Sitting of 29 July 1954

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN

  MINISTRY OF MATERIALS (TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS)
  The VICE-CHAMBERLAIN OF THE HOUSEHOLD reported Her Majesty's answer to the Address, as follows:
  I have received your Address praying that the Transfer of Functions (Ministry of Materials) Order, 1954, be made in the form of the Draft laid before Parliament.
  I will comply with your request.

  LIVING ANIMALS (EXPERIMENTS)
  Address for
  "Return of experiments performed under the Act 39 and 40 Vict. c. 77, during 1953. (In continuation of Parliamentary Paper No. 312 of Session 1953–53)."—[Sir H. Lucas-Tooth.]

  MOTOR VEHICLES (OFFENCES)
  Address for
  "Return showing the number of offences relating to motor vehicles in England and Wales, the number of persons prosecuted for such offences, the results of proceedings in magistrates' courts, and the number of alleged offences in respect of which written warnings were issued by the police, together with the number of persons concerned, during the year ended 31st day of December, 1953."—[Sir H. Lucas-Tooth.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  EDUCATION

    Physical Recreation (Encouragement)
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Education (1) what steps she is taking to encourage and develop the game of association football; and what grants she has made to voluntary bodies in this connection;
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    (2) if she will make a full statement on what action she intends taking to encourage physical fitness and sport of all kinds;
    (3) if she will call a conference of representative people interested in sport in order to receive suggestions and advice for future action.
    The Minister of Education (Miss Florence Horsbrugh): Physical education forms part of the curriculum of all schools and of a great many establishments of further education. According to their age and sex children take part in a wide variety of games or sports, which will usually include association football for boys. Local education authorities also use their powers under Section 53 of the Education Act, 1944, to provide other facilities for physical training and recreation.
    I make a substantial grant to the Central Council of Physical Recreation, which has close contacts with governing bodies of most national sports' organisations and which advises me on needs generally. I see no reason to call a conference or to suggest a change in our ways of encouraging young people to keep fit.
    Mr. Smith: Will the Minister reconsider her answer in the light of the debate that took place last night and the excellent reply made by her Parliamentary Secretary? Will she consult her leading officials and then consider what action to take?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I shall certainly consider the debate that took place last night, and also the excellent speech of my hon. Friend.
    Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamiltonasked the Minister of Education whether, in view of the extent of juvenile crime, she will take steps to facilitate the provision of more courses, on the now well-tried principles of the Outward Bound schools, to divert the young into the interesting and healthy channels which they provide.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I regret that I cannot add to the answer given to my noble Friend by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary on 8th July.
    Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: Bearing in mind the gap between the school-leaving age and the time of call up, does not my right hon. Friend think

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    that a considerable extension of the type of training that is provided by the Outward Bound schools would have a tremendous effect not only in reducing juvenile crime but in diverting some of the activities of the "Edwardian" groups?
    Miss Horsbrugh: The work that the schools are doing is excellent. I would remind my noble Friend that it is open to local education authorities to assist young people attending these courses and that their expenditure in this respect ranks for grant. I believe that local education authorities generally are aware of the work those schools are doing, and that it needs no further recommendation from me, but if it does I certainly say again in this House what tremendously good work they are doing.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Would the right hon. Lady specify what organised efforts are being made outside school hours to divert young people's minds into constructive channels?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I think there are a very great many of them, such as through youth club schemes and further education. If the hon. and learned Gentleman would like details of any particular branch of these activities perhaps he would put a Question on the Order Paper.

    Obsolete Schools (Rebuilding)
    Mr. Morleyasked the Minister of Education whether, in view of the fact that she proposes to bring Part III of the Education Act, 1944, into operation about 1957, she will ensure that, by that date, obsolete schools which have been on the black list since 1926 will have been rebuilt.
    Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. I cannot say precisely what progress will have been made by 1957 in dealing with unsatisfactory school buildings.
    Mr. Morley: When does the Minister mean to modify Circular No. 245 so as to allow local authorities to get on with the rebuilding and rehabilitation of very old schools?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I think I made the position clear in the debate on Monday. Children are going from old buildings into new schools. In fact, one in six of
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    all the children are now in schools that have been built since the war. That process is continuing. We shall have fewer children in the bad schools and will get to the stage in which we shall be able to pull down the old schools when we have sufficient new ones for the children to go into.
    Brigadier Peto: Is my right hon. Friend aware that old buildings do not necessarily mean bad schools?

    Playing Fields
    Mrs. Slaterasked the Minister of Education when she expects to be able to lift the ban on the development of playing fields imposed in 1952.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary gave her on 22nd July.
    Mrs. Slaterasked the Minister of Education how many schools in Stoke-on-Trent have no playing fields; how many have school yards inadequate for organised games; and how many of these are primary and how many secondary modern schools, respectively.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I regret that this information is not available in the Department.

    Catering Training Facilities, South-West Region
    Mr. Wilkinsasked the Minister of Education if she is aware of the urgent need for a catering training school in the South-West region of England to meet the needs of the catering industry; and whether she is now prepared to give her consent to the inclusion in the 1955–56 education building programmes of such facilities.
    Mr. Haymanasked the Minister of Education what proposals she has received for providing a catering unit at Torquay Technical College to serve the South-Western counties; and what decision she has taken in this matter.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I am aware of the need for better facilities for catering education in this region, but as I have explained to the Devon local education authority, I cannot at present approve a proposal which involves substantial new building.
    Mr. Wilkins: May we take it that it is only a temporary embargo on the provision of these facilities? Is the right hon. Lady not aware that her Department not only sanctioned the proposals but, I am advised, set aside money to carry them through? Does she realise the urgency of this need in South-West England, in which the catering industry is a basic industry?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I quite agree that we want to have better facilities for catering instruction, but we have certain urgent priorities in the building of technical colleges. The priorities are engineering, mining, textiles and building. However, I have suggested to the Devon authority that although it cannot put through its bigger project at the present time we should meet to discuss how its more pressing needs could be met by a relatively small project.
    Mr. Hayman: Will the right hon. Lady bear in mind that this is intended to be a regional unit for the whole of the South-West? Will she remember that the tourist industry is one of the most important in the South-West, particularly in Cornwall and in my constituency, Falmouth and Camborne? If the Treasury is blocking the way to this much needed extension of the buildings will she ask the Chancellor to remove his embargo quickly?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I do not think I can add to what I have said, and the hon. Gentleman will not disagree with me about the importance of mining, as well as catering, in his constituency.
    Mr. C. Williams: Will my right hon. Friend, now that the Government's policy has progressed so much, use her influence with other Ministers who are in favour of amending this circular so that there can be better training for this great dollar-earning industry in future?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I think that we must keep the priorities, and that the other Ministers and the House will agree that the four priorities we have in the types of technical education must come first.

    Meals and Milk Service
    Lieut.-Colonel Lockwoodasked the Minister of Education whether she is aware that children who receive education in premises specially sanctioned under the Education Act, 1944, by reason of the
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    fact that they receive education otherwise than at school, are ineligible to receive meals and milk service afforded to other children; and whether she will take whatever steps are necessary to put an end to this anomaly.
    Miss Horsbrugh: Yes, Sir. Local education authorities have power to provide milk and meals only for children who are in attendance at school. Legislation would be required to change this position.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lockwood: Will my right hon. Friend consider introducing legislation in view of the extreme importance of children receiving adequate meals? It is not more important that they should get adequate meals than that we should be put to a little trouble to amend or remove regulations that prevent them from having them?
    Miss Horsbrugh: The children who go to the schools do, of course, get milk and meals. At present, I cannot ensure legislation could be brought in to deal with these particular groups of children.
    Sir W. Smithers: Is there no limit to the activities and, therefore, to the expenditure of the taxpayers' money in my right hon. Friend's Department?
    Miss Horsbrugh: Yes. I think the fact that there is a limit has been brought out in several debates and answers to Questions. I should like that limit to be as high as possible, and, perhaps, even higher than it is.

    Modern Secondary Schools, Bristol
    Mr. Awberyasked the Minister of Education how many classes there are in the modern secondary schools in Bristol with over 30 pupils; to what extent the overcrowding is due to a shortage of teachers or accommodation; and if she will now agree to grant the number of schools requested by the local committee for the coming year.
    Miss Horsbrugh: There were 263 such classes in January, 1954. The Bristol education authority would require both more teachers and more accommodation to enable it to reduce to 30 the size of classes in its secondary modern schools. I have included in the authority's 1955–56 building programme and its reserve list

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    all the projects designed to provide additional secondary school places for which they asked.
    Mr. Awbery: In view of the serious position in Bristol, will the Minister now consider reversing her previous decision to reduce the number of schools required by the education authority from 10 to seven? Will she help the local authority by granting money for the three schools?
    Miss Horsbrugh: As I pointed out, I have included in the authority's 1955–56 building programme and its reserve list new secondary schools designed to provide accommodation for about 2,750 children.
    Mr. Awbery: Is it not a fact that the Minister reduced the number of schools required by the local authority last year from 10 to seven and now, in 1955 to 1956, she is restoring the number to 10?
    Miss Horsbrugh: Bristol is carrying out an enormous building programme. It is building practically everything it possibly can and, in 1955–56, will be building to accommodate an extra 2,750 secondary school children.

    Bec Grammar School, Wandsworth
    Dr. Kingasked the Minister of Education why she has refused to permit the London County Council to proceed with its development plan for Bec Grammar School and secondary education in that area.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), on 15th July last.
    Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that that answer means that she is the sole arbiter of what is educationally advantageous to children, that it means that she has the right to flout the decisions of local education authorities, and that in this she is behaving like a French minister of education and not a British Minister of Education?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I am rather surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who knows so much about the Education Act, 1944, did not look it up before making those remarks. If he will look at Section 13 he will see that although a local
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    authority may propose closing or opening a school the responsibility for the decision is the Minister's. I am also surprised that the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members opposite should talk of the flouting of the opinions of local authorities by Ministers, when in their own statement of their future policy, they say they will insist on comprehensive schools in all parts and tear up, I presume, more than 140 development plans.

    Minor Capital Work (Allocations)
    Mr. Morleyasked the Minister of Education why, when Southampton local education authority asked for an allocation of £42,690 for supplementary allocations for minor capital work on school building, only £13,600 was allocated for that purpose.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I made this allocation, as a supplement to the authority's basic allocation of £17,775, after taking into account the size of its major school building programme, its need for additional school places and the relative urgency of the need for the improvements which it wished to carry out.
    Mr. Morley: Is the right hon. Lady aware that this reduced allocation is preventing the local authority from carrying out some very necessary and urgent work on the schools, particularly on improving sanitation? Will she be a bit more generous the year after?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I would point out that the total allocation for minor works has been £31,375, and, in addition to any extra places provided, there will he about £15,000 for improvement.
    Miss Baconasked the Minister of Education the total amount requested by local authorities in the last financial year for minor capital work; and how much was approved.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I will write to the hon. Member as soon as I have the figures.
    Miss Baconasked the Minister of Education how much of the money allowed for minor capital work in the last financial year was used for extensions.
    Miss Horsbrugh: £2·1 million out of the allocation to local education authorities in 1953–54 for minor works.
    Miss Bacon: I am not quite clear why the right hon. Lady is now able to answer this Question when she was not able to give me an answer to Question No. 28. This Question is consequential upon Question No. 28. How, therefore, is she able to give me one answer without the other?
    Miss Horsbrugh: If the hon. Lady will look at the two Questions, she will see that in Question No. 28 she asked me to give the total amount requested by local authorities in the last financial year for minor capital work and how much was approved; and, in Question No. 29, she asked me how much of the money allowed for minor capital work in the last financial year was used for extensions. The first figures I cannot give her immediately, but I will let her have them in writing.

    Boy, Midsomer Norton (Technical School Entry)
    Mr. Leatherasked the Minister of Education why Michael Sandells, of Drill Hall Cottage, Steam Mills, Midsomer Norton, Somerset, was refused entry to a secondary technical school on the grounds that the Somerset County Education Authority did not consider him suitable, although he was top of his form, passed all his tests, and the said authority did not interview him.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I am writing to my hon. Friend.

    Boys, Durham (Corporal Punishment)
    Mr. Peter Freemanasked the Minister of Education whether her attention has been called to the action of Mr. Oliver Whitfield, of the Secondary Modern School, Durham, who caned 200 boys because he was unable to discover a misdemeanour alleged to have been made by one of them; whether such mass corporal punishment of children has her approval; and whether she will issue instructions for the dismissal of this headmaster for punishing 199 innocent boys.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I have seen reports of the incident in the Press. Disciplinary matters of this kind are within the discretion of the headmaster and of the local education authority, and I would not wish to intervene. In any case, I have no
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    power to require the dismissal of the headmaster.
    Mr. Freeman: Is the right hon. Lady aware of the statements made by the Home Secretary on this question of punishment a few days ago, when he said:
    "… the two requirements of natural justice that have gone back to the beginning of civilisation are that a person who may be punished should know what the complaint is against him and that he should be given an opportunity to meet it. That is the basis of the rule of law throughout the ages."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th July, 1954; Vol. 530, c. 1292.]
    Was either of those conditions fulfilled in the case of any one of these 200 children? Is this not a gross abuse of the ordinary custom of justice which is being denied to these children and has not the right hon. Lady the responsibility of safeguarding their rights? What action does she intend to take to prevent this gross abuse of justice?
    Miss Horsbrugh: Without expressing an opinion whether there was justice or not, I can only repeat that I shall not interfere with the duty and responsibility of the local authority and the headmaster.
    Mr. G. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that the parents in this district are not complaining, and that it would be an advantage if my hon. Friend the Member for Newport (Mr. Peter Freeman) would leave the teaching profession alone for a while? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Is the Minister further aware that the discipline of this school can only suffer from the publicity given to a Question of this sort?

    New Secondary School, Cippenham
    Mr. Fenner Brockwayasked the Minister of Education if she will authorise the building of a new secondary school at Cippenham, Slough, during 1955–56.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I hope that, following discussion with the Buckinghamshire local education authority, it may be possible to include this project in the reserve list to their 1955–56 school building programme.
    Mr. Brockway: While expressing appreciation of the Minister's consideration of this problem, as there will be 1,000 children in this school at the end

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    of 1956 and the school is built for only 540, may I ask whether she will give urgent consideration to the request for a new school?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot say anything precise at this stage. We are still in discussion about the reserve list. In the main programme settled for 1955–56 there are four secondary and four primary schools at an estimated cost of £631,000. An enormous programme is being undertaken. I know that the school is wanted urgently.

    School, Bacton-Mendlesham
    Colonel Harrisonasked the Minister of Education when the proposed central school in the Bacton-Mendlesham area of East Suffolk will be built; and on what approximate date it is anticipated that it will be ready for use.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I have received no proposals from the local education authority for the inclusion of this proposed school in an early building programme.
    Colonel Harrison: In view of that rather distressing reply, will my right hon. Friend take as much action as possible with county authorities to see that these schools are built in the rural areas and allay the fear of parents that children who are sent into small towns become urbanised?
    Miss Horsbrugh: Yes, I think that what I said in the debate last Monday will show my hon. and gallant Friend that that is my desire. That is why I have been anxious to retain the village schools. We are getting a further programme of secondary schools.

    Circulars 242 and 245
    Mr. G. Thomasasked the Minister of Education when she expects to be able to withdraw Circulars 242 and 245 and to restore the freedom which local education authorities enjoyed prior to these circulars being issued.
    Miss Horsbrugh: These Circulars will continue in force so long as the national financial situation requires. I do not accept the implication of the last part of the Question.
    Mr. Thomas: Is the education service to be the last to find any relief under the
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    apparent prosperity which the Government claim to have restored?
    Miss Horsbrugh: The financial position is very much better, as the hon. Gentleman has said, thanks to the work of this Government. If he will look at the Estimates and the amount of building work that is being done, he will see that, thanks to the improvement, we are able to spend more on education and, I think, get better value.

    School Building Programme
    Mr. G. Thomasasked the Minister of Education what protests she has received from the Welsh Joint Education Committee concerning the school building programme in Wales; and what reply she has sent.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I have been informed that the Welsh Joint Education Committee wish to discuss with me the question of educational building programmes in Wales and Monmouthshire. I hope to arrange a meeting at a convenient date.
    Mr. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that I should like to be there? Is she further aware that there is trouble on the way and that the Welsh local authorities are saying many things before they reach her office? Does she not realise that the best way to peace is to meet the requests of these authorities?
    Miss Horsbrugh: The hon. Gentleman said that he would like to be there. Perhaps he will communicate his desire to the Welsh Joint Education Committee. As to what these people say before they reach me, perhaps when they have heard what I have to say they will go away saying something different.
    Mr. G. Thomasasked the Minister of Education how far local education authorities are permitted to decide their own priorities with regard to the selection of what new schools shall be built in their areas.
    Miss Horsbrugh: Each year I invite local education authorities to list in order of priority the projects they wish me to include in the following year's programme and its reserve. I exclude from this list only those projects which fall outside the categories of work allowed by Circular 245, or which could without damage be deferred to a later programme, or which

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    cannot reasonably be expected to start during the period. This, of course, is normally done in consultation with the authority.
    Mr. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that publicity has been given in the educational Press to a local authority in whose area No. 1 priority has been given to a school for a term of years, and that this has been crossed out by the Minister who has given priority to another school? Does she think that the woman in Whitehall knows best?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I do not say that the people in Northamptonshire who drew up that list necessarily knew best, for this reason. The school that was listed was chiefly for reorganisation and, therefore, did not come under the provisions of Circular 245. That particular school has now been put into the reserve list because, I think, by 1958 there will be more children coming to the school, and that is the date when it is required. The other schools are for more children who will be coming there before that time.
    Mr. Blackburnasked the Minister of Education to what extent schools included in the reserve list for one year are included in the actual building programme for the following year.
    Miss Horsbrugh: If I put a new school project unconditionally in a reserve list, authorities can assume that it will be included in the following year's main programme unless there has been a marked change in circumstances or they satisfy me that alternative arrangements can be made to accommodate the children.
    Mr. Blackburn: Does that mean that the proposed new school at Newton Hyde, which the Minister placed in the reserve list for 1954–55, will definitely be in the building programme for 1955–56?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I would have to refresh my memory about the school to which the hon. Gentleman refers.

    New School, Trimdon
    Mr. Slaterasked the Minister of Education what consideration is being given to the representations made to her by the hon. Member for Sedgefield for the building of a new school at Trimdon village; and whether this school is to be commenced in the 1954–55 programme of the Durham County Council.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot finally settle the Durham authority's school building programme for 1955–56 until I receive the further information from it for which I have asked. Meanwhile, its proposal to build a new infants' school at Trimdon has been included in the reserve list for that programme.
    Mr. Slater: Who is responsible for determining the order of priority? Is it the right hon. Lady's Department or the county council? Is she aware that the parents in this area, which is a development area, are concerned at the number of accidents which have taken place on the highway which adjoins this new estate, through children having to travel to other parts of the district?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I have just informed the hon. Gentleman that the programme is not settled because I have asked for further information. When I get that further information I will consider the whole matter.

    Gateshead
    Mr. J. T. Hallasked the Minister of Education how far the county borough of Gateshead was permitted to select the type of schools to be built in its area in its latest building programme.
    Miss Horsbrugh: The Gateshead local education authority listed three secondary schools in order of priority for inclusion in its 1955–56 school building programme. I included the first in its main programme and an instalment of the second in its reserve list, and deferred the third.
    Mr. Hall: Is the right hon. Lady not aware that this local authority has pressed for permission to be allowed to build a Roman Catholic grammar school in Gateshead and that she gave me an assurance some time ago that she hoped to go as far as possible in increasing the number of grammar school places in Gateshead? Is this not the wrong way to carry out her assurances?
    Miss Horsbrugh: No, I do not think it is. I think it is right to increase the number of secondary school places. Work on the new school which was started in March, 1953, will provide for about 700 children. The authority already has under construction a secondary school which will double the number of places in the maintained grammar

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    schools. The third school was, I know, for Roman Catholic children, but arrangements are being made for the authority to take up a number of places in Roman Catholic independent and direct-grant schools. At present, it has 29, but it is to increase that number this August.

    Small Trusts (Rural Parishes)
    Mr. Vaneasked the Minister of Education whether she will give an assurance that the many small trusts founded to further the betterment and education of children in rural parishes will be protected and the trustees encouraged, where necessary, to find new ways of carrying out the intentions of their founders rather than that the funds should be controlled centrally or merged into county founds.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot give an assurance that I will not in any circumstances make use of the powers given me by Parliament under Section 2 of the Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1948, but it is my policy to help the trustees of individual educational charities to play a useful rôle wherever possible.
    Mr. Vane: While thanking my right hon., Friend for that partial assurance, may I ask whether she can tell us whether she has torn up the proposals made in the days of her predecessors for looting these endowments in many counties? I should like to think that she has.
    Miss Horsbrugh: I do not know anything about looting in the time of any of my predecessors or in the time that I have been at the Ministry of Education.

  COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

    Arms Thefts, Northern Ireland (Extradition Treaty)
    Lieut.-Colonel Hydeasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he will initiate talks with the Government of the Irish Republic with a view to concluding an extradition treaty to cover individuals guilty of thefts of arms from military establishments in the United Kingdom and similar crimes.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. John Foster): No, Sir. I do not think that this would be appropriate.
    Lieut.-Colonel Hyde: Does my hon. Friend not consider that recent thefts of Crown property in Northern Ireland are extremely deplorable, and does he not think that it would help if an extradition treaty covering Northern Ireland were concluded?
    Mr. Foster: No, Sir. There is a procedure in force for the mutual endorsement and execution of warrants of arrest between the Republic and Great Britain. With regard to the position in Northern Ireland, I am in consultation with my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary as to improving the position.

    British Bases, Middle East (Consultations)
    Mr. P. Williamsasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what consultations have taken place between the United Kingdom Government and the various Commonwealth Governments on the future of British bases in the Middle East; and with what results.
    Mr. J. Foster: In accordance with the usual practice, other Commonwealth Governments have been continuously informed of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Williams: Do I understand from my hon. Friend that decisions are now come to rather than that consultations take place?
    Mr. Foster: No, Sir.
    Mr. Grimond: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the Commonwealth Governments were, in fact, consulted and, if so, what were their views?
    Mr. Foster: The answer to the first part of that supplementary question is "Yes," and the answer to the second part is that it is not the practice to give details of consultations between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Is it not better that this matter should be referred to the United Nations rather than that either the Commonwealth countries or ourselves should deal with it independently?
    Mr. Foster: No. Sir.
    Mr. Shinwell: Is it the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in relation to defence in the Middle East, to include the question of a Middle East defence organisation?
    Mr. Foster: I cannot say.
    Mr. Shinwell: Does not the hon. Gentleman know anything about it, or is he not permitted to say anything about it?
    Mr. Foster: It is another question.

    African Affairs Board (Grain Marketing Regulations)
    Mr. Fenner Brockwayasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if the provisions of the Federal Government Notice No. 112, 1st April, 1954, Grain Marketing Regulations, 1954, and in particular Regulation No. 9, were considered by the African Affairs Board; and whether the Board made any report under the terms of Article 77 (i) of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Constitution.
    Mr. J. Foster: The proceedings of the African Affairs Board are not within the control of the Secretary of State and he is not informed about them. No report by the Board on the Regulations mentioned has been received by the Secretary of State under Article 77 (2) of the Constitution.
    Mr. Brockway: As these regulations may have a serious effect on the prices paid to Africans for their goods, can the hon. Gentleman at least indicate that it is desirable that this matter should be considered with the African Affairs Board?
    Mr. Foster: No, Sir. That would not be possible.

    Commonwealth (New Members)
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what representations have been made and what consultations have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and other Commonwealth Governments with the intention of determining the most appropriate and acceptable means of accepting new members of the Commonwealth.
    Mr. J. Foster: None, Sir.
    Mr. Sorensen: Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that this is a matter of some importance and should not be just laughed off? Membership of the Commonwealth of Nations is a very onerous and honourable position, and it should not depend merely on this country determining it but on the whole membership of the Commonwealth. Will he give a serious and constructive reply to this Question?
    Mr. Foster: I quite agree with what the hon. Member has said about the importance of Commonwealth membership, and when the matter arises other Commonwealth members will be consulted, as was stated by the Prime Minister on 16th June, 1952.
    Mr. Sorensen: Has not that already arisen in view of the possibility of two black Dominions ultimately coming into being and becoming members of the Commonwealth?
    Mr. Foster: No, Sir. It has not arisen.
    Mr. J. Johnson: Will the hon. Member give an assurance that he himself and the Government will not be party to any settlement in which we have a two-tier system inside the Commonwealth, and that future black Dominions will be on an equal status with the present white Dominions in the Commonwealth?
    Mr. Foster: I cannot go beyond the statement of my right hon. Friend.
    Mr. Gordon Walker: As new problems of this kind may arise, and as it is obvious that they cannot be settled in a rush, when they do arise would it not be wise to have some preliminary consultations with the other Commonwealth Governments on the principles involved in this matter?
    Mr. Foster: I will put the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion to my right hon. and noble Friend.
    Mr. Sorensen: Cannot the hon. Gentleman put my suggestion to him, too?

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Coin-operated Phonographs
    Mr. Errollasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that the manufacturing capacity of British

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    firms is capable of satisfying all foreseeable demands in this country for coin-operated phonographs; and whether, in view of this, he will prohibit the importation of such machines from Western Germany.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): Coin-operated phonographs are admissible from Western Germany under the open general licence as gramophones, and I regret that my hon. Friend was informed on 8th July that they are included in the quota for amusement machinery. I understand that British firms have considerable manufacturing capacity for these machines, but I am not prepared to prohibit their import from Western Germany since such a prohibition is not necessary to safeguard our balance of payments.
    Mr. Erroll: As the Minister is not prepared to prohibit the importation of these machines, would he at least try to obtain an assurance from the importers that they will maintain the same standards of distribution of these machines as is at present operated by the United Kingdom manufacturers?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: They are on open general licences in this country, and I do not think that we can impose on importers a condition about their distribution.

    Racing (Industrial Production Loss)
    Mr. T. Williamsasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what estimate was made of the possible loss of industrial production through the running of the Two Thousand Guineas race on a Wednesday, the Epsom Derby on a Wednesday, the Royal Hunt Cup on a Wednesday and the forthcoming Goodwood Cup on a Thursday; and whether the Stewards of the Jockey Club were advised to run these races on a Saturday;
    (2) what estimate was made of the possible loss of industrial production if the Doncaster St. Leger was run on a Wednesday; and why Her Majesty's Government advised the Jockey Club to change the traditional day from Wednesday to Saturday.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: As regards the St. Leger, the Government have received strong representations about the serious effect which there would be on industrial
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    production, particularly coal-mining, if this race were to be run once again on a Wednesday. Those representations were considered very carefully before my right hon. Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power asked the Jockey Club to keep the St. Leger on a Saturday. No numerical estimates have been made of the loss of industrial production caused by running the St. Leger or continuing to run the other races, to which the hon. Member refers, in midweek.
    We have received no representations about these other races, and we should not regard it as our business, save on the basis of some very substantial evidence, to request the Jockey Club to make alterations in the dates of these other races.
    Mr. Williams: Are we to take it that Her Majesty's Government feel that those who attend the Two Thousand Guineas race in Cambridge, the Derby in Surrey, the Royal Hunt Cup in Berkshire, and the Goodwood Cup in Sussex are all non-workers and, therefore, production is of no account, and that only those in industrial Yorkshire are to be penalised because they cannot have their race meetings on a Wednesday?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think that that would be rather a large assumption to draw.
    Mr. Williams: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us why the Government show no concern at all when these four southern classic races are held on any day that the Jockey Club feel disposed to hold them, and only interest themselves in the North—in Doncaster—as to whether the St. Leger shall be run on a Wednesday or a Saturday?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Very strong representations were made about the date of the St. Leger, and it was in the light of these representations that the request was made to the Jockey Club. No such representations have been made in the case of the other races. I am not anxious to extend the activities of Her Majesty's Government to suggesting when various races should be held.
    Mr. Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that 47 of the largest pits in Yorkshire are already taking their holidays during Doncaster race week and

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    that it would have no material effect whatever on output if the St. Leger was run on the traditional day, Wednesday?
    Mr. Ede: Will the President consult the Whips on both sides of the House about the desirability of running the Derby on a Saturday, and also consider the private views of the Prime Minister on the subject?
    Mr. Llewellyn: Can my right hon. Friend say from whom the representations have been received?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: From the National Production Advisory Council for Industry, the Sheffield and Rotherham Productivity Committees, which include both sides of industry, and the National Coal Board.
    Mr. Williams: Is this not gross discrimination in favour of the South against the North?

    United Kingdom-Pakistan
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the prospects of increasing trade between this country and Pakistan, especially by Britain buying more Pakistan cotton and selling more textile machinery to Pakistan.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The prospect of increasing trade between the two countries will depend in part at least on the scale on which Pakistan cotton can be sold here. A Lancashire-Pakistan Cotton Committee has been formed to encourage the use of Pakistan cotton in Lancashire and a representative delegation from Pakistan attended the inaugural meeting last month. I very much hope that the Committee will be successful in achieving its purpose and that, as a result, there will be an expansion of trade between the two countries.

    Commonwealth Countries (Preference Rates)
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the fact that the average rate of preference granted to Commonwealth countries is now roughly only half the level of prewar and that the rise in prices has reduced the value of specific preference margins, he will make an investigation into the adequacy of existing rates in readiness for the time when convertibility of sterling is restored.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I do not think that at this stage it would be useful to undertake an investigation in the sense my hon. Friend suggests.
    Mr. Russell: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will undertake such an investigation before this contingency arises, and not after it?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: My hon. Friend will recognise that there are two sides to the question: the preferences which we give, and the preferences which we receive. My hon. Friend's suggestion would involve almost a re-negotiation of all the preferences in the Ottawa Agreements. I suggest that we await the outcome of the discussions which we are having with the Commonwealth on the broad issues of policy that are involved before we go further in this matter.

    N.E. Trading Estate Factories
    Mr. Willeyasked the President of the Board of Trade how many people, men and women, were employed in the factories in Sunderland administered by the North Eastern Trading Estates, Limited, on the latest available date.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: On 29th May, 1954, the latest date for which official figures are available, 1,617 men and boys and 2,541 women and girls, making a total of 4,158, were employed in these factories.
    Mr. Willey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these figures show a further decline in the numbers employed in these factories?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Yes, Sir. The decline in employment is due to the cessation of work in the two factories, of which the hon. Member is well aware.
    Mr. Willeyasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a further statement on the Trading Estate Company factories in Sunderland, at present vacant or not fully used.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I cannot add anything to what was said by my hon. and learned Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the hon. Member during the Adjournment debate on 16th July. If any development occurs of which the hon. Gentleman would wish to know while the House is in recess, I will get in touch with him straight away.
    Mr. Willey: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. Do I understand that no decision has yet been taken about the third factory that is in danger of closing?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think that is so, but I should like to look into the point.
    Mr. Willeyasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that 250 more women have lost their employment on the Trading Estate at Sunderland; and what action he now proposes to take to promote more employment for women in Sunderland.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I understand that the hon. Member is referring to a factory which, though nearby, is not on the Pallion Trading Estate, and is not owned by the Government. This company hopes to re-engage these women workers in the autumn.
    As regards the second part of the Question, I can add nothing to what was said by my hon. and learned Friend during the Adjournment debate on 16th July.

    Polish Bilberries
    Lieut.-Colonel Schofieldasked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent he proposes to issue import licences this season for Polish bilberries; and to what extent the British firm which has contracted for the total exportable quantity of these bilberries will be enabled by such import licences to implement its contract.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: As an interim measure, licences to a value of £125,000 for the import of Polish bilberries have already been issued this year and arrangements are now being made for the immediate issue of a further interim quota of £75,000. As regards contracts, no firm should enter into binding contract to act as importer without first ascertaining whether the goods will be admissible.
    Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that there is something incongruous in the fact that the firm which secured the contract for the whole of the Polish bilberry crop has been granted import licences for only one-quarter, whereas a firm which was unsuccessful in tendering has an import licence for the remaining three-quarters? If the Department continues by granting licences on a repeat performance basis,
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    will it not lead, in the long run, to a complete monopoly by one firm? Would it not be better to open the whole thing to free competition, as exists in many other imports?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: There is something incongruous about all forms of import licensing, but so long as it is necessary to maintain licensing one must have some system for distributing the licences. Up to the present we have tried to do it upon the basis of previous trade, but I shall be happy to discuss with my hon. and gallant Friend the problems to which he refers.

    Film Industry (Eady Levy)
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the failure of the film industry to agree on a basis for continuing the Eady Levy, he will introduce a statutory scheme forthwith.
    Mr. G. Darlingasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the failure of the film producers and exhibitors to agree on the amount of the voluntary levy to aid film production and on the division of the recent tax reliefs, he will introduce statutory schemes for both purposes and place all sections of the film industry under his supervision and control.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I regret to say that while the other three associations concerned are willing to accept my suggestion to proceed at once to arbitration, the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association is not, at this time, prepared to agree that matters have reached a stage which makes arbitration appropriate. I still hope that agreement may be reached, but I think the interest of all concerned will be best served if I make no further statement at this stage.
    Mr. Robinson: Does the President not think it would encourage the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association to agree to arbitration if he would make a categorical statement that he will introduce legislation in the event of failure to agree? Will he state, also, that this legislation will be made retrospective to the end of the present voluntary agreement?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not want to elaborate upon this rather complex problem at present, but I certainly have not

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    departed from the statement I made previously about the necessity of having a scheme of this kind, if necessary by statutory means.
    Mr. Darling: While I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman does not want to get too deeply involved in this business at the moment, will he bear in mind that he has a public responsibility in this matter and that in these discussions the interests of the cinemagoers, who pay for the industry and keep it going, ought to be borne in mind?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The industry, too, has a responsibility in this matter to try to arrive at a sensible solution of its own problems.

    Film Producing Companies (Operations)
    Mr. G. Darlingasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will arrange for the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission to inquire into the operations of film-producing companies which also control film laboratories and have substantial ownership of cinemas.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir.
    Mr. Darling: As it is an odds on chance that the President will have to intervene in this industry owing to the failure of the trade associations in it to come to some agreement, would it not be as well to have a better picture of the structure of the industry, how it operates and how the big concerns dominate it through a report from the Monopolies Commission?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have considerable doubt whether Monopolies Commission legislation would cover such a matter. There is a good deal of legislation dealing with monopoly inside the film industry, such as the Cinematograph Films Acts, and I think it is better to deal with those problems under Acts concerned with the film industry rather than by outside legislation.

    Film Projectors (Price-fixing)
    Sir L. Plummerasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will refer to the Monopolies Commission the price-fixing arrangements made among themselves by the suppliers of projectors and other equipment for the showing of stereophonic sound films.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am not sure what arrangements the hon. Member has in mind, but, if he will let me have details, I will consider the matter further.

    Imported Goods (Marking)
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give a decision about the withdrawal of the option under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, which allows imported goods which are required to be marked to bear the words "Foreign" or "Empire" instead of the name of the country of origin.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The matter is still under consideration, but I hope to announce a decision on policy soon.

    Monopoly Commission Investigations (Time)
    Sir L. Plummerasked the President of the Board of Trade the average time now taken by the Monopolies Commission to investigate a case and to report on a case, respectively.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: An investigation is not completed until the Commission's report is signed. For the three reports made during the three months ended last June, the average time between the making of the reference and the signature of the report was just under 23 months. But these averages are of little significance since some inquiries necessarily involve more work than others.

    U.S. Contracts (British Tenders)
    Mr. Jayasked the President of the Board of Trade what reply he has received to the representations made to the United States Government about the award of contracts for the Chief Joseph and Dalles Dams to United States firms in spite of a tender by the English Electric Company at lower prices.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No reply has been received as yet, but I understand that we may expect one shortly.
    Mr. de Freitasasked the President of the Board of Trade in how many cases in the past three years British firms have been refused contracts by the United States Government although their tenders have been lower than competing American firms; and whether he has drawn the attention of the United States Government to each of these violations of the principles of fair competition.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: United States Government procurement extends over an immense field and Her Majesty's Government do not necessarily hear of all cases where British firms have been unsuccessful. I am, however, aware of three cases in the last three years where the British bid, though both the lowest of all bids submitted and fully compliant, was rejected; and in each of these, representations were made to the United States Government.

    Motor Vehicles (Export to Canada)
    Mr. de Freitasasked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the decline in the volume of our exports of motor vehicles to Canada; and what he is doing to remedy this.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Yes, Sir. I am aware of the drop in our exports to Canada of motor vehicles. It is due partly to a fall in the demand for new cars and partly to intensified competition by United States and Canadian manufacturers. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply and I are in close touch with our manufacturers on export and other problems affecting the industry, but I can give no assurance of an early reversal of a situation which arises mainly from conditions in Canada.

    U.K. Trade Commissioner, Canada (Staff)
    Mr. de Freitasasked the President of the Board of Trade what plans he has for increasing the staff of the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Canada.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The staff needs of the Trade Commissioner offices in Canada are kept under constant review, and two additional Assistant Trade Commissioners have been sent to Canada this year.
    Mr. de Freitas: Is the President sure that that is enough staff to tackle the enormous problems which confront us in this dollar market, which is becoming even more important in view of the trend in the United States as shown by recent tariff changes?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think so. Only recently I had a good opportunity of seeing how our Trade Commissioners work
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    but I am fully alive to this matter and am keeping it under review. If any additional staff is necessary I will see that it is made available.

  PRIME MINISTER (ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS)
  Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Prime Minister on how many days of the week he will answer Oral Questions in the House after the Recess.
  The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): Tuesdays and Thursdays are the most convenient days to me, but hon. Members can, of course, put down Questions for any Sitting day, except Friday.
  Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: While we welcome the implied assurance that the right hon. Gentleman will still be Prime Minister in the present Administration after the Recess, is he aware that some inconvenience is caused to hon. Members who put Questions down on days other than the two he has mentioned when we get to know only a short while beforehand that the Prime Minister will not be present? I assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are all very interested in his future movements.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
  Mr. Doddsasked the Prime Minister what progress has been made towards meeting Mr. Malenkov.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the statement which I made to the House as recently as the day before yesterday. I said then that Her Majesty's Government intend to take all possible steps, of whatever nature, to decrease tension; but the situation is complex and I cannot yet be more specific on this point.
  Mr. Dodds: Does the Prime Minister recollect that a few weeks ago, in reply to a similar Question, he referred to a horse in the Grand National not being expected to jump two obstacles at once? Does he not agree that if any horse was as hesitant as he is himself about his second hurdle, it would meet a rather sticky end? Will the Prime Minister see that he is not restrained until it is too late by those who yesterday acclaimed Syngman Rhee as the champion of freedom and liberty?
  The Prime Minister: I am sure that that supplementary question is as clear to the House as it is to me.

  CIVIL SERVICE AND PARLIAMENT (RELATIONSHIP)
  Mr. Harold Daviesasked the Prime Minister if he will recommend the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate and report upon the relationship of the Civil Service to Ministers and Parliament.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir.
  Mr. Davies: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for the usual type of reply which seems to be supplied to him either by the 1922 Committee or by the Civil Service, may I, in all sincerity, ask him whether he does not think that because of the growing complexity of modern Government there is a need to clarify the relationship of the Civil Service to Ministers and Members of Parliament? I assure the right hon. Gentleman that this Question was not put down in any vindictive spirit but merely to clarify the position between the Civil Service and Ministers and Members of Parliament.
  The Prime Minister: I think it is a great mistake to assume that a Royal Commission offers an immediate solution to great problems. Much thought is given to this matter, and custom and practice build upon each other. On the whole, I believe that in this country the best results have been achieved that have so far been experienced by modern Governments.

  ATOMIC ENERGY (COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE)
  Mr. Stewardasked the Prime Minister whether he will reconsider calling a Commonwealth conference to co-ordinate policy for the production of uranium, research and the use of atomic energy in industrial processes.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I see no reason to disturb the current arrangements, outlined by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply in his reply to the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) on 17th November last, which are working satisfactorily.
  Mr. Steward: Would the Prime Minister agree that it would be necessary in the future to set up a permanent Commonwealth standing committee to work with the United States and other free countries in the peaceful development of this new force?
  The Prime Minister: It may well be that something of that kind will eventuate, particularly when we consider how the importance of this subject grows from year to year and that the close connection of the Commonwealth is also strengthened.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Cement Works, Strood (Rating Assessment)
    Sir R. Aclandasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it has yet been possible to reach agreement about the assessment for rating purposes of cement works in the area of the Strood Rural District Council.
    The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. R. Maudling): Yes, Sir.

    University Teachers' Salaries
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that, apart from an increase in salaries below £600 per annum, the range of salaries laid down in 1949 for university teachers is still in operation; whether he is satisfied that these salaries are adequate; and what representations he has received on this matter in recent months.
    Mr. Maudling: Apart from an increase in 1952 for junior staffs, existing rates of pay are those announced by Sir Stafford Cripps on 15th March, 1949. Revision of academic salaries is now under consideration, but I am not yet in a position to make a statement.
    Mr. Robinson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that since that time there has been a considerable increase in professional salaries generally—about 30 per cent.—and that university teachers have a strong case for reconsideration of these scales?
    Mr. Maudling: I have no doubt that that point is being put forward in the course of these discussions that are taking place.
    Dr. Stross: Would the Economic Secretary bear in mind that there is a very great difference between the medical and non-medical teaching staffs at the universities and that this alone is a cause of offence to those who are not so happy as to be medical people?

    University Grants Committee (Welsh Representation)
    Mr. Gowerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps have been taken, or will be taken, to secure representation from Wales on the University Grants Committee.
    Mr. Maudling: Though the members of the University Grants Committee are chosen to cover among them the main fields of university study, as well as certain interests outside the universities, they serve in a personal capacity and not as representatives.

    International Bank (Sterling Loan)
    Mr. Roy Jenkinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the purpose of the sterling loan recently raised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the London market.
    Mr. Maudling: The purpose of the loan of £5 million which the International Bank is now raising on the London market is to provide the Bank with sterling for lending to borrowers outside the sterling Commonwealth.

    Dividends (Distribution Rate)
    Mr. Roy Jenkinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the rate of dividend distribution by public companies in the first six months of this year as compared with the similar period for 1953.
    Mr. Maudling: The figures available show that the shareholders' gross return on invested capital for the first six months of 1954 was about 6 per cent. compared with about 5·4 per cent. for the same period last year.
    Mr. Jenkins: Could not the hon. Gentleman also tell us what has been the absolute increase as well as the increase relating to the amount of invested capital?
    Mr. Maudling: If the hon. Gentleman would put that question on the Order
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    Paper I would be glad to give him the information, but it would be very misleading information.

    Private Industry (Capital Investments)
    Mr. Roy Jenkinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what information he can give about current rates of capital investments in private industry.
    Mr. Maudling: I regret that I have no current figures. The figures for 1953 were published in the Economic Survey, 1954.
    Mr. Jenkins: Is the hon. Gentleman unable to give us any indication of the effect of the Budget and its investment allowances on the rate of capital investment?
    Mr. Maudling: I think it is too early in July to hope for evidence of the effects of the Budget on investment through the investment allowances. It takes a little while for investment allowances to bear fruit through the building of plant.

    Houses (Estate Duty Valuation)
    Miss Wardasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what date, in the valuation of houses for the payment of Estate Duty on small estates, the term "vacant possession," and the concession made in 1944 in relation to the valuation of houses became the identical basis of calculation; and whether the directive to district valuers will be placed in the Library of the House.
    Mr. Maudling: The statutory and concessional values for Estate Duty purposes of owner-occupied houses within the scope of the concession have now tended to coincide in some cases but not in all, and not as from any common date. No directive has been issued to district valuers in this connection; the assessment of the concessional figure is essentially a question of valuation and depends on the circumstances of each individual case.
    Miss Ward: Is my hon. Friend aware that his answer is most unsatisfactory and that I am sending his right hon. Friend particulars of cases? Is he also aware that 1953 is the date by which the change of policy came into operation, and that,

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    when the House reassembles, I hope he will be able to give me a better answer?
    Mr. Maudling: So far as that question conflicts with my statement, I cannot accept the point of view of my hon. Friend.

  NATIONAL AND TATE GALLERIES (TRUSTEES)
  Captain Kerbyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why Her Majesty's Government have departed from the hitherto customary policy of not appointing civil servants to the boards of trustees of the National Gallery and Tate Gallery; and what other departures from precedent in this respect have taken place during the past decade.
  Mr. Maudling: Trustees of the National and Tate Galleries are chosen for their general suitability. In recent years it has not been customary to appoint serving civil servants other than as ex-officio trustees. One present trustee is now a civil servant, though at the time of his appointment he was not in the Civil Service. Thus there is not any marked departure from precedent.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he has a statement to make about the business of the House on our resumption after the Recess?
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for the first week after the Summer Recess will be as follows:
TUESDAY, 19TH OCTOBER and WEDNESDAY, 20TH OCTOBER—Report and Third Reading: Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Bill, until 7 o'clock.
Second Reading: Overseas Resources Development Bill.
Committee stage: Money Resolution.
THURSDAY, 21ST OCTOBER—Draft Housing (Review of Contributions) Order.
Motions for Addresses: International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Orders.
Draft Insurance Contracts (War Settlement) (Finland and Italy) Orders.
FRIDAY, 22ND OCTOBER—Second Reading: Pests Bill [Lords].
Committee stage: Money Resolution.
Mr. Attlee: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, for the convenience of hon. Members, having regard to the forthcoming debate, whether there have been any more Ministerial resignations this morning?
Mr. de Freitas: Since the Civil Defence Bill is one of the few sensible steps taken in this field recently, and since it has already left another place, why is it not to be dealt with as soon as we get back in the autumn?
Mr. Crookshank: I am only talking about the first week when we return. I thought the hon. Gentleman was among those who were wanting the Pests Bill.
Mr. de Freitas: I want the Civil Defence Bill as soon as possible, and "as soon as possible" means the first week when we return.
Mr. Dugdale: Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to take the Overseas Resources Development Bill late at night, or is it to be taken at a reasonable time of day?
Mr. Crookshank: What I said was that the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Bill would be taken until about 7 o'clock on the Wednesday. I hope the right hon. Gentleman considers that a proper arrangement.
Mr. Hayman: Would the Lord Privy Seal take the Teachers Superannuation Bill during the week we come back, so as to prevent another Cabinet resignation?

OSBORNE HOUSE PRIVATE APARTMENTS (OPENING)
The Minister of Works (Sir David Eccles): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about Osborne House.
On the occasion of King Edward VII's Coronation and by reason of the Osborne Estate Act, 1902, Osborne House, in the Isle of Wight, became part of the public property of the Crown to be administered by the Ministry of Works. The Act directed that the House should be used as a memorial of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria. Since that date certain rooms which had been in the personal occupation of Queen Victoria, including that in which she died, have been maintained exactly as they were and never shown to visitors.
This year marks the jubilee of the opening of the House and Her Majesty the Queen has commanded that these rooms should now be open to the public. Her Majesty has also offered on permanent loan the furnishings and works of art which are lodged in Osborne House or in the Swiss Cottage and Museum. These objects are to remain permanently at Osborne and I shall have the duty and charge of maintaining and administering the collection in the interests of the visiting public and of the patients of the King Edward VII Convalescent Home.
I have had the honour to accept Her Majesty's gracious offer. It is hoped that the private apartments can be opened to the public early next year.

ADJOURNMENT (SUMMER)
Mr. Speaker: It may be for the convenience of hon. Members who are interested in the Adjournment Motion tomorrow to know that, owing to the change of business which has been announced, I have had to re-allocate the times. In brief, the only change is that I propose to put down the debate on disarmament as the first item from 11 o'clock until 1.15, and the other subjects I have allotted will be proportionately postponed.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 19th October."—[The Prime Minister.]
3.36 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: I beg to move, to leave out "To-morrow," and to insert "on Monday next" instead thereof.
If the Motion should be accepted by the House as it has been moved, we shall adjourn tomorrow for a period of rather more than 11 weeks. I will concede at once to any critic of my Amendment that in those circumstances to defer the Adjournment of the House for only one day might not alter the position very much. Therefore, I explain at once that I am moving this Amendment in order to call attention to the really shocking mismanagement of Parliamentary business which has put the House of Commons this week into a position of confusion and impotence.
The last two days of the Session prior to the Adjournment day were to have been devoted to the Second Reading, subsequent and final stages of the Consolidated Fund Bill. Those days have always been days which have been used by Parliament, and particularly by private Members of Parliament, to deal with the accumulation of small but important matters which are not capable of being regarded as important enough to deserve a whole day's debate or an official Motion on either side, but which nevertheless are matters with which Parliament has always wished to deal. Because of the number of important statements that have been deferred by the Government until the last day—
Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask you, with respect, to ask the House to give order, because I am trying hard to hear what my hon. Friend is saying and I cannot hear a word.
Mr. Speaker: I was not aware that there was any unusual noise, but I ask hon. Members to conduct their conversations quietly.
Mr. Silverman: I can quite understand, Sir, that there are many hon. Members—perhaps the majority of those on the other side—who do not wish to hear what I
have to offer—[An HON. MEMBER: "Absolutely right."]—and they are perfectly entitled to leave the House if they wish. It would be a great convenience to them and would save them a good deal of boredom and mischief if they would all leave together instead of in these organised small groups. I would willingly wait for them to leave, and if they do not come back today or tomorrow or on 19th October, or ever, those of us on this side of the House would not regret their absence.
Sir Ian Fraser: On a point of order. Could you say, Mr. Speaker, how long an hon. Member can be in possession of the House without making a speech?
Mr. Speaker: I think that is a matter for me.
Mr. Silverman: I should like to call the attention of the House to the number of important, urgent matters which will be left undiscussed and undealt with if we adjourn tomorrow. One of them was to have been the subject of debate today, and, for reasons with which I shall deal in a moment, it is to be dealt with in private Members' time on the Adjournment tomorrow. That is the question of the conference on disarmament which proceeded in London over a number of weeks and at which this country was represented by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister of State. This is, I suppose, as important a subject as the country and the world are likely to be faced with, and it fits into a pattern of international affairs which are of mounting urgency.
We have never yet had any statement to the House, though it is many weeks since the conference closed, as to what
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took place. There has been no report and no debate. For that reason, my right hon. Friends were compelled to place on the Order Paper for this afternoon a Motion to debate that subject. It is a matter which ought to have been reported to and dealt with by the House a long time ago. Now it is to be taken on the last day and the rights of private Members are again to be invaded and removed. The assurance which you, Mr. Speaker, gave to me yesterday that private Members' interests were in no way affected by taking the disarmament discussion on Friday, because it would be taken between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. by the extension for two hours at the normal sitting time of the House on the Adjournment day, has now gone. The disarmament discussion is to take place in the first two hours of the Adjournment day, leaving only three hours of normal time.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I should not like the hon. Member to argue from a misunderstanding. It is still my intention to move the extension of the Sitting tomorrow by two hours and therefore no time will be lost to private Members.
Mr. Silverman: The right hon. Gentleman is quite right, and I appreciate that he intervened in order that I should not make an argument which was falsely based. I recognise that it is the intention to add two hours. If that makes no difference to the rights of private Members, perhaps when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will tell me why the change has been made and the two hours placed at the beginning of the day instead of at the end, as was promised yesterday.
I suggest that the reason is that, for a variety of reasons which we all understand and about which nobody complains, the two hours from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. on the Adjournment day are likely to be abortive. I suppose that the reason the disarmament discussion comes at the beginning of the day instead of at the end is that it is rightly regarded as an important subject which ought to be debated when there is a reasonably large attendance in the House, and not between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. when, in the circumstances, it is not likely that there will be so large an attendance.

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There is also the question of the proposed concession of full sovereignty to West Germany. The House is being asked to adjourn for 11 weeks without any statement from the Government or discussion by the House as to what that is to involve. Does it, for instance, mean that when we come back on 19th October we shall be faced with a situation in which German rearmament will have been conceded, as it were without discussion and informally? That is to say, shall we come back and be faced with the position that West Germany has been accorded by treaty full sovereignty, which must involve the right to rearm without condition and limitation? Full sovereignty can mean nothing else but that.
One recognises that this is not the time to discuss the merits of the case and I do not propose to do so, but everybody knows that there is keen controversy, which cuts across normal party division, about the desirability of German rearmament at all. Surely, very very few even of the most convinced and enthusiastic supporters of German rearmament within the limits of E.D.C. would be prepared to support German rearmament without such limitations and conditions as the E.D.C. Treaty imposes.
There ought to have been a proper discussion by Parliament long ago of what is intended. The Government ought to have told us what is in their minds and ought to have given us any assurances which might reasonably have been asked for, or which they felt that they could give, in order to make sure that in this important and controversial matter the House of Commons is not faced on 19th October with a fait accompli.
There is another matter connected with international affairs. There was a conference months ago in Berlin about the future of Europe and about security in Europe, involving also necessarily this question of the future of Germany. That conference failed. Proposals were made which were found to be unacceptable. Since then there has been another conference which succeeded, and since that conference new proposals for a new conference on European security have been made.
The House still does not know what is the Government's attitude to those pro-
698
posals. Again, I am not seeking to discuss or even to advert upon the merits of the proposals one way or another. I concede that this is not the time to discuss or debate what the Government's attitude ought to be or what kind of reply the Government ought to send, but we ought not to adjourn for three months without knowing what is in the Government's mind on this matter.
We are entitled to know. They may say, "We are discussing the matter with other nations. We desire to move in step with our friends and those with whom we have been in the habit of acting in concert in these matters." Even so, it is still surely right that the House of Commons itself, before it adjourns for three months, should have some idea of what the Government think about it, what proposals they will make to those friends and what kind of answer they would like to see made.
Sir Roland Jennings: The hon. Member is repeating himself.
Mr. Silverman: I should be out of order in repeating it often enough to enable the hon. Member to understand it. Therefore, I shall not attempt to do so. All I am attempting to do is to make the point—I make it again for the sake of clarity—that this is a matter on which the whole future of Western civilisation may well depend. Is there going to be peaceful co-existence or not? The answer to that question may very well depend on what decision is ultimately made about the future of Germany, and that question may well depend on what answer is given to the proposal which has now been made. I say that we are entitled to know, and ought not to disperse for three months unless we know, what is the attitude of the Government to that proposal.
There are one or two other matters. One reason the House of Commons has not been allowed to pursue its normal constitutional right of raising any debate on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, and of raising the variety of questions which normally are raised, is that there is a row going on in the Conservative Party about Egypt. Later this afternoon we shall see those whom I may refer to—I hope without disrespect—as the head hunters, hunting heads. In the

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course of that there will be a general debate about the Egyptian Agreement. There ought to be such a debate. No one pretends for a moment that there is anything wrong in back benchers disagreeing with Governments. I certainly never complain of that. I do not regard it as an anti-democratic practice that groups of like-minded back benchers should take counsel together in order to see how they can further the causes in which they believe.
I say that with all sincerity and great diffidence, because I have never belonged to such a group myself. Whether what is in issue is a "keep left" group, a "keep right" group, or a "don't care" group, it remains true that there is this difference of opinion, and the proper place to debate such differences of opinion is the Floor of the House of Commons. There is no better and no more proper place for such debates. But why on the last day before the Recess? There has been no shortage of time about this. There is nothing new in the Agreement. The Heads of Agreement which were signed the other day were available to the Government two years ago. They have known that they had a group of their supporters who are not happy about this. There was a time when Members of the Government were not so happy about it themselves.
An Hon. Member: Including the Prime Minister.
Sir R. Jennings: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is the hon. Member in order in making these arguments on the Amendment he has moved?
Mr. Speaker: I was waiting to see what relevance it had to the Amendment. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) seemed to be discussing the Heads of Agreement with Egypt.
Mr. Silverman: The general point I am making, if I may respectfully explain it, is the one with which I opened the few observations I want to offer to the House as an illustration of the mismanagement of Parliamentary business which has put the House in the difficulty which has led me to move this Amendment. I say there can be no better example of such mismanagement than the necessity
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to debate on the last day before we adjourn a subject which could have been debated two years ago, or at any time during that two-year period, and that we ought not to be put in that position by such shocking mismanagement.
Mr. Lewis: Repeat it so that the hon. Member opposite can understand.
Mr. Silverman: I am sure that even the hon. Member who interrupted earlier now understands that.
There is a final matter with which I want to deal, without wishing to keep the House too long. There is a question upon which the House would like some information before we adjourn for three months and which, I think, transcends, at any rate in immediate importance, any of those questions to which I have so far referred. It is the state of disintegration, bordering on total collapse, of the Government themselves. We do not even know who the Government are. We are entitled to know, before we adjourn for three months, which right hon. Gentleman or which right hon. Lady will be in charge of each Department when we come back, and during the period before we come back on 19th October.
There have been a number of recent moves whereby one or two Ministries have been abolished altogether. Whilst undoubtedly to that extent confidence in the Government will have been improved, it could have been done so much more speedily and satisfactorily if it had been done collectively. If they had all gone together instead of piecemeal, we would have known what the situation was and how to deal with it. Then we could have gone away for three months or six months with much greater ease of mind than we can as things are. Apart from the Ministries abolished altogether, there have been a number of changes—
Mr. Leslie Hale: Will my hon. Friend forgive me interrupting him? Up to now I have been in full agreement with him. He will have observed that in the most widely distributed Conservative newspaper today far less space, and apparently far less importance, is given to the disappearance of two Members of the Cabinet than to the disappearance of a fast bowler from the forthcoming Test team.
Mr. Silverman: My hon. Friend is quite right to draw my attention and the attention of the House to the sense of importance which Conservative newspapers have for Conservative Governments and for cricket.
I say that we are entitled to know who is likely to be in charge and who is to meet us on 19th October, if any of them do then meet us. We are entitled to know that before we adjourn tomorrow. Such an announcement would not take very long and could be made on Monday, if my Amendment were agreed to. We could then perhaps agree to adjourn for the rest of the period.
Mr. Ede: That is Bank Holiday.
Mr. Silverman: The House has sat on Bank Holiday before in a good cause, and no better cause than this could be found. Perhaps we would be told on Monday that the Government had resigned and we could nominate a new one. I am sure that my right hon. Friends would not object if that were done.
I conclude by saying in all seriousness that it must be very many years since the House of Commons was called upon to adjourn for three months with so many fundamentally important questions not merely unresolved but unexplained by the Government. I suppose the last occasion on which the House adjourned in a state of international affairs of greater—but not much greater—anxiety was the summer and autumn of 1939. I have pointed out a large number of weighty matters which will be left unresolved, and with the Government's attitude to them unexplained, if we adjourn in accordance with the Motion now before the House.
4.0 p.m.
Sir Richard Acland: I beg to second the Amendment.
I do so briefly because I, too, feel that the House, particularly the Opposition, have been treated with something very near to contempt by the Government in the last couple of weeks. I do not put it so high as to say that the Government have deliberately created the situation which we have run into, but I do say that they have seen it coming and that they have deliberately run the House and the Opposition into it. For at least the last three weeks, the Government must have known
702
that the Geneva Conference was going to come to an end one way or the other. Happily it came to an end which was reasonably satisfactory, but the Government ought surely to have known that, whichever way it came to an end, the House would wish for an opportunity to discuss the vital question, what comes next? We have been entirely deprived of that opportunity.
My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has said enough on Egypt for the House not to wish me to elaborate on that subject. Clearly the Government have known for a full three weeks that that matter, too, was coming to an end. Can anybody say that, in relation to this great act of Government policy, on which it was known that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Government side of the House had very strong views, anything less than one whole day of Government time would have been appropriate?
They knew, too, that they were on the point of making a new announcement about Cyprus which they had every reason to know was bound to be of a highly controversial nature, and which the House would wish to discuss. Yet they deliberately allow a situation to develop in which the last two days before the Recess—I except the conventional Friday which is available for back-bench Members to raise relatively minor though no doubt locally very important matters—were two days wholly at the disposal of the Opposition.
My memory of past procedure in the House is not always of the brightest and sharpest; therefore I speak subject to correction. I do not, however, seem to remember the Second Reading and the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill ever before being put into the last two days before a Recess. My memory of various and vigorous debates—once on the issue of Seretse Khama, once on the issue of arms for the Egyptians—is that those debates took place on the Consolidated Fund Bill a week or two weeks before the Adjournment for the Summer Recess; and that the last few days before the Adjournment were filled with Government business so that, if some emergency arose and a debate about it was imperatively demanded, time for such a debate was not given out of Opposition time but a day of Government time was used.

703
Yet the Government, with their eyes wide open, knowing that all these great and weighty matters were coming forward and that a demand for a debate on them would arise, have chosen to go on and leave the House and the Opposition in the position in which some of the subjects are not to be discussed at all. One of these is the aftermath of the Geneva Conference. Another great subject mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne, the future sovereignty of Germany, is not to be debated at all. Steel, on which the Opposition had a justifiable desire to move a Motion of their own, was squeezed out; Cyprus was debated for half a day; and Egypt is to be debated for what everybody in the House will regard as a wholly inadequate time—and all because the Government could not put off, until the autumn, the concluding stages of their Television Bill.
That is all they need have done, seeing, as they must have seen a fortnight or three weeks ago, the red light, or at least the amber light, of all these great world issues piling up against them. But no, they must use up the time of the House on the concluding stages of their Television Bill and other quite unnecessary Measures, to leave us in the position in which we find ourselves today. I hope that my hon. Friend will press this Amendment to a Division to mark our disapproval.
4.6 p.m.
Mr. William Warbey: The House should not part with the Motion without hearing a great deal more from the Government about their intentions on a number of matters which have been raised already by my hon. Friends, and also on a number of other questions of great importance on which we entirely lack information either about facts or about Government policy. I intended to put quite a number of questions to the Foreign Secretary, whom I expected to see on the Government Front Bench this afternoon. I am very glad that there is a representative of the Foreign Office here. No doubt the Foreign Secretary himself is drafting his resignation speech in succession to the other Members of the Government.
One matter I wish to put has not been answered. We have been told what are
704
the Heads of Agreement made with Egypt, but we are now left to have a debate on this vital matter sandwiched in between a debate on this Motion and Amendment and a debate on the Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill. I do not see how much time will be left for the debate on Egypt. I am quite sure that hon. Members opposite who are genuinely anxious to see this vital matter properly discussed will join with us in opposing the Motion and in seeking to ensure that proper time is given for the discussion of these serious questions.
I do not wish to deal any further with Egypt, but I should like to add one or two questions to those put by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) on the question of the proposal to accord sovereignty to Western Germany. I should like to know, first, when this question is to come up. It seems to me that it will arise very soon after we adjourn, if the Motion is carried. The Government have been less than honest and courteous to the House about this whole matter.
When we had a debate recently I intervened to ask the Prime Minister whether any time limit had been set for the ratification of the E.D.C. by the French Government, and the Prime Minister categorically assured the House that no definite time limit had been set. Yet, on that very same day, Mr. Dulles announced that the French Government had been given until 15th August. Now we learn, not in this House but from a debate in another place, that a time limit of 15th August has in fact been set, according to a statement made yesterday by a noble Lord. That means that the time is very short indeed.
As I understand it—I hope that the Joint Under-Secretary will correct me if I am wrong—the Government will then proceed, in conjunction with the United States Government, to raise immediately this whole question of West German sovereignty. We would like to know in what form that is to be done. For example, is it proposed to amend the Bonn Convention? I think that we should be told, because the Bonn Convention says quite categorically in the first Article that
"The Federal Republic shall have full authority over its internal and external affairs, except as provided in the present Convention."
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is departing from the terms of the Motion.
Mr. Warbey: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I accept your Ruling, but I was trying to show first, that this question falls to be dealt with during the period in which we shall be in Recess, and secondly, that we are asked to disperse without being informed exactly what are the intentions of the Government in this matter. I think that we are entitled to know, before we disperse for the Recess, whether the Government intend to amend the Bonn Convention, and if so, in what form. If they do not intend to amend the Bonn Convention, how is it proposed to place restrictions on the power of the West German Government to have completely unlimited rearmament, an armed force without any control whatsoever?
In another place there were references to undertakings which are to be given. What will be the value of these undertakings? Will any undertakings have any value if they are not part of a solemn contract such as the Bonn Convention? I suggest that it is not treating the House fairly if we are not informed about these vital matters before we disperse.
Finally on this subject I wish to ask one further question. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has on more than one occasion asked for a specific assurance from the Government that this House will be recalled before any decisions are taken in regard to West German sovereignty. We have not had any assurance whatsoever. All we have had from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House, is a reference to the Standing Order of the House. We know all about the Standing Order, but what we want is an assurance from the Government that they will pledge themselves to advise Mr. Speaker to recall the House in the event of their being on the point of taking any decision—[HON. MEMBERS: "Before that."]—and before they take any decision regarding West German sovereignty. I hope that we shall have that assurance before we disperse.
I wish to ask some questions about one or two other matters, first affecting the Far East. We have had the ending of the war in Indo-China, and I may perhaps be allowed to say that we are all
706
gratified to see that the cease-fire has been brought about even sooner than had been anticipated. But what is to follow? What about this South-East Asia security organisation? On this matter we have been greeted by dead silence from the Government. We have not had silence from Mr. Dulles. Mr. Dulles told us that there is to be a conference called very soon to confirm a military alliance with South-East Asia.
What is the policy of the Government in this matter? Are they proposing to call such a conference? Are they proposing to join in such a conference? Is a conference to be held? Are we to take part in this conference? Is it to be a conference to draw up a military pact, or to enter into certain specific commitments? And quite apart from the formation of a military alliance or a specific pact, what military commitments are the Government proposing to enter into with regard to South-East Asia?
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is getting far away from the question of when we should adjourn. No doubt there are all sorts of questions which might be asked about public affairs, but they cannot be raised within the terms of this Motion.
Mr. Warbey: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I am suggesting, first, that these are matters of the highest state policy, affecting the welfare of the whole country, and possibly the issues of war and peace. Secondly, I am trying to call attention to the fact that these issues fall to be decided by the Government during the period in which they are seeking to disperse hon. Members for three months to their constituencies and to their holiday avocations. It is not treating the House properly that we should be left completely uninformed about the intentions of the Government in these vital matters.
Are they proposing to join in a military alliance with South-East Asia? Are they proposing to enter into any commitments, secret or avowed, with regard to South-East Asia? We ought to know the answers to those questions.
Mr. S. Silverman: Ought not my hon. Friend to add a request for an assurance by the Government that they will not enter into any final arrangements with anybody on these matters in the absence of the House of Commons?
Mr. Warbey: I am glad to welcome the assistance of my hon. Friend, and to ask that that assurance shall be given.
I wish to turn to another question which falls to be decided possibly within the next two or three weeks, namely, the question of Korea, with which this country is vitally concerned. Recently there was a conference at Geneva, and on 15th June the discussions on the Korean question were abandoned without any agreement being reached. Mr. Syngman Rhee, the President of Korea, has already announced to the world that, 60 days after the decision at the Geneva Conference, he intends to resolve this matter by force of arms. He has already stated that, and repeated the declaration on more than one occasion, that he proposes to use armed force in order to re-unite Korea. I wish to know what the Government propose to do about that situation. Do they propose that a renewal of fighting in Korea, brought about by the actions of the South Korean Government, shall be brought before the Security Council of the United Nations? Or do they propose that the matter should be by-passed, as was the Guatemala question?
These are matters about which the House should b informed. There is a state of acute tension in the whole of the Far East. There have been signs of extreme jitteriness in China—we have seen incidents arising out of it in the last day or two—and there is also something approaching hysteria in the United States which has even invaded the American Congress. I want to know what the Government are doing to protect this country against the possibility of rising tension in the Pacific area leading possibly to a state of war.
Have the Government any plans for preventing this country from being involved in a war which might arise in the Far East? This is a question which is important and urgent. I think that all of us must have been shocked to read the incredible speech made yesterday by Mr. Syngman Rhee to the joint meeting of Congress. What is the Government's attitude on that subject and its implications? What are they proposing to do to protect the interests of this country? It would be very convenient if one could dismiss the statements of Mr. Syngman Rhee as the ravings of an elderly lunatic; but, unfortunately, one reads that what he
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said was repeatedly applauded by no less a person than Admiral Radford, the chief—
Mr. Speaker: Order. Again I must tell the hon. Member that he is going into far too much detail. He may discuss the importance of the subject, but the hon. Member is going too far into the merits. I think that there is a line between importance and merits which he is quite capable of drawing for himself.
Mr. Warbey: I am trying very carefully to draw that line, and I appreciate your assistance, Mr. Speaker, in drawing me back to the path from which I may have strayed.
I am seeking to show that there is a state of affairs in the Far East which is highly dangerous for this country. We ought not to separate for the Recess without knowing what is the Government's policy in these matters. When we have the leading military man in the United States, the chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff, applauding proposals for a declaration of war against China in which Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek should join, backed by American military assistance, then I want to know what is being done to protect the interests of this country. Can this country be kept out of a war arising in the Far East from such a development?
I come to another and related matter. The Prime Minister recently visited the United States with one very important matter on his mind, namely, the question of the hydrogen bomb and its implications. This is where the question of a possible conflict in the Pacific area comes right home to this country. There are American bases in this country from which atomic and hydrogen weapons might be launched in the event of war—
Mr. George Lawson: On a point of order. Would I be in order in moving the Closure?
Mr. Speaker: Yes.
Mr. Lawson: Then I move.
Question put, "That the Question be now put."
The House proceeded to a Division—.
Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas(seated and covered): On a point of

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order, Mr. Speaker. I submit that no Motion has been moved. The question asked by the hon. Member was whether he would be in order in moving, "That the Question be now put." He did not move, "That the Question be now put." Therefore, I submit for your Ruling that there is no Question before the House.
Mr. Speaker: That is not so. I said "Yes" and the hon. Gentleman said "I move." The Chair is quite accustomed to correcting verbal inaccuracies in the form adopted by hon. Members in moving Motions.
Ayes, 264; Noes, 181.

Division No. 212.]

AYES

[4.24 p.m.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Finlay, Graeme

Longden, Gilbert

Alport, C. J. M.

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Low, A. R. W.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Amory, Rt. Hon. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Fort, R.

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Foster, John

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Arbuthnot, John

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.

Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)

Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe & Lonsdale)

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D. (Pollok)

McKibbin, A. J.

Baldwin, A. E.

Gammans, L. D.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Banks, Col. C.

Gamer-Evans, E. H.

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Barber, Anthony

George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd

Maclean, Fitzroy

Barlow, Sir John

Glover, D.

Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Beach, Maj. Hicks

Godber, J. B.

Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bremley)

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

Macpherson, Wall (Dumfries)

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Gough, C. F. H

Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)

Gower, H. R.

Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

Graham, Sir Fergus

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir Reginald

Bennett, William (Woodside)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Birch, Nigel

Hare, Hon J. H.

Marples, A. E.

Bishop, F. P.

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Marshall, Douglas (Bodmi)

Black, C. W.

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfield)

Maude, Angus

Bossom, Sir A. C.

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Maudling, R.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Hay, John

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Boyle, Sir Edward

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Medlicott, Brig. F.

Braine, B. R.

Heath, Edward

Mellor, Sir John

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Molson, A. H. E.

Braithwaite, Sir Gurney

Higgs, J. M. C.

Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)

Moore, Sir Thomas

Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Browne, Jack (Govan)

Hirst, Geoffrey

Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

Hollis, M. C.

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Bullard, D. G.

Hope, Lord John

Neave, Airey

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry

Nicholls, Harmar

Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Campbell, Sir David

Horobin, I. M.

Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)

Carr, Robert

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence

Nield, Basil (Chester)

Cary, Sir Robert

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Channon, H.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Nugent, G. R. H.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Nutting, Anthony

Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)

Hulbert, Wing Cdr. N. J

Oakshott, H. D.

Cole, Norman

Hurd, A. R.

Odey, G. W.

Colegate, W. A.

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)

O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Hutchison, James (Scotsteun)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Hylton-Foster, H. B. H.

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.

Iremonger, T. L.

Page, R. G.

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

Crouch, R. F.

Jennings, Sir Roland

Perkins, Sir Robert

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Pilkington, Capt. R. A

Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)

Jones, A. (Hall Green)

Pitman, I. J.

Davidson, Viscountess

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Powell, J. Enoch

De la Bére, Sir Rupert

Kaberry, D.

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Digby, S. Wingfield

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Kerr, H. W.

Profumo, J. D.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Lambert, Hon. G.

Raikes, Sir Victor

Donner, Sir P. W.

Lambton, Viscount

Ramsden, J. E.

Doughty, C. J. A.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Rayner, Brig. R.

Drayson, G. B.

Leather, E. H. C.

Redmayne, M.

Drewe, Sir C.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Renton, D. L. M.

Duthie, W. S.

Lindsay, Martin

Ridsdale, J. E.

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Eden, Rt. Hon. A.

Llewellyn, D. T.

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Roper, Sir Harold

Erroll, F. J.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Fell, A.

Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.

Russell, R. S.

Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.

Studholme, H. G.

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Summers, G. S.

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)

Schofield, Li.-Col. W.

Sutcliffe, Sir Harold

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Scott, R. Donald

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Wall, Major Patrick

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Shepherd, William

Teeling, W.

Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Watkinson, H. A.

Soames, Capt. C.

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Webbe, Sir H. (London & Westminster)

Speir, R. M.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Wellwood, W.

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)

Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)

Spent, Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)

Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.

Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

Stevens, Geoffrey

Tilney, John

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)

Turner, H. F. L.

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Turton, R. H.

Wills, G.

Stoddard-Scott, Col. M.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Storey, S.

Vane, W. M. F.

Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Vosper, D. F.

Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith and

Mr. Legh.

NOES

Acland, Sir Richard

Greenwood, Anthony

Paget, R. T.

Albu, A. H.

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Grey, C. F.

Pannell, Charles

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Pargiter, G. A.

Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.

Grimond, J.

Paton, J.

Awbery, S. S.

Hale, Leslie

Peart, T. F.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Balfour, A.

Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Bartley, P.

Hamilton, W W.

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Benn, Hon. Wedgwood

Hargreaves, A.

Proctor, W. T.

Benson, G.

Hastings, S.

Reeves, J.

Beswick, F.

Hayman, F. H.

Reid, Thomas (Swindon)

Blackburn, F.

Healey, Denis (Leeds, S.E.)

Reid, William (Camlachie)

Blenkinsop, A.

Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)

Roberts, Rt. Hon. A.

Blyton, W. R.

Herbison, Miss M.

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Boardman, H.

Hobson, C. R.

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Bowden, H. W.

Holman, P.

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Bowles, F. G.

Holmes, Horace

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Holt, A. F.

Royle, C.

Brockway, A. F.

Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Brook, Dryden (Halifax)

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Silverman, Julius (Erdington)

Burke, W. A.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Burton, Miss F. E.

Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Callaghan, L. J.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Skeffington, A. M.

Carmichael, J.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke-on-Trent)

Chapman, W. D.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Slater, J. (Durham, Sedgefield)

Clunie, J.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena

Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S.)

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Jenkins, R. H. (Stechford)

Sorensen, R. W.

Cove, W. G.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)

Sparks, J. A.

Crosland, C. A. R.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.

Crossman, R. H. S.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Stross, Dr. Barnett

Daines, P.

Keenan, W.

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Kenyon, C.

Thomas, George (Cardiff)

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)

King, Dr. H. M.

Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Davies, Harold (Look)

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Tomney, F.

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Lewis, Arthur

Turner-Samuels, M.

Delargy, H. J.

Lindgren, G. S.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Dodds, N. N.

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Usborne, H. C.

Donnelly, D. L.

MacColl, J. E.

Viant, S. P.

Driberg, T. E. N.

McGovern, J.

Wallace, H. W.

Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)

McLeavy, F.

Warbey, W. N.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Weitzman, D.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

Mason, Roy

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Mellish, R. J.

Wells, William (Walsall)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Messer, Sir F.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Mitchison, G. R.

Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.

Fernyhough, E

Monslow, W.

Wigg, George

Finch, H. J.

Morgan, Dr. H. B. W.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)

Morley, R.

Willey, F. T.

Foot, M. M.

Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S.)

Williams, W. R. (Dreylsden)

Forman, J. C.

Moyle, A.

Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)

Freeman, Peter (Newport)

Mulley, F. W.

Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.

Wyatt, W. L.

Gibson, C. W.

Oliver, G. H.

Yates, V. F.

Glanville, James

Orbach, M.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Gaoch, E. G.

Oswald, T.

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon P. C.

Padley, W. E.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Mr. Wilkins and Mr. John Taylor.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order—
Mr. Speaker: There is no point of order. I am ordered by the House to put the Question. It must be put.
Question put accordingly, "That 'Tomorrow,' stand part of the Question."
The House proceeded to a Division—
Sir CEDRIC DREWE and Mr. VOSPER were appointed Tellers for the Ayes, but no Members being willing to act as Tellers for the Noes, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER declared that the Ayes had it.
Mr. Silverman: On a point of order. I want to put this to you, Mr. Speaker, as a point of order, but to preface it by saying that the purpose for which I ventured to intervene just now was to seek the leave of the House to withdraw my Amendment, for a reason which I wish to give. You, Sir, ruled that because the Closure Motion had been put and agreed to, you had to proceed at once. Does that mean that if any new Member of the House, possibly not understanding the procedure, chooses to move the Closure without notice and it is carried, the mover of the Motion or an Amendment loses his opportunity to seek leave to withdraw it?
Mr. Speaker: When the Closure is moved it has to be put at once, without
Amendment or debate, unless I think it is an abuse of the rules of the House, which I did not in this case.
Mr. William Blyton: On a point of order. I want to make it clear that when the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) says that South Korea—which my own Government supported in the United Nations—was the aggressor, he speaks for himself, and not for hon. Members on this side of the House generally.
Mr. Warbey: On a point of order—
Mr. James Simmons: Sit down you Communist tool.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. P. G. T. Buchan-Hepburn)claimed, "That the main Question be now put."
Main Question put accordingly.
Mr. S. Silverman: Clear the Chair.
The House proceeded to a Division—
Sir Charles Taylor(seated and covered): On a point of order. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said "Clear the Chair." Is that not a reflection upon Mr. Speaker?
Mr. Speaker: It may well be, but I shall not allow it to interrupt the Division.
Ayes, 271; Noes, 187.

Division No. 213.]

AYES

[4.40 p.m.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Alport, C. J. M.

Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Erroll, F J.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Campbell, Sir David

Fell, A.

Amory, Rt. Hon. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Carr, Robert

Finlay, Graeme

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Cary, Sir Robert

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Arbuthnot, John

Channon, H.

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Fort, R.

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)

Foster, John

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Cole, Norman

Fraser, Hon Hugh (Stone)

Baldwin, A. E.

Colegate, W. A.

Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe & Lonsdale)

Banks, Col. C.

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Fyfe, Rt. Hon Sir David Maxwell

Barber, Anthony

Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D (Pollok)

Barlow, Sir John

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)

Beach, Maj. Hicks

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Gammans, L. D.

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col O. E.

George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd

Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)

Crouch, R. F.

Glover, D.

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Godber, J. B.

Bennett, William (Woodside)

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)

Gough, C. F. H.

Birch, Nigel

Davidson, Viscountess

Gower, H. R.

Bishop, F. P.

Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)

Graham, Sir Fergus

Black, C. W.

De la Bére, Sir Rupert

Grimond, J.

Bossom, Sir A. C.

Digby, S. Wingfield

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Boyle, Sir Edward

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Hare, Hon. J H

Braine, B. R.

Donner, Sir P. W.

Harrison, Col J. H. (Eye)

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Doughty, C. J. A.

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V (Macclesfield)

Braithwaite, Sir Gurney

Drayson, G. B.

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Hay, John

Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)

Duthie, W. S.

Heald, Rt. Hon Sir Lionel

Browne, Jack (Govan)

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.

Heath, Edward

Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

Eden, Rt. Hon. A.

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Bullard, D. G.

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Higgs, J. M. C.

Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)

Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Hirst, Geoffrey

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir Reginald

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Hollis, M. C.

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Scott, R. Donald

Holt, A. F.

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Hope, Lord John

Marples, A. E.

Shepherd, William

Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry

Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Maude, Angus

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Horobin, I. M.

Maudling, R.

Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Soames, Capt. C.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Medlicott, Brig. F.

Speir, R. M.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Mellor, Sir John

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Molson, A. H. E.

Spens, Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)

Hulbert, Wing Cdr. N. J.

Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Stevens, Geoffrey

Hurd, A. R.

Moore, Sir Thomas

Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Hutchison, James (Scotstoun)

Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Hyde, Lt. Col. H. M.

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Storey, S.

Hylton-Foster, H. B. H.

Neave, Airey

Strauss, Horny (Norwich, S.)

Iremongor, T. L.

Nicholls Harmar

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Studholme, H. G.

Jennings, Sir Roland

Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)

Summers, G. S.

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Nield, Basil (Chester)

Sutcliffe, Sir Harold

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Jones, A. (Hall Green)

Nugent, G. R. H.

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Nutting, Anthony

Teeling, W.

Kaberry, D.

Oakshott, H. D.

Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Odey, G. W.

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Kerr, H. W.

O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Lambert, Hon. G.

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Lambton, Viscount

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)

Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.

Leather, E. H. C.

Page, R. G.

Tilney, John

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Peaks, Rt. Hon. O.

Turner, H. F. L.

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Perkins, Sir Robert

Turton, R. H.

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Peto, Brig. C. H. M.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Vane, W. M. F.

Llewellyn, D. T.

Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)

Pitman, I. J.

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Powell, J. Enoch

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Wall, Major Patrick

Longden, Gilbert

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Low, A. R. W.

Profumo, J. D.

Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Raikes, Sir Victor

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)

Ramsden, J. E.

Watkinson, H. A.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Rayner, Brig. R.

Webbe, Sir H. (London & Westminster)

Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.

Redmayne, M.

Wellwood, W.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Renton, D. L. M.

Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

McKibbin, A. J.

Ridsdale, J. E.

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Wills, G.

Maclean, Fitzroy

Rodgers, John (Sovenoaks)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Roper, Sir Harold

Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Russell, R. S.

Sir Cedric Drewe and Mr. Vosper.

NOES

Adams, Richard

Callaghan, L. J.

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Albu, A. H.

Carmichael, J.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Chapman, W. D.

Fernyhough, E.

Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.

Clunie, J.

Finch, H. J.

Awbery, S. S.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)

Bacon, Miss Alice

Cove, W. G.

Foot, M. M.

Balfour, A.

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Forman, J. C.

Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.

Crosland, C. A. R.

Freeman, Peter (Newport)

Bartley, P.

Crossman, R. H. S.

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Benn, Hon. Wedgwood

Daines, P.

Gibson, C. W.

Benson, G.

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Gooch, E. G.

Beswick, F.

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Blackburn, F.

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Greenwood, Anthony

Blenkinsop, A.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Blyton, W. R.

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Grey, C. F.

Bowden, H. W.

Delargy, H. J.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Bowles, F. G.

Dodds, N. N.

Hale, Leslie

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Donnelly, D. L.

Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Brockway, A. F.

Driberg, T. E. N.

Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)

Brook, Dryden (Halifax)

Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)

Hamilton, W. W.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Hannan, W.

Burke, W. A.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

Hargreaves, A.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Hastings, S.

716

717

Hayman, F. H.

Messer, Sir F.

Skeffington, A. M.

Healey, Denis (Leeds, S.E.)

Mitchison, G. R.

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke-on-Trent)

Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)

Monslow, W.

Slater, J. (Durham, Sedgefield)

Herbison, Miss M.

Morgan, Dr. H. B. W.

Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S.)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Morley, R.

Sorensen, R. W.

Hobson, C. R.

Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S.)

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Holman, P.

Moyle, A.

Sparks, J. A.

Holmes, Horace

Mulley, F. W.

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.

Houghton, Douglas

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.

Stross, Dr. Barnett

Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)

Oliver, G. H.

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Orbach, M.

Thomas, George (Cardiff)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Oswald, T.

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Padley, W. E.

Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)

Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)

Paget, R. T.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Tomney, F.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Pannell, Charles

Turner-Samuels, M.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Pargiter, G. A.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Jeger, Mrs. Lena

Parkin, B. T.

Usborne, H. C.

Jenkins, R. H. (Stechford)

Paton, J.

Viant, S. P.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Peart, T. F.

Wallace, H. W.

Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Warbey, W. N.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Weitzman, D.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Keenan, W.

Proctor, W. T.

Wells, William (Walsall)

Kenyon, C.

Reeves, J.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Reid, Thomas (Swindon)

Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.

King, Dr. H. M.

Reid, William (Camlachie)

Wigg, George

Lawson, G. M.

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Willey, F. T.

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Williams, W. R. (Droylsden)

Lewis, Arthur

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)

Lindgren, G. S.

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Royle, C.

Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)

MacColl, J. E.

Shackleton, E. A. A.

Wyatt, W. L.

McGovern, J.

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Yates, V. F.

McLeavy, F.

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Marquand, Rt. Han. H. A.

Silverman, Julius (Erdington)

Mason, Roy

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Mellish, R. J.

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Mr. Wilkins and Mr. John Taylor.

Resolved,
That this House, at its rising To-morrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 19th October.
4.49 p.m.
Mr. Warbey: I ask your leave, Mr. Speaker, to make a personal statement in connection with a statement made by the hon. Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton) on an alleged point of order. In the course of that statement, possibly due to a misunderstanding, because I believe the hon. Member was not in the House when I made my speech, he said that I had accused South Korea of having committed an act of aggression. I did no such thing.
I have always supported the United Nations Security Council in taking action against the aggression committed by North Korea. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]What I did in the course of my speech was to ask what action the Government were proposing to take in reference to the threat which has been uttered recently and repeatedly by President Syngman Rhee in connection with a proposed use of force against North Korea. I suggest that the hon. Member who made that statement should now withdraw it.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: There cannot be a debate on a personal statement. The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) was entitled to correct what he thought to be an aspersion upon himself.
Mr. S. Silverman: On a different point of order. Your attention, Mr. Speaker, was drawn a little while ago to a remark made by me, which was correctly said to be "Clear the Chair." It was a portmanteau way of trying to express in the circumstances of the moment what I wish to convey to you now more formally, and I hope more properly, and that is that we need some clarification of what the House has been doing during these last 10 minutes.
As I understand the situation, it is that a Motion was made from the Government Front Bench for the Adjournment of the House to a specified date when the House rises tomorrow. Immediately thereafter, when no speeches had been made at all with regard to the Motion—even the right hon. Gentleman who moved it did so formally and without a speech—I was called upon to move an Amendment to it. I moved the Amendment to it, and that, of course, was not enough to propose the Question to the House until the Amendment had been seconded. It was

719
seconded by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland). My hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) continued the debate, as I understand it, on that Amendment.
He had made part of his speech when another hon. Member, rising as we all thought on a point of order, asked you whether it would be in order if a Motion for the Closure were moved. No one understood at that time—I do not think the hon. Member himself so understood—that he was moving any Motion whatever, but it seems to have been interpreted by you not merely that he had asked whether such a Motion would be in order but that he had, in fact, moved it.
A Division was taken upon it. I am not raising any question upon that Division, but upon what followed. Assume that the Motion had been properly moved but, as I say, without any speech having been made the Closure on the Amendment was then carried and there was a Division upon it, which I suppose disposed of the Amendment, but it did not dispose of the Motion. What I think we are all puzzled about is what has happened since.
In the attempt that some of us were making to clarify the previous procedure, and while that was still going on, the Government Chief Whip got up and mumbled something which you may have heard but which was not heard anywhere else in the House. I do not know what he said to you. He might have been supposed to have said that he would like to take a Division on the main Question. If that is what he was saying, I suppose the Closure could be put. I look at Standing Order 29, under the heading: "Closure of Debate." Paragraph (2) says:
"When the Motion 'That the question be now put' has been carried, and the Question consequent thereon has been decided, any further Motion may be made (the assent of the Chair, as aforesaid, not having been withheld) which may be requisite to bring to a decision any Question already proposed from the Chair."
The Question already proposed from the Chair was no doubt the main Motion, and the Motion that was necessary in order to take a decision upon that was the motion for the Closure.
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That Motion for the Closure has never been put to the House at all. What you proceeded to do was, not to put the Motion for the Closure, but to put the main Motion, before the debate upon it had been concluded. That was the point that I wanted to clarify.
There is another point. It has been always thought by most of us that the discretion of the Chair to accept a Motion for the Closure at any time is a judicial discretion and that the Motion is never accepted by the Chair in circumstances where there has not been adequate debate. In the case of the Amendment, the adequate debate consisted of half a speech after the Amendment had been moved and seconded.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is asking for an explanation of what happened. What happened was that, after the Closure had been carried on his Amendment, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury claimed the main Question, which he is quite entitled to do. I then proceeded to put the main Question. As to the rest of the hon. Member's speech, if he has any criticism of my action in putting that Question, he ought to put it in the form of a Motion. I cannot allow it to be put in this way.
Mr. Silverman: I do not think I have had any Ruling on the point I was raising. With all respect, may I say that I should like to have it? It is true that a Minister may claim the main Question, but it does not follow that he is entitled to have it as of right. He is entitled to have it in the discretion of the Chair.
Mr. Speaker: Certainly. It is in the discretion of the Chair. I repeat what I said about the hon. Member's challenging that discretion. I thought that the debate on the Amendment covered the main Question sufficiently to entitle me to put the Question.
Mr. Tom Driberg: There was no reply.
Mr. Speaker: I cannot have the matter debated here now. If the hon. Member has any challenge on my action, he must put it in the form of a Motion.
Mr. Silverman: I would not wish to be responsible for putting a Motion on the Order Paper to challenge the action of Mr. Speaker until I was quite certain

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what Mr. Speaker had done. I am asking these questions in order that I may make up my mind whether any question of challenge arises. It is a little difficult for us to understand without explanation that a debate can be held to have been completed when there has been no speech made for or against the Motion and when the speeches on an Amendment which was held to cover the main Motion had not been replied to by the Government. I think it quite wrong—
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is putting the same point as he previously raised. I must again tell him that if he has any criticism to make he must make it in the form of a Motion.
Mr. W. T. Proctor: On a further point of order. The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) and myself put down an Amendment on which it was our intention to raise the question of the old-age pensioners. You informed me, Mr. Speaker, that I would be able to speak on the main Motion, as you did not intend to call our Amendment. Have we no opportunity now of raising that very important question?
Mr. Speaker: Certainly not. The hon. Member's Amendment was not selected.
Sir C. Taylor: Further to the point of order raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). I am the hon. Member who raised the question of what the hon. Gentleman opposite said, which was "Clear the Chair." Most of us on this side of the House think that a graceful apology to you, Sir, would be more in keeping with his action than the speech he has now made.
Mr. Speaker: That is a matter for me. I have taken the course which I have taken. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne did put another construction upon it. I am quite prepared to accept it.

CLERK OF THE HOUSE (RETIREMENT)
4.58 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I beg to move,
That Mr. Speaker be requested to convey to Sir Frederic William Metcalfe, K.C.B., on his retirement from the Office of Clerk of this House, the assurance of its just sense of the exemplary manner in which he has uniformly discharged the duties of his important office, and its appreciation of his thirty-five years of devoted service in different offices of the House, of which twenty-four were spent at the Table, where his experience and ready advice have rendered constant assistance to the House and its Members in the conduct of its business.
This Motion is on the Paper in the name of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself, and of the two right hon. Gentlemen opposite who are the Leaders of their parties. With his natural modesty, Sir Frederic himself would have preferred it that we should leave it at that today and make no personal references to him. He is essentially a modest man. I feel that the House, for the first time in many years, would be unwilling to take Sir Frederic's advice on that matter, even if he tendered it.
The resignation of a Clerk of the House inevitably marks the end of a Parliamentary chapter. Sir Frederic leaves us with the good wishes of everyone. He has served the House for 35 years, and at all times he has been a perfect model of patience with all those who sought his guidance. Courtesy was his hall-mark and friendliness his outstanding characteristic, and he joined us in other spheres besides his work. He was a private—there is the modesty again—in our Parliamentary Home Guard during the war. With some he played golf, and in earlier days he shone as a run-getter for the Lords and Commons on the cricket field.
Now he leaves us, his duty done, but young enough for us as a House—with confidence, I hope—to wish him a long and happy retirement. Today we want to thank him for his great services, and to say that we shall all miss him from his place at the Table.
Mr. C. R. Attlee: Only a few words are needed from me to associate very fully all hon. Members on this side of the House with what has

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been so admirably said by the Lord Privy Seal. I think, perhaps, that we in this House are rather apt to take for granted the services of the officers of the House, but we all know what the unfailing help and courtesy we receive from the Table mean to Members.
Sir Frederic has a long line of distinguished predecessors, and he has himself added to a very great tradition. He is a personal friend of so many in this House, and we all join in wishing him a long and happy retirement.
Mr. Clement Davies: May I also add my word of thanks to Sir Frederic now that he is leaving us and thank him very sincerely on behalf of all for his kindliness, courtesy and readiness at all times to help us on any matter on which we approached him?
Sir Waldron Smithers: I think it right, as I have had the honour of Sir Frederic's friendship for 30 years, not only in this House but on the cricket field, for a back bencher—if I may presume to do so—to add our tribute to him for his work, his helpfulness and his kindliness at all times. I hope that the "Fellowes" that follow him will do equally well.
Mr. Charles Williams: May I put a point of view which I think very few others in the House can put—certainly one or two can—with regard to the immense value which Sir Frederic has been to those of us who had the honour of serving the House in the Chair? No one can know how difficult is the work of the Chair and how utterly impossible that work would be except for the services of the Clerk. Sir Frederic was an old friend of mine long before he occupied any of the seats at the Table, but I must say that whatever his services to private Members have been—and they have been very great indeed—his services to the occupants of the Chair have been quite invaluable and have made our job possible.
Mr. George Benson: I think it fitting that a back bencher on this side of the House should also express his appreciation of the services rendered by Sir Frederic to back benchers. It is a long time since I first came into this House, and in those days Sir Frederic was Second Clerk Assistant. I can remember
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the advice which I received as a new Member, completely muddled and befuddled by our procedure and in finding my way about, and the problem I had with Questions. The advice was—and I pass it on to the House in the words in which it was given to me—"Get hold of that red-headed chap. He will help you." That was Sir Frederic. It was very good advice indeed. Sir Frederic has always been at the service of Members, and his services have been most helpful. I wish him God speed.
Question put, and agreed to, nemine contradicente.
Resolved,
That Mr. Speaker be requested to convey to Sir Frederic William Metcalfe, K.C.B., on his retirement from the Office of Clerk of this House, the assurance of its just sense of the exemplary manner in which he has uniformly discharged the duties of his important office, and its appreciation of his thirty-five years of devoted service in different offices of the House, of which twenty-four were spent at the Table, where his experience and ready advice have rendered constant assistance to the House and its Members in the conduct of its business.

SUEZ CANAL ZONE BASE (ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT)
5.10 p.m.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I beg to move,
That this House approves the heads of agreement initialled in Cairo on 27th July between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.
I think that in opening this debate there is at least one point on which I shall have the support of the overwhelming majority of the House, and that is in saying that the speeches from the Front Bench will not be too long. I have my duty to deploy the arguments on behalf of the Government's case, and I think that if I am to do that briefly I must ask the House to be indulgent towards me with regard to giving way on interventions, because I think that to do so would serve to waste the time of the House and to make it harder for me to fulfil my job.
It seems to me that the main consideration of this debate, and the main discussion, will centre round two points, first, the context of the Heads of Agreement which, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I initialled in Cairo the day

725
before yesterday, and, secondly, on whether or not Her Majesty's Government are correct in the policy which they are pursuing towards Egypt and in initiating a step which will lead to a formal ratification of an agreement with Egypt.
I think that both those points depend to a very large extent on strategic considerations, and, in particular, on a strategic review which was carried out by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed by the Cabinet in the light of present conditions and circumstances. Although, obviously, I cannot go deeply into that, I think that I should bring to the notice of the House three considerations—comparatively recent—which apply particularly to policy in Egypt.
The first of these is the advent of the hydrogen bomb, together with other thermo-nuclear weapons. In war, I do not think that we can do other than expect the use of these weapons, and, in particular, their use on this country. In such circumstances, I think that all hon. Members would agree that our ability to mobilise, equip, train and dispatch overseas large quantities of troops would be restricted. Furthermore, our ability to maintain them at long distances from home would also be severely strained.
Not only that, but I think it equally true to say that the same considerations would apply to any Power, say, Russia, which attempted to maintain large forces in a campaign in the Middle East. It, too, would be hampered by long lines of communications running through difficult mountainous country, peculiarly vulnerable to this form of attack. The deduction, therefore—which I think hon. Members will agree is a fair one—is that the likelihood of large-scale land campaigns in the Middle East in any war in the future has been considerably reduced.
The second point to which I would draw the attention of hon. Members is the coming into N.A.T.O. of Turkey and the considerable progress which she has made in re-equipping her army with a lot of modern equipment which the United States have provided for her together with their technical advice. Turkey is determined to fight and to defend herself, and in the circumstances of the increased difficulty which I have mentioned regarding the lines of communication from Russia towards Turkey,
726
the chances of her succeeding have very considerably increased.
That being so, I think that hon. Members will appreciate that the likelihood of our being able to take part in a more forward strategy on Turkey's right flank in the defence of the Middle East is very much increased. That being so, hon. Members would see at once, if they looked at a map, that that places the base in Egypt very much more remote from the area in which we are most likely to fight in war. Therefore, not only is the importance of the base—I would not say done away with; but it is the case that the likelihood of subsidiary bases closer to that area would be necessary in war. Further, the advent of all these very powerful weapons puts a premium on dispersion and is very much against concentration.
In addition, should that be the position in war—and this is true to some extent in peace—the geographical position of Egypt as a country, with the double sea entry to Egypt, with the Canal which may well be shut in war, with the communications which run parallel to the Canal, and as a large source of labour—those facilities will be of very great importance indeed, especially in the event of either the Canal and/or the Mediterranean being closed.
Those facilities would be of little or no use to us in peace or in war with a hostile Egypt. Unless there is a better spirit and more co-operation in Egypt, it will be vain to expect that we can take any useful advantage of these facilities. I therefore think that that second point suggests that strategically we need a better spirit and more co-operation from the Egyptian people if we are to strengthen our strategic position in the Middle East.
The third point which I would make is one which has often come up in this House. It is the fact that with the size of our forces—and particularly is this true of the Army—we are overstretched and overstrained. Our commitments are too large for the forces which we have, and we lack a strategic reserve. Time and again in every debate on this subject to which I have listened hon. Members have urged upon the Government the need to reduce our commitments. But I think that those commitments are the consequence not so much of any failing on the part of Her Majesty's Government

727
but of the deliberate purpose of the Kremlin to stir up trouble for this country wherever it can. I think that it would be unwise of anybody to count on those commitments being reduced.
It is for those reasons that, if we are to balance the Army, we must attempt to build up in this country a strategic reserve. I think that if hon. Members surveyed the general situation today they would agree that the only possibility of achieving that is through being able to free the equivalent of the two and one-third divisions now locked up in the Canal Zone.
Those three points then, I think, come to this. We can afford to have a smaller base; we must aim at better co-operation with Egypt; we must aim at strategic reserves. It is, I think on reflection, the aim of those Heads of Agreement and of the policy now being pursued by Her Majesty's Government to reduce the size of the base, to bring about a better spirit in Egypt, and to free those troops to build up a strategic reserve. Therefore, I would contend that on those considerations, strategically this policy is sound and justified up to the hilt.
Now I turn to the Heads of Agreement. I believe that the House would wish me briefly to consider those matters contained in the Heads of Agreement which are somewhat different from those which have been discussed at such length, and with such patience, by General Sir Brian Robertson and Sir Ralph Stevenson. The first, which is new, is that this reduced base should be manned by civilian technicians from this country. When the previous discussions were going on we aimed at a base which would require some 4,000 soldier technicians. Today, under the considerations which I have outlined, we consider that to retain the workshops, to keep the fixed installations in working order, with a minimum of stores necessary for local maintenance and some war reserves can be done with a very much smaller force—well under half the number of soldiers required. In such circumstances, and after examination, we believe it perfectly feasible to operate the base by civilians from this country. I would say, from my own point of view, that to have civilians is a very great deal better than to have soldiers disguised as civilians.
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The second point which differs from the original agreement is that the evacuation of the base will now be completed in 20 months whereas previously 15 months was the time allotted. I think that hon. Members will appreciate that now that we are reducing the base we shall have more to disperse and more to move both locally in the Middle East and back to this country. The question of this period has been looked into closely at the War Office, and I have personally discussed it at some length both there and with General Keightley. I am satisfied that those 20 months will give us the opportunity to carry out an orderly and efficient evacuation of the base, but, as hon. Members who have seen the base will realise, it will be an extremely difficult task
The third point in the Heads of Agreement to which I think I should refer is the duration of the treaty, which is for seven years. There are some hon. Members who say that it should be for 20 or more years. There are other hon. Members who say that a treaty of this kind would not be worth the paper it is written on. There are still others who say both—which does not seem to me to be entirely logical. But I believe that both for the base itself and for the advantage of the use of Egypt as a place in the future, the main consideration, strategically, is our relations with the Egyptian people and with the Egyptian Government in the future.
In that seven years, we shall know full well whether or not our relations with Egypt have changed very considerably for the better. If they have not, then whether we have 80,000 men there or just a few technicians that base will never be a true asset. If they improve and if, as I believe, there is a gradual improvement in this way, we shall not only have the base of which we can take full opportunity, but have the use of Egypt as a place, which is of even greater value.
I know that there are many different opinions about our future relationships with Egypt, but I would say this. Since the present Government has been in power in Egypt they have had one target and one target only. That target has been the British. "Get the British out of Egypt" has been their cry, and, whatever one may think of their policy and views, that target has gone. I cannot conceive

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that from the point of view of self-interest the Egyptian Government, which has to improve the economy and standard of living in Egypt, could gain any advantage whatsoever by continuing to abuse this country and remain on bad terms not only with us but with the United States of America.
I think that we have reason to hope for better relations in future. I was gratified to see that the initial statement of Colonel Nasser which, by what has gone before might have been very extreme, did show considerable moderation. To those who think that our future relationships with Egypt may be bad, I say that they may or may not be right, but I would suggest that they await the events which they expect in silence rather than, by saying anything, spoil the chances that those relationships will improve.
I know that there are many hon. Members who may agree with the strategic considerations which I have put forward, who may agree in general with the contents of the Heads of Agreement, but who disagree very violently with this policy because of reasons of prestige. I think that everybody realises and appreciates those reasons for disagreeing with this policy. For a proud and great nation to take a step which looks as though she is being forced by duress to do something which she has been shouted at to do for a long time, and to do it deliberately, is always unpalatable for national pride. I think that everyone feels that, and I can assure hon. Members that I am aware of it myself. I can equally well assure them that I would not speak in this debate, still less go to Cairo, were I not unquestionably and absolutely sure that the policy being pursued by Her Majesty's Government is a right one.
I would ask hon. Members who have a reason for disliking this policy, "Have they carefully considered the alternatives?" What are the alternatives? First, we can remain there indefinitely with the 80,000 already there. Would they be prepared to ask the British Army to sit it out indefinitely in conditions in which I do not believe any other Army would have shown such good temper for so long a period? Are they prepared to accept that expense and that waste of effort, which makes no contribution whatever to our difficulties in the cold war?
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I have yet to hear an hon. Member on either side of the House who advocated that course.
What is the other alternative? My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and one or two others have said that the correct course is to say to the Egyptians, "Until we get a proper treaty which we agree upon, we will sit it out with a force of 10,000 or 15,000 or 20,000 men." Because of difficulties which might arise, such a policy has been very carefully examined by the Chiefs-of-Staff.
It means that one would concentrate a proportion of the base at Fayid, including an airfield. In that portion one would have that force guarding itself, the base and the airfield, and from it one could afford a small force for the immediate port facilities and wharfage at Port Said or Suez or whichever port one chooses. But one could not have sufficient forces to guard one's lines of communication from Fayid to the port. That being so, and accepting, as I think hon. Members must accept, that such a course would be provocative and would result in an increase of banditry and terrorism, what should we do? If that happened what would one do about one's lines of communication? One could either supply that force by air, as in the case of the Berlin airlift—hut surely one would look rather stupid with a beleaguered garrison in Egypt being supplied by air; or one could reinforce with more troops in order to safeguard one's lines of communication.
I say to hon. Members: could there be a more provocative course of action than to bring reinforcements into Egypt, having previously stated the limitation on the number of one's troops and having no rights on that occasion to bring in the reinforcements? That solution has been turned down by the best military advice, and politically it is considered—and rightly so in my opinion—quite unacceptable.
What other alternatives are there? I have listened to all these debates, I have talked to many hon. Members and hon. Friends—in both senses of the word—on this subject; but I have yet to hear a practical proposal other than those two. That being the case, I suggest to hon. Members who oppose this policy that in

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a serious subject like this, and with a full sense of responsibility, they should put these two questions to themselves: first, "Would I remain with the 80,000?"—and I believe that the answer is, "No"; and secondly, "Would I reject all military advice and remain there with a smaller force?"—and I believe that from any responsible consideration the answer again would be, "No."
If I am right and the answer is "No" to both those questions, then any hon. Member who votes against our policy comes face to face with one inescapable fact—that by voting against this policy he is voting for one of those two courses of action. Hon. Members cannot escape that fact because those are the only alternatives. I would say this very sincerely to all hon. Members who disagree with the Government: I appreciate the reasons of pride, and indeed of emotion, which prompt them to resist this policy, but this is an occasion on which emotions come into conflict with common sense. Before they vote tonight I feel that hon. Members should think very hard on this subject for, if they do not, then on further reflection they may well find that on this occasion they have not merely voted against their own party but, in my opinion a more serious matter, they have voted against their own common sense.
5.27 p.m.
Mr. C. R. Attlee: The right hon. Gentleman speaks in this House not only as a member of the Government and Secretary of State but as a distinguished soldier. I thought that he was speaking a lot of sound sense, but it differs very much from what he used to say when we were in Government. In fact, we have listened to a lot of special pleading. It is not true that the difference between the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb has created all that change in the position which existed when we left office.
Mr. Head: If we take the Hiroshima explosion and the hydrogen bomb in units, the Hiroshima explosion would be unit one and the hydrogen bomb would be unit 1,000, which is a radical change.
Mr. Attlee: A few atomic bombs on Cairo and Alexandria would, I think, be pretty effective vis-à-vis the Egyptian population.
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I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman proved rather too much because his colleague, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, was at pains to explain the great importance of the base at Cyprus. Is Cyprus immune from the hydrogen bomb? The right hon. Gentleman's speech was a lot of special pleading to cover the fact that he and his colleagues have at last come to realise the rightness of the Labour Government's policy. While recognising the position in the base and the rest of it, I cannot accept that there has been this change. I much prefer to accept the Prime Minister's brief remark yesterday that it is a matter of necessity.
This is an historic occasion. It is the termination of the long presence of British troops in Egypt, and there are two aspects of the matter into which we must look closely. One concerns the merits of this Agreement, both in its entirety and in its detail, and the second is how it squares with the policy laid down year after year by leading members of the present Government who in the past were so bitter in their attack on the Labour Administration.
This is no new question. Negotiations have been prolonged over the years since the war. It will be remembered that in October, 1946, agreements were initialled between Mr. Bevin and Sidky Pasha providing for mutual arrangements for defence arrangements, for the evacuation and for the Sudan—terms which were infinitely better than those now laid before the House. Those arrangements broke down owing to the unwillingness of the Labour Government to sacrifice the people of the Sudan. Sudan has now been dealt with but in such a way that I fear that, through the dilatoriness and supineness of the present Government, in effect the Sudanese have been sold down the river. Owing to the period which was allowed to elapse before the election, the bribery and all the rest of it, I think there is a very great danger of the Sudan falling again into the hands of the Egyptians, and that is a very sad ending to a very great achievement by the British Administration.
I should like to recall to the House the statement which I made on 7th May, 1946, on the policy of the Labour Government. I said:
"It is the considered policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to con-

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solidate their alliance with Egypt as one between two equal nations having interests in common. In pursuance of this policy, negotiations have begun in an atmosphere of cordiality and good will. The Government of the United Kingdom have proposed the withdrawal of all British naval, military and air forces from Egyptian territory, and to settle in negotiation the stages and date of completion of this withdrawal, and the arrangements to be made by the Egyptian Government to make possible mutual assistance in time of war or imminent threat of war in accordance with the alliance."
How did the present Prime Minister react? He said:
"Things are built up with great labour and cast away with great shame and folly."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 781–2.]
What would the right hon. Gentleman have said if the Labour Government had presented the present proposals?
The Adjournment of the House was moved and accepted, and the present Foreign Secretary said:
"… our troops … are there for one purpose and one only, the defence of the Canal and its security …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 850.]
The right hon. Gentleman called it "a British purpose," "an Imperial purpose," "an Anglo-Egyptian purpose" and "a world purpose." He said that the Canal was an essential artery to our imperial life.
In the right hon. Gentleman's speech today there was no mention of the Canal. It dropped out completely so far as I could see. However, on that previous occasion the present Prime Minister said:
"… we know that there is no satisfactory method of keeping the Canal open, and making sure that it is kept open, except by keeping troops there."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 894.]
The right hon. Gentleman said over and over again that the British troops must be kept there.
When I announced the plan to withdraw our troops, the Prime Minister said that it was a most painful blow. He must have been in acute pain yesterday. Yet what we proposed then has the support of all informed military opinion. I am sure that the proposal to withdraw our troops from Egypt has been welcomed by all ranks in the Canal area. This has been pressed for a long time. There has been a great deal of cost in money, lives and discomfort for our troops before this Agreement has been reached. The Agree-
734
ment seems to be the result eventually of accepting what has been refused month after month and almost year after year by the present Government.
Besides the defence of the Canal there was also the question of the Base. The Labour Government sought an agreement whereby, as I stated, mutual assistance should be available in time of war or imminent threat of war. I was pressed on this by the present Prime Minister. I said, in May, 1946:
"I am perfectly alive to the fact that under conditions of modern warfare we can only carry out our obligations if we have been put in a position by the Egyptian Government to bring our Forces into action in the area without loss of time in an emergency—
Mr. CHURCHILL: Before fighting begins?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Yes, certainly."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 857.]
This was followed up by the present Foreign Secretary on 24th May, 1946. He said:
"It may be thought that if the necessary preparations can only be made in advance, the actual movement of Forces can await the sounding of the hour of menace. That may be strategically sound—I am not qualified to pronounce, although I have doubts about it —but I am quite sure that it is politically unsound and even politically very dangerous. What happens? When tension grows and peril menaces, it is not fair to put too much strain on a small country by saying at that very hour, 'You must agree that danger threatens and you must let us come, publicly before the world, into your country in order to share with you the averting of that danger'."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th May, 1946; Vol. 423, c. 706.]
There was stress upon that point over and over again, that it was not fair to leave this to the last minute. But if we look at the White Paper we read:
"In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on Egypt or any country which at the date of signature of the present agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary."
The war has then already broken out, which is just what was so roundly condemned previously by the right hon. Gentleman. It is true that the White Paper says:
"In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above-mentioned countries, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt."
That puts a small country in just the difficulties to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. The Labour Government

735
were envisaging the possibility of war breaking out somewhere in the world and not necessarily in the Middle East, because, as we understood and as we have been told, this is our Imperial lifeline. Apparently it is now only a matter of attack on certain States.
What I am sure must have struck everybody is how curious it is that Palestine is left out. I was very surprised at that because the Prime Minister has always been a strong Zionist. There is no doubt that there is a great deal of apprehension, whether justified or not, in Palestine and in Israel.
The Labour Government envisaged an alliance in defence with the Egyptians, as we had had with the 1936 Treaty. We worked on from that and sought later to get a regional defence organisation. It was stated, and I believe it is true, that that it is necessary, in order to carry out our obligations and in order to keep the peace in that difficult area, that there should be some British troops somewhere in the region.
The right hon. Gentleman brushes it all away with his hydrogen bomb, but I do not believe that if there were trouble in hitherto undisturbed areas of the world we could use the hydrogen bomb. The Labour Party certainly do not want to use the hydrogen bomb. It is necessary, and has been stated over and over again, that there should be some troops there. There is nothing there now. There is only Wimpey's or some other contractor there.
What has become of all the talk about the Suez Canal as an international waterway which must be open and kept open? The Prime Minister has used that phrase over and over again. In the White Paper the 1888 Convention is invoked. We are all bound by that, it is said. But, of course, Egypt has been in default of that Convention for a number of years, and yet nothing has been done about it. It is not much good just affirming a convention which is not observed by one side.
What is to be done about it? When we asked about it, there was a vague reference to the effect "This is a matter for U.N.O. and not for us," and yet this is "our great Imperial lifeline." It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to come here now with his special pleading. Why did not right hon. Gentlemen opposite think of these things previously?
736
The Opposition entirely agree with the evacuation of our troops from Egypt. I can remember saying over and over again, and my right hon. Friends have also done so, how hopeless it was to try to have a base where there was a hostile population. We did not get much sympathy then, but that is acknowledged now. At all events, it is acknowledged today, but I do not think it was acknowledged by the Colonial Secretary yesterday because he was advocating putting troops and a base and everything else into Cyprus. At that time the right hon. Gentleman had not had his talk about the hydrogen bomb. I must point out that in all the talks that I have had with the military they have never thought that Cyprus was a satisfactory base, for obvious reasons.
However, we have our duties to the Arab States and to Turkey and to Israel—and, indeed, to Egypt. The question is, how are these to be carried out? What of the security of the Middle East? Let me remind the House of a statement by the late Ernest Bevin on 24th May, 1946:
"There is one thing on which I will give the Committee an assurance. I will be no party to leaving a vacuum. There must not be a vacuum."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th May, 1946; Vol. 423, c. 788.]
That is exactly what we have got today—a vacuum.
We contended that this was an area of possible disturbance and that the right thing was that there should be an international force there. We wanted to build up, with others, in that area an international force for the preservation of peace. We have nothing at present. Apparently we are merely to shelter behind the Balkan Alliance of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. That is not carrying out our obligations.
There is a case for a base of some kind. I wonder what the alternative is. We had to look at many alternatives, including the question of somewhere else in North Africa, and we actually looked at Cyprus. There is a possibility, and, I think, a much more likely possibility, of perhaps somewhere in Israel—say, at Haifa. There might be one possibly somewhere near Alexandretta—with agreement, of course.
But none of these alternatives is possible without the full agreement of the people. The day has gone when we can put bases in other people's territory when the people do not want them. That,

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let me say, was quite as abundantly plain in 1945 and 1946 as it is today, and that is why our policy was right then, and it is a pity that the Government, when they were in opposition, did not recognise it.
I am quite sorry for a number of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who are, naturally, upset by this Agreement, because they took the Prime Minister's speech to be an expression of serious strategical views. I am afraid that they do not recognise that there is an immense difference between the Prime Minister in office and the Prime Minister in opposition. When he comes into office he has to face realities; he has to take responsibility instead of indulging in merely factious attacks on those who are bearing responsibility. We have borne for years these accusations, freely thrown about, of "scuttle."
Now we come down to this Agreement that we have got, and we all hope that it will be carried out, but its terms are worse than any I have ever seen. The right hon. Gentleman knows this could have been settled on better terms, and in fact on these very terms two years ago, if he had stood up to his own back benchers. He refrained from doing what was right. He has now to eat humble pie. We all hope that this may lead to a new and better era in the Middle East, but there is very little credit to the Government.
5.44 p.m.
Captain Charles Waterhouse: It is never easy for a Member of this House to get up and take a view strongly opposed to that of a leader whom he highly respects and whom he has followed with loyalty for so many years. It is never an easy task for any back bencher to follow the speeches made from the Front Bench, but when we have had two speeches such as we have had today, one of very high oratory, the other both of oratory and very close argument, it is more difficult still, and the House will, I hope, have sympathy with me.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Which was which?
Captain Waterhouse: I always keep chronological order. The House will, perhaps, have sympathy with me when I am putting a view which is now, I know, definitely going to be disagreeable to my
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right hon. Friends on the Front Bench. I want to assure the House and my right hon. Friends, too, that there is not the smallest bitterness in anything I intend to say or that will be said by anybody from these benches so far as I know. We speak in sorrow. We speak, I am sure, with very real sincerity.
I should like with very great respect to make a passing reference to our late colleague, Sir Herbert Williams, whose memorial service many of us attended this morning. Sir Herbert Williams took part in many hard fights in this House. He worked with us in this little party we have had in opposing what we believe to be a wrong policy. I believe it to be a cause of very deep regret in all parts of the House that he is not with us tonight.
There are not many aspects of this problem on which I can congratulate the Government, but I want to keep in as good odour with them as I can and, therefore, I shall start off by congratulating them on the manner in which this negotiation has been closed, although I certainly cannot congratulate them on the matter of its conclusion.
There is one very sound piece of advice which applies, I am told, both in matrimonial and in military matters, and that is, "If you are going to run away run fast, run far, and run in good company." Whether my right hon. Friends had that in mind or not I do not know, but they certainly decided that in this case we were going to run in good company when they sent the Secretary of State for War to do the deed. Nobody has had a better war record than he; nobody is more respected as a Minister than he. I wonder exactly what instructions he had. I have a very good idea of the sort of instructions he received—"Get out there and sign an agreement. Don't bother too much about the terms. Get it signed." I imagine the Patronage Secretary chipping in by saying, "And mind it is signed by Tuesday, or you are likely to lose some of your holidays." The Agreement was signed by Tuesday. Here it is, and in this piece of paper we have got all that is left of 80 years of British endeavour, thought and forethought.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at the start of his career wrote one of the finest books in the English language, "The River War," on this subject. It

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must be grave indeed for him now to have to take this decision. I am not saying that as a measure of blame; I have the very greatest sympathy, and I know how hard it must be for him to have so decided. I and my friends had feared that there would be a sell-out. This is not a sell-out. It is a give-away. Instead of having physical control of a great base, instead of having troops on the major waterway of the world, we have got this piece of paper in our hands. It is indeed a hard day for anybody on this side of the House to have to sit and support this Government which has, as we believe, not taken a wise decision on the Suez Canal.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War divided his speech into two portions; in one he discussed the terms, and in the other he discussed the reasons. I propose to follow him very closely in that. The terms are for the evacuation of all forces within 20 months. In other words, we have got to get out just as quick as our ships and our engineers can get us out. The stores, the equipment, installations, public utilities, communications, bridges, pipelines and wharves are to be handed over, and the Egyptian Government will assume responsibility for their security. We pay the bill.
Egyptian or British technicians will be sent in there under a contractor. That contractor will nominally be under the protection of the Egyptians. If any stuff is to be removed, we have got to discuss it with the Egyptians. If we want to do any building we have got to get their permission. We pay the bill for all this. We are actually to be allowed to use some of the airfields that we have built if we arrange when the flight is coming in and inform the Egyptians of the time of the flight, and if they give their consent.
What happens if these provisions are broken, as they may well be broken? We have got to be prepared for that. Are we going to re-enter forcibly? Do hon. Members opposite welcome that? I doubt whether all hon. Members on this side would welcome that. Are we going back there by force, in the face of everything that we have said, in the face of a hostile Egypt? I do not believe that that is feasible at all. Really and truly, we have handed over £500 million
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worth of stores and buildings to the Egyptians, and if they like to use them against Palestine or against anybody else, who is going in to say, "No, you will not"?
We have got the right of re-entry and a treaty for seven years. I do not mind whether this treaty is for seven years or 70 years. What do we mean by saying that we have gained a right of re-entry? If Egypt wants us in in some future emergency, as she wanted us in when she was threatened by the Italians, she will invite us in, treaty or no treaty. If she does not want us in when the time comes, this piece of paper is not going to get us in. We shall then have to fight our way in, with this treaty, just as we would have had to fight our way in without the treaty if Egypt at that time was not friendly to us.
In all such papers there is a little bit of light relief, and in this paper we find our light relief in Article 8 where we read that both parties express their
"determination … to uphold the 1888 Convention. …"
That really is a pretty good one, considering that Egypt has consistently been breaking it for the last four years. It is for those reasons that I think this piece of paper is not worth anything at all to us, and it is because of that that I say we have not sold out but we have cleared out.
During the last Election my right hon. and hon. Friends spoke from the platforms and pointed out what we believed to be the errors of Abadan. We pointed to the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) and told him that he had scuttled from Abadan. We pointed to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and said that, thank heaven, that policy would now be reversed. We said that the Canal would be re-opened and freed again. We said that we on this side of the House at least stood for a strong and a definite principle. It is with very great regret that I say that if the electorate of this country had seen or foreseen this paper in 1951, we would not now be sitting on this side of the House.
What are the arguments that have been adduced to persuade us to this course? One good argument is sufficient to convince anyone of any honourable course,

741
provided it is a good argument. If arguments are multiplied, doubts arise; but if arguments are changed, we have a right to have grave suspicions. When this proposal was started, when, as some hon. Members opposite suggested, we first thought of scuttling from Egypt under the preceding Government—and I do not hesitate to use the term—the main thing was nationality. It was wrong to fly in the face of Egyptian nationality.
I suggest that nationality is very like alcohol. It is extremely pleasant and it is definitely stimulating when it is taken in small quantities, and so is patriotism, but it is very dangerous and utterly besotting and misleading when it takes hold of a person, just as nationalism is when it takes hold of a nation. We have got to resist extreme nationalism because it is bad for the world and it is bad for the people who adumbrate it. It leads to murders. It leads to wars.
The second argument was that a friendly Egypt was necessary. That may be so, but the Egyptians have already said that there are two things necessary for Egypt; one is possession of the Canal. They have that. The other is a free hand in the Sudan, and the Leader of the Opposition mentioned that in his speech. Have we finished with the Sudan? Are we now saying to the Sudan, "You have had your chance. You have not taken it. You can lump it"? If we are not doing that, then there is little chance immediately of a friendly Egypt. If we are doing that, then I say we are grossly betraying an almost sacred trust.
Then I come to the main argument, the strategic argument. Obviously, anything that I say will be considered against what my right hon. Friend has said. That is one of the troubles of this argument. Does my right hon. Friend come to the House as a very eminent, successful and fine soldier, a brigadier or a major-general? Does the Minister of Defence when he speaks in another place speak as the most respected soldier certainly in England and probably in the world? Or are they both speaking as representatives of the Cabinet putting over Cabinet policy? It is extremely difficult for us to decide, and in saying that, I am in no way attributing any dishonesty in motive or any dishonesty at all. But it is quite impossible to have at the head of a Department, in my view, a man who can take a Depart-
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mental view based on that of his advisers and completely exclude from his view the policy which he is in the Cabinet to sponsor.
Mr. Head: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me to say, as he has made personal reference to my status, that I thought that I had already made it clear—and I should like now to make it clear—that I was referring to the strategic appreciation which was approved by the Defence Committee and the Cabinet, and it was as a member of Her Majesty's Government and not as a soldier that I was putting forward these matters.
Captain Waterhouse: I think that it is perfectly obvious that when the right hon. Gentleman speaks from that Box he speaks as a member of the Cabinet, but it is equally obvious, as the Leader of the Opposition said, that he speaks with the added weight of a soldier.
What we must base our argument on today is not the personal opinion, greatly as we respect it, of my right hon. Friends but that of the General Staff. We are told that the General Staff, having weighed up the position most closely, now take this definite view. Well, 18 months ago—the Foreign Secretary will correct me if I am wrong—they took quite a different view. They have been able to alter that now, but they will not be able to alter it again in another 18 months when we have left the Canal. We are now taking a decision which is absolutely irrevocable so far as the Canal goes.
We have heard the argument of strategic reserves, and the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the morale of our troops. I appreciate the great discomfort in which they live, but an Army does not lose its morale because it lives in discomfort. It most quickly loses its morale when it is used for a purpose which is proved to be wrong or abortive. If our troops now feel that the grave difficulties which they have been in have been of no avail, that their friends who have been killed have died in vain, are they going to be quite so ready and staunch when they are moved to other places? The British Army can stand up to any strain, it is one of the finest organisations in the whole world, but it is a very cruel strain that is being put upon it.

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A third argument—and a recent one—is that of economy. I think that I can dismiss that in a few words. The Chancellor of the Exchequer answered a Question earlier this week, and said that if all the troops were brought back from the Canal to this country about £10 million would be saved. There is no question of bringing them all back. We shall be very fortunate if we get one-half back, so the saving will be about £5 million, and that has to be weighed against new installations, new barracks and new houses elsewhere. The economy argument is an utterly false one.
So we come to this most peculiar argument of the hydrogen bomb, on which "The Times" based a leading article quite recently, and which my right hon. Friend has expounded today. With great respect, I have to say to him that it is both the latest and the worst of all these arguments. If the hydrogen bomb is going to be awkward in the Canal, it is surely going to be a little more awkward in Cyprus.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: And in London.
Captain Waterhouse: After all. Cyprus is 500 miles nearer to the airfields of the potential enemy. Along with this question of the hydrogen bomb, may I finally ask my right hon. Friend this? If the hydrogen bomb is making our position in the Suez Canal completely untenable, why have we been fiercely arguing for six, eight or 10 months about the power of re-entry?
I do not believe that these are the real reasons at all. It grieves me to have to say so. I believe that the real reasons on that side of the House—and I believe that they have been almost accepted by some on this side of the House—are that we are becoming weary of our responsibilities, that our burdens are becoming too irksome for us and we are really losing our will to rule. [HON. MEMBERS: "If that is really happening, then, indeed, it is a sorry day for Britain.
In this we have been urged along by the United States of America. I am not one of those who normally carp and criticise that great country. I believe that we need close friendship with them more than anything else in the whole world, but I think that we have to realise this
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as a House—that the United States have a real regard, almost an affection, for the British Isles. They have a very great respect for the Commonwealth, but they actively dislike the British Empire. Their actions throughout the whole world seem to me to have been activated by the motive of dislike for the Empire and anxiety to do it injuries, small or great.
For many years we have had a little American lamb bleating in Cairo, not helping and if anything hindering in most things. Well, he has got his way, but whether or not this will be to the lasting advantage of the Americans any more than to us is a very different consideration.
The Secretary of State for War has put up the alternatives. The first was that of keeping 80,000 troops there, and he spent several minutes on expounding it. Then he said that no one wanted that. Of course, no one does want that. With great humility, I challenge his second argument. I do not believe that it is impossible for us to hold, with something like a brigade or two brigades' strength and to keep supplied on the Canal, a small base. All over the world we have been doing that for hundreds of years. It is nothing fresh. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Hon. Members opposite may laugh, but that is true. All over the world we have been holding positions in the face of adversity and we are not unable to do it now if we really felt that we had to do so.
It is said that we cannot do it because the population is hostile. Is there a very friendly population in Cyprus? Are there any indications that our people are going to be welcomed in Cyprus any more than they have been in Egypt? [An HON. MEMBER: "Not after this speech.] Nor before the speech either. We have to look ahead in our whole appreciation of these grave affairs. Are we leaving Egypt as a final move in our retreat or is it just one more step? If it is one more step, then I, for one, shall lose much of my interest, much of my belief, in British politics. I believe that the British Empire and the British Commonwealth still have a mission to fulfil and that if we once forget that, or if we once just write it off as sentiment, then we shall get ourselves into a miserable and unhappy position indeed.

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There is one other point before I come to my conclusion. In looking into the future, have my right hon. Friends considered the possibility of Communism in Egypt? We are told that some of their leaders are moving in that direction. What happens supposing Egypt were to go Communist? What is then our attitude? Is it going to be—"so far and no further," or is it going to be "peaceful co-existence"?
I want to close by asking my right hon. Friend four questions. The first is a comparatively small one, although it is of long-term importance. When the Egyptians denounced the treaty, they said that all goods going to our Army had to be subject to Customs. Already they have booked up some £20 or £30 million against us. There are other similar items to be dealt with. Is it the intention to deal with those in the treaty, or will they be left, as I hope they will not, to be a running sore in the future? The second question is: does our pledge of real independence to the Sudan still stand? Are we going to do any more about it, or do we feel that by the action we have already taken we are exonerated from that pledge?
The third question is this. We understand something of what the redeployment plans are to be to the north of the Canal. What is to be the position in the south? Is my right hon. Friend going to reinforce Africa or to reinforce any of the stations in the Persian Gulf? If we could get a reassuring statement on the position there, at least some of our fears would be removed.
My last question: What is to be the position if this treaty is broken like the others? I believe it would be an advantage if it were made clear that if this treaty goes the way of the other three, we will no longer tolerate it and that this treaty, such as it is, is our last word. If that is not made clear, I feel strongly that in signing it we may have opened the grave of British greatness.
6.11 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: I should be deeply interested to know what the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) means by "our last word." Does he mean war? Is it his view that if there be any breaches in the working out of the Agreement, the alternative is that
746
we should invade Egypt? That is an alternative that we would like to know about.
During the last Election, as the right hon. and gallant Member candidly and honourably pointed out, he and his colleagues on the benches opposite attacked people on this side of the House for scuttling from Abadan and pointed out that there would be a very different policy from the Prime Minister with regard to Egypt and the Canal. When we asked whether the alternative to that policy was war, the right hon. and gallant Member complained. What does this "last word" mean?
The right hon. and gallant Member made a highly important assertion, and I should like to ask this question. He asserted that the General Staff had changed their minds recently on this question. Is there any truth in that?
Mr. Head: I said that two matters have occurred recently which affect considerations about this. One is the invention of the very powerful thermo-nuclear weapons, and the other is the long-term situation of our very large commitments in the cold war.
Mr. Paget: Did not those both exist—and the transition from the atomic to the hydrogen bomb made little difference—two, three and four years ago. Has it not been the opinion of the Secretary of State for War, of the Foreign Secertary and of the General Staff throughout the life of this Government that it was quite futile to try to maintain ourselves within the Canal Base? All the General Stall and the two right hon. Gentlemen who understood this matter have known all along that we could not with profit maintain ourselves in the Canal Base. The reason has nothing to do with atomic bombs. It is a basic matter of theory.
What is a military base? Military bases were, I believe, the great strategic contribution of Marshal Turenne. Their purpose was one and one only: to give added mobility to one's forces. If a base does not give added mobility to one's forces, it has no purpose at all. A base is to provide alternative points of supply so that our forces may be more quickly manoeuvrable. Did that apply to the Canal Zone? In so far as ports, labour forces and a friendly population were

747
available, it fulfilled that function of a base. But the moment that ports ceased to be workable, communications within the area ceased to be available, and the population became hostile, it no longer gave added manoeuvrability; it no longer enabled us to move our forces. It did exactly the opposite. It tied down our forces, and that has been our position over these years.
We have had 80,000 troops tied down in the Canal Zone, not available to be moved elsewhere—tied, unmanoeuvrable, unusable, in rotten conditions and in conditions in which they could not be trained.
Major H. Legge-Bourke: I hope that the hon. and learned Member, in making that accusation, does not forget that the Government responsible for the size of the base being what it is today is not the Tory Government but was the Government which he supported. The base has doubled since 1948, before this Government ever came to power.
Mr. Paget: I have not made a party point and I am not going to make one. What I am concerned with is the defence and foreign policy of England which I regard as a matter for both parties. I am not trying to score advantages. The position which the Government faced when they came into office was that their whole strategic reserve, instead of being made more mobile and available by the existence of the base, was tied up with that base and could not be used. That was an intolerable situation and one which ought not to have been tolerated for any length of time.
Recently, and again today, the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East brought forward his proposal that we should retain a brigade in the Canal Zone. The Secretary of State for War illustrated the futility of that suggestion. When I asked the right hon. and gallant Member what the brigade was to do, his answer was that it would do the same as it did before the war: it was useful then. Before the war a brigade was useful in Egypt because it was a convenient place to move it from. It was useful in Egypt because it was a convenient place to train in. Now, the situation is entirely different. A brigade there would be a beleaguered garrison.
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Any commander who puts a force deliberately into a position where it will be immediately beleaguered has the brains of a louse. That is the difference in the situation, and that is why what was sense before the war is lunacy afterwards. It is different circumstances.
So far as the H-bomb is concerned, there is no safety from it in Suez, in England, in Cyprus or anywhere else—that argument is irrelevant. The reason is that Suez is not a base. It cannot be a base. It is a tie-up; a commitment without profit; it gives no manoeuvreability of forces. The Secretary of State for War agrees. There were two alternatives. We could have moved out of the base by coming home or by going into Egypt.
In January, 1952, the opportunity arose to go into Egypt if we had wanted to. For a month our people were being murdered and Egyptians were being deliberately infiltrated into our lines as saboteurs and murderers under the guise of assistant police. This culminated in the Cairo riots in which, at the Turf Club, a number of our citizens were burnt alive by being thrown on a bonfire and between £10 million and £50 million—I do not think it has ever been ascertained—of our property was destroyed.
If the Government had meant to stay in Egypt and in the Canal Zone they had the opportunity to do it. It was an opportunity that would not recur. We could have gone into Egypt then and taught the pashas and the very small class of educated Egyptians a lesson which they would not have forgotten for a decade. We could have gone back and ruled Egypt, but it was only on those terms that we could have stayed in the Canal Zone. We decided not to do it, and I think that decision was right.
I would not have the least objection to ruling Egypt on any ethical grounds, because I do not regard it in the least moral to condemn the Egyptians to the horrible fate of being ruled by Egyptians. I do not regard the proposition that self-government is preferable to good government as being either a responsible or an ethical proposition, nor does even a Liberal if he has got a nursery.
This country has carried very formidable responsibilities throughout the world, and I believe that where we have gone we

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have conferred immense benefits upon the nations we have governed. I do not think we have any need to be ashamed of the contributions that we have made.
The decision not to go into Egypt was right because it would have involved a commitment which it was not in our interests to undertake. With Germany destroyed, we became committed on the continent of Europe to the defence of her marches. We cannot at the same time also carry the commitment of ruling Egypt. But once that decision was taken it was abundantly clear that we could not stay in the Canal zone. The right hon. Gentlemen the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for War know that full well and they knew it then.
We had an opportunity to get out on honourable and advantageous terms. General Neguib overthrew the wretched royal Government in Cairo and the people who had inflicted injuries upon us by their irresponsibility. I urged upon the right hon. Gentlemen at that time that we should have gone to Neguib then and said, "We are delighted to see you. We want, as Ernest Bevin once said, to get out of the Canal Zone. You will, of course, realise that while the wretched King's Government was here we had nobody to whom we could hand over the base. Now, of course, a responsible strong man is in charge. Now there is somebody to whom we can hand it over. All that there remains for us to do is to make our arrangements to leave."
Neguib's whole prestige would have been built up on the fact not that he was going to get rid of the British but that he had done so. From that point onwards he would have gone into the negotiations for the arrangements committed to their success. He could not go back to his people and say, "I have not got rid of the British after all." He would have been committed to the fact that he had got rid of us, and we could have had any terms we liked for our withdrawal with the very best of good will from the new Egyptian Government. Under those circumstances, we would have come out not damaged, but with our prestige enhanced.
Instead of that, by delay we are having to withdraw on miserable terms, having carried a burden which has gravely injured our Army, which has weakened
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recruitment, and has weakened our defence position. Why has it happened? For one reason only. It was not because the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not know what was the right thing to do. It was not because the Secretary of State for War did not know, but it was because of a back bench cabal in the Conservative Party encouraged under the table by the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): That is an absolute untruth.
Mr. Paget: Does the right hon. Gentleman say that he really was not obstructive in the Cabinet—and letting it be known to the people behind him—to the wish of the Service Departments and of the Foreign Office to conclude an agreement to get out of Egypt?
Mr. Ralph Assheton: That is absolutely untrue.
The Prime Minister: I behaved with perfect correctness in my relations with my colleagues and with Members of the House. I have not in the slightest degree concealed in public speech how much I regretted the course of events in Egypt. But I had not held my mind closed to the tremendous changes that have taken place in the whole strategic position in the world which make the thoughts which were well-founded and well knit together a year ago utterly obsolete, and which have changed the opinions of every competent soldier that I have been able to meet.
I am not going to attempt, in interrupting the hon. and learned Gentleman, to lay this argument before the House, but I should be prepared to do so and to show how utterly out of all proportion to the Suez Canal and the position which we held in Egypt are the appalling developments and the appalling spectacle which imagination raises before us. Merely to try to imagine in outline the first few weeks of a war under conditions about which we did not know when this Session commenced, and about which we had not been told—merely to portray that picture and submit it to the House would, I am sure, convince hon. Gentlemen of the obsolescence of the base and of the sense of proportion which is vitally needed at the present time, not only in military dispositions but in all our attempts to establish human relationships between nation and nation.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) should try to answer that one.
Mr. Paget: I certainly do not disagree with what the Prime Minister has said.
Mr. Assheton: Then withdraw the previous remark.
Mr. Paget: What the Prime Minister has very clearly indicated is that he held one opinion until this Session began, when events which he has described in flowing language and which, I suppose, mean the hydrogen bomb, changed his view. That is all I was saying. The fact that he was wrong up to this Session encouraged back benchers to prevent the Foreign Office and the War Office taking the obvious and correct course which they could have taken honourably on good terms, a year before this Session started.
The right hon. Gentleman's action has compelled us to take worse terms, in circumstances vastly more injurious to our prestige. The reasons for leaving the Canal base were clear and evident to everybody two years ago except a group opposite and the Prime Minister. In this Session they have become obvious to the Prime Minister; they still are not obvious to a group on that side of the House.
Now I want to say something about the alternatives as to where we are going. It is said that we are going to Cyprus. Now what could be greater folly than to say, on the one hand, that it is necessary for us to leave Egypt because of a hostile population and then, on the other hand, to go into Cyprus where we challenge the Cypriot to show that he is at least as good a man as the Egyptian? What could be a crazier thing to do? The Cypriots showed their quality as guerilla fighters in the war. When we give them that sort of challenge, do we think they will not do it again? And it is totally unnecessary.
Let us look for a moment at the position in relation to Cyprus. In Cyprus, we have our interests, they are purely strategic ones. We require a base there and, apart from that, it does not matter the least to us who rules provided that there is a friendly population there for our base. Secondly, there are the Greeks and the supporters of Enosis. The Enosis movement is purely sentimental.
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Its supporters do not pretend that jointure with Greece would give them any material or economic advantage. Their case is that they want to take their part in the heritage of Athens and Sparta and in the great stories of the past.
Thirdly, there is the interest of Turkey, which makes up 18 or 20 per cent. of the population and which has recently come into alliance with Greece. To deal unilaterally with Greece would blow wide open the new Turkish-Greek alliance. We have to come to terms on three matters: our strategic interest, which requires a base and control of a base such as Gibraltar or Malta; the sentiment of the Enosis population, which is tremendously strong—not the less strong for being sentimental; and the interests of the Greeks and the Turks.
I would urge that before we move any troops into Cyprus we should confer with the Greeks on this subject, with the Turks on this subject, and with local opinion in Cyprus. I beg the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, and the Secretary of State for War, to take over these negotiations. The ham-handed way in which this was handled from the Colonial Office yesterday might well give us another war. We had a crazy display from that Box yesterday by the Colonial Office, showing utter misunderstanding of the sentimental position in Cyprus. For goodness' sake let these two right hon. Gentlemen, who have shown themselves such artists in negotiations, negotiate an agreement here which will please everybody. There is one available. We do not mind the jointure with Greece so long as we have our strategic control; it does not hurt us in the least. Do let us have some negotiation about this alternative. It will not be beyond our wit to devise safeguards for the Turks.
Finally, I ask them to consider whether Israel should be consulted as to whether she would like a brigade based there. I am informed that there is a good possibility that the Israelis would feel that it is a proposal which would add greatly to their security and which they would be willing to discuss. So before we make our new arrangements, let us consider that too, because English troops there would, I think, scotch any possibility of an Arab invasion, would stabilise that area and would provide us with a base from which we could move

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and mobilise troops. Let us at least take the trouble to see we are welcome this time.
This has been done two years too late; it has been delayed as an act of appeasement to the 1922 Committee; it has been done, because of that, in circumstances of ignominy, and it has been done without consideration as to what that we do now. The Government have done ill in this and they are extremely lucky to have an Opposition which may be prepared to save their necks.
6.36 p.m.
Colonel Cyril Banks: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) will forgive me if I do not follow the line he has taken, because in many respects I find it too complicated. In my maiden speech in this House in 1950 I raised the issue of the Middle East and South-East Asia. I talked of conditions that I had found there after having made a study of the situation for about nine months and of the relation between those conditions and what we must face in the future.
During the course of that speech I cited Egypt and other countries surrounding Egypt and said that, unless we did something about them, we would be in serious trouble in a comparatively short space of time. I would not like the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition to get by with the attitude he has shown towards the problem this afternoon, because I want to remind him that even during his time in office I wrote to his Government and asked for their help. Also I suggested what could be done to help those countries and probably to stave off something that is happening at this moment.
To my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), who has spoken against this Motion, I would only say that, if he saw conditions for himself in that part of the world, he would probably have a different viewpoint. I have been there four times in nine months and have visited the Palestinian refugees, of whom I have seen 400,000 in that time. I have seen their plight, I have seen how they live on the United Nations allowance for food and medical aid which is at the rate of only 6d. a day.
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After seeing those conditions I made a visit to Egypt in April this year. I saw the Gaza district, where there are 200,000 refugees with no work to do and no possibility of work until schemes are started for them. Then I returned to Cairo to see what were the possibilities of employing refugees. Hon. Members opposite have said a lot about Israel this afternoon, and I spent three days there. I looked at the conditions that obtained in the whole of Egypt, where there are at the present time 100,000 people unemployed in light industries. In agriculture the minimum unemployed is a million, but the figure is probably far more than that.
I ask hon. Members opposite not to gloat over this, because it has been going on during their period of office, but the truth is that Egypt has been for many, many years a land of the haves and the have-nots. Something had to happen. We may take pride in many of the things which we as a country have achieved overseas, but I think that we should also be very cautious and take very great care when we talk about what we have achieved.
It is at that stage that I actually met Colonel Nasser. A great deal has been said about him in the Press. I would say this of him—that he is not someone who has just sprung up overnight. He has lived a dangerous life over a number of years planning to overthrow poverty in his country. He sat down with a group of people in his country and planned this revolution. As I saw him, he is a man of simple taste and is determined to rid Egypt of poverty. The more he does to that end the better it will be not only for Egypt but for the whole of the world.
He has been committed to the removal of our Forces from the Canal Zone from the start. On both sides of the House we know what it is to be committed at some time or another in our political life, and it would be wrong to judge Colonel Nasser as an individual merely because he says that British troops must leave the Canal Zone.
We have two alternatives in Egypt. The first is to agree to help the Egyptian people, to back the Egyptian Government in helping to feed the starving people, who are having a very bad time, and in getting on with land irrigation with water

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from the Nile, and to send out our technicians. I think that they are far better ambassadors than people in an Embassy. Let them help the Egyptians to irrigate land hitherto untended and to grow food, and let our people build factories over there to employ the 100,000 who are now unemployed in light industry. By doing that we should earn the love and respect of the people of Egypt, and that is very important at the present time.
The alternative is to decline to do anything. The question is whether we should have troops in a hostile country. We would be in a hostile country. We would be shot at. I am no strategist, but in my opinion we shall want more men if, as we must, we spread further afield, but it is for someone else to say from where those men are to come. I say that here is an opportunity to co-operate with the Egyptian Government and the people in making their land a better place to live in and in getting rid of some of the things that have obtained there in the past. We should do that rather than say that we are going to sit there all the time. That would make a highly dangerous situation.
Both sides of the House support the United Nations and the Colombo Conference and anything which has as its purpose the making of peace in the world. We have done all that. If we truly believe in that, it means bringing our troops out of Egypt and bringing them back home. If we do that, we shall have the good will of 22 million people in Egypt and the possibility of earning their respect. That is a grand thing to do and I am all for it.
There has been much reference to "scuttle." I do not think that to put ourselves in the position to earn the love of 22 million people is a scuttle. Talk of loss of prestige has been bandied about in recent weeks, but I say sincerely that we can do an awful lot of damage to British prestige in the House of Commons if we are not very careful. In my experience in the countries that I have visited I have found that our prestige has not decreased. Our relations have been very friendly in Egypt. British people are popular there. The British business man is particularly popular at present. I believe that the Government will stay there for many years. I made a journey with Colonel Nasser of nearly
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200 miles along the Upper Nile and I saw how he was received. I believe that he has a great future before him and that he earns all the respect and help that we and the United States can give him. I hope that, as a result of these discussions, we shall give a friendly hand to Egypt and let the Egyptians know that we wish them well and want to help them out of their very serious trouble.
6.46 p.m.
Mr. George Wigg: I applaud the sentiments of the hon. and gallant Member for Pudsey (Colonel Banks) and I certainly do not want to approach this debate in any spirit of gloating. I remind the hon. and gallant Member that his policy of the development of the Nile Delta and the furthering of the interests of Egyptian people, was also the policy of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and the late Mr. Ernest Bevin.
The great tragedy is that when in 1946 and 1947 Mr. Bevin and the then Prime Minister were trying to rebuild British policy in the Middle East we received from the present Prime Minister, who was then in Opposition, not support but a response which forced us to go slow, because from one end of this island to another the cry of "Scuttle" was raised. However, I willingly join with the hon. and gallant Member in agreeing that we should drop the word "scuttle" and forget the past. I am prepared to believe that under the force of events the Prime Minister has been compelled to change his point of view.
Colonel Banks: I do not think that the hon. Member should blame the present Prime Minister for a position which he could not have influenced at all, because in 1946 there were plenty of schemes before the countries concerned. They had been put before them by the United Nations and the money was available, but they would not agree to them.
Mr. Wigg: The hon. and gallant Member was not a Member of this House then, but if he takes the opportunity to read HANSARD of 7th May, 1946, he will find that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition announced in the House that negotiations were to be opened with the Egyptian Government. This prompted the present

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Prime Minister to move the Adjournment of the House in protest. It was from that moment that we were forced to go slow on a policy which might have produced a much more favourable result than we have now obtained. The waste of eight years and the disappointment and the bitterness of hon. Members opposite are wholly due to the irresponsible action from 1946 onwards of the Prime Minister.
But there are others besides the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State for War said today that he went to Egypt to speak not as a soldier but as a member of the Government. Of course he did. There is a world of difference between what he has been saying in the last week and what he said in the 1946 debate. He then compared our policy to the selling of an Egyptian carpet. We do not want to gloat. But we are human beings, and I have been waiting for eight years to hear the speech which the Leader of the Opposition made today. Nevertheless, let us forget the past and try to look to the future.
The hon. and gallant Member for Pudsey spoke of two alternatives. I should like to put forward two others. We have been a great imperial Power. I agree with the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse). I am not ashamed of all that Britain has done in the backward corners of the world. I have been proud of the humble part that I have played, not on Parliamentary visits but in washing socks and opening tins of "bully beef" in those areas. It is not all lost; we are leaving behind a record of decency, a record of fair play, which will enter into the everyday lives of the peoples of those countries.
We have been a great imperial Power. I respect the point of view of hon. Members opposite and sympathise with them even if I do not agree with them. I sympathise with them because I respect some of the things for which they are standing. I have respected them in the past and respect them now. But there are other things besides the days that are gone. We can at this moment be borne down by our imperial memories and by looking over our shoulders to the memories and glories of our great past. We can leave the Suez Canal Zone because we cannot stay there any longer and can go into Cyprus or
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Africa because they are second best and try to lay a base in Cyprus or in Cyrenaica, but the policy of second best based on memories of yesterday will not help us.
As every hon. Member opposite who has had any military service knows perfectly well the policy of going to Cyprus is a piece of utter nonsense. It has no military validity at all. It is common knowledge that the principles upon which a great base stands must be great sea communications—they are there, although the harbours in Cyprus are not good—good road and rail transport and great forces of native labour, but all those things are lacking. This is a prison into which we should be sending British troops for reasons of prestige.
In 1946—this is the last time I shall hark back to it—perhaps things might have gone differently if we had been wiser and if there had been wisdom all round. There is no monopoly of wisdom in any quarter of the House. We might have got a redeployment on much better terms than we can think about now. Israel might have become a seventh Dominion. Certainly, we would have had more good will than we have at present. So, let us look at the problem in order to get the maximum amount of good will we can get from not only the Egyptians and the Israelis, but also from the other countries of the Middle East. For what we want in the Middle East, above all, is stability, and there can be no stability without good will.
Last Christmas a number of hon. Members were prepared to give up part of their holiday to go to Egypt. We did not go as a result of a vindictive Press campaign, but because it was a good idea and it would be excellent if the Foreign Secretary would offer the Egyptian authorities a good will mission from this House in order to get the maximum results in the shortest possible time. Similar missions should also go to the other countries in the Middle East, for we want the good will of Egypt; we want the good will of Israel; indeed, we want the good will of the whole of the Middle East.
At present, we have to recognise the realities of the situation. Some hon. Members on this side of the House and some hon. Members opposite imagine that when we go out the Egyptian Army will be a great menace. That is not true. I

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have not been back to Egypt for two or three years, but I was in Israel a couple of years ago and had an opportunity of looking at the Israeli Army. It is a very good Army and it has a much better system of mobilisation than we have. It is dovetailed into their needs and is the most effective fighting force in the Middle East. If there was any danger of invasion when we go out the Israeli Army would be on the Egyptian border in a couple of days. At the moment, there is no danger of the Egyptian Army invading Israel; for the moment it is the other way round, but there is no intention in that small country—which wants to get on with the raising of its standard of life—of pursuing an aggressive policy. But let us remember that the effectiveness of the Israeli Army gives us four or five years in which to lower the tension and get a policy of good will under way.
In 1946, I used to quarrel with Mr. Bevin, and even now I do not think that all the blame for the follies of Middle East policy is to be found on the benches opposite. Although, goodness knows, there is enough there, some of it had its origin over here. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) spoke as if he had talked with the Israeli authorities. I do not know whether that is so, but I know that Haifa is one of the best ports in the Middle East and could sustain a considerable force.
I suggest that the policy I advocate might lead the Israeli people and their authorities—as a free will act on their part and a gesture towards the policy of stability in the Middle East which is so essential both to this country and to the interests of the people of the Middle East—to consider not ceding Haifa—such a thought would be absurd—but coming to an arrangement whereby we could have the use of the port of Haifa and perhaps an area around it. That would be a much better and more realistic policy than the nonsense about Cyprus.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I think there has been a misconception throughout the debate. I think the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. Member have fallen into the error of thinking that a base is to be set up in Cyprus. There is no question of that, but it is to be a head-
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quarters. I quite agree with what the hon. Member said about Haifa.
Mr. Wigg: I hope that by a slip of the tongue I have not led hon. Members to think I suggest that Cyprus could be developed as a base like the Suez Canal. That is not so and I am sorry if I led the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) into the view that Cyprus would be a base for a considerable body of troops. What we want is an effective point from which we can rapidly expand should the necessity arise. It seems to me that, if the Israeli authorities are willing, Haifa would be much better for that purpose.
That might be done as a result of an act of good will by the Israeli authorities or the Israeli people, but it is no good us thinking of forcing our way back there any more than to dream of hanging on in the Canal Zone. That day has gone for ever. What I am pleading for is that we should forget the imperialist memories given expression to by the Secretary of State for War in the 1946 debate when he was speaking, not as a member of the Government, but, I think, as a soldier, and talked of the Suez Canal being a great imperial life-line—I think he called it a great artery of the Empire. That was the kind of romantic, sloppy, nonsense which the Conservative Party likes, particularly the female section. He may have been carried away by his own propaganda.
Mr. Head: It is still perfectly true.
Mr. Wigg: If it is still perfectly true, and it is an artery of Empire, has he cut his own throat?
Mr. Head: The hon. Member is being contentious—
Mr. Ede: Why should he not be?
Mr. Head: I do not see the slightest reason why the Egyptian Government should close the Suez Canal, because it is as much a life-line to them as to anyone else.
Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman must not be too clever. Of course it is a great life-line, but that is not what he said. He said that it was an artery of the Empire, and the policy of the present Government in Opposition was opposed to leaving Suez on just that thesis.

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The right hon. Gentleman is too good a soldier not to know that it was sloppy nonsense then and that it is sloppy nonsense now. But let us get away from the past. Let us get the troops out. Let us build up recruiting and cut down conscription by six months. The right hon. Gentleman has another chance. We can do it, provided that we do not look over our shoulders; provided we do not want an imperial future, and provided that the troops do not do "three years hard" in Cyprus instead of "three years hard" in the Canal Zone. Let us bring them back—
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: From Korea, Malaya and everywhere else?
Mr. Wigg: There we go! The noble Lord is bowed down with the memories of the past.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Korea and Malaya are very much in the present.
Mr. Wigg: The noble Lord is thinking so much of the past that he has to throw across to this side of the House words of bitterness. He would charge us with a policy of "scuttle" at the very time when his hon. Friends have shown concern about this matter in a most realistic way. I am pleading that we should leave Egypt. I realise that we cannot withdraw from Malaya. Neither can we withdraw from Kenya, though I recognise that it is the follies of the former Colonial Secretary, the right hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton), which has caused us to bog down a division of troops there.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: The hon. Member has said that he does not think that we should withdraw from Malaya. Would he consider that it is necessary for us to defend our maritime communications and that the defence of the Canal Zone—H-bomb or otherwise—is of great importance?
Mr. Wigg: I should delay the House too long were I to give the hon. Gentleman elementary lessons in geography as well as elementary lessons in strategy. In the First World War it was the strategy of this country—in which the Prime Minister played such a distinguished part, particularly over the withdrawal from Gallipoli—that the Mediterranean should be kept open. But it was clear on
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Christmas Day, 1914, that that was impossible. On Christmas Day, 1914, the late Duke of Westminster, with an armoured car command, contacted the Turks, actually on the Canal, and a number of actions were subsequently fought in a vain endeavour to keep open the Mediterranean, to keep open the Canal Zone.
In the last war—though the hon. Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) appears to have forgotten it, and it appears that roughly 50 years of history has passed him by—we made no attempt to keep open the Mediterranean. We used the West Coast of Africa as our life line. The great burial ground of our maritime fleet was down the West Coast of Africa. Sierra Leone was the important base, not the harbours of the Mediterranean. The coming of the submarine and air power makes the policy advocated by the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends complete nonsense. We have the H-bomb 750 miles away, and the hon. Member and his hon. Friends wish to provide a potential aggressor with the most perfect target in the world.
But I do not want to enter into an argument with hon. Gentlemen opposite. I am sorry that I have been dragged away into this digression. I wish to plead with the Government to take every step in their power, not only by words but by actions, to try to stimulate the maximum amount of good will both in Egypt and in Israel. I speak as a friend of both countries, indeed, as a friend of all the countries in the Middle East. I have visited them all—not as a member of a Parliamentary mission, not on a visit of two or three days. I have served in all those countries and, in a humble way, I claim to know something about them. I believe that the potential friendship for this country is enormous. I believe that memories are shorter than we sometimes think. I believe that in a very few months—certainly, in a year or two—all that has happened in Egypt in the last 70 years can be forgotten.
Perhaps I may be permitted to tell a story. I was serving in Constantinople in the occupation forces after the First World War. Heaven knows, there was bitterness between us and the Turks, because the Turk, although he is a good fighter, does not always fight according to Marquis of Queensberry rules. We

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called him, "Johnny Turk" and for some reason they called us "Johnny," too. I left Constantinople on the last trooper. The last and the best troopship was, of course, reserved for the Brigade of Guards. They had to have the best. They travelled home in cabins, and I came on a trooper. It was a very old boat. It had been old at the time of the South African war.
I remember that as we pulled away from the quayside there was no chorus of abuse nor shaking of fists. The Turkish people, with whom there had been very difficult relations since the rise of Kemal, turned up in their hundreds shouting, "Goodbye Johnny, come back again." Give him the chance, and that is the kind of good will which is created by the British soldier; not because he has been trained in the Foreign Office, or kicked around in a public school, but because he is what he is. That is the kind of memory which the British soldier can leave behind. That is the kind of memory which will be left behind in the Canal Zone. The murders and the shootings and the robberies will be forgotten. But the simple kindness and the generosity of several generations of British troops will be remembered.
That is better than all the bases and, may I say, all the White Papers in the world. In any case, what fools we shall be if we do not create good will. We have not got the base any longer. The troops will come out in 20 months' time, so is it not far better for hon. Gentlemen opposite to accept this, and to say, "Well, after all, this is not what we should have liked and we are sorry about it but we must make the best of it"? It was clear from the emotion shown by the Prime Minister when he spoke that he is sorry, and I understand why, and I certainly do not gloat over it. But if we have to come out, let us, in the name of British common sense—which is one of the great national virtues to which we lay claim—make the best of a bad job. Let us come out and try to leave the maximum amount of good will behind; so that if ever we have to go back—and God forbid that the occasion should ever arise—we shall be greeted with friendship.
I hope that that will be the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite. Do not let
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them forget the fears which undoubtedly exist in Israel and in other countries as to what the effects of the redeployment will be. The efficiency of the Israeli Army will guarantee sufficient time for this Government, and other Governments concerned, to recognise that 29th July, 1954, marks the end of British imperial power in that part of the world, and the coming of a new era of friendship and kindliness. If that happens, I am sure that there will be a new respect, not only for Britain, but for everything for which she stands.
7.10 p.m.
Major Sir Roger Conant: For quite a number of years my contribution to our proceedings has consisted of the suggestion, "That this House do now adjourn." I hope that my observations today and on any future occasion when I may catch your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, will be equally agreeable to hon. Members.
We are considering whether the Heads of Agreement initialled on Tuesday should form the basis of a treaty with Egypt or whether we should continue this long-drawn-out dispute. That is the simple issue—whether the dispute which has gone on for eight years should be continued. I agree that the base ingratitude of the Egyptians after the last war and the great length of time our troops have been in Egypt makes everyone reluctant to approve proposals for the withdrawal of our troops, but we must face facts.
Our troops are stationed in Egypt for defence. We must ask ourselves whether in the circumstances of today, bearing in mind the hostility of the Egyptians, modern methods of warfare, and in particular the possible use of nuclear weapons in a future war, it is wise to keep troops in Egypt and to maintain there the great base which we have kept up ever since the war. It is very easy to pick holes in any agreement and to suggest improvements. Today we are not concerned with hypothetical agreements. We are discussing this compromise Agreement which has been reached, and the alternative to accepting it is that we must face the job of maintaining 80,000 troops, or possibly a slightly smaller number, in the Canal Zone where they will be tied up indefinitely defending themselves as much as they will be defending the Suez Canal.

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They live, as hon. Members know, under appalling conditions.
I would certainly have preferred a treaty which was to last longer than seven years, but I do not think that it is unreasonable to expect that with this great bone of contention removed our friendship with Egypt may grow and that at the end of seven years we may conclude another treaty. Therefore, I have no doubt that our defence needs are best served by the redeployment of our forces.
The effect of the treaty will be to reduce our direct overseas commitments considerably. I think that my right hon. Friend said that two and a half divisions would be relieved and made available for other uses. I am sure that this will lead to many demands for reductions in the period of National Service. In fact, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has already staked a claim. No doubt we shall also have suggestions for cuts in civil defence, but I hope that the Government will think very carefully before they agree to any proposals which would diminish the effectiveness of our defences.
Anyone who has read the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission which met in London last month and which has studied the outlook of Soviet Russia on disarmament, cannot but feel the great urgency of maintaining our defences at the highest pitch if war is to be prevented. I am sure that all hon. Members hope that if this treaty is concluded it will result in more secure defences, and in a firm and lasting friendship being established with Egypt, and that in time to come the Egyptian people will appreciate the very deep debt of gratitude which they owe to British troops.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): Mr. Crossman.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Of course, it is not competent for me in any way to reflect on your choice of speakers and I do not attempt to do so. I could not suggest, for example, that the opposition in this debate comes from a small nucleus of 40 Members and that they should be called one by one, and I could not make any comment on your choice of speakers, but I should like to draw your attention to the distinct possibility that unless there is a selection of speakers from the
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effective opposition in this debate it may be necessary in Committee on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, which occurs later in our proceedings, to make our views known.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member has rightly pointed out that that was not a point of order with which I could deal.
7.15 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I sympathise with the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). I remember a good many times when I was sitting on the Government side of the House and thought that the effective opposition was not getting its full representation. Indeed, on the subject of the Middle East, I can remember a debate on Egypt when I thought that I was the effective opposition.
However, there is one difference which the noble Lord has not noticed. When he talks about the effective opposition, he seems to have overlooked the speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. If that was thought to be a congratulatory speech, then the noble Lord's estimate of his own powers of oratory and of his own case is higher than I believed. I doubt whether he will be able to do a job of debunking the Government equal to that done by the Leader of the Opposition. My right hon. Friend castigated the Government. I assure the noble Lord that we on our side will play our part in exposing the Government, though I know that the stab from the rear hurts more than the stab from the front. I shall occupy no more than a very few minutes, and then I hope to see fratricidal strife between hon. Gentlemen above and below the Gangway on the Government side of the House.
I do not intend to spend a great deal of time in castigation, because that was done by the Leader of the Opposition once and for all. I want to speak shortly and not polemically. I think that some of us on this side of the House ought to say one or two things to the Government not in a polemical way. I am one of those who, unlike the Secretary of State for War, feel no conflict of emotion and common sense about this decision. I was aware that the right hon. Gentleman was

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not really speaking to those of us who have been pressing this policy on him for two years. The fact that we have been pressing for it over here has been something of an embarrassment to him. I knew that he was speaking to his hon. Friends when he said that there was emotion on the one side and common sense on the other.
We are more fortunate. Our emotions coincide with his common sense, and we are delighted to realise that he sees the common sense reason. We also feel an immense relief that the 72-year occupation of a country, which was detested by that country, is to be ended, and we recall that on 17 occasions British Governments have pledged themselves to withdraw. At last that promise is to be kept. We do not see any great emotional tragedy about that.
On the contrary, we feel that at last there is a chance of a new beginning of relationships in the Middle East. I would say to the Secretary of State for War that it is touch and go whether this Anglo-Egyptian Agreement ends in complete chaos and collapse in the Middle East or whether it marks the beginning of a new relationship between our country and Egypt.
That depends not only on Egypt but on the attitude of the Government of this country. I should like to echo something said by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I was proud to be the friend of the present Prime Minister of Israel when he was locked up as a terrorist by a Labour Government. I was proud to be the friend of the present Prime Minister of Egypt when he was reviled and despised by leaders on the Front Bench opposite only 18 months ago. I claim to be a friend of Israel and a friend of Egypt. I claim that unless we in this country can feel friendship for Israel and for the Arab States, including Egypt, and can genuinely want collaboration, there is no chance for all the military plans in the world.
The whole future of the Middle East depends on breaking that deadlock, that curtain of hatred, which divides the Arab world from Israel. It is only from this country that it can be broken. May I remind the House that we largely created it? By our action, the unnecessary and disastrous war in Palestine came,
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and that divided these people. We must accept our responsibility. It is only if hon. Gentlemen opposite will accept the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement as giving the possibility of entering upon new relations with the Arabs and the Jews that it will not be a scuttle. It will not be a military disaster if only we take that new attitude.
That is what disturbed us about Cyprus. What happened? On the same afternoon a concession to common sense was made by the Foreign Secretary and half an hour later a concession to emotion was made by his colleague in his statement on Cyprus.
An Hon. Member: Is this a repeat performance?
Brigadier Christopher Peto: Would this not come under the terms of vain repetition?
Mr. Crossman: I am sorry that none of us had the privilege of speaking yesterday afternoon after the Colonial Secretary. He made a series of assertions which seriously invalidated the good intentions of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, for if the Agreement means the end of the Imperial relationship in the Middle East, then we cannot possibly assert British sovereignty in Cyprus on the same day. [Interruption.] I know that it is unpleasant to remind the unofficial Government opposition of this.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I was saying that the hon. Gentleman was making a selfish and tedious speech.
Mr. Crossman: The noble Lord is usually courteous, but on the subject of Cyprus and Egypt he really must learn in time. We have had these mistakes made time after time during the last eight years. Hon. Members have never listened to our warnings. Each time we have got up and warned hon. Members what is likely to happen. Each time hon. Members opposite have called it tedious repetition and have turned it down. Then disaster comes, and it is too late.
All I do now is to beg the Foreign Secretary, who listened to sense, although I admit he was over-ridden by the Prime Minister for a year, to think again of what was said about Cyprus yesterday by the Colonial Secretary and ask himself whether it is compatible with the new relationship that we are trying to achieve in the Middle East that we should assert

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to the people of Cyprus that they shall never get their sovereignty. I do not believe that we can have a military relationship with the Middle East except on terms of friendship with the people there. We have only got it with Israel today because Israel achieved her independence by force. We have only got it with Egypt because Egypt is getting her independence. Unless we give the people of Cyprus their will, they will not be with us.
This is the first thing that we want to emphasise to the Government today from this side of the House. Whether or not the Agreement leads to good will depends upon how the Government interpret it. [Interruption.] Of course it depends partly on the Egyptians. I assure the hon. and gallant Member for Pudsey (Colonel Banks), who made such an interesting speech about Colonel Nasser—I agree with him that Colonel Nasser is a charming man—that I am, nevertheless, not quite so one-sided in my picture of Colonel Nasser.
Colonel Nasser is a politician who is faced with realities in Egypt. The great danger about Egypt today is that, having lost one scapegoat—it has been the British who have been blamed for everything there in the last 25 years—she may find another foreign scapegoat next door. We shall have to see. It depends on whether Colonel Nasser is strong enough not to use the xenophobia there, which has given an excuse to every Egyptian leader for 25 years to blame the British, to find a scapegoat in Israel now with the result that there may be a possibility of a "second round."
It is our responsibility as a country to ascertain whether the military security arrangements which have been made will reduce the risk of there being a "second round." I ask myself whether we are doing it. [Interruption.] I was saying to the unofficial Government opposition—there are critics of the Government on this side of the House as well—that we are asking ourselves what security we have in the present world against a "second round" occurring. What are we doing to help Colonel Nasser to strengthen himself against that temptation? I agree that this is not likely to come for two or three years. The Israeli army is certainly stronger than the Egyptian army today, but there is that danger in the future. We have at the
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moment a tripartite agreement which is merely a bit of paper. How can we give that bit of paper some substance?
I suggest that, much better than going to Cyprus and insulting the Cypriots by saying, "We will stay in your country and build a base here whether you like it or not," we should go to the one country in the Middle East which is now friendly to us, friendly because it got its freedom despite the British Government—Israel. Here is a friendly country, with a friendly people, which might really be a reliable ally in time of trouble.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is it a friendly attitude towards Israel to suggest that we should put a bomber base there?
Mr. Crossman: I am not talking about a bomber base. I am talking about looking for allies in the Middle East.
Mr. Harmar Nicholls: To which "opposition" is the hon. Gentleman speaking now?
Mr. Crossman: I am speaking to the Chair. I suggest it is worth considering whether Israel would be prepared to lease us part of Haifa as a naval base. At least, it is an offer worth making to her.
I have said to the House previously that I think it is essential that the Gaza Strip, with its 260,000 refugees, should be taken, as a burden, off Egypt and that we should have there a battalion of British troops, a battalion of French troops and a battalion of American troops, as a token force and as proof that the tripartite statement means something and we should implement it if any trouble occurred. If we are to make a commitment, as we are making, that we will prevent aggression, I want some meaning given to it. I believe that small token forces in that area would deter both sides from aggression.
The Egyptians have previously stated that the Gaza Strip is a serious burden to them. Who wants the Gaza Strip, with the 260,000 refugees in it, today? My suggestion is worth considering. These ideas are turned down time after time until it is recognised that they make sense.
The last thing I say is this. While the 900,000 Arab refugees rot in their camps there will be no military security in the Middle East, there will be no friendship

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between Israel and the Arab world, and there will be no friendship between us and the Middle East. When are we going to do something about the refugees? The British and the Americans should recognise that they might as well take on the compensation of the refugees. It may be said that we cannot afford to do that, but we are spending hundreds of millions of pounds on the military defence of the area while at the same time we are making the area impossible to defend. A few score millions of pounds paid out to the refugees to enable them to leave the camps, buy a bit of ground and develop their lives, would do more for the defence of the Middle East than any amount of guns and bombers.
I pray the House to realise that as long as we say to ourselves that military principle should over-ride common humanity we shall have no friends in the Middle East. If the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is the beginning of a new relationship and not merely a scuttle out of Egypt into Cyprus, there is some hope for us in the Middle East, but if it is the same old thing, merely Imperialism grown weaker, then the military vacuum will end in final collapse.
7.28 p.m.
Mr. Julian Amery: Perhaps I might congratulate the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) upon his contribution, which, as his contributions always are, was dazzling and entertaining. The way he puts it, it always seems so easy. According to him, the great thing is to be friends with the Arabs and friends with the Jews, to establish a new relationship, and not to put the base into Cyprus but put everything into Gaza. Sometimes, in my more irresponsible moments, I should rather like the hon. Member to be at the Foreign Office, so that I could see what would then happen to all our interests and to the interests of other countries.
These is one point upon which I am sure there will be no difference in any quarter of the House, and that is the momentousness of the decision which is being taken here today. It is the end of a process which has lasted 72 years. It is 72 years since we went into Egypt, at the behest not of an Imperialistic Conservative Government but of a
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Liberal Administration under Mr. Gladstone; 72 years which Colonel Nasser described yesterday as "72 years of bitterness," a phrase which was echoed by the hon. Member for Coventry, East just now; 72 years in which Cromer, Milner, Allenby, Kitchener, Lloyd and Killairn built modern Egypt as we now know it; 72 years in which we built the foundations of what became a British Empire in the Middle East after the First World War and has remained so until the other day. It is an area to which the forces of the Commonwealth came twice in a generation to defend freedom and civilisation. There has been a very difficult position in that area in the last three years. There has been a state of seige. Now the garrison is to march out with full honours of war, but after submitting to a full capitulation.
The documents which we have on this new Agreement are very few; in fact, only two. There is the communiqué which was put forward on the evening of the signature of the Heads of Agreement and there is the White Paper itself. Let me say a word or two first about the communiqué. It begins by telling us that the Agreement is not aggressive in its intentions. There will be no disagreement on that. It goes on to say that the Agreement aims at "removing sources of friction and misundertsanding." A study, however, of the Heads of Agreement shows that only one thing is to be removed—the British Army. I do not know whether that was a very happy phrase for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to use about his service.
The communiqué ends by expressing the hope that the Agreement will "contribute to the maintenance of peace and security." That is really the vital question which we have to answer. Will it do so? I cannot escape the conclusion that when we go the last element of stability in Egypt goes with us. The country is beset with fearful social and economic difficulties, and nobody can solve them easily. In fact, I doubt whether any combination of forces in Egypt could succeed in solving them. The military junta may manage with dollar aid to control the dark forces for a time. But that, in the end, there will come an explosion is more than likely. Which

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way it will go is anybody's guess, but there is at any rate a serious risk that it will involve an attack on Israel, or the suppression of the anti-Egyptian element in the Sudan, or perhaps a Communist revolution in Cairo. All or any of these developments could bring the Middle East down in ruins.
Now for the Heads of Agreement themselves. If we are to pass judgment on them, we must compare them both with what we had under the 1936 Treaty and what we might have had, for better or worse, as an alternative to these arrangements. First of all, a comparison with the 1936 Treaty. In 1936, we had a full alliance with Egypt; under this arrangement, we have none. In 1936, we had a right to station troops there; under this arrangement, we have an obligation to evacuate them. In 1936, we had a right of re-entry in the event of war anywhere in the world, or a threat of war or of an apprehended international emergency, whatever that curious legalistic term may indicate; in this Agreement, we have a right of re-entry only in the event of attack on certain Powers.
Here I should like to ask a question to which I hope my right hon. Friend will reply in winding up. What happens if, for example, Turkey becomes involved in a war in the defence of another member of N.A.T.O.? Will that constitute an attack against Turkey, and would that bind the Egyptians to open the Suez Canal to us, or would it not? It would not be an attack against Turkey, but against one of Turkey's allies in N.A.T.O., and I think we ought to know what is the position there.
The 1936 Treaty was of unlimited duration; this Agreement is to last for seven years. In the 1936 Treaty, it was stated that the Suez Canal was a primary interest of the British Commonwealth, as well an an international trade route; there is no mention of the British Commonwealth in these Heads of Agreement before us today. There is one other point, of which no mention has been made, but perhaps it will be covered in the Treaty, and perhaps my right hon. Friend will say something about it. Are there any provisions for naval facilities like those which are accorded to the R.A.F.? As to the facilities accorded the R.A.F., what
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is meant by "most-favoured-nation-treatment"? Am I right in believing that it is the same treatment as that accorded to other countries?
Certainly, of course, we secure certain rights and pledges under this Agreement, and we might have had nothing at all. We have the right to maintain civilian contractors and the right of inspection of their work, and we have certain promises over the maintenance of the Canal Convention, but there is no security for any of these rights or pledges. Egypt receives the substance—control of the Canal, of the Base and of the land bridge from Asia to Africa. We receive the shadow—certain promises. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday expressed the hope that there would be a growing improvement in our relations with Egypt and that this might one day come to something. I hope that what he says will indeed come true, but there is very little foundation, for such hopes at present, and my right hon. Friend, of all men, after his bitter experience of Egyptian good faith in the Sudan last November, must have found it hard to give public expression to these hopes.
There is no evidence yet of good will on the part of the Government of Egypt, and we have to ask ourselves whether, even if they feel good will, they are in a position to show it. Powerful forces are arrayed against the Egyptian Junta. Indeed, I think that the statements made in Mr. Aboul Fath's letter in yesterday's "Manchester Guardian" are significant. He, a leading member of the Wafd, made it quite clear that the intention of himself and his friends was to try to outbid the xenophobia of the Egyptian Government. Any good will that we might receive may thus only be maintained by making further concessions to the Egyptians. We cannot make many more concessions to Egypt on Egyptian soil, but we might have to make concessions to Egyptian policy in other parts of the Middle East.
We have to face the fact that this Agreement is virtually unconditional evacuation of the Canal Zone. I am bound to say that it is hard to see that these negotiations have got us anything which we could not have got two years ago. I believe, as the House knows, that the whole of this Agreement is wrong. But if we were determined to go, then

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there was a lot to be said for going quickly. As it is, lives have been lost, time wasted and money spent all in vain. The truth of the matter is that this Agreement falls between two stools, and, because of that, I do not think that it has much chance of commanding respect in the Middle East any more than it has a chance of commanding the respect of many people in this country and on this side of this House.
The Prime Minister, in an intervention earlier on, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, put a great deal of emphasis on the change in the situation which has been brought about by the advent of the hydrogen bomb. From a purely strategic point of view, what they said is no doubt true, but we have also to consider what will happen if there is no war. After all, our efforts in other spheres of policy are devoted to avoiding war; we have also to remember that there are British interests in the Middle East which we had before the Soviet threat arose and which I hope will still survive after the Soviet danger has receded. I think myself that the Agreement has to be judged as much on political as on military grounds; and, to understand it, we must try to look at it in the perspective of recent developments in the Middle East.
It is fair to say that the Middle East was chiefly important to Britain before the war because it was the area through which our communications passed by sea and air to India—India which was the great bastion of British power in the area of the Indian Ocean. With the coming of independence to India, the Middle East ceased to be simply important as a line of communications; it became itself the main bastion of British power looking towards the Indian Ocean, and it was from the Middle East that we had the strength to influence events in that part of the world. It was very important, I think, that we should have restained that strength, not only for our own traditional interests which bound us to that area, but because the new Commonwealth countries which have emerged on the Indian sub-continent needed to feel that there was, not too far away from them, a Power which could go to their aid in the hour of need. I know that public opinion in India and Pakistan tends to sympathise with Egyptian Nationalism. But I believe
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that the leaders of those nations are much more concerned in their hearts with there being someone who can come to their help and who is not too far away. Their interest in the Commonwealth will be reduced by the withdrawal of British power from the Middle East.
British power in the Middle East was based in Palestine, the Suez Canal and the Sudan. I do not want to go into the rights and wrongs of the Palestine issue, but our withdrawal from there and our renunciation of responsibility led to a cruel and unnecessary war, the consequences of which will long bedevil affairs in the Middle East.
I must say a word about the agreement over the Sudan. In the 1936 Treaty, the Sudan and Canal problems were knit together. On this occasion, they have been separated. I am not sure that the separation has been very wise. It has led, by the way, to a curious fact. This Administration is the first Conservative Administration to lose nearly one million square miles of territory of the Empire since the day of Lord North. His policy towards the American Colonies suffered from excessive firmness. I do not think anyone will say that the Middle East policy that we are discussing today has suffered from that particular defect.
The agreement over the Sudan has never been fully debated, but in my view it was worse than the Heads of Agreement that we are considering tonight. What we have now is the surrender of vital British interests. What we did in the Sudan was a betrayal of trust. I would go further than that. I believe that the agreement over the Sudan was worse than crime: it was a blunder. There was a chance of giving genuine independence to the Sudan and at the same time of securing such military installations as we needed in that country, and of discharging our trust to the more backward peoples of the Southern Sudan. That opportunity was tragically lost, and there followed the whole miserable tale of elections in which bribery, corruption and pressure played a very full part.
Had we left the Sudan but kept control of the Suez Canal, our action would have been immoral but it would at least have been rational. Had we reached military agreements with Israel, as the Leader of the Opposition suggested, and at the same time kept our installations in Sudan, we

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might with some equanimity have left the Suez Canal. In the result, we have left all three. There is now a withdrawal of British power from this central position in the Middle East to the perimeter. Of course, we all realise that the Government had no easy or clear-cut choice in this matter. The position they inherited was difficult and our resources were strained to the utmost. In circumstances of that kind withdrawals are sometimes necessary, but they are justified only when they are withdrawals to prepared positions.
We have introduced the word "redeployment" into this debate. I wonder if my right hon. Friend will tell us more precisely what is intended by "redeployment." How secure are our title deeds to the air bases in Iraq at Habanyah and Shaibah? How many troops are we allowed to keep in Jordan? Is it true that pressure is being exercised on the Jordan Government to dismiss British officers in the Arab Legion? How secure is our position in Libya? We are told that the Egyptians are already organizing raiders into French Tunisia. Is that happening under our eyes? Could they be turned against our men?
I cannot help feeling that the decision was taken to quit the Suez Canal before we had decided where to go, and that ever since we have been looking round but no very clear plan has emerged. I would echo here what was said on this point by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), when he asked what the plan was for some military bases south of Egypt.
It is all very well to talk of treaty rights in Libya; we have treaty rights in Egypt. It is all very well to talk of sovereignty over Cyprus; I believe that the moral position is much weaker in Cyprus than in Egypt. In Egypt we could rest our case on the very strong ground that we were there because the security of the Canal and of the base were of vital importance to many millions of people in other countries outside Egypt, and that we had the right to put their safety in front of the technical claims of Egyptian sovereignty.
Mr. John Baird: Does the hon. Gentleman say that we had the right?
Mr. Amery: Yes, we had the right. The hon. Gentleman queries the word "we," but it was we who undertook the responsibility when we went to the Middle East 72 years ago. It was we who built up this system of Arab countries which we liberated from the Ottoman Empire. You cannot create a structure in life and then renounce all responsibility for it just because it is unpopular or inexpedient to do otherwise.
Mr. Crossman: The hon. Gentleman says that we created and liberated the Arab world. Surely we do not liberate and then try to rule?
Mr. Amery: There is no question of our trying to rule Egypt. We were not keeping the Army in the Suez Canal Zone to rule Egypt, but were merely putting the interests of other nations before the technical sovereignty of the Egyptian State.
Mr. Baird: What is "technical sovereignty"?
Mr. Amery: The grounds which I have stated were something which our public opinion and our soldiers understood and for which they have shown themselves prepared to make considerable sacrifice. Shall we be able to work up the same will to resist about the other places to which we are proposing to redeploy our forces?
Now let me say a word or two about the effect of this decision on Africa. There is a tendency, fostered I think by some of our Middle Eastern advisers, to forget Egypt's African rôle. One effect will be that the pro-Egyptian party in Khartoum will be immeasurably strengthened by the Heads of Agreement announced in the House yesterday. Unless Her Majesty's Government are prepared to exert pressure to see that Sudan's independence is respected, the victory of the pro-Egypt party there will be almost complete.
But the Nile does not rise in the Sudan. It rises in Uganda. In the lifetime of the Prime Minister most of Uganda was under Egyptian rule. I have very little doubt that the crisis about the Kabaka which arose some months ago was not uninfluenced by the changes in the Sudan. Remember, too, that there are close links between Northern Nigeria and Khartoum. If Egyptian influence is to predominate

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in Khartoum it will extend to Nigeria. Nor can we close our eyes to the repercussions of this decision on our French allies in North Africa. Whatever view we may take of French policy in Tunisia, Algeria or Morocco, it cannot be in the interests of Anglo-French relationships or of the security of the free world that the whole of North Africa should become, as it may well become, an area of insurrection.
There are wider implications even than these. To me it is rather shocking—I use the word seriously and frankly—that Ministers have not been able to say that they could claim the full agreement of the Commonwealth in this matter. I gather that there is pretty serious doubt about the decision in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about India?"] The rulers in India and Pakistan are not in any doubt about what the decision means, and I fear it will diminish their interest in the Commonwealth.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said yesterday in answer to a Question that no one could speak for the Commonwealth as a whole. I do not disagree with that sentiment, but was this not an issue which justified, perhaps, an emergency conference among the countries of the Commonwealth? We are about to lose control of the communications which link the western half of the Commonwealth with the eastern half. Who will fill the vacuum which we leave? Probably, in the immediate future, it will be filled by the United States, and it is better that they should go there than that there should be anarchy and chaos. But is it a good thing to increase the dependence of the Commonwealth on the United States more than it is at present?
I could have understood it if these Heads of Agreement had been brought before the House by the party opposite. I should have disagreed with what they said, but such a course would at least be consistent with their opposition to an empire of direct authority. I can imagine what I should have said about it, and I believe I know what all on this side of the House would have said about it.
I am frankly rather perplexed by the decision that the Government have taken. Why have we done this? My right hon.
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Friend the Secretary of State for War told us about the grave possibility of the use of the hydrogen bomb. If it is so grave that it makes the whole Suez Canal Zone of no further military use, and the effort of maintaining the base no longer worth while, then what is the outlook for Portsmouth, Chatham and London?
I do not know whether the premium on dispersal is high or not. I think that my hon. Friend said that it was. I do not know whether there is anything to be said for the case which I have heard put forward that concentration at least allows more radar and fighter protection, and makes it harder for aircraft to get through. But, surely, what we have to bear in mind here is not just the hypothesis of hydrogen war, but the reality of the cold war, the possibility of local war and the hope of peace. In all these things, the Suez Canal Zone and our presence there could be of the greatest value. I cannot help feeling that this mention of the hydrogen bomb was introduced as a political camouflage to make easier the Government's recent change of mind.
I will try to reply to the argument advanced by my right hon. Friend about manpower in the base. He said that we have a choice. We can either have 80,000 men there or—and his words struck me as rather surprising we can have 10,000, 15,000 or 20,000. He then said that if we had 10,000, 15,000 or 20,000 men we could hold the base area around an airfield and a port, but not the communications in between. But what is the figure to hold the communications too? Is it 25,000 or 30,000? There are 80,000 men in the Zone today because of the size of the installations that have to be maintained and guarded. But if the base were contracted and if the hydrogen bomb makes it unnecessary for us to have such a big base, then, surely, a smaller force, a division or a division and a brigade would be sufficient. We should then still be able to bring a division back, not as was suggested by an hon. Member opposite in order to reduce the period of National Service, but so as to have a strategic reserve.
I think that another consideration weighing with the Government has been world opinion, and here, I think, we have been guilty of a good many blunders in the field of diplomacy. There was the

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possibility of mobilising a good deal of Commonwealth opinion on our side. France, too, with its North African and Canal interests, would have come on our side, as would Turkey and Israel. But no effort was made to mobilise the influence of these friendly countries.
Then there was the problem of American pressure against us. Was any effort made to see whether we could strike a bargain with the Americans under which they would agree to support our interests in the Middle East if we, in turn, helped them more in some other part of the world?
Finally, I want to say a word about Egyptian opinion. My right hon. Friend said that it is no use having a base in a hostile country. But Egypt has not become as hostile as it is simply because it does not like the presence of British troops. Terrorism has been encouraged by the fact that we have yielded to it, and because we allowed Sabis, Lawrence's soldier, to be put to death by the Egyptians because he worked for us. There are now very few moderates in Egypt. There would have been many more had we pursued a different course in the past.
It is only fair to say that these mistakes coincided with the illness of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign Secretary a year ago. I doubt whether even now, the burden of administration is sufficiently adjusted to make the preparation of long-term policy easy enough. Fearful mistakes have been made, but it is not because of such mistakes that we are leaving Egypt. We are leaving because we are undergoing a certain moral collapse. The responsibility may rest nominally on the Ministers concerned but it goes far deeper.
All too often in this House, in the Civil Service and in the country at large we have lost sight of the pursuit of British interests and of the defence of Britain's honour. Even now, our vision is obscured by alien values. We have tended to put the United Nations and the Atlantic Community before our first duty, which is to guard the honour of this country and of the Commonwealth.
All this is natural enough. Material weakness has made heavy inroads on our influence, and only a supreme effort of will can keep us as an independent force in the world. We have not made that
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effort of will in Egypt. We have taken a step which it will be very hard, if ever possible, to repair, because mistakes of foreign policy, unlike mistakes of domestic policy, are not so easy to retrieve.
It is easy to say hard things about the policy of others, and I may have done that tonight, but it is not easy to vote against men for whose persons and policies I have so much respect as I have for the leaders of my party. But I shall do so tonight because I can do no; and because what is happening is to my mind the repudiation of a fundamental principle of the party to which I belong. Loyalty must be a two-way traffic.
I know that our vote tonight is unlikely to effect any change of policy, but I do not think that our action, either before or during this debate, will be in vain. I fear—I hope I may be wrong—that the consequences of this Agreement will not be long in showing themselves. Then, perhaps, those who now oppose or deride our efforts may think again and may realise that this is not a fight in the last ditch, but perhaps the beginning of a return to that faith in Britain's imperial mission and destiny without which, in my belief, our people will never be prosperous, or safe or free.
7.59 p.m.
Mr. J. Grimond: The hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) has made a most courageous speech, from his point of view. He has ranged from the Atlantic to Persia and from the Equator to the boundaries of Russia. But as I understand it, the proposal which he and his hon. Friends put forward is that this country should keep a division, or thereabouts on the Canal. Personally, I fail to see how the presence of a division, or of any force of comparable size, would solve the tensions which he regarded as being such a serious threat to the future of the Middle and Near East.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the whole area is highly dangerous. There are appalling dangers in North Africa, in the Arab States, and on the Arab border. But I fail to see that by keeping a division in a hostile Egypt we should be making any great contribution to the solution of these problems. He may say that prestige is at stake—keep our forces

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in that area and it will maintain our influence in a way which is not possible once the troops are taken away—but will we really maintain our prestige by keeping this small number of troops there who will be immobile, who will be engaged largely in defending themselves against a hostile population, and who certainly will not be able to protect the Canal?
I suggest that always—and more especially today—the prestige of a country does not only depend upon the presence of armed force. Throughout the Middle East the British are respected for their fair dealing, and for the benefits which they have brought with them. I think that the House was much impressed by an earlier speech which drew attention to the good which we had already done in Egypt and to the greater good we are capable of doing. Although I do not in any way minimise our obligations to protect the area; nor do I for a moment say that it is not essential to keep forces where we wish to maintain our influence. But military forces are not enough today. To take one extreme example, there is the case of the Quakers, who gained for themselves immense prestige in very many countries simply because of their reputation and good works.
I agree with a great deal of what the hon. Member for Preston, North said about the order in which these negotiations have been carried out. I have always thought that before we left the Canal we should have come to a firm agreement with Iraq about our air bases there. In Jordan, too, which is about the only Arab country in the Middle East which is consistently friendly to us, we should have been quite certain that we should be able to maintain our troops and our Air Force.
Perhaps we can, but I entirely agree with the hon. Member that we need more reassurance from the Government as to what is to be done to introduce a general defence plan throughout the area. I suggest that even if we have not done that—and we ought to have done it—we do not rectify that error by maintaining our base in the Canal Zone. On an earlier occasion the Prime Minister said that one did not cure a mistake such as putting a left boot on your right foot
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by putting your left foot into a right boot.
It is, I think, essential to remember—and the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and the hon. Member for Preston, North should face it—that the purpose of the base is to maintain an Army somewhere towards the Russian frontier. It is generally agreed by everybody that it is now no longer suitable for that purpose. We have to keep too many troops there. The atomic and hydrogen bombs have altered its value, we have no means of protecting it from the air even without those bombs; and it is at least far enough away.
Now the argument is changing to one of keeping the base for prestige reasons and for the protection of the Canal. Prestige does not depend on keeping troops there. It depends on pursuing, throughout the Middle East, a consistent policy, I thought that the announcement about Cyprus made in the House yesterday was most foolish and flatfooted. I do not think that can help our prestige anywhere in the Middle East. But if we can really build up the friendship of the Arab States and assure our position in Jordan and Iraq this agreement may well lead to a much better feeling towards us throughout the whole area.
We have also an obligation under the tripartite guarantee. I feel very far from happy about that. I do not see how, in fact, we are to discharge our obligations if there is war between Israel and the Arab States. I do not see what we would do if Egypt attacked Israel, or, for that matter, if Israel suddenly flowed down into the Jordan valley. I cannot believe that this country would be in other than a most unenviable position. That, too, should have been dealt with and cleared up before, and not after, we came to an agreement with Egypt.
Most hon. Members must have been greatly surprised by how little was said by the Secretary of State for War about the Canal itself. Can we be assured that the Commonwealth countries were really consulted over this? Can we be assured that the Commonwealth will be there when the treaty is made and signed? I ask because there is no doubt that Australia and New Zealand feel very strongly about that part of the world, whether or not it is defensible in time of

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war. Without, at the moment, worrying about war they are deeply concerned about free navigation in time of peace.
Are the Government taking any steps to see that that will be guaranteed? I do not think that a division there would guarantee that but what alternative steps are the Government taking in that regard? What will happen when the Canal Company's concession comes to an end? Have the Government any proposals for putting the Canal under international control or putting in an international force to protect it, if we are not there ourselves?
Like the hon. Member for Preston, North, I was astonished at the introduction of the hydrogen bomb into this debate. If we are to maintain a civil defence organisation for Coventry in the face of the City Council there I cannot believe that the bomb makes it absolutely impossible for us to maintain a base anywhere in the Middle East. I do not think that that argument is tenable. Furthermore, surely what we are faced with very often is not a world war or a hydrogen bomb war, but local aggression at secondhand such as we have seen in Indo-China and Korea—such as we may see in the Middle East. It is against that sort of attack that we have to provide defences just as much as for a full-scale world war with hydrogen bombs.
What is to happen if there is that sort of attack in the Middle or Far East and the Egyptians for reasons which may seem to us very shortsighted—and the Egyptians are not always moved by the most logical calculations—should decide to interfere with our shipping in the Canal? How are we to retrieve such a position? It is all very well to say—and quite true to say—that it is very much against the interests of Egypt to close the Canal. She draws enormous revenue from it and she is bound by treaty obligations.
It is quite true that Italian ships went through in the Abyssinian war, and Russian vessels during the Russo-Japanese war, but we cannot absolutely rely upon the Egyptians being moved by enlightened self-interest. After all, she is losing revenue now by denying passage to oil tankers for Haifa. I do not think that even if we get a guarantee that in that sort of situation it will be worth very much, but we have to make up our minds that
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the problems will arise and be ready to take appropriate action.
The whole value of the treaty depends upon placing a lot of trust in the Egyptian Government. I hope and think that that trust may be justified, but I am well aware that it might not be justified, and we might be deluding ourselves to take such an optimistic view as has been taken by the Secretary of State for War. I think that the real outcome of the Agreement, in the long run, will be that the base, in its present form, will be written off. I think that this Agreement is the least harmful way out of the situation, but we must face the dangers, and the sooner we negotiate a new agreement about the Canal the better. This is the end of one period and the beginning of another. It is the least bad way facing the country, but I do not think that we should delude ourselves that it is a very good way.
I can only hope that it is the beginning of an effort by the Foreign Office and the War Office to build up a defence system in the Middle East in which the Commonwealth will play its part in peace and in war. I hope that, as in the past, we shall make every effort to increase our trade and economic interests throughout the area—and not least in Egypt. We have to go further than before. It is on the friendliness of the Egyptian and Arab peoples that we must now depend to safeguard our interests in one of the most important areas in the world.
8.10 p.m.
Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: It is never a very easy task either to oppose the policy of one's own Government or to argue against hon. Members on one's own side. I am perfectly certain that we all feel that, whatever my hon. Friends have said, they have said it from the deepest possible sincerity and belief. There are others on this side of the House who believe that their emotions have dominated their practical common sense in these matters; and that is the reason why there are others who agree wholeheartedly with what the Government have done on this occasion.
I want to refer for a moment to the speech by the Leader of the Opposition. He chided us and almost sneered at what had been said by the Conservative Party, then in opposition, when he was in power. He said that it had always

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been the policy of his Government to evacuate the Canal Zone, and he said that we should have done it two years ago when we first came into power. May I ask him one question? If he was so convinced that that was the right policy, why did he not carry it out when he had an enormous majority in the House for nearly six years?
My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) did neither himself nor my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War justice when he suggested that my right hon. Friend had been told to get out there and sign anything. I am convinced that no Foreign Secretary of this country worthy of the name could have said such a thing, or have intended to suggest such a thing; nor would such a Secretary of State as my right hon. Friend have accepted such a commission. I do not take that statement by my right hon. and gallant Friend very seriously.
I quarrel with him, however, over the subject of nationalism in the world today. I agree with him that it is a danger, but I am convinced that we cannot subdue it by force. It is something which has come to stay. It is a new force in the world. We may say that it is equally as dangerous as Communism, but there is one way in which we cannot deal with it—and that is by an attempt to subdue or frustrate it.
My right hon. and gallant Friend spoke of the morale of the troops and asked whether it would be raised or lowered by this Agreement. I can tell him that there is nothing as devastating to the morale of troops as to know that they are on guard one night out of two or out of three—when in peace-time it is normally one night out of five—and to no purpose whatever. They are on guard, and yet the base is being pilfered and robbed every night; and although there are police dogs in use, the Brigade of Guards, the finest troops in the world, cannot stop it from happening. That is devastating to the morale of any soldier.
My right hon. and gallant Friend also spoke of Communism in Egypt and suggested that to keep 80,000 troops on the Canal would be a deterrent to Communism in Egypt. I cannot see how. Indeed, I suggest that precisely the opposite is the case.
Captain Waterhouse: I said nothing of the sort. What I asked was what we should do if Egypt went Communist.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I apologise to my right hon. and gallant Friend; I misunderstood him and therefore will not pursue the point.
The last point which I want to put to him applies also to my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), who has just made what was, in my view, one of the most brilliant speeches he has made in the House. Neither my right hon. and gallant Friend nor my hon. Friend has given us the alternative. They have had the question put to them fairly and squarely by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, but they offer no practical alternative. My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North suggested that the base should be reduced and that one division would therefore be able to look after it, thus releasing another division to return home to form our mobile reserve. That is a very facile argument; but it is not the point.
The point is this: if we are to retain a base, however small, and are to depend on civilian labour for the operation of that base; and if we are to maintain it in a country where sabotage has been kept down to its present level only because there were hopes of a solution; then if those hopes of a solution went overboard, we must recognise what the consequences would be. German saboteurs have been training the Egyptians Sabotage would have broken out on the widest possible scale and the consequent loss of life would have been immeasurable. That is the point; let us keep troops there by all means if there is willing agreement, but it is impossible to do so in present conditions with a country so determined that the troops shall not remain there as the Egyptians have shown themselves to be.
We have debated this subject often, and it is therefore difficult not to repeat oneself, but in my view the strategic argument here is quite overwhelming. I want to emphasise only one point in my right hon. Friend's speech: when Lord Alexander's campaign was being waged along the North coast of Africa and when it outran its communications from this base by 300 miles, there had to be a pause while he built up forward bases before

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he could advance. This base is 900 miles from the nearest possible killing ground in the event of a hot war and a campaign through the Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Canal. Strategically, therefore, it is quite useless for supporting the South-East flank of the Turkish Army, and the Turks have been very disturbed about that South-East flank since they came into N.A.T.O. and have been wondering what would be done to help them to defend it.
The bases, clearly, should be Alexandria, Basra in the Persian Gulf, or, as suggested by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), with the agreement of Israel—if that is possible—Haifa. That is the conception of a redeployment which, I believe, is complete and absolute commonsense for the hot war.
This is not only a question of a hot war, however, but of what we are to do in the situation of the cold war. This is a question of whether we are doing the right thing in that situation. In my opinion, those political considerations are just as weighty as the strategic considerations which, in my view, are overwhelmingly in favour of evacuation. Had we decided to keep those troops in the base against an unwilling nation, what would have been the position when the Treaty came to an end in 1956? Should we not be in a sorry position if Egypt took us to U.N.O. and if we were branded by U.N.O. as an aggressor with no right at all to be in the Canal Zone? Carried one stage further, if we insisted on remaining there, would not U.N.O. have a perfect right under the Charter to send in a combined force to turn us out, as they did in Korea?
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Does not my hon. and gallant Friend conceive it possible that for once we should use the veto in our own interests?
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I do not think I need answer that.
Another political aspect to consider is that there is always the Wafd in the background. The present régime in Cairo exists and has existed because it supports and has supported a policy of the evacuation of the Suez Canal. I do not think Nasser's head would have been worth five minutes if we had remained there very much longer, and then we should have had to deal with a Government like the Wafd Government or a similar Govern-
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ment. I have met Neguib, but I have not met Colonel Nasser; at one time I knew Neguib quite well. Fundamentally those two men like us. I am pretty certain of that, and I believe that they know perfectly well that it is in their own interests to see that there are friendly relations between the two countries. In their view, rightly or wrongly, such friendly relations could not exist as long as we remained in the Canal Zone.
Hon. Members have asked what the effect of the Agreement will be on Pakistan. I have not been able to obtain the quotation, but I have been informed that according to the Press yesterday some voice of Pakistan has suggested that this course which we are pursuing will do more to consolidate Moslem opinion in the Middle East in favour of Great Britain than anything we have done for many years. I am hopeful that that will be so. I have spoken to people from Jordon, Iraq, Syria and other countries in the Middle East, and I know that that is their view.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: With regard to alliances with the Arabs, the hon. and gallant Member has suggested that somehow or other we might also contrive an arrangement with Israel—this at the same time as we improve our relations with the Arabs. How can we expect to get an alliance with Israel and still keep Arab friendship? That is a point I find difficult to understand. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman would explain what he has in mind for our deployment in the Middle East?
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I think it was the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) who suggested that. I have not yet used the word "Israel" in my speech, although I may do so in a minute or two. That brings me to the Treaty with Iraq, about which I wanted to ask my right hon. Friend. Would it not be a sound idea to negotiate a fresh treaty with that country before the present one expires? Is there not the danger that if we do not do that a similar thing will happen in Iraq?
My solution to such a problem is this: that bases in other countries can only be maintained in a similar fashion to that which obtains here at the moment, where there are American bombers based by complete agreement with us. I do not

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believe that ever in the future can a base be maintained in any land whose people do not wish to have it. Therefore, I suggest to my right hon. Friend that he should consider the possibilities of negotiating treaties with Iraq, Jordan, and, if necessary, with Israel, on the basis that the Israelis might welcome such bases, particularly at Haifa, on a similar kind of understanding. That is the right deployment for us to follow in the Middle East.
Before I sit down, I want to say one word about this nationalism. In the Middle East and in Asia it is a new force which is raising its head, although it is one which is as old in history.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: As old as Moses.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Just like some hon. Members.
It is a force which has to be recognised. It is no use thinking it does not exist, or that it is only a flash in the pan. It is a searing, tearing force in many of these small States, and it has to be treated as such and, if possible, guided into right channels. We have to recognise it and sympathise with it.
The danger of this nationalism is that the moment small States achieve their independence they are in danger of losing the day they achieve it, because they immediately become a prey to larger nations such as the Soviet Union unless there is somebody near to give them a helping hand. It is vitally important for us in the Middle East, and elsewhere, through our diplomatic channels to impress this fact on these people, because one must realise that they are prone to think only of their own problems in their own area, being completely unaware of the dangers outside and in the distance. These facts must be brought home to them, and they should be made to realise that they risk losing the freedom for which they have fought so long unless they follow a proper course.
This old conception of Empire dies hard with us. People seem to forget that we have had three Empires, each one different from its predecessor. It is my firm opinion that we are on the threshold of the fifth British Empire and Commonwealth. Tremendous opportunities open before us if we handle these matters properly, but it will not be done on the old basis and on the old conceptions. We
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have the greatest constitution in the world, and it has been copied by many small and large nations. If these people are built up and brought to self-government in the proper time, they will comprise a part of a new Commonwealth far greater and more glorious than anything which has existed in the history of the world.
8.25 p.m.
Mr. M. Philips Price: This is one of the occasions when this House can be regarded as the sounding board of public opinion in the country, and as the debate has shown, opinion is not entirely on party lines. There are divisions on the Government side of the House and there are various shades of opinion on this. All the views that have been expressed are very sincerely held, and party shackles are somewhat less strong because we all feel that the issue at stake is very vital nationally and internationally.
The Government have performed an act of wisdom in what they have done. It must be painful to some hon. Members opposite to have to eat their own words. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has already quoted some of the things that were said by the Prime Minister on the occasion when the last Government were faced with a similar problem. On the other hand, there are some hon. Members opposite who take a reasonable and realistic view on this matter. It is a good thing that at least some of the Conservative Party show themselves ready to reconsider problems as they arise. This country has been saved from much internal trouble in the past because of the fact that the Right has always been ready to think out problems again.
We are faced with that situation today. I did not hear all the spech of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), but I heard most of the speech of the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), and both showed that neither realises the new world into which we are moving. However, the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) certainly does so, and is to be congratulated on the clear view he takes of public opinion in these Middle Eastern countries.

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There are not two groups in the world today—the group behind the Iron Curtain and the Western world—but three; those two, and the nationalist world of the Middle East and Southern Asia, which is rising because those who have been dominated by the Western nations for many generations have acquired freedom and a nationalist feeling. That feeling ran through Eastern and South-Eastern Europe during the greater part of the last century, but only now has it reached the Middle East and Southern Asia. That is the problem we are facing today.
There is an old Turkish saying to the effect that for the weak there are no friends. It is very true, and we must be strong and not ignore prestige. But we must also be wise, and this Agreement is an act of great wisdom which is more likely to safeguard the interests of peace in the Middle East than any other conceivable alternative. It is not a bad thing that it has taken some time to negotiate this Agreement. The Leader of the Opposition twitted the Government on having delayed so long, but I believe that the delay has made it possible to get the Egyptians to agree to something of vital Importance.
The Egyptians I have met were not inclined to agree two years age, or even a year ago, to the reactivisation of the Canal Zone if Turkey is attacked—but only if the Arab League is attacked. Last year I was in Turkey and spoke to many statesmen and editors there. They were extremely worried about the situation because they felt that they might be left out on a limb and let down. I believe the Egyptians have only recently come round to this point of view, and therefore the delay has been of value and I am glad that the Government have succeeded in getting the agreement.
Turkey is the key point for the defence of the Middle East. In this age of atomic warfare it is unwise to concentrate large supplies and forces in one place. Another point to remember is that in the last war the enemy came across North Africa from the West, when the Suez Canal base was a good deal nearer the area of danger than it would be if the enemy came from the North, across the highlands of Kurdistan to the plains of Mesopotamia or into the plateau of Eastern Anatolia. So there is a great deal to be said for
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having our defence bases farther north and far more dispersed, and while it is a good thing that the Government have succeeded in getting agreement to the reactivisation of the Canal Zone, it should be by no means the only base used for the defence of the Middle East.
Of course there is Cyprus, about which we have had some discussion in the last 24 hours. Whatever is the political future of that island, it certainly ought to be a defence base; whether for our Forces alone or N.A.T.O. forces is a matter for the future to decide. In Turkey, however, bases are already being developed. Last year I made a point of visiting the port of Iskanderun in South-East Turkey, which is already becoming an important base for supplies, I also visited a naval station which is being developed by N.A.T.O. Turkey, with that wisdom which goes with long experience of government, realises that she cannot defend herself alone. She has never been able to defend herself alone against Russia but has always needed assistance throughout the course of her history, and more so during the last 50 years, from other Powers against the overwhelming power in the North.
Turkey knows more about Russia and the Russian danger than any country of either Europe or Asia. Therefore she has realised that she must pool her defence resources with the Powers of the West, and there is no difficulty about having defence forces on her territory. She is making no difficulty about N.A.T.O. bases, either inland as airfields or on the coast as naval stations.
Turkey prefers to be a junior partner in a sound Western alliance than a senior partner in a weak league of Middle Eastern States. There is, however, one weakness in this Agreement which might lead to trouble. The "Manchester Guardian" referred to it in a leading article yesterday. There is no provision for Persia. Can the Canal Zone be reactivated in the event of trouble there? Apparently the Egyptians have held out against it and we have not pressed it any further.
I know the position of Persia only too well. The Persians are always people who sit on the fence, and they will probably try to do that as long as possible. I can well understand it. They are perhaps

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too near the source of danger and, unlike the Turks, they have not a strong military tradition as far as the central Government is concerned. Indeed, they have the very opposite.
On the other hand, suppose Persia were attacked by Russia and the Russian force was coming down through North-West Persia towards Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The only way to defend Persia would be for a Turkish military force, backed by Western air forces, to intervene on the right flank of the Russian force. Would that be possible? Would it be still possible to reactivate the Canal Zone in a situation of that kind? It appears not. We should bear in mind that a situation of that kind might arise and we should try to see if later it is possible to get the Egyptians to agree to something of this kind.
There is another point of importance. I do not want to consider only military matters. I entirely agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing that one has to consider questions of morale and prestige and matters which are not entirely material or strategic. I feel that this Agreement will result in the Egyptian ascendancy over the Arab League going. Up to now, Egypt has acquired an ascendancy over the Arab States because they all felt that they had to support Egypt against us on the question of the Suez Canal. Once this is out of the way I believe that Egypt will lose that dominant position which she has had up to now and that Iraq who, along with Jordan, is potentially the most friendly of the Arab States, will be much more ready to take part in a defence system for the Middle East.
Until this Agreement was reached, the most important event of the last year in the Middle East has been the signing of the Turkey-Pakistan Pact of Friendship and Co-operation which may lead to something further. The question of Iraq joining it might be raised. I do not think that Iraq would have considered that until the Canal question was out of the way. Now that it is out of the way there is a very good chance that that will happen. I do think also it is desirable, as the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said, to consider our future relations with Iraq and to come to new treaty relations with her,
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particularly concerning the air bases we have in that country. I know the internal situation in Iraq is a little uncertain at present, but we must hope that in the course of the next few weeks—or at any rate the next few months—the situation will clarify itself and become sounder.
I know that some of my hon. Friends are concerned about what will happen to Israel when we leave the Canal Zone. I can only agree with the Foreign Secretary who said yesterday that the best defence of Israel will be friendship between Egypt and the Western Powers, particularly ourselves. I believe now that this problem is out of the way and Egypt knows there is this tripartite agreement, by which she is bound to leave Israel alone, that is the best defence Israel can possibly have.
I think we all agree in this House that one of the problems is to try to bring about today in the Middle East an understanding between Israel and the Arab States, although many of us—including myself—have much regretted the way in which the State of Israel came into existence and thoroughly understand and sympathise with the feelings and bitterness of the Arab States in that connection. The Foreign Secretary has done a great work in getting this Agreement for which all who want to see peace in the Middle East will thank him. It is for that reason that I hope the House tonight gives this Agreement its full support.
8.42 p.m.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) has been talking about Turkey. He knows a great many things about Turkey. I also hope, after a visit there this summer, to know a few things about it. At present I only know one—that they do not want us to get out of Egypt.
The Secretary of State for War asked those of us who disagree with the policy of Her Majesty's Government to consider well whether we should not be silent in future once this Agreement has been arrived at. Of course, that is a demand which always has some force. When one is preparing opposition to a measure there is always some limit beyond which one cannot go if that opposition is not successful. On this issue of Egypt, although it may be not on the wider themes of foreign policy behind Egypt, my opposition

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extends to the Division Lobby tonight and not beyond it.
I have no intention of going down to my constituency during the Recess, perhaps finding some troops who have been flown back from the Middle East as a result of this Agreement, and telling them that they must go back to where they were before. I have no intention of going to Egypt—as I hope to go later in the Recess—and machinating against Her Majesty's Government, or the Government of Egypt, as a result of this Agreement. Once it has been done it has been done. Faithless and unwise though it is to have done it, we shall have to see what we can do to make something workable, understandable, real, politic and useful out of it for the cause of British policy afterwards.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War said that the only solution he knew about which had come from this quarter of the House was one which was not tenable. He was referring to the solution which my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) have adumbrated in previous debates of maintaining a force of, as my right hon. and gallant Friend described it, a division or two brigade groups or, as the Secretary of State for War described it today, a force of 15,000, 20,000 or 25,000 men in the Canal Zone.
The Secretary of State said that that was impossible. It is only impossible on the basis of the existing situation without an agreement, just as the situation of the corps of civilian technicians left alone at the base would be impossible without an agreement, and may be is impossible now or will be impossible with an agreement; that is what we fear. But what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and Her Majesty's Government have never understood about the solution to the situation which we on our side of the House offer is that it is a solution based upon agreement with Egypt—the retention of a force sufficient to give us a strategic reserve, sufficient to maintain the ports and the airfields, with the agreement of Egypt.
At no time have Her Majesty's Government gone to the Egyptian Government and said, "We want an agreement to maintain such a force," and it is no use
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the Secretary of State for War talking in terms of strategy and in military terms, because the answer to our question is not to be found in military terms; it is entirely in political terms. That demand or request to Egypt has never been made, and it is because it has never been made that we are in the situation that we are in today.
I say only a few words in passing about the remarks of the Secretary of State for War about the need for a strategic reserve. I do not put myself forward as a judge of military matters by any means, but I should have thought that if we want a strategic reserve we want it in the area where it may have to be used. Is Aldershot such an area? We have had trouble in British Guiana. We had, I believe, to mobilise part of Her Majesty's personal guard to deal with a situation in Bermuda.
But it is not in the N.A.T.O. area, where Britain is the centre and fulcrum, that a central reserve is needed. From what we can see about foreign policy needs all over the world these needs show that the place for a strategic reserve is in that vital pivot of world power which we have always understood the Middle East to be and it will remain there so far as we can see.
Mr. Paget rose—
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I am sorry, but I wish to be brief.
I feel I must say something about the hydrogen bomb argument. I shall not repeat what has been said so very cogently by my right hon. and hon. Friends. Some very clear, definite and hard things have been said in the House today, and I think usefully said. For my part, I am in the most appalling mental dilemma about the outlook of the Prime Minister today upon this subject. The Prime Minister has been telling us, in a voice reverberating with emotion, for the last few weeks and months, about this terrible danger of the hydrogen bomb. I am sure that it is a terrible danger.
But it seems to me that there is an equally terrible dichotomy between the political and military extensions of the fears of the Prime Minister. In the debate on the Address last November, and in the recent debate on the hydrogen bomb, the Prime Minister was saying to

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us that perhaps, by the creation of the hydrogen bomb, a tremendous era of peace to mankind would come, because no one would dare to use it. He talked of the consequences in prosperity and the rejuvenation of nations and of the building up of hopes.
All this has gone along with the sea-change in his thinking on foreign policy which began with that great watershed speech of 11th May, 1953; and after which we have had—not "appeasement." because that word has sinister connotations—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Realism.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Realism, if the hon. Gentleman likes—pacification; the lowering of tension; ending in the accepted policy of co-existence with the Communist world which now rules the day.
But when it comes down to this debate on Egypt, we are told that the consequences of the hydrogen bomb are so appalling that we must move out of a vital base in the Canal Zone. What is the message to Russia, or to the Communist world, in that? The message must be, "The Western world is trying to make peace with you diplomatically in the high councils of the nations; but, on the other hand, they are making secret preparations behind the scenes to get out from vulnerable existing bases and move further forward against you." At the appropriate time I should like to have a full explanation of this dichotomy of thinking, because it puzzles me. It must present a two-faced attitude to the Communist world, who will not be slow to take it up, and I do not believe that it is giving to the people of this country the service which they should be given.
On other grounds, I fully accept the view of my right hon. and hon. Friends that the hydrogen bomb argument has been dragged in at the last minute in order to give speciosity, plausibility, to this new desire to clear out of the Middle East. [HON. MEMBERS: "Speciosity"?] "Speciousness," I think, is a better word, although I think that "speciosity" is to be found in the dictionary.
I have only one other thing to say, because I have no desire whatever to waste time repeating the most powerful arguments which have already been
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advanced in this debate. I wish to refer to what my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East and my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North stressed in sombre, but real notes towards the end of their speeches. This to me—as regards the heritage of the British Empire, the prestige of Britain and our influence throughout the world as a great Christian force for peace and good will—is a more lowering cloud even than the atomic cloud. It is not a subject one can enlarge upon so late in the evening; but it is represented to me by a coherent series of decisions made by the United Nations originated for their own purposes by the United States and originated, alas, even by ourselves.
Since the First World War, a great many people have ceased to think in national terms, in imperial terms, in British terms. They have transferred their thinking to a new concept of international government. They have erected this as a kind of godhead which is sent to judge us and to judge other nations as to how we should behave. What we in this country have failed to do is to realise that at all times we are part and parcel of that United Nations and that every decision made in it reflects our own will and should be made according to our own standing and our own beliefs.
If we accept the automatic godhead of the United Nations while other nations inside it, like the United States and Russia, do not accept it, then perforce we must see our world power and influence reduced. Experience since the war is that the United States of America have largely used the United Nations as an instrument of their policy. There it is, sitting firmly in New York where my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, wisely or unwisely, placed it at the end of the war. The Americans have not hesitated to use it for their own purpose.
Russia, by contrast, has used the veto. That is equally effective to maintain the interests of Russia. But if we neither use the veto in our own interests nor the machinery of the United Nations in our own interests, then we must inevitably sink as a world Power, so that our situation becomes worse than if we had pursued the ways of the old diplomacy.
We dared not take this issue of Egypt to the United Nations. My hon. and

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gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) said just now that we might take it to the United Nations and lose. I will not deal with the argument, but I cite it as an example. I echo the words of my hon. Friend who said that he believed that this country has to determine upon a new path of policy. We have to realise that we have reached the nadir of our imperial fortunes, of our power to influence events in a sense equal to the opportunites of our great Christian nation. We have to determine that. Let this be the very night when a new policy begins. From now on we must move forward into an era of greater opportunities and greater hopes.
8.59 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Lee: I should imagine that from now on we shall not hear from hon. Gentlemen opposite that anti-Americanism has emanated only from the Labour benches. I do not think that I have ever heard a more virulent anti-American attack than the one we have just heard from the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke).
It is most important that the attitude of the House towards this Agreement should be known in the Middle East. For my part, I detested the attitude of the present Government when, in opposition, they attempted to infer that we were indulging in a policy of scuttle. My right hon. Friends, who did more to ensure world peace and the avoidance of a third world war when they gave freedom to India, were actuated by the same type of policy when they tried to negotiate a settlement on the Suez question. Unfortunately, in those days we had even the present Foreign Secretary talking about gunboats being necessary in order to bring Egypt to her senses. We also had the Prime Minister talking about policies of scuttle.
Although I think it is right and proper that the Labour Party should support the efforts of the Government now to get a settlement in the Middle East, it is also right that we should try to show the peoples there that, anyway, we are supporting the present policy in a consistent line flowing from the attitude which we adopted when we were the Government; in other words, that we do not adopt one
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attitude when we are the Government and another when we are the Opposition.
I wish—I agree with the noble Lord on this point—that the issue of the hydrogen bomb as a reason for leaving Suez had never been brought into the argument. It is important that we should seek to show that, although we recognise power arguments, we really are desirous of leaving peace and security in the Middle East and that this contribution of ours is designed to lead to that end and is not mere expediency and not merely a matter of being influenced by the new forces of atomic and hydrogen bombs.
We should seek to relate the position in Suez to what is happening not only in Egypt but throughout the African Continent. An hon. Member asked whether there could be a Communist revolution in Cairo. I do not know whether there could or not, but I do know that as long as there is a feeling throughout Africa that the white races are still niggardly in their approach to the problems of the coloured races, Communism can always triumph by its argument that the white peoples are still somewhat ashamed and defensive in their attitude to the new nationalism which is arising in various parts of the world.
I believe that the attitude of mind displayed by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), utterly sincerely held as I am sure it is—I pay him the compliment that I consider he made one of the most courageous speeches that I have ever heard in the House—is actuated by a desire to move backwards into the days of the British Raj in India, into an era in which he could feel that the coloured races could advance only through the charity of British Imperialism. I hope he will realise that if he and his hon. Friends are to continue to deploy such arguments we can never hope to influence the minds of men in China and other places, which may well determine the future peace of the world, because it can always be said by the Communists that we are merely retreating to a new position from which we shall attempt to re-assert our old supremacy over the so-called backward peoples.
It is important that the right message should go out from this House. It is important not only that an Agreement

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like this should be signed but that it should be seen that we sign it in good faith in the knowledge that by accepting such an Agreement we are demonstrating that the West has a new conception in its dealings with the peoples of the Middle East and, indeed, of the Far East.
We were born in the days when Suez meant something in the history books that we read. It is not easy for us to feel that we are now no longer the great world power which we once were. There is nothing to be ashamed of in wanting to feel that we are citizens of a first-class nation. Indeed, if in the days which lie immediately ahead this nation, which is not now the great material, physical Power it once was, can play the part which it alone can play by reason of its diplomacy and its vast experience in dealing with other people, therein resides the main hope of avoiding a third world war.
It is a country which, I believe, no matter what we may say about Toryism or Socialism, has accepted what the Minister of Housing and Local Government once described as the middle way, a country which recognises, as the adolescents in neither Moscow nor Washington have accepted, the idea that by living together in amity and using the great wealth which our scientists have given to us we can avoid a third world war. If that message can not go out from this House of Commons, then I think this world is doomed. On this question of the Suez Canal, I believe we have reached a testing point.
I applaud the attitude of the Foreign Secretary. It cannot be easy for the right hon. Gentleman in the knowledge that his policy is not acceptable in some parts of his own party, but I applaud his determination to go ahead with it. I hope, however, that he will agree with me that it is not only the act of coming out of the Suez that matters, but that it is also necessary to show to the peoples of these areas that this is merely the crystallisation, as it were, of the new thinking of this country, showing that we in Britain realise the great rôle which we still have to play in the world, and that we are giving an earnest of our sincerity in our approach to world politics.
From now on, I believe that we are taking the moral leadership of the whole world, because we are trying to show that
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the old smears that used to be made about "perfidious Albion" no longer apply, but that we believe that we have an even greater part to play in the future of the world than ever we have had in the past. Those who have talked of Britain as a decadent nation have gone; the Hitlers and those who sneered at us have gone. We now have an opportunity, and it may be the last, because we are all aware that if some madman once pulls the trigger in this atomic and hydrogen bomb age, then this island will be completely and utterly undefendable. It may well be that our best opportunity lies in this Agreement on Suez, because I think it can be shown that this party, at least, has accepted the fact that we are now living at the end of the colonial era, and entering an age in which the younger nations can see that it is no longer necessary for them to accept the yoke of supremacy from the white people; that, rather than attempting to retard them in their advance, we are doing everything possible to assist them in order that this nationalism of today may become the responsible internationalism of tomorrow.
I believe that it is for this House and for this great nation, which has done so much in the past to enlighten men's minds and improve their health and well-being, to take a lead which neither the United States nor any other nation has the power to take. I hope the House will try to show that this is not a niggardly retreat merely because it is inconvenient to stay in Suez, because of fear of the hydrogen bomb, but rather that we believe that the time has come when we accept the logic which is forced upon us by events in the second half of the 20th century. We should try to show that, without turning to the extremes of Communism or any other "isms," we have a rôle to play in the world towards the achievement of that peace which alone can come by understanding of the problems, and that that is the basic reason why we desire to renounce our own powers abroad, believing that the time has now come when the best interest of world peace may be served by a lead given in that direction.
9.10 p.m.
Mr. Fitzroy Maclean: I should like to say at once that I am not happy about the Agreement we are discussing. I have given my reasons, in a

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number of speeches, for disliking the idea of a British withdrawal from Suez and I put my name last year to the Motion which stood in the name of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), with other of my hon. Friends. I am not happy about the political or the psychological implications of the Agreement and I should like to be reassured more than we have been about the Government's plan for redeployment after evacuation.
On the other hand, the Agreement is, or soon will be, an accomplished fact, and, speaking for myself, I do not feel able to disregard the assurances that we have been given by the Government, to the effect that during the last six months or year the strategic situation has changed, and that in the present circumstances the course which the Government are taking is the only possible course. The Government, we must remember, have the benefit of the expert advice of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Foreign Office. They have in their possession a mass of information which we, as back benchers and private Members, do not possess.
I, for my part, would not venture to lay claim to greater foresight, courage or strategical understanding than the Prime Minister or his colleagues in the Government and if, after all that they have said in the past on this subject, they are prepared, in the light of the changed circumstances, to accept the present Agreement, then, so am I. If I were not I should take the courageous course which has been followed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke). I do not see that there is any course in between. That is why I shall vote, though reluctantly, for the Motion that stands in the name of the Prime Minister and his right hon. Friends.
9.13 p.m.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: I find myself in the embarrassing situation, at this time of the Session, of having to go into the Lobby in support of the Government. I looked hopefully at the Government benches when the Egyptian news came, as I thought there would be a rebellion on the Government side. In principle, I approve of rebellions in politics. I believe that I have been
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associated with most of the rebellions in this House since 1945.
Mr. S. N. Evans: What about mine?
Mr. Hughes: I was strongly attracted by what was said by the hon. Gentleman, but that was an occasion on which I did not approve of his conduct. I have listened very carefully to this debate and I have come to the conclusion that I cannot offer my services either as organising secretary or as a Teller. In fact, I find myself wholeheartedly on the side of the Prime Minister in this debate. Although there have been strictures on the Prime Minister from the back benches opposite, I must say that I have never so thoroughly agreed with the right hon. Gentleman as I do on this occasion.
The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) criticised the Prime Minister on the ground that he had introduced the argument of the hydrogen bomb. I do not know whether that argument was introduced as an afterthought or not, but it is entirely relevant to this debate and to the question of strategy and politics today.
I entirely approve of a Government which says that we cannot continue to have this base in Suez because it is obsolete in the atomic age. That is what the Prime Minister said, and I believe that in stressing the danger of the atomic and hydrogen bomb at the present time—even though it may seem to be slightly inconsistent in this debate—the right hon. Gentleman is doing an essential national and international service. He has pointed out that this is something which dominates everything else.
If the Suez Canal base is untenable in the atomic age, the dilemma arises, where are we to go? The decision of the Government to go to Cyprus has resulted in a great deal of criticism from this side of the House. I entirely agree with the statement made by an hon. Member opposite in the previous debate that in the atomic age a hydrogen bomb might explode over Cyprus. In that case, the answer would be, "Well, that was Cyprus." But that applies equally to other bases.
I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). He is opposed to the base going to Cyprus, but he is in favour of it going to Haifa.

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I do not believe that a base is likely to be acceptable to the people of Israel once they realise the implications of what it would mean, because the hon. Member for Coventry, East argued that the base was to be used against the Egyptians. If we put the base in Israel, that will be regarded by the military authorities as a potenial base in the strategy of war against Russia.
I believe that in the hydrogen bomb age any country which has bases which are liable to be regarded by the other side as offensive bases is in very serious danger indeed. We have now come to the conclusion that, whether we like it or not, from the point of view of realism, the Prime Minister has said the right thing, even though what he has said might be rather inconsistent with the polemics of this debate.
Though I may be embarrassing the Prime Minister and the Government, I must say that they are doing their duty towards the country and towards humanity by stressing the importance of the fact that the hydrogen bomb age has arrived, and that we must adapt our diplomacy, our strategy and our politics to this grim and terrible fact. Although I have been a frequent critic of the Government I believe that if they strive consistently and persistently for peace, whether in Egypt, in Indo-China or in Germany, they will represent the point of view of the ordinary people of this country.
I am glad to see that the Foreign Secretary is here. I was in Geneva during the first week of the recent conference there and met the Swiss photographer who took the first photograph of the assembled delegations. I asked what he thought were the prospects of the conference. He replied, "There are no prospects for such a conference where so many people so obviously hate each other." I am glad to see that that prophecy has not turned out to be corect, and to see the change which has come about in international tension.
By this further step of easing the tension in Egypt there is one fewer trouble spot. I believe that Her Majesty's Government, in their attitude towards Egypt and their decision to take a step—a reluctant step—away from the old policy of British imperialism and to face the fact that a new international policy needs
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to be worked out in the atom age, are more in line with the feeling of the country than are those hon. Gentlemen on the other side, sincere though they may be, who oppose them on this issue; and on this occasion we can only go into the Division Lobby in support of the policy of the Government.
9.22 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Eden): We have had a remarkable debate in which hon. Members on all sides of the House have spoken with vigour and conviction and in which there has been at times deep feeling. I should like to say, for my part, that though some of my hon. and right hon. Friends have certainly been severe in their strictures of the Government, I have on that account no hard feelings, because I know that they have deep conviction. At the same time, I must also tell the House that a Government which has to face issues of this kind has to face them in the light of the realities and of the existing alternatives, and carefully though I have listened to this debate, I have not yet been able to find any practical alternative to the course which Her Majesty's advisers now submit to this House.
I am attempting to delay a little because I would like the Leader of the Opposition to be present. Perhaps feeling a little in holiday mood, he was extremely severe in his strictures on the Government. He was very severe in regard to our attitude in Opposition for those six years. According to him, our behaviour was in all respects unworthy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] That is all right, but that does not excuse the Government of the day for what they did or did not do.
I see the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition is now in his place. He is so invariably courteous that I did not want to reply to his remarks until he was here. I was saying that he was severe to us in his strictures this afternoon, and particularly critical of our conduct in regard to these issues when we were in opposition. Though I think that probably he would admit—at any rate in a benign mood he would admit—that, generally speaking, in those years both at home and abroad we did try to support the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government of the time over

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a pretty wide field of endeavour, still the issue which we would really have to debate would be, not whether the Opposition did well or badly, but whether the Government of the day did well or badly. Although the right hon. Gentleman told us all that he had wanted to do, with a great deal of which I cordially agree, the fact remains that during those six years it was not possible to do it and that he failed to get the kind of agreement which he says ought to have been reached.
The fact remains that by the end of his period of office he was driven largely to reinforce our troops in Egypt, with the result that we had 80,000 men there, and when the present Government took office, as I do not think he will deny, we were left with a situation in which the civilian labour force was rapidly being withdrawn, the Egyptians had denounced the treaty—perhaps encouraged by what had happened in Persia—and a state of general turmoil existed. Nor will the right hon. Gentleman deny that the Persian situation which we inherited was not precisely a happy one. While strictures may be passed by him on the Opposition's behaviour at that time, it seems to me that in all fairness he must admit that the heritage left to us was not entirely enviable.
If we can get agreement thus far, I must also remind him of some other things. He let slip one or two sneers, particularly at the expense of Wimpey's—nothing was being left in Egypt, he said, except Wimpey's. I must give credit where credit is due and I must confess that the idea of the civilianisation of the base—if that is the right word—was not mine; it came from the right hon. Gentleman's proposals of April, 1951.
Mr. Attlee: I was not complaining about that. What I was complaining about was that there is a complete lack of defence in the area. There is nothing whatever of what we were trying to do—to get some defence organisation; there is a complete vacuum.
Mr. Eden: I am coming to the question of the vacuum; I have thought of that one, too. At the moment I am dealing with the civilianisation of the base, and I think it is not unfair to say that the right hon. Gentleman sneered at
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this a little and said that all that is left is Wimpey's. I am merely pointing out that the idea of Wimpey's is his. If hon. Members want me to read out the text, I am prepared to do so. I am quite ready to claim any ideas of which I have the originality, but I am also prepared to give the authorship to those to whom it belongs, and it is right in the circumstances to say that my attention was drawn to this passage from the proposals of April, 1951:
"The progressive civilianisation of the base which it is suggested should be completed by 1956"—
almost exactly to the month the date when we will complete. The passage continued:
"… essential British civilian personnel being introduced as military personnel are withdrawn."
I do not think it was very wise of the right hon. Gentleman to taunt us with having done what was in his proposals.
The right hon. Gentleman also spoke about the countries covered by the Treaty. The Bevin-Sidky agreement, with much of which I agree, contained one clause with which I do not personally agree which deals with the countries concerned. The countries concerned in the definition of that Treaty were those which were called "adjacent countries." With respect, I think that is a very bad definition to put in a Treaty. We want to know which are the adjacent countries to Egypt. I should have said, from my reading of the Bevin-Sidky proposals, that it is pretty clear that Turkey, for instance, would not have been covered by that agreement. I am not quarrelling with the right hon. Gentleman because the agreement was not reached but merely pointing the facts out to him, for he attacked us The present proposals, as far as that is concerned, are infinitely to be preferred to the Bevin-Sidky proposals. On that account, I do not think his attack was justified.
Let us consider this question of the vacuum. The right hon. Gentleman said that we were leaving a vacuum in the Middle East. I do not know whether he heard the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) which was an answer to that criticism better expressed than I could express it. The hon. Gentleman said he thought that the Leader of the

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Opposition was mistaken in criticising us for delaying the agreement so long because it is only recently, he said, that the Egyptians have been willing to include Turkey in that agreement—and Turkey is the vital defence factor in this agreement.
The hon. Gentleman went on to say something else with which I agree. He said that Cyprus is not enough. Of course it is not enough. We are not proposing to create a new base in Cyprus. Nothing of the kind is proposed. The main base, as the base for war, will remain in Egypt.
I hope and believe that under this Agreement there will be other forward bases, and I agree with some of the ideas of the Leader of the Opposition about that. He is absolutely right, but he will not expect me to describe where those forward bases will be or what arrangements may be made for them. It is somewhat ludicrous to accuse us of scuttle when, by the arrangements we are trying to make, we shall get nearer to the possible enemy than we were before. It seems to me a misuse of terms. I am not attacking the right hon. Gentleman.
Then there was this reference to a vacuum. There is no vacuum because, as a result of these arrangements, we shall be able to redeploy our forces and make them mobile to an extent that they have not been hitherto. I should have thought that, instead of the right hon. Gentleman's criticism, he would have endorsed what we are doing, because he would have been right if he had said that there is a vacuum in our Middle East, arrangements which exist at this very hour. There most certainly is, because if 80,000 men are unable to do anything effective, then that is a vacuum. If we get this Agreement and we are able to bring about the redeployment I have mentioned, it will bring the vacuum to an end.
How, then, shall we redeploy our forces? As my right hon. Friend said, we will bring part of these forces home to form a strategic reserve. To base our forces here does not mean they are not in any sense available to the Middle East or to any other part of the world. We have to remember the increasing mobility of our forces by air and other means. We have to adapt our minds more and more
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to the conception that countries, wherever they are, do not like to have foreign troops on their soil. Western countries tolerate it more easily than those where nationalism has been recently resurgent. No nation likes it, and more and more we shall have to base ourselves upon our own strategic reserve here and our ability to fly it to whatever quarter it is needed.
That is the conception behind this Agreement, especially when we add to it the treaty which we have made with Libya, for which the late Mr. Ernest Bevin worked very hard and for which I certainly have no desire to take the credit, but which we have signed and ratified. Under it our forces are in Libya and they can be increased. When we remember the possibilities of redeployment there and also the possibilities of increasing our forces in Jordan and elsewhere, and when we take into account our Air Force in Aden, we can see the pattern of redeployment which will add to our mobility, and, as I maintain, add enormously to our strength.
Now let me deal with some of the criticisms of this document. I would ask some of my hon. Friends to consider what would happen in 1956 if they were successful in their appeal tonight and if the House did not approve these decisions. In 1956 we could renew the treaty with Egypt as it is now, and if agreement was not reached then we would have to go to the League of Nations—I suppose it is the United Nations now—or to arbitration. Well, of course, we could wait until 1956 and base ourselves on those articles of the Treaty of 1936 which provide for a continuing alliance, but does anybody in this House really suppose that, if we waited until 1956, and went to arbitration then, we could hope to get the rights and facilities of the 1936 Treaty exactly as they had been in 1936, with the Egyptians strongly resisting them at every point? I think that some of my right hon. and hon. Friends are under a misconception in respect of the 1936 Treaty—which I well remember, for I signed it—and the conditions at that time.
The 1936 Treaty allowed us to station troops in Egypt in order to fulfil an Anglo-Egyptian alliance for the joint defence of the Canal. That was the purpose of that Treaty. We would have no chance whatever of going to international arbitration and saying, "Instead

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of doing that, we are now going to maintain 80,000 troops in Egypt to prevent the Egyptians from doing whatever they want to do." The case would be utterly indefensible and my noble Friend would have to use the veto, not once but almost every day.
What would be the position if we did not reach an agreement? I do beg my right hon. and hon. Friends once again to face this, and I will face it as fairly as I can. First, no redeployment of any kind would be possible. The 80,000 troops would remain in Egypt and probably there would be a clamour for their reinforcement if conditions grew worse in the great cities. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] Does my hon. Friend who says "nonsense" not remember that two years ago, when my right hon. Friend was on the high seas, I had the responsibility, when the riots threatened in Cairo and it seemed likely that our forces would have to march into Cairo to save the white population of that city? If my hon. Friends think that is a task which could be carried out by small forces, they are living in a world of illusion.
I think we are all agreed about this. Only one alternative has been given to us today, so far as I can understand, and that is that we should reduce the figure. My right hon. and gallant Friend said, I think, two brigades or something of that order; that is to say, something within the actual treaty limits of 1936. I am not clear at all about what the value of that arrangement could be. If it is intended that those two brigades are to defend a restricted base, such as we now contemplate creating, without the agreement of the Egyptian Government, then I must say frankly that two brigades would be completely useless and in a short time we would be back again to the 80,000 men.
If, on the other hand, they are not to guard the base but are to be there as a token force on the Canal, I would say that they are of no military or strategic value whatever and would simply be under the constant irritant of a continuing request that they should be reinforced.
Captain Waterhouse: I know that my right hon. Friend does not want to misrepresent me. I did not develop the whole subject today, but he will remember that when last I spoke I tried to make it clear that our view was that had there been a
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different approach to Egypt from the start, had we not been talking about evacuation from the start, we would not have arrived at this decision, and that if now—even now—we let it be clearly understood that we meant business and meant to stay there, we could come to an agreement with this or some other Government in Egypt which would allow us to maintain our forces and maintain our position.
Mr. Eden: That simply means that we should be able to reach an agreement with Egypt on the basis of our keeping troops in Egypt. I can only say, in reply to my right hon. and gallant Friend, that for years past, long before this Government came into office, the persistent position of the Egyptian Government has been that they would not make such an agreement. My right hon. and gallant Friend might be able to do that. I can only say that I do not believe it to be possible or diplomatically within the range of possibility. I do not think we ought to pretend to ourselves that these things are realisable when we must know in our hearts that they are not.
What would happen in 1956 if we had no arrangement? We would have no place, no establishments, no workshops, no possibility of going in again, no right of re-entry whatever and no assurance of the upkeep of the base. We would have the absolute assurance of the worst possible relations with Egypt and with all the other Arab countries, leading to rising tension.
How far does this Agreement, with its admitted shortcomings, meet our needs? For the first time we shall have installations and facilities in Egypt by agreement, because we had no such rights under the 1936 Treaty. What we need now is a working base and not a beleaguered garrison. Our ability to return in the event of crisis is a strengthening element which will enable us to defend our position in the Middle East, and the air transit rights are of real value.
I should like to answer further questions that have been asked by our critics. With regard to the claims question, we need not wait for the Agreement. We are trying to get them settled now and have begun to discuss them already with the Egyptian Government. Certainly we have not lost interest in the Sudan. We have

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said that the Sudan must decide its own future. Tonight I do not want to say harsh things—though I could do so—about the past in respect of agreements about the Sudan. I will only say that we in Britain are not opposed to friendship between Egypt and the Sudan. We want to have friendship ourselves both with Egypt and the Sudan, but we trust that all concerned will give to the Sudan a real opportunity to decide its own national life and future. All the reports we have had for the last few months show that there is an increasing determination in the Sudan to do just that. Beyond that, we have no claim which it would be within our rights to make.
My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East asked about redeployment to the south. There are no plans at present in that direction but it could happen, and one example is that some of the redeployment will consist in strengthening our air forces in Aden. My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) asked about the position of Turkey. Any armed attack on Turkey would bring this Agreement into operation. The situation in which Turkey came to be attacked would not affect that right.
Now I come to a heavy burden of criticism and I think the strongest case that can be made against the Agreement. That is in respect of the navigation of the Canal, the freedom of the Canal. Strong views have been expressed in this debate about that. In listening to some of the debate, one would almost have had the impression that traffic on the Canal has largely been held up. Actually the volume of traffic on the Canal has never been greater than it is at present. What we are discussing is a particular aspect of that traffic, and that is the strategic goods for Israel going through the Canal. It is to traffic in that respect that Egypt and the Arab States have been opposed.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition tried rightly to have international action to resolve this problem. We tried also. When the right hon. Gentleman was Prime Minister a resolution was passed by the United Nations which Egypt did not observe. We attempted to have action taken at the United Nations and Soviet Russia vetoed it. Although it is very hard to say how
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it can be best handled, in my view if this House wants to see an end to hostilities between Israel and the Arab States—and surely we must all want that—the only hope of doing so is that we should be able to create for ourselves better relations with both sides.
Everybody knows the history of our relations with the Arab States in recent years and that these have been largely bedevilled by the actions of Egypt, whose influence in this respect is very powerful. If we can improve our relations, it might be possible to do something to reduce in its turn tension between the Arab States and Israel and to try to obtain agreement and final peace. Truly, short of warlike action, I do not believe that it is possible to do anything effective in this particular situation unless we can reduce this tension between the Arab States and Israel.
That is the heart of this matter and every matter in the Middle East, of which the refugee problem is the most tragic of all. If I have any hope of this Agreement, it is that it will perhaps give us more opportunities to use our friendly influence to bring those together who should be on good terms instead of, as they are today, harshly staring at each other or sniping at each other across uncertain frontiers.
I have been asked about the position of the Commonwealth. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North said it was shocking to think that Ministers cannot say that they are in full agreement with the Commonwealth, although he rightly added that it was for the Commonwealth themselves to say that rather than for us. I have two messages here which might interest the House. Pakistan has been much mentioned in this debate and its attitude has been inquired about. I have had a telegram today from Sir Zafrulla Khan, known to this House as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who, after beginning with some nice observations which I will not read, goes on to say about the Agreement:
"I am sure this lays the foundation of firm friendship and beneficent co-operation between Egypt and its people and the other free democratic States in the service of all the peoples of these regions. The Agreement is a great achievement and an outstanding instance of the exercise of wise statesmanship and courageous handling of world issues on the part of Her Majesty's Government."

817
The Foreign Secretary of Australia, Mr. Casey, well known to us all, made a Press statement which has been published. I will not read the whole of it to the House, but I will read one paragraph:
"The Australian Government have watched the course of these negotiations closely and, like Britain, we have been sympathetic with Egypt's request for full sovereignty over its territory. At the same time, however, we have realised the inescapable realities of the situation resulting from Egypt's geographical position and the military needs of the free world. It is satisfactory that these two conflicting interests have now at length been reconciled."
Those are two Commonwealth countries: it will be for the others to express themselves in due course if they wish.
I will conclude with some observations, not only on the Heads of Agreement, but on the policy we are seeking to pursue in the Middle East. I do not think the only purpose is to hold to a particular position that one may have to hold to at that moment regardless of surrounding circumstances. I and Her Majesty's Government are as anxious as anyone that our influence throughout the Middle East shall continue and be increased. I thought that what the hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Lee) said in his speech about the influence we have in the world today was a fair and true observation. It is ludicrous to pretend that, as a result of this Agreement, our influence is going to be undermined throughout the Middle East. I do not believe that for one moment, and I will tell hon. Members why.
The conditions as they exist now in all these countries, their sentiments, their national feelings, bear no parallel to those of even 15, let alone 20, years ago. Yet I believe that, on a basis of friendship, we have an opportunity, on an entirely new basis—a new conception—to influence them and work with them. That is just what we have been trying to do. Will the House look for a moment at that picture?
Let us start with Persia. We hope before very long to conclude an agreement with Persia which will result in oil flowing again to the markets of the world, bringing her back revenue and prosperity and raising the standard of life of her people. That is what we want to do, not for selfish reasons but for Persia's sake as much as ours. It is to our interest that she should be prosperous and free
818
where she lies in that part of the Middle East. So I hope that will be fostered. If so, it will be a bit of rebuilding—I am not criticising the past, but it can be compared with what we inherited.
It is the same with Saudi Arabia. We have just concluded an agreement to arbitrate our differences there. In Libya we have reached this agreement. With Jordan we have our treaty. With Israel we want and shall maintain the friendliest relations we can establish. There is no question of us forgetting our obligations. That is why yesterday we reaffirmed the obligations which we have under the 1950 agreement, by which we stand and by which our allies have recently said they stand.
We realise all these responsibilities. Does not the House see that through all these things, and finally, most important of all, this agreement with Egypt, we shall be creating a new pattern of friendship throughout these Middle-Eastern regions? That is what we want to do. It is the only way we can hope to work with those countries. We cannot hope to work with them by putting 20,000, 30,000, 80,000 men there and telling them what to do. They simply will not do what they are told and that leads to endless trouble for us all.
I ask the House to consider the alternatives. We can go on as we are now until 1956, with a continued waste of manpower, immobilisation of what should be an essential part of our strategic reserve, with considerable hostility in Arab States and very probably an unlimited commitment if that leads, as it could have led, to serious anti-British outbreaks in many of these nations, all of them leading almost certainly to adverse arbitration decisions in 1956 and total evacuation without rights and without the advantages we have obtained by free consent, at any rate for the next seven years.
Set in this context, I suggest to the House that the prospect of a new and growing collaboration with our Arab friends is now opened up. We have heard a lot today in this debate about failure of will power. I do not believe that to face unpleasant realities in a changing world shows a failure of will power. I believe that to maintain the conditions there are as we would have them, and as they once were, and to behave as we could then, or did then, and

819
as some would have us do now, is to show a lack of adaptation to the realities of the present time.
I believe that this Agreement is militarily sound. It gives my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War a strategic reserve which they have not got and which they ought to have. I believe it is politically sound because it enables us to re-establish, I trust, conditions of friendship with all the Arab lands while not losing our friendship with Israel. Of course, it is true that no one can foresee how it will work out in direct terms of our relations with Egypt.
I want us in this House to say plainly to Egypt tonight that we are going to enter into this new era with a real determination to try to make it succeed. If they will do the same by us they will find full reciprocity and understanding here. It is in that spirit that I hope the House will affirm these heads of understanding, because if from the beginning we start to criticise and disbelieve those whose hands
we have shaken in the signing of these Heads of Agreement, we shall lose everything before we have begun.
I conclude by saying that I believe that this instrument, while not perfect, is one which can be made of service to the cause of stability in the Middle East. By that, too, it can serve our nation's interests and, wider still, the cause of peace.
Mr. Paget: The right hon. Gentleman has made an unanswerable case, but he has not told us why it has taken him three wasted years to do it.
Mr. Eden: I had hoped that I had made it plain, although I could not cover all the points, that it is only in the last few months—three months I think—that we have been able to obtain from the Egyptian Government the undertaking in respect of Turkey. Without that undertaking the agreement was not one which would have been satisfactory to this House.
Question put.
The House divided: Ayes, 257; Noes, 26.

Division No. 214.]

AYES

[9.55 p.m.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Cole, Norman

George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd

Alport, C. J. M.

Colegate, W. A.

Glover, D.

Amory, Rt. Hon. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Godber, J. B.

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

Arbuthnot, John

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Gough, C. F. H.

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Gower, H. R.

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.

Grimond, J.

Baldwin, A. E.

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Banks, Col. C.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Hare, Hon. J. H.

Barber, Anthony

Davidson, Viscountess

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Barlow, Sir John

Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfield)

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Do la Bère, Sir Rupert

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Deedes, W. F.

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)

Digby, S. Wingfield

Hay, John

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Bennett, William (Woodside)

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Donnelly, D. L.

Heath, Edward

Birch, Nigel

Doughty, C. J. A.

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Bishop, F. P.

Douglas-Hamilton, Lord Malcolm

Higgs, J. M. C.

Black, C. W.

Drayson, G. B.

Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)

Bossom, Sir A. C.

Dugdale, Rt. Hon. Sir T. (Richmond)

Holt, A. F.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Duthie, W. S.

Hope, Lord John

Boyle, Sir Edward

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.

Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry

Braine, B. R.

Eden, Rt. Hon. A.

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence

Braithwaite, Sir Gurney

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Brockway, A. F.

Erroll, F. J.

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Finlay, Graeme

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)

Fisher, Nigel

Hulbert, Wing Cdr. N. J.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F

Hurd, A. R.

Browne, Jack (Govan)

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)

Bullard, D. G.

Ford, Mrs. Patricia

Hutchison, James (Scotstoun)

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Forman, J. C.

Hylton-Foster, H. B. H

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Fort, R.

Iremonger, T. L.

Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Foster, John

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Campbell, Sir David

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Jennings, Sir Roland

Carmichael, J.

Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe & Lonsdale)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Carr, Robert

Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Cary, Sir Robert

Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D. (Pollok)

Jones, A. (Hall Green)

Channon, H.

Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Gammans, L. D.

Kaberry, D.

Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Keeling, Sir Edward

Lambert, Hon. G.

Nield, Basil (Chester)

Speir, R. M.

Lambton, Viscount

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Nugent, G. R. H.

Spens, Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)

Leather, E. H. C.

Nutting, Anthony

Stevens, Geoffrey

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Oakshott, H. D.

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Odey, G. W.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Lindsay, Martin

O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Storey, S.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)

Llewellyn, D. T.

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Studholme, H. G.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)

Summers, G. S.

Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.

Page, R. G.

Sutcliffe, Sir Harold

Longden, Gilbert

Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Low, A. R. W.

Perkins, Sir Robert

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)

Peto, Brig. C. H. M.

Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Peyton, J. W. W.

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

McCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S.

Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, W.)

McGovern, J.

Price, Henry (Lewisham, w.)

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.

McKibbin, A. J.

Profumo, J. D.

Tilney, John

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Raikes, Sir Victor

Turner, H. F. L.

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Ramsden, J. E.

Turton, R. H.

Maclean, Fitzroy

Redmayne, M.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Remnant, Hon. P.

Vane, W. M. F.

MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)

Renton, D. L. M.

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)

Ridsdale, J. E.

Vosper, D. F.

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir Reginald

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Roper, Sir Harold

Wall, Major Patrick

Marples, A. E.

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)

Russell, R. S.

Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

Maudling, R.

Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.

Watkinson, H. A.

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Webbe, Sir H. (London & Westminster)

Medlicott, Brig. F.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Wellwood, W.

Molson, A. H. E.

Scott, R. Donald

Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Moore, Sir Thomas

Shepherd, William

Wills, G.

Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Neave, Airey

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Nicholls, Harmar

Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Nicholson, Geoffrey (Farnham)

Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn and

Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)

Soames, Capt. C.

Sir Cedric Drewe.

NOES

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.

Powell, J. Enoch

Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)

Kerby, Capt, H. B.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Crouch, R. F.

Kerr, H. W.

Teeling, W.

Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)

Fell, A.

Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Graham, Sir Fergus

Maude, Angus

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Mellor, Sir John

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Sir Robert Grimston and

Horobin, I. M.

Pitman, I. J.

Sir Patrick Donner.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House approves the heads of agreement initialled in Cairo on 27th July between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL
  Considered in Committee, and reported, without Amendment.
  Motion made, and Question proposed. "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

ANGLO-BRAZILIAN TRADE
10.9 p.m.
Mr. John Hynd: I wish to discuss a subject tonight in which, I am afraid, a great deal of political interest has not been shown lately, and to which a little time might be devoted now.
There has been a great deal of talk in political circles in this and other countries about the need for the development of trade with the East. Generally, that does not include Japan; Japan is not a Communist country, and, therefore, there does not seem to be a great deal of interest in trade with her.
I want to talk about another non-Communist country. I want to talk about the need to concern ourselves a little with West-West rather than East-West trade. I want to talk particularly about Brazil.
Brazil is a country in respect of which trade difficulties with this country are in some ways the same as those which exist between Great Britain and China, but they are not complicated by such questions as strategic considerations. In the last two years, something has gone wrong with trade between this country and Brazil, as was pointed out in a very important and striking article in "The Times" of 17th February this year. Three years ago, Brazil was one of our best markets in South America. In 1951, only 14 countries offered better markets for British goods than did Brazil. "The Times" drew attention to the situation in these words:
"Never before in the history of Anglo-Brazilian relations has the trading atmosphere been as dark as it is today … The Anglo-Brazilian Payments Agreement has soured relations all the more, and the recent visit of Mr. Heathcoat Amory, Minister of State at the Board of Trade, did little to sweeten the air."
It behoves us to ask ourselves why we have got into this serious state in our
824
trading relations with Brazil, when only a few years ago our reputation and trading connections stood higher, possibly, than they did in any Western European country.
First, the House ought to know what is the picture of trade relations with Brazil. In 1951, we imported from Brazil £66 million worth of goods; by 1953, our imports had fallen to £29 million worth. We exported to Brazil in 1951 £55 million worth, and in 1953 only £17 million worth. These figures are sufficient, without going into the tables year by year, to indicate how serious was the drop in those two years.
The case is pretty well-known to everybody. It is that of the commercial debts that exist between Brazil and this country. The House knows that this commercial debt position arose from a quite unexpected and unprecedented situation that occurred in 1950, when Brazil, like many other South American countries, was persuaded that there was a great possibility of war within the next few months, the result being that there was a considerable amount of panic buying and sterling resources were exhausted. This was followed, when the war scare disappeared, by inflation, and many Brazilian goods were driven from the markets of the world.
The immediate result from our point of view was seen in the fall in cotton purchases from £32 million in 1951 to £1 million in 1952. Total sterling debts at that time developed to about £65 million or £67 million. I understand that the position was not made any better by the fact that the Export Credits Guarantee Department decided to suspend cover on Brazilian trade. The immediate result of that was the situation which was reported in "The Times" article, to which I have already referred. Our trade relations with Brazil are worse than they have ever been.
I must confess that my attention and interest was drawn to this matter by the reports which began to appear in the Press followng "The Times" article, and representations made to me by some of the steel firms in Sheffield which are interested in Brazilian trade. I should like to quote a few lines from a report which was circulated by the managing director of one important Sheffield steel firm only

825
a few months ago, following a visit to South America in March and April of this year, in which he tried to develop trade between Brazil and the Sheffield steel industry. He said:
"This market"—
Brazil—
"is closed to British steel and likely to be for some time unless our policy alters … one of the largest importers … can easily take 100 tons of Sheffield steel per month."
He goes on:
"We called at the following Brazilian ports: Bahia, Rio, Santos. I walked the lengths of the docks at two of the ports, and part of the other. There were plenty of imports, agricultural machinery from U.S.A., machinery and parts from Germany, steel and tubes and pipes from Japan, wire from Belgium, etc., etc. At each port I asked if I could be shown any British material on the dockside—alas, no."
I know that this picture is true of other places, but I am dealing with Brazil, which may be even worse than other places.
What is happening is shown by the three extracts from the report of the Sheffield director, to which I have referred. This report can be elaborated, for example, by a report in the American "Journal of Commerce" dated May, 1954, to show how our competitors are cashing in on the situation. This report, which is not directed to Britain, says
"Japanese and Brazilian officials are negotiating the renewal of the commercial agreement between the two nations that will regulate exchange of goods expected to reach a record value of more than 100 million dollars both ways this year. … Japanese purchases of Brazilian raw materials and goods reached the astonishing level of 55 million dollars in 1953, moving Japan up from 14th to seventh among the South American nation's world customers.
At the same time, it became apparent by the end of 1953 that Japan would obtain a much larger slice of Brazil's total imports this year than it did during 1953."
The article concludes:
"Japan … will … continue to ship to the South American country finished textiles, raw silk, chemicals, machinery, iron-steel products, coastal craft, and sundries."
That is the position of trade between Brazil and Japan, and I have no objection to it. If Japan can get the markets she is as much entitled to them as is anybody else. However, we have to consider our own position and to get our share of the markets if we can. It is not only a matter of Japan. The same thing can be said about other countries. The article in "The Times" drew attention to the fact that Germany is cashing
826
in very much on this market and that, for example, British cars are off the market altogether.
Need this situation go on indefinitely? It is true that we have a debt problem, but so have other countries. I understand that Germany had a very much heavier debt in Brazil than we did. Germany has been in the market for only two years and now has a credit of some £90 million, and has not ceased to give credit to Brazil, realising that Brazil is a developing country and a fairly safe investment. As a result, her exports are soaring in that country.
There has been a slight improvement in recent months. I saw reports in some of the Brazilian commercial magazines, such as the Chamber of Commerce Magazine, that English Electric has recently sold locomotives to Brazil worth about £7 million, but I am also told that there was a long and bitter struggle before the company could get cover for that money. I believe that a certain amount of television equipment is going to Brazil from this country, which is all to the good. I understand that the result, up to date, is that our imports from Brazil have gone up from £29 million in 1953 to £18 million for the first six months of this year. Of course, that does not mean that our imports this year will amount to £36 million, but it does represent an increase.
What is important is not just the total figures. Assuming that we take imports at £36 million based on the first six months of the year—ignoring the seasonal changes which take place in trade—as against the £29 million of last year, that looks good; but when one takes the figure in relation to the existing debt and looks at the arithmetic of the thing, it does not look so good. If we take the total amount which we import from Brazil and which we pay for in sterling, including the oil from the sterling countries, that gives Brazil £36 million to play with and with which to pay for goods from this country and the sterling area.
We have a fixed agreement for £15 million for payment with the sterling area, and then there is the question of the debt payment which is likely to amount to some £12 million. On top of that, we have, of course, the invisibles, including the interest on the debt, which is estimated at £5 million. This accounts for

827
£32 million out of the £36 million, leaving £4 million for current purchases from this country for the whole year.
I believe that the Bank of Brazil has only just released £1 million, which means that £3 million remain in the kitty for the rest of the year. What kind of prospects are there for any substantial development of trade or for the cutting in on markets which have been so considerably exploited by our competitors, so long as that situation exists? On 25th May, I asked the President of the Board of Trade, in a Question, what the debt position was and what reduction had been achieved under the 1953 Agreement. He replied:
"Commercial debts owed by Brazil to the United Kingdom have been reduced by about £20 million since October last and now stand at approximately £40 million."
That is a reduction of roughly one-third of the total in six months. He added:
"It is not to be expected that normal trade will be fully restored with Brazil so long as Brazil is in balance of payments difficulties."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th May, 1954; Vol. 528, c. 17.]
I now want to examine why it is not possible, and whether, in fact, some modification of the position cannot be made, because here we have a credit—that of the £60 million commercial debt, of which, in the first six months of the Agreement, Brazil has repaid £20 million due, I quite agree, to special considerations such as the borrowing of up to £10 million from the International Monetary Fund and the heavy cotton buying which took place at the end of 1953 which enabled Brazil to accumulate a sterling reserve. The fact is that, on top of that, Brazil is continuing to pay towards the reduction of this debt.
I understand that she paid £1 million this month, and on that basis it will take 5 or 6 years to repay the whole debt unless there is, for instance, some more heavy buying of cotton or an arrangement for spreading the debt. Does not the Minister think that, as Brazil has not only repaid a considerable portion of the debt in such a short period, but has shown evidence of wishing to clear off the remainder as speedily as possible by allocating a considerable amount of the very little sterling which she gets from exports to this country, we can consider making a bolder approach towards the
828
development of trade by giving a little more credit and by showing a little more confidence in that way?
Here, of course, the Export Credits Guarantee Department comes in. I do not want to develop a debate on that but I understood that that Department was set up for the purpose of encouraging and developing the export trade when the commitments were possibly too risky and too dangerous for private enterprise to undertake, or when private enterprise was unnecessarily hesitant. It seems, however, that the Export Credits Guarantee Department is developing into something like the ordinary commercial concern which is not prepared to look at anything in which there is not the prospect of an immediate and easy profit.
Is it not possible for that Department—which does make a profit I believe in a number of its transactions—to risk those profits? In this case I do not think there is much risk but where there appears to be risk, or where private enterprise is hesitant to undertake it, is it not possible for some of these profitable transactions to be transferred to secure an easing of the situation in several directions? I am no economist and I do not propose to analyse any of the proposals which I put before the Minister. I only put them to him in the interests of my constituents to see whether they have been considered and what the answers are.
Another proposal might be a long-term Government loan to cover the outstanding debt and so release the amount of sterling earned by Brazilian exports to this country which would develop imports by Brazil from this country. Another alternative might be to try, by some means or other to boost imports from Brazil, say this year, from a figure between the £36 million and £38 million which it seems likely to be to something like £45 million. I understand that if by some special boosting we raised the figure above its present rate Brazil would be prepared to consider repayment of her debt on a sliding scale from £6 million to £7 million or £7½ million.
Alternatively, would it be possible—in the light of developments since the 1953 Agreement, the amount paid off and the obvious willingness and determination of Brazil to pay off the rest—to make a new agreement spreading the instalments over a much longer period

829
and so releasing sterling during that period for the development of trade? Amongst a number of letters which I have received on this subject here is one which refers to one disturbing fact. In this letter I am told:
"… it is cheaper to buy Brazilian produce such as, for example, raw cocoa beans for shipment via the continent than for direct shipment to the United Kingdom. The reason for this is that, through the intervention of a dealer on the continent, Brazilian offers in 'Convention' dollars, say to Holland, can be switched into sterling which shows a considerable discount against offers in sterling from Brazil for direct shipment to the United Kingdom. The result of these operations is that the United Kingdom importers are paying continental countries, principally Holland, for Brazilian produce thereby helping those countries with their exports to Brazil and preventing Brazil from earning sterling."
That kind of thing is likely to develop unless we can find ways and means of encouraging direct trade between this country and Brazil rather than driving the Brazilians to these roundabout methods of getting into our markets.
I do not know how far the Government are responsible for the situation. I now find myself in the somewhat embarrassing position of suggesting that, because private enterprise does not seem able to face the position, the Government should intervene, so assisting private enterprise to make more profits—but there is not much point in going into that question. The fact is that we have a Conservative Government. We must rely on private enterprise. If private firms cannot do it we must face the alternative either of letting things slide or of the Government taking steps to enable the trade to develop.
Brazil is bigger in space than the United States. Its potentialities and untapped resources are probably greater even than those of the United States. In one journal recently I read that in the last 10 years there has been in Brazil a 100 per cent. increase in passenger train miles. That is comparatively big, but it can obviously go on increasing by 100 per cent, as the development of Brazil gains impetus in the modern world. Roads are being developed even more quickly than rail and there is therefore every reason for us to have the maximum confidence in Brazil and to take what in other countries—fully-developed countries—might be regarded as unusual risks in credit facilities.
830
I understand that Sir George Nelson, Chairman of The English Electric Company, Ltd., is in Brazil and has said that he is there with the full support of the British Government in order to improve trade. If he is there with the full support of the British Government, I want to ask the Government what that support represents and how Sir George Nelson will be assisted in any opportunities he may find for developing trade with Brazil. How will he be assisted—by Government action or, alternatively, by some other action; and if by some other action, what action? If he is there with the full support of the British Government, presumably the Government have something in mind to see that his work is not entirely useless.
I am not seeking to criticise the Government; I am asking for information. My constituency of Sheffield is largely dependent upon the steel industry and the steel products industry, for which there is a considerable potential market in Brazil, and we are very interested in this question. I have no doubt that the people of the Lancashire constituencies are also interested in it, because British textiles previously found a good market in Brazil and I understand that at the moment they find no market at all. Our textile industry can do with all the markets it can get. No doubt Binning-ham and other car-producing towns are equally interested.
I am therefore pleased to have had this opportunity of bringing this matter to the notice of the House in order to give the Minister a chance to reply fully to the points which I have made. I hope that he will be able to give us some positive assurance so that we are not left with the thought that Brazil, in which British enterprise, investment and trade have played such a large part, is now to slip through our hands and to find its way into the hands of Germany, Japan and our other competitors.
10.33 p.m.
Commander J. W. Maitland: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) for having raised this question. I little thought, when I arrived back from Brazil last night, that on my first day here there would be a debate on the very subject which I have been trying to study on

831
the spot during the last three weeks. That is not the only reason for my gratitude; I am also grateful because the debate gives me an opportunity to congratulate my right hon. Friend, who is to reply, on his new appointment. It must be almost a unique occasion when a Minister of Agriculture replies to a debate on trade with Brazil.
The hon. Member was right when he said that the problem arose from the fact that Brazil bought too heavily as a result of her fears about the outbreak of a world war after Korea. It has made the position astonishingly difficult. No one is more interested than I am in exports to Brazil, but the fact remains that those who have exported to Brazil want to be paid for their goods. The hon. Gentleman spoke of extending credits or loans, but we must realise that this country is not in a particularly happy position for extending loans and credits at the moment. We have not a very large surplus which we can afford to use for that purpose. There are many countries in the Empire which are desirous to take any opportunities in this direction which exist.
Having said that, I must say how much I sympathise with much of what the hon. Member said. Brazil is a country in which we have inherited wonderfully good relations. Apart from our traditional friendship which is a very real factor there is a tremendous feeling of real business friendship in Brazil today, but the brutal fact of sterling shortage remains and is extremely difficult to overcome. I should like to make one point about the question of export credit guarantees. The present system of obtaining sterling in Brazil, which is by auction under the Aranha system, means that when an importer or agent has obtained a licence and the necessary sterling to import goods from this country he creates a guarantee in himself. The great majority of exports from Great Britain to Brazil are guaranteed by the peculiar and interesting method that the Brazilians use to provide sterling credit to finance these operations.
I seriously ask my right hon. Friend to consider the question of extending these guarantees even further, though obviously he cannot give an answer in a debate at this late hour. This is a
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matter which deserves far greater consideration than we can give to it now. I hope that one day we shall have a full-dress debate on the important question of trade with Brazil. When one talks about trading with Brazil many people think only that one is talking about trade with one of the countries of South America, but the population of Brazil is rather more than that of the whole of the rest of South America put together and in size the country is larger than the United States.
Brazil has made a tremendous effort to pay off her debts and I think that the visit of the Minister of State, Board of Trade, had a successful issue. At the time it created a certain amount of despondency but after consideration I think that it was realised that the douche of cold water was necessary. When I was in Brazil I heard from many sides indications that people were ready to face the realities of the trade situation between Great Britain and Brazil.
Quite soon a deputation of exporters is coming to this country from Brazil. They will not be the official guests of the Government but it is vital that the Government should do their utmost to see that these people have every possible opportunity to meet their opposite numbers, the importers in this country. I am certain that when they arrive they will be ready to do their best to do business. I hope that this will prove a very satisfactory experiment. It is up to the Government to do all in their power to increase trade by increasing exports from Brazil to this country and I am confident that they will make the most of this opportunity.
10.38 p.m.
The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. Heathcoat Amory): I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), on probably the last occasion that I shall be addressing the House from this Box on behalf of the Board of Trade, for raising a subject which falls fairly and squarely in the field of overseas trade. Whether I shall do justice to it I do not know, because my mind is already being re-filled with subjects like eggs, foot and mouth disease and myxomatosis. I fully understand the hon. Member's concern at the low level of trade between this country and Brazil and I assure him that his

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concern is shared by Her Majesty's Government.
The hon. Member will agree that the basic reason is Brazil's shortage of sterling. The hon. Member has already referred to some of the difficulties and I can illustrate them. In 1951 our imports from Brazil amounted to £66 million. In 1952 they had fallen to £15 million. In 1953 they had risen again to £27 million. This year they are running at the rate of £36 million. That fits in fairly well with the figures quoted by the hon. Gentleman. I am afraid that we must acknowledge that the figure for 1951 was abnormal. It reflected abnormal purchases of cotton.
The point I want to make is that Brazil is perfectly free to earn sterling not only by selling to the United Kingdom but by selling in almost any other country in the non-dollar world. As a corollary to that, she is not only free to earn sterling in those areas but is also free to spend her sterling in those countries, and we can have no objection to her doing that.
Our imports from Brazil have traditionally been cotton—most important, coffee, cocoa, softwood, iron ore, nuts and bananas. In case we feel too depressed about this, it is encouraging that our imports from Brazil are showing an upward trend now, as I hoped they would when I was over there six months ago. It is also interesting that last year Brazil succeeded in earning £6½ million in sterling through sales of coffee in countries other than the United Kingdom.
The hon. Gentleman implied that we were doing nothing to help Brazil in a positive sense, but we are doing something in a positive sense in that we have opened our markets here to the exports of Brazil, making them almost entirely free of restrictions. If the hon. Gentleman says that that is a rather negative thing to do—
Mr. J. Hynd: Does that apply equally to cotton?
Mr. Amory: Yes, it applies to cotton and all the main exports of Brazil except bananas. Bananas are subject to a quota, but after June next year they will also be on open general licence. When we look round the world and see how few countries that applies to, surely we can say that that is a positive act to assist Brazil.
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I turn now to the question of commercial debts. As the hon. Gentleman said, these amounted to about £60 million, though at their peak they rose to £70 million. Today they are something under £40 million. They began piling up, in a rather dangerous way by the latter part of 1952.
The debt agreement arrived at last year provided for an initial repayment of £10 million. As the hon. Gentleman said, this was going to be raised by Brazil by a loan from the International Monetary Fund. Then there was to be an annual payment, not of £12 million but of £6 million, which could be increased on a sliding scale if Brazil's earnings of sterling exceeded the estimate of that time. The figure is £6 million or better, but I do not think that we ever visualised anything like £12 million.
At the time the debt settlement was arrived at the criticism against Her Majesty's Government was not that the terms were too severe but that the repayment was spread over too long a period. Now we are meeting the kind of criticism which the hon. Gentleman has mentioned—that we have spread the repayments, in agreement with the Brazilian authorities, over too short a period. However, when I look at it—I have looked at it on very many occasions—it seems to me to be about right on the whole.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned an estimated earning of £30 million to £35 million sterling. That is a reasonable estimate, but out of it only £6 million is allocated, as it were, for debt repayment. I do not think that that is an unreasonable proportion. I am told that we should not have agreed to the Brazilians spending £15 million on oil, but they would have liked to have spent more. They are spending more, but are making up the difference in dollars. Brazil is short not only of sterling, but of dollars, and I think in all the circumstances that the settlement of the commercial arrears is not far wrong.
I should like to make the point, because sometimes one hears the statement that very substantial proportions of the arrears were covered by the Export Credits Guarantee Department for which the Government, indirectly through that Department, were responsible, though they were less than half.

835
It is sometimes suggested that the Government should have taken over the debts. That was considered, but the Government came to the conclusion that it would not be reasonable in all the circumstances. If the terms of the payment had been spread over a lesser period it would not have helped Brazil; it might have helped the creditors, but the only way we could help Brazil was to spread it over a longer period.
But our resources are not unlimited. We have from all over the world and from the Commonwealth many demands for loans and investments. What we can afford to do must be related to the surplus we can earn on current trading. In addition we have to consider the claims of one country as against another. If we found ourselves unable, as we did, to spread the repayment over a much longer period, that was because our resources were insufficient. We are very appreciative of the way in which the Brazilian authorities have carried out the debt agreement in the last nine months. They seem to have set to work to carry it out scrupulously.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the German position. To the best of my knowledge the amount the Germans were owed in commercial arrears was not as large as ours. It was something less than 100 million dollars.
The hon. Gentleman also referred to the Brazilian import policy, and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horn-castle (Commander Maitland) also mentioned the auctioning of sterling. The currency available to the Brazilian authorities after paying for necessary imports is put to auction in different categories. Only £1.4 million sterling has been auctioned so far.
I want to say a few words about the E.C.G.D., because otherwise there might be a danger if I were to accept what the hon. Gentleman said. The Department is under a statutory obligation to pay its way, and it must operate on commercial lines. The hon. Gentleman said that he does not believe that it makes money. For 30 years it has just paid its way. In the last year or two, mainly because of the unfortunate situation in Brazil, it has got in the red. It is in the red now. There again it must have some regard to commercial considerations. It must
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operate, largely on the advice of the advisory committee of men skilled in finance and commerce.
Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Can my right hon. Friend tell the House the extent of our indebtedness through the system of E.C.G.D. in the Brazilian market? Is it not the case that if the advice had been taken of those best informed on these matters and the Government had taken action dictated not by political considerations but by commercial transactions the extent of that debt would not be nearly as great as it is today?
Mr. Amory: My hon. Friend brings a blush to my face because I must acknowledge that there is something in what he says. There is £16 million outstanding to E.C.G.D. in the case of Brazil, but there was a sum of £20 million to £25 million. It is true that our commercial advisers recommended us to stop earlier than we did, but, looking back, I cannot say that the Export Credits Guarantee Department could possibly have postponed withdrawing cover longer than it did. If it made a mistake it was that of continuing too long, and it may be that we could be criticised for having postponed re-opening cover unnecessarily long. But within a few months of the settlement of the debt and the initial payment under it, we have re-opened E.C.G.D. We may be condemned for not doing that sooner, but I hope not.
I should like to add that we have the situation continuously under review and we are hoping that gradually we shall be able to remove the restrictions, such as they are, that we have on E.C.G.D. cover. We did re-open cover only within limitations, but we shall consider the points that have been raised this evening in that connection. We look forward to the time when we shall be able to offer the same cover to Brazil as we do to other credit-worthy countries.
I want to say a few words about the Parliamentary delegation which has recently visited Brazil under the leadership of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle. I wish that there had been more time this evening to hear more about that visit from my hon. and gallant Friend and his colleagues on that delegation. Judging from the reports

837
which we have had from Brazil, the mission was a great success. The Brazilians liked my hon. and gallant Friend and his colleagues from both sides of the House. They did a good job. I have received reports about the visit from members of the delegation, and I should like to thank them for their help. I can assure hon. Members that we are giving them careful consideration, for we attach very great weight to what is said in those reports.
I should also like to refer to the visit which Sir George Nelson recently made to Brazil. We welcome that visit, for it is the kind of visit from our leading industrialists that we like to see. Sir George is a man of tremendous energy and experience, and we hope that many other people will follow his example.
We are delighted that the Brazilian Exporters Association are to send a trade delegation here in the Autumn to study the United Kingdom market for Brazilian exports. That seems to be an excellent thing to do, and it received our support directly we heard about it. Her Majesty's Government will do everything they possibly can to ensure that the delegation's visit will be fruitful from every point of view.
In conclusion, I should like to say that we share fully the hon. Member's concern about the low level of current trade with Brazil, but the key to the whole situation is somehow or other for Brazil to earn more sterling. We should do everything we can to promote and to foster an improvement in that respect, and to help and to promote the sale of Brazilian exports to this country.
As the hon. Gentleman said, the Government do not buy cotton, timber, cocoa, or other commodities. It depends on whether our importers find Brazilian products at the right price and of the right quality. We have every hope that we have passed the bottom and are on the upgrade. We are sincerely anxious to see the volume of trade rise to a better level, and I believe that it will. We agree that Brazil has tremendous potentialities. Her development is going rapidly ahead. Within our powers and the scope of our responsibility we will do all we can to help forward an improvement in the level of trade.

MOCK AUCTIONS
10.56 p.m.
Mr. Norman Dodds: We have had important debates today about Egypt and Brazil. It might seem presumptuous of me to raise what some people would consider the piffling matter of mock auctions. No matter how important the other debates were I claim that among the people of this country there is as much, if not greater, interest in mock auctions. This is largely because many have had experience of the swindling tactics of the mock auctioneer. It is 12 months since I raised this subject on an Adjournment debate. The Minister who replied then is to reply tonight.
I am well-informed about the activities of these mock auctioneers, both by the general public and by men who work, or worked, in this type of racket. My information is that this July there is much less activity by mock auctioneers than there was a year ago. I also know that many of them are marking time, and that if they could believe that the limelight would be taken from their activities they would be operating again. I ought to say, with respect to the remarks I have just made, that many of them have left their usual haunts in the large towns and seaside resorts and gone to small towns and villages where several days pass before the local people get to know their tactics and they are forced out.
What is remarkable is that the best pickings seem to be among Scottish people. Last year the biggest profits and easiest pickings were made at the Highland Games. A newspaper this week indicated that the Scottish visitors to a northern inland town were found to be easy pigeons for plucking. I wonder what has happened to the canny Scot, whom all of us knew to be loath to spend a penny if a halfpenny would do.
We cannot thank the Home Office for the improvement in the position in regard to mock auctions. I have been more than disgusted at the types of letter I have had from the Department, and I think that that disgust is shared by many. We have to thank the Press for the improvement. The Press has done a good deal to educate the public. For instance, the "Sunday Chronicle," the "Daily Herald," for the last few days "The Times" in its correspondence columns,

839
and the "News Chronicle"—all the daily papers, and many of the Sunday papers—have carried stories about mock auctions. Consequently many more people know about these things than knew of them 12 months ago.
We must give credit to the B.B.C. for the television show of two or three weeks ago that portrayed in a glaring fashion the swindling techniques of the mock auctioneer. The action of the Brighton Corporation in getting a Private Bill through the House has given splendid publicity to the matter and helped to pinpoint the evils of this trade. Quite modestly, I think that some of my activities have had more than a little interest for the general public in this connection. During the past 12 months some terrible threats have been made by mock auction people to me and to members of my family about what would happen. Four or five weeks ago Scotland Yard found a plot against myself and I was offered police protection. Of course, in these matters I am not asking the police to be a wet nurse. I think that it is a public duty to keep on exposing these mock auctions, and I hope that I shall have the health and strength to continue to do so as long as they operate.
What are the views of the Home Office about the B.B.C. television show? It surprised many people that there could be such a clear exposure of swindling technique. The Home Office must know about it. Do they agree with it? They must know whether it is desirable or undesirable. If it is undesirable, are these tactics within the law, and if they are, what is the Home Secretary going to do about seeing that these people are not operating within the law?
A week ago I gave notice of this matter so that we could expect an answer tonight. Do the Home Office think that the B.B.C. imagined these things and were unfair to the mock auctioneers? Many people would like to know the answer.
The B.B.C. exposed a technique that was easy to portray. They showed quite clearly that there was a confederate in the audience who was taking part in the bidding. Is that not unlawful? Many people will think that it is. There is a much deadlier technique than that, operated by the big circuits of mock
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auctioneers. They do not have a confederate in the audience. They believe there are dangers of blackmail in that, because even mock auctioneers fall out sometimes. The confederate may be stupid, or not too clever, and he has to be paid.
The modern technique is that goods which are never intended to go to the public are "planted." The auctioneer pretends to have accepted a bid from the audience that has never been made. The man in the front of the counter, while on his way through the crowd, having paused in the meantime to sell a pair of braces for 6d. or a pair of scissors for 1d., will produce notes himself for the expensive bid—collect the 6d. or 1d.—hand up cash to auctioneer—the goods never intended to be sold go behind to be wrapped up and appear at the next sale.
Is that not illegal? If it is, what is happening about it? I see it almost every day, when I go to the mock auctions. I have gone to some trouble, because last year, when I spoke, I generalised and realised it was not anybody's business. Since then, I have rather put the Home Office on the spot and at least made them get a report about it.
Following investigations in Oxford Street, I went to the Tottenham Court Road police station and made a complaint about a practice, which I stipulated, and asked that it should be looked into. I did the same thing in respect of Petticoat Lane at Commercial Road police station. I have done it with the City Police and been interviewed by a representative of the fraud squad.
I informed the Home Secretary of the specific complaints and asked that I be informed, following investigations, whether these techniques were seen by the police and if so whether they were illegal and what steps were being taken to deal with them. I got a letter back from the Home Secretary, months after I put in the complaints, and only when I asked about it. That letter was very vague. I have, since then, sent a letter to the Home Secretary asking for further information and asking whether these techniques have been seen. I have repeated the other questions I asked prior to that. I should like to know the answers tonight.

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During the last few weeks, I have been checking to see if these operations still exist and they do, in Oxford Street at No. 80. I should say that the two big mock auctions in Oxford Street, that I specified last year, have, of course, closed down, but recently two others, but smaller ones, have opened. It is difficult to twist when there is a small number of people but in No. 80 I saw the technique again. It was rather remarkable, because the British people know about the evils of mock auctions; one could hear them in the shops, talking about the B.B.C. show and the various newspapers that have been reporting about it. In the districts in which people read the papers and really know what is happening in life, the mock auctioneers are having great difficulty.
They are finding it difficult to get away with the technique, because of the knowledge people have; but, what a scandal it was in Oxford Street—and it is happening every day—to see that most of the people who were swindled were foreigners, people coming to Britain and buying goods marked British and guaranteed as Sheffield steel which really were absolute rubbish. I saw a Persian man, who could not speak English, with his young son of 12, who was showing off his knowledge of our language and who was fleeced of a lot of money.
We want to encourage these people to come here and we want to build up a thriving tourist trade, but visitors are being swindled and it is an absolute disgrace. Let us think of someone else's testimony. Earlier in the year, the National Chamber of Trade held its conference at Margate. A resolution was passed expressing disappointment with the replies of the Home Secretary to points about mock auctioneers.
Later in the conference, reference was made to the fact that Brighton got a Bill through the House, and of course they mentioned that it seemed to be all wrong that the ratepayers of the various towns, should be put to the cost of thousands of pounds to get the powers to control mock auctions. There may be something to be said for the view that it might be a good thing for Brighton to try this out and to see how they get on, but when one reads the minutes of the evidence of the Committee on the Brighton Corporation Bill there, at least, is testimony as to the tactics adopted by these people, which, I
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am sure, no one could claim to be anything but undesirable.
I have here the testimony of the Incorporated Society of Auctioneers. It says:
"The Society has always taken the view that mock auctioneers swindle the public and injure legal practitioners and bona fide traders in general, and that more effective action should be taken than at present to prohibit or control their sales. Since these people use what looks like auction technique—that is to say, they stand on a rostrum and use patter to excite the interest of crowds—they are frequently confused in the public mind with proper auctioneers, and our members are far from happy about this result."
I have been criticised for the fact that in my activities in this connection I may have damaged the legitimate business of auctioners. I want to say that at all times I shall endeavour to correct that impression, because I have no quarrel whatsoever with the legitimate auctioneers who, I think, represent a valuable part of the British way of life. In support of my argument, I will read to the House a letter from a man who practised for two years as a mock auctioneer, but who, because of the adverse publicity which made the job more and more nerve-wracking, was advised by his wife to give up the job and to seek a more legitimate means of making a livelihood. It says:
"Previous to the slick salesman getting the audience to bid for the bigger lots like canteens and brush sets, etc., he will offer an article, run it up to £2 to £3 and may be more, and knock same down to a fictitious customer. The floorsman works his way round the side of the audience and asks them to come forward please assisted by the auctioneer. In the shuffling forward of the audience, the floors-man works his way back and hands up to the auctioneer £2 or £3 which the customer, a fictitious one, is supposed to have bid. This money the floorsman has concealed in his hands, and it is the money he is given to use during the sale. This indeed is a glaring incident of obtaining money by means of a trick. If the police watch for this move, they can catch the floorsman with the money in his hand."
I do not wish to go into the technique of how I think these people can be caught, but I should be willing to accompany two or three plain-clothes police officers to a mock auction and point out how it is done. I was able to get behind the scenes in one mock auction in Petticoat Lane, and I saw what happened to the tray of goods which was supposed to have been knocked down to a bidder for £4 or £5. I saw how when the goods

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were handed back, ostensibly for the purpose of being wrapped up, they were taken off the tray and put on the shelf ready for the next sale.
It is beyond my comprehension that the police cannot get proof of the trickery that takes place. Every mock auctioneer who confesses to it says that it is absolutely impossible to make money unless this trickery is practised. I am sure that one prosecution would cause the collapse of the whole racket. I said at the beginning that the mock auctioneers were going to the small towns and villages. Here are some of the bills:
"Great Sale—M. Browne & Co.,
Crown Hotel, High St., Pateley Bridge,
Harrogate, Yorks.
£5,000 worth of Household Linens.
200 Turkish towels at 2s. 6d.,
500 Heavy Pattern Tablecloths at 3s.,
also £2,000 worth of Glass, china, canteens of
cutlery."
"Great Sale—Dixon's
The Assembly Rooms, Barton-on-Humber."
Here, strangely enough, the articles are exactly the same. It is only the name which is different, which clearly indicates that these rackets are being worked by big people who send these mock auctioneers round the towns and villages.
Another reads:
"Wisdom Clubs invite you to a £1,000
Advertising Sale at Vallis Way, Frome.
Tea sets 2s. 6d., stockings 1s. a pair,
pillow cases 1s. a pair etc."
Here is the trick: none of these things ever appears. The man comes with a motor van and all his usual junk but none of the household linen or towels. These are the bills which bring the people. There is plenty of evidence that in some areas these mock auctioneers have been bundled out of the district. That is due to the education carried on by the Press and the B.B.C.
In one of my letters to the Home Secretary about five weeks ago I told him that trouble was brewing in Petticoat Lane. Many of my friends from the North visit that bazaar in a thoroughfare when they come to London, as I did years ago as a country yokel. Some still think that I am a country yokel, but there was no doubt about it then. I spent many happy hours there and got many a bargain. There is a great feeling of animosity among the many people who have had stalls there for tens of years that they have among
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them this growing body of dishonest people. In this morning's "Daily Herald" it says:

PETTICOAT LANE MEN START WAR
Tricksters who flood London's famous Petticoat Lane market with shoddy goods are to be driven out. Every Sunday, visitors fall for their smooth patter and are wheedled into buying junk at high prices.
The 1,200-strong Stepney St. Traders Association has declared war on the tricksters. 'We are determined to stamp them out,' said one member. 'We are losing trade and our reputation because of them.'
Fifty sandwich-board men have been employed to parade Petticoat Lane and the borough's seven other markets, warning the public against mock auctions."
I am informed that it is only necessary for one man organising them to get them to tip up their stalls and there will be real trouble in Petticoat Lane. I hope that it will not be necessary and that the honest decent traders in Petticoat Lane will get the protection for which they pay well from the authorities who are required to look after them. In all the circumstances as we see them today it is shocking that the Home Secretary is doing nothing about this menace. If, of course, something is being done then tonight is the night to let us know what is happening on the mock auctions front.
11.20 p.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth): It is a year since the subject of mock auctions was last discussed in the House and I can assure the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Dodds) that the Government have treated the concern which he expressed last July with the respect which it deserved. I very much appreciate the interest which he has taken in this matter, and it may well be that the publicity which he has given to it has done something to produce the effect which he has described today.
It is unfortunate, in a way, that this subject has been raised on the Consolidated Fund Bill, because that is bound to present a somewhat one-sided picture. The hon. Member can describe the proceedings of these mock auctions—and he does not mince words in describing them—and can imply, as he has implied this evening, that the Government are responsible for action, but I reply I am in a difficulty because, in the first place, the Home Secretary is not responsible for taking proceedings and, in the second

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place, reference to legislation is out of order in this debate. There is very little which it is open to me to say.
The Home Office and the police have paid a great deal of attention to this question of mock auctions. No doubt undesirable practices take place at these auctions—there is no question about that at all; but that does not necessarily mean that criminal practices take place, for there is a considerable difference between the two.
The kind of thing which would be criminal under the present law would be, for example, if there were sham bidders who pretended to be real bidders and forced up the price against those who attend auctions. If it could be shown that that was taking place, the promoters of the auctions could be charged with conspiracy with intent to defraud.
Mr. Dodds: The B.B.C. showed that.
Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: It may well be that an example of that was given in the television programme. There is no difficulty in putting on an example if one wishes to do so; but that does not necessarily mean that that kind of thing takes place in real life.
Mr. Dodds: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the B.B.C. were making this up?
Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I have no doubt that the script of the B.B.C. programme was written by some able script writer. Every thriller or murder play is made up in that sense; it may correspond to something which occurs in real life or it may not. I have no doubt that the overall picture was a good picture. It brought home to people's minds the kind of thing which may be occurring. But that is not evidence that crime of this kind takes place.
If goods were knocked down to someone who had not bid for them and he were intimidated in some way into paying for them, that would be a form of larceny; or if goods were sold—this is the sort of case which the hon. Member had in mind—by some false description—for example, if cutlery were sold as silver when in fact it was nothing but base metal—those engaged would be guilty of obtaining money by false pretences.
In view of the representations which the hon. Member has made, both in the
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House and by correspondence to the Home Secretary, that criminal acts of this kind were taking place, the Home Secretary called for reports from the police, and particularly for reports of what was happening in this connection in London. I have seen the reports and have studied them carefully. They are full and careful, and a great deal of time and trouble were taken by the police in attending the auctions and preparing the reports.
The police have been advised that there is no evidence which would justify criminal proceedings. There is nothing that they have seen and reported upon which would enable criminal proceedings to be taken against those who hold these auctions. I quite agree that undesirable things go on. Those who conduct the auctions are no doubt guilty of sharp practice which goes just as near the edge of crime as they dare go. Unless they step over the boundary, and evidence can be produced that they have done so, it is not possible to take proceedings.
Mr. Dodds: If the Joint Under-Secretary says that these undesirable practices are near to criminal offences, does he not make out a case for giving local authorities power to prohibit them?
Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I shall say something on that subject.
There is a great deal in the way of blandishment and what is generally known as ballyhoo, but neither blandishments nor ballyhoo are illegal. The hon. Member will agree with me that it would be wrong in principle to make such things illegal. The policy of the law has been not to insist upon protecting people against themselves. I think that that is the right policy, and I am perfectly certain that the House would be very loth indeed to depart from it. The hon. Member has suggested that the law could be amended. It was easy for him to make that suggestion, but he will appreciate the difficulty in which it puts me.
As a result of a deputation from the National Chamber of Trade, my right hon. and learned Friend caused inquiries to be made of chief constables about the scope of the problem. We also sought the views of the Association of Municipal Corporations and the Urban District Councils Association. It became quite clear from the chief constables

847
that the problem was a localised one. It exists in London and in the larger seaside towns, that is to say, in places where people resort for amusement. The people who attend these auctions are not, for the most part, serious buyers. They go there for amusement and they are the ones to get caught in the toils.
In the second place, it became clear that the local authorities favour dealing with this problem on a local rather than a national basis. I cannot possibly give reasons now why there are objections to dealing with this matter by general legislation, but perhaps I can say within the bounds of order that one of the Home Secretary's administrative duties is to report upon Private Bills which come before the House, and I take it that I can refer to what has been done in past legislation.
In a recent case a large seaside town was seeking new powers. It promoted a Private Bill containing a Clause requiring the registration of premises used in the borough for the conduct of auction sales, and, as the hon. Gentleman indicated in his speech, the purpose of the Clause was to enable the borough to control the holding of auctions of this kind. The Clause was amended by the Select Committee to make an exception for auction sales conducted by members of certain organisations representing reputable auctioneers.
I think it is right that I should read the advice that was given by my right hon. and learned Friend in this connection, because it is generally applicable. It is:
"The Secretary of States takes the view that provisions of this nature, which confer upon a local authority a discretionary power to grant or refuse permission for the carrying on of a lawful occupation, should not be allowed except on clear evidence that it would be in the public interest to do so. He recommends, therefore, that Part II of the Bill should only be allowed if the promoters can show that there is a serious public mischief in …"
the borough
"… that cannot be dealt with by other means and, if any provision is to be allowed, it should be limited to what is really necessary to deal effectively with that mischief."
Here is a way of dealing with the matter in the particular places where it is a nuisance. It is a way which can be easily followed. It has not the objection which
848
I have indicated in broad outline to taking general legislative powers which would be vastly in excess of what is necessary to deal with the matter.
Mr. Dodds: Would it cost much?
Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I should have said that in the case of a substantial borough the cost would be negligible.
I suggest to the House that the right way to deal with the matter is by mobilising public opinion and by enabling those areas which are seriously afflicted in this way to take action on the lines that I have indicated.

TRAFFIC CONGESTION, PURLEY WAY
11.33 p.m.
Mr. Charles Doughty: Today we have discussed many subjects, and at the conclusion of the day I want to raise a matter which, although it primarily concerns my own constituency, must affect large numbers of people who live in the southern part of this country.
The Brighton Road passes through Purley and Coulsdon and right through East Surrey. I want to speak particularly of the very bad crossroads at the end of Purley Way at the junction of the Brighton Road and the Eastbourne Road.
Before I explain the problems which I have to lay before the House, I ought to describe the geographical position at that place. Between the wars a new arterial road was built past Croydon Aerodrome, which at that time was of great importance as an international airport. That road came down to Purley Corner via Purley Way, narrowing like a funnel as it came to the corner, where it met the old road which came through Croydon, and so from South London. Then the two roads branched off at right angles, one to Brighton and one to Eastbourne. As if that was not sufficient complication, there is another local road which comes in there, the Banstead Road, which is of great local importance, although it has no significant through traffic.
Coming from London on either of those main roads, there are, of course, many delays, but there is nothing compared with what happens at busy times of the

849
day, particularly at weekends, at Purley Corner. The traffic coming along Purley Way is held up as it approaches Purley Corner. It is then stopped at the lights, after which it goes straight on to Eastbourne or to the right to Brighton. The lights are as efficient as they can be, but the inevitable result is that traffic moves for only a short time before it is stopped again when the lights change. Once the traffic has moved off, although I would not say that it has a clear run to Eastbourne or Brighton, it has certainly got over the worst of the journey.
Some improvements have been made in the last few months. The fountain which used to be in the middle of the crossroads has been moved to the side and the tramcars from Croydon which used to have their terminus there have been removed. In addition to the traffic difficulties, this is the main shopping centre for miles around. It is time that something was done to relieve this considerable congestion, which will continue until something is done.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation has been good enough to visit these crossroads. I am sure he must agree that some remedy must be found for the problems as soon as conviently can be. My own suggestion is that there should be a roundabout. Some roundabouts have recently been constructed on the main road to Purley Way, and I am sure a roundabout could be constructed at Purley Corner. That is the only feasible way I can see by which the flow of traffic can be kept continuous, and the only method by which the congestion at the weekends can be relieved.
Some miles further south of Coulsdon there is on the main Brighton road on which a lot of traffic travels extremely fast, and I do not criticise it for that, a road junction of extreme danger because it is not apparent. There has been one serious accident there in which two persons lost their lives and there have been others in the not too recent past. Two important sideroads come in there, both partially blind, the one coming from the East is hidden by the bend in the road and the hill, and if one comes out slowly one is likely to find oneself in the stream of fast moving vehicles. Again I have had the opportunity of
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discussing this with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, whom I find sympathetic about it. The solution is not to extend the 30 miles an hour speed limit or to provide lights, which must inevitably slow down the traffic, but once again to provide a roundabout for the safety of both vehicles and pedestrians.
I do not wish to detain the House any longer except to draw the attention of the Parliamentary Secretary to the danger and inconvenience to the people in the locality and the drivers who have to pass these dangerous and awkward places, and to the necessity to ensure not only the flow of traffic but the safety of pedestrians and those who travel in the vehicles. We cannot allow our main roads—and these are very important main roads—to be neglected. We cannot allow the traffic to increase without anything being done for its speeding up. I would ask my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary if we can hope in the near future for anything to be done in this part of the county which will alleviate the difficulties and assist in preventing the serious delays which occur at Purley Corner and the dangers at the crossroads which I have already mentioned.
11.42 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): No one can be long Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport without being very well aware of the amount of inconvenience and danger which is caused by the inadequacy of our roads to deal with the present volume of traffic. I make no complaint that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Mr. Doughty) has raised the question of two roads in his constituency where there is a great deal of traffic which does not come from his constituency but which uses those roads in travelling between London and the South Coast. My hon. and learned Friend is a very pertinacious representative of the interest of his constituency, and he persuaded me to go to Purley Corner to study on the spot the problems which he has again brought forward tonight. I am glad that he has described my attitude to these matters as sympathetic, and certainly he has done me no more than justice when he has so described me.

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I have studied both the problems of Purley Corner and the question of congestion and danger as well as the other problems which he asked me to study. I have had the matter looked at by the divisional road engineer concerned with that part of the country. But when he asks me to give a date when remedial measures can be taken, he is asking for his particular problems to be dealt with on their own without taking into full account the many other parts of the country which are concerned with equally or even greater problems.
In the new road programme which was announced by my right hon. Friend, who is shortly to become the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 8th December last he indicated what the priorities would be. The first was that he would try in spending the additional money which was made available to give priority to those industrial areas where improvement of communications was likely to have a direct and beneficial effect upon our industry. In the second place, he indicated that he would try to complete some of those large road schemes which had been interrupted by the war and where a large sum of money had been left unused because of the failure to complete those schemes.
My right hon. Friend indicated that where there were black spots he would try again to carry out such alterations and improvement of the road as would be likely to reduce accidents. It is only under the third of those categories that my right hon. Friend would be able to bring either of the projects which the hon. and learned Member has mentioned tonight. I am glad that he has not attached too much importance to the idea of extending the speed limit. Having looked at both of these stretches of road, and having been advised by the divisional road engineer I do not believe that a general extension of the speed limit would have beneficial effect.
In the case of Coulsdon, the solution in the long run will probably be found by provision of the roundabout for which my hon. and learned Friend asked. That will be a considerable undertaking, and it will involve acquisition of a considerable amount of land, which will need fairly large expenditure. When so many demands are being made on the
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resources at the disposal of the Ministry, I am not able to indicate when it will be possible to carry out the improvement. I can assure my hon. and learned Friend, that I have not forgotten what he showed me. The matter is still being carefully considered in the Ministry. We will do what we can to give priority to this scheme if we are satisfied that provision of a roundabout is likely to reduce accidents.
Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

WELSH SLATE INDUSTRY.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Vosper.]
11.47 p.m.
Mr. Goronwy Roberts: I wish to raise the problems of the slate industry. I am sorry that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works is not in his place. I am wondering whether the new Financial Secretary to the Treasury, whom I congratulate on his elevation and welcome to the Front Bench, on this first occasion in his new office, is going to reply.
By location, extent, and social character, the slate industry can practically be described as a Welsh industry. Much more than 80 per cent. of the slate produced in the United Kingdom is quarried in North Wales, in the counties of Caernarvon and Merioneth. Welsh slate is the best roofing material in the world. It is found roofing palaces, universities, schools, hospitals, and homes in almost every land. There is Welsh slate on the roof of this building. It is a natural product, processed for ages by nature herself for its protective task, and as a result it has withstood the test of centuries. It has considerable aesthetic appeal, too, especially in some settings. It is durable and dependable. One could almost say that Welsh slate is capable of resisting the rigours even of an English summer.
Why is it that this industry, which produces this fine product in a country bound to make the best use of its resources, has declined so much in the last 50 years? Why is it that in the last half

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century the annual output has dropped from more than 600,000 tons to fewer than 200,000 tons?
I pass to the human and social aspects of this problem, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Conway (Mr. P. Thomas) will speak in support of me in this respect. The number of slate workers in North Wales has declined from 14,000–50 years ago—to barely 3,700 today. The industry is well-served by its management and its union, and yet when I, with my hon. Friend the Member for Conway and my hon. Friend the Member for Merioneth (Mr. T. W. Jones) who will, I know, speak on this subject on a future occasion, met representatives of the industry last February in Caernarvon, we learned that, even in a period of building boom, orders for slates were falling fast, that there was short time in the industry and that 8 million roofing-slates and 4½ million slates for damp courses had to be held in stock. This has meant a tying up of a disproportionate amount of the capital which is badly needed in the industry for development.
The Minister may say that the position in the industry is now slightly better and that slate is moving again. That may be true, but the basic conditions of steady prosperity are still lacking. The industry still feels far too insecure; operators still have large stocks, particularly of the small-size slates for damp-courses, on their hands, and no-one can say that the position will not worsen once more. All this inhibits investment and recruitment in an industry which, with a very little official encouragement and help, could be revitalised, with great moral and material advantage not only to Wales, but to the United Kingdom as a whole.
When we look at the reasons for the decline and the insecurity in the industry we must remember that the slate industry was very badly damaged in the two world wars. In the last war in particular it received very heavy blows indeed. Its manpower was dispersed and its markets were dislocated. In 1945, the industry was told that it could not supply slates for new buildings and that priority would have to go to the supply of slates for war-damage repair work. The roofing of new buildings became the prerogative of the tile manufacturers. In this way, long-established markets for the slate industry were lost, some of them irrevocably. In
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that sense, the slate industry is a war casualty and is entitled to a little first-aid.
What I have described is serious enough, but in the post-war years even worse was to come. Local authorities have been encouraged officially to substitute tiles for slates in their housing schemes; not directly, perhaps, but indirectly and very effectively; and not because local authorities prefer tiles—more often than not they prefer slates—but in order to effect economies which will bring the tender price per house below the ceiling fixed by the Ministry of Housing. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to give his special attention to this problem.
The saving from substituting tiles for slates in a house costing £1,400 to build is only about £35, or, about 2½ per cent. of the total cost. The extra cost of putting in slate damp courses is only about £2 10s. There is really no comparison between this small initial cost and the future saving in repair bills, yet the fact remains, that, whenever a tender has to be cut, the Ministry of Housing officers immediately attack the roof and the damp course, probably the two most vital aspects of a new house.
I have here a letter from a Liverpool building merchant, to the managing director of a large quarry in my constituency, stating that an important rural district in North Wales, the home of the slate industry, is, after many years, reluctantly discontinuing the use of slates in the roofing of its houses, because of the difficulty of keeping down to the Ministry's prices. What a short-sighted policy this is. For the sake of a few pounds now, we are laying up a lot of expensive trouble for ourselves in the future—and in the near future, too.
It is well known, that the vast influx of cheap tiles which afflicted our roofs about 1935, are now already rotten—ripe for replacement, at very great cost. Faulty damp courses and leaking roofs also account for much of the dry rot in the buildings of Britain and for the colossal annual bill, amounting, I am informed, to more than £20 million per annum, for making good that dry rot. Where is the real economy in all that?
Then there is the quite unjustified importation of foreign slates. When nearly 10 million Welsh slates lay in stock in 1953, we were importing slates, to the value of £106,000, into this country and

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they were disastrously inferior to our own. Some of the roofs, which were slated with these importations, have had to be stripped and re-roofed.
One contractor told me many of these foreign slates are so brittle, that he was able to crumble them to dust with his bare hands. How can these importations be justified? How can we justify, also, the importation of hessian from the Far East when we have, or had until quite recently, redundant stocks of slates, suitable for damp courses to the extent of 4½ million units?
What the slate industry needs is a reasonably steady market which will enable it to plan development and recruit manpower on a reasonably secure basis. It cannot do that—no industry could do that—when Government policy appears deliberately to throw such obstructions in its path. But it can do so if action is taken at appropriate levels on one or two simple points.
The first is that a proportion of new roofing should be allotted to slate. That proportion need not be more than a minute percentage of the whole, but it will be enough to revitalise the industry. I am told that the Scottish slate industry has precisely that guarantee and, in addition, that it has received considerable advances from the Treasury towards development and the clearing of debris and overburden.
I ask whether that is the case, because, if it is the case, the Welsh slate industry has an absolutely equal claim to similar treatment and I and my hon. Friends will expect the Parliamentary Secretary to deal firmly with that point tonight. At the very least, I would press him to consult his opposite number in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government to see that, in Wales at least, not only are local authorities not dissuaded from including slate in their specifications but are actually encouraged to use it for roofing and damp courses.
My second suggestion is that the hon. Gentleman should talk seriously to the Board of Trade and to the Treasury about importations of foreign slate. The amount involved is very small compared with the total trade of the United Kingdom, but it is of great importance to the turnover of the slate industry.
856
Thirdly, I wish to say a word or two about manpower. As I have said, the war took away hundreds of skilled quarrymen, many of whom have never returned to the industry. The age old rhythm of recruitment, whereby son followed father and grandfather into this industry, has been shattered, and we find it very difficult to attract apprentices to it today. Conditions in the industry have never been better. The relations between management and men are excellent, and the terrible threat of silicosis is now practically mastered by the introduction of dust suppressors, at considerable cost, I may add, to an industry which is largely organised in rather small units. Nevertheless, young school leavers are still holding back from entering the industry.
I think that the Ministry of Labour could help, partly by publicising the improved conditions and partly, also, by taking a sympathetic view of applications for deferment of National Service by slate workers. A skilled quarryman needs to go through an apprenticeship of five years. If that apprenticeship is interrupted, it is extremely difficult to start the training again and to complete it satisfactorily.
I personally consider that slate quarrymen should be grouped with coalminers in the matter of National Service. They are already grouped together in the matter of safety regulations and legislation. At the very least, I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to take up with the Ministry of Labour the question of the sympathetic consideration of all applications for deferment of National Service for slate quarrymen.
In conclusion, I wish to say that to Britain this industry is an asset, but that to Wales it is vital. The House will easily grasp the economic implication of the decline of the industry, but I also want to emphasise the incalculable social and cultural importance to Wales of the slate industry. These quarries are located in the heart of Wales, in Snowdonia, which is the reservoir of all those things which distinguish the Welsh race as a separate and significant element in the world.
In Bethseda, Llanberis, the Nantlle Valley and Ffestiniog there are communities whose democratic way of life is a thing of beauty. Here the Welsh language flourishes as a modern tongue, and among its people there is a deep passion

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for the simple graces of life, for literature, music, education and religion. Their lives are patterned by the influence of two great fellowships, the Church and the quarry.
I ask that action be taken to see that these unique communities do not disappear from the Welsh scene, for their loss would not only be economically serious, but socially irreparable. We are determined that that shall not happen, and we appeal to the Parliamentary Secretary, who knows North Wales very well, to come to our aid and to give to this gallant little industry the help and encouragement that it so richly deserves.
12.5 a.m.
Mr. Peter Thomas: The hon. Member for Caernarvon (Mr. G. Roberts) and I have been closely connected with this problem for some time, and I congratulate him on his good fortune in getting the opportunity to ventilate these problems on the Motion for the Adjournment. I wholeheartedly agree with what he has said and fully support him. He has described the slate quarrying industry as being a Welsh industry and that, of course, is so; it is indigenous to North Wales industry.
In the past, the quarrymen of North Wales have made an immeasurable contribution to the social, cultural and educational life of Wales. The continuance of what is sometimes described as the "Welsh way of life" in my opinion depends to a great extent on the future of the quarries of North Wales, for in the quarrying towns there you find almost the only urban industrial societies in Wales where Welsh is still the unconscious and unaffected language of the hearth.
From every viewpoint it is important that this industry should be given security for the future. The hon. Gentleman has given the problems in a succinct manner. He has posed the reasons for the decline of this industry from one of 14,000 men employed in 1885 to about 3,700 today. He has described it as a war casualty and that is so. After the war the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in their wisdom decided that a directive should be issued that no new house should be roofed with slate. The small number of quarrymen employed at that time were required to repair existing war damaged houses. That was a great blow to the
858
industry because the Government have given great assistance and encouragement in every manner to the synthetic tile industry which now, of course, forms great opposition to the future of the Welsh slate industry.
I should like to reiterate what the hon. Gentleman said about certain matters. I do not ask the Ministry to deal with this matter from any Welsh point of view. It may be difficult for them to do that. I ask them to look at this problem from the point of view of hard common sense. We have heard about how a slate roof will last for about 150 years. A synthetic tile roof which, admittedly, is £30 to £35 cheaper will last only about 30 to 40 years. A damp course, which is admittedly superior when made of slate, costs £2 10s. more. It will last immeasurably longer than any synthetic damp course. The subsidy which the Government spends on a new house is about £35. It is only common sense that the Government should insist that the materials put into a house should at least last as long as the period of the rent they are subsidising. That is all we ask.
As far as the import of foreign slates is concerned, it seems to us who are interested in the slate industry of North Wales absolute nonsense that we should be imparting thousands of pounds worth of foreign slates when we in North Wales depend so much for our welfare and livelihood on the production of slates. I would ask my hon. Friend to put these matters as strongly as he can before the various Ministries concerned.
There is security for a number of people for some time on the repair of existing houses, but what we need is new entrants and here, I believe, the Government can do something to help. Safety in the mines has greatly improved of late; there are dust extraction appliances; and the old fear of silicosis has been largely removed. The pay compares favourably with many other industries, and all that is needed is some assistance from outside to give people who want to enter the industry a feeling of security.
12.10 a.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works (Mr. J. R. Bevins): I am sure that the House is grateful to the hon. Member for Caernarvon (Mr. G. Roberts) for his interesting

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speech, and also grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Conway (Mr. P. Thomas) for his contribution. If I speak quickly I hope the House will forgive me, but time is short.
The hon. Member for Caernarvon was right to refer to the rather calamitous effects of two world wars on the slate industry in North Wales, but even before the First World War the Welsh industry was contracting. Many things contributed to this. Perhaps the two most important factors were the changes in house building and the competition of the tile-making industry.
We should bear in mind that during the last century most of the houses built in this country were back-to-back working-class properties. Streets were narrow and it was not easy to see the roofs from street level. Nowadays, as we know, roads are wider and the Jones's of 1954 demand semi-detached houses with gardens back and front. In the main, the roofs of the new houses are more conspicuous than used to be the case in the 19th century, and that is one reason why the demand for coloured tiles, in preference to slates, is so much stronger than it was.
Mr. Garner Evans: Is my hon. Friend suggesting that a tile roof is more beautiful than a Ffestiniog roof?
Mr. Bevins: I am simply suggesting that it is more colourful and it appears to be in harmony with current demand.
Mr. Evans: Can anything be more colourful than Ffestiniog or Dinorwic slates?
Mr. Bevins: That, of course, is a matter of taste and a matter of opinion. I am simply recalling the fact that today there is a preference, by and large, for tiles rather than slates, for reasons of colour and on various other grounds. It is not, of course, the only reason; there is also the question of relative costs. The slate industry, as the House knows, is an extractive industry which works under diminishing returns, whereas the tile industry is a manufacturing industry and is able to take advantage of modern processes and mechanisation.
What the hon. Member said about the decline in the industry and the impact on
860
the labour force in North Wales is true. What he said about the incidence of silicosis, or what we know now as pneumoconiosis, is also true, and I am sure we are all glad to know that so much progress has been made in the provision of dust prevention plant in the sheds attached to the North Wales quarries.
Perhaps I may come rather quickly to one or two of the questions which the hon. Member asked. First of all, the question of imports: for both hon. Members appeared to think that it was wrong that imports of slate should be allowed into the country. I thought that doctrine came a little strangely from hon. Members representing North Wales constituencies, but the fact is that this industry is already protected by a 10 per cent. tariff and I hardly think it my duty to make representations on the subject to my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. If there is any question of representations to my right hon. Friend, it is open for the industry itself to make them in the ordinary way. It is only right that I should add—and I think this is pertinent—that at present we are moving towards the liberalisation of European trade rather than in the contrary direction.
The hon. Member also asked about financial help for the industry. I should like to make it clear that there is no financial subsidy to the slate industry in Scotland. It is true that in 1948 money was made available for Scottish re-equipment and development in this field. That money was advanced out of the Building Materials Fund then in being to stimulate the production of building materials. Following the improvement in the supply of building materials generally, that fund was wound up in 1953, and I am sorry to say that there are no Government moneys available for the purpose which the hon. Member had in mind.
The principal point which was put forward in the debate was the question of a partially guaranteed market for the products of the North Wales slate industry. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government, quite rightly, allows local authorities in England and Wales a free choice in the matter of roofing material. Whether we like it or not, we have to face the fact that, generally speaking, local authorities prefer tiles to slates. Even in Wales, where we have tried to encourage the use

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of slates rather than tiles, the efforts of Her Majesty's Government have been frustrated by the costliness of slates.
There is one rather hopeful feature in the recent legislation affecting rents and repairs. I hope and believe that this legislation will create an increased demand for slates from the North Wales industry, for many of the rent-restricted houses which are affected by that Measure are slate roofed and essential repairs carried out by landlords will often include roof repairs. The slum-patching provisions will also be helpful to the industry.
As to questions of labour, apprenticeship and National Service, I do not think that there is any real analogy between the position in this industry and the coalmining industry. Nevertheless, my right hon. and learned Friend the
862
Minister of Labour and National Service, whom we have consulted, will continue to consider any applications for deferment from men undertaking courses of training based on the customs and practice in the trade.
I am sorry that I cannot be more helpful than, possibly, I have been, but I assure the House that I shall bring to the notice of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government all that has been said on the question of a guaranteed market. If there is any other way in which the Government can help the industry we shall gladly do so.
Adjourned accordingly at Seventeen Minutes past Twelve o'Clock a.m.

EDUCATION
  School Milk Scheme
  School Milk Scheme
  Teachers Superannuation (War Service)
  Teachers Superannuation (War Service)
  Religious Instruction
  Religious Instruction
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Nigeria (Export Credits)
  Nigeria (Export Credits)
  Imperial Preference (Reductions)
  Imperial Preference (Reductions)
  Machinery (Duty-Free Licensing)
  Machinery (Duty-Free Licensing)
  Anglo-Indian Trade
  Anglo-Indian Trade
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Roads Expenditure (Loans)
  Roads Expenditure (Loans)
  Customs Facilities (Greatham Airport)
  Customs Facilities (Greatham Airport)
  Fatstock Marketing Board (Loans)
  Fatstock Marketing Board (Loans)
  Income Tax (Personal Case)
  Income Tax (Personal Case)
  Member's Expenses (Sessional Allowance)
  Member's Expenses (Sessional Allowance)
  Fiduciary Note Issue (Increase)
  Fiduciary Note Issue (Increase)
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
  Regional Organisations
  Regional Organisations
  Ministry of Food (Transferred Staff)
  Ministry of Food (Transferred Staff)
  Land and Properties
  Land and Properties
FORESTRY COMMISSION
  Pitwood Working Party (Report)
  Pitwood Working Party (Report)
  Forest Name Boards
  Forest Name Boards
  EAST YORKSHIRE RIVER BOARD (SCHEMES)
  EAST YORKSHIRE RIVER BOARD (SCHEMES)
AGRICULTURE
  Land Tribunals (Procedure)
  Land Tribunals (Procedure)
  Myxomatosis
  Myxomatosis
  Television Station, Hessary Tor (Common Rights)
  Television Station, Hessary Tor (Common Rights)
  Marketing Schemes
  Marketing Schemes
  FRENCH FISHING VESSELS (ARRESTS)
  FRENCH FISHING VESSELS (ARRESTS)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Royal Commissions (Reports)
  Royal Commissions (Reports)
  Aliens Order (Personal Case)
  Aliens Order (Personal Case)
  Mock Auctions
  Mock Auctions
  Docks and Harbours (Rescue Services)
  Docks and Harbours (Rescue Services)
  Dr Joseph Cort
  Dr Joseph Cort
  American Nationals, Burtonwood (British Law)
  American Nationals, Burtonwood (British Law)
  New Criminal Courts, South Lancashire
  New Criminal Courts, South Lancashire
POLICE
  Caravans, London
  Caravans, London
  Goods Vehicles (Speed Limit Prosecutions)
  Goods Vehicles (Speed Limit Prosecutions)
  Motor Vehicles, London (Noise)
  Motor Vehicles, London (Noise)
  Abnormal Loads (Mobile Patrol Escorts)
  Abnormal Loads (Mobile Patrol Escorts)
  CIVIL DEFENCE, COVENTRY (TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS)
  CIVIL DEFENCE, COVENTRY (TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS)
  EMPLOYMENT, NORTHERN IRELAND (MEETING OF MINISTERS)
  EMPLOYMENT, NORTHERN IRELAND (MEETING OF MINISTERS)
EMPLOYMENT
  Older Workers
  Older Workers
  Factory Inspectors (Science Graduates)
  Factory Inspectors (Science Graduates)
  Industry (Electricity Load Spreading)
  Industry (Electricity Load Spreading)
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Foundry Workers (X-Ray Facilities)
  Foundry Workers (X-Ray Facilities)
  Associations for the Blind
  Associations for the Blind
  Tonsil and Adenoid Operations
  Tonsil and Adenoid Operations
  Chronic Sick Beds, Newport
  Chronic Sick Beds, Newport
  Hospitals, Manchester (Operations and Waiting Time)
  Hospitals, Manchester (Operations and Waiting Time)
  Hearing Aids, Lincoln
  Hearing Aids, Lincoln
  Dentists
  Dentists
  Hospitals (Compensation Expenditure)
  Hospitals (Compensation Expenditure)
TRANSPORT
  Speed Limits
  Speed Limits
  Greatham Airport
  Greatham Airport
  Clyde Tunnel (Deputation)
  Clyde Tunnel (Deputation)
  Bovingdon Airport (Notice Board)
  Bovingdon Airport (Notice Board)
  Transport Commission (Report)
  Transport Commission (Report)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  House Refuse, London (Disposal)
  House Refuse, London (Disposal)
  New Towns (Sale of Houses)
  New Towns (Sale of Houses)
  Estate Development, Avon Castle
  Estate Development, Avon Castle
  AIR POLLUTION COMMITTEE (REPORT)
  AIR POLLUTION COMMITTEE (REPORT)
  VICE-CONSUL, BELGIAN CONGO
  VICE-CONSUL, BELGIAN CONGO
  EGYPTIAN SWAHILI BROADCASTS (REPRESENTATIONS)
  EGYPTIAN SWAHILI BROADCASTS (REPRESENTATIONS)
  TRIESTE
  TRIESTE
BRITISH ARMY
  Goodge Street Deep Shelter (Conditions)
  Goodge Street Deep Shelter (Conditions)
  Suez Canal Zone (Vegetarians)
  Suez Canal Zone (Vegetarians)
  COLONIAL TERRITORIES (LOTTERIES)
  COLONIAL TERRITORIES (LOTTERIES)
EAST AFRICA
  Mau Mau Terrorists (Surrender Terms)
  Mau Mau Terrorists (Surrender Terms)
  Extra-Mural Studies, Tanganyika and Kenya
  Extra-Mural Studies, Tanganyika and Kenya
  MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (CHAPLAINS' PAY)
  MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (CHAPLAINS' PAY)
  MALAYA (AMBUSH)
  MALAYA (AMBUSH)
  TELEPHONE SERVICE, SOUTHEND
  TELEPHONE SERVICE, SOUTHEND
  TELEVISION LICENCES, HARLOW
  TELEVISION LICENCES, HARLOW
  AERODROME, ASHBOURNE (DISPOSAL)
  AERODROME, ASHBOURNE (DISPOSAL)
  COMET AIRCRAFT LOSSES (PUBLIC INQUIRIES)
  COMET AIRCRAFT LOSSES (PUBLIC INQUIRIES)
  BASUTOLAND (MENTAL DEFECTIVES)
  BASUTOLAND (MENTAL DEFECTIVES)
  NORTHERN IRELAND (FATSTOCK MARKETING)
  NORTHERN IRELAND (FATSTOCK MARKETING)
SCOTLAND
  Requisitioned Properties (Disposal)
  Requisitioned Properties (Disposal)
  Southern Electricity Board (Appointments)
  Southern Electricity Board (Appointments)
  HOUSE OF COMMONS (WORKS OF ART COMMITTEE)
  HOUSE OF COMMONS (WORKS OF ART COMMITTEE)
Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN UGANDA
  2.35 p.m.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government to cases reported in the Manchester Guardian of 14th July, 1954, in which a resident magistrate in Kampala is reported to have sentenced 14 Africans convicted of robbery with violence to a total of 132 years imprisonment and 312 lashes; in another case, to have sentenced each of three Africans to 15 years imprisonment and two of them to 24 lashes; and in a third case, to have sentenced two African footpads to 7 years hard labour and 24 lashes each; to ask whether such sentences are not at variance with the policy of the Government to bring Colonial practice into line with that in this country; and whether they will draw the attention of the Governor of Uganda to these cases and request his co-operation in making this policy effective.]
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, it would not, of course, be proper for my right honourable friend to call in question the exercise by a court of law in Uganda of discretion vested in the court in awarding sentences, and it is to be assumed that the award of corporal punishment in this case is in accordance with the law in force in Uganda. As the noble Lord is aware, however, it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to encourage the progressive reduction and ultimate abolition of corporal punishment in Colonial territories and Her Majesty's Government have the matter very much in mind.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for his reply,
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  may I ask him whether he is aware of the great satisfaction that it will give in various quarters?

GOVERNMENT LAND DISPOSAL POLICY
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether food production will no longer be the main consideration in deciding the disposal of land compulsorily acquired by Government Departments, and whether land sold in accordance with the new land disposal policy will be offered to the highest bidder in the open market.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (LORD CARRINGTON): My Lords, as my right honourable friend Sir Thomas Dugdale has made clear in another place, where agricultural land compulsorily purchased by a Government Department is no longer required by the original acquiring Department or immediately by any other Government Department possessing compulsory purchase powers for a purpose for which the use of these powers would be justified, the Government's policy will in general be to sell it. The Government's view is that the interests of production are generally best secured if agricultural land is privately owned. The Government will consider each case on its merits, with the desire that where circumstances show that the land can properly be offered to a former owner or his successor who can establish his claim, this will be done at a price assessed by the district valuer as being the current market price. Subject to this, the procedure for the sale of land will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, may I first say how glad I am to see the noble Lord replying to this Question. I say that both on personal grounds and because we respect his Parliamentary ability. We should have been extremely sad if he had not continued to discharge this important function. May I ask the noble Lord one or two supplementary questions, of which the first is this: Does

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he agree with the statement made by the late Minister of Agriculture last week in another place, that maximum production is no longer necessary, on account of the improvement in the food situation; and, further, whether that is not the main reason for the change in policy in relation to the disposal of land since Crichel Down? My other question is this: Does the noble Lord not agree that it is in the interests of the taxpayer that the Government should try to get the best price for public land?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am grateful for what the noble Earl has said about me. With regard to his first supplementary question, if he will read the speech of my right honourable friend in another place he will, I think, realise that in point of fact my right honourable friend did not say what is attributed to him, and therefore the second part of the noble Earl's supplementary question does not arise. With regard to his last supplementary, I would point out that the land to which he is referring was purchased compulsorily by the State at a price fixed by the district valuer, and it seems only reasonable that it should be returned in the same way.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, with regard to the first part of the noble Lord's reply, may I ask him whether he really interprets the Report of the Minister's speech in the OFFICIAL REPORT in a different way from my interpretation? The words are these—I quote from the OFFICIAL REPORT (Commons) Vol. 530 (No. 152), col. 1192:
"In the circumstances at that time, when maximum production was essential, I am confident that my decision was right, but to-day, two years later, the food situation has materially altered for the better."
My interpretation of those words is that maximum production, which was essential in 1952, is no longer essential according to the late Minister of Agriculture, because the food situation has improved. I cannot see what other interpretation could be placed upon those words.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, what the noble Earl is trying to make me say is that the Government no longer think that food production is important—and I am not going to say it, because we certainly do not believe it. Food production is still of the greatest possible importance. What my right honourable
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friend was saying was that the food position has materially improved in the last two years, thanks to the efforts of the farmers, and thanks to the efforts, I think, of my right honourable friend. Consequently, one must be more careful to spend money economically on getting food production.
EARL JOWITT: Is food production still the main consideration?
LORD CARRINGTON: That is one of the considerations, as I made clear in my original Answer.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I looked just now at the Report of the debate in another place and read what the Minister said in regard to 1952—that is only two years ago. He said (OFFICIAL REPORT (Commons) Vol. 530, No. 152, col. 1186), that
"there was still an overriding need for maximum food production."
Has the "overriding need" departed? Many farmers in the country are very disturbed about the implication of the statement in another place.
LORD CARRINGTON: If the noble Viscount will try to cast his mind back to that time, so far from rationing having been abolished, it was becoming in some respects even more severe; and though we all have short political memories it is as well to remember the great transformation wrought in this respect by Her Majesty's Government.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: Is it contended that there is no longer an overriding need for food production here in relation to the immediate food problems of general exchange of trade and exchange rates generally?
LORD CARRINGTON: I have already said several times in answering supplementary questions that Her Majesty's Government consider food production to be of the greatest possible importance.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, may I ask a further question on another reply of the Minister when he expresses the view of Her Majesty's Government that the holding of land in private ownership is the most efficient method of securing food production. Is that not an entirely doctrinaire approach, induced by the efforts of the 1922 Committee? In some

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cases it might be much more efficient to have land in public ownership. Surely it would depend on the circumstances.
LORD CARRINGTON: If the noble Lord will study my answer, I said that "in general" the Government believe that the best way of achieving food production is to leave land in private ownership.
LORD WINSTER: May I ask the noble Lord whether his reply is based upon opinion or upon statistics?
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (VISCOUNT SWINTON): It is based on common knowledge and common sense.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I am sure the noble Lord has done his best but he will observe that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction on this side of the House and we shall put down a Motion for discussion.

SLAUGHTER OF ANIMALS (AMENDMENT) BILL
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.
PIER AND HARBOUR ORDER (SALCOMBE) CONFIRMATION BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
PIER AND HARBOUR ORDER (WHITEHAVEN) CONFIRMATION BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
BRADFORD CORPORATION (TROL LEY VEHICLES) ORDER CON FIRMATION BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
WOLVERHAMPTON CORPORA TION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

AGRICULTURE ACT (PART I) EXTENSION OF PERIOD ORDER, 1954
2.45 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON LORD CARRINGTON rose to move, That the Agriculture Act (Part I) Extension of Period Order, 1954, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this Order is to extend for another year the operation of Section 4 of the Agriculture Act, 1947. This section would lapse if it were not renewed from year to year. It is concerned with the making of arrangements for providing guaranteed prices or assured markets for products included in the First Schedule to the Act. Briefly, it gives the Minister power to modify existing arrangements if they are not suitable, or to make new ones if none have hitherto existed.
Wool is the only product for which these powers are now in use. Wool was added to the First Schedule to the 1947 Act in 1950 and at the same time the British Wool Marketing Scheme came into operation. The guarantee arrangements were then discussed with the British Wool Marketing Board and given statutory force in an Order under Section 4. This provides, among other things, that the Board should pay producers an average price not less than the guaranteed price fixed by Ministers after the Annual Review. The practical object of continuing Section 4 is, therefore, to keep in force this Order relating to wool. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Agriculture Act (Part I) Extension of Period Order, 1954, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved.—(Lord Carrington.)
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, this is the fourth successive year in which Parliament has been asked to approve an Order of this nature. The policy of guaranteed prices for basic agricultural products is now an agreed policy between all Parties. I suggest to the noble Lord that it would save Parliamentary time if fresh legislation were introduced giving the Minister permanent price fixing and marketing powers. Such legislation should include powers now exercised by the Minister of Food under Defence

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Regulations—which are always unsatisfactory for this purpose—in relation to other agricultural products. Will the noble Lord ask his right honourable friend (to whom we all wish well in his new position) to consider the desirability of tidying up existing legislation in relation to price fixing and marketing by introducing a Bill in the next Session of Parliament?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, the power to pay money for all these guarantees under the Agriculture Act arises from the general power of Ministers of the Crown to perform executive actions, provided that the expenditure involved is authorised by Parliament. In this case Sections 1 to 3 of the Agriculture Act empower Ministers to determine guaranteed prices, and the expenditure is ultimately authorised by the Appropriation Act. Whether or not any new permanent legislation is needed for any particular commodity depends on the final shape that the marketing and financial structure takes.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

WHITE FISH SUBSIDY (UNITED KINGDOM) SCHEME, 1954
2.50 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON LORD CARRINGTON rose to move, That the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1954, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, it is a year since I laid before your Lordships the first scheme under the White Fish and Herring Industries Act, 1953, for subsidy to the inshore, near and middle water catchers of white fish. That scheme is not due to expire until 31st July, 1955; but the losses which the near and middle water fleet incurred in 1953 and the increased costs which they have since had to meet on wages, coal and freight have led us to the conclusion that to keep them at sea an immediate increase must be made in the rates of subsidy payable to steam vessels of 70 to 140 ft. and to motor vessels of 100 to 140 ft.
The new scheme, which runs for one year only, until July 31, 1955, makes the necessary changes in the rates of subsidy for these vessels, at a total cost of £250,000, and leaves unchanged the subsidy paid to inshore vessels and to near
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and middle water motor vessels between 70 and 100 ft. in length. This is a further increase in an already substantial subsidy, which we hope will merely be temporary. We believe that the long-term solution of the industry's difficulties is to be found in the international measures for the conservation of fish stocks which have recently come into force, and the rebuilding of the fleet with the help of grants and loans from the Government and the White Fish Authority, but in the interim we see no alternative to the increase in subsidy for which, in tabling the Scheme, we seek your Lordships' approval.
There is one change in the conditions of payment of the subsidy to which I ought to draw your Lordships' attention, In paragraph 14, the appropriate Minister is given discretion to vary the rate of subsidy paid to a vessel which, as a result of some structural alterations, has increased its length. Part of the subsidy to near and middle water vessels is paid according to the length of the vessel, with the rate of subsidy increasing for every 10 ft. in the length of the vessel. This means that a ship which is, say, 79½ ft. long may be altered, at no great cost to its owner, in a way which serves no other apparent purpose than to make it 80½ ft. long, and so eligible for the rate of subsidy payable to boats of 80 to 90 ft. instead of the lower rate payable to boats in the 70 to 80 ft. class. Under the present scheme, the Minister has then no discretion but either to pay subsidy at the new higher rate or to refuse it altogether. In putting this possibility to your Lordships, I am not drawing upon my imagination. Something very much like this is suspected to have happened in one case already, and we have thought it right that in such cases the lower rate should continue to be paid, unless the Minister can be shown that the alteration served some useful purpose such as improving the vessel's seaworthiness. I bee to move that the Order be approved.
Moved, That the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1954, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday, the 21st instant, be approved.—(Lord Carrington.)
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I think the increase of a quarter of a

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million pounds in this subsidy is probably justified by the increase in the costs of the fishing industry. At the same time, it is a very large sum of money. Over £2 million was spent last year, and I think it would be interesting for us some time, but not on this occasion, to be told how the fishing industry is using this money in modernising the fishing fleet. Perhaps we could also hear something about the activities of the White Fish Authority—I am not suggesting that at the moment, of course. May I ask the noble Lord one question—namely, whether, in paragraph 1 (3) of the Order, he would consider using the name Outer Bailey and not the name Lousy Bank, as the latter might be misunderstood by those not knowing that Lousy Bank is situated south of the Faroe Islands?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I will bring the noble Earl's suggestion to the attention of my right honourable friend. With regard to the noble Earl's first two questions, there is a comprehensive Report of the White Fish Authority published on March 31 of this year, which perhaps he has not seen and which may be of some interest to him. With regard to the modernisation of the fleet, it is going forward fairly well. I think I am right in saying that in the last seven years something like forty-seven new vessels have been built.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS (VALIDATION) BILL [H.L.]
2.57 p.m.
Order of the Day for the consideration of the Commons Amendments read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD SIMONDS): My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendments be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[The references are to Bill 71 as first printed for the House of Commons]
Clause 1, page 1, line 9, leave out ("also") and insert ("nevertheless").
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is the most technical and complicated small Bill I think I have ever had the privilege of dealing with, but I do not think I need trouble your Lordships at any great length with these Amendments. The intention of the first Amendment is simply to ensure that, where the objects of a trust are both charitable and non-charitable, the trust is to be regarded as a valid one although the funds can be applied for non-charitable as well as charitable purposes. It was suggested in another place that the word "also" created some ambiguity. I do not think it did, but if it is considered that we should make it more clear by putting in the word "nevertheless," I am content that it should be so. I think the result is precisely the same. I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 2, page 2, line 14, leave out from ("disposition") to end of line 22, and insert ("if before the sixteenth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, property comprised in, or representing that comprised in, the disposition in question or another disposition made for the objects declared by the same imperfect trust provision, or income arising from any such property, has been paid or conveyed to, or applied for the benefit of, the persons entitled by reason of the invalidity of the disposition in question or of such other disposition as aforesaid, as the case may be.")
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the next Amendment, to Clause 2 of the Bill, arises in this way. Subsection (1) defines the dispositions to which the Act is to apply, and subsection (2), as it left your Lordships' House, defined the classes of disposition to which it was not to apply. That was a provision which gave us the greatest difficulty and there was a good deal of criticism of the way in which it was drawn. I invited the noble Lords who criticised to assist by suggesting some alternative, but nobody was able to suggest one. In another place an Amendment has been made which I think helps to define more clearly the dispositions to which the Act is not to apply. Your Lordships will see the suggested words in the Commons Amend-

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ment. The clause will now provide that the Act does not apply to dispositions,
"if before the sixteenth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, property comprised in, or representing that comprised in, the disposition in question or another disposition made for the objects declared by the same imperfect trust provision, or income arising from any such property, has been paid or conveyed to, or applied for the benefit of, the persons entitled by reason of the invalidity of the disposition in question or of such other disposition as aforesaid, as the case may be."
At any rate that has the advantage of clearly defining the sort of disposition to which the Act is not to apply. Previously the definition has been in more vague words. It was not to apply to a disposition which had been treated as invalid. Now the actual disposition of the property is made the test. That is more favourable to the charity and less favourable to the persons taking the view that the trust was invalid. The Amendment commended itself to another place and I hope it commends itself to your Lordships. I beg to move that this House do now agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 4, page 4, line 7, leave out subsection (1), and insert—
("(1) Subject to the next following subsection, effect shall be given to the provisions of this Act in legal proceedings begun before its commencement, as well as in those begin afterwards.
(2) This Act shall not affect any order or judgment made or given before its commencement in legal proceedings begun before the sixteenth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, or any appeal or other proceedings consequent on any such order or judgment.")
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the last of the three Amendments which I ask your Lordships to approve is, in a sense, a corollary of the previous one. Clause 4 provides that the Act does not apply for the purpose, of any proceedings begun before December 16, 1952. An Amendment has been suggested in the terms your Lordships will see on the printed paper and subsection (1) of the clause will now run thus:
"(1) Subject to the next following subsection, effect shall be given to the provisions of this Act in legal proceedings begun before its commencement, as well as in those begun afterwards."
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That is to say, the commencement of proceedings is not to debar the Act from applying. But the new subsection (2) provides that
(2) This Act shall not affect any order or judgment made or given before its commencement in legal proceedings begun before the sixteenth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, or any appeal or other proceedings consequent on any such order or judgment."
That provides that the mere institution of proceedings shall not prevent the Act from applying, but if, in any proceedings instituted before December 16, 1952, judgment has been given before the Act comes into force, then the Act will not apply. That appears to be a fair compromise, and I hope that it will commend itself to your Lordships. I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.— (The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
3.0 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order), on the Motion moved by Lord Henderson yesterday: That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Papers, relating to the international situation.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I rise to resume the discussion on the Motion on foreign affairs which was introduced, if I may say so, in a typically admirable speech by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, yesterday. As your Lordships know, it has been the custom during recent years for the Leader of the House to speak first in foreign affairs debates, to paint the broad picture, and to leave the details to be filled in at the end by the noble Marquess who speaks for the Foreign Office in this House. We decided this time, as your Lordships know, to vary this procedure. I thought it desirable—and I am sure the House will agree—first, because the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has given, as we all know, a great deal of thought to the international problems of the day, and it is only right that he should have a chance to put them in their proper perspective; and secondly,

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as was pointed out yesterday in several speeches, because he has himself taken a prominent part in many of the events which we are discussing, both at Geneva and elsewhere, and can therefore speak with more authority than anyone else on a good many of the topics with which we have to deal. But if that is true, it is equally true that it is only the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who is in a position, from his day-to-day work in the Foreign Office, to deal with many points of detail which are likely to be raised. He has therefore been good enough to say that he will intervene again, by leave of the House, at the end of the debate.
My purpose in rising is merely to make some observations on some of the important speeches which were made yesterday, and, if I am able, to knock some of the nails home. I saw the other day, in an article in the Press, the word "turbulent" used in connection with the present world situation; and I think it is a very good word to describe the century in which we have been fortunate, or unfortunate, enough to be born. No doubt, even in the past the surface of the world situation was never quite so still and peaceful as, looking back, it now seems to us. There always were wars and rumours of wars; there always were individual nations passing through periods of national ebullience which made them a danger to their neighbours. There is nothing new about all that. What is new is the immense scale of these areas of disturbance, and the immeasurable catastrophe which must ensue if the uneasy surface of the peace is broken and total war again comes to engulf the world. As I see it, we are like people crossing an Alpine slope at a time when avalanches are apprehended. In such a situation, as I am sure any mountaineer would tell us, it is necessary to move with the utmost delicacy, because an incautious movement, even a loud shout, may precipitate catastrophe. Similarly, in the present situation, it is evident that we all have need both of a frank recognition of the extent of the dangers which are facing us and of the most patient diplomacy with which we must approach them.
That, I believe, was the main purport of a remarkable maiden speech yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Strang,
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whose analysis of the international situation, I know, so greatly impressed your Lordships. Whether it is necessary for all of us to take such an uncompromising view of the position as he did is, of course, a matter of opinion; but I think we should be unwise lightly to dismiss what he said to us. The noble Lord has spent his lifetime in the Foreign Service, and spoke from the wealth of a lifetime's experience. What, in effect, did he say? He had no illusions about Russia. He described the position there as he saw it, frankly, objectively and without passion; and the conclusion he drew—or I understood him to do, and I hope that I am not misrepresenting him—is that in the present rulers of Russia the world is faced, for the first time in modern history, with a régime based upon a philosophy, almost a religion, if one may use such a word in this connection, of which the main purpose is to establish that faith throughout the world by peaceful means or by force, as seems most feasible to the rulers of the country at the time.
It was not to be supposed, as I understood from the noble Lord, that thinking as they do, the rulers of Russia are likely to be converted easily to the alternative philosophy which is supported by us. He did not think that any early change of heart was probable. In his view, the best hope of ensuring that they would be deterred from violent action was to make them realise that any attempt to impose by force their own faith on the world, in present circumstances, was doomed to failure; and that for Russia herself the risks involved were likely to be greater than the advantages which were likely to be obtained. It must, therefore, as I understood the view of the noble Lord, be the aim of Western policy to make that fact clear to the rulers of Russia. If we succeeded, we should at least create in the immediate future pre-conditions for what the Foreign Secretary has described as "peaceful co-existence," at any rate, in a negative sense of "co-existence without conflict"; and that, as the noble Lord pointed out—and I personally agree with him—would be much better than nothing; indeed far better in these days of hydrogen bombs. For such a breathing space might well enable us—if I may be allowed to go back for a moment to my Alpine simile—to pass safely across this dangerous slope on which we are now

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embarked and come through to firmer ground.
This forthright, and indeed, if I may say so, bleak statement of the position, I think, shocked some noble Lords. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, gave a faint indication of the pain it caused him, and I believe that his view may well be shared by others. But, personally, I found it neither shocking nor unduly depressing. On the contrary, in some ways I thought it rather encouraging, for the noble Lord, Lord Strang, evidently thought that a basis for a "peaceful coexistence," in the sense that I have described it, could be found. I do not think I am misrepresenting him if I say that he thought it already exists, if we do not live in a world of rosy illusions and if only we are ready to recognise that, in the world as at present constituted, war can be prevented only if it is made too unattractive. After all, my Lords, there is nothing so very new about that policy: it is, as I see it, the old policy of striking a balance of material strength between differing combinations of nations. That was the logical conclusion, as I saw it, of the noble Lord's speech; and I find myself in considerable sympathy with that view.
I would make it clear, however, that by "a balance" in this context, I mean—and I imagine the noble Lord himself means—a true balance; that is to say, a balance so even that no one in any country, or on either side, is tempted to embark on a policy which could lead to a world war. That, I think, is an important point. If we can achieve that, though no doubt local disputes will continue—and I am afraid that nothing is likely to prevent them—I still believe that the final catastrophe of a Third World War can be avoided. I suggest, therefore, that the immediate aim of our policy must be to secure and maintain that balance. It is in relation to that main aim that we must consider our attitude to the various problems that face us to-day.
Take the European situation. I am going to say only a very few words about it; I am going to use it only as an example of my main theme. I do not propose to-day to speak in any detail about the E.D.C. The noble, Marquess, Lord Reading, has already dealt pretty fully with that matter. Moreover, I have often in the past said to your Lordships
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that I believe that the E.D.C. is by far the best method that can be devised of reducing any dangers that might flow from German rearmament; and I have in no way altered that view as a result of recent events.
As your Lordship know, a new factor has been introduced into the situation within the last few days by a Note which has been presented by the Soviet to the Western Powers, making suggestions as to the future of Europe. It would be very improper for me to attempt this afternoon to pronounce upon that Note, because it is still under consideration by the Western Governments. But I think I may say this. Judging by any proposals on this subject, from whatever quarter they may come, it is surely essential that we should remember that there is no real balance of power to-day in Europe alone. The true balance with any combination which includes Russia must include the United States; and no proposal that did not recognise that could, in my view, be regarded as a very serious contribution to peace. I would suggest that the same consideration of its relation to the essential balance must apply equally to our policy in other parts of the world. Everywhere our basic aim must be the maintenance of this essential balance between the two great blocs of which the noble Lord, Lord Strang, spoke.
That, of course, means, in plain words, a continuous, close and confident co-operation with the United States. In that, I would agree most wholeheartedly with what was said by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and the noble Lord, Lord Strang, and other noble Lords who spoke. By that, I do not mean, of course, any more than Lord Samuel did, that we must always agree with the United States on every individual issue. As was pointed out yesterday by one speaker, their minds often work in quite a different way from ours, and we must recognise that fact. The American people, for instance, reacted rather differently from us over the Geneva Conference. We—that is, the British people: I am not speaking of Government so much as of peoples—believed on balance that it was better to get a cessation of hostilities in Indo-China on the terms that were obtained, with much saved which might otherwise be lost. We feared that the alternative to such a settlement would be continued

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hostilities and probably steadily increasing tension.
On that particular issue, we had to agree, as your Lordships know, to differ from wide sections of American opinion, though those wise and moderate words by Mr. Bedell Smith which were quoted yesterday by the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, show that our point of view was at least understood. Whatever differences there may be between us and the United States from time to time on individual issues, broadly speaking I think it would be undeniable that we share the same point of view. We speak, in the widest sense of the term, the same language—not merely in words, but in the way our minds work. That is why, as I see it, that great nation, which was only lately so traditionally isolationist, has, with a wise and far-seeing statesmanship—the vital importance of which to the future of the world we are only now beginning dimly to recognise—abandoned all those past traditions and thrown in its full weight on the side of the free world. In such circumstances, I am quite certain that noble Lords on all sides of the House will agree that the closer we can work with United States, the more constant the consultation between them and us on all matters of mutual interest, the better for us, for them and for the world.
The same thing, of course, applies to our other close Ally, France—that old and tried Ally of ours with whom we fought so long side by side. I feel that one of the happiest developments of recent months has been the close collaboration which has been established between Mr. Eden and M. Mendès-France, both at Geneva and elsewhere. That, as the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, said yesterday, is a happy augury for the continued life of the Entente Cordiale which has already survived fifty years of unparalleled international storm and stress.
In conclusion because I am making only a very short intervention to-day—I should like to say a word about Egypt which, not unnaturally, occupied so large a portion of the debate yesterday. On Tuesday, as the House knows, as a culmination of months of weary discussion, agreement was reached between the two Governments touching matters at
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issue between them. In some quarters of the House yesterday that agreement was welcomed as a wise and statesmanlike act. In other quarters of the House it was regarded as a tragic defeat and a bitter humiliation. The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, indeed, went so far, when paying a tribute to Conservative Members of Parliament who opposed it, to say that they had the courage to put their country before their Party. If he will allow me to say so, I rather wish that he had not lent his great name to what I can only regard as a rather unworthy jibe. Does he really think that those of us who came to a different view have not put the interests of our country first? I should not like to think so.
If I may say so to him, I feel that it is we, rather than he, who have faced the full facts, who have weighed the full considerations which have had to be taken into account in reaching a wise and right decision. It was a remarkable fact that in all his references to Egypt yesterday the noble Lord made no attempt, so far as I could see, to weigh our position in Egypt against our position and our commitments in other parts of the world. He appeared to regard this question as a completely isolated issue, divorced from all others. I got the impression—I hope wrongly—that for him it was an article of faith that British troops were to stay in Egypt; an article of faith which needed no supporting argument and no defence. But we in the Government, and many others in the Conservative Party, who have had to study this question, have not been able to afford to take such a detached and so Olympian an attitude as that. We knew that our military resources are stretched to the utmost. We have troops in Germany under a definite obligation to N.A.T.O. We have troops in Malaya; we have troops in Korea; there are troops in Kenya and in Guiana. We have a far larger number of troops abroad than ever before in peace time in the whole history of our country, and we also had 80,000 troops in Egypt for the defence of the Suez Canal and the stabilisation of our position in the Middle East. We were bound to ask ourselves: was it really necessary to have so large a number as that for this purpose?
The conclusion to which we were driven—and I think it was borne out by the military opinion that we sought—was that what made these forces necessary

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(and we were told that it was necessary) was the fact that the Base was actually situated on the Canal. And then we were bound to ask ourselves the further question: was the Canal itself, under modern conditions, the only, or indeed the best, Base, strategically, for the performance of a task of safeguarding passage through the Canal and exercising a stabilising influence in the Middle East? As I understood it, to that question the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, would unhesitatingly have answered, "Yes." I think it is extremely doubtful whether modern strategists would have held their view. I was reminded, as I listened to those two noble Lords yesterday of a famous remark made by the late Lord Baldwin of Bewdley, then Mr. Baldwin (not Lord Hankey's Mr. Baldwin, but our own) that "the frontiers of Britain are now the Rhine" I could not help feeling that to the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, that remark was very shocking indeed. If they were consistent with their views about the Suez Canal, they would no doubt have retorted that it was the white cliffs of Dover that had to be defended and it was there that our Forces should be massed. Lord Baldwin's remark has, I believe, been generally approved by students of modern strategy—indeed, I think it is generally considered to have been one of the wisest things he ever said.
Similarly, I suggest in this particular case, with all deference to noble Lords, that, if the troops were to be of any value for the purposes for which they were intended, it was quite useless to pin them down permanently on the banks of the Canal itself. To be of real value in the Middle East there was, as the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, said, need of mobility and flexibility; and I am sure that is right. The noble Lord, Lard Killearn, spoke of a "vacuum," as if we were abandoning the Middle East altogether. There is no question of a vacuum. As I understand it, we are likely, when this operation is completed, to have just as many troops in the Middle East as we had before the war—and probably more. The difference will be that they will not be in the same place.
Actually, I believe that, in their heart of hearts, what has been worrying noble
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Lords like the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, and those who think like them, has been not the threat to the Canal or to the Base, but the fact that in any circumstances our troops should leave Egypt. Here, I think there are a good many of us who would have considerable sympathy with them. We are all sad that our troops are leaving Egypt where they have had many happy memories in the past, but we believe that their presence there in the times to which I have referred has probably been to the advantage of both our countries. I should not dissent from that at all. But that is a very different thing from saying that it is the best thing for them to stay there now, living in conditions of the utmost inconvenience, in a kind of armed camp, away from their wives and families, amid a hostile population. That, I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, would hardly redound to the prestige of Britain. I truly and sincerely hope that these arrangements which have now been made may lead to a better relationship with Egypt than we have had in recent times.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, may I ask whether the noble Marquess has considered the alternative proposal that I made. I asked why we did not have some deployment of these troops in other territories, leaving some men to form a protection for the Base, within easy reach. They could be easily stationed in Egypt. I never wanted 80,000 troops in Egypt: it is too many.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I quite appreciate that. But I would only say to the noble Lord that all the military advice we have received was that it was impossible to keep the Base, the attitude of Egypt being what it has been, with less than the number of troops that we had there. It would have been no good to withdraw half the troops and to attempt to do the same job with them under similar conditions. That is why we had to make this difficult decision.
LORD KILLEARN: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess, but those of us who have taken the line which we have taken over this matter have agreed that it is not in the least necessary to have 80,000 men there. We have been so told; but we challenge the view of the General Staff. We think that 80,000

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is a gross over-estimate and we still think so. I quoted a speech of some years ago in another place to show that it is not always the case that the views of the General Staff are right or sacrosanct.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Nobody has ever said that the views of experts are sacrosanct. There is no doubt that, in this particular case, it is in the light of the advice that we have been given—and it is the advice to which the very important person to whom the noble Lord has referred has come round—we have been able—
LORD KILLEARN: Under possible Treasury pressure.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Nonsense!
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think the individual to whom reference has been made is at all susceptible to Treasury pressure. I would hesitate to say such a thing, but, if I had to choose between the advice of the noble Lord and the advice of the General Staff on military matters, I should be inclined perhaps to take their advice. In diplomatic matters, of course, the position would be different.
LORD KILLEARN: I do not want to pursue this point. The only point is the one I made—and it is as true now as it was in 1946—that no Government should shelter behind the advice of the General Staff. In fact, if I remember the actual context, I think the line was taken that the reasons of the General Staff should be submitted to Parliament. That is the only point. Obviously, my view against that of the General Staff is as nothing. I admit it fully.
The MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I agree that no Government should shelter behind the General Staff, but that does not involve generally disagreeing with them.
LORD HANKEY: The General Staff advised against the evacuation of Cairo and Alexandria.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think we can carry this point much further. We can all retain our views about the General Staff, but let me say, too, that it is not merely the views of title General Staff that have influenced Her Majesty's Government. We have had to
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get the views of the General Staff—any Government would have to do that—but it is right that we should take the full responsibility for the decision that has been taken. That is ours and ours alone. On balance of considerations, therefore, I am sure personally that the decision was right, and on a clear view of all the manifold necessities that confront us at the present time I believe it will be approved by history.
Now I would return for a moment to my main theme. As I said, I believe with the noble Lord, Lord Strang, that in the present situation of the world, with its two conflicting blocs, Communist and anti Communist, the only practicable policy is to preserve some sort of balance between them. Only in that way, I believe, for the time being at any rate, will peaceful co-existence be possible. But within that main policy there are no doubt many steps that can be taken to eliminate causes of strife. There can be more trade between East and West, there can be more communication between East and West. Co-existence, as I see it, means what it says. It means not complete segregation one from another; it means, so far as possible, living together. Everything possible in this direction I am sure we should do.
Nor is that, as I see it, the only way in which, in these days in which we live, nations are likely to be deterred from major wars. It seems to me—I know we are venturing on rather controversial ground—that the new weapons which have been discovered, by the very fact that they have such an appalling power of destruction and that in these days of air power no nation, however vast, can be immune from their effects, may of themselves, paradoxical though it may seem, prove an additional buttress to peace. I am not asking anybody else to believe that. I see the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, shaking his head.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The noble Marquess must have noticed the alarming reports which leaked out in America of the views of the American General Staff on this matter.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: We have just been told there is no necessity for Governments to take the advice of General Staffs. At any rate, I am expressing it only as my belief. I believe from what knowledge I have of this

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subject—and I have now a certain amount of knowledge—that no nation that is not completely insane would lightly run the risks now involved in total war. Let us then, with other like-minded Powers within the ambit of the United Nations, stand strongly together, not blinking the dangers of our time, but cautiously and patiently working to avert them. In this way, I firmly believe, we may, like the Alpine party to which I referred earlier, without disaster, pass by the present dangerous slopes on to the firmer ground that lies beyond.
3.32 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I know the House will welcome the innovation which has been introduced by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House in his having spoken at this stage in the debate rather than at the beginning. He has heard what has been said by a large number of other speakers and it is of value to the House as a whole that we should know his views and his reactions to those earlier speeches. This has so far been a very remarkable debate, in that we have had a large diversity of opinion freely and frankly expressed in a way which justifies, in my view more than anything else, the existence of this House. On a memorable and most important occasion such as this—and I hardly remember a period since I have been a Member when the position has been so urgent and important in relation to international affairs—it is important that there, should be a forum from which people can speak freely and frankly in what they believe to be far the best interests of the country.
I want to comment on a few of the subjects—I cannot hope to deal with them all—which have been dealt with in the course of this debate. I should like to say first a few words about the Geneva Conference. I was rather surprised that on this subject there was less controversy than I had expected. I had expected to hear from some quarters the opinion that there had been appeasement, that we had given way to the Communists and that we had made a very bad transaction. The only voice which sounded a little like that was that of the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, who did express some doubts about the outcome of that Conference. He first accused my noble friend, Lord Henderson, of having
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spoken too favourably about it in terms which he said could not be justified. I have read my noble friend's speech again and I must say that I can find not one single sentence that would justify such an opinion about it. Indeed, subject to what the noble Marquess who is going to reply will say, I thought the views on the Geneva Conference of my noble friend and those of the noble Marquess were very similar indeed.
The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, referred to the fact that we had set the seal upon China as a first-class Power. Really, a Power which has a population of 600,000,000 does need the setting of a seal to convert it into a first-class Power. It is, I should have thought, by the very size of its country and the very wealth of its population, a first-class Power, and it would be exceeding folly not to recognise that fact. He also said that China had gained important concessions; but, after all, we must recognise—and I am sure that the noble Marquess who is going to reply is the first to recognise—that in these particular negotiations we were not negotiating entirely from strength. We were in a position where, if it had been so desired, the result might have been very much worse than it was. I want to pay my tribute, as others have done, to the great skill and patience with which Mr. Eden conducted those negotiations and to congratulate him about the outcome. I think it is a really remarkable achievement. Of course, it could not have happened at all but for the co-operation of all parties; and I hope I may be allowed to be frank and say that, at any rate so far as these negotiations are concerned, some tribute is due to our opponents, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Chou En-lai, without whose co-operation it would not have been possible to arrive at any agreement at all. But, looking at the facts as we know them, and realising that what one has lost on the battlefield one cannot redress entirely at the conference table, I believe that Mr. Eden has done extremely well and is to be congratulated.
Three things stand out as a result of this successful negotiation. The first is that it is possible to negotiate with the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Agreement is not necessarily impossible and we have not always to be making all the concessions. The exercise of patience and skill and, I agree with the noble

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Marquess who has just spoken, also an equal balance of power (I think that is a most important factor in negotiation), can together lead to successful negotiations. It would be a great mistake to assume that negotiations with the countries behind the Iron Curtain are bound to be unsuccessful.
Another outstanding thing of which to take note—and here I am perhaps treading on dangerous ground—is the fact that this agreement was arrived at in the absence of the United States of America. Now I do not want to say for a moment—it is not part of my case—that that is a good thing. On the contrary, I agree with every word that has been spoken in this debate about the great importance of our co-operating entirely with the United States. But I do feel that, in a sense, to have carried through these negotiations without the United States of America, and no doubt in opposition to their wishes, does free the soul of this country. It puts us in a much higher position. I think it has raised our status with the world as a whole. I feel that we can look the world in the face much better by reason of the fact that we have taken an independent line in this matter and have been shown to be right, than if we had acted against our better judgment and in accordance with the views of the United States. Indeed, I believe our prestige in the world has been immensely enhanced as a result of these negotiations. My third point is that, having regard to the success that has been achieved at Geneva, there is every hope for recommencing the negotiations as regards Korea, and with far better chances of success than we have had previously. That is all I think it necessary to say about Geneva.
I should now like to say a few words about Egypt. I support the decision which the Government have arrived at as regards Egypt. I do not think it is materially different from the decision which the Labour Government had arrived at in 1950, a decision which was so seriously criticised. I have not available the terms which were being discussed at that time. The noble Marquess who is to reply may be able to correct me if I am wrong, but my impression is that those terms were not at all different from those which, quite rightly, have been
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accepted by Her Majesty's Government. I am not aware that the circumstances were any different at that time than they are to-day. No doubt the Government are to be congratulated in this respect: that the two years that have elapsed and the change in conditions in Egypt may have made their task a little more difficult than the task of the Labour Government; but, at any rate, I am delighted that they have effected a settlement on terms which I think are again the best that could have been achieved and which, on the whole, are reasonable to both parties.
My noble friend Lord Henderson intervened in the speech of the noble Marquess and asked for certain information as to the meaning of guarantees of freedom of navigation through the Canal. I did not think that the reply of the noble Marquess was entirely satisfactory. I should have thought that "freedom of navigation" meant exactly what it said. There is apparently no qualification in the Heads of Agreement, and I should have thought that that phrase must mean that there would be freedom of navigation for all ships sailing through the Suez Canal, whatever their destination and whatever their contents. But apparently there is a reservation, and I should like to be much clearer than I am at the moment as to how it comes about and in what form this reservation is going to be left. The reservation concerns, of course, the right of the Egyptians to carry out a blockade of any ships that are carrying goods and which have Israel as their destination. But if we are going to make an agreement for the freedom of the Canal, surely there ought not to be any exceptions in that respect. I hope Her Majesty's Government have not said their last word on that subject, and are not going to leave in the air this most vital question for the peace of that part of the world.
There is one other point that I should like to mention in connection with Egypt, and I am sure the noble Marquess will be aware of it—namely, that there is a considerable apprehension in Israel as to what is going to be the effect on them of this Agreement. Are we, as part of the arrangement, to provide arms to the Egyptians? I understand that the United States of America are going to do so. Is it not a fact, and have not the

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Egyptians said it openly, that it is their intention at the first opportunity to have another round in Israel? If the noble Marquess can give us some assurances on that matter, I am sure he will be rendering a great service in regard to the peace of that part of the world, because there is great apprehension in those quarters. In that connection may I ask him this question too? We are entering into an arrangement by which if any of the members of the Arab League are attacked we will discuss with them the question of going to their assistance. As the noble Marquess knows, there are daily incidents between Jordan and Israel. Shots are being fired, and it is not always easy to see from which side aggression takes place. Suppose that it were held that in the course of these frontier incidents the aggression had started with Israel, in the view of the noble Marquess would that be a case where we might be required to intervene? I agree that we have already committed ourselves with the United States and with France to preserve the peace in that part of the world, but we do not seem to be able to do that very effectively.
The next subject on which I should like to say a word is Germany. I am not going to repeat a speech I made last March on the question of German rearmament. I think those noble Lords who did me the honour of listening to me will know where I stand on that subject, and I have had no cause to change my views up till now. I will not repeat what I said then, if for no other reason than that the case was put so admirably yesterday by my noble friend Lord Archibald, and I do not think it needs repeating. But I recognise that events are moving on and that Her Majesty's Government have taken a certain line on this question. I understood the noble Marquess yesterday to say that if by some date, roughly August 15, the French Government had not ratified E.D.C., then we and the United States would feel at liberty to act. I gathered, however, from a subsequent intervention by the noble Marquess, that all he meant was that we should then discuss with France the question as to what steps should be taken.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF READING): I said that at the beginning, and repeated it later.
LORD SILKIN: I know the noble Marquess repeated it; but I looked at his speech again and I did not gather that that was what he said originally. I do not want to make any point on that; I accept that if he did not say it as clearly as would enable me to understand it, it may have been my own fault and not his. But that is the intention. Of course, as an occupying Power, France has an equal right with ourselves and the United States to object to the grant of sovereignty to the West German Government. The matter is, I take it, perfectly open. These discussions, of which I do not complain at all, will take place, and, as I understand it, the position will be perfectly open. Perhaps in his reply the noble Marquess will confirm that there is no, commitment beyond the view that has been expressed and that the matter will really be discussed with France on the basis that some action has to be taken or that it is desirable for some action to be taken.
I will put to the noble Marquess a question put by Mr. Attlee in another place. If, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, it becomes necessary to take action, either contrary to the view of the French Government or, alternatively, along a course not so far discussed or considered by Parliament, will Parliament be convened in order that the matter may be discussed before any final decision is made? The noble Marquess will be aware that feelings upon this matter are exceedingly strong. In the debate last March I was relieved to hear the Leader of the House say that he approached the question of German rearmament with considerable doubts, and that he had arrived at his conclusion on balance. I have arrived at a contrary conclusion, also on balance. Anyone who does not see the difficulties either way must be very blind to realities. There are difficulties whichever course one adopts; but the country as a whole is greatly divided on this question. It would be quite wrong for Her Majesty's Government to take a final decision on this matter during the Recess without Parliament having an opportunity of expressing a view.
On the Soviet Note, my last subject, I recognise that the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Strang, was a maiden speech; and one is in some difficulty in dealing with it in a non-controversial manner. The noble Lord speaks with tremendous

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authority, and he made a most important speech. In some ways it is a pity that he had not broken the ice a day or two earlier, so that his speech could have been put into the arena. As it is, one is a little hamstrung. The noble Lord, Lord Strang, put forward a view of "peaceful co-existence" which I regard as the most important subject discussed yesterday in your Lordships' House. What do we mean by "peaceful co-existence"? The noble Lord appeared to take an exceedingly gloomy view. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, said that he did not take quite so depressing a view, but I thought that his view was not materially different from that of the noble Lord. Both take the view that the Soviet Union have made their plans; that they are determined, by fair means or otherwise, to spread Communism throughout the world and that that is the thing we have to accept. Those noble Lords feel that if we are strong enough so that the two forces—the Soviet force and the resisting force—are equally balanced, Russia will not be so foolish as to start a war; and that the right thing in present conditions is to strive to create a kind of balance (obviously a position of unstable equilibrium) and thus in some way prevent the actual outbreak of war.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I went rather further in my last words: I said that I believed it important that we should do anything we could to achieve better relations. I suggested increased East-West trade and communications, and a general whittling down of the Iron Curtain. I have not yet seen any evidence of a change of heart in the Soviet Government. I do not think I am alone in that view.
LORD SILKIN: But the noble Marquess starts with the same premise as the noble Lord, Lord Strang. Is it really going to be in the least effective to start with the idea that "This is what Lenin said," and "This is what the Soviet Union intend?" Does the noble Marquess really think that buying a few more goods from the Soviet Union, or selling them more, or even having a few drinks with them, will make any material difference in their outlook? I find that difficult to believe. The real difficulty is the premise from which we start. If we start with the view that their intention is
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to spread the doctrine of Communism throughout the world then the only logical course is to hold war off as far as possible. There is nothing else we can do. We shall certainly not effect a change of heart in that way. That is a premise held, quite sincerely, by many people; but there is a premise held by others, equally sincerely. Either may be wrong or partly wrong.
I do not believe that it is the intention of the Union or China to spread the gospel of Communism throughout the world. They will, of course, resist any attempt to encroach upon their ideology, but I believe that to-day they are prepared to "live and let live," and have no intention of spreading the gospel of Communism beyond their own confines. The negotiations for disarmament, for some kind of accommodation in Europe and for settling the German question can have a real meaning only if I am right. If we do not believe that they intend to act peacefully, to "live and let live," then there is no point in negotiations. The attitude of the United States is more logical than ours, for they frankly believe the first doctrine and are acting accordingly; they have no desire to negotiate and no confidence in negotiation. We are taking a different view, and it would be more realistic, if we take the view of the noble Marquess, if we acted in accordance with it. Nobody is prepared to speak with dogmatism on that view. The Soviet Union may be really desirous of living at peace and may have no intention of forcing their own ideology upon other people. It is better, surely, to work on that hypothesis until the contrary is proved.
That seems to me to be a justification for making every possible attempt to arrive at a peaceful accommodation with the Soviet Union, and even to try to secure a considerable measure of disarmament. After all, the view of the noble Marquess of a balance of forces is really a counsel of despair. Where there are two enormous forces, equally balanced, in the world, one can never be sure, with the best will in the world, that something might not happen to cause one to topple over and bring about the disaster which we all fear. Therefore, I feel that the most valuable thing Her Majesty's Government can do at the present time is to persevere with the policy of securing disarmament to the

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fullest possible extent—complete disarmament, if possible. If they could achieve that, it would be a solution to the German problem as well. I had hoped, therefore, that the noble Marquess and the Government would have looked at the Russian Note with rather more sympathy than the words in the noble Marquess's speech would lead us to believe, when he talks of a voluminous Note.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I said "voluminous." This is the second time I have been called to account for having used the word "voluminous" —as if there were some sinister significance about it. I think the Note is voluminous, because it is sixteen pages long. In my view, for the normal diplomatic Note, that is voluminous. I think I may leave it at that.
LORD SILKIN: The noble Marquess need not be so bitter about it.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I cannot understand the criticism of the word "voluminous."
LORD SILKIN: Coupled with the other adjectives he used about the Note, I took it to mean that he was being extremely critical of it.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: The only other adjective I used was "new."
LORD SILKIN: Oh, no, if the noble Marquess will look at his speech, he will find that he used a word like "aspersion."
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I said we found the Note was in terms of asperity.
LORD SILKIN: That does not sound to me as if the noble Marquess and the Government are going to give this Note the sympathetic consideration which I think ought to be given to an offer to negotiate.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think the noble Lord is making a false point here. He suggested that something I said indicated that we are not going to give the Note fair consideration. In my criticism the use of the word "asperity" was directed not towards the substance but to the form of the Note. I said it was unusual in the asperity of its language. That does not mean that we
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are not going to give it careful consideration.
LORD SILKIN: I am very glad to hear it, but with the greatest respect, I think the noble Marquess would have been better advised, during the period in which the Note is being discussed, not to use language about it which sounded at all critical. If it is intended to reject the Note, I cart understand that one can use all sorts of reasons for doing so, But during the period when the Note is sub judice, so to speak, I should have thought it would have been better to leave it alone, because it does lead to a certain amount of misunderstanding if, in the end, it turns out to be the Government's intention not to carry on with the negotiations. That is all I want to say. The debate has shown one thing: that we are all united in our desire to achieve peace with those countries with whom we are not on the best of terms at the present moment. So far as my judgment goes, the events of the last few years have shown that it is possible, with patience, with skill and with good will, to bring about results which will bring that end nearer. Having achieved one success at Geneva, I sincerely hope that Her Majesty's Government will not tire of good works and will continue, however difficult it may seem for them at times, with the objective of securing similar agreements on all other matters which are subjects of dispute.
4.6 p.m.
LORD LAYTON: My Lords, I shall not attempt to cover the tremendous area covered by the debate up to date. Certainly I have no intention of adding to the growing Press file of the Ambassador of Peru. Like the previous speaker, I shall refer to only one or two points. In regard to the evacuation of the Canal area, speaking for myself and for the Liberal Peers who sit on these Benches, we consider, on balance, that the military arguments are in favour of the course taken by the Government, and that that decision is immensely strengthened by the enormous difficulty in maintaining a base in a hostile country. Those negative considerations, though important, are perhaps in the long run even less important than the positive consideration that a settlement at this time should lead to infinitely better and more friendly relations between Britain and

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Egypt; and if those friendly relations really develop we may be considerably nearer the point where it will be possible to establish an international defence system for the Middle East, not with the hostility but with the approval of the parties concerned and with such assistance as they are able to give.
I am very much tempted to pick up the admirable speech of my noble leader, Lord Samuel, yesterday. His broad survey of the last fifty years and his projection into the future was interesting and inspiring and we should all reflect upon them. I should like to add one point to what he said. Speaking of the possibility of the development of a Second Elizabethan Age, he expressed the hope that the younger generation were going to achieve that. I do not believe that that will happen unless Europe contrives to change its character from that which has been responsible for the outbreak of two world wars in the first half of this century. My noble friend put a most powerful case for the development of unity in the sense of the positive collaboration—military, economic and cultural—of the peoples of Europe who, after all, have spread civilisation throughout the world.
There was another background speech which has been referred to by almost every speaker since—I refer to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Strang. It has been commented upon by both speakers this afternoon, who have taken different views of his main thesis—which, in the shortest possible terms, is that the co-existence of the East and West is possible in the sense of an absence of war, but that in present circumstances it is not possible in the sense of harmonious collaboration, so long the declared objectives of Russian and Communist policy remain as they are. Both the previous speakers find that a pessimistic view, and I do, too. But the qualification I should make of it is this—and it is not perhaps something that can be concretely expressed—that it leads to the position that all we can positively do is to maintain our strength.
But there is something else. Speaking for myself, I have a deep conviction that no totalitarian system can for ever go on moulding human beings, containing, that divine spark, into a standard pattern, and permanently prevent independence of
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thinking and the desire for liberty from springing up again. If the democratic and Christian ideals underlying civilisation are really nearer to the truth than Marxism, sooner or later changes will take place within the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Somehow the change will come, and the problem will be resolved from within. I believe that there were signs of something like that happening after the death of Stalin. The change of policy that appeared to take place seemed to me to emerge from something that was created by the sentiment and opinion of the people—of course, this is all speculation. However, I should just like to make the point that I do not see the end of this very bleak road unless a change comes from within. I do not know whether it will be a long or a short time coming. But science and the elimination of distance are on our side, because there is no way of keeping ideas out of the air; it is not possible always and for ever to isolate an area and prevent it from knowing what is happening in the rest of the world. I put that as my personal qualification to the otherwise pessimistic thesis of the noble Lord, Lord Strang.
From that I should like to go on to a reference to the Indo-China settlement. I am afraid that some of my friends on the Labour Benches are apt to indulge in a little wishful thinking and draw a wrong conclusion from what happened at Geneva. There are, of course, good features about the settlement at Geneva. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, referred to the cease-fire, and we must all take that as a most important fact. Then there is the recovery of the prestige of European diplomacy, and particularly of the diplomacy of Britain and France. In the case of France, there has been something of a revolution of feeling since the change of Government took place. From the long-term point of view, that is extremely important. Furthermore, I believe it is a good thing that this important achievement has come about independently of the United States. I hope your Lordships will not think for a moment that I underrate the importance of close relations with the United States, but I am convinced that there should be a diplomatic movement which springs from its own internal rightness and strength. That, I believe, has improved the situation diplomatically. United as

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both Britain and America are, that united action policy should spring from, and draw its strength from, all the sources of thought and experience of the free world, and not merely from copying what the United States thinks to be the right thing at the time. The very fact that we call it "the free world" means that there are various streams of thought and various experience which can contribute to the whole.
But there is another aspect of this Agreement. When full account is taken of the positive advantages, there are also some disadvantages, which were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha. The word "success" has been used—it was used by my noble friend Lord Samuel. It is in certain ways a success; but I wonder whether, if Asia is considered alone, the balance sheet is a positive or a negative one. In any case, I have a feeling that the use of the word "success" is perhaps strange when such a suggestion is made, as was made in the New Statesman this week. They say:
"Is there any good reason why renewed negotiation with the Russians should not stand as good a prospect of success as we had in Indo-China?"
Before we accept that point of view, surely we must remember that in Indo-China the free world has had a setback; it has been in retreat. Secondly, although by great patience and diplomatic skill we "got away with"—and I think this is the right way to put it—the lesser of two evils, that fact is, without question, due to the armed might of the United States in the background. To borrow a phrase from the leader writer in this week's Economist:
"British diplomacy was pivoting on a fulcrum of American power."
That is the sheer and naked truth of the situation. We may hope that we are in a period when agreements of the type so well described by the noble Lord, Lord Strang, can be made with the Soviet world, and we must never relax in the slightest degree in our efforts to reach those agreements. But in the world as it is to-day, all these hopes depend upon our understanding that both military and moral strength are necessary—and I underline that it is both military and moral strength that we must have.
This brings me to the question of E.D.C. and the rearming of Germany.
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Several speakers have expressed their opinion about the prospects of the ratification of E.D.C. We are all conscious of the deep emotions that are aroused in France by this question, and I should not care to be dogmatic about what will happen. However, if I had to make a guess, I should expect that the French Prime Minister will ask for ratification of the Treaty in August, but with some qualifications, which may take the form of a protocol, modifying perhaps some of the supranational factors in the Treaty; and I should guess that he will get the ratification from the French Assembly. What I think we may certainly take for granted is that the French Assembly will be asked to reach a decision next month. I should like to give some of the reasons why the need for a decision is so desperately pressing. First, the existing cleavage in France is politically devastating to that country, and all the leaders of France thoroughly understand the tremendous drawback under which at the moment they are suffering. Secondly, for many months the cleavage on E.D.C. has been preventing the attention of France from being devoted to some extremely pressing internal political and economic problems. Thirdly, there is a warning against delay in the situation across the Atlantic, where there is an election pending—an election which will be in full swing at the end of September.
That election may have important effects and repercussions in Europe. The pundits and the forecasters are freely asserting, and asserting very positively, that the Republican Party are going to lose control of both Houses in Congress—in the lower House by a large majority against them, and in the Senate by a small majority against them. That situation would create difficulties for the President, even if he were of the political facility and ability of President Roosevelt. If, when the election takes place, the situation in Europe has not yet clarified and is still seen from across the Atlantic to be in confusion, it may well happen that many of the Congressmen and Senators who are returned in November will return having taken on awkward commitments with their constituents with regard to Europe, and particularly, perhaps, with regard to France. I know that that situation is known and appreciated by many of the leaders of French opinion.

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Those are some of the reasons why I think that the issue will certainly be brought to a decision next month. There are others. The technical position, too, about the E.D.C. is complicated. It might seem at first sight that there is an easy alternative by bringing Germany into N.A.T.O., but the objections and the difficulties of that course are well known in this House, and I need not develop them; I have referred to them many times before. Clearly, if Germany were to be brought into the N.A.T.O., it would be necessary to have important modifications of that organisation. Indeed, it might almost be said that it would have to be re-negotiated on a basis which would make a different covenant for the European members from that which applies to the United States. All that would involve delay.
There is also the position of other participants. We sometimes forget that the E.D.C. Treaty has been ratified by four of the six countries, and that one of them has had to go to work to alter its Constitution to enable it to do so; and that our near neighbours of Holland and Belgium, after immense heart-searching, faced with precisely the same problems of being overshadowed and brought into the ambit of a strong Germany, have nevertheless decided that that is, all things considered, the best course to take, from the point of view of their own future security. All that apparatus of legislation has taken place, and to throw it overboard entirely and start again from scratch would be extremely unfortunate and undesirable. I think that that consideration was not entirely forgotten by the leaders of French opinion.
Hesitation and delay are most important from the point of view of Germany. The effects of the Second World War are fading with the years. Neutralisation is an attempt to put off decision. It is not a final answer; it is postponement. It is a solution which involves policing Germany by British, French and American troops. Nobody has yet suggested an adequate economic counterpoise to the burden which would be carried by Britain, France and the United States in defending Germany and in maintaining their troops on the German Eastern frontier. It is impossible to conceive the situation ten years' hence, and even if it were possible, neutralisation would be
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only a postponement. The lessons of history, surely, are very clear indeed. Such a solution is conceivable only on the assumption that, at the end of it, we shall have arrived at a substantial, perhaps complete, disarmament agreement with the East. But in the light of past history, is that assumption really tenable? Is it sane to base our policy on such a far-reaching assumption? We have only to think of what happened after Versailles, and our promise to the Germans to disarm, to realise how very brittle any such hope is. On the short view, at the moment the danger signals are out in the Far East. Planes are being shot down and the Korean problem is unsolved. The best that we can hope is that the conviction of the great Powers that war would not suit them will suffice to prevent the outbreak of a Third World War, and to ensure that the sparks are trodden out before they lead to an explosion or a conflagration.
Looking a little further ahead, there is still some ground for misgiving. We have travelled a great way in the international sphere since the war. International discussion, collaboration and interchange have developed enormously, but there is some reason for fearing that the momentum is slowing down. The danger is that we may have reached the peak and that, provided there is no renewed fear of war, we may slip back into the old, established ways. I believe, for the reason I have given, that the United States are going to have a difficult year politically. If E.D.C. is rejected, Europe will be starting its negotiations all over again, and in a very disordered state. But if it is approved, then the bringing into existence of the European Army can be made the basis on which to develop further in the direction of unity—not necessarily precisely in the directions already planned, but in similar directions.
I think our best hope is that, next year and in the years immediately ahead, the great areas of the world will be free from disturbance, and so give time for consultation. There are good reasons why Russia and China should wish to turn their eyes inward at this stage. To a certain extent, the United States will be preoccupied. If France takes the decision with fairly general consent—as there is certainly a hope that she may do—then, during that breathing space, the evolution and development of Europe which

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is so essential could take place. I believe that the passing of the E.D.C. Treaty is the crucial issue. I believe that for many reasons. I believe that military solidarity, with economic solidarity growing up behind, gives the military and moral strength to Western Germany which will provide the condition for an understanding—not necessarily of peace in the full sense that the noble Lord, Lord Strang, was talking about—but for an understanding, a standstill if you like, between the free world and the Communist world. It is the best basis for getting it. When we have that understanding—and only then—shall we have the basis for disarmament. In that basis, and on that basis only, is there the possibility of the unification of Germany. Therefore, I suggest to your Lordships that ratification of the E.D.C. in something very like its present form is the first of the steps which will lead down the long vista that may end in permanent peace.
4.31 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, if I may do so without seeming to patronise him—and certainly it is the last thing that I am in a position to do—I should like to add my congratulations to Those which my noble friend Lord Strang has already received from your Lordships for his brilliant and penetrating analysis of this turbulent world in which we are living. Like others of your Lordships, I have had the opportunity in the past of working closely with the Foreign Service, and I have never taken the view, which I know is fashionable in many quartets, that merely because members of the Foreign Service are, in the main and in general, men of outstanding ability, great attainment and vast experience, therefore, and for that reason alone, they are poltroons and cowards whose advice must be brushed aside and rejected on every occasion. Having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Strang, yesterday I am fortified in my belief that in this case the view which is, as I say, fashionable in some quarters is not the right one.
Just now, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, thought that the noble Lord, Lord Strang, took too gloomy a view. He differed from Lord Strang's view of what was meant by "peaceful co-existence." The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, asked: What do we mean by "peaceful co-existence"? He gave,
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perhaps, a more comfortable answer than Lord Strang. But I do not think the real question we have to ask ourselves is: What do we mean by "peaceful co-existence"? I think what we have to ask ourselves is: What do the Russians mean "peaceful co- existence"? My noble friend the Leader of the House, earlier this afternoon attributed the phrase "peaceful co-existence" to the Foreign Secretary. I speak subject to correction, but I do not think it was the Foreign Secretary who invented the phrase "peaceful co-existence"; I believe that it was Marshal Stalin.
I sincerely wish that I could share the optimistic view of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and I have no doubt others of your Lordships, about this last Russian approach. It may be that some noble Lords feel that it is probably a genuine approach. I am afraid that I do not believe that for a single moment. This new Russian Note, this "voluminous" Note, seems to me to be too "pat" and too "slick." It seems to me to be so patent an attempt to sow dissension between the peoples of the West that I think we ought to beware. I was very glad to hear the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, say yesterday, at the end of his speech, that Her Majesty's Government, whilst they had not finally made up their minds, were treating this Russian initiative with some reserve. After all, it is not as if we were without experience of Agreements made with Communism. Our experience has been bitter and, I think, shows that Communism uses an Agreement not as a bridge of confidence and friendship but as the base for further hostilities. Before we agree to pick up the hand of friendship which has been offered to us again, I think we might look over our shoulder at some of those who took that hand before—Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example. A new Agreement, which we all welcome, has been made with Communism over Indo-China. Let us see what happens there first. Let us see what happens in Indo-China before we agree to follow that success—and it was a success—by trying to make a new Agreement in Europe.
I want, primarily, to speak this afternoon about the Egyptian Agreement. I know, and the Government know, that there is much disquietude in the public at large over this Agreement. There is

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much misgiving among public men, men of great repute, like the two noble Lords who addressed the House yesterday, two noble Lords whose experience is so great that one must certainly pay heed to what they say. There are friends of my own in another place, whom I know well and whose judgment I respect, who have a first-hand knowledge of this area that I cannot claim, and who have considered the problem of the defence of the Mediterranean far more deeply than I have. I cannot conceal from myself that there is a considerable body of criticism of the Government's actions—considerable in every sense, in its experience and in its detailed knowledge of Egypt and of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, I am profoundly convinced that the Government are right. That does not mean that I, any more than the Leader of the House, like the circumstances which have necessitated this Agreement; but my view is that in the circumstances this Agreement is necessary.
If I may say so, without disrespect to the two noble Lords whom I know to take the opposite view, I believe that in the final analysis their attitude is based far more upon emotion than upon reason. I say that because I share those emotions. I resent tremendously the changes which have come about in the past generation in the might and power of Britain. I remember the days when peace was secure, or seemed to be secure, behind the shield of the Royal Navy, and when those who were called, impolitely and, I think, improperly, "the lesser breeds without the law" knew their place and kept it. I regret the passing of those days. I think they were better days than these. I think they were better for us and for the world. I resent the loss of the Indian Empire and, in particular, the loss of the Indian Army, whose stabilising influence would have been so great to-day. I resent the fact that Egypt has turned against us, who are, in a sense, the creators of modern Egypt, and who did raise Egypt from the dust.
I have the feeling that the attitude of many of the critics of the Egyptian Agreement is really based on that kind of emotion which I have tried to describe. It is as though all the frustrations and humiliations and disappointments of the past generation, and especially of the past ten years, have come to a head in
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a determination at all costs to cling on to this particular patch of sand. It is a gesture, as it were, of defiance at the unkindness of fate. It is a gesture not without nobility, but I do not believe that it is a gesture of much practical value. I can well understand the feelings of those who oppose this Agreement, but I cannot see as clearly as they do the facts which justify their opposition.
First of all, it appears that the Base is of relatively little military value. I understand that it is useless without local labour; and local labour is not, in fact, available. I understand that it is useless if it is in the centre of a hostile population. But it is in the centre of a hostile population. I understand that a concentration of this kind would probably be highly dangerous if war broke out, and that in the meantime it is highly wasteful. These, my Lords, are matters on which I cannot form for myself an independent judgment, but I understand that, generally speaking, what I have tried to say represents the best military opinion of the day. As my noble friend said earlier, I should be only too glad to defer to the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, on other matters, but on matters of military judgment I think I would sooner defer to those whose experience of military matters is more direct.
I cannot, as I have said, form for myself an independent judgment on these military aspects of the problem, but there are other aspects of it on which I think I can form judgment, though I do not claim for a moment that it is necessarily a right judgment. To maintain the Base as it is at present constituted is obviously a serious drain upon our manpower and a serious drain upon our economic situation. But we are told (we were told by Lord Hankey this afternoon) that we can ease the strain by reducing the size of the Base and the number of troops stationed there. Surely that must be sheer fantasy. It is surely the most extraordinary argument. Let me just summarise the argument. I will try to do so briefly, but not, I hope, unfairly. The argument of the noble Lord, as I understand it, is this: that the Egyptians have behaved badly; British troops are being murdered; the British position in Africa is being undermined by broadcasts in Swahili and other native dialects; the safety of the Canal is in danger.

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This has got to stop. That I think is the noble Lord's argument in the main.
LORD HANKEY: I can hardly accept that as my argument. My argument is in what I said yesterday. It would detain the House too long for me to repeat it.
LORD COLERAINE: I did not think I was misrepresenting what the noble Lord said yesterday, but if I did I certainly withdraw it. But that is certainly the argument that has been put by other opponents of the Agreement.
So far so good; it is a perfectly logical argument. But what is the next step? All these evils are coming about, and all this has happened when we have 80,000 troops in the Zone. How many troops do we need to prevent these things coming about?—100,000, 200,000, 300,000? Not a bit of it. Ten thousand or 20,000 is the figure suggested. Now that does seem to me to be a fantastic argument. Twenty thousand troops would have all the exacerbating effect of 80,000 troops, and 20,000 troops would obviously be far less powerful, far less able to influence what is going on than 80,000 troops. It really seems to me that the logic of the situation is this. Either we must make this kind of Agreement or we must reoccupy Egypt. I do not think there are any other alternatives. The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, says that the Canal can be safeguarded only in an atmosphere of security. I think that is true. But does he describe the atmosphere of the past two years or so as being an atmosphere of security? How is he going to make the atmosphere more secure than it has been, except by getting control again of the Egyptian Government? The noble Lord says that the broadcasts must stop. I quite agree. But if we cannot stop them by agreement with the Egyptian authorities, what other way have we of stopping them, except by occupying the broadcasting stations and taking control of them ourselves?
My Lords, the conclusion that I have reached in this very difficult matter is that, whether we like it or not, we must make a new assessment of our position in the world. Our position has changed. It has changed as the result of new weapons; it has changed as a result of the loss of India; it has changed as the
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result of economic weakness. Those are facts, and I do not think that to admit facts is a sign of weakness or defeatism. On the contrary, I believe that it is only if you face facts that you can have the strength to overcome them. What we have to do, and what I think many of us have never really done in our minds, is to fit our policy to these new and highly unpalatable facts. What we have to do is to realise that the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean, like the defence of other parts of the world, is no longer an operation we can undertake single-handed. I think, in justice to those who differ from me, that we all do realise just that. I think the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, said as much yesterday.
LORD KILLEARN: Very much so.
LORD COLERAINE: But the noble Lord's complaint, as I understood it, was that while he agreed that we must organise a new system of collective defence in that part of the world there should be no vacuum.
LORD KILLEARN: May I intervene for a moment? This phrase "there must be no vacuum" is not mine at all; it is Mr. Bevin's, and I was quoting Mr. Bevin's phrase as a convenient one. It is a very good phrase: it represents, apparently, exactly what is going to happen. But it is not my phrase.
LORD COLERAINE: I was not suggesting that the noble Lord had invented the phrase, but he used it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, asked the Government whether they approved of a vacuum. I do not know what the Government's view about a vacuum may be, but as a part of nature myself I abhor it. The plain fact of the matter, as it seems to me, is that what Mr. Bevin pledged some years ago was overtaken by events, and I would say that, for all practical purposes, there has been a vacuum in that part of the world for the last two years or more. The only thing is that it has been for us a terribly expensive vacuum.
LORD KILLEARN: A vacuum full of bodies.
LORD COLERAINE: A vacuum full of bodies whose lives consist, in the main, of defending each other, rather than defending the Canal.

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I do not want to say any more about the Canal, and I do not want to detain your Lordships for more than another few moments. I should just like to say a brief word or two about the Geneva Conference. I agree with my noble friend Lord Strang that in the main the achievement of the Conference really amounted to substituting a lesser evil for a much greater evil. But in my judgment that is a considerable achievement, and I think we owe an enormous debt to my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and to the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, for the part they have taken in bringing this about. There are advantages in the Geneva Agreement. One advantage, I think, is that it has brought us much closer to our French Allies and friends. Another is that, for the first time since 1939, there is peace on earth. That peace is very precarious; nobody knows whether it will be lasting, or how long it will last.
Some of your Lordships have taken a gloomy view of what my noble friend Lord Strang said, because he seemed to look forward to such a long period of tension. I am inclined to agree with him. I think this may be a very long haul indeed. I feel that we are faced now with something like the Muslim invasion of Europe—something that may go on for generations. I do not know. I do not think that war is inevitable; I am not sure that I think it likely. But there is one thing that could make war inevitable, one thing that would unfailingly produce a Third World War—namely, a serious rift between the United States and her European Allies, in particular between the United States and this country.
There is no doubt that the Geneva Conference imposed a strain upon our relations with the United States; but those relations, we may well believe, are so firm and so friendly that they can stand that strain. We must not, however, strain them too far. In my judgment, it is not only the neutralists to whom Lord Pakenham referred yesterday who are straining our relations with the United States. If I may say so, with the greatest respect, I think that some of us who know a lot better are tending sometimes to do the same thing. Lord Silkin said that our prestige has risen as a result of our success at Geneva. He described it as a success which was independent of
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United States policy, and in some senses opposed to it. He said that our prestige had risen as a result of that.
LORD SILKIN: Not as a result of it. I said that our prestige has risen as a result of the way in which we handled the Conference.
LORD COLERAINE: I am glad that I misunderstood the noble Lord, if I did misunderstand him, and that he has made his position clear.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not know if it would help the noble Lord. I took a note of what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said. What he said was that we had carried through the negotiations at Geneva without the United States and in opposition to their wishes, and that it had raised our status in the world as a whole.
LORD COLERAINE: I thought that that was what the noble Lord had said. It is very nice to have our status raised; it is very nice to have increased our prestige; but one can sometimes buy prestige too dearly. My own view is that we must at any cost have a common policy with the United States. We have different approaches to these problems; we form different views about how they should be dealt with—all that is true. Nevertheless, those views have got to be compromised—a compromise has got to be reached if civilisation is to survive. I myself would go as far as to say that a less good policy pursued in the closest collaboration with the United States would be much better, for the safety of this country and for the hopes of mankind, than a better policy pursued independently.
4.55 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I am afraid the noble Lord, Lord Strang, must be suffering from a surfeit of compliments, but it is most difficult to speak in this debate without referring to that notable speech, so provocative of thought—a speech to which one will wish constantly to return when considering these matters. For myself, the part of the speech which rang strongly in my ears was one which has, I think, not been referred to, and it concerns what the noble Lord said about America. I agree that while American politicans very often irritate us and it is extremely difficult

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to know what value or what interpretation to put upon statements by the American Secretary of State and others, in the event, however wildly disturbing it may be, American policy, just like the compass needle, eventually settles down pointing to its North point—which is the conception that policy must be based upon law and moral principles. While that is the case with that great Power, I think it gives us considerable confidence when we have to think about and face the future.
As regards the rest of the speech, I feel a little difficulty in believing that co-existence with Communism is in fact eventually possible. To me, the belief of seems incompatible with the open, avowed Communist aims, about which they make no secret. The spirit of Communism reminds one of the doggerel of Lord Macaulay, about
"One of us two, Herminius,
Shall never more go home."
I think that is the spirit which informs Communist beliefs. Then the noble Lord spoke about "calmness and confidence" and about "a positive spirit of harmony and concord." I ask myself, how those desirable things can exist when living in what the noble Lord called a state of "co-existence with conflict." The ideas seem to me to be somewhat incompatible.
This afternoon I want to speak particularly about the question of Germany. I was a little surprised yesterday when the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, said something which seemed to envisage the bare possibility of our going back on promises made to the Germans—those were the noble Lord's words—or that we might let Doctor Adenauer down. I think those are not very fortunate suggestions to put into the air. To begin with, they are unjustified by our record in regard to our pledged word, and they are also irreconcilable with the recent Anglo-American declaration, that failing ratification of E.D.C. we intend to find a way to accord to Germany the benefits of the Bonn Treaty. That, I think, is clear evidence of our good faith; in fact, Anglo-American studies have been undertaken with a view to finding the best way to bring that about.
In regard to E.D.C. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the noble Marquess, Lord Reading for the
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reply which he has been good enough to give to what was a rather complicated question. I have not yet had time to study the reply. At a cursory glance I can see what great trouble has been taken in compiling it, and I express my gratitude to the noble Marquess. The ques-of Germany and the E.D.C. must be considered in the light of a declaration of belief by M. Herriot, that France will never ratify E.D.C. and that M. Mendès-France can produce an alternative acceptable alike to the French people and to the Allies. I cannot answer for the French people, but from many declarations I have seen some high Allied authorities are extremely averse to struggling to find an alternative to E.D.C.; they would not so much mind the struggle to find a suitable and effective alternative if there were any prospect of success. Juridically, if E.D.C. is not ratified the Bonn Treaty falls. But, as I have said, America and Britain intend to find a way to give Western Germany the benefits of the Bonn Treaty.
That Treaty, with two or three exceptions which are not of major importance, gives Western Germany complete sovereignty. Let us look ahead to the day when Germany is unified, even though that may be looking a very long way ahead. We can see how the mind of America and Britain is working. When Germany is unified we are to conclude with her a freely-negotiated Peace Treaty. Now we can hardly give a unified Germany less than we have expressed our willingness and intention to give to Western Germany; and we shall already have conceded everything to Western Germany. There is this difference: the Bonn Treaty imposes a certain responsibility upon Western Germany. She is to contribute twelve divisions to the European Army. But we have already also conceded that a unified Germany will be free to stay in or to leave E.D.C. as she chooses. In the event of a unified Germany coming out of E.D.C., it is agreed that she will be free to set up national armaments of whatever types and on whatever scale she pleases. It should also be remembered that while we have, in principle, restored to Germany all our rights, Russia has announced that she retains her rights of every description in Germany. So as between the unified

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Germany and Russia, the unified Germany will already have milked the Allies dry of everything they have it in their power to concede to her; but at the same time she will have much to hope to gain from Russia. We shall be dead metal, whereas Russia will have a magnet in her possession. Which way will Germany be attracted—to the Allies, who have conceded everything to her; or to Russia from whom she has much to gain?
There are two thoughts on German rearmament. First, to agree to German rearmament, having regard to the past, is to take upon one's self a very dread responsibility. Secondly, Germany has great faults about which we have good reason to complain; but she is not a nation you can put in leading strings. The idea held out in this last Russian Note, of a neutralised Germany, is moonshine. Some time, somehow, Germany will rearm with national, independent armies. Would we not be better advised to let that come about in it own way? It might, in the future, be highly inconvenient either to have sanctioned German rearmament or to have opposed it. There is much to be said for letting what, I believe, must come about, come about in the natural course of events. Why must we put a finger in that particular pie? To sanction rearmament, or to put in train events which must lead to rearmament, will inevitably bring us into conflict with France, either openly or below the surface. It will cause strong feeling. The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, was rather hard on France yesterday. I infinitely preferred the words used by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, when he spoke of keeping in "complete harmony with France." The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, appeared to have written France off completely. Let us not despair of France too soon; let us not do anything which may give rise to thoughts that we are courting Germany at the expense of France. Let us stand by France in every way we can in her time of difficulty and bitter reverse.
On foreign affairs generally, I come back to what the noble Lord, Lord Strang, said. The essential point is that, short of entirely surrendering our own point of view, we must get back into step with America as quickly as we can. That will not be achieved by dismissing
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as "misunderstandings" quite irreconcilable disagreements on policy. The Angel Gabriel could not come down to earth and persuade America to recognise China or admit her into the United Nations. That is not a misunderstanding or something to be glossed over as a misunderstanding. We have seen that, in spite of his great efforts, the Prime Minister has been unable to convince President Eisenhower on that point, any more than he was able to convince him about the value of top level talks with Russia. So long as America does not recognise China, the idea of an Eastern Locarno will not produce stability; it will only stiffen China's intransigeance and incite her to underhand methods.
The proposal for an Eastern Locarno is based upon a completely mistaken belief that one has only to give Communist countries what they call their "rights" and they will then settle down. The record shows only too clearly that that is not the case. Nor is it the case that the issue in South East Asia is which country lies in which sphere of influence. That is old-fashioned, to talk about spheres of influence. The Communist aim is not spheres of influence; it is complete absorption of small and powerless neighbouring countries. The task of the Allies is not to deal with Communist "rights" and Communist "spheres of influence," but to defeat the Communist expansionist policy, which goes far beyond spheres of influence. It is being simple-minded to assume that Russia and China will be content with a slice of Asia as their sphere of influence. Do the Simple Simons really believe that, having won in Indo-China, Chou En-lai will say, with Hitler, that his territorial ambitions are now satisfied and will renounce all naughty thoughts about Siam and Burma and Malaya? Russia progressively swallowed Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rou-mania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Albania, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithunania. That is the Communist way of going on.
Nor do I believe that the signing of a non-aggression Treaty would deter Peking from aggression at a convenient moment. Not, of course, that any Communist country has ever admitted that it has committed any aggression. All the victims of Russia which I have enumerated, of course, asked to be taken over. There was never any suggestion of such

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a vulgarity as coercion, or subversion, or intimidation. No, they asked Russia most kindly to be good enough to take them over. Red China, of course, would never violate a non-aggression pact, but would act in response to what she would call "spontaneous outbursts of public opinion" or, "armed popular movements" in favour of Big Brother taking the country over. That is where I think certain misconceptions exist in regard to what should govern our policy in Asia.
A word about Egypt. We are to debate that matter on a separate Motion and I think that will be the time to bring forward the main arguments, and I will say only two or three things today. First, I intensely dislike the carrying on of negotiations under duress and I feel that these negotiations have been carried on under duress to a large extent. I also have little faith, if any, in Agreements which are come to with countries which are notorious for their bad faith, and which in the record of history can point to hardly one Agreement which they have honoured. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, in the debate on the Navy Estimates, rightly deprecated the making of speeches on political subjects by high-ranking officers in the Forces. I entirely agree. I think it is right that they should make speeches on professional subjects. They are entitled to do that and it is often helpful to the country if they do, but I think it is better that they should "lay off" politics. I notice this morning in The Times that General Keightley, Commanding Officer in Egypt, has made what I should call a distinctly political speech. It would be deplorable in any case, but I think it is more than ever regrettable because Parliament has not yet had the opportunity of discussing the matter with which the General has dealt.
Another point about the Egyptian Agreement that I should like to make has reference to Cyprus. Cyprus is 300 miles from Alexandria. An agitation has been conducted for some time in the island by the Archbishop, who is a very determined and in some ways unscrupulous opponent. He carries on his agitation for the cession of Cyprus to Greece in alliance with the Communist Party of Cyprus, which is the best organised and most positive Party in the island. I should not be surprised if the
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Archbishop were to say to the hot-heads of his entourage, "You see what is happening. The British are marching out of Egypt. The British never showed a sign of doing that until" (what he will call) "some fine, patriotic Egyptians started a campaign of agitation against them, which included murder, violence, sabotage and propaganda directed towards aiding Britain's enemies." He will say, in the privacy of his sanctum, "Of course, I could not possibly advise you to do anything of the sort in Cyprus. I merely call your attention to the fact that the British are marching out of Egypt in response to such an agitation." That is not what we think. We know our motives. But the Agreement with Egypt has this drawback: that it will inevitably encourage those who are already too ready to say, "The only way to get rid of the British is to conduct an agitation, a murderous agitation, against them. That is the only language to which they listen."
I have nothing else to say about Cyprus except this. When the matter was discussed in another place yesterday, Mr. Bevan spoke of the people of Cyprus as a hostile population. That is one of those shouts about which the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, spoke this afternoon, as likely to start an avalanche. If the noble Marquess were here I would tell him that that old legend arose merely because the Swiss guides did not want their clients to open their mouths. For the same reason, they invented the legend that if a climber keeps a pebble in his mouth during the climb he will never feel thirsty, the object being to keep the client silent during the climb. I think it was unfortunate that Mr. Bevan should have spoken of the population of Cyprus as hostile. Perhaps I know a little more about them than he does, and I know they are not hostile at all, but extremely friendly to the British, most courteous and most hospitable. I am not quite sure of my ground here, but I remember being told that Cyprus is the only British Colony in which an Englishman has never been murdered. At any rate, there is no question whatever about the general friendliness of the population to us.
A survey of the field of our foreign affairs to-day is rather a melancholy spectacle. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, spoke of the century in which we have been fortunate, or unfortunate, enough to live. I recall

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the saying attributed to Mr. Trotsky, that if any man was looking for a quiet life, he had made a mistake by getting himself born in the twentieth century. I think that is very true. The prospect is extremely black at the present moment. As we are in a good many troubles, I would mention this to the noble Marquess. A short time ago a leading article in the Manchester Guardian ascribed a great many of our troubles in the field of foreign affairs to the fact that the Foreign Office does not think ahead sufficiently. Well, the pressure of work is very great, but I seem to have noticed for many years now a tendency on the part of the Foreign Office not to deal with a matter until it begins to come into the "In-tray." I think the criticism that there is a certain absence of thinking ahead there has some justice in it. It is certainly a long time since a Foreign Secretary has announced any good news to us. Mr. Eden has been at the Foreign Office a very long time indeed, and I can think of few occasions when he has brought any bacon home, although he may have had some influence in preventing even greater troubles. I feel that we must be realistic about some of these things. We were told that the Berlin Conference was a great success, because at last we knew what the Russians are really like—a thing that I should have thought we knew long before that—and also because it had fixed up the Geneva Conference. Now the Geneva Conference is being represented as a great success, because it has produced an Agreement. Certainly it has not produced "peace in our time," nor, in my opinion, has it produced "peace with honour."
There are perhaps not now many possibilities in the field of foreign affairs. We seem to have little power of independent action: our actions are conditioned by the Atlantic Charter, by our membership of the United Nations, by our obligations to our Allies and so on. What are called "foreign affairs" seem to me largely to take their course, whatever we try to do, because we have so little independence of action in regard to them. That is why I have been thinking for some time that perhaps our economic affairs are more important than our foreign affairs, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer may be a more
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important man than the Foreign Secretary, because in the realm of economic affairs we have independence of action, and the results there depend upon our own efforts and upon facts which it is in our power to control. I end on this last thought: that if the distinction I have drawn between foreign affairs and economic affairs is not agreed to, at any rate I am quite sure that our foreign affairs will go better once we have set our economy on a sound footing and are standing on our own feet in that sphere. Then our words will carry far more weight in the world when discussing foreign affairs.
5.23 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, we are coming to the end of this debate, which I think has been a remarkable debate and in which we have traversed a wide region. You can, as I think, having listened to the whole debate, "pay your money and take your choice" as to what is going to happen to us in the future. You can be an eternal optimist, with the boyish enthusiasm of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, who thinks that we are confronted not with a sunset, but with a dawn; or you can agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strang (I am sorry, but I must refer to his speech; everybody else has done so, and I must be in the fashion), that the prospect that confronts us is a grievous prospect, but not so grievous as total war. Whether the optimistic survey of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, or the rather pessimistic view of the noble Lord, Lord Strang, is right, I have no doubt that, as a practical piece of realism at the present time, we must pay regard to the advice which both those noble Lords gave us—namely, that, whatever may be the outcome in the future, at present we must be defensively strong.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I must interrupt my noble friend to disclaim the word "optimist." I resent that accusation. I am not an optimist; I am a meliorist.
EARL JOWITT: I accept that—at any rate, the noble Viscount is not a pessimist. I feel that all sensible people will agree that, however grievous the cost may be, at the present time, we must, in conjunction with our Allies, see that our means of defence are strong.
I do not like these prognostications into the future. No one can speak with

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more authority than the noble Lord, Lord Strang, as to the past, and indeed, as to the present; but he does not claim to be a Nostradamus who can see what is going to happen in the future. I remember, in one of the first chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, a gentleman called Gamaliel, whose advice was asked as to whether some activity should, or should not be vigorously put down; and he gave the advice:
"… if this … work be of men, it will come to nought.
But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it. …"
I would humbly say, with Gamaliel, that I think there is a great deal of good sense in that. I believe that if we can have a period which does not involve open war the fallacy of Communism will become plain to be seen. I believe that Communism is of man, and is founded upon a wholly false philosophy and false doctrine. Therefore I cannot bring myself to believe that Communism, as it was expounded in the days of Lenin, is necessarily going to continue into the future in, the same way. I believe that it will be following a course which is quite common in history with regard to revolutions if it modifies itself and becomes more reasonable. However, that is a question of the far, indefinite future.
It may be that Mr. Malenkov to-day has advanced some way from where Lenin stood; and it may be that the Mr. Malenkov of the future will advance further still. It is problematical. I entirely agree that we must look at the reality of the situation as it is to-day, and in doing so we must certainly bear in mind the advice given to us in the notable speech of the noble Lord, Lord Baillieu: that while we should remember the truth of the saying, "He travels the fastest who travels alone," yet without American aid and American assistance we should, indeed, be in a very sorry position. When I say that, I also re-echo the advice which was given by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, with regard to France. For goodness sake let us remember at all cost to keep in step with France! What the world would be like without a strong, active and vigorous France I just tremble to think.
The Government are going to have, so far as I am concerned, and indeed have had, a rather easy debate. I am glad
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to say that there are few matters of outstanding criticism; and I do not apologise for that at all, because I think it is a good thing with regard to foreign affairs. In my view, the more the two Parties can act in concert in that sphere the better. I believe it to be an enormous source of strength to this country if, when one Government goes out and another Government takes over, it does not mean a change in our foreign policy. Long may it continue that there are no serious points of difference between the two Parties on foreign policy!
We have had from this side of the House notable speeches. The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, a sort of tour d'horizon, to which the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has already referred, was up to his own very high standard; and we have had from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, too, equally notable contributions. Therefore, I am not going to trouble your Lordships at any great length. However, I want to say this about Europe and the E.D.C. It is only some nine years since the war ended. If anybody had told me that within ten years after the war I should be standing up and publicly advocating the rearmament of Germany, even to a most limited and qualified extent, I should have thought that he was mad.
Reading again, as I did last night, some of the incidents of those days, it seems to me that we have travelled right round the circle in a most extraordinary way. Why have we all changed so much? I can remember the day when one of our two most distinguished soldiers asked me to go and dine with him. I was only a lawyer: I was in the Cabinet, and I was not concerned primarily with military matters. He then told me, quite frankly, that if Russia wanted, she could walk through to the Channel ports—and that was the position. I used the word "walk." We had at that time no effective resistance whatever. That is the explanation why so many of us have changed our views about German rearmament. To my mind, it was, and still is, essential that we should be able to put up some sort of defence so that the progress of the Russians at any rate should not be a walk, and so that, as the noble Marquess who leads the House said just now, the risks of war would be so

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apparent that no one would wish to undertake them.
If we are to put up any sort of defence, it must be a reasonably effective defence—to this extent at any rate: that the aggressor must realise that he may, in due course, be met by serious forces, and that his task is not going to be too simple. Then we started arming, and a year or so afterwards I was told (and I have never been told anything different by the military men): "It is not possible to have your defence against that walk-through really effective unless you have some contribution from Germany." I regret to say that I believe that to be the unpalatable truth.
What is the position to-day? I venture to make this criticism of those who talk about E.D.C. and who so often discuss the matter quite disregarding the fact that years have passed, positions have altered, undertakings have been given, and that the whole matter cannot now be considered as if it were res integra. It is not only the Benelux countries, who have reason to know what German rearmament may involve them in, who are deeply concerned about this. They have expressed their view. Germany, in her turn, has expressed her view. There remain France and Italy. Italy, I think, is due to ratify in September—I forget the exact date, but I think the matter comes up for consideration in September. Everything depends on the attitude France is going to take. I would say this. Let us do everything to avoid putting France in a difficult position. Do not let us, as it were, hold a pistol at her head and say, "If you do not do it by this date, then you will be deprived of this, that and the other." I do not believe that is the way to act. I appreciate this difficulty. If France agrees to ratify E.D.C., then I think the noble Lord, Lord Archibald, and those who spoke with him, will agree that, in view of what has happened, we should have to honour the bargain.
But if France does not ratify E.D.C., what then? It seems to me, in view of the position which the various countries have taken up, that it is impossible to go back to the situation as it was four or five years ago. I think we are bound to have some measure of German rearmament.
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Certainly Dr. Adenauer's Party want it. The noble Lord, Lord Archibald, said definitely that the Social Democratic Party were opposed to it. He has this justification for his statement. I think there is on record, and still standing, a resolution against it; but, on the other hand, they had a meeting recently, and their leader, Herr Ollenhauer, and other leaders, said quite definitely in their address to Congress that they thought that, unless an Agreement with the Russians, with the Communists, could be arrived at, the time would come when Germany would have to make some contribution to Western defence. Although it is true that the Social Democratic Congress did not agree or pass any resolution to that effect, yet they did, after these speeches had been made, re-elect their leaders; and they did say that these matters should be discussed in full detail before some further conference.
Therefore, I think it would be wrong to say, categorically or definitely, that the Social Democratic Party in Germany are definitely opposed to rearmament at the present time. I do not believe they are. I believe, therefore, that we may get this position. We may get both the Parties in Germany determined to embark upon rearmament. If that happens, who is going to stop them from doing it? Certainly not America, because America, as we know, is strongly in favour of it. That being so, I cannot see where we should get to. I should have thought, therefore, that there was everything to be said for having this measure of control by E.D.C. which, after all, was a French plan, devised by the French and accepted by some of us—of whom I was one, I say quite frankly—with the greatest reluctance. I accepted it because I realised the strength of the argument on the other side. As the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, it must be a question of balance of convenience.
If I am not troubling him too much, I want to ask the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who is to reply to us, this question: Supposing France does not ratify and comes to a definite decision not to ratify, is this Parliament going to be called together to deal with the situation before the Government are committed? That seems to me to be a very important matter. I quote from column 229 of

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yesterday's OFFICAL REPORT when the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, said:
"… if there had been no ratification by August 15, then the countries concerned would enter into discussion with the other countries concerned as to the method of putting this plan into operation."
Not, "as to the plan"; not "as to what is to be done," but "as to the method of putting this plan into operation"—a plan which, if I understand aright, was arrived at without the French being there.
I am sure that the last thing the noble Marquess and the Government desire to do, is to treat France in any way unfairly, or without the most complete consideration. But I do suggest to them, most respectfully, that for these countries to agree among themselves upon a plan and, when they have agreed it, to tell France what the plan is; and then to say to France, "If you do not ratify by August 15, we shall meet together to discuss with you the method of putting into operation the plan which we have agreed," would be to throw the whole thing open. We should then have to consider exactly where we stood, because the project of unfettered German rearmament fills me with some alarm and surely, too, would fill the Benelux countries and France with misgivings which ought to be considered. Therefore I ask the noble Marquess to tell us categorically, if he will, whether, in the event of the failure of France to ratify, he will see that this Parliament is summoned before the Government have so far committed themselves that they are morally bound to carry out the plan.
That I say because I so firmly desire to carry France with us in everything that we do. Because I am a friend of France, as I always have been, that does not prevent me from being a friend of Germany, too. I think it is only right to say this. After the war I was very much concerned with the trials of the war criminals in Germany. We found that we had so many of the minor criminals on our hands that it was impossible to set up English courts of any sort or kind to try them. Therefore we tried the experiment of setting up German courts to deal with their own offenders. I am bound to say that the German courts dealt with these cases very fairly and satisfactorily. Therefore, I can say that I believe that in Germany to-day there is a real change of heart from the bad days of the past.
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But that is not to say that I should be prepared to embark on completely unrestrained and uncontrolled rearmament without careful consideration.
I should like to ask the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, a question. It may well be that he will not think fit to give me an answer, and if he does not refer to it I shall know that it is probably deliberate and that it is right that he should not answer it. I should like to know whether he has anything he can conveniently tell the House about the negotiations relating to Trieste. It is a sore spot and it would be an excellent thing if it could be cleared away. We used to advocate open covenants, openly arrived at. I regret to say that I have now come to the conclusion that I am in favour of open covenants but I think they are much better if they are secretly arrived at. I think you are very much more likely to get your covenant open, as it should be, if you do not have to discuss it before the gaze and the microphones of the whole world. If the noble Marquess can say anything about that, I shall be grateful. If he cannot, we shall fully understand.
I pass to Egypt, or rather to the Middle East. I say at once—and I speak with no sort of expert knowledge whatever—that I am glad that the Government have taken this course. I believe it is right. I express no opinion as to the military reasons or the views of the Chiefs of Staff; I know nothing about them. What has always concerned me about Egypt is this. In the archives of the Foreign Office, if they have troubled to keep such documents, there can be found large numbers of letters written by me to Mr. Bevin and from him to me about this matter. What I am always concerned about is that our right to stay in Egypt is based on Treaty, and, except for that Treaty, we have no right there at all. That Treaty stipulated that the number of troops that we should have in Egypt should not exceed 10,000. For very many years past we have had many more than 10,000. At the present moment, we have 80,000 troops there, though I think that number has been comparatively recent; it was between 50,000 and 80,000. I am not happy now about this matter from the point of view of the legal side of the problem—and I do not apologise for using the word "legal." After all, the

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contrary sense to the use of force is agreement, and agreement and treaty depend on law. I have never been able to see that we were justified in basing ourselves upon a Treaty limiting us to 10,000 men, when we were staying there with numbers of men vastly greater than 10,000 and when we were told by our military advisers that it was no good having only 10,000 men there. That was the problem and, in the circumstances, I am glad that we are setting an example and dealing with it in this way. I do not know whether or not we are giving up a great deal from a military point of view. I can well understand that a base surrounded by a hostile population (if they are a hostile population) is not a base of very great value. I am satisfied, for my part, that the Government have taken the right line in this matter.
But I am bound to say this. If we had still been sitting on the Government Benches and noble Lords there had been sitting here, what should we have heard about "Scuttle"! I remember when we were confronted with a similar situation in Persia and a question arose not about a Treaty but about a contract between a British oil company and the Persian Government. Let me say, at once, that in my view, the Persian Government were breaking that contract in a most flagrant manner. What were we to do? Of course, we could invade Persia; we could occupy Persia, or try to; or we could say: "This is a deplorable thing; we must refer this matter to some arbitrary tribunal." We took the latter course. I was responsible in this House for announcing that to your Lordships, and I was accused roundly of the policy of "Scuttle," because we did not go to war with Persia, in spite of the fact that the Leaders of the Party opposite knew perfectly well that we had had the strongest possible representations from the United States of America making it quite plain what their wishes were. Although those facts were known, still I was accused of a policy of "Scuttle." I am sorry to remind noble Lords of that fact, but, now that we are doing this, as I think rightly, in Egypt, just as rightly as I think we were in taking our line in Persia, I must point out that if my Party or the Liberal Party had done anything of this sort, we should have been held up to ridicule, hatred and contempt.
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I want to ask only two questions about this Treaty. Both questions have been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, but they have such importance that I make no apology for referring to them again. Article 8 of the Treaty provides that the freedom of navigation of the Canal has to be continued as it was. It states:
"… the determination of both parties to uphold the 1880 Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation"—
THE MARQUESS OF READING: When the noble and learned Earl talks about "the Treaty," he means "the Heads of Agreement"?
EARL JOWITT: Yes, the Heads of Agreement.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not want to get it mixed up with the 1936 Treaty.
EARL JOWITT: I am much obliged; I mean the Heads of Agreement. It is Article 8 of the Heads of Agreement. Of course, the 1880 Convention, as we all know, was a Convention which guaranteed freedom for navigation on the Canal, and for some years—I do not remember how many now—Egypt has been forbidding Israeli traffic to go through the Canal. Therefore, when this point arose at the conference table and it was asked: "Now what about the navigation of the Canal? Shall we go on with that?" and the reply came, "Yes, that is all right," surely someone must have said: "But what about the Israeli traffic?" I can hardly imagine that that was not discussed. That traffic is the very thing they have been stopping for years past. Here I must say that, with the greatest respect to him, I thought that Lord Reading's answer yesterday was thoroughly unsatisfactory. He said [Col. 221] that this question is
"in rather a different category, because the question of transit of Israeli ships through the Canal is a matter which arose out of a discussion in the United Nations, and from that point of view it would surely have been an unsuitable matter to discuss merely between us and the Egyptian Government."
Now why? Imagine yourselves sitting round a table negotiating this thing and agreeing about free navigation through the Canal. Then somebody says, "But what about the Israeli traffic?", and someone else holds up his hands and says, "Hush! That is a matter that was

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discussed in the United Nations and therefore we must not say anything about it." I can hardly believe that that matter was not discussed. Of course, one would not necessarily come to a decision, and one would not come to a decision without telling all one's friends about it; but in view of the fact that this traffic has been blocked for years past I cannot think that it should not have been and indeed was not discussed to see what the position was going to be. I ask the noble Marquess whether he can in any way expand that answer or give us any indication or impression as to what the attitude of Egypt is going to be with regard to Israeli traffic—namely, is she really going to honour the Convention of 1888?
The other matter I want to ask about is this. We had the Three-Power Declaration of May 25, 1950, in which we, the Americans and the French made it quite plain that we were unalterably opposed to the use of force between any of the State in the area. What is the position of Israel at the present time? As the noble Marquess knows—I am not going to quote any of them—there have been some very uncomfortable things said by some of the leaders of the Arab States and also by some of the Egyptian leaders as to what they are going to do with regard to Israel. Now of course our negotiators knew of those statements. Did they ask for any assurance on this point? Has it been discussed? Do we know whether or not they contemplate, when the British soldiers leave Egypt, that that will give them the opportunity to start an attack on Israel? Because this matter—and I am not being alarmist at all—is causing considerable apprehension in the minds of people in Israel.
Lord Glyn made a speech yesterday—I nearly always agree with what he says and I wholeheartedly agreed on this occasion—as to the necessity of our getting together with the Arabs. My Lords, the only obstacle to our getting together with the Arabs in the old happy way is Israel, which is an awkward fact but it is a fact. If only we can get that difficulty settled in some way or other and out of the way, what an enormous source of strength would come to us and how much happier and more prosperous would be the whole of the Middle East! I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, however, that it is no good to speak of
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the matter as though that difficulty were not there and were not a very cogent and real difficulty. I therefore say that we must lend our good offices in every way we can and even spend our money to see if we cannot help to settle some of this refugee problem. But let us at all costs try to see that the source of bitterness between the Arab countries and Israel is ended, and let this Treaty, this happy beginning of a new relationship, as I believe, between Egypt and ourselves, be also the beginning of a happier relationship between Israel and the Arab countries.
Now I have nearly finished what I want to say and I am compressing it into as short a time as possible. The next thing I want to say is something about the Far East. Lord Hore-Belisha made a remarkable speech yesterday, and as I had a small passage of arms with him the other day about some minor Amendments may I say how much I, and indeed the whole House, welcome his incursions into these debates on large topics; he paints so well and he paints on a large canvas. He called attention to the fact that the Geneva Agreement represented a very considerable gain for the Communists. I think that is true. I hope that no one is going to say that France was wrong in concluding that Agreement. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Winster, did not mean that France, in saying that she had not achieved peace with honour, meant that she has in any way sacrificed her honour. After all, we must look at the position. France has been waging this war alone, without any assistance from anybody else, for the last eight years. It has been a terrible drain on her. Her young men have been going out there and dying; her money has been spent on a huge scale out there, and things had gone badly for her. M. Mendès-France was realist enough to recognise those facts and make the best deal he could. I quite agree that it was a bitter price for France to pay—that is what he himself said. If it was a bitter price for France to pay, it is a bitter price for the whole Western world to pay. But I cannot think that those of us who did not go in and help France in her fight have any right to criticise her for having taken these steps to get out of her difficulty. I think mistakes were made.

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With regard to the Eastern countries I have come to this conclusion: that, as Lord Coleraine said, one must realise that we are now living in a new and different world. I believe the fact that the Labour Government took the course they did just after the war with regard to India, with regard to Pakistan, with regard to Ceylon and with regard to Burma, has been an immense source of strength to us. If we had taken any other line in those countries who knows but that we might have been involved in all sorts of wars and rebellions, all bleeding us to death. Instead of that, we went with prestige high, with full honours, and treated the whole thing as a natural development. I mention those things because I saw in a newspaper yesterday that a lecturer at the Overseas League had been saying with what horror he realised that, in the year after the war, the Labour Party were concerned to give away the Empire. Well, thank God we did! And I hope we shall do the same in Malaya, too, in the near future, following the logical course, so that all over the world we shall add greatly to our credit and, in due course, have these countries as independent members of the Commonwealth. First, it will be necessary to give them some measure of help, some measure of assistance, some measure even of tutelage; but the whole thing must be progressive. That I feel sure is natural and right.
Now we talk about China. I have always believed, and I believe firmly, that China ought to be admitted to a seat at the United Nations. China is one of the original members of the United Nations. China is entitled to a seat. The only question is, who is China? It seems to me—and I think this is true of the majority of my countrymen—not to be a realistic point of view to pretend that China is Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek is not China. Chiang Kai-shek is Formosa—if indeed he is that, which is doubtful. I realise that at the present time, as Lord Winster says, it would be quite impossible to get such a policy over in America. That being so, we must not press it unduly at the present time. Moreover, owing to the situation in Korea, we are still technically at war with Communist China.
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But I agree with Lord Strang: I never believe in trying to obscure the differences that arise with America. I believe he was right when he said that the right thing to do is to bring those differences out in the open for everyone to see. After all, if two people are going to be friends, surely it is the essence of friendship that they can criticise each other's policies and outlook; otherwise what does friendship mean? I hope that we shall ultimately convince the Americans to our point of view. I realise that that will take time and tact, and will need consideration for each other's point of view. I should like to say one thing more about China. We all saw in the newspapers—I think it was to- day—reports of an address given by President Syngman Rhee. I think that President Syngman Rhee would advocate, here and now, an outright war against Communism. Well, I would not. I am not prepared to fight Communism by force of arms. I am prepared to fight Communist aggression by force of arms, but not Communism. It seems to me foolish to contemplate that you can fight Communism by bombs or guns or anything of that sort, any more than you can fight poliomyelitis by that means.
The way to fight Communism is surely this: by means of proper use of your economic resources to try to lift up the standard of living in those parts of the world where the living is all too low; to try to increase the standard of education; to try to make people realise that life under the Western outlook and régime can be, and is, a life worth living. Of course, that line of attack must always go hand in hand with the other line of attack—namely, that you must be pre-pared, if necessary with your arms, to fight, not Communism but Communist aggression. My Lords, I hope that we shall show that we are fighting Communism by doing everything we can, throughout out our dependencies all over the world, and in other countries too, to try to try to raise the standard of living and to make life for so many people a little happier than it is to-day.
6.4 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, there have been a good many entries for this particular "two-day race." I do not know whether it ought to be described as a Grand International or a Tourist Trophy, but certainly we have

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had a long and valuable discussion, as was only to be expected in view of the questions of considerable gravity which have been before the House. I do not propose to try to make a further, what I may call, consecutive speech, but to do my best, speaking on this second occasion with the permission of the House, to answer a number of the questions which inevitably have been put in the course of the discussion.
May I deal first with the question which has troubled a certain number of noble Lords in the course of the debate, on the position which I tried to make clear in my original speech regarding the situation if France either rejected or unduly delayed ratifying the E.D.C. Treaty. A number of noble Lords have expressed anxiety in the course of our discussion lest some irrevocable step in regard to the rearmament of Germany should be taken if the French National Assembly failed to ratify the European Defence Community Treaty before it began its Summer Recess. I should like to repeat what I said yesterday on this subject—namely, that if, as Her Majesty's Government certainly hope will not be the case, the French National Assembly should rise without taking a decision on the European Defence Community Treaty, Her Majesty's Government will consult with the other countries concerned, and of course with France and the United States in the first place, about the steps which should be taken to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany.
There may be in the minds of some noble Lords some confusion about the relationship between the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany in certain hypothetical circumstances, and the rearming of Germany. They are two different things. As I tried to explain yesterday, the process of restoring sovereignty before the European Defence Community Treaty is ratified is one thing; but, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in another place on July 14, it is clear that the discussions to which I have referred, if it were necessary to discuss the plan, would necessarily entail the deferment of German rearmament for the time being. Her Majesty's Government, however, remain of the opinion that Western Germany should be enabled as soon as possible to
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play her proper part, in agreement with other countries, in the defence of the West. I can give your Lordships this assurance, which I think is what the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, and others wanted: that before any Agreement which may become necessary to separate the Bonn Conventions from the European Defence Community Treaty is ratified, Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate the matter. I think that is what the noble and learned Earl wanted to know.
EARL JOWITT: Thank you very much.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, having dealt, in a way, with that matter, may I also try to elucidate a little further, although possibly not to the entire satisfaction of noble Lords opposite, the question which several noble Lords have put to me on the Egyptian Heads of Agreement concerning the passage of Israeli ships through the Canal. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, first asked the question as to whether these ships were now free to travel through the Canal. They are not. As noble Lords know, the dispute between Egypt and Israel is an international issue, which has in fact been debated many times in the security council and in the General Assembly of the United Nations; and Her Majesty's Government deemed it inappropriate to attempt to deal with this dispute in the Agreement which we have just concluded with Egypt. The late Government decided to deal with this dispute by international action at the United Nations, and Her Majesty's present Government have followed that policy.
Noble Lords will remember that the Security Council in a resolution of 1951 called on Egypt to terminate the restrictions that she had imposed. That resolution still stands and a further resolution on the same subject was vetoed by the Soviet Union in March last. Her Majesty's Government held the view that Egypt was wrong in ignoring the resolution of 1951. The Egyptian Government, as noble Lords will know, based their action on their alleged right under the Suez Canal Convention to take measures for the defence of Egypt; but I would emphasise that measures taken for the defence of Egypt do not affect the

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general principle of freedom of navigation. The Egyptian restrictions on shipping in the Canal originated in the hostilities between the Arab States and Israel. All Governments who wish the Middle Eastern countries well are ready to do everything in their power to reduce the tension which, as the noble Earl, Lord Jowitt, said, still exists between the Arab States and Israel. Her Majesty's Government feel sure that these Heads of Agreement now concluded with the Egyptian Government will help to reduce that tension and will enable this country, with an increased influence in that part of the world, to counsel wisdom and moderation.
I will continue with other speeches which have been delivered in your Lordships' House, answering the questions which arose in the course of them. The noble Lord, Lord Strang, followed immediately after me, and I propose to embarrass him as so many other noble Lords have done by paying a very sincere compliment to the extreme interest and wide vision of his speech. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, who always enjoys a little dig at the Foreign Office when opportunity offers, said that his impression was that the Foreign Office did not look very far ahead. He then graciously sought to excuse them on the ground that they had a good many other things to do. During the nearly three years that I have had the privilege of serving as Minister in the Foreign Office, my experience has not coincided with the noble Lord's. I have found that, heavy as the pressure of work is, there has always been time—and there have always been people whose explicit business it is to look ahead. Certainly I recall with pleasure numerous occasions on which I attended in the room of the noble Lord, Lord Strang, meetings the sole purpose of which was to consider a particular survey of some area of the world which had been carried out expressly for our consideration, in order that we might not be accused of having failed to look ahead. I hope our future discussions on foreign affairs will again be illumined by contributions from the noble Lord out of his long and valuable experience.
The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, confined himself largely to Egypt and his points have been largely dealt with by my noble friend the Leader of the
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House. There are one or two points in his speech upon which I should like to take him up. Though the noble Lord asked no particular questions on it, he said, in discussing the settlement (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 189, col. 254):
"There is no advance towards peace in Korea, and the Communists have gained an appreciable success in South-East Asia."
And the noble Lord went on to say:
"It is not a particularly good moment for subjecting the Western Powers to further criticism such as will certainly come in South-West Asia and in France, and in many other countries, over this new Agreement."
I do not share his certainty that that criticism will be likely to come from the quarters to which he refers. I should expect the reverse to be much more likely, that the Agreement will be welcomed in those particular quarters of the world.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked me a number of questions to which I will endeavour to reply, although the noble Viscount has informed me that, not having realised it was to be a two-day debate, he was unable to be here so late on this particular afternoon. The noble Viscount expressed some fear that if we moved our garrison from the Canal Zone to Cyprus we might be merely solving one problem by creating another; and there have been echoes of the same apprehension from other noble Lords. We must bear in mind that the prospect ahead is not the transfer of the entire garrison which has been occupying the Canal Zone to Cyprus, but will merely include Cyprus in plans for the deployment of troops now stationed in the Canal Zone. The noble Viscount painted a pathetic picture of these men in a position in which they were wanted by nobody, and he suggested we might now reduce our period of National Service and take other steps to deal with that situation and comfort these forlorn and forsaken troops. The majority of these troops will return to this country for the express purpose of enabling us to do what we have long wanted to do, to create a proper strategic reserve. That is, from the military point of view, one of the most valuable results which we hope to get from the arrangement to which we have now come with Egypt. There must be great advantages from the points of view of strategy, economy and the efficiency of the units and the individual soldiers who compose

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them, when they have been released from the conditions in which they have been serving in the Canal Zone.
LORD HANKEY: Was not the Army always in reserve in Egypt? Did we not reinforce Korea repeatedly, when troops had to be sent there, from the Zone? I was there and some of my own regiment, the Royal Marines, were sent out. Did we not reinforce Kenya from this very handy reserve, and has that not always been argued by the military authorities as one of the reasons for holding it—that it was a reserve in a convenient place? I agree it may be useful to redistribute the garrison.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: The fact remains that for some time past now we have been unable to accumulate a strategic reserve, because so long as we were holding that Base on that scale we could not take the men away to any considerable extent. Our primary preoccupation was with Suez. Another great difference from the past is that we can now reinforce rapidly and effectively on a considerable scale by air, and if we have a strategic reserve where the military authorities think it can be best situated, which for the moment is in this country, we are in a position to transport it, in the case of emergency, to whatever part of the world it may be required.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, also asked me about a provision in the Heads of Agreement which was causing him some apprehension. I think it need not bother him. With reference to the second of the Heads of Agreement he asked what was the significance of the provision that the two Governments would consult together during the last twelve months of the duration of the Agreement on the arrangements which would be necessary when it came to an end. He seemed to think that there was some hidden "catch" in this provision which would be released at a critical moment. The provision means exactly what it says—no more and no less. It means that during the last year of the agreement, during the seventh year, Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government will consult together, and it will be for them to decide whether it is in their common interest that the Agreement should continue for a further period at the end of the seven years or whether it should come to an end.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, the point at issue is the defence of the Canal; that in 1956 we should discuss how far Egypt is able to take over or assist in the defence of the Canal.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: The 1936 Treaty, I know, dealt with that. What was troubling the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, was the second of these Heads of Agreement. It may be that, in putting the question, he had in mind something in the nature of (I think it is) Article 16, in the 1936 Treaty. All I can say now is that there is no question of continuing beyond the specified period of seven years unless there has been, in the course of the last year of those seven, an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government—
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I think my noble friend Lord Stansgate had in mind the Article in the 1936 Treaty about the position that would arise in 1956 when the Treaty came to an end. He wanted to make sure that there was no question of the Heads of Agreement being in the same position as that Article, on which I understand there has been a legal dispute as to whether the Treaty would come to an end in 1956 or would stand even if there were not an agreed amendment.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I am obliged to the noble Lord. I think there was some recollection of that dispute in his mind when the noble Viscount put the question. What I was trying to say is that no such ground for dispute exists in these Heads of Agreement; and this Agreement, of course, will supersede the 1936 Treaty.
The noble Lord, Lord Killearn asked me a question which he had already asked me on a previous occasion and which, in spite of his doubts on the subject, I hope I understood when he first asked it. He asked me, both yesterday and at an earlier date, about the possibility of adapting out direct and indirect obligations under the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 into an effective guarantee of the freedom of navigation of the Canal. The noble Lord will, of course, have it very much in mind that this is not a question Which Her Majesty's Government can decide for themselves. There are a number of other countries involved. If one reads the preamble to

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the Convention, it reads rather like a pre-1914 Almanac de Gotha. A number of the countries which signed it have disappeared and their places have been taken by others. It is not a question which the Government can decide for themselves. The Suez Canal is an international waterway, and the Suez Canal Convention which regulates it is an international Treaty. Actually, our view is that the provisions of the Convention are still so clear in their expression that there would be little to be gained, and maybe indeed something to be lost, if we set about trying to re-negotiate it to-day. One of the difficulties would be this list of signatories the identity of whom has completely changed.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I hope I do not spoil the noble Marquess's train of thought by interrupting, but the inherited obligations which were transposed from Turkey will remain as they are now.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not quite follow the noble Lord's point. The Heads of Agreement we are discussing now, apart from one reference to its being a free waterway, do not affect—
LORD KILLEARN: The point I make is this. If we are to leave Egypt, what about our guardianship in the second degree, or whatever it is called, which we inherited from Turkey? Shall we just carry on as under the old Treaty? We inherited these rights from Turkey, and now we are going out. What about our guardianship? Do I make the point clear?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: We were never under any obligation under the 1888 Convention to put or keep troops in Egypt. It is true that we inherited the Turkish obligations, but that does not involve us automatically in any duty to put troops in Egypt or maintain them there.
LORD KILLEARN: May I, with all respect, refer the noble Marquess to the case which Sir Alexander Cadogan put before the United Nations, in which he made the point that there was an obligation on us to be there? He made it very clearly. I had the volume with me yesterday; I have not got it to-day, but it is available.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I can tell the noble Lord only what I believe to be the position at this moment. We inherited the obligations which Turkey had under the 1888 Convention, but there was no automatic duty upon us to put troops in Egypt and keep them there. We are under an obligation to bring in troops, if we are called upon to do so by the Egyptians. That is my recollection of how the matter stands—
LORD KILLEARN: Yes, for the maintenance of the freedom of the Canal.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Perhaps it would be more convenient if I finished the sentence. That position under the 1888 Convention remains. These Heads of Agreement do not overrule, and do not alter, anything contained in the 1888 Convention.
LORD KILLEARN: But surely that is just the point. If we are going to withdraw all our troops under these Heads of Agreement it is quite impossible to carry out the inherited obligations which were Turkey's and are now ours under the 1888 Convention.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Assuming, for the purpose of the noble Lord's argument, that we are still under obligation (I am not going to argue this point at length this afternoon), we are not going to put the troops we are removing from Egypt either in the Antarctic or at the North Pole. We are putting them in other parts of the Middle East. With today's transportation—
LORD KILLEARN: That is an answer. I accept that.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Possibly if the noble Lord had allowed me to, I could have given him the answer some minutes ago.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Anyhow, that, I think, is the position, and I hope that that, for the moment, satisfies the noble Lord.
A number of other questions have been raised by noble Lords who have spoken. I remember, in particular, that the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson of Drumochter, at a latish hour last night, turned his and our attention, very properly, to Ethiopia, and inquired about the prospects of a

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Treaty there. We are anxious—I believe this will give the noble Lord some satisfaction—to conclude with Ethiopia a Treaty of trade and of friendship. We are looking forward with great pleasure to the visit of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor in the autumn. As your Lordships know, he has many friends and admirers awaiting him in this country who made his acquaintance and admired his fortitude in the years of his residence here during the war. A draft of such a Treaty as the noble Lord had in mind is already now being negotiated. But there are, I must admit, certain political and economic problems involved in it which may make it a rather more long-drawn-out process than we should wish, and I cannot give a guarantee that it will be ready before the visit of His Imperial Majesty. But as I say, the Treaty is in negotiation, and we hope that it will be possible to bring it before long to a successful conclusion.
Certain noble Lords argued, both yesterday and to-day, against the European Defence Community. We have had a good deal of discussion on that particular subject in the last two years, and I do not think that the House will expect from me—or would welcome—an attempt to reargue that case; indeed, I think the speeches which have been made in support of the European Defence Community have already achieved the task without any contribution from me.
As to the speeches which have been made to-day, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in a passage to which reference was made by my noble friend Lord Coleraine, said, in dealing with Geneva, that there were three points of satisfaction: that agreement had been arrived at there in the absence of the United States; that we had carried through negotiations without the United States, and in opposition to their wishes, and that the agreement had raised our status in the world as a whole. I only want to say this, as one who was present at Geneva: it is possible to over-emphasise to a remarkable extent the differences which there arose. We were working in constant daily contact with the United States' delegation—and not only in daily contact, but in friendly contact. I think that any attempt to exaggerate the differences, which fluctuations of policy must from time to time introduce, into a triumph on our part
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over the American delegation at Geneva is not an attitude which is likely to be of permanent service to the relations between the two countries. The noble Lord also said, in his third point, that, as a result of Geneva, he had every hope of successful negotiations in Korea. I made some attempt to deal with the difficulties there yesterday, and I do not propose to go over the ground again.
In speaking of Egypt and these particular Heads of Agreement the noble Lord said that we were making an agreement for the freedom of the Canal. We were making no such agreement. The Convention is there, and has been there since 1888. All we were doing here, as I have said in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, was to re-assert our belief in the value and the principles of that particular Convention. I think that that was the right way to deal with it.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, also put a question with regard to the question of Israel and the raids which have been going on along the Israel-Jordan border, and as to the responsibility which lies upon the Government of this country. He also referred to threatening passages in the speeches of various Arab personalities on the subject of what they intended to do to Israel. I said yesterday—and I will repeat it, if it is any satisfaction to the noble Lord—that Her Majesty's Government stand entirely by the terms of the joint statement which was issued, together with France and the United States, in 1950. As I said yesterday, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has been in touch with both of those countries and has received from them assurances that they equally abide by those terms. These Heads of Agreement that we have now made do not alter the position which is covered by that declaration. The obligations upon this country which it contains stand, and amongst them is the obligation that if the three Governments find that any of the States is preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, they will, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, went on to deal with the question of "peaceful co-existence," and he thought that I had dealt rather harshly with the most recent

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Soviet Note. I do not want to rebut again the accusation that in using the word "voluminous" I was somehow being offensive to the Soviet Government. What I did say—and I will say it again —is that the Note was in language of unusual asperity. However, that is a criticism of the form of the Note and, as I said, does not mean that we shall not, as I promised we would when I made my speech yesterday, give it careful consideration.
LORD SILKIN: I do not want to pursue this point, but I would ask the noble Marquess to look at what is reported in column 230 of yesterday's OFFICIAL REPORT. He may find that he went rather further than he suggests. However, as I say, I do not wish to pursue it unless the noble Marquess wishes to.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I have no particular desire to pursue it. I merely thought that I was entitled to point out that I did not think I had been so critical or so doctrinaire in my commentary as the noble Lord tried to make out. But let us leave these questions of personal use of phrases out of it and go on to something more substantial.
When the noble Lord was dealing with "peaceful co-existence" I could not help wondering whether he had remembered that the Berlin Conference had ever been held at all. He seemed to be talking as if the situation now was that the whole ground with regard to Germany was completely open to discussion. Again, I am not pre-judging the second Note, but I do want him to remember that all these matters were carefully considered not very long ago. Then the noble Lord went on to say that to talk about the balance of forces, as my noble friend the Leader of the House did, was a counsel of despair. I am bound to say that I should feel much less desperate if I felt that my forces balanced those of the other side than if I felt that the other side's forces greatly exceeded my own. I should have thought that, having started from a situation in which, surely, by all acknowledgment, the Russian forces were considerably larger than our own, it would have been not a counsel of despair but a comfort to the noble Lord to feel that the gap between the size of the forces on the one side and the size of the forces on the other was, by the operation of
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N.A.T.O. and other means, being rapidly reduced. I do not wish to take up further time arguing that matter.
I do not know that the noble Lord, Lord Winster, in his interesting speech, put to me any particular questions, but he did deal with the question of spheres of influence and the difficulty of preventing by force the spread of Communism in those areas. I would entirely agree that everything possible must be done to counter, by other means than force, the spread of those doctrines in those areas, just as the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, at the end of his speech emphasised what I may call the social and economic aspects of it. With that approach I would entirely agree. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, asked me a particular question which he thought I should probably not answer. The noble and learned Earl is always intelligent in his anticipations as in everything else, and as regards Trieste I would prefer at this moment, for obvious reasons, to say no more than that negotiations are proceeding; and the House hopes, I have no doubt, that they will come to a successful end. The noble and learned Earl dealt with a good many other matters with which at this moment I think I had better not begin to deal. He asked me, in particular, about the opportunities which Parliament would have of discussing the E.D.C. arrangement, but that point I think I answered at the outset. I am personally grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, as I am on repeated occasions, for raising these debates and for presenting with so much clarity the situation as it seems to him. I am always grateful to find that the situation as it appears to him differs so little from the situation as it appears to me.
6.44 p.m.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I am going to take only two or three minutes before I ask the leave of the House to withdraw my Motion. First, I should like to express to the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, the apology of my noble and learned Leader who could not sit throughout the noble Marquess's reply because of a personal engagement. Since the noble Lord, Lord Strang, made his speech, every speaker has referred to it, and because of my long personal association with him I should regret it if I

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did not take this opportunity at the end of the debate to pay a personal tribute to him. I think noble Lords will agree that it was a remarkable maiden speech. It has been referred to either approvingly or with hints of a desire to criticise if it had been appropriate to do so. I think, that is the test of the impact which the noble Lord has made with his maiden speech. He will understand me if I say that his personal Parliamentary success would have given great joy to one who is not here.
I should like to thank the noble Marquess for the assurance which he gave with regard to E.D.C. I was disappointed at what he had to say about the freedom of navigation of the Canal. The breaches which are being made by the Egyptian Government are having a serious effect upon the life of Israel. I should have thought that in the reaffirmation by the two Governments of the Convention of 1888, there would have been some opportunity to secure or to influence the Egyptian Government to call off the violations. The noble Marquess said that Her Majesty's Government would counsel wisdom and moderation. I would only say that I think many people will be surprised that, at the moment we are recognising the full independence and national traditions of Egypt, Egypt is not reciprocating in the same way as regards Israel. I hope that, despite the fact that the matter could not be dealt with, as the noble Marquess says, between the two Governments, some means will be found of bringing about the reopening of the Canal to Israeli shipping.
There was one other point with which I had intended to deal—namely, some misapprehensions on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, regarding the early portion of my speech. Fortunately for me, and without my foreknowledge, my noble friend Lord Silkin covered the point effectively, and I do not feel that I need take any more of your Lordships' time by dealing with it myself. Having said that, I think we shall all agree that it has been a remarkable debate. I opened the debate with a sentence that I felt sure that many noble Lords would be glad of the opportunity of discussing international affairs. I did not realise how many noble Lords would be interested in it. We have
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had a very interesting debate, covering many important subjects. It was particularly timely to have had it on these two days, in view of the fact that your Lordships' House is dispersing to-morrow for the Summer Recess. With those few words, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

OSBORNE HOUSE
6.48 p.m.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I should like, with the permission of the House, to take this opportunity to make a short Statement, similar to that which has already been made by my right honourable friend the Minister of Works in another place, on the subject of Osborne House in the Isle of Wight. On the occasion of King Edward VII's Coronation, and by reason of the Osborne Estate Act, 1902, Osborne House in the Isle of Wight became part of the public property of the Crown to be administered by the Ministry of Works. The Act directed that the house should be used as a memorial of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria. Since that date, certain rooms which had been in personal occupation of Queen Victoria—including that in which she died—have been maintained exactly as they were and never shown to visitors. This year marks the Jubilee of the opening of the house, and Her Majesty the Queen has commanded that these rooms shall now be open to the public. Her Majesty has also offered on permanent loan the furnishings and works of art which are lodged in Osborne House or in the Swiss Cottage and Museum. These objects are to remain permanently at Osborne, and my right honourable friend the Minister of Works will have the duty and charge of maintaining and administering the collection in the interests of the visiting public and of the patients of the King Edward VII Convalescent Home. My right honourable friend has had the honour to accept Her Majesty's gracious offer. It is hoped that the private apartments can be opened to the public early next year.

ELECTRICITY REORGANISATION (SCOTLAND) BILL
6.51 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, although this Bill is, I agree, complicated, its main purpose is simple and, I hope, sensible. It is to transfer to the Secretary of State the responsibility for electricity matters in Scotland and to set up a new public authority for the generation and distribution of electricity in the South of Scotland. The South of Scotland will then be in line with the North of Scotland which, for the purpose of generation and distribution, is covered by the Hydro-Electric Board. Scotland will, therefore, have control of its own electricity undertakings, and the responsibility for adequate performance will lie, in the last resort, with the Secretary of State, except for some small and purely technical matters.
The fact that the South of Scotland will be one area for the purposes of generation and distribution will, we hope, lead to some administrative simplification. At present, there are two British Electricity Authority divisions for generation, based, respectively, on Glasgow and Edinburgh. There are also two area boards for distribution, responsible to the British Electricity Authority and to the Minister of Fuel and Power. We feel that the new arrangement, whereby there will be one board for the South of Scotland, able to cover the whole area, will bring a definite administrative advantage which should be reflected in a more efficient service and in closer attention to Scotland's needs.
I think it is important to say that this measure of decentralisation which we propose will not mean that there is in any sense a barrier at the Border. Supplies will continue to flow in both directions, as they do at present—that is to say, between England and Scotland and Scotland and England; and between the North of Scotland and the South of Scotland. This kind of exchange of electricity supply presents no technical problem whatever. It has been suggested, and we thought at one time, that one Board might have been preferable for the whole
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of Scotland, but as this exchange of current is a commonplace procedure, and as the North of Scotland Board is, in the main, dealing with the harnessing of water power and is working well, we have decided not to disturb either its position or its authority. So we merely take the opportunity in this Bill, so far as the North of Scotland Board is concerned, to make certain comparatively small changes.
In future, the Board will be appointed by the Secretary of State alone. The Board will no longer have to submit its schemes for construction to the British Electricity Authority for approval; it will submit them to the Secretary of State direct. The South of Scotland Board, and not the British Electricity Authority, will have to purchase at a guaranteed price the surplus electricity from the North. Decentralisation must not be a dogma; it must be a convenience. Although for the main purposes the Bill places a direct responsibility upon the Secretary of State, nevertheless with certain functions it is desirable that he and the Minister of Fuel and Power should exercise joint responsibility—for instance, so far as safety regulations are concerned. Responsibility for the certification of meters, a very technical matter, will remain with the Minister.
Again, and more important, by an amendment of Section 53 of the Act of 1947, we require the three authorities—the British Electricity Authority, the North of Scotland Board and the South of Scotland Board, which will now, as independent bodies, have equal status—jointly to consult with the trade unions in any matters which concern wages and conditions of service. The necessary modifications to achieve that are in the First Schedule, and they are acceptable to the trade unions and all concerned. The Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Bill is so full that I do not think I need trouble your Lordships very much with the details of its clauses. Many of them deal with the technical matter of the transfer of assets and liabilities, and there is only one figure that I need bring to your Lordships' notice: that is, that there is a limit of £75 million placed on the borrowing powers of the new Board. We anticipate that that will see it through the first four years of its life.

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The transfer of responsibility to the new Board next April from the British Electricity Authority and the two Scottish Area Boards will involve a good deal of preliminary work. Accordingly, the Bill provides that the new Board may be appointed as soon as the Bill becomes law. That cannot now be, I am afraid, until the autumn. It may, however, be helpful if I let it be known now that, if the Bill becomes law in substantially its present form, it is Secretary of State's intention to appoint Mr. J. S. Pickles, the present Chairman of the South-West Scotland Electricity Board, and Sir Norman Duke, the Chairman of the South-East Scotland Electricity Board, to be the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman, respectively, of the new Board. I cannot at present say any more about the other members of the Board.
It will not have escaped your Lordships' notice that this is an amending Bill. It is the most convenient way of modelling the new arrangements for the South of Scotland on the same lines as those for the North of Scotland which have, on the whole, been so effective. The best way to do that was to apply the same legislation, with such amendments as are necessary to achieve that end. We could have introduced an amending and consolidating Bill at once, but I remember the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, saying on a previous Bill that I introduced last year: "I would much rather take two such steps—that is to say, bring in a Bill showing what amendments to make in the law and then, having made these amendments, bring in a Consolidation Bill." That advice we intend to follow, and the Secretary of State in another place has given assurances that a Consolidation Bill will follow these amendments as soon as it is possible to introduce such a Bill. Although this Bill is complicated, nevertheless, as I say, the object is simple. I hope that your Lordships will find it sensible. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Home.)
7.0 p.m.
LORD MATHERS: My Lords, the Bill which the noble Earl has introduced with his usual capacity and lucidity—and he has explained the purpose of it very clearly indeed—arises from an election
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pledge on the part of the Government, a promise made in 1950 and again in 1951, that separate committees for the fuel and power industries would be set up. It seemed to be clearly intended (and I think it was made evident by the speech of the noble Earl) that the electricity set-up would provide for the responsibility of one body for all electricity production and transmission in the whole of Scotland. This Bill, as has been indicated, does not carry out that declared intention but is a kind of semi-detached or Siamese twin structure.
THE EARL OF HOME: They are Scottish twins.
LORD MATHERS: Yes, they are both to be of the same nationality, but I think the term "Siamese twins" is the usual one to use about those who are joined together in a somewhat unnatural manner, although I would hardly say that it is unnatural for these two boards to be joined in this way. It has been a matter of speculation as to why the original intention was not carried out. The question is put in this way: Was it that the redoubtable parent and guardian of the North of Scotland Hydro-Electricity Board would not allow his bairn to be adopted? If that were the reason, I would have great sympathy with him, for Mr. Tom Johnston has laboured valiantly for the important development of which he is the chairman, and he is entitled to safeguard it in every legitimate way.
Since the Bill was first introduced in another place, Clauses 4 and 5 have been dropped from it and the Bill has thereby, I believe, been improved. There are those who would say that this Bill is of so little account that not only might Clauses 4 and 5 be dropped, but Clauses 1 to 3 and 6 to 17 might also be dropped with no great loss to Scotland. It is obvious that no great haste is being made by the Government with the Bill. It had its Second Reading on February 3 and its Third Reading only on July 12. That is a period of more than four months. The Government themselves were responsible for that delay, because they overloaded the programme of work. Obviously, there was no hurry for the Bill. It could very well have awaited the report of the independent inquiry to be carried out by the Committee announced by the Minister of Fuel and Power on July 9, which is an inquiry into

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the organisation of the electricity supply industry in England and Wales. I cannot see why that inquiry should not have covered Scotland as well as England and Wales. Armed with the recommendations of such a Committee, the Secretary of State for Scotland would have had something concrete to work upon. As I see it, he is pressing forward with this Bill without any expert opinion to go upon. May I put the question to him, whether competent technical advice has been taken and whether it is favourable to what the Bill is designed to do?
It is claimed for the Bill that it will bring Scottish consumers of electricity into closer touch with the new South of Scotland Board to be set up by the Secretary of State, but I fear that the terms of the Bill do not prove this. I ask the question: Does the disappearance of the South West and South East organisations and corresponding consumer-consultation machinery mean that there will be only one consultative council after the Bill is passed? I urge that, for the convenience of consumers by keeping the new Board in touch with the needs of the community, there should continue to be two consultative bodies as before, one in the East and one in the West. I hope I can have a favourable answer to that inquiry, to which I attach considerable importance.
I am glad that the noble Earl has made reference to the solving of the trade union difficulty and that we are not to have the kind of attitude taken towards this Bill that was taken when it was sought by the Railway Amalgamation Bill of 1920, or thereabouts, to set up the grouping of the railways. The first intention then was to have a separate group for Scotland, but both the railway workers and the traders were opposed to that idea because of the possible repercussions upon them. It was their insistence that caused the longitudinal grouping to be adopted. It will be remembered that the L.M.S. took one side of Scotland and the L.N.E.R. took the other side, and ran to London and elsewhere in conjunction.
The borrowing powers have been mentioned by the noble Earl, and I think these are satisfactory. He has given us an indication of those who are to be in charge of the new Board and I am sure
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that the names he has mentioned are names which will give great confidence to those who will look to this new Board to do good work in Scotland along the lines that are intended. That is all I have to say on the Bill. I concur in giving this measure a Second Reading.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, I should like also to give a welcome to this Bill. Quite apart from its merits, to which my noble friend, Lord Mathers, has referred, there is, to my mind as a Scottish Peer, one very pleasant aspect of it, and that is, the important contribution it makes to restoring to Scotland the management of some of her Scottish affairs. You will observe that the control of her electricity industry is being transferred from London to Edinburgh. That, I think, is a welcome step and one which I am sure will be hailed with enthusiasm in Scottish circles. The noble Earl who introduced the Bill made some reference to the retention of the management of the meters by the Ministry of Fuel and Power. Did he mean the meters for measuring the flow or the meters which take the shillings?
THE EARL OF HOME: The testing meters.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: I see. I was going to say that it would be a pity if we were not going to restore to the people of Scotland the right to look after their own meters as well as to manage their own industry. With those remarks, I also wish to welcome this Bill.
7.9 p.m.
LORD POLWARTH: My Lords, it is notoriously hazardous for Members of your Lordships' House to meddle in matters electrical, as witness the fate of our lamented and, I must admit, apocryphal noble colleague, Lord Finchley, who, you will remember, in the words of the late Mr. Hilaire Belloc,
"tried to mend the electric light
Himself. It struck him dead and serve him right.
It is the duty of the wealthy man
To give employment to the artisan."
In spite of that warning I think I must say a word on this Bill. Before going further, I should like to welcome the apparent change in heart of the Party of the Members who sit on the Benches

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opposite. The Bill has received a much warmer welcome from your Lordships than it did in another place, and I am delighted to think that noble Lords opposite are changing their minds on this matter.
LORD MATHERS: Would the noble Lord allow me to say that this Bill is not the Bill to which such great exception was taken. Improvements have been made and assurances have been given which make it more palatable.
LORD POLWARTH: I am glad that we have been able to meet the noble Lord and his friends.
At this late hour one cannot spend long on this subject, but I should like to concentrate on one field, with regard to which I think this new Bill is going to bring Scotland quite considerable advantage—that is, in the field of rural electrification. We in the South-East and South-West of Scotland have a large area of countryside, comprising fine farming country, which at present is one of the most meagrely electrified areas of all the country areas in the United Kingdom. In considering this matter of rural electrification I do not think anyone will deny that it can never be wholly economic—that is to say, it can never pay for itself; and I think it is accepted on all sides that part of the cost of carrying electricity to these more remote districts must be borne by consumers in the towns, just as the town dweller bears part of the cost of delivering the mail to the country dwellers. I think it is generally agreed that this bringing of electricity to the country is one of the most potent forces available towards a prosperous agriculture, both from the point of view of providing the amenities which will keep our country population living in the country and of the power which it will brine to enable the farmer to do more work on the farm and to do it more efficiently.
I come from the South-Fast of Scotland. Perhaps I speak with a certain amount of bias, but I feel that we in the South-East have come off worse than the South-Western area. In the South-West, before the war, some enlightened local authorities took powers to distribute electricity, or made schemes for the distribution of electricity themselves; and as a result the South-West area is electrified to a much higher degree than the South-East. So long as these two areas, the
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South-West and the South-East were under the control of a Board situated 400 miles away, quite obviously it was difficult for that Board to assess the relative needs of those two areas. I have felt all along that they said "Well, here are these two areas. Obviously they are very similar; their needs are the same, they can both have the same capital and the same materials." I think that they tended to overlook the fact that the South-West was already in a much more advanced stage than the South-East, and I believe that this is one thing which the Bill will rectify, because our one Board in Scotland is close to the country and knows the position.
The economics of supplying these South of Scotland rural areas are, I think, more serious than in many others, owing to the geography of the land. Most of the farms and rural communities are scattered over the length of long valleys and are not grouped round the villages, as they are, in general, in England. The valleys run away up into the hills like the fingers of a hand, and the resemblance to the fingers of a hand is even more marked when you look at the map which I have seen, showing the proposed schemes for carrying electricity to those districts, because you will find that the valleys are marked off into joints—as it were, the joints of a finger. There is, first, a large area low down in the valley, where there are good farms, fairly concentrated, and where there is a good demand for electricity. That is marked off as one scheme. As you go further up, and the farms become more scattered and the population lower, you will find another area marked off; and that is another scheme.
This raises a difficult problem, because the present policy of the Boards has been to take the lower parts of the valleys—the palm so to speak—and to electrify them first, which is a quite natural inclination. But in the future this is going to run them into serious difficulty. In the first place, it is the remote farms that in many ways are in most need of electricity, because unless it comes to them soon a great many of the people living there will have given up the struggle and will have moved into the towns. Quite apart from that, there is another practical difficulty: once all the lower reaches of the valley, the more lucrative areas, have been electrified, the future Board will be faced

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with the problem of dealing with all these outlying areas one after the other; and as a result a heavy burden will fall on the town consumer of electricity to subsidise the cost of taking the current up to the valley heads. I do not know what the solution is, but it is a problem that will clearly have to be faced by the new Board. I believe that it would bring great hope to the people living far out if the Board would take the current right up some of these valleys, even if they could do only some of them now, because that would at least give hope to the people living up the other valleys that before long they will possess the current.
My Lords, the noble Earl who moved the Second Reading mentioned the question of capital. Of course that is the first essential in all these schemes of development. There is to be £75 million of borrowing power made available at the start. I agree that this should be adequate for quite a time to come. Speaking on the Bill in another place, the Joint Under-Secretary of State said (OFFICIAL REPORT, COMMONS, Vol. 523 (No. 46), col. 488):
"The House may be quite sure that the southern Board will be able to engage in capital development as hard as it is capable of going for some years to come. If, in the end, the £75 million is found to be not sufficient, and more is required, we shall have to take steps."
That is a most encouraging statement, because so often in the past we have been told that these schemes could not be proceeded with owing to restrictions on capital development. But I think that in the last year or two the pendulum has been swinging the other way. In fact the position is that the Boards have not been able, with their physical resources, to carry out the work for which they received authorisation from the point of view of expenditure. I believe that, taking the southern sub-area of South-East Scotland, that is true. They have been allowed this year to expend the sum of £167,000 on rural development. That sounds all right, but it also turns out that there was a considerable amount their previous year's balance unexpended at the end of the previous year, and that that has just been cancelled. So presumably this fresh allowance will really include schemes that were originally approved for the previous year and with which they have not caught up.
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Three things, as I see it, are needed to remedy this position. First of all, the new Board must take a long-term view of its budgeting for these schemes. It must not work on the Government principle of working for a year ahead, on a cash basis, and then having to pay back anything that has not been spent. It must not think that it can complete schemes and run them economically within a financial year; it must look further ahead. Secondly, I think the Board can do a great deal more by putting this work, both the construction and the surveying, out to contract, instead of trying to tackle it with its own resources. Thirdly, and I think most important, the Board must have the determination to treat this matter of rural electrification as one of real urgency and not merely pay lip service to the need for it.
There is another matter which I would have raised but for the announcement of the noble Earl regarding the appointment of a new chairman and deputy-chairman of this new Board, to both of whom I should like to offer my congratulations. There will be an interval before the new Board can take over, and presumably there would have been a natural inclination for the old Boards to wish to get a pat on the back for handing over a good balance sheet and a full bank account, instead of pushing on with this slightly uneconomic development as rapidly as they might otherwise have done. I am delighted to hear that these two chairmen of the old Boards are to head the new Board, for they will realise that they can go full steam ahead: they might, indeed, have a competition to see which of them can have the greater amount of new work in hand before the new Board takes over.
Progress is a strange thing; it is very uneven in its incidence. Some noble Lords may be unaware that 130 years ago a very famous Borderer, Sir Walter Scott, was one of the pioneers in pioneering artificial lighting in the South of Scotland; he was chairman of the Edinburgh Gas Company and he installed gas lighting in his house at Abbotsford. Today, 130 years later, there are still houses and farms within a few miles of Abbotsford with no other means of lighting but oil lamps. This Bill, if put into operation intelligently, with the new Board

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taking a proper view of their duties, foreshadows the end of a reproach on our present standard of living.
7.22 p.m.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, by leave of the House, may I acknowledge the speeches which noble Lords have made? The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Polwarth, will no doubt be read with great advantage by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the new Board. There are major generating projects in prospect. These include a new power station at Barony in Ayrshire, extensions at Portobello and at Braehead in Renfrewshire, and also at Clydesmill and Dalmarnock. Planning has been proceeding for an entirely new generating station on the biggest scale at Kincardine-on-Forth. That news is doubtless welcome, as it shows that we are getting ahead with our capital works in toe South of Scotland. Expenditure on distribution has been running at over £5 million a year; if expenditure continues at this rate there will be about £50 million available for other capital expenditure over the next four years. It is right, as my noble friend said, that there is no shortage facing the new Board in this respect. I have no doubt they will apply their minds seriously to the problem of electricity distribution in the Border country.
Lord Mathers twitted me slightly, saying that there was an election pledge that we should set up one Board for the whole of Scotland. We must not be doctrinaire. Take a completely hypothetical case: it might be that some political Party said they would nationalise all the industries in this country, and when it came to the point, in spite of all the facts being against them, they went on with it. I have looked into the indication we gave that there might be one Board; but we came to the conclusion that the sensible, practical way of doing things, the system which would work best, would be to have two Boards. It is felt that, for the time being, that is the better way to proceed. The noble Lord then said that he thought it would be of advantage to drop the whole Bill, without great loss to Scotland. What would Robert Burns say? Here I come along and offer him the glorious privilege of being independent of the British Electricity Authority and the noble Lord asks me to drop the Bill. We may go for our holidays in
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complete harmony because I remember Mr. Woodburn saying in his election address (I have made my researches too):
"It is clearly desirable that we should press for more and more devolution and Scottish administration of Scottish affairs."
Here is a modest contribution: so perhaps we can proceed happily to our holidays. The technical advice we have received has indicated that this new setup will work perfectly satisfactorily from the technical point of view. So far as the consumer is concerned there will be one consultative council, but the obligation is laid upon the consultative council by the Secretary of State to set up local committees or representatives to keep, it in touch with all parts of the area; so although there may be only one consultative council it can he completely representative of consumers over the whole area.
LORD MATHERS: I thank the noble Earl.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

MYXOMATOSIS IN SCOTLAND
7.26 p.m.
LORD SEMPILL LORD SEMPILL rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, having regard to the recent importation from England into north-east Scotland of rabbit carcases infected with myxomatosis, they will take immediate steps to arrest the practice that causes untold suffering and to prevent by local action the spread of the disease in Scotland. The noble Lord said: My Lords, may I apologise to your Lordships for the fact that last week I failed to observe the traditions of your Lordships' House by making some remarks in regard to my Starred Question. I started to make a speech and was reminded by the noble Marquess the Leader of your Lordships' House, with that charm and consideration that ever has our admiration, that I was out of order, and that I had better put down an Unstarred Question on what the noble Marquess said was "this very important subject." I also owe an apology to my noble friend Lord Saltoun who told me afterwards that he was protesting at my failure to follow the traditions of this House and had cried out "Order,

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order!" but that I paid no attention. I had to tell my noble friend that I had not heard his remarks. It was certainly the first time in your Lordships' House—and surely the first time for centuries—that a Forbes has not heard a Fraser—and he the Chief of that great Clan.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, stated last week, the Myxomatosis Advisory Committee was to meet this week. My noble friend was good enough to tell me that after this meeting, and after hearing his reply to-day, I should feel more happy. I sincerely hope so. I should like to congratulate the Committee over which the noble Lord presides on the firm stand they have taken against the deliberate spreading of this frightful disease. This stand, as is made clear in the Report, is taken first on humanitarian grounds and secondly on legal and practical grounds. According to the Committee there is some doubt as to the position in law of a person who transports a diseased rabbit from one place to another, but no doubt at all that a person who deliberately takes a rabbit and inoculates it with the virus would be committing one or both of the offences of:
"doing an act causing unnecessary suffering to an animal"
and
"administering a poison to an animal without reasonable cause or excuse,"
contrary to the Protection of Animals Act (Scotland), 1912. The Committee also point out that under civil law a person who deliberately spreads such a disease on his own land may be held liable for damage caused to a neighbour as a result of the disease spreading to his land or to his stock of domestic rabbits. As a result the Committee, to whom all congratulations are due, recommend categorically:
"that no attempt should be made to assist the spread of myxomatosis, or to introduce it into unaffected areas of the country."
In this month a Mr. Milne, of Balrownie, Durris, Kincardineshire, introduced diseased rabbit carcases obtained in England with a view to spreading the scourge amongst his own rabbits. I would assume that Mr. Milne had no idea at all of the horror he was importing. He may even have felt that death would he nearly as instantaneous as it would be where rabbits are gassed. Otherwise,
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I cannot believe that anyone would deliberately spread this dreadful scourge that causes some ten days of frightful suffering. So horrible is that, that Mr. Foster, of Holyhead, a senior inspector of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and in charge of one of the mercy patrols in England, of which there are a growing number, says:
"I have never been so terribly sickened and disgusted, and I am still haunted by the sight of these creatures. Without any shadow of doubt they suffer intense agony and misery for at least ten days."
These are the remarks of a senior inspector of a Society used to dealing with dreadful conditions of cruelty in animals.
As your Lordships will have heard, the equivalent Society in Scotland, on hearing what had been done in Kincardineshire, immediately arranged for a mercy patrol to be sent from Aberdeen to find and gas all the unfortunate sufferers. The Scottish Society engaged on this humanitarian work had first to obtain the permission of the owner before gassing the tortured rabbits. As your Lordships will know, where someone who, through negligence, traps a rabbit in a gin-trap, the use of which we are all so glad to know is shortly to be forbidden, is reported to the Society, the result is immediate police action and a fine—and quite rightly, too. But in the case of rabbits infected by myxomatosis, permission has to be asked; and in some cases permission has been asked of certain owners of land and refused. Your Lordships may judge of the feelings of people when I say that a large placard bearing the words "Down with Milne" was recently displayed—and this despite the fact that Mr. Milne welcomed Scottish R.S.P.C.A. officials on his land with gas equipment.
Urban dwellers often think that gamekeepers—ghillies—are callous to the sufferings of animals. This is not so. They are revolted, as are all right-thinking people, at the long tortures produced by myxomatosis, and they deplore its spreading by man. With your Lordships' permission I should like to read a few words from a Report made recently by the factor at Crathes in Aberdeenshire, Mr. Russell Birnie. He said:
"I have seen it at Durris. It is a ghastly thing. I cannot understand how anyone could import such a horror."

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I should also like to quote the words of the head ghillie or gamekeeper, Mr. Robert Maclaren, of Craigievar. He said:
"I have discussed this disease with all around and a large majority deplore what this man at Durris has done. This disease is many, many times more cruel than the gin trap, as the rabbits are tortured to death for several weeks."
These are the opinions of people who are experienced in these matters.
My Lords, this is no occasion, and not the hour, for a long speech, telling not only of the misdemeanours of rabbits but of the uses they serve by what they eat and by what they give, since we are all agreed that the rabbit population must be reduced until the rabbit is in balance with his predators and food supplies. This can be achieved as your Lordships have emphasised before, mainly by the use of the gun and the net. The fearsome gin trap will soon be out and replaced by the humane trap. In all this, the rabbits who have to die pro bono publico must not, by the hand of man, be tortured to death by being infested with myxomatosis. That great pioneer aircraft designer, who is well known by name to your Lordships, Sir Richard Fairey, one of the most active and far-sighted squires of to-day, writes:
"I support your attitude about myxomatosis and am really shocked at the callousness of so many people who, one would think, would be more civilised than to want to spread this obscenity deliberately throughout the country."
In my own part of Scotland, the North-East, the Ministry of Agriculture's wishes that the Carrington Committee's recommendations should be observed are being widely flouted. The rule of law is giving place to a condition of unease, of growing uncertainty, of the immediate and ultimate future of the many persons employed in what I will call shortly, "the rabbit industry," the United Kingdom total income of which, as your Lordships have heard before, is some £15 million per annum. Diseased rabbit carcases are fetching high prices. Live rabbits are being infected with the virus by drawing infected cotton threads through them, after which they are again let loose. The sale of rabbits is being seriously affected, and therefore the urge to reduce their numbers is being greatly minimised. More important than all, immense suffering on a growing scale brings horror into the lives of people of all ages as they
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see these ghastly, swollen, tortured rabbits crawling in the open until merciful death overtakes them. In closing my remarks, I implore the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to take this matter immediately in hand, and to make known, through the Press and over the air, the view of Her Majesty's Government and that of the Carrington Committee, so that this macabre act may be stopped.
7.36 p.m.
LORD MATHERS: My Lords, I hope it will be possible for the noble Lord who is going to reply to this Question to give a satisfactory and helpful reply to the noble Lord, Lord Sempill, who has raised this matter with so much earnestness. For many years I have been a town dweller, but I was born and bred in the country and I have some idea of what all this means. When listening to the desperate anxiety of some people to reduce the rabbit population, I have reflected that they might have helped to keep their rabbits down to proper numbers by giving more freedom to the poacher, who in country districts is not looked upon as a person with a bad reputation. As a matter of fact, the poacher, not only of rabbits but of fish, is looked upon as a public benefactor in some country areas of Scotland, and when he finds himself landed in gaol for his depredations he has the sympathy of the whole community, and not only of those who might benefit from his activities.
I approach this question principally from the point of view of the humanitarian interests that are involved, and will content myself, because the case has been put so well by the noble Lord, Lord Sempill, with reading one or two extracts from a letter which appears in The Field under this day's date. The Field is a magazine which I am sure is well known to your Lordships. This is a letter signed by C. A. Nunn, of Whitnal, Broad Hinton, Swindon. I will not read the whole letter, because it is too long, but here are some extracts:
"Recently I had my first opportunity to visit a farm on which rabbits are infected. I am a rabbit-catcher myself and in being so have always considered myself hardened to the suffering and death of the rabbit, but I have never seen anything so revolting and disgusting as this disease. All around the fields the rabbits sat in different stages of the disease. Their eyes had gone—this I am told occurs on the fifth day—and they appeared to be deaf. If approached quietly they could be picked up, but if approached ordinarily

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they attempted to get away. It appeared that they could sense the approach of anything by vibrations."
There are two other short paragraphs I should like to quote. They say:
"The sooner effective action is taken to check the spread of the disease by the shortsighted individual the better. The control of the rabbit is a simple enough operation if it is done properly and at the right time of year, and it need not be an expense to the landowner or the country. Carried out properly it can be an asset to both.
"From time to time various figures are published by the agricultural industry to show the damage done to agriculture by the rabbit. Among these are figures presented to the Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis which quoted £15 million for cereals and £21 million for grassland, but the Advisory Committee states there is no reliable basis for these calculations."
It is true that man has dominion over the lower animals, but he should exercise that dominion in a proper way. If he does not, and if he attempts to override the ordinary processes of nature, it is likely that he will find himself creating some other difficulty that he has not foreseen. Nature has a wonderful way of maintaining the balance of things. If I cared, I could give instances of that, not in respect of rabbits, but in respect of forestry. But we are dealing with this particular matter now, and I earnestly hope that we may have a sympathetic and helpful reply from the noble Lord.
7.43 p.m.
LORD DORCHESTER: My Lords, very diffidently I make a contribution at this late hour. I fully agree with all the powerful arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sempill, but I do not think he has covered all the points. I would point out that there are certain almost inevitable repercussions which must occur if this disease is introduced on a large scale in England. As your Lordships are aware, our local carnivorous animal fauna are very limited in number, but I consider them very precious. These are the fox, the badger, the polecat, the marten, the stoat, the otter, the wildcat, and even the weasel. I regard all those animals as precious, and they are the principal animals which live upon rabbits. To those can be added the stray cat and the stray dog. Imagine all these animals suddenly deprived of their food. They must eat. Those who can will migrate, but the others will naturally turn to our poultry,
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and in the cases of foxes and badgers, to lambs. In self-defence the farmers, gamekeepers and poultry keepers will react forcibly, and we shall see every sort of horror in the way of gas, poison traps and gins. You will not be able to stop them. Gins will reappear everywhere, not underground, as they are at present, by law, but set in the open, because the farmers and poultry keepers must protect themselves. We shall also find poison put down indiscriminately. Therefore, we run the risk that not only shall we practically lose our wild carnivorous fauna, but also a number of our humble friends, such as cats, dogs, sporting dogs, shepherd dogs and so on. On those grounds, I hope my noble friend will take some steps to stop this horrbile disease from being spread.
7.45 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, at their meeting on Monday last, July 26, the Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis considered this question of the deliberate spreading of myxomatosis. When the Advisory Committee recommended in their Report in March that no attempt should be made to assist the spread of myxomatosis or to introduce it into uninfected areas of the country, they did not know what course the disease would take, and their recommendations were based largely, though not entirely, on humanitarian considerations. Since the Committee's Report the disease has spread from the initial outbreaks in Kent, East Sussex, Essex and East Suffolk to 25 other counties in England and 10 in Wales, and to Kincardineshire in Scotland.
Up to the present, infection seems to have been carried from rabbit to rabbit almost exclusively by fleas. In Australia and, it is thought, in France as well, mosquitoes have been the main vectors of the disease. When the weather is warm and humid mosquitoes are about in large numbers but they do not yet appear to be biting rabbits nor can we be sure to what extent they will do so. If and when the mosquitoes do turn their attention to rabbits it is likely that the disease will reach epidemic proportions and spread faster than we have seen at present in this country. One thing of which we can be reasonably sure is that so long as there are wild rabbits in Great Britain we will have this disease with us.

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There seems little doubt that the spread of the disease has been assisted and accelerated by human agency, but it does not necessarily follow that its ultimate course has been materially altered or that the disease would not by natural process have reached sooner or later the areas that are now affected. In view of the present indefinite phase in the development of the disease in this country, the Advisory Committee did not feel able, at their meeting on Monday, to express any definite opinion as to its probable future course or the significance of human agency in its spread. The Committee, in present circumstances, adhere to the view expressed in their report that the Government should take no action deliberately to spread the disease; nor do they approve of its deliberate spread by private individuals. The matter will be kept under review and the Committee will meet again in the autumn to consider it further in the light of developments. In the meantime, however, they do not recommend any legislative action in regard to the spreading of the disease by private individuals.
With regard to the second part of my noble friend's question, there is no way in which the local spread of the disease can be arrested. Attempts were made to control the initial outbreaks of myxomatosis in Kent and East Sussex last autumn, but it became clear that no containing action the Ministry might take could effectively influence the course of the disease, and the Committee reached the conclusion that such attempts would serve no practical purpose.

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