr. Lewisasked the Minister of Labour whether, on the formation of a new German army within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, he will take steps to allow National Service men who have lost parents and relatives at the hands of the German army or Nazi authorities or have had relatives murdered or tortured in German concentration camps to claim exemption from military service on these grounds.
  Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir.
  Mr. Lewis: Is it not straining the loyalty of these National Service men to expect them to associate with the German army, which will be officered largely by former Nazis and others who committed bestial crimes against their relatives? Surely it is too much to expect them to be associated with such people? Is not that a sufficient ground for carrying out the suggestion I have made, and allow them to claim exemption for the reasons stated in the Question?
  Mr. Watkinson: The implications of the hon. Member are outside the scope of this Question.

  HOME DEPARTMENT

    Lord Mayor's National Flood and Tempest Distress Fund
    Mr. Fellasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) the total amount of the contributions to the Lord Mayor's National Flood and Tempest Distress Fund; and the total of the payments so far made from this fund;
    (2) if he will introduce legislation to give him powers to use the residue of the Lord Mayor's National Flood and Tempest Distress Fund for the alleviation of distress caused by recent and future flood and tempest damage.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Major Gwilym Lloyd-George): I am informed by the Chairman of the Lord Mayor's Fund that the total amount subscribed to the Fund is £5,148,763. Interest earned is £35,510. The total spent to date is £6,934,216. Public funds have been drawn on to meet the difference and there will be further calls until the work of the Fund is completed. In these circumstances no question arises of using the residue of the Fund for other purposes.
    Mr. Fell: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend say whether the contribution mentioned as £5,148,000 plus interest includes the contribution of the Government.
    Major Lloyd-George: No, subscriptions to the Fund only. The difference between that and £6,900,000 is the Government contribution.

    Capital Punishment (Royal Commission's Report)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he intends to put the Government's proposals on the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment before the House of Commons.
    Major Lloyd-George: I would refer the hon. and learned Member to the statement which I made on 10th February, to which I have at present nothing to add.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that in the recent debate not one word was said about the relevance of the Report to Scotland, and that his policy of complete negation is a shocking waste of time and public money spent on the Royal Commission which prepared the Report?
    Major Lloyd-George: I would commend the hon. and learned Gentleman again to read what was said in the debate with reference to the recommendations in the Report. He will see that many of the recommendations would involve legislation. If he will look at my statement he will see that some recommendations are very controversial but many others which do not involve legislation were either going to be put into effect or had already been put into effect.
    Mr. S. Silverman: Does that mean that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is now telling the House that the Government have rejected all the recommendations of the Royal Commission which either require legislation or are controversial?
    Major Lloyd-George: No, Sir. I cannot now repeat my statement.

    Approved Schools (Vocational Training)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department his present plans for improving the law and practice relating to juvenile delinquents.
    Major Lloyd-George: I understand that the hon. and learned Member is particularly interested in vocational training in approved schools, and I am sending him a Home Office Report containing information about the subject.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say what steps he is taking to diagnose the aptitudes of juvenile delinquents and to teach them appropriate, constructive trades and make good citizens of them?
    Major Lloyd-George: The Report deals with that matter. If the hon. and learned Gentleman will look at the Report he will see what is there stated.

    School Crossings (Patrols)
    Mr. Morleyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many county and county borough councils have not yet made arrangements for patrolling school crossings.
    Major Lloyd-George: Seventeen, Sir.
    Mr. Morley: Is the Secretary of State taking any steps to persuade authorities which have not established school patrols to do so?
    Major Lloyd-George: Under the Statute I have no authority at all to interfere.

  INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (ANGLO-U.S. CONSULTATIONS)
  Mr. Lewisasked the Prime Minister whether he will extend an invitation to President Eisenhower to visit this country and discuss with him international problems, with particular reference to Formosa; and whether he will offer to visit the President in the United States of America for this purpose.
  The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): The President has long known how glad we should be to welcome him in our country, to which he has had cordial invitations. I have, in fact, been three times to see him in the United States or at Bermuda since he was elected President, and I would gladly go again if the occasion was opportune. But I think I must be the judge of that.
  Mr. Lewis: With regard to the latter part of my Question and the reply thereto, does not the Prime Minister remember that on a similar occasion, when international difficulties were rather grave, his predecessor, quite rightly, took the opportunity of flying to America to see the
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  former President of the United States? Does the right hon. Gentleman not feel that, in view of the grave situation and the deep concern felt in the world about this subject and many other subjects, it would be wise for him to consider such a trip now?
  The Prime Minister: I think that I must be the judge of these matters.

  FOUR-POWER TALKS
  Mr. Lewisasked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to the official statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister that in the event of the ratification of the Paris Treaties the Soviet Government would be unwilling to enter into Four-Power talks; and to what extent this statement affects his proposals for eventual Four-Power talks.
  The Prime Minister: I have read the speech made by Mr. Molotov before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 8th February, which I presume the hon. Member has in mind, together with other recent statements of the Soviet Government. I am unable to find in any of them the particular statement to which the hon. Member refers.
  Mr. Lewis: Surely the Prime Minister has seen many references to the fact that the Soviet Government have declared that in the event of ratification they would refuse to take part in any Four-Power talks? That has been widely reported in most of the Press. In view of that, can he say what will be the position with which we shall be confronted in the event of ratification, when the West will not be able to negotiate because of the Russian refusal to do so? Surely he will put forward some ideas?
  The Prime Minister: I cannot attempt to deal with hypothetical situations.
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Prime Minister to what extent the proposed Four-Power Conference to be held after ratification of the Paris Agreements is in substitution of his policy of talks at the highest level.
  The Prime Minister: Neither meeting is exclusive of the other once the ratification of the Paris Agreements has been achieved.
  Mr. Henderson: With a view to preparing the ground for the proposed Four-Power Conference, is any action being taken through diplomatic or other channels to ascertain the detailed proposals of the Soviet Government with regard to free elections in Germany?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. Nothing that has not already been laid bare has been attempted in that direction.

  TRANS-ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION (UNITED KINGDOM AID)
  Mr. W. Stewardasked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the steps to be taken by the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Governments, financially and technically, to ensure the success of the proposed Antarctic expedition.
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared to make a grant of £100,000 towards the cost of the proposed trans-Antarctic expedition and there may be other ways in which Departments of Government can help. The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand and the Deputy Prime Minister of South Africa are likely to bring the project to the notice of their Governments.

  A.N.Z.U.S. PACT AND S.E.A.T.O.
  Mr. Wyattasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had recently with other Commonwealth Prime Ministers concerning United Kingdom membership of the Australia, New Zealand and United States Pact; and what arrangements were made for obtaining Australian and New Zealand help in defending Malaya.
  The Prime Minister: The final communiqué of the Conference states that the security of Malaya is regarded by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand as of vital importance. No change has been made in the relationship of the United Kingdom to A.N.Z.U.S. The Manila Treaty, which set up S.E.A.T.O.—"Seāto,"or "Seato," as some people call it—to which the United Kingdom is a party, has come into being,
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  and the relationship of these two bodies has not yet been finally or formally defined. I have little doubt that a satisfactory relationship will be reached in the spirit of unity and friendship which rules in our Commonwealth affairs.
  It would not help the discussions which are to take place in other Commonwealth Parliaments, nor would it be compatible with the efficiency of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences in London, if confidential and intimate conversations, both formal and informal, were laid before the House of Commons.
  Mr. Wyatt: Can the Prime Minister say whether Australia and New Zealand propose to send troops now to Malaya to help in the operations against the guerrillas?
  The Prime Minister: I think I have given the hon. Gentleman a very full and considerate answer to his Question.

  EMPLOYMENT, NORTHERN IRELAND
  Mr. Callaghanasked the Prime Minister what progress he has to report in the efforts which Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are making, in consultation with the Government of Northern Ireland, to improve the unemployment situation in Northern Ireland.
  The Prime Minister: All this, as I told the hon. Gentleman three weeks ago, is being earnestly studied by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of Northern Ireland. The continued reduction of the exceptional rate of unemployment in Northern Ireland is an outstanding objective for both of us.
  Mr. Callaghan: Does the Prime Minister know that this afternoon a very large public demonstration is taking place in Belfast because 1,770 shipyard workers are about to be stood off? Could we have fewer studies and a little more action from the Prime Minister?
  The Prime Minister: I think it will be found that the Government have acted with sincerity, earnestness and vigour.
  Hon. Members: With what result?
  Mr. Bottomley: Is the Prime Minister aware that last year the House passed a Private Member's Motion saying that a

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  revision of the Purchase Tax on linen goods would help to ease the unemployment situation in Northern Ireland? Will the Prime Minister say when the Government mean to give expression to the wishes of the House?
  The Prime Minister: I certainly cannot plunge into a matter of that kind now.

  FOOD HYGIENE (MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY)
  Dr. Broughtonasked the Prime Minister to which Ministry the food hygiene functions of the Ministry of Food will be transferred when the amalgamation of the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries and Food is completed.
  The Prime Minister: This is at present under active consideration.
  Dr. Broughton: Can the Prime Minister state when a decision is likely to be made? When he is considering the matter, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it is the opinion of the medical profession that these responsibilities, which relate so closely to health, could be most appropriately transferred to the Ministry of Health?
  The Prime Minister: There are arguments and disadvantages on both sides.

  U.S.S.R. (PRIME MINISTER)
  Mr. E. Fletcherasked the Prime Minister whether he will send a telegram or other message to Marshal Bulganin on his appointment as Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
  The Prime Minister: This is not the custom, and I see no reason to depart from precedent.
  Mr. Fletcher: Will not the Prime Minister agree that, whatever may be the significance of the recent changes in Moscow, it is very desirable that he should try to establish cordial relations with Marshal Bulganin in view of the heavy responsibility that he has undertaken as head of a friendly Power?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, but in these matters one must conform to the general precedents which have been established.

  CEYLON (TEA EXPORTS)
  Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Prime Minister what conversations he had with the Prime Minister of Ceylon, on the occasion of his recent visit, on how to increase exports of tea to Britain, by Government purchase or otherwise.
  The Prime Minister: None, Sir. Buyers in this country are already free to purchase, either at the Colombo auction or at the London auction, as much Ceylon tea as they wish.
  Mr. Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that the Prime Minister of Ceylon expressed the opinion that the high price of tea was "damn ridiculous"? Is he aware that that is the most popular pronouncement made by any Prime Minister during the Conference? Will the Prime Minister, as one of the veteran tea drinkers in this country, do something to help the Prime Minister of Ceylon in this very worthy crusade to bring down the price of tea?
  The Prime Minister: As the Minister who abolished the import duty on tea, I should certainly be very glad to see the Prune Minister of Ceylon abolish the export duty on tea.

  SITUATION, SIERRA LEONE (COMMISSION OF INQUIRY)
  The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper:
  Mr. J. Johnson: To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement upon the rioting and disturbances in Sierra Leone, where armed police and military forces opened fire and 20 people were killed and many injured.
  Mr. John Hall: To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement about the recent riots in Sierra Leone.
  The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): I will, with permission, answer Questions Nos. 97 and 98.
  For some time two unions in Sierra Leone have been negotiating, through a joint industrial council, for wage increases. A deadlock was reached on 4th February. The employees adhered to a

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  demand for an increase of l0d. a day, while the employers offered an increase of 6d. with a promise to re-open negotiations as soon as new cost-of-living figures were available. The employers asked for arbitration if their offer were not accepted.
  The employees' representatives refused both the offer and to go to arbitration. They invited all workers to a mass meeting at which it was decided to call a general strike on 9th February. The Railway Workers' Union publicly dissociated itself from this call, and on 9th of February there was only a partial response. During the next two days the strikers caused a series of disturbances at the railway workshops and the port installations, and a number of arrests was made.
  On Friday the 11th, strike leaders and the leader of an opposition political party addressed a meeting of strikers. The strikers were promised the opposition party's support and the failure to get their demands was blamed on the political party in power. The meeting was orderly, but was followed by serious rioting.
  The railway workshops, the dock areas and the Eastern Police Station were attacked by the strikers. Troops stood by to help the police, who were becoming exhausted after two days continual pressure, and in the afternoon began operations in support of them. One company relieved the Eastern Police Station, which was in danger of being burned down with men inside it. The police fired a number of rounds of rifle fire in defending the area of the police station. There were three casualties among the strikers and one European police officer was fatally injured by the crowd.
  Rioting spread, and continued into the next day, Saturday. Attempts were made to dislocate essential service installations, road communications, water and electricity supplies, and the telephone system, at key points. The Governor states that these appeared to be carefully planned and executed.
  Three companies of troops were fully engaged during this period. They and the Police had to open fire a number of times in their attempts to control the widespread rioting, and to prevent the looting, arson, and general destruction of property which was going on.
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  On Saturday afternoon, the strike leaders approached the Government. The Governor informed them that he would appoint a Commission of Inquiry to look into all circumstances of the dispute and the disturbances and that he would immediately set up a Conciliatory Committee to bring workers' and employers' sides together again.
  On this the strike was called off. Rioting immediately died down. Patrols and a curfew were maintained over the weekend, and on Monday there was an almost complete return to work. Troops were withdrawn on Monday and the curfew is being lifted today.
  Seventeen persons killed and 84 injured have been reported to date, but there may still be some casualties not yet reported. There were no serious casualties among the troops, but besides the police officer who was killed there were four others severely wounded and many suffered minor injuries.
  The Conciliatory Committee has met several times, but I have not yet heard that it has reached a conclusion.
  I would like to express the regret and the grave concern of Her Majesty's Government at these happenings. I think that I must await the report of the Commission of Inquiry before coming to any conclusions upon them.
  Mr. Johnson: May I thank the Colonial Secretary for his statement, and ask him if he is aware that these 20 people who were killed included five schoolchildren and one woman? Is it not a fact that this is one of the worst incidents in the Colonies for some years? Public opinion, both here and in the Colony, is most disquieted about this state of affairs, and we hope that the Commission will have the widest terms of reference to deal with wages and the circumstances of the shooting and so on.
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I can assure the hon. Member that there will be a most searching inquiry into what I recognise as a most serious state of affairs.
  Mr. J. Griffiths: Will the Colonial Secretary take an early opportunity of either making a statement, or of making a statement and presenting copies to the House of the report of the investigation ordered by the Governor? We join with

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  the Colonial Secretary in expressing sympathy to those bereaved and injured. Will he make particular inquiries into what I am told are two of the most important issues in this conflict, the recent steep increase in the cost of living and the position of rice, both as to availability and price? Would those be suitable subjects for inquiry?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: In addition to the inquiry, I will follow what the right hon. Member has said. An expert from the United Kingdom is shortly going out to recalculate the cost of living indices, which the Government recognise are probably not entirely reliable.
  Mr. Hall: Is there any evidence that the riots were stimulated or planned as a result of the conflict of interests between the Colony and the Protectorate?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: It would be wiser to wait until I have the Commission's report before I attempt to estimate the cause.
  Mr. Bing: Can the Minister tell the House what was the weekly wage over which a l0d. increase was sought?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Of course, that will undoubtedly emerge and be given full publicity in the report of the inquiry. There is not a common wage. There are many varieties of wage, and any answer I gave would be misleading. We had better wait until these things have been sifted and they will be given full publicity.
  Mr. Alport: What is to be the composition of the inquiry for which His Excellency the Governor has called?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: What he has in mind is that it should consist of a chairman from the United Kingdom, an expert on industrial relations from the United Kingdom and two judicial representatives from West Africa.
  Mr. Rankin: Can the Minister say whether any other methods have been considered for dispersing a crowd? Time and again it is the bullet that is the method. Is there no alternative like the fire brigade, or tear gas, that might be used in cases such as this?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The hon. Gentleman knows that it is when the bullet is used to disperse a crowd that, naturally and quite properly, much publicity
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  attaches to it. Crowds are frequently dispersed by quite different means. The force that was used and the reasons for using it will be thoroughly thrashed out at the inquiry.
  Mr. Dugdale: Is the Minister really telling the House that he does not know what the wages are? Can he give us no idea what they are?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: That is quite clearly a matter into which the Commission of Inquiry ought to go, and I am not prepared to add to the answer that I have already given.
  Mr. J. Johnson: Is it not a fact that the meagre pittance of 6d. a day increase will be about a 10 per cent. increase in wages?
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I have nothing to add to the statement I made that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Commission of Inquiry.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal to state the business for next week?
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
Monday, 21st February—Debate on a Government Motion inviting the House to approve the Agreement concerning the relations between the United Kingdom and the European Coal and Steel Community, until 7 o'clock.
Afterwards, a debate will take place on the work of the Council of Europe on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Tuesday, 22nd February—Second Readings: Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Bill.
Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill.
Committee stage, Money Resolution.
Report and Third Reading: National Service Bill.
Wednesday, 23rd February—Committee and remaining stages: Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill.
Motion to approve: Town and Country Planning (Minerals) (Scotland) Regulations.
Thursday, 24th February—Supply [2nd Allotted Day]:
Committee stage: Civil Estimates and Estimates for Revenue Departments, Vote on Account, 1955–56.
Debate on Monopolies.
Friday, 25th February—Private Members' Motions.
Mr. Bevan: Is the Leader of the House aware that there appears on the Order Paper a Motion in the names of more than 100 hon. Members? If so, when does he propose to give time for its discussion?
[That this House regrets the failure of Her Majesty's Government to carry out the resolution unanimously passed by this House on the 5th April, 1954, which declared: That this House, recognising the hydrogen bomb with its immense range and powers as disclosed by recent experiments constitutes a grave threat to civilisation and that any recourse to war may lead to its use, would welcome an immediate initiative by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Heads of Administration of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of considering anew the problem of the reduction and control of armaments and of devising positive policies and means for removing from all the peoples of the world the fear which now oppresses them and for the strengthening of collective peace throughout the United Nations organisation; considers that the unwillingness of the Government to act in the spirit of this resolution displays a contempt for the decision of the House of Commons; in particular, deplores the Government's present refusal to take part in discussions with the Soviet Government on the future of Germany before all the countries involved have ratified the Paris Treaties; and further considers that these rejections of the opportunities for negotiation constitute a conspicuous failure to appreciate the gravity of the crisis in the affairs of mankind.]
Mr. Crookshank: I think that by now everybody is aware of the existence of this Motion, but I am afraid there is no possibility of my finding time for it at present.
Mr. Bevan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that hon. Members have their privileges and rights and that if he finds no time for discussion in the ordinary way it might be that we should seek to use the procedure of the House to compel a discussion?
Mr. Crookshank: I recognise that, but the right hon. Gentleman will have noticed that there is already one day on foreign affairs next week.
Mr. Bevan: No.
Mr. Crookshank: Certainly. There is the debate on the Council of Europe and European matters, as requested by the Opposition.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Would my right hon. Friend take note of the fact that the Far East crisis has not been discussed by this House, whereas it has been fully discussed on the radio and in the Press and in all other political circles? Should my right hon. Friend, in the course of next week, receive representations from various quarters of the House—as he is most unlikely to receive them through the usual channels—would he be good enough to consider whether a debate on the subject might take place in the following week?
Mr. Crookshank: There are, of course, many kinds of usual channels.
Mr. Strachey: Does not the Leader of the House agree that it is already apparent that, whatever views various hon. Members may take on the Motion on the Order Paper in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), there is no subject of greater interest throughout the House? Would he, therefore, not be well advised, sooner rather than later, to find time for a discussion upon it, which would embrace a discussion of the subjects just mentioned by the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke)?
Mr. Crookshank: The right hon. Gentleman put his finger on the point when he used the words "sooner or later." I was saying that sooner is not suitable.
Mr. Strachey: I said "sooner rather than later."
Sir R. Boothby: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether it is his intention to

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provide a day in the near future to discuss the Report of the Royal Commission on Betting and Lotteries, because if we are never to discuss it there does not seem to have been much object in having set up the Commission?
Mr. Crookshank: I have not taken that into consideration very recently, but a Bill dealing with one aspect of these matters has been set down for discussion tomorrow.
Mr. Wyatt: Could the Leader of the House say whether it is proposed to have a separate day to debate the deplorable and misleading White Paper on the Supply of Military Aircraft, so that we do not interfere with the debate on defence and on the Air Estimates?
Mr. Crookshank: I could not accept any of those adjectives about the recently published White Paper, but, as the hon. Member knows, from next week onwards we shall be concerned almost continuously with defence matters, and I have no doubt that it will be arranged for this matter to arise in one or other of the debates.
Mr. Nicholson: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that a large body of opinion in the House would regret the arrangement of a debate on foreign affairs in the absence of the Foreign Secretary?
Mr. Crookshank: That just shows how many different usual channels there are.
Mr. Edelman: Will the Leader of the House say whether he proposes shortly to afford time for a debate on the Government's new atomic energy programme?
Mr. Crookshank: Whether we have a debate or not, I think every hon. Member would want time to read the Report.
Mr. Ross: Has the Leader of the House seen a Motion on the Order Paper in the names of many Scottish hon. Members deploring the fact that in the recent debate on the Report on Capital Punishment no Government statement was made about the specific recommendations relating to the practice and the law in Scotland? In view of that, will he arrange for this matter to be debated at an early date? No Scottish hon. Member caught your eye on that day, Mr. Speaker. It may not be the Government's fault. But the fact
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is that we understand that the Government propose to make some changes, and it surely would be unwise to do so without having a proper debate on the subject in the House.
Mr. Crookshank: I noticed this Motion on the Order Paper, but I also notice that Motions are put down almost every day and I cannot promise time for all of them, especially at a time when the Ballot for Private Members' Motions is still open.
Mr. Nally: Is the Leader of the House aware that the faint hope which we have of discussing the Private Member's Bill tomorrow relates only to quite minormatters affecting the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Betting and Lotteries? May I put this point to him, as I have put it to him before: he will be aware that the Royal Commission was set up under the chairmanship of a former Conservative Minister, that it was set up in April, 1949, and that it made its recommendations. I think, in March, 1951. There were two years' hard work on that Report and many of the facts and figures are becoming out of date. If the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to find time for a discussion of the Royal Commission's Report, will he be good enough, on behalf of the Government and the Opposition, to send a letter to the members of the Commission apologising for the contempt and indifference with which their two years of work is being treated?
Mr. Bing: Despite his very full programme for next week, would the Leader of the House find time for a statement by the Foreign Secretary on the legal position of Formosa, in view of the fact that the Senate of the United States has ratified the Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek on exactly contrary legal principles to those set out in a Written answer by the Foreign Secretary?
Mr. S. Silverman: Reverting to the question by the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), and having regard to the very discouraging answer which the Leader of the House gave to the question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), can he say at what stage the House may have an opportunity of discussing the critical state of affairs in the Far East so as to enable

569
it to understand at least what Government policy is? If the usual channels in this matter are getting a little obscure, perhaps the noble Lord and I might be able to clear them up for the right hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Crookshank: The hon. Member seems to be asking about a different point. The Motion of his right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) has nothing to do with Formosa at all. It is quite a different set of problems. All I said was that I am unable to find any time next week for a debate on this subject, but we are in the Supply season and it is open to the Opposition to ask for a debate when they like. In fact, there is a Supply day next week and they have chosen the subject of monopolies.
Mr. Bevan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Resolution which the House carried unanimously last April would embrace the Far East as well as Europe—all causes of tension in the world and a desire for their reduction—and therefore is an all-embracing Resolution which the Government have neglected for nearly a year?
Mr. Harold Davies: Does not the Leader of the House realise that it is the duty of the House to try to clarify Britain's objective in Far Eastern, policy? Does he not think that before his right hon. Friend goes to Bangkok it is the duty of the House to discuss the position so that the people of Britain can see that we shall not be involved in any adventure whatever against China?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Proceedings on Government Business exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  ARMY BILL
  Considered in Committee [Progress, 9th February].
  [Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

  Clause 70.—(CIVIL OFFENCES.)
  3.50 p.m.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I beg to move, in page 34, line 26, to leave out the second "or."
  The Chairman: I think it would be convenient to discuss, at the same time, the two other Amendments to this Clause in the hon. and learned Member's name.
  Mr. A. Woodburn: I do not think it would be appropriate, Sir Charles, to discuss with this Amendment the one in my name, in page 34, line 30, after "section" to insert:
  Provided that a person subject to military law shall not be tried by court-martial for a civil offence committed in Scotland without the consent of the Lord Advocate.
  Mr. Hughes: It was made clear on 9th February that it would be convenient to consider with the Amendment which I have moved the other two in my name, in page 34, line 27, after "law" insert:
  "or any act or omission punishable by the law of Scotland which, if committed in Scotland, would be punishable by that law,"
  and in line 37, at end, insert "or Scotland."
  I resume the speech I was making when the House rose on 9th February, in which I was explaining that my three Amendments were designed to secure that a person who, in Scotland, commits a civil offence against Scottish law shall be tried in Scotland by a Scottish court. This is not an academic matter; it is very practical and real, because it may cost a person his life in England but not in Scotland. The most illuminating way of making clear to the Committee the gravity of the Amendments is by showing how a Scottish person would be prejudiced if tried by English law.
  The example that I want to give is that which I gave during the Second Reading debate. The doctrine of "implied malice" is English, and does not

  571
  apply in Scotland. This doctrine may cost a man his life in England, but not in Scotland. It means that in a case where no malice is expressed or openly indicated, the law will infer it from circumstances such as a deliberate and cruel act, the commission of a felony by the accused, or the killing of an officer of justice in the legal execution of his duty. A recent Royal Commission recommended the abolition of this doctrine, and the different penalties in England and Scotland show how important are my Amendments and how terrible may be the results of not passing them.
  These three cognate Amendments were foreshadowed in my speech during the Second Reading debate. On that occasion they were misrepresented and misunderstood, and have continued to be so. I have been attacked as an iconoclast, putting forward Scottish nationalism as against British law. The very reverse is the case, because the Amendments are designed to apply British law to the British Army, while the draft Bill seeks to implement English law for the British Army. So far, the attacks upon my Amendments have been irrelevant and partisan, made by members of the Select Committee seeking fondly, and, I submit, foolishly, to divert attention from the defects of their own offspring.
  The arguments which were advanced against the Amendments were directed both to their form and principle. I should like to inform the Ministers concerned that I do not much care about the form, if the principle is accepted—and if the Government think that the form of my Amendments does not carry out the principle which I have enunciated I shall be very glad if they will say that they will take back the Clause and consider it in relation to the principle for which I am arguing.
  I want to do full justice to the arguments adduced against me by the learned and distinguished Chairman of the Select Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens). He rose immediately after me during the Second Reading debate and purported to reply to my arguments. He said:
  "Every matter which he raised in his speech was considered in great detail by that Committee …"
  572
  I regret to say, Sir Charles, that this is manifestly inaccurate, and I say that for four reasons. First, the Committee did not include any expert in Scottish law; secondly, the Scottish Law Officers were not present; thirdly, the Lord Advocate's Department was not invoked or consulted; and, fourthly, in page 38 of the evidence it is made abundantly clear that the Committee intended to draft an entirely English Bill and to insert one Clause applying it to Scotland—and this is what it did.
  I invite the Committee to look at page 38 of the evidence. It makes it quite clear that when the Select Committee was considering the two systems of law it decided to deal with Scottish law later and separately, but this has never been done. The relevant passage in page 38 begins with Question 253, when the Chairman said:
  "But it is very difficult this interlocking of military and civil jurisdiction. Mr. Scott reminds me that something has to be done about the Scottish courts. You will bear that in mind?"
  In reply, the witness said:
  "Yes, indeed. … It is Section 167."
  The learned Parliamentary counsel then intervened and said:
  "I do not know if I might mention this now, but I thought probably the most sensible course would be to wait until we have all the Clauses, and then ask the Scottish draftsman to look at it. I think it would be putting undue labour on him to ask him now."
  4.0 p.m.
  That very proper advice was agreed to by the Select Committee, but was never implemented. The nearest to it is that part of the Bill which, under the heading "Application to different countries" applies the Measure to Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and certain overseas territories, including Malaya and the Republic of Ireland.
  It would be ironic to suggest that the Bill applies Scottish law, or touches any major point of principle or difference between English and Scottish law. My Amendments are designed to cast a lifebuoy to the Select Committee to enable the members to cure the ill-effects of their proposal and to save themselves from submersion.
  The second point made during the Second Reading debate by the right hon.

  573
  and learned Gentleman who was Chairman of the Select Committee was:
  "I want to deal with the point that we have codified the military but not the civil offences… it is not for an Army Act… to proceed to codify the civil laws of the land."
  The answer to that is in my Amendments. The implications made by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South are unsound. They make the operation of the Clause difficult and unjust, especially when forces; are operating overseas, for instance, in Germany or Korea.
  The implications of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, which, I say, were and are unsound, were that a court may have definitions of military offences, but not of civil offences. I ask him to tell me, not now but later, what happens when definitions of civil offences differ from country to country. The right hon. and learned Gentleman does not answer this essential question, but, clearly, the answer is to codify and define civil offences in the Army Bill—particularly the graver crimes such as murder—according to British law. That is what I ask for. That is what I seek, and that is what I hope the Government will do when they take back the Clause and put it before the Select Committee again for more mature consideration.
  The third point made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman was:
  "Why should any civil offence be made a military offence at all? Why should it be triable by court-martial in any circumstances. The answer is … Annex 13 to our Fourth Report…"
  But that is no answer at all. Annex 13 does not deal with this matter, or does not affect the subject of my Amendment. It deals with a conflict between military and civil jurisdiction and not with any conflict or relation between English and Scottish law. Therefore, that falls as being any answer to the principle that I ask should be implemented in the Bill.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman ended by saying:
  "I am not going to take up the time of the House in dealing with the other points mentioned by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I am not by any means certain that I have fully appreciated some of his other comments…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT,. 25th January. 1955; Vol. 536, c. 67–8.]
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  That is no answer to the concrete suggestions which I put clearly and the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not answer because, in my submission, the points that I put so clearly are unanswerable.
  I beg the members of the Select Committee to consider the three Amendments on their merits in an informed and statesmanlike way. I beg hon. Gentlemen to leave aside their natural paternal bias in favour of their offspring as it stands and to abandon the tactics of a bad advocate who attacks his opponent rather than his opponent's case. I ask them to realise that this is not a Clause in an ordinary Army Annual Bill. It is a Clause in a Bill designed to be of long duration. It should be considered calmly and constructively, without any bias.
  This should not be done, as my critics seem to wish to make it, as a kind of game of the Select Committee versus Scotland. On the contrary, it should be a piece of constructive legislation designed to harmonise both systems of law, English and Scottish, which constitute British law. This permanent Measure should be based upon a kind of synthesis containing the finest elements of the two systems of law.
  Questions 253 and 254 of the Minutes of Evidence make crystal clear that the members of the Select Committee, in breach of their remit, intended to draw up an English Bill with a Clause which would merely apply it to Scotland. That is what they have done. They have drafted it on that basis, and the Bill is now before the Committee with its imperfections. My Amendments seek to cure this defect. As I have said, I am not wedded to the wording; I merely ask for consideration of the principle.
  I am glad to see that the new Lord Advocate is here. I hope that he will seize the opportunity to make his maiden speech and—
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: On a point of order. The hon. and learned Member has referred to the Lord Advocate making a maiden speech. This presents a difficulty for many hon. Members. If the Lord Advocate makes his maiden speech, then, according to precedent, it must be largely non-controversial. I have some doubt how we can question the Lord Advocate and elicit answers from him if we are supposed

  575
  to be non-controversial. I should like to know, Sir Charles, whether there is any precedent to guide us?
  The Chairman: I am afraid that I am beaten by that one.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: As usual, my hon. Friend was anticipating. I was saying that I am glad to see the Lord Advocate here. I hope that he will make his maiden speech in reply to my request and that he will conform to the tradition of maiden speeches by saying, in a non-controversial way, that he will accept my Amendment.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Further to my point of order. It is our procedure that anyone who follows an hon. Member who has made a maiden speech must congratulate him and express the hope that we might hear him very often in our debates. How can any hon. Member do that if the Lord Advocate makes a controversial speech? I submit that this is most unfair on the Lord Advocate.
  The Chairman: I shall call the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), and perhaps he will be able to get round this difficulty.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: If the Lord Advocate sets the example of accepting good Amendments when they are proposed, as I am proposing a good Amendment I hope that he will continue in the same way all the days of his Parliamentary life.
  I have said that on the Select Committee there was no expert in Scottish law. The assistance of the Lord Advocate, or his Department, was not invoked. This treatment of Scotland, therefore, is no surprise in the circumstances. The Minister who introduced the Bill did so on the basis that it requires no amendment, but the Committee must see that it does, in fact, require the three Amendments which I am submitting. Clause 70 is imperfect, and these Amendments will cure its imperfections.
  I have referred to the evidence, and I have made clear the basis on which my Amendments stand. Before the Lord Advocate or the Government decide these grave matters, I beg them to check the views expressed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman who was the Chairman of the Select Committee, and to check them with the leading authorities. I
  576
  would particularly refer the Government to the "Cambridge Law Review" for November, 1954, page 232 onwards, where they will find complete support for the principle which I am putting forward.
  The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South said that Clause 70 merely continues the state of affairs established in 1879. In saying this, he overlooks the fact that, in those days, all soldiers were volunteers, and, therefore, were deemed to accept voluntarily the Army code, whatever it may have been; but, today, thousands are conscripts, and this development is much more recent than 1879. The conscripts of today, therefore, are- not deemed to accept the Army code; they are forced by conscription to accept it, whatever it may be and however it may differ from the code of their own country.
  The Chairman: I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is now making a speech that would be more appropriate on the Question "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
  Mr. Hector Hughes: No, Sir Charles; it is dead on the Amendment.
  To put it in a concrete way, I have instanced the case of a Scottish conscript who is abroad, and who may be subjected to this dangerous doctrine of implied malice, which is not Scottish, but English. He may be made the victim of it, even though he has not in any way assented to it. In my submission, my three Amendments, taken together, will cure this defect.
  That is a bare outline of the reasons for these Amendments. I hope that the Government will either accept them, or, at worst, promise to consider them in conjunction with the Scottish Law Officers. If not, I hope that the Committee will remit the Bill to the Select Committee, so that it may reconsider this Clause in the light of these Amendments.
  Sir Patrick Spens: As a great deal of the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) has been directed against me personally, I hope that the Committee will forgive me for trying to reply again, fairly shortly, to what he has said.
  I have very great respect indeed for anything that comes from Scottish lawyers, as

  577
  I am a Scotsman myself, and nothing but a Scotsman. I have a very great deal of respect, in particular, for Professor Smith, of Aberdeen, who, I am inclined to think, is mainly responsible for this point being taken at this stage.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I should like to make it perfectly clear that I take complete responsibility for the principle of my Amendments. I quoted from Professor Smith, because I, too, have very great respect for his distinction as a lawyer, and I was glad to have his support for my Amendments.
  Sir P. Spens: Never for a moment did I suggest that the hon. and learned Gentleman would not take full responsibility for what he said and for the insinuations which he made in his speech. Of course, he docs; he always does. Nobody will accuse him of any form of intrepidity in this matter.
  There is a serious point in this Amendment, and one which was considered by the Select Committee long before we finally recommended the draft Bill to the House. Every Clause was gone through, and the draft Bill was submitted to the Scottish Office and its advisers, so that there is no question about this matter not having been very fully considered.
  4.15 p.m.
  To make the situation clear, I repeat that, wherever troops are stationed in England, whether they be English, Scottish, Irish or Welsh troops, or anybody else, they are subject to the civil law of England and the civil courts of England, and they cannot be tried by court-martial for civil offences committed in England unless the civil authorities are willing to allow them so to be tried. Similarly, troops stationed in Scotland, whether English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish, can all be tried, and must be tried, for civil offences committed in Scotland according to the Scottish law by the civil courts, and they cannot be tried by court-martial for civil offences committed in Scotland unless the civil authorities say that they may be so tried.
  It is quite possible that, shall we say, one of the Black Watch, which regiment has just gone to British Guiana, had committed a civil, offence in Scotland before he went there, and that it was not found out until after he reached British Guiana.
  578
  Even then, he cannot be tried by court-martial in British Guiana unless the civil authorities in Scotland are willing to allow it.
  Let us suppose—and this is the real point at issue—that British troops stationed abroad, whether English, Scottish or Irish troops, do, in fact, commit civil offences which are not military offences. Are they to get off? They are, of course, subject to the ordinary civil law of the place, and they are liable to be tried by the local civil authorities, whoever they are, unless special arrangements are made to exempt them when stationed abroad. But, supposing that they commit offences which are civil offences according to English law, but are not military offences, are they to get off altogether, or are they to be tried by court-martial?
  It is true that what the Select Committee has said is that the code to be applied to civil offences which are not also military offences is the English code. The hon. and learned Gentleman and those who agree with him—and I have a great sympathy with this feeling—say that that is very hard on a Scottish soldier who, having committed an offence when stationed abroad which is an offence under English law, finds that he may be rendered liable to it.
  But what is the alternative? It is that English soldiers stationed abroad who commit English civil offences shall be triable for them by court-martial, and that Scottish soldiers stationed abroad who commit civil offences under Scottish law shall also be tried by court-martial. That is how the hon. and learned Gentleman and his hon. Friends would have this Clause altered. This is purely a question of practice, because no one has the slightest idea who is a Scottish soldier and who is an English soldier. Are we to say that every young man who is at present serving in the Black Watch in British Guiana is a Scottish soldier? There are hundreds of English soldiers, as well as Welsh and Irish soldiers, in every Scottish unit, and in every English unit there will be three or four nationalities.
  I want the hon. and learned Gentleman to consider this point very carefully. This is a code that will be administered not by lawyers but by officers sitting in court-martial and the only help they have may

  579
  be a manual. A man is brought up, say in British Guiana, and alleged to have committed an offence which is a civil offence by Scottish law. If he says, "I am not liable because I am English," or vice versa, the first step of the court-martial must be to decide whether the man is English or Scottish—unless we put in a Clause that everybody in an English unit is deemed to be English and everybody in a Scottish unit is deemed to be Scottish. Otherwise, the first point to be decided at every court-martial will be the nationality of the accused. For a civil offence which is not a military offence the court-martial will have to start by inquiring into the question of birth, domicile, residence and all the rest of it.
  Take my own case. I am a Clydesider of Clydesiders. I was born inGlasgow and lived in Glasgow for the first 10 years of my life. I have been in England since. I was educated in England, was called to the English Bar and joined an English regiment, but I hope to return some day to Scotland. What am I at present? Any court would have the greatest difficulty in deciding whether I am a domiciled Englishman or whether my domicile in Scotland still survives. How can a court-martial take place if it first has to decide a question of that sort?
  On the Select Committee we had to make a choice. We adopted what had been the law in 1879, that where offences committed are not military offences the test shall be, "Are they offences under English law or are they not?" We could, of course, have made everybody liable for all the offences under English law and Scots law, but then we should have to teach court-martial practice to officers by lectures, and so on. We should have the very greatest difficulty in getting a court-martial on its legs and able to start. Although my sympathies are very much with the right hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North, I think that in the circumstances the Bill should remain as it is.
  Mr. Woodburn: Would it be possible in some cases for a soldier to opt as to which law he wished to be tried under?
  Sir P. Spens: That is a matter for the Secretary of State for War, and not for a lawyer.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Should not these legal questions be addressed to the Lord Advocate? As a layman who is exceedingly ignorant of these technicalities, am I not justified in asking one of the chief Law Officers of the Crown to give the Committee his considered views, according to Scots law?
  Mr. Hector Hughes: May I ask the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) a question before he sits down?
  The Chairman: The right hon. and learned Member seemed to be satisfied with what his English hon. Friend has said.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I am not satisfied. I was born in Wales. I do not understand the complexities of Scots law and I think it is the duty of the Lord Advocate to explain them to the Committee.
  The Chairman The Chairman rose—
  Mr. Hector Hughes: May I ask a question of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South, before he sits down. [Laughter.] It is quite customary to use that phrase and I do not see anything amusing in it. The right hon. and learned Gentleman made a speech which, superficially, was persuasive, but it does not persuade me. How would he apply his speech and his reasoning to the case of a young Scottish boy conscripted into the Army, and later charged with murder, and who says, "I want to be tried according to Scottish law, because I am against the doctrine of implied malice. If I am tried according to English law the doctrine of implied malice may hang me. That doctrine does not apply in Scots law and I may be acquitted, because I am innocent".
  Sir P. Spens: If either a Scotsman or an Englishman committed murder in Scotland he would be tried by a Scottish civil court according to the law of Scotland. If either of them committed murder in England, he would be tried by a civil court, according to the law of England. If the murder were committed abroad, he would be tried by the law relating to murder in that country, in a local court and by the local authority, unless arrangements had been made by the local authority that it would allow British soldiers who committed murder there to

  581
  be tried by court-martial. If that agreement had been entered into by our Foreign Secretary with the foreign country, then the civil authorities would allow the man to be tried by court-martial for murder, and he would be tried under this Clause and according to the law of England.
  The case cited by the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North is the one possible case where a Scotsman being tried according to the law of England might feel that he ought to be tried according to the law of Scotland.
  Mr. George Wigg: We are not only having a nice legal argument, but are discussing a code of discipline. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) has made a very substantial legal case. In so far as I am competent to express an opinion, I think he has made an overwhelming case in pointing out how utterly impossible the position of a court-martial would be if it was uncertain under which code a man was to be tried. There would be no means of deciding that question. I cannot imagine any more disruptive Amendment than this, and if anybody wants to destroy discipline in the Army he will vote for the Amendment.
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) may or may not be right on his points of law, but there are one or two things that he does not understand—and this is astonishing—and one of them is the procedure by which a Select Committee is set up and what happens when it discharges its duty. Time and time again my hon. and learned Friend asked the Government to convey his suggestions to the Select Committee. That body met for two and a half years. Its Report has now been presented, and as a Select Committee it is no more. The responsibility now lies with the Government.
  My hon. and learned Friend again charged those of us who were on the Select Committee with not discharging our remit. Here I find difficulty in taking him seriously. It was not part of the remit of the Select Committee that we should reverse the military decision of Culloden or of the Battle of Flodden. The point is an English one and as an English nationalist I do not think anything about it. My form of English nationalism expresses itself in a rather simple way. I
  582
  am one of those whose origins are quite English.
  As my name implies, my ancestors formed part of the reception committee that met William the Conqueror, at Hastings. But my nationalism never got me any further than a mild preference for the word "go" rather than for the word "proceed," and a violent preference for the word "beginning" rather than for the word "commencing." I know, from military experience, that one would never call a regimental sergeant-major "illegitimate" because that would not be understood, whereas everybody knows what is meant when one calls him by another word meaning the same thing. My Anglo-Saxon preference has never really gone beyond that.
  4.30 p.m.
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North has introduced a rather crabbed, confined, academic, musty, legal argument into a practical discussion. It is a practical discussion, because, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South pointed out, when military law comes to be applied to soldiers serving abroad, there is no citizens' advice bureau round the corner, nor is there a legal expert. There is only the Manual of Military Law and a copy of the Army Act, with its footnotes. We must make sure that the law is understandable and can be simply applied, because the persons charged with applying it are not only concerned with abstract, legal doctrine, but also with maintainng discipline. I ask my hon. and learned Friend to remember that.
  Mr. A. C. Manuel: I am impressed by the case which my hon. Friend has built up from his point of view, but does he not recognise that if a young Scottish lad is conscripted into the Armed Forces and is sent abroad he would not necessarily be subject to the civil law? With all due deference to the legal profession to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) belongs, I do not accept that he would. If he is charged with murder, and if he is in the ranks, I do not think that that would apply. Any Scot is then in the position of being tried under the English penal code, and if he had not been conscripted away from Scotland that charge would not have been

  583
  brought against him, except in so far as certain aspects of a charge can be brought against him, such as those indicated by my hon. and learned Friend.
  Mr. Wigg: In considering matters of life and death, let us use our brains and not our hearts. Let us get rid of emotion in dealing with this matter. Do not let us worry about the Scottish lads who have been conscripted, because there are far more English lads who have also been conscripted. A considerable number of English lads have the misfortune to be stationed in Scotland, and it is a much greater misfortune for an Englishman to be stationed north of the Border than it is for a Scotsman to come south of the Border.
  Mr. Manuel: I should like my hon. Friend to recognise that we accept gladly, and give overwhelming hospitality to, the English lads stationed in Scotland, and that I have never heard of one who did not appreciate it, acknowledge it, and like his stay in Scotland.
  Mr. Wigg: Equally, I have never met a Scotsman who came south of the Border and ever went back. Like the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South, who talked about going back, he always stops short at Carlisle.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes Mr. Emrys Hughes rose—
  The Chairman: Unless the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) resumes his seat, the hon. Gentleman is out of order in rising.
  Mr. Wigg: I am sorry if, for the first time in my life, I have been led astray by a Scotsman.
  I want to deal with the point raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North, and to ask him to reconsider his submission that he regards it as a misfortune that Scottish lads should be tried by English law. I think that English lads might regard it as a misfortune to be tried by Scottish law. I would not regard it as a misfortune. Obviously, we have to accept the law of the country in which we are living, and it seems to me very important that, wherever possible, the civil law should be paramount. I think it is absolutely vital that wherever a soldier happens to be in these islands, he should be tried by a civil court and not by a military court.
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  If my hon. and learned Friend is considering the hardship to Scottish lads who are tried under English law, then, before we know where we are, we shall need to find a machinery of justice to deal with the complaints of English lads. We shall not be able to stop there. We shall have to consider the hardship to the lads of Northern Ireland. When we have done that, we shall have a wonderful system of law in the Army, but we shall have no Army. It will become a chaotic mob.
  One of the dangers about the Army is barrack-room law. We have enough of it anyway, and we do not want any more. I beg my hon. Friends to reflect that we are dealing here with something more than abstract, legal argument. Let them draw on their imagination and ask themselves what would happen in one of the awkward places, such as British Guiana, or an odd spot in Kenya or in Singapore, where an offence is committed and where a man is remanded for a summary of evidence, and then there had to be carried out a wonderful hunt in order to establish whether he is of English or Scottish domicile.
  I suggest that among the first to complain would be my hon. and learned Friend. He would put Questions to the Secretary of State, saying, "Here is little McTavish. He has been under arrest for the last three years because we do not know whether he was born in John o'Groats or in Berwick." After all, if he employed a lawyer like my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) he would serve a life sentence awaiting trial, while this argument went on. What has been discovered here is an absolute mares' nest. In my judgment, it has no substance in law and certainly no substance at all from the military point of view. Therefore, I hope that the Committee will waste no more time on it, but will proceed to the more important matters which it has to consider.
  The Lord Advocate (Mr. W. R. Milligan): I hope that any word I say this afternoon will not be controversial, because I particularly do not want to encourage the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) to be controversial should he speak later. This is not a controversial issue at all in the sense in which the House or the Committee use the word "controversial." All

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  of us, on both sides of the Committee, I am sure, are anxious to get fair treatment for everybody in Her Majesty's Forces from wherever he comes.
  The only controversy so far as I can see at the moment is on the other side of the Committee. The Amendments which have been put down to the various Clauses of the Bill have, I think, been put down in order to raise the issue to which the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) referred. A feeling apparently existed, and was noticeable, in the various speeches on Second Reading that somewhere in the Clauses of the Bill, or in the existing law, there is some unfairness, particularly to Scottish soldiers.
  I hope to be able to convince the Committee that, in point of fact, there is no unfairness to anybody under the existing law or in the Bill. Before coming to the Amendment which the Committee is considering at the moment, it might help the Committee and save time later, when we come to the other Amendments, if I attempted to set out the position in law as it is at present, both as regards courts-martial and civil courts.
  I will deal, first, with courts-martial. Any person who is subject to military law is liable to be tried by court-martial for, first, any of the specific offences set out in the Bill as charges triable by court-martial, for example, Clauses 24 to 69, which were discussed when the Committee last met. These may, in general terms, be described as military offences. They are all offences with a military flavour about them.
  Secondly, any man subject to military law may be tried by court-martial for any offence which, if committed in England would be punishable by the civil law of England. In other words, the English civil code is incorporated—as it has been now for 70 years—in the law of court-martial. In practice, of course, a man in the Army who has committed an offence which is a civil offence would, in normal cases, be tried by the civil courts and, as we shall see later, the civil courts have the first opportunity of trying him.
  As the Committee will know there are certain exceptions to the general rule which I have set out; namely, particularly serious offences—treason, murder and the like, set out in Section 70 (4)—which, if committed in the United Kingdom are
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  only triable by a civil court. The result is that, wherever the offence is committed the whole Army is thus under one code so far as courts-martial are concerned. This is highly necessary, highly desirable and has been the law for at least 70 years.
  May I turn now to the civil courts, where the position is materially different? The liability of a soldier to be charged in a civil court is exactly the same as that of a civilian. Merely joining the Army does not exempt a man from being tried when he commits a civil offence. He can in general—and I stress the words "in general"—and I am talking of civil courts at the moment—only be charged if the offence is an offence against the law of the country where the offence is committed. Clause 70, which we are now discussing, has nothing whatsoever to do with trial in civil courts nor does it create any new civil offence.
  May I give three examples of what can happen so far as civil prosecution is concerned? If a man, subject to military law commits an assault in Yorkshire he can be charged in Yorkshire. Assault is a crime in England. Similarly, if he commits an assault in Perthshire he can be charged in Perthshire. Assault is a crime in Scotland. If, however, he attempts to commit suicide in Perthshire he cannot be charged in the civil courts. An attempt to commit suicide is not a crime in Scotland. I think the examples will show how narrow is the position so far as civil offences are concerned. There is another Amendment arising from another Clause which does deal with safeguards, but I think I could leave that to a later stage in our discussion.
  The final position which I have set out, is, so far as civil courts are concerned the same for all soldiers, regardless of their parentage or of their homes. May I just note the exception? The exception depends on an English Statute and on a Scottish Statute, which provide that certain crimes may be tried in the English or in the Scottish courts although they have been committed abroad. They are special provisions, but the general position is as I have outlined.
  The Amendments in general—and I am only talking generally now—have, of course, been carefully considered by all Scottish Members, because we are as anxious as I know are all other Scottish

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  Members to see that everyone gets a fair deal under this Bill, but having considered this matter with the greatest care I am quite satisfied that the Bill does not contain any provisions which are unfair to any soldier whatever may be his place of birth or upbringing.
  Several suggestions have been made, not only during Second Reading but today and throughout the country, of various methods by which the present situation might be improved. A code has been discussed. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) referred to it. I respectfully agree with him that it would be unfortunate if we introduced a further code of law—and, at the end of the day, I very much doubt whether it would be to the advantage of the soldier. He would have great difficulty in getting the specialised help for which he might well feel inclined to ask. There would be very few lawyers who would be able to help him, because very few would know the code.
  The right hon. Member for East Stirlingshire (Mr. Woodburn) referred to the possibility of a soldier, on joining the Armed Forces, opting as to whether he wanted to be tried by the law of Scotland or by the law of England. Unless it was developed a little I think that that would be an extremely difficult and unsatisfactory way of approaching the problem. We might well get someone who had no connections with Scotland at all—coming, say, from Cornwall—selecting the Scottish law, or someone from the north selecting to be tried by English law.
  On the other hand, if someone was asked if he was a domiciled Scotsman I am quite certain, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Kensington, South that he would not know. There must be many hon. Members of this Committee who do not know at the moment whether they are domiciled Scotsmen or not. It may be difficult to know whether one is a domiciled Scotsman or Englishman when it comes to questions of testamentary disposal and the like. That is the position, as I see it, concerning the general law, and the law which will continue to be the law on these matters if this Bill receives the Royal Assent.
  4.45 p.m.
  I turn now to the Amendment which has been moved by the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North. I note that when last the Committee met he said:
  "It is obvious that these Amendments are designed to secure that a person who in Scotland commits an offence against Scottish law shall be tried by a Scottish civil court."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th February, 1955; Vol. 536, c. 2025.]
  I do not know whether the intention of this Amendment was to say that no man might be tried by court-martial if he could be tried by the civil court—whether the English civil court or the Scottish civil court. If that was the intention the Amendment certainly does not achieve it. The only effect of the Amendment is to make the man liable to be tried by an additional code of law. Members will note that the Amendment, as incorporated in the existing Clause and as read out by the mover says:
  "In this Act the expression 'civil offence' means any act or omission punishable by the law of England which, if committed in England, would be punishable by that law; or any act or omission punishable by the law of Scotland which if committed in Scotland, would be punishable by that law."
  If the Committee gave effect to that, it would mean that a person could be tried by court-martial, not only for a typical military offence but for any offence against the civil law of England or for any offence against the civil law of Scotland. I do not think that that was what was intended but, on construction, that is what the Amendment means as a question of law. I therefore invite the Committee not to widen the Bill by introducing these additional words and making the lot of the Serviceman even more difficult than it is today.
  I do not think it is for me to suggest any other reason or any other meanings which should be attached to it, because the hon. and learned Member himself said that it was intended to ensure that a Scottish civil court should try anyone who was to be charged with a civil offence; in other words, to remove from the courts-martial any offences which also ought to be civil. That would be an extremely difficult, and I think unsatisfactory, thing to do, because tremendous numbers of these court-martial offences, which the Committee dealt with on the last occasion are themselves, by common law or by Statute also criminal offences.
  Were this Amendment accepted, the result would be that the civil courts would try practically all these offences set out in the earlier Clauses of the Bill. I think it desirable that there should be cases dealt with appropriately by court-martial, and I invite the Committee to reject this Amendment. I do not think that any unfairness is created for anyone. I consider it absolutely necessary that soldiers, wherever they may be, should all serve under one simple straightforward code known as military law.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: May I express the gratification of the Committee that at long last we have had an opportunity of listening to the Lord Advocate? We have watched his career with great interest. Now we see that the Government have so much confidence in him that they choose a Scottish lawyer with no previous experience of speaking in this House to fill the gap. The English lawyers have been kept in reserve because the Government thought that a clear mind, trained in the Scottish courts, had the necessary perspicacity and clear legal training to explain this complicated Measure to the Committee. I know that we shall have pleasure in listening to the Lord Advocate again, and I hope that on future occasions he will be able to make a speech worthy of a better cause. I have done my best for the Lord Advocate.
  The point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) did not impress me at all. The most impressive case which he could think of to convince the Committee was that of a Scottish soldier in British Guiana. What was to be done about such a man? The right hon. and learned Gentleman foresaw a long and complicated situation which would result if this Amendment were passed. I submit that the problem could be easily solved by bringing the Scottish soldiers home from British Guiana; in fact by bringing all the soldiers home from British Guiana. I am quite sure that no one would be more pleased about that than the Scottish soldiers themselves.
  Mr. Woodburn: We all listened with appreciation to the Lord Advocate, and we Scotsmen are indebted to a fellow Scot for giving us such a lucid explanation of the law as applied both in this country and abroad. I wish to add my congratulations to the Lord Advocate
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  upon his maiden speech. Judging by his attitude at the Dispatch Box, even had everyone broken the rule of the House and interrupted him, it would not have disorganised his speech; nor would it have upset him to the extent that some of we less practised speakers might have been upset.
  The Committee will appreciate a Scottish Lord Advocate able to expound Scottish law and clear up points of difference. I can assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that he will have many requests to elucidate points, both in this Chamber and in the Scottish Grand Committee. No one will get more opportunities to perform his functions than the Scottish Lord Advocate.
  The debate has been interesting and has turned on this question of Scots or English. I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) that this is a great and difficult problem. The other night we had a debate on the herring, and sooner or later every hon. Member declared that he was a Scot, although none of us had known it before. It was rather difficult to discover whether a Secretary of State or an Under secretary of State with a name like McLean would be tried under English law or as a Scot—
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Or as an Irishman.
  Mr. Woodburn: The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would obviously be tried as a Welshman, no matter where he was domiciled.
  We encounter great complications when we discuss the question of nationality. I understand that legally there is no such thing as a Scottish or an English nationality, though that seems to be missing in the teaching in English schools. We in Scotland are conscious of the word "British," but south of the Border that does not seem to be so commonly known. It may be that some English soldiers do not know that they are British and that they are subject to any other law except the English law.
  From what has been said, I think it is clear that a soldier in Scotland will be tried in the civil courts according to Scottish law and in England according to English law. I do not think that objections will be raised to that from either side of the Border. My hon. and learned

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  Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) made clear the point of his Amendment, although he agreed that the Amendment might not actually achieve its purpose. I thought that my hon. and learned Friend should have added at the end, "or"—and then said whichever was the better for the soldier, so that the soldier could opt for Scottish or English law. But I disagree that a soldier should be tried according to both codes. If a man is to be tried, I consider one code quite sufficient.
  There is the problem that in Scotland there are certain laws—I do not propose to try to interpret them, because the Lord Advocate can do that much better—which may convince a man that he will get a fairer trial in Scotland than under English law. The question of murder may not enter into this, but if we asked anyone in Scotland whether he would rather be tried for murder under the English or the Scottish law, I do not think there is a single Scot who would not say that he preferred to take the risk of the Scottish code. Every Scottish lawyer is convinced that people charged with murder get a fairer trial under Scottish law than under English law.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: And a good many English lawyers too.
  Mr. Woodburn: We gather that in England a person has about three trials and the matter is publicly discussed before a person comes to his trial. In Scotland we think that a man has one trial and that he has a fair chance against the prosecution. The prosecution cannot, as it were, influence the minds of the general public before the trial has taken place. It is this feeling which has influenced a great many hon. Members. They feel that if the English code be applied to some Scots boy abroad—and there have been some unfortunate cases abroad—it may be that the Scots boy would not have a fair trial.
  I have had as much experience of courts-martial as most people, and I am satisfied that a great many people who conduct courts-martial do not know much about the law at all, not even their own law. I have seen a man convicted by court-martial when strictly according to the Manual of Military Law he should
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  not have been convicted at all; because, according to the Manual, no court-martial could accept a plea of guilty to the offence with which he was charged. But the court-martial I have in mind went ahead and accepted a plea of guilty.
  I agree that according to English law common sense should rule. The man was probably guilty in any case, but the court should not have accepted a plea of guilty. Had the man known anything about the law, either Scottish or English, he would have appealed. I am quite sure that had he been a Scot he would have appealed and the decision of the court-martial would have been overthrown by a superior court, or the Judge Advocate General's Department would have advised the Secretary of State to remit the punishment.
  5.0 p.m.
  There is no use imagining that the officers at these courts-martial know all about the law, whether English or Scotch. I do not think we exaggerate the possibility of unfairness occurring on some occasions, because I am sure that the proceedings are sometimes disposed of pretty summarily. For serious offences, of course, the matter goes to a higher level for confirmation, and I have no doubt that in many cases it is put right.
  I have raised the question whether there is a possibility of a person opting to be charged under either the law of his own domicile, or under the English law. As a matter of fact, the words:
  " 'civil offence' means any act or omission punishable by the law of England or which, if committed in England…"
  could quite easily have read:
  "… any act or omission punishable by the law of Britain or which, if committed in Britain…"
  I do not see why the matter should be limited to one section of the law in this country. It should be much more general.
  It has been said that Englishmen do not know anything about Scotch law. Certainly all Scots seem to know about English law. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South has advised us on English law, and as every Scot is born half a lawyer, he is probably at a less disadvantage in dealing with English law than an Englishman would be in dealing with Scotch law.
  I hope the Lord Advocate will tell us that he will look into this question of whether it would be possible to grant a soldier the right to opt, as I have suggested, if he felt that he was going to be unfairly treated. In 99 cases out of 100 it probably would not make any difference, but if there is some serious crime for which a soldier could be charged when abroad and a soldier felt that he might be more fairly treated if he were tried under his own law, it seems to me that we ought to err on the side of enabling that soldier to feel that he was getting justice. A sense of injustice is sometimes even worse than the punishment a person gets if he feels that he has had a raw deal.
  I hope the Lord Advocate will take into account what has been said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North. It is true that Professor Smith has written a lot about this subject in the Press. I do not profess to be able to judge, but I am satisfied that the Scottish advocates and the Scottish Bar know how to look after their own business. I do not think we can teach them anything. It would be interesting to hear what the Scottish Bar has to say about this question. I should like to know whether the Scottish Bar can give any advice to Scots people on this point. They have at least kept the law separate from English law since the Act of Union, and they ought to be conscious of the rights of the Scottish Bar which should not be left to civilians or even to hon. and learned Members from across the Border to defend.
  We are more concerned with the rights of the Scottish soldier, and we suggest that he ought to feel that he is being treated fairly. If some provision could be made whereby anyone feeling in doubt about his treatment could opt to be tried under a legal code other than the law of England, all would be well. If a Scot felt that the Scottish law differed to such an extent from the English law in his case, he should have the right to choose to be tried under the law which was fairer to him.
  Sometimes a man who is tried before a court-martial feels that all the heavy odds of the British Army are ranged against him, and sometimes the man whose duty is to defend him knows less about the
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  law than he does himself. I hope, therefore, that such people will be given confidence that they are being treated fairly.
  Mr. E. G. Willis: The Amendment has been moved in order to secure justice for the Scottish soldier and to ensure that he shall be tried under Scottish law. One of the arguments against the suggestion—it has been mentioned several times—is that it might be difficult to decide who was a Scotsman. A Scotsman who commits an offence in England is tried under English law, and an Englishman living in Scotland—as I happen to be, in spite of the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that no Englishman likes to be in Scotland—is tried under Scottish law. It seems to me that this matter could be based on domicile.
  The point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes), which to me seemed very relevant, is that today everyone is conscripted into the Army whether he likes it or not. There is no dodging it. This creates a difficult legal position. I do not think there has been much controversy on the subject of trials in England and Scotland, but a case has been quoted by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens), who was Chairman of the Select Committee, of soldiers serving in British Guiana. Let me take as an example the case of a soldier serving in British Guiana. Suppose that soldier attempts to commit suicide. He would be liable to be charged because he comes under English law, but as a Scotsman if he did it in Scotland he would not have been so liable. I think that is the correct interpretation of the law.
  The Lord Advocate: He would be equally chargeable if he did it in England.
  Mr. Willis: But he would not be chargeable if he did it in Scotland. This is a Scots boy conscripted into the Army, normally domiciled in Scotland, and because he does something which is no crime in his own country he is convicted because he tries to do it in British Guiana.
  I am sorry to be controversial with the Lord Advocate, whom I congratulate on his maiden speech, particularly as he happens to be my Member of Parliament.

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  but it seems to me to destroy the argument made by the Lord Advocate that this Bill does not adversely affect the Scots boy. It seems to me that it does affect him. I suggest that it would be possible to decide whether a person comes under Scots law or English law simply by recording his case of domicile. If a boy of 18 comes from Glasgow one can say that he ought normally to have been under Scotch law. I should not have thought that that was very difficult. Certainly the other arguments that we have heard seem to me to be irrelevant.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, who, as a member of the Select Committee, had a lot to say about this, said that we would destroy the discipline of the British Army. What a wild statement to make. Here is a boy in British Guiana who commits a crime. He is arrested and put in detention until such time as the officers decide under what code he should be tried. If the officers know that he is domiciled in Scotland, it is a simple matter. It is on his papers, anyway. The suggestion of my hon. Friend that months would be wasted in deciding his nationality was quite irrelevant to this argument.
  Mr. Wigg: My hon. Friend says that the argument is irrelevant, but take the case of a man born in London, the son of Scottish parents. His birth place was in London but his parents had lived in Scotland most of their lives. Would he be Scottish or English?
  Mr. Willis: That is the point that I am making. He would be domiciled normally in Scotland and subject to Scottish law, irrespective of the fact that he was born in London. Normally, had he not been conscripted, he would have been subject to Scottish law. All the officer would have to do is to look up his papers which would tell him the man's domicile. Then he would say, "This lad lives in Scotland, he comes under Scottish law and he will be tried accordingly."
  Sir P. Spens: No.
  Mr. Willis: I am not stating what happens now, but what we should like to see happen to these boys. I have had a considerable length of service in two Services—the Navy and the Army. To suggest that this procedure would lead to bad discipline is rather ridiculous. A
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  soldier does not ask himself, if he is going to commit a crime, whether he is living in England or Scotland and is subject to one law or another. There is no premeditation about it at all. One could quote other cases in which the law of Scotland is rather different from that of England. I thought the Lord Advocate could help us about the case of suicide. What about a suicide pact in Scotland? If a person survives such a pact he cannot be charged with murder?
  The Lord Advocate: No, there is no such thing in Scotland as a suicide pact, but may I take this opportunity of clearing up a possible misunderstanding between the hon. Member and myself? A moment ago the hon. Member was talking about someone going to British Guiana. I intervened and said that of course it would be an offence similarly as in England, but even in Scotland the soldier could be charged by court-martial with attempted suicide.
  Mr. Willis: He would not be charged under the civil law?
  Mr. Woodburn: Could we have this matter cleared up? Am I to understand that the Lord Advocate said that if a Scots soldier situated in Scotland attempts to commit suicide and fails—no one is punished for committing suicide in either country, but in England he would be punished if he failed and in Scotland he would not—he would be punished by court-martial but would not be punished under civil law?
  The Lord Advocate: Yes, it is a court-martial offence wherever the man is stationed, if he is under military law.
  Mr. M. Turner-Samuels: This matter comes in a most extra ordinary context. I cannot see why it should not be an offence committed in Italy or France. Is it not perfectly clear that an offence which would be an offence in England would not be an offence in Scotland? An example has been given of a suicide pact—
  The Temporary Chairman (Mr. Malcolm MacPherson): I think the hon. and learned Member is intervening in the speech of another hon. Member. He ought to make the intervention very brief.
  Mr. Willis: I want to conclude with this thought. There seems a great deal of dubiety about this. There also appears

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  to be a certain wrongness in the treatment of the Scottish person—in spite of what the Lord Advocate said about the Scottish boy conscripted into the Army—and I would ask him to look at this matter again. It has caused a considerable amount of discussion in Scotland and in the Press, and it has caused some concern. I ask the Lord Advocate to look at it again, even if he is not able to accept the Amendment.
  5.15 p.m.
  Mr. William Ross: There has been some reference in this interesting debate to the narrowness of Scotsmen and to our unique sense of nationalism within the United Kingdom. I hope that it has been noticed that there have been three back-bench speeches by hon. Members representing Scottish constituencies, made by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis), an Englishman representing a Scottish constituency, my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), a Welshman, and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes), an Irishman. Surely we shall not again be accused of lack of generosity or failure to recognise the true equality of men. Nationality counts for little; we look for worth in Scotland.
  Mr. Wigg: Does that not confirm my view, as all those hon. Members are members of subject races of the English?
  Mr. Ross: I wish to thank the Lord Advocate for his maiden speech. I say this quite sincerely. He is going to be an asset to the Scottish hon. Members for his clear, lucid and unruffled explanation of the law as it stands. As such he will be welcomed by us. I sincerely hope we shall hear him often and see him often. I say that with recollection of complaints we have had in the past about his predecessors.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman was not today talking about Scottish law but was explaining how military law and English law apply to Scottish soldiers. He was quite right when he said that this Clause creates no new offence. It perpetuates what has been the Army law in relation to Scottish soldiers for the past 70 years. I am, therefore, rather sorry that in his maiden speech as a Law Officer of Scotland he should be explaining away and justifying what he knows
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  is considered a matter of injustice within legal circles in Scotland as well as among ordinary men. I hope that when he deals with Scottish legal matters he will have a much happier subject.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman intervened a moment ago with what I thought unnecessary frankness, but frankness for which I was very pleased because it showed the quality of the man. The one thing which was worrying me when he was giving his exposition of what would happen to a person who committed an offence in England which is not an offence in Scotland was what would happen if the man committed an offence in Scotland which is an offence as construed by English law but not an offence as construed by Scottish law. Here is a Scottish soldier in Scotland committing an offence which, if he were out of the Army, would not be punishable but which, in the Army, because English law has been brought in, is punishable. He admitted that a Scottish soldier attempting suicide in Perth could be tried by court-martial and could be sentenced according to the sentence of a civil court in England. Am I right?
  The Lord Advocate: Yes.
  Mr. Ross: There is a sense of grievance and nothing that the Lord Advocate can say will remove that sense of grievance. I asked him on Second Reading to look at this point. I agreed with much that was said by the hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens), that the real core of Scottish grievance is that only one code can be applied and that that code is an English one. We should like to see a British code applicable to civil offences as construed by courts-martial. We have not got that yet. Until we do get that we shall have this grievance in this type of case. I ask the Lord Advocate, even now, to look at this matter again.
  What worries me is the question of a civil offence which is not a civil offence according to Scottish law. In that case, the civil authorities are not concerned, but the man is still liable to court martial under the Army Act. That is the point about which we are still unsatisfied and I hope that the Lord Advocate will apply his mind to a solution of this Scottish grievance.
  Mr. Arthur Henderson: The course of the discussion

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  has shown that there is a great deal of anxiety on the part of hon. Members on this side of the Committee in relation especially to the specific case where a Scot joins the British Army and commits an offence which is chargeable under the civil law of England and chargeable before a court-martial but which would not be an offence if he were in civil life in Scotland. That is a position which it is difficult to justify, even though it may be inevitable until we get, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross) suggested, a British code of law, which is, perhaps, some distance away.
  I ask the Lord Advocate whether he will not shorten the discussion by agreeing to look again at the particular example that has been cited by various hon. Members on this side. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman says that it is quite impracticable to do it, we will have to accept that at present, but would he not agree to have another look at it and then make a statement when we reach the Report stage?
  The Lord Advocate: Between now and Report stage we will, naturally, be considering with great care all the statements that have been made and the various questions that have been raised, among which is the last one raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr.A. Henderson). But it would not be right if I said that I could offer any hope regarding either of the solutions which have been suggested from the other side of the Committee.
  One of the two solutions that were suggested was a universal or eclectic code. I gave my reasons earlier for suggesting that that was not appropriate. The other suggestion was, not to have one single code, but to have two codes, one Scottish and one English, under court martial procedure, and that a soldier could opt when he enlisted or had committed the offence as to the code under which he would be tried. While all these things are, of course, kept under review, I do not think that my right hon. Friend and I are likely to be able at the Report stage to meet hon. Members opposite on either of those solutions.
  Mr. Woodburn: The right hon. and learned Gentleman seems to be closing his
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  mind before he opens it, so to speak. If he is going away with an open mind to consider the matter, he would seem to be a little rash to announce his conclusions before he has considered it. What we want is at least an honest assurance that he will look at the matter and consider whether what we have suggested can be done. We are not asking the Lord Advocate to do the impossible. It might be impossible, but surely it is worth considering after the arguments which have been put to him.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: This matter really must be looked at again. I should like to put to the Lord Advocate a point arising from the observations which he himself has just made. I am sorry that I was not present when he made his maiden speech, because I should have liked to have heard his explanation of the extraordinary situation which is created by the Clause. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has just said that one of the reasons why he does not think this unusual position can be put right is that to do as we suggest would be to create two codes. By that very statement the right hon. and learned Gentleman gives his whole case away, because two codes are, in fact, in existence already. If a man is a civilian, there is one code which applies in England in regard to the particular offences concerned and there is another code which applies in Scotland. All that is being asked now is that that situation should be allowed to continue.
  How can the Lord Advocate possibly justify departing from all conventional practice and changing the opinion of the law merely because a man happens to be recruited into the Army? If the Clause applied only in the case of an English soldier, there would be no objection, because if the English soldier committed a civil offence he would be committing an offence which was an offence under English law. The Clause, however, also applies to a soldier in Scotland who commits an offence that in fact and in law would not be an offence if he were not in the Army, yet because the Clause is made to apply to what is an offence in England, the Scottish soldier is made liable.
  How in reason can the Lord Advocate justify that extraordinary situation? I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman can find in our law

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  any situation which compares with the position which the Clause sets up. Is that not then strong enough reason to reconsider the matter? This is not a question of a sense of grievance but of a sense of reason.
  Why should a man who would not be liable for a certain offence as a civilian in Scotland become liable merely because he happens, although in Scotland, to be in the Army? What difference can that possibly be argued to make? The right hon and learned Gentleman is importing into Scotland liability for a Scotsman who would not be liable if he remained a civilian there. Simply because a man is in the Army, why should the law be imported from England and the man made liable under it? This seems to be going too far. It appears to be a most grotesque thing to try to do. On grounds of reason, in the name of good law and in the name of what is obviously just, I ask the Lord Advocate to look at this question again and to have it put right.
  Commander C. E. M. Donaldson: Unfortunately, I have not been present during the entire debate on the Amendment, and I want only to raise one point which I have not heard discussed during the last half hour. It appears to me that the arguments adduced by hon. Members opposite in support of the Amendment are based on the question whether a man serving in the Army is a Scotsman or an Englishman and that the matter is to be based on the man's domicile. That was one of the strong arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis).
  What is the definition of "domicile"? Is there anything to say that a serving soldier may not change his private domicile while he is in the Army? Suppose that a Scotsman marries an English girl and wishes to set up a domicile and is fortunate in getting a home south of the Border. He can do that on his leave while he is serving in the Army.
  Mr. Willis: If I live in Edinburgh, I come under Scottish law. If I change my domicile and live in London, I come under English law.
  Commander Donaldson: The hon. Member has interrupted too quickly. If the Army has the normal proportion of 11 out of every 80 soldiers as Scotsmen,
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  surely it follows that if domicile decides the law to which a serving soldier is liable, the remaining 69/80ths—Englishmen, Welshmen and, perhaps, Irishmen—in the Army might wish, if they are subject to that law, to transfer their domicile to Scotland in order to obtain the benefit of this Scots law. The thing would be quite impossible. I should like my right hon. and learned Friend to indicate whether a private soldier can change his private domicile when he is serving in the Army, because that has some bearing on the decision of the Committee.
  5.30 p.m.
  Mr. Wigg: A soldier can of course change his address as many times as he likes. I do not know whether that satisfies the lawyers or not. I wish that right hon. Gentlemen opposite would have the guts to say what nonsense all this argument is and that in no circumstances will they look at the matter again. Any Lord Advocate who says that he is going to give further consideration when he knows very well that he will do nothing of the kind is, if he is competent to hold office, misusing the occasion. I bear in mind that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is new to our ways. It is far better for the Government to announce their decision and say, "This Amendment is ill-conceived nonsense. Let us have a vote and get on with it."
  Mr. Woodburn: As far as the Committee is concerned, the protection of a private soldier, however humble, comes even before the discipline of the Army. If the Committee allows it to go out that any young Scot will be treated unjustly or unfairly in the Army because of some sergeant-major's idea of Army discipline, it will cause untold harm to the Army. We are asking that discipline should be conducted in a way which is fair to people in the Army. We are out to protect the private soldier so that on no occasion will he feel that he is unfairly treated.
  The Lord Advocate: I can assure right hon. Gentlemen opposite that this matter has been considered, is being considered, and will be considered.
  Amendment negatived.
  Mr. Woodburn: I beg to move, in page 34, line 30, after "section," to insert:
  Provided that a person subject to military law shall not be tried by court-martial for a civil offence committed in Scotland without the consent of the Lord Advocate.

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  The Amendment is concerned with a much smaller point, and I do not think that there can be any dispute about the justification for it. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) and the Lord Advocate have both explained that in Scotland a person who commits an offence which is subject to civil law can be tried by court-martial only with the consent of the civil authorities. I take it from what has been said that, despite the fact that attempted suicide will be an offence under this code, the man may not be tried by court-martial unless the civil authorities give their consent.
  We have been assured by the Lord Advocate on that point, but we have not been satisfied on the question of whether that is a matter of law and at whose discretion it is decided. The Amendment states:
  "… without the consent of the Lord Advocate."
  The Lord Advocate is the prosecutor for the Crown in Scotland. No prosecution can be initiated in Scotland except under his authority.
  The Lord Advocate: It can in very inferior courts.
  Mr. Woodburn: No serious prosecution can be initiated without the consent, theoretical or practical, of the Lord Advocate. We on this side of the Committee think that that is a good system which should be maintained and sustained. The Amendment seeks to ensure that it will be part of the code of military law, so that nobody will be under any misunderstanding.
  My own experience of courts-martial is that those who conduct them always try to be fair, and sometimes lean backwards to be fair, but sometimes they do not know the law. In the case which I have mentioned, the man received justice although he was convicted illegally. If the president of a court-martial does not know that this provision is part of the law he may act quite contrary to the law when soldiers are stationed in Scotland.
  The Lord Advocate himself is the custodian of his office. He knows the tradition that attaches to that office. The Amendment merely seeks to protect his rights and duties with regard to offences
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  committed in Scotland which may be susceptible to court-martial. I hope, therefore, that the Lord Advocate will be able to give us an assurance that this provision will be embodied in the Bill. If the wording of the Amendment is not the wording that would meet the situation, we should have no objection to his having it drafted to comply with the proper relations that should obtain between the Lord Advocate and military law.
  Sir P. Spens: The right hon. Member for East Stirlingshire (Mr. Woodburn) referred to remarks which I made. I also made them when we were previously in Committee. The Select Committee took evidence on what happens when a soldier commits a civil offence. The effect of the evidence was that if the offence is committed against a civilian, almost automatically the civil authorities claim jurisdiction.
  Even when the offence is committed against another man in the Army, such as stealing from a barrack-room comrade, the matter does not go to court-martial without the consent of the civil authorities. That is the established practice both in England and in Scotland, which every commanding officer and staff officer knows. I do not know whether it is necessary to put the provision in the Bill for the first time, but if it is put in the Bill it should not be confined only to our native Scotland.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: In view of the fact that the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) says that this is a well-established practice, I see no objection to it being inserted in the Bill in order to give the person who is subject to military law the statutory protection which he has hitherto enjoyed merely as a matter of practice.
  The Lord Advocate: I fully appreciate the point made by the right hon. Member for East Stirlingshire (Mr. Woodburn) but, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) has said, it is the established practice, both in England and Scotland, that civil offences are, as it were, given first to the civil authorities, and they have the choice.
  I should like to remind the Committee of the views of the Departmental Committee, as reported on page 346 of the Select

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  Committee's Report, H.C. 289 (1952–53). The Departmental Committee said:
  "4. The provisions of 1881 remain substantially unaltered in Section 41 of the present Army Act. But though this wide power of trial is given, it is not as a rule necessary or expedient to exercise it generally.
  In the U.K. the question whether an offender should be tried for a civil offence by a civil court or dealt with by the military authorities where this is permissible under Section 41"—
  that is Clause 70 of the present Bill—
  "is one for determination by the chief officer of police concerned, who is guided by certain principles laid down after consultation between the Home Office and the War Office."
  And, I may add, also the Scottish authorities.
  The principles are laid down in an Army Council Instruction, which appears in page 412 of the same volume, where this is stated:
  "The chief officer of police concerned, normally after consultation with the CO. of the accused, is alone responsible for the decision whether an officer or soldier who is alleged to have committed a civil offence of which the police have cognizance is to be tried by civil court or handed over to the military authorities to be dealt with under military law. Once an accused has been arraigned before the civil court no request will be made to the court by the military authorities for the accused to be handed over to them."
  Further procedural methods are set out, and on the next page is described the position in Scotland:
  "The position in Scotland is different in view of the fact that in most cases proceedings are instituted by Procurators Fiscal who act under the instructions of the Lord Advocate. Some minor offences are prosecuted by Burgh Prosecutors and Justices of the Peace Procurators Fiscal in Burgh or Justice of the Peace Courts respectively. The police do not prosecute in Scotland. Consequently 'procurator fiscal' should, where appropriate, be substituted for 'chief officer of police'."
  and so on. I am perfectly prepared to look into the matter and see if any form of words is either necessary or desirable.
  Mr. Woodburn: After listening to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, the position seems to me to be satisfactory. The Lord Advocate is the custodian of his office, and he would be condemned by history if he surrendered any of its prerogatives. He gave us the assurance that he is satisfied that, through his servants, the procurators fiscal, he has control of the situation. I am quite sure that my colleagues from Scotland on this
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  side of the Committee, and the Committee as a whole, will accept that.
  In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Frederick Elwyn Jones: There is one part of the proviso to subsection (3) which does not seem to me to be entirely free from ambiguity. Perhaps the Solicitor-General will look at the point. The proviso is in these terms:
  "Provided that where a civil court could not so award imprisonment, a person so convicted shall be liable to suffer such punishment, less than cashiering, in the case of an officer, or detention, in the case of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer or soldier, as is so provided."
  I imagine that what is intended is that the words "or detention" are governed by the previous words "less than," and that what the drafters of the Clause wanted to say was
  "such punishment less than detention."
  I am not quite sure that that is clear from the words as drafted. Before I develop my argument, perhaps I might be given an assurance that that is what is intended, namely, that "detention" should be governed by the words "less than."
  The Solicitor-General (Sir Harry Hylton-Foster): That is what is intended, and to save the hon. and learned Gentleman further trouble I will inform him that we will look at it and see whether any further emphasis is necessary to make the meaning plainer.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I am much obliged.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 71 to 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 74.—(POWER TO ARREST OFFENDERS.)
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I beg to move, in page 38, line 18, after "or," to insert "reasonably."
  This is a new provision in the Bill. It relates to the power of arrest of a person subject to military law and suspected of having committed an offence. All that I desire to do by this Amendment, which I feel confident will receive the support of the Government, is to bring the words of

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  this Clause into line with the traditional century-old association of "reasonably suspected," and to bring Clause 74 into harmony with the provisions of Clause 186. That deals with the power to arrest deserters and absentees without leave. The subsection says:
  "A constable may arrest any person whom he has reasonable cause to suspect of being an officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier of the regular forces who has deserted or is absent without leave."
  Then in subsection (2) we find this:
  "Where no constable is available, any officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier of the regular forces, or any other person, may arrest any person whom he has reasonable cause to suspect as aforesaid."
  5.45 p.m.
  The purpose of the insertion in Clause 74 of "reasonably suspected" is to make it quite clear that when a citizen of this country goes into the Army he still has rights. He is still free from arbitrary arrest, and I submit that the addition of the word "reasonably," although one of my hon. Friends on this side of the Committee may think it is a somewhat contemptible legal point, may not be one without significance.
  Some of the great battles for liberty in this country have been fought around words like that, and I quite unashamedly move this Amendment because I do think it adds something, not a great deal, to the protection given to the soldier, and brings him into line with the civilian, and Clause 74 into line with the provisions of Clause 186.
  The Solicitor-General: I think it might be for the convenience of the Committee if I said at once that we do not think that this is a contemptible point. In fact, we—in the other sense of "we" as Members of the Select Committee—discussed this matter and I remember the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) taking part in that discussion. We did not complete our consideration of the matter. Using "we" in the other sense, that of the Government, we think that the hon. and learned Gentleman is right, and we advise the Committee to accept the Amendment.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I beg to move, in page 38, line 39, at the end, to add:
  (6) The substance of the offence shall be made known to the person arrested at the time when the arrest is made, unless the circumstances are such that the general nature of the offence must be known to such person at the time of arrest.
  Having achieved that vindication of the interests of justice, with the co-operation of the Solicitor-General, I hope he may regard this Amendment as merely consequential on that, although I cannot seriously argue that it is. But this is another endeavour to protect the soldier in the way that a civilian is protected. The more we instil into the minds of the Army authorities our idea that the soldier is a person with personal rights, and that he should be protected within the limits imposed by the necessities of discipline, and the more emphatically we assert that in this House and in this day and generation, the better it will be. The purpose of the Amendment is to bring military practice into line with civil practice.
  In the Clause as it stands, there is no requirement upon those who put a soldier under arrest to notify him of the nature of the offence for which he has been arrested. That is a fault which was not in the old Army Act. I speak subject to correction on that. I do not think that the matter was dealt with at all in the old Army Act; I believe that the Act dealt only with persons charged, which, by the nature of the phrase, implies the notifying to the soldier of a charge and the nature of that charge.
  It has been an ancient principle of this country that, as one of the judges has put it,
  "a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized."
  There is very good and abundant reason for that. Is not the right which the ordinary citizen has a right which we should give to the soldier as well? My hon. Friends and I are very conscious of the fact that in the Army there are restrictions on freedom. I do not want to overstate the point with which the Amendment is concerned, or its importance, but I believe it to be a point of some importance.
  Only this week, the civil courts have emphasised the importance of correct behaviour on the part of the police authorities in regard to matters of this

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  kind. Therefore, I submit that it is not unreasonable to impose upon the person arresting a soldier, whoever that person may be—he has, of course, to be an authorised person under the terms of the Statute—the duty of notifying the soldier at the time of the arrest of the general nature of the offence. He does not have to put it into technical language, but I submit that the soldier ought to be told as soon as possible the reason for his arrest.
  It is true—I have had a discussion on this matter with one or two of my hon. Friends—that what is more important is that the soldier should be dealt with quickly, and should not be detained under arrest for an avoidably long period of time. However, that is a quite separate protection, albeit a more important one. It is equally important that, in accordance with the practice of the ordinary law relating to constables and the ordinary citizen, the soldier should be entitled to be told at the time of his arrest of the general nature of the offence, unless, of course, the soldier is actually caught red-handed, for which contingency my Amendment provides.
  The Solicitor-General: I should be just as enthusiastic as the hon. and learned Gentleman for maintaining the rights of the soldier to be told, in primitive language, what he is being run in for, and I am sure it is correct that that right should exist, but I should not be prepared to accept his Amendment. I will tell him why. First, even if we do not put it into the Bill that the soldier has the same right he has nevertheless the same entitlement as the civilian to be told what are the facts alleged to constitute a crime on his part for which he is being arrested.
  However, there are two difficulties about enacting it. One is that one cannot put into a short subsection a treatise on the law. The Amendment contains one of the obvious exceptions to the right to be told for what one is being arrested:
  "… unless the circumstances are such that the general nature of the offence must be known to such person at the time of arrest."
  The trouble is that that is only one of the necessary exceptions, which are many.
  I do not know whether I can illustrate that frivolously. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman's experience in these matters is wide, like mine, and so
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  I will choose a civilian example. I recall an instance concerning a very respectable dance club shortly after luncheon. Some people were alleged to have been squirting soda water syphons down the dance hostesses' dresses and kicking holes in a drum. When the police came on the spot, the people set about the police in fine style and then ran away. I believe I have all my illustrations in that example. No doubt the policeman, having to act rather quickly, would have a good choice of "substance of offence." He might say that it would be some kind of assault, some kind of malicious damage to property, just being drunk or disorderly, or some disorderly behaviour, but it is not particularly desirable to require him to state at the time the substance of the offence as opposed to the facts in respect of which the people are being run in.
  There are other necessary exceptions. If one violently assaults the person who is arresting one and it is dealt with by counter-attacking, plainly, one cannot require the person doing the arresting to give the reason for arrest at the time of arrest, for it is usually not physically possible, the circumstances being too lively. The same principle applies if the person to be arrested runs away. In other words, if we were to put an express enactment of this kind into the Bill we should have to list a number of exceptions.
  The hon. and learned Member quoted a judgment. He will probably remember the speech of the late Lord Simon in the well known case of Christie and Leachinsky, in which the noble Viscount was not himself prepared to list the exceptions, because there arc so many. That is difficulty No. 1.
  Difficulty No. 2 is this. In the case of the constable, to leave to the common law the obligation to state the cause of arrest when he arrests without warrant, and at the same time to put a statutory enactment into the Army Bill, would inevitably have the consequence that it would be said either that by enacting words we were seeking to add something to the common law or that by enacting words we were seeking to derogate something from the common law. It seemed to us to be wiser to leave the soldier's rights in this respect as they are in common law and not to enact anything.

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  I would remind the Committee that there is a provision in Queen's Regulations as they now stand designed to reinforce the necessary protection of the soldier's rights. It is in Regulation 561 (d), which provides that the commander of the guard will, at the request of any person received into custody, inform him of the rank and name of the person preferring charges against him or ordering his arrest and give to him a copy of the charge report as soon as he himself receives it. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman and the Committee will bear in mind the provisions of Clause 53, which the Committee has already accepted, which in the context carries the protection substantially further.
  In these circumstances, I ask the Committee not to accept the Amendment, because I think it would be wiser in the interests of the maintenance of the soldier's rights not to do so.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I am sure that the Committee will be very disappointed at the speech to which we have just listened. At the outset the Solicitor-General agreed that the soldier has the elementary right to be told what he is being arrested for. Then he proceeded to give reasons for not putting that right into the Bill, and I submit that his reasons are inadequate.
  The Solicitor-General first said that one cannot put into a Bill a treatise on the law. No one is asking that a treatise on the law should be put into the Bill. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) is asking that this elementary right shall be assured to the soldier in statutory form instead of being left at large under common law.
  The Solicitor-General went on to cite an extreme case, that of a dance club where some people after lunch, and, no doubt, in an inebriated state, made a row and kicked holes in a drum. That is too obvious a case. I want to draw the Solicitor-General's attention to another kind of case. Let us suppose in that same dance club somebody has missed his overcoat, and some perfectly respectable soldier is arrested on that charge. Is that soldier not to have the right of being told why he is being arrested? Surely, if he is not told, that might lead to a breach of the peace.
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  If an ordinary man is arrested without knowing why he is being arrested, he is likely to resist arrest. As we all agree that that elementary right exists, I see no reason, from the Solicitor-General's speech, why this elementary right should not be enshrined in the Statute. It does not involve writing a treatise on the law.
  6.0 p.m.
  I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South that this Amendment is not consequential on the previous Amendment, but it accords with natural law and with common sense. It is wrong that the person arrested should not be told why he is being arrested in 99 out of 100 cases. If he is not told, he might resist arrest and that might result in a breach of the peace.
  I can see no reason why he should not be told, and I see no reason why that requirement should not be put into the Bill, instead of there being an argument as to what is the man's right in common law. I accordingly support the Amendment, and I hope that it will be accepted by the Committee.
  Mr. Wigg: I very much hope that the Solicitor-General will not give way to the pleas of my hon. and learned Friends, because the Amendment would not strengthen the rights of the private soldier. The position seems to be misunderstood. If a soldier is placed on a charge, his greatest safeguard is that the matter will be investigated at the earliest possible moment by the commanding officer under the provisions of Queen's Regulations, which provide that charges shall be investigated without delay.
  It might be possible, although it is very unlikely, that a commanding officer would behave in such a grossly improper fashion as to hold up the submission to a convening authority of an application for a summary of evidence. But here again the rights of the soldier are already adequately safeguarded, because if the soldier has been remanded for a summary of evidence—I am now speaking from memory—for more than eight days, that must become a matter of special report.
  If my hon. and learned Friends are not satisfied with the present Regulations, they would be serving the interests of the private soldier much more

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  adequately than they now are if they sought to strengthen Queen's Regulations, rather than rely on the Army Act. Again I would plead with them to remember that they are not dealing with lawyers. They are dealing with officers and soldiers of whom 99 per cent. are honest and honorable men, anxious to do their best—perhaps a smaller proportion are intelligent men—and they have to rely on the information which is available to them.
  That information consists of the Manual of Military Law and its footnotes, and Queen's Regulations. Of the two, Queen's Regulations will be more readily understood by the investigating officers and by the soldiers concerned. I therefore plead with my hon. and learned Friends that, in the interests of the men whom they are seeking to assist, if they are not satisfied, they should approach the Government with a view to the amendment of the existing Regulations, rather than amendment of the Bill.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: In view of the observations of the Solicitor-General, I am disposed to take the view that he is quite right, if I may say so with respect, in saying that the Bill as it stands is sufficient in conjunction with the common law, from the protection of which, of course, the soldier is not deprived. The matter about which I felt anxiety is covered in general terms in Clause 53.
  I was not entirely happy about that, which was the reason I put the Amendment on the Order Paper. But the reference to paragraph 561 (d) of Queen's Regulations is more impressive, and it comes pretty near to the point I had in mind. In those circumstances, not because I agree with the different view which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) is taking about the rights of the soldier as against the rights of the military authority, but because I think that the rights of the soldier are adequately protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 75 and 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 77.—(CHARGES TO BE DEALT WITH SUMMARILY OR BY COURT-MARTIAL.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: I want to raise a question on Clause 77 (2) about the charge against a soldier being summarily tried by his commanding officer after investigation. My point is that a civilian should not be subject to a military court, nor subject to the military authorities' proposed restrictions on a civilian's movements.
  It is very unfortunate that steps were not taken during the Select Committee's review to deal with a concrete problem of which I have an example. It would be unfair of me to raise that concrete example, and I will not do so. It should be clearly understood that my long experience of the House shows that one can take a legitimate grievance to the Minister who will deal with it after investigation, and I look forward with confidence to the application of that procedure in this case.
  I know how ordinary men are treated in the Armed Forces, because I have served in them. It would have been wrong of me to have allowed this to pass. No man who has completed his National Service should still be subject to Territorial Service. A National Service man who has finished his National Service should then become a civilian and should recover his civilian democratic rights, which should be fully safeguarded.
  If that is accepted, then he should be subject only to a civil court. A National Service man who has completed his National Service and becomes a civilian should be subject only to a civilian court and in no circumstances should he be tried in private by commanding officers, nor should he be tried by a military court. I have had a long analysis made of this subject after reading newspaper leading articles which gave me great concern. I wish to read two extracts, but it must be remembered that I am not dealing with the special case but only with the application of the rights of commanding officers.
  "… When a National Service man completes his full-time service and accepts the limited obligation of part-time service, he is absorbed once again into civil life, with all its responsibilities and rights, except during a period of war or emergency."

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  Now we are at peace and, therefore, this is support for my plea that no man should be tried in the way that this Clause provides.
  "In civilian life one of the vital rights of an individual accused of an offence is to have his case heard in open court. The reason for this is to meet the essential requirement that 'justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done'."
  If we part with this Clause in its present form, and especially if the military authorities are able still to get away with what has taken place, there will be opportunities for commanding officers to take proceedings against young men either by court-martial or by summary action.
  What annoys me is that during the war we took steps in the House and in the various committees to prevent this kind of thing happening. It is to the everlasting credit of the House that it safeguarded our democratic rights all through the war. I cannot remember how this right of commanding officers crept in, but it should never have been allowed. I feel sure that something has gone wrong and that it was never intended that civilians should be tried in this way. I hope, therefore that, though the learned Solicitor-General may not be able to give me a reply immediately, he will give an undertaking similar to that which he gave to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones), in which case I shall be quite satisfied.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: Perhaps it would be helpful if I indicated to the Committee the kind of situation which my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) has in mind, without referring to any specific case which it may be that the Secretary of State for War already has under consideration.
  It is the case where a National Service man who has done his National Service is subject to a period of training which he is under an obligation to perform and fails to report for that duty. The point of my hon. Friend is that in those circumstances, although we are dealing with a breach of duty by a man who then is a civilian to all intents and purposes, he is taken by the Army and made the subject of military procedure; and that it is desirable in those circumstances that the man should be dealt with as a civilian. I hope my hon. Friend will not think it an impertinence that I sought to give an
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  explanation of the problem which is worrying him.
  Mr. Ian Harvey: I think that the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) is under a misapprehension. The man in question would be a Territorial under the National Service Act which was passed some time ago.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: Of course the man is subject to Territorial service under that Act, but he is subject to punishment under this Bill, and disciplinary proceedings are taken against him under the terms of this Bill. I am only dealing with that aspect of the matter.
  The Solicitor-General: The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr.Ellis Smith) and the Committee will understand that I had no notice that the hon. Member desired to raise this point. He would be the first to recognise that there would be grave difficulties attaching to the proposition that we could have someone serving in military circumstances by virtue of any kind of Statute who is not subject to military law. I will study what the hon. Gentleman has said, and I am obliged to the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) for his further elucidation. I do not hold out any hope, but I will see whether it is possible to meet the difficulty.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: Let me make it clear that in matters of this kind I believe that we should play the game with one another and that certain standards of conduct should apply. I have tried to follow that principle. I could not raise this matter until I had carefully studied the Bill. I also had the benefit of the excellent legal advice of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South. I took advantage of this Motion in order to raise it, and I am now quite satisfied.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 78 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 88.—(CONSTITUTION OF DISTRICT COURTS-MARTIAL.)
  6.15 p.m
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I beg to move, in page 46, line 37, to leave out "officers" and insert:
  "members of Her Majesty's forces."
  The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): It may be for the convenience of the Committee if this Amendment were discussed with the four following Amendments; namely, in page 47, line 2, leave out from "officer" to end of line 6; in line 9, at end to add:
  "and shall include at least one non-commissioned officer or private soldier.",
  in Clause 89, page 47, in line 11, to leave out "officers" and insert:
  "members of Her Majesty's forces,".
  and in line 19 to leave out from "officer" to end of line 20.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I understand that the principle underlying all these Amendments is the same, and the principle I wish to have recognised and inserted in the Bill is that soldiers other than officers should be allowed to sit as members of courts-martial. I cannot understand why the Select Committee, which presumably set out to reorganise Army law along the lines of present-day democracy, should have overlooked this point. It may be that the insistence that only officers should be members of courts-martial dates back for hundreds of years when the idea was that the superior people who were then called on to administer justice belonged to a certain strata of the governing class.
  In civil law cases a hundred years ago it was impossible to find an ordinary working man acting as a justice of the peace. It is only during my time that we have seen magistrates who belong to the working class and not to the propertied class being allowed to sit on civil benches and administer justice. I believe that has had the effect of strengthening justice and the law, because an ordinary man, if he finds himself charged with an offence, can now realise that he is being judged by another ordinary man.
  I believe that to be democracy. I do not pretend that we can make the Army democratic. I would not argue that that can be so in the final analysis. We have frequently heard that hon. and gallant Members have tried to make the Army more democratic and have tried to create a feeling in the mind of the ordinary soldier that the Army has some resemblance to a democratic institution for the defence of democracy. I do not sec why the ordinary soldier should be excluded from sitting as a member of a court-martial.
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  In my five courts-martial I was always tried by officers. I cannot say whether I should have had any more sympathy if I had been tried by men of the lower ranks, but I never could see the reason why officers were supposed to have a monopoly of human understanding. I cannot understand, for example, why a sergeant-major should not be allowed to sit upon a court-martial. I am not arguing that I should have had greater justice if a sergeant-major had sat as a member of my courts-martial, but if we must have military law I cannot see why there should be this division between the hierarchy of the Army and the lower ranks of noncommissioned officers and privates.
  Nobody would say that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) did not have a sense of justice, or that he would not be qualified to sit upon a court-martial. On more than one occasion I have heard him recall his experiences in the Army as a sergeant-major. I am sure that he had a very gallant career, and had as much common sense as any officer from Sandhurst, and could, therefore, tackle the human problems involved in offences against discipline just as well as those officers.
  I have not the prejudices against Sandhurst that are held by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg); I have an objective view of the whole lot. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley will support the Amendment. He usually looks with the greatest suspicion upon Amendments moved by me on the assumption that I am out to undermine the discipline of the Army. Sometimes he takes the point of view which used to be adopted by the late Will Fyffe, that "Glasgow belongs to me." My hon. Friend believes, in the same way, that the British Army belongs to him. The only difference is that Will Fyffe was drunk and my hon. Friend is sober.
  I appeal to my hon. Friends to support the Amendment, or at least to attempt to answer the arguments I am putting forward. I do not see why we should not attempt to democratise court-martial procedure. I believe that the president of the court should be able to look through the list of soldiers under his command and say, "So-and-so is an intelligent man; so-and-so has a wide experience of life. Corporal so-and-so and Sergeant so-and-so have been in the Army for a long

  619
  time; they understand the Regulations, and know the human problems with which the soldier is confronted. Let them sit as members of the court-martial." I can see no answer to that argument.
  We not only want justice to be done; we want it to be seen to be done. In these days of compulsory military service we do not know whom we might be able to call upon from the ranks. There might be a qualified lawyer, a businessman or an ordinary human being capable of coming to a reasonable human decision upon matters affecting discipline in the Army. I do not see why this duty should be a privilege of the officer corps.
  Let us consider some of the offences which are covered by the Bill. A soldier can be prosecuted for being drunk. I do not know that one needs to be an Army officer in order to be able to make up one's mind whether or not a man is drunk. I do not know whether the question requires legal argument. I cannot understand why, throughout the whole range of disciplinary offences, the ordinary private soldier or non-commissioned officer should not be legally entitled to sit as a member of a court-martial. If we allowed him to do so I believe that we should be taking a step forward.
  The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I was most interested in the speech of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). I could not help feeling at one period that, had he moved the Amendment successfully before his own troubles arose in respect of courts-martial and a sergeant-major had been sitting as a member of the court, we might have been deprived of the pleasure of hearing the speech which he has just made—because it might have been that his sentence would not yet have expired.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Under the Section of the Act with which I was charged I received the maximum sentence, which was two years.
  Mr. Head: I did not think that the hon. Member was always the sergeant-major's favourite during his soldiering career. In all seriousness, I do not think that he will expect me to make a long speech upon the point, which has been considered most seriously by a great many people, including the Services.
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  The hon. Member referred to what he termed the democratic or non-class side of the question. He said that in the civil equivalent today all manner of men sit upon the bench, but that situation was not in any way reflected in the Army. I do not want to make a long speech about officer entry into the Army, but today, with Welbeck and places like the Duke of York's School and Sandhurst, commissions are being given to men from the ranks in very much larger numbers than ever before. I assure the hon. Member that that is so. Within the general framework of the structure of the officer class, the situation is altering to a considerable extent.
  I do not expect to carry the hon. Member with me upon my second point, which concerns the question of discipline in the Army. This is a matter which is peculiar to the Services. A special responsibility devolves upon officers in connection with discipline. The right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede)—whom we all know was a sergeant-major—and the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) will agree that although, as I should never deny, in his influence for discipline in the Army a sergeant-major has much more effect than a second-lieutenant, the fact remains that a special responsibility is laid upon officers in this connection. It is traditional.
  The question whether or not this change should be accepted was discussed at very great length by the Lewis Committee, who considered the suggestion in relation to three questions:
  "First, would it tend to improve the quality of the court? Second, would it tend to improve the prospect, or the appearance, of justice being done? Third, would it tend to improve or impair discipline?"
  6.30 p.m.
  Those were the three aspects from which they considered the matter. They took a lot of evidence and considered the position at great length and then made a Report which I have no doubt the hon. Gentleman has read. They said at the end of it:
  "The fundamental objections are that in the emphatic opinion of those who ought to know the suggested innovation would damage discipline, and that in our opinion it would not improve the administration of justice. In fact there would be a danger that the non-commissioned officer selected to sit would tend to regard himself as being on the court in a representative rather than in a judicial capacity."

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  That was the conclusion of the Lewis Committee. That conclusion was then considered by the then Labour Government and they accepted it without amendment. In fact, they issued a White Paper to that effect. When the Select Committee was appointed the whole question was re-considered and I think that the members were in agreement with the Lewis Committee in this respect. They acquitted the Services entirely of being reactionary or unprogressive in their attitude to changes throughout the Army.
  I think that the right hon. Gentleman and those on the Committee will agree with what I have said. The Lewis Committee said the same thing. They said that they believed that this change would not be an asset, that it would not be better from the point of view of justice being done, and that in general it would be against the maintenance of discipline throughout the Army.
  I understand and appreciate the motives and feelings of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire, which I am certain are based on justice; but in the light of what was proposed by the Lewis Committee and of the former Government's adoption of that proposal, and in view of the Select Committee's reconsideration and their unanimous finding on the subject, I am afraid that T cannot accept the Amendment.
  Mr. S. Silverman: I have been very disappointed indeed by the right hon. Gentleman's reply. He will forgive me for saying that he has not sought to offer any answer whatever to my hon. Friend's most persuasive argument. He has fallen back on authority. He has said, "I will not do what you are asking because the Lewis Committee did not recommend it, because the previous Government accepted the decision of the Lewis Committee and because the Select Committee, which has just reconsidered the matter, has come to the same conclusion as that reached by the Lewis Committee."
  As far as I know, this is the first occasion on which the House of Commons has been asked to consider this suggestion and to deal with it. I want to try to follow the arguments. I did not take a note of them, but I think that I can remember most of the arguments to which the right hon. Gentleman referred
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  as being those on which the Lewis Committee—which everybody has followed since—relied.
  I should like to say, first, that the argument about discipline does not impress me at all. I confess that arguments about discipline never do impress me in this or any other matter, but one recognises that one cannot have the Services without discipline. What I want to say to the right hon. Gentleman is that courts-martial have nothing at all to do with discipline. The court-martial is still a court. The business of the officer may be, and indeed is, to be responsible for discipline, but it is no more the business of the commissioned officer than it is of the non-commissioned officer. He, too, has responsibility for discipline. One would have thought that every loyal soldier would have his own particular responsibility for discipline, too.
  Courts-martial only come into the picture when an offence has been alleged and some kind of third-party judgment, some kind of judicial opinion, is necessary upon two questions. One of them is whether the act alleged was committed at all, which is very often denied at courts-martial as in other courts, and the other is, if guilt is proved, what ought the penalty to be.
  Both those are judicial questions. It is precisely because in many cases the commanding officer feels that the question involved on a certain charge is one not proper for him to determine as a matter of discipline within his own function, that the court-martial is called upon. It seems to me, therefore, that arguments directed to the question of discipline are completely irrelevant. If they were not irelevant I should have thought that the argument was wrong, anyhow. Why in the world discipline should be adversely affected instead of improved by having a court which would command the full confidence of everyone who might come before it, I cannot understand.
  Then the right hon. Gentleman said, "Never mind the argument about democracy. There may have been something in the argument once, but there is not much in the argument now because in fact we take officers from a great variety of classes and backgrounds now when previously we did not do so and, therefore, the argument by analogy does not apply because commissioned officers also

  623
  come from all walks of life." That may be so, but it does not dispose of the argument in the least. There are a great many people in the Army who might not be suitable for commissioned rank and still very suitable to be members of a judicial tribunal.
  All kinds of considerations go into the selection of officers, and I am prepared to agree that they are much more democratic considerations—to use a much abused word—than they used to be; but still there are a great many grounds on which a man who is a valuable soldier is, nevertheless, not regarded as suitable for commissioned rank. We all know of cases, especially in National Service, of boys with very good backgrounds and excellent educational records who are nevertheless regarded by the personnel selection officers as more suitable for non-commissioned rank than for commissioned rank, for a variety of reasons which seem good to them. They may be correct reasons but they have absolutely nothing whatever to do with the considerations which ought to apply when one is considering whether a man is fit to discharge judicial functions or not.
  It seems to me that there is no good reason for not accepting the Amendment. I am reminded of the discussion last week about the phrase "officer and a gentleman." We are really in the same field and arguing against the same background. I should have thought that the words ought to be amended and one should say either simply "officer" or "a soldier and a gentleman." Why not? One could say, "a sergeant-major and a gentleman" or "a non-commissioned officer and a gentleman." Alternatively, let us leave out the words "and a gentleman" altogether, on the basis that the qualities that entitle men to that description may equally be found in all walks of life, in all classes and in commissioned or non-commissioned ranks.
  It seems to me that the objection to the proposal of my hon. Friend belongs to that order of thinking, the order of thinking that, when all is said and done and when all allowances have been made for broader and more democratic criteria of selection, and when the selection has been made, there is, nevertheless, drawn a deep chasm, a broad, wide and unbridgeable distinction, between com-
  624
  missioned officers in the one class and everybody else in the Army in another. Nothing that the right hon. Gentleman said or quoted from the Report of the Lewis Committee, or, for that matter, from the Select Committee's Report, which is now, more or less, being implemented, removes that suspicion from people's minds.
  Let us take the case of a man who has served 20 years or more in the Regular Forces, perhaps in a Guards regiment. He may have fought through two world wars; he may have served in every possible variety of condition in every quarter of the globe. Admittedly, such a man has a broader and deeper experience of life, a more mellow attitude to affairs, an understanding, based on his own experience, of the conditions in which soldiers' lives are lived and of the offences that may be committed, than a newly-commissioned officer, whatever his background.
  What can be the objection to saying that the first of these two individuals, the man with a very long, wide service, broad experience and a deep knowledge of life, is much better and more useful sitting on a court-martial inquiry than a man whose commission may be barely a week old? How can we justify a law which prevents or denies to the Forces the judicial services of people so eminently qualified, unless, indeed, sub-consciously or unconsciously, we are really relying on a class distinction to which no one would confess and which no one would approve? I hope the Government will reconsider the matter.
  Mr. Ede: I would not have spoken in this debate but for the fact that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and the Secretary of State for War both alluded to me personally in the course of such observations as they had to offer.
  I should be sorry to see this amendment made to the Bill, because I do not agree with the bon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) about the mellowing influence of 20 years in the Guards and of fighting in all quarters of the globe. I have met some Guards sergeant-majors, and mellowness is hardly the description which one would give to the result of prolonged military experience in such a regiment. In fact, I recollect that when I was a provost-sergeant I once had

  625
  to arrest a private of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, who was getting a little mellow himself, and who had happened to wander into a village in France into which some Guards had come from a neighbouring village. He was confiding to a pot of weak French beer—which he was steadily weakening by his own tears—that he had fought all over the world with soldiers, and that he now found himself brigaded with the Guards.
  Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. Friend allow me? My right hon. Friend himself has been for many years a distinguished justice of the peace and has presided for many years over a bench of magistrates, if I may so, with great success. Does he really think that if he had been sitting as a member of a court-martial he would have been less judicial than he was on the bench?
  6.45 p.m.
  Mr. Ede: I may not have been less judicial, but I might have had a far worse time afterwards. I know that when I sat as a magistrate I went home or came to the House and carried on my ordinary avocations, and did not meet the people with whom I had had to deal on the bench, but if as a non-commissioned officer or as a private soldier I had had to sit in this capacity, and then go back to the barrack room—
  Mr. Silverman: They come from another unit.
  Mr. Ede: There is nothing in this Amendment about coming from another unit.
  Mr. Silverman: Oh, yes, there is. It is the same with the officers; they do not come from the same unit, either.
  Mr. Ede: The hon. Gentleman made a speech of some length, and I do not wish to emulate him in length. I am trying to deal with a very human aspect of this matter. Whether or not it was my own unit or another unit, I am quite certain that there would be a judicial finding by men in the unit of the way in which a man of the same rank as themselves had discharged his duty in this respect, and I am quite certain that that is an entirely different thing.
  I rejoice that since about 1906 there has been no property qualification for justices in this country, but I would not
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  be sure, from what I occasionally hear in the magistrates' room, that the presence of people of comparatively small incomes dealing with other people of small incomes means that they get less harsh treatment than they would otherwise receive. I am certain that those people who thought that, by making women jurors, women's cases would receive more sympathetic consideration in the courts cannot feel that experience has justified them in what they said.
  I do not think that a court composed as my hon. Friend wishes it to be composed would carry the full confidence of the rank and file of the Army. I am quite sure that they also would suspect that, on occasion, there would be the kind of pressure that acts inversely on the person subjected to it, and that greater severity might on certain occasions come from the presence of these people on the court than would otherwise be the case. I do not know how many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen now present saw what I thought was a very fair play on this matter—"Carrington, V.C."—when it was recently produced in London. What happened there? There was a conflict between law and justice, to put it quite crudely, and the two officers on the court-martial, who were the traditional type of officer, stood for justice, while the two rankers who were there knew the regulations so well that they stood for law. As a matter of fact, taking any form of abstract justice into consideration, an injustice was, in fact, perpetrated on a very gallant officer.
  The disciplinary powers of the noncommissioned officer and of the warrant officer come from entirely different sources from that which is enforced by courts-martial. It is the personal respect which the man of subordinate rank has for the officers that secures for them their position. I would be very sorry to see them mixed up with the judicial system in the Army. I always felt that if ever I were guilty of an offence, were found out and had to be tried, I would rather be tried by a court-martial than by a civilian court. I would not say the same about people who were innocent.
  The position of the non-commissioned officer and the warrant officer in a unit derive from a form of respect entirely different from the form of respect enforced by a court-martial. I daresay that the

  627
  Secretary of State knows of the private soldier, a recent recruit, who was stopped by a colonel because he had not saluted. The colonel said to the private soldier, "Don't you know I'm your colonel?" The private soldier said, "Oh, you'd better look out. I've just heard the sergeant major say, 'Where's that b colonel? I can never find him when I want him'."
  I could not vote for this Amendment. I believe it will not be wanted by the rank and file in the Army and will not increase their respect for courts-martial. In fact, any non-commissioned officer, warrant officer or man who was selected to serve on a court-martial would have a very grim task for many months in living down the fact that he had been thought worthy to be on a court-martial.
  Mr. James Simmons: In spite of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede), for whom I have a great respect, I must support the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). My right hon. Friend mentioned the film "Carrington, V.C.," but he did not say that if the rank and file had served on the court-martial they would have supported Carrington, V.C. We had a very clear indication of what the feelings of the rank and file soldiers were. They knew what a despicable cad the officer was. They would have supported Carrington, and would have used their judgment in favour of justice on that occasion.
  The analogy with benches of justices of the peace is good. In the old days, the J.P.s were all drawn from one social class and were of one social status. We know what happened in country districts to poachers and such people who were brought before magistrates who were landowners, and who had no regard for justice but were protecting their own property and property rights. The introduction of people like housewives on to magistrates' benches has resulted in a far more reliable and much more just appraisal of a case than happened in the old days when only one social class sat on the bench.
  I failed to gather from the speech of the Secretary of State his reasons for opposing the Amendment. He made assumptions but did not back them up with reasons. He said that there would
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  be danger to discipline, but he did not say how. I have yet to see how the inclusion of a private soldier or noncommissioned officer upon a court-martial would undermine the discipline of the regiment or the battalion. We have been told that officers of the Army are drawn from all classes of the community. It is easier to become an officer now than it was when I was a private soldier. What we called "the officer class" is now more representative of the whole community.
  It is, therefore, claimed that there is no need to have non-commissioned officers or privates on a court-martial. The answer is that even if the officer used to be one of the rank and file he is no longer one of them. It is the existing environment that matters. A private or a noncommissioned officer on a court-martial would represent a point of view which he would understand from his present experience, and not from past experience.
  We are up against the old class idea again of "officers and gentlemen." I am bound to conclude that the refusal to place on courts-martial people below the rank of commissioned officer is for the purely class reason that commissioned officers belong to a special category of the community and that only from them can we expect justice and fair play in carrying on a court-martial.
  In these democratic days, when people even from the lower ranks enter the officer class, there is no reason why, by the same token, they should not sit on courts-martial to weigh evidence and pass judgment, both on officers and on people of their own rank.
  Mr. Willis: I support the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), because the Clause is too tightly worded. This Measure will have to last a long time. The part that we seek to amend provides that a district court-martial
  "shall consist of the president and not less than two other officers."
  Whatever we decide will remain the practice for as long as this Measure exists. I think the wording is much too tight and that the Government ought to be prepared to experiment.
  We all agree with the point put by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) but I could not quite understand what it was he assumed about

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  the non-commissioned officer responsible for maintaining discipline. If his story was correct, the discipline of the N.C.O. is based on nothing but fear. If it is not based on fear it is based on respect. If it is based on respect for the non-commissioned officer, surely more respect will be shown to that non-commissioned officer if he has to serve on a court-martial. Why should a man from the rank and file be unfit to serve on a court-martial and, three months later, simply because he has been promoted, be fit to do so? That is quite the wrong approach.
  The qualifications required of a man who sits on a court-martial are not necessarily anything to do with his qualifications as an officer. The Secretary of State for War spoke about widening the scope of entry into the officer ranks. We all agree about that, but why has the scope been widened? It is not to make it more democratic, but because the Army is becoming more and more technical; therefore, we have to widen our scope.
  Promotion today depends far more on being competent in one's trade or profession than ever it did in the past. I have yet to learn that because a man is competent in ballistics or something of that sort he is necessarily a suitable person to sit on a court-martial. Therefore, we ought to approach this matter with much greater flexibility of mind.
  7.0 p.m.
  As I said earlier today, I have had some experience in two Services on what one might call the "lower side of the fence." I have had a considerable amount to do with the other ranks in the Army and outside the Army in ex-Service men's organisations, and I have always found that when the other ranks, or, when I was in the Navy, the lower-deck ratings, were expected to approach anything with a sense of responsibility they invariably did so. I have never found it otherwise.
  This insistence on having two other officers as well as the president is pandering to the mystique which exists in the Forces today. It is not in accordance with civilian practice or in accordance with our democratic ideas about which we speak so much, but to which we pay little more than lip-service. If the right hon. Gentleman cannot accept the Amendment, he should at least experiment in this direction. He need
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  not make it obligatory that there should be other ranks on a court-martial, but at least he could so frame the Clause as to make it possible for the experiment to be tried, in order to see if all the dire consequences expected would result from it.
  I was quite unsatisfied about the point made that this step would destroy discipline in the Army. We have been given no evidence that that would necessarily result from this proposal. We have been told merely that that is the conclusion which has been reached, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman, even if he does not accept the Amendment, should consider it with a view to seeing if he cannot progress a little in this direction.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: I must say, first, that I have no predilections on this matter, although it is a problem which, while I have been listening to the discussion, has exercised by mind very much. The Secretary of State certainly gave no reasons why this Amendment ought not to be accepted. He gave no intelligent grounds why there should be this distinction in courts-martial in the Army as compared with trials of offences in civil life. Speaking as a lawyer, I do not at the moment recognise any fundamental reason at all why there should be this distinction, and certainly none has come from the right hon. Gentleman.
  A court-martial is a military trial, and is just as much a trial as is an ordinary civil trial. One has to consider questions of fact and questions of law. The officers whom it is suggested should be appointed to the exclusion of any other lower rank are not people who are particularly qualified in matters of law. Indeed they are not picked for that purpose, and no decision of law is or could be left absolutely to them without due direction. They would be advised by the Judge Advocate General or the Deputy Judge Advocate General on questions of law, and that functionary would also sum up the whole of the evidence in order to guide the court in its decisions.
  I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman and also the Lord Advocate what distinction they draw between the constitution of a court-martial und that of a jury. In the history of this country it has been fundamental to the trial of any subject, in the case of a civil trial, that he

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  should be tried by 12 of his own fellow men. Of course, it is true that being tried by officers is being tried by one's own fellow men, but it is being tried by a particular class of fellow men to the exclusion of others. What is exercising my mind is whether that is right.
  On a jury we have all sorts of people and all classes, the rich, the less well-to-do, and professional people, so long as their professions do not exempt them from serving on a jury. All types and kinds of people from all walks of life are called to sit on a jury to try the particular case. A trial for an offence before a court-martial is no less and no more a crime than a trial before a civil court. Why should it have been historically considered all through the centuries as essential, advisable, right, good, profitable, and just to have a jury in an ordinary criminal prosecution before a civil court, and yet to lay down, in the most specific terms, that that should not be so in a court-martial trial?
  To my mind, the Secretary of State and his legal advisers ought to consider whether, in the face of that distinction, there might not be in the minds of those in the Forces a feeling that they are not receiving the fair consideration in Army life which they would normally receive in civil life. I think that this is a matter of some substance. It may be that in the last analysis there is some good reason which we have not heard for rejecting the Amendment. Certainly a good reason would have to be adduced in order to show either the inconvenience or the in-advisability of doing what is sought to be done by this Amendment.
  I am not dogmatising in any way, but it will not do for the Secretary of State, or anyone else, to come along and say, "Well, one has an apprehension here of the consequences to the members of the court." I do not believe that there can be any difference at all from that point of view as to what is likely to happen to officers if there are no other ranks of the Army on the court-martial as against what would happen to ordinary soldiers or those of non-commissioned rank.
  Even if it could be said that while this proposed change was being tried out there might be difficulty for the time being, I do not think that would be an
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  excuse for not trying it, because eventually the matter would right itself. We might say exactly the same thing about members of a jury when they find a man guilty of some crime. It is true they have not to live in prison with the man, and that they go to their own homes and have no further association with him. Nevertheless, that does not dissociate them from the verdict which has been given, and if the verdict is right, then it stands upon the basis of its integrity. That would apply equally to a court-martial.
  It seems to me that the ground of apprehension as to the consequences to members of the court, which has been put forward, will not do. If the court is constituted of officers, of non-commissioned officers or of men in the ranks, and a really just and proper decision is given, and seen to be given on the facts and on the evidence, I cannot believe that there will follow some sort of vendetta in the barrack room or anywhere else. I do not think that the view to the contrary can be seriously accepted.
  In the administration of our system of justice—and, after all, this is the administration of justice; it does not matter whether it is in the Army or in civil life—trial by courts-martial is an exception to the principles of the jury system. That point should be made very forcibly. This is an exception to what everyone agrees is a proper institution—trial by jury. That being so, some justification ought to be given as to why this exception should continue in relation to the Army.
  Upon that note, I would ask the Secretary of State and the Lord Advocate, who will no doubt consult the other Law Officers, to see whether an experiment cannot be made in order to bring into the administration of justice in the Army exactly the same sort of structure, the same sort of obvious justice, the same sort of assurance to the ordinary man who is to be tried there, that he is to get, not only justice but justice from his peers in a democratic way about which he cannot possibly have any reason to complain.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 89 to 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 103.—(Rules of Procedure.)
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I beg to move, in page 55, line 16, at the end, to insert:
  (h) requiring the accused to give notice prior to trial of his intention to raise any special defence, such as insanity, alibi or self defence.
  This Amendment speaks for itself and I can move it very briefly. As I generally appear for the defence in criminal trials and also in courts-martial, it may seem a little surprising that I should put forward an Amendment which would assist the prosecution, but I do think that it would assist the course of justice. It will prevent the prosecution from being taken by surprise.
  The Clause provides that the Secretary of State can make rules. That is permissive, not mandatory. It sets out a number of things upon which he may make rules.
  The Temporary Chairman (Major Anstruther-Gray): If I may interrupt the hon. and learned Member, perhaps it would be for the convenience of the Committee if we also take the next two Amendments standing in his name.
  Mr. Hughes: The same kind of considerations apply to all three. If the Government are willing to accept my Amendments, I am quite agreeable to proposing them all together. If not, I must say a word about this Amendment and about each of the other two, but I do not want to bring about the defeat of the Government through anything done on their part. If that is to happen, I want it to be done by design—and by my design.
  This Amendment, as is obvious, would add a matter on which the Secretary of State may make rules. It would facilitate the course of justice and prevent the prosecution being taken by surprise by requiring the accused to give notice of any special defence he might wish to put forward. It would prevent confusion, and enable the prosecution to have the appropriate witnesses available. In the case of insanity, it would be necessary for the prosecution as well as for the defence to have expert witnesses such as psychiatrists and doctors. If the defendant wished to put forward an alibi, the issue would be "who were you with last night, out in the pale moonlight?" and it would be necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence to rebut the alibi. In the case of self-defence, it would be necessary to
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  have people who were present at the row in which the self-defence took place. This Amendment seems to speak for itself.
  The next Amendment dispenses,
  "… with opening speeches by the prosecution and defence."
  The object of eliminating those speeches is to enable the issues of the case to be determined on the evidence rather than on opening speeches. I say no more about that.
  7.15 p.m.
  The third Amendment provides for:
  (h) permitting the defence to make the closing speech whether or not witnesses (other than the accused) are called for the defence.
  My submission is that the accused or his counsel should have the last word. That last word should not be with the prosecution. The order of events would then be that the evidence would be adduced, a summing-up speech would be made by the prosecution and a final closing speech by counsel for the defence. This, unlike the first Amendment, is in favour of the accused, but I do not balance them like that. I put forward the Amendments as three improvements to the Bill.
  Clause 103 provides that the Secretary of State may make rules upon a variety of topics running from (a) to (m). The three elements which I seek to include are similar in character to those others. It seems to me that there are gaps in the series of things concerning which the Secretary of State may make rules, and three of the gaps will be filled if the Amendments are accepted.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I rise to oppose this Amendment. I am, indeed, amazed that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) should have moved it at all. The fact that it is in defiance of the tradition of our criminal law may not, perhaps, be an impressive argument to call in aid from this side of the Committee, but the Amendment is calculated, or might indeed have the effect if passed into law, seriously to prejudice the defence. It is introduced, apparently, by my hon. and learned Friend so as to ensure that the prosecution is not taken by surprise. He has told the Committee that he appears on many occasions, as I am sure he does, for the defence. That being so, I am astonished that he should make his own

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  task so much the more difficult in the multitudinous cases in which, we are all sure, he will be appearing in the near future. He would, indeed, curse himself if the Committee permitted him to act according to his own folly.
  My hon. and learned Friend said that he has introduced his second Amendment to ensure that the trial of the case will be conducted upon the basis of the evidence and will not be determined by the quality of speeches. Perhaps I ought to speak modestly about the rô1e of counsel in these matters but, by and large, an opening speech by the prosecuting counsel is of some assistance to the court. I will not seek to put it higher than that. It may be that there are some prosecuting counsel who throw more confusion than light upon the proceedings, and I do not exclude that possibility. It may well be that there are some defending counsel who may have the same unhappy effect upon the proceedings.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: No.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I am not by implication referring to my hon. and learned Friend in saying that. Generally speaking, it is helpful to a court-martial to have a picture of the case before the case ever begins, and indeed from the point of view of the defence, it is imperative that the prosecution should be well and truly tied down at the beginning of the case in the opening by the prosecution and should not be allowed to wander at large into fresh fields and pastures new.
  Therefore, there is abundant reason for rejecting this Amendment, and I am indeed surprised that so experienced a defending counsel as my hon. and learned Friend should have been so misguided as to give it publicity upon the Amendment paper.
  Mr. Hughes: Does my hon. and learned Friend not realise that in presenting my argument I regard myself not as an advocate on one side or the other but as an officer of justice seeking to set up the best possible system by which soldiers can be tried?
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I appreciate that the object of my hon. and learned Friend is purely public-spirited and that he is entirely concerned with the administration of justice.
  Mr. Hughes: I am obliged to my hon. and learned Friend.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: But having said that, I am astonished that he should propose a course which would have the exact opposite to the effect which he has in mind and which would pervert the course of justice by gravely imperilling the rights of the accused.
  In the last Amendment my hon. and learned Friend has sought to be on the side of the angels, if making the task of the defence easier may properly be so described. I see no reason why, in the Rules of Procedure applicable to courts-martial, we should depart from the ordinary rules applicable to criminal proceedings. Therefore, I also oppose my hon. and learned Friend's third Amendment.
  The Lord Advocate: We from north of the Border are naturally gratified that some of our procedure should be suggested here, and I am obliged to the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) for drawing attention to it. While I agree with the general attitude of the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones), I cannot agree with his strictures on the proceedings which it is sought to introduce.
  However, I invite the Committee to reject the Amendment, in the first place because it is unnecessary. It is open to my right hon. and learned Friend when the Rules of Procedure are drawn up to make the very provisions which are suggested here. Subsection (2) of the Clause says:
  "Without prejudice to the generality of the last foregoing subsection. Rules of Procedure may make provision with respect to"—
  certain things. Paragraph (f) is:
  "the procedure to be observed in trials by court-martial."
  It is competent for my right hon. and learned Friend, in drawing up the Rules of Procedure, to introduce rules to cover the matters to which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred. It would be a pity if we were to depart from the present well recognised code which is followed satisfactorily in the conduct of courts-martial.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: This not being the Lord Advocate's maiden speech—he made it some little time ago—I make bold to

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  interrupt him. If he is going to construe (m) in the wide way that he has indicated, why include paragraphs (a) to (l)? Surely it would be sufficient to couch subsection (2) in this way:
  "Without prejudice to the generality of the last foregoing subsection, Rules of Procedure may make provision with respect; to all or any of the following matters"
  and then:
  "any matter which by this Part of this Act is required or authorised to be prescribed."
  The intervening paragraphs are unnecessary on that construction.
  The Lord Advocate: It may well be that this Clause could have been framed in a different way, but what I am clear about is that under paragraph (f) these suggestions of the hon. and learned Gentleman could be incorporated in the Rules of Procedure. There is a good deal to be said for and against each of them. I am far from saying that their mere introduction as a group or even individually would necessarily improve the procedure in any particular form.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 104.—(RULES AS TO EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE ADVOCATE.)
  Mr. Head: I beg to move, in page 56, line 34, at the end, to add:
  (3) In the last foregoing subsection references to questions of law include references to questions as to the joinder of charges and as to the trial of persons jointly or separately.
  This is an elucidating Amendment which is in line with the recommendations in paragraph 83 of the Select Committee's Report. What it does is to clarify the situation and to make clear that a Judge Advocate can deal with the question specified, that is to say joinder of charges and joint trials in the absence of the court. This is entirely in line with civil practice in this respect. It is obvious that this was the intention of the Select Committee. It is intended to insert this Amendment here to make it absolutely clear that this Clause includes joinder of charges.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  The Temporary Chairman: The Amendments which have been put down
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  by the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) to Clause 116 not having been selected, I propose, with the consent of the Committee, to put en bloc the Question, That Clauses 105–123 stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: Will you please call Clause 110?
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I cannot contest your decision, Major Anstruther-Gray, not to call the Amendments to Clause 116, but may I make this observation? They are largely matters of wording. They seek to introduce a different finding on the question of insanity, and I venture to think that they would be accepted by the Government. They substitute—
  7.30 p.m.
  The Temporary Chairman: It would be getting beyond the rules of Order to go into the hon. and learned Member's Amendments on this point of order.
  Mr. Hughes: Then I take it, Major Anstruther-Gray, that there is no objection to my putting down the Amendments on the Report stage?
  The Temporary Chairman: I have no objection whatever to what the hon. and learned Member does on Report stage.
  I take it that it would be convenient now to put the Question for the block of Clauses on which no one wishes to speak.
  Clauses 105 to 110 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 111.—(CONFIRMING OFFICERS.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I wish to say a few words about the provisions in Clause 111 as to who is to confirm the finding and sentence of any court-martial. With great respect to the distinguished gentlemen who laboured so long and ably upon the Bill, I would say that it seems regrettable that they did not seek to separate the officer who convenes the court-martial from the officer who confirms the finding and sentence of the court.
  A major criticism can be made of the administration of Army justice because the officer who convenes the court is the same officer who decides whether there shall be a prosecution, and that officer

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  is also the officer who ultimately confirms the finding and sentence of the court. Taking an analogy from the proceedings in civil courts, the same officer is Director of Public Prosecutions, judge and Court of Criminal Appeal all in one.
  I appreciate that there are difficulties in the field in regard to these matters, and one wants to avoid a duplicity of functions and spreading the burden too widely as between one officer and another; but there is a very strong case for requiring that the officer who has power to confirm the finding and sentence of a court-martial should be an officer one rank higher than the officer who convenes the court.
  At the present time an officer, whether a brigadier or of any other rank, first considers whether there shall be a court-martial at all. If he thinks that the case is a proper one, and requires the court-martial of the soldier or officer, he then decides to convene a court-martial. Then, the trial is held, and in the event of there being a conviction it is the same officer once more—the officer who had to take the preliminary decision as to whether there should be a trial, and who has committed himself to a decision on the earlier part of the proceedings—who has placed upon him the responsibility of deciding whether there should be a confirmation.
  This fault in the machinery of military justice—or, at least, one's anxiety about its failings—has been corrected to a certain extent by the legislation which enables appeals to be taken, in certain cases, to the Court of Criminal Appeal—that certainly reassures one to some extent. Nevertheless, I feel that in this Bill the Army authorities—the same thing may well apply to the Air Force Bill, which we shall be discussing later—should have made an effort to separate the identity of the general officer responsible for convening from the general officer confirming. Therefore, I ask for further consideration to be given to my submission, which is a matter of substance and importance, before we reach the Report stage.
  Mr. Head: The hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) said at the outset that he felt worried because the convening officer was at one and the same time initiating proceedings and also acting as judge of
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  appeal. I should like to make it quite clear that he is not judge of appeal. The duty of an officer is, as convening officer, to satisfy himself that there is a case. Then, as confirming officer, his job is purely to see that the proceedings themselves were in order and properly conducted.
  The question of appeal, however, still remains for the man who has been court-martialled, who can appeal against those proceedings. In his job of convening the court, therefore, the officer does not turn himself into a judge of appeal. He merely sees that the proceedings themselves are in order.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: Surely, the officer confirming can first, if he thinks fit, quash the conviction. He has powers of supervision over the conviction. In addition, he undoubtedly has power to reduce or remit the sentence. In both of those duties he exercises a judicial function. I hope I am not thought to be splitting hairs, but this is an important matter.
  The officer who convenes the court is, in fact, exercising appellate functions when he confirms a conviction—unless the procedure has changed considerably since 1942–45, when I had some contact with these matters. Therefore, when he performs both those functions, confirming the conviction and considering whether there should be any variation of the sentence, he is surely acting in an appellate capacity.
  Mr. Head: The hon. and learned Member has made that point, but I repeat that the man who has been court-martialled has the power to appeal. Furthermore, the sentence is reviewed. I feel that the position of the individual who has been tried is perfectly safeguarded.
  If this procedure, which has been operating for a considerable time—I think quite successfully—werechanged, it would in many cases lead to considerable delay. Very often, especially under conditions of active service, it may be that in a local area or garrison there is only one officer who is qualified for these court-martial duties. One thing that has been borne in upon me during my period as Secretary of State has been the paramount necessity and aim of avoiding undue delays where court-martial proceedings are concerned. In view of the

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  rights of appeal and the review of proceedings, I do not think that there is any danger of injustice being done to the man. A change of this kind, duplicating these two functions, would be likely to give rise to considerable delays.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 112 to 115 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 116.—(PROVISIONS WHERE ACCUSED FOUND INSANE.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I submit that the Clause should not stand part of the Bill because it is couched in an out-of-date and illogical form. It deals with provisions in the case where the accused is found insane. This affects a finding where the defence is that the accused was insane at the time when he committed the act. In my submission, the finding should be in accordance with that fact.
  Clause 116 (2) provides,
  "Where, on the trial of a person by court-martial, it appears to the court that the evidence is such as, apart from any question of insanity, to support a finding that the accused was guilty of any offence, but that at the time of the acts or omissions constituting that offence the accused was insane, the court shall find that the accused was guilty of that offence but was insane at the said time."
  That is illogical. To be guilty of a criminal offence one must have criminal intent, and if one was insane at the time one cannot have had any intent, even a guilty intent which would make one guilty of the offence.
  The proper finding, therefore, should be that the accused committed the act but was insane at the time. Therefore, the Clause should not stand part of the Bill. If the Amendments on the Order Paper in my name had been selected earlier, I would have asked that the Clause should take the form suggested—that the accused committed the act charged but was insane at the time.
  The Lord Advocate: The hon. and learned Member has certainly a point on the phraseology "guilty but insane" because, as he and the Committee know, a recommendation has been recently made. But it would be quite inappropriate for the phraseology in a Bill to run ahead
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  of the ordinary civil law, which is being considered at this time. I do not think that the hon. and learned Member commented on his Amendments but only dealt with the phraseology. I think that the phraseology in the Bill is perfectly adequate and appropriate as it stands.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: The Lord Advocate has said, probably by accident, something that is very interesting to us in Scotland, namely, that there is a prospect of an alteration of the law relating to the death penalty and that he does not think that the military law should have precedence over the civil law. That is an interesting point on which we should all agree, but the Lord Advocate has opened the door a little and we should have more enlightenment.
  I make the point because I think that the Lord Advocate has lost a magnificent opportunity to state his ideas on what the law of Scotland is in relation to the death penalty. We were all very disappointed indeed that the Lord Advocate did not make a contribution to the debate on the civil liability. I suggest that the right hon. and learned Gentleman might now tell us a little more. We have known previous Lord Advocates, very distinguished gentlemen—
  The Temporary Chairman: I hope that the Lord Advocate will not endeavour to tell the Committee more about civil law, because it is not civil law that the Committee is now discussing.
  7.45 p.m.
  Mr. Hughes: I caught the sentence of the Lord Advocate when he made the point that military law should not take precedence over civil law. I am not sure whether that argument holds good. If there is anything wrong with the death penalty in relation to military law, now is the time to deal with it, since the death penalty in Scotland comes under a different set of circumstances to that which prevails under English law.
  I was very much encouraged by the remarks of the Lord Advocate. I do not wish to press him on this occasion, but I hope that he will give us an assurance that he will make a fuller statement elaborating the remarks that the law was being considered in Scotland.
  The Lord Advocate: In order that there shall be no misunderstanding, I did not refer a moment ago to the death

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  penalty, but merely said that the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which contains certain recommendations about insanity and the form of verdict, was being considered.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 117 to 123 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 124.—(RESTRICTIONS ON SERVING OF SENTENCES OF DETENTION IN PRISONS.)
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I beg to move, in page 69, line 32, at the end, to add:
  Provided also that a person sentenced to a period of more than six months' detention may be allowed on request to serve such sentence in a civil prison and at the end of that period be entitled to ask for his discharge from Her Majesty's forces.
  We have not been very successful in persuading the Government to accept any of our Amendments, but here is an opportunity for a little generosity as we are nearing the closing stages of the Bill. My Amendment refers to "detention." What is detention? In different parts of the country we have had for generations now military prisons which combine the worst features of military discipline and the civil penal code. I hold the view that the detention prisons are a blot on our civilisation and should be abolished. I speak with some inside knowledge. I have some idea of what goes on in detention prisons.
  Everybody knows that the "glasshouse" means something rather terrifying to the soldier. If the Army is so popular, I do not know why such an elaborate system of torture chambers, called glasshouses, is essential in the interest of military discipline. I do not for a moment argue that I can carry many hon. Members with me in this respect, but I have heard the Prime Minister make some very good remarks about political discipline. He said that he wanted camaraderie and not coercion from above. Surely that also applies to military discipline. These very elaborate penal measures and this organisation of glasshouses are something which would simply have appalled people like Oliver Cromwell, who believed that they had something to fight for and believed that people can organise an army and that
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  military discipline is possible, and indeed military victory is possible, without this threat of the glasshouse in the background. I am quitesure that when Robert Bruce won the Battle of Bannock-burn he had no system of glasshouses to back him up. Indeed, on the eve of Bannockburn Bruce said that if there were any soldiers who did not want to fight, they could turn and flee. I am not sure that that should not apply to the Army today. If a soldier did not want to serve in the Army after a certain time, then he should turn and—I will not say "flee"—but get some more congenial and useful occupation.
  We have it on record that the Duke of Wellington, one of the most informed persons on military matters for 200 years, expressed the view that the military profession was a damnable profession. Nothing I have been able to say here can put it further than that. The people who have been sentenced to long terms of military detention would re-echo the views of the Duke of Wellington and say that the military profession was a damnable profession and the most damnable part of it was military detention.
  What I suggest is that a soldier sentenced to a long period of military detention should be allowed to say that he preferred to serve his sentence in a civil instead of a military prison, and at the end of the period he should be allowed to leave the Army entirely. I do not know what the military authorities think they can gain from a military point of view by hanging on to the bodies of people who, after serving in a military prison, must be thoroughly browned off and thoroughly disgruntled. To me they do not seem to be useful military raw material.
  I do not ask the Committee to accept my suggestions as infallible, because my experience is limited, but I know a little about the glasshouse. We have been told that things have changed in recent years, but periodically there crops up an ugly case of a prisoner being badly treated. Memories of certain cases of that nature are still within the recollection of the Committee. I think the Minister could accept this Amendment without the Army falling to pieces.
  If there were an Army composed of people who really believed in military

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  activities and were bound together in a common desire to serve their country, then there would be no need for all this elaborate penal background nor the severe penalties which an individual has to endure which often represent to him physical and mental torture. I submit to the Committee that here is an opportunity to do something for the soldier. It does not relieve him of his obligations. He can still be sentenced to periods of imprisonment, but a soldier should have the opportunity to say he prefers to serve his sentence in a civil prison. I believe such a choice would not injure the discipline of Her Majesty's Forces and it would be a humane thing to do to a person who otherwise would have to spend long periods in a military detention camp.
  The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean): The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has treated us to one of his disquisitions on the subject of discipline in the Army. But he missed one or two rather important points. First of all, the purpose of this Clause is to distinguish between detention in a detention barracks and detention in a civil or military prison. The effect of his Amendment would be to send a man to prison instead of to a detention barracks. That would, I think, be most undesirable because the aim of a spell in a detention barracks is to give a man who has committed only a comparatively minor offence, a chance and, in fact, every encouragement to become a good soldier once more. By sending him to prison the stigma of that place would attach to him and would deprive him of that opportunity.
  Another objection is that in wartime it would enable a man who wanted to, to shirk his responsibilities altogether—and I am not referring to the conscientious objectors because they come under a different category altogether—because all he would have to do would be to commit an offence which would get him a sentence of say seven months. After that, he could opt for imprisonment in a civil prison and when he had done his spell he would be discharged from the Army. It is open to question what the further legal effects of such a proposal would be under the National Service Act. Quite obviously this is not an Amendment that we could possibly accept.
  Mr. Simmons: The Under-Secretary is making it too easy for these would-be offenders. He has told them how to do the job. He says that all they have to do is commit an offence, get seven months.' imprisonment, and then when they have done it they can walk out of the Army.
  Mr. Maclean: I said that they could do that if this Amendment were accepted.
  Mr. Simmons: Yes, under the Amendment proposed by my hon. Friend. But he would be a very clever private who would know exactly what sentence to a month would be imposed for any particular offence that he might want to commit.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: He would be a good strategist.
  Mr. Simmons: After all we have heard about the superior intelligence of the officer class, and the horrible possibility of democratisation and co-existence in the Army between officer and private, now we have the Under-Secretary—I do not know what his chief will think about it—coming along and attributing to a private soldier an excess of intelligence or intelligence to the extent that he can estimate to a month the sentence he will get for a certain offence and then, after being in "chokey" for a certain period, he will be able to opt out of the Army and walk out of the barracks at the end of the day.
  Mr. Hughes: He ought to be on the General Staff.
  Mr. Simmons: I do not know what are the qualifications for the General Staff, but surely we ought to have some more information about this matter. We are told there is a great difference between a detention barracks and a military prison. What is the difference between a detention barracks and a military prison?
  Mr. Ellis Smith: My hon. Friend should know.
  8.0 p.m.
  Mr. Simmons: I always managed just to steer clear. Occasionally I balanced on the doorstep, but I never got inside. Do we understand that today a detention barracks is more like a Borstal institution? I am interested in this matter. Before we decide which way to vote on the Amendment we are entitled to know what is the

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  fine distinction between a detention barracks and a military or civil prison.
  Is a detention barracks for rehabilitation? If so, one has to be certain about the material that one is to rehabilitate. There is a great deal of force in what my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has said. On the National Service Bill I had something to say about this which was slightly misrepresented. What is the object of the Army? Is it to get anybody and everybody, irrespective of their quality, within its clutches, or is it to make good soldiers?
  We have heard about influence this afternoon. Who are the people who have influence on the candidates for the "can"? What is their influence upon the rest of the troops with whom they come into contact once they have landed inside "chokey"? Have they not proved themselves to be guilty of conduct unbecoming a soldier and a gentleman, and, therefore, ought they not to be removed from further contact with other soldiers and gentlemen who are still in Her Majesty's Forces?
  I beg the Under-Secretary not to brush the matter aside as he has done but to go into a little more detail about it so that we can appreciate the full impact of the Amendment. If he can prove that the impact would be to the detriment of a soldier or to the detriment of the Service, we shall vote against it, but we have to be convinced first.
  Mr. Willis: The Under-Secretary said that a detention barracks was intended to rehabilitate a soldier and make him a good soldier. I wonder what facts he has to substantiate that statement. Is it not true that men who go to detention return to detention time and time again? How many of the men who go to detention come out better soldiers and gain rapid promotion as a result? We ought to have some information about this. The Under-Secretary made rather wide, sweeping statements about the beneficial effects of detention barracks, but no one would accept from his own Service experience that detention barracks make a man into a better soldier.
  Mr. F. Maclean: What I was trying to do on the point about detention barracks was to distinguish between a spell in a
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  military or civil gaol and a spell in a detention barracks. As to the distinction between the two, a detention barracks is designed for a soldier who has committed a less considerable type of offence, and the purpose is to give him a chance to rehabilitate himself. It is possible that a man may go into a detention barracks more than once, but there is no reason why it should not do him good. If a man is sent to a civil gaol, it is undoubtedly a more severe stigma on his record. That is the point.
  Mr. Simmons: Will the hon. Gentleman say whether his idea is rehabilitation on the instalment plan?
  Mr. Michael Stewart: When I held the office which the hon. Gentleman now holds I visited both the main detention place at Colchester and the military prison at Shepton Mallet. In my experience, all penal establishments, whether military or civil, are melancholy and depressing places to visit. One finds that some of the inmates are people who make one despair. It looks as if throughout the whole of their lives, whether they are in the Army or out of it, they will be up against society.
  However, having allowed for that small and tragic section, I was profoundly convinced that the military corrective establishment at Colchester was doing a useful piece of work with young men who either commit a purely military offence or do something which would be an offence against the civil law but are not irreconcilable enemies of society.
  I remember the story, which had a good deal of currency and is true, of a young illiterate soldier who was sent to a detention barracks. As is common in such places, he was taught to read and write. The great day arrived when for the first time in his life he could write a letter to his mother. Perhaps not unnaturally, he concealed from his mother the exact place from which he was writing and merely described himself as in D.B.—detention barracks. Delighted at the receipt of the letter, his mother wrote to the commanding officer of his unit a letter expressing her great pleasure and concluding, "God bless D.B.! Why was not my boy sent there years ago?" I do not say that the results are always so satisfactory, but I believe that in detention places nowadays a genuine attempt is made to help the

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  young man. I do not say that the young man likes it; it would be silly to pretend that he does.
  However, there is a real difference between that and the much more serious sentence of imprisonment. There is a further point to be considered in this respect. In seeking certain kinds of employment in later life, a man may have to answer the question, "Have you ever served a term of imprisonment?" He can, quite truthfully in the letter and the spirit, answer "No" to that question if he has served only a term of military detention. If the Amendment were passed, I am not at all sure that he could do so. For that and other reasons, I hope that my hon. Friends will not press the Amendment.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 125 to 130 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 131.—(TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENCES UNDER MILITARY LAW NOT- WITHSTANDING OFFENDER CEASING TO BE SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW.)
  Mr. F. Maclean: I beg to move, in page 73, line 5, after "military" to insert "or air-force."
  The purpose of the Amendment is simply to make good a drafting omission. Under the circumstances foreseen in the Clause, it is occasionally more convenient for a person to be detained—I am afraid that we come back once again to the subject of detention—in Air Force custody rather than in military custody. It is very often simply a question of geographical convenience. Provision for this is made in the earlier part of the Bill, and the Amendment simply brings this subsection into line with the rest of the Bill.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: This seems to be a rather casual Amendment, and as far as I can summarise the argument of the Under-Secretary it is that the Army forgot about the Air Force. We hope that that is not symbolical. I should like to know how an airman can be rehabilitated in a military prison. Surely the purpose of sending an airman to prison is—according to the previous argument of the Under-Secretary—to make him a better airman. How can one be made a better airman in a military prison?
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 132 to 142 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 143.—(INTERPRETATION OF PART II.)
  Mr. F. Maclean: I beg to move, in page 81, line 7, at the end, to insert:
  "and includes his successor or any person for the time being exercising his or his successor's functions."
  The purpose of this addition is to provide for the eventuality of the death, or the posting away, of the convening officer whilst the court-martial which he has convened is still in progress. Adding these words makes it possible for his successor, or locum tenens, to exercise his functions after his departure, or in his absence.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 144.—(FORFEITURES AND DEDUCTIONS: GENERAL PROVISIONS.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: Under Section I of this Clause
  "No forfeiture of the pay of an officer… shall be imposed unless authorised by this or some other Act, and no deduction from such pay shall be made unless so authorised or authorised by Royal Warrant."
  I should like to know why there is this distinction. The procedure of authorising deductions from the soldiers pay by Royal Warrant really means that Parliamentary control over such measures just does not exist.
  The Royal Warrants, I suppose, are drawn in the financial branches of the War Office. No doubt very admirable gentlemen function there, but they are not under our control. Perhaps the Under-Secretary would tell what the position is. On this side of the House we are not at all happy about parting with Parliamentary control over deductions from soldiers' pay. Soldiers' pay is not generous, and we want to be reassured and know why this power has been given to the War Office.
  8.15 p.m.
  Mr. F. Maclean: In the first place, I should like to refer the hon. and learned Gentleman to the report of the Select

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  Committee. From that it becomes clear that the present Clause, which deals with forfeitures and deductions, and replaces Section 136 and parts of Sections 138 and 140 of the present Act—this particular part is largely negative—provides that no forfeiture of pay shall be made, unless authorised by Statute and no deduction from pay shall be made, unless authorised by Statute or Royal Warrant.
  It specifically provides that deductions of a penal nature may be authorised only by Statute. It also provides effective regulations under Royal Warrant to provide that the officer, or other rank in question shall receive such minimum rate of pay as may be prescribed by the Army Council, but in case of forfeiture the amount of pay issued for the period may be recovered by subsequent deductions of pay.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: While the Undersecretary has a further briefing upon the matter, perhaps I can usefully pass the time which he requires for further instruction by venturing to suggest that that does not reassure us at all. It is true that it might be even worse, and that the Clause might indeed have given the War Office power by Royal Warrant to make penal deductions as well, but it has done enough already to authorise in a very general sense deduction by pay.
  It is true that penal deductions are excluded, but a whole range of deductions is available. If the Under-Secretary has now been adequately instructed—I say this without offence—on this matter, perhaps he will reassure us further about this point, because the obscure decisions of an obscure office in the financial department of the War Office are something over which the soldier has little influence and in which Members of Parliament can take little interest once we have given power to these obscure offices, who have the force of law behind them by reason of the machinery of the Royal Warrant. I hope that we shall get more light on this subject.
  Mr. Maclean: As I said before, the provisions of this Clause are largely negative. The reason why the Royal Warrant comes into it is that a soldier's pay is a matter of Royal Prerogative.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 145.—(FORFEITURE OF PAY FOR ABSENCE FROM DUTY.)
  Mr. F. Maclean: I beg to move, in page 82, line 42, to leave out from "court" to "or" in line 43.
  I suggest that this Amendment might be taken together with the Amendment to Clause 225 which also stands in the name of my right hon. Friend. Clause 225 defines a civil court as a court of ordinary criminal jurisdiction, and the purposes of the Amendment to Clause 145 is to bring the Clause into line with Clause 225. The need for the Amendment to Clause 225 is to make clear that the references to a civil court do not include any foreign court.
  Mr. E. Fernyhough: I should like the Under-Secretary to tell me whether, when a man is sentenced to the "glasshouse" and forfeits his pay, his wife is debarred from receiving her allowance. Is it only the man who suffers, or does the wife also lose her allowance?
  Mr. Maclean: I do not think that point arises on this Amendment.
  Mr. Fernyhough: That reply is very unsatisfactory. Here we have the case of a man who has committed an offence and been sentenced to a period of detention. While he is under detention he forfeits his pay. That may be proper in the case of the man, but I am concerned with what happens to his wife and children. Are they being penalised as well? Will the wife have to go to the National Assistance Board for help? I think that we are entitled to know.
  Mr. A. Henderson: Can the Undersecretary tell the Committee the position regarding the separation allowance?
  Mr. Maclean: I still maintain that that has nothing to do with this Amendment. But so far as I know, the position is that though the man forfeits his pay, his family go on receiving the family allowance.
  Mr. Fernyhongh: I thought, Major Anstruther-Gray, that you had put the Question "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." It is not enough for the wife to continue to receive the family allowance, because that is something which the Army authorities cannot stop, as they have no jurisdiction over it—
  The Temporary Chairman: Order. We have not yet reached the Motion "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
  Amendment agreed to.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Fernyhough: I wish the Undersecretary to give an assurance that the wife of a soldier sentenced to detention does not have her pay withheld.
  Mr. F. Maclean: I think that is the position, that the wife gets her allotment although her husband forfeits his pay.
  Mr. Ede: Now we have a new word introduced, the word "allotment." In the far-off days when I was in the Army, a man could make a voluntary allotment from his pay which was part of the separation allowance. I joined under the "shilling a day" rule, and one could make an allotment out of that. In fact, a man could so allot his money that he only had 3d. a day left for himself.
  Part of that was a voluntary allotment. It was part of his pay which a man could make over to his wife or to some other dependent relative. I always understood that was part of the man's pay, and that when his pay ceased, the allotment ceased. I hope that the hon. Gentleman was choosing his words carefully when he said that the allotment also would continue.
  Mr. Maclean: The matter does pot really arise under this Clause at all. It is governed by Regulations. If the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) will communicate with me I shall be glad to go into the details. It is a complicated matter. Certain allowances—I think that is the better word to use—continue for a certain period while the husband is in gaol.
  Mr. Fernyhough: If this matter does not arise under this Clause I do not see under what Clause it can be raised. The Clause states:
  "The pay of an officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer or soldier of the regular forces may be forfeited… for any day of absence in such circumstances as to constitute an offence…."
  It is obvious that if a man's pay be forfeited that means his total pay, and if the total be forfeited there is nothing left for the wife. We wish to be assured, not
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  only that the wife receives her marriage allowance, but that she continues to receive it.
  The Financial Secretary said that she would receive it for a period, and we wish to know for how long. If a man is sentenced to six months' detention, does the wife's allowance continue for three months? If he is sentenced to 12 months does the allowance continue for six months? For how long does she continue to receive the allowance and what is she expected to do when it stops?
  Mr. Simmons: I do not see why this matter does not arise under this Clause, which deals with forfeiture of pay for absence from duty. This is the second time this evening that we have received an answer from the Government benches which sought to deny Parliament's responsibility for the pay and allowances of a soldier.
  Earlier we were told, "This is a Royal Prerogative and therefore Parliament has no control over it." It was always my understanding that until we had approved the annual Army Bill we could not raise an Army, let alone pay the soldiers, because we had no right to do so. That was why it was important that every year we should pass an Army Act so as to secure Parliamentary authority for raising an Army and paying the soldiers.
  I do not think that those people who are supposed to be experts on military affairs are so expert. We usually see the benches opposite cluttered up with admirals, generals, colonels, majors, and so on, but they have been absent today. Even hon. Members of the officer class upon the Government Front Bench today do not seem to know their business.
  We expect a little ignorance of military affairs among hon. Members on this side of the Committee, when so many of us never rose above the rank of private, but we expect superlative intelligence in military matters from hon. Members opposite. They have always been the people who waved the Union Jack and yelled at the tops of their voices about the great and glorious British Empire, upon which the sun shall never set. That is their stock in trade. The Tory Party are the military party—the brains and the intelligence of the General Staff.
  8.30 p.m.
  Yet, when we ask a simple question about pay and allowances of members of Her Majesty's Forces, we are fobbed off with the statement that this is a matter of the Royal Prerogative and that we have no right to ask any questions about it. I have pointed out that it cannot be a question of the Royal Prerogative, because we have to pass the Army Act every year in order to authorise the raising of money to pay the soldiers. Now we come down to the question of the forfeiture of pay for absence from duty, under Clause 145 of the Army Bill—revised version. It will be the authorised version when it is passed.
  The simple question is asked, "What happens to the poor wife and starving children when the soldier's pay is forfeited?"—and nobody knows. The question has stumped hon. Members opposite. Yet they are supposed to be the party of the officers. Upon their Front Bench are now sitting at least three officers of substantial rank. I am sorry that their supporters, who are usually here during these Army debates, are missing. There may be a meeting of the 1922 Committee; anyhow, they are not here.
  We should be told what becomes of the wife and the starving children of the man whose pay is forfeited before we pass the Clause in the revised version of this Measure, which will probably go on for another 300 years—as long as the first one did. It may even go on for 500 years, as a tribute to the workmanship of the Select Committee. At any rate, before we pass the Clause we are entitled to know the position.
  We know that when a soldier's pay is forfeited the allotment cannot continue to go to the wife and children, because the allotment is part of the pay. The allotment cannot be allotted out of nothing. We should be told whether the wife and children of the soldier whose pay is forfeited will be a charge upon National Assistance, or whether the Army will have any responsibility for them.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I do not want to stop the debate upon this fascinating question, but I want to mention another point of serious importance. The eloquent speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) raises very serious matters, but I should
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  like an explanation from the Undersecretary of State of the odd words in subsection (1, a),namely:
  "The pay of an officer… may be forfeited for any day of absence in such circumstances as to constitute an offence under section thirty-seven or thirty-eight of this Act or, if the Army Council or an officer authorised by them so direct, of other absence without leave…"
  What on earth does that mean?
  Apparently there are two sorts of absence without leave. First, there is the absence without leave which constitutes an offence under Clauses 37 or 38, and then there is some other mysterious absence without leave which is constituted by a decision of the Army Council or an officer authorised by them.
  This raises an extraordinary situation, because for that specially constituted and defined offence—we know not upon what basis, upon what principle, or for what reason—the unfortunate soldier is also subjected to forfeiture of pay. We must have an explanation of this matter. Either there is absence without leave—and if there is the soldier is liable to proceedings under Clauses 37 and 38—or there is not. I should have thought that the only sort of absence without leave for which he should be deserving of the punishment of forfeiture of pay would be for a properly constituted and proven absence without leave, as an offence under Clauses 37 or 38. Will the Financial Secretary at least tell us the purpose of adding these words "other absence without leave"?
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Before we pass this Clause, I think that we should have some enlightenment from the Lord Advocate. My hon. Friend the Member for J arrow (Mr. Fernyhough) has asked questions of other Ministers, who seem to have been completely mystified by what was really elementary. They ought to know what happens to the dependants of prisoners sentenced by court-martial. It is not an abstruse legal point, like the one on which the Lord Advocate threw light earlier in the debate.
  Let me put a concrete case. Supposing a soldier of the Highland Light Infantry or of the Black Watch has been sentenced to military detention, what happens to the allowance of the dependant? Surely, we are entitled to know. If, as my hon. Friend suggested, it might be a case of National Assistance or help from other funds, then it is coming out of State

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  funds, and the local authorities are interested. I therefore ask the Lord Advocate to come once more to the rescue of his colleagues on the Front Bench and to tell us how this Clause affects the Scottish soldier.
  Mr. F. Maclean: Perhaps I may deal, first, with the point raised by the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones). The purpose of subsection (1, a) is to give discretionary powers, and it provides that forfeiture in respect of absence should cover not only absence which constitutes the offence of desertion or of absence without leave, but also, in certain cases, where the Army Council or an officer authorised by it so decides in any particular case, an unauthorised absence—for example, when a soldier is sentenced to imprisonment in the Republic of Ireland while on leave there. That is the sort of case we have in mind.
  Perhaps I might return to the question of allowances and allotments while a soldier is under detention. It is not quite such a simple matter as some hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to think. In general, the position is as I stated it, namely, that the soldier's pay is forfeited, but that certain allowances and allotments continue to be paid for a period to his dependents. [An Hon. Member: "For how long."] It depends, first of all, whether a soldier is undergoing detention or imprisonment in a military prison or in a civil prison.
  If it is in a military prison, then his family continues to receive the marriage allowance and the qualifying allotment for the whole period of his detention or imprisonment, while any voluntary allotment in issue ceases. On the other hand, if the soldier is undergoing imprisonment in a civil prison, the marriage allowance and the qualifying allotment, but not the voluntary allotment, continue in issue to the wife for the first two months of the sentence or to the date of discharge, if that is earlier. I hope that makes the position clear.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: I welcome the explanation of the words at the end of subsection (1, a), and I appreciate that there are circumstances in which there may be absence without leave which is not necessarily an offence under Clauses 37 or 38. Are the circumstances to be set out by the Army Council in the pay
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  warrant or in some published Regulations, or is a completely wide and absolute discretion to be given to the Army Council or the appropriate officer in regard to this matter?
  Secondly, has the soldier whose pay is to be forfeited any redress, in respect of that type of absence? If he is tried by court-martial in the ordinary way he has an opportunity of offering an explanation and putting up a defence. For the other type of absence, is he to be tried? Is there a hearing? Has he any means of objecting to forfeiture of pay?
  Mr. Willis: Why is there a difference between the results of civilian imprisonment and of detention? Why should the wife of a man who goes to prison be treated more favourably than the other man? There does not seem to be much justification for it.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: We have raised important points. I appreciate that the Select Committee has gone into all these matters, but we too have a duty. I ask for an answer to our reasonable questions. I do not know whether the Minister heard them. I am willing to repeat them, but I hope it will not be necessary to do so.
  Mr. Maclean: As I said on that point, the powers are discretionary. They are at the discretion of the Army Council or of the officer authorised by it. If the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to pursue the matter, an appropriate moment would be during the Report stage, when we could consider it further.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: If the Minister will bear in mind the observations I have made and the questions I have asked, I promise him that we shall revert to them at the Report stage. We are not satisfied that the pay of the soldier is adequately protected by the Bill.
  Mr. Ede: In regard to the offer to deal with the matter at the Report stage, will the Government make certain that they put something on the Paper to raise this issue, as the Report stage is very different from the Committee stage?
  Mr. Maclean: We shall certainly have another look at the matter, and if the wording seems not sufficiently clear, as the hon. and learned Gentleman suggested, we shall try to redraft it. On the

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  question of the difference between imprisonment in a military or a civil prison, I would point out that the offences involved are different, and that it is with regard to the military prison or detention barracks that a prisoner's family gets more favourable treatment.
  Sir P. Spens: Might I try to deal with the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones)? We were frightfully careful on this question of the forfeiture of pay and went into it with the greatest care. It was obvious from the evidence that there might be exceptional cases where the absence would not be dealt with under Clause 37 or Clause 38. The man himself might to some extent be responsible for a particular absence which was not a military offence.
  If my recollection is correct, a general power was suggested, but we were not satisfied with that. We said that the exceptional case must be dealt with directly by the Army Council or by some officer authorised by it, so as to go into the particular case and to make certain that there were grounds on which the man should forfeit the whole or part of his pay. It was to meet these very exceptional cases that we put that recommendation in. I hope that we inserted it in a way that is fair both to the man and to the Army Council.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 146 and 147 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 148.—(DEDUCTIONS FOR BARRACK DAMAGE.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  8.45 p.m.
  Mr. Fernyhough: This Clause is one of the most objectionable Clauses in the Bill. It is a Clause which deals with collective punishment, and if there is anything that I abhor it is that innocent people should be made to suffer the consequence because the culprit cannot be found. It does not matter whether that happens in Kenya, Malaya or in the British Army, I am against it.
  I think that there is something wrong in a situation in which, when the military
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  police or the investigators have been unable to find the culprit who caused the damage, the authorities should say, "All of you must make good the damage." There is nothing more likely to cause bitterness and resentment than an innocent man being made to pay for some action of which he is completely innocent. Collective punishment—it does not matter where it is imposed—arouses more bitterness and animosity than anything else I know.
  I hope that on Report it will be found that something a little more generous has been brought in. I would never, in any circumstances, support the principle that those who are innocent should be punished because those who are guilty cannot be found.
  Mr. Head: From the time when I myself was at school, I have never been in favour of collective punishment, because I was once beaten in conjunction with 27 other boys, and I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that I was innocent.
  Mr. Ede: We understand that.
  Mr. Head: This is a point which the hon. Gentleman can perfectly well argue on those lines. If, on the other hand, in all the barracks of the British Army throughout the world it were said that because an individual culprit could not be found the damage would be put down to public funds, the total rise in the cost of the Army Estimates would be quite considerable.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: How much on the Income Tax?
  Mr. Head: I cannot answer that without notice. But it is a fact that this provision does not operate very often, because soldiers are well aware that if the individual responsible is not found they will be dealt with collectively. Being aware of this, the chances of finding the individual go up by about 98 per cent. If we say that, because we cannot find the individual responsible, the damage will be put down to public funds, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that, human nature being what it is, the total increase in public funds would be very considerable. I think that this is a Clause which, in the interests of public economy, must remain in the Bill.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 149 to 179 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 180.—(COMPLAINTS BY OFFICERS.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: There appears to be a remarkable discrimination in this and the subsequent Clause between the rights permitted to an officer and those permitted to other ranks. If an officer thinks himself wronged by a superior officer he can go to the Army Council, but a warrant officer or non-commissioned officer goes to his commanding officer or, in the event of dissatisfaction at that level, he can go to an officer not below the rank of brigadier.
  I do not know why there is that distinction. Is it thought that there would be so many complaints from those members of the Armed Forces below the rank of officer that the Army Council would be swamped? Why is there this apparent discrimination in the provision for redress of complaints?
  Mr. Head: The hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) has not put down an Amendment, nor has he given notice that he would raise this matter, but I would say to him that this is a matter in which either an officer or an other rank wants to have righted something in which he feels he has been wronged. At that stage it does not concern anything criminal. It is a complaint, really, against his superiors, who, he thinks, have treated him in a manner which is unfair.
  An officer makes his complaint to the Army Council, which is the superior authority for him. The other rank, as has been customary in the Army for a very long time, I think, goes to his. commanding officer and says, "I have been wronged." His complaint, presumably, is against either an individual N.C.O. or officer in the battalion. The commanding officer has a particular position of trust and authority in the battalion and is responsible for its discipline and efficiency as a whole.
  It is traditional in the Army that that individual should listen to the complaints and so-called wrongs—or rather, not so-called, but wrongs—of noncommissioned officers and put them right, and should have the authority to do so
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  so far he is responsible for the whole well-being of that unit. I think that that trust in the commanding officer, and the knowledge of the individuals in the battalion that it is his responsibility, is something upon which the whole foundation of the army system and the battalion system is based.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 181 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 182.—(OFFICERS ON ACTIVE LIST NOT TO BE SHERIFFS.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed. That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: This Clause will be read with a great deal of astonishment in Scotland. It seems to bar the professional progress of a very worthy class. One notes that:
  "An officer of the regular forces… shall not be capable of being nominated or elected to be sheriff of any county, borough, or other place."
  In Scotland a sheriff is a judge, and it seems to me a great hardship that members of the legal profession who happen also to be officers should be barred from being nominated to be sheriffs
  "… of any county, borough, or other place."
  Of course, the Clause may not mean what it says. Thinking that it meant something else I have put down an Amendment to Clause 214—which is the "Application to Scotland" Clause—and which I cannot discuss now, asking that this Clause do not apply to Scotland. If it means what it appears to mean, that Army officers are not to be allowed to become judicial personages in Scotland, I am sure that even my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who spoke so highly at an earlier stage of the great judicial qualities of officers and gentlemen, would not approve of this. The Committee should have some explanation of this very astonishing Clause.
  Mr. Willis: Arising from what has been said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes), earlier we discussed an Amendment dealing with the composition of courts-martial, when we were told that only officers could serve on a court-martial because they apparently had all the legal wisdom, experience and ability to undertake that task.
  The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): The hon. Member must not revert to a previous Amendment.
  Mr. Willis: I accept your guidance, Sir Rhys.
  Under Clause 182 we are now told that an officer is not suitable to be a sheriff in Scotland, which is essentially a judicial post.
  Mr. Head: It applies only to England.
  Mr. Willis: The Clause does not specify England. It says that an officer shall not become a
  "sheriff of any county, borough, or other place."
  Mr. Head: A sheriff in Scotland is a different thing.
  Mr. Willis: Of course, he is a different thing. But this Clause is not restricted to England. There is nothing in the Clause which restricts its application to England.
  The Lord Advocate: I do not want to anticipate an argument, but to shorten the proceedings may I say that this Clause cannot possibly apply to Scotland because no sheriff is nominated or elected in Scotland. A sheriff in Scotland is appointed by the Crown.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 183 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 184.—(EXEMPTIONS FROM TOLLS, ETC.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I would like the Lord Advocate to explain subsection (3) which says:
  "Members of the regular forces on duty when using ferries in Scotland shall be entitled to be carried at half rate."
  This provision appears to be inconsistent with the first part of the Clause. Probably when this subsection was drawn up there was some historical reason for it, but now tolls are becoming once more in the news, especially after the announcement of the Minister of Transport. Why should members of the Regular Forces be exempt from tolls, whereas lorries of the nationalised industries are not exempt
  664
  from tolls? The whole question of tolls has become a burning political issue, and I should like an explanation.
  Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is complaining about a lack of parity as between the Army and the Ministry of Transport. It is only within my province to answer for the Army. It seems to me that where the Army is concerned this Clause is eminently reasonable, and I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he should make representations to the Ministry of Transport to see if they can improve their own position.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 185 to 191 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 192.—(PUNISHMENT FOR PROCUR ING AND ASSISTING DESERTION.)
  9.0 p.m.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I beg to move, in page 104, line 11, to leave out "fifty" and insert "twenty."
  The Deputy-Chairman: It might be convenient to the Committee to discuss at the same time the hon. Member's next three Amendments, in lines 12, 14 and 15.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I put down these Amendments to get some satisfaction as to whether the penalties provided in the Clause were not rather severe and whether by substituting the smaller sums proposed in the Amendment the same purpose of justice would not be achieved. I would especially like an explanation of why the fine has suddenly gone up to £500 in line 14, subsection (2).
  Mr. Hector Hughes: The cost of living is rising.
  Mr. Head: The offences referred to in the Clause are serious offences. The hon. Member has, I know, both an extensive and a practical knowledge of the questions of military law and he will appreciate that the offences laid down in the Clause are serious offences, particularly in time of war. The rise in the amount of the fine to which the hon. Member refers, in subsection (2), is because the fines are imposed on conviction on indictment. This is entirely consistent with the advice both of the Select Committee

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  and of the Departmental Committee, who went into the question of the more serious offences concerned, for which the penalties are provided on conviction on indictment.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 193 to 196 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 197.—(UNAUTHORISED USE OF AND DEALING IN DECORATIONS, ETC.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I should like an explanation on subsection (2), which relates to
  "Any person who purchases or takes in pawn any naval, military or air-force decoration. …"
  Surely, we should have some reason for the insertion of these words in the Bill. Do soldiers and airmen really pawn their decorations, and to what extent? Does the pawning of decorations take place on such a scale as requires the insertion of a special subsection in an Act of Parliament?
  Mr. Head: There is, and always has been, a considerable market in medals. Nobody responsible where the Services are concerned has ever raised any objection when the holders of the medals are dead, but as far as members of Her Majesty's Forces are concerned, we wish in every way to remove every temptation to a man to sell or even to pawn his medals, of which most soldiers are extremely proud. If there were a ready market in these things and temptation were put in a man's way to sell off all his medals, we believe that that would be a bad and wrong thing. This provision is included in the Bill to discourage those who traffic in medals and to prevent any attempt to make men sell or pawn their medals.
  Mr. Simmons: Surely, some hon. Members can allow their recollections to go back as far as the end of the 1914–18 war, when the pawnshops were full of the medals of men who came out of the Forces at the end of that war and who went almost straight into the unemployment queue.
  Mr. Head: The hon. Member is under a misapprehension. The subsection refers
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  only to members of Her Majesty's Forces and not to those who have left the Forces.
  Mr. Simmons: It says:
  "Any person who purchases or takes in pawn any naval, military or air-force decoration awarded to any member of Her Majesty's military forces…"
  These men were members of the Forces when the medals were awarded to them. At the end of the First World War there was an hon. Member representing a Birmingham constituency—
  Mr. Head: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Member, but he is under a misapprehension. The closing words of Clause 197 (2) are:
  "… the person to whom the decoration was awarded was dead or had ceased to be a member of those forces."
  I think that that meets the point. Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 198 to 204 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 205.—(PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW: GENERAL PROVISIONS.)
  Mr. Head: I beg to move, in page 112, line 25, at the end, to add:
  (3) References in this section to an officer holding a commission include references to a person entitled to have a commission issued to him.
  The Amendment facilitates the position, especially in war, when a very considerable number of commissions are apt to be given in a short period of time. The Bill refers to an officer holding a commission, which within the law means an individual who has actually received the commission itself, that is the document. The Amendment makes it mean a person entitled to have a commission issued to him. That means that the Queen shall have signed the draft gazette gazetting that officer into the Forces. The Amendment is designed to cover the period of time between the Queen's signature and the issue of the actual document to the person concerned.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 206 to 208 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 209.—(APPLICATION OF ACT TO CIVILIANS.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Elwyn Jones: We should not pass from this important Clause without noting the wide extent of it and the new departure which it constitutes, in that it now subjects civilians not on active service and of a very wide category to the military law. Clause 209 (2) states:
  "Subject to the modifications hereinafter specified. Part II or this Act shall at all times"—
  that is to say, under active service conditions or not—
  "apply to a person of any description specified in the Fifth Schedule of this Act who is within the limits of the command of any officer commanding a body of the regular forces outside the United Kingdom, and is not subject to military law…"
  under the various Acts.
  It will be seen from the Fifth Schedule that the persons who are subjected to military authority include
  "Persons forming part of the family of members of any of Her Majesty's naval, military or air forces and residing with them or about to reside or departing after residing with them."
  Therefore, if Aunt Matilda goes on a visit to a family in some foreign field and she exceeds the speed limit in the barracks she is liable to be "whipped" before the commanding officer and fined some £10.
  This marks a remarkable development in our law and a remarkable extension in the power of the military. It means that the nurses and all that category of persons are liable in conditions not of active service to be brought before the commanding officer and dealt with in accordance with these modifications. I ask whether these wide powers are necessary and whether we should encourage the Army in this respect, with all the appalling social risks involved. I tremble to think of the future of a commanding officer if he punished any Aunt Matilda in the way the Bill empowers him to do. I wonder whether it is really right that we should place these new perils in the paths of inexperienced commanding officers and whether these powers are really necessary.
  Mr. Head: The hon. and learned Gentleman has perhaps expressed apprehension about taking the bread out of the mouths of foreign lawyers, but, in fact,
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  the reason for this being introduced is that we have had a great deal of experience since the war of the difficulties arising through units and formations being overseas where there is this or that civilian offence to be dealt with in civilian courts. The British Army is all over the world today, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, and I am not casting any aspersions on individual nations when I say that civil courts and civil prisons vary considerably.
  This matter was carefully considered. It was referred to the Whitley Council because it was concerned with civilians. It was referred to N.A.A.F.I. and to everybody concerned, and it was agreed that it would be to the advantage of the individual civilian who was accompanying the soldiers over the wide world that this provision should be in the Bill. It was for their benefit that it was inserted and not to victimise anyone.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 210 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 211.—(APPLICATION OF ACT TO RESERVE AND AUXILIARYFORCES.)
  Mr. F. Maclean: I beg to move, in page 116, line 6, after "to" to insert "warrant."
  The purpose of this Amendment is to correct what is really a misprint. Subsection (2) refers to
  "warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Army Reserve and the Territorial Army."
  It goes on to say that it applies to "officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the regular forces." That should be "warrant officers" and not "officers."
  Amendment agreed to.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: I shall not repeat what I said previously, but it arises again on this Clause where it states that the Act applies to the Reserve and auxiliary Forces. I raise this matter again for two reasons. First of all I should like the Secretary of State to give an undertaking that he will consider the specific case I have raised through his office, and secondly, he will

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  consider whether proceedings should not be taken in public.
  I do not want to go into the special case, so there is no need to be concerned about it, but what I am asking is that before the Report stage the specific case should be considered. The particulars are in his office. The second point is that when any civilians—and I am concerned with civilians here—are subject to proceedings by the military authorities, these proceedings should be heard in public. For example, if a man is finished with National Service and has settled down in his employment and is taking a great interest in his trade, in engineering, in mining or whatever it might be, he might take exception to being called up again at a special time.
  What happens now is that he is first subject to the civil authorities and is then handed over to the military authorities. What I am suggesting is that any proceedings taken against him should be heard in public rather than behind closed doors, because the latter system means that the locality is left wondering what has happened and what is taking place. That undermines confidence in the proceedings. If the Secretary of State finds that there is anything in my allegation about our democratic rights being undermined, it should be considered on the Report stage.
  9.15 p.m.
  Mr. Head: I will certainly look into what the hon. Gentleman says, and if I think there is any injustice, I will bring it forward on the Report stage.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 212 and 213 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 214.—(APPLICATION TO SCOTLAND.)
  Mr. Hector Hughes: I beg to move, in page 118, line 30, at the end, to insert:
  (6) Section one hundred and eighty-two shall not apply to Scotland.
  I have already discussed this matter in connection with Clause 182. It is obvious that Clause 182 does not apply to Scotland, and I ask that that be stated in Clause 214.
  The Lord Advocate: If it is obvious that the Clause does not apply to Scotland, it seems unnecessary to put in a
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  Scottish application Clause a provision that it does not apply. Clause 182 could not possibly apply to Scotland for the reason which I gave a few moments ago. The Amendment is unnecessary.
  Mr. Hughes: I purposely cut short my observations when moving the Amendment because I thought it would be accepted. I said that Clause 182 obviously does not apply to Scotland, but that may not be so obvious to all readers. Where a Clause like Clause 182, which does make sense in connection with Scotland, is inserted in a Bill, it should be expressly stated somewhere in the Bill that it applies not to Scotland but to England and Wales only. I ask the Committee to insist on the insertion of these words.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 215 to 219 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 220.—(JURISDICTION OF COURTS.)
  Mr. Ross: I beg to move, in page 121, line 21, after "Act" to insert: "except an offence committed in Scotland."
  I want to find out from the Lord Advocate how the jurisdiction of Scottish courts will be affected, and the extent to which he is satisfied that justice will be done in this case. The Secretary of State said earlier that civil courts varied enormously—
  Mr. Head: I said that I did not wish in any way to be invidious. I stated that in the very many foreign countries in which the British Army was stationed there was a certain variation in both prisons and courts.
  Mr. Ross: That still applies as far as the United Kingdom and the Colonies are concerned.
  Mr. Head: I did not say that.
  Mr. Ross: No, I am saying it.
  In places where Scottish or British soldiers are temporarily engaged in their Army work, it obviously means that for the convenience of the Army the soldier is to be tried by a civil court, and we have not the slightest idea of the competence of that court, nor of its procedure and practice. We should not accept this reduction of the jurisdiction of our own courts without some explanation from the Government.

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  I am also interested in knowing what this means to a Scottish soldier, or any soldier in Scotland who commits an offence which would be triable by the Scottish court, if the soldier is moved to England, where he will presumably be tried by an English court. The processes are entirely different, and I do not think that it is a great inconvenience to anyone to take a man back to Scotland for trial.
  I take as an example the case of a long-distance driver who committed an offence in Yorkshire and who had to go from Kilmarnock to stand trial in Yorkshire. Even different civil courts in England are giving entirely different interpretations of what to fine people for motoring offences, for instance. I had some figures sent to me in a letter. This is very important and relevant to the Amendment, because soldiers can be tried in these courts for offences committed elsewhere.
  I can instance a case, to which I have just referred, where the driver was fined £5 and had his licence taken away for a year, which was a considerable punishment for a man employed in driving. But the chief constable, for driving without due care and attention, was fined only £2 in Doncaster, and a chief inspector of Sunderland was fined £4 and disqualified from driving for three months for dangerous driving.
  The Deputy-Chairman: This seems to be beyond the scope of the Amendment.
  Mr. Ross: It is very pertinent. It deals with the fact that a soldier can be tried in any court—no court is specified—outside the country in which the offence was committed. If the offence is committed in Scotland, a man can be tried in England where the process is entirely different. I think that the matter is one of considerable importance in relation to the jurisdiction of Scottish courts.
  There is the question of murder. From my reading of the Bill, a person can commit, or be charged with, murder supposedly committed in Scotland, and might be tried in England where the procedure is entirely different. The differentiation is considerable, and I hope that the Government will accept the Amendment.
  The Lord Advocate: There is certainly a point in this Clause. It is the successor of an earlier Section in the previous Act,
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  but it goes a little further. The previous Act was limited to courts of summary jurisdiction, but now there is no limit, and I see that the objection that might be raised to this type of Clause is that it does enable a person to be tried in a court, other than the court of the country where the offence was committed—I am talking about civil offences. That may be necessary in certain limited circumstances, but unless it is necessary, I think it is undesirable.
  I have discussed this matter carefully with the hon. and learned Member for Paisley (Mr. D. Johnston) and the right hon. Member for East Stirlingshire (Mr. A. Woodburn), and I have suggested, and now inform the Committee, that I hope on Report stage to be able to produce a variation and Amendment to Clause 220. If the draftsmen can achieve it, the effect will be to make offences under this Bill—it is only offences under this Bill referred to in Clause 220—committed in Scotland triable only in Scotland and those committed in England triable only in England. That of course applies only if they are tried in civil courts. It has nothing to do with courts-martial.
  It will mean that if a civilian or a soldier commits a civil offence in Scotland contrary to Clause 220, and unless he is tried by court-martial, he will be tried in a Scottish civil court. Similarly a soldier or civilian committing such an offence in England will be tried in an English civil court.
  Mr. Ross: I am glad to see that, even in England, the Lord Advocate sees the Scottish light.
  Mr. Wigg: As an English nationalist, may I congratulate the Lord Advocate on protecting the rights of the English in this matter?
  Mr. Ross: On that assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: This Clause is a little difficult to understand at first glance. As I read Clause 220, it deals only with offences created by Clauses 191 to 196 inclusive. Those are civilian offences created by this Bill. I admit that I have great difficulty in understanding that.

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  When I first read Clause 220 it seemed to me that the effect was that if a man had committed, say, murder in England and then, owing to military duties had gone to Kenya, he could be tried by a Kenya district magistrate without a jury. I am now satisfied that that interpretation is wrong, but I believe that this Clause is sufficiently difficult to understand for consideration to be given to whether it might be worth while inserting in the fourth line after "offence under this Act," the words
  "under sections 190 to 196 of this Act."
  Perhaps the Government will consider that before Report stage, because I think it might save a lot of confusion.
  Mr. Head: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Member for his most learned opinion. I must confess that at short notice I am not entirely apprised of the implications of his suggestion. I am not particularly learned in the law, but his hypothetical instance of what might happen is impressive. I can give an undertaking, on behalf of myself and my learned advisers, that we will examine the matter.
  Mr. Paget: I should be entirely satisfied with that. There may be nothing in my suggestion, but it might help to clarify the position.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Causes 221 to 224 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 225.—(GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO INTERPRETATION.)
  Amendment made: In page 124, line 13, at end, insert:
  "but does not, except where otherwise expressly provided, include any such court outside Her Majesty's dominions."—[Mr. Head.]
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 226.—(SHORT TITLE, COMMENCE MENT AND DURATION.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  9.30 p.m.
  Mr. Wigg: This is a very important Clause, because upon it hangs the life of the Bill. Until 1952 the situation was that, year by year, the House passed into law,
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  with the passing of the annual Army Bill, a code of law for the Army which was fantastically out of date. It may have been all right when our Army was composed of volunteers, but once we had a conscript Army it certainly seemed that the House of Commons had a direct responsibility to see that its military law was up to date. My right hon. and hon. Friends therefore discharged their duties as an Opposition—I have always held the view that it is the duty of an Opposition to do so; it is one of its great constitutional rights—and the Government accordingly set up a Select Committee to consider the matter. This Bill is its work.
  The Clause advocates that the House shall maintain its statutory rights by having an annual debate upon an affirmative Resolution, and that at the end of a period of five years the Bill shall expire and the Government will have to come forward with a new one. In that way the House of Commons will be able to maintain effective control; there will be an opportunity to debate the Bill, and each year the Government must either ask for an extension of time or bring in a new Bill.
  The Select Committee recommended something which, so far, the Government have given no definite signs of accepting. The Committee recommended that a Standing Order should be adopted which would require, after the Second Reading debate in the Army Bill's fifth year, that it should be submitted to a Select Committee. On a previous occasion the Secretary of State for War referred to me as a Buchmanite, because I was always honest about this matter. Having caught the Government in 1952, I was most anxious that my right hon. Friends, who will shortly become the Government once more, shall not be caught in the same way. In other words, I wanted to keep the Bill up to date but, at the same time, to put a safety catch upon it—that is the right hon. Gentleman's phrase; not mine—in the form of a Standing Order.
  There is no need for me to weary the Committee any further. I should have thought that the House has not surrendered anything, and that the Army has certainly gained something, by the Clause in its new form. We have not lost any of our democratic control of the Armed Forces. If the right hon. Gentleman will

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  be good enough to declare the Government's honourable intention upon the issue of the Standing Order, I am sure that my right hon. Friends will accept the Clause not only in the letter but in the spirit of the unanimous recommendation of the Select Committee.
  Mr. Head: I am obliged to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for referring to this matter because, as I said during the Second Reading debate, there is nothing between the intentions of the hon. Member and the Government regarding the Bill. It is a question of machinery. The hon. Member, with considerable ingenuity and, I have no doubt, a great deal of work, devised a machinery, and that is to what he has referred in his remarks.
  The point at issue is that this Bill, which has lain fallow for many years, was brought forth by chance as a result of the discussion on the 22-year engagement. I do not know whether the initiative came from the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) or the hon. Member for Dudley himself, but they said "Here is the finest imaginable natural opportunity for filibustering which has ever come before the House of Commons," and, after introducing a batch of Amendments that looked like a novel by Ethel M. Dell, they proceeded to do it. That is how this Bill was born.
  As the hon. Gentleman rightly says, both sides of the Committee are anxious about three things. The first is that it does not really make sense to have a serious and important piece of Service legislation so out of date. Nor do we wish it to be an instrument for party political filibustering. Nor do we want both sides of the House to be so frightened about it as to put it in such a state that, from now on, it will lie fallow for another 100 years. In these objects we are united.
  The hon. Gentleman, exactly on the lines, spirit and object, of that policy tried to devise a safety catch, and it is with regard to the safety catch that the problem arises. The hon. Gentleman's safety catch stems from three things. Firstly, it stems from the five-year period, which is stated in the Clause; secondly, from the appointment of the Select Committee, which, judging from the only experience which we have of this particular one,
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  tends to reduce the heat, and provides a non-partisan, sensible, logical and all-party appreciation of the problem; and thirdly, it provides for a Standing Order which will say to the Government, "Do not be too frightened to amend it when you think you should, because there is a Standing Order which says that on the Committee stage, you will have only one day, and another for Report." These are roughly the three contributory parts of the safety catch.
  If it were possible for one Parliament to bind another, I think that there would be a really strong case for adopting the hon. Gentleman's suggestion, but I have been into this matter most carefully with a great many experts. The result is that, although our intentions are the same as those of the hon. Gentleman, it is the fact that one can drive, not one coach and horse, but three coaches and horses through the safety catch.
  Let us take it this way. The Government may say, "We do not want this to go before a Select Committee," or, "We have had a Committee, and we will let it lie fallow." They need only bring in a one-Clause Bill to say, "For five, read ten." Secondly, if we introduce a Standing Order for this Parliament, a new Government can throw it away at the beginning of the next Parliament. Lastly, the appointment of a Select Committee must, and always will, be the responsibility of the Parliament of the day.
  What I wish to say, on behalf of this Government—and no Government has ever been able under our procedure to bind another—is that we are at one with the hon. Gentleman in his intention. I repeat that this important piece of Service legislation should be kept up to date, that the fear of introducing them into this House should not deter the Government from doing the necessary amendments for keeping it up to date, and that the principle of appointing a Select Committee in order to avoid controversy is one in which we agree. Lastly, it may be, and I think always will be, up to the Government to adopt the hon. Gentleman's suggestion regarding a Standing Order, which may be a safeguard and a reassurance which the Government at the time feel they should have. It is an ingenious suggestion, and we take note of it. There it is for any Government which seeks reassurance.

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  We are agreed in principle, but I think that all hon. Members who consider it carefully will also agree that to attempt in this Parliament to bind another Parliament would be unwise. A Government of the future could drive a coach-and-four straight through it. We take in principle the suggestions that the hon. Member has made, while leaving to a Government of the future the task of finding a way to ensure that the Act is kept up-to-date and does not become a matter for party filibustering.
  Mr. Paget: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman's three coaches are correct. Let us see. The first one is that of just inserting an Amendment and saying "for 'five' read 'ten'." A Government who tried that would not save time. We should put down an Amendment, "Except as to Clause 1," and so on. When we reached "Except as to Clause 226" we should have done quite an amount of work. If we tried to do that, and I think it would be within the rules of order, it would provide an opportunity for obstruction to the Opposition such as this House has never seen. That is what I understand the right hon. Gentleman wishes to avoid.
  It is true that one Parliament cannot bind another, but if one Parliament introduced a Standing Order for the protection of the Government it is unlikely that the next Parliament would wipe that protection away because, on the whole, Parliament does what the Government ask it to do. I therefore do not think that the reasons given by the right hon. Gentleman are very substantial. I urge him to adopt, as he has done in a broad way, the suggestion which originated from the very careful words of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), which were adopted by the Select Committee, with the advice of experts from the Table.
  This protection is not 100 per cent. In a sovereign Parliament nothing can be 100 per cent., as it can always be changed, but it is quite unlikely to be changed and ought to be adopted. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept it.
  Mr. Head: I have not yet finished, so perhaps I could make these points on what the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has said. He has mentioned Amendments like "Except as to Clause 1."It shows legal ingenuity, but although I cannot get advice on
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  hypothetical legal cases, nevertheless, by the telepathic process which takes place in this House, I know that there is at least some doubt as to whether the hon. and learned Gentleman is right.
  He said that it would be better for the Government to introduce a Standing Order now as it would be there for any Government who would be likely to use it. That argument is equally applicable the other way. A Government could say, "It is now 1960. The Army Act is about due. Let us put down the Standing Order of the hon. Member for Dudley and enforce it." It would be there, and it could be done by any Government. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate to a considerable extent how it would work. We cannot speak from personal experience. It would be rather like the troop trials of a rifle; we can only tell what it is like when it has been operating for some time.
  Mr. Paget: If a Government introduced this new method it would have to give a day for disccussion. Governments are a bit mean about days. If it were there already, it would be part of the procedure, so why not introduce it?
  9.45 p.m.
  Mr. John Strachey: This Clause raises points of considerable constitutional interest. I want to comment on only two of them. On the one which the Committee is debating at the moment, I will only say that, although I was not a member of the Committee, it certainly seems strange to us that the Government are refusing steadfastly—I will not say obstinately—to introduce a provision which is designed to prevent or limit possible obstruction. It seems strange that the Government should find it so difficult to accept that.
  I agree that some future Parliament could undo the Committee's work if they accepted the Committee's proposed Clause now. I would agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that this is something which one would have thought the Government would welcome as part of the general settlement, if I may call it so, for future procedure on the Army Act. It is certainly strange that they do not want to have it.
  The other point is this. I think that we have followed with some interest the learned correspondence in "The Times"

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  on this issue. The letter that most interested me was the one which, while welcoming some features of this new arrangement, said that a regrettable sign was the altering of the old Army Act procedure which had been one of the buttresses of the democratic Parliamentary system of this country, as it was one of the things which compelled the Executive always to summon Parliament, at least every 12 months, because, if they did not, they would have no Army.
  I think that the fears of the learned writer in "The Times" were actually unnecessary, because, as I read this Clause, the Government must still summon Parliament in order to get its affirmative Resolution passed. I think that on this point it might be worth while to note that this is so if only to reassure the doubts of the learned correspondent in "The Times." I think that, remote though the contingency is, it would be a pity if we took away even one of the numerous provisions which, in fact, the Executive have for summoning Parliament. As I say, we are not doing that, and I think that that is well safeguarded by subsections (3) and (4).
  Mr. Geoffrey Bing: I think that it was before you, Sir Charles, took the Chair that the Secretary of State for War compared those of us who put down this Amendment to characters in the novels of Ethel M. Dell. If he will permit me to return the compliment, I would say that the right hon. Gentleman resembles a character in the novel of that equally great novelist Ouida. He will remember the description of the university boat race in which the Oxford Eight were all described as rowing fast, but none so fast as the stroke. The right hon. Gentleman is, I think, in this case the stroke. He is well ahead of everyone else, and the rest of us are still trying to catch up.
  There are two points which I wish to make about this Clause. The first is regarding what will be discussable on the annual Resolution which renews the Act. It is important that while we shall not have more than one day's discussion, there should, at least, be a day available for the discussion of any current grievances. Anyone who has had experience of the Army or of the Air Force knows that there are always grievances about church parades or about this, that, and the other.
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  Therefore, if a statutory Resolution comes forward, it should not be in such a narrow form that it would have to be said, "You have to decide to have this Army or no Army." This Clause needs a little looking at to see that it is so drawn as to fit in with the spirit which the Committee intended. I think it is rather a matter of the conventions of the House. We all know that on certain matters, by moving the Speaker out of the Chair, we can discuss all sorts of things which normally we could not discuss. If it is thought, as it may be, that this Resolution procedure gives some opportunity for discussion, as by established tradition we have a little debate on the Army or the Air Force, it may be that time is well employed.
  It would be unfortunate if we did not say just a word as to the intention of the House in passing this provision; that at any rate each year there should be some discussion on the Army, and that the Motion should not be of such a formal nature that no matters could be discussed. The rule at present is that the discussion can go on until 10 o'clock, but if one looks at the time spent in previous years the time might just as well not be fixed at that hour.
  If I might say so without being out of order, Sir Charles, I hope that subsequent Orders will let us deal with the three Forces. It is rather an anomaly to see on the first the name of the First Lord of the Admiralty. I do not know why that is so. I thought he stood for the principle that in these matters there should be no legislation, but that all should be done by Prerogative. In that case he is rowing even faster than is the right hon. Gentleman—as, indeed, befits one who carries a silver oar.
  Perhaps I may come to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that surely it is a matter for this House to decide, by agreement between both parties, what are the appropriate Standing Orders. As you well know, Sir Charles, there are Standing Orders still in force which were passed in 1667 or 1668—I am not quite sure which. At any rate they have not been objected to by either party since then, though indeed they obstruct many of us when we hope to make speeches, for example on a Money Resolution. If such a tradition can be accepted, it seems

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  reasonable that the House should, in agreement between both sides, and on the basis which the Select Committee put forward, agree to a Standing Order.
  If, in fact, in the experience of the House, the Standing Order does not result in the examination of Army problems, the House as a whole could alter it. It is hypocrisy to say on the one hand how wonderful it is to have a Standing Order on which we have agreed, and then, when we try to apply that procedure in one of the more difficult things, to say, "We cannot bind future Parliaments." We shall bind future Parliaments by saying that they shall be denied their annual opportunity for discussion.
  We should have something rather stronger from the right hon. Gentleman; some undertaking, at any rate, that there will be inter-party consultations, that if the form of the Standing Order approved by the Select Committee is not one that receives approval there will at any rate be an arrangement by which there will be discussions before this Bill becomes law about an appropriate form of Standing Order. I do not want to divide the Committee on this matter now, but I hope that the Secretary of State will look further into the matter. I think I probably speak for many of my hon. Friends on this side when I say that his answer is not really very satisfactory.
  The Clause was introduced on the basis that there would be some such agreement as that mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley. If that is not so, then perhaps it is better to go back to the annual Army Act, even if it does occupy the time of the House.
  I hope that the Secretary of State for War will give further consideration to this matter. If he feels that the proposals put forward by the Select Committee are not altogether acceptable we shall have to have some other arrangement, or a Standing Order can be put down for discussion by the House, either in the form suggested by my hon. Friend or in some other form.
  If the House later feels it should not be bound by it, it can be repealed, as the House repealed the Standing Order which said that we should sit in St. Stephen's Chapel on the first day of every Session. It is a mark of our democracy that we can among ourselves decide on the best way to discuss our business. The right hon. Gentleman is not doing justice to
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  Parliament if he refuses to consider a Standing Order.
  Mr. A. Henderson: I am sure the Secretary of State for War must realise by now that those of us on these benches who sat on the Select Committee are extremely disappointed with the reply he has given tonight. This question of how we should deal with the Army Act in future years was given the most serious and careful consideration by hon. Members on both sides of the House who were members of the Select Committee. I think that, with one exception, we came to a unanimous agreement which resulted in our putting forward what I would call a package which contained the three proposals to which my hon. Friend the-Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has referred.
  I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will not mind me suggesting that the credit for this very excellent suggestion and the detailed proposals which are based on the original concept resulted not only from the work of my hon. Friend but also from the very excellent advice and help given by the previous Clerk of the House, Sir Frederic Metcalfe. Certainly the Select Committee is very grateful for the assistance it received from Sir Frederic.
  The Secretary of State is missing a great opportunity. As he knows, the whole of the deliberations of the Select Committee were conducted on a non-party basis, or above party, which, as I said on one occasion, made it almost a miniature Council of State. The Report which was submitted to the House by the Select Committee emphasises that approach. It says that it was felt that such periodic examination in the less partisan atmosphere of a Select Committee was likely to result in the legislation being kept more up to date and to give less opportunity for criticism or amendment of a partisan or obstructive nature than if the Bills were to proceed straight to a Committee of the whole House, as has hitherto been the practice.
  I was surprised to learn that the Secretary of State was so pessimistic. One of his main reasons for not going on with the proposals for a new Standing Order was, as he said, that another Government could drive a coach and horses through it, that another Government could either

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  make use of it or take what he called evasive action. It seems as if one of the reasons why the Secretary of State and his colleagues are not prepared to accept responsibility for it at the moment is that they do not anticipate being in office after the next Election, because if they were confident of being the Government after the next Election his argument would not hold water.
  If the right hon. Gentleman agrees in principle with the proposal for a Standing Order, and he and his hon. Friends are satisfied that they will be there in the next four or five years, they would propose this change knowing that they will be.there at the end of the quinquennial period. Surely the Secretary of State does not seriously suggest that the fact that a Government in five years time might have different ideas about dealing with the Army Act or the Air Force Act in a non-partisan way and, therefore, might have no use for the Standing Order, is any reason for not proposing it now if he and his hon. Friends agree with the idea behind it. Otherwise, that argument would apply to any amendment of Standing Orders. A Government later on might take a different view and might seek either to evade or to amend the Standing Orders.
  10.0 p.m.
  Therefore, I endorse what my hon. Friends have said, and I hope that between now—[Interruption.] May I have some attention from the Government Front Bench? Three of its members seem to be engaged in conversation.
  The Solicitor-General: That is quite usual here.
  Mr. Henderson: It may be on that side of the Committee. This is a serious matter. We have tried to keep it off a controversial basis. Therefore, I hope that the Secretary of State and his colleagues will give serious consideration to the point I am making.
  I do not want to suggest that there is any question of a breach of faith, because the right hon. Gentleman was very forthcoming as far as he put his personal point of view. But as I said earlier—and I think the Chairman would agree with me, because it is in the Report—in a sense this was a package composed of three ideas. The Government have accepted two and have rejected the third. There-
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  fore we feel, especially at this late stage of the Bill, that we are not getting the treatment that we hoped to get for the basis of the Bill, embodying the main recommendations in the Select Committee's Report and what, we think, was a sine qua non of that part of the Report with which we are dealing. Therefore, I hope that before Report stage the right hon. Gentleman will give the most serious consideration to the suggestions that have been put from this side and let us end our deliberations on the Bill in that atmosphere of sweet reasonableness and agreement that has characterised our proceedings.
  Mr. Head: I feel very much, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman does, that we have now got to the last fence, and I would like to go over it on the same horse, or whatever the correct analogy is. The easy thing for me would be to say that I would consider the question on Report stage. I do not believe that would be right for me to do, for this reason.
  The first point is that I think hon. Members opposite are, and I understand it, a little suspicious about this. Let me put it this way. One of two things will happen in the next Parliament. We shall be either the Government or in opposition—I am not talking personally; I am talking about my party. For the purposes of this discussion, that is a reasonable assumption.
  If we on this side form the Government, we have and know—and I have expressed the fact—a method, namely the Select Committee and the Standing Order, which enables the Government within five years to deal with this as the Select Committee and the general discussion have shown is believed to be the best way. On the other hand, we might form the Opposition. If we are to form the Opposition, I would say that the Government of the time has equally the opportunity of safeguarding itself in exactly the same way. I cannot see that from our own purely party point of view we can be accused of running away from something.
  I do not think it has been said at all that this was recommended by the Select Committee for the consideration of the House; it was not an actual firm recommendation. It is quite new in an Act of such wide repercussions as the Army Act—it is a considerable departure from previous Parliamentary experience—to

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  put down a Standing Order which limits the period of discussion of legislation of that type to, say, one day in Committee and one day on Report. That is a considerable innovation and departure from any previous Parliamentary practice on Measures of legislation of the magnitude and width of the Army and Air Force Act.
  Mr. A. Henderson: Surely the right hon. Gentleman is not serious when he seeks to justify his attitude because of the fact that the Report of the Select Committee with regard to the Standing Order was only a recommendation to the House, for that applies to the whole of the Report and it applies to the Bill itself. Surely he will not differentiate on that basis.
  Mr. Head: I was not present at the deliberations of the Committee, but I believe that there was a good deal of discussion on this question and it was felt that there was a good deal in it and that it was a matter which should be looked into. I said on Second Reading, and I was quite frank and honest with hon. Members, that in principle we were in sympathy with and agreed with the objectives of the Committee and of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I also said quite clearly that it was a very difficult problem of machinery to make this safety catch. One does not want to go too far with hypothetical cases, but one can conceive conditions in which some fundamental alteration to the Army Act was made by the Government and the House of Commons would find itself, by Standing Order, in a position of being confined in its discussion to a very limited period of time.
  Mr. Wigg: I am sure that my hon. Friends had no intention of putting in the Bill a Standing Order and, of course, we understood on the earlier proceedings that the Government were still to make up their minds. The Secretary of State for War says that he feels that some of my hon. Friends are suspicious of the Government, but I think that he is being a little suspicious of us. We did all that we wanted to do to the Government in 1952, and this is the result. Now, quite honestly, and I am sure that I speak for my hon. Friends, having done that, all we want to do is to get this subject on a non-party basis.
  I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. and right hon.
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  Friends are quite aware of the concessions we made in the Select Committee. We were concerned with something fundamental in dealing with this suggestion. I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he would be kind enough to consult his hon. and right hon. Friends and the Prime Minister with a view to opening up discussions through the usual channels with my right hon. Friends to see whether an all-party solution can be found. If he did that, he would make everyone very happy and bring the proceedings to an end in the spirit in which we have tried to carry them out.
  Mr. Head: I am perfectly prepared to meet the hon. Member and any of his right hon. Friends. We could discuss something and I could see whether the Government could find a formula. It is very unusual to limit discussion to a period of days on what might be highly controversial in the way of what one could do to the Army Act. I do not speak in the slightest way with my tongue in my cheek when I say that I will discuss it further with the hon. Member and see whether something cannot be devised, but I should be less than honest if I did not say that I had discussed the matter in its present state and that we do not feel that this is a really satisfactory or practical solution. If we discussed the matter between now and the Report stage we might be able to think of something which would be acceptable, but beyond that I am not prepared to go.
  Mr. Wigg: I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, but this is much too hot for me to hold, though any contribution I could make I should be only too glad to make. Discussions should take place through the usual channels between the party leaders. The point at issue is one of a fundamental character, and there should be discussions between the senior members of the parties and not with "ragamuffins" like myself.
  Sir P. Spens: I want to emphasise first of all to the Committee that this was an agreed solution to a very difficult problem. There was a number of alternatives put in front of us, one of which was that we should have one permanent Act going on ad infinitum like an ordinary Act of Parliament to be amended from time to time, retaining one or two Clauses for an annual Army Act. We tried to find a solution to get away from the ordinary procedure

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  year after year of the ordinary Army Act. This proposal was the best solution we could find, and I hope that it will be possible to get an agreed solution to this very difficult problem.
  I would not be honest with my colleagues from the other side of the Committee if I did not say that they made very considerable concessions in order that we should get agreement to this solution, and I cannot believe that it is not possible to get an agreed solution on the lines suggested in our Report. I personally feel that far more important than machinery is to get rid of any idea in the country that we are making any substantial alterations to the protection of the liberties of our country. I hope that by this Clause we are in no way diminishing the safeguards which the country has always derived from the annual Army Act.
  It has puzzled me why constitutionalists have always thought that our liberties depended on the annual Army Act. It really was very largely a disciplinary Act which dealt with discipline, enlistment, billeting and all sorts of other things. It is perfectly true that if Parliament did not pass the annual Army Act the Army would be brought to a state of absolute chaos, but the fact that concerned us was the voting of the money and the voting of the men. Those two things, the fundamental basis of our safeguards, remain exactly the same. I think the country should realise that nothing we have done diminishes in any way the annual safeguards which come up year after year in the House.
  I want to say one other thing about this Clause. We did understand—and I hope everybody understands—that the affirmative Resolution coming up each year will be a second occasion for a full debate on general Army affairs. There is no question of running it, so to speak, with the ordinary Estimates. It will be something quite different and something which will give everyone a chance to bring forward any general points in connection with the Army and the way in which this Bill actually works out from year to year. It is important that that should be so. Subject to that, all I say is that I hope that we shall be able to conclude the proceedings—I have been a little anxious once or twice in Committee
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  —on this Bill in the same way as we were able to conclude them in the Select Committee.
  Mr. Head: May I say in reply to my right hon. and learned Friend that nobody is more anxious than I am, in so far as I am able, to emulate his example and his leadership in the Select Committee and end these proceedings on a harmonious note for the benefit of the very excellent Bill which he and his Committee have brought in and which the Government have accepted virtually in toto. I would ask the Committee also not to be suspicious of me or to think that I am being hot. I assure hon. Members that that is not a fact.
  10.15 p.m.
  Our purpose is identical, particularly so far as I, as a Service Minister, am concerned. What we all want is to keep the Bill up to date and not to have it a matter of controversy in the future. I have taken advice on the governmental side and on the legal side on what is, frankly, quite a problematical case. If hon. Gentlemen opposite were looking at it from this side, I believe they would have another look at it. The Standing Order is an innovation, as any hon. Member who has thought hard about it would agree.
  What I want to do and am absolutely prepared to say to the Committee is that I will initiate discussions with whichever hon. Gentleman opposite calls himself the ragamuffin—that is entirely for hon. Members opposite to decide—between now and the Report stage to see if we can reach some agreement which will be acceptable to both sides. Our objects are the same, but at the present stage of examination we do not feel, for the reasons which I have put forward, that the proposal will work. Nevertheless, I am prepared to discuss the matter.
  Mr. Bing: The right hon. Gentleman is being a little less than frank with the House.[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am trying to follow in the tradition of moderation set by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens). On the Motion of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the Report of the Select Committee was unanimously carried by the House. The right hon. Gentleman is now saying that the Government are unable to carry out the proposal.
  Mr. Head: I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman was present during that debate.
  Mr. Bing: I was.
  Mr. Head: Then perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not do me the courtesy of listening to my speech. It will be within the recollection of other hon. Members that I particularly stressed that on this matter—I termed it the "safety-catch"—I could not give any undertaking. I said that twice in my speech. It is unfair to say that I am being less than frank when it will be within the recollection of many hon. Members that I particularly stressed this matter.
  Mr. Bing: The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt excuse me. I did him the courtesy of listening to his speech; I merely lacked the intelligence to understand it, and it may well be that other of my hon. Friends were equally ill placed.
  It hardly lies in the mouth of the right hon. Gentleman to say that the House could not enact a Standing Order to limit discussion to one day when the Leader of the House has introduced and carried, with the approval of hon. Members on both sides of the House, a Standing Order limiting discussion on Prayers to an hour and a half. What is the difference between saying that important Statutory Orders should be limited to a discussion of an hour and a half and saying that the Report stage or the Committee stage of the Army Bill should be limited to one day? It is an artificial type of distinction to draw. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will bear these matters in mind.
  It really was not fair to the House to give the impression—it was certainly the impression left on my mind, and I did my best to understand the right hon. Gentleman's speech—that the Government accepted the Select Committee's Report for good or for ill and then for him at the last moment to draw back from what was one of the most controversial matters. This was one of the matters specifically referred to the Select Committee, and it was on this that we reached an arrangement and a compromise. We were told that the Select Committee's Report was accepted. The right hon. Gentleman has said some rather dubious things which were not clear to
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  some hon. Members and certainly not clear to me. He ought not now to be allowed to draw back from the arrangement that was made.
  I do not want to say anything more. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members opposite should remember that we have still 226 Clauses of the Air Force Bill to discuss. If it is their suggestion that we should depart from a bargain to carry this matter through as an agreed Measure, I have a great many comments that I was not able to make on the Clauses in the Select Committee which I should be only too pleased to make to the House of Commons as a whole. So I think that perhaps they might reserve themselves until a little later. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not only give a formal promise to reconsider the matter, but will appreciate that this is a fundamental matter and will for that reason meet the leaders of both parties to try to find an arrangement.
  Mr. M. Stewart: I think that the right hon. Gentleman will have realised that there is a good deal of feeling about this matter and will have realised from the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) that this question is not confined to this side of the Committee.
  There is a feeling that it is desirable as far as is humanly possible to treat this, as it was put, as a package and, if possible, to carry through all the recommendations of the Select Committee. Certainly this matter of the Standing Order is a very important part of the recommendations.
  Although I have been prepared to be as reasonable as possible, I am not convinced by the right hon. Gentleman's argument against having a Standing Order. The essence of his argument was that there was no use in having a Standing Order, because it could not bind a future Government, or future Parliament. If one admitted that argument, we would not make changes in our Standing Orders, because they could be reversed by a future Parliament or a future Government.
  We want a definite assertion that this Government and this Parliament are of the opinion that such a Standing Order ought to be in existence. This is not entirely a last ditch on the matter and, if

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  he wants to cross the remaining fences without difficulty, he will pay attention to what I am saying.
  He has gone so far as to say that he would be willing to enter into consultations with some my hon. and right hon. Friends. We want him to make a little clearer one other thing he said. In such consultations, would not only he himself but, for example, the Leader of the House be a party? Will he, in view of what has been said tonight on both sides of the Committee, make it clear to his colleagues in the Government that there is rather more feeling on this matter than perhaps he had imagined and that the conclusion to which the Government have apparently come, that a Standing Order is unnecessary, is one which they ought at least to be prepared to reconsider?
  We are entitled to ask him that. If he can give us an assurance on those lines, I believe that we can proceed in the spirit of harmony that we all want. But he has not persuaded us that it is undesirable or unnecessary to introduce such a Standing Order. In the light of what has been said, he ought to be prepared to represent the feeling of the Committee on that matter to his colleagues in the Government, so that they and we could try to reach an agreed solution.
  Mr. Wigg: As I understand it, the right hon. Gentleman was kind enough to offer to have consultations with myself and other of my hon. and right hon. Friends. Subsequently he was kind enough to say that he would do his best to initiate discussions at the level of the Leader of the House, the Leader of the Opposition and the senior members of both parties, to see if an agreed solution could be found.
  I think that that is as far as we can expect him to go. I am sorry if my hon. Friends think that I am deserting them on this point, but I think that the right hon. Gentleman has been gracious, if I may say so with respect, in going as far as that. I think that I understand some of his difficulties and if it is, as I understand it to be, his intention to initiate early discussions with senior members of the parties, I would ask my hon. Friends to accept that assurance.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  New Clause.—(DISCHARGE, OR DESIGNA TION FOR NON-COMBATANT DUTIES, ON GROUNDS OF CONSCIENCE AT TERMINATION OF BOY'S SERVICE.)
  (1) A person who enlisted when he was under the age of eighteen years for a term ending with the expiration of a period beginning with the day on which he attains that age may, within the period of three months beginning with that day, or, if he is then performing his service outside the United Kingdom, within the period of three months beginning with the date on which he next begins to per form his service within the United Kingdom, apply in the prescribed manner to a tribunal claiming—

  (a) that he conscientiously objects toper forming military service, or

  (b) that he conscientiously objects to performing combatant duties.

  (2) The tribunal, if satisfied upon an application duly made under this section that the applicant has established that he has such an objection as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of the last foregoing subsection, shall certify accordingly, specifying the claim which has been established.—[Mr. J. Hudson.]
  Brought up and read the First time.
  Mr. James Hudson: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
  I have waited throughout the long two days of these discussions, and kept out of other discussions in which I was interested, in order to have the opportunity of raising this matter, as I promised to do during the Second Reading debate.
  I understand that you, Sir Charles, would desire me to discuss this Clause together with the other Clauses on the Order Paper in my name, although I shall have to wait for some Ruling about which are in order. These Clauses are intended to carry out the will expressed in the resolution accepted by the Select Committee in theory, if not in practice. It agreed that there should be some such resolution as is worked out in these Clauses, and that it should be put before the House, but it thought that the matter could be better dealt with by being left to the War Office for an administrative decision on what should be done with conscientious objectors, or boys who become conscientious objectors during their life as soldiers.
  The Select Committee's report purported to provide machinery by which a soldier who had enlisted as a boy could, on reaching the age of 18, have the right to apply for a discharge on grounds of

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  conscientious objection. The argument put to the Committee, and which I understand the War Office still insist upon, is that such cases are so few that we need not trouble about them other than by giving the sort of promise which has been made about administrative action.
  The two cases referred to on Second Reading turned out to be cases in the Navy, although it is still an issue with us, because the Navy gave a promise to the Select Committee that they would deal with the matter in the same way as is promised by the Army. The fact that the Navy did not do so is an indication that what is done by a great Service Department cannot be left to vague promises about administrative action. If the War Office acts anything like as badly as the Navy, there is not much in the promise which has been made. One of the naval cases has been dealt with by an arrangement which compelled the parents to buy out a boy who found himself a conscientious objector at the age of 18. I consider that to be no way out of the difficulty at all.
  We now have the case of James Ellis; I have given his address and the facts regarding him. His case is still unsettled. He has been before his commanding officer, and there was some misunderstanding, because it was thought that the commanding officer had said something to him about appearing before a court-martial when he was 18. I have seen a letter from the commanding officer denying that he said any such thing, and I have also heard from the boy that his commanding officer did not say that to him. At no time has the boy made that accusation against the commanding officer.
  his boy had come to the conclusion that on conscientious grounds he ought not to be in the Army. I have here a letter from his mother which indicates the sort of difficulty that I believe will grow when these cases increase, as they are bound to do. The mother says that the boy
  "James"—
  she speaks of him in her letter as "James"—
  "has no father, and when he wanted to join the Army Apprentices School I had to face a very difficult decision—stick to what I knew was right, impose my will upon him and so possibly turn him away from me, or recognise his right to individual choice, stifle my con-
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  science and give my consent. Rightly or wrongly, I chose the latter course.
  Because of what was my own weakness I feel largely responsible for the situation in which my son now finds himself. He is not yet 17 and the thought that he may have to spend another 10 years as an unwilling soldier appalls me."
  Well, it appalls me, too, and I hope it appalls every hon. Member that it is possible for such a thing to happen. It may not happen if the War Office promise is carried out that this matter will be dealt with by administrative action. Whether administrative action would lead to the boy's discharge or to the granting of a hearing by a tribunal, I do not know.
  10.30 p.m.
  But my case, and the case made out by the Committee, as embodied in the suggested Clauses which I have put down, is that the War Office should not be left to decide this issue. The War Office is not an appropriate authority to decide it. In other respects, in connection with such matters, Parliament has decided that military men should be excluded when decisions are taken, as, for example, in the tribunals to which military representatives were once appointed by the War Office and in which, certainly in the First World War, they very much influenced the tribunals in the decisions which they took. The War Office representatives are now entirely eliminated and these questions are a matter for civilian decision.
  My Clauses seek to provide, by legislative action in the Army Act, that the young soldier who develops a conscientious objection shall not have his case dealt with by the War Office or the military but shall be given the same facilities as other men who, at 18 years of age, if they wish to appeal on grounds of conscience, can put their case to a tribunal. I should have thought that, with all the trouble it has experienced in the past about conscientious objection, the War Office more than anyone would have been glad to get out of its difficulties in that way.
  It is not as though the tribunals were at all slow and careless in the way in which they deal with the matter. That has never been so from the beginning of the use of tribunals. I have with me a book which was written by a distinguished Quaker, John William Graham, about what happened in tribunals and then what happened afterwards in the War Office about conscientious objectors

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  in the First World War. Unfortunately it it too late for me to read extracts from the book, but, in what he describes as a lamentable chapter, he tells of the disgraceful things which happened. Everybody now feels it on his conscience that they were disgraceful things. We do not want them to happen again. We do not want the War Office to have the trouble of having to make decisions which might make it possible for such things to happen again.
  In what way do I assume that there may be other cases for the War Office to deal with, such as the case I have mentioned? The boys who start their service at the age of 15 or 15½very often come from orphanages, and sometimes from approved schools; sometimes they have a genuine desire to get a musical education in an Army band with the hope, perhaps, of reaching the Kneller musical institute. That is certainly a very laudable ambition for musical boys. They hope to get into contact with music and find an opportunity in life, but they join before they have had a chance to consider all that may be involved and what they will have to do as soldiers. Later they discover. The drills in which they must take part, the things they hear, the preparations that are made, all bring home to them that soldiering means something more than the band or the other training they get in their special apprenticeship courses. They go through a turmoil of difficulty which leads them ultimately to the decision that, on conscientious grounds, they cannot continue their service.
  I appeal particularly to hon. Members of my own party to stand firmly by the boy's right, on his coming to such a decision to a proper presentation of his case before a proper tribunal. I appeal not only to my own colleagues but to hon. Members opposite. I have to admit that in the fight there was in this House to safeguard the right of appeal by conscientious objectors, perhaps the most brilliant speech of all came from a Conservative Member, Lord Hugh Cecil.
  He spoke of the conflict between the law of the land and the higher law, and said that when that higher law called on a man to make a decision that higher law should be paramount. He used the remarkable words that the duty of the Christian stood before even the duty of
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  an Englishman. That was Lord Hugh Cecil's view, and it was the view then of many Conservatives.
  I ask only that the right of appeal should be retained in the case of those who join at 15 and, as men of 18, make their decision as to continuance of their life in the Army. The cases would be few, but such a decision by this House would relieve the distress and anxiety of a large section of the public.
  I have received letters from members of the Society of Friends, and by the central body of that Society have approached me officially, begging that this matter should be dealt with by law. I received a letter yesterday from the Rev. Edward Rodgers, Secretary of the Department of Christian Citizenship of the Methodist Church. I shall not read it all, but he says:
  "Referring to the question of the provision of machinery by which enlisted boys could, on reaching the age of 18 have the right to apply for discharge on the grounds of conscientious objection, we should like you to !:now that you have our support in pressing this point. The numbers affected may be small indeed but the point of principle is a big one."
  The Committee would do well to take account of the earnest and sincere views of people in the Churches; the House would do well to maintain the provisions that have been made, which are such a credit to the House, in dealing with a difficult matter. I think that the War Office, if I can persuade the Committee now to back me up in the appeal which I make, would be thankful for having been saved from a very difficult and thankless task.
  It is a task which the War Office is not fitted to perform. It is outside the primary job of the War Office of organising an armed force for victory in war which seems to me to interfere with the views of men who subscribe to what they consider to be a higher law and who, in obedience to that law, find themselves compelled to take a line which the State cannot, by force, impose upon them.
  Mr. Head: I wonder if it might be for the convenience of the Committee if I say to the hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. J. Hudson) that I fully appreciate the sincerity of his views, and how strongly he holds them, on the matter of conscientious objection. This matter was considered by the Select Committee, and he must be aware, in view of the new

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  Clauses which he has tabled, of the machinery which is necessary to deal with these cases concerning boys. We have also been into the subject in the War Office, and again, I think that he knows that there is this single case; although, as he correctly states, I think, there were two cases in the Navy.
  What are the alternatives before me? I want at once to assure the hon. Member that we want to do the right thing by the conscientious objector, and I believe he will agree that the tribunals have given a fair deal to these objectors among the National Service men. We want to carry that attitude on through the whole structure of the Army; we do not want to be obstructive. We have had this one case which the hon. Gentleman has brought forward, but it is the only one we have had.
  As to the alternatives, I could, first, introduce into the Bill all these new proposed new Clauses, and that would entail quite complicated legislation which is contained only in the National Service Act at present, and I could also by doing so, disregard the advice of the Select Committee. Secondly, I could give a firm undertaking in the matter of administration when we get an isolated case in respect of one of these boys.
  Hon. Members opposite may feel that if a boy is a conscientious objector and puts his case forward within what might by some people be called the unsympathetic climate of the Army, such a boy would not get a square deal. If they hold that opinion, I cannot alter it. They may think that generals and members of the Army Council are most unsympathetic and unresponsive towards anybody who has a conscientious objection; but that is not true.
  I have thought over what I can do in this matter between introducing this quite enormous machinery into the Bill—and, I emphasise again, against the advice of the Select Committee—and that the Army and the generals should give a hearing to these boys, which the hon. Gentleman fears would be unsympathetic. It would not be, but that is what the hon. Gentleman says. So I give, here and now, the undertaking that whenever a boy puts forward a case such as the hon. Gentleman has in mind, that case shall go, not to the Army Council, but to a Minister on the Army Council. There will be
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  very few of them. I do not want to be critical of the generals, but that does provide for the case to come before a civilian. If the boy is not satisfied, constituents would be able to bring the case to the House of Commons, and the Minister personally would be responsible for the case and answerable to the House.
  Without the enormous paraphernalia of legislation, and without wanting to disregard the hon. Gentleman's understandable anxieties, that is, quite frankly, as far as I can go to meet him, and I very much hope that he will accept what is meant to be as good an alternative as I can give.
  10.45 p.m.
  Mr. Henry Usborne: I am sure that this side of the Committee will be delighted to have heard what the Secretary of State has just said, and there may be a great deal in it. This is the first time we have heard that idea and, speaking for myself, I do not think we can evaluate its importance immediately.
  I have often wondered, however, and particularly when the right hon. Gentleman was speaking, whether the Committee and he fully realise the depth of feeling that certain people have on this subject. It is essential that boys in the Services should, if they develop a conscientious objection before the age of 18, be treated in identically the same fashion as another man who is called up for National Service. It seems to me very important that the treatment should be the same.
  I am aware that if a Service man exercises his right, and the procedure as now described is adopted, ultimately his case reaches a civilian—in other words, the Minister. But quite obviously it has to go through the military machine, and there is always the sneaking feeling that it will be dealt with by a committee of colonels or that it will be dealt with in some way different from the conscientious objection of a brother of that man who had not been called up.
  At this late hour, I do not want to keep the Committee one minute longer than is necessary, but I do not think that the people in my constituency who have urged me so passionately to voice their feelings will be entirely satisfied with what we have heard. I think they will want us to press this matter, if we possi-

  699
  bly can, to the conclusion that the treatment should be on a basis of exact equality, whether the boy joined the Services at the age of 14 or whether he be called up for National Service at the age of 18. I do not want, without further thought, to press the matter immediately, but we ought to hear a little more about this proposal by the Secretary of State before we are able to make up our minds.
  Mr. Frederick Willey: From my own experience, I do not think that one could get more sympathetic treatment and consideration than one gets from the Services.
  Mr. Donald Chapman: Oh.
  Mr. Willey: That is my experience, and perhaps I may refer briefly to two cases.
  I remember a court-martial in which we considered for a long time what was the best step to take. Everyone was most sympathetic, and the court was embarrassed. I remember two cases in which administrative action was taken. Again, everyone in the Services was most sympathetic.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: What was the rank of the men?
  Mr. Willey: One was an officer, the other a ranker.
  The difficulty that I had was with the conscientious objector. In both cases, I think, the genuine, sincerely developed conscientious objection was recognised, but the conscientious objector did not wish to be released by a backstairs method from the obligation which he had undertaken. This difficulty can arise where a youngster goes into the Army and develops a strong conscientious objection. There is, then, a person who is in a peculiar difficulty.
  I can anticipate cases arising where the conscientious objector himself would not wish to take advantage of this machinery, and would wish his conscientious objection to be tested in the ordinary way, by a tribunal, like the case of anyone else. When it is a question of conscience we are entitled to legislate for individual cases, even though there be only a small number of them. I feel that such members of the Services as may develop a conscientious objection would prefer to
  700
  appear openly before a tribunal, express their conscience, and accept the decision of the tribunal, rather than have the matter settled by the administrative method.
  Mr. Chapman: We should not accept the Minister's kind offer to meet us half way. The real danger of these cases does not come in times of peace, and in times of settled conditions and unhurried activitity in the War Office. The great danger that will arise in the kind of cases which my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. J. Hudson) has been quoting will be in times when the country is near war or in war.
  I cannot believe that it will be the case when we have a period of great national emergency, or with a war actually having started, that we can be sure that an undertaking given by the Minister on the Floor of the Committee, and not contained in any specific Army code or in an Act of Parliament, will be understood and carried out amidst the strain, anxiety and difficulties of such a time. It would be at that time that the real test of the Minister's promise would come.
  We should not take the risk that, in those circumstances, the emergency would prevent a boy from having the kind of treatment which the Minister envisages. It is because of that period when the greatest test of the Minister's promise would come, and when the promise would be almost incapable of being fulfilled unless it was contained in an Act of Parliament, that we should press the new Clause on the Minister.
  The Minister gave his case away when we discussed Clause 226. His main case against my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) was that this Government could not bind their successors. How, therefore, can the Minister claim to tell us on this new Clause that he can now speak on behalf of all his successors in the War Office? The promise which the right hon. Gentleman is giving to the Committee would have to be honoured by a Minister who might replace him at any moment, and who might not care to honour it in a time of war, and when half a dozen Ministers might replace one another quite quickly. In view of what the right hon. Gentleman said earlier today about binding his successor, I do not know what his promise

  701
  amounts to. He cannot have it both ways. He cannot say, on Clause 226, that he cannot bind his successor and now claim on the new Clause that he can do so.
  I should like to see examined the possibility of these matters being dealt with by the Minister or the Army Council, followed by the possibility of a tribunal hearing the man's case if the Minister refused to accept his conscientious objection. When one is dealing with young lads of 18 it is probably much better for the Army administratively to say, "Perhaps it is best to accept this man's protestations and discharge him. He will not be a very useful soldier in these circumstances, and perhaps we can settle it quite quickly".
  If it is a good thing to keep in the Bill a provision that the Minister should deal with this matter, we must provide in the Bill power for the boy himself, on non-acceptance of his objection by the Minister, to appeal to a tribunal. I think that would satisfy my hon. Friend, and it would certainly satisfy me. I also think that it would go some way to meet the right hon. Gentleman's point of view, which is that it would be best for as many as possible of these cases to be settled amicably, by discharge, through the action of himself or the Army Council. I hope, first, that my hon. Friends will not give way—because it is not at times like this that the matter will be decided—and I hope the Minister will perhaps meet us by suggesting the kind of compromise which I have put forward, perhaps on the Report stage of the Bill.
  Mr. Simmons: I hope that my hon. Friends will appreciate the Minister's sincerity in making this offer tonight, even if we are compelled to say it does not go far enough. The very fact that we can have this quiet and considered debate on this subject is a tribute to the way in which the idea of recognising conscientious objection has made progress in this country.
  We are not discussing now the principle of conscientious objection. That is accepted, apparently, on both sides of the Committee. We are discussing the machinery for allowing conscientious objection to be upheld under certain circumstances. Already the man called up for National Service has the right to go before a tribunal to defend his conscientious objection to military service.
  702
  We are dealing with a very special class of persons, and the argument for not dealing with them in the same way as we are dealing with the National Service man is that there are not many of them. I do not think that is an argument at all. It is not a matter of how many wrongs are done, but whether a wrong is being done at all.
  If a boy of 18 finds, at the age of 18, having been enmeshed in the military machine from the time he was 15 or 15½, that the stirrings of conscience come, and he feels an uncontrollable desire to express his conscientious objection to further military service, we are not asking any concessions for him compared with a boy of 18 who is being called up for military service—we are asking only for the same rights. If he is to have the same rights, why can he not have the same machinery for those rights to be safeguarded?
  Mr. Usborne: On that point, it seems most important that such a boy should have the same rights, for this reason. It may be true, and quite probably is, that there are very rare instances of people in this particular category actually making an application as conscientious objectors, but the public is uncertain whether such statistics are reliable because they know how much more difficult it is for a boy already in uniform to take up that position. They therefore fear that there may be many in uniform who would have applied to a tribunal had they not already been in uniform.
  Mr. Simmons: The excuse of the Minister that it would be a waste of time and energy to superimpose this new Clause on the Army Bill, when it becomes an Act, just to deal with one or two cases, is all very well, but what is his alternative? If what my hon. Friend proposes is not the right machinery, the Government ought to tell us what the right machinery is. I am not here to do the thinking for the War Office, but I throw out a suggestion.
  It may be possible to incorporate a small Clause into the Army Bill during the Report stage, providing that, on attaining the age of 18, if a boy has conscientious objections to continuing military service he should have the right to use the machinery which is used by men called up for National Service. Some Amendment of that kind might easily be incorporated. We are not paid to do

  703
  the job of the War Office; the "brass hats" are paid enough as it is, and they might do their jobs properly; but I throw out that suggestion.
  11.0 p.m.
  Many of us feel very strongly on this matter. We feel that the fact that only three cases have been reported—two in the Navy and one in the Army—is no argument for doing nothing about the matter. We feel that my hon. Friend the Member for Yardley (Mr. Usborne) was right in saying that once these lads are within the military machine it is more difficult for them to find the courage to express their opinions. They feel enmeshed in the machine. But if they knew that they had the right to go, not to their commanding officer or the War Office, but to an outside and impartial tribunal, and have their case tried, many would find it an encouragement to self-expression.
  I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) that these conscientious objectors do not want somebody to do them a favour, or for some kind-hearted Minister to say, "Come on, my lad. Come into my room, sit in front of me at my table, and have a talk—and if you are a nice chap I shall agree that you are a conscientious objector." They do not want that; they want the right to go before a properly constituted tribunal, stand on their own feet and put their own cases. They want to be men. The fact that they are conscientious objectors does not mean that they are cowards. As a matter of fact, the majority have far more courage than a good many men in uniform—and I speak as one who was in uniform in the First World War and who went to a tribunal to defend my brother.
  Mr. Charles Doughty: I thought that the hon. Member was one of them.
  Mr. Simmons: If the hon. and learned Member has something to say, I will give way to him.
  Mr. Doughty: I thought that the hon. Member was one of them.
  Hon. Members: One of what?
  Mr. Doughty: The "conshies."
  Hon. Members: Oh.
  Mr. A. Henderson: On a point of order. Is it in order to refer to an hon. Member of the House—who, incidentally, was wounded and lost a leg in war, and has shown all the courage that is necessary—as a "conshie"?
  Mr. Doughty: I wish to express my regret. I mistook something that the hon. Member said. I understand that he has a very gallant record in the First World War. I wish to express my regret, and to withdraw my remark.
  Mr. Leslie Hale: The hon. and learned Member has not withdrawn the offensive remark he made when employing the words "conscientious objector" as a term of reproach.
  Mr. Doughty: I have withdrawn what I said. I cannot do more that that. I apologise to the hon. Member. I understand he has a most gallant record in the First World War. I said what I did because I mistook something he said, and because of that I wish to withdraw my remark.
  Mr. Simmons: I am sorry to have caused all this trouble, and I accept the hon. and learned Member's withdrawal. It only shows how careful one has to be when throwing sneers about.
  The fact that a man has served in Her Majesty's Forces does not make him unsympathetic to, or uncomprehending of, the courage of a different kind which was required especially in the First World War by those who took up the stand of conscientious objection. The note introduced from the other side of the Committee just now was the first of its kind to be introduced into this debate, I am glad to say. When we are discussing these matters of deep spiritual importance, matters which affect the innermost thoughts and feelings of our fellow human beings, we should all exert a greater amount of tolerance than that shown by the recent intervention.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North and I have received a summons from the Christian Citizenship Council of the Methodist Church to support the demand that the conscientious objector shall have the right to go before a tribunal. I appreciate the Minister's desire to meet us to some extent, and I appreciate the fact that the Minister is

  705
  appalled by the length of the new Clause, which is not the fault of my hon. Friend.
  When I was interrupted, I was about to say that during the First World War, when I served as a soldier, I went before a tribunal on behalf of one of my brothers. I was the eldest of a family of eight, having six brothers. One brother was a conscientious objector, while three of us served in the Forces. It made no difference to our comradeship as brothers, and I went before the tribunal on behalf of my brother who was a conscientious objector, although I was in uniform and was a wounded man.
  I have four sons. Two of them have served in Her Majesty's Forces and two of them have fought before tribunals and have been declared by tribunals to be genuine conscientious objectors. I am equally proud of the two who had the courage to go before tribunals and claim conscientious objection to war and the two who fought for their country in war.
  Let us show some tolerance in this matter. Let us ensure that young boys who are taken into the Forces at the early age of 15 or 15½shall be able to have every opportunity of expressing their convictions before an impartial court empowered to give an impartial judgment when they reach the age when they have a mind of their own, have had some experience, and can think more clearly for themselves, and have come to the conclusion that the step that they took originally was one which is to them morally wrong, and have a conscientious objection to carrying on with military service.
  Mr. Head: I wonder whether I can help the Committee at this stage. I was particularly struck by the fact, which has been raised, that a man might feel that if he had an unofficial discharge from the Army Council he was going out through a back door compared with other conscientious objectors going through the normal procedure of tribunal machinery, and might feel that he had not vindicated his bona fides.
  I speak without absolute certainty, although I am more or less certain, that if a boy in this position went before a Minister on the Army Council and it was agreed that he should go out, he would be called up by the Ministry of Labour and the normal tribunal procedure would apply.
  706
  If that were not the case, it could be perfectly easily arranged with the Ministry of Labour. There is no legal difficulty, because it is an administrative action and the boy would be in the age for call-up for National Service. I can give hon. Members an assurance on that point. If a boy had been acknowledged as a conscientious objector, and had been released by the Army Council, he would, in addition, go before a tribunal.
  It was also asked what was the good of administrative action and an assurance from the Secretary of State for War when a few minutes before I had said that one Government could not pledge another. That is abundantly true, but administrative action is quite different from legislation. If I give this assurance, as I have done, about cases of this kind—and this has very often happened to me in the War Office—my successors will be told that there had been an undertaking from a Secretary of State that such and such would be done. That is handed on to the successor. I cannot see a successor refusing to do it.
  It would be most unusual for him to refuse, and there is a very vigilant outfit round here. I should not care to be a Secretary of State who dared to refuse, and who found a Parliamentary Question on the Order Paper the following week to ask him why there had been this departure from his predecessor's undertaking.
  Mr. Chapman: Would the Secretary of State consider the position where there might be the stress of a great emergency, or an unsympathetic Minister? His assurance would then amount to nothing at all.
  Mr. Head: However unsympathetic Ministers are, they have considerable regard for the House of Commons, and I do not think that anybody who has had the experience of being a Minister will entirely dismiss a perfectly reasonable administrative arrangement made for perfectly good reasons. The hon. Member can have as many apprehensions as he likes, but I can assure him that administrative arrangements do not change whether there is war or peace.
  I am trying to find a solution and, at this late hour, to conclude the debate and try to meet hon. Members. I would remind hon. Members that this is a difficult problem, because to include this very considerable number of new Clauses would

  707
  make the Bill very cumbersome. I have given an undertaking and reinforced it by the statement that the boy would, when he is called up for National Service, go through the normal tribunal machinery.
  Mr. Willey: I am sure that the Secretary of State is trying to avoid a Division, as we all wish to do. Would he give an undertaking to meet, between now and the Report stage, my hon. Friends who are interested in this matter so that we can further discuss this matter and be satisfied that right of access to the tribunal will be strengthened as the right hon. Gentleman has indicated?
  Mr. J. Hudson: As I sense that the Committee is extremely anxious to come to a decision, and although I would be willing to go on in a conciliatory spirit—I am sure that we all appreciate what has been offered to us—I think that this subject is too big for the Secretary of State to settle in the way he intends.
  There have been two cases in the Navy. As soon as there was one case, another followed on the same ship when the first was known. As soon as it is known that the Secretary of State said tonight that there was some sort of machiney to deal with this question, there will be far more than one or two cases with which to deal. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would be well advised to accept the proposal we have made and put it into legislative effect.
  Mr. Fernyhough: Suppose the boy appeared before his commanding officer, or someone from the Army Council, and was not able to convince them? He would not then get his discharge and come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour. The position outlined by the Minister would not then obtain.
  Question put:—
  The Committee divided: Ayes 55, Noes 133.

  Division No. 36.]

  AYES

  [11.15 p.m

  Awbery, S. S.

  Hayman, F. H.

  Price J. T. (Westhoughton)

  Blackburn, F.

  Herbison, Mist M.

  Pryde, D. J.

  Blenkinsop, A.

  Holman, P.

  Rhodes, H.

  Blyton, W. R.

  Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

  Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

  Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Swingler, S. T.

  Burke, W. A.

  Jeger, Mrs. Lena

  Taylor, John (West Lothian)

  Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.)

  Johnson, James (Rugby)

  Thomson George (Dundee, E.)

  Callaghan, L. J.

  Jones, Frederick Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

  Thornton, E.

  Chapman, W. D.

  Lawson, G. M.

  Timmons, J.

  Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

  Lee, Frederick (Newton)

  Usborne, H. C.

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

  Wallace, H. w.

  Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

  Mitchison, G. R.

  Wilkins, W. A.

  Evans, Albert (Islington S.W.)

  Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

  Willey, F. T.

  Fienburgh, W.

  Nally, W.

  Willis, E. G.

  Finch, H. J.

  Oswald, T.

  Yates, V. F.

  Fletcher, Erlo (Islington, E.)

  Padley, W. E.

  Gibson, C. W.

  Parker, J.

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Hale, Leslie

  Peart, T. F.

  Hannan, W.

  Popplewell, E.

  Mr. James Hudson and Mr. Sin mons

  Hargreaves, A.

  Porter, G.

  NOES

  Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

  Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

  Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

  Alport, C. J. M.

  Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hn. H. F. C.

  Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

  Arbuthnot, John

  Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

  Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

  Armstrong, C. W.

  Crouch, R. F.

  Heath, Edward

  Barber, Anthony

  Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)

  Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythanshawe)

  Baxter, Sir Beverley

  Deedes, W. F.

  Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

  Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

  Doughty, C. J. A.

  Hirst, Geoffrey

  Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)

  Duthie, W. S.

  Holland-Martin, C. J.

  Bing, G. H. C.

  Errington, Sir Erie

  Hornsby-Smith, Mist M. P.

  Bishop, F. P.

  Fisher, Nigel

  Horobin, Sir Ian

  Boyle, Sir Edward

  Fletcher-Cooke, C.

  Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

  Braithwaite, Sir Gurney

  Ford, Mrs. Patricia

  Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

  Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

  Fort, R.

  Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

  Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)

  Garner-Evans, E. H.

  Hulbert, Wing Cmdr. N. J.

  Brooman-White, R. C.

  Glover, D.

  Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.

  Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

  Gower, H. R.

  Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

  Billiard, D. G.

  Greshant Cooke, R.

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Campbell, Sir David

  Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

  Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

  Cary, Sir Robert

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

  Clarke, Col. Sir Ralph(East Grinstead)

  Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.)

  Kaberry, D.

  Cole, Norman

  Harris, Reader (Heston)

  Kerby, Capt. H. B.

  Colegate, Sir Arthur

  Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

  Kerr, H. W.

  Leather, E. H. C.

  Nield, Basil (Chester)

  Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)

  Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

  Noble, Comdr A. H. P.

  Studholme, H. G.

  Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

  O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

  Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

  Linstead, Sir H. N.

  Ormsby-Core, Hon. W. D.

  Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

  Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

  Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

  Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

  Longden, Gilbert

  Page, R. G.

  Touche, Sir Gordon

  Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

  Peyton, J. W. W.

  Turner, H. F. L.

  Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

  Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

  McCallum, Major D.

  Powell, J. Enoch

  Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

  Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

  Raikes Sir Victor

  Walker-Smith, D. C.

  Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

  Redmayne, M.

  Wall, Major Patrick

  McLean, Neil (Inverness)

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

  MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

  Ridsdale, J. E.

  Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

  Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)

  Roberts Peter (Heeley)

  Webbe, Sir H. (L'nd'n & Westm'r)

  Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

  Robertson, Sir David

  Wellwood, W.

  Marlowe, A. A. H.

  Robertson, Sir David

  Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

  Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

  Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

  Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

  Medlicott, Sir Frank

  Roper, Sir Harold

  Wills, G.

  Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

  Russell, R. S.

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Morrison, John (Salisbury)

  Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.

  Woollam, John Victor

  Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

  Shepherd, William

  Neave, Airey

  Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbr'gh, W.)

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  NicholollS Harmar

  Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

  Sir Cedric Drewe and

  Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)

  Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (K'ns'gt'n, S.)

  Lieut.-Cmdr. Richard Thompson.

  Question put and agreed to.

  The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): With the leave of the Committee, I propose to put the seven Schedules together.
  Mr. Hale Mr. Hale rose—
  The Deputy-Chairman: If there is any objection, I will put them separately.
  Mr. Hale: I am not objecting to that; I am raising another point of order altogether. It is that the other new Clauses discussed by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. J. Hudson) have not been put.
  The Deputy-Chairman: They have not been put as they are out of order. The Question is—
  Mr. Hale: Further to that point of order. My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North, when he rose to move the new Clause, said that he had consulted the Chair and that he understood it was desired that it and the other new Clauses in his name should be discussed together, but that they could be put separately.
  The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Member is under a misapprehension. The hon. Member for Ealing, North rose to move the first new Clause, and that alone was put. The others were out of order.
  Schedules 1 to 7 agreed to.
  Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, to be considered upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 46.]

AIR FORCE BILL
Considered in Committee.
[Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris in the Chair]
Clauses 1 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24.—(Aiding the enemy.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
11.27 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Elwyn Jones: I desire to raise with the Undersecretary of State an important aspect of this Clause, namely, the words at the end of subsection 1 (c),
"or in any other manner whatsoever not authorised by international usage."
This is a very important Clause, dealing with the offence of aiding the enemy. This subsection reads:
"Any person subject to air-force law who with intent to assist the enemy—(c) having been made a prisoner of war, serves with or aids the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities or of measures calculated to influence morale, or in any other manner whatsoever not authorised by international usage."
It appeared from the Committee stage of the Army Bill that the reference in those concluding words is a reference to the various international conventions which entitle the holding Power to require a prisoner of war to perform certain duties and to render certain defined and limited services.
The words, as they stand in the subsection, are very vague and no guidance is given to the serving airman, or indeed to the Air Force officer, by the terms of the Bill as to what manner of aiding the

711
enemy is authorised by international usage so that he may be immune from any proceedings in his own courts for aiding the enemy and be immune from proceedings by the holding Power for disobedience of lawfully given orders by the holding Power. Numerous difficulties arise, and the principal difficulty is for the prisoner of war to know what he may lawfully do and what he may not lawfully do.
11.30 p.m.
The position concerning British airmen in international law appears at the moment to be dealt with by the 1929 Convention, but in 1949—nearly six years ago—there were agreed at Geneva four Conventions relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. They were the Prisoners of War Convention itself, and three others for the protection of war victims; that is to say, those concerned with the amelioration of the conditions of the sick and wounded of the Armed Forces in the field; the amelioration of the conditions of sick, wounded or shipwrecked members of the Armed Forces at sea, and the protection of civilians in time of war. Those are all very important Conventions, signed by the representatives of the British Government at the time. In many respects they protect the prisoner of war in a more substantial way than did the Convention of 1929.
I raised this matter with the Secretary of State for War in the debate on the Army Bill and received an undertaking that he would look into it. In the case of the Air Force, as in the case of the Army, there was the same difficulty, namely, that officers and airmen who happened to have the misfortune to be taken prisoner of war found it difficult to know precisely where they stood. The Manual of Military Law was silent on this subject, and although I do not know what the state of the Manual of Air Force Law is on the matter, I think it is equally silent. So far as the Army and the Air Force are concerned, there is a complete void as to the instructions and guidance the soldier and the airman may receive.
In the course of the evening I have received a letter from the Secretary of State for War, and I have his permission to quote from it. This is what he says:
712
"These Conventions have been ratified by forty-five countries, including some members of the Commonwealth"—
and including, if I may interpose, the Soviet Union, and approved, I understand, by the West German Government. For some reason which I quite fail to understand, the British Government have taken no steps to secure ratification of these important Conventions, nor, I regret to say, have the Government of the United States. When I say "have taken no steps" they have, at any rate, taken no Parliamentary steps to introduce the necessary legislation to secure ratification.
The letter goes on:
"All four of the Conventions involve some legislation before they could be made fully operative by the United Kingdom."
This letter goes on to remind me of an answer given by the then Minister of State on 2nd February, 1953,
"… when he stated that it was proposed to ratify the Conventions when the necessary legislation had been enacted…"
and also points out that on 16th December last the Home Secretary said
"… that it was not possible to say when legislation could be introduced."
The Secretary of State for War says today that he cannot add to those replies.
We are left in a state where there is no undertaking by the Government to bring in legislation to ratify these Conventions. I should have thought they would have been a far more admirable purpose for the legislative minds of the Government to be applied to than some other pieces of legislation with which the House has dealt in recent months—but that may be a purely partisan point which, perhaps, I should not have introduced into this non-controversial question.
The letter continues:
"… it will not be possible to bring the Army Bill into operation for some time after it is enacted. In the meantime, Part I of the Manual of Military Law, 1951, will be largely rewritten; a new and up-to-date Part III on the laws and usages of war will also be published."
The Secretary of State for War says that careful consideration will be given to those steps which may be necessary to acquaint soldiers of their liabilities if ever they become prisoners of war.
So, through inaction on the part of the Government, we are faced with this unsatisfactory position of legislating for the Royal Air Force and introducing into

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the most important part of it something which, if the airman goes wrong about it, may result in his being court-martialled for aiding the enemy; and that, I believe, is a capital offence. If I may say so, I think we are in a twilight stage; the twilight stage between the 1929 Convention and the ratification of the 1949 Convention, which, so far as the Korean hostilities were concerned, the Government announced it would consider as binding. I think that there were reciprocal agreements on the other side, but at least the Government tried to do something for the men in that way.
The Air Force Manual is silent about the matter. If this Air Force Bill acquires the force of law in the near future, what will be the position? Is the Royal Air Force to be directed that the governing Convention is the 1929 Convention, or is it to be told that the standards which apply are the standards in the 1949 Convention? Is it not desirable that that difficult situation be put beyond doubt, either in Clause 24, or in some provision in this Bill?
I should like to know what are the expectations of the Air Ministry about the publication of the new Air Force Manual, and we shall await with great interest the publication of the equivalent to Part Three of that Manual dealing with the laws and usages of war. Many of my hon. Friends on this side of the Committee have been anxiously awaiting the nature of the Government's declaration on the circumstances in which the dropping of hydrogen or atom weapons may be deemed to be lawful. That raises highly controversial issues of international law with regard to which the Air Force Manual will, presumably, make some declaration.
In all the circumstances, I have an uneasy feeling that if we let this Clause go through as it is we are leaving the Royal Air Force, by reason of the inaction of the Government in relation to this 1949 Convention, in a most unsatisfactory state. I think that the Secretary of State should have done better than send a letter saying that nothing could be done at the moment.
The Royal Air Force must face up to the urgency of this problem; because, first of all, it is the Royal Air Force that is particularly susceptible to regulations about conditions for prisoners of war by
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reason of possible flights over enemy territory. The Committee should demand some elucidation before we agree to this Clause.
The Under-Secretary of State for Air(Mr. George Ward): I am most grateful to the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. F. Elwyn Jones) for having raised this matter, but I am afraid that I was not in the Committee at the time that this was discussed during the Committee stage of the Army Bill. It is, therefore, the first time that I have been able to think about it, and he would not, therefore, expect me to give a hard and fast ruling on it tonight. I should like to know what guidance we propose to give the Royal Air Force through the medium of the Manual of Air Force Law, and I assure the hon. and learned Member that I will look into that point as soon as I can.
Mr. Leslie Hale: Really, the Committee cannot allow a provision involving the death sentence to pass merely with an observation by the Minister that he is not quite sure what it will be imposed for but that he will make a few inquiries about it and hopes that such instructions as are given will be capable of being understood by the people to whom they are to be given.
How are those instructions to be given? They are to be given in the Manual of Air Force Law, which, I take it, corresponds to the Manual of Military Law, with which I have had some familiarity. I do not know what happens nowadays, but in the days which I recall the private soldier who had got hold of a copy of the Manual of Military Law was regarded as a barrack-room lawyer and a man to be very much discouraged. But usually it was not possible for a private soldier to get the Manual of Military Law and find out what the law was; and, with respect to those men, a great many of them would not have understood it even if they had got it.
That is not a very unfair observation to level against all ranks in the Army when the Under-Secretary of State for Air says that he does not understand the Clause and is obliged for having his attention called to a Clause which has emerged from two years in Committee, and which prescribes the death sentence. The House of Commons is called upon very often at midnight to take decisions

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which it might be reluctant to take at 3 o'clock in the afternoon; but to allow a Clause of this kind to pass with that limited comment and observation just is not good enough.
My hon. and learned Friend has done a service to this Committee in raising this matter, and in raising it with his usual erudition. These observations were made by a number of us to some extent in the discussion on the corresponding Clause in the Army Bill. The Clause contains quite a number of dubieties. All of us are grateful to the people who served on the Select Committee, and we appreciate the difficulty of producing matters which are the result of compromise. All of us realise that the Clause is probably a considerable improvement on its predecessor. But, as I said before, once the Committee has reported, once the Bill is drafted, and once it is brought to the House, we cannot abrogate our responsibilities by saying that they were able men on the Select Committee, that they considered it at great length and came to the conclusions which they have reached, and that this is the best possible form of words and, it being such, we must accept the Clause.
Indeed, the Select Committee did not reach this form of words. It was done by the Parliamentary draftsmen. The Report, as I recollect it, does not contain these words in the sense that they are put—
Mr. Wigg: Yes, it does.
Mr. Hale: I am obliged; then I accept the correction. All that has happened is that I have to withdraw—I hope, with generosity, but with reluctance—what I said in exonerating Members of the Committee from the responsibility of drafting the Clause.
Let us look at the Clause to which my hon. and learned Friend has called attention:
"Any person subject to air-force law who with intent to assist the enemy".
I want to pause at that stage, because I am certain that when a fuller reply is made from the Government Front Bench, we shall be told that that controls everything, that those are the controlling words, and that it does not matter what a man does unless he does it with intent to assist the enemy. —
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The first thing to question is, what is the test? I never speak much about the law. I never knew much about it, and I have been so out of practice that I know less than I did. But, as I understand it, the test of intent is drawn from the facts before the tribunal. The court-martial has to say, "What is the logical view to be taken from the facts that are now before us? Does it appear that this was done with intent to assist the enemy?"
Let us take a simple case. I do not want to take extravagant cases. I quoted this in a slightly different connection on the Army Bill. Take the man who works on a farm. If he does work of any kind which is not provided for by the international Convention, he is doing work which assists the enemy. We had some controversy in the House over the detention of German prisoners of war on farms in this country after actual hostilities had ceased but while a state of war still technically existed.
11.45 p.m.
What is the position of a man who works, it may be not quite obviously voluntarily and not obviously compulsorily, in circumstances in which, when he comes to trial, it is quite impossible for any evidence to be available of the circumstances in which he worked? The Under-Secretary of State says he does not know. I am not saying that unkindly, for I do not know and I have spent a lifetime in the law. If the Undersecretary of State does not know, and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South does not know, how is the prisoner of war to know? I do not want to put my ignorance in the scale to affect the judgment of hon. Members.
I do not want to take any extreme instances, but in the international field today a man may have the greatest difficulty in knowing the enemy. A ship sailing through the Straits of Formosa today may be machine-gunned from the air, and a man does not know the enemy. He does not know who the Chinese are and which is the Chinese Government concerned.
In the last war, there were nations who were enemies in 1939. There were changes of front and of Governments in the Balkans. No one knows better than the Under-Secretary of State for War,

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who served in that area with such distinction, that there were times when no one knew who the enemy was. There was a whole variety of Governments contesting against one another. One might be a prisoner of the Russians, the Communists, the Yugoslav rebels, the Chetniks, and I know not what, all operating in the Balkans. I do not want to take extravagant points. I hope that someone will be able to decide who the enemy was when a prisoner's trial takes place, but the prisoner of war is entitled to know where he stands.
Clause 24 (1, c) states:
"having been made a prisoner of war, serves with or aids the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities or of measures calculated to influence morale,"—
Hon. Members should note the comma after "morale," which is an unusual feature at that stage—
"or in any other manner whatsoever not authorised by international usage, …"
I understand that comma to be intended to make a definite break in the reasoning at that stage. Therefore, we now have it that one of the offences on the part of any person subject to Air Force law is to do
"… with intent to assist the enemy…
anything
"… in any other manner whatsoever not authorised by international usage…"
Does it mean that or not? I submit that the comma makes it mean that
"… not authorised by international usage…"
does not control the whole Clause. It is said that there are three separate offences under the Clause. One can either serve or aid the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities, or serve or aid the enemy in measures calculated to influence morale, or in any other manner not authorised by international usage.
Anything to do with this subject which is covered by the Hague Convention is a matter in which the death penalty is involved. I was told on a previous occasion that I need not worry too much, that a man might not be shot at all but be imprisoned for life. But imprisonment for life is a rather heavy penalty to pay for acting not in a manner authorised by international usage, though it is fair to add that it must be in such a way that a court thinks that he intended to assist the enemy.
As I understand it, "intent to assist the enemy" does not imply some change of front. It does not necessarily import treason, in the sense of a man having thrown his lot with the enemy, and saying, "They are now the enemy and these are my people and I associate with them." The Clause speaks of the man acting in any manner calculated to assist the enemy. In other words, if he weakens, if he yields to solicitation to do something capable of being regarded as war work not authorised by Convention, if he yields to demands that he should work in the mines or on a farm, if it is not authorised by a Convention he commits an act for which the death sentence can be called for by a court-martial.
I suggest to the Under-Secretary that it would be bringing the House into disrepute if, merely because the time is late and because a similar Clause has been discussed and accepted—with considerable dubiety and only after a Division on part of it—the Committee let this matter go like this. To do so would really be abrogating our duties to the community, particularly to men being conscripted into the Forces, men who are not educated in the law, who are told at the age of 18 that they have to go into the Forces, to find out what is the law, to act in accordance with it, and accept the penal consequences of failing to act in accordance with it.
But the final conclusion is not only this. A man may be either a Beau Sabreur, or an Admirable Crichton, a man with all the virtues and knowledge of Benvenuto Cellini, Leonardo da Vinci, and all the rest. He is called up for service in the Air Force, and must, as the Manual of Air Force Law says, know what his duties are; he must know that he is liable to the death sentence if he acts in a manner not in accordance with the international usage. He knows all that, and has mastered it.
He has done more than the Undersecretary and I have done, and more than any Member of the House has done. He knows it all—and then, when he is taken prisoner, he suddenly finds out that the Hague Convention is in force. He has not a clue as to what is a Convention by reading the Manual of Air Force Law. He has got to master the Hague Convention and the International Convention of Geneva. He has got to know the Conven-

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tion of 1929, now in force, and the Convention of 1949, which might be in force quite soon.
Then, having done all that, having earned the applause of men and women and probably qualified for a job as editor of the "Titbits" advisory column on current problems, he must find out what nations have ratified the Convention, whether the enemy he is now fighting is bound by it, to what extent the Convention is reciprocal, and so on. It is rather a lot for a lad of 18, being called up for four shillings a day pay, to be put in such a dilemma. In these circumstances, I suggest that he ought to have a little more information, and the House ought to have more information before we discuss this matter.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: I only want to say that whatever is written into the Manual of Air Force Law should be written in simple language that the ordinary man, and not necessarily only lawyers, will understand. I think that the hon. Member for Old-ham, West (Mr. Hale) has made rather heavy weather of this matter, but then he is a lawyer and one would expect him to do that. I am speaking from my experience in the last war. The aircrew did not run into any great trouble because of the points which he has been making. They were adequately briefed before taking off to fly over enemy territory or even over their own territory.
I think that the young aircrew men who are going to fly over enemy territory ought to be told as little as possible. If they are to be bound up in a whole mass of law, and they get before an enemy lawyer, heaven help them. They will really be in trouble. The one idea of the young prisoner is to get out of the country again. Provided that he knows his unit, the type of aircraft and the equipment, and so on, there is very little that he ought to know. I recommend, as the Under-Secretary has said, that he should look into this matter, and he is right to do so. It needs very careful thought, and he should not be led away by the solicitors and barristers into a long rigmarole which will confuse everyone.
Mr. Geoffrey Bing: There is one question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) to which we should have an
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answer. He mentioned the case of a British ship sunk in the Sea of Formosa, and asked who would have provided the ammunition, the bombs, and the aircraft. We all know which Power would have provided them, but in a discussion of a non-party Measure of this sort it would be tactless to name that Power.
What we are really concerned with is the fact that the Committee—and I take my share of responsibility for this—included these words. They were not the words of the Parliamentary draftsmen, but of those who dared to differ from them and insisted on their going in. They were designed to protect our own prisoners of war—and those prisoners of war are placed in a very difficult position by the refusal of the Government to ratify these Conventions.
The Minister should tell us why the Government—and the Government of the United States, if the Government feel that they can speak for them in this regard—are unable to ratify the Conventions which other Powers have ratified. Otherwise we had better strike out those words. They were put in under the belief—and here I speak for myself—that we were going to ratify the Conventions, as other civilised Powers had done. I cannot understand why Her Majesty's Government have not seen fit to do so, and the House should be told the practical reasons why it has been impossible to do so.
Is it because of the situation in Malaya, or because these Conventions deal with the civil population, or something else? All sorts of suggestions are being put forward.
Mr. Hale: My hon. and learned Friend will also bear in mind the fact that in Korea Commonwealth units were serving with our troops. Some members of the Commonwealth have ratified the Conventions, so it may be possible for two prisoners of war, serving in the same regiment—certainly in the same corps—to be bound by different rules upon this point.
Mr. Bing: The Under-Secretary should explain what he means by
"not authorised by international usage."
We all approached this question on the basis that there existed certain international Conventions which would be ratified by all the Powers concerned. If it is the intention of the Government to ratify them immediately, the words have

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some sense; otherwise, what do they mean? Do they mean "not authorised by a Convention to which we have been a party but have refused to ratify"? Are we bound by a Convention which we have not ratified? Does the Minister say that British prisoners of war would be treated in a separate category, or excused, because Her Majesty's Government have not seen fit to ratify the Conventions while other Powers have done so? What do these words mean, in view of the apparent refusal of the Government to ratify the Conventions? That is a question to which we should have an answer from the Under-Secretary.
Mr. Eric Fletcher: I thought that we were going to have some further reply either from the Undersecretary or, preferably, from the Solicitor-General. With all respect to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) and my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who were members of the Committee which devoted so much time to this matter, and for whose efforts we are all very grateful, as my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) said, I do not think that that absolves any of us from doing our duty and analysing the details of the Clause, because it involves a matter of life and death. I do not agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) that we should be doing our duty if we dismissed this question lightly. We are entitled to know what the Clause means. Can the Solicitor-General explain, for the guidance of the Committee, his interpretation of the following words, in Clause 24?
"Any person subject to air-force law who with intent to assist the enemy…having been made a prisoner of war, serves with or aids the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities or of measures calculated to influence morale, or"—
these are the dubious words—
"in any other manner whatever not authorised by international usage… shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer death…"
12 midnight.
If those words mean anything, they mean that there are circumstances which prisoners of war may, in accordance with international usage, aid the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities. The words themselves mean that there are circumstances in which, under international
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usage, it is legitimate for prisoners of war to give their aid and assistance to the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities or of measures calculated to influence the morale of the enemy.
I should have thought that it was elementary common sense that it must be most difficult for the ordinary airman, taken as a prisoner of war, knowing that there are circumstances in which he can under international law legitimately aid the enemy and certain circumstances in which he cannot do so except at the risk of suffering the death penalty, to know where to draw the line and to appreciate where he stands. It is no use hon. Members opposite saying that this is a matter of mere law. It is a matter of the greatest concern to the airman.
I do not see how we can expect the ordinary airman to know where the line is drawn as between the circumstances in which international law permits him to aid the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities and the circumstances in which he may suffer the death penalty. Surely it is not good enough for us to pass legislation of this kind in such a vague and ambiguous form.
Only the other day we had a long discussion about the merits of capital punishment as applied to civilians, and large numbers of hon. Members wished to abolish it altogether, but unless we are careful we shall pass a Bill involving airmen in liability to capital punishment in circumstances in which none of us knows what the law is, and we do not even know the circumstances which will involve liability. It is not good enough.
The Under-Secretary said he was not present during the debate on the corresponding Clause in the Army Bill, but the debate was a week ago and he has had an opportunity to read it. It is not good enough for him to come here, knowing that this point was certain to be raised, and try to put the Committee off with the few glib words that he uttered. I appeal to the Solicitor-General to say something to satisfy my hon. Friends and myself, and to answer the points which have been raised.
The Solicitor-General (Sir Harry Hylton-Foster): I will endeavour to do what I can. The problem is not easy. We thought in the Select Committee that we were trying to legislate for a long

723
time. I suppose we all hope that in various international processes there will not only be ratification of the 1949 Convention, about which I am not qualified to speak at the moment—and I should probably be out of order if I did so—but, in future, other Conventions progressively bettering the lot of prisoners of war.
What the Committee has to do in these Bills is to find, if it can, a form of words sufficiently elastic so as not to require amendment of the Measure if there be some future reform to the advantage of the prisoner. We must find, if we can, an adjustable form of words to that extent. I would not, speaking with all humility, claim to have found the best form of words. I can say only that the Secretary of State for War and the Undersecretary of State for Air both gave an undertaking to see if they could hope to improve the form of words which we have adopted.
As the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) rightly says, they are words intended for the protection of the prisoner of war and are put there only in his interest. I would not dare to suggest to the Committee now—it is very difficult to do so—any other form of words which would better define the case and apply to the state of international law and international usage at the given moment when the words have to be applied. Necessarily some vague form of words has to be used to allow for future changes. That is the legislative difficulty of the form of words, and the Committee will agree that some form of words is necessary for the safety of the prisoner of war.
How does one put the position better for the aid of the airmen and the soldier than in the Manuals? It is said that he is not likely to read the Manuals, and nobody would blame him for that. But he is less likely to read a series of Geneva Conventions, because they are less accessible. Part HI of the Manual is not concocted by lawyers, but is subject to the consideration of the Law Officers of the Crown.
The current redrafting of Part III of the Manual of Military Law is at present under consideration and will represent the best we can give the soldier. No doubt the Manual of Air Force Law will follow
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in due course. That is subject to amendment, as we all have cause to know, because of horrid slips which somebody sticks in from time to time, as international usage changes.
The Secretary of State for War and the Under-Secretary of State for Air have given an undertaking to the Committee that they will do their utmost to find a better form of words, if one exists. We looked at the matter hard in the Select Committee, and found that it was difficult to discover a better form of words.
Mr. Hale: What about morale?
Mr. E. Fletcher: What would the Solicitor-General say is the verb which governs the phrase:
"… any other manner whatsoever not authorised by international usage…."
Surely the verb must be "serves" in "serves with or aids the enemy"?
The Solicitor-General: That is another matter at which we shall be glad to look. It did not occur to us in the Select Committee that it could be treated in the manner in which the hon. and learned Gentleman is treating it. I will gladly take the opportunity to look at it again.
Mr. Hale: "Influence on morale" is a most difficult phrase to interpret. We have had a great many decisions on that point in civil law in time of war. We passed Emergency Regulations dealing with the making of statements calculated to destroy the morale of the people, or assist the enemy, an offence; and a great many varied, remarkable, and regrettable decisions were made. If the Solicitor-General will refer to a very great book "Free speech in the United States" by Dr. Zecheriah Chafee, he will find a whole series of cases.
On this question of the influence on morale we have the celebrated case where someone who was knitting socks for soldiers was told "Those socks will probably never get to the soldiers." In these circumstances I should have thought it a little off-handed to say, "We will look at it and perhaps give an opportunity for it to be talked about on Report." We shall certainly talk about it on Report, unless some further undertaking is given.
Mr. Elwyn Jones: The observations of the Solicitor-General have a considerable amount of force behind them, in that he has stated that this is not an easy problem,

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and I am not pretending that it is. I sympathise with the difficulties of the draftsmen in this matter, but our duty as a Committee is not to make their task easier, but to protect those of our citizens affected by this legislation; and the generality of these words is much too wide in the case of a capital offence.
Look at what they say. In effect, any airman
"who with intent to assist the enemy…having been made a prisoner of war, serves with or aids the enemy in the prosecution of hostilities or of measures calculated to influence the morale, or in any other manner whatsoever…"
Look at the width and generality of that. I do not know whether it is for the prisoner to prove that it was authorised by international usage or not—perhaps not. Perhaps the burden remains on the prosecution to prove that it was not authorised by international usage.
But having defined the kind of service or assistance contemplated as constituting a capital offence in paragraph (c), in terms of aiding in the prosecution of hostilities or engaging in measures calculated to influence morale, having taken the trouble to specify those two particular matters, we then have this monstrous generality,
"or in any other manner whatsoever…"
It really will not do.
I hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite who seems a little impatient does not think that these are lawyer's quibbles. These things mean life or death to a soldier, and they may make a great difference to the position vis-a-vis his captor and what he can reasonably be commanded to do by his captor. Having had some experience of war crime trials after the war, I think that there may be certain repercussions in that field also; though heaven forbid that there should be any situation in the future which would give rise to that sort of matter coming before lawyers again.
These are not lawyer's quibbles. The matter is very important, and I feel that, whatever words are used, these will not do. The words used in the subsection in question are, "authorised by international usage". Does that go wider than these matters to which we have added the phrase, "as governed by international convention"? I am a little stale in my
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international law on this subject, and I am open to correction, but it seems to contemplate something rather wider than those commitments to which participation in international Conventions give a right.
Mr. Hale: International usage or abusage.
Mr. Elwyn Jones: My hon. Friend has developed a skill in using words in his own inimitable fashion.
If the phrase "international usage" is retained, does that bring in practices authorised by customary international law? In all our Governmental approaches to these matters we have always been a little reluctant to stick solely to the black and white letter of commitments into which we as a Government have entered by way of international convention. I think that there will be remarkable and interesting developments from the point of view of laws of warfare, particularly in regard to hydrogen and atom bombs, if we start getting involved in what is right and what is not in regard to customary international law. There is a strong section of thought which holds that customary international law clearly condemns the use of these weapons as manifestly illegal. Therefore, that phrase again gives rise to very serious difficulties.
I hope that I shall not be thought to be making clever points about this subject. These are matters of substance, and we really must have an undertaking from the Government that when we get to the Report stage we shall be given a full opportunity of considering the revised version which the Government have undertaken to provide for us after giving the matter what I am sure will be their most anxious consideration.
12.15 a.m.
Mr. Bing: I only wish to add one word, particularly in view of the conciliatory speech of the Solicitor-General on this matter. I think that we all appreciate the attitude with which the hon. and learned Gentleman approached the matter in the Select Committee and in this Chamber. The difficulty of those of us who inserted these words, however inadequate they may be, was that we imagined that we were safeguarding people by certain Conventions which would be ratified by the Government.
We should like to hear from the Solicitor-General whether the Govern-

727
ment propose to ratify the various Conventions which have been mentioned in the course of this debate, because, otherwise, we shall, so to speak, put our prisoners of war in a much worse position than the Service men of some other Power which may have ratified these Conventions and whom we take as prisoners.
This is really a ridiculous and absurd position. It is much better to say, "as ratified by other Powers," or to use some such phrase as that. If, in fact, we are not going to ratify these Conventions, or if it is the considered view of the Government that they are going to ratify eight or nine Conventions, then they should tell us, and we should reconsider the wording on that basis without going into the whole morality of whether or not we should ratify them. Is it or is it not the intention of the Government to ratify those conventions?
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 25 to 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64.—(SCANDALOUS CONDUCT OF OFFICER.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Bing: I do not propose to delay the Committee unduly on this Clause because we have already debated it in connection with the Army Bill, but I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will deal with this aspect of the matter. The Air Force is only too willing to copy exactly what the Army does. This is a responsibility of the Select Committee which, in fact, reproduced exactly the same Clause for the Air Force as it produced for the Army.
The arguments against this Clause were deployed on the Army Bill, but they are really stronger in the case of the Air Force. We ought not to part with the Clause without expressing the arguments against it. Take one which was expressed in the Select Committee. When we asked the witnesses to suggest any offence which an officer could commit and which could be dealt with under this Clause and not under any other, they suggested indecent correspondence.
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I understand that on an aircraft there is a device called "George" which enables the machine to fly automatically. Let us suppose that the captain of the aircraft is an N.C.O., and, as so often happens, the navigator is a commissioned officer. The automatic pilot being put into operation, they both sit down to write a letter, and, by chance, they write identical letters. Is it suggested that in such circumstances one would commit an offence and the other would not? How utterly nonsensical it is to suggest that in an aircraft of such an N.C.O. is in charge, one of his crew can commit an offence which makes him liable to be removed, but which, if committed by the captain, he being of non-commissioned rank, is not an offence, and that therefore there is no penalty.
The basis of the Clause is that there are certain offences which can be committed by somebody who is commissioned and cannot be committed by somebody who is not commissioned. In other words, the captain of an aircraft can go free while his subordinates can commit an offence for which they can be removed from the Air Force. This is nonsense and is snobbery run to its final degree.
Here is a chance for the Under-Secretary of State to say, "This may be the right thing in the Army, where they have years of tradition, where they have the Guards and all that, where we have to preserve tradition, but in this newer Service, the Air Force, we can get away from it and, as an experiment in this Service, we will drop the Clause and see whether the discipline of the Air Force is any worse in the absence of the Clause than the discipline of the Army, which has such a Clause."
Mr. Hale: My hon. and learned Friend was a member of the Committee. Would he say in how many ways one can behave scandalously which are becoming the character of an officer and gentleman?
Mr. Bing: My hon. Friend is taking a rather unfair advantage of me. I was a member of the Committee. I said—and it is clear from the Report—that this is a mistaken Clause; and some of my hon. Friends hoped that it would not be included. We had a difference of opinion on this Clause.
I am proposing a compromise—to put it in the Army Bill and leave it out of the

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Air Force Bill. That seems a very reasonable approach to the problem, and it is all the more reasonable because this will be the better Bill for its omission. We know that many people go into the Army—I hope I shall say nothing controversial—because they believe that there is certain social position attached to it, and possibly they feel a certain advantage in having a Clause like this. We had a very emotional speech in defence of it. I can understand the feelings of officers who have served for a long time in the Army, and who feel that this is a safeguard of the officer's position.
But in the R.A.F., where every day we see aircraft commanded by N.C.Os., it is ridiculous to include a Clause which penalises a member of the crew but does not catch the commander of the aircraft. Here is a compromise which the Undersecretary could accept—put the Clause in the Army Bill and leave it out of the Air Force Bill. After five years, when we have to review, we shall see whether a great number of offences have been committed by Air Force officers which would not have been committed had the Clause been in existence; and if a great number have been committed, we can put the Clause back.
We discussed such a suggestion on capital punishment. Why not try it on the subject of "an officer and a gentleman"? Why not try a moratorium for "an officer and a gentleman" in the Air Force for five years and see whether they cannot behave themselves—if I may put it in that way without offence—without the Clause? I am certain that the officers in the Air Force do not require this disciplinary measure to apply 1:0 them once they are commissioned.
There are sergeant-pilots and warrant officers in the Air Force holding responsibilities equal to those held by people who, because they do different jobs, are commissioned. I think it is a little insulting to the warrant officer in the R.A.F., who possibly occupies an even more responsible position than the warrant officer in the Army, that he should be treated in a different way from that in which the commissioned officer is treated.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will agree to drop the Clause from the Air Force Bill, if only from the point of view that the Air Force, which in connection with this Bill started on the same basis
730
as the Navy and not on the basis of the Army, should in this one respect at least be prepared to be different from the Army.
Mr. Ward: I am sorry to have to disappoint the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) but clearly, even if I felt it right, it would be impossible for me to accept the Amendment and to drop the Clause while it remains in the Army Bill. But I do not think it would be right to drop it. This quality is the most difficult thing in the world to put into words. It is intangible, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said. But I firmly believe that to leave the Clause in the Bill is a reminder that a certain standard of behaviour is still expected from an officer—a high standard of behaviour which commands the respect of his men.
Having established that high standard of conduct, his leadership will not be disputed; and when he and his men go into action, whether in the air or on the ground, they will feel that they are following a man who accepts a high standard of conduct below which he feels ashamed to fall. If he does fail we feel that he is not fit to hold the Queen's Commission. The dropping of this Clause would have an extremely bad effect on both Services. It serves as a reminder that officers are still expected to behave like gentlemen, and I hope that they always will.
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 65 to 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 74.—(POWER TO ARREST OFFENDERS.)
Mr. Elwyn Jones: I beg to move, in page 35, line 16, after "or" to insert "reasonably,"
I am happy to inform the Committee that a similar Amendment to a similar Clause in the Army Bill was accepted by the Government. I have reason to hope that the Air Force will show an equal determination to proclaim that when an airman goes into the Air Force he does not thereby become shorn of rights and liberties, and that he is as immune from arbitrary and unreasonable arrest as before he enters the Air Force.

731
Perhaps he has not the same rights as a gentleman so successfully asserted in the Queen's Bench Division this week in taking proceedings in the event of an arrest on unreasonable grounds, but at any rate the insertion of the traditional, the historic, word "reasonably" will proclaim to the man in the Air Force that the use and law of England does clothe him with as much protection as is possible, given the circumscribed conditions of life in a modern Service.
Mr. Ward: I am very happy to say that we regard the insertion of the word "reasonably" as reasonable, and we are delighted to accept the Amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 75 to 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 95.—(DISSOLUTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 48, line 3, to leave out "authority" and insert "officer."
The effect of the Amendment is to substitute "convening officer" for "convening authority." "Convening officer" is the expression used in Clause 95 of the Army Bill, it is used throughout both Bills, and also, in the interpretation Clause—Clause 143—in this Bill. "Convening officer" is the right description. Under Clause 86, only an officer—and not an authority, such as the Air Council—can convene a court-martial. I therefore ask the Committee to accept the Amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Further Amendment made: In page 48, line 6, leave out "authority" and insert "officer."—[Mr. Ward.]
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 96 to 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104.—(RULES AS TO EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE ADVOCATE.)
12.30 a.m.
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 53, line 31, at the end to add:
(3) In the last foregoing subsection references to questions of law include references to ques-
732
tions as to the joinder of charges and as to the trial of persons jointly or separately.
The Select Committee recommended a revised procedure where, if a question concerning the admissibility of evidence arises, or, on a joint trial, one of the accused applies for a separate trial, or if it is requested that one or more charges be heard separately, the Judge Advocate may ask the members of the court to withdraw in order to hear arguments about the point in their absence; and give a decision which is binding on the court. This, I think hon. Members will agree, is clearly in the best interests of justice, and Clause 104 is designed to give effect to this. But, on a strict construction, it might be argued that joint trials are not covered, because Clause 104 (2, b) refers to questions of law, and this Amendment seeks to make it clear that the Clause covers separate trials and the joinder of charges.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 105 to 110 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 111.—(CONFIRMING OFFICERS.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Elwyn Jones: A similar point to that with which we are here concerned arose on the Army Bill. Clause 111 states that the confirming officer is, in effect, the officer who convenes the court-martial; and this does seem to indicate a serious difficulty in the administration of justice both in the Army and in the Royal Air Force. It really means that the same officer is at once the officer authorising the prosecution, convening the court, and examining the proceedings of the court in order to consider whether the conviction shall be quashed or not; and secondly, to consider if there should be any variation in the sentence.
So, in one and the same officer, we have, to use a civilian analogy, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the trial judge, and the Court of Criminal Appeal all combined. That is a trinity of duties providing a multiplicity of responsibilities and of loyalties. Let us not forget that loyalty is prominent here. How is the officer to be loyal to each of his three tasks; to each of the expectations that

733
these three functions require him to sustain? The temptation as convening officer is for him to sustain a conviction; the inclination is great on appeal to see if something can be done to mitigate the conviction, and it really does put the one officer into a most difficult position.
The answer which was given on behalf of the Army to this complaint was that it might be very difficult administratively, or in the field, to find reasonably accessible another officer to act as second officer for confirmation. I must admit that I am not familiar with the structure of the Royal Air Force, and I do not know if that argument would be valid in its case, but if it is, I hope it is a really valid objection; for if this gesture could be made, it would be an important assurance of the complete fairness of proceedings by way of Air Force courts-martial.
We have in recent years had the benefit of the provision of appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal, and that is a very important change which has made this point, perhaps, not quite so important now as it was during the last war, when that privilege was not available. But as things stand I feel, with great respect to the distinguished colleagues of ours who were on the Select Committee, that it is a pity that the opportunity was not taken then to strike a blow in this way.
The difference between the Army and the Air Force structure of administering justice and the civil structure is considerable. In the civilian set-up there is the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, which is under the Attorney-General, quite a separate body from the judges and quite separate from the Court of Criminal Appeal. There is a tendency in the Army and in the Air Force for all these things to be mingled up in some perplexing manner all together.
The soldier, sailor, or airman—or officer, for that matter—who comes into the hands of this curious machine is not always reassured that there is the necessary division of function between prosecution, trial, and the processes of appeal which he is accustomed to find in civil proceedings—a division of functions which manifestly ensures that justice is done and which goes to maintain that confidence of the ordinary citizen in the administration of justice in this country which is such an admirable feature of our lives.
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I therefore ask that serious consideration should be given to this matter, and I hope that the Under-Secretary may be able to say that in this respect, at any rate, the Air Force will do better than the Army finds it is administratively able to do.
Mr. Ward: The first of the two points that arise is that there is a very real difficulty about units serving in out-of-the-way places or small detachments, where a good deal of delay would be caused if an officer of appropriate rank and standing had to be found when already the convening officer, of the right rank and standing, was present. Secondly, this procedure has been the practice ever since the Royal Air Force started in 1919, and there has never been any suggestion of abuse or cause of complaint. I really do not think that the point is a strong enough one to justify an alteration in the Bill.
Sir Patrick Spens: I should like to make these few remarks in view of the point taken by the hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones). In both the Army and the Air Force procedure, unlike the civil procedure, there is the procedure for review. The review can be made by any officer superior to the confirming authority; it can be done at his own option, and it must be done if a petition is presented. Then, there is the procedure for appeal. I think, therefore, that a man is very well protected against any possible bias one way or the other by the confirming authority.
Mr. Hale: Surely, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) has missed the point. As I understood it, the observations of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) were directed mainly to the question of the field general court-martial. If they were not, I would agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South, because in two Clauses later in the Bill we have procedure for review in the sense of provision for confirmation.
I see no objection to that at all. In that respect military law is much better than civil law. Normally in the Army the confirming officer would be the brigade commander, who would have no interest in the matter except to set up a tribunal to investigate something that

735
had happened in his command. The sentence would go from brigade to division, to corps, to Army headquarters and to the War Office. It would be open for each authority to confirm and magnificently open for each authority to reduce the sentence, or indeed set it aside. But now we are dealing with this unusual conception of a field general court-martial.
This is a classical example of a case where, because something is unusual, we should not dismiss it. If the law is carefully administered a field general court-martial occurs very rarely. Only in circumstances and under the authority of certain officers of a certain rank, authorised by Clause 84 of the Bill, can they be held. The authorised officer must certify that it is not reasonable or practicable to deal with the matter by the ordinary process of court-martial.
Then we get the difficulty that, because that same officer set up the field general court-martial, there is no possibility of the matter being reconsidered above if an irrevocable sentence has been imposed. The field general court-martial has been held precisely because the military conditions are difficult and the situation of the unit so remote, and because of those same conditions there is no confirming officer available. I sincerely hope I am wrong, but I have not found anything in the Bill which suggests otherwise.
If this is so, we have an officer in a lonely spot who sets up a court-martial. He determines its constitution and can sit on it with other officers, and can then confirm the sentence when, because of the difficult military situation, there is no prospect of a review. If that be so, and I hope that I am wrong, clearly this is a matter for a little more consideration. It is, of course, difficult. The situation of a lonely unit is inevitably difficult and the necessity of taking urgent action may unfortunately be all the more urgent on that account.
Sir P. Spens: I think the sentence that would worry the hon. Member would be a sentence of death, and, if a sentence of death is confirmed by an officer below the rank of air vice-marshal, it
"… shall not be carried into effect unless approved by an officer not below the rank of air vice-marshal or by a naval or military
736
officer of corresponding rank, being a naval or military officer commanding the command in which the person under sentence was serving at the date of the sentence."
Mr. Hale: I am much obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I did not say that the only sentences that worried me were sentences of death, but I did speak of the carrying out of irrevocable sentences as a matter which loomed large in my mind. The reviewing and confirmation of sentence is a matter of great importance.
I should like to ask the Minister what happens when a sentence is passed by a field general court-martial and it is confirmed and then the situation is altered when the unit concerned comes into contact with headquarters again. Does the Bill provide for reconsideration automatically in those circumstances? I know that the Minister will say that there is always an inherent power in the Ministry to reconsider any sentence from time to time, but is there automatic power to consider it once the opportunity comes and the forces are reassembled?
Mr. Ward: As I understand it, it may do at any time by review. I do not want to be too dogmatic about it, but I would interpret those words as meaning when the unit came back into headquarters.
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 112 to 130 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 131.—(TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENCES UNDER THIS ACT NOTWITH STANDING OFFENDER CEASING TO BE SUBJECT TO AIR-FORCE LAW.)
12.45 a.m.
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 69, line 38, after "air-force" to insert "or military."
An airman can be confined in a military establishment—either a military prison or detention barracks—in the same way that a soldier can be held in an Air Force establishment. The Amendment will enable the Clause to operate whether the airman is in confinement in an Air Force establishment or whether, because it is more convenient, he is confined in a military establishment.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 132 to 142 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 143.—(INTERPRETATION OF PART II.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 78, line 21, at the end, to insert:
"and includes his successor or any person for the time being exercising his or his successor's functions."
A convening officer, besides convening a court-martial, may perform other duties up to the date of confirmation of the proceedings. For example, he may adjourn the court, or may appoint a new president, and this Amendment, by widening the definition of the convening officer, enables these other functions to be performed although the officer himself may not be available because of his death or some other cause.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 144 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 145.—(FORFEITURE OF PAY FOR ABSENCE FROM DUTY.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 80, line 3, to leave out from "court" to "or" in line 4.
This Clause provides for the forfeiture of pay during the time an officer or airman is imprisoned under sentence of a civil court in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions. The Amendment: takes out the words "in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions "because it is being added to the definition of the civil court by a later Amendment to Clause 223.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 146 and 147 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 148.—(DEDUCTIONS FOR BARRACK DAMAGE.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Bing: I shall detain the Committee for only an instant on this Clause which, in the Select Committee, I
738
passed with rather a heavy heart. My feelings about it have been a little increased by the experience in my own constituency, where I have an aerodrome, though the people who live there are not residents because they are never there long enough to register for a vote. But I have certain Parliamentary responsibility for them, and this is the Clause which deals with barrack room damages. This is a matter which I think ought to have been raised on the Army Act.
Hon. Members: It was.
Mr. Bing: I am sorry I was not here on that occasion, because as far as my constituency is concerned, it is particularly an Air Force matter. I have Horn-church Aerodrome, which, having been one of the more distinguished aerodromes during both world wars, has now ceased to be operational and is now largely a base for people passing through. I am seeking from the Under-Secretary some undertaking that the regulations regarding barrack room damages will be very strictly interpreted, because there is nothing worse than people who are there for a short time being made to pay for other people's damages. Nothing encourages people to make more damage than the knowledge that they will be going out very soon and that somebody else will be left to pay for that damage. The unsatisfactory feature of the matter is that from time to time the garrison engineer or somebody else can just assess the damage and charge it to the people who happen to be there at the time.
I apologise to the Committee for not having been here when the matter was discussed in regard to the Army Bill, but I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to give us some undertaking in this matter. Certainly in my own constituency there is a feeling that some people are being unjustly charged for damage done by other people. I hope that the Undersecretary can give an undertaking that there will be a strict regard for the way in which barrack room damage is charged up.
Mr. Ward: If we know who the culprit is who caused the damage he has to pay. The difficulty arises when we do not know who did it. Then, if that damage was paid for from public funds, it would immediately lead to a very large increase in damage. The only way is

739
to charge everybody who occupied that barrack. The question of people coming and going is a much more difficult one, because, clearly, we cannot add up damage and charge the men every few days. I can give the hon. and learned Gentleman the assurance that, as far as humanly possible, we will handle this matter in the fairest way we can.
Mr. Bing: The Under-Secretary says that there is a certain responsibility upon everybody in the barrack—but that is the responsibility of officers as well as men. It is so easy to pass it off—especially in transit barracks—and allow all sorts of damage to take place, feeling that it does not matter; that it will not fall upon public funds; that there will not be any fuss about it; that every three months the barrack damage will be totted up and charged against the people who happen to be there at the moment.
The ordinary man cannot say, "It was not me who made this hole in the floor." I know from my experience in the war how unfairly this can react. It bears out various complaints which I have had in my constituency, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will look very strictly into the matter and ask the Air Council or somebody else to make a few examinations of the amounts charged up for barrack room damage. If we can have a few spot checks by the Ministry, and the amounts charged by one establishment compared with those charged by another, I shall be quite content.
Mr. Ward: If the hon. and learned Gentleman comes across cases which he regards as unfair, I hope that he will let me know.
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 149 to 204 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 205.—(PERSONS SUBJECT TO AIR- FORCE LAW: GENERAL PROVISIONS.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 110, line 8, at the end, to add:
(4) References in this section to an officer holding a commission include references to a person entitled to have a commission issued to him.
740
This Clause specifies various categories of officer holding air force commissions who are subject to air force law, such as serving officers and officers of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. The purpose of the Amendment is to show from what moment of time an officer can be said to be holding an air force commission. The practice is to notify an officer by letter of the date from which he will be granted a commission, and the "London Gazette" eventually announces the grant to him of the commission and the date from which it takes effect. It is from this date that he can be said to be holding a commission within the meaning of the Amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 206 to 209 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 210.—(APPLICATION OF ACT TO RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 113, line 13, to leave out "(5) and (6)"and insert "and (4)."
This is a drafting Amendment due to a mistake in printing. The reference to Subsections (5) and (6) was a mistake caused by copying this from the Army Bill. In this Bill the reference should be to Subsections (1) and (4).
Amendment agreed to.
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 113, line 16, after "to" to insert "warrant."
This is another drafting Amendment. The existing reference to "officers" is a mistake for "warrant officers," which is evident from the context. The Amendment corrects this.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 211 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 212.—(APPLICATION TO SCOTLAND.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 114, line 46, to leave out from "a" to "county" in line 3 on page 115.
Clause 212 (2) provides for the application to Scotland of the references in the

741
Bill to a county court. I am advised that this object can be achieved more clearly and accurately by the deletion of the words proposed to be left out. The Army Bill was amended in this way, but, by an oversight, the same correction was not made to this Bill.
Amendment agreed to.
Further Amendment made: In page 115, line 4, leave out from "sheriff" to end of line.—[Mr. Ward.]
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 213 to 215 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 216.—(PROVISIONS AS TO FEDERATION OF MALAYA.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Elwyn Jones: Why is it necessary to make special reference to the Federation of Malaya? There may be a special reason. I am curious to know why it is. Perhaps it is late in the night to be merely curious.
Mr. Ward: I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will forgive me if I do not answer him now. There are air forces there. I will find out more about it and let him know the reason.
Clause ordered to stand part of the BUI.
Clauses 217 to 222 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 223.—(GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO INTERPRETATION.)
Mr. Ward: I beg to move, in page 121, line 10, at the end, to insert:
"but does not, except where otherwise expressly provided, include any such court outside Her Majesty's dominions."
The object of the Amendment is to make it clear that, except where otherwise provided, the expression "civil court" includes only a court within Her Majesty's Dominions.
Amendment agreed to.
Motion made, and Question proposed. That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
1.0 a.m.
Mr. Wigg: The Under-Secretary will have heard the discussion which took place on Clause 226 of the Army Bill, and I want to raise the same points with him. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was kind enough to give us an assurance that he would join in conversations with the senior members of the Opposition and that the Leader of the House would join with him in those conversations. I should be much obliged if he would give the Committee a similar assurance, and perhaps I may add one point more.
The Chairman: Is the hon. Member speaking on Clause 223 or 224?
Mr. Wigg: Clause 224.
The Chairman: I will first put Clause 223.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 224.—(SHORT TITLE, COMMENCEMENT AND DURATION.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Wigg: I beg your pardon, Sir Charles. I will start all over again.
The hon. Gentleman will have heard the discussion which took place on the Army Bill, and I should be much obliged if he would be kind enough to assure the Committee that he associates himself with the assurance given by the Secretary of State for War, namely, that conversations will be opened with the senior members of the Opposition and with the Leader of the House with a view to seeing whether a compromise can be reached which would be agreeable to both parties, which would accept the provisions of Clause 224 and go a little further and accept the unanimous recommendation of the Select Committee.
If I may trespass a little further on your kindness, Sir Charles, earlier I made a plea to the Under-Secretary of State for War that, when the Manual of Military Law came to be written, he would see whether he could arrange for some professional historian or learned gentleman to be asked to write some of the earlier chapters so that young officers who have to study

743
the Manual could do so with some degree of pleasure while still discharging their duty. Would the hon. Gentleman be kind enough to make similar inquiries?
Mr. Ward: I willingly give the hon. and gallant Gentleman my assurance that I will associate myself with the assurance given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War about the discussions. Quite clearly anything that is decided about the Army Bill must also be applied to the Air Force Bill.
On the second point, I will also ask my right hon. Friend, who I know has this matter under consideration for the Army Manual, what progress he has been able to make. I will take full advantage of his experience in that matter.
Mr. Wigg: I am much obliged.
Mr. Bing: Those of us who are lawyers think that these Manuals are the best textbooks that exist, and both the Army and the Air Force are to be congratulated, in my humble view. I hope that the tradition will be maintained. They give the clearest and best expositions of the law, and it would be a pity if the Select Committee did not pay tribute to some of its predecessors who wrote these excellent Manuals.
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 1 to 6 agreed to.
Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, to be considered upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 47.]

REVISION OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE ACTS (TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS) BILL
Considered in Committee.
[Sir Charles MacAndrew in the Chair]
1.5 a.m.

Clause 1.—(INTERIM CONTINUATION OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE ACTS.)
Mr. Michael Stewart: I beg to move, in page 1, line 6, to leave out "appointed day" and to insert:
"end of the year 1956."
744
My right hon. and hon. Friends and myself would like to move our Amendment in this form instead of the form in which it appears on the Order Paper. Since our Amendment appeared on the Order Paper the Secretary of State for War has been good enough to acquaint me with the views of the Government, and we were happy to find that there was no difference of substance or principle between the Government and ourselves. The Amendment now proposed would achieve the desired result in the most convenient way. It is a point of considerable constitutional importance, and I hope that even at this late hour the Committee will bear with me for a few minutes.
Our reason for putting down an Amendment at all was because, were this Bill carried without an Amendment, we should have a legal position in which the Army and Air Force Acts continued until the appointed day, and the naming of the appointed day would be entirely within the discretion of the Government. Parliament would have let go its hold on the Army and Air Force Acts, because it would have been entirely within the discretion of the Government as to how long, not the Bill we are passing now, but the old Army and Air Force Acts, remained in force. It seemed to us undesirable that that position should arise.
Mention was made earlier of the fact that the annual control over the Army is not the only nor, perhaps, the main safeguard that the House has over the Executive. But it is a safeguard of some importance, and at any rate it would be a bad precedent were the House to throw over a safeguard of that kind quite casually as if the act of throwing it over were a matter of no importance. We felt, therefore, that it was important to have in this Bill a specific date beyond which the Army and Air Force Acts could not remain in force.
The problem arises as to what that date should be. At first we were inclined to think that it should be 31st July, 1956. But we are aware that before these new Bills can come into force and before the present Acts can be allowed to expire, a great deal of printing and indeed of instruction must be done; and it would have been unreasonable to press the Government for too early a date. I understand that a date at the end of

745
1956 is the date at which the Government feel it would be reasonably possible that the new Acts could be brought into force.
One other point remains. There is always the possibility of some completely unexpected difficulty arising, some breakdown in the operation of the printing trade, which would oblige the Government to say that it was simply impossible for them to bring in the new Acts by that date. We accept that, provided that, if the Government want a date later than the end of 1956, they are prepared to come to the House and ask for it. One result of putting the Amendment in this form is that, should it be necessary, the Government can ask for such permission in a comparatively intelligible Parliamentary form.
An Amendment in this form achieves the preservation of the important constitutional principle that the House ought never to give to the Government of the day complete control over how long the Army and Air Force Acts should remain in force. At the same time we take account of the practical difficulties and possible causes of delay before the new Army and Air Force Acts can come into operation. For these reasons, I hope that the Amendment will be accepted by the Committee.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I am obliged to the hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) for moving this Amendment. There is nothing between us on this. There was no intention, so to speak, to leave the future date of renewal of the Army Act wide open. It was, as I explained to the hon. Gentleman, merely a question of the time for printing and so forth. I am perfectly satisfied to accept this Amendment, and I am also obliged to the hon. Gentleman for what he said about the possibility, which I hope will not occur, of difficulty over printing. It is our object not to leave the period open, and I therefore accept the Amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 2 to 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 1 to 3 agreed to.

Fourth Schedule.—(ENACTMENTS (OTHER THAN ANNUAL ACTS) REPEALED.)
Mr. Head: I beg to move, in page 22, line 33, column 3, after "twelve" to insert:
"in the First Schedule, Part II".
This is a very simple Amendment. The point is that we omitted the words "Part II" and we want to put them in. I think it is self-explanatory.
Amendment agreed to.
Further Amendment made: In page 23, line 44, column 3, leave out "subsection (7)"and insert "subsections (5) and (7)".—[Mr. Head.]
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, to be considered upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 48.]

DISABLED EX-SERVICE MAN (MOTOR CAR)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. R. Allan.]
1.13 a.m.
Sir David Robertson: I desire to discuss a different kind of military matter from those which we have been discussing today and on previous days. This is about a fighting soldier, John Kennedy McLeod, who is a constituent of mine and a crofter in Strathnaver. He volunteered for service in the First World War with the 5th Sea-forth Highlanders, Caithness and Sutherland Regiment, and on the first day of the Battle of Arras, on 9th April, 1917, he sustained multiple wounds.
After months in hospital, he was discharged with a 100 per cent. disablement pension, minus his right leg, his right arm, with his left shoulder joint destroyed, and with an entire bullet still in the root of his neck close to the spine. He was then 22 years of age. He is now 60 and his general health has deteriorated. Osteoarthritis of the spine has occurred. He has become totally blind in one eye. He is unable to use crutches because the right arm is amputated an inch or two below the shoulder, so that there is no shoulder there to hold a crutch, and the other shoulder, of course, is destroyed owing to an immovable joint and other injuries.

747
He is able to hobble about on one stick for very short distances.
Before the disabled car scheme came into being, he was granted a motor-tricycle. When he was learning to drive it, in order to undergo his driving test, the machine got out of control and he was thrown out on to the kerb and sustained very bad injuries. He attributes the loss of his eye to that accident, but the Ministry of Pensions takes a contrary view. It attributes the eye trouble to glaucoma.
When the car scheme for the disabled came out in 1948 he immediately applied, and I think I had better read his letter because it sets out exactly what occurred:
"Being unable to use the tricycle any more, I applied for one of the motor cars supplied to 100 per cent. disabled limbless soldiers, when these were first issued. The Ministry of Pensions made an excuse then that the cars were in very short supply. This I accepted at the time. I have repeated my application several times since then and I have been turned down every time. Their excuse was that the cars were supplied only to men with amputations one below and one above the knee or with paraplegia."
Here are letters which he received from the Department at St. Andrew's House. The first is dated 3rd August, 1954, and I must quote from it because it is a very important letter. It sets out the basis, which runs right through this case, of the reasons for which this man is unable to get one of these cars, which I maintain were designed for men like him.
"With reference to your application for the supply of a motor car, I wish to explain that the number of cars available is strictly limited and a car can only be supplied to war pensioners accepted as being within one of the following categories of disablement: (a) double leg amputation with one or both above the knee; (b) paraplegia causing total or almost total loss of the use of both legs; (c)"
—and this is the material category, I believe, to this case—
"other severe disablements directly affecting the legs to such an extent as to cause total or almost total loss of the use of the legs. As you do not come within any of these categories, I am very sorry to have to tell you that we are unable to supply you with a motor car."
It is signed by "R. Ewing."
Here is another letter, of 14th September, 1954, written in reply to a letter which my constituent addressed to St. Andrew's House on 1st September:
748
"While it is agreed that your disabilities are severe, we can consider only those disabilities which have been accepted by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance as a direct result of your war service. In view of this I am directed to inform you that you do not qualify in any of the three categories for a motor car."
At that stage, John Kennedy McLeod, my constituent, referred the case to me. I took it up immediately with my right hon. and gallant Friend the Joint Undersecretary of State for Scotland, and he immediately agreed that the case required further consideration. He set about having that carried out, but I was very disappointed to receive a letter from him dated 21st December wherein he said:
"In view of Mr. McLeod's serious disabilities, I have given his application most serious consideration. He has been medically examined again at my request. I am informed that while he naturally cannot walk a long distance, he still has full movement of the hip and knee of both legs, and the artificial limbon his right leg fits satisfactorily. Examinations by different doctors over several years do not suggest that his condition is getting worse. There is no evidence that his eye condition, chronic glaucoma, was due to either war service or to the accident which he had with the tricycle given to him on trial, and he was so informed by the Ministry of Pensions in 1950. While I have the greatest sympathy for Mr. McLeod, I feel that I must continue to keep the very few cars that are available for ex-Service men who have lost both legs (one or both above the knee) or otherwise have a total, or almost total, loss of the use of both legs. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more helpful reply."
I will come back to that letter in a moment or two. I was, of course, dissatisfied with that reply and I asked my Friend, Mr. Ian MacPherson, who is one of Scotland's greatest surgeons and is consultant at the Victoria Infirmary, Glasgow, to have Mr. McLeod examined. I felt that I had to bring in an independent man of the highest standing, and Mr. MacPherson kindly took Mr. McLeod to the Victoria Infirmary, Glasgow, and made a thorough examination of him. I will read a summary of his report:
"This man is in excellent spirit despite his gross disability. He has lost the right leg and the right arm, for which suitable artificial limbs have been supplied and which are quite satisfactory. He has lost all movement at the left shoulder joint. A bullet is still present at the base of his neck and arthritic changes in the spine are so well marked that there is wedging of the bodies of the vertebrae as shown by X-ray in the mid dorsal region. In addition he is completely blind in the left eye and the right eye shows limited visual acuity.

749
He goes about with the aid of a stick which is not of much help in view of the fixation of the left shoulder joint. Progress in walking is slow and laborious and the distance he can cover is very limited. One must recognise that, as the years pass, any muscular weakness will increase and the disability become a little more exaggerated on account of the usual strains and stresses causing degenerative changes. He is unable to use crutches on account of the loss of the right arm and the fixation at the left shoulder joint."
His covering letter says:
"Enclosed is my report on John Kennedy McLeod together with your letters to me. I cannot understand anyone more deserving of the need of a car; as Gladstone quoted 'What is morally wrong cannot be politically right.'
This case will require to be considered under clause three."
Clause 3 is the one that gives some latitude.
I looked at the beginning of the scheme, because I find that the categories have been accorded a sanctity which I do not think they deserve. The civil servants who conducted the correspondence glorified in categories, but there is no force of law behind the categories. They are simply a scheme designed by the then Minister of Pensions, and he referred to them in July, 1948, in the; following terms:
"I am glad to say that a scheme has been worked out in agreement with my Central Advisory Committee under which a limited number of small cars, not exceeding 1,500, will be made available over the next two years for supplying, free of charge, to certain classes of very seriously disabled war pensioners who may elect to receive a car in place of the motor propelled tricycle to which they are entitled under existing regulations. These classes consist of double leg amputees, of which at least one amputation is above the knee, paraplegics, and pensioners suffering from other disabilities resulting in the total, or almost total, loss of use of both legs."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th July 1948; Vol 454, c. 1603.]
That is what has happened to this man, and right through the years he has failed to get a car. I take the view, as I think most people would, that it is wholly wrong that he should continue to be deprived of it.
This story of the shortage of cars is not true at all. Since 1948, when the disabled car scheme started, Britain has produced 3,557,000 cars The number of cars issued under the scheme reached 1,945 in 1953, and although the number is now lower, what a very small percentage of cars go to men who are in the greatest need of them. I uphold economy
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in the public service—I want much more of it than is practised now—but not at the expense of those in greatest need. This man is one of those in the greatest need.
Life must have been very grim for him since April, 1917. He was engaged to be married when he went into the Army. The marriage did not take place. It needs no imagination to know why. And now here he is, in the evening of his days, wanting the kind of car that has been supplied to 1,900 people. There is no shortage. People can buy Morris Minors and Ford Eights, the cars used for this scheme, at any showroom. The Government do not find a shortage when getting mail vans and other cars, but, owing to an alleged shortage, a car is denied to this man. Nobody can be in greater need. I am disappointed that my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State and the Joint Parliamentary Secretary seem to support officialdom. I have the greatest regard for our civil servants, but it is notable in this case that Mr. McLeod has one foot too many. But he also has one bullet in the neck too many, and two smashed shoulders, and one eye missing. But he "does not fall within the category." "Category" is never referred to in an Act of Parliament, or in any regulation of this House.
The record since this car scheme went to St. Andrew's House is not a good one. A few days ago, in answer to a question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Ross and Cromarty (Mr. John MacLeod), who asked how many disabled men in Scotland were waiting for cars and how many had been refused because of the absence of the necessary disablement qualifications, my right hon. and gallant Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland said:
"Out of 25 applications received since 31 Aug., 1953, when my right hon. Friend became responsible for the service in Scotland, 12 have had to be refused for the reason stated. Cars have been supplied to 11 applicants, and the other two are waiting for cars that have been authorised."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st Feb., 1955; Vol. 536, col. 893.]
Two years—eleven cars! Value £400 apiece, total £4,400. But Parliament has authorised the Secretary of State to spend £93,000 for the year 1953–54 for these cars, and also for the tricycles and invalid chairs, and £84,000 for 1954–55. It seems that the money which Parliament has voted is not being used. It must be

751
wrong that this man should be denied something which I am certain every hon. Member of this House would want him to have; which the people who elected us to this House would want him to have. Those people would take a very poor view of those who have refused it. This man happens to be a constituent of mine and, for that reason, his case has come to me. I wonder how many more of them there are?
1.28 a.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Henderson Stewart): This is the kind of case which, I imagine, must have come to the notice of all of us in the course of our Parliamentary careers. This is the case of a soldier suffering severe disability from the First World War and who, now getting old, feels the effect of that misfortune. We all want to do what is right and proper by a case of this kind, and it is very proper that my hon. Friend, having had the case brought to his notice, should seek some easement of this man's troubles.
The difficulty is, as we have explained to my hon. Friend by letter and in talks, that border lines have to be drawn. That is the only way in which administration can be carried on and, while it is quite true that the conditions which he has quoted are not embodied in the laws of the land, they are administrative arrangements made by previous Governments and found to be workable and, therefore, maintained by the present Government.
My hon. Friend has set out those three conditions, and therefore I do not need to repeat them." Translated into the language of ordinary men, they mean broadly this. That if an ex-Service man suffering from a war disability is not able to move about because of injuries to his legs, if he is not able to get out of his house at all, then he is entitled to a car, provided he can get somebody to drive it for him. But if he is able to get about on his legs, we have to draw the line and say that a car is not available for such a man.
This man is clearly a case of very heavy disability—there is no argument about that; but he is able to move around, as my hon. Friend has said, with a stick. I gather that he lives the greater
752
part of his life with a relative in Edinburgh and sometimes possibly in the summer months, he goes up to his croft in the North.
Sir D. Robertson: For six months.
Mr. Stewart: As my hon. Friend knows, this case has been examined over and over again by, not one specialist, but different specialists. Since he applied, the man has been examined five times, and three of these have been special examinations. In each case, the medical specialist has reluctantly had to come to the conclusion that he does not fall within this broad distinction of being unable to get about on his legs.
Sir D. Robertson: That just will not do. This man is in Edinburgh for six months in the year, mainly getting attention at hospital there for his eye and his limbs. A car is sent for him, and he is taken back in a car; the hospital people do not expect him to walk. The only walking he does is hobbling about, as far as the distance between the two sides of this House. That is the extent of it. How can it be otherwise? He has not got shoulders, he has only one hand that can lightly hold a stick, and he has only one leg. It is nonsensical to take that view. My hon. Friend is good enough to suggest that because five specialists have taken that view, what Mr. Ian Macpherson says is wrong.
Mr. Stewart: That is where my hon. Friend's case is weak. What the specialist whom my hon. Friend engaged said was precisely what all the other specialists said. His examination produced a report exactly the same as that of everybody else. There is no dispute about the medical facts.
What, then, can we do for this poor man? This is what I can tell my hon. Friend. I accept my hon. Friend's contention that the man's present limited mobility may possibly be further curtailed if his war service disabilities were to become worse. As my hon. Friend knows, any possibility of deterioration is kept under careful review by regular medical examinations, and, of course, Mr. McLeod can apply for a special examination at any time if he thinks any change has come about, and I assure my hon. Friend that no difficulty whatever will be raised in granting him that examination.

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It is left to the limb surgeon in Edinburgh to decide whether to bring him into the limb fitting centre or to examine him in his own home. In fact the examination which my right hon. and gallant Friend arranged in November of last year was undertaken in the man's own home. Every facility is offered to this man to have these examinations.
At some future date these war disabilities may reach a stage at which Mr. McLeod will qualify for a car. One can quite easily foresee that with age coming on and one thing and another his ability even to cover the 50 yards, which I am told he can now walk, might be curtailed. If his war disabilities reached that stage, he would undoubtedly qualify for a car under "Category 3" Provided that the problems of garaging and of obtaining the services of a driver could be solved, there
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would then be no delay at all in seeing that a car was provided for him.
Administering this great scheme, as we try to do, honestly and fairly between one man and another, I regret that it is not possible to bring this ex-Service man immediately into the category that would entitle him to a car, but I assure my hon. Friend and the House that this man is receiving the most careful attention. Every facility will be offered to him for further examination, and should there be any real sign of deterioration through war disability he will be immediately provided with a car.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-four minutes to Two o'clock.

AGRICULTURE
  Straying Sheep (Crop Damage)
  Straying Sheep (Crop Damage)
  Transit of Animals (Horses)
  Transit of Animals (Horses)
  Rabbits (Clearance Orders)
  Rabbits (Clearance Orders)
  Fowl Pest
  Fowl Pest
  Hill Sheep Subsidy (Discontinuance)
  Hill Sheep Subsidy (Discontinuance)
EMPLOYMENT
  Applicants, Lichfield (Trent Valley Estate)
  Applicants, Lichfield (Trent Valley Estate)
  Remploy Factory, Willesden
  Remploy Factory, Willesden
  Nationalised Industries (Wages)
  Nationalised Industries (Wages)
NATIONAL SERVICE
  Farm Workers, Scotland (Deferments)
  Farm Workers, Scotland (Deferments)
  Naturalised British Subjects
  Naturalised British Subjects
HOME DEPARTMENT
  School Crossing Patrols, Devon (Grants)
  School Crossing Patrols, Devon (Grants)
  Discharged Prisoners (Assistance)
  Discharged Prisoners (Assistance)
  House of Commons Precincts (Disorder)
  House of Commons Precincts (Disorder)
  Museums and Art Galleries (Thefts)
  Museums and Art Galleries (Thefts)
  Cardiff and Swansea, Prisons
  Cardiff and Swansea, Prisons
  Occasional Licences (Young Persons)
  Occasional Licences (Young Persons)
  Steeplechasing
  Steeplechasing
  Prison Rules (Preventive Detention)
  Prison Rules (Preventive Detention)
  Dartmoor Prison
  Dartmoor Prison
  Accused Persons (Assistance)
  Accused Persons (Assistance)
EDUCATION
  Films and Television
  Films and Television
  Roman Catholic Schools (Displaced Pupils)
  Roman Catholic Schools (Displaced Pupils)
  General Certificate Examination
  General Certificate Examination
  Anson Primary School, Willesden
  Anson Primary School, Willesden
  University Students (Grants)
  University Students (Grants)
  Hereford Training College (Dispute)
  Hereford Training College (Dispute)
  Higher National Certificate
  Higher National Certificate
  Headships, Middlesex (Political Tests)
  Headships, Middlesex (Political Tests)
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Television Tubes (Import Price)
  Television Tubes (Import Price)
  Newsprint
  Newsprint
  Bankruptcies
  Bankruptcies
  Anglo-Bulgarian Trade
  Anglo-Bulgarian Trade
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Post Office Staff (Superannuation)
  Post Office Staff (Superannuation)
  Cinema Exhibitors (Tax)
  Cinema Exhibitors (Tax)
  NATIONAL ASSISTANCE (FACILITIES, DAGENHAM)
  NATIONAL ASSISTANCE (FACILITIES, DAGENHAM)
  CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT (ACTIONS)
  CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT (ACTIONS)
  COLONIAL TERRITORIES (DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES)
  COLONIAL TERRITORIES (DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES)
  NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS)
  NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS)
  ARMED FORCES (POSTAL FACILITIES)
  ARMED FORCES (POSTAL FACILITIES)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Sewerage Schemes, Kettering and Brixworth
  Sewerage Schemes, Kettering and Brixworth
  Rural Housing Improvement Grants (Publications)
  Rural Housing Improvement Grants (Publications)
  KENYA (SURRENDER OFFER)
  KENYA (SURRENDER OFFER)
  BRITISH ARMY (PERSONAL CASE)
  BRITISH ARMY (PERSONAL CASE)
  S.S. "LANCASTRIA" (OFFICIAL MEMORIALS)
  S.S. "LANCASTRIA" (OFFICIAL MEMORIALS)
Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
  3.5 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.
  Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House in Committee accordingly.
  [The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
  Clause 6:
  Amendment of safety provisions of 23 & 24 Geo. 5. c. 53
  6.—(1) The grounds on which a licence under Part I of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, may be revoked or suspended under subsection (1) of section thirteen of that Act (which provides for the revocation or suspension of such a licence on the ground that any of the conditions of the licence have not been complied with) shall include the ground that the holder of the licence or any servant or agent of his has, in relation to an authorised vehicle, been convicted of contravening or failing to comply with any statutory provision (however expressed) relating to—
  (a) the maintenance of vehicles in a fit and serviceable condition, or
  (4) In this section the expression "authorised vehicle" means, in relation to a licence under the said Act of 1933, a vehicle authorised to be used thereunder, whether or not it is for the time being in use for a purpose for which such a licence is required.
  LORD DERWENT LORD DERWENT moved, in subsection (1), after "vehicle," where that word first occurs, to insert:
  "belonging to the holder of the licence or in his possession under a hire-purchase agreement,"
  The noble Lord said: This clause deals with various reasons for which the holder of a commercial vehicle licence may have his licence withdrawn or suspended. Amongst other reasons mentioned is a previous conviction as servant or agent for an offence named in the clause to do with an authorised vehicle—that is, a commercially licensed vehicle. Unfortunately,
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  this also covers the case where a servant or agent has been convicted whilst in previous employment, the present licence holder not knowing that there has been such a conviction and being in no position to find out about it. My Amendment is designed to put this point right. It restricts the loss or suspension of licence to the employer to those cases where the servant or agent has been convicted for an offence to do with a vehicle owned by the present employer, the licence holder, or which he operates under hire purchase agreement. It seems clear to me that the wording of the clause as it stands is so unfair that it cannot be the intention of Her Majesty's Government that the position I have indicated should arise. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 6, line 15, after ("vehicle") insert the said words.—(Lord Derwent.)
  THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (THE EARL OF SELKIRK): I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining the purpose of this Amendment. I hope he will not mind my saying that I did not understand it from the Amendment which he put down. I do not think the Amendment will achieve the object which he has in view. So far as I can see, he confines the cases of possible convictions to which he has made reference to vehicles belonging to the holder or in his possession under hire purchase. I had taken that to mean that he did not want to include vehicles which were hired or possibly loaned to him. I now understand what the noble Lord has in mind, although I feel bound to say that somebody who deliberately takes on a man with a known bad record of driving vehicles might not be without at least some measure of responsibility.
  I am quite prepared to look at this matter to see whether we can make it clear that the offences here referred to, or the circumstances in which they are referred to, can properly arise only in regard to occasions when the driver is in the employ of the holder of the licence. I am bound to admit that it is a thin case, and I hope the noble Lord will agree with me because, if he observes the proviso, he will see these words:
  "Provided that the licensing authority shall not revoke or suspend a licence … unless he is satisfied, after holding a public inquiry if the holder of the licence requests him so to do …"

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  I think that in the course of that public inquiry it would become abundantly clear that, for offences committed not in the present employer's employ, it would be unfair that any suspension should take place. I think it is a very remote contingency but I readily accept that there is a possible interpretation which should be investigated. If, on those conditions, the noble Lord could withdraw this Amendment, I should be grateful.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Before the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment, would the noble Earl in charge of the Bill, in the consideration of this matter which he has promised, take these two factors into account? First, an endorsement upon a driving licence can be obliterated from the driving licence in two years although the record is still there. Therefore, a man can present his new employer with a perfectly clean licence unless the employer is not only himself going to subject every prospective applicant for employment to a categorical examination but is also going to apply to the police for his past record. Secondly, I beg that at a public inquiry a man's past will not be raked up—whether or not he has been convicted of so many prosecutions—in such a way as to jeopardise his chance of future employment. I ask the noble Earl to take those factors into consideration because they sprang to my mind immediately upon hearing the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, move his Amendment.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I readily accept what the noble Lord has said. It is a perfectly proper point. The purpose of the public inquiry is to examine two points: the frequency of such convictions with various vehicles in the control of the holder of the licence or, alternatively, the wilful disregard of these most important considerations, which the noble Lord will see in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (1)—whether the licensing authority consider that they have been wilfully or frequently violated. In that sense, the previous record of the conduct of the business is bound in some measure to come under examination, but I agree with the noble Lord that it would be most undesirable that an individual should have his long record thrown open to public examination.
  EARL HOWE: I hope it will not be forgotten by the House that the present law relating to heavy vehicles is simply disregarded by everybody on the road. The Road Research Board have given the figure that 94 per cent. of the drivers of heavy vehicles which are subject to the 20 m.p.h. limit, as it is to-day, completely disregard it. On the whole, from the point of view of the country, it is probably a good thing they do, but it might at any moment be possible for the police to start operations to try to enforce a law which I think even the Government agree is really unworkable. I suggest that that might be borne in mind, because drivers might easily, as we all know, exceed the 20 m.p.h. limit, thereby ipso facto breaking the law. As the law relating to heavy vehicles is in such a complete mess at the moment, it seems to me that this Amendment requires careful consideration. I was glad to hear what the noble Earl said. His generally sympathetic attitude towards the Amendment is to be welcomed, but, as it stands, the law relating to heavy commercial vehicles, as those of us who know anything about it (including, I know, the Government) realise, is quite unworkable.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I appreciate the point that the noble Earl is making; we come to it later. Here, two stages are involved. There is conviction in individual cases, and subsequently, if that should happen frequently, there may be suspension of the licence, which is, of course, a very serious matter and certainly would not be undertaken by the licensing authority unless they were well satisfied that it was fully justified—in other words, that the person concerned was not suitable to be charged with the responsibility for a licence. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, will be satisfied with the explanation I have given.
  LORD DERWENT: The only difference between us is that I believe the danger to the licence holder could be more real and more serious than my noble friend is prepared to agree. But, as I understand it, he is going to look at this point again and I presume he wishes to meet the point behind my Amendment. I take it that if he is able to do so, he will introduce a Government Amendment on the next stage. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  LORD DERWENT LORD DERWENT moved, after subsection (1) to insert:
  "(2) In the case of a goods vehicle used in connection with any business it shall not be necessary for the driver or the holder of a licence to keep or cause to be kept the records prescribed by these regulations if and so long as there accompanies the vehicle on all journeys a certificate in the form set out in the Fifth Schedule to this Act and the vehicle is being driven by the driver named in the said certificate and he is driving in accordance with and within the particulars set out in the said certificate; nothing in the immediately preceding sub-paragraph of this paragraph of this regulation shall—

  (i) exempt any person from keeping or causing to be kept the records prescribed by these regulations if any goods vehicle used in connection with any business is so used on a journey any part of which lies outside a radius of 25 miles from the place where the vehicle is usually kept;

  (ii) exempt any person from keeping or causing to be kept the records prescribed by these regulations if any goods vehicle used in connection with any business is used on a journey, or at any time any part of which is not in accordance with and within the particulars set out in the said certificate;

  where any goods vehicle is used in connection with any business on a journey any part of which is otherwise than in accordance with and within the particulars set out in the said certificate, every driver shall keep and every holder of a licence shall cause to be kept the records prescribed by the other paragraphs of these regulations in respect of the whole of that journey, and there shall be added to the schedule to those regulations Form 5 being a certificate in accordance with the additional paragraph to the regulations contained in this subsection."
  The noble Lord said: Under the Goods Vehicles (Keeping of Records) Regulations, 1935, all commercial vehicles not driven by the owner must have a log book, which has to be kept up to date, showing the journeys, hours of work, and that type of detail—a most proper and necessary regulation in the case of all long-distance driving. But there is one class of vehicle for which a log book has become something of a farce, and where the regulation creates a great deal of unnecessary work and wastes a lot of paper. I refer to local delivery vehicles, such as bakers' vans, butchers' vans and so on. In this class of vehicle the log book has an entry at the top of the page, and for subsequent dates has the word "ditto" written against it; it is a class of vehicle the log books of which are practically never looked at. These log books are entirely unnecessary as a day-to-day
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  record and as a rule serve no useful purpose, because the vehicles concerned do much the same round and much the same work day after day.
  The point of my Amendment, which is a long one, is simply this: that for this type of vehicle power should be given for the granting of a certificate. The specimen certificate I have in mind is dealt with in a later Amendment, following the Third Schedule. It would include the name of the owner, the name of the driver, the place where the vehicle is usually kept, the hours of work, the actual hours of the man's break in work, and absolutely essential details of that kind. The certificate would be all that was required for most days of the year, and would apply as long as the terms of the certificate were strictly adhered to and as long as the vehicle was in use within a 25-miles radius of its garage. On the odd days in the year when the terms of the certificate were not complied with, there would be an obligation to put the variations to the certificate down in the log book for that day. For example, the hours of work for a grocer's van might be from nine till five, with a break from one till two. Christmas Eve might be a difficult day and there might be late deliveries. The certificate would not then apply, and there would have to be an entry in the log book.
  The advantage of this system is, that if an inspector stops one of these local delivery vans and demands the certificate, he has only to read through what are the hours of work, where the van is kept, and so on, and he can see at once whether the van is working within the terms of the certificate. If it is not working within the terms of the certificate, then he looks at the log book. If the log book is not properly kept upon a variation from the certificate, then an offence has been committed. This system would save a tremendous amount of work; it would make things much easier for an inspector who stopped a vehicle of that kind, and it would save a great deal of paper. I suggest to my noble friend that this is a proper, practical way of running a check over local delivery vans. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 6, line 38, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Derwent.)
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: The purpose of this Amendment is to prescribe the nature of the records which must be kept where a vehicle travels not more than twenty-five miles from its base. These records are, of course, concerned with hours of work, journeys, loads and other matters. I must emphasise that we attach considerable importance to these records as an essential means of control of the conditions of work; and on that account we regard them as an essential element in assisting safety on the roads. It is true that at the present time we are asking that the same records should be kept for delivery vans as for long-distance vehicles and others. I say at once to the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, that there is a case for simplifying some of the C licence records in respect of vehicles which travel only a short distance. The noble Lord's suggestion excluded such things as the load, the nature of the journey, or the area, and the last occasion on which the man worked. Those are, however, factors which might have to be taken into consideration. I must make it quite clear, however, that the considerations I have mentioned do not apply in the ordinary way to A and B licences, and it would also be undesirable for simplification to take place in the case of long-distance C licences.
  I hope that what I am saying will meet the noble Lord's point in this matter. As a matter of fact, I rather doubt whether the twenty-five miles basis would be the correct way of dealing with this matter. But if we were able to do anything, it would be only in regard to a limited class of vehicles; and we should certainly not do anything until we had consulted the organisations of both the employees and the employers engaged in this work. I will see whether we can do something on this point, but I must point out that I think it is unnecessary for an Act of Parliament to specify the precise form in which these returns should be made. I think it would be rather inconvenient to stereotype it to that extent. I should also point out that there is a defect in the drafting of the Amendment, because in line 4, and again a little later on, it refers to "these regulations," and it is not clear what regulations are referred to. I believe that they are regulations made under Section 16 of the 1933 Act, but it would have to be made quite clear what reference was being made. Accordingly, I
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  hope that the noble Lord will withdraw this Amendment. We will see whether we can meet the point.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, for raising this matter, and to the noble Earl for the sound and conciliatory manner in which he has met the point. There is a point for consideration, but I am at one with him in saying that it has to be carefully considered. I would ask him to bear in mind, with regard to a C licence, that if the proprietor or the owner drives the van concerned, he does not have to keep a record when it is not carrying goods; it is only when the employee drives it that a record has to be kept. Let us look at the position of the village butcher. He may drive his van for some part of the day, and his assistant may drive it for the other part of the day. One has to keep a record of journeys and loads; the other does not. When the driver is self-employed he does not have to keep any records.
  I am at one with the noble Lord in thinking that it would be highly dangerous to bring A and B licences into this Amendment, and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, agrees. I feel, however, that there is a problem with C licences, because many C licence holders are one-man businesses. Then there is the man who has one assistant who drives the van; and there is, of course, the C licence where a number of people drive the van, so that it never has any settled driver. It would mean putting a heavy burden on these relatively small businesses, and (though I hesitate to put this into the mouth of the noble Lord), if inspectors were to turn up at perhaps 75 per cent. of such businesses they would find the records unintelligible. If the records could be made simple, so that they can be easily kept, no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, would be very grateful.
  LORD DERWENT: I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Selkirk for saying that he will look into this matter, but may I just stress one point before asking leave to withdraw my Amendment. I believe that a certificate rather than the present log-book system, is very important in regard to hours of work. The certificate, I suggest, should state break-hours during the day, and, unless the

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  owner is driving that vehicle during those hours, that vehicle must not be on the road without some special mention of the fact in the log-book. That is one of the reasons why I believe a certificate is better with this type of vehicle than a logbook. However, in view of what my noble friend has said I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  3.23 p.m.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved to add to subsection (4):
  "Provided that a dual purpose vehicle (which expression shall have the meaning assigned to it in subsection (1) of section 24 of this Act) shall be deemed not to be an authorised vehicle whilst for the time being adapted for the carriage of passengers and in use for a purpose for which a licence under the said Act of 1933 is not required."
  The noble Lord said: I now come to an Amendment which in my view is a very important one. I ask your Lordships to allow me, in the course of my argument upon this Amendment, to refer also to Amendments Nos. 36 and 99. This is a highly technical matter and I ask the indulgence of your Lordships. I will do my best to explain it as simply as I can—that is, if I really know it myself. This Amendment deals with the utility vehicle, station wagon, estate car, call it what you will; but for the purpose of this Bill I prefer to call it a utility vehicle. I ant forced to go into a little past history on this subject because I have a past in connection with it.
  Technically, any vehicle up to three tons unladen weight is, according to the Road Traffic Act, 1930, a motor car. The motor car, as we know it, is a motor car constructed solely for the carriage of passengers, not exceeding seven excluding the driver. All the others are commercial vehicles or goods-carrying vehicles constructed solely for the carriage of goods or burdens. That was all right until 1934 when the enterprising motor industry conceived the idea of the dual purpose vehicle. Immediately that came on to the market it had so ready a sale that at this date there are about 80,000 of them in use in this country. I should think the large majority of noble Lords have one of their own; I see many outside your Lordships' House on occasion. As their numbers grew, confusion became worse confounded. What was this vehicle? Was it a passenger vehicle, and
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  therefore a motor car, or was it a goods-carrying vehicle and therefore subject to the 30 miles an hour speed limit, as are all goods-carrying vehicles? Nobody could solve that problem, for the vehicle could be used for both purposes.
  The position arose that, throughout this country, chief constables took one of two views. In some areas they regarded it as a commercial vehicle, and if anyone drove one of these utility vehicles at a speed over 30 miles an hour they made an appearance before the bench. In another county or area the chief constable perhaps did not bother, and therefore such drivers were immune. This position continued for fifteen years and I must admit it cost many people a lot of money in fines. There was always some doubt whether or not fines should be imposed, but technically I imagine that the police were correct. In 1950 the Minister of Transport was persuaded to make an attempt to rectify this anomalous position, and in your Lordships' House on October 24, 1950, I introduced, and asked your Lordships to pass, the Motor Vehicles (Variation of Speed Limit) Regulations, 1950. To make clear what this regulation did, I will read from the explanatory note, because that is intelligible while the regulation, like every other regulation, is not. It says:
  "The present Regulations exempt from the speed limit so prescribed certain goods vehicles fitted with pneumatic tyres and not exceeding three tons in weight unladen when not drawing trailers. The speed limit of thirty miles an hour which has hitherto applied to all such vehicles will in future apply to such vehicles only if they are authorised to be used under carrier's licences,"—
  these are the words I ask your Lordships to note—
  "or if they would require to be so authorised but for the specific exemptions contained in Section 1 (7) of the Read and Rail Traffic Act, 1933."
  Those exemptions in the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, are numerous. I will not read them to your Lordships but they cover ambulances, fire engines, local authority vehicles and so on. These dual purpose vehicles were brought under the carrier's licence. If an owner of one of these utility vehicles used the vehicle for passengers and for the carriage of his own goods only, he did not need a C licence. If he carried goods in the course of a business or profession, or for hire or reward, he fell into the category of a

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  C licence holder just as if he had been using a van or commercial vehicle—that is, a proper goods-carrying vehicle, van or lorry—and he was restricted to a speed of 30 miles an hour.
  Now he could use this utility vehicle for passengers only and he was immune; the vehicle was a motor car in the full and accepted sense of the term. If he carried some person other than himself it was still a motor car. But as soon as he put in any goods he brought himself within the requirement to hold a C licence, and was subject to the 30 mile an hour speed limit. I just want to quote what I said upon the occasion to which I have just referred. I said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 168, Col. 1253]:
  "We have attempted to overcome this difficulty by using, if I may put it in this language, the carriers' licence formula. As your Lordships know, a goods vehicle, carrying goods for hire or reward, or for or in connection with a trade or business, must have an A, B or C licence. These are known as carriers' licences. We have now come to the conclusion that we will make another division, and any goods-carrying vehicle that does not require a carriers' licence will in future be exempt from the speed limit which applies to commercial vehicles. Therefore, a utility vehicle which is constructed to carry goods and passengers, so long as the goods carried in that vehicle are not carried for hire or reward or in connection with a trade or busineses, will in future, if your Lordships agree to this Motion, be exempt from the thirty mile an hour speed limit."
  May I pause there. We thought that everything was going to be plain sailing. So it was until there was a case which is mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum regarding Clause 6. This was the case of Blenkin v. Bell, in 1952. That was in connection with a utility vehicle. It went before a Divisional Court presided over by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice held that this regulation and the law as it stood at the time did precisely what it was intended it should do but with the plus effect of saying that while a utility vehicle carried goods for hire or reward, or goods of any description, it came within the carrier's licence category. When it had not those goods in it, it was not subject to the conditions of a carrier's licence. That went—because of that particular judgment—for every commercial vehicle up to three tons unladen weight.
  Later there was the case of Woolley v. Moore, which concerned an ordinary goods-carrying van. And there was the
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  same dictum that any C licence vehicle was subject to the provisions of the C licence—that is, the restriction to the 30 miles an hour speed limit and the keeping of records—only when it was engaged in the actual function for which a C licence was so required. That had many results. Any commercial vehicle up to three tons unladen weight was able to go about the country at any speed the driver liked outside the 30 mile an hour speed limit, the same as a motor car. That was never intended; it is just abject nonsense—I am not saying that the judgment was nonsense, but the effect of it was. I am not concerned with the judgment. There have been expressions of opinion questioning it, but I expect there are always expressions of opinion questioning any judgment in any court of law. I am concerned only with the effect.
  This clause seeks to bring the position back to where we thought it was when the regulation was issued. In my submission, it means that if you have a utility vehicle to-day and you use it only for the carriage of passengers, you are in the same position as you were before—that is to say, you will not be subject to the 30 miles an hour speed limit. If you use that utility vehicle for the carrying of your own personal luggage you will, as before, not be subject to the 30 miles an hour speed limit. What this clause now does is to say that if you do license it in order to carry some goods in the course of your business, profession, occupation or trade, not only must you have a C licence but the condition of that C licence regarding the keeping of records applies, whether the vehicle is carrying goods or whether it is not. It means that if you want to carry goods in your utility vehicle you must have a C licence, and when you are not carrying goods and are using that vehicle as a passenger carrying vehicle wholly and solely, because it has a C licence you are still subject to the 30 miles an hour speed limit; and unless you, the owner, are driving it, it is also subject to record-keeping in precisely the same way as is a commercial vehicle. At this point I breathe a sigh of relief, because I see that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is nodding his head. So I take it that I have not made much of a mistake up to now.
  What the Amendment now seeks to do is to improve the position as it was at

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  the status quo. It seeks to say that although you may need a C licence for a utility vehicle when it is carrying goods, it is not to be subject to the 30 miles an hour speed limit when it is not carrying goods. But the Amendment restricts this freedom to a utility vehicle. The definition of such a vehicle which I hope your Lordships will accept is the meaning assigned to it in subsection (1) of Clause 24 of the Bill. It now becomes apparent that there are still further anomalies. I want, if your Lordships will allow me, to quote just another two or three words from what I said in 1950 when I proposed the approval of the regulation which I have mentioned. After the remarks I have already quoted I went on to say this:
  "I do not pretend that this will not raise some anomalies—it is bound to; but it was a question of a choice of evils. I may be asked about a doctor carrying a case of instruments in a utility vehicle which is not constructed solely for the carrying of passengers, or a veterinary surgeon, or, for that matter, a sweep. Will such a case be exempt? As I am advised, the answer is No, it will not, because that is carrying goods in connection with a trade or business in a goods vehicle. I must add this proviso—and I am now speaking subject to correction. The courts, I understand, have never yet been called upon to decide whether the professional instruments of a doctor or a veterinary surgeon are goods carried for or in connection with a trade or business. In case any noble Lord is prepared to make the experiment, I should advise him not to do so."
  I want to address obliquely my next few remarks to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, who spoke to your Lordships the other day lucidly, and for me plainly, on the question of the Negative Resolution procedure. The regulation I have just read out requires an Affirmative Resolution. The Ministry of Transport did not wait for the courts to decide whether a doctor's case of instruments was goods. On September 5, 1951 (and this is an interesting date for the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor), a regulation was made. It was laid before Parliament on September 8 and came into operation on September 19. At that time, Parliament was in Recess and everybody's mind was on the General Elections. This regulation went through on the Negative Resolution procedure, and escaped even the vigilance of the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport. So these things can slip through; and this one did.
  This is the paradoxical position we have now arrived at as a result of this regulation, which I shall read to your Lordships. It is Goods Vehicles. The Road and Rail Traffic Act (Exemption) Regulation, 1951. It tries to get the doctor, dentist and other professional people out of the dilemma and this is how it does it. These regulations re-enact with amendments the Road and Rail Traffic Act (Exemption) Regulations, 1930, as amended, by granting exemption in certain cases from the regulation under the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, that goods vehicles shall not be used for the carriage of goods for hire or reward or in connection with trade or business except under a carrier's licence. The principal changes are that exemption is now granted to the following additional cases—this is made under the last paragraph of Section 1 (7) of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933:
  (n) to the use of a motor vehicle by a medical practitioner, state registered nurse, state certified midwife, dentist or veterinary surgeon for the carriage of medicines or of any instruments or apparatus necessary for his or her use in carrying on his or her profession as a medical practitioner, nurse, midwife, dentist or veterinary surgeon as the case may be, provided"—
  and I call special attention to this point—
  "that no other goods are carried in the vehicle."
  So, for the first time, it is laid down in Statute that the doctor's little black bag is goods. I expect the draftsmen thought that they had done what had to be done, and that the doctor, dentist and all the others, were now able to carry their instruments in the course of their professional duties, and that they would not have either to keep records or conform to the 30 miles an hour limit.
  I must now take your Lordships back to the previous regulation and read the last two or three lines again. This regulation exempted utility vehicles from the operation of the 30 miles an hour limit. It stated:
  "The speed limit of 30 miles per hour which has hitherto applied to all such vehicles will in future apply to such vehicles only if they are authorised to be used under carrier's licences,—
  and these are the operative words—
  "or if they would require to be so authorised but for the specific exemptions contained in Section 1 (7) of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933."

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  They become exempt vehicles under the first regulation I have read and do not have to keep records; but under the second regulation they have to conform to the 30 miles an hour limit. It means that a doctor who has a utility vehicle and who puts his little black bag in the back when going to an emergency case can travel at only 30 miles an hour. What a peculiar state we have got into! But the anomaly does not stop there. If the doctor owns a motor car instead of a utility vehicle, he can carry his instruments in it and be immune from the speed limit. No one could have foreseen this at the time the regulation was passed, as it went through during Recess and did not have the benefit of Parliamentary scrutiny and Parliamentary debate. I am going to give another example to show what a farcical position we have arrived at. If a commercial traveller puts his samples in the back of his ordinary motor car, he is within the law; but if, for private reasons, he owns a utility vehicle and puts his samples in the back of it, he must have a C licence and travel at not more than 30 miles an hour. As your Lordships will see, I have included the commercial traveller in my Amendment.
  This is a simple question. It all stems from the 1930 Act. It took us fifteen years to get the first regulations, and since 1930 we have been trying to legislate for one of the most virile industries in this country—the motor industry, which has done a job of work for the country by its ingenuity and enterprise second to none—with an archaic Act which we passed in the days when traction engines and solid-wheeled vehicles were very much in evidence. I have sought to get over this difficulty by formulating a definition of the utility vehicle, as your Lordships will see from Amendment No. 99. I have based that definition on the Customs and Excise definition for the purpose of purchase tax. This is not a case of tax dodging or anything like that, because a utility vehicle pays precisely the same excise tax and precisely the same purchase tax as a motor car. I am trying only to bring up to date a regulation which, if this carefully-thought-out Amendment is not carried, will be a grave blow to the motor industry. Production of utility vehicles, from the Husky to the Rolls and Bentley (I have put the limit at two tons in my Amendment, to take care of the whole
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  range of these vehicles), is now about 30,000 a year, to meet a popular demand. It is the British answer to the German and the American utility vehicles. Surely we cannot, at this stage of development of one of our greatest industries, shackle it to something that is archaic. We have the definition of a motor car, and we have in the regulations the definitions of a goods-carrying vehicle; now we must have a regulation defining what is a dual purpose or utility vehicle.
  I have been rather long in moving this Amendment, but this is a highly technical subject and I have done my best to explain it lucidly to your Lordships. In Amendment No. 34 I try to say that a dual purpose vehicle, though it may now have a C licence, shall not be subject to a 30 miles an hour limit when it is not carrying goods. In Amendment No. 36 I propose to rectify the position of doctors, midwives, dentists and such people, including commercial travellers; and I have put in paragraph (c) to give the Minister power to make further regulations if he so desires. I think one could continue this matter indefinitely. Would the engineer with a bag of tools come under this provision? He must come under it, because the regulation defines all these things as "goods." By Amendment No. 99 I try to give your Lordships a practical definition of what constitutes a dual purpose vehicle. I thank your Lordships for your patience, and I beg to move this Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 7, line 13, at end insert the said proviso.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
  THE EARL OF ROTHES: Before attempting to address your Lordships on any of these Amendments, I must declare an interest, inasmuch as I am connected with the road passenger transport industry, although I do not think that on this particular Amendment that fact has any bearing. I should like to support a good deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has said, and from a particular point of view. The clarification of dual purpose vehicle is an important point from many aspects, but in particular, I think, from this one; that if it is not clearly understood what you may and may not use a dual purpose vehicle for, that will affect the popularity of, and the demand for, this vehicle; and that, in turn, will affect the volume of the

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  output of the manufacturers of this vehicle. If, however, this point were clarified, the demand would, I believe, substantially increase, and that would enable manufacturers substantially to reduce their costs. As all your Lordships are aware, the motor industry at this moment is playing a most important part in the export trade; and you are equally aware that we vitally need increased exports. If, therefore, by clarifying the purposes for which a dual purpose vehicle may be used it were possible to increase its popularity, I think that would help the motor trade to get the exports which we all want so badly.
  LORD WEBB-JOHNSON: The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has singled out the medical profession and ancillary helpers as rather startling instances of the difficulties which might arise under existing regulations or under the terms of this Bill. It is obvious from the Bill that we are dealing with life and death matters, and it is legitimate that the medical profession should take some notice. At the same time, I must say that it is difficult enough already for the ordinary surgeon or midwife to know the real position. I cannot see that the present Bill, or the exposition of the noble Lord, makes the position much clearer: in fact, one is left like a client who has a judgment against him in the Court of Appeal, feeling that the only resort left to him is to appeal to the Lords—and we have to adjudicate on this.
  Is the doctor travelling with what the noble Lord calls his "little black bag" to be regarded as travelling with his luggage, or carrying his own goods? Noble Lords must realise from the pharmaceutical costs to-day that a "little black bag" no longer meets the situation. The noble Lord mentioned in his argument the doctor's "little black bag": but what about the civil servant's brief-case? The contents are the tools of his trade. If he puts them in a utility vehicle, is he still further to delay the decision of a Ministry by travelling at 30 m.p.h.? Surely, the noble Earl in charge of the Bill, on behalf of the Government, will do something to clarify the position in regard to the utility vehicle when being used, not for carrying goods and not only for carrying the driver's or owner's own goods, but for carrying the tools of his trade. I hope the noble Earl will realise that, from the point of
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  view of ensuring that the regulations and the Bill are understood by people whose minds are full of different things, it should be made clear what regulations apply to their activities. It would be a great pity if a Bill which is designed to preserve life and to delay death should delay the surgeon when going on a life-saving mission because he has got to obey some regulations which may result in there being no other alternative but death. I am sorry to terminate my remarks on the word "death," but that is inevitable; and difficulty and trouble is inevitable under this Bill unless it is clarified.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, said that this was a highly technical subject, and if I may humbly say so, I thought that his exposition of it was exceedingly able; in fact, he has given me not a little trouble, with the assistance that I have, to try to understand the nature of this problem. I can find no fault with the statement of the case which the noble Lord has made, but I must emphasise that there are two things which are quite different. First of all, there is what we are actually doing in this clause; and secondly, there is what the noble Lord proposes—and they are quite different things.
  Let me remind your Lordships of what we are doing in the clause. When the speed limit was abolished in 1930, cars were divided into two categories: those for carrying persons and their effects, and those for carrying goods. We are concerned here only with vehicles which carry goods or burdens of any description. By and large, for vehicles over three tons the limit is 20 m.p.h., and for those under three tons it is 30 m.p.h. That was how the law stood until the cases which the noble Lord has mentioned, Blenkin v. Bell and the other case. The effect of the Court's decision is this. When vehicles are running empty the conditions of the licence do not apply, which means—we have been advised so—that not only does the speed limit not apply, but also that none of the other conditions, such as maintenance of the vehicle, the keeping of records and the keeping of driving hours, applies.
  I think your Lordships will agree that in those circumstances we had no option but to bring in amended legislation to make it quite clear that, in regard to the ordinary carrier's licence, the conditions

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  should apply. And that is what we have done here. I do not think I need explain it. We have done it in a somewhat complicated manner, but I need not weary your Lordships with it. You will see paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (1) of Clause 6, which apply whether or not goods are being carried. I want to emphasise that what we are doing here applies only to licence holders. It does not, so far as we are concerned, apply to anything else. That is the only alteration which we make in the law.
  The noble Lord has brought up another question, and that is the dual purpose car, generally known as a "utility." Under the definition of the 1933 Act, that was, and is, a goods vehicle, although, as we all know, a large number of them are used for private purposes. The noble Lord has explained that, but for the regulations of 1950, all these cars would be controlled by a 30 m.p.h. limit. That is no longer the case, because these regulations apply only to C licensed vehicles and to specific exempted vehicles. Other dual purpose vehicles are not subjected, of course, in any way tó the 30 m.p.h. speed limit. That, in effect, means that the 30 m.p.h. speed limit applies, apart from C licensed vehicles, to farm vehicles with an F licence and Crown vehicles generally, such as military vehicles, and to doctors' vehicles, and vehicles used by nurses, veterinary surgeons and people in trade and industry, although these do not require a C licence.
  The purpose of the Amendment is to extend the number of dual-purpose vehicles which are not subject either to licensing or to the 30 m.p.h. speed limit. The noble Lord does it in this way—by saying that an authorised vehicle, when it is adapted for the carriage of passengers and not in use for the purpose for which the licence is required, will be deemed not to be an authorised vehicle. There is a little difficulty there about the drafting, but I think the intention of the noble Lord is perfectly clear. If that is the case, under the regulations of 1950 it comes into the category which is not covered by the 30 m.p.h. speed limit.
  My first objection to the idea is that it means that the same vehicle, if it can be adapted, will sometimes be within the 30 m.p.h. speed limit and sometimes not. I
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  think that would be a matter for some confusion, which would be a pity. The noble Lord then goes on to describe the dual-purpose vehicle, and I will say a word or two about that description in a minute. In his Amendment No. 36, the noble Lord says that where a dual purpose vehicle as already described is used for certain purposes—doctors, the carrying of samples, and things of that sort—it will not be regarded as a goods vehicle and, therefore, will not require a C licence and will not be subject to the 30 m.p.h. speed limit. I think I should make the point straight away that in both these spheres the Minister has power to act by regulation. This matter is one of such complexity that I think it is better discussed round a table. Also, these regulations may require amendment from time to time. With the evolution of the motor' car, it is quite possible that other changes may take place which will make amendment necessary. What I am prepared to say straight away is that if anyone can produce a water-tight description of a dual-purpose vehicle, we shall be happy to consider putting it into the Statute or using it in other ways.
  I entirely agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Rothes, and the noble Lord, Lord Webb-Johnson, said about the clarification which we should like in this matter. That clarification requires two factors. In the first place, the dual purpose vehicle must be defined in such a way that the ordinary light goods vehicle does not come within the definition and cannot be readily designed or adapted to come within it. In the second place, I think it is necessary that one should be able to tell fairly well at a glance whether a vehicle is or is not subject to the speed limit; otherwise, it seems to me, the task of the police will be very difficult. The definition in Amendment No. 99, I say at once, is a most ingenious definition. I do not think the noble Lord is right in saying that it is the Customs and Excise definition.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: It is based on it.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I should say that the Customs and Excise definition causes a great difficulty. It is much easier, of course, to examine the vehicle for Excise purposes than it is to recognise

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  it when it is on the road. If your Lordships would look at Amendment No. 99 you will see this in (b):
  "as to the rear of the driver's seat roofed accommodation"—
  I suppose that could be of canvas or tarpaulin—
  "fitted with side windows or is constructed or adapted for the fitting of side windows."
  I suppose that means something in the way of a piece of perspex. I do not know whether it is sufficient to have just a hole, but it is obviously fairly simple to come within the terms of that. Then if we go on to paragraph (d), it says:
  "as, in that part of it which is to the rear of the driver's seat, seating, which may be collapsible, for at least two passengers sitting side by side …"
  If you have two tip seats side by side behind the driver's seat, which could be put in perhaps for £2 or £3, that will immediately convert almost any lorry into a dual purpose vehicle. It is for that reason that I must advise your Lordships that this definition will not hold water. Frankly, I should welcome it if it did, because it would greatly simplify the matter.
  There are, of course, as the noble Lord has said, a good many exemptions which have been made under the 1951 regulation. We are aware of the anomalies. The noble Lord was quite frank about it when he moved the regulations in 1950: he said that there were anomalies there. But if we are going to change the law we must go to a better position where the anomalies are less marked. That, I think, is fundamental. It is no good moving from one anomalous position to another. It will not clarify the position at all if we do that. I think we must bear in mind that, though there must be confusion, we are not aware of any great hardship arising from this, and we do not feel justified in seeking to remove a few anomalies if, at the same time, we abandon effective control over a large and increasing number of light goods vehicles which are extensively used in trade. I should like to say to the noble Lord that we have regulatory powers to deal with this matter. The Minister can alter the classes of vehicles—they can go into the C licence group—or he can alter their permitted speed. We think it would be a much more effective way of getting the result and a more adaptable way which
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  could be changed from time to time, if necessary. I hope that the noble Lord will not press this Amendment, because I do not think it would clarify the situation, which all your Lordships are most anxious to clarify, if possible.
  LORD DERWENT: Before the noble Lord replies, may I say that there is one point about which I am rather disquieted. I am inclined to agree with my noble friend that it may be better to put this matter right by regulation, but many of us who are interested in this subject would like to have some assurance that the Minister will try to meet the points that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has made, and will, in fact, make the regulation. Speaking for myself, unless my noble friend gives some assurance of that kind I shall be profoundly dissatisfied.
  4.12 p.m.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble Earl for his most courteous reply. If we have a battle, then it will be a perfectly friendly one. I must say, and I say it with no discourtesy to him, that all he said from that Dispatch Box to me had a very familiar ring. I heard all those excuses given for our waiting fifteen years for the first regulation. From a lifetime's experience in the motor industry, I could shoot holes in any regulation on the construction and use of motor vehicles in this country. One talks about being able to evade. Commercial vehicles are licensed by unladen weight. There is not one commercial vehicle in a thousand on the roads of this country that is the same weight today as it was when it originally got its excise licence. I am sorry for the noble Earl in a matter such as this, because it is highly technical. The noble Earl says he shot holes in my definition, although he admitted it was an ingenious one. It has satisfied the Customs and Excise; and if you can satisfy the Customs and Excise on a definition where revenue from tax is concerned, believe me, you have a miracle on your hands. They are perfectly satisfied.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I said they were.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: When the manufacturer of any vehicle in this country produces a vehicle that requires a tax exemption certificate—for

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  instance, if he wants to evade the purchase tax on one of these utility vehicles—he has to obtain the Customs and Excise inspector's certificate of exemption before he is allowed to put the vehicle on the road. What the noble Earl's advisers have put into his mouth they tried to put into mine every day when I was battling to get this first exemption of the utility vehicle from the 30 miles an hour limit. Frankly, I am not prepared to go on throttling a great industry of this country by the whim of producing regulations. It is something from which we have all suffered. The noble Earl has not said one thing about the burden of my complaint. It is as a result of regulation cancelling regulation that the medical practitioner, the midwife and the dentist cannot now travel at over 30 miles per hour. I read the regulations to your Lordships. You ask me to give up this Amendment when we now have a Road Traffic Bill on our hands. I doubt if many of your Lordships will be alive when we get the next Bill; this is the golden opportunity.
  Of course, there will be anomalies—I admitted it before. I do not care what regulation the noble Earl brings forward, if I have a mind to I can shoot more holes into it than he has shot in my Amendment, because I have the technical knowledge. Of course you will never get a cast-iron regulation to conform with a design of the motor industry. Why should you? Regulations! It was a regulation of the horse-power tax days that nearly put this motor industry out of business.
  I am sorry, but I feel so strongly about this matter that, whatever anomalies are involved in my Amendment—and I fail to see one-hundredth that the noble Earl can—I am not prepared to allow this industry, the 80,000 people who have these vehicles and the 30,000 who are going to buy them every year, to suffer under this disadvantage. As this is the opportunity of putting matters right, I shall ask your Lordships to express your opinion in the Division Lobby.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I do not think the noble Lord is quite right in saying that the 1951 regulation subjected the medical profession to that limit. What I did think it did was to release them from the obligation of having a C licence.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: No; it is not so as regards the 30 miles an hour limit.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: That is the position.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: No, it is not. May I read the regulation to the noble Earl?
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I have read it.
  LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: May I appeal to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor to allow me to read the regulation? It is the regulation of 1950 exempting the utility vehicle from the 30 miles an hour limit. This is what it says:
  "The speed limit of 30 miles per hour which has hitherto applied to all such vehicles will in future apply to such vehicles only if they are authorised to be used under carrier's licence"—
  that is, the A, B, or C licence—
  "or if they would require to be so authorised but for the specific exemptions contained in section 1 (7) of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933 …"—
  this is the exemption—
  "or if they would require to be so authorised but for the specific exemptions …"
  The "specific exemption," as I read it to you, is
  "the use of a motor vehicle by a medical practitioner, state registered nurse,"
  et cetera when they are carrying medicines,
  "instruments or apparatus necessary for his or her use … provided that no other goods"—
  so "instruments" are goods—
  "are carried in the vehicle."
  They are exempt; they become an exempted vehicle. If they were not an exempted vehicle, they would be an authorised vehicle. When we have here:
  "would require to be so authorised but for the specific exemption,"
  it means that they would have to be authorised because they are carrying goods, and the limit then is thirty miles per hour.
  LORD WEBB-JOHNSON: May I say a word of explanation? I understood from the noble Earl that he was prepared to clarify the situation. I was hoping that points like these would not come to a Division—in which, indeed, I should not take part—because I understood that we

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  might have a shorter and clearer exposition at a later stage of the Bill. I also want to take this opportunity of saying, that whatever may be the interpretation of regulations or licences and what-not (which I find it extremely difficult to follow) where it has been made clear that the breach was necessary in the service of others my profession has always been treated extremely generously and sympathetically, in magistrates' courts and right up to the highest court, whenever any objection has been taken to speed on the road or any other breach of regulations.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I thank the noble Lord, Lord Webb-Johnson, for what he says about this matter and I appreciate the strength and feeling behind what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has said. I think it is fair to recognise that if there had been a simple classification in 1950 the noble
  Resolved in the Affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
  Lord opposite would have put it into the regulations, and if there were a simple classification now we should do it to-day. What I will undertake to do is to represent as strongly as I can to the Minister that some of the anomalies to which the noble Lord has referred should be ironed out. I do not say that that will get rid of them all, but I will represent as strongly as I can that that course should be adopted. I do not pretend that that will not leave other anomalies, because I think that is inevitable. I can only hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, will accept that offer, because I am afraid that I cannot do more.
  On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
  Their Lordships divided:—Contents, 35; Not-Contents, 33.

  CONTENTS

  Camden, M.

  Amulree, L.

  Jessel, L.

  Cholmondeley, M.

  Brabazon of Tara, L.

  Kenswood, L.

  Burden, L. [Teller.]

  Kershaw, L.

  Albemarle, E.

  Chorley, L.

  Killearn, L.

  Gosford, E.

  Derwent, L.

  Lucas of Chilworth, L.

  Howe, E.

  Douglas of Barloch, L.

  Mathers, L.

  Jowitt, E.

  Gifford, L.

  Ogmore, L.

  Listowel, E.

  Gisborough, L.

  Sempill, L.

  Lucan, E. [Teller.]

  Glyn, L.

  Strabolgi, L.

  Malmesbury, E.

  Hampton, L.

  Strathcarron, L.

  Rothes, E.

  Henderson, L.

  Waleran, L.

  Hindlip, L.

  Winster, L.

  Stansgate, V.

  NOT-CONTENTS

  Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

  St. Aldwyn, E.

  Belstead, L.

  Salisbury, M. (L. President.)

  Selkirk, E.

  Brassey of Apethorpe, L.

  Shaftesbury, E.

  Carrington, L.

  Sutherland, D.

  Cranworth, L.

  Leathers, V.

  Digby, L.

  Beauchamp, E.

  Soulbury, V.

  Dovercourt, L.

  De La Warr, E.

  Swinton, V.

  Fairfax of Cameron, L.

  Dundee, E.

  Trenchard, V.

  Goddard, L.

  Ferrers, E.

  Woolton, V.

  Hawke, L.

  Fortescue, E. [Teller.]

  Leconfield, L.

  Home, E.

  Aberdare, L.

  Mancroft, L.

  Munster, E.

  Amherst of Hackney, L.

  Wolverton, L.

  Onslow, E. [Teller.]

SIERRA LEONE
4.30 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I wish to make a statement similar to that which has been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the situation in Sierra Leone.
For some time two unions in Sierra Leone have been negotiating, through a joint industrial council, for wage increases. A deadlock was reached on the 4th February. The employees adhered to a demand for an increase of 10d. a day, while the employers offered an increase of 6d. with a promise to re-open negotiations as soon as new cost of living figures were available. The employers asked for arbitration if their offer was not accepted. The employees' representatives refused both the offer and to go to arbitration. They invited all workers to a mass meeting at which it was decided to call a general strike on February 9. The Railway Workers' Union publicly dissociated itself from this call, and on February 9 there was only a partial response. During the next two days the strikers caused a series of disturbances at the railway workshops and the port installations and a number of arrests were made.
On Friday, the 11th, strike leaders and the leader of an Opposition political Party addressed a meeting of strikers. The strikers were promised the Opposition Party's support, and the failure to get their demands was blamed on the political Party in power. The meeting was orderly but was followed by serious rioting. The railway workshops, the dock areas and the Eastern police station were attacked by the strikers. Troops stood by to help the police who were becoming exhausted after two days' continual pressure, and in the afternoon began operations in support of them. One company relieved the Eastern police station, which was in danger of being burned down with men inside it. The police fired a number of rounds of rifle fire in defending the area of the police station. There were three casualties among the strikers and one European police officer was fatally injured by the crowd.
Rioting spread, and continued into the next day, Saturday, February 12.
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Attempts were made to dislocate essential service installations, road communications, water and electricity supplies, and the telephone system, at key points. The Governor states that these appeared to be carefully planned and executed. Three companies of troops were fully engaged during this period. They and the police had to open fire a number of times in their attempts to control the widespread rioting, and to prevent the looting, arson and general destruction of property which was going on.
On Saturday afternoon the strike leaders approached the Government. The Governor informed them that he would appoint a Commission of Inquiry to look into all circumstances of the dispute and the disturbances: and that he would immediately set up a Conciliatory Committee to bring workers' and employers' sides together again. On this the strike was called off. Rioting immediately died down. Patrols and a curfew were maintained over the weekend and on Monday there was an almost complete return to work. Troops were withdrawn on the same day and the curfew is being lifted to-day. Seventeen persons killed and eighty-four injured have been reported to date, but there may still be some casualties not yet reported. There were no serious casualties among the troops, but besides the police officer who was killed there were four others severely wounded and many suffered minor injuries.
The Conciliatory Committee has met several times but my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State, has not yet heard that they have reached a conclusion. My right honourable friend has expressed the regret and the grave concern of Her Majesty's Government at these happenings. My right honourable friend feels that he must await the report of the Commission of Inquiry before coming to any conclusions upon them.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I am sure we all greatly regret these happenings in a Colony which was making such good and steady progress, and we sympathise very much with the relatives of the European police officer who lost his life and with the relatives of all those who have been injured or have lost their lives in this disturbance. It is a sad happening and a serious one, when one considers how many people have been killed and injured. There are one or two questions

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I feel I must ask the noble Earl. First, I notice from his statement that when the Governor informed the strike leaders that the Conciliatory Committee would be called together the strike was immediately called off and rioting died down. Was any attempt made by the Governor to contact the strike leaders with such an offer before the rioting took place? Secondly, the noble Earl was unable to give us the full figures of casualties. Has he any estimate of the figures of the likely casualties, in addition to those whose death or injury is known? Finally, with regard to the Commission of Inquiry, could the noble Earl inform us how that Commission will be constituted and who, in fact, constitute the Conciliatory Committee?
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, may I ask one question before the noble Earl replies? Can he say whether the Report of the Commission of Inquiry will be published—as I think it should be—and, if so, whether a copy of the Report could be placed in the Library of your Lordships' House?
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, I would say that, as I mentioned, on Saturday, February 12, the strike leaders approached the Government, and when the Governor informed them that he would appoint a Commission of Inquiry and that a Conciliatory Committee would be set up the strike was called off. So far as my information goes, I do not think the Governor had had previous contact with the strike leaders, but he did draw their attention to the provision of Section 5 of the Trade Disputes Ordinance which had the effect of making it an offence for persons engaged in the maintenance of certain essential services wilfully and maliciously to break their contract of service. I do not think the Governor had any other contact with the strike leaders. I have no further information about casualties at the present time, but I will let the noble Lord have that information as soon as possible. With regard to the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry, my right honourable friend proposes that this should consist of a chairman from the United Kingdom, an expert on industrial relations, also appointed from the United Kingdom, and two judicial members from West Africa. In reply to the question of the noble Earl,
206
Lord Listowel, on the publication of the Report, I would say that I have little doubt that the decisions reached by the Commission of Inquiry will be published, and I feel certain that my right honourable friend will be quite prepared to lay a copy in the Library of your Lordships' House.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
4.39 p.m.
House again in Committee.
4.40 p.m.
LORD SEMPILL LORD SEMPILL moved, after Clause 6 to insert the following new clause:
Conditions relating to driving licences
".—(1) Subsection (1) of section five of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 (which makes provisions as to the physical fitness of applicants for licences) shall have effect as though the words 'including inability to drive a motor vehicle with full efficiency by night or day without the use of spectacles or other visual aids' shall be inserted after the word 'vehicle'.
(2) Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section five of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, shall have effect as though the following words were added at the end thereof 'and if the test proves his fitness to drive vehicles efficiently only when using spectacles or other visual aids, the licence shall be subject to the condition that the applicant undertakes to use such spectacles or visual aids when driving.'"
The noble Lord said: I beg to move the new clause standing in my name. The object of this clause is to ensure that persons who are able to drive efficiently either by night or by day only with the aid of spectacles or other visual aids shall have proper regard for the need to wear these whenever they are driving. As your Lordships are well aware, at the present time licensing authorities take no particular steps to impose special conditions upon drivers who suffer from poor vision and who may be a serious menace on the roads if their vision is not adequately corrected by artifical means. All that is now asked is that a person should be able to read the number plate of a car some twenty-five yards away. This is a very crude estimate of a person's visual ability, in any event, and, of course, many persons are able to read a number plate at that distance only when wearing their glasses. Once they have passed the test, they can, if they so wish, go on the roads and drive without their glasses, and in the event of this carelessness leading to some serious accident,

207
the courts, at the moment, have no means of going into the matter in any way at all.
It has been estimated that nearly 5 per cent. of the motorists of this country have vision below the standard laid down in the Road Traffic Act: they cannot read a number plate at 25 yards in broad daylight without the aid of glasses. Incidentally, as your Lordships are well aware, that standard is less than half that of normal vision, since a person with good sight would be able to read a car number plate at, say, 60 yards. What is suggested in this Amendment is that the Minister should take steps to arrange that driving licences in this country should be endorsed with some such words as: "valid only when spectacles are worn" in the case of motorists who cannot, without visual aids, read a car number plate at 25 yards. As your Lordships know, this additional endorsement of licences is already carried out in New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, certain States of Australia and the majority of States in the United States of America, including New York State. Reports I have received indicate that the arrangement works very satisfactorily. I have, as a matter of fact, in my possession a photograph of a New York State licence so endorsed, and in order to illustrate what was in my mind in submitting this matter to your Lordships I handed that reproduction to my noble friend Lord Mancroft. I suggest that the Minister of Transport might well look into the desirability of introducing some similar order here, since such an arrangement would effectively bring home forcibly to motorists that really good vision is essential for safe driving. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 6 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Sempill.)
LORD WINSTER: There seems to me to be considerable force in what the noble Lord has said about his Amendment. But if the Government should be thinking of accepting it there is one point that I should like to make. The last few words of the second paragraph of the Amendment read:
"the licence shall be subject to the condition that the applicant undertakes to use such spectacles for visual aids when driving."
I do not care very much for the word "undertakes." That means that a man
208
should give an undertaking. I think that it would be simpler, more forcible and more direct if these words were made to read
"the licence shall be subject to the condition that the applicant uses such spectacles or visual aids when driving."
My object is simply to make the provision more direct. The word "undertakes" might give rise to some difficulty in cases coming before a bench.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MANCROFT): I think we all have considerable sympathy with the point which Lord Sempill has put. Naturally, we all look with a certain amount of distaste upon a man who drives a motor car knowing full well that he ought to drive only when wearing spectacles and yet does not do so. But the problem is not quite so simple as it at first looks, because the real culprit is usually not the man who deliberately takes his test with glasses and then does not wear them, but the person, whose eyesight has been steadily deteriorating, who, not realising that he or she ought to wear spectacles, offends unconsciously. I say "he or she," advisedly, because I am afraid that such meagre statistics bearing upon this matter as we have, seem to indicate that the culprit is nearly always a middle-aged lady who is not prepared to admit that the time has come for her to wear spectacles. Those people like myself who have worn spectacles all their lives (I have worn them since I was two years of age—which I understand is about the age nowadays when young people begin to take an interest in horror comics) have to take the test wearing spectacles because they cannot pass it without them. These people would not cause any problem under the proposed Amendment. We must, however, also consider the many people who obtained their licences before the test was introduced or whose eyesight was adequate when they took the test but has since deteriorated. What would be their position?
We must also examine whether there is evidence to justify the proposed Amendment. I am bound to say that from the meagre figures at my disposal the problem at which this Amendment is directed does not seem to be the cause of very

209
much trouble on the roads. There are very few cases where it appears that the accident was directly attributable to the failure of the driver to wear spectacles. There is the further difficulty that the drafting of the noble Lord's Amendment does not achieve what he thinks it does, or what he wishes it to do—for this reason. The noble Lord's intention, if I have understood him correctly, as provided in the first subsection of the new clause, is to require that the declaration made by applicants for a licence shall include a declaration as to the applicant's ability or inability to drive efficiently at all times without the use of spectacles. I doubt whether a declaration of that kind would be of great value. But if it were, I can tell the noble Lord that we are able to provide for this in the application form by a simple amendment of the Motor Vehicles (Driving Licence) Regulations; no amendment of the Road Traffic Act of 1930 is necessary. The result of requiring such a declaration would be that, if it were made, the licensing authority would, under Section 5 (2), be obliged to refuse a driving licence except after a test.
The intention of the second half of the noble Lord's Amendment is to amend Section 5 (2) (b) so that if the driving test proved that a candidate was fit to drive efficiently only when using spectacles or other visual aids, the grant of a licence would be subject to the condition that the applicant undertakes to use such spectacles or visual aids when driving. That brings me to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster. I doubt whether an undertaking would be of very much use. It would be a pious declaration that the driver intended to wear spectacles. But what kind of spectacles would that be—would they be proper spectacles, sun glasses, reading glasses or long-distance glasses? What we should need to give effect to what Lord Sempill wishes, I presume, would be the American system of the endorsed licence. I am not certain that we really want that, however. I am not certain that the noble Lord has fully applied his mind to that matter, because it does not marry up at all with the Amendment. I ask your Lordships to consider this point very carefully, and perhaps the noble Lord also would look at it again and consider it, because such a proposal is a
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very radical departure from our present practice.
I will leave your Lordships with the thought that Lord Sempill's Amendment clearly does not cover the endorsing of licences at all; that the effect of his Amendment, as at present drafted, would not meet what I understand to be his wishes. If I have interpreted his wishes correctly, I believe that we already have power to give effect to them under the existing law; although we have not yet taken the powers under the enabling Statute. I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw his Amendment now, and perhaps he will consider it again very carefully, particularly with regard to the question of endorsing driving licences. Perhaps he will consider whether that rather drastic step is worth while, when so very few people, probably, would be involved and so few accidents are directly attributable to the cause at which his Amendment is directed. Perhaps we can discuss it again, bat on the present argument, I am afraid the Amendment is not acceptable.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: The noble Lord's reply has helped those of us who are in a quandary about this matter. I rather agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, that if any tightening up is done it should be upon the driving licence application form. Would the noble Lord consider that, and perhaps, if the noble Lord, Lord Sempill cares to put down a revised Amendment, the noble Lord could give the House the benefit of his consideration of that aspect, because I think that there the solution lies.
LORD MANCROFT: I will certainly look at it in the light of the noble Lord's remarks.
LORD SEMPILL: I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Winster for his useful suggestion about the drafting of the clause and for the sympathetic attitude adopted by my noble friend Lord Man-croft. I shall not take up your Lordships' time any further. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, for his remarks, which are in line with my own thoughts in following the advice of my noble friend, Lord Mancroft. In the circumstances, I beg to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I take it that the noble Earl in charge of the Bill will adopt the usual course and accept this Amendment without further discussion. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 6 insert the following new clause—
(". In subsection (1) of section 36 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, there shall be inserted after the words ""Goods" includes goods or burden of any description" the words "save the following:—

(a) samples carried in a dual purpose vehicle as defined in subsection (1) of section 24 of the Road Traffic Act, 1955, used by a commercial traveller for the purpose of soliciting orders but not for the purpose of advertisement or of the sale or delivery of goods;

(b) medicines, instruments or apparatus carried in a deal purpose vehicle by a medical practitioner, state registered nurse, state certified midwife, dentist or veterinary surgeon and necessary for his or her use in carrying on his or her profession as a medical practitioner, nurse, midwife, dentist or veterinary surgeon, as the case may be;

(c) such other articles as the Minister may by regulation prescribe."")—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)

THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7:
Amendments as to provisional driving licences
7.—(1) Where application is made to a licensing authority for the grant under subsection (3) of section five of the Act of 1930 of a provisional licence with a view to the passing of a test under the said section five or under section six of the Act of 1934 and the authority are satisfied that such a licence has been granted to the applicant (whether by them or by another authority) within the last twelve months, then if it appears to them that the applicant does not intend to submit himself to the said test within a reasonable time, they may refuse to grant the licence.
(2) In the said subsection (3) (which provides for the grant, on payment of a fee of five shillings, of provisional licences to drive for a period of three months) for the words "a fee of five shillings" there shall be substituted the words "such fee not exceeding ten shillings as may be prescribed" and for the word "three" there shall be substituted the word "six."
4.52 p.m.
LORD WOLVERTON LORD WOLVERTON moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after "satisfied" and to insert:
"that the applicant has held provisional licences in respect of the same classes or descriptions of vehicles for an aggregate period of not less than twelve months then if it
212
appears to them that the applicant does not intend to submit himself to the said test within a reasonable time they may refuse to grant a licence unless a period of three months has elapsed since the applicant ceased to be the holder of such a licence."
The noble Lord said: In moving the Amendment which stands in my name and in the names of my noble friends, Lord Willingdon and Lord Stonehaven, I should like to make their apologies for being unable to be here to-day. They had thought, on the programme, that this Amendment would have come up yesterday. They support it wholeheartedly.
I think this is a fairly important Amendment, which has a good deal of backing behind it. The purpose of Clause 7 is to enable a licensing authority to refuse a provisional driving licence to any person who, having been granted a provisional licence within the last twelve months, does not seem to intend to take a driving test within a reasonable time. The clause also increases the period of the validity of the provisional licence from three to six months, and the cost from five shillings to a sum not exceeding ten shillings, as decided by the prescribed Minister. The object of the Amendment is to prevent the holders of provisional licences from continuing to drive for long periods without making any serious attempt to pass a driving test. The practice has been common in the case of motor-cyclists, for whom the holding of provisional licences does not mean the disability of having to be accompanied by an experienced driver. The Amendment would introduce a definite break in the continuity of the provisional licence, which is given for six months, and at the end of that time would provide the learner-driver with the incentive to take the test. It is anticipated that normally a licensing authority would not use the power given without first writing to the licence-holder to inquire why he has not taken a test. I should like to read out the clause as we should like it to be.
"Where application is made to a licensing authority for the grant under subsection (3) of section five of the Act of 1930 of a provisional licence with a view to the passing of a test under the said section five or under section six of the Act of 1934 and the authority are satisfied that the applicant has held provisional licences in respect of the same classes or descriptions of vehicles for an aggregate period of not less than twelve months then if it appears to them that the applicant does not

213
intend to submit himself to the said test within a reasonable time they may refuse to grant a licence unless a period of three months has elapsed since the applicant ceased to be the holder of such a licence."
I hope that I have made the point clear. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 18, leave out from ("satisfied") to end of line 23 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Wolverton.)
LORD WALERAN: I should like to support my noble friend, Lord Wolverton, in his Amendment and say that I think it is one which the Government should seriously consider.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: In this clause we are doing something very simple, but I do not stand by the words as drafted, if noble Lords think they are not effective. We have really two suggestions here—one from the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, and the other from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in the first part of the following Amendment. The difficulty of this Amendment is how the local authority is to know that the person has held a provisional licence for not less than twelve months. There is no limit stated here, so that it might have been held at any time in his life. The local authority would have extreme difficulty in knowing whether someone had taken out a provisional licence in a different area. I suggest that the words, "for an aggregate period of not less than twelve months," impose an almost impossible condition on a local authority. In that respect, I prefer the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, which says that the last licence shall have been held in the previous twelve months.
In the clause as it stands, we put responsibility directly on the local authority. Both Amendments seek to impose a condition before action is taken. I am prepared to consider that, but we think the matter should be left to the local authorities, which are competent to say whether a man really intends to take a test. He has, of course, a right of appeal to the court, which can be made under Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. I do not think any local authority would be keen to appear unreasonable in withholding a licence, in view of the fact that action might be taken in court. As the noble Lord has seen, we have increased the duration of the licence to six
214
months. That means that a licence is held for six months, but at the discretion of the local authority may be withdrawn subsequently if they consider that the holder does not intend to take a test. My own guess is that he will write a letter and give an explanation that he has been abroad, or has been sick, or something of that sort, and they will say: "Here is another licence." If noble Lords think that that is giving too much discretion to local authorities, then we shall be prepared to consider it further.
LORD WOLVERTON: We felt that it was a good thing to have a definite break, because it would encourage people, and particularly motor-cyclists, to come forward for a test. We realised the difficulty of having two different licences with two local authorities. The present practice is somewhat abused now, and as the Government were taking power to tighten it up, we felt that a definite break would encourage the drivers to submit themselves for a test. However, we shall have further discussion on the Amendment to be moved by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and therefore, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL THE EARL OF LISTOWEL moved, in subsection (1), to omit all words from and including "such" down to the end of the subsection, and to insert:
"the applicant has been granted such licences which were in force for a total period of not less than twelve months (the last licence granted to him having been in force at any time during the twelve months immediately preceding the date of commencement of the period for which a licence is desired) and has either (a) not been subjected to the said test during the last twelve months of such total period as aforesaid or (b) failed to pass the said test on at least three occasions, they may after considering any representations made by or on behalf of the applicant refuse to grant a licence."
The noble Earl said: I was glad to hear what the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, said in reply to the last Amendment, because it seems to me that he would agree with my view that this subsection of Clause 7 is unsatisfactory at the moment. I move this Amendment because the subsection as drafted seems to me to be somewhat vague and ambiguous, and for that reason will not carry out the intentions of the Government, with which I think both the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, and I are in sympathy.

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I was also glad to note that the noble Earl is anxious to meet the views of the licensing authorities, because in what I have to say I am speaking with the support of at least one important licensing authority. What I am afraid will happen if the clause as drafted goes into the Bill and becomes law is that, on the one hand, licensing authorities will interpret it in different ways, and therefore, that different practices will grow up in different parts of the country; and, on the other hand, unnecessary litigation will occur and magistrates will find difficulty in interpreting the subsection. Before going further, I would say that I do not expect the noble Earl to accept my Amendment as it stands. All I should like, and what I feel the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, would like, is that this subsection should be withdrawn for consideration between now and the Report stage, and that the Government should be willing to produce another form of words when we come to the next stage of the Bill.
I should like to specify what I feel would be improvements in the subsection. As it stands, the subsection does not specify the length of time the applicant must have held a provisional licence before a licensing authority may consider refusing his request for a renewal. In paragraph (a) of my Amendment I propose that the applicant must have had a provisional licence for at least twelve months—that specifies the period. The second part of my Amendment provides that the ground on which a licensing authority may refuse a provisional licence is based on fact and not intention. The words in the subsection are:
"that the applicant does not intend to submit himself to the said test within a reasonable time."
Is it not asking a lot of local licensing authorities to interpret the intentions of an applicant? After all, intentions, even good ones, are notoriously unreliable. A man may intend not to take a driving test one day and then change his mind the following day. I think this emphasis on the subjective state of mind of intention makes it difficult for the licensing authorities.
Therefore my Amendment suggests as the ground for a refusal to grant a provisional licence two matters of fact. The first is that the applicant has not, in fact,
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taken a driving test in the previous twelve months; and the second is that he has taken a driving test three times and failed in all three tests. Both of those are quite easy things for the licensing authority to establish, and therefore they would be in a position to judge with absolute certainty whether or not there was ground for refusing an application for a provisional licence. It is on those grounds that I hope the noble Earl will be willing to reconsider this subsection between now and the next stage of the Bill, and I hope that in doing so he will be willing to consult with the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, and myself, and any other noble Lords who have expressed an interest in this particular matter. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 18, leave out from ("that") to end of line 23, and insert the said new words.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
LORD GIFFORD: I had intended to speak on the last Amendment, but I think that both of these Amendments are really aiming at the same thing. The noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and other noble Lords, feel that there has been considerable abuse of these provisional licences, and that the criterion of intention is so vague that there ought to be something definite in the clause to guide local licensing authorities: it may be the gap suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, or, even better, that the man should automatically have a definite period of grace when he gets a provisional licence, but after that must show cause why he has not been for a test. Paragraph (b) of the Amendment of the noble Earl is also reasonable, in my view—that if the man has failed on three occasions he must show the reason why. I gather that the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, is sympathetic towards the principle of these two Amendments. Whether or not we have got quite the right answer I do not know, but I hope he will look into this matter between now and the Report stage.
LORD WINSTER: I imagine that the thought lying behind these two Amendments is that their movers wish to see some teeth put into the existing system of the driving test, and I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, may feel inclined to give full consideration to that idea. The system of the driving test

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seems to me to be a quite admirable one: to improve the general standard of driving on the roads. However, I fear that it does not entirely achieve that object, because abuse of it by means of the provisional licence is notorious. I cannot see what is the use of instituting a driving test if people are able to go on driving month after month without having passed it. They drive about with a plate with the letter "L" on it. What we really want is to get them to put up a plate with "GB" on it—"Getting better."
5.10 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I am glad to accept what the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, says. I will take this back and look at it and see whether we can devise words which will be more suitable. I think we are all at one. What we want is administratively the simplest way of doing it—that is to say, whatever is most suitable for the local authority who have to deal with it. I know that the noble Earl speaks with considerable authority for one great local authority, and I have no doubt that they have given their mind to this matter. It seems that the opinion expressed is that the conditions in which the local authority can operate are too vague, and I will see whether we can put something in the clause to make the position clear.
I think the noble Earl passed rather lightly over paragraph (b) of his Amendment, because that goes rather further. I have to be a little careful before saying that we endorse that suggestion, because the noble Earl there proposes that after a man has failed a test three times he should not get a licence at all. The purpose of this clause is, in a sense, a reversal of that principle. The clause seeks to encourage people to take tests. Under the noble Earl's Amendment, I presume, if a man takes a test three times and does not pass, he would never get a licence. It is rather important to be clear about that, because it is a little different from the rest of the clause. I am afraid that it might act as a discouragement to people to take tests, because they would say, "If I take a test too soon, and I make a mess of two of them, I may never get a licence at all." Some people are very bad examinees in this matter, and do themselves less than justice when they take the examination. Finally, there is no special reason to
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believe that where a man is taking his test for the fourth or fifth time it will not be entirely satisfactory.
In his Amendment the noble Earl uses the words, "may, after considering … refuse a licence." I am afraid that that may be taken by the local authority as meaning that after the third test they ought not to grant a licence; I am afraid that is the way in which the local authority might act. I do not know whether the noble Earl intends that, and that a man should be permanently disqualified from driving if he fails three times. He did not say so, and I do not know whether it was his intention. As he has not said so, perhaps I may take it that it was not. I think the second point is different, but at the moment I am not convinced that it is necessary.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I said in moving my Amendment that I did not expect the Government to accept it as it stands. Let me say now that I have the same objection to my Amendment as the noble Earl opposite. I think paragraph (a) is much sounder than (b). All I wanted, however, was that the Government should consider the wording of this subsection, with a view to stiffening it a bit, if possible, and making it more acceptable to local authorities. With the undertaking which the noble Earl has been good enough to give, I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.12 p.m.
LORD BURDEN LORD BURDEN moved, after subsection (1) to insert:
"(2) Any person aggrieved by the refusal of a licensing authority to grant such a licence may appeal to a court of summary jurisdiction and on any such appeal the court may confirm the decision of the licensing authority or order the grant of such a licence."
The noble Lard said: I beg to move the, Amendment standing in my name. May I say, if exception is taken to the wording of the Amendment, that I should prefer Amendment No. 40 standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton. With the broad intention of this clause, I think no one will disagree, but for many people the possession of one driving licence is a necessity for them to earn a living; and to be deprived of one would be a serious hardship. It might be that in all the circumstances the refusal of a driving licence was justified, but I suggest that

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the persons concerned would feel an acute sense of grievance if, first of all, they were not informed of the grounds on which the refusal was based, and, secondly, had no opportunity of appealing against the refusal. This may seem a trivial matter, but I feel sure that on reflection your Lordships will agree that a person deprived of the means of earning a living is entitled to a measure of consideration to ensure that justice is not only done but appears to be done. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 23, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Burden.)
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I think I can give the noble Lord an assurance. As I think I said earlier, this point is already covered by Section 5 (5) of the 1930 Act, which says:
"If any person is aggrieved by the refusal of a licensing authority to grant a licence"—
he may appeal to the court. That fully covers the point, and I can say that it covers a provisional licence just as much as an ordinary licence. Therefore, I think the Amendment is unnecessary.
LORD BURDEN: I am grateful to the noble Earl, but may I suggest to him, with all respect, that this ought to go into the Bill? It is all very well to say that that is provided for, but, if he is intelligent, the unfortunate person who may have his licence refused may turn to this Bill; and he will see nothing in it about a right of appeal. What is he to do then? Surely to expect a person who may feel aggrieved to go back to an Act of Parliament passed twenty-three years ago is asking a little too much. I would appeal to the noble Earl either to put it into this Bill, or, if he cannot do that, to see that the licensing authority refusing the licence makes it perfectly clear to the person concerned that he or she has a right of appeal.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): I appreciate the spirit that is animating the noble Lord, Lord Burden. There is always a difficulty in repeating statutory provisions. If we insert a special one in this context it may throw doubt on the general point that "licence" includes "provisional licence." I shall be glad, however, to examine the noble Lord's second point on administrative action which would make it easier for the applicant. Perhaps he will allow me
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to report it to my right honourable friend, to see what can be done. I hope that that will content him.
LORD BURDEN: With that undertaking, for which I thank the noble and learned Viscount, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 agreed to.
5.20 p.m.
LORD SEMPILL LORD SEMPILL moved, after Clause 7, to insert the following new Clause:
Conditions relating to provisional licences
(". Subsection (3) of section five of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, shall have effect as though the following words were added after 'conditions,' that is to say 'and the said conditions shall provide that the holder of a provisional licence shall not drive any motor vehicle unless another person holding a valid driving licence is also present in such motor vehicle and unless the said vehicle is so adapted as to enable the said person to stop the said vehicle from the position in which he is seated.'")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name on the Marshalled List. As I see it, it was the clear intention of Parliament, as expressed in the legislative measures of 1930 and 1934, that any holder of a provisional licence who had not passed the Government driving test should be accompanied by a qualified driver who would be in a position to control the actions of the learner. That intention can be, and is, as your Lordships know, avoided and abused, whilst complying possibly with the letter of the law. For instance, the qualified driver in the vehicle may be asleep or reading a book in the back of the car, or he may be seated in the "dicky" or, in a Pullman type vehicle, on the tip-up seat with his back to the driver and with the glass partition closed. In any case, in a large number of modern cars the hand-brake is completely inaccessible to a passenger in the front seat, thereby making the contribution of the instructor in a moment of crisis a verbal one—a state of affairs hardly calculated, as your Lordships will agree, to assist a beginner in an emergency.
I suggest that the essence of the existing law is that the holder of the valid licence should be in a position where he can control the vehicle should it be necessary in the interests of safety. As has already been mentioned in the course of this debate—and it is not irrelevant for me to

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refer your Lordships to it again—these provisions came into effect some twenty years ago, at a time when there were only 2½ million vehicles on our roads, as compared with 5½ million to-day. In order adequately to exercise a degree of control sufficient for the valid licence holder to bring the vehicle to a halt in an emergency, it is essential not only that he should be seated in a position allowing maximum visibility, but that some simple form of dual-control of the foot-brake should be immediately accessible to him. The provision of a dual-control apparatus sounds a cumbrous and expensive operation, possibly involving structural alterations to the vehicle. That is not so. There is a simple device which could be purchased for a small sum, or even hired for a few shillings, and fitted in a matter of minutes to any type of private car: that is, the dual control foot-brake. Of course, to attain the ideal, to have a dual control of the clutch and accelerator, would naturally require a more involved arrangement, but that can be done. Should any of your Lordships be interested to see a device of this nature, arrangements could be made for a car or cars so fitted to be outside your Lordships' House for demonstration purposes.
It will be generally agreed that there are few roads in this country where the embryo motorist may practise, at least in the early stages, without his lack of experience constituting a real danger to other road users. The danger would be greatly minimised, however, if a dual control of the type I have suggested to your Lordships were to become obligatory for holders of provisional licences. I think it possible that this suggestion may not be greeted with enthusiasm by Her Majesty's Government. I would suggest, however, that the failure to date of the Ministry of Transport to publish figures relating to the number of provisional licence holders involved in notifiable accidents, when such figures obviously are easily available, is an argument for the adoption of this Amendment rather than its rejection.
This Amendment is aimed directly at the reduction of accidents in the immediate future, without cost or labour to the Ministry of Transport. Both experience and common sense show that, in the interests of the learner drivers themselves, as well as of other road users, there
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should be a statutory obligation to provide dual control in vehicles put to this use. The cost is negligible and the results, I submit to your Lordships, might well be substantial. The adoption of this Amendment would constitute, in my view, a real and practical step towards the reduction of accidents. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Sempill.)
EARL HOWE: I have listened with great interest to what the noble Lord has just told us in support of his Amendment, but I am sorry I cannot agree with him. I appreciate his efforts to assist the back-seat driver to take a hand in the proceedings, but that is sometimes done to-day, with all its attendant dangers, without learner drivers in the car. The noble Lord has been a member of the country's naval forces. I should have thought he knew of the dangers of having two people on the bridge. With all its possible defects, surely it is better to have one person solely in charge of a vehicle rather than the possibility of a sort of split line between the pair of them. I would much rather accept whatever possible dangers there may be in the learner driver, and just have the other man with him, than allow the instructor to "chip in" on occasion and interfere with the learner when he is actually controlling the vehicle. Somehow, I think that the proposal now made is unsound. I cannot see that the present arrangements work too badly. I have not heard any very great complaints that they do.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I hope the noble Lord who moved this Amendment will have a second thought about it, because I find myself in agreement with the noble Earl, Lord Howe. After some considerable experience, I must say that it is far from inexpensive to make a dual control car really safety-complete. More accidents, I would suggest, are likely to be caused, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has said, by having two people to do one man's job, than there would be without. I fear that it would have the reverse effect rather than that envisaged by the noble Lord, Lord Sempill. I am afraid should find great difficulty in trying to support him.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: The noble Lord, Lord Sempill, has drawn attention

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to a matter which I suppose could be considered to be of some importance but without which we have, on the whole, got on very well up to the present time. I do not think there are any statistics or any evidence showing that those with "L" licences have an unusual number of accidents. I have made inquiries on that point and there is no evidence at all to show it. Of course, if there were, obviously it would be the motor-cycle driver who would be more likely to be involved than the motor car driver. I must say I think it unlikely that any wise person would go with a learner driver and either sit in the back seat or fall asleep. It is certainly not the intention or the letter of the Act that that should be the case. Apart from other considerations or regard for the law, he is supposed to have at least a regard for his own skin.
I find myself in full agreement with what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has said. It has been said that it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. That probably applies in the same way to two people tugging at a brake. It might create a very difficult situation indeed. I feel that what is proposed is not necessary. Another point which would inevitably arise is that it would make it very much more difficult for people to learn to drive. It is most important that people should have full facilities. Many of your Lordships have probably taught people to drive. It is not too difficult to find isolated places where one can start and gradually move up without any real danger. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sempill, will not press this Amendment.
LORD SEMPILL: I thank my noble friends the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth (both of whom are experienced motorists), who have had something to say on this matter, and also the noble Earl who has replied for Her Majesty's Government. In view of the fact that the feeling of the Committee seems to be against this Amendment, I will comply with the noble Earl's suggestion and withdraw it. I do so with great regret, because I believe that there is a real and growing need for a dual control attachment. But since that cannot be to-day, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.31 p.m.
LORD BURDEN LORD BURDEN moved, after Clause 7 to insert the following new clause:
Licences of drivers of heavy goods vehicles
". Section eight of the Emergency Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1953, which provides for the temporary suspension of section thirty-one of the Road Traffic Act, 1934 (which provides that a person shall not drive a heavy goods vehicle on a road unless he is licensed for the purpose) shall have effect as though there were substituted for all words after 'until' in subsection (1) the words 'the first day of January nineteen hundred and fifty-six' and as though there were substituted for all subsequent references in that section to the appointed day a reference to the first day of January nineteen hundred and fifty-six."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name. The object of this Amendment is to fix a definite date for the reintroduction of special licences for drivers of heavy goods vehicles. These special licences were obligatory until the outbreak of the war when they were suspended under the Defence Regulations. Provision was, however, made in Section 8 of the Emergency Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1953, for the reimposition of special licences on a day to be appointed by the Minister. All that is suggested in this Amendment is that the appointed day should be January 1 next year. May I point out that the bringing into force of that section would not involve any undue difficulty so far as concerns those who are now driving heavy goods vehicles, since it lays down that licensing authorities will automatically grant licences to those who have been driving such vehicles for six months in the aggregate during the preceding year, or who already hold a heavy goods vehicle driving licence. Moreover, the section makes provision for spreading the work of granting licences within a period of four years.
Anyone who has had experience of motoring on the trunk roads will agree with me when I say that the great majority of those driving heavy goods vehicles in this country are among the best and most considerate drivers on our roads; but it is desirable that we should ensure that new recruits to that responsible job should be properly trained and capable of doing the work. We have heard on several occasions that under this Bill we are dealing with lethal weapons. Would anyone to-day allow a young man of twenty-one, trained in the use of a rifle, immediately to use one of the new

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cannon-fired rocket projectiles? Yet something similar to that is operating on the roads to-day. In present circumstances any young man who has attained his twenty-first birthday can pass the Government driving test with a pre-war car of any type, and be entrusted the following day with a heavy goods vehicle weighing up to as much as twenty tons. I would submit to the Committee that obviously that is not right. It may have been necessary during war-time, when manpower was short and when great risks had to be taken, but the time has long passed when the proper regulations should be reinstituted.
I do not think it would he any answer to say that owners of heavy goods vehicles would not entrust such expensive vehicles to inexperienced drivers. In many circumstances, they are obliged to use the only men available. It has been suggested that the unskilled driver is a prime cause of accidents. I would suggest that we ought seriously to consider that only properly skilled drivers should be allowed on our roads with what, more than once to-day, have been described as lethal weapons. I have been told by the British School of Motoring—this is a point in support of the case I am endeavouring to put to the Committee—that one commercial firm, engaged in road transport in an extensive way, have reduced their number of road accidents by over 50 per cent. as a result of themselves ensuring that their drivers are fully competent. I venture to think that the case I have tried to submit to the Committee is one which should receive the sympathetic consideration of Her Majesty's Government. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Burden.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should like to begin by underlining, and expressing my agreement with, what the noble Lord, Lord Burden, said as to the present-day standard of driving by those who have to drive heavy goods vehicles. There is only one point I think one ought to have in mind in order to get the position into true perspective. It is quite correct, as the noble Lord, Lord Burden, said, that these vehicles may he very heavy—he spoke of vehicles of over twenty tons. Of course, this classification includes all articulated vehicles which are
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used for heavier haulage; but, as a matter of definition, it also includes any lorry over three tons. Therefore, the whole field is not confined to heavy loads, in the sense that we have been discussing them in another context.
With regard to the general problem, I had it very much in mind myself, because, as I once told your Lordships' House, it had been my task during the last three years to endeavour to get rid of the Defence Regulations, and to decide which could be allowed to expire and which raised a problem that needed to be restated in permanent legislation. That was the reason why I decided, and Parliament eventually passed, the section dealing with this point to which the noble Lord, Lord Burden, referred—Section 8 of the Emergency Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. It then became a matter for the Minister to decide when it should be reintroduced. If there were any feeling in the Ministry that present arrangements were having an adverse effect on road safety, I should certainly not be advancing this argument to the Committee; but I have looked into the matter and I have had information put before me, and I should like to put that information before the House because I feel it disposes of that point.
Taking personal injury accidents as a percentage of heavy goods vehicles licences, and using that percentage for purposes of comparison, I understand that the figure in 1936 was 11 per cent., in 1949 7 per cent. and in 1953 7 per cent. I think noble Lords will be sufficiently interested to bear with me if I give the number of vehicles in those years: 1936, 62,700; 1949, 78,500; 1953, 101,500. It is remarkable that, despite that increase in the total number of vehicles, there has been no increase in the percentage, and that the present figure compares so well with those of pre-war days. There are few spheres in which the post-war figure compares well with the pre-war figure.
I will explain the difficulties in which we find ourselves on this point. First, there is the general increase in manpower required. I am advised that to restore this licence would at the start require upwards of 100 additional clerks. Look at the matter from another angle. We estimate that there are approximately three drivers for every heavy goods vehicle, so that, on the figures which I mentioned a

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moment ago, there is a total of about 300,000, and, as the noble Lord himself said—and I agree—new recruits are constantly coming along. The restoration of the heavy goods vehicle licence would thus require either a considerable increase in the complement of technical staff to do the driving testing or would reduce the time that the existing certifying officers and vehicle examiners—those who formerly did the testing for these licences—can spend on the non-goods vehicles, on the more important work of examining and testing the condition of the passenger service vehicles, and on the goods vehicles themselves. That is a matter which we must consider at the present time. I am sorry that a question of staff should be important, but we do so regard it.
I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Burden, that, while the figures show that there is not an acute safety problem here, I shall convey to my right honourable friend, the Minister, the importance which the noble Lord has attached to this matter and the arguments which he has put forward. Although at the moment we do not think it is a suitable time to make these increases of staff, and it would indeed be difficult to find the certifying and examining staff without taking them off very important work, I shall explain to the Minister that in the view of the noble Lord and, I am sure, of his friends, this is an important matter, and I will ask the Minister to bear that in mind. Perhaps the noble Lord would be prepared not to press this Amendment tonight, but might put down a Question or ask for Papers in a few months' time. In the meantime, I assure him that I shall press the importance of the point on my right honourable friend.
LORD BURDEN: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount. Now I must step very warily, because I was never good at figures and I am a little puzzled at those he has given. Unless my calculations are absolutely wrong, the number of incidents remains about the same.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord is quite right; it is a question of the proportion. I hope I did not make any false point. The proportion is reduced as compared with the pre-war figure. I agree the numbers have gone up, as I said.
LORD BURDEN: That is how averages and percentages are apt to lead one astray, for it is little or no consolation to a man or woman who may be killed that he or she is one of a falling percentage; nor is it much help to a person who has been injured that the Ministry takes pleasure in the fact that percentages in these cold figures have fallen. I appreciate the argument in regard to staff, and on that point there may be some further representation made to the Minister. But in view of the kindly and considerate nature of the answer of the noble and learned Viscount, I have pleasure in asking leave of your Lordships to withdraw this Amendment. At the same time, I would assure the noble and learned Viscount that I have also noted his other, very amiable, suggestion about a Question.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.49 p.m.
LORD BURDEN LORD BURDEN moved, after Clause 7 to insert the following new clause:
Amendment of 20 & 21 Geo. 5. c. 43, s. 4
". Notwithstanding anything contained in section four of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, a driving licence issued by a local authority in Northern Ireland shall not be effective in Great Britain except in so far as the Minister may by order provide."
The noble Lord said: I hope that in moving this Amendment I shall not be accused of any political animosity in view of the well-known majority political view in Northern Ireland. I am putting the Amendment forward because I believe the present position is anomalous. The object of the Amendment is to do away with what I consider is the present absurd situation under which persons who are unable to pass a driving test in this country can, if they can raise the fare, go over to Northern Ireland, where I am advised no driving tests are necessary, and can obtain a Northern Ireland driving licence which is equally valid in Great Britain. I have no means of testing the fact, but I gather that this method of evading our own licensing arrangements is becoming increasingly known, with the result that more and more people are giving the Northern Ireland Government the advantage of the receipt of the driving licence fee and then coming over here and using the vehicles on our roads. I know that in these matters between Governments, and particularly with a Gov-

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ernment so proud, I suppose, of its position (I do not like to drop a brick and say, "anomalous position"), they are very jealous of their prerogatives. I suggest, however, that it is time that their licensing laws were brought into line with our own, so that this anomaly may be ended. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Burden.)
5.50 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: I very much regret that I do not feel able to support the Amendment moved by my noble friend, Lord Burden. To the best of my knowledge, the inhabitants of the Republic of Southern Ireland are not treated in this country as foreigners. In fact, I believe that many thousands of them are working in Birmingham at the present moment without any let, hindrance or restraint of any sort. I should not think it would be advisable to impose any restriction of this sort—and it is a restriction of rather small nature—upon Northern Ireland. I cannot imagine that the practice to which my noble friend has referred is very widespread, or that there are such a number of people driving about with Northern Ireland driving licences as to make any regulation on the subject necessary. I think it will be far better to leave it to the good sense of the Government of Northern Ireland, to perceive as time goes on what an excellent idea it is to have these driving tests and to impose them in their own territory.
Incidentally, the Amendment brought to my mind something which proves how hospitable the Government of Northern Ireland are in regard to such matters as this. I once visited Northern Ireland with the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and it was at a period when his driving licence was suspended. He was unable to drive in this country. But at one point in our journey we were met by the Attorney-General of Northern Ireland with a very nice Vauxhall car. With all the pleasure in the world, he invited Lord Howe to drive. Lord Howe at once climbed into the driving seat and drove us for the remainder of our journey on that occasion. Remembering that instance of Northern Irish hospitality, I do not feel that I could give any support to this Amendment.
LORD BURDEN: I am sure that that hospitality has now been amply repaid.
LORD MANCROFT: Lord Burden is quite right, and I think he has put his finger on rather a curious anomaly. Whether when he raised the matter he knew what Lord Winster has just told us about the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I do not know. That is a matter for them to settle between themselves afterwards. Lord Burden is only right in a sense when he says that it is possible for a citizen of this country to pay a flying visit to Northern Ireland, obtain a driving licence without a test and then to come back and drive in this country. The operative term is "flying visit," because before a licence is granted the Northern Ireland authorities demand that you should satisfy them that you are in fact not paying a flying visit but intend to or are residing in the country. I do not believe the practice of obtaining a licence in this way is very widespread, but the queer anomaly has received a certain amount of publicity as the result of the conduct of a certain film star who, having failed to pass her driving test in this country, rather petulantly announced that she was going to fly to Northern Ireland to get her licence there. I think she was not aware of the fact that she would have to satisfy the Ulster authorities that she intended to reside in Northern Ireland. To do so would no doubt have upset her film career quite considerably.
I see also the validity of Lord Winster's point. But I think I can meet both noble Lords. There are three possible ways of getting over the difficulty. First, the Northern Ireland authorities could introduce a test themselves. I believe they are thinking of doing this in a Bill which will shortly be introduced. Second, they could tighten up their scrutiny of the applications in response to which these licences are issued. That also is being done, though, of course, it will not solve the problem entirely. Third, an appropriate clause might be put in this Bill. I must tell the noble Lord, Lord Burden, that I do not think his Amendment will meet the case. I think he is trying to amend the wrong portion of the Bill. We did at one moment contemplate putting a clause in the Bill, but we withdrew it, because we thought that there were other and more important things upon which to concentrate. But now the matter has

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been raised we must look at it again. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Burden, not to tie me down to any one of those three methods which I have suggested for dealing with this problem. But I will give him an undertaking that we will consider how to tackle the matter. I ask him to withdraw his Amendment and to allow us to deal with it in whatever way seems best and most sympathetic towards Northern Irish feelings.
LORD BURDEN: In view of the atmosphere in which this Amendment has been discussed, I have much pleasure in asking leave of the Committee to withdraw it. At the same time I am sure Lord Mancroft will not object if I also pick up in regard to this Amendment what his noble and learned friend told me in regard to the previous Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8:
Road-safety information and road training
8.—(1) The Minister may with the approval of the Treasury—

(a) provide for promoting road safety by disseminating information or advice relating to the use of roads, or

(b) make contributions towards the cost of arrangements made by local authorities and other bodies for the practical training of road users or any class or description of road users.

(2) A local authority shall have power to make arrangements for the purposes of paragraph (a) of the last foregoing subsection or for giving such practical training as is mentioned in paragraph (b) thereof, and to make contributions towards the cost of like arrangements made by other authorities or bodies.
5.57 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1), to omit paragraph (b). The noble and learned Viscount said: It might be convenient if we considered the content of this Amendment and the next Amendment, which is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, and Amendments 46, 47 and 48, because they all deal with the same subject matter and, I hope, clarify the things which we all desire to see clear. The four Government Amendments—and I hope that after consideration Lord Lucas of Chilworth may think that they meet his point; they are certainly intended to do so, and if they do not I shall be very pleased to look at them again—are intended to do five
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things. They are intended to make it absolutely clear, first, that the Minister may spend money on road safety information; secondly, that the local authorities, as defined in the clause, may spend money on road safety information; thirdly, that the local authorities may spend money on road training; fourthly, that the local authorities may contribute towards road training arrangements made by other authorities or bodies; and fifthly, that the Minister may contribute towards arrangements for road safety information or road training made by the local authorities or other authorities or bodies. I am afraid that the way I have read this out—I have tried to be very quick—makes it sound like an exercise in permutations and combinations. I think, seriously, that it is important that everyone should be in a position to help everyone else and that it should be absolutely clear that they have the right to do it. That is what we have sought to do. I hope that the Committee will approve of our method. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 32, leave out from ("roads") to end of line 36.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for moving the Amendment in that way. Subject to anything which my noble friend Lord Milner of Leeds has to say on a particular point, I think the Amendment covers what I was seeking to do. May I put it in my own language—not that the noble and learned Viscount was not clear. I would say that these Amendments of the Government give reimbursement to the local authorities for monies dispersed on practical training in road use and safety and also in the dissemination of information regarding road use and safety. I was a little cloudy on this point, and, if the noble and learned Viscount will not mind doing so, I should like him to refer to Section 115 of the Road Traffic Act. I think he is right. I do not want to keep on pressing this point about consolidation, but it is so terribly difficult to have to keep on going back to find the reference of the legislation. If the noble and learned Viscount will take a glance at it, he will see my point. What clouded the issue in my mind was the statement that payments may be made out of the Road Fund for this purpose. Unfortunately, the Road

233
Fund ceases to exist, but that does not matter so long as the money is paid out of a central fund. If the noble and learned Viscount can give me the assurance that there is no attempt to repeal anything in Section 115 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, and that these Amendments give the Minister power to reimburse out of central funds, I am prepared to accept the Government's Amendments and not move Amendment No. 45 standing in my name—subject, of course, to anything that my noble friend, Lord Milner of Leeds, has to say on the point.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: It seems to me that I ought to speak at this time or otherwise I may be cut out, if the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is passed. The point of my Amendment, No. 45A, is that for some years local authorities have spent money on road safety propaganda and the Minister has made contributions towards those activities. I gather that it is perfectly clear that the Minister is satisfied that he has power to make these contributions and that he proposes to do so. In point of fact, his power has been extended under subsection (1), because he will be able to make contributions towards the cost of training road users, which, I think, is something new.
That situation is satisfactory, so far as it goes, but an important point of principle is involved. I am informed by the Association of Municipal Corporations that in these cases the Minister does not make grants towards central administration expenses, although such grants would seem to be very necessary. Central administration expenses are that proportion of salaries and wages of local authority staff which can fairly be attributed to time spent by staff on this work. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is in a position to give me any undertaking on that matter, but, as I say, it is one of principle.
I am informed that the Local Government Manpower Committee in their first Report (Cmd. 7870) recommended, as a matter of principle, that all actual expenditure incurred for the purposes of grant-aided services should be admitted for grant, irrespective of whether it related to work which was decentralised and
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carried out in separate departments or to work carried out centrally in one of the general administrative departments of the local authority. Admittedly, there was an exception in the case of road works, but that does not affect the principle I am putting forward. I shall be glad if the spokesman for the Government can tell me whether the Government are prepared, in the grants they make, to include contributions towards the central administration expense of local authorities. It seems only fair and reasonable that they should do so, and that they should not limit those contributions to the publication of Bills and so on. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount is in a position to give me any assurance on this matter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think I can be of some assistance to the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, on this point. I should be glad to see that what I say now is thoroughly checked, and if there is anything I say which I have to modify in any way, I will write and let the noble Lord know. The object of Amendment 45 is presumably to ensure that the Minister shall be empowered not only to make grants towards the cost of actual disbursements by local authorities in disseminating information and advice but also to make contributions towards such proportion of overhead expenses as can be allocated to road safety work—for example, salaries and office expenses. I understand that the Minister can do this under the clause as it is proposed to be amended by the Government Amendments Nos. 46 and 48, by which the Minister is to be empowered to make contributions towards the cost of arrangements made by a local authority. The determination of how much of such costs is to be attributed towards salaries and office expenses is merely a matter of accountancy. It is not a bar to a contribution towards the cost of arrangements that the cost includes salaries and office expenses.
That is as I am advised on the matter, and that appears to me to be right; but, as I say, if any doubt should arise I will communicate with the noble Lord. But I am advised that the matter is covered. Again, if I may deal with the point of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, in the same way, so far as I can see, from listening to the noble Lord, his point

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is also dealt with satisfactorily. Perhaps he would leave it in the same way and when I read the speeches, if any point should arise, I will communicate with him.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: I am obliged for what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I do not doubt that the power probably exists now. The point is that apparently the Ministry do not take advantage of it. It may be a matter of administration—I do not know, but if the noble and learned Viscount would be good enough to look into it and let me know, I should be obliged.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I also accept what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I think he has met me completely, but he will know better than I do whether he has or not, and he can tell me later.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I thank both noble Lords very much.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 38, leave out ("paragraph (a) of").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
6.9 p.m.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS LORD MILNER OF LEEDS moved, in subsection (2), after the word "subsection" to insert:
"including publication of leaflets and advertisements arranging lectures, demonstrations and exhibitions, holding competitions, awarding prizes and organising research into the causes of accidents on roads."
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that the local authorities have power to do the various things mentioned. I may say that these provisions follow the precedent of Section 89 of the West Riding County Council (General Powers) Act, 1951. They would enable local authorities to develop their road safety activities in the most effective manner. Following the usual practice, whereby, when an enterprising local authority like the West Riding County Council obtain a power, that power is later extended generally, it would appear desirable that these powers
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should be included in this Bill and extended to all local authorities. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 38, after ("subsection") insert the said words.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will illustrate the difficulty we feel about this Amendment by two proverbs. Surely your Lordships would all applaud the proverb that "Many hands make light work," but your Lordships would equally applaud the proverb that "Too many cooks spoil the broth." The difficulty we are in here is that this Amendment, which has the distinguished ancestry to which the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, referred, makes a list of certain matters which are deemed desirable. It stipulates various methods of road safety propaganda which, with the possible exception of organising research into the causes of accidents on roads, will be entirely covered by Clause 8 (2) as at present drafted. I do not think there is any point—in fact, I think it would be a disadvantage—in listing particular powers when the general power is all-embracing. As the noble Lord knows, the trouble about specifying in this detailed way is that it has, and can have, a limiting effect on general words. Therefore, I would ask the noble Lord, on the merits of the matter, to rest assured that the points on which he is anxious are covered and, on the legal aspect, to prefer the method of safety.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: As I understand it, we are assured that the whole of these powers will be covered under the general terms of the clause. If that is so, then I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Before the noble Lord withdraws it, I want to be absolutely frank and say that there is the possible exception of organising research. I think that is dealt with in another way, and I do not think the noble Lord need worry about it.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 39, leave out from ("giving") to ("and") in line 40 and insert ("practical training to road users or any class or description of road users").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This, too, is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 41, at end insert ("and the Minister may with the approval of the Treasury make contributions towards the cost of any such arrangements as are mentioned in this subsection").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS LORD MILNER OF LEEDS moved, in subsection (3) (a), after "borough" to insert, "a metropolitan borough." The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that metropolitan borough councils are included amongst the local authorities who under this clause will be able to make arrangements for road safety information, road training and so forth. I understand that the metropolitan boroughs have made a request to that effect, and it would seem desirable, and indeed necessary, that they should have these powers. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 44, after ("borough") insert the said words.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)
LORD MANCROFT: I can assure the noble Lord that the word "borough" does include "metropolitan borough," and therefore this Amendment is unnecessary.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.
6.14 p.m.
LORD HAMPTON LORD HAMPTON moved, after Clause 8, to insert the following new clause:
". The following subsection shall be substituted for subsection (1) of section one of the Act of 1934:—
'(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall not be lawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle on a road in a built-up area at a speed exceeding thirty miles per hour.
For the purposes of this Act a length of road shall be deemed to be a road in a built-up area:—

(a) in the case of a road which forms part of a trunk road or a road classified under
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the Ministry of Transport Act, 1919, in Class I, II or III if a system of street lighting furnished by means of lamps placed not more than two hundred yards apart is provided thereon on or before the first day of September nineteen hundred and fifty-five unless a direction that it shall be deemed not to be a road in a built-up area is in force under this section; or

(b) in the case of an unclassified road, if a system of street lighting furnished by means of lamps placed not more than two hundred yards apart is provided thereon unless a direction that it shall be deemed not to be a road in a built-up area is in force under this section; or

(c) in the case of any such road as aforesaid if a direction that it shall be deemed to be a road in a built-up area is in force under this section;

and not otherwise.'"
The noble Lord said: The object of this Amendment is to ensure that as from September 1, 1955, the lengths of road regarded as being in a built-up area, and thus subject to the general speed limit of 30 miles an hour, shall, in the case of Trunk and Class I, Class II and Class III roads, be altered only by the making of an order. Under the law as it stands at present, if on any length of road a system of street lighting is installed with the lamps not more than 200 yards apart, automatically that length of road becomes subject to the speed limit. In many cases the effect of the installation of street lighting is to make the road more safe, not less safe, and therefore automatic restriction is quite illogical. The Amendment deals only with trunk and classified roads, so that where new residential estates are developing the roads in them will automatically become restricted without the necessity for the making of orders and the consequent waste of administrative time and effort.
When a general speed limit was introduced by the Road Traffic Act, 1934, it was necessary to have some simple method of defining the areas where the speed limit would apply. At that time, generally speaking, the street lamps were installed mainly for the benefit of pedestrians, and therefore the built-up areas were closely related to the areas having street lighting. With the growth of motor traffic and the extension of high intensity street lighting to stretches of main arterial road, the automatic restriction resulting from the provision of such street lighting has become both undesirable and unnecessary. If the Amendment is accepted, in future each length of road

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where there is a proposal for restriction will have to be considered on its merits.
I realise that there are possible objections to this Amendment. It is believed that the Government may be sympathetic to the acceptance of an Amendment upon these lines. It may, however, be argued that if this Amendment is adopted, in several years' time there may be a dispute as to the date on which the requisite system of street lighting was installed on a particular road. It is suggested that such an objection to the Amendment would be ill based for the following reasons. First, local authorities are under a duty to erect and maintain the appropriate traffic signs indicating restricted and de-restricted lengths of road—I only wish they would do it a little more accurately. If their records are properly maintained, they ought to know which areas need to be signed, and there should, of course, also be an appropriate system of inspection of the signs to see that the authority's statutory obligations are being properly performed.
It is perhaps appropriate to mention here that the compliance of local authorities with their statutory obligations to maintain a small de-restriction sign on all lamp posts situated outside built-up areas leaves much to be desired. As we all know, these signs are very difficult to see. I never can make out why they put these little de-restriction signs for the most part on the top of a lamp-post, because the top of the lamp-post at night is the one place where you can see nothing, as the light is shining on to the road and on to the pavement. In the Annual Reports upon the Road Fund each year information is published in regard to the lengths of roads restricted and de-restricted. I have a number of figures here with regard to restricted and de-restricted roads, and so forth. I do not think I need weary your Lordships with them, but they are available if anybody wants to see them. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 8, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Hampton.)
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I have listened with great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has said, because I have an Amendment down later (No. 54) which purports to do precisely the same thing. After listening to the
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noble Lord, and having read his Amendment carefully, I prefer his Amendment to mine—perhaps he was fortunate enough to get a better draftsman. I support what the noble Lord has said, and I speak from bitter experience of this matter, having been once connected with the administration of the Act which makes it automatic that a built-up area is an area that has street lamps 200 yards apart. It does not matter whether that area is in the wilds of the country. That has been known. I remember great difficulty at times, when by-passes were built to go round built-up areas, and in order to get sections of them restricted to 30 miles an hour the enterprising local authority put up street lamps 200 yards apart. Automatically the by-pass which was built to circumvent the congestion of the built-up area and the necessity to have a 30 miles an hour limit became a built-up area itself. I think that is wrong, because the trouble that has to be taken to get a stretch of road like that de-restricted really defies description. It takes months and months and months. I agree with the noble Lord that it should be the affirmative process, and not the negative process. In other words, no Class I or trunk road should be a built-up area and subject to a 30 miles an hour limit without an order from the Minister. That is where the noble Lord's Amendment is better than mine, because it might be said that by my Amendment every little street on a housing estate had to go through the same process, which is something I did not intend.
I also agree with the remarks the noble Lord made about the de-restriction signs on the lamp-posts. I know the noble Lord appreciates that as soon as those lamp-posts are up, the local authorities are compelled by law to put a 30 miles an hour disc up. If further lamps are put along this trunk road the sign has to go out still further. Then they have to bring it back when the Minister makes the de-restriction order, which may be six months after the lamp-posts have been put up. They then have to bring it all back and put the black striped discs on the lamp-posts. I want the noble Lord who is to reply to consider this point. Some lamp-posts on some of these roads are 300 yards apart. At night you do not know whether you are in a restricted or a de-restricted area unless you have a steel tape in your pocket and go

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out and measure the distance, because driving along a dark, wet road, you cannot judge whether the lamps are 200 or 300 yards apart, and you wonder whether they have forgotten to put the black and white discs up. Therefore I hope the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, will accept this Amendment. It is something which is vitally necessary. From my experience in the Ministry I know the Minister will always restrict a road if he thinks it is necessary, but the pressures which are put upon the Minister of Transport not to de-restrict a road are many, varied and very heavy. Therefore I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Man-croft, will be sympathetic and will accept this Amendment. I think it is a good one. At least, the principle is unassailable, even if the drafting is not to his liking.
LORD MANCROFT: I agree with all that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has just said, and in the face of advocacy of such power coming from such diverse quarters as my noble friend, Lord Hampton, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, I have no option but to accept the Amendment. This I will do in principle, as I think it is a change which clearly we ought to make. There have been objections to such a proposal in the past, but I think those objections are no longer very valid. Perhaps there will still be objections—the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, mentioned the two principal ones. I think we must run that risk. The main point in support of the Amendment which he made is the fact that nowadays the effect of installation of lighting on a road is to make the road more safe and not in need of restriction. That is a most important point. I can therefore accept the Amendment in principle. I say "in principle" because there may be one or two changes in the drafting which we may have to make. I thank the noble Lord for having put the matter so fully and lucidly.
LORD HAMPTON: I am grateful to the noble Lord.
LORD MANCROFT: I hope I made it clear that I was accepting the Amendment in principle, and I would, therefore, ask the noble Lord to withdraw his Amendment now so that we can look at the drafting problems.
LORD HAMPTON: In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9:
Section 1 of Act of 1934 to be permanent
9. Section one of the Act of 1934 (which provides for a general speed limit in built-up areas) shall have permanent effect and accordingly subsection (10) of that section (which relates to the duration thereof) is hereby repeated.
EARL HOWE EARL HOWE moved to add to the clause:
"(2) The following subsection shall be added at the end of section one of the Act of 1934:
'(9) For the purposes of this Act a length of road shall, notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, not be deemed to be a road in a built-up area unless there is upon such length of road an indication that it is a road in a built-up area by reason of the presence of a system of street lighting with lamp-posts placed not more than 200 yards apart or by the presence of prescribed signs indicating such restriction placed not more than 200 yards apart.'"
The noble Earl said: As we all know, a restricted area is normally indicated by the 30 m.p.h. sign and by the fact that the lamp-posts are not more than 200 yards apart. Under the extreme difficulty of modern traffic, and the extraordinary congestion that one finds, it is easy for a driver, with the best will in the world, and being very anxious to observe the speed limit both in the letter and in the spirit, to pass such a sign—it may be temporarily blanketed, for instance, by another vehicle. If he does find himself in such a road it is true that he should realise that there are lamp posts, but I feel that it is all wrong that the existence of the limit should depend on the presence of lamp posts. Moreover, in the aggregate, there are nearly 2,000 miles of unlit roads which are restricted. They constitute the real trap. Past the restricted sign there is nothing to warn the driver that he is in a restricted road. Therefore, I am asking that in such a restricted road, the restricted sign—if you like in miniature—should be repeated. Personally, I should like to see the restricted sign repeated on all the lamp-posts where they exist, but I realise that that is probably impracticable and would give rise to great expense. I do feel, however, that we ought to remove the anxiety which a driver must feel that he may come on a restricted section of the road when he has not been able to "spot"

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the restriction sign and when there are no lamp-posts to remind him of the speed limit, and that he may inadvertently break the law. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 4, at end insert the said subsection—(Earl Howe.)
LORD STRATHCARRON: Many of your Lordships will know of a stretch of road to which the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, might be applied. There is just such a road at Burgh Heath. I duly appeared before the bench and I sought guidance from the chairman. I am afraid that I was not much wiser after his reply, because it was short and sweet—it was, "40s." But he could not really answer my inquiry about how I could have known that this particular road was restricted. I do not feel that it would be an expensive or particularly difficult job to mark all these roads clearly, and it would help to clarify a situation which can be most confusing.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: The noble Earl, Lord Howe, has clearly raised a point which is a safety measure. I do not think anyone can be in any doubt that at various places where a 30 m.p.h. speed limit is imposed there are neither lampposts nor any signs for some distance. As he has said, there are somewhere in the order of 2,000 miles of restricted roads in this country which are not flanked by lamp-posts. I would point out one fact straight away; that is, that this involves expenditure both by local authorities and by the Treasury. My right honourable friend would like to have the opportunity of consulting the local authority associations before finally accepting this Amendment, although in principle he is in entire agreement with what the noble Earl has suggested here. If that procedure is agreeable to him, I should be grateful if the noble Earl would withdraw his Amendment so that this consultation can take place before it is inserted in the Bill.
EARL HOWE: I should like to thank the noble Earl very much for the sympathetic answer he has given. Of course, I shall be delighted to withdraw the Amendment. May I ask him whether it would be in order to replace it on the Marshalled List for the Report stage, or
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would the Minister simply write and tell us what he is going to do?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I will certainly keep the noble Earl informed, but in the ordinary course he should replace it on the Report stage.
EARL HOWE: I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.31 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved to leave out Clause 9. The noble Lord said: I put down this Amendment not with any intention of pressing it but once again to appeal to Her Majesty's Government to accede to a request that I made some time ago in your Lordships' House, when I put down a Question, to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they would have an all-embracing inquiry, in the economic interests of the country and in the interests of all classes of road users, into this general question of the vehicle speed limits. I do not want to say anything that will detract from any argument that may be raised by any noble Lord in your Lordships' House on any Amendment that is to come, but I should like to recall the Answer I received from the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. The Question I asked was [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 190, No. 5, col. 267]:
"To ask Her Majesty's Government if they will have a special inquiry made and a report presented to Parliament on the present road vehicle speed-limit legislation with special reference to its effect upon the national economy and the safety of road users."
The noble Lord, Lord Hawke, said—I quote a few lines from his reply:
"… my right honourable friend"—
that is the Minister of Transport—
"does not feel that a convincing case has been made out for a general inquiry into vehicle speed-limits."
The only comment I can make about that statement—and it was not an appropriate time to make it on Question and Answer—was that his right honourable friend had been very badly advised, because speed limits applicable to types of vehicles are laid down in the First Schedule of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, and were really only applicable to conditions of that age and year and to vehicles of that age and year.
There are fifteen different speed limits (if your Lordships would like to refer to them at any time, they are contained in the First Schedule to the Act of 1930) ranging from three miles per hour for heavy locomotives—that is, traction engines—"within any city, town or village," and five miles per hour "elsewhere." There are numbers of speed limits of eight miles per hour, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, only this afternoon in your Lordships' House has given the anomaly of the 20 m.p.h. limit for vehicles of three tons and over, also referred to by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor. The permitted maximum speed for any vehicle on the roads of this country, other than a motor car constructed solely for the use of passengers to the number of seven and under, excluding the driver, is thiry miles per hour.
I want to ask the noble Earl who is to reply on behalf of Her Majesty's Government how many cases he can give me, in the last measurable period, of a motor coach driver being prosecuted for driving at over thirty miles per hour. The law is absolutely in contempt; and the reason is that it is a foolish law. I think it was the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, himself who said during the course of our discussions on this Bill: "It is no good trying to enforce a law which does not meet with the approval of the public, or which is inoperable." If the speed limit laws of this country were rigidly enforced, the whole of the road traffic of this country would come to a standstill. There is an overwhelming case for revision. There is an overwhelming case for a thoroughgoing inquiry. Indeed, the noble Earl's right honourable friend the Minister is having one in London, for he has referred the case of the 30 m.p.h. limit to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee. Is London any different from Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow or any other overcrowded city in this country?
We shall argue this matter. Lord Howe will argue it later on, I expect, because there are Amendments down on the speed limit question. Why not clear it up? Why try to enforce regulations which the police do not even attempt to enforce, or to enforce laws passed in 1930 that pay no regard to modern engineering and the great strides that have been made with mechanical perfection? Take the brakes of the
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modern 36-seater, long-distance coach of to-day and the charabanc of 1930. The vast bulk of the coaches of this country travel at fifty and sixty miles per hour, and in perfect safety. How long can we withstand having some sensible inquiry? I know what the noble Earl's answer will be when he is pressed on a later Amendment to abolish the 20 m.p.h. limit and raise the limit to 30 m.p.h. for all goods vehicles of three tons and over. I am not going to put it into words, but what an opportunity for spineless Governments, who have burked that issue for so many years, to have a public inquiry and the weight of a public inquiry to give them the necessary courage to do it! That goes for all Governments: I am not singling out the present Government for condemnation when I say that.
I will not waste your Lordships' time any more because the case does not need any advocacy. It is outstanding that the whole of the road users of this country, from pedestrians upwards, should be alerted to one of the great problems which we are facing in this country—that is, to get our traffic moving as fast and as safely as we can. We must try to get all classes of traffic travelling at uniform speeds, and not try to amble along under an archaic law that was passed in 1930 and has had little or no revision since. As I told the noble Earl, I shall not press this Amendment. I have no objection to this clause, because it simply means that the speed limit provisions are taken out of the Expiring Laws Continuance Act and that in future we shall not have to pass this once a year. If the noble Earl can give me a sympathetic reply on the case of having a thorough investigation into this matter, with a view to having a revision of the speed limit laws of this country, I shall appreciate it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 9.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth):
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: All that Clause 9 does is to move the 30 m.p.h. limit from the Expiring Laws Continuance Act into a permanent Statute. I hope the noble Lord will not mind my saying this, but I had not the faintest idea what he was going to say when he began to move this Amendment—
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I apologise for that.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I had no idea that the noble Lord wished to raise a debate on the subject of speed limits. I would make just one point. I am not instructed to answer the point which he raised, as he knows perfectly well, but here we are dealing with a Bill which is primarily a safety Bill. The basis of the noble Lord's argument was an all-round increase in the speed of cars. If you are going to revise the speed limit all round, you are not going to revise it downward, you are going to revise it upwards. I cannot say that we are as enthusiastic in regard to that as we are in making a determined inroad into the number of accidents which take place on the roads. I appreciate that there may be a broad case made by the noble Lord, and certainly I will consider the point which he has advanced to-day. I hope, with those few words, that he will withdraw the Amendment.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: The noble Earl has said precisely what I thought he would. I wanted to bring this home once again to the noble Earl. Will the noble Earl discuss it, and will other senior Ministers on the Front Bench endeavour to see that the Minister looks at this matter? That is my point. I will not prejudice the issue by talking about raising or lowering the limit; I want the whole thing examined, and on that note I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.42 p.m.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA LORD BRABAZON OF TARA moved to leave out Clause 9 and insert the following new clause:
"9.—(1) In subsection (1) of section one of the Act of 1934 (which provides for a general speed limit in built-up areas) after the word 'hour' there shall be inserted the words 'between the hours of 5 a.m. and 12 midnight.'
(2) Section one of the Act of 1934 as amended by subsection (1) of this section shall have permanent effect and accordingly subsection (10) of that section (which relates to the duration thereof) is hereby repealed."
The noble Lord said: Before I move my Amendment may I say a word on the speech I made on Second Reading, by which, I am afraid, I offended a magistrate by implying that he had hurried my case through and had not allowed me to ask certain questions. He was much hurt by what I really did not mean to imply,
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which was that he was hurrying my case. He certainly hurt me, but I did not mean to imply that he was hurrying my case because there were so many motoring cases. Having said that, I come to this Amendment. I do not know whether the Committee will remember that when the 1934 Act was introduced it proposed a speed limit which was going to be rather difficult to push through the House of Commons. We made an arrangement with the Government of the time, that if we could have the speed limit off at certain hours of the night, we should not object to the speed limit during the day. Mr. Oliver Stanley was then Minister of Transport, and by virtue of that pledge things went fairly well and smoothly through Committee. When the Bill came to your Lordships' House, it contained the very words which I am moving in this Amendment, and your Lordships' House eliminated those words. Unfortunately, between the time of the Committee stage of the Bill and its return to another place, there was a change of Minister. The new Minister wanted to get the Bill through, and he never implemented the pledge which the former Minister had given; consequently, I have always considered that we were extremely badly treated over that matter: it was a pledge which the Government did not implement.
This is a fairly simple matter. We have speed limits for the reason that there is traffic and danger at certain times of the day—for example, when school children go to school and when there are crowds. Those are the times when speed limits are desirable. But between the hours of midnight and 5 a.m. you will see, by all your records of accidents, that there are no accidents at all; consequently, it is absurd to have a regulation which does no good and which is very often disobeyed. It is absurd to have a speed limit on an open road in the middle of the night. On being caught or trapped by the police, not a single motorist would consider it anything else but a trick to be "had up" at that particular time. I do not plead for the abandonment of speed limits as they are, although one could put up a tremendously strong case for that proposition; but when a speed limit is not necessary, as is the case between the hours of midnight and 5 a.m., there is no reason for having it. It was the opinion of the Ministry of Transport at the time; it was the opinion

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of the Government at the time, and I cannot see that anything has happened since to make them change their minds on what was a satisfactory idea and one which I should like to see reintroduced. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 9 and insert the said new clause.—(Lord Brabazon of Tara.)
LORD WINSTER: I warmly support the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara. I remember when I was a young naval officer being shown an example of how not to give an order. A certain commander of a naval barracks put up a notice in the officers' bathroom: "Order. No officer is to occupy a bath for more than 10 minutes. N.B. This order is to be obeyed." Then came the commander's signature. The lessons I was taught were: first, that it is absurd to make an order and then say that the order is to be obeyed; and, secondly, that it is equally absurd to make an order which you know will not be obeyed and which you know you cannot possibly enforce, because, short of putting a seaman sentry upon each bath, you could not possibly enforce that order. I think some of those considerations apply in this case, because, between the hours of midnight and 5 o'clock in the morning, the 30 miles an hour limit is not obeyed, and there is no reason at all why it should be obeyed, for, as the noble Lord has said, there are no accidents at that time. In any case, there are no means of enforcing that order between the hours of midnight and 5 a.m. To enforce it would not only be superfluous but would necessitate keeping on duty men who do not normally have to be on duty at that hour. For those reasons, I think there is great force in the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara. I strongly support it, and I hope that the Government will accept it.
EARL HOWE: I think I ought to say a word at this stage, because, when the matter came before your Lordships' House, I was one of the people who voted for the retention of the speed limit between the hours of twelve midnight and five in the morning. I remember the occasion quite well. Many noble Lords thought it a silly idea to have a speed limit which ended at an arbitrary time, like five minutes to twelve, and to suggest
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that it was dangerous at five minutes to twelve but was quite all right at five minutes past twelve. I think that was the reason which actuated those of us who voted as we did on that occasion. It is not by any means unknown for drivers to find speed limit patrols working in the small hours of the morning. It is true that it was some time ago, but I myself remember discovering three officers on an open road in Surrey, miles away from any town. A police officer jumped out from a blackberry bush, and that was that; I had "had it." At the same time I do agree with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara. On reflection, and certainly if we in this House had known of the arrangement which had been made in another place on that occasion so long ago, I do not believe we should have voted for retention of the speed limit during the hours of 12 midnight and 5 a.m. Having had experience through all these years, I should be prepared to vote for the noble Lord's Amendment.
LORD MANCROFT: The noble Lords, Lord Brabazon of Tara and Lord Howe, are perfectly correct in saying that this particular topic had a very chequered Parliamentary career in 1934, well before my time, and any attempt to unravel it from the pages of Hansard and to decide who was in favour of what, and why, would be an extremely difficult task. I suggest that the real criterion now on which to judge the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, is to ask, "Will it increase road safety? Will this Amendment, by taking off the speed limit between the hours of 12 midnight and 5 o'clock in the morning, increase safety on the roads?" It is largely a matter of opinion what answer one gives, but there are one or two aspects of the problem which I should like to put before your Lordships for consideration. First, it is not true to say that the speed limit is not enforced at night. It is, of course, not enforced as strictly as it is during the hours of daylight; but I have very vivid memories of being stopped in the main street of Amesbury in Wiltshire during a Territorial camp when I was driving a 3-ton Army lorry at four o'clock in the morning, and spoken to by a police sergeant in what I considered—perhaps not altogether justifiably—the worst possible taste.

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It is not accurate to say that there are no casualties between 12 midnight and 5 a.m. There are quite a number, though not as many, of course, as during the hours of daylight. I will not weary your Lordships with the figures which I have here, because statistics when read out are neither convincing nor pleasant. But the casualties are still far too high, and between 12 midnight and 1 a.m. nearly as many casualties occur as do during the remaining hours of the night. The figures for the early hours of Sunday morning are alarmingly high, and noble Lords have only to think for a moment of the reason for that to realise that the subject must be treated seriously. I agree with the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that the fixing of an arbitrary time, from midnight to 5 a.m., is bound to cause difficulty.
LORD SILKIN: Is the noble Lord giving us here the figures of accidents in built-up areas?
LORD MANCROFT: I imagine they are very largely for built-up areas.
LORD SILKIN: But not specifically so?
LORD MANCROFT: I am afraid my figures do not give details and I should require notice, but I imagine that very largely they refer to built-up areas. A further point is that when a speed limit is in operation it causes people to avoid driving at 70 m.p.h. and to prefer to travel at 40 m.p.h., even if they do not attempt to keep strictly to the 30 m.p.h. speed limit. I believe that if the speed limit were taken off people coming out of a party and going home in the small hours of the morning would be under no restraint to drive at a sober pace. I consider that is an important factor. I believe it is also important that one should remember the need to drive at a moderate pace in the early hours of the morning to keep down the noise in built-up areas. I have been dealing with arguments for which it is not easy to provide concrete proof, but I believe that together they provide cumulative evidence that no great improvement in road safety would be achieved by taking off the speed limit between the hours of 12 midnight and 5 a.m., but that to do so would cause an increase in accidents. I hope the noble Lord will not press this Amendment and that he will consider these arguments. I
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shall be happy to let him have my figures and perhaps he may then consider whether he is able to agree with my thesis. Before asking the noble Lord to withdraw his Amendment, may I thank him for the apology he made when he first opened his remarks. My noble friend the Lord Chancellor has also asked me to express his appreciation, and I am sure noble Lords will be pleased to hear him say this.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I feel that both the advocacy for this Amendment and the very reasoned reply which the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, has made pinpoint the whole of my previous Amendment. Such a matter as this should be subject to inquiry, because there is great point in what the noble Lord says. But we have to take into consideration the conditions of 1955 rather than those of 1934, and the great increase in traffic. The Minister of Transport has referred this question of the 30 m.p.h. limit in London to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee. I would suggest to the noble Lord that this question should also be referred to that Committee for their opinion. I find myself now between the two sides, for I can see the force of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, and the force of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft. I would ask the noble Lord who moved this Amendment to tell me what good it would do, even though it might not increase road danger. So far as I can see, the only advantage would be to get rid of an irksome restriction. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, has said that the speed limit does put a sense of responsibility into people. I do not agree, for if the sense of responsibility is not there, and reflected in sober behaviour at 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, the mere fact that there is a 30 m.p.h. speed limit will not put it there. While the figures of the noble Lord may well be correct, he cannot tell me that they have been due to excessive speed; they may be due to many other circumstances, apart from the question of sobriety.
I believe there is a real danger that we are apt to go the easy way and to say that speed qua speed is the source of evil; but it is not. The evil is speed by the wrong people at the wrong place at the wrong time. I should like this question thoroughly examined by impartial

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people. If the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, will forgive me for saying so, he is, and always has been, throughout his life, a special pleader for the taking of risks. We all admire the risks he takes. We congratulate him on a wonderful performance in upholding British prestige in Switzerland only two weeks ago. On the other hand, the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, with that forensic skill which we admire, is really pleading the case of a Government Department who loathe having the status quo altered; so they are both special pleaders. I believe noble Lords would be content—I feel sure we on this side of the House should—if the noble Lord would reinforce my plea for an inquiry into the whole question of the speed limits, road safety and the economics involved, and would refer this specific matter—as it deals only with built-up areas where a 30 m.p.h. limit is in force—to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee.
LORD MANCROFT: I will, of course, do everything I can to help the noble Lord. One objection that immediately occurs to me is, however, that the procedure which he wishes me to adopt would not be altogether suitable because the Committee could only consider the problem as it arises in the Home Counties. But I will certainly look at the point again, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, will agree to withdraw his Amendment. I am not certain what is the best way of meeting Lord Lucas of Chilworth's request for an inquiry into the matter—on this I should like to have the opportunity of consulting my noble friend Lord Selkirk—and I do not wish to make promises to which I cannot give effect. I shall, however, investigate whether anything can be done.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My whole point is that what we all want to do is to carry public opinion—that is absolutely necessary. Public opinion requires a lead; and it will not get one unless there is a representative inquiry. I suggested referring this matter to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee only because that body is sitting on this particular problem in London at the present time. My advocacy was for an overall inquiry, because this is a problem which affects Glasgow, Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham, and any other city one likes to mention. We really have got
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into a jam on this question in present conditions, and I think that a thorough examination is necessary to determine the right attitude to the question of a speed limit.
LORD SILKIN: Before the noble Lord replies I should like to say just a word—and I hope that my noble friend will not mind my intervening at this stage. Of course, no one could object to an inquiry at any time. If it is possible to have an inquiry on this point by all means have one. But I should like the noble Lord to appreciate that there are some noble Lords who feel that speed is an important factor in road accidents and who are not wholly enthusiastic about this particular Amendment.
LORD MANCROFT: I think the best thing I can do to satisfy everyone is to consult with my right honourable friend the Minister of Transport, tell him exactly what has happened, inform him of the views that have been expressed, and then let your Lordships know what we can best do to meet this valid point. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, that we must carry public opinion with us. But I would differ from him when he says that the Government wish to keep this speed limit merely because a Government Department is unwilling to consider any change in the status quo. I should not be prepared to argue the case on that basis. I feel that public confidence in the efficacy of the speed limit would be weakened if there were any serious relaxation in its requirements. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, will agree to withdraw his Amendment so that I may have the opportunity of discussing the matter with my right honourable friend. If he will, I shall represent his views as strongly as I shall represent those of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: Before I withdraw the Amendment, I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, on having made a second speech on his own Amendment, which I thought was extremely ingenious of him. But I do not like his saying that I have taken risks all my life. I can assure your Lordships that I am one of the most careful drivers in London. I do not say that I do not go fast in other places—but that one is entitled to do.

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On this question of speed limits to be enforced at certain times, Lord Howe suggested that it was rather ridiculous to have one law applied at one time and to change it at another. But surely we are used to that sort of thing in the licensing laws. It is an offence to drink at one time but not an offence to do so at another, perhaps only live minutes later. We are all used to that—or at least everyone who drinks is used to it. What I should like to put to my noble friend, if he will bear with me, is this. Will those conducting the inquiry into this matter bear in mind the fact that there may be a new type of speed limit in which hours of the day come in? I know of many roads used by school children, and at certain times the danger at these places is very great, and the speed limit should be very low. But to have a 30 m.p.h. speed limit there between two o'clock and six o'clock in the morning is to bring the law into disrepute and contempt. It is this sort of thing which we want considered, with the possibility of future legislation. If my noble friend will say that he will look into this I will certainly withdraw my Amendment.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I wish to correct any wrong impression which I may have given when I said that the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, had taken risks all his life. I certainly did not mean that to apply to him as a motorist.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): I only want to say this. I have listened to my noble friends, Lork Selkirk and Lord Mancroft, and I thought that they took a very sensible line. They did not agree to an inquiry: they said that they would get into touch with the Minister of Transport and put before him fully everything that has been said to-day. I do not think that they could have gone further than that. I got some impression from the last remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, that he thought the Government had agreed to an inquiry. My noble friends cannot do that—at least we should be very rash to do that without consulting the Minister of Transport.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: But if we make out a good case the Minister may well consider it a good thing to have
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such an inquiry. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.7 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Before the House resumes it will perhaps be useful if I tell your Lordships of the future dates for the various stages of this Bill. What we propose is to resume the Committee stage on Tuesday next at 4 p.m., after concluding the business on the other Bills which are set down for that afternoon. There are four small Bills to be disposed of. As soon as we have done that we will come back to this Bill. We shall sit until seven o'clock or half past seven that evening, and we hope to be able to conclude the Committee stage on the following Tuesday, March 1, when the Bill will be first Order at half past two—that is to say, there will be two more days for the Committee stage. The Government are anxious not to hustle the House in any way over this Bill: we regard it as most important that it should have the fullest consideration. The Report stage would then be taken on Monday, March 14 (which should give practically a fortnight between the Committee stage and the Report stage, allowing any consultations that may be necessary), and also the following day, if necessary; that is to say, two days will be devoted to the Report stage, if needed. The Third Reading would be taken on Tuesday, March 22. I hope that that programme will be satisfactory to the House.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: On behalf of noble Lords on this side of the House, may I say I am grateful to the noble Marquess the Leader of the House for what he has said. It is quite acceptable to us, and on behalf of noble Lords here I should like to thank him for the consideration which he has shown, and for the time he has allowed the House for this very important Bill.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: May I ask the noble Marquess if, when he said four o'clock on Tuesday next, he really meant that; or did he mean when first Orders were over?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am afraid that I meant when first Orders were over. But we hope that that will be by four o'clock.
House resumed.
House adjourned at nine minutes past seven o'clock.