Sitting of 29 July 1953

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o' Clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION BILL
    LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL
    Lords Amendments considered, pursuant to Order [27th July], and agreed to.
  OFFENCES (MOTOR VEHICLES)
    ADDRESS FOR RETURN
    "showing the number of offences relating to motor vehicles in England and Wales, the number of persons prosecuted for such offences, the results of the proceedings in magistrates' courts, and the number of alleged offences in respect of which written warnings were issued by the police, together with the number of persons concerned, during 1952."—[Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  WIRELESS AND TELEVISION

    Aberdeen
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Assistant Postmaster-General if he is yet in a position to announce the date when a television service will be available for Aberdeen and the North-East of Scotland.
    The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. David Gammans): No, Sir, not yet.
    Mr. Hughes: Will the hon. Gentleman explain three esoteric mysteries about this television plan? First, will it take precedence over commercial television? Second, is it not strange that he can fix the place and mode in which but not the
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    time when it will be available? Third, what areas in the North of Scotland will it cover?
    Mr. Gammans: The last part of the supplementary question I answered last week. With regard to the selection of the site, that is a matter for the B.B.C. As to the time when it will be ready, if the hon. and learned Gentleman will put down a Question in about six months' time, I shall probably be able to give him the information.
    Mr. Hughes: What about the first part of my supplementary?

    Band III
    Brigadier Raynerasked the Assistant Postmaster-General (1) what procedure is adopted in deciding whether a licence for business radio within Band III can be granted;
    (2) what considerations are taken into account in dealing with applications for licences for business radio within Band III.
    Mr. Gammans: In order to conserve the limited number of frequencies available, a licence is not normally granted for radio where the telephone or telegraph services would do equally well. The frequencies assigned to a particular applicant are determined by the type of his business, the communication range required and the nature of the terrain, and the number of stations already operating on each of the available frequencies. The conditions under which business radio licences are issued are given in pamphlet BRs 1, 2 and 3, copies of which I am sending my hon. and gallant Friend and placing in the Library.
    Brigadier Rayner: Is it not a fact that the whole of this Band is being allocated in rather a reckless and piece-meal fashion, and would my hon. Friend answer two questions? First, can existing users be removed if necessary; and, second, do we not require an independent licensing authority rather like the Federal Communications Commission in America?
    Mr. Gammans: It is only a part of this Band which has been allotted for that purpose. The people who occupy it can be removed if necessary by the cancellation of their licence, which is only

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    for a limited period. The last point which my hon. and gallant Friend raised is a much bigger matter, but I would point out to him that F.C.C. in America deals only with civil allocations of frequencies and is not concerned with the fighting Services.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is it not a fact that there is an Inter-Departmental Committee which does have something to do with the allocation of frequencies in this Band, and the reference he has made to business licences does not necessarily apply to other users of frequencies in this Band?
    Mr. Gammans: There is an Inter-Departmental Committee, but my hon. and gallant Friend raised the question whether this matter should be taken outside the range of a Governmental Department altogether.
    Mr. N. Macpherson: Is not the B.B.C. represented on this Inter-Departmental Committee and was not the B.B.C. consulted before allocations were made in this Band to persons other than the BBC.
    Mr. Gammans: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewingasked the Assistant Postmaster-General who was represented on the committee which allocated frequencies between 174 and 185 megacycles to mobile services; and why these allocations were made in contravention of the 1947 Atlantic City international agreement where the United Kingdom reserved the right to share this portion of Band III between broadcasting and fixed services.
    Mr. Gammans: The committee had representatives from the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry; the Home Office, Post Office, Foreign Office, Dominions Office and Colonial Office; the Ministries of Information, Supply and War Transport; and the Wireless Telegraphy Board. A domestic allocation of this sort, which does not interfere with foreign stations, is not a contravention of the Atlantic City Agreement.
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: If international agreements mean anything—I have here a text which states specifically that the frequencies are reserved for fixed services—why does my hon. Friend's Department—or why did his predecessor—allocate them
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    to mobile services? Does it not make nonsense of international agreements? Does not the muddle over the allocation of frequencies in this band suggest a need for an independent body which could hear representations from all who are interested, particularly those concerned with exports?
    Mr. Gammans: I am informed that the use which we ourselves make of the band does not in any way contravene the international agreements on the subject. I hoped I had dealt with the second point which my hon. Friend raised, in an answer which I gave just now.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is not the reservation to the protocol on page 103 of the report of the Stockholm Conference an adequate cover for what has been done?
    Mr. Gammans: I believe I have answered the points which have been raised about the matter.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. There is to be a debate on this subject on Friday.
    Sir L. Plummerasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether the British Broadcasting Corporation have yet been informed that frequencies in Band III allotted to East Anglia, South-East Kent, West Wales, North Scotland and South Cornwall for first television coverage by the Stockholm Conference can now be used by them.
    Mr. Gammans: No, Sir. I would refer the hon. Member to my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Truro (Mr. G. Wilson) on 22nd July.
    Sir L. Plummer: Does not the hon. Gentleman believe that now is the time for him to make clear to would-be viewers in these areas that he will protect their interests before those of would-be advertisers to the areas?
    Mr. Gammans: Technically, the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question has no relation to the Question on the Order Paper. However, it is not in the least certain that the B.B.C. will require any band other than Band I in order to cover those areas.
    Mr. Shackleton: Will the Assistant Postmaster-General read the Report of the Television Advisory Committee, where he will find the answer to what he has stated?
    Mr. Bullard: Is my hon. Friend aware that in this matter the great historic kingdom of East Anglia is associated with bits of Kent, bits of Wales, bits of Scotland and bits of Cornwall, and will he bear in mind that the claims of East Anglia are different from and in a far higher category than those of the other places?
    Mr. Gammans: I should not like to be responsible for starting a civil war. My hon. Friend will recollect that last week I informed him that when a further programme is sanctioned East Anglia will have priority.
    Mr. Rankin: If East Anglia is associated with a bit of Scotland, does not that compensate for all the other defects?
    Mr. Hobsonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General on what dates licences were given to present users of frequencies in Band III.
    Mr. Gammans: Over 250 licences are involved, all of which were issued between 1945 and the present.
    Mr. Hobsonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General if he will make available immediately in the Library a list of the names with type of service operated and the frequency of all licences on Band III.
    Mr. Gammans: No, Sir; to publish only the names of licensees, without giving extensive details of the areas within which they are permitted to operate, would simply be confusing. I will, however, publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT a list of the services which occupy this Band.
    Mr. Hobson: Will the Minister reconsider this point? When we come to discuss the Television Advisory Committee's Report, it will be impossible to do so intelligently unless we have the full information before the House.
    Mr. Gammans: That would mean giving a whole list of taxi companies, docks, and so on. From the point of view of discussing the Television Advisory Committee's Report, that detailed information would not really be required.
    Following is the list;
    Radio services at present in Band III are as follows;
    174–175 megacycles per second;
    181–184 megacycles per second;
    Private business radio services amounting to some 180 licences, covering the use of about 180 fixed stations and 1,500 mobile stations. They are used mostly for such purposes as ambulances, taxicabs, public utilities, and commercial concerns which have motor fleets.
    175–181 megacycles per second;
    Radio circuits forming part of the Post Office trunk telephone network in remote areas. No licences are issued.
    184–200 megacycles per second;
    Four frequencies are used by the British Broadcasting Corporation for outside broadcast work, and are covered by their general licence.
    200–216 megacycles per second;
    Aeronautical radionavigational aids'. These are Government services and no licences are issued.
    174–216 megacycles per second;
    75 experimental licences on short term basis.

    North Hessary Tor Station (Inquiry)
    Sir H. Roperasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether he can now make a statement as to the use of North Hessary Tor for a transmitting station for television; whether a public inquiry is to be held; and when it is expected that a decision will be reached.
    Mr. Gammans: In view of the public interest in this proposal, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government has arranged that no decision will be taken until a public inquiry has been held.
    Sir H. Roper: Is my hon. Friend aware that this matter has now been dragging on for over a year and it is high time a decision was reached?
    Mr. Gammans: That is so, but there is a good bit of local controversy in the West Country as to whether this site should be used for this particular purpose.
    Mr. Dudley Williams: Would the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that there is great anxiety in the West Country about this problem, and can he give any indication when this inquiry is likely to be set up and to reach a conclusion?
    Mr. Gammans: I think that question should be put to the Minister who is holding the inquiry.

    Licences, Wales
    Mr. P. Morrisasked the Assistant Postmaster-General the number of wireless and television licences issued in Wales; the total revenue; and what proportion of it is retained for developing and expanding the Welsh services.
    Mr. Gammans: The numbers of "Sound only" and television licences current in Wales (including Monmouthshire) are about 557,300 and 70,200. representing some £700,000 in licence fees. As regards the last part of the Question, I would refer the hon. Member to the British Broadcasting Corporation's published report and accounts. The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to know that the amount spent on sound broadcasting in Wales is nearly double the revenue received.
    Mr. Gower: Is my hon. Friend aware that the people in Wales will be extremely gratified that he is one of the few Ministers who are able to give separate figures for Wales?

    North-East Area
    Miss Wardasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether he is aware that in the northern region the sound and television reception at the present moment leave much to be desired; and what he is doing to improve the situation.
    Mr. Gammans: Good television reception is given in North-East England within the range of the temporary station at Pontop Pike, and the B.B.C. have now been authorised to go ahead with a permanent station which will give an appreciably wider range. The solution to the present difficulties in sound reception lies in the introduction of very high frequency sound broadcasting, and my noble Friend has promised to give North-East England priority in this matter. Before such a system can be introduced it will be necessary to determine the form of modulation to be used, and this is now being considered by the Television Advisory Committee.
    Miss Ward: I thank my hon. Friend for that information, but can he tell me whether more than its revenue is being spent on the services of the Northern Region, because that sounds an attractive proposal?
    Mr. Gammans: That is a different question from the one on the Order Paper, and if my hon. Friend wants to know that, perhaps she will put down a Question.
    Sir H. Williams: For the information of those who do not live in the North-East, can my hon. Friend say where Pontop Pike is?
    Mr. Gammans: My hon. Friend should seek not my advice but that of some other hon. Members who live in that area.
    Captain Orr: Has my hon. Friend yet decided about the question of modulation? Is his mind moving on amplitude or frequency lines?

    Stockholm Conference (Frequencies)
    Mr. Ness Edwardsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General (1) how many frequencies for commercial television were provided in the national broadcasting plan put forward at Stockholm in June, 1952, by the British delegation;
    (2) whether the national broadcasting plan for double television coverage put forward by the British delegation at Stockholm in June, 1952, still represents the policy of the Government.
    Sir L. Plummerasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether the reservation made by the United Kingdom delegation at the European Broadcasting Conference held at Stockholm, and included in the protocol and agreement, cover the present use of Band III in this country.
    Mr. Gammans: A plan was put forward at the Stockholm Conference which envisaged double television coverage but did not stipulate that Band III would be used either by the B.B.C. or by any other television interests. What our delegation did was to submit a draft plan envisaging the whole of Band III for the purpose of television, in order to safeguard our position within that Band. This plan showed proposals of a provisional nature for 28 television stations, but the United Kingdom delegation reserved freedom of action with regard to the actual use of frequencies in Band III for purposes other than television.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that the plan put

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    forward for double coverage was the B.B.C.'s plan which had been accepted by the inter-departmental committee and authorised by the Cabinet and was accepted at Stockholm, and that in the plan there was no provision for commercial television?
    Mr. Gammans: No pledge whatever has been given to the B.B.C. that it will be allowed double coverage before its competitors have single coverage.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: With all due respect, is not the position—the hon. Gentleman is dodging the question—that the British delegation was sent to Stockholm with the B.B.C.'s plan which had been accepted and authorised by the Cabinet and contained no provision for commercial television?
    Mr. Gammans: The plan which the British delegation took to Stockholm was the responsibility of the Post Office.
    Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Is my hon. Friend aware that there would be deep resentment if the Post Office went to international conferences already committed about the allocation of frequencies? [HON. MEMBERS; "Why?"] There would be deep resentment in the country because the present procedure is that we submit plans to international meetings for the broad allocation of frequencies, and the individual allocations are made afterwards by my hon. Friend's Department, which must not be committed beforehand.
    Mr. Haymanasked the Assistant Postmaster-General which channel was applied for and granted at the 1952 Stockholm Conference for a British Broadcasting Corporation television transmitter for Cornwall; and if he will give an assurance that such a transmitter will take precedence over commercial television.
    Mr. G. Robertsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General what channel was applied for, and granted, for a television transmitter in North Wales at the Stockholm Conference in 1952; and if he will give an assurance that the provision of such a transmitter will take precedence over commercial television.
    Mr. Peartasked the Assistant Postmaster-General how far labour and materials required to put into use the
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    frequency for television allotted to Cumberland at the 1952 Stockholm Conference will take precedence over those required for competitive television.
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Assistant Postmaster-General how far the labour and materials required to put into use the frequency allotted at the Stockholm Conference for a television transmitter to the north of Scotland will take precedence over those required for commercial television.
    Mr. Gammans: The Stockholm Conference assigned frequencies as follows;
    North Wales; 189·75 and 214·75 megacycles per second for vision and 186·25 and 211·25 megacycles per second for the associated sound.
    Cornwall; 194·75 and 214·75 megacycles per second for vision and 191·25 and 211·25 megacycles per second for sound.
    These assignments were made in accordance with a provisional plan tabled by the United Kingdom. I cannot at present give any information about the time-table for the erection of further B.B.C. television stations additional to those recently authorised, or of commercial stations.
    Mr. Hayman: Will the Minister give an assurance that the whole of Cornwall will get a satisfactory television service before any part of the country gets an alternative service?
    Mr. Gammans: The hon. Member had better wait until we have the White Paper on television in the autumn.
    Mr. G. R. Howard: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that certain parts of West Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly are experiencing difficulty and that they should not be left out of this?
    Mr. Gammans: There is no question whatever of leaving them out. It is merely a question as to when the expenditure to cover them can justifiably be sanctioned.
    Mr. Hughes: Is it not a fact, as the hon. Gentleman's answer indicates, that the North of Scotland will be still further prejudiced with regard to television? Does he not think that in common fairness the North of Scotland should have

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    one television station before any other part of the country gets two stations?
    Mr. Gammans: As I said last week, the extreme North of Scotland is not within the range of any programme of television extension yet envisaged.
    Mr. Hughes: Why not bring it within range?
    Mr. Hobsonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General what representations have been received from countries represented at the 1952 Stockholm Conference against the use now being made in this country of frequencies in Band III.
    Mr. Gammans: None, Sir.
    Mr. Hobson: Does that reply mean that there has been no breach of the Atlantic City Convention and that all the allocations have been in strict conformity with the Stockholm Conference?
    Mr. Gammans: No. What is means is that I have answered the hon. Member's Question. He asked whether any representations have been made, and the answer is that none at all have been made.
    Captain Orr: Is it not of the greatest importance that as many channels as possible in this band should be freed as quickly as possible?
    Mr. Shackleton: Will the Minister give serious consideration to resisting any pressure that may come from certain—only certain—hon. Members to interfere with the defence of the country by taking essential services away from Band III?
    Mr. Gammans: I should have thought that the hon. Member did not need any assurance on that point. We are not likely to put pure entertainment before the defence of the country.

    Wales
    Mr. Gowerasked the Assistant Postmaster-General what plans he has for the provision of television in parts of Wales not adequately served by existing transmitters; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Gammans: I regret that I am not able to add at present to the statement made on 2nd July by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal.

  POST OFFICE

    Mail Deliveries, Selkirkshire (Tima Valley)
    Commander Donaldsonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General for an estimate of what would be the additional cost of a daily mail delivery service in the Tima Valley of Selkirkshire compared with the present service of three deliveries weekly.
    Mr. Gammans: About £60 a year, or rather more than Is, for each letter delivered earlier.
    Commander Donaldson: In view of the fact that the farmers of this area have been trying for 36 years to get an increased delivery service, will my hon. Friend not consider the benefits that could be derived from it by these rural areas, and in this case give it sympathetic consideration?
    Mr. Gammans: I should very much like to do what my hon. and gallant Friend asks, but if I did it here it would be necessary to do it for similar rural areas in Scotland, and that would involve us in very heavy expense.
    Commander Donaldson: But is my hon. Friend not aware that the rural areas in Scotland and in other parts of the country need some support, for they have few if any other amenities?
    Mr. Gammans: Yes, but I think it is rather difficult to make out a case for this when we are trying to economise in other directions and I tell my hon. and gallant Friend what would be the cost of this additional delivery.

    Telegrams (Telephone Deliveries)
    Sir W. Smithersasked the Assistant Postmaster-General if, to save expense, he will arrange for telegrams addressed to persons who are connected with the telephone to be telephoned and not to be delivered by motor-cycle.
    Mr. Gammans: It is our normal practice to deliver telegrams by telephone if this would be cheaper or appreciably quicker than delivery by hand. If my hon. Friend has any particular case of failure in mind, I shall be glad to look into it.
    Sir W. Smithers: While thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him to make it widely known, so that expense can be saved on this head.
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Is it not a fact that this practice had been in operation for many years, and is it not time that the hon. Member for Orpington (Sir W. Smithers) brought himself up-to-date on these things?

    Trade Union
    Mr. Wadeasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether he is now in a position to announce the result of his consideration of outstanding claims for recognition by Post Office associations.
    Mr. Marloweasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether he is now in a position to announce the decision of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the recognition of the Electrical Officers (Telecommunications) Association.
    Mr. Peter Freemanasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether he will now make a statement concerning the recognition of the Engineering Officers (Telecommunications Association).
    Mr. P. Robertsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General whether he is now able to make a further statement with regard to the recognition of the Engineering Officers Telecommunications Association.
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General if he is now in a position to make a statement regarding breakaway unions in his Department.
    Mr. Gammans: My noble Friend hopes it will be possible for a statement to be made tomorrow to this House and in another place.
    Mr. Wade: May I ask the hon. Gentleman whether, and, if so, when, there will be an opportunity for asking Questions on this subject in this House?
    Mr. Gammans: I am making a statement tomorrow.
    Mr. Marlowe: Is my hon. Friend aware there are some ugly rumours going round about this matter and that many of us on this side of the House will be very disturbed if recognition is not given to
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    the Engineering Officers (Telecommunications) Association. If we do not give recognition of this kind we may force a man to join a union not of his choice, and that is a policy which is extremely hostile to the policy of this party.
    Mr. Gammans: I think that before we get too warmed up on this subject we had better wait until tomorrow.
    Mr. J. Johnson: Can the Minister say, as this was a matter of urgency some two years ago, why it has taken so long for the Government to make up their minds on this matter?
    Mr. Gammans: Because we have tried to see whether there cannot be some conciliation in the matter, which primarily concerns the unions themselves.

    "Delivery Officer"
    Captain Orrasked the Assistant Postmaster-General for what reason the term "delivery officer" is being used increasingly in official correspondence; and if he will give an assurance that there is no intention of doing away with the respected designation of "postman."
    Mr. Gammans: It is true that the term "delivery officer" is sometimes used in official correspondence, but it is not in place of the term "postman" which since its introduction in the last century, has been respected by the public and the staff alike. I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that I have no ambition to be known as Her Majesty's Assistant "Deliverymaster-General."
    Captain Orr: Is my hon. Friend aware that his answer will help to mitigate the resentment felt by all who abhor this type of bureaucratic terminological pomposity? Can he assure us that neither he nor anyone in his Department will indulge during the Recess in the ancient game of "Delivery Officer's Knock"?

  TELEPHONE SERVICE

    Roxburghshire
    Commander Donaldsonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General how many new telephones were installed in the county of Roxburghshire in the year 1952; and how many outstanding unsatisfied applications were on file at the end of June, 1953.
    Mr. Gammans: 115 telephones were provided during 1952; 147 applications were outstanding on 30th June, 1953, of which 35 were in course of provision.
    Commander Donaldson: While thanking my hon. Friend for that answer, may I ask him if he can see the vanishing point of these outstanding telephone applications in the near future?
    Mr. Gammans: I am afraid I cannot see the vanishing point, but certainly we should have been able to get on with this much more quickly if it had not been for the storm damage earlier this year. My hon. and gallant Friend will be pleased to know that some additional exchange equipment is planned for this area, and that should do a good bit to relieve the situation.

    The Highlands
    Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamiltonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General, in view of the difficulties caused by inadequate communications in rural areas in the Highlands of Scotland and the fact that the postal authorities are unable to provide telephones in many instances through shortage of cables, when sufficient cable will be available to measure up to the needs of the area.
    Mr. Gammans: The reason why the telephone system cannot be developed more rapidly is restriction on capital expenditure rather than scarcity of materials. I appreciate that there are substantial arrears to be overtaken, but I regret that I cannot say when our resources will be sufficient to enable all applications to be met.
    Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: While thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him if he will bear in mind the importance of telephone communication in the Highland area, and will he do his best to see that this is expedited?
    Mr. Gammans: I fully realise that. I do not like having to get up here every week and tell the same weary story about people waiting for telephones, but at least we have reduced the waiting list by 60,000 in the past year. I can assure my hon. Friend that we are very much alive to the importance of telephones in the Highlands.
    Mr. Hobson: Does not the hon. Gentleman think that it would be better to divert capital expenditure towards the removal of the waiting list for telephones rather than to waste it on sponsored television?

    Bath Race Course Cable (Damage)
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Assistant Postmaster-General to make a statement about the telephone breakdown at Bath on 16th July.
    Mr. Nallyasked the Assistant Postmaster-General if he will make a full statement as to the cause of the overhead cable breakdown which cut off the telephones at Bath Race Course from the telephone exchange.
    Mr. Gammans: The damage occurred in an overhead section, about three-quarters of a mile from the Bath Race Course, where the cable is partly hidden by a large bush. Preliminary examination suggested that the cable had been deliberately cut and the police were immediately notified. With their agreement arrangements were made to have the cable examined by experts at the Post Office Research Station, Dollis Hill. Tests made with an identical cable showed that the damage was entirely consistent with its having been caused by an oxy-acetylene torch, and the presence of small splashes of metal from the cable sheath on the foliage and in the soil round about, further confirmed this impression. Police investigations are continuing.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: How long did it take the Post Office to find out that this break down was not an act of God, and will the Minister also say whether he has considered the possible use of radio telephony as a stand-by in case of emergency, and so make communications to race courses more crook-proof than at the moment?
    Mr. Gammans: The break was discovered within half-an-hour of the cable having been cut. With regard to the other suggestion, I do not think that the Post Office could be put to this enormous expense to help the bookies.
    Mr. Nicholson: What odds would my hon. Friend lay on the discovery of the miscreants?
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is this not an example of private enterprise, and why does the Minister want to interfere with it?
    Mr. Nally: Can the Minister confirm whether or not there is any truth in the stories that are being circulated that the knowledge of what this cable did and the ability to decide at what particular point it could be broken could never have been discovered by an ordinary layman but only by someone with technical knowledge? Is there any truth in that?
    Mr. Gammans: There is not an iota of truth in it. It was perfectly obvious to anybody that this cable served the race course, and it did not require very much skill for a cut to be made.
    Mr. Nally: Will the hon. Gentleman emphasise that, in view of the fact that a good deal of annoyance has been caused to certain sections of the Post Office industry by the widely-circulated Press stories that this thing could not have been arranged without technical knowledge?
    Mr. Gammans: If any annoyance has been caused to the Post Office staff, they certainly have not complained to me about it.

    Exchange Names
    Mr. Dudley Williamsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General what duplication there is of names of telephone exchanges in the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Gammans: There are 139 names which apply to more than one telephone exchange. There are, for example, six Newports and six Whitchurches. The exchange names are distinguished, for telephone operating purposes, by the addition of a suffix, for example; Bampton (Devon); Bampton (Westmorland).
    Mr. Williams: Is my hon. Friend aware that the use of the suffix, to which he refers, is not always successful, because when telephoning a certain exchange in the West Country I am invariably put through to somewhere in Derbyshire? Will my hon. Friend look into the matter and see whether the problem can be rectified?
    Mr. Gammans: I am surprised if my hon. Friend does not know the suffix of
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    the particular Bampton to which be is telephoning.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Assistant Postmaster-General aware that on one occasion I asked for a number on the Brixton exchange and was put through to Brixham, Devon?

    Denton and Audenshaw
    Mr. W. R. Williamsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General when a cable was last laid to connect the Guide Lane district of Audenshaw with its appropriate local exchange.
    Mr. Gammans: A cable scheme to serve part of the district was completed in 1951.
    Mr. Williams: When does the hon. Gentleman suggest that an additional cable should be laid in this area?
    Mr. Gammans: I should like to complete the cable scheme there as soon as our capital resources permit.
    Mr. Williams: I understand that, but I want something more definite. It is not a question of when the hon. Gentleman would like to do it. When is it going to be done?
    Mr. Gammans: The Question asked about what has happened. If the hon. Members wants to know what is going to happen, I suggest that he puts down another Question.
    Mr. W. R. Williamsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General how many applicants for telephones in Denton and Audenshaw are still waiting for them; how many of these reside in the Guide Lane-Guide Bridge area; and what prospects they have of getting telephones soon.
    Mr. Gammans: Two hundred and ninety-seven. Of these, 36 are in the Guide Lane-Guide Bridge area, part of which is served from Ashton. I regret that, in view of our limited resources, it will be some considerable time before we can materially reduce the waiting list in this area.
    Mr. Williams: Is the Minister aware that that will give no satisfaction whatever to the business people and others in the area who have been waiting a long time for telephone installation? What is the hon. Gentleman going to do about it?
    Mr. Gammans: Nothing would give me greater pleasure than if we could catch up with all these arrears, in which event I should not have to answer half the Questions that I now answer.
    Mr. Williams: Is the Minister dealing with this area as equitably as with some of the large industrial areas?
    Mr. Gammans: I can give the hon. Member that assurance. It is certainly not being unfairly treated.
    Mr. W. R. Williamsasked the Assistant Postmaster-General when it is proposed to provide additional cables which will enable waiting applicants in Denton and Audenshaw to be provided with telephones.
    Mr. Gammans: New cables will be provided in part of Audenshaw at the end of this year. Other cables are planned but I regret that they are not expected to be laid before the middle of 1955.
    Mr. Williams: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the first part of his answer will give some satisfaction but that I am extremely disappointed with the second part of his answer?

  PAYMASTER-GENERAL (DUTIES)
  Mr. Jayasked the Prime Minister the present duties of the Paymaster-General.
  The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): The duties of the Paymaster-General are those set out by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in answer to the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) on 6th May, 1952.
  Mr. Jay: Can the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that in the impending reshuffle of the Government, which everybody agrees to be overdue, the system of Overlords will be finally terminated and representation of the House of Commons in the Cabinet restored to a more normal level?
  Mr. Crookshank: I am afraid I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman is talking about.
  Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Lord Privy Seal aware that although he has
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  referred to the Question which I put on 6th May, 1952, I am still very dissatisfied with the answer I got on that occasion?

  UNITED NATIONS (CHINA)
  Mr. Wyattasked the Prime Minister whether he will instruct the British delegation at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations to propose the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.
  The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. R. A. Butler): I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer I gave to him on 16th July and to the answers given by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State to the hon. Members for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) and Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) on 27th July.
  Mr. Wyatt: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that since he gave those answers a truce has been signed in Korea, and that consequently there may, even in the Government, be some flexibility towards new events? Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the categorical statements made by Mr. Dulles that the United States are determined to see that China is not admitted to the United Nations, although it is the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government that she should be admitted? Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that during the Recess, when the Government are unsupported by the House, they will not give in to American bludgeoning at the United Nations but will persist in putting forward the policy which has been agreed on all sides in this House?
  Mr. Butler: As regards a truce in Korea, not only do we know that it has been signed, but I announced it to the House, and I should have thought that the hon. Member would have heard what I said. In answer to the latter part of his Question, my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State said that the recognition of the Central People's Government would have to be dealt with in the course of or after the political conference. I think we had better await the political conference and regard the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly as one in which arrangements are made for the political conference.
  Mr. Noel-Baker: Since every member of the United Nations who has resisted aggression in Korea has specifically declared that it has done so in support of the principles of the Charter, and not in any way in respect of strategic or national interests, will our delegates urge that the representatives of the United Nations to the political conference shall have a collective mandate from the Assembly on such points as this?
  Mr. Butler: I think we had better await the meeting of the Assembly before pledging the views of particular Governments. In regard to the United Kingdom Government, the right hon. Gentleman must be aware that we are going well prepared to take a line on this subject.
  Mr. Osborne: Could the Chancellor explain why so many hon. Members opposite seem to be so bitterly anti-American on every possible occasion?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Since the right hon. Gentleman said that we would be aware of the line that Her Majesty's Government would take, would he be so good as to tell us what the line is?
  Mr. Butler: The line is as announced in the answer I have just given, namely, that this matter should be decided at the political conference.
  Mr. Morrison: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is not a line? What he implied was that the Government would have a line on the question of the admission of China to the United Nations. That was what he implied very clearly. Will he be so good as to tell us what the line is to be at the Assembly?
  Mr. Butler: I cannot add to the answers which have already been given on this subject, because this question depends upon taking the views of the other nations concerned. No doubt preparatory discussions will be taken at the United Nations Assembly, and we have always taken the view that the recognition of the People's Government does not follow automatically from the conclusion of an Armistice but should be decided at the political conference.
  Mr. A. Henderson: If the American Government can make unequivocal statements as to where they stand on this problem, is there any reason why the British Government should not state their line,
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  and is it not unfortunate that if we are going into the Political Conference with an agreed policy with the United States that the United States should queer the pitch by making their statement before going to the Assembly?
  Mr. Butler: I am not prepared to state any further the attitude of Her Majesty's Government on this matter. I am prepared to say that when we go into the Political Conference, following upon the meeting of the United Nations Assembly, we shall take into proper account all expressions of opinion.
  Mr. Noel-Baker——
  Sir H. Williams: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it proper for Privy Councillors to abuse their privilege by asking six supplementary questions on one Question?
  Mr. Speaker: That is a matter for them.
  Mr. Noel-Baker: May I press the Chancellor for an answer to my question? Since we have all been in Korea simply to defend the principles of the United Nations, is it not desirable that our delegates should press that the people who go from the Assembly to the Political Conference should have an Assembly mandate?
  Mr. Butler: I am not going to carry this matter any further—[HON. MEMBERS; "Oh."]—by making any further statement, but I will say this to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, that Her Majesty's Government are perfectly capable of taking their own line.
  Mr. Wyatt: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. This was my Question originally and other Members have been allowed more than one supplementary question on it. May I not ask another one?
  Mr. Speaker: I remember that the supplementary question of the hon. Member was a very long one.
  Mr. Driberg: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the inadequate and negative replies given by the right hon. Gentleman, I beg to give notice that some of us will endeavour to catch your eye on this matter tonight on the Consolidated Fund Bill, after other matters have been disposed of.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (HIGH LEVEL TALKS)
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the armistice in Korea, he will now propose that the meeting of Heads of States of the Four Powers, as originally suggested, should take place irrespective of the outcome of the proposed Foreign Ministers' Conference on Germany and Austria.
  Mr. R. A. Butler: A proposal has been put forward, after careful consideration, which represents the agreed views of the three Western Governments. This proposal in no way excludes a meeting of Heads of Governments and I think we had better now await the Soviet Government's reply, which will, we hope, enable contact to be made. As regards Korea, I would remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that provision is made in the armistice agreement for a political conference.
  Mr. Henderson: Is the Chancellor aware of the statement made by the Lord Privy Seal on Monday, in which he stated that the decision as to whether we should go on with the informal high level talks depended upon the successful outcome of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in September? I am asking the Chancellor whether he will give an assurance to the House that, even though the Foreign Ministers' conference is unsuccessful, he will insist on proposing that the informal four-Power talks as proposed by the Prime Minister should be held?
  Mr. Butler: I cannot really carry this matter any further. We have first to receive the reply of the Soviet Government. Then I trust we shall be able to discuss matters as arranged by the three Western Governments. In any case the possibility of a high level four-Power meeting as desired by the right hon. and learned Gentleman is in no way excluded if it proves possible or feasible.
  Mr. Henderson: Then this does not depend upon a successful outcome of the conference in September?
  Mr. Butler: I said we had better take one step at a time. No one can foresee how the international situation will develop, and it will be dealt with with flexibility and imagination.
  Mr. S. Silverman: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government are as prepared in this matter to take a line as they are in the matter referred to just now, and could he tell us in that case what that line is? Does he realise that these matters are far too serious to play a kind of political "What's my line?" parlour game, to be followed some day by the game "Why?", and that his whole performance is altogether——
  Hon. Members: Speech.
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is now expanding his supplementary question into a speech. I wish he would ask his question to see if he can get an answer.
  Mr. Silverman: I was in the middle of the last sentence anyway, Mr. Speaker, namely, whether the right hon. Gentleman is aware that his whole performance is altogether too tragically reminiscent of the similar stone-walling performance which he used to offer us when he played the same part at the time of the Spanish Civil War, when he betrayed—[Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order, Order.
  Mr. Silverman: —altogether too tragically reminiscent—[HON. MEMBERS; "Speech"]—of the kind of policy in international affairs which the Government of the late Neville Chamberlain, of which he was a member, pursued.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. Is it not possible to hear the question without interruptions from the opposite side of the House?
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) is in a better position to hear than I am, but I would ask the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) to recollect that in putting a supplementary question it is not proper to expand it into a long speech.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I cannot hear.
  Mr. Silverman: I was endeavouring to make it reasonably short, but it is extremely difficult to ask a short compact question on a highly complex and difficult and important matter if one has to do it against constant interruptions from some Members on the other side

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  of the House who wish to prevent me from putting any question at all. I want the right hon. Gentleman to answer my question, if he will, and tell us, because we should like to know from the Government, what line they propose to pursue. We can understand—[HON. MEMBERS; "Speech"]. I am not going to be put off by hon. Members opposite. We can recognise that he cannot foretell the result of the Conference, and we are not asking him what the result will be, but we do ask him to let us know what is the policy which, in the name of Great Britain, the United Kingdom Government intend to put forward to the Conference when it meets and not keep us in ignorance until the whole thing is over?
  Mr. Butler: I find it somewhat difficult to remember——
  Mr. Silverman: And I found it somewhat difficult to put it.
  Mr. Butler: —what the hon. Member's question was.
  Mr. Manuel: Whose fault was that?
  Mr. Butler: All I will say about it is that it is far too serious and important a matter to indulge in the sort of abuse in which the hon. Member indulged, or to drag in the purely political arguments which many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite are bringing in. What I shall say quite simply is this, bearing in mind the desire of the House to hear what is intended, that we have achieved absolute unity of aim and policy on behalf of the three Western Governments supported by the Governments of the N.A.T.O. countries and by the Government of Western Germany. I am proud to present such a policy to this House.
  Mr. Silverman: Tell us what it is.
  Mr. Butler: We have sent an invitation to the Soviet Government and we are now awaiting a reply. In any case, the possibility of a high level conference is not excluded, and it is one the British Government would welcome.
  Later—
  Mr. S. Silverman: I desire to ask your leave, Mr. Speaker, to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
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  "the refusal of the Government to inform the House of the policy it intends to pursue at the important international conferences to be held while the House is in Recess."
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member begs leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
  "the refusal of the Government to inform the House of the policy it intends to pursue at the important international conferences to be held while the House is in Recess."
  I need say nothing about the merits of the Motion, because the House has an opportunity immediately before it of discussing the matter on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill. It would be quite wrong and contrary to the practice of the House to accept such a Motion when an opportunity immediately exists for that purpose.
  Mr. Silverman: May I ask, for the enlightenment of the House, whether you mean the defence debate which is to take place now as being such an opportunity. Mr. Speaker?
  Mr. Speaker: I have nothing to do with the subjects which are discussed. The Question which will soon be before the House is "That the Consolidated Fund Bill be now read a Second time." That is the Question as far as I am concerned.

  ROYAL AIR FORCE

    Road, Molesworth Airfield
    Mr. Rentonasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air why the road from Molesworth in Huntingdonshire to Clapton in Northamptonshire has been closed; whether he is aware that the alternative road via Old Weston, which is suggested by his Department, is not the most suitable alternative available; and whether he will make a statement.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): This road has been closed so that Molesworth airfield can be developed to modern operational standards. The question of the line of an alternative road is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport.
    Mr. Renton: In negotiating with the Minister of Transport in this matter, will my hon. Friend remember that peace

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    seems to be breaking out in Korea? Will that encourage him to do everything possible to enable the inhabitants of these peaceful villages to pursue their lawful occasions?
    Mr. Ward: I shall bear that and other points in mind.

    Mobile Repair Unit (Hoax)
    Mr. Lewisasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air if he is aware that the Acting Commanding Officer of the No. 4 Mobile Repair and Salvage Unit of the 2nd Tactical Air Force, Pilot Officer Speakman, with the support of seven senior non-commissioned officers, perpetrated a hoax on Sergeant W. Bailey, No. 4 Mobile Repair and Salvage Unit, in falsely presenting him with a Coronation Medal on behalf of Her Majesty at a ceremony in the office of the headquarters of the 2nd Tactical Air Force, Germany; and what action he proposes to take against those responsible for this breach of Service Regulations.
    Mr. Ward: This incident is being investigated and the competent authority will if necessary, take appropriate disciplinary action.
    Mr. Lewis: The Under-Secretary will be aware that he wrote to me yesterday, and for that letter I thank him. In his letter he states at the outset that preliminary reports confirm the facts in this Question, and he went on to say that the Air Officer Commanding is still away—that is some 23 days ago—but he will investigate it and, if the facts are confirmed, he will take the necessary action. The latter part of the letter is completely contradictory, because the Under-Secretary himself says that the allegations are confirmed, and that if the Air Officer Commanding does not take suitable action he himself will. Why the long delay? Will the hon. Gentleman give us something more definite?
    Mr. Ward: I will quote from the letter I wrote to the hon. Gentleman, a copy of which I have before me. I said in it;
    "From the preliminary reports which I have had I think I can say that the facts of the matter are broadly as stated in your Question and in the report in the 'Daily Mirror'."
    That is quite different from saying that we have investigated it and got all the details.

    Batmen and Mess Staff
    Mr. Osborneasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air how many civilians are employed on Royal Air Force stations as batmen and for domes tic purposes; and how many of these were previously employed in agriculture.
    Mr. Ward: There are about 5,000 civilian batmen and mess staff at Royal Air Force stations in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I cannot say how many were employed in agriculture before they entered our service.
    Mr. Osborne: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that there is great disquiet in agriculture because of the number of men who are attracted to work on the aerodromes and, in view of the need to keep men on the farms, will he discourage this?
    Mr. Ward: All our employees are engaged through the local employment exchange, and they ordinarily do their best to persuade the agricultural worker to remain in agriculture. In any case, I doubt whether the difference between our wages and those in agriculture is large enough to be considered a temptation by the average agricultural worker. Finally, I hope my hon. Friend is not suggesting that the agricultural worker should be restricted in his choice of employment.

    Washington Aircraft
    Mr. Beswickasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air what change of policy agreed between the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force is indicated by the decision to withdraw the Washington bomber; and what air craft are now charged with the responsibilities hitherto assigned to the Washington.
    Mr. Ward: There is no change of policy. A further stage has been reached in the re-equipment of our expanding bomber force with modern jet aircraft. Moreover, the experience gained in operating Canberras will be invaluable when we begin to form medium jet bomber squadrons as the Valiant, the Vulcan and the Victor become available.
    Mr. Beswick: The Under-Secretary has made it clear that the new bomber to which he has referred cannot do the task previously assigned to the

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    Washington. Will he answer the second part of my Question, which asks which aircraft is now going to undertake this task, and can he say quite definitely that the United States Air Force is not to be responsible for all strategic bombing from this country?
    Mr. Ward: I can start by giving the hon. Gentleman an assurance which he asked for in the second part of his Question. I am sure he realises that this is a complicated subject, but I should like to say in reply to him that the departure of the Washington will not in any way reduce the ability of the Royal Air Force to carry out its commitments.

    Medical Reports (Disclosure)
    Mr. Dribergasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air in what circumstances details from medical reports on men and women serving in the Royal Air Force are disclosed to outside persons; and to whom.
    Mr. Ward: Details from such reports are only disclosed if a member of the Royal Air Force is charged with a serious criminal offence, such as murder. In a case of that kind, the medical record is made available to both the prosecution and the defence.
    Mr. Driberg: Does that answer mean that the practice of the Air Ministry differs in some respects from the practice of the War Office and the Army, and could the hon. Gentleman say whether he finds, in practice, that his Department's policy is adequate?
    Mr. Ward: Our practice at courts martial differs a little in detail from that of the Army, but the result is very much the same. The defence, in confidence, may be given an idea of the contents of the reports to help in the preparation of their case, and the medical authority concerned may be called as a witness. No report or extract from it, however, may be produced in court.

    Gnat Fighter
    Mr. Shackletonasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether he will now initiate the placing of a development contract for a light fighter of the Gnat type.
    Mr. Ward: The Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply have for some time been giving careful consideration to the
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    potentialities of a light weight type of fighter. But from information available from the designers of the Gnat, the performance and fighting qualities of this aircraft, as at present envisaged, would seem unlikely to meet essential R.A.F. specifications.
    Mr. Shackleton: In view of the fact that the designers claim a similar performance and that, in fact, we are not getting supplies of the new type of fighter and there is little prospect of supplying European N.A.T.O. countries with the new type of fighters, will the Under-Secretary not again consider the desirability of developing a contract for a N.A.T.O. prototype?
    Mr. Ward: As the hon. Member will realise, only limited resources are available for research and development, and to produce a satisfactory engine for the Gnat would involve considerable expenditure and take some years. He himself has pointed out that the performance is similar to this aircraft which we have already ordered. Finally, the question of supplies to N.A.T.O. is primarily a question for the Ministry of Supply.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Is my hon. Friend satisfied whether there may be a requirement for this aeroplane by N.A.T.O.? If this particular firm could make the air frame, could not perhaps the jet engine be made by a French company? Will he look into this and give encouragement to the company which showed such initiative?
    Mr. Ward: Perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will address a question to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply.
    Mr. A. Henderson: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House the difference between the performances of the Hunter and the Gnat in altitude and speed?
    Mr. Ward: Not without notice, but I understand that the difference might not be very great.

  AIRWAY CORPORATIONS (TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION)
  Mr. N. Macphersonasked the Minister of Civil Aviation what machinery exists in the British airways corporations by which members of the

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  Aeronautical Engineers Association may make representations to the managements of the corporations, in view of the refusal of the trade union side of the national joint council to entertain representations from members of organisations not affiliated to the Trades Union Congress.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Mr. John Profumo): No special machinery exists outside the National Joint Council, which I am satisfied fulfils the statutory responsibility of the corporations. Of course, any employee of one of the corporations has the right of personal appeal to the management in accordance with the corporation's regulations.
  Mr. Macpherson: While recognising the truth of what my hon. Friend has said, may I ask, before he is satisfied in this matter to look very carefully at what is happening at Northolt at the present time when the B.E.A.C. staff is being run down. Will he satisfy himself absolutely that in recommending employees to transfer to London Airport the N.J.C is exercising no discrimination whatsoever in favour of one employee as against another dependent on the union to which he belongs.
  Mr. Profumo: I am not aware that there is any victimisation as a result of the transfer of staff of B.E.A.C. to Northolt, but any individual who may feel that he is being victimised can make representations to the management, as I have said in my answer.
  Mr. Rankin——
  Mr. Mikardo: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that approaches made by the trade unions to the officers of this Association to find a basis upon which its members can be admitted to affiliated organisations have always been rejected? Does not this indicate that the object of those officers is, not to look after the interests of their members, but to make trouble in what is a first-class piece of joint consultation machinery?
  Mr. Profumo: I think that is another question.
  Mr. Rankin: Question No. 54.
  Mr. Speaker: The time is up for Questions.
  Mr. Rankin: I was under the impression that before my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) interrupted me, my Question was in order before his supplementary question. Was I wrong in that impression?
  Mr. Speaker: The time is up. I allowed the supplementary question of the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) because the Question and answer to which it was a supplementary was asked before the time was up. I thought the hon. Member for Tradeston (Mr. Rankin) was about to ask another supplementary question; otherwise I would not have called him.
  Mr. Rankin: I was under the impression that my Question had been intimated before the time for closure of Questions had been reached.
  Mr. Speaker: I did not share that impression.

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION AND EXECUTIVES
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): With permission, I should like to make a statement about the future of the British Transport Commission and its Executives.
As regards the Commission itself, Lord Hurcomb told me some time ago that he did not seek reappointment at the end of his present term of office on the 31st August next. Sir William Wood has also said that he would like to retire on that date. The rest of the Commission will, I am glad to say, remain, and their great knowledge and experience will be available so that there will be no break in continuity. The House will remember that the size of the Commission is increased by the 1953 Act from nine to 15. The chairmanship of the Commission demands of its holder qualities not easily to be found. I have devoted much thought to this question and have narrowed the field, but I am not yet in a position to say who the new Chairman will be. Pending his appointment, I should not think it right to appoint any new members, whole or part-time, to the Commission.
After consultation with the Commission, I have decided that the Executives,

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with the exception of London Transport, should not continue after 30th September next. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to these Executives for the energy and devotion which they have brought to their tasks, and to their staffs of all ranks who have stood loyally by them during a difficult period. I am sure that the whole House will join me in this. The Transport Act, 1947, envisaged that the Executives would not necessarily be permanent institutions and their cessation at this juncture, except in the case of London Transport, will, in the Commission's view, help them in the discharge of their duties. In appropriate cases full-time Members of the Executive will of course be given the opportunity to continue to serve the Commission as its officers. For instance, nearly all the full-time Members of the Railway Executive have had life long experience on the railways, and have attained leading positions in their profession. I understand also from the British Transport Commission that it is their intention that the present Chairman of the Road Haulage Executive should be offered a senior post in their organisation and that other steps should be taken to ensure continuity of operation.
As to the London Transport Executive, Lord Latham announced publicly some time ago his intention of resigning the chairmanship of the Executive at the end of his present period of office. This, as everyone in the House will agree, is a position of high importance requiring not only a wealth of skill and experience, but also, what is so necessary in this particular position, a keen realisation of the views and feelings of the public on matters relating to their daily travel. I am giving close thought to the appointment of his successor. In the circumstances, however, I have thought it desirable to re-appoint all the present members of the London Transport Executive apart from the Chairman for a period of one year. This will not, of course, preclude their re-appointment later for a longer period, and London Transport must remain for as far as one can look into the future as one of the most important transport entities in the world.
Time does not permit me to pay, at this moment, an adequate tribute to Lord Hurcomb. As one of the greatest of our civil servants, he has brought the highest qualities to the discharge of the onerous
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duties placed upon him by the 1947 Act and this is not the first or only office in which he has given great service to the nation.
The thanks of all Londoners are due to Lord Latham for his work in administering the elaborate network of services upon which millions of people depend for their daily travel to and from their work. An organisation of this kind can attain the requisite pitch of efficiency only at the cost of continual effort and search for improvement, but London Transport as Lord Latham leaves it, is without doubt the finest metropolitan transport system in the world.
Sir Michael Barrington-Ward is retiring on 30th September and Sir William Wood, whom I have already mentioned, on 31st August. The retirement of these eminent railwaymen will be a great loss to the Commission and to the railways and I should like to pay a tribute to their long and distinguished service. Apart from those I have mentioned, there will be few other retirements and if time does not permit me to refer in detail to the services of those concerned, it does not mean that I do not realise the hard work, the ability, and the devotion which they have brought to their tasks. The fact that in some directions the Commission will be making a fresh start, does not detract, I am sure, from the thanks which the whole House will feel are due to those who are now laying down the burden of their office.
Mr. H. Morrison: I join with the Minister in paying tribute to the service of Lord Hurcomb as Chairman of the British Transport Commission. He was the first Permanent Secretary with whom I worked when I became a Minister, and I have a high estimate of his abilities. My only regret is that the Minister has not taken more notice of the advice he has had from him. I join the right hon. Gentleman also in paying tribute to Lord Latham, who has served the London transport organisation with ability and fidelity.
I hope that the House will forgive me if I put a series of questions of some little length to the Minister on this most unsatisfactory and revolutionary statement—[Interruption]—but it is. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in relation to the appointment of the Chair-

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man of the British Transport Commission, he has not known for quite a long time that this vacancy would arise, and why is it that the Government cannot make up their mind as to the new Chairman? Why should there be this delay? Moreover, may I ask the Minister why he has not been able to make up his mind about the appointment of the new members authorised by the new Transport Act, and why there should be that delay?
I wish to put a point to the Minister about his decision to abolish all the Executives with the exception of London Transport, which means the abolition of the Hotels Executive, which I should have thought ought to have been separate from the railways; and the abolition of the Docks and Waterways Executive. Has not the Government's argument been in favour of decentralisation of the organisation, and why have they gone in for this wholesale system of centralisation under the British Transport Commission?
The Minister says that the Commission agrees with the decisions. May I ask him if he would be good enough to lay the letter from the Commission on this point so that we may know exactly what it has said. One notes that the Minister is transforming persons who are at present on boards into officials of the Commission, which will make them subordinate officers. In the case of the London Transport Executive, in respect of which it has been known for months that Lord Latham was retiring, why is there this very grave delay about the appointment of the new Chairman?
It is a great pity that this announcement should be made on the eve of the Parliamentary Recess. It is characteristic of the dishonesty of this Government, and particularly of this Minister, with whose political tendencies we have been familiar for years, that the House should be held up until this moment, when obviously this is a matter which ought to command immediate debate. I give notice that we shall require an early opportunity to debate this thing, which is a manifestation not only of the bias of the Government but of their utter incompetence to run the country.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I hope that I can deal briefly with all the points which the
1300
right hon. Gentleman has raised. I am anxious to get the best Chairman for the Commission and the best Chairman for London Transport. I am more concerned about getting the right people than on coming to a hasty decision on matters involving millions of people and our public credit.
Turning to the other questions of the right hon. Gentleman, he chided me with not having taken sufficient notice of the advice of Lord Hurcomb. It is the unanimous wish of the Commission that I take this action, and here, on the greatest field of all, I have accepted its advice. The Commission has fully satisfied me that a system of executives appointed, as is the Commission itself, by the Minister and not by the Commission is not the best way. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to look at the debates in 1946, when the present Home Secretary made it clear that this was and would continue to be our view. As to the right hon. Gentleman's charge that this will lead to more centralisation, I would say that that will depend on the railway scheme, and I shall certainly see, and so will my colleagues, that the intentions of the Act in that field are fully carried out.
Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked me to lay before the House correspondence which I have had with Lord Hurcomb on this matter. Apart from saying that the Commission is in entire agreement with my decision to bring the executives to an end, I have no intention of doing any such thing.
Mr. Renton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the praise which has been given to Lord Hurcomb should not be regarded as a mere formal expression of Front Bench opinion but that on the back benches on both sides of the House there is genuine admiration for the zeal and ability which he has shown in the discharge of an exceptionally difficult task?
Mr. Ernest Davies: As the Minister has failed to fill the vacancies on the Commission, would it not have been better to continue the executives until reorganisation had taken place, until the railway reorganisation scheme had been produced and the disposal of the road haulage vehicles completed? Can the Minister tell us what form of management there is to be in the interim period? Is the Commission to act as a functional

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body? How is this organisation, in which the Minister himself says our public credit is involved, to preserve the national assets in the interim period?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: These are two quite proper questions, if I may say so. [Interruption.] They are at least related to the problem before us. I seriously considered continuing the Executives for a short period until the new Chairman was appointed and the new Commission established, but on the urgent entreaty of the Commission itself, which represented that a continuance of the uncertainty was highly undesirable, I have come to the conclusion not to re-appoint them. As to what happens, the right hon. Gentleman should know that under his party's own Act, the powers and authority of the Executives now revert automatically to the Commission, which has always been in a position to issue directives to the Executives. I have every reason to think that the Commission whose responsibility it will be will at an early date make it quite plain what form the organisation will take after next September, though the full railway scheme will take a good deal longer than that.
Mr. H. Morrison: Does it follow that because there is a power and elasticity under an Act of Parliament under which the Government are not bound to appoint Executives and can make changes, it follows that they have to abolish the lot? The right hon. Gentleman did not give the slightest indication, during the discussions on the Transport Bill which led to the Act of 1953, that he was going to abolish all the Executives. What is his case for centralising all these functions under the Commission when the whole of the Government's argument has been in favour of decentralisation?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman clearly under stands all the considerations involved——
Mr. Morrison: Yes, I do.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: —in talking about the Executives as if they were subject to precisely the same considerations. The Railway Executive has to come to an end with the making of the railway scheme. I am told that the uncertainty is bad for all concerned and that it is better to make it plain now. The Road Haulage Executive comes to an end at the conclusion of the disposal of the road haulage
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vehicles and I am told that the anxiety is bad there. We are ending it there, too. In the case of the Docks and Inland Waterways Executive, I am satisfied that as part of the Commission they can be better administered than as a separate Executive—[An HON. MEMBER; "Under the railways."]—though there is no question of docks and inland waterways passing into railway control. I have not abolished all the Executives. London Transport, as I have announced, will of course remain separate.
Mr. Beswick: The Minister has mentioned most of the personnel concerned and the future. He has made no reference to the Chairman of the Railway Executive. What happens to him in the rearrangement? Are we to lose the services of this able person?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I think it would be most unwise to be drawn into the question of the future of any individual, however distinguished. I have made an exception in the case of General Russell, Chairman of the Road Haulage Executive, for I am conscious that the recent Act of the Government has created more change in the field of road haulage than anywhere else, and it seemed desirable to make clear that the services of the Chairman, whom men throughout the country have come to respect, will be available to the Commission as one of its senior officers.
Mr. Callaghan: Is the Minister aware that we are automatically drawn into the field of personalities by his inability to announce who the new members are to be. It may be that Mr. John Elliot is to be one, we do not know. We think we have the right to ask the Minister why he has not come here in order to announce to us the names of those persons who are to carry on an organisation worth £1,500 million. Will the Minister not reconsider his decision to abolish the Docks Executive and the Hotels Executive—he cannot reconsider the Railways Executive—also the Ports Executive, and the Road Haulage Executive, which need not come to an end?
In view of the fact that the appointments of the Chairman and Sir William Wood run out in four weeks time; that the Commission are to be left with only three experienced full-time members, who

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will have the responsibility of initiating into this business the remaining nine—I imagine it will be nine which the Minister intends to appoint—and will also have the responsibility of taking over, apparently immediately, the work of the new Executive, may I ask the Minister if he realises the turmoil into which he will throw the whole organisation of transport by this process of immediate centralisation at this point? May I invite him seriously to consider whether it would be worth while to continue for another 12 months so that this appointment may be made?
Does the Minister realise—he may shake his head in annoyance, but this is a most serious and important subject—with what dismay the decision to abolish the Docks and Inland Waterways Executive will be greeted in South Wales ports, where, for the first time since 1947, they have been able to get free from the grip of the railways and act independently in the running of the ports?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The expression "turmoil I am causing" by failure to reconsider the decision not to reappoint these Executives is a curious description to apply to the acceptance of advice from the Commission which the hon. Gentleman has praised so often.
Mr. Callaghan: May I ask the Minister one final question; will he reconsider the position of the Docks and Inland Waterways Executive, in view of the special position it has built up for itself in South Wales?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd Mr. Lennox-Boyd indicated dissent.
Mr. Callaghan: All right.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Proceedings on Government Business exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. I (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. Crookshank.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL
  Order for Second Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."—[Mr. Crookshank.]
  Mr. Ellis Smith: I wish to raise a point of procedure with you, Mr. Speaker, with a view to facilitating business. I was pleased to hear the reply you gave earlier to my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and of course, as you rightly stressed, that applies to all hon. Members. Can you give some advice with regard to the allocation of time in order to facilitate a more orderly debate?
  Mr. Speaker: I am afraid I could not undertake such a task.

DEFENCE
3.53 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: The question we are asking the Government is whether, in present circumstances and without imperilling our security, we can bring about a reduction in defence expenditure. The cost of defence is running at the rate of £1,600 million a year. Hon. Members will agree that that is a vast sum which is straining our resources in money and in manpower and weakening our capacity in the sphere of civil production.
There is a further reason—indeed there are many but at this stage I shall mention one—why the Opposition make no apology for raising a debate on defence. As most hon. Members will agree, I think, the time has come for a review of the defence position. Are we proceeding along the right lines? Are we spending the funds made available for defence preparations to full advantage? Moreover, have we the right conception of defence?
During this year there have been two debates on defence, one in this House and one in another place. I should transgress were I to quote what was said in another place, and I will merely refer to it. There were disclosed serious rivalries between

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the three Service Departments. Ex-generals, ex-field marshals, ex-marshals of the Royal Air Force and ex-admirals all contrived to demonstrate that their individual Service and the preparations for defence with which that Service was concerned were the correct technique to deploy. There was no indication at all from those contributing to the debate that we were concerned, not with the merits of individual Service Departments or the Services themselves, but with the purpose of defence. It is a remarkable feature of that debate that the Minister of Defence made no contribution whatever.
In the debate which took place in this House earlier in the year, the time of most hon. Members was occupied in discussing National Service. I do not propose to speak upon that matter beyond making a passing reference, though I shall not be surprised if some of my hon. Friends make their contributions. All I wish to know from the right hon. Gentleman is when the Government propose to bring forward their legislation, whether an amending Bill or an Order in Council, in connection with the National Service Acts.
These Acts will expire at the end of this year. It is clear that we cannot deal with this matter during this week. We must wait until the autumn Session. But we ought to know what are the intentions of the Government. This is an important matter affecting the future of vast numbers of young men, and they naturally express concern and anxiety about the intentions of the Government. We ought not to be left in the dark, and perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can give the House some indication of what the Government propose.
I turn to the substance of defence itself. In this matter we all proceed on an assumption which is, whether we like it or not, that at some time we may be compelled to undertake some measure of defence to promote our security; that we may be the victims of aggression and therefore must be ready for an emergency. That is the assumption on which we proceed. Indeed, if we reject that assumption there is no case for defence preparations at all other than, as hon. Members will appreciate, the provision of garrisons in overseas stations.
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I wish to emphasise this aspect. The assumption on which we proceed is that some day there may be trouble, the balloon will go up and we must be ready. On this matter there are conflicting statements which create a good deal of confusion. Reference has been made in previous debates to statements made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, both of whom on occasion have declared that the danger of war is receding. But more recently a statement has been made by General Gruenther, the Supreme Commander in charge of Western defences who is reponsible for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation military arrangements. Hon. Members may be interested in what he said.
It is remarkable that he said what I am about to place on record at a secret session of the Senate Appropriations Committee. This happened on 18th July. It is quite recent. Secret sessions in the United States appear to be somewhat different from secret sessions here, or rather the deliberations and records of secret sessions in the United States are apparently made available to anyone. At any rate, they have been made available to me. This statement is apparently authentic. I think that the House should hear it. It says;
"'I don't think war is ever going to come,' General Gruenther told the Senate Appropriations Committee at a secret session."
That is very interesting. Clearly, if war is never going to come there is not much purpose in proceeding with our extensive and costly defence preparations. Perhaps the Government would enlighten the House on this matter. Do they agree with General Gruenther or do they disagree? Perhaps they will inform us. A great deal depends on this.
There is not only General Gruenther. At the Paris meeting of the Council of Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation held early in the year, it was clear from the communiqué and from other reports of the proceedings that the Ministers did not accept the view which has been expressed in certain quarters that Russia intended an immediate aggression. Indeed, the view was expressed that there was no danger even of a remote aggression. Because of that atmosphere at the Council of Ministers, they decided that all the nations could curtail their

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defence expenditure—at least they could slow up the proceedings.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: The right hon. Gentleman took a small piece out of the text of General Gruenther's remarks in the secret session. It is hardly fair simply to quote that one passage. This goes on the record, and the House ought to be given more details.
Mr. Shinwell: I will give whatever the secret session disclosed, if the House wishes. I respond to the request of the hon. and gallant Member. It is true that General Gruenther told the Committee;
"We are going to stop this war from ever starting. I am absolutely convinced of that. These fellows (Russia and the other Communists) are no supermen. They have no edge on us at all."
Then, in reply to a suggestion that presumably N.A.T.O. should take measures in consort with the United States to bomb strategically the Russian industrial centres, he said;
"My contention is that if there ever was time for relaxation, this is not it."
But that certainly was not relevant to the question put to him. It is all very confusing. We ought to know exactly where we are. I hope that the Government will tell us. No sense of urgency was disclosed at the N.A.T.O. Council of Ministers conference. It was clear that they did not expect the targets set in previous years to be reached. So much for that.
Undoubtedly there has been a change in the situation since 1950. First, there has been an easing of the tension. I shall not refer to the Korean affair and what has just happened. The truce may lead to peace in the Far East; at any rate, we hope so. But apart from what has happened in Korea, it is obvious that, generally speaking, international tension has been relaxed. That is one factor in the situation. Obviously if there is a relaxation the time comes when we must review the defence position. We cannot ignore it. We cannot continue to spend money on defence measures in the context of an easement in the international situation.
That is the first factor, but the second is, I think, much more important. We are all members of the N.A.T.O. club. We subscribe financially and in man-
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power to the N.A.T.O. military organisation. That club has expanded substantially since we first became members. It began originally through the Brussels Treaty Organisation, consisting of five Powers. Then the United States came in, with Canada and several other countries, but in the last 18 months or so Turkey, Greece and Italy have become subscribers. There is a prospect—a remote one but nevertheless there has been some discussion about it—of Yugoslavia coming in.
The original conception was that as other countries came into N.A.T.O., making their contribution in manpower, weapons, research and development and of course in finance, our contribution would diminish. That was the idea behind it all. Let me place on record the facts. We read—and, from the military and defence point of view, we welcome it—that Italy has four fully-equipped divisions and that there are 10 reserve divisions in process of being equipped. We read that Turkey has 18 divisions, and that the United States are providing the arms. I am not familiar with the position in Greece, but we know that Yugoslavia has many skeleton divisions requiring to be clothed and provided with the necessary equipment.
I must ask the Government why it is that, in spite of all the additional members coming into the club, making their contributions in manpower, material and finance, our contribution is rising all the time. I suggest that that is a pertinent question that ought to be answered. I will come to the N.A.T.O. structure and the cost of N.A.T.O. in a few moments.
The third factor in the situation is the advent of the atom bomb. Undoubtedly, progress has been made, and when I use the word "progress" I use it in the military sense, for there is precious little progress about it from the social angle. However, there it is. Not only have we to consider the advent of the atom bomb, but the provision of modern weapons such as guided missiles, rocket launches, bazookas, with modern tanks, jet aircraft and all the rest of it. This is all very satisfactory from a defence point of view, but I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman these questions.
Why does the Government proceed with the provision of conventional weapons? Do we require a Navy such

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as we have at the present time? I know that this will bestir the naval element, but it is a fair question to put. Do we require all the aircraft carriers? In a debate that took place in another place, Viscount Trenchard disposed completely, at any rate to his own satisfaction, of the suggestion that we require more aircraft carriers. Anyway, there is controversy about this matter. It is alleged that, just as the battleship is a thing of the past, so the aircraft carrier in a few years' time will become obsolete. We ought to know what are the Government's intentions. After all, an aircraft carrier now costs something like £13 million—an enormous sum. We simply cannot afford to go on producing weapons of this kind, which may become obsolete in the course of a few years.
Therefore, I should like to know what is the Government's conception about the continued provision of conventional weapons and equipment in face of the advent of the atom bomb. I recognise, of course, that, in the event of the un fortunate contingency of war, it may be necessary to employ land forces for occupation purposes, and indeed for other purposes, but clearly all this vast number of vehicles now in the possession of the War Office, large numbers of which may be obsolete——
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): They were yours.
Mr. Shinwell: I beg of the Secretary of State for War not to interrupt me. He is the last man who ought to interrupt anybody at this time. I want to deal kindly with him, and so far I have dealt kindly with him, but I beg of him not to interrupt. I want to leave him alone.
There were occasions when estimates were put to me as Minister of Defence for army vehicles, and I cut them down by many millions. I simply would not tolerate it because I knew they were always asking for too much. All this bears profoundly on the conception of defence, and on this issue we must know how the Government propose to proceed.
Now I want to turn attention to the N.A.T.O. structure. The Minister of Defence presented Estimates earlier this year, in which there was financial provision for our contribution to N.A.T.O. That contribution is rising. Last year, I think the total Estimate was something
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like £17 million, and the N.A.T.O. contribution was in the neighbourhood of £2 million. I am not speaking of the infra-structure element, which is quite different. I think we provided £13 million this year as our contribution to the infra-structure element and that is essential for the provision of airfields, telecommunications and the like, which are all necessary ancillaries of defence organisation.
But what about this grandiose, elaborate top-heavy structure at N.A.T.O., largely inspired by the United States? We are sending more and more personnel to S.H.A.P.E. headquarters, and N.A.T.O. is always asking for more. We have to keep our end up with United States personnel. The more they have, the more we have to send. It is an unsatisfactory position, and the time has come when we ought to know from the Government what we are getting out of this N.A.T.O. structure. Is it making the substantial contribution to actual preparations for defence which requires to be made in the event of an emergency? We ought to know, and we ought not to be led away by these grandiose ideas of United States military personnel.
On this matter, I am going to quote a real authority. Some time ago, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery disclosed his views on this subject, and it is no use ignoring what Lord Montgomery said. There was a time when he was the hero of the opposite benches, quite rightly, and I myself have a great admiration for Lord Montgomery.
If I may digress, I saw the other day a statement in an American newspaper to the effect that General Eisenhower was the man who had laid the foundations of the N.A.T.O. organisation. It is just nonsense. The foundations of the N.A.T.O. organisation were laid by Lord Montgomery when he was Chairman of the Brussels Treaty Organisation Staff Committee. He was responsible for it, and, therefore, he is someone of whom notice should be taken when he makes comments of this kind.
I cannot read the whole speech, but he referred to the whole organisation being "swamped in a morass of com mittees, conferences and talk." One might imagine that it was a political organisation——
Sir Herbert Williams: Margate.
Mr. Shinwell: —or the Conservative Party conference.
But what about the headquarters? He says our forces there are too big, and then he makes this declaration; "Cut the whole thing in half." Lord Montgomery is either right or wrong. If the right hon. Gentleman does not agree with Lord Montgomery, let him say so; and if Lord Montgomery is a person who does not know what he is talking about, then he ought not to be Deputy Supreme Commander of N.A.T.O. He went on to say, at a Press conference in Washington, when he was speaking to the National Press Club, that the West was trying to handle a global problem without a central organisation to direct political policies and military strategy on a global scale. He said;
"There is a great lack of clear and agreed political aims. There is no grand design or master plan. Because of that, there is an enormous dissipation of effort and strength, particularly of military effort."
These are startling and striking words for Lord Montgomery to use, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman should tell us what he thinks about those statements.
I now come to the Ministry of Defence and its function and purpose. What was the original objective in the creation of the Ministry of Defence? It was to effect, so far as practicable, co-ordination between the three Services. When I was Minister of Defence, I tried to bring the Service Departments together. I believed that it might be possible to effect coordination in the medical services and in other directions, including the chaplain services, though that might have been considered as a very minor effort at coordination. But that was the conception.
What have we achieved in this connection? I venture the opinion that at the present time the three Service Departments hang by their tails more than they ever have done since the inception of the Ministry of Defence. They are all out for themselves. The Ministry has never made any attempt to effect active co-ordination, and, in any event, there is no evidence in it of any reduction of expenditure or any new conception of defence or strategy.
We are in a difficulty this afternoon because the Minister of Defence is not
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here to reply, and we cannot do anything about it. He is in another place, and that, I believe, is unfortunate. I agree that the Parliamentary Secretary is very able, and he can certainly be very evasive in reply to Questions and in debate, which is the hall-mark of a politician. That is all very well, but he does not carry any actual responsibility. He has got to do as he is told. The man who should be here is the Minister of Defence himself. But he is not here, and, therefore, we cannot interrogate him or hear what he has to say about these questions, except at second hand.
Of course, I know that the right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the House, is to reply, but, so far as I know, he has not served in a Service Department. Therefore, he is not familiar with these matters. No doubt he will produce a very useful brief because these civil servants, whatever else may be said of them, can write very good briefs indeed, and I commend them for that. But the Minister is not here, and it is a most unsatisfactory position. All that I can do is ask the right hon. Gentleman a few questions in order to elicit what is the Government's conception about these matters.
The first thing I want to know is how far have they effected any co-ordination between the three Services? If they have effected any co-ordination, how far has that brought about any reduction in expenditure? What are their plans for the future? I am not suggesting the integration of the three Service Departments. I do not think that would be wise, because there is the difficulty of administration, and to bring the three Departments together might lead to an unwieldy situation. But there is a great deal of dead wood that ought to be cut out of the individual Services so that the Minister of Defence can handle the organisation to greater advantage.
I also want to know whether the Ministry of Defence has given its attention to proposals that have been made about reducing the size of divisions while giving them greater manoeuvrability and more effective striking power. On this matter, General Gruenther has expressed a view which cannot be ignored, and which I will read to the House. Perhaps the Secretary of State for War will take note of this if he has not already read it. Speaking about the

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Russian divisions, General Gruenther said;
"Russian divisions each number about 12,000 in strength compared with the British, French and American 18,000. But this did not mean that the N.A.T.O. divisions were 1·5 times as strong, because the Russians concentrate on fire power and a 'very astute programme'."
I do not know what he meant by that, but I know what he meant when he referred to concentrated fire power, because we have had discussions at the Ministry of Defence, at the War Office and at N.A.T.O. conferences about this very matter. In my view, and I think this is the view of many military experts, there is no reason why our divisions should remain at their present strength. If they could be reduced—and I think they could—it would mean fewer vehicles and fewer tanks. So long as effective striking power was not lost, I believe it would lead to a curtailment of expenditure, and I should like to know what the right hon. Gentleman can say about that.
Finally, I want to put one or two further points. I want to know why we have so many men in Egypt. I am not pleading for the withdrawal of our Forces from Egypt. I recognise that, in the absence of a diplomatic settlement, it is impossible for us to effect a complete withdrawal, but at the same time I am satisfied that we do not require 80,000 men in the Canal Zone in order to deal with an emergency. Indeed, the extra divisions that were sent to Egypt were not sent because of any difficulty which had presented itself there, but rather because of what happened at Abadan. It was the Persian situation that made it necessary to alert further troops to Egypt.
I think that the time has come when we should at any rate reduce the number of our troops in Egypt, certainly by half to begin with. I do not want to impinge on foreign affairs, but we have no right anyway to have 80,000 troops in Egypt. Under the Treaty we are not entitled to have more than 10,000 combatant troops, and we have 80,000.
Sir H. Williams: Are they all combatant troops?
Mr. Shinwell: Of course not. I am glad that the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) has mentioned this, because the fact of the matter is
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that we have far too many non-combatant troops there.
Sir H. Williams: The right hon. Gentleman mentioned 10,000 combatant troops, and then went on to speak about 80,000 troops. I wanted to know whether he meant that they were all combatant troops.
Mr. Shinwell: One of the difficulties is that the withdrawal of Egyptian labour—and there has been a substantial withdrawal—necessitates the employment of more military personnel. We have a large number of Mauritians in the Army, and they, of course, add to the numbers. But we have far too many troops in Egypt, and I believe that we could cut down the numbers without weakening our position.
What about the brigade at Trieste? How long is it to remain? Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to say. I am not clear about the strategic importance of having a brigade there which must cost a considerable sum of money. What are the numbers of our men in Tripoli? Have we still men in Tripoli? The intention was to take them out. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence shakes his head. I suspect we still have men in Tripoli. Why have we men in Tripoli? What about Cyprus? We have far too many men in Cyprus, unless it is the Government's intention to withdraw troops from Egypt and to make Cyprus a main base. I hope they do not do anything of the sort, because it would be a most unsatisfactory base, particularly for air operations. We must be very careful not to spend additional sums on creating a new base, a very costly operation, only to discover in the course of a few years that it is unsatisfactory.
Can we not reduce the number of men in Malaya? We have about 40,000 men. General Templer is said to have effected a considerable improvement in the position. All the better. We have built up a police force there. The original intention was to make it unnecessary to send so many military men out there. What has happened? Instead of the numbers being reduced, they are going up. What is meant by an "improvement"? If a situation improves we ought to be able to reduce the number of our men.

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I ask these questions because when we were the Government and right hon. Gentlemen, and particularly the Secretary of State for War, sat on this side of the House, hardly a day passed, certainly when questions affecting the Services were under review, but we were asked questions about the absence of a strategic reserve in this country. What attacks, what criticism, we heard at that time. I ask the question in a kindly fashion, not with all the acerbity that was created at that time by right hon. Gentlemen opposite; what about the strategic reserve? Why have we not a strategic reserve? I will tell the right hon. Gentleman what we have got. The Prime Minister talked about it some time ago. We have mobile columns. When he talked about them everybody thought; "Now we have something substantial." What are they. We have put together the cooks, waiters, people in the messes, all the ancillaries and the odds and ends, given them a little bit of training, marched them up and down, and those are the mobile columns. What nonsense. It is as bad as the Home Guard position.
I do not want to be unfair, but when it comes to questions of defence we are as much concerned about promoting the security of these shores as anybody on the Government side of the House, although at the same time we want expenditure to be reduced.
Let me put a further question about the Middle East. It is about time we heard something about the Middle East Defence Organisation. It is clear there is no remedy for the trouble in the Middle East other than that. If the countries in the Middle East and ourselves were at peace with no further danger of disturbance, and we did not apprehend an attack from a certain quarter into the Middle East, there would be no need for a Middle East Defence Organisation. The alternative to the present position in the Canal Zone is a Middle East Defence Organisation. What have we heard about it? Nothing. What is the Minister of Defence doing when he is in Paris, when he goes to the meeting of Ministers, when he goes to the Cabinet, or speaks in another place. What does he say about this? Nothing at all. He says nothing at all because he has nothing to say.
I have ventured to put certain questions to the right hon. Gentleman because
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I feel that the whole position of defence should be reviewed and a serious effort made to reduce expenditure, and because I believe that there is not the least prospect of substantial reduction in defence expenditure unless (1) we can reduce our oversea commitments, and that is not so easy as it seems, but I welcome any attempt in that direction; (2) we can coordinate the three Services and by promoting a new technique in defence bring down the cost all round.
I have tried my best not to say anything about National Service. It has not been easy, so I would conclude on this note. Although I said nothing about it beyond asking the right hon. Gentleman about the Government's intentions, I make a prophecy. It is that at the end of this year when the Government come to the House to deal with this matter, they will be compelled, by force of public opinion and by the exigencies of the situation, to reduce the period of National Service. However, that is not the purpose of my speech, which is to elicit from the Government some information about what they regard as the paramount needs of the situation and whether they can assist us by enlightening the House on the Government's intentions on defence.
4.36 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): The speech of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. E. Shinwell) was one which, in its tone, we all welcomed, because it was objective and was genuinely seeking knowledge. I will try to answer some of the right hon. Gentleman's questions, but if I do not answer them all my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, who has been given notice of some points to which a reply is desired, is here, and so of course is the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.
Mr. Arthur Henderson: Do we understand that three Ministers are to speak in this debate tonight?
Mr. Crookshank: If the Opposition desire it, I say that they are here to do so. The right hon. Gentleman has put some detailed questions to which nobody but the Secretary of State for War can reply. However, we will see how the

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debate goes. I was merely saying that the Ministers are here to deal with points if the necessity arises.
I do not think any debate on this topic this week could open from this Front Bench without a very brief reference to the statement made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State in this House last Monday with regard to Korean troops. He then pointed out how indebted we all are to those troops—our own armies and those of our Allies and Commonwealth—who have taken part in the fighting out there. I should like to add, in order to put it on record, how quick we were to take up the challenge when it came to this nation under the previous Administration who, in this matter, had our full support.
Within 72 hours of the North Korean offensive, the majority of the Far Eastern ships of the Navy had already reached the advanced base. That was quick work. During the campaign they have been largely responsible for activities on the west coast. We have had 29 ships of the Royal Navy there and 25 ships of Commonwealth Navies have served in those waters.
So far as the Army is concerned, it was just two months after the attack was launched, namely, on 29th August, 1950, that the 27th Brigade arrived. It covered itself with distinction during the fighting and it was in fact the first of the United Nations troops to be there. I think it was two years yesterday, at any rate it is two years this month, since the Commonwealth Division was first formed. It was a wonderful example of Commonwealth co-operation and was a Division which has had to taken part in the course of its duty in many bitter actions. They and our other troops out there have covered themselves with renown and distinction.
The Air Force contribution has not been negligible by any manner of means, but it was largely on an individual basis, that is to say, British pilots seconded to United States and Commonwealth squadrons.
At the end of it we have to note casualties totalling 4,450, of whom 740 have been killed. That is a record of our support to the call of the United Nations in this campaign. I am quite sure that, while we would wish to express
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our sympathy with the relations of those who have fallen and our sympathy with those who were wounded, those who are still sick and those who have suffered as prisoners of war, we also would wish to give the congratulations and thanks of this House to all who took part in the campaign.
It is slightly unusual perhaps to have a defence debate at this period of the year. The spring is the time for that in the normal way, when we have the defence Estimates and then the White Paper on defence. According to form, all that happened in the spring of this year, and the defence debate took place on the White Paper on 5th March. The gist of the White Paper, which was approved by the House, was the determination of Her Majesty's Government to strengthen the Forces of the United Kingdom on the one hand and, on the other, to make the maximum contribution that we could to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
It was pointed out in that document, and in the debate in the House, that there was to be some check on the rapidly rising cost of the programme which was rightly launched by our predecessors but in the circumstances of the case very hurriedly launched. Economic grounds have made it necessary for that programme to be spread over a longer period and in the end to be held at a lower peak.
The right hon. Member for Easington has reminded us that the cost of that White Paper this year was £1,637 million. That compared with £1,513 million a year before and with £736 million in 1949–50, but that was, of course, pre-Korea. So the figures are vast. I was interested to remind myself of the Estimates in my first year in this House, 1925. They were only £76,500,000 for all Services. The increase, of course, is due not only to the increased requirements but to the increased cost of everything. A modern Centurion tank, for example, costs three times as much as the tank which was considered necessary in 1939.
The right hon. Member for Easington referred to aircraft carriers. In a fleet carrier, the electronics, a most essential part of the equipment, cost only £12,000 in 1939. The cost of electronic equipment for a fleet carrier today is £350,000.

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These figures, just taken at random, are some measure of the increasing cost.
I said that spring was the time when we normally discuss these matters and spring was the time when we approved these Estimates and the defence White Paper. The House approved the White Paper by a majority of 41, which is a large majority in this House. In fact it was very nearly a bipartisan approach to this problem, for, while the Opposition had an Amendment on the Order Paper, it started with the words;
"recognises the need for a defence programme which is adequate both for our own security and to enable us to play our part in the defence of the free world, and is also compatible with national solvency;…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512. c. 581.]
So we were agreed on our objectives.
Hardly long enough time has elapsed up to now, the end of July, to enable us to announce—and certainly it will not be the case—any startling changes since what was then laid down. There has been hardly time for such big alterations to take place, and indeed hardly time for them to be planned in the detail which is necessary before great changes are made. I have, therefore, nothing novel to report with regard to the development of our defence plans, except to make the point that naturally they are always under consideration. There is a constant measure of revision, a certain amount of flux in these matters, because there are always two factors to be kept in mind.
The first factor is the new technical developments which seem to come one after the other so very quickly and which have to be assessed and their use discovered. The other factor, to which the right hon. Member for Easington alluded and which must be constantly in our minds, is the political possibilities of the day. Any defence programme must be based on a right assessment of the nature of the threat to our security. That is what it is for, and so one naturally now asks oneself what, for example, will be the effect of the Korean armistice in the short term and in the long term. There is still a great question mark over Russia and the satellite countries. There might be some relaxation in the offing, but as recently as 11th May the Prime Minister was saying:
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"This would be the most fatal moment for the free nations to relax their comradeship and preparations. To fail to maintain our defence effort up to the limit of our strength would be to paralyse every beneficial tendency towards peace both in Europe and in Asia."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 902.]
In other words, if we could be rash enough to paraphrase the Prime Minister's remarks, it would be to say that on a balmy day in March it would be premature to put on one's summer suit. There is something in the adage, "Cast not a clout till May is out." We are not even sure that it is yet a balmy day in March, and we certainly have not reached May in this problem.
We have to be watchful and it is not ourselves alone who are involved. Rearmament is now the concern in the field of 14 sovereign States under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and, as the right hon. Member for Easington will recollect, we have only just reaffirmed in the most formal manner in the communiqué from Washington after the Foreign Ministers' Conference the determination of the three Governments
"… to safeguard, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the freedom, the common heritage and the civilisation of their peoples, based on the principles of democracy, freedom of the individual and the rule of law."
There are further paragraphs in that document which merely put into words the feelings which we all have on that subject.
It may be that, generally speaking, sufficient recognition has not been given to the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and what it has achieved. When General Eisenhower opened his headquarters in 1951 there was very little available. There were not many effective divisions—a dozen or so perhaps. A thousand or so aeroplanes were operationally available but obsolescent, and there was no command structure or organisation on anything like the scale that was required.
If we look from then to now we can see that there have been great changes. Not only have we had, as the right hon. Member for Easington pointed out, the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the Organisation, but the forces which were planned at Lisbon, for example, have been substantially achieved. The equipment has been tremendously improved

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with the enlightened assistance of the United States, and there is an effective command now from the North Cape to the Mediterranean. Last year a series of large-scale exercises were held on land and sea and shortly there is to be another one covering the Atlantic, European and Channel Commands. We are, therefore, moving very fast into the build-up of a well-trained organisation.
Mr. George Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman told us that the figures in the Lisbon Conference announcement had been fulfilled. Would he be good enough to tell us the exact figures as compared with the Lisbon objective, because according to my recollection we are a long way from it?
Mr. Crookshank: I said that they were largely fulfilled. I said that all the build up which has taken place may well have influenced the world situation——
Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does not want to mislead the House. The objective given at Lisbon was 50 divisions. We have now got about 20 under arms, so to say that we have achieved the Lisbon objective is absurd.
Mr. Crookshank: I was quoting what was said in the Paris communiqué after the discussions, and the words used there were "substantially fulfilled." What I was saying was that the result of all this work in the last two years and the equipment and training which have taken place may well have influenced the world situation, because three years ago I think the Russians might have had some confidence in thinking that they could have had, at any rate by land, a walkover had they decided to take any offensive action.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Why did they not do it?
Mr. Crookshank: I would say that they have, today, many more doubts. I remember that only last week the Leader of the Opposition was saying;
"… I think that we have built up our strength. …"
I think that is perhaps going too far, but that is what the Leader of the Opposition said. He said that these changes to
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which I have been referring in the international scene
"are due to some extent to the fact that we have built up this strength of the Atlantic Community."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st July, 1953; Vol. 518, c. 233.]
Perhaps the creation of these forces may have had some considerable influence. Anyhow, I think that this organisation and what has been achieved by the effort and sacrifice on the part of all the countries concerned can be regarded with satisfaction.
We are, however, still faced with very formidable strength. If hon. Members reflect upon the Russian situation and that of the satellite countries, we know that their national service, or whatever they may call it, is far more rigorous than anything that we have in this country. We know that there has been a great deal of re-equipment going on there—in jet aeroplanes, for instance, and the ship which they sent here did not look so unmodern. There is no doubt that the training has continued through all the years.
The first answer to the right hon. Gentleman's question, therefore, is that we cannot think now of dropping our guard. This is not the time to do that. There is still possibly a long period of cold war, and we must not allow ourselves to be diverted by any kind of wishful thinking. Even if there is a favourable breeze, it is worth remembering that in this country, at any rate, the cold wind comes from the East, and it may still go on blowing.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: But the deep depressions seem to come from the West.
Mr. Crookshank: The nice warm winds come from the West.
The key to our success is to try to establish strong fighting forces, up-to-date equipment, trained reserves, and special efforts are now being made, in the organisation about which I am speaking, to achieve this end. As to the trained reserves, I would point out that it is to try to concentrate on improving their readiness and their efficiency that Field Marshal Montgomery is now devoting most of his time, and I think that the work that he is doing is work for which we should be most grateful because it is a very important part of what has to be done in that field.

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There are, of course, still many weaknesses, as General Ridgway recently pointed out, and that is one of the reasons that we have been so insistent on the need for a German contribution to Western defence through the European Defence Community. That is why, in April, the North Atlantic Council was making plans for further development—I shall come to this in a minute—under the new Supreme Commander, General Gruenther, to whom on his access to that high post we offer our good wishes because he is a most distinguished military man in whom we all have the fullest confidence. [HON. MEMBERS; "Hear, hear."]
There have recently been two changes, to which I might refer, in the command structure of the organisation. That, again, has to be under constant review and kept up-to-date. There is now established a fourth Commander-in-Chief, that is to say, the Commander-in-Chief of the Central European Sector, Marshal Juin, with co-equal subordinate Navy, Air and Army commands responsible to him.
The point of the change is that formerly the Supreme Commander had two rôles. Formerly, he had the control of all the wide command from the North Cape to the Mediterranean, and, at the same time, he was co-ordinating the central sector. It has been decided that there would have been difficulties, had it ever come to the test, in both controlling such an enormous command and operationally directing one part of it. Therefore, the change has been effected. At the end of the day we have to remember that in any future war there will be far greater responsibilities on the Supreme Commander than ever experienced by any previous commander, certainly far greater than General Eisenhower had in the last war.
The second alteration is that the Deputy Supreme Commander (Air) at Supreme Headquarters in future is to do two things. First of all, he is to define the general air policy of the organisation, and he will be controlling the air operations necessary to secure their co-ordination, and particularly the coordination of strategic air forces which do not come under the Supreme Command. That post is held by an American.
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It has been suggested that the fact that a British officer is now the Tactical Air Forces Commander in the central sector is some denigration of the Royal Air Force and some reduction in the status of our command. What Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry has now got to command is the largest operational air command in peacetime. He commands squadrons of the Royal Air Force, United States, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and France, and his duty is to train them in peace and to command them in war. If anybody has any qualms about it, I think we can truthfully say that this is one of the key posts in the whole organisation, and that we wish Sir Basil well on taking it over. The whole of the Royal Air Force may feel proud that an Air Chief Marshal occupies this post.
The other matter relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to which I want to refer is the infrastructure. The right hon. Member for Easington used the word. It is a hideous word, for which Her Majesty's present advisers are not in any way responsible. Indeed, it does not mean anything because it does not appear in any dictionary, and if it did mean anything I think that by derivation it should mean "structures below ground" and therefore, a mammoth organisation of dugouts and what-not. It is a word which somebody invented and to which a meaning has been attached ever since.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: It was in the Government's last White Paper.
Mr. Crookshank: Of course; we had to use the word that somebody else invented—[HON. MEMBERS; "Why?"] Because it had become international common form by then. It was far too late for the purists of the English language to act.
This infrastructure covers an enormous variety of things connected with common defence and which are organised, paid for and erected in common. It concerns not only airfields but headquarters organisations, military works of every kind, port improvements and, most important in this sphere, telecommunications. Good progress is being made and has been made.
Last year, the original estimate of the four instalments which have been

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approved totalled as much as £346 million. This is a tremendous figure. In April, £67 million more was added, and a decision was taken to plan out, over the next three years, beginning in 1954, on the scale of about £250 million, which means that a total of some £700 million, roughly speaking, is envisaged for the infrastructure programme.
What is important, particularly to hon. Members who are interested in the point, is the question how any form of financial control is exercised over this vast international expenditure. The answer is that there is an international committee in Paris, representative of all the Governments concerned. Programmes are submitted to them; they approve them, and before any work is started engineering and cost estimates are submitted by what they call the "host" countries.
That is another awful word which has arisen in this context. The "host" country means the country in which the work is to be done, and the country which is to be paid for it if the expenditure is greater than its own contribution. "Host" generally means just the contrary, but that is the word which has been adopted for this purpose.
The "host" countries submit these engineering and cost estimates; they are examined by the technical experts on the staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—and we can be quite sure that anything connected with the staff of the Organisation will be effective under the general supervision of Lord Ismay—and, as the payments are made and the work proceeds, quarterly statements are sent in. Then, when everything is passed and agreed, the committee call upon the contributing countries to pay whatever their due may be for any particular project. That is the sort of control which is exercised with, superimposed upon it, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Board of Auditors. So far as the British Government have been able to influence these matters, we have certainly done whatever was possible to see that the tightest control would be achieved.
So much for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Since the March debate—and all I am trying to do is to pick up any changes which have occurred since then—a recent development has been announced; the intention of the United States Administration to reduce
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next year—and soon to end—the economic and defence support. I can only say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out what our consequent duty would be when he said, last week:
"… we must therefore prepare ourselves as a country to carry our immense defence burden under the proud flag of our own economic independence."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st July, 1953; Vol. 518, c. 225.]
That will certainly be our aim.
In this question of the expenses for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, attempts are bound to be made in different quarters to compare the relative burden of the different countries. I have seen a number alleging that we were bearing a disproportionately heavy burden. If we are, I think it is a better criticism that we should be bearing too much than too little, but we certainly should not minimise what is being done by all the other nations concerned. The Organisation conducts an annual review into these very matters, and bears in mind the burden, which is heavy financially, economically and personally, and as far as possible tries to see that it is equitably distributed between the countries belonging to the Organisation.
That annual review has revealed two things. First it has shown that superficial comparisons are very misleading, because it is almost impossible to get a yardstick, or even a collection of yardsticks, applicable to 14 different countries with very different economic and other arrangements. Secondly, it has shown that while we are certainly not lagging behind, there is not much justification for criticising the efforts of other people. It is quite true that others have a less onerous form of National Service than we have, but that is not the only burden which the nations have to carry.
That leads me to the question which was raised by the right hon. Member for Easington about National Service. It was all stated, as a matter of fact, in the Defence White Paper, but if the House wishes to be reminded of it the call-up under the 1948 Act comes to an end on 1st January, 1954, unless a later date is adopted and approved by Parliament by their approval of a draft Order in Council.
Mr. George Craddock: Is it not 1st January, 1953?
Mr. Crookshank: It is 1st January. 1954. January, 1953, is passed.
The Government's conclusion in this matter is that we cannot afford the depletion either of the active or the reserve forces if this arrangement is allowed to lapse on 1st January because, in spite of the improvement in the enlistments, it still remains true that our reliance on National Service is such that 35 per cent. of the National Service men are serving overseas, and they represent 42 per cent. of the United Kingdom Army and Air Force serving overseas. It is quite obvious, therefore, that we could not yet let up in that sphere.
What the Government propose to do is to introduce a draft Order in Council when we resume, not at the end of this Session but in the new Session which is to be opened in November.
Mr. Shinwell: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for that information, but does he appreciate that if the Government proceed by Order in Council no Amendments can be moved? We have either to accept or reject what the Government propose.
Mr. Crookshank: We were not responsible for the 1948 Act, and that is what is provided in that Act for extending the period. We are all aware of the difficulties about Orders in Council, but that is what the Act demands in order to extend the serving period after 1st January, and it is our intention to introduce a draft Order in Council.
Mr. Shinwell: Does not the right hon. Gentleman recognise that from the Government's point of view, on the assumption that there is a change in public opinion which may influence the minds of hon. Members opposite—who can tell?—the only possible Amendment would be one for a rejection of the proposal, and that might be a very serious matter? Would it not be far better to come forward with an amending Bill, which would enable hon. Members to put down Amendments in Committee?
Mr. Crookshank: The right hon. Member's party should have foreseen that when framing the 1948 Act. I am merely saying that there are certain powers which would lapse, under existing circumstances, on 1st January, unless
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action were taken under that Act. We hope to introduce the Order in Council soon after the new Session is opened, and in good time for public opinion to make itself felt and public debate to take place on the matter.
During the course of the year it is also our intention to make a change in the National Service Act, to ensure that the reservists whose obligation now comes completely to an end after the full 5½ years should be registered in the same way as are the Class G and Class Z reservists, so that track can be kept of them and so that, should an emergency arise, they can be found quickly and be immediately available.
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman was not listening. I said that during the year we were hoping to introduce legislation to do that, so that in a major emergency the National Service reservists, after their 5½ years of initial service, do not escape all obligations; while at the same time the Z and G reservists are under obligations, and they are an older generation and men who served in the war. We would wish to limit their obligations at the age of 45, but we think it is only fair and equitable that the young ex-National Service man should have the same sort of obligations as the older man, who himself has been called up for National Service at an earlier date.
The right hon. Gentleman asked a number of questions of a rather more detailed character and of which he had not given me notice. Perhaps he will allow my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to deal with them when he replies. But when the right hon. Gentleman was claiming that we ought to bear in mind that there is a change in the situation and an easing of the position, I am not sure that I would take so categorical a line as he does about that being the fact. I should rather go back to what I quoted from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and say that
"this would be a fatal moment for the free nations to relax."
We are all bound to recognise—these are serious topics—the great weight of the burden which is thrust upon the nation as a whole and upon innumerable people in it, not only here but in all the other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. As I say, they are economic and financial burdens, and they are

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personal burdens in the form of actual personal service. But we have to recognise—and I think we have done so—that these burdens, financial and economic, must not, and cannot, be so heavy as to bring about economic collapse, because that is the worst result of all. Potential enemies might benefit as much from that, should it occur, as they might from actual military success. That is the lesson of what I was trying to put, very inadequately, I am afraid, before the House this afternoon.
The lesson is that our programme must be constantly under review. It has to be planned and replanned, sifted and turned over, and seen whether it adequately fits the necessities of the hour. We may be near a turning point in international relations, but whether we are or not, it is my firm conviction, and that of my right hon. and hon. Friends in this Administration too, I think, that we must continue to be firm and to increase our strength, because it is just that which has brought us to this point of history.
I have not seen what General Gruenther may or may not have been reported as saying in a secret session. I only heard of it from the right hon. Gentleman, and I do not know whether newspaper reports of secret sessions are necessarily to be accepted as accurate. I remember that there used to be a good many reports of our secret Sessions during the war that had no foundation whatever in fact. Whether General Gruenther ever said it or not, the quotation which the right hon. Gentleman made,
"We are going to stop this war from ever starting,"
is exactly the objective of this whole defence build-up. I took down the words of the right hon. Gentleman. Anyhow, it is all hypothetical, because it is alleged to have been a secret session, and it is a newspaper report and all the rest of it.
Mr. Shinwell: It was not the only report.
Mr. Crookshank: That is the one I am quoting back to the right hon. Gentleman. If what General Gruenther did say is,
"We are going to stop this war from ever starting,"
that will only be done by building up our strength, our equipment and our reserves
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as a deterrent. If he ever said anything of the kind, I have no doubt that that is what the General had in mind. The tide may, indeed, be turning—we cannot tell; but I am certain that it must be much more surely set for peace before we can launch any radical changes in our programme, which, if once launched, cannot be easily reversed.
In the past there have been Governments of whom it was said with regard to their rearming policy that they were too late. It is not the intention of Her Majesty's present Ministers to fall into an error, equally dangerous, of relaxing too soon. We intend to go forward along the lines which we indicated in March, which we have carried on since and from which there have been no great changes or deviations, and no great call for any changes, excepting those with regard to the Organisation to which I have referred. We shall go forward patiently, in full accord with all our allies, on the path of safety. We shall, as we do it, prepare for the worst and pray and hope for the best, working always for security, and through security, because that is the only way, for prosperity and peace.
5.17 p.m.
Mr. John Strachey: The Leader of the House seemed to express a good deal of surprise that we on this side called for a debate on defence, and he implied that there was not very much to discuss. If the right hon. Gentleman's speech was intended to demonstrate that there was very little to discuss, it was a masterpiece for that purpose, because it seemed to offer little or nothing that was new to put before the House in circumstances which, I venture to say, on the authority of his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, are decidedly new.
The reason why my right hon. and hon. Friends wished for a defence debate now was precisely to see whether the House had a collective view on how the continuing purpose of defence could be carried on in these new circumstances. That continuing purpose is, I suppose, quite simply, the strength and independence of this country. I say, in passing, that if we wish to reconsider our defence policy for that purpose today, we do so secure in the fact that the record of the former Labour Government in their

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defence policy stands comparison with the record of any Government that this country has had.
It cannot be denied that in sustaining the forces of this country, in solicitude for our Armed Forces and concern for their well-being and their strength, no Government has done more than the Labour Governments which followed immediately the Second World War. That approach to defence matters comes, perhaps, as a strange one to certain senior and highly respected Members on this side of the House who were nurtured in pacifist traditions. Nevertheless, it is an approach which, in the troubled world of the mid-20th century we cannot possibly avoid making. Indeed, we were strongly criticised for devoting too much of the national resources to defence; and as I have said in the House before, those criticisms have turned out to be correct.
We devoted, or attempted to devote, in the closing years of the Labour Government too high a proportion of the national resources to defence. The so-called £4,700 million programme, to be executed in three years, was too big. It had to be scaled down, and it has been scaled down. There is no doubt of that fact, but, again, I do not think that that error, if it was an error, on the part of the Labour Government was something of which we need be ashamed. The important thing at that moment was that a marked defence effort should be made. The precise size of it had to be discovered by trial and error as that effort went along.
Now, the question the House has to consider today is whether the present level of our defence effort, in the circumstances of the day, will really best promote that simple purpose of the maximum strength and independence of this country. Because, of course, we all agree that a defence effort can be too big and too costly as well as too small. The defence effort today, £1,600 million annual expenditure, two years' full National Service for the whole citizenry, with small exceptions, of the country, and amounting, as it does, to some 12 per cent. of the national income—it is about that figure this year—is, as the Leader of the House himself has just said, a tremendous burden on this country.
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And I do not think there can be anyone in the House who does not ardently desire that that burden should be reduced, especially, of course, in terms of manpower.
However, the question is—and I expect other speakers from the Government Front Bench will say so—how is it to be reduced? How are we to meet our tasks and yet manage to reduce that very, very heavy and damaging—I shall not say crippling, for I do not think it is crippling, but damaging—burden upon the economy of the country?
What are those commitments which we find it such a heavy burden to meet? They are of three kinds. There are commitments which arise out of the nature of our contribution to N.A.T.O., to the forces of the West and—do not let us mince words about it—facing Russia in the West. This N.A.T.O. type of commitment takes about 4½ divisions of the Army and, in one way or another, much the greater part of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. Then there are commitments in the Far East for the containment of the possible expansionist policies of the new Chinese Government—in Korea, in Hong Kong and elsewhere. That is taking the best part of two divisions of the Army and some, though much smaller, air and naval forces.
I do not want to say anything today about those two types of commitments, because their size is not really in our control. We all hope—and the hope has been expressed by both the right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken so far—that the international climate is changing and improving, and we certainly derive great hope from the conclusion, at long last, of the Korean armistice; but, necessarily, these things are hopes rather than decisions which we can make. Even if the international situation does greatly improve he would be a bold man to state that the world is not going to continue to be sufficiently disturbed to make it necessary for this country to maintain forces for that type of purpose, forces which, to put it at its broadest, enable the British Commonwealth to hold its own in the world. We shall need substantial forces of that kind, for a very long time. Therefore, we can all sincerely hope that these burdens will be reduced, but we certainly cannot decide to reduce them because we

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are dependent entirely on what the international climate actually does turn out to be.
There is the third type of commitments, and it is about those that I do want to say a word; and here I am bound to be more controversial. There is the type of commitments which I would call commitments involved in the attempt to maintain the remaining part of our imperial position of the old type. And by that I mean attempting to maintain by armed force the type of Empire which existed in the pre-war period. Our commitments of that type are very substantial indeed. There are some 20,000 men in Malaya; not in divisional formation; one cannot give them in that way.
Mr. Shinwell: Forty thousand.
Mr. Strachey: My right hon. Friend says 40,000, but that is including the local forces; that is including the Malay Regiment and the rest. I am probably understating it even at that. By far the biggest commitment of that type is the Middle East, one of 80,000 men. Then there is a brigade in Kenya——
Mr. Wigg: Much more than a brigade.
Mr. Strachey: I am being accused on this side of the House of understating my case; but, at any rate, I am not overstating it when I put it at those figures. We can put it like this. The rest of the active Army is engaged on those commitments, because as we know, as the Secretary of State himself has often said, there is none of it at home at all, except the part which is engaged in training. Those commitments are of an increasingly arduous type, and I would say that if we maintain the policy which involves commitments of that type those commitments are only too likely to grow rather than to diminish.
One thing I am bound to say. I could not altogether agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) when he said that he favoured a partial evacuation of Egypt, a reduction of the number of our forces there. I should have thought that that was a particularly hazardous thing. If we decide to maintain, wrongly, as I happen to think—the House knows my views on this—our forces in Egypt, to weaken them would be an exceedingly hazardous thing there.
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I think that if we are maintaining that kind of garrison in the teeth of the determination of the country in question to get rid of us, either we must maintain ourselves in very strong force indeed, or we must go altogether. I am bound to say that this is only an example of the fact that if we try to maintain an imperial position of the old sort, our commitments in doing so will grow greater and greater, not less and less. We may think it right to do so. We may think it worth while to do so——
Air Commodore Harvey: The right hon. Gentleman will, perhaps, tell the House what he really thinks ought to be done in Malaya after four or five years of an effort in which, I think, he himself was once involved? Are we to give up altogether, or keep troops there to deal with the situation?
Mr. Strachey: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will have patience for a moment he will see that I am coming to exactly those points. I believe that if we maintain the policy which involves those commitments, of that kind, there will be no possibility, no talk, of reducing the total of our effectives, no possibility of reducing the term of National Service, as we want so strongly, and as, I am sure, many Members on the other side of the House would desire, too. These are very arduous commitments, which place a terrible burden upon us, upon the Army above all, because the burden falls mainly on the Army as against the other two Armed Forces and under the old policy they will inevitably grow rather than diminish.
What a serious view is taken of that I take from a recent issue of the "Daily Telegraph," whose distinguished Military Correspondent, Lieut.-General Martin, wrote just the other day;
"Already, at its present figure the Army is over extended. Its units, other than those in Korea, are under-posted and under strength. To under-post still further would be folly. The only possible course is to select certain units for disbandment and to cut commitments accordingly."
That is not my view. That is General Martin's view.
I come to the issue which is the obvious point made by the hon. and gallant Member who has just interrupted me. What should we do about it? If we have

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any determination to reduce this very grave defence burden gradually and, above all, in manpower, and in terms of military service, which will be the most serious issue before this House, we have to apply a world policy which enables us to do so. Even then, such a world policy will not give us any automatic and quick solution, but it will, in time, make these questions soluble. The way to do it is to pursue the policy which the late Administration pursued, of transforming the old type of Empire, which was forcibly maintained by armed forces on the spot, into a free Commonwealth association.
This was done, of course, on the very largest scale in Asia by the last Government. By far the largest part of the old British Empire was so transferred—India, Pakistan and Ceylon—and it was a genuine transformation because in the test case of Burma, where one of the old members did not wish to stay in the Commonwealth, she was permitted to go. That is the test of whether we really mean a transformation of the old type of Empire into a Commonwealth. The test arises when a particular country, as in the case of Burma, wishes to leave—whether you allow it to do so or whether you attempt to keep it in by force. One has only to think what our commitments would be today if we had not effected that transformation, successfully in every case except Burma, into a free Commonwealth in the years immediately following the war.
We should not have 10 divisions overseas; we should have 20 or 30 if we were attempting forcibly to maintain the old type of Empire in those parts of the world. Therefore, it is the continued application of that transformation of our old type of Empire position into a free Commonwealth which is the only policy which can give us a solution. This is no great, or new, or shocking innovation, because not only was such a policy pursued by the Labour Government on a great scale in India, rightly, as I think, but in some parts of the world—I readily admit this—it is still being pursued by the present Government. In the Sudan and in parts of West Africa it is being pursued.
Therefore, what is needed is a clear reaffirmation and stronger application of
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that principle. Then these imperial commitments, which are so great a burden on us today, will become capable of solution. They will not be immediately solved. Take the case of Malaya, which has been raised. Such a policy will not immediately enable us to withdraw from Malaya. We cannot possibly yield to an insurrection in Malaya, to people who have absolutely no democratic right to rule that country; of course, we cannot. But it can be applied, and it is being applied to some extent, in the sense that the Malaya insurrection—and that was certainly my view from the very slight acquaintance I had with the country—can in the end only be finally suppressed by the inhabitants of Malaya itself. That is being applied by a steady recruitment, battalion by battalion, of the Malayan Regiment which General Templer has continued and, indeed, hastened forward.
That, of course, involves, in practice, the fact that we have to give the right—because if they have arms in their hands they have got that right—to the people of Malaya themselves to decide whether they stay in the Commonwealth or not, and what type of Government they will have. Therefore, as we arm and build up the Malayan Regiment and formations of native Chinese and native Indians, too, we are, in fact, applying that policy and, at the same time, making the defence burden and commitments tolerable for ourselves. Such a policy cannot be applied automatically or easily in this part of the world or that, but it is in the application of that free commonwealth principle, and in that alone, that, it seems to me, we can find easement for these burdens which will not merely remain high, but will otherwise grow and become crushing on us.
It is above all, to my mind, in the Middle East that we can immediately apply that policy. The House knows what my views are on the subject of the Canal Zone and I do not intend to repeat them today. Here, it is not, of course, a question of the occupation of a country which has never been our Colony; but it is the question of whether or not we attempt to maintain, and forcibly maintain, the imperial position. I believe that if we make that attempt not only are we imposing upon ourselves what is fast becoming an intolerable defence burden, but we are actually defeating all our own objectives, and,

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above all, our objectives in the field of N.A.T.O.: our objectives of having forces facing any possible Russian aggression.
I believe that it is the policy we are pursuing there which prevents the formation of an alliance by these countries in the Middle East, comparable with the N.A.T.O. alliance in Europe, which is the only possible first-line defence against invasion from the North. If what I have called the free Commonwealth principle is applied progressively, as is being done in the Sudan and West Africa even by the present Government, that will gradually make our defence situation tolerable and possible. Above all, it will ease that frightful strain on the Army which General Martin refers to in the extract which I have read, and result in a very substantial saving in manpower and also in money.
I certainly do not believe that a two-year period of National Service in peacetime is a permanently tolerable thing. When my right hon. Friend who opened the debate, introduced this measure—and I also spoke as Secretary of State for War—we were perfectly clear that it was not being introduced as a permanent measure. It was not introduced, of course, for training purposes. A two-year period of National Service has nothing to do with training whatever. We can do our training in a far shorter period than that. It was introduced because the outbreak of the Korean war meant that our distant overseas commitments, of which I have been speaking, finally became impossible to meet without the two-year period of National Service.
It was introduced simply for these distant garrison purposes, and that is why it has to be maintained today. I agree that unless these commitments are substantially reduced, above all in the Middle East, there is no real hope or possibility of reducing the period of National Service. But if we push ahead, honestly and sincerely, on what I have called the free Commonwealth principle, under which there is an association of genuinely free nations uniting in their own defence, I believe that we can reduce the defence burden and the manpower burden very substantially.
I suggest that every Administration should make a reduction of the period of National Service by stages from two years
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to one year an urgent objective towards which they should work, and that they should regard their defence dispositions all over the world in the light of what can be undertaken within those limits. I cannot see that a two-year period of National Service can be maintained in perpetuity in this country.
Mr. Ian Harvey: The right hon. Gentleman has intimated that the period of National Service has nothing to do with training. His colleague, a former Minister of Defence, the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) yesterday posed the question whether it was necessary to keep a man in the Service longer than 18 months for training. Is the right hon. Gentleman, then, in disagreement with his right hon. Friend?
Mr. Strachey: If my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington is now saying that it is necessary to keep a man in for more than 18 months for the purpose of training, most certainly I disagree with him. All the military authority that I know would say that, for purposes of training, a period of two years' National Service is unnecessarily long. I feel that very strongly indeed.
I believe that we are in jeopardy of having large masses of rather badly trained reserves, and that the period of annual training in the reserve period is very short. I believe that if, and when, we get the period of National Service down to one year, the period of annual call-up in reserve might well be reviewed, because the period of 14 days is very short if we wish to have really strong, trained reserves. That seems to me to be the key question for training, not the question of the period of the initial call-up.
Mr. Harvey: If the young Service man is to be trained for longer than two weeks, who will train him? The Territorials cannot give more than two weeks and the Regulars are not available.
Mr. Strachey: I agree that there are great technical difficulties, but the hon. Gentleman raised the question of training and it is in that field of annual call-up and not the two years that the real key to the problem lies. I do not believe that a two-year period is necessary for training purposes. After all, we were training our reserves on a period of 18

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months up to the Korean war and nobody then said that that was impossible.
The keynote to our whole defence position is; do we or do we not mean to attempt to maintain those commitments which are essentially involved in the attempt to maintain an imperial position of the old type? If we are sincere when we say that we are transforming our old Empire into a freely associated Commonwealth—as we have actually done in part, and as the present Government are continuing to do to some extent in the Sudan and West Africa, though much too hesitatingly, I believe—there is a possibility of getting our Defence burden within bounds and our Defence dispositions into reasonable shape.
I shall not traverse the argument of my last speech in a Defence debate. But those concentrated dispositions which are today from a military point of view so essential, only become attainable as and when one rids oneself of the commitments of the old imperial type. Then and then alone will there be an opportunity of our disposing of Defence forces really capable of maintaining the strength and independence of this country.
5.44 p.m.
Mr. Airey Neave: This is the first time that I have had occasion to address this House and I ask the indulgence of hon. Members. A maiden speech in the House of Commons is a milestone in the life of a new Member and I ask, therefore, for the consideration of hon. Members when I make certain points on the subject of defence.
It may be thought that this is a complicated and difficult subject for a maiden speech, but I have chosen it for certain reasons. In the first place, in my constituency of Abingdon, which I have recently come here to represent, there are certain defence establishments, in particular the Military College of Science at Shrivenham and several other Service establishments, as well as the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell. As hon. Members will be well aware, my predecessor was much interested in defence matters and it would appear that I shall be connected with such matters through having these establishments in my constituency.
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There are personal reasons why I should like to take part in this debate and to put forward a few views which I hope will be regarded as not very contentious. The first is that I served for a long time in the Territorial Army, recently leaving it, when I retired about two years ago, and I specialised during the last war in military intelligence. As a consequence I want to lay emphasis on the subject of training in that sphere, and the points I want to make about National Service men are in respect of the time they will spend in the Territorial Army. I also want to suggest certain measures by which they can be attracted towards remaining in the Territorial Army on a voluntary basis.
It is clear to all hon. Members that a certain amount of radical re-thinking is required upon defence policy. I want to preface my remarks by referring to the need for highly trained Reserves. That applies to the policy of having a system of defence under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Highly trained Reserves are essential to any practical scheme of defence. That point has been made by General Eisenhower on numerous occasions and it is in that connection that I shall call attention to the principle that, in respect of the Territorial Army and other Reserve organisations in the future, it is our duty to seek the highest quality as much as quantity by creating large and skilled Reserves. By encouraging the voluntary aspect of service in the Territorial Army, and by encouraging men to remain on after they have done their National Service, the Territorial Army could be made more attractive to the National Service men of the future.
My first point is that the training of Territorial intelligence officers should be encouraged. That is a type of military service which would be highly suitable for certain types of men who might volunteer to remain on in the Territorial Army. There is at present a certain amount of machinery for that purpose in the field security units which exist in T.A. camps, but it should be carried much further. In the war, no branch of the Armed Forces had a higher proportion of civilian soldiers than military intelligence, and it will be well within the knowledge of hon. Members that many men came from offices and factories to carry out this type

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of work. It is thoroughly interesting work, and although there may be security problems involved in taking on Territorials for this purpose—former National Service men—I suggest that a lot could be done.
I therefore have three suggestions to make which I hope will find agreement in the House. First of all, we should encourage more language training for Territorials. That could certainly be done more widely than it is at the moment. It would be useful to have a pool of trained linguists available from the resources of the Territorial Army. Secondly, it should be possible to send Territorials abroad in connection with the liaison work which may be required if, unhappily, we have to defend Western Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Individual Territorials could be sent abroad to study such problems in Europe and in other N.A.T.O. countries.
Another point which concerns all Territorial units is training abroad. Would it not be possible to send them abroad a great deal more than is done at present? I know that certain airborne units are being sent abroad for their annual training, but it could be done more generally so that the Territorials could study some of the ground upon which they might unhappily one day have to operate, although we hope that the present relaxation in the international atmosphere will prevent that from occurring.
Speaking of the policy of building up these highly-trained Reserves, I suggest that these are imaginative and interesting methods of training, more likely to attract men to the Territorial Army than an increase in bounty or action of that kind. It may well be that such an increase in bounty would do a lot of good, but if we are to build up skilled Reserves we must attract the sort of people we want by the methods which I have suggested.
My final point can be put much more shortly and it relates not to training in intelligence but to the provision of up-to-date weapons for the mechanics and skilled engineers and, indeed, the infantrymen who are willing and available to join the Territorials at present. I realise that this involves very difficult questions of cost and the whole problem of keeping weapons up to date, but as to the
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nature of the training, I ask the House to consider that it is very important that mechanics and trained engineers should do a type of voluntary training which does not involve too much in the way of regimental duties or too much foot drill.
Although such duties and training are necessary for certain branches of the Army, I think we ought to provide specialists with facilities to study, in the case of those I have mentioned, the mechanics of new, technical and complex weapons. It seems to me that to adopt this procedure and to cut down the purely regimental duties is a much more effective way of training them, because in my submission it is our duty, in building up a specialist Reserve for the future, to concentrate on quality.
In that connection, although I do not wish to go deeply into the subject, I think the standardisation of weapons should reach down into the Reserves within the N.A.T.O. system. That certainly would be of assistance in bringing about some of the results which I have suggested.
I have made those few points and suggestions for future methods of training in looking ahead to the possibility that we may have to rely upon a long-term plan for training Reserves for the Army and, indeed, the other Services. I believe these are methods by which we can establish an efficient defence system in the future. I thank the House for listening so patiently to my views on the subject.
5.54 p.m.
Mr. George Wigg: I count myself most fortunate in conveying to the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) the congratulations of the House on his maiden speech. My own first speech was also on defence, and I only wish I could have done half as well and spoken half as lucidly as he has done this afternoon. I think the House would wish me to say that as Member for Abingdon he follows a very honoured Member of this House, a man for whom I personally have the highest respect. I am speaking very sincerely when I say to him that he has impressed the House this afternoon with the extent of his knowledge. We shall look forward in the future to many other contributions from him, much more lengthy and more contentious.
I am sorry that the Leader of the House has escaped. He spoke about the war

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and I was quite sure, especially after having listened to and endured all of his speech, that he was referring to the Boer War. For he certainly bored the House. It was an astonishing performance. He gave the game away when he talked about infrastructure, because he said this was a horrible word which had crept into the English language. It became crystal clear that he had had the brazen-faced impertinence to come to the House of Commons this afternoon and talk about defence without having read the speech of the Minister of Defence in the House of Lords in the middle of April. On that occasion Lord Alexander told the House of Lords the origin of the word "infrastructure." He explained that it was not an English word or a bastardised word which had crept into our language but was a French word which was used in French railway circles to indicate the operation of railways before the rail tracks are laid. The right hon. Gentleman therefore came to the House this afternoon and displayed a woeful ignorance which is in keeping with the reputation which he has established as Leader of the House.
That was not all. He told us that by some means or another N.A.T.O. has substantially fulfilled the Lisbon commitments. Of course, that is absolute nonsense. It is ignorant nonsense and it merely underlines the extent to which the country rightly lacks confidence in the Government's present defence policy. The Leader of the House said he did not see why there should be a defence debate at all, because nothing very much had happened since our last defence debate. In fact, quite a lot has happened. The Americans have announced that they will pay no more towards the cost of our defence, so that this year the bill, which is in the neighbourhood of £1,600 million, will be increased by at least another £80 million because there will be no American aid.
In addition, it is becoming crystal clear that the Secretary of State for War is landing the country in a complete collapse of the Army's manpower position. When he was in opposition, the right hon. Gentleman nailed his colours to the mast and had one simple solution and one solution only to the Army's manpower difficulties. He demanded increases in
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pay. In season and out of season he lambasted my right hon. Friends who were then the Service Ministers for their failure to increase the pay of the Services. All we had to do, he said, was to increase pay, and the troops would roll in and everything would be all right.
The right hon. Gentleman has had his way. We have had two years of him and we have had the pay increases. The right hon. Gentleman claims 100 per cent. credit for the steps which he has taken in altering the terms of service. Yet it is perfectly clear that recruiting has fallen off and that this country faces a most serious situation indeed in the Regular Army. We are spending sums of money which are the very limit within our economic resources. Nevertheless, we have a Regular Army which is negligible in numbers and woefully weak in training. It is impossible to turn out senior N.C.O.s and warrant officers and to get an adequate backbone to the Regular Army if the majority of our men are serving on three-year engagements.
That is what the right hon. Gentleman has done. He has offered the soft option. He failed to see that the importance of the increase of pay which was put into operation by the Labour Government was not in the increase itself but in the introduction of the differential, and that the difference between the rate of pay for National Service men and that for Regulars was bound, human nature being what it is, to stimulate the number of men who undertook Regular engagements. The right hon. Gentleman failed to see that recruits would undertake an engagement for three years because they got higher pay, but that it was obvious that they would go for the three years only and doubtful if they would extend their engagements beyond that period.
The hon. Member for Abingdon has hit the target with his first shot. The real problem facing us is what is to happen about our Reserves. At present we have Reserve Forces amounting to 460,000. In July, 1954, our National Service Reserve will rise to its peak. After that time a trickle of men will begin to go out and they will more or less balance those entering. At the present time the Reserves are not getting any training above the regimental level, and if we are ever to fulfil the Lisbon commitment, if

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ever N.A.T.O. is to become a reality, and if ever we are to make a reality of the conception of defence based upon a holding force which will hold long enough for the Reserves to be mobilised and for an effective striking force to be built up, these Reservists must have training at divisional level. That cannot be done while the period of Reserve training is as it is at present.
The Government would be very well advised, before coming to the House and asking for an extension of the two-year period of compulsory service, to look at the possibility of making the length of service a little less and, if necessary, increasing the period of Reserve training. I do not for a moment believe that it is possible to abolish National Service overnight. If the whole international scene were suddenly transformed, it would still be a long job to tail off National Service. It cannot be done quickly, and probably, as a result of the present Secretary of State for War, it never will be done. Once the Regular Army gets into the position that it is now getting into, it will be a generation before we get out of the mess. The Government are failing in their duty not only in the matter of the defence conception but also in the matter of the country's economic necessities if they do not undertake a very large-scale inquiry into the working of National Service.
If the Leader of the House had even the passing knowledge of defence questions that one would expect from a Cabinet Minister, he would have read some recent articles in "The Times" which inquired into the reasons we were not getting Regular recruits and why we were in some difficulties about the Regular Army. It has been very interesting indeed to read the subsequent correspondence from responsible leaders in industry who say that they are really concerned about the impact of National Service on our young men. There has never been an inquiry into it. There are suggestions that a great deal of the juvenile delinquency can be attributed to unsettlement as a result of National Service.
The country pays a very heavy price, something far beyond the economic price, for National Service. I accept National Service as a necessity, but the Govern-
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ment will be asking far too much if they come to the House next December for a blank cheque. We ought to have an inquiry while there is time. If the Government have to carry the House with it and build up public confidence in the matter, an inquiry, at which there could be public hearings, should be undertaken by a committee which has public confidence. That would be a real step forward, and it would help the Government.
Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for interrupting him to ask a question about a subject which he has passed. I had not the figures with me at the time, but I dashed out and got them. He referred to the drop in Regular recruiting. It would be dangerous if it went out from the House that it was as serious as he tried to indicate. Recruiting in 1952 was double that in 1951. This year recruiting has dropped a certain amount because there has been a smaller call-up of National Service men, and it is from the National Service men that the voluntary recruiting into the Army comes.
Mr. Wigg: That is the kind of interruption which makes me very sad. The hon. and gallant Gentleman, after his long service in the Army and long membership of this House, still comes forward with such an ignorant point of view as that. He has swallowed lock, stock and barrel, the propaganda from the War Office. Of the 40,000 recruits enlisted in 1952, 35,000 were National Service men, and the Secretary of State got only 5,000 genuine recruits that year.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I spoke of voluntary Regular recruits.
Mr. Wigg: The hon. and gallant Gentleman does not realise the simple point that the young men who are undertaking Regular engagements are doing so for three years only, and for the first two years they are doing the same service as they would have done as National Service men. The total addition to the Armed Forces of the Crown in 1952 was only 5,000, and the build-up about which the Secretary of State for War made such a song and dance has declined in 1953. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has looked at the figures covering the early

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part of this year. Figures for another three months are nearly due, and I prophesy that they will show a further drop. That is why Colonel Martin wrote his article in the "Daily Telegraph" and why "The Times" published the articles to which I referred. Certainly a very serious and disquieting situation is disclosed by the Government's failure to get recruits for the Regular Army.
Air Commodore Harvey: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, if the recruiting figures have fallen during the last three months, it is probably due to the decrease in the general unemployment figures and the greater demand by industry?
Mr. Wigg: I do not know what the causes are. I wish I did. I have no doubt that the War Office wish they knew. When the Secretary of State for War and his hon. Friends were in opposition they were constantly arguing for an increase in the rates of pay as the sole solution of our recruiting problem. I always had my doubts about that.
Air Commodore Harvey: They are still not enough.
Mr. Wigg: That may be so and they may have to be increased, but surely there must come a time when we cannot increase pay any further. I believe there are other causes. I do not want to anticipate the debate on officers' retired pay which will take place on Friday—that subject does not affect me personally—but the fact that not only the present Government but other Governments over the last 20 years have failed to give retired officers a square deal is one of the reasons officers' sons do not now join the Armed Forces. Because past Administrations, including Conservative Administrations, treated the ex-Regular N.C.O. and warrant officer very badly—I am one—their sons are not joining the Army.
Two important links have been broken. In the mining industry the link has been broken between the miner and his son and the result is that the mining industry is not getting the recruits it wants. A link has also been broken in the case of the Armed Forces, between the Regulars and their sons. The problem cannot be solved simply by granting astro-
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nomical increases in rates of pay; it is necessary to convince the warrant officer, the long-service N.C.O. and the Regular officer that they will get a square deal. Hon. Gentlemen opposite take a poor view of human nature if they think that, because they give an increase in the rates of pay, the lads will gather round the recruiting office and not only join the Army but stay in the Army. The lads may join, but they will not stay. That is the Secretary of State's trouble. He has a few thousand more National Service men to undertake the three-year engagement, but they are going out again, and the result is that at present there are many Territorial units which have not a single senior N.C.O.
Mr. Frederick Gough: The hon. Gentleman says that the men are going out at the end of the three-year engagement, but he cannot say that, because the scheme was introduced less than three years ago.
Mr. Wigg: I quite agree, but I would recommend the hon. Member to take the Secretary of State for War behind the Chair and talk to him. He is losing his senior N.C.O.s and warrant officers hand over fist, and he has not got the extensions or re-engagements that he wants. If I am wrong, let the right hon. Gentleman get up and say so.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): The hon. Gentleman has asked me to get up, and in reply I would point out to him that this trend has been going on ever since 1945, as he well knows. He was a P.P.S. at the War Office and I hope he knows. It is not a trend that can be stopped by some magical method as long as there is a very large proportion of the Regular Army serving overseas. If the hon. Member can give any constructive method of stopping it, I should be most interested to listen to it.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Get the boys back from Egypt.
Mr. Wigg: But what the right hon. Gentleman says is precisely what I have been saying. I know there is no simple solution. From 1945 onwards when the right hon. Gentleman and his friends were in opposition, on occasion after occasion they suggested an increase in the rates of pay, but I told them then

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that there was no simple solution. The fact is that in 1945, because the war had gone on for six years, the Regular Army had ceased to exist. The present Prime Minister and the then Secretary of State for War in the Coalition Government both failed to appreciate that situation, and no preparations were made. The result is that today we have not got the warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s we require.
Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is going into the past, and while I do not want to stir up controversy on this subject, I would recall that what I consistently said was that if hon. Gentlemen opposite, when they were in power, had put up the rates of pay 18 months or two years before they did they would have retained a good many men who were disillusioned by the derisory increases in pay made by the then Minister of Defence.
Mr. Wigg: But what is the right hon. Gentleman doing about it now, because there is a bigger wastage today? Warrant officers and N.C.O.s are now going out at an increasing rate, and in three years' time, when the new recruits have had an opportunity to see what the right hon. Gentleman's Army is like, we shall discover whether they will carry on in the Army or not. I prophesy that they will not. I have told the right hon. Gentleman before that he is a disaster for the Army, and that the Army will pay a big price for him. Many times in the past he has told us that the Army has too long a tail; I say the Army has now got too much head. [An HON. MEMBER; "Brilliant."] It is not brilliant, but neither is the right hon. Gentleman, so that is a pair. The facts are that the Army's manpower situation is going from bad to worse, and the right hon. Gentleman knows it.
When the Army Estimates come forward next year, we shall find a more alarming situation than in the time of the Army Estimates this year, and if the right hon. Gentleman still thinks that another increased rate of pay is the right answer, then I hope he will go to his right hon. Friends and get them to agree to such a step. But the reason he will not do so is that he is rapidly coming to the conclusion that something more is wanted. I will tell him and the present Minister of Defence what they have to do. They have to start not with those in the
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Armed Forces but with those who have left them.
Let them begin next Friday by making an announcement which will remedy the wrong done in 1935 to the retired pay of ex-officers. Let them do something for the thousands of ex-Regular soldiers who are drawing pensions from the Royal Hospital, Chelsea. They are much better recruiting sergeants than the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, because they can speak to their sons and to members of their own families. It is a fact that they have ceased to be recruiting sergeants, for they are saying to their sons and relatives, "I have had some of the Army; you keep out of it." The result is that the right hon. Gentleman and his friends have turned the tap off at its source. They will not get it restarted until they recognise that the Army understands one thing very well, that it is always jam tomorrow but never anything for those who have served in the past.
That is a policy that will not do. The Labour Government in 1945 took the initial steps to improve conditions in the mining industry, although they only partially solved the problem. A lot remains to be done, and just as the mining industry put right some of the errors of the past, so something has to be done for the Armed Forces. It is not merely a question of giving an increased rate of pay, because the young recruit is too fly for that. He takes the increase, gets the gratuity and then goes out into civilian life to tell everyone what things are like. He advises them to have nothing to do with it. So an increase in the rates of pay will not necessarily better the situation. I urge the Minister of Defence—I do not expect to get an answer today—to undertake an inquiry before the autumn so that every aspect of the matter will be gone into with the greatest care to see whether we cannot lighten the burden of two years' compulsory military service.
6.16 p.m.
Mrs. Patricia Ford: On rising to address the House this evening, I should like to ask for the indulgence which I believe is usually given to hon. Members on these occasions. It may perhaps be thought unusual for a woman to speak in a defence debate, but I feel that the last two wars have proved that

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this is a subject which vitally affects every citizen of these islands, for we are all now in a potential front line. Certainly no one can question the wonderful work and brave deeds of the women's forces and voluntary organisations during the last war, working as they did side by side both at home and overseas with the other Armed Services.
In this defence debate I should like to draw the attention of the House to Northern Ireland, part of which I have the very great honour to represent at Westminster. No one can deny the vital strategic position of Ulster in any defence programme concerning these islands, and we must all remember the great part she played in the last war, when her industrial and agricultural resources were placed unreservedly and voluntarily at the service of the British war effort. Without the use of Northern Irish ports such as Belfast and Londonderry, the task of our convoys bringing Lend-Lease and essential supplies of food and equipment would have been nearly impossible. Between 1940 and 1944 Belfast shipyards alone constructed 140 warships and also 10 per cent. of the total merchant shipping of the whole of the United Kingdom.
For the Army, Ulster produced tanks, guns and ammunition and in the field of aircraft production we built many heavy bombers and Sunderland flying boats. The Ulster textile industry turned out over 200 million yards of cloth for Service use, and 90 per cent. of the Service shirts for the British Forces were made in Ulster factories. Certainly not least to help the war effort, the farmers of Northern Ireland made a larger proportionate contribution to home-produced food supplies than did any other part of the United Kingdom. Do not let us forget the farmers and fishermen of Ulster now, for they are as much part of a defence programme as any of the Fighting Services.
The list of famous soldiers and generals who have sprung from Ulster would be too long and numerous to number here, but surely one of the most illustrious must certainly be the present Minister of Defence.
We must all know that while Northern Ireland entered the war automatically and by her own freewill, the Government of Eire adopted a policy of neutrality. This meant that during those dark days when
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we were surrounded by the enemy blockade, the sea lanes past Northern Ireland were the only channels still open across the Atlantic for our Navy and Merchant Navy. A neutral Eire cast a shadow 500 miles into the Atlantic, within which there was no air-cover protection from land-based aircraft for our convoys at sea. It is a fact, I believe, that had British Forces not been present in Northern Ireland, the whole of Ireland might well have been conquered and occupied by the Germans.
Ulster became the most important base for aircraft engaged in the protection of trans-Atlantic shipping at all ranges, from short-range fighter cover to the Catalinas operating from Lough Erne and the Coastal Command Liberators and Flying Fortresses. We in Ulster have very strong links with our friends and allies across the Atlantic and during those war years we were the base and training ground for a large force of American troops building up for the final invasion and assault in Europe. This is one more reason why we in Ulster feel it is so vital for this friendship and understanding between the English-speaking worlds to be fostered and encouraged.
Between 1942 and 1945 five divisions and a corps headquarters of American Forces passed through Northern Ireland, and in 1944 two American divisions went straight from Ulster to the Normandy beaches. But let me stress once more that without the use of Northern Ireland harbours and ports it would hardly have been possible for the convoys bringing American troops and American aid to have reached these shores without crippling losses, and the whole of Lend-Lease might well have been disorganised.
However, that is all a thing of the past and we in Northern Ireland can see no reason why we should not live on good terms with our neighbours in the South. We have no quarrel with them. Although we argue and disagree, we can perhaps learn to agree to differ and each respect the other's points of view and different loyalties. All that we in Northern Ireland ask is to be left alone as loyal citizens of the United Kingdom. We want to be considered as much part of Great Britain as Lancashire or Cheshire. Our constitutional position and our civil and religious liberties were won for us through the courage and sacrifice of our forefathers and such men as Carson and James Craig.

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I hope that our neighbours in the South will come to realise that Northern Ireland is firmly established. We are not an aggressive country; we are a defensive part of the United Kingdom. I am proud to call myself an Ulster woman and proud also to say that nowhere in the United Kingdom will be found a people more loyal or more sincere in their feelings for the British Crown and Monarchy than in our province of Ulster.
Even if Northern Ireland made no Imperial contribution—and it is a fact that during the last 10 years she has made contributions of more than £250 million—our strategic importance is so vital to the defence of these islands that it still warrants defence expenditure there, for this expenditure is for the protection of the United Kingdom as a whole.
In this defence debate I also speak as the mother of young children, fearful sometimes of the world which faces them and determined, if possible, that they may be spared the horrors of war. I am more and more convinced that we shall not achieve anything approaching a settled Europe without a strong United Kingdom. That is why I support most wholeheartedly any measure to ensure that we speak as a nation, not from weakness as we have sometimes had to do in the past, but from strength, confident in our powers, with N.A.T.O. and E.D.C., to take a leading part with our Commonwealth in moving towards an ideal which must be shared by all free-thinking peoples of the world.
We have a great chance; do not let it slip from our fingers, for any relaxation of defence effort now might ruin all the improvements which growing Western power has already gained. Let us look upon it as an insurance policy for the future against the threat of yet another war. I am sure I speak for the majority of thinking women in the country when I say, "Do not let us be penny wise and pound foolish when the security of our homes and families is at stake." Defence, I know, costs money—increasingly so all the time—but surely it is worth any sacrifice. I think it is true to say that for any Government to succeed the country must first be solvent and then must be safe from foreign aggression. These are the two essentials, and from them all else follows.
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In negotiating and dealing with heavily-armed countries it would be quite wrong to contemplate a premature disarmament programme based upon an apparent change in the attitude of the new Russian régime. If this new attitude is proved to be genuine, relaxation of re-armament must of course be our ultimate goal. But let us be quite sure first.
I should like to end by emphasising once again that Northern Ireland has stood loyally by Great Britain in the past and she will most certainly do so again, not only during the troubled times of peace but, if the need arose, which God forbid, in times of war also. I do not think I can do better than quote the words of our Prime Minister here in paying tribute to the value of Ulster's cooperation in the hour of need, when he said;
"But for the loyalty of Northern Ireland we should have been confronted with slavery and death and the light which now shines so strongly throughout the world would have been quenched."
We do well to remember these stirring words, for they are as true today as they were at the end of the war.
6.26 p.m.
Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: It is a very great pleasure to be able to follow the hon. Lady the Member for Down, North (Mrs. Ford), who has spoken to us with such grace and charm and, at times, very movingly. We all have very vivid memories of her father, Sir Walter Smiles, and on both sides of the House we deeply and bitterly regretted his tragic death last January.
I think the hon. Lady did right to remind us of Northern Ireland, which she knows so well, and the part which Northern Ireland has played in the defence of these islands. I think, also, that she did right to put so much thoughtful matter into her speech and I can assure her that it was in no way felt to be an intrusion that an hon. Lady should take part in a defence debate. We all hope that she will be fortunate enough to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, many times in future. On those occasions when she may not be so fortunate, and we cannot look forward to hearing her, if I may say so without impertinence we shall look forward to seeing her.
I hope it will not be considered provocative if I begin my speech by saying

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that I think the events of the last few months have triumphantly vindicated the rearmament programme of the Labour Government and have proved beyond doubt the lightness of the decision taken by the last Government in initiating that large programme in January, 1951. We were then terribly weak in Europe. Today we are not strong, but we are stronger. I do not think anyone can believe that the changes which seem to be coming about in Russia could possibly have come about if we had remained in our then state of defencelessness. There is, obviously, no reason at all why Russian tactics or policy would have changed in the slightest if we had remained in that state. The very fact that we have been able to reduce the speed of that rearmament programme is proof of the tightness of its conception at the time.
Today, I think we can safely say that before any attack could be launched by the Russians they would be obliged to give us some two or three months' notice. They could not possibly begin to attack Western Europe without reinforcing the divisions they have in Eastern Germany and Poland, and by bringing up reinforcements they would give us notice of their intention. But, because we have reached that first step it does not mean that this is any occasion for lowering the general rate or level of our rearmament programme. Indeed, if we are to believe General Ridgway and the late Supreme Commander in Europe, we are far from being in a state of security vis-à-vis the Russians.
I should like to quote briefly from the report of 5th June issued by the Supreme Commander, when he said:
"Measured against Soviet capability, our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success, if attacked. We are still far short of the minimum requirements. We lack essential supply and support."
Incidentally, I think it would be as well if the Parliamentary Secretary, in winding up tonight, could explain the growing divergence of view between the Government and General Ridgway and General Gruenther about the necessity for the building up of the forces of N.A.T.O. This is becoming increasingly apparent day by day and is very disturbing.
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During the last year, it seems as though the Russian forces in Eastern Germany have become a little weaker. On the other hand, the rate of supply of new weapons, new equipment, to the Russian forces and to the satellite troops has gone on, and has, if anything, increased. Also, we do not know whether there might not be at any time another change of policy, or tactics, in the Kremlin. The fact that there may have been one change leading towards a lightening of tension during the last few months does not rule out the possibility in another year's time, if they find out that they do not like the new policy or that they have pursued it long enough, that there might be a change back to the old policy. We cannot relax our defensive effort at the present time.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Might I ask——
Mr. Wyatt: No, the hon. Member might not.
We should look at the type of forces which we have and which we are building up today, and the use of those forces. In the last debate we had on defence, the Prime Minister said:
"As a result of the Government's strategic review, the types and quantities of weapons and ammunition to be produced have been more precisely related to the kind of war or wars which we might have to fight in various parts of the world."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 579.]
What he meant was that we are going to place more reliance on new weapons, on atomic artillery, on new gadgets and inventions, and less on manpower. That was apparent from the rest of his speech.
It also meant that we were abandoning the original concept of having 12 reserve divisions fully equipped with up-to-date equipment. That was made clear in the White Paper issued at the same time, which said, in paragraph 5:
"There was also good reason to doubt whether, even after the "—
original—
"plan had been completed, the cost of maintaining the forces which would have by then have been built up and of keeping them equipped with the most up-to-date material would have been within the country's resources."
In other words, the original idea of having 12 reserve divisions fully equipped with up-to-date equipment has been abandoned.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of these reserve divisions, have we

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got the right new weapons, the right balance and the right numbers of the new weapons? I should like to quote from the remarkable leading article in "The Times" of this morning. If this were the American Congress I should like to put the whole article into the record and get the Government to answer it because it is a savage indictment of their defence policy. It states:
"The Army still anxiously awaits bulk deliveries of many of the new weapons which it badly needs. The automatic rifle has become a political jest. The heavy gun tank, which Mr. Head praised highly last March, has not been heard of since."
If the automatic rifle is a political jest today, it was not in the days of the previous Government. Then it was a military reality.
Mr. Head: The reason why the heavy gun tank has not been heard of is that it is on the secret list, and I think it is a great tribute to the War Office.
Mr. Wyatt: It would appear to have come off the secret list a little earlier this year for the purpose of self-praise by the Minister——
Mr. Head: No.
Mr. Wyatt: —but when we want to know how it is getting on in respect of supply to the Army it is on the secret list again. "The Times" is quite right to ask these questions.
For example, the ·280 rifle is the most essential of all the new weapons. This should first be given to every infantryman—a semi-machine-gun which would give him confidence in face of the overwhelming numbers of Russian troops he would have to face if there was a war in Europe. It has been practically abandoned by the Government and we have heard very little more about it.
We might have more information as to the trend of tank development—whether we are going on with more and more self-propelled guns masquerading as tanks or whether we are going in for a lighter, speedier-moving tank and are getting away from the somewhat bogged-down concept of an almost static tank.
In the case of the R.A.F., we might query altogether the need for a strategic bomber air force in the possession of this country. We were told in the last debate on the Air Estimates that each of the new Valiant bombers will cost £400,000. We
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cannot have more than 10 for £4 million; we cannot do much with 100, which would cost £40 million. One sees at once that it is a vast expense to the nation to try to build up a fleet of Victors, Vulcans and Valiants for long-range strategic bombing.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: That is my old speech.
Mr. Wyatt: Why should we want a long-range strategic bombing force in any war which we can envisage? We needed one in the last war, when we were fighting alone, but I do not think that anyone doubts that the Americans would be in another war from the start. Why not let them carry the expensive burden of a long-range strategic bombing force and let us concentrate on a tactical air force and save a good deal of money?
So far as the Navy is concerned—I hesitate to say this in front of the hon. and very gallant Member opposite—one had a feeling at Spithead that some of those costly-looking aircraft carriers and heavier ships were perhaps a little more expensive than they were worth to us.
One wonders when we hear about this "balance of forces" what it means. Does it mean three Ministers, each responsible for his own Service, or three chiefs of staff, each saying, "We are each going to have a third of the cash available," or an attempt to balance our forces with those of other countries with whom we hope to be in association in the event of war?
We should be told rather more about what is happening in the field of atomic artillery. We have heard nothing as to any development or experiment which has been carried on. It is of enormous importance if we are to try to make up our minds as to the size of Army we are to have and the number of reserve divisions. We have had little news about that aspect, and if there is good news why not let us have it because if there is such news the more of a deterrent it will be to the Russians. If they know that an atomic artillery barrage will be put up against them the less likely they will be to attack us.
All these factors affect the question of reserve divisions and the type of Army we are to have. It is no good having reserve divisions unless they are available for immediate use. We have not got that

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position today. If we are to keep reserve divisions we must have the equipment—the mobilisation equipment—of at least three of them ready all the time on the Continent. If we do not it will take too long to fit them out here to enable them to go to the rescue of our four divisions already in Germany. The result will be that we shall lose our four divisions in Germany—they will be cut up without the possibility of support. We need to be able to put into the field immediately three of the reserve divisions we have here, and we should try to have the mobilisation equipment to which I have referred ready on the Continent all the year round.
We must think again about the size of the Army. Now that we are concentrating on new-type weapons, more expensive weapons, the cost of the maintenance of the present size Army becomes increasingly prohibitive, as has already been indicated in the White Paper. It is also becoming clear from the recruiting figures that we shall not be able to get an efficient Army with the right Regular content in it for a very long time.
Where can we reduce the size of this Army? [Interruption.] I shall not shirk that question. We certainly cannot reduce it yet in Korea, or in Germany. We may be able to do so in Malaya, for General Templer reports that he has the situation under control and we may be able to turn it more and more into a police operation. We cannot yet reduce the Army in Egypt, though Egypt is the most promising area for reduction in the East. The Government are correct in insisting that if there is to be a base maintained in Egypt we must make sure we have control over the minimum number of technicians necessary to keep that base in working order and ready for use immediately, should there be war.
But, as with so much else, I feel that the Government have conducted negotiations with the Egyptians with a great lack of imagination. Why not tell the Egyptians that we are quite prepared to leave the base in the Canal Zone altogether, if they so wish? But if that is what they want us to do they must realise that we must have a base somewhere else in the Middle East. They must appreciate that the only other place would be Israel, where there is a welcoming
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population; where there is the port of Haifa capable of development and a tottering economy which would be strengthened by injections of British and American money required to build a base.
That would, of course, involve making Israel the strongest Power in the Middle East, without doubt, and it would mean that Egypt would never again be able to attack Israel. But if that is what the Egyptians want we should have no objection, because it is only a matter of convenience where we have our base. Why the Government does not tell that to the Egyptian goodness only knows.
If we got the 80,000 troops at present in Egypt away from the Canal Zone we should have something to play with in the reduction of the Army. Some of them might be used as a strategic reserve in this country. We have no such reserve and we should have one available for use anywhere in the world. Some of them would have to go to Cyprus and perhaps to Tripolitania as well. I do not think we can take all those troops out of the Middle East area, but it might allow us to have about 30,000 who could be relieved from Army service altogether.
With the addition of some troops we might be able to spare from Malaya, and later on from Korea, that might allow us to reduce the length of National Service to 21 months, or even to 18. We might combine that with a slightly more selective call-up for the Army, and stop calling up people who are in grade 3, marking them grade 1, giving them flat feet by marching them about all over the place and then have to reduce their grade a little later. In fact, we might call up the healthier content rather than have a too widely ranging call-up such as we now have.
I do not think we can reduce the Army by much more than that in the foreseeable future and even that reduction depends upon the use of some ability and imagination by the Government. We have not been given much promise of that, particularly this afternoon in the speech of the Leader of the House. He started by telling us that he had nothing to say and he said it for nearly an hour. One of the disadvantages of having a Government which is disintegrating is that those few members of it who do

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come to the House are unable to speak authoritatively, or they get the wrong brief, or they do not understand the brief they have been given.
I do not think that we can afford to reduce the size of the Army in Germany, for example. I believe that we should think more carefully about the military consequences of an agreement with the Russians over Germany than we seem to have done in the last few weeks. Our enthusiasm at the prospect of reaching agreement with the Russians over anything seems to have blinded us to the possible consequences of such an agreement. I believe that we cannot agree anything with the Russians which would involve us in withdrawing British and American troops from Germany so long as there is no German Army, of the size of about 12 divisions, to take their place.
We cannot do that because if we take away our troops and the Americans do the same, and the Russians move their troops back 70 miles into Eastern Europe, the whole structure of the defence of Western Europe will collapse at once. Even were the Russians to take their troops right back to Russia we must remember that it would not take very long to bring them back again, far less time than it would take to get troops from America or even from England to Germany. We must face that fact. We cannot accept the neutralisation of Germany without British or American troops on German soil.
That is why one of the silliest proposals ever to come out of a Foreign Minister's conference was that we should begin to try to lighten the tension with Russia by first discussing quite the most important and intractable problem—that of Germany—and see how we get on with an almost insoluble problem. We can only discuss a question like Germany with the Russians if we have already created an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence which would enable us to approach them with rather less suspicion than we have of each other today.
I deprecate the sudden abandonment by its previous devotees, including the hon. Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir R. Boothby), of the conception of a European Defence Community. Quite apart from the correctness of such an attitude we are bound in a contractual agree-
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ment that we have made with Germany to support the inclusion of Germany in the E.D.C. It has been ratified by both Houses. That applies not only to the Western Zone. Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention of 26th May, 1952, make it clear that we understand from that Convention that the whole of Germany should eventually come into E.D.C. If not, the independence we give to Germany under this convention falls to the ground. In fact, the very independence we have agreed to give to Germany depends, in turn, upon the whole of Germany joining E.D.C. Whether or not we think that a good idea we are tied to it by the Vote of this House. Recently, that seems to have been forgotten.
We also need to have German divisions, in the long run, to maintain the effective defence of Europe. Certainly, we need to have them so long as there is no truce in Indo-China. Nearly all the best part of the French Army is locked up in Indo-China and unable to give any real help in the defence of Europe. To have Germany in E.D.C. would also be to the interest of Russia. She would be a great deal safer with German rearmament contained within a European Defence Community than in the hands of an independent German State, with complete and absolute sovereignty over its own national army unlimited. That would be as dangerous for the Russians as for France or ourselves.
One of the difficulties in discussing this problem of the European Defence Community is that we are never told by the Government what they have committed us to. The Government have been carrying on conversations, they tell us, with the six Powers concerned and committing us to some sort of an arrangement, but we are not to be told what. In Washington, they can be told; in Brussels, they can be told, but in Westminster we are not allowed to know to what we are being committed by the Government. I believe that we should have a much closer association with the European Defence Community than we so far have. It may be that we shall have, but I do not know.
If the European Defence Community collapses I believe that we should come forward with proposals for a new type of

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European Army which we could join without the rigid structure we find objectionable in this country; something more homogeneous than N.A.T.O., but less constricted than E.D.C. Those who think that Germany, with its own separate national Army, should go direct into N.A.T.O. are wrong. The virtue of the European Army idea is that we should be able to have integrated commands, international commands, to the lowest possible level, so that we may know what the German military mind is thinking about all the time.
If the commands are integrated down to corps level there is no possibility of secret training going on in the Black Forest or of all sorts of manœuvres or modifications of the position within Germany. We would know at once what they were doing and we should be able to make them account for it. We could not do that if Germany were an independent and direct member of N.A.T.O. with an entirely sovereign and independent Army.
I have never yet made a speech in a defence debate without advocating a closer British participation in the European Army, and I do not want to change my habits today especially as I was once supported by the Prime Minister himself, who now seems to have abandoned that position. One of my hon. Friends says that the right hon. Gentleman supports so many things that he changes about to suit what he thinks to be his political advantage at any moment.
Mr. Ian Harvey: He did not do that before the war.
Mr. Wyatt: I hope that I am not giving anybody apoplexy over there. When the Prime Minister made his first speech on this subject at Strasbourg he advocated British participation in the European Army because, he said, the whole concept of the European Army would be a tonic for Europe—would brace the morale of Europe and would in itself be a good thing. I absolutely agreed, and I still do.
Finally, I would say that in the field of defence generally we should continue to be as resolute and determined to build up our defences as we have been for the last three years, because this is a policy which is at last beginning to pay the dividends which we hoped it would pay.
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It would be insane to abandon it just at the moment when we are beginning to get the most profit from it. At the same time, we should take advantage of any lightening of tension that that policy may produce to modify our own forces, and to adjust ourselves to the economic breezes as well, and to make sure that we get the utmost advantage from what we are spending. We should be resolute, but we should not spend more than we need to spend as we move into a period when our resolution produces good results.
6.52 p.m.
Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: It is not very often that I agree with the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), but tonight I agree with some of the more serious aspects of his speech, with the exception of the most unworthy remarks which he made about the Prime Minister. We know that he did that to try to raise a cheer from his own hon. Friends, and to do that one needs to have a little dig at someone else; but nobody takes what he said seriously.
I wish to make one comment about the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). As one who has had long experience, I should like to tell him as a matter of actual fact that it is impossible to train a man adequately to fight in a modern tank and to operate the wireless and the gun in under two years. I tried to do it in war working seven days a week 14 or 15 hours a day, and it was difficult. Under peace conditions it is impossible. I say that categorically as a fact. Whether we are to expect a lower standard of training is another matter; but do not let us tell the people that it is possible to train a man for modern warfare in 18 months even in the infantry.
Hon. Members opposite have mentioned a reduction in our commitments, but if they consider the matter carefully they will find that the number of men it would be possible to withdraw would not enable us to reduce National Service to 18 months. As I have said repeatedly in our debates, I am opposed to conscription. I always have been. One volunteer is worth ten conscripts. I look forward to the day when the pay and the amenities of the Forces are raised

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to such an extent that service in the Forces competes adequately with industry; the day when our commitments abroad are so reduced that we can fulfil them with an entirely volunteer Army serving for only three years abroad and coming home in rotation. Whatever I can do in a minor way to assist to bring that day nearer I shall do willingly.
But let us realise, and let us announce to the mothers, fathers, and sweethearts of our soldiers that what will happen if we reduce National Service too soon is that a greater burden will be thrown on the Regular Service men who will have to serve longer abroad. If the Regular has to serve longer abroad, then recruiting will fall even more than it is falling now, with the result that eventually we shall have to reintroduce National Service. Do not let us get into that vicious circle.
I should like to comment on the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). I remember well that when we were in Opposition we used to have a committee meeting at about this time of the year and say, "What are we to talk about this time?" Whoever was to open the debate would say, "I will ask a few interrogatory questions; that will get the debate going, and we can go on from there." That is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman did. Of all the many speeches he has made, this was the weakest which I have heard. [Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman will not bully me. I have had to deal with nastier people than him.
I want to talk for a short time about the Middle East. With a few minor exceptions we all agree that the Canal is an international waterway. Through it 100 million tons of shipping go in a week. Only 35 per cent. of it is British. To move our vast base from its present position would cost £500 million. It is a base which dealt with 500,000 tons of stores a month during the peak period of the last war.
With those facts as a background, I want to say that that base as it is now without any assistance from other bases will not support whatever Forces are intended in the field in the event of what we clearly envisage, and that is an invasion from the North between the Caspian and the Black Sea or through
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North-East Persia by Russian forces. The very simple reason is that it is too far away. It is 900 miles away from the probable battlefield.
I want to give an example from the last war to illustrate my argument. When the battle of North Africa reached Tripoli it was discovered that until Tripoli could be opened as a base the Army could not move one yard further. It was not until Tripoli was built up with 30 days' stores in reserve that the Army could proceed. Incidentally, Tripoli is exactly 900 miles from Fayid. The base at Fayid is too far away to support operations on a large scale if a Russian army descends between the Caspian and the Black Sea with a view to advancing on the Persian Gulf and the oilfields.
Therefore, my suggestion is that we cannot leave that base—on that we all agree—but we must have two forward bases, one at Alexandretta and the other at Basra, to be supplied from the main base in exactly the way in which Tripoli was a forward base for the Eighth Army supplied from the base at Fayid. It is 900 miles in both cases. No Army can operate beyond 900 miles from its base. That was proved in the last war.
I hope that our friends the Arabs in the Persian Gulf, who are very great friends of ours, will realise that they will never be sacrificed and that we and the N.A.T.O. countries will ensure, with the help of Turkey, that we are in a position to prevent quite effectively any attack on the Persian Gulf oilfields. Turkey is on the flank of any defence and I believe possesses 30 divisions.
I turn now to the question of manpower, and I wish to say a word or two in regard to the voluntary element of the Territorial Army, particularly the officers, the senior N.C.O.s and the staff officers, who are finding it extremely hard to keep up with the work which is imposed upon them. Most of these people work very hard during the week, and I know several officers of Territorial armoured divisions who have to spend Saturday and Sunday keeping up with the paper work which is going through the office in order to keep the organisation going at all.
There should be an improvement here. I know exactly what is the reason for it; in fact, there are two reasons.

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One is that the Territorial Army is the first-line reinforcement of the Army in Germany, and has to be prepared to go out there within approximately six weeks' notice in the event of a crisis, and therefore it has to be in a very high state of readiness. No doubt at one time it was necessary that it should be in such a state of readiness, but I wonder if it is any longer quite as necessary. What is happening is that the very good voluntary element, finding that they cannot compete, have to leave. I think that would be disastrous. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War has now returned to the Treasury bench, perhaps I may repeat that I was asking him if he could not arrange to reduce some of the work imposed upon the voluntary officers, senior N.C.O.s and staff officers of Territorial Army formations, in order that these men may get some of the week-end to themselves.
One other point on the question of manpower concerns education. I would emphasise strongly that most married personnel today, unlike the days before the war, demand—and intend to see that they get—a really first-class education for their children, and if they find that they cannot get it in the Army they will quit at the earliest moment. There is a good deal of inevitable disturbance of families in the Army today, and I ask the Secretary of State urgently to consider this matter, in consultation with local authorities at home and authorities abroad, in order to see that the children of the married personnel get the finest education that it is possible to give them, and that they have every assistance in getting it.
I come now to the technical part of my speech, about which I feel strongly, and it concerns this question of modern weapons. I was one of those in favour of the ·280 rifle. I believe that the old rifle is out of date, and I am not at all sure that the rifle is any good to an infantryman anyway. I knew infantry commanding officers who asked if they could leave their rifles behind; they did, and got on all the better for it. The old idea of shooting with rifles, as in the Boer War, at a range of a thousand yards, is completely out of date. Therefore, I hope the whole question of the rifle is being tackled.
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I want to see infantry moving in vehicles which can cross the country, because the roads will not be available for use, certainly not in daylight, and they will be extremely uncomfortable at night under enemy air attack. The old idea of mobility in lorries on the roads, whatever the distance between the lorries, is out of date. The modern infantry formation has to be highly mechanised, with high fire power in their hands to be able to compete with large numbers of enemy troops attacking in mass.
I think the time has also come to take stock of our tanks. I have been with tanks since 1936, so that I hope that hon. Members will realise that I do not say these things lightly and without having given them serious thought. I certainly would not say the sort of thing I am now going to say unless I had given this matter serious thought. I am not at all sure that the day of the large tank is not finished. It was originally designed as a weapon of infantry destruction. Ever since that day, it has gradually evolved as a weapon to combine two roles, that of destroying the enemy tanks, and that of keeping out the enemy anti-tank fire. In my view, it is quite impossible to combine those two roles in one vehicle. As a result, what we have achieved is this great monster carrying enormous armour, which has to be dismantled in order to get it across the Channel. Indeed, I am not at all sure that it has not to be dismantled to get it up to the battlefield. I think we have reached saturation point as far as this kind of weapon is concerned, because it has not got mobility, and cannot pretend to have.
Again, the latest medium tank, the Centurion, costs about £50,000, which is equal to the cost of an entire horse cavalry regiment before the war for a year. What the new tank is going to cost, heaven only knows. These are weapons which can be put out of action by one brave infantryman with an adequate recoilless weapon in his hands. Therefore, let us seriously think what we ought to do about this matter. I am not at all sure that this new tank should not be converted into an S.P. anti-tank gun. Some of its armour will have to go, so that it can be more speedy in movement. Therefore, we should dispense with a certain amount of its armour, and have as a result the tactical use of a mobile self-
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propelled anti-tank gun, which I believe is its real role.
In the field of other tanks, we have got the Centurion which can tide over any change-over period. The Centurion is one of the finest tanks which has ever been produced, and it has many years of useful work ahead, but in planning for the future let us seriously think about lots and lots of little tanks, with a low silhouette and nothing but machine-guns as weapons, and use them in their original role for the destruction of infantry. I believe that is the line which should be studied at this moment. We could use them in one large packet or split up into their component parts; then they would be very difficult to locate and very difficult to hit.
We have today several new weapons, including a new type of mine, ground rockets and new infantry anti-tank weapons which are light, mobile and easily carried. We have also got radar, and a far greater and harder hitting air attack than before. Before these various weapons were introduced at the end of the last war, one German panzer division was completely annihilated in battle after only one month's fighting, mostly on the approach march. That shows how, as always happens in history, the batting is beginning to beat the bowling. That is why I wish most earnestly to urge all those brought up in armour, who have learnt all their lessors in armour and got all their promotion through armour, to think again and see whether it is not the time now to think of an entirely new concept as between infantry and armour.
Finally, I am not at all happy that all is well in our rearmament programme. Quite apart from the slowing down announced by the Prime Minister in the winter, the process seems to be going very stickily indeed. The Ministry of Supply should seek out the bottle necks and eliminate them. There appears to me to be something wrong somewhere. The materials and the money appear to be available, and yet there is a slip between the bat and the ropes, and the ball is not quite getting there. I hope that the Ministry of Supply will realise that the Services are getting worried about it and will before long have a serious investigation into this matter.
7.10 p.m.
Mr. F. J. Bellenger: I should have liked very much to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) along some of the interesting paths which he has laid out for us this evening, but I want to keep my remarks very rigidly within limits because I think that so far in this debate we have concentrated almost entirely on what one might call the strategical and weapon aspect, and that, with the exception of one or two speeches, notably that of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), we have ignored the personnel question.
It is no use the House talking about defence and ignoring those who have got to make it effective. I suppose that with all the wonderful weapons which we possess today, we still need soldiers to operate them just as much as we did in the days of Agincourt or on the beaches of Normandy, and it is in relation to that aspect of defence that I wish to raise a question which concerns the War Office, and particularly the Secretary of State for War. If I could have raised this matter on an Adjournment Motion on Friday, I would have done so, but that is not possible. Therefore, if I am to keep to the notice which I gave the House that I would raise the subject at an early moment, tonight is the only opportunity I have of doing so.
It is in connection with a recent occurrence affecting the welfare of British soldiers with which hon. Members are all conversant. I want to ventilate this grievance because it is something which has created doubts in the minds of many hon. Members and of the public outside. It has to do with the administration of the Army, particularly in respect of its medical services.
The House will recollect that yesterday the Secretary of State for War made a statement on the recent court-martial of Colonel Gleave who was charged with two specific charges, on both of which he was acquitted, and on one of them honourably acquitted. The point about which I wish to ask the Secretary of State for War is that concerning the diagnosis made in the case of the late Private Harrison. Of course, physicians, like politicians, all make mistakes, but it is said that physicians are more easily able to cover them up.

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I cannot imagine why in an illness so serious as a malignant disease, which was found out quite quickly when a physical examination was made, it was not possible to make an earlier diagnosis. I do not say that an earlier diagnosis would have saved the man's life, but I do say that it might have prevented the inhuman treatment which he received before his death.
I cannot understand—perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can tell us—why not only the Army medical officers failed, but also the Ministry of Labour doctors failed to diagnose the disease when they examined this Service man before he was called up. Why were no X-ray photographs taken of him? One would have thought that in the case of a man who complained that he was in pain and could not walk and who exhibited various other symptoms, including hysteria, the doctors would have taken all the precautions possible to enable them to form a proper diagnosis.
It appears to me that only a superficial examination was undertaken by the doctors at the Army hospital, and I think that anybody who reads the evidence of the court-martial, which is available to hon. Members in the Library of this House, will see that there is a strong feeling underlying all that evidence that there ought to have been a more careful examination. I believe that in one part of his evidence Colonel Gleave stated that after this occurrence he gave specific orders that much more careful examinations were to be made of patients on admission to hospital.
I venture to suggest that had this occurred in a civil hospital there might have been a court action for damages, and judging by previous cases where doctors have been sued for negligence, I suggest that had such action been possible in this case a certain individual would have been mulcted in very substantial damages.
There is another aspect of this case which I want to draw to the attention of the House and that of the right hon. Gentleman. Are men such as Private Harrison really of any use to the Army? In one or two of the speeches so far made in this debate, the question of recruiting figures has been discussed. But is it any use the Army filling up its ranks
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with third-rate individuals who can only be a liability to the Service and possibly a burden to the taxpayer if, as I believe in this case, their dependants become a charge on the Revenue of the country in the shape of pensions either because disease was contracted or aggravated while the deceased were undergoing National Service?
I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that these individuals are much more of a burden than an asset to the Army, and that the sooner we become more selective in our examination of either recruits or National Service men, the better it will be for the Army and for the country, and certainly incidents like this will be avoided.
I wish to refer to the personal position of the Secretary of State for War in this matter. I believe that by his actions prior to this court-martial, by the statements which he made in this House in reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Stockport, North (Wing Commander Hulbert), the Secretary of State has done a grievous injustice to one of his officers, which is something that a right hon. Gentleman in his position should not do.
On 16th June, the right hon. Gentleman issued a statement which seemed to most of us to be a very frank and open one and which had the effect of mollifying some of the criticism which was evident not only in this House but also on the part of the public outside. The right hon. Gentleman set up a court of inquiry, as a result of which he took it upon himself to say about one of his commanding officers:
"I have been into the whole of this serious occurrence most carefully."
He then went on to say that he was convinced that it was not a fault in the method of procedure, but the failure of certain individuals to carry out their duties. He also said:
"Members of the Army Medical Service carry heavy responsibilities and those who fail to discharge them must be called to account."
He concluded by saying:
"The commanding officer will be called to account for his conduct in this matter, and is to be tried by court-martial."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th June, 1953; Vol. 516, c. 44.]
The right hon. Gentleman gave us the impression yesterday that he was giving Colonel Gleave an opportunity to clear

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himself of certain accusations by way of a court-martial.
Mr. Head: Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to explain that these words "called to account" literally mean "given an opportunity to state why"?
Mr. Bellenger: By his own statement the right hon. Gentleman had assumed, as a result of the court of inquiry, that there was a prima facie case of guilt against this commanding officer.
Mr. Head: If the right hon. Gentleman had been in my job, on what other thing than a court of inquiry could he have based his decision on whether or not Colonel Gleave was to be court-martialled? I had a court of inquiry, but it is not like the evidence in a court-martial. How else could I have made my decision as to whether he should be court-martialled?
Mr. Bellenger: I am in full agreement with the right hon. Gentleman. Certainly, if he thought that Colonel Gleave should be court-martialled he should have said so, but he should not have coupled with that a statement which pointed to Colonel Gleave as guilty of two very serious offences. What were those offences?
Mr. Head: I am sorry to argue with the right hon. Gentleman in the middle of his speech, but this is important. Suppose I had said what the right hon. Gentleman has said, that Colonel Gleave would be court-martialled. There could have been nothing in the public mind but the inference that Colonel Gleave was accused of being responsible for the ill-treatment of Harrison. I specified that the reason Colonel Gleave was being charged had nothing to do with the ill-treatment of Harrison but was purely on the facts that I had deduced from the evidence available to me from the court of inquiry about what happened after the ill-treatment had occurred. I specified that Colonel Gleave was not concerned in the ill-treatment of Harrison.
Mr. Bellenger: That was not the impression that was gained outside or even inside this House. The right hon. Gentleman impugned Colonel Gleave's honour. Let us put no gloss on it; the impression which the right hon. Gentleman left in the mind of anybody who can understand the Queen's English was that Colonel Gleave had lied. One of
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those accusations was the substance of the charge at the court-martial. Who made those charges up? Was it done in the Judge Advocate General's Department or in the right hon. Gentleman's own office, and were they brought to the attention of the right hon. Gentleman? Did he approve of those two charges, one of which suggested that Colonel Gleave was lying and of which he was honourably acquitted?
The right hon. Gentleman had some evidence at his court of inquiry which unfortunately the House does not know about. That court of inquiry was private, or at any rate not public, and on that court of inquiry the right hon. Gentleman made his statement. If a court-martial is to take place, surely the right hon. Gentleman should be much more reticent in his remarks. He need not have said all that, or given the impression that Colonel Gleave was lying. Indeed, those two offences with which the officer was charged under Section 40 of the Army Act might have resulted, if he had been found guilty, in cashiering and if that officer had appealed to Her Majesty, as he has the right to do, the Secretary of State for War would have had to give Her Majesty certain advice. In his attempt to mollify the House the right hon. Gentleman went too far in assuming the guilt of this commanding officer.
The fact is that officers in the Army are not allowed to answer the Secretary of State back. They are not able, by the customs of the Service, to criticise any of their superiors, and least of all the Secretary of State himself. Therefore, it is incumbent on the right hon. Gentleman who has to occupy the position of head of the Army Council for the time being to be very careful about what he says about his officers, and of other ranks too; otherwise the morale of the Service, and especially of the commissioned ranks, might suffer. At the trial, defending counsel referred obliquely to the right hon. Gentleman's statement, and used it to show that his client Colonel Gleave had been prejudiced, at any rate as far as his military career was concerned, by something that the Secretary of State said.
Mr. Head: Supposing that I had decided not to court-martial Colonel Gleave; would not Colonel Gleave's

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career have been infinitely more prejudiced? After the proceedings of the court of inquiry it would have been extremely difficult for the Army to employ him afterwards. It is far better to have a court-martial and leave him clear than to leave him under the court of inquiry.
Mr. Bellenger: I do not disagree. Of course, Colonel Gleave should have been court-martialled, and of course after the court of inquiry the right hon. Gentleman should have given orders for the court-martial, but he should have left it at that and should not have added his own comments on this officer's conduct. That is all I am saying. I am not objecting to the officer being court-martialled. As it happened, he was vindicated by his own colleagues and comrades. That vindication was not possible after the Secretary of State made that remark, as he could not have been challenged, as he was, by the verdict of the court-martial. I only wish that the right hon. Gentleman would give us some of the details that he read in the documents produced by the court of inquiry and which led him to make the statement he did. The House would be better able to judge from the evidence—which was not adduced at the court-martial because the charges were limited—whether Colonel Gleave had done something very seriously wrong.
The right hon. Gentleman said in his statement yesterday that he was still convinced that the medical specialist and the day sister had failed in their duty. That is another portion of the court of inquiry. Those two individuals had been condemned by the Secretary of State, and until the professional bodies to which they belong have had their say, this House has no right to assume, on the right hon. Gentleman's own words, that they were as guilty of serious misconduct as the right hon. Gentleman's statement led us to believe.
I want to raise a final item in this case. I do not want to overstress the point about the right hon. Gentleman. In many respects he has done quite a lot for the Army since he has been in his position, but this case shows that at times his judgment is not sure, and that he is guilty of doing something which reacts against those who are subordinate to him. It is
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because I think he has done that in this case that I have raised it tonight.
There were two witnesses at this court-martial, Private Nicholson and Private Rosser, one a man and the other a woman. They did their duty in bringing this case to light, but I am bound to say that I disagree with the way in which they set to work to do it. All the evidence of the court-martial goes to show that they were not animated by such high motives of public duty as we were led to believe by merely reading the Press reports. The fact remains that, if they had not brought it to light, this House, which is the guardian of the National Service man, would not have known that one Service man who was grievously ill had been inhumanly treated by Army medical personnel. It is because I want the right hon. Gentleman to investigate his medical services a little bit more closely that I have brought this case before the House tonight.
In connection with Private Rosser, the evidence shows that she is pregnant. In due course, presumably, she will become a mother. I am going to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he does not think it would be as well to relieve her of her uniform. I know some of the difficulties with which the right hon. Gentleman is faced, but the fact remains, and this is in the evidence produced at the court-martial, that the psychiatric report about Private Rosser recommended that she should be discharged long before this case occurred. With that to go upon, and with certain other events which have happened since this case, I think the right hon. Gentleman would be most unwise to keep her in the Service even though, as I believe, his intentions are good and he wants to do the best he can for her in her difficulty. It is not his duty to look after unfortunate cases like that. The civil welfare services in this country can do that and there are many good Army charities which might be able to help better than can the War Offices
Hon. Members saw that photograph the other day of this girl being arrested after again being absent without leave. She was in a highly distraught and almost hysterical condition. Does the right hon. Gentleman want that to happen frequently when this girl goes absent, as she will and, as is reported in this morning's papers, she has already done? Is she

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to be brought under arrest continually with photographers there to show how she has been pulled back into custody? In the right hon. Gentleman's own interest and in the interest of the Army, he had better let her go her way into civil life.
I think that I have said enough to disclose that in my mind there is some doubt about the way in which the right hon. Gentleman has acted, and also some doubt about the administration of the medical services. Colonel Gleave has been acquitted by court-martial of the two limited charges that were laid against him, but I suspect very much that the administration of that hospital under Colonel Gleave was not all that it should have been and he as commanding officer must take his share of the blame for what happened. It may be that he can say that he did not know what was going on, but the right hon. Gentleman has been an officer and he will know that officers have to take the blame for the mistakes of those under them.
Dr. H. Morgan: Surely this is a very disgraceful charge and insinuation to make against an officer who is now subject to a review of his general conduct in connection with this incident. Surely it is unfair that an hon. Member in this House, a privileged place in which any statement made cannot be challenged in law and in the courts, should make a statement about this officer when his conduct is subject to review by his employers—and employers like the Army. This is quite unfair.
Mr. Bellenger: I do not think that this is subject to review. This commanding officer has been acquitted of two specific charges against his honour. He has not been charged with any offence as to his administration of this hospital and I am entitled to say, with full responsibility, that when an incident like this happens in an Army hospital it raises grave doubts in our minds about all concerned. Two of them, one the medical specialist and the other the day sister, have been reported to their professional organisations. Colonel Gleave has not. I am bound to say that I hope that Colonel Gleave does not go back as commanding officer of that hospital. I merely say that the right hon. Gentleman had better investigate a little more closely what is
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happening in some of his hospitals, otherwise he may lose the good will of the public on which he depends if he is to have a contented Army and contented parents with boys in the Army.
7.36 p.m.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head) rose——
Mr. Michael Stewart: On a point of order. Before the Secretary of State addresses the House would you consider, Mr. Speaker——
Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot have both the hon. Member and the right hon. Gentleman standing at the same time.
Mr. Stewart: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I said, "On a point of order."
Mr. Speaker: What I was trying to secure was that both the hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Gentleman should not remain standing while I was standing.
Mr. Stewart: I beg your pardon, Mr. Speaker. The point that I wish to put is that there may very well be other hon. Members who would like to comment on the matter to which I think the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was rising to reply. I wondered whether any way could be devised whereby hon. Members who might wish to add something further to what has been said on the subject could do so before the right hon. Gentleman makes his comment.
Mr. Head: I was told by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) that he was raising this matter. As this was a defence debate and this subject was somewhat outside the usual scope I was also asked if I would reply to the right hon. Gentleman, and I was rising to give a reply, so as to enable other hon. Members who want to speak in the debate to get on with other matters.
Mr. Speaker: I have no means of knowing whether hon. Members wish to pursue this topic or any other, but, speaking from experience, I would say that as this matter which has been raised in a defence debate is a perfectly proper intrusion into the debate under the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill it is better for the House to hear the right hon. Gentleman's reply to what has been said.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw was courteous enough to give me notice that he was going to raise this matter. Indeed, he gave me notice of the points which he was going to raise. In intervening in the debate, I should like to apologise, having been a back bencher for six years, for being an additional Front Bencher intervening today. I know the irritation that that causes, but I can assure those on the back benches who may be feeling irritated that it is not of my own choice that I am intervening.
I think I am not saying anything too strong against the right hon. Gentleman when I say that what he has rather implied is that there was a scandal in the medical hospital and as a result I decided to avoid difficulty in the House by being extremely rough with my own officers. That is the inference that I make from the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I do not particularly wish to defend myself, but that is a strong charge to make against anybody in my position. Therefore, wasting as little time as possible, I should like to explain the position to the House, because I think that there are few things more contemptible when one gets into trouble personally than to get out of it by being unduly rough with officers in the organisation which one represents.
First, the right hon. Gentleman stated that it was extremely wrong that there was no subsequent examination of this man after the first preliminary examination when he was admitted to hospital, and he said that that was a thing which I should investigate. But it is exactly for that reason—that there was no second examination—that I reported Major Hobson to the professional body. It is laid down by the medical regulations in the Army that that second examination must take place, and it never took place. It is an absolute travesty of everything that I have said to the House for the right hon. Gentleman to say that I should look into the matter.
Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman said that we should not allow Grade 3 men to go into the Army. I will not argue that or its relevance to this case, except to say that it was the right hon. Gentleman's own Government who introduced the admission of Grade 3 men into
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the Army. I believe that it was a justified step, because I do not think that a man who has a physical disability which would allow him to do clerical duties should have a two years' start in civil life because of it. The right hon. Gentleman's own Government introduced this provision and it is no use his putting that against me.
The right hon. Gentleman said that I did a grievous injustice to Lieut.-Colonel Gleave because I said what I did say in my statement. I have tried to explain the position in my previous statement yesterday, and I will explain it again now. I am in a very peculiar position; I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman has ever been in this position. There is a court of inquiry, and one reads the report of it very carefully. One has the G.O.C.'s comments on the report. I cannot tell the House what is in those documents, and I believe that state of affairs to be right; nor are they admissible in the court-martial. Therefore, I am deciding what steps to take about Lieut.-Colonel Gleave on a document which I cannot explain to the House and the contents of which cannot be divulged to the court-martial.
I decided, after consultation with the Director-General of the Army Medical Services and with my other chief advisers, that the only fair thing—I use the word "fair" advisedly—was to ensure that Lieut.-Colonel Gleave's Army career would not be prejudiced. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Very well, why specify so closely what you were saying against him?" I say again that, supposing I had said nothing, the general public would have inferred that it was Lieut.-Colonel Gleave's fault that this boy had had wrong treatment. If he had been found guilty, in my opinion that would have been the general impression among the general public.
What Lieut.-Colonel Gleave was being court-martialled for was nothing to do with Harrison's alleged ill-treatment. It was purely concerned with what had happened after it was all over. I believe, wrongly or rightly, that that was better for Lieut.-Colonel Gleave. If I was wrong I accept it, but at the time I was not being vindictive against Lieut.-Colonel Gleave, nor was I attempting to get out of the situation. I thought that was the best thing to do.

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The last point that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned was the question of the witnesses. The story of the witnesses has been an unhappy one. Since I cannot divulge the contents of this document, I can only tell the House that when I decided to take the action which I did take in this case, I was well aware of what the House and the public know about the witnesses. I did not at the time believe that they were two pure saintly types who had done this for the public good. I was aware of certain facts of which the House was not then aware and which have come to light since. I do not want to do anything vindictive or unfair to these two people. They have had their own difficulties of which, goodness knows, we are only too well aware.
There is Private Rosser. I do not wish to divulge too much to the House of her own private affairs, but supposing—I put this hypothetically—that I were to discharge her from the Army as a potential mother, and she had no visible means of support and nowhere to go except this unfortunate man who is already married, and she got into trouble, would not the House accuse me much more strongly than if I were to keep her under adequate care until we can be certain that she will go to some place where she will be looked after? I have been much accused, and it would be easier for me to say, "I discharge Private Rosser and, therefore, I have done the noble thing." It would have been the easiest course, but I suggest that it would have been the wrong course.
I have one last thing to say on this matter. I regret this occurrence as much as anybody else in this House. As far as the Army is concerned, I want to convince the mothers of boys who are called up for National Service that the Army gives them a good deal and runs a good show. I want people to think that the Army is a good place. Recently, we have had a certain number of unfortunate cases which have gone against that impression. I ask the House sincerely to believe that I accept full responsibility for these things, and that I am prepared to answer for them and take full blame for them.
But may I remind hon. Members of this? These incidents, naturally and inevitably, are news. What the Army is doing all over the world is not news. In
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the middle of these unfortunate events, may I take this opportunity of reminding the House that all over the world, with hardly anything being said about it, the Army is doing a job for which the House and the nation owe it an enormous debt. It is carrying the major burden of the cold war, and it is doing it magnificently. My fault is for these things, but the Army's credit is for the job which it is doing overseas.
7.46 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I am sure that the Secretary of State will not mind if I go back to the main subject of the debate. May I say, in passing, as someone who has listened relatively detached during the last hour, that he convinced me that he has taken this matter in the right way, and I accept his explanation.
I should like to go back to the speeches, all of which I had heard, and say that, having heard them all, I am still impressed by the speech of the "boneless wonder"—the Leader of the House. I doubt whether a more remarkable speech has been made than the speech which we heard from the right hon. Gentleman, except that made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer last week, when he opened the debate on foreign affairs. He opened it with a number of platitudes which, as far as I can see, were written in the Foreign Office. The only difference between that speech and the speech we heard this afternoon is that the right hon. Gentleman's platitudes this afternoon were spontaneous and he told us nothing whatsoever about what is to be done. His general theme was that nothing has happened since the start of the Korean campaign which would justify any major change in our defence policy or in the burden of defence.
I want to argue, as briefly as I can, that a substantial number of things have happened; not only have they happened, but under this Government substantial changes have already taken place. I should like hon. Members to cast their minds back, as I did this morning, to the debates which we had in September, 1950, and February, 1951, when the armaments programme was launched. I know it is embarrassing to remember what one said three years ago, but those who believe that nothing has changed in this period

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had better read what they were saying three years ago.
We launched the defence programme under the impact of the Korean war. It was assumed at that time, in speech after speech from both the Labour Government and the Conservative Opposition, that the Korean war had proved that military aggression was an imminent risk to Europe. It was my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) who said that as this had happened in Korea, it might happen anywhere else in the world; it might be Yugoslavia or Eastern Germany. The assumption that the Korean war would lead to other acts of a similar nature, if not to general war, was the justification for the whole defence programme.
That programme was really a telescoping of a 10-year defence programme, first, in September, 1950, into a five-year programme and, finally, in February, 1951, into a three-year programme. Of course, if we decide to rearm within three years it means building obsolescent weapons. The year 1953 was to be the year in which war was to occur. This was the year of destiny, the year for which we were planning. It was this year when the enemy's attacks would have to be met. If we plan in 1950 to be ready in 1953, we do not plan the weapons of 1960; we plan the weapons which we have got—the obsolescent weapons. Therefore, this kind of rearmament is enormously costly if the war does not happen to come off, because by 1953 we have the obsolescent weapons coming out in great quantities.
I do not blame anyone for this; I am only stating a fact. We were planning in May 1950, on a 10-year schedule; in September, 1950, on a five-year schedule; and in February, 1951, on a three-year schedule; and now, when the Leader of the House says there has been no change, I would point out that the change is that we are no longer on a three-year schedule. The Prime Minister has switched back. The war is no longer imminent. We have gone back to a position such as we were in before the Korean war, in terms of military planning.
I therefore say to hon. and right hon. Members on the Front Bench that we in the Opposition have a perfect right—and this was the first point which my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington
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made—to say, "Since these major changes have occurred; since you have gone back from planning for three years to planning for we do not know how long—five, seven or 10 years—we have the right to know what changes you have made, for there must be major changes in the defence programme once you scrap your three-year programme for imminent war and go for a five-, seven- or 10-year programme."
All we know is that the armament programme has been cut three times by the present Prime Minister. What we do not know in detail is how the extremely awkward transition is to take place from the planning for imminent war in 1953 to the more reasoned planning such as, in my view and that of many of my hon. Friends, we might always have carried out throughout the Korean war if we had kept our senses and not got into a state of hysteria. How is that transfer taking place? I was suprised at my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) who said that, after all, the great lesson we had to learn today was that it was our rearmament, and our rearmament alone, which had caused all the changes in the attitude of the Eastern bloc.
I should have thought that what we ought to have studied was the lesson to be learned from the Korean war. The fact is that we have never seen a war where both sides were more determined to prevent it from spreading. Both sides were willing to have one hand tied behind his back. There were wild men in Washington; there were probably wild men in Peking and Moscow, who said, "Let us try for outright victory in Korea by untying our hands," but the significant fact is that both remained resolutely one-handed and fought under a great disability. Even more significant is the fact that for the first time for over 100 years both sides decided to call it a draw and give up the attempt to achieve outright victory. I should say that this was a very important military fact and a very important test of the willingness of the Western and Eastern world to risk general war.
I give, as an analogy, the situation in 1930. If the Spanish war had been fought to a standstill; if the Republic had been saved and Spain left divided, that would have been a proof of a great many important things. It would have proved the

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resoluteness of the Western Powers and also the willingness of the Nazis—would they have been willing?—to be content with stalemate. But that did not happen. In Korea we have had a little taste of total war on a remote peninsula, in which it has been proved conclusively that, despite great popular pressure in America which we know of, and great pressure in Peking and Moscow about which we know much less—despite those wild men—each side has decided that a limited war and a draw is better than general war.
If that is not proof of a change from what was imagined to be the situation when we started the armaments programme in September, 1950, what is? It has proved that that imminent risk which was imagined in 1950—and which was the basis of rearmament—has been removed. We know that now. We have the statements of General Gruenther and of the Prime Minister. Nobody is assuming that war is imminent today—not even the Chiefs of Staff. The proof? Study the cuts in the American arms programme this year; major cuts, about which nothing has been said in this debate and about which I should like to say a word or two later. It is, therefore, reasonable for us to look at the situation—not forgetting the past—and to say that in the Korean armistice we have the most encouraging fact of modern times—a war which has not ended in the total destruction of the other chap but with both sides giving up the fruits of victory in order to avoid a general war.
Since this enormously encouraging armistice has taken place we must now try to balance up once again the economic risks to which we have subjected ourselves in this armaments programme against the military risks which, we must all agree, have now been substantially reduced. I only want to add to what has been said in previous debates some evidence which my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has already referred to—the three articles in "The Times" on social security and defence costs.
Even in this House there are great illusions about the burdens on this country's economy. It is felt by many people that the cost of the social services and of defence is divided roughly fifty-fifty; that they are both terribly heavy burdens; that they are both a weight on
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taxation, and, somehow, that the burden of social services has increased since 1945 more than that of defence. I should like to read to the House the actual figures. I am not talking of budgetary figures, but I am giving the proportions of the national product, which is the only just way of considering the matter.
Defence takes four-and-a-half times more of the national product today than it did in 1928, when we were a great deal wealthier than we are now. It will be five times by the end of next year. Housing was 4·2 in 1938 and is only 3·2 now. We are spending less of our national resources on housing now because there was a housing boom then to try to mop up unemployment. The health services take 3·0 instead of 1·2, but if we take the actual proportion of the national income we must add what, before the war, was spent on private services, in order to get the real figure, so there is very little change in the real cost of health today as compared with 1938.
On education, we spent 1·9 of the national product in 1938. We spend 2·3 today, which, considering the extra number of children we have, means that we are spending exactly the same per child as we were spending 15 years ago, in the benighted prewar period. The cost of our social services, apart from subsidies, which are a big wartime and postwar addition, have very slightly increased in terms of their proportion of the national product, whereas defence, which in 1938 was 5·9, has jumped to 10 this year and will be 12 next year. Let us make up our minds to face this fact.
The thing which cripples us now, as compared with before the war, is not the burden of the Welfare State, which has hardly increased in terms of national product; it is the burden of defence. I think everybody will agree on one very simple point, which is that our national survival depends on capital investment. For 30 years before the war, under a declining British capitalism, we failed to invest sufficient money in new machinery and plant. For five years afterwards, under a Labour Government, we invested at a higher rate than in the previous 30 years.
Since rearmament started, the capital investment programme has been cut back. It is untrue to say that the cost of rearmament fell mainly on our consumers. Consumption was maintained at very nearly

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the same level as before; it sank slightly. What really was cut back was investment, the planning for our future as a trading and manufacturing nation. We all know that Germany, Japan, and America are spending more on capital investment today than we are and the reason for our failure is that one cannot use the engineering industry simultaneously for export, for capital investment and for defence. Something had to go, apart from the export trade, and it was largely capital investment.
I put it in all seriousness that there has been a major change in the world situation since the beginning of the Korean war. It is the way the nations behaved in that war; the proof they gave of their unwillingness to have a general war, and the belief of the General Staff today that war is not now imminent. Yet we are spending 10 per cent. of our national product—twice the amount we spent in 1938—on defence, and we are thereby jeopardising our capital investment.
"The Times" article is perfectly blunt about this. They point out that even if the Conservative Government cut the whole of the food subsidies, even if they took all the miserable little savings they could make on the social services, that would not give us sufficient for the capital investment programme. Something else has to go, and I think it is about time that in these defence debates in the House we faced up to that situation. If the danger is really immense, if we face an imminent war, then everybody will sacrifice his economic future in order to survive; but if the imminent danger is removed, surely it is apposite for the House to look at defence this July and to record the fact that this programme is continuing at a level which, before Korea, would have been thought totally impossible. The fact is, as always happens with Government expenditure, that once you pass the expenditure you begin to take it for granted.
Consider the term of National Service. It was introduced for only six months, explicitly, by my right hon. Friend in September, 1950, as an emergency measure for the particular imminent danger in Europe arising out of Korea. It is now agreed that the imminent danger of aggression in Western Europe has been removed, but we are told that we cannot
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get on without two years National Service. If we cannot get on without it, if the vast increase in the defence programme is to stay, if we get on to that plateau of defence costs and stay on it, then in five years' time there will be no chance whatsoever of this country's economy competing either with Germany or Japan or, indeed, with American exports in the first minor recession.
We must be prepared to accept that from "The Times." After all, "The Times" is not a Bevanite paper. But it admits that it is defence which will have to be cut if we are to have the investment which we need, because defence impinges on that very sector of the economy—the engineering industry—which is vital to the capital investment programme.
I must add, however, that so far from cutting defence we face the certainty of increasing it. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley mentioned two important facts. First, we know that next year we shall pay £140 million extra because there will be no American aid; and, secondly, we know that directly the occupation of Germany ceases—and hon. Members opposite are determined to rearm the Germans—directly we cease to be an occupying Power, we shall pay between £80 million and £120 million in dollars for our troops in Germany. Putting the two together, I get £260 million extra without any increased defence whatsoever.
What is the good of right hon. and hon. Members sitting on the Front Bench opposite saying that there have been no changes? What action do they propose to take? How are they to pay the £260 million extra? Is it to be additional to our present defence costs or are we to cut defence so as not to pay any extra? The Foreign Secretary once assured us that the occupation costs—which he then told us would not be as big as in fact they are now—would, somehow or another, not be paid by us. I said that was not so; I said we should have to pay them.
What is to happen? Where are we to find the £260 million extra which it will be necessary to find to keep the reduced defence programme, after its third Churchill cut, going at the present level? The House has the right to know the answer to that question. The Government must have been thinking about it

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for the last two months, because they have known about the decision to bring American aid to an end and about the other factors.
There is a third fact which they do not mention, but which I mentioned in the defence debate last year. I pointed out, in the defence debate last February, the danger of having an armaments industry greater than we could afford and selling our surplus products to the Americans. I pointed out that if we relied on that, one day it might be cut off. I was told that that was idiotic nonsense, that I simply did not know about America and that I was being positively anti-American in distrusting what the official Washington hand-out said instead of reading what Mr. Taft said. I thought that Mr. Taft knew more about the future than the official State Department handout. Now we are faced with this situation; in addition to losing direct dollar aid we are losing the purchase of the arms, because if the Americans do not give aid to France and the other European nations, they will not buy our Centurions or our jets, and so we shall lose the orders.
What is to happen to the 25,000 workers in Coventry now engaged on armaments production, mostly for sale to America? What is to happen next year if Senator Taft is right and foreign aid is wound up altogether? I had my doubts about whether being merchants of death was a very sound investment for the British engineering industry and I made my protest against it. Now I ask the Government directly what preparations are being made in view of the clear knowledge that the arms programme for America's allies is to be cut to the bone next year and to go altogether in the following year? What is to happen to all those gorgeous tanks which we have built, which we cannot afford to have for ourselves and which other people will not buy? What is to happen to the workers? Is it not time that we tried to switch these factories and to recapture the export markets which we have lost?
Air Commodore Harvey: I think the hon. Member is inaccurate in his inference that American aid is to be cut off right away. Some of the offshore orders for jet aircraft will occupy our factories for no fewer than three
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years' ahead, which will give a breathing space for the organisations to consider how to change over. It may create alarm in the aircraft industry if it goes out from the House of Commons that these orders are to disappear altogether in the next few months.
Mr. Crossman: I do not want to create alarm but I want to remove illusions, and it is about time the aircraft industry realised that orders without appropriations mean nothing in America. There are many American civil servants who do not get paid salaries because the appropriation does not come, and it is, therefore, no good our armaments industry believing that, because they have an order for 100 tanks, the dollars will necessarily be provided by Congress to pay for the tanks. It is what I call a precarious type of enterprise to rely on Congressional appropriation from year to year. One takes the order and starts making the job, and then Congress changes its mind. I was against that in principle.
Air Commodore Harvey: Had we not accepted the orders it would have put British people out of work and made the situation worse.
Mr. Crossman: On the contrary; if we had not accepted the orders and had not switched our factories from making peaceful products to making wartime products, we could have held our export markets, which were taken over by the Germans when we switched to armaments production. The Germans had no armaments production and they have been taking up our orders all over the world. Because we were engaged on arms programme we could not make the exports, and we lost the contracts. That is a point which we made time after time, and slowly it is sinking in.
I want to make two other points. First, let us agree that, economically, the whole future of this country depends upon a huge capital investment programme in agriculture, engineering and chemicals. That cannot be done as long as we keep our defence programme at anything approaching the present level. Secondly, some hon. Members suggest that our 11 divisions overseas are all there defending the free world against Communism. This is an illusion. The four in Germany are playing their part in

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an international defence force, as is the one Commonwealth division in Korea; but do not let us have any nonsense by suggesting that the three and a half divisions in Egypt are there because the Americans asked us to put them there or because anybody else except this House asked them to be there. They are an imperial obligation, something which we took on ourselves, without arousing any great enthusiasm among any of our allies.
The two divisions in Malaya are not all that altruistic either, nor is the one division in Hong Kong, nor the five battalions in Kenya, nor those units which are to be sent to Central Africa. I reckon that two-thirds of the overseas divisions are holding the Empire or using military force to maintain imperial influence. It is, therefore, an issue of policy whether to defend our interests by the methods shown by the Leader of the Opposition in his Indian policy rather than by the methods which we have been using lately in Africa and in the Middle East.
The decision to cut imperial commitments is not a scuttle decision. It is a decision to carry out systematically, in the rest of the Commonwealth, the policy which we followed in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. I say frankly to the House that until we are prepared to cease to try holding the Middle East by force the Middle East will not be our ally. An hon. Members opposite says that we will never secrifice the Arabs. But there is nobody in the Middle East who does not regard it as an imposition to be defended by us. We are the main enemy in the Middle East. Ask any Egyptian. We have not had one treaty voluntarily negotiated with a Middle Eastern State since the war for the purpose of maintaining our forces in that area.
We know about the treaty of Portsmouth with Iraq, which was negotiated with champagne, but before the Prime Minister of that country could fly home again he had been disowned by his Government. Do not let us have any nonsense about Middle Eastern States wanting to be protected. They want to be free. Are we to cripple our economy by maintaining an imperial situation which is ultimately untenable? That is sheer lunacy.
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On 11th May we had the Prime Minister's speech about Egypt, with the new tough line. On that occasion the Tory back benchers were represented by the Prime Minister, who threw out the Foreign Secretary's policy of appeasement and substituted the tough policy. We have had two months of that. It was said that that would bring the Egyptians to their senses. But, Sir Brian Robertson has flown back and we are negotiating after all. Everybody in Cairo and every other capital in the Middle East knows that the British must negotiate and must accept evacuation. Meanwhile, we are spending £50 million a year to keep troops in Egypt—that is what we are spending this year—and we are ruining our capital investment programme by doing so.
In Cairo, I met a very distinguished diplomatist who had come from the Far East, and I asked him what he thought of Cairo. He replied, "I have always heard that the Chinese are supposed to be concerned about face but I have never seen so much face-saving as is going on on the part of the British in Cairo today. They forget about their interest and are merely concerned about their prestige." By so doing, they are undermining their prestige and ruining the economy of this country.
I now come to the central issue of the cuts that we could make. We have 3½ divisions in Egypt. It would have been of tremendous benefit to our position in the Middle East if the troops had been taken out four years ago. Ernest Bevin wanted to get them out in 1946. He got agreement about this, but failed because of the Sudan. Why should not the agreement which was good enough in 1946 be good enough for the present Government, an agreement under which our technicians would be there not as British officers and men but—I believe it is called "Operation Flannel Bags"—as civilians, therefore removing the national sovereignty objections which the Egyptians hold very strongly? Responsible men knew well that the only justification for the Sudan Agreement was as a prelude to a rapid agreement about the Canal Zone, a reduction in our commitments and a reduction in the threat to our economic future.
If our present policy is continued in Kenya and Central Africa, there is no doubt that we shall need three or four

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divisions to hold that area. The issue of whether we can cut our military commitments is not a military issue but an issue of the foreign policy. If we have a policy which seeks to substitute "Commonwealth" for "Dominion" we have a policy which can cut commitments and we can then hold these people as our friends, just as the people of the Gold Coast are our friends. If we are to have the East African policy, an increasing number of soldiers will be required, and we shall have ruin at home and the growth of Communism all over the world. It is simple. I am glad that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence agrees with me.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch)The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch) indicated dissent.
Mr. Crossman: I should like to hear the Government's policy on this matter. The term of National Service is only justifiable, as has now been pointed out, not in terms of training reserves but in terms of what number of conscripts we require to maintain our overseas commitments. Somebody will probably say, "If we cut the term of National Service, we shall be disloyal to the Americans." But the Americans have cut their National Service this year. The "New York Times," which publishes reputable news, has reported that the present strength of the U.S. armed forces is 2,290,000 and that the cut this year will be 160,000, of whom 15,000 will be Regulars, 67,000 National Guard and 77,000 National Service or draft. That is a cut of 15 per cent. in the National Guard and 9 per cent. in the National Service or draft.
Did the Americans come to N.A.T.O. and discuss it? No. Like every other member of N.A.T.O., except the British, they decided unilaterally to do it. The Americans have cut down their air force, cut the budget, cut manpower. If America could cut the manpower of her armed forces before she had finished the Korean war, in which she was the major participant, why is it impossible for us to look after our own economic future and reduce our National Service? I am not saying anything critical of the Americans, for they have a right to do it, but I criticise hon. Members who, when we suggest this, say, "We cannot do this without consulting N.A.T.O." So poor old
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Britain goes on consulting N.A.T.O. and maintaining a manpower burden in her Services higher than that of everybody else, and everybody else is sensibly and calmly disarming.
We are "carrying the can" and ruining ourselves. That sort of altruism was all right for a great Empire when we had a lot of fat to lop off, but today we have not got the fat to lop off. Our production is still not higher than it was in 1951. Despite what we hear about "Tory prosperity," we are just back to where we were two and half years ago, while other countries are gaining by 5 per cent. every year. Still we are told, "We must face the burden. Do not hesitate."
Great appeals are made to us from both sides of the House to stand by our allies. I agree that we should stand by our allies, but the greatest gift that we can give to our allies is to be solvent, to have some equipment that we can export to the backward areas, to develop our industries and so to carry the load of military establishment that we can afford combined with a reasonable capital investment programme. That should be our policy this year and it means a vast cut in our military commitments.
8.18 p.m.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)—we have all enjoyed his speech—covered a very wide field and ended by saying that under a Conservative Government we were just back to where we were in 1951. At the end of 1951 it did not look as if we would recover anything like as quickly as we have done. We have tried to rearm, carrying on the policy of his own Government, and yet the country is progressing, even in production.
With regard to rearmament during the last two years—looking at the better side of rearmament, if there is such a thing—the country has profited considerably by the machine tools which have been brought in from America, Switzerland and Germany. If the hon. Gentleman goes round some of the factories in Coventry, he will see really up-to-date machinery which would not otherwise have been available. That is a bonus which has been given to the motor car and other industries. Therefore, we have got something out of it.

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The hon. Member referred to National Service. We all want the period to be reduced. No one with any sense wants it to continue indefinitely at two years, but what would the world say if three days after the Korean truce was signed the Government decided to reduce National Service? When dealing with the Russians and the Chinese, let us keep a sense of proportion.
Mr. Crossman: I see the hon. and gallant Gentleman's point, but why did the Americans make a major cut in their Forces manpower even before the truce was signed?
Air Commodore Harvey: The Americans make many mistakes, and I think they over-reached themselves in their rearmament programme, the same as the Labour Government did. They found out that they could not fulfil their commitments. The American Air Force, to which the hon. Member referred, has been cut, it is quite true, because if they had gone on trying to make the aircraft already ordered they would have been out of date by the time they were delivered. The number of Canberras ordered by the Labour Government had to be cut. What was that? Because the aeroplane did not come up to expectations, and by delivery time it would have been hopelessly out-of-date. It was left to a Conservative Government to cut a programme which could not have been achieved. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who unfortunately is not in his place, said that the precise size of our rearmament programme was worked out by trial and error, I thought what a way to carry out planning—a Labour Government working by trial and error.
Mr. Shinwell: Nothing of the sort.
Air Commodore Harvey: That is what the right hon. Gentleman said, and he was Secretary of State for War in the Labour Government, with the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence. Here was a Privy Councillor saying that his own Government had planned a rearmament programme by trial and error. Frankly, I was appalled. All Governments make mistakes, and when we are dealing with complicated designs it is very easy to be wrong. However, to suggest that it was worked out by trial and
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error when £1,600 million a year of the taxpayers' money was involved is something which must have amazed every one of us, as it did me. I hope the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) was right when he said it was not true.
Mr. Shinwell: The position is quite clear. The programme was very carefully planned on the basis of the requisitions made by the Chiefs of Staff in the light of the circumstances of the time. The programme was cut down because of the economic position of the country. Eventually we came to a decision which we thought was satisfactory, but even the decision we reached about the £4,700 million programme was subject to modifications, and those modifications were stated at the time by the then Prime Minister.
Air Commodore Harvey: I accept that the right hon. Gentleman had to accept the advice of those with technical knowledge, but nevertheless the Minister in charge is eventually responsible, just as my right hon. Friend was responsible for something earlier in the debate today.
I want to discuss expenditure for the Royal Air Force and the other Services. It is a great pity that the Royal Air Force does not possess more up-to-date squadrons, particularly large bombers. Here I must declare my interest, because I am responsible for the production of the Victor Bomber. I have some knowledge of that aeroplane, and I think the whole country has reason to be proud of these modern types of aircraft, if we can be proud of any armaments at all. Many of the features in those aircraft apply to civil aircraft, and when it is suggested that we should let the Americans carry out all the bombing from this country, I say that America has nothing like the Victor, the Valiant and the Vulcan.
If this country is going to have any say in world affairs, we must have a bomber force. Without it would be equivalent to giving away the whole Battle Fleet 40 years ago. What position would we have been in then at the Peace Conference? Britain must have its own bomber force, however small it may be, so that we can play our part if unfortunately we should be required. We have got the best

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prototypes in the world, but that is not enough. We have got to speed up production.
Mr. F. Beswick: The hon. and gallant Gentleman was looking at me when he was making his remarks about the American bombing force operating from Britain. I hope he did not think that that was the implication of a Question which I put today?
Air Commodore Harvey: I will put the hon. Gentleman's mind at ease straight away. I did not realise I was looking at him when I was making those remarks. I was not thinking along those lines at all.
Production has got to be speeded up. We have shown that we are capable of building air frames and jet power units. What we are not capable of doing at the moment is building in quick time and in short time all the accessories that go into the modern bomber, like the hydraulics and the various features which make 50 per cent. of the aeroplane. I suggest to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply that everything should be done to encourage the speed-up of the production of accessories, particularly by sub-contractors who are making their contribution.
Lord Trenchard wrote a letter to "The Times" the other day. While it is a very good letter, I do not personally think that it was very constructive, even though I have very great respect for the noble Lord. He did not tell us what ought to be done and had he said it, it would have been quite useful to those required to carry out the programme.
I can well understand the reasoning of any hon. Member who says that we ought to cut our armament programme. Things look better in the world at the moment, but I believe to do so right now would be foolhardy. Trim it, streamline it and make it more efficient and see if we can get a saving between the Services, but until we have seen a real indication of Russian and Chinese sincerity we should go along, for the time being at any rate, as we have been doing.
Suppose we did cut the programme now, what then? There would be an immediate saving, and then at the next flare-up in world affairs immediate measures would be taken. In the mean-
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time the industries concerned would have ceased preparing their designs and paid off many of their workers. The organisation would have been broken up, and as a consequence production would be dislocated, if not stopped altogether. Then emergency measures would have to be taken, and the cost would be more over a period of three years than if we had continued production at a steady rate. In the meantime the impression would have been created abroad that Britain was disarming. Other countries would have followed suit, and it might well be that we would be back where we were four or five years ago.
I believe that this country and the world in general are in a more favourable position because we are strong. The war in Korea has been bad enough, but how much worse would it have been had it spread to Western Europe, South-East Asia and other parts of the world. It has; been a cheap price to pay, if we have had value for our money, to avoid a world conflict. But I believe that the expenditure has reached a maximum for our economy, and I do not think that Britain can afford one penny more than we are spending today.
Maybe it should be further reduced, and here I want to put to my hon. and right hon. Friends that as far as the Royal Air Force and the Navy are concerned, serious consideration has to be given to expenditure in the Royal Navy. With everyone in Britain I have the greatest admiration for the Royal Navy. They play a tremendous part in our defence. It is easy to say, "You are an air commodore; you are biased"; but, believe me, I am not in the slightest biased in this matter.
I want to see the Navy play its full part in the most efficient way possible. But so far as aircraft carriers are concerned, I am informed that 15 per cent. of the time at sea is lost because of the tilt of the deck and aircraft cannot take off or land. That is a considerable figure. If the Navy are dealing with enemy submarines, two aircraft are required for the kill—one for reconnaissance and the other to carry the weapon. The ship has to be built and maintained. It must have dockyards and all the items which are essential to maintain the ship and there has to be a naval

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airfield where the aircraft can land to be serviced and maintained, whereas the Air Force, with one aircraft, can do the whole operation from land on either side of the Atlantic.
I do not recommend that aircraft carriers in commission should be scrapped. Let us use them, but let us reconsider any future programme of spending vast millions on an instrument which I think is almost obsolete. I do not believe it will last, because we do not use our aircraft carriers in the same way as do the Americans. I believe the Merchant Navy can be protected mainly by land-based aircraft.
If the Navy complain that they have bad or indifferent aircraft, I think they have only themselves to blame entirely. For the last 30 years the admirals and senior officers in the Royal Navy have not been air-minded. They have never considered the air as a weapon which would really win wars. We find in the department of operational requirements of the Air Ministry a considerable team of officers considering the future—six, eight, ten, twelve years ahead—as in 1930, when they thought of the Spitfire and the Hurricane. I believe the Navy have only a few officers and an observer, not even a pilot, in charge carrying out this work. I sincerely recommend to the Financial Secretary that they should look into this matter and get the best brains available into their department of operational requirements to supply what is really required for the future.
Britain, unfortunately, is a concentrated and highly vulnerable target. A completely new approach to the whole question of defence organisation is called for. In the event of a war, our major ports might be rapidly immobilised—undoubtedly they would be—by a few atom bombs. The emphasis for the future is removed from the surface to the air arm. Anyone who does not appreciate that today is not very well in the head. It has been taught to us throughout the last war and since. To whatever extent the enemy might rely on submarine warfare, the most dangerous foe of the submarine is eventually aircraft. Even in the last war, which finished eight years ago, more submarines were sunk from the air than by surface vessels and great progress has been made since that date.
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Taking the long view, our sea routes must be defended by our bomber force operating over enemy territory. As I said earlier, the bomber force must be our own. We cannot leave ourselves entirely in the hands of the Americans or others in this respect. After all, we never know what is going to happen in America. They have unpredictable changes of political, financial and strategic policy. We do not want this matter to depend on the whim of the Americans or others; we want to plan our own policy. I should like an assurance tonight that the bomber force will be a British force and that we shall speed it up to the utmost.
Our new bombers may be the best weapons in the N.A.T.O. armoury. They may be the best available and it might be that by having those bombers there will never be a war. Fighter defence is required against surprise attack and also for warfare against submarines. Therefore, we must not neglect our fighter force. The air battle must be won before any victorious offensive is possible.
Finally, I would put to the House that in 1949 the armament programme was cut. Certainly that was so with regard to the Air Force; vast cuts took place. In 1950 the Korean war was brought about. The policy was then, "Buy everything." In 1951 the policy was to speed up deliveries and in 1952 there were cuts. Where are we today? I hope that my hon. Friend in charge of the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff will get together to bring about more co-ordination in the three Services. I believe that considerable sums can be saved by integration, even more than in the past. If the admirals and air marshals do not agree, let the politicians knock their heads together and make them agree and tell them what to do.
We need our Fighting Services to have greater integration than before. We must not over-spend, but in what we do spend we must be sure that we get value for money. I am satisfied that the Ministry of Supply are taking care of that. Much thought and brains have been put into these matters. I believe that more integration can take place, and that by doing that we shall have Fighting services of which this country can indeed be proud and which will enable us to play our part in keeping the peace of the world.
8.35 p.m.
Mr. C. R. Hobson: We are discussing tonight the Second Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill, which deals with the allocation of Appropriations passed in Committee to the various Departments. I wish to deal tonight particularly with the allocation made to the Admiralty. It may indeed be necessary for some of us to consider an Amendment should there not be a response forthcoming from the Civil Lord, who I take it will, in the absence of the First Lord of the Admiralty, be well aware of the point that I wish to raise.
Many hon. Members have stressed the need for economy, the need for ensuring that all this vast sum of £1,600 million is well spent. I am sure that we all concur in that, but unfortunately the union of which I have had the honour to be a member for many years, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, has had brought to light very grievous waste of public money, time and material at one of the Royal Naval establishments in Perth. It is unfortunate that this grievance has to be voiced on the Floor of the House of Commons, but there is no other way out. The executive council of my union took up this matter with the Admiralty, and even now, after two years of correspondence, and indeed of seeking an interview with the First Lord of the Admiralty, have still not secured any redress. When we are dealing with Supply, we always say in Parliament, "No supply without redress of grievance."
What are the complaints of the members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union who are employed at this establishment? They are that there has been at Almondbank great waste of material and of work being done which certainly cannot be considered as being work for the Admiralty. There has been proved beyond peradventure that portable golf caddies, fish aquariums motor cycle frames, silencers for ·22 rifle——
The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Wingfield Digby): I am sure that the hon. Member will not wish to mislead the House. He is alleging that this has been proved beyond any doubt. That is exactly what there has been doubt about. Investigation has already taken place and there has been no proof of what the hon. Member is alleging.
Mr. Hobson: I am afraid that the Civil Lord is a little too eager. I am quite conscious of the words I am using. I know the meaning of my mother tongue, and I should not have dreamed of saying that there was proof unless I was convinced that there was. The Civil Lord had better wait while we produce the proof.
The fact is that all this "homework," of which I have given a list, has been made at Almondbank—fish aquariums, motor - cycle frames, wheelbarrows, silencers for ·22 rifles and portable golf caddies. These have been made with the knowledge of the officers in charge, the foremen and the chargehands. A statement was made in writing to the executive council of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the Admiralty, after 18 months, were sufficiently convinced that there was a case that they instituted police inquiries. There were members of the Admiralty police sent from Rosyth to conduct the investigation. Twenty-two members of my organisation were interviewed at Almondbank and 19 of them signed statements that this work had been done. We cannot allow that to continue.
It is now more than eight months since there has been a reply about the investigations that have been carried out there. Our view is that if there is to be any confidence placed in the people in charge of that establishment, action should be taken. What sort of action do we see being taken? A reply was given by the Civil Lord in this House not denying these facts, but merely asserting this was not going on now. The implication was that the work had actually been done. We quite believe it is no longer going on—this "homework"—but we say that people are being shielded in this establishment. After all, there were 22 people interviewed, and the 19 who signed statements would not have done so unless they had either worked on the job or seen the work carried out.
What has happened since makes the position even worse. The charge hand has been promoted to supervisor. He is the man who knew this work was being carried out. I have sufficient confidence in the members of my union and I know sufficient of workshop practice to realise that 19 people would not sign statements that work had been carried out unless it was so.
Mr. Charles Pannell: Is not the man who was promoted supervisor the man whose motor-cycle frame was made on the spot and whose motor cycle was ruled out of order in the local rally?
Mr. Hobson: I am afraid those are the facts. We have had further correspondence from our members engaged in this establishment which we shall be only too pleased to give to the Civil Lord.
The charge hand, as I say, has been promoted supervisor. That is more or less cocking a snook at the lads who complained. We are not standing for that sort of thing. My union has 800,000 members. It is not possible to have a successful rearmament programme in any branch of industry without the good will of the members of my union. Our relations with the Admiralty in the dockyards have been very good and we are not complaining about that. But we are not prepared to tolerate this sort of thing in a Scottish Air Service depot.
A member of the national executive of my union wrote to the Board of Admiralty and it was eight months before a reply was received. That is not good enough. I do not know of any other Department which would treat a national officer of an important trade union in such a manner. Not only was the charge hand promoted supervisor, but there has been petty victimisation, with the knowledge of the engineering officer in charge.
Mr. Digby: It is easy to make allegations, but when we have asked for proof I do not think we have been able to get any information about a single act of victimisation. If the hon. Member would give such information it would make it easier.
Mr. Hobson: We are giving that information. I do not wish to weary the House by reading the whole of the letter, but what has happened is that there was a rota for overtime in the machine shop and the men who have given evidence—we can give the names—have not been included or done their fair share of overtime. That is petty victimisation of a kind we thought had disappeared many years ago.
I would warn the hon. Member that if such a thing happened in Devonport or Chatham, where ships are repaired, there
1404
would be a stoppage of work or a complete ban on overtime. People cannot be treated in this way. There was also a merit scale from which these men were excluded, and I must ask the hon. Gentleman to look at these things. He knows that several of us saw the First Lord about this matter. Were the First Lord present, I would say far more about that interview, but we came away bitterly disappointed. This must be stopped. A national organisation such as this cannot be treated with what is almost contempt by great delay in dealing with these investigations.
Mr. Digby: As the hon. Member is going into so much detail in this one case, surely there is another relevant point which he has neglected, and that is that it was two years before these matters were reported. That was one of the difficulties in the investigation. We are dealing with events which took place long ago. That does not make it any easier to carry out an investigation.
Mr. Hobson: The Civil Lord is wrong. We are not complaining about the speed with which inquiries were put into force. We are complaining about the length of time which elapsed before the result of the inquiries was made known. That took two years. It was only after national representation by members of the executive council that anything was said. It is no good the Civil Lord laughing——
Mr. W. G. Bennett: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House whether all this took place under a Socialist Government?
Mr. Pannell: That has nothing to do with the matter.
Mr. Hobson: That is a most foolish intervention. We are not dealing with a personal responsibility of the Civil Lord. We know that power is delegated. We do not expect him to be on the spot all the time. He has to work from Whitehall. We are concerned that he should bring pressure to bear in his Department to see that efficiency is the order of the day.
We have proved that there has not been efficiency. There has been great delay in dealing with grievances. There has been only the admission that the abuse of "homework" has stopped. We are concerned that, as a result of the inquiry, further steps should be taken.

1405
That is the salient point. It is no good laughing. Nineteen out of 22 men signed the document to the effect that this work had been done. It is wrong, and the Civil Lord knows it.
Therefore, I hope that, as a result of what has been said today, he will look round some of the other more outlandish establishments. He should ensure that a lead is given to the men employed on this job and that there is somebody they can look up to instead of people who are trying to cover up this kind of thing. Once the matter has been brought to light, it is his duty to see that it is dealt with.
Mr. F. Blackburn: Will my hon. Friend——
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris): Order. Captain Ryder.
Mr. W. R. Williams: On a point of order. My hon. Friend the Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Mr. Blackburn) asked my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley before he sat down whether he would be prepared to say something. Is not that in order?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There is no point in asking that question. A large number of hon. Members wish to take part in the debate.
Mr. Williams: But is not that the usual practice in this House?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is not the usual practice to put a series of questions. Captain Ryder.
8.50 p.m.
Captain Robert Ryder: I do not want to be led away by the point raised by the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Hobson). All I would say is that I listened to him attentively and I wish to express the hope that the Civil Lord will look into the matter very carefully. When a union makes a serious charge like this, it is of the utmost importance to make sure that everything is above board.
I wish to refer to the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) during which I thought he cast some doubt on the value of aircraft carriers. He was followed by the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) and, in more detail, by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey).
1406
I do not wish to pose as an expert in naval tactics, or as a prophet of the course which events will take, but I do suggest that, in considering the position of aircraft carriers, there are a great many factors to be taken into consideration. For instance, there is the question of their various duties; for example, the provision of fighter aircraft to protect ships at sea. In my submission, this is far beyond the possible capabilities of Coastal Command in any foreseeable future. We cannot possibly provide fighter aircraft for more than a very limited distance; off-shore we must have carriers from which to operate them.
Then there is the question of strike aircraft, which are a main element in any sea battle. At the moment, as far as I am aware, Coastal Command, by virtue of the clumsy line of demarcation between the two Services, have failed to provide any form of strike aircraft in any strength. I do not say it is their fault, but it is no good crying down the carriers if we have nothing to put in their place. With regard to reconnaissance aircraft, Coastal Command have an aircraft, the Neptune, which is now capable of carrying out most of the requirements of reconnaissance aircraft. But in regard to strike aircraft and fighter aircraft, particularly the latter, the carrier remains an indispensable part of the Fleet, unless we are virtually to withdraw from the sea altogether.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield on previous occasions has castigated the Admiralty as not being air-minded, but the fact is that the Admiralty and the Royal Navy have been suffering severely from the restrictions imposed by this House, I think, in 1937, in what was termed the Inskip Award—restrictions on the extent to which they can use shore-based aircraft. They have had their wings clipped, and we might just as well go to the pelicans in St. James's Park and say, "My good birds, you are not air-minded." They have been pinioned, and I have no doubt that the Admiralty, like the birds in the park, would like to fly down the Thames and out to sea. The fact is that the Admiralty have been pinioned, and this has had a very harmful effect on the whole development of naval tactics and naval thought. It is no good accusing the Admiralty of not being air-minded. What we must do is consider the position in

1407
which the Inskip Award has left our naval service at the present time.
The fact is that, as the effectiveness of aircraft at sea increases, the position of the Admiralty under this award becomes increasingly more invidious, and the question which we must ask ourselves is whether we wish to see the position of the Admiralty steadily down-graded into little more than the headquarters of an escort force or a minesweeping organisation, or whether we wish to resume our traditional position as a great maritime Power in the world, because there is a great deal at stake here.
So long as the battleship was the dominant factor at sea, then this award could be accepted as second best. But now that that is not the case, and the aircraft is the dominant factor, the position of the Admiralty has become absolutely untenable. With a small truncated Fleet Air Arm it is unable to produce the aircraft which it needs, and we all saw at the Fleet Review what that amounts to. They cannot produce the modern aircraft they need.
The trouble, of course, arises over the length of time that is needed to give birth to a new aircraft. It takes between five and seven years, sometimes longer—longer than it takes to build a ship. During that time inventions are produced, tactics may alter, and so in the past the Admiralty have gone to the designers and added inventions during the development stage of the aircraft. This has increased their weight and increased the delay until, eventually, by some process of super-priority, it has been deemed expedient to try to get some small numbers of these aircraft completed before they become obsolete. That, in my submission, is the case with the Gannet.
I would say that two things are absolutely essential in this respect. The first is that the aircraft industry must do something to reduce the time taken up in the development stage, and, secondly, the Admiralty for their part must make it a rigid rule that once tenders have been accepted for a certain aircraft there must be no further additions made to it. When inventions come along, they must be deferred until the next design is called for. In that way we shall speed up the delivery and get up-to-date aircraft, which will be able to be operated without being overweighted.
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Although we have been assured by the First Lord of the Admiralty that vigorous steps are being taken to overcome the appalling deficiency in naval aircraft, I feel that they are too complacent about this, and that they are only nibbling at the problem. In my view, we must now seriously consider the need for a complete amalgamation between Coastal Command and the Admiralty on equal terms. Neither Service is going to like this, but I think the time has now come when we can no longer afford to see our Fleet Air Arm in its present state. We face the sombre fact that the Fleet Air Arm, the main arm of the Fleet, is now obsolete. I address my remarks to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence for his very serious consideration.
Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: Before my hon. and gallant Friend sits down, would he consider——
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is not a desirable practice for an hon. Member to ask another hon. Member a question after he has sat down.
8.58 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Henderson: The Lord Privy Seal, in his opening remarks, paid a tribute to our Forces in Korea in which ——
Mr. James Hudson: On a point of order. May I suggest to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that we have just witnessed, what I am sure you did not intend it to be, a loss of a longstanding Parliamentary privilege. When an hon. Member rises at the end of another hon. Member's speech with a request that the hon. Member who has just sat down should answer such and such a point, it has always been assumed that if the hon. Member so requested is willing to reply, he should be allowed to reply. Am I to understand, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that that privilege has now been brought to an end?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: A large number of hon. Members on both sides of the House want to take part in this debate. I am not departing from the usual practice of the House that is observed when an hon. Members asks a question and prefaces it with the words "Before the hon. Gentleman resumes his seat," when, in fact, he has already done so. It is another form of getting in a further point.
Mr. Orr-Ewing: May I humbly submit to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that my hon. and gallant Friend had not sat down? I was hovering because I did not want to interrupt him in the middle of a sentence.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I recognised the hon. Member to be hovering, but, as a matter of fact, the hon. and gallant Member had sat down before the question was put.
Mr. Henderson: I was about to associate myself and my right hon. and hon. Friends with the tribute paid by the Lord Privy Seal at the beginning of his speech this afternoon to our Forces who served in Korea, and with the expression of sympathy which he voiced in relation to the families who have suffered loss in that conflict.
I should like also to associate myself with the tributes that were paid to the two maiden speeches this afternoon, especially that of the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) who, I thought, made an extremely thoughtful contribution.
The Lord Privy Seal based his speech upon a statement of policy, namely, the determination of the Government to strengthen our defences and to make our contribution to N.A.T.O. To that view the great majority of those sitting on this side of the House would subscribe, but I was somewhat doubtful about his further remark, taking it at its face value, that we must continue to increase in strength. That would be acceptable in relation, of course, to the circumstances that may or may not develop in the next year or two.
I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), who has now left the House, made a powerful criticism of the armament position. There was a good deal of justification for what he said. It is obvious that a country like our own, eight years after the end of World War II, with 860,000 men and women in the Services, 200,000 conscripts and an average—it may be a minimum average—expenditure of anything up to £1,600 million a year for the next five years on the present basis, will undoubtedly be faced with very great difficulties, unless something is done to adjust the financial expenditure to be incurred in respect of rearmament to the economic position of the country.
1410
I thought that to associate the economic burden with the question of commitments was a fair comment. I believe that sooner or later—it may be that they have already done it—the Government will have to re-assess our economic position or our armaments policy in order to relate the economic position to the commitments which face our country at the present time. It has been done before, but it will not be easy.
I do not believe that the way to settle the problem of commitments is merely to walk out of this or that area of the world; on the other hand, we have to realise that as long as our commitments are maintained as they are we shall have to face the demand that they make upon our reserves. The fact that in the present state of commitments we have 11 divisions or 11½ divisions stationed abroad raises questions which must be of great concern to the Government.
A good deal has been said in the debate about National Service. In spite of the suggestion made in the last defence debate by the Parliamentary Secretary, who is to follow me, that objection to National Service in peace time
"has a rather 19th-century Victorian smell."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 680.]
—whatever that may be—I say without fear of contradiction that the great majority of the people of this country are opposed to National Service in peace time and have accepted it only because of the abnormal international situation which has existed in the past two or three years.
The Parliamentary Secretary also paid a tribute to the late Prime Minister, the present Leader of the Opposition, saying that one of his greatest services to his country had been to take National Service out of party politics. May I express the hope that the Government, in their turn, will keep this problem out of party politics? Like my right hon. Friend who opened this debate, I do not believe that we can abolish National Service at the present time, but we feel that there is a case for a review of the whole problem, and in the light of that review Parliament could decide whether the period should be two years, 21 months or 18 months. Moreover, we consider that Parliament should have the opportunity, not only in the forthcoming autumn but every year, to approve or disapprove the proposed term of service.

1411
The case for two years in the Royal Air Force is very much less today than it was two or three years ago. When I was at the Air Ministry, one of the strong arguments put forward by the Air Staff at that time was the need to train National Service cadets as pilots, navigators and so on. They argued with force that it took at least 18 months to train a pilot, for example, and that if they were to be trained for over 18 months and then relegated to the Reserve they would not be able to render any productive service to the squadrons of the R.A.F. We are told that it is no longer intended to train National Service men as air crew, with certain exceptions, so that part of the case for two years' service seems to be no longer of any relevance.
Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that the operational strength of the R.A.F. has depended on its technical tradesmen, and that they cannot possibly be trained in very much under two years to do their job?
Mr. Henderson: There are very limited numbers of technical tradesmen who require two years' service, but that only strengthens my point, because if it takes two years to train them and they are in the Air Force for only two years they also will not render productive service to the Air Force.
I hope that I am not misinterpreting the statement which was made in the Air Estimates debate earlier this year when I refer to the projected smaller front line. There is a strong case for arguing that with a projected smaller Air Force the R.A.F. could well manage with a 21 months' period or even an 18 months' period. It was reported yesterday that American chiefs of staff are to undertake a revaluation of the role and mission of the armed services of the United States. Is not this a vital and urgent necessity in our own Services?
We have 860,000 men and women in the three Services at the present time. Even allowing for existing overseas commitments, might there not be possibilities of considerable savings in manpower if the roles and missions of the three Services were re-assessed in the light of modern conditions and on the basis that air power is the greatest deterrent against
1412
war and aggression? There may be room for differences about what I am going to say now, but will not the new situation in Korea have any effect upon the requirement of the Army and the Navy for manpower? There is certainly one commitment less if events turn out as we hope that they will.
Meanwhile I want to raise a few points-which are relevant to the use of manpower in the three Services. The fact that young men are being compelled to serve in time of peace makes it all the more necessary that the Government should make the most efficient use of the manpower at their disposal. The Prime Minister, speaking on 5th March and referring to the Royal Air Force, said;
"However, I am strongly of the opinion that the members of non-flying personnel in the Royal Air Force must be the subject of continuer scrutiny with a view to any saving which will not detract from efficiency."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512. c. 574.]
I should like to know whether that scrutiny has taken place or is taking place, and if so, what saving has been effected by the decision not to train National Service men as aircrew.
Could the Parliamentary Secretary say anything about economies in manpower as a result of air trooping? Are there possibilities of greatly increased air trooping so as to reduce the number of men who are in the pipeline? What has been done about the use of civilian manpower? Speaking in the same debate on 5th March, the Parliamentary Secretary, in reply to an interjection by the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing), who had made inquiries about the employment of civilian manpower, said;
"I will certainly draw my noble Friend's attention to that. It may be that an inquiry about that should be carried out."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 682.]
Has that inquiry been carried out, or did, the Parliamentary Secretary forget all about it? Perhaps he will let us know whether that inquiry has taken place, and what possibilities there are of saving manpower by a greater use of civilian labour.
A week or so ago many of us were at the Royal Air Force Review at Odiham, and I think it will be agreed that it was a most impressive display of co-ordinated flying, and afforded striking evidence of the high efficiency in the Royal Air Force. The Hunter and Swift prototypes showed

1413
a remarkable performance, but I think there was widespread disappointment that none of these machines was as yet in service. Production orders were placed more than two years ago for these advanced fighters, and in spite of super-priority, the planes do not yet seem to be coming off the production line.
The Canberra, for example, was ordered early in 1949, and I think I am right in saying that the first squadron of Canberras was formed in the autumn of 1951—about two and a half years after the first orders were given. This was without super-priority. The Swift and the Hunter were ordered early in 1951. Yet in July, 1953, this month, all we have are the two prototypes, and this is with super-priority. Surely there is something unsatisfactory in this state of affairs. Can the Parliamentary Secretary give any explanation? Can he hold out any hope about the dates upon which both these advance fighters are likely to come into squadron service?
Does this indicate that the policy of super-priority has not had any real effect on production? If it has, we would be very glad to have the information. Can we be told when the Swift and the Hunter are likely to come into squadron service? Can we also be told when the Valiant, the first of the three four-jet bombers to be ordered early in 1951, is likely to come into service? Is everything possible being done to expedite the production of this vitally important machine?
My hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) made what appeared, on the face of it, to be a very attractive suggestion that the United States should take sole responsibility for strategic bombing. I do not think that is likely to be a very satisfactory solution, even though it would save this country a great deal of money. So long as we have a Royal Air Force, so long must we seek to make the Royal Air Force a balance and highly efficient force, and if the equipment with which it is provided is to be of the best type, then, if financial considerations prevent us from providing as much of that equipment as we should like, we must rather regulate the size of the Air Force than the quality of the equipment which it is to have.
This afternoon a Question was asked about a light fighter—the Gnat. This
1414
raises very interesting problems. Hon. Members opposite who served in the Royal Air Force know better than I do that one of the problems of a modern air force is that the latest machines, in their turn, very soon become obsolescent. Moreover, they have already become very much more expensive. The Lincoln, an obsolescent four-piston-engined bomber, cost £70,000; the Valiant is to cost £300,000. The Spitfire cost £10,000; the Hunter costs more than £20,000. I did not think that the answer of the Under-Secretary of State for Air was particularly satisfactory. He indicated that the projected Gnat was not equal in performance to the Hunter or the Swift. On the other hand, when I asked him if he could state the differences in performance between the projected Gnat and the Hunter, he said he would require notice. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the Under-Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Supply to give very careful consideration to this new light fighter.
I am informed that for an expenditure of £6 million, 215 Hunters or Swifts could be provided, as against 900 of these light fighters. In production time, five times as many light fighters could be produced, in the same number of working hours, as against the Hunter. None the less, I should certainly put in one qualification. Whether it be the Gnat or any other type of new light fighter, it must be a plane in which our pilots have full confidence, as regards its performance both as a flying machine and a fighting machine, within limits. Those limits must be limits as to quantity. As regards quality, our Air Force pilots, who take their lives in their hands every time they go into the air in these fast-moving planes—many of them getting near supersonic speeds—are entitled to the best in quality that can be provided.
With regard to the build-up of Bomber Command, it was announced the other day that the 70 Washingtons received from the United States Air Force three years ago are to be dispensed with and returned to the United States. The Parliamentary Secretary stated, in the debate in March, that our light bomber force, consisting mainly of Canberras, was to be smaller than was originally intended, but when these new Washingtons were received it was the policy of the Air Council that the

1415
strategic bomber force should be composed mainly of Washingtons and Lincolns, pending the arrival of the four-jet-engined advanced bombers.
We are told that those advanced bombers are not likely to arrive in quantity for some time, possibly another two or three years. Does not that mean that getting rid of these Washingtons will seriously weaken the effective strength of the medium bomber force of Bomber Command? I understood from the Under-Secretary this afternoon that there was no change of policy. In that case I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary why these six or eight squadrons of B.29's—the Washingtons—are being returned, when we know that for another two years at least they will not be replaced by the new four-jet bombers. I should think that the striking power of our Air Force would be considerably weakened for the next two or three years as a result of this policy.
I want to say a few words about the radar chain. There was an exercise in Germany at the end of last week called Exercise Coronet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Tactical Air Force expressed misgivings about the radar equipment in use in his command. I should like to have the comments of the Parliamentary Secretary on that statement. A few months ago the Under-Secretary of State for Air gave what I thought to be a reassuring reply about the radar chain facing the Iron Curtain when he said its rehabilitation was being pressed forward with as much urgency as that in the United Kingdom. That does not seem to agree with the statement made by the Commander-in-Chief last week.
In his reply to the last debate, the Parliamentary Secretary said that the nature of future wars might be very different from the nature of the wars we have known in the past. I agree with him. If scientists are to be believed, we are rapidly passing from the aeroplane era to the rocket era. Conventional planes may form only a part of the defence requirements within a comparatively limited number of years, and more and more emphasis may have to be placed on the provision of defence against the rocket.
It was reported in "The Times" on 17th July that mass production methods
1416
had enabled the Russians to produce 24,000 supersonic missiles of an improved V.2 German pattern each year. It was also stated that with an improved technique, a single launching ramp fired missiles at the rate of 800 an hour and, further, that great efforts were being made by Russian engineers to perfect and produce in quantity a 97-stage rocket which would have a range of 2,500 miles. That is not quite as fantastic as it may seem to some people, for even at the end of World War II the V.2 was being fired with a range of anything up to 400 miles. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, as a result of research and development during the past eight years, the Russians, and indeed it may be the Americans, too, have been able to produce a rocket of the V.2 character with a range of up to 2,500 miles. The accuracy of this information may be questioned, but I am not in a position to question it. Perhaps the Minister can say whether any intelligence information has been received which supports that suggestion.
I want to ask the Minister what the Government are doing on the research and development side to provide counter-weapons to the rocket. We know that an air-to-air guided missile is under production, and the Minister of Supply has informed the House that its availability is not very far away. Do the Government or the Chiefs of Staff rely on the guided missile or on a combination of the missile and the bomber?
It seems to me that we must face the fact that there can be no perfect air defence and that absolute safety cannot be guaranteed. Some months ago Lord Trenchard told us that the best defence was the power of attack. On the other hand, a number of American scientists recently reported that perfect defence against air attack is unobtainable and completely impracticable economically and technically in face of the expected advances in potential hostile offensive capabilities.
May I say a word about N.A.T.O.? We have had quotations from General Gruenther and General Ridgway which appear to be in contradiction. I would suggest that N.A.T.O. certainly justifies its existence. The countries associated with it have made great increases in their expenditure—Canada nearly five-fold, France three-fold, United States four-fold

1417
and the United Kingdom more than twofold. It is not surprising that General Gruenther a few days ago stated that N.A.T.O. Forces are increasing in strength. He also said he did not believe that a third world war would take place because of the armed strength of N.A.T.O.
Both statements are inconsistent with the misgivings expressed by General Ridgway a few months ago. It is difficult to understand the general's pessimism. The armament expenditure of N.A.T.O. countries during the past two years has averaged £20,000 million, and if the position were as serious as indicated by General Ridgway in March, when he said that during the foreseeable future we should be critically short of material, one is entitled to ask where all this vast outlay of money has gone. The trouble is largely due to the veil of secrecy which surrounds all information about the Armed Forces of this and other countries. The Lord Privy Seal will not mind, I am sure, if I say that he was not very forthcoming with detailed information. The Labour Government were attacked year after year for drawing this veil of secrecy round the information about our Armed Forces which was at our disposal, but the present Government are not living up to their criticism.
What is the position about the 50 divisions which General Ridgway said were more like 35? Various suggestions and comments have been made today, but what is the position? Can we be told whether the 50 divisions are in as poor a state as General Ridgway suggested? In the last debate the Parliamentary Secretary rather rode round that by suggesting that generals always ask for more men than they are likely to get. It is not only a question of numbers of men. General Ridgway was dealing with the question of the divisions being under-equipped, under-trained and under-supplied. What he means by "under-supplied" refers to oil, ammunition and so on. What is the position about these divisions, in view of the enormous outlay of money?
What is the position about N.A.T.O. air defences? Lord Ismay has said that the air forces of Western Europe would be equipped with more than 4,000 planes by the end of the year. Is that forecast likely to materialise, especially
1418
in view of the fact that, as a result of the curtailment in the production of Canberras, the strength of the Second Tactical Air Force will be very much less than it was intended to be?
I now want to say a word about naval power. Is it a fact that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, the Russian Navy is now the second best in the world? Is that accepted?
Hon. Members: No, it is not.
Lord John Hope: The hon. and learned Gentleman is confusing the Red Navy with the Red Ensign.
Mr. Henderson: Perhaps I have seen more Red Ensigns than the noble Lord has. During the Navy Estimates debate the First Lord stated that the Russian Navy was the second largest navy in the world in ships actually in commission. He must have had a reason for trying to impress upon this country the fact that the Russians had the second largest navy in the world. Is it accepted by the Government that the Russian Navy is the second largest navy in the world, merely because it has more ships in commission, without evidence that the fighting capacity and the efficiency of the Russian Navy makes it the second in the world? I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to say a word about that.
I should like to deal, in conclusion, with one other point. In the long run the best defence against war and the use of all these engines of destruction is to prevent war. Today the world burden of re-armament is estimated at £40,000 million per year and this country's share of that is £1,500 million. This burden seems inevitable unless we can secure a vital change in the international situation. I agree that it is essential that we should negotiate from strength. None the less, few will doubt the value of reaching agreement with the Russians, especially in the field of disarmament. Russia can make no greater contribution to world peace than to accept the disarmament proposals put forward by the Western Powers at the United Nations. Russia, playing her part in removing antagonisms and suspicions, has nothing to fear from N.A.T.O. It has been made clear that N.A.T.O. is only a defensive alliance and its basis is economic,

1419
political and cultural co-operation between the countries belonging to it.
I look forward to the day, provided the world will disarm, when N.A.T.O. can be transformed into the nucleus of a world system of collective security, similar to the proposed Geneva Protocol of 1924, which was conditional upon a progressive reduction in world armaments. If that were accomplished, I see no reason why N.A.T.O. should not be utilised as a basis of world security to include, not only Russia and China, but any other country which was prepared to conform to the rules of the organisation.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: I should like to ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker. In this debate so far those who have spoken have been in favour of conscription. Those who are against conscription have not had an opportunity to put their point of view. Will it be in order on this Bill to discuss defence following the Minister's speech?
Mr. Speaker: It would be quite in order.
9.32 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch): I shall try to answer as many of the 52 questions asked by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), as my strength and the patience of the House will allow, but before I start to do so I think the House would wish me to congratulate my two hon. Friends on the maiden speeches which we have heard today. My hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) made some well-thought-out and sensible suggestions in a short and modest speech, and I thought he put his case very well. We were all very glad to hear the hon. Lady the Member for Down, North (Mrs. Ford), particularly as we had such respect and, if I may say so, affection for her late father. I am sure that he would have liked to hear the noble panegyric she made on her native Ulster.
In a sense this debate has been dominated by some words that were used by the Prime Minister on 11th May. They have already been quoted in this debate. He said on that occasion that;
"This would be the most fatal moment for the free nations to relax their comradeship
1420
and preparations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 902.]
At the time that speech met with very general agreement and appreciation. The arch warmonger had become the arch peacemonger. It is pleasant that that——
Mr. Ellis Smith: There was no need to say that.
Mr. Birch: —particular poison in the political wells has been removed. That speech has been given almost scriptural authority and people have applied to it both the higher and the lower criticism. What I would say is that that speech was designed to be read as a whole and that we should not pick out patches and pieces from it.
I think we can all agree that there are great possibilities both for good and for evil in the world, and if the good is to prevail we must succeed, somehow or other, in maintaining that general agreement on the broad principles of our armament policy which we have had over the last few years. In spite of some of the things that have been said in the debate today, I do not think we need altogether despair of being able to do so. Some hon. Gentlemen opposite have not supported the present policy, but they never supported the policy of the late Government, and I think that we can, on the whole, be satisfied that there is still a very broad measure of agreement. Certain specialists in wishful thinking on the opposite benches have not agreed. They have said, "We think a new situation has arisen."
I noticed that in the last foreign affairs debate almost every speaker declared that he had no idea of what was going on in the Kremlin but added that no doubt something important was going on. It reminded me of a great Cambridge philosopher, McTaggart, who, after a long study of philosophy, finally reached a conclusion and his conclusion was that "something exists." I think that that was a sensible conclusion. Obviously, something is going on in the Kremlin. It may be something very good and we should certainly welcome any hopeful sign. We should be ready to meet them half way and certainly to go into conference with them, but I do not think that at this stage we ought to abandon the policy which has brought us to this point.

1421
I am reinforced here by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) because, speaking in the debate on foreign affairs, he said this:
"As far as I know, nobody on the Labour side has suggested that we should weaken our defences at once because of the improved language and spirit of Soviet pronouncements. We have not done so and do not propose to do so."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July, 1953; Vol. 518, c. 494.]
I hope he was not referring to the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) as "nobody." In any case, it would be wrong to try to beat off the fruits of our policy before they are ripe. If we did that we should risk losing the value of all the work we have done and of the sacrifices we have made.
That brings me to the question of N.A.T.O. Of course, things are better. It is perfectly true that the provisional force goals set at Lisbon have been substantially reached. Even so, when they are reached our defences on the Continent will still not be very strong. I do not think we should blink at that fact. That is why General Ridgway and General Gruenther have pointed this out occasionally, and warned us that we have not an absolutely solid defence on the ground in Europe. That is why many people who have studied this question are anxious that the Germans should be brought into E.D.C., or some other organisation simply because, unless they are brought in, we can have no realistic defence.
The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) made great play with a quotation of General Gruenther, but it was quoted a little out of its context because the general was trying to get more money out of a reluctant Congress and the matter was put better by the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt).
To sum up the first part of what I have to say, I do not think we want to alter our policy radically at this moment. That brings me to the subject of National Service. The right hon. Member for Easington was very delicate on this subject this afternoon. The last time we had a defence debate he was "in the dog house" and was not allowed to speak. He seemed very much on his best behaviour today, but rather "let his hair down" in the "Star" yesterday. Before I get on to the argument he used in the
1422
"Star" I should like to put the Korean matter into proper perspective, because that was mentioned by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton.
We have in Korea 20,000 United Kingdow Service men, of whom 8,000 are National Service men. The total manpower in the Services is 867,000, so we can see what a small proportion is represented by our forces in Korea. As several hon. Members have pointed out, we cannot remove our troops immediately from Korea. They will have to stay there for a time.
Mr. Shinwell: There are more than 20,000; that was said in another place.
Mr. Birch: These are the figures. I think that the right hon. Gentleman is probably confusing them with those of the Commonwealth forces. I am talking about the United Kingdom forces. It is perfectly true that National Service was extended only after the start of the Korean war, but that war was the last straw, and, as the House knows, we still have in this country today no real strategic reserve, and our first concern must be to rebuild a strategic reserve. Out of the 867,000 total of Service manpower at the beginning of June, 312,000 were National Service men. A 25 per cent. reduction would amount to 78,000 men, a number far in excess of the saving of 20,00 men which might be occasioned by the truce in Korea.
The present recruiting figures, in spite of what the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) said, are not altogether discouraging. They are not very good, but they are not desperately bad. Engagements are for the three-year short engagement in the Army, and there are various short-service engagements in the R.A.F. It is a fact that many of these short-service engagements, or even most of them, are attributable to our having 24 months' National Service. For instance, in the financial year 1952–53, 33,000 men otherwise due for call-up enlisted in the Army and 31,000 in the R.A.F. If the period of National Service had been 18 months I think it most improbable that anything like that number of men would have enlisted.
This is shown by another pointer. In the current financial year the number of men available for call-up is 12 per cent.

1423
fewer than last year. Great play was made by the hon. Member for Coventry, East with the argument that "The Americans are doing us down, they are calling up 5 per cent. fewer men." We are calling up perhaps, very evilly, 12 per cent. fewer men. At the same time, the rate of Regular recruiting is 19 per cent. down during the first six months. The two figures are not exactly the same, but there is a certain correlation between the two. I cannot doubt that if we reduced the period of National Service we should also reduce the number of Regular engagements.
This brings me to the article of the right hon. Member for Easington, in the "Star." Its very clear title was
"Cut the call-up to 18 months."
In the first paragraph there was a reference to Field Marshal Slim. I would rather like to read it to the House; it was rather an important one. After stating that he did not accept two years National Service, and that it was wrong, the right hon. Gentleman wrote:
"In an article in the 'Star' some time ago Field Marshal Sir William Slim stated that eighteen months was sufficient except for the technical branches of the Army."
I may be stupid, but I should have thought that that meant that Field Marshal Slim had said that it was not necessary to have two years' National Service except, possibly, for certain technicians. I checked that impression with other people; they were equally as stupid as myself. Knowing the Field Marshal and his views, however, it seemed a little improbable.
I thought it wise to look up the article. The title of it was:
"We can't cut the call-up."
Mr. Shinwell: Read what it said.
Mr. Birch: I am going to read a lot of what it said.
Mr. Shinwell: What did the Field Marshal say?
Mr. Birch: I am going to tell the right hon. Gentleman. The Field Marshal stated the case for two years' National Service much better than I could, and I am going to quote a few of his arguments. The first point he made against cutting the call-up was the effect which it would
1424
have on the quality of our reserves, and he used these words. He said:
"There is an immense superiority of fighting value, in leadership and in general usefulness in the officer or man who has had this experience of two years' service, much of it abroad, and possibly some of it in action."
It is true that the Field Marshal said it may be possible to train non-technicians in less than 18 months. But the point that he was making was that you need for your Army not only technicians but experienced other men. He pointed out that unless you have two years' training you would not be able to mobilise your reserves quickly——
Mr. Shinwell Mr. Shinwell rose——
Mr. Birch: Perhaps I could say one word about training, because the hon. Member for Dudley was talking of training the Territorials. He said it was essential that there should be divisional training and in fact three divisions this year are doing divisional training——
Mr. Wigg: Only in this country.
Mr. Birch: Certainly only in this country. I do not know where the hon. Gentleman wants them to go. [Laughter.]
Mr. Wigg: It is interesting to hear the laughter on that point. But when mobilisation occurs, if ever it does, the whole of the defence of this country will depend on getting those reserve divisions across to Germany, and therefore they ought to-do their training in Germany.
Mr. Shinwell Mr. Shinwell rose——
Mr. Birch: I have a lot more of Field Marshal Sir William Slim's article——
Mr. Shinwell: But could I deal with this point? What the hon. Gentleman is endeavouring to do is to show that I misquoted Field Marshal Sir William Slim on this point. [HON. MEMBERS; "Hear, hear."] We are all agreed that is the point at issue. What the Field Marshal said—it is in the "Star" article—was that you can train an ordinary soldier in 18 months, but for the purposes of training technicians you require two years. That was the argument to which I addressed myself in the article I wrote yesterday and that is the point of substance; because if you can train the ordinary soldier for effective purposes in 18 months, then I ask the question—as indeed I asked it in the article yesterday

1425
—why do you want to keep them for six months longer?
Mr. Birch: May I read what the right hon. Gentleman said? He said:
"In an article in the 'Star' some time ago Field Marshal Sir William Slim stated that eighteen months was sufficient except for the technical branches of the Army."
If that means anything, it means that 18 months is sufficient for the whole call-up. The whole point of the article, which is evinced by the headline, is that you cannot cut the call-up. We know the right hon. Gentleman has a very agile mind. It darts forwards and sideways and up and down, but all I am saying is that an ordinary simple person who read the article, who did not know the Field Marshal and who had not read his previous article, would think that the Field Marshal had advocated cutting the call-up.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Shinwell: Obviously the hon. Gentleman will get the cheers from the claque behind him. That we expect—[Interruption]—that is inevitable particularly at this time of night. I do not attach any importance to that. I want to stress this question to the hon. Gentleman. Before the Korean War occurred, when the Labour Government decided, in view of the situation, which was very tense at that time, to increase the period by six months, was there any demand by the Conservative Party that the call-up should be increased to two years? None whatever. If they believe now that it was essential to do it all along, why did not they make a demand at that time?
Mr. Birch: Quite a number of things have happened since then. We did support hon. Members opposite in their decision, and we blamed them very much for putting their tails between their legs and running away from it. We supported them wholeheartedly against their own followers on the two-year period.
I have one or two other quotations from the Field Marshal which I should like to give. His second main point for not reducing the call-up was that without the two-year period we could not fulfil our commitments abroad. He added, and it is perfectly true, that no soldier or statesman wants to have large garrisons overseas but that successive Governments have in fact been forced to do so.
1426
We have had a great deal of discussion on this matter. We had the hon. Member for Coventry, East, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee. West (Mr. Strachey) and others and they have not all completely agreed with each other. A simple answer is, "All right. We will pack up and go." That is a very simple answer which we can all understand, but I believe that it is a wholly disastrous one. Hon. Gentlemen opposite should remember that they were the people who sent the troops originally to Malaya and to Egypt. I believe that they were right in both cases and that if we had run away it would have been disastrous.
The next point the Field Marshal made——
Mr. Shinwell: Answer the questions.
Mr. Birch: I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman is becoming allergic to field marshals.
Mr. Shinwell: No.
Mr. Birch: The next point——
Mr. Shinwell: The hon. Gentleman has not answered the questions put to him.
Mr. Birch: I intend to answer them all. This is exempted business.
The Field Marshal put the case far better than I can and that is why I wanted to quote some of his words. This is very relevant; many people have referred to the point. He said that the shorter period causes more waste and delay. He said that it causes much more movement and involves periods of acclimatisation and local training. It causes a great deal of waste through excessive movement.
The last point I make on this question concerns what was said about building up our Regular Forces. The Field Marshal also said that if we cut our period of National Service, we shall automatically have to have a larger proportion of Regulars abroad. Now, if the prospect for a Regular soldier is almost permanent absence from his country, it is not very likely that men will join up. Who can blame them? The Field Marshal said he recognised the great responsibility which those who decide the period of call-up have, not only to their country, but also to what he described as the greatest asset

1427
the country had, namely, the young men themselves. He ended with some ringing words; he said:
"Two years' National Service is a burden, but in the world today it is worth carrying. The citizens of ancient Rome might in the long run have done better to keep their legions overseas up to strength and have had fewer circuses at home."
Another point the right hon. Gentleman made in his article was that the Navy did not need any National Service men, and that the only reason they called them up was that they had nowhere else to go. I cannot understand why, when the right hon. Gentleman was Minister of Defence, he did not do something about it.
Mr. Shinwell: But I did. The hon. Gentleman knows nothing at all about the subject. How can he? The fact of the matter is that we did a great deal about it. It is true that the Navy did not want National Service men, and I doubt if they need them now. At first there was a proposal that they should get 10,000 National Service men every year, but that was cut down to a minimum number and they required them only for shore duty. For seagoing purposes they did not require National Service men at all.
Mr. Birch: Of course they have had National Service men throughout and they still have them. I will tell the right hon. Gentleman why they want them. There are three main purposes. First, they get between 500 and 600 trained artificers as National Service men each year. They get about one-third of their aircrew and also a number of doctors, dentists and Royal Marines. They also build up a number of trained reservists.
Mr. Shinwell: Trained artificers at 18 years of age? Nonsense.
Mr. Birch: We heard a great deal from other hon. Gentlemen about waste. There has been very considerable progress in the elimination of waste. When I was first sent to a Service Department after the last election, I was astonished, not at the waste, but at the ease and profusion with which money was supplied for defence. That has very definitely now come to an end, and the real security for the conservation of Service manpower and civilian manpower, or saving in anything else, is that money
1428
should not be too easy to get. We know perfectly well that, as the hon. Member for Coventry, East has said, we are up against financial difficulties, and, therefore, it behoves us to see that every man is properly employed and every penny is spent to the best advantage, and that is what we are endeavouring to do.
I am also asked whether we are carrying out a special review at this time. None of these things has been unforeseen, and we said in the Defence White Paper that further reviews would be carried out. The size of the Armed Forces is under continuous review, as further knowledge becomes available, and although I should be the last to say that there is no waste in the Services, I think that the right hon. Gentleman opposite can, at any rate, be gratified that the waste is a good deal less today than it was during the period of his incumbency of the Ministry. One can conclude that what the Prime Minister called the "Shinwell system" should continue, and, as far as I am aware, that is still the official policy of the Opposition. We shall have the Order in Council before us when we come back, and the matter can then be fully debated.
There is one other point—not the Field Marshal's point——
Mr. Shinwell: Why does not the hon. Gentleman answer the question?
Mr. Birch: I want to deal with another matter, for there have been many questions in the House and a great many articles about it. It is the question whether men are being wrongly classified by the Ministry of Labour when called up for their National Service. This is a rather important subject, and we hear a great deal about it. The first medical examination takes place by a National Service Medical Board, which comes under the Ministry of Labour, and which assesses a man's physical standard and functional capacity, according to a system laid down. He is then placed in one of four medical groups.
It is not the job of the Board to say whether the man ought or ought not to be called up; they simply classify him, and the business of the Services is to say what men they need and whether they could utilise the services of a particular man in a low medical category.

1429
It is a fact that certain category 3 men are accepted for clerical duties, cookhouse duties, or as storemen, telephonists and for certain tradesmen's jobs.
This is the system which the right hon. Gentleman himself very rightly started and announced in February, 1951, and it is the right one, because it is wrong that men who are perfectly suitable for combatant duties should be doing non-combatant duties. The Medical Boards are composed of experienced professional men, and they are instructed to ask for the fullest information on a man's medical history and his family's medical history. If necessary, a report is called for from his medical practitioner or from the hospital if he has been in one. If there is any doubt, the man is sent to a consultant, and it is a noteworthy fact that one man in seven does go to a consultant. National Service men are called up some time after they have been examined by the Ministry of Labour; on being called up, they are examined immediately by the Royal Air Force, and within a very few days by the Army. A very small proportion of men are rejected by the Forces after they have been called up. I should like to give some figures, because I think that a wrong impression has been created in some quarters.
The figures of National Service men discharged from the Army on medical grounds within 14 days of entry were 10·4 per 1,000 in 1950, 7 per 1,000 in 1951, 6·9 per 1,000 in 1952 and 7–7 per 1,000 for the first 10 intakes in 1953. The figures are very low indeed, and more than half the men rejected are rejected on psychiatric grounds.
Mr. Crossman: All grade 3 men.
Mr. Birch: Not necessarily all grade 3 men. These are the figures for all the men. I think we can conclude from this that the medical boards do their job well and that the number of mistakes they make is small. Fifteen or 20 cases have recently been ventilated, but hon. Members must remember that 250,000 men are examined annually. I am sorry for having made this digression, but so much has been said on this subject that I thought I had better give the House the figures.
I now come to the question of equipment.
Mr. Crossman: Before we leave the question of manpower, may I ask the hon. Gentleman one question? Do I understand that in his view there have been no American cuts in Service manpower this year?
Mr. Birch: There has been no change in their system. The hon. Gentleman told me that they were calling up 5 per cent. less men this year than last. We are calling up 12 per cent. less.
Mr. Crossman: Let me get the question clear. I do not think that the "New York Times" can be regarded as a frivolous newspaper, and it heads its article
"Levelling Off of American Manpower."
I am asking why, if the Americans are right to level off 160,000 men this year, the hon. Gentleman rules out any possibility of our levelling off our manpower. Does he deny that the Americans are levelling them off?
Mr. Birch: What I am saying is that we are levelling off twice as many.
Mr. Crossman: It is a damned lie.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must not say it is a damned lie.
Mr. Crossman: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker. I will withdraw that remark and will say that it is a totally inaccurate statement.
Mr. Birch: If what the hon. Gentleman says is true, namely, that the Americans have called up 5 per cent. fewer men this year than last, then I am equally right in saying that we have called up 12 per cent. fewer men.
Mr. James Callaghan: There is more than a debating point involved here because the Parliamentary Secretary is allowing it to be thought that, in fact, we are calling up 12 per cent. fewer men than we called up last year. Will he say whether, in fact, the number of men serving in our Forces is 12 per cent. fewer than it was last year, or is the decrease accounted for by the fact that more people are joining the Regular Services, and that therefore not so many are available for conscription?
Mr. Birch: It is accounted for by the fact that there was one extra call-up last

1431
year. The point is that neither the Americans nor ourselves have altered the systems under which we work. Under both systems it is perfectly possible to balance the number of men called up, either by adjusting the medical categories or by accelerating or decelerating the rate of call-up, and we have in fact done that. We have not had as many call-ups this year as last year.
I shall now, if I may, get on with the next part of my speech. I want to deal with equipment. The hon. Member for Coventry, East warned British workers about offshore purchases. He said that when the time came the Appropriation Committee of the American Congress would very likely not put up the money and that they might be thrown out of work. I am informed that no off-shore contracts are signed by the Americans until the money has been appropriated. We can take it that off-shore contracts are all right.
We had a comment from the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, and comments from other hon. Gentlemen, about the delays in production. It certainly is true that there have been disappointing delays. The Russians have been extraordinarily quick with the M.i.G15s, and we ought to be quicker than we have been. The difficulty with modern types of aircraft is that, more often than not, the prototype bears only a very partial resemblance to the aeroplane when it finally enters a squadron. Between the statement of staff requirements and the aeroplane becoming operational, there are invariably modifications, new devices added, and technical developments incorporated. The recent practice of ordering off the drawing board naturally complicates the problem still further.
There are two points on which I would like to lay some stress. The modern type of aircraft capable of breaking through the sound barrier presents quite new constructional problems, on which there is no fund of experience on which to call. Secondly, it is most important not to put an aeroplane into squadron service until the tests have been done and safety factors assessed. To do otherwise would not be fair to the men in our Air Force. The point is not the difficulty of production; it is difficulty of design. Several
1432
hon. Members have mentioned electronics. Take a modern medium bomber, designed to bomb at two or three times the height of any previous aeroplane; it is not just a matter of planning and producing bombing and navigational aids. We have to invent and design them. That is why it is so difficult to get everything to march in line.
Mr. Hobson: While I agree with that statement, does not the hon. Gentleman think, bearing in mind all the difficulties, that there are still too many types of aircraft?
Mr. Birch: That is certainly a possible view, and it was discussed at some length on the Air Estimates debate, when it was disclosed that the Victor and the Vulcan had been ordered. The great point has always been made by the air staff that it is extraordinarily difficult to tell by looking at the drawings, or even at the prototype, how an aeroplane will turn out in practice. For instance, the Swift and the Hunter are now coming along and there have been, to my certain knowledge, several changes of view as to which is the better aircraft. It is not an easy decision to make, and if we put our money on one type and happen to back a loser we are in a very dangerous position indeed.
I do not think that the position is quite as gloomy as it has been painted. So far as the Fleet Air Arm is concerned, they are being re-equipped steadily with Sea Hawks. A large number of Avengers have been received from the United States under Defence Aid, and the first squadrons are being equipped with this aircraft, which is still in service with the United States Navy. The first Strike Squadron of Wyverns has been formed ashore, and certain obsolete types of aircraft, like the Firebrands and the Baracudas, have been withdrawn. Answering further questions by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, I can say that the Swifts will be in quadron service this year and the Hunters will follow fairly close behind. Next year, the Valiants will be in squadron service.
Super-priority has worked well. I am informed that in the case of the Vulcan and the Victor, anything between 6 months and 18 months has been saved in the procurement of supplies of various sorts. Certainly we have been slower

1433
than the Russians, but there is some evidence that the Russians are not having it all their own way with the later types, and there is no evidence that we are really slower than other countries which are producing aircraft in a comparable quality. The Americans get a great deal of teething trouble as do other people.
Mr. Wyatt: Will the hon. Gentleman say something about the wisdom or otherwise of having a strategic force which is highly expensive when the Americans have a very adequate one of their own?
Mr. Birch: I shall say something about that in a minute. As I said, we are not the only people who are having teething trouble.
The Navy has been under fairly heavy fire and in fact its only defender was my very gallant friend indeed the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) who made a spirited defence. I do not want to go into that controversy now. It is an argument which has been ventilated in both Houses, and it will have to be decided not only by considering the history of war, but also by looking at future scientific developments and how they bear on the conduct of war. The trouble is that we cannot very well discuss these things here, and as the security curtain descends upon this interesting argument I hope that I shall be forgiven for not pursuing it.
Mr. Shinwell: What of the point to which I and some of my hon. Friends addressed ourselves? Surely the hon. Gentleman, on behalf of the Government, has something to say about the new situation which has emerged and is continuing to develop—that is, the production of modern weapons like guided missiles, rockets and the rest, and what effect they have on the production of conventional weapons. Surely that is not a matter to be discussed in complete secrecy inside. The House is entitled to be informed of some aspects of the situation.
Mr. Birch: I think that the right hon. Gentleman, who must know many secrets about these matters, will agree that we cannot publicly discuss future developments in guided missiles. I really do not think anyone could reasonably ask that. It is a very interesting subject but I cannot do it.
Mr. Shinwell: The hon. Gentleman is quite unable to do it. That is the point. He has not the information and that is why the Minister of Defence should be in this House.
Mr. Birch: I come now to the question of the radar chain. There has certainly been criticism of the operation of the radar chain on the continent in recent days. Lately new equipment has been tried out and that equipment is being given equal priority with the radar chain at home. It is now a question of production and we have reason to believe that in a reasonable time we shall get an adequate chain. I have nothing to add to what was said by my right hon. Friend about the Washington bomber or the Gnat fighter.
Mr. A. Henderson: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether responsibility for the radar chain facing the Iron Curtain right across Europe from Norway to Italy is that of the United Kingdom Government or that of the national Governments concerned?
Mr. Birch: I am sorry but I cannot answer that question now. I will inform the right hon. and learned Gentleman afterwards.
We have kept the House a very long time and we have had a very long and diffused debate. I have tried to answer as many questions as I could.
Mr. Shinwell: Oh!
Mr. Birch: I have answered many questions.
Mr. Shinwell: On a point of order. On the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, it is open to any hon. Member to raise any question which is within the rules of the House.
Mr. Ellis Smith: If we get the chance.
Mr. Shinwell: With great respect to my hon. Friend, there is the opportunity tonight at the close of the defence debate or indeed during the defence debate. No one has any grievance on that score. But I wish to ask, Mr. Speaker, whether in the circumstances of a Consolidated Fund Bill debate, and particularly when important issues relating to national defence are under review, it is not desirable that we should have on the Front Bench in charge of a debate of this kind, not a

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number of Parliamentary Secretaries who are not conversant with these subjects at all and have no responsibility whatever, but Cabinet Ministers.
Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman's question is addressed to me in form, but it is really addressed to the Government.
Mr. Shinwell: But if I address myself to the Government, I cannot get anything but an evasive reply. What is the use of asking?
Mr. Birch: I think the right hon. Gentleman has had some very clear replies this evening. I was about to close my remarks by saying that we have had this long debate and I have tried to answer as many questions as I can. I could very well speak for the rest of the evening, but other Members must have a chance.
The Roman mobs used to shout for bread and circuses. They used to insist upon the social aspect, as the right hon. Gentleman would say. Bread we must have; it warms the heart to have an occasional circus, but we can have neither unless we have our legions. I therefore hope that the House will give their full support to this Bill.

EVANS CASE (REPORT OF INQUIRY)
10.16 p.m.
Mr. Geoffrey Bing: Although I know there are many who wish to contribute to the subject of defence, I think it is now time that I should refer to a matter which, in the opinion of many hon. Members, while it may not be of equal importance, is of very great importance indeed. Just two weeks ago there was presented a document to this House, and whatever has been said by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence about secrecy, this quite clearly is a document about which there should be no secrecy. This is a document in which the facts should be as fully and frankly stated as possible.
The document to which I refer is the Scott Henderson Report into the question whether or not our judicial system has erred. This is a non-party matter, and
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perhaps I can relieve some hon. Members opposite by saying that it is not one on which I desire to divide the House. It is none the less a very important matter. Indeed, about 21 of us, headed by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), put down a Motion condemning this Report and saying that we regretted that we were not able to accept it.
Obviously, this Report affects the whole controversy over the death penalty. It raises the whole issue of whether an innocent man has been hanged, or whether, in a wider form, it is possible to hang an innocent man; and if it is possible to hang an innocent man, obviously that is one of the reasons for doing away with the death penalty.
Quite apart from any question of the death penalty, there are other issues in this matter which are of equal importance. Do our police methods of examining crimes, not only capital crimes but all crimes, require some revision? Are our forms of trial always those which result in the truth being brought out? Finally, if there is any doubt whether a trial has gone properly or not, is the present method—it has been employed by both sides of the House; I am asking the House as a whole—of holding an inquiry in secret, very often under a distinguished and very experienced lawyer, either fair to the lawyer concerned or to the public who are disturbed by the facts?
I am compelled to say, quite firmly and with a due sense of responsibility, that I consider the report produced by Mr. Scott Henderson to be in every way unsatisfactory. I think it most unfortunate that the Home Secretary should have seen fit to present it without any explanation and without providing any opportunity in Government time for its debate. What Mr. Scott Henderson set out to investigate was the question whether or not, in the case of the man called Timothy John Evans, there had been any injustice in his having been sentenced to death, and, indeed, in his having been executed.
If the Home Secretary will look at paragraph 15 of the Report, he will see that Mr. Scott Henderson asked himself some questions. He said:
"The crucial question which I have asked myself during my investigation is; Is there any doubt that Evans murdered his wife? Putting

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the question in the converse way, I have considered whether there is any possibility that Christie murdered Mrs. Evans."
To that last question he answered, "No." He said that the facts that were put before him were such as to prove without doubt that Evans had murdered his wife and child.
Before going into the Report in detail, I want to say a word about the case as a whole. The inquiry arose because it subsequently turned out that in Evans's case the principal witness for the Crown was found to have murdered six women in exactly the same way as he had, in the witness box, by implication, accused Evans of murdering two female persons. Quite apart from any confession, or absence of confession, it would be a really extraordinary coincidence that there should be two killers, killing their victims in exactly the same way, hiding them, as it turned out, in exactly the same place, and acting completely independently of each other. That is what Mr. Scott Henderson found had taken place.
This coincidence alone would be quite sufficient to justify looking into the case, but when one looks at the second coincidence one finds that it is the even more remarkable one that Evans, without knowing anything about any of the murders committed by Christie—not one word was said in the cross-examination—nevertheless chose to accuse, just by chance—and that is Mr. Scott Henderson's case—the one person, probably in the whole of London at that time, who was murdering people in exactly the same way.
If it had been known at the trial of Evans that Christie, who was described by the prosecution as the principal witness, had in fact already murdered two women, hidden their bodies temporarily in the very washhouse where Evans was accused of hiding the bodies, and had subsequently buried them in the garden, Evans would have been bound to be acquitted.
Let us consider how serious is the finding of Mr. Scott Henderson that Evans was guilty. Mr. Scott Henderson says that if there is no doubt that Evans did murder it was only by the most wonderful lucky chance, in that the police were not able to put all the facts before the court, that this desperate murderer was ever convicted, and that if the police had
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put the full facts before the court a murderer would have got off scotfree. That is Mr Scott Henderson's finding. If we put it round the other way, if the police had had the good fortune to unearth all the evidence there would have been a most serious miscarriage of justice, because Evans, who Mr. Scott Henderson pronounces to be guilty, would undoubtedly have been acquitted.
If that is so, it is a most dangerous thing for the administration of our law. It must lead the police inevitably to think that perhaps they are justified in suppressing a little bit of the evidence in order that they can secure a conviction and prevent an acquittal. That may be thought fanciful, but my first complaint in this case is that that is what took place. That is one of the most disturbing factors out of the whole of the evidence which was before Mr. Scott Henderson, even though it was not altogether fully reported in his Report. He failed entirely to deal with this aspect of the matter.
Perhaps I may shortly recapitulate to the House exactly what was the position in this case. In the first statement which he made to the police, Evans proceeded to accuse Christie, and it was not until he was confronted with the clothes which had been taken from the dead bodies of his wife and his child that he suddenly made a confession and admitted both murders. That was the position. I am sorry to weary the House with one or two dates but they are necessary if the House is to understand the position.
That confession was on the evening of 2nd December, and on that evening Evans made a statement to the police saying that he placed the body of his wife in the washhouse on Tuesday, 8th November, that he placed his child's body there on Thursday, 10th November, and that he left 10, Rillington Place, where the whole thing took place, on the afternoon of Monday, 14th November. I do not think there is any dispute that he left in the afternoon of Monday, 14th November, but after the police had taken this statement they proceeded to take some other statements which, unfortunately so far as they were concerned, did not altogether tally with Evans's confession, and the next complaint which I have to make is that these statements were completely suppressed in 1949, that they were again revealed to Mr. Scott

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Henderson but that he passed them over completely in 1953.
I have given to the Home Secretary, and he will also have them in a letter from me, the name and address of each one of those people who made the statements, but because people do not like to be involved in these things, I do not propose to give the names to the House. The point is, briefly, that there was working in this house at this time a group of workmen. I propose to refer to them as the plasterer, the plasterer's mate, the carpenter and the employer.
The employer kept, as some employers do, very careful time sheets which showed on what job and where these men were working. These were given to the police and one of the most curious features—and one wonders that Mr. Scott Henderson did not see fit to investigate it—is that they were returned after the Evans' trial, but one of the time sheets, unfortunately that of the plasterer, was missing from the pile when it came back from the police. This time sheet was thought, and is thought now by those who are interested in the defence of Evans, to be the most material of all the documents.
The disappearance of a document which is highly material to the case should have been mentioned, one would think, in a Report which dealt with the case; it is a matter which one hoped might have been investigated in passing. I do not necessarily say that it was taken away by the police. It may have been lost by the employer or there may have been some other perfectly innocent explanation, but the employer says today, "I never got that time sheet back from the police."
In 1949, the plasterer's mate gave his evidence to the police. He said, "It is nonsense your telling me there were bodies in this washhouse because I myself cleaned it out. This was where I kept my things. This was where we kept our cement, our plaster and all the rest of it, and when we had finished we cleaned it out. On the Friday evening no bodies were there." The case against Evans was that he put his wife's body there on the previous Tuesday and his child's body there on the Thursday.
That evidence itself is quite dramatic, but what is much more dramatic is some evidence which has not been dealt with by Mr. Scott Henderson, nor was it ever
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brought forward by the police at the trial of Evans himself, namely, the evidence of the carpenter. The carpenter has checked this evidence. He checked it at the time, in 1949, when he was asked to make a statement to the police; I saw him myself this afternoon and he has again checked with his employer his times of working as marked on his time sheet. This, fortunately, is not a time sheet that has disappeared; it is locked up, and when I ask the Home Secretary to reopen this inquiry, as I think he must agree to do when I have finished, I hope that this will be one of the first exhibits he will look at.
It is quite clear that the timber behind which the bodies were found was the old timber which was taken by this carpenter from the floor of Christie's flat and the floor of the hall. The time sheet gives in detail the times at which he took up this timber, and the carpenter's recollection is perfectly clear. There was some conversation about the timber, and the timber was given to Christie. It could not have been given to Christie before, at the earliest, midday on Monday, 14th November, and Evans—as is admitted by everybody—had left the premises for good by at least four o'clock that afternoon. That is the position. There was the timber, behind which the bodies were found, in Christie's possession at midday.
The first question I want the Home Secretary to answer is, why was this evidence not put forward by the prosecution, as it should have been, at Evans's trial in 1950? A statement was taken, or at any rate all these persons were questioned by responsible officers. Why was it not put forward? Secondly, why did Mr. Scott Henderson see fit not to consider the carpenter's evidence? What happened was this. A proof of the evidence of the carpenter, as I understand it, was taken by one of the firms of solicitors or other people interested in the matter; it was sent to Mr. Scott Henderson; the carpenter was never called upon to give evidence, and, so far as I can discover—though there was a little doubt about this, and I say so quite frankly, because the employer himself is away and I have only spoken to his office—no inquiry was ever made from anybody on behalf of the tribunal in order to look at the time sheets to check whether this story was true.

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Looking at Mr. Scott Henderson's Report, one sees from paragraph 37, page 15, that he knows about the carpenter's evidence, but he sees fit to cover it up. I will just read the passage in the Report:
"As no work was done in the washhouse after the 8th November, 1945, I do not think that workmen would have paid any attention to pieces of timber put against the sink after that date"—
he, of course, ignores entirely the fact that the timber was shown by the evidence not to be available to be put against the sink at that date at all—
"and in any case it is not certain that the bodies were put there before the 11th November. A plumber and a carpenter came to the premises after the 11th November"—
this is the very carpenter who offered the evidence to him—
"but they had nothing to do with the wash-house."
Of course they had not anything to do with the washhouse. But what the carpenter did was to produce the timber which afterwards went into the wash-house.
Now that is, if I may say so, a most deceptive and improper method of writing a report. I have satisfied myself that a full statement of the carpenter's evidence was provided for Mr. Scott Henderson and that he did not make use of it. He did not question the carpenter in any way, and the only thing from which we can even deduce that he read it is this one sentence in which he attempts to explain this evidence away.
Of course he was in a difficulty when he had to explain away the evidence about the bodies—that they could not possibly have been there before Friday, What is Mr. Scott Henderson's suggestion on that? I raise this because I think it shows the House the flimsy nature of the Report which, after all, was presented by the right hon. and learned Gentleman to Parliament and he must bear responsibility for it. It was he who prescribed the conditions under which Mr. Scott Henderson worked, and if we are to make criticisms of Mr. Scott Henderson it is only because he was, possibly, compelled by the right hon. and learned Gentleman to work under such conditions and was compelled to make a report of the unfortunate nature of the one now before us.
What was Mr. Scott Henderson's suggestion to get out of this difficulty? He
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said it was quite likely that Evans did not put the bodies there until Friday because he said his plan was to dump the bodies from the lorry on Friday
"when he was due to make a long journey."
But the right hon. and learned Gentleman has only to read the actual evidence which Mr. Scott Henderson prints to see that Evans went for a long journey on Thursday too. He went to Brighton. Why did he not dump the bodies on the Thursday? He gave up the job on his own accord, according to the evidence, on Thursday night; why did he not do that if it was his plan to dump the bodies on Friday? This is the sort of speculation which should never go into a judicial document of this sort. What I suggest to the right hon. and learned Gentleman—and with some vehemence—is that the whole evidence which was heard by Mr. Scott Henderson should be published so that hon. Members and members of the public can judge whether it is a fair Report or whether it is not.
I suggest further to the Home Secretary that he may consider it is in the public interest to have a public hearing, a public inquiry, not only into the Christie and the Evans cases, but into the conduct of this particular inquiry as well. On the face of it there have been a number of grave irregularities committed by the police. It may be that the police are entirely wrongly blamed; it may be that they have not committed these irregularities, but if, in fact, as we now know, there was a mass of evidence in support of Evans's case which was known to the police before his trial in 1949 which was never put forward in court, some explanation is called for from Mr. Scott Henderson.
Mr. Hylton-Foster: I am a seeker after truth. Is the hon. and learned Member in a position to tell me whether or not at the time of the trial of Evans any statement taken by the police from the carpenter to whom he has referred was made available in the sense that the carpenter's name and address was supplied, in accordance with the ordinary custom, to the defence?
Mr. Bing: I am in a position in the interests of truth to answer the hon. and learned Member. No such statement was made; no such address was supplied and

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this is one of the matters which requires investigation, very considerable investigation. I am obliged to the hon. and learned Member for noting this great departure from what should take place.
The defence had no knowledge of the existence of any of these witnesses, and the real difficulty was that the witnesses themselves, with whom I have spoken, did not appreciate the importance of their evidence. Therefore, they did not come forward and produce it or get in touch with the defence. It is quite understandable. One cannot quite work out how a time sheet and what timber one has taken up is really going to help in solving the truth about a murder and things of that sort. But the police must have known. The Director of Prosecutions office must have known and one of the things the inquiry should decide is where the responsibility lies.
Did the police ever tell the Director's office; did the Director's office know this? These are things which I suggest to the House should be the subject of a public inquiry. If this irregularity was the only disturbing matter in regard to this inquiry, then one might well say that it was an unfortunate event, but explicable in some other way. But, unfortunately, the whole of the Report is shot through with prejudice and evidence of irregularities playing down the evidence on the one hand, and playing it up on the other.
I gave the right hon. and learned Gentleman a list of these things in a letter which I have sent him; and I apologise for having done that so late, but I did not want to write before I had been able to support by my own personal discussion with the people concerned, certain facts which had come to my notice second-hand. If one goes to the main case of Mr. Scott Henderson in an effort to prove the guilt of Evans, there seems to be an even more unfortunate suppression of certain evidence in the case of the police. I am sorry to detain the House for a little time, but I must refer to a few paragraphs in the Report itself.
In paragraph 34, where Mr. Scott Henderson gives his reasons why he thinks Evans was guilty, and implies that Evans' final confession was substantiated by outside factors, it is stated:
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"I am, therefore, satisfied that there was a great deal of evidence to support Evans' account in his confession of why and how he was fighting with his wife on 8th February, 1949. He alone knew that he had strangled her with a piece of rope."
In parenthesis, may I say here that this again questions the nature of the inquiry, because nobody has ever found any rope, although Christie, in the articles in the "Sunday Pictorial," stated that he kept a piece of rope, 18 inches in length, and knotted at both ends, and which he used for his murders. But that piece of evidence, like so much more, has been disregarded by Mr. Scott Henderson.
The Report goes on:
"I wrapped my wife's body up in a blanket and a green tablecloth from off my kitchen table"—
this is Evans's evidence—
"and I then tied it up with a piece of cord … I carried my wife's body down to the wash-house and placed it under the sink. I then blocked the front of the sink up with pieces of wood so that the body would not be seen."
Then, the Report observes:
"Similarly, his statement that he had strangled his baby with his tie and hid her body behind some wood in the washhouse was also an exact description of what had happened to the baby."
I ask the House to note these words which follow:
"Evans could not have obtained these details from the police, and I am satisfied that he was able to give these details because of his first-hand knowledge."
Mr. Scott Henderson underlines his conclusions a little earlier, in paragraph 29, by saying that,
"With Mr. Blackburn I have made a close study of all police documents relating to the case and I closely questioned the three officers named above."
Those are Chief Inspector Jennings, Detective Inspector Black, and Detective Sergeant Corfield. Mr. Scott Henderson continues:
"Both Mr. Blackburn and I are satisfied that nothing was said to the prisoner relating to the bodies and the causes of death other than was given in evidence by Chief Inspector Jennings at the trial."
It is quite clear what Mr. Scott Henderson is saying. What did Chief Inspector Jennings say?
"I am Chief Inspector Jennings, in charge of this case. At 11.50 a.m. today I found the dead body of your wife, Beryl Evans, concealed in a washhouse at 10, Rillington Place, Notting Hill; also the body of your baby daughter, Geraldine, in the same outbuilding,

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and this clothing was found on them. Later today I was at Kensington Mortuary when it was established that the cause of death was strangulation in both cases. I have reason to believe that you were responsible for their deaths."
I want the House to appreciate that Mr. Scott Henderson found that that was all that was told to Evans. Apparently he did not even trouble to read the depositions at the trial of Evans. If he had bothered to look at the evidence given by Detective Inspector Black on oath at the trial he would have found that the words he had set down were contradicted by one of the two police inspectors. I will read what the police inspector himself said. If the Home Secretary cares to follow it he will find it in the transcript of the Evans case in page 76, paragraph (e).
Inspector Black was asked this:
"Q. And there did Mr. Jennings tell him that he (Mr. Jennings) had first found the body of his wife hidden beneath the wash basin by the sink in this outhouse?—A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he also tell him that he found the body of his baby hidden behind some timber in the outhouse?—A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did he say that both of them appeared to have died by strangulation?—A. Yes, sir.
Really, if Mr. Scott Henderson is asking this House to say that what a senior police officer said on oath at the trial was untrue he ought at least to have put a footnote in his report explaining why.
If one looks at the judge's summing-up one sees—and if the Home Secretary likes to see it he will find it on page 157, paragraph (e) and it goes on to page 158 paragraph (b)—that he tacitly admitted that the only item which Evans could not have known, and had not been told by the police, was that his baby had been strangled with a tie. That was the sole point on which there was any question that Evans had any knowledge.
I want to ask the Home Secretary whether he knows what evidence was given on this point at the inquiry. I say, with a sense of responsibility, that at the inquiry Chief Inspector Jennings proceeded to give some further evidence on this matter and said, "Well, as a matter of fact the clothing, the two lots of clothing, were put in two separate piles, on the one side the mother's clothing and on the other side the child's clothing, and on top of this clothing was put the tie."
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The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows enough of criminal proceedings to know the way in which those exhibits would be prepared. The tie, of course, would be slit across the back so as to preserve the knot. Therefore there would have been a small area just sufficient to strangle the child, and the tie would be there in that form. Anyone seeing that these things were in two piles would immediately suppose that the tie was in fact the thing that had been used for the strangling. It is so obvious.
What happens then? The tie is asked for, to be produced at the inquiry, and is not there. That is another thing which is missing. It may well be it is quite properly missing, and has quite properly been destroyed by the police. I make no criticism of that. But what I do make a criticism about is that Mr. Scott Henderson, knowing that the tie was a matter in issue, knowing that there was evidence at his inquiry that the tie did not belong to Evans, says in paragraph 4 of his own report:
"I am satisfied that all relevant material relating to the deaths of Mrs. Beryl Evans and Geraldine Evans has been put before me."
How could he possibly say that, when the one thing, the one item, the one most important item in dispute, is in fact missing and has been destroyed?
I come to the next point. There is no reference in the Report to the evidence given at the inquiry by Dr. Matthew Odess. One of the most telling points made both by the prosecution and by the judge in his summing up in the Evans trial was that Christie was so crippled by enteritis and fibrositis, which is merely muscular rheumatism, that it would have been impossible for him to have carried the bodies down in the way he did. I understand that Dr. Odess has now re-examined his notes. He finds that in fact he was wrong, he was mistaken, in what he said in the Christie trial in this matter, and that in fact Christie did not come and complain to him about his fibrositis until after the murders had taken place—on Saturday, 12th November.
I understand that when pressed on the point the doctor said that indeed the trouble of which Christie was complaining was perfectly consistent with strain from carrying a heavy weight. That evidence may be quite valueless but it

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seems to me extraordinary that Mr. Scott Henderson did not see fit to put it before the public in his Report. The Home Secretary will tell me if the doctor did not give that evidence; but I am compelled to say with reluctance that throughout the Report there seems to be the most extraordinary bias against Evans.
To give one example, a letter from his mother which contains all sorts of bitter comments which parents sometimes make about their children in times when they do not know what their children are doing, and so on, is printed in full. At the trial this letter—all but a few sentences—was particularly excluded because of its prejudicial nature. Mr. Scott Henderson did not see fit to publish the evidence of Dr. Odess, but he did see fit to publish a letter which was excluded at Evans's own trial. It seems to me that there is a degree of prejudice of mind—I do not say this in any way personally. One has to try to enter the mind of someone who is set the extremely difficult task of having to justify the police action and possibly feeling that he must justify the police and the normal course of the law, and who then sees things gradually from a different slant.
He produces as proof that Evans probably committed the crime the fact that there were Press cuttings dealing with the case of a man named Setty found in Evans's room. But what did Evans want with cuttings? The one thing admitted on all sides was that Evans was illiterate. Here it is said, "Here is proof that an illiterate man did the murder. Cuttings were found, long after he left, in his rooms." Who did keep Press cuttings? We all know Christie did. He was found with the Press cuttings of Evans's case.
If a man had a body in the garden and he wanted to direct the attention of the police not to digging the garden, as they so often do when a person is missing, but to looking for a parcel, in what better way could one do it than by leaving in the empty flat of the man concerned a few Press cuttings to draw attention to the fact? If the Press cuttings about Setty show anything it is that they were put there, planted there, by Christie rather than the reverse.
There was evidence given, and I do not complain about it, of a statement made
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by Christie to the chaplain. The permission of the bishop was obtained. The statement was not made by way of confession. The Home Secretary knows perfectly well that when counsel asked Mr. Scott Henderson whether he would be prepared to take a statement from the chaplain who had seen Evans, Mr. Scott Henderson would not receive the evidence.
Dr. Barnett Stross: We are dealing with the Evans case, and the hon. and learned Member said Christie at first.
Mr. Bing: I began by referring to Evans.
Then there was the statement to the chaplain by Christie. Mr. Scott Henderson thought it would help the inquiry if it were possible to print the statement to the chaplain, so the permission of the bishop and others was obtained, and the chaplain volunteered what Christie said to him. There was another chaplain to whom Evans had confided some information. It was suggested by counsel that if what Christie said to the chaplain was admissible, what Evans said to the chaplain was admissible. But apparently it was not. The Home Secretary will tell us about these things. We may be doing a great injustice. Everyone knows that there is a transcript of the evidence, which would show whether what I say is correct. Why cannot it be published?
The Report leaves out of consideration what are the most telling points in Evans's favour. If he was guilty, and Christie innocent of these two murders, Christie had no reason to tell an untrue story when he was giving evidence in the Evans case. If one compares the evidence, which can be independently checked, which was given in the Christie case with the evidence which Christie gave in the Evans case, one sees that Christie was lying throughout his evidence.
For example, Evans said that Christie told him that he was a medical student and that he was preparing for a medical career but was prevented from following that career by an accident. Mr. Malcolm Morris, to whose skill in Evans's defence one must pay tribute, asked him directly,
"Mr. Christie, when did you have an accident?"
Christie said, pausing for a moment,
"I never had an accident."

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Mrs. Christie was asked about it, and she said,
"Oh no. I do not know of any accident which my husband had."
When Christie came to be tried, the accident reappeared. It was said to have been a serious accident which affected the whole of his life, in 1934; that he was run over by a car, was unconscious, and was in hospital for a considerable time. Christie denied all medical knowledge. At his own trial it turned out that he used a pretended medical knowledge to lure some of his victims. Christie said he knew nothing of the furniture remover. Evans said that Christie told him to sell his furniture to Mr. so-and-so. In Christie's case, the furniture remover said he had known Christie since 1949. Why should Christie lie about the furniture remover unless it was a part of some guilty knowledge?
None of those points is given consideration in this Report. There was one point at the Evans trial which was in his favour, namely that he left the child's clothes, pram and chair with Mr. Christie. Why should he do that? Why not get rid of them, as he got rid of the rest of the furniture, if he knew the child was dead? I understand that that was given in evidence before Mr. Scott Henderson, but it does not appear in the Report. When Evans was arrested, he said to the detective sergeant, "Will you please get in touch with my mother and get her to see Christie, because he knows where the child is."
We may ask how could such a result to the inquiry have come about; how could it happen that there should appear, on the face of it, to be so many errors and mistakes in this document which the Home Secretary has submitted to Parliament? I suggest that it was the result of the unfortunate way in which—these are my last words—[An HON. MEMBER; "Hear, hear."] An hon. Member says "Hear, hear." I appreciate that I have been delaying the House a long time, and I much appreciate the courtesy with which I have been treated from practically every part of the House. I would merely say to the hon. Gentleman who interrupted in that way that this is a matter in which the reputation of British justice is at stake and, therefore, the House of Commons might, perhaps, fulfil its long tradition by being a little
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tolerent on the subject of British liberty.
The real misfortune is the way in which the inquiry was conducted. I wish to ask the Home Secretary a few questions in order to ascertain whether certain things were done by his direction or not. In paragraph 8 of Mr. Scott Henderson's Report one sees:
"After I had started my investigation I was informed that the Evans family … had retained solicitors … who had instructed … Counsel to represent them at my Inquiry. The procedure I had adopted for the investigation was not such as fitted in with formal presentation of evidence by an interested party …"
There was only one party who really had an interest, and that was the Evans family.
So far as Mr. Malcolm Morris was concerned, his client was dead. So far as Mr. Curtis Bennett was concerned, he had still a duty to his client, who was still alive. His job—properly so—was to represent in the best way he could Christie's position. It was not necessary for him to secure a clearing up of the position of Evans and to sacrifice his own client's interest to a rambling and general inquiry.
Mr. Scott Henderson's Report says:
"The procedure I had adopted for the investigation was not such as fitted in with formal presentation of evidence by an interested party, but I welcomed the assistance of Mr. Gillis in suggesting names of possible witnesses and questions for their examination. Mr. Gillis was necessarily at a disadvantage compared with the other Counsel who helped me, as on the 9th July when he first appeared at the examination of witnesses he had not received a copy of the transcript in the Evans case and he knew nothing about the statements which his client had made to the police in 1949."
Will the Home Secretary answer this question? Why was not the transcript made available to the counsel who were concerned? How can one suppose that an inquiry of this sort into a trial can possibly be conducted when nobody is given an account of the trial? And to get an account of the Evans trial, even from the transcript, is extremely difficult. Not a word is reported in "The Times." Anybody who attempted to do anything without the transcript had an absolutely impossible task.
These are the questions that I wish to put to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. First, what rules did Mr. Scott

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Henderson make for the conduct of the inquiry? Secondly, were counsel and the solicitors instructing them allowed to be present at all times? Thirdly, did the Home Office receive any representations from any of the counsel concerned in the course of the inquiry as to the way in which Mr. Scott Henderson was conducting it, and did the Home Secretary give any directions altering the methods which Mr. Scott Henderson employed?
I have taken a long time over this matter, but I thought that in a matter of this importance, even at this time of night, it was worth while trying to set the facts before the House. I agree with what was said in the earlier stages when the matter was first raised, that a secret inquiry of this sort cannot allay public disquiet. It may result in all sorts of charges being made against all sorts of people who are, in fact, not guilty of them. But do not let the people who are raising these points be blamed. In the files of the right hon. and learned Gentleman is the complete answer. There is, no doubt, a shorthand note of everything that took place before Mr. Scott Henderson. Why not? There was a shorthand writer present, was there not? Or has it already been destroyed?
Is the record of what took place still in existence, and if not why not? If it is still in existence, is there any reason why it should not be published? When there is already in the evidence the letter of a mother distressed by the position of her son, and when the confession of a man awaiting death to the chaplain has already been published, surely we should not be too tender about the briefs written by solicitors or the nature of inquiries made by the police.
This is a matter which I do not believe the House can allow to remain in its present position, and I ask the Home Secretary first to publish the whole of the inquiry, and secondly to consider setting up some body to investigate the two trials and the method by which this inquiry has been conducted.
11.6 p.m.
Mr. Michael Foot: I have just listened to one of the most formidable speeches which has been delivered in this House for many years, and I do not think there can be any honest Member of this House who is not
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very gravely disturbed by the evidence which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) has presented. [An HON. MEMBER; "Evidence?"] There may be one or two hon. Members on the opposite side of the House who are not prepared to listen to this discussion in the same spirit in which I am sure my hon. and learned Friend raised the matter, but if they are not prepared to do so on a matter of this kind, I think they will do a greater service to the House by leaving.
This is an issue in which the reputation of British justice is at stake, and if there are Members who are not interested in British justice, it would be very much better if they did not attend this debate. If there are some hon. Members who suggest that it is unfortunate that a debate of this kind should be held at this time, then the responsibility for that rests squarely on the shoulders of the Home Secretary, because it is by his decision that the debate is taking place in the present circumstances, rather than the debate for which my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) asked at another time, when the debate could have been held in very different circumstances and when some of the evidence, at any rate, would not have been destroyed. Some of the evidence in this case has been destroyed by the decision of the Home Secretary. It was his decision that we should not have a discussion on this matter while Christie was still alive.
I shall come back to that point as to why it was so vital that we should have had the debate before Christie was sent to his death, even though Christie's evidence on most points was worthless. But it is due to the decision of the Home Secretary that this debate is taking place in the circumstances in which we are having it tonight, rather than in the circumstances in which we asked for it first, before Christie was hanged. Subsequently, when the Report was issued, it would have been perfectly possible for the Home Secretary to have asked the Leader of the House to provide time for a debate on the Report. If the debate takes place in these circumstances the responsibility must rest upon him.
To those hon. Members opposite who are content to jeer on this issue, I would say that there has been an earlier

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occasion in the history of this House, which the Home Secretary will remember very well, on a legal issue, on which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch was proved right and the right hon. and learned Gentleman was proved to be wrong. Therefore, I hope that every hon. Member will consider with respect the tremendous case which was presented by my hon. and learned Friend this evening.
The main charge with which I am concerned is not about the detailed case which my hon. and learned Friend has presented so powerfully The main case, in my view, is the charge against the Home Secretary, because one of the reasons why we are presented with a situation in which all the details of this inquiry have to be ransacked in the House of Commons is because of the nature of the inquiry which the Home Secretary ordered. It was by his decision that it was a secret or semi-secret inquiry, and an inquiry at which the case for Evans was not represented by a lawyer.
As to the Report, it is a little curious that Mr. Scott Henderson should devote a considerable part of it to defending the Home Secretary's decision on the nature of the inquiry. What business was it of Mr. Scott Henderson's to spend part of the money taxpayers provide for White Papers in defending the Home Secretary's decision, and dealing with precisely the issue for which the Home Secretary is responsible? What right had he to enter into a matter which is one for the House of Commons—whether it was a proper form of inquiry?
When the announcement was made there were many people who immediately criticised the form of the proposed inquiry and who immediately suggested that it was bound to lead to worthless conclusions. There was much criticism, led by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne—and indeed he was supported then by almost all the newspapers in the country. There was hardly one which did not criticise beforehand the kind of inquiry set up. Surely it was rather remarkable, when this inquiry was rushed through in two or three days, that most of the newspapers turned round and helped to apply the same whitewash that the Home Secretary had been applying to the case?
Of course the inquiry was bound to be worthless, because if new evidence was
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produced—and we have the authority of the legal correspondent of "The Times" for saying that much new evidence was available to the Scott Henderson inquiry which was not available at the Evans trial, and which indeed would not have been admissible at the Evans trial—Evans, the man chiefly concerned, had no chance of answering the evidence brought forward at his second trial. If he could not answer he might have been granted a lawyer to cross-examine on his behalf, but that right was denied by the Home Secretary, whose decision it was to have an inquiry rushed through in a few days, and who made sure there was no lawyer present to cross-examine the new evidence on which Mr. Scott Henderson partly reached his result.
The hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch has already produced many overwhelmingly powerful reasons why this Report is not worth the paper it is printed on, because there are little snippets picked here and there to suit Mr. Scott Henderson in order to reach this conclusion, which it is clear he had reached before he had started. [An HON. MEMBER; "Disgusting."] I do not believe hon. Gentlemen opposite have read the Report. If an innocent man has been hanged why are they so eager to hush it up and see it is not discussed?
Mr. J. E. S. Simon: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether, so far as he knows, either he or the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch gave any notice of the matters they are raising to the Home Secretary or the Attorney-General at the time when many of these irregularities, to which they are referring, occurred?
Mr. Foot: I am afraid it is hardly worth delaying the House to answer the hon. and learned Gentleman, because what we are discussing is the nature and the results of an inquiry set up by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I will say this for the Home Secretary, even if I cannot say it for his supporters; I am sure he will stand up for what he is responsible; he will not try to run away from it. I hope that he is prepared, tonight, to defend his own action.
If hon. Members opposite want more details why this Report is rubbish, and why nobody with any sense of justice would believe it, let them take the last

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account of the interview with Christie. It is most extraordinary, because, according to the evidence given in this Report this was not the only interview between Mr. Scott Henderson—or those associated with him in his inquiries—and Christie. The account of one cross-examination of Christie is given in the Report; but there was another meeting between Christie and those responsible for the Scott Henderson inquiry.
It is here in the Report. It slipped out. There were some points at which the editing was not good enough. Probably they were too hasty about it. It may be that it would have helped the Home Secretary's case if it had been edited a bit more carefully than this. The first question put by Mr. Scott Henderson, introducing the persons he had brought to the inquiry, is this:
"The gentleman who is sitting next to you, as you can see, is the Shorthand Writer. Mr. Blackburn, the Assistant Chief Constable of the West Riding, is here, and I think that you have seen him already?"
When did Christie see Mr. Blackburn? Did he see him the day before? If so, why are we not told what happened on the day before? Why had Mr. Blackburn seen Christie on the day before? What were the conversations? Is there a shorthand report of those conversations?
I ask, with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch, whether we can have that report published, because some very important conversations did take place on the day before, in the interview between those responsible for the Scott Henderson Report and Christie—a very important interview which has not been reported. That is proved again by the answer given on page 71.
Mr. Harmar Nicholls: How does the hon. Member know?
Mr. Foot: The third question from the bottom of page 71 is on a very important matter, according to Mr. Scott Henderson, because he was examining how much faith could be placed in the confession of Christie and the evidence which Christie gave at his own trial.
Mr. Scott Henderson asked:
"Short of your being satisfied that there is definite proof that you must have done it, are you prepared to say that you did do it? —(A). I was only informed yesterday that there is no such proof."
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So Christie was told on the day before the public interview between Christie and Mr. Scott Henderson—in a private interview—that there was no proof that he had committed the murder. Therefore, his mind had already been conditioned by an interview that had taken place, to which no reference is made, and in connection with which I go so far as to claim that it has been sought deliberately to suppress the evidence that it did take place. It is only because of hasty and bad editing that they did not cut out that incriminating evidence from this document.
We must have an account of what took place in this interview. No doubt a curious psychological situation prevailed, because none can guess exactly what might be in the mind of a man who knows he is going to hang in a day or two, and what he might confess to. Nobody can say what would be the psychological state of a sane man in such circumstances, but what about the psychological state of an insane man? If we are to judge the matter we should have all the evidence, and not just little bits and pieces that Mr. Scott Henderson and the Home Secretary choose to present to the House. [HON. MEMBERS; "Shame."] Do hon. Members opposite say that the House of Commons should not be allowed to see one interview between Mr. Scott Henderson and Christie when we are presented with the other? Why should not we see them both? Of course, these are only further facts which I cite to support the overwhelming case of my hon. and learned Friend, that the evidence has been selected in the most extraordinary way.
There is, in my view, one final proof which I should have thought no hon. Member would dispute of why this inquiry has been totally unsatisfactory and why it was always bound to be unsatisfactory—a very simple proof. Suppose that Evans had been alive when the inquiry took place. Suppose that we had not had the death penalty. Suppose he had been serving a life sentence. Suppose then that all the evidence of the Christie trial had come out and all the doubts which persuaded the Home Secretary to set up the inquiry had been raised. Suppose that Evans had been in Penton-ville Prison too. Does anybody think they would have been content with this kind of inquiry?

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Should we have had an inquiry about which the Home Secretary had come to the House and said, "We are going to ask Christie questions on two occasions. We will print one. We may not print the other. But we will not ask Evans anything." Would anybody have been content with such a suggestion? If Evans had been alive, would he have been cross-examined without a defending counsel? Christie had a defending counsel, so if Evans had been alive he would have been able to give evidence at his second trial and would have had a defending counsel; he would have had the opportunity of examining the evidence; and, unless something very extraordinary had happened to British justice, it would have been held in public.
But all those claims were denied by the Home Secretary.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Because Evans was dead.
Mr. Foot: Because Evans was dead. Even so, even with Evans dead, he could have had a defending counsel. Even with Evans dead, the Home Secretary could have had a public inquiry; he could have had an inquiry all the evidence of which was printed, even in this kind of inquiry. But all that was denied by the Home Secretary. Therefore, the Home Secretary's responsibility in this matter is a very grave one indeed. This is not only a question of whether the Home Secretary believes in capital punishment or not—we all know that he is a strong defender of capital punishment. It was not only a question of whether there was some doubt about Evans's innocence or guilt and that it was a tender matter that had to be looked into. It was a much bigger question than that.
The fact is that, when there was grave doubt and widespread disturbance in the public mind, and when there was a possibility of searching out the truth by long and detailed examination according to the rules which we have always tried to uphold in the British judicial system—when all those opportunities were available, and when it was possible at all events to extend the inquiry for four or five weeks so that people like those cited by my hon. and learned Friend could bring their evidence forward—it was the Home Secretary who turned down all
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these possibilities and said, "Oh, no, I am going to have a different kind of inquiry. I am going to have one that is rushed through in a few days. I am going to have one in which all the evidence is not published at the end; and I am going to have it through quickly enough to see that Christie is hanged on the date that was fixed. I am going to get it through and push it all out of the way as quickly as possible."
When the case is presented in that fashion, this is a much bigger issue, and if the Home Secretary has not a detailed and valid reply to all the evidence which has been presented in this debate tonight——
Mr. E. Partridge: Evidence?
Mr. Foot: —and if he has not got the courage to print all the evidence that came before even this inquiry, if he cannot do the first and is not prepared to do the second, the only course open to him is to resign his office.
11.25 p.m.
Mr. Michael Stewart: I have not the legal knowledge of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), nor the gift of powerful presentation of narrative that belongs to my hon. Friend the Member for Devon port (Mr. Foot), but I want to put to the Home Secretary the point of view which I think is shared by a very great many ordinary laymen—people without legal knowledge—throughout the country.
Like millions of other people, I read the reports of the Christie trial and, as it developed, there occurred to me—as it must have occurred to millions of people—that it was indeed remarkable if we had the coincidence of two murderers murdering by the same method in the same house. With that anxiety in our minds, we were naturally relieved when the right hon. and learned Gentleman set up the Scott Henderson inquiry, although I think a great many of us would share the view we have just heard powerfully expressed that it might have been better if that inquiry had taken a different form. Again in common with a great many people, I read the Report of the inquiry anxiously and, indeed, rather hoping, since after all Evans was dead, that if it was in conformity with the truth it would

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establish beyond doubt that Evans was guilty, because none of us would wish to believe that an innocent man had been hanged.
It was in that frame of mind that I read the Report, and I believe I am expressing what was in the minds of a very great many people. It was partly a hope that it would be proved that an innocent man had not been hanged but there was the other worry—could the coincidence have occurred of two murderers in the same house, using the same method? When I read the Report in that frame of mind it did strike me, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch pointed out, that the general tone of the Report seemed to be prejudiced against Evans. But there was one item which seemed to me to tell very strongly in favour of the view that Evans was guilty. That was the clear and categorical statement that Evans had described how the murders were committed and that the only way in which he could have done that was by having first-hand knowledge.
When I read that in the Report I was profoundly impressed by it because, while there was so much, inevitably, in the case that was bound to be a matter of opinion, where judgment might turn this way or that, here there seemed to stick out a solid, unquestionable fact which almost seemed to decide the case. It disposed of the mystery of the coincidence and seemed almost to establish the guilt of Evans, for how indeed, if he were not guilty, could he have described how these murders had occurred? How could he, since it was clearly stated by Mr. Scott Henderson that he could only have done that from first-hand knowledge?
Therefore, with something of bewilderment I set the Report aside feeling that it was extremely hard to decide the truth in this matter, but having very much in mind that here seemed to be one unshakable and unquestionable fact that bore very heavily against Evans. But now what do we hear from my hon. and learned Friend tonight? [Interruption.] An hon. Member opposite has twice contemptuously repeated the word "Evidence" when it has been used to describe what my hon. and learned Friend has said. Anyone who attended carefully to
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the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch would have noticed that it was confined exclusively to statements of what he believed to be facts, that he did not impute motives or draw deductions beyond what followed inevitably from the statements he made and, what was still more important, that for every statement he made he drew our attention to where we could verify whether that statement was accurate or not.
I do not think that can be questioned. Therefore, it seems to me not reasonable to speak contemptuously of the statements put before the House by my hon. Friend this evening.
Mr. Partridge: Statements.
Mr. Stewart: I do not know whether the hon. Member knows what the word "evidence" means. Evidence means statements made by a witness.
Mr. Partridge: From his own knowledge.
Mr. Stewart: An hon. Member, having read the transcript of the evidence at the trial, is surely in a position to tell of his own knowledge what is in that transcript. I could agree that he was not in a position to say what was said and done at the Evans trial, because I presume that he was not there; but he is in a position to say what is in the transcript of the evidence at the trial.
As we all know the reputation of my hon. and learned Friend, and putting the matter at its lowest, and saying he has made a mistake, then the transcript can be checked. But I assume that he is correct when he states that the transcript of the evidence records the fact that Evans could have known of the way in which the murders were committed by something other than first-hand knowledge.
Mr. Bing: If I may interrupt, because this is a point of some importance, I would say that one of the two police witnesses, on oath—[Interruption.]—and hon. Members opposite may not consider that statements made on oath are evidence—swore that of the three points which are produced in Mr. Scott Henderson's Report as being matters of firsthand knowledge by Evans, two were told him before he made his statement. They were mentioned by the chief inspector

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and, in fact, the inspector said that if he was pressed on the matter he could not remember if he had been told about the tie or not
Mr. Stewart: I am obliged to my hon. and learned Friend for confirming that I have understood the argument correctly. My hon. and learned Friend therefore draws attention to the fact that, in the transcript of the evidence at the trial, in a statement imputed to a police witness, there is something which knocks away the whole of much which appeared to be a valid and essential point indicating the guilt of Evans; and a point to which a layman must have attached great importance.
We ought, at the very least, to have been told that this was contradicted in the trial of Evans. Possibly Mr. Scott Henderson may have come to the conclusion that the statements of witnesses at Evans's trial were incorrect, but in his Report he should have drawn attention to the fact that these statements were made on oath and not have led us to suppose that an essential part of the case against Evans was something which had been controverted by police witnesses, giving evidence on oath. That point alone seems to establish the case which my hon. and learned Friend has made tonight. He has asked the Home Secretary to make available to the public all the evidence put before the Scott Henderson inquiry.
Is it possible, in view of the doubts which, on any interpretation, must be in any fair-minded person's mind after hearing my hon. and learned Friend, for the Home Secretary, to refuse the request that we should be able to see all the evidence on which Mr. Scott Henderson reached his conclusions? Is it reasonable to deny our further request that there should be a further inquiry into this matter by a properly constituted body?
I do ask hon. Members, at their leisure tomorrow, or when there is a little more time than there is now, to read over the series of statements, every one of which is supported by verifiable references, and then ask themselves if they are satisfied with what has been done. I know that some people—I trust no hon. Member of this House—would
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say, "After all, what does it matter? Both these men are dead now, and neither of them when they were alive, were particularly worthy or attractive members of society." That may well be true—indeed it is true. But we talk a great deal in this House and elsewhere about the free world and the values of Western civilisation.
It is a cardinal point in those beliefs that any human being in this country, whether he is a useful member of society or not, whether in other respects he may be a criminal or not, is entitled to the same treatment before the law and has the same claim to justice as the most honourable and the most useful member of society. In the free world, and particularly in this country, there are many things we should like to see put right. But we believe that our civilisation is moving slowly and perhaps stumblingly towards an honourable life for mankind.
The moment we start to say, "This man was a poor and wretched creature of no use to society," even though that allegation is true; the moment we say, "We cannot be bothered, we have more important things to do than question whether he has had justice or not," we turn from our progress, we turn from the light, and start walking along the road that leads ultimately to Belsen and Auschwitz. I do not think any hon. Member will deny that that is so. As my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said on an earlier occasion when we discussed this matter, our system of justice can survive an imputation that it is not infallible.
One hon. Member opposite seemed to consider it relevant to know under what Government irregularities occurred. That is not relevant at all. It may well be that during the term of this, that or the other Government there is a suggestion that police irregularities have occurred. Serious as it is, that would be much less serious than any suggestion that once such matters occurred attempts were made to hide them.
It is within the power of the Home Secretary to allay the anxiety which must be felt by an enormous number of ordinary decent people who are concerned with the reputation of this country. It is within his power to allay that anxiety by meeting the request made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Horn-church.
11.38 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: After the speeches which have been made it is not my purpose to trouble the House further with points of argument as to whether Mr. Scott Henderson reached a right or a wrong conclusion in the right or wrong way. I think the case which has been made out will be admitted to be a very powerful one and to demand an answer.
I wish to make an appeal to the Home Secretary. I have known him for a long time. I think he would permit me to say that we have been friends. I have the greatest respect for his personal integrity in this and in all matters with which he deals. We all have the greatest possible sympathy with him in his position tonight. He was not the Home Secretary at the time and it is his duty as Home Secretary to speak in this House for his Department, and for those who work under his authority. In our Constitution those persons include the Metropolitan Police.
I think it a serious embarrassment, both to him and to the House, that the same Minister should be responsible in the House for this inquiry, and also be bound by his office to defend his subordinates, who were the officers concerned in the original investigations, the original trial and the events that have taken place in recent weeks. It may be that one of the lessons of these tragic circumstances is to reinforce the case that many of us have supported for very many years that there ought to be in our constitution a Ministry of Justice with somebody responsible for the administration of justice who is not also the spokesman in the House of Commons for the Metropolitan Police Force or for any other police force.
That is the first point. The second is that everyone understands that when an execution has taken place it is with the greatest possible reluctance that anyone comes to the conclusion that there is even the faintest real possibility that an innocent man was hanged. There is an inevitable bias in the minds of all of us—a preference, as my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) said just now, to believe that what was done and what cannot be recalled was rightly done.
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That is not only because we should all be so—I do not know what the right word is; I suppose heartbroken would not be too strong—if we were to believe that the administration of our justice had resulted in so tragic and irrevocable an error, but also because if it were so established there must inevitably be some reflection from it, some undermining of the public confidence in the administration of justice upon which that administration must inevitably rely. If it were established in this case, as I for myself believe it has been established, that a man totally innocent of the crime with which he was charged was nevertheless executed, it is impossible to believe or to assert that that would not result in some undermining of public confidence in the administration of justice.
But there is something which would undermine confidence in the administration of justice much more than the conviction of error in a particular case. No one would expect any human institution to be infallible. No one pretends that our administration of justice is infallible. No one thinks for a moment that we have never made mistakes, never acquitted a guilty person and never convicted an innocent one.
We can survive the proof that an error was made. But there is one thing that the administration of justice will never survive, and that is if people begin to doubt not its infallibility but its integrity. That is where the damage is done. If a mistake is made, far better that the public should see everyone concerned and all the resources of our community and nation harnessed to establish the error, confess the error and, so far as it may be done at this time of day, put the error right.
In that way we can do something—not very much, but we can do something—to restore the confidence undermined by the error. But if we allow people to believe that, having made the error, all the resources of the community are being employed to hush it up and deny it, then indeed confidence in the administration of justice will be undermined in such a way that it can never recover.
Therefore I appeal to the Home Secretary not to be tempted to argue with the hon. and learned Member for Horn-church (Mr. Bing), with the hon. Member

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for Devonport (Mr. Foot), or with my other hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East. I know his forensic skill. I have had experience of it for many years. He could employ it now to try to remove the impression which must have been produced on the minds of every hon. Member who heard the speeches of my hon. Friends, by saying that perhaps the inference has been too strongly pressed, and that perhaps after all the picture is not so black as it was painted. He could send us all away with comfortable assurances, laying the flattering unction to our souls which Hamlet told us about. He will do no permanent good that way.
It would be much better that he should say that while he does not agree with the case made out, there is sufficient in the case made in the debate tonight to make it unsafe to rely solely on Mr. Scott Henderson's Report. Let there be some other inquiry. The better the answer which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has to the case made out tonight, the stronger the case for a proper inquiry at which the answer to it can be properly established. Much better that he should do that than commit himself tonight and so embarrass any future inquiry which might be instituted by seeking now to defend the position, which is beyond serious pretension, that there is no objection to the Scott Henderson Report, and that it removes all reasonable doubt that Evans murdered his wife and child.
Whatever he may say, however eloquently and powerfully, he will not satisfy the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch, and he will not satisfy millions of our fellow countrymen. Let us not deceive ourselves into thinking that the unanimous chorus of the leading newspapers reflects the state of mind of the public. Let doubts be removed by a proper inquiry. If we can be assured that no error was made, let it be put beyond controversy. If that cannot be established, let us humbly admit that our administration of justice went wrong, and let us make up our minds that while we cannot guarantee that there will be no further error we will at any rate remove for ever from our law that provision in it which makes an error irrevocable.
11.49 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe): May I say one word of explanation which I do not think that even the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) will hold against me? I think it is only fair that the House should know that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) wrote to me, as he said. The letter reached the Home Office at 3.30 this afternoon. I happened to be receiving, as some hon. Members will be aware, a deputation from the Trades Union Congress at four o'clock in regard to matters arising out of the Gowers Report, so that the first time I heard that this matter was to be raised was shortly before five o'clock. If there are any matters on which I am not fully informed—I hope there are not—I only hope that the House will take that into account, because I agree with everything that has been said about this being a most serious matter, about which I should like to put all the points I know before the House.
Mr. Bing: I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not think that I intended any discourtesy. I rang his office and told him that I was intending to do this and was sending the letter along, but I had to wait until I had seen one of the witnesses before I could deal fully with the point.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am not imputing blame but am merely explaining the position, and I hope that the House will not think it unfair to be asked to accept that.
The other point—it is a much more serious one—is this. The hon. and learned Gentleman referred several times to Mr. Scott Henderson "making his case." He also referred to Mr. Scott Henderson's having to justify the police action and the normal course of the law. I say that it will be a poor day for Great Britain when we cannot find men in this country who are prepared to undertake an inquiry and come fearlessly to the conclusion to which the facts point without any regard for the consequences of opinion. I endeavoured to choose a man who, I believed, would approach it in that way. The terms of reference which I gave Mr. Scott Henderson are set out in the document before the House. I told the House that my object, as I believe it

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to have been the object of the whole House, was to discover the truth.
I am sorry that, as I gathered from the hon. Member for Devonport, notice had not been given to my predecessor in the office of Home Secretary, and, therefore, he is not here. Although we are concerned tonight with something that happened in his term of office, I am sure that he would be just as anxious as I am to see that the truth was arrived at. I am certain that nobody holding the office of Home Secretary, whatever his party, would in any way seek or desire that the person who held the inquiry should be biased one way or the other in the result to which he came. I resent that the hon. and learned Member for Horn-church should have put the matter in that way. I have seen no reason for it, nor have I heard any reason deployed tonight.
The hon. Member for Devonport has—quite properly—made an attack on me. As he was good enough to anticipate, the fact of the attack is not a matter which worries me or from which I should ever retreat. The question is, as he would be the first to admit, whether his attack was soundly based. He said, in a momentary exaggeration, that this was an inquiry which took two or three days. I hope he will just look at that aspect of the matter again, because that is a damaging remark to go out.
From the Monday when I announced the inquiry to the Monday on which Mr. Scott Henderson brought the Report for me to see, before my decision in the Christie case was finally reached, was a matter of seven or eight days according to arithmetic. The hon. Member probably did not notice it, but if he will read the Report again more carefully he will observe that Mr. Scott Henderson said, in paragraph 3:
"Having been told by you of the proposed appointment, I had started several days before your announcement to read the papers in the cases of Evans and Christie."
The other point which is connected with that one, and on which he blamed me, was that I did not postpone the execution of Christie. That is a matter for my decision, and I came to the conclusion that it would have been an inhuman thing to do, because I had come to a conclusion as to whether he should
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die or not. The alternatives then in front of me were to keep a man alive, knowing in my own mind that he would ultimately die, and not tell him, or to tell him and keep him hanging on for a period which might have been extended, knowing that ultimately he was to die.
I rejected that course, and I believed and still believe that in the time, say 12 days, or 11 days—I do not want to exaggerate for a moment—that Mr. Scott Henderson had, he had full time to examine the subject and the subject was of such a compass that it could be dealt with in that time. I hate to introduce personal experience in addressing this House, but it obviously goes without saying that those in my profession have had a very considerable experience of inquiries of various sorts, and have conducted many, and therefore one applies practical knowledge and experience in dealing with that point. Therefore, I do not think it is fair or right to say that this was a rushed job, as the hon. Gentleman said.
As to the procedure, I said when I first announced the inquiry to the House that it would be left to Mr. Scott Henderson, and I made no attempt to hide my view from the House. The hon. Gentleman can look up what I said at the time; hon. Members here will remember me saying it. I said that I firmly believed that the procedure should be that of a private inquiry, and I gave the four reasons, which appeared in HANSARD and which I have emphasised since, for taking that course. The House was under no illusion, not only as to the course but why I took it.
The hon. Gentleman raised another point. He asked what right Mr. Scott Henderson had to refer to that matter. The hon. Gentleman—I do not blame him for this—had probably not listened to what I said, or read it carefully. It is impossible to cover everything that is said in the House or that appears in HANSARD, but if he looks at it again he will see that I said that I had consulted Mr. Scott Henderson on that point, and he agreed with me. I put that before the House on the day that I announced the inquiry, and I gave my own reasons.
Let me say at once that it is my responsibility, whatever Mr. Scott Henderson thinks. However, he has given his view and he has given his reasons. I think he was justified, not only because I had

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given him my point of view, but also for the sake of public confidence. He had undertaken the inquiry. Although the major responsibility is mine, he cannot divest himself of his part of the responsibility as being the person who held the inquiry. I want to speak most temperately, but I must entirely refuse to accept the suggestion that this matter was rushed through, either on my part in ordering the inquiry, or in Mr. Scott Henderson's part in conducting it.
I now come to the first point that was made by the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch, and that is, that apart from any specific matters which he mentioned, that there was a general reason for thinking that the result arrived at by Mr. Scott Henderson was wrong, and the hon. and learned Member said that that came to this point of the coincidence. Those were the first general points that he made. I am sure that there he put his finger on the point which had worried a great many people—the point of coincidence of the two stranglers in the same house. Whatever they were, lawyers or politicians, or the ordinary man in the club or pub, that was the point they had in mind.
Therefore, I think it is extremely necessary to proceed, as was done by Mr. Scott Henderson, by setting out the case against Evans, and both the case at the trial and the other material considered by me—I am referring to the title of the Report—relating to the case of Evans. I should have thought that when—as they are perfectly entitled to do—Members in this House seek to upset and displace the view that has been arrived at by an independent tribunal they would address themselves most seriously and carefully and completely to the points on which the person holding the inquiry relied and placed the weight of his affirmation. If the House will allow me—because I think it is the only way to get the matter into proper perspective and proportion—I will just look at these points and see how far they have been dealt with by the hon. and learned Gentleman who was the spearhead of this attack.
The first point—and one with which the hon. and learned Member did deal—was the question of the information available to Evans. The hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) said that he was most impressed by that point. If the
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House will look at the end of paragraph 29 to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred, it states:
"Both Mr. Blackburn and I are satisfied that nothing was said to the prisoner relating to the bodies and the causes of death, other than was given in evidence by Chief Inspector Jennings at the trial."—
And there is a reference to that evidence in paragraph 25—
"It follows as an irresistible inference that Evans could not have known about the details of the strangulations and the disposal of the bodies unless he had first hand knowledge of the crime. I was told by at least one witness that the tie did not belong to Evans. I have no evidence that I can accept as proof of that. Evans himself said that it was his own tie (paragraph 25). Christie was asked about the tie at the trial but did not attempt to identify it. The tie was destroyed in the ordinary course after the hearing of the appeal."
Mr. S. Silverman Mr. S. Silverman rose——
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I should like to finish this point, because the hon. Member for Fulham, East attached great importance to it, and I should not think he has had a chance of reading this rather lengthy transcript himself; but it is in the Library and he can look at it. I shall endeavour to put the point fairly to him.
The evidence given by Chief Inspector Jennings—I have just quoted Mr. Scott Henderson's reference to him—is, as the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch said, on page 68. It began in this way, with the Chief Inspector speaking to Evans:
"I am Chief Inspector Jennings in charge of this case. At 11.50 a.m. today I found the dead body of your wife, Beryl Evans, concealed in a washhouse at 10, Rillington Place, Notting Hill; also the body of your baby daughter, Geraldine, in the same outbuilding, and this clothing was found on them. Later today I was present at Kensington Mortuary when it was established that the cause of death was strangulation in both cases. I have reason to believe that you were responsible for their deaths."
Then he was cross-examined by Mr. Malcolm Morris, for the defence, and on page 73, at Letter C, Mr. Morris said:
"When you showed him"—
that is Evans—
"the clothing, he then did appear to be nervous, did he, and upset?—A. That had upset him, yes.
Q. It had upset him. You told him exactly what you and the Chief Superintendent had found?—A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Explaining how his wife's body was wrapped up in a green table cloth?—A. Not at that stage—I found them concealed."

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Then the judge said:
"Found what?—A. I found them concealed in the outhouse.
Q. You found it concealed?—A. Yes, and this clothing was found on them."
Then Mr. Morris said:
"But you said it was concealed behind pieces of wood?—A. No, Sir.
Q. Did not you?—A. No, Sir.
Q. I must suggest that you did?—A. No. Sir.
Q. Nothing of the kind?—A. No, Sir."
Mr. R. T. Paget: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman read the next question?
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Yes.
"Q. Are you quite sure that you did not mention wood or timber?—A. Yes, Sir."
That is a re-affirmation of that point.
On page 76 the next witness, Detective Inspector Black, was asked about the point. Hon. and learned Gentlemen in my profession will see that he was asked a series of leading questions, which is usually done when one is going over some evidence that has been given before.
Mr. Paget: This is cross-examination.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Yes, I am sorry. Leading questions then are entirely permissible. He was asked, at Letter E:
"And there did Mr. Jennings tell him that he, Mr. Jennings, had first found the body of his wife concealed underneath the wash basin or the sink in this outhouse?—A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did he also tell him that he had found the body of his baby concealed behind some timber in the outhouse?—A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And did he say that both of them appeared to have died by strangulation?—A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did he mention that the baby had been strangled by a tie which he produced?—A. No, Sir, not at that stage.
A. At what stage did he? Was it afterwards, when he produced the clothing? Try and remember if you can.—A. Yes, Sir. Whilst Mr. Jennings was stating to the prisoner what you have said the prisoner picked up the clothing and also the tie.
Q. Then what was said? Did Mr. Jennings say where the tie had been found?—A. No. Mr. Jennings did not mention the tie.
Q. What, if anything, was said about the tie?—A. We did not mention the tie."
Mr. Bing: Read on.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Very well.
"Q. Was anything said about a tie by anybody?—A. No, Sir.
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Q. Well, I must suggest to you that at some time—and it may not have been at the very beginning—it was said by somebody to Evans that a tie had been found round the baby's neck. If you are not certain perhaps you will say. I do not know if you can remember?—A. I cannot remember.
Q. When Evans was looking at the clothing it included a tablecloth and blanket in which his wife's body had been wrapped?—A. Yes."
I would ask hon. Members to examine it. I really do not see any difference of materiality.
Mr. Paget: What?
Mr. Tom Driberg: Staggering!
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: This is a very, very important matter indeed. I am certain the right hon. and learned Gentleman wishes lay people like myself to understand it, because it is not the lawyers who have to decide this matter outside but ordinary men and women. From what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has now said it would appear that every material fact about the murder of the woman and the child, Mrs. Evans and Evans's child, had been disclosed to Evans by the police before Evans made his confession—every material fact; where the bodies were found, that they were found in the basement under the floor, behind wood and strangled. The only thing which is left at the present time is the comparatively trivial one about the tie.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The right hon. Gentleman was not here, of course, when his hon. and learned Friend made his point.
Mr. Bevan: Oh, yes, I was.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon.
The point that was made by his hon. and learned Friend was that that statement which I have quoted from Mr. Scott Henderson, that
"Both Mr. Blackburn and I are satisfied that nothing was said to the prisoner relating to the bodies and causes of death other than what was given in evidence by Chief Inspector Jennings"
was wrong because of the passage that he referred to in the evidence of Inspector Black. I have shown by reading those two passages that there is no divergence on a material point between them, and that what Mr. Scott Henderson says

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there is perfectly right. It was the evidence that was given in the evidence of Mr. Jennings, and then Mr. Scott Henderson goes on to make the first point to which he attaches importance, that Evans had said this was the tie, which was clearly a material matter.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose——
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I did not interrupt any hon. Gentleman opposite who spoke and I must have a chance of developing this case.
Mr. Bevan: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is leaving that point at the moment and going to another one, and we are very anxious about this.
This is not a party question at all. [HON. MEMBERS; "Oh, no!"] I do beg hon. Members opposite to realise that this debate is going to be read outside by other people and they will judge us by the way we conduct ourselves in this matter. As I understand it, the position is this. My hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) said—and I think it was in all our minds when we read this Report—that the piece of evidence against Evans which appeared to be irrefutable was the fact that in the course of his confession he narrated incidents about the murder which could only have been known to him if he had committed the murder. Now, from what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has read out, all the material facts except the tie itself were disclosed to Evans before the confession was made by Evans.
Mr. S. Silverman: And the tie was shown.
Mr. Bevan: And the tie was shown. This is a complete refutation of Mr. Scott Henderson's deduction.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The right hon. Gentleman has been most unfair, and I am surprised at him—[HON. MEMBERS; "Oh."] I refused to give way, and then gave way because I thought he had some special point to ask me about. He has made a most tendentious argument and refuses to face the point I was answering. I have been trying to answer it most dispassionately.
The hon. and learned Member, on that paragraph, made a clear point to the
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House—the right hon. Member will see it if he reads the Report—that it was quite wrong of Mr. Scott Henderson to say that all that was said by Chief Inspector Jennings. In fact the hon. and learned Member said he had not read the evidence given by Inspector Black. The right hon. Member will find that I am right. I am saying there is no material difference between the evidence given by Chief Inspector Jennings and Inspector Black.
Mr. M. Stewart: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman allow me?
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: No, the hon. Member must appreciate that a case has been deployed; I sat through it without interruption and it is fair that hon. Members should listen to the reply.
The next point of my defence of Mr. Scott Henderson comes in the next paragraph of the Report. It is the confession which was given to Dr. Matheson, the Prison Medical Officer. That is clearly a matter of great importance. If hon. Members will look at the page about two-thirds down they will see the terms in which that was described.
Mr. Bing Mr. Bing rose——
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am sorry, I cannot give way.
The hon. and learned Member made one slip earlier. He said the first two statements made by Evans involved Christie. He will remember on reflection that the first statement did not involve Christie. The second involved Christie and the third and four were confessions about Evans himself. I merely correct the hon. and learned Member on that point of fact. The case was based, in part on those two statements—two admissions—and confessions after statements, the first of which was admittedly wrong. The second was a statement about abortion and not about strangulation. Then there were the confessions.
The next point which Mr. Scott Henderson says is a matter worthy of consideration is that there was a further confession not very long afterwards to the prison doctor, and he sets that out. There was no mention in the speech of the hon. and learned Member of that; no suggestion against its weight.

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The next point is, perhaps, more one of comment, but it is a remarkable fact which no one looking fairly at the matter could refuse to consider. The amount of weight they will attach to it is a matter which varies from person to person. But then one sees the solicitor's comment on the way the case appeared to him, saying it would be a matter for serious consideration
"whether it would be possible to set up a defence of insanity or let the prisoner pursue his somewhat wild story of abortion or endeavour to put to the jury the possibility of an alternative verdict of manslaughter. The latter could clearly be only an alternative as regards the wife. The destruction of the poor little girl can only be accounted for if in fact the prisoner strangled her by insane impulse possibly induced by fear of discovery of the murder of the wife."
After that Mr. Scott Henderson analyses the facts that gave rise to the feeling between Evans and his wife. He says that they were established before him. He then, in the next paragraph, goes into the evidence, which is corroborated of Mrs. Evans having been involved in a fracas before her death, which is part of the confession given to Dr. Matheson.
I can well understand strong views being held in such a matter as this; I can understand the advocate or the politician not failing, when seeking to put forward a case, to take the stronger points. Perhaps, one might even tend to overemphasise those, and automatically shrink from discussion of the weaker points. But, I cannot see how anyone who is really seeking to make up his mind on this difficult matter, could ignore these four points; and I deem them worthy of some discussion in endeavouring to enable this House to make up its mind.
I paused there because Mr. Scott Henderson was dealing with the evidence up to that point. But then, there is additional evidence about the ring, and the selling of it in South Wales. Surely these are important points——
Mr. Paget: Totally irrelevant.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: —and as I was saying, I really find it difficult to appreciate an attempt to attack an independent inquiry when one does not seek to deal with the important matters which the inquirer has set out as a basis for his research.
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I want to come to the point which the hon. and learned Member for Horn-church has raised with regard to the presence of the workmen; and I do think that it is important in considering this matter for the House to have in mind the way in which it is dealt with in paragraph 37. The hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch read only two sentences of that paragraph, but I want to draw attention to what Mr. Scott Henderson says at the beginning;
"Before I leave the facts of the Evans case, I should deal with a number of other matters which I investigated, most of which were the subject of inquiries by the police in December, 1949. There is nothing to fix the time when Evans placed the bodies in the washhouse."—
That is important because it is quite clear that Mr. Scott Henderson saw these witnesses, and this is the basis of his approach.
The Report goes on—
"Evans was due to make a long journey on Friday the 11th November, 1949. The account which he gave to Christie about packing up his job unexpectedly the night before was a true one. It may well be that he intended dumping the bundles containing the bodies when he was out with his lorry on the Friday, and that he did not put the bodies in the washhouse until after Thursday. Workmen had been working in the washhouse and in the house during that week. The actual work in the washhouse had been finished on Tuesday, 8th November, 1949. But the workmen who had been working there may have been going in and out of the washhouse between the 8th and the 11th when they finished in the house and cleared up. At least one of them is now satisfied that no bodies could have been in the washhouse and that there was no timber in the washhouse (as was found by the police on the 2nd December, 1949) when they cleared up on Friday, the 11th November, 1949. As no work was done in the washhouse after the 8th November, 1949, I do not think that workmen would have paid any attention to pieces of timber put against the sink after that date, and in any case it is not certain that the bodies were put there before the 11th November. A plumber and a carpenter came to the premises after the 11th November, 1949, but they had nothing to do with the washhouse."
What is clear is that Mr. Scott Henderson has considered this point and has emphasised in two portions of the paragraph I have read that there is nothing to fix the time when Evans placed the bodies in the washhouse. But that does not affect the evidence to which I have called the attention of the House and on which he has based his conclusion. May I say one thing I should have said earlier? The hon. and learned Gentleman was good enough in his letter to say

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he had no objection to my showing his letter to Mr. Scott Henderson. Unfortunately, Mr. Scott Henderson is conducting his Sessions as Recorder of Portsmouth today. I tried to contact him, but he was at Portsmouth and I could not do so. I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will take it from me that I tried, but in the circumstances I could not do so.
The next point made by the hon. and learned Gentleman was in regard to Dr. Odess. He said that Dr. Odess had given a different recollection from previously as to the time when Mr. Christie had fibrositis and the other complaint. So far as I have been able to get the date that Dr. Odess now says that Christie made the complaint, it was 12th November, which was at the beginning of this. I should remind the House that at his trial Evans said in his evidence—not in his statement—that he had helped Christie who was carrying down the body of Mrs. Evans because Christie was not capable of doing it himself. And Christie himself said that on 8th November he was suffering severely from enteritis and fibrositis in the back. In view of that evidence I do not see the substance of the complaint that Mr. Scott Henderson did not mention a change about the date.
It would of course be a work of perfection to include every matter, but I do not see that on the reasoning of the conclusion which he gave that was a material matter which invalidates the conclusion. I am trying so far as one can from notes to deal with the points as they were made. I have dealt with those two and I wish now to deal with the point made about the chaplain.
Clearly no statement ought to be made by the chaplain unless two conditions are present; first that he is willing and the church authorities are willing and secondly that the man by whom the statement was made agrees. These conditions were present. That is why the evidence was taken with regard to the statement given by Christie. Evans was a Roman Catholic and it is entirely news to me that it is possible for contemplation that a statement made signo confessionis could be given at all. That is the explanation of that point.
Mr. Driberg: I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is not suggesting
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that there is any difference in standard on that point between the churches?
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I would not suggest that for a moment. That is why I put the two conditions, one, that the Church agreed that it was proper and, two, that the man who had made it agreed; but I do not want to argue the metaphysics of that today. At any rate, these were the conditions which seemed to me good. If they fall short, I must bear the brunt.
I come to the other main point which was made against me and that was that I did not order a public inquiry. I gave the reasons to this House before the inquiry commenced. I have noted the views of people I respect and I still believe that I was right. I still think that the conception of a man under sentence of death being brought before a public inquiry and giving his evidence in that way is one that I could not contemplate as being right. I still believe that a secret inquiry gives, first of all, the fullest chance and the greatest probability of ordinary people who do not want to be mixed up in dreadful affairs coming forward, and the greatest flexibility for the tribunal in conducting its affairs and following up new paths.
I am sorry if I have not carried the whole House with me. There is, I know, a body of opinion which thinks I am wrong in that. I am very sorry to disagree with those who hold that opinion. I think that I was right. I said to the House that what we all want is the truth. I believe that on this occasion we have got it. I am sorry if I have transgressed the appeal of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). I am sure that he intended to put it in the most friendly way that he could in view of the disagreement that I had already expressed, but it is the old difficulty of once bringing a matter into the arena.
Once the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) had made these attacks on the approach and performance of the gentleman who held this inquiry and used this House as the place for such attacks, I do not think——
Mr. Bevan Mr. Bevan indicated dissent.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but to say of

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someone holding an impartial inquiry that he had to justify the police action and the normal course of the law is an imputation. The right hon. Gentleman is a serious student of our political affairs and methods. That is not a façon de parler. The hon. Member has shown it many times. One thing which the Government always require is to have available people who will fearlessly conduct inquiries. I am not going into that point again.
I have said that I do not believe for a moment that Mr. Scott Henderson would be influenced by any question of the Executive, or anything of that sort. I believe he would approach it fearlessly; but I also believe that when attacks are made upon the motive of someone who undertakes a task of this kind, if the Minister who has appointed him has not the courage to meet the attacks with as dispassionate a survey of the ground as he can make, then we are putting in danger not only the justice of the matter, but the great power of the Government of being able to call on people who will know that if they conduct an inquiry and fearlessly state their conclusions, and their motives and methods are attacked, they will be defended in this House by the person who has appointed them, unless a case is made out showing that the charges against them are justified.
I do not believe that the case has been made out. I do not believe that there is a scintilla to support the attack on the motives and methods of Mr. Scott Henderson. Therefore, I must regretfully refuse the inquiry which has been asked for.
Mr. Bing: Just one question. Did Mr. Scott Henderson hear the evidence of the carpenter? If he did not, why did not he?
12.40 a.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has said that when a public man undertakes an inquiry he has a right to be defended. Can he be better defended than by publishing the evidence upon which he acted?
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I said there would be a private inquiry. That was my promise to those who came forward, or who would come forward. Would
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the hon. and learned Gentleman, after that, publish the evidence?
Mr. Paget: What about Christie's evidence? That is published. What about the chaplain's evidence? That is published. Why not ask the other people if they object to their evidence being published? Why not ask the carpenter if he objects to having his evidence published? It is suppressed in this Report. Why not ask Dr. Odess if he objects? His evidence is suppressed in this Report.
Let there be no misunderstanding about this matter. We are not attacking this Report merely because, in our view, this Report does not disclose the truth; we are attacking the Report because we say that it deliberately conceals the truth. We are attacking this Report not because it is mistaken, but because, we say, it is dishonest. I put that charge, and I ask that it be inquired into.
Mr. Frederick Gough: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman——
Mr. Paget: I cannot give way. I want to be brief.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman made four points. The first was that Mr. Scott Henderson said in his Report that he was satisfied that nothing was said to the prisoner relating to the bodies and the causes of death other than that given in the evidence of Chief Inspector Jennings. Either Mr. Scott Henderson did not read Superintendent Black's evidence—I prefer to believe that—or that was dishonest. There is no kind of question but that that is a categorical contradiction. Chief Inspector Jennings was asked if he was quite sure he did not mention wood or timber. His answer was, "No, sir." Superintendent Black was asked whether Chief Inspector Jennings also told Evans that he found the body of a baby concealed behind timber in the outhouse. His answer was, "Yes, sir." Is that a categorical contradiction or is it not? That is only one of them. I take it as a sample.
I wish also to refer to the last few lines of paragraph 34 on page 14 of Mr. Scott Henderson's Report, where it says that Evans's statement:
"… was an exact description of how the body had been dealt with and where it had been put. Similarly, his statement that he

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had strangled his baby with his tie and hid her body behind some wood in the wash-house was also an exact description of what had happened to the baby. I have already stated my finding that Evans could not have obtained these details from the police. …"
Compare that with what Superintendent Black said about his being told that the body of a baby was found concealed behind some timber in the outhouse. That is precisely one of the things which had been mentioned. Either Mr. Scott Henderson had not read Superintendent Black's evidence, which was grossly negligent, or both those observations were dishonest.
Secondly, there is the evidence of the carpenter. The charge against Evans was that he killed his wife on the Tuesday, took her body to the outhouse and concealed it with timber, and that he murdered his baby on the Thursday and took the body into the outhouse and concealed it with timber. But he had left for Wales on the Monday. If—the time sheets of the carpenter seem to make this plain—the timber which concealed the bodies was part of a floor until midday on Monday, Evans could not have committed the crime.
The only conceivable opportunity he would have had would have been in broad daylight on the Monday, and it would have involved going through Christie's flat, going past the window of his kitchen at a time when both Christie and his wife said they were at home, and carrying the bodies to a washhouse overlooked by a dozen windows. The thing is fantastic. There is evidence given to Mr. Scott Henderson and suppressed. We want to know why, and we are entitled to know why.
Next, there is Dr. Odess. One of the most powerful points made against Evans at his trial was that Christie, owing to fibrositis, was too weak in the back to have moved the bodies. That evidence was given by Dr. Odess at Christie's trial. Dr. Odess then goes to the inquiry and says, "I am sorry. I am wrong. Christie did riot complain of fibrositis or a strained back to me until the Saturday, and what he complained of was consistent with his having carried an unusually heavy weight a day or two before." Was that not evidence that was worth a mention? Was it not at least as relevant as the fact that, as is admitted, he had sold his wife's clothes and his
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wife's furniture, and also his wife's ring, which, because it is prejudicial, rates a whole paragraph? But the evidence of Dr. Odess contradicting what he had said, which had carried some weight in the Christie trial and had been printed in all the papers, has not even been mentioned. Is that an honest way to prepare a report?
Finally, referring to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), were there two interviews with Christie or was there only one? If there were two interviews, why does the Report not say so? Why is the Report dressed up to conceal the fact?—for that is what it is.
Let us put this perfectly plainly. This is not the last that this House or the right hon. and learned Gentleman will hear about the case of John Timothy Evans. Evans's mother, who is a devout Catholic, desires the body of her son to be taken to consecrated ground. It is the body of an innocent man, and it is entitled to be interred in consecrated ground. We shall not leave this matter, whatever Government is in power. We should raise it and raise it until that body is put at rest in holy ground.
12.47 a.m.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: The House will probably not be anxious to carry on the debate for very much longer, but I would like to say this in answer to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said. I have listened to every minute of this debate. I think that probably that is the case with most hon. Members who are in the Chamber at present. I believe that if we strip ourselves entirely of any bias in the matter, which is not too easy to do in this Chamber, almost everybody will say not so much that the right hon. and learned Gentleman made an inadequate reply, because I believe that is self-evident, but that what the right hon. and learned Gentleman ought not to have tried to do this evening was to make a final reply.
That is where he has made the mistake. He admitted—no one blames him for that—that he did not have an opportunity of looking at some of this case until 4 o'clock. He did not have a chance to read the letter until late afternoon. He certainly did not know what my hon. Friends were going to deploy in full in the course of the debate.
Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I ought to say, in fairness to the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), that he made eight points in the letter, and I think I am right in saying that he gave me notice of every one of the points he made tonight.
Mr. Bevan: Certainly, but I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman, seeing five points, would not be in a position to appraise their weight until he had first heard them deployed in argument.
Therefore, it seems to me that he made his first mistake in coming to the Box and working up a great deal of emotion in defence of the person who was directed to make the inquiry. He is perfectly correct in saying that we have to be extremely chary in this House of imputing motives to people who do public work. They must do it fearlessly, and if they are to be frivolously attacked and to have motives attributed to them which cannot be proved against them, then, of course, he will not find men to do this work.
But, clearly, the charges made against this inquiry are inferred from the nature of the evidence. I take it from my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is a very competent lawyer indeed, but if he is able to make a high income at the Bar on the kind of defence he made tonight then I have gone in for the wrong career, for really it was a weak affair. What he should have done was to say, "I am prepared to listen to what is said. I am hearing a great deal of it for the first time. I am prepared to examine it and find out whether new evidence has been brought forward as to whether there is any cause whatsoever for uneasiness, and if there is I will consult the House on some future occasion and discuss whether some further inquiry should not be made, and if so, of what kind."
Instead of that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has entirely disregarded, as far as we can see, Evans's character. He is much more concerned with defending the reputation of the member of the legal profession whom he appointed to conduct the inquiry than to defend the integrity of British justice, and far more concerned about that than he is to satisfy public opinion that justice has
1484
been done in this case. I consider his reply so unsatisfactory that it will be pursued, as far as I am concerned. We are bound to press this matter further because it would be a very bad thing if it were left as it is now.
It would be very bad indeed if the impression were given on this matter of Evans's innocence or guilt that the Labour Party takes up one position and the Conservative Party another. Nothing surely could be worse for the reputation of the British judicial system than for it to go out that it has become the football of party controversy. We have always believed that British justice stands superior to any party affiliations, and that ought to be maintained. But surely hon. Gentlemen opposite will confess that they have heard tonight at least a case powerful enough to justify a better answer than the summary one we have received from the Home Secretary. I think they would agree to that, and, therefore, it would be an exceedingly bad thing indeed if this went on for week after week, as it will, because my hon. Friends will persist in this matter until they see that justice is done.
I beg the right hon. and learned Gentleman even now not to take up a final position. Will he look at the debate again? Will he examine carefully the speeches, and will he realise that my hon. Friends throughout their speeches have depended on what my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) has called verifiable evidence. He himself is in possession of the evidence. He can publish it, he can confirm or deny what they have said. One thing stands out clearly above everything else, and it has been mentioned by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). It is quite clear that either Mr. Scott Henderson did not read the evidence of the Evans trial or he has misdirected his Report. That is quite clear because I have got the impression that Evans was guilty, because of the fact that Evans for the first time told nobody of the circumstances surrounding the death of his wife and child.
Here I really accuse the right hon. and learned Gentleman of something almost amounting to sharp practice when he took up my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch on the nature

1485
of the evidence given at the Evans' inquiry. He addressed his answer only to pointing out that in the course of the Report of Mr. Scott Henderson he called attention to the evidence at the trial of Evans. That was not the point. My hon. and learned Friend might have been wrong—I do not say that he was—in saying that Mr. Scott Henderson had concealed the fact that the evidence was given, because, in fact, in the Report he refers to it. But the evidence to which he refers points to the opposite conclusion to that which he himself reached. That is the whole point. The right hon. and learned Gentleman completely failed to reply to that, but the whole crux of the matter is that every material fact about the murder of the wife and child had been disclosed to Evans by the police before his confession. Yet Mr. Scott Henderson says that it is the prior knowledge of Evans which is conclusive evidence of his guilt.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman can do better than that. That is a weak one. Sometimes, in controversies in the House, we try to get away with a shoddy argument of that kind, but this matter is too serious for shoddy arguments and slick debating tricks. Therefore, I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman ought to look at the matter again, and see whether at least a prima facie case has not been made out for a further and, in this connection, a proper public inquiry into Evans's alleged guilt.

DEFENCE
12.56 a.m.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: For a couple of hours we have been listening to a discussion of murder under the auspices of the Home Secretary. I wish to return to the discussion of murder under the auspices of the Minister of Defence. I do so because the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, in a previous debate, complained because no opportunity had been given to those of us who take the traditional attitude of the Labour Party towards defence and conscription to put our point of view in a defence debate He said that on 5th March.
We have had another defence debate today and, owing to the array of Under-Secretaries and Ministers who held office under the former Government, and who
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have spoken, no opportunity has yet been given to Members who wish to put the traditional points of view about conscription and those matters which, in times past, have been stated by such people as George Lansbury and James Maxton. I do not apologise for taking up the arguments of those of us who criticise the statements of policy of the Government and the Minister of Defence from a more fundamental point of view than that taken by the ex-Minister of Defence and his Under-Secretaries in the debate today.
I do so not because of any trivial reason, but because we have had a rather important speech today, from the Leader of the House, in which a rather important announcement slipped out on the whole issue of conscription. He gave us to understand that on this question of the continuation of National Service we are to have not legislation in the normal way but an Order in Council, which will be slipped through, probably after a few hours' debate, in which we shall have the usual panoply of gladiators coming along. I therefore presume that this is the only opportunity that we have to state our case against the continuation of the National Service Acts and the policy under which it is argued that they are necessary.
In his preliminary remarks about this issue the Leader of the House spoke about Korea and argued that the lessons of Korea seemed to be that we must continue conscription. I hope we shall not have any more wars on the pattern of Korea. I remember that when the previous Prime Minister said we were going into action in Korea I asked certain questions and was told rather brusquely that this was not a war at all but a "police action." That was how President Truman justified the hostilities in Korea in the first stages; it was not considered respectable to call it a war then; it was just some kind of action to prevent war, some kind of police action. We have had three years of this police action in Korea, and the fact that we have had this kind of military organisation is now used as one of the arguments why we should continue conscription. I hope the Lord Privy Seal will reconsider whether this is a justifiable argument for continuing the system of National Service.
Nobody has argued that this war in Korea was necessary in defence of this country. It has been said to be in defence of some principle called collec-

1487
tive security. I want to know whether our whole system of defence is now to be organised on the assumption that we are going into some other kind of action of this sort and that the pattern of Korea is likely to be repeated in other parts of the world. Will our defence organisation or our National Service men be used in, say, Indo-China as they were used in Korea?
I say that the Minister of Defence is not justified in arguing that the precedent of Korea is one which justifies us in continuing the elaborate military organisation and call up of a very large number of men for National Service in the way suggested. It is not good enough to justify these military preparations by having the sparring debating exhibition such as occurred between the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and the former Minister of Defence.
I know that reference has been made to articles of the former Minister of Defence written in certain newspapers. The Parliamentary Secretary even said that what he called "the Shinwell system" was the policy of the Labour Party. I should like to tell him that that conglomeration of contradictions is not the policy of the Labour Party at all, and that a large amount of this verbal sparring between the Parliamentary Secretary and the former Minister does not seriously touch the question of the real organisation of defence.
I protest very strongly—and I hope there will be further protests from other parts of the House—against the way that, by a side door, the whole system of conscription is to be fastened on this nation for another five years. I have no doubt that after another five years the Government of the day will come along and find further reasons for continuing this conscription system. It will not be adequately dealt with by this Order in Council, because there are various phases of thought in opposition to conscription. Some people, like the ex-Minister of Defence, have now come to the conclusion that 18 months' conscription is a reasonable period for non-technical forces. There are other hon. Members who are quite prepared to agree to conscription for a period of 12 months and some of us who argue that the whole system of forced labour should be discontinued altogether. How are we to
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get these different points of view adequately expressed in a debate on an Order in Council, on which there is no opportunity to put forward Amendments?
I appeal to the Leader of the House to give this matter further consideration before this kind of procedure is adopted because fastening a period of two years' conscription on the youth of our country is something which at least deserves two or three days' debate in which every point of view can be expressed. I do not know whether the Parliamentary Secretary has seen that an important trade union, the building trade workers, have this week called for a reduction to 12 months' conscription, arguing that the building trade is just as important to the national economy as other industries whose workers are exempt from military service. I suggest that there is now such keen anxiety on the part of hon. Members in all parts of the House to have the question of National Service adequately discussed that there is absolutely no excuse for rushing it through in this form of procedure which does not give every shade of opinion an opportunity to express its point of view.
When hon. Members who have now gone from the Chamber read the speeches in the OFFICIAL REPORT there is every reason to believe that they will want a full and complete discussion of the system of National Service before fastening it on the people of this country for, it may be, another generation. We are told that there are 8,000 out of the 20,000 National Service men in Korea. They are young men who have never had an opportunity of saying anything about Korea at all. They have just been conscripted, sent to Korea, and there they are.
Although the war is presumably over we have no hope given us today that those conscripts in Korea are to return home. Those 8,000 conscripts are to remain there—what for? Is it to protect Mr. Syngman Rhee? We have had no hope at all, although a truce has been declared in Korea, that these unfortunate young people dragged away under the system of forced labour, are ever to have an opportunity of seeing their homes again.
When we look back on our military record in Korea, of which the Leader of the House spoke today, we know that

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while no doubt many of those soldiers have performed deeds of great personal heroism the history of military intervention in Korea has been one of the most tragic and futile experiments in war in the whole history of war. This week we have had Ministers saying that we have won the war in Korea. The Russian leader, Malenkov, says they won the war in Korea. All we know is that the people we went out to liberate in Korea have lost the war. A huge military organisation, continuing armed forces and this kind of activity in that part of the world, is something we cannot justify.
Nothing but superficialities and fripperies, on the issue of re-armament, have been discussed here today. The whole economic issue related to rearmament has been evaded by the House, and by both sides of the House; but it has not been evaded by "The Times." In two of three very interesting leading articles last week, "The Times" discussed the economics of re-armament, and argued about some of the figures which the Leader of the House gave this afternoon; namely, that the burden of this so-called re-armament and defence is now so heavy that it is going to land us inevitably into an economic crisis.
That was the view of "The Times" last week, and I found no fault with the logic that if we are to continue this armaments programme, then we are going to be faced with an economic crisis from which we shall all suffer very severely. I do not know whether the Leader of the House ever has the opportunity to look at the television programmes; but last week-end there was the news of an item which should make every serious-minded person think. It depicted the new German exhibition in Canada, with motor cars and bicycles on show in an effort to gain the markets of Canada.
That is one way in which the Germans can compete, probably successfully, in the Canadian markets, because at present our own motor industry and our export industry are burdened with this colossal expenditure on armaments, while the Germans take full advantage of the situation and capture our markets; and not only in Canada, but probably in South America as well, while we go on trying to hide the disagreeable facts.
There is no promise that we shall spend less on armaments under this Government
1490
because it is continuing what has been done before, with the excuse that it is simply following the programme set out by the Labour Government. In all these Service debates we are then told that, after all this expenditure, we have no division here to defend us against any air attack by the Russians, and that the country has less real defence than it has had for the last 50 years.
The Leader of the House has told us that three years ago Russia could have swept over Europe because we were defenceless, and we are told that the Russians have a plan of aggression. If they had that three years ago, then they could have swept over Europe, but they did not. I never really believed that this bogy of the 175 divisions in Eastern Germany was the kind of military activity which justified us in embarking on a huge programme of re-armament such as was indulged in by the Labour Government. It is these serious realities, and not the cheap party fripperies that are worrying the serious-minded people in this country. They are not worrying about the "Shinwell system," or the gyrations of various politicians. No student of economics can fail to be worried and perplexed about conditions in this country, which is crushed under the burden of re-armament. But we ignore these issues and decide to carry on as usual.
I tried to make an interjection during the speech of the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt). He saw not only the 175 divisions but another 30 or 40 which did not enter into the calculations of the Minister of Defence. He made a point which was also made by the Leader of the House. It is always made after hon. Gentlemen talk about the possibility of coming to an agreement with the Russians. They say, "The Russians are more agreeable to talk but we must not relax."
I am in favour of relaxing. When one is suffering from heart strain and this country is suffering from a kind of economic heart strain, the remedy is to relax. But we proceed as usual. The Russians will say "If we are to get peace and argue from strength we must not relax either," so in a few months' time we shall be in the same position again.
When the hon. Member for Aston, who disappears after giving the pontifical advice of a former Parliamentary Secretary,

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talks about having to meet the Russians in strength his counter-part in the Soviet Union will speak in the same way. We can quite understand the military-minded men in the Soviet Union saying, "Why should we relax? The other side are not." So the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the West are crushed under this burden of rearmament, but the Governments carry on as usual and pretend that these problems do not exist.
It is curious that there was hardly a mention of the atom bomb in this whole debate. I remember when it was difficult to mention the atom bomb in this House. I was told it was out of order to mention it when we discussed the Army and it was out of order when we were discussing the Navy. I was once nearly ruled out of order for suggesting that it came under the Air Ministry. We have completely ignored this vital fact in modern war, but when that is ruled out all talk of rearmament is simply irrelevant nonsense.
The only prominent politician who has ever faced up to the fact of the atom bomb as one of the deciding factors of modern warfare is the Prime Minister. In defence debates he used to say that allowing American bases in this country had put us in greater danger, and that six atomic bombs could destroy our economy. That was three years ago and the development of the atom bomb has gone on in Russia. I fail to see what defence scheme for this country is relevant if it neglects the prospects of another war and the probability of attack from the air.
What is the defence against the atom bomb? What is the defence against guided missiles? There is hardly one deep shelter in the whole of the country to which people could resort in the event of an atom bomb attack. The Home Secretary is present. This is murder on a bigger scale than that we discussed earlier. The Home Secretary has some responsibility for defence against atom bomb attack. I should like to know what steps he is taking to bring to the notice of the Government the fact that if we get an atom bomb attack, by the Russians or anybody else, we have hardly any means of defence in the way of deep shetlers.
The Government are still dithering about what to do about deep shelters. Great industrial cities like Glasgow have none. There we have a population of
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one million people almost defenceless in the event of atomic attack. These are considerations which should have emerged in the debate. They have been ignored. We have merely had a political sparring match. This is not defence policy at all.
We had an interlude from the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer), who argued that gigantic tanks were out of date. He said that we needed mobile anti-tank guns. Presumably, mobile anti-tank guns are needed for defence against tanks. The hon. and gallant Gentleman did not deal with the question that if the other people realise that the tanks are out of date the antitank guns will be unnecessary. In all these debates we have confused superficiality.
We are regimenting, mobilising and imposing a system of militarism on the country for no useful purpose at all. If we continue in this way, if we take manpower away from useful industry, if we take materials and skill away, we shall inevitably go into an industrial crisis from which no amount of rearmament is likely to save us. These are the considerations which should dominate the debate. We are not getting these matters attended to in a spirit of realism. The time has come when the Government should adopt a more realistic policy.
1.23 a.m.
Mr. G. M. Thomson: Before the House ends its long debate on defence I should like to deal with an urgent matter concerning the welfare of our serving men. In the earlier part of the discussion we had points raised and anxiety expressed about the medical examination of Service Men. We have also had anxiety expressed about the medical administration of hospitals.
I want to raise a question in relation to the welfare of Service men in training, especially in regard to the kind of military exercises that they are expected to undertake. I am a newcomer to this House and I do this in what I believe is the old tradition of the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, during the debate on which it is legitimate for Members to raise immediate grievances in connection with their constituents.
I only do this at this late hour because the matter has come to a head this afternoon and the long Recess is immediately

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in front of us. This is a matter which should have public attention before Parliament goes into Recess. I want to deal with the death on service of a very young constituent of mine, Gunner Walker, of the Royal Horse Artillery. I raise the matter not as a personal case, but because I think that it has some important general implications in relation to the anxiety that everybody feels about the welfare of those in the Services.
Gunner Walker was a young Regular soldier. The son of a serving soldier, he went into the Army as a boy. He was a soldier of the finest character. I wish to read to the House a description of how he met his death which was given to the parents in a letter by his commanding officer. He said:
"I am sorry to hear that you are worried about how the accident happened, and since I do not know what has been written to you, perhaps the best thing I can do is to tell you what I saw, since I happened to be a spectator. The demonstration was designed to teach young n.c.o.'s how to organise road convoys in a hostile country and consisted of two parts—how not to do it, followed by the right way.
In order to rub in the lessons, all the wrong things were exaggerated. The three ton lorry, with your son and one or two others in the back, had the sides of its canopy hanging loose instead of being secured, and the sides had slogans like 'Benghazi or bust' and 'Roll on Python 260' chalked on them, and in the back the two or three soldiers had put their rifles on the floor and if I remember rightly were sitting on the sides waving beer bottles about.
Another soldier dressed up as an Arab was walking down the middle of the road and the truck swerved round him. It was a fairly sharp swerve and your son fell over backwards over the side and was run over by the back wheel. He probably caught hold of something as he fell and pulled himself under the wheel by mistake instead of falling clear.
I did not watch the rehearsals, but got the impression that probably Tony was overacting the beer-bottle waving on the day, as one often does in that sort of thing, and that the swerve caught him unprepared No one in particular could be held responsible for such a pure accident—it was just his fate. The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, and who are we to question His wisdom?
I understand that the motive of the commanding officer in ending his letter in that way was a wish to comfort the parents; but, without being irreverent, the point is that we are not questioning the wisdom of the Lord, but the wisdom of the War Office in allowing this sort of
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military exercise. Many young lives are wasted in this sort of thing. The instance I have cited was not an example of an exercise carried out without realisation of what might happen, because another officer wrote to the parents telling them that the General Officer Commanding, the Brigadier, and other officers were present.
This kind of military exercise raises important questions. I have been in correspondence with the War Office about this matter, trying to get the War Office to accept responsibility for this young soldier's death. I have been unsuccessful. The War Minister tells me that the legal position regarding compensation is that by virtue of Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act, and the circumstances of the action, no course of action lies against the Crown, or the driver of the War Department vehicle.
I am not a lawyer, and I cannot question the legal side of that; but if the War Office had been training these soldiers in some of the inevitable dangers of war-time actions, if it had been teaching these young soldiers how to take precautions, and they had failed to take those precautions, I could perhaps have understood the War Office point of view.
In this case the military authorities were teaching young soldiers the kind of things that they ought not to do, and putting them through things which were dangerous to do. From the educational point of view, that seems to be most utter folly. Any elementary school teacher knows that one never teaches children what not to do, for one might tell them things which they would not otherwise have thought of. If the military authorities ask soldiers to act in an irresponsible way as part of their military training and an accident occurs, surely the responsibility must lie with the military authorities.
That is the personal side of the matter, and I hope that, even at this stage, the War Office will accept that responsibility and try to make some reparation to the parents of Gunner Walker. I am not in any way trying to make a party point of the case, for it has dragged on for a long time and originated under the previous Administration. Now that it has come to a head, I ask that some reparation should be made to the parents.

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My general point is that the War Office should examine very seriously the methods of military training which are being employed and make sure that young lives are not wasted in this futile manner through silly military exercises in which the young soldiers are made to do all sorts of dangerous and risky things which there is no need for them to do. The idea of parents sending young men into the Armed Services and then having the military authorities make them sit on the side of unguarded vehicles, waving beer bottles to make it look like the real thing, will shock our parents.
I hope that the House will be indulgent with me for having raised the subject at this late hour and that the responsible authorities will take steps to make sure that in future young men do not pay the penalty that Gunner Walker has had to pay.
1.32 a.m.
Mr. Crookshank: I have taken a note of what the hon. Gentleman has said. I do not think he warned my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War that he proposed to raise the subject at this late hour, and, therefore, my right hon. Friend is not here. It is a matter of which I cannot possibly have any cognisance and on which I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman, but I have no doubt that there are facts which could have been explained by my right hon. Friend. Had he been given adequate notice, it would have been his business to be here. I will let him know what the hon. Gentleman has said, which is the best answer that I can give at the moment.
Mr. Thomson: I am grateful for the assurance of the right hon. Gentleman. I received the final letter from the Secretary of State for War only this afternoon. I made an attempt to communicate with him, but was not able to do so, and I informed the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. I am not complaining about not getting an answer, because I was unable to contact the Secre-
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tary of State, but in view of the long Recess ahead I felt that the matter ought to be raised in this way while I had the opportunity to do so.
Mr. Crookshank: I accept that, but my right hon. Friend was here until 10 p.m. having taken part in the earlier debate which came to an end then. There was an opportunity to catch him then. However, I do not take it amiss from the hon. Gentleman. I know that he is a comparatively new Member of the House and was perhaps not aware of what should happen.
Question put, and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Committed to a Committee of the whole House.
Committee this day.

EMERGENCY LAWS (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) BILL [Lords]
Lords Amendment considered.

Clause 10.—(PROVISIONS AS TO ORDERS.)
Lords Amendment; in page 6, line 29, leave out from "containing," to "an" in line 30.
1.34 a.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth): I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."
After the Bill had left this House it was discovered that the words proposed to be deleted were otiose. They are:
"… an Order in Council under section two of this Act or …"
They related to an earlier provision in the Bill concerned with the revocation of an Order in Council for any of the Defence (Trading with the Enemy) Regulations in whole or in part. The unnecessary words are removed by the Amendment proposed in another place.
Question put, and agreed to.

WOOL BRANDING (MATERIALS)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Redmayne.]
1.35 a.m.
Mr. H. Rhodes: I suppose that wherever wool is produced in the world, branding takes place for the purpose of identification. I wish to deal, briefly, with the materials used in branding, which are pitch, tar and paint. The use of these materials is causing financial loss, frustration, loss of export trade and, above all, waste.
I raise this subject, not on behalf of any association but for thousands of people engaged in the woollen industry, either as employees or employers. I declare my interest and that of my employees without any hesitation, because before I came to the House this week my own employees gave me a terse and colourful brief consisting of two sentences, but I shall not risk being called to order by quoting it.
Manufacturers first petitioned this House on this subject in 1752, but without success. That must have sickened the manufacturers somewhat because, as far as I can ascertain, no sort of protestation or official representations have been made here since, perhaps for a simple reason. In our trade we do not believe in getting mixed up with Governments, politicians and the like. We work on the principle that if a Minister is very able the less we have to do with him the better, and if he is not so able it is no use bothering with him anyhow. That is no reflection on the leaders of our industry, whose wisdom and judgment, born of experience, have no equal in any other industry. They have a capacity for saying what they mean and sticking to it, as Governments in the past know very well.
I do not wish to minimise the great efforts which have been made to solve this problem by the Wool Federation, the Woollen Industries Research Association and other authorities at home and abroad; for instance, the New Zealand Government's action in prohibiting the sale of soluble marking material and the South African Government's efforts to keep contaminated wool separate. I am
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well aware of the efforts of other bodies in education, exhortation and propaganda. But all this has failed; we are having more trouble now than at any time since I started work in this trade when I was 12 years old.
From my experience of the last few months it would seem that at branding time the word goes out to empty all the motor car sumps and to mix the contents with tar to provide an indelible brand, with no consideration for its effect during the later stages of manufacture. For the past few months, to my knowledge, many firms have been spending 10 per cent. of their wages on the eradication of these faults. There is, in addition, a heavy cost in solvents and I may say that it does not apply to the wool in the fleece so much as to the later stages of manufacture.
For instance, if raw wool, after scouring, is dyed and made up into pieces the faults in a piece cannot be removed. A tremendous lot of our export trade with the United States and Canada is in highly selective fashion-type goods which demand the finest workmanship and materials. More often than not the material is dyed in the loose before it is woven. In that case there is a tremendous loss, and there is a tendency in the trade not to make this kind of material for fear of the loss that may be involved if the material is full of tar and pitch.
The producers are working against their own interests. Today, there is quite a lot of competition in our trade from other fibres. In the case of one of the newer industries like rayon, most meticulous care is taken with material which costs something in the region of 24d. a pound. How much more care should be taken with material that costs 160d. a pound, and I put it to the people in the Dominions that they are working against their own best interests in the long run in permitting this state of affairs to continue. Technically, the crux of the matter is that the needs of the grower and manufacturer are contradictory. The farmer demands indelibility for 12 months, while the manufacturer needs to be able to clean his wool as satisfactorily as if no brands are used at all.
I suggest that pitch, tar, or any other substance which cannot be removed by scouring should be prohibited altogether. Secondly, I suggest that the wool producers should be forced to remove all

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staples contaminated by these substances. Thirdly, financial penalties should be introduced. In the case of prohibition, Eire is already doing this. South Africa is trying the second proposition, and this country is trying to do the third. The Wool Marketing Board gives a premium for tar free wool, or at least it imposes a penalty of 4d. a lb. if there is tar in wool produce. But even after you have paid the 4d. you cannot be sure you can get wool without tar in it.
In the dim and distant past it was considered virtuous to daub sheep with tar. In fact, William Camden wrote in 1605:
"He who will lose a sheep for a ha'penny-worth of tar cannot deserve the name of a good husband."
Now it is a mark of inefficiency, carelessness, and indifference to the future well-being of an industry. I can do no better than finish in the words of the petitioners of 1752:
"That the increasing quantities of pitch, tar, and redding now made use of by the growers of wool is an increasing evil, and therefore pray that this House provide such a remedy as to them shall seem meet."
1.45 a.m.
Dr. A. D. D. Broughton: The problem to which my hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Rhodes) has so ably drawn attention is one that is met with in my constituency, where woollen cloth is manufactured. In Batley and Morley it is well known that the undetected presence of even tiny pinheads of tar causes unsightly marks when the piece is subjected to heat in the later processes of manufacture. The British Wool Federation has tried for many years to educate farmers about the advisability of marketing wool in a good, clean condition, but, so prevalent has become the use of tar, that the Wool Marketing Board, which buys all wool clipped in the United Kingdom, has now found it necessary to impose a financial penalty of 4d. per lb. on fleeces shorn in this 1953 season and marked with tar.
I have made inquiries about the fleeces coming from Devon selecting that at random from among wool growing areas. I am informed that there is very little trouble with tar on the Devon breed of sheep, which are usually kept in fields, but that it is found on Scotch sheep that graze on Dartmoor, and on the Exmoor
1500
Horn sheep that roam on Exmoor. These findings support the contention that the culprits are usually hill sheep farmers who use tar, paint, or other objectionable marking substances because they are cheap, easily applied, recognisable at a distance, and capable of withstanding wet, hot, or hard weather and rough wear on growing wool.
Manufacturers in the West Riding, whose world-famous products are of immense value to the nation, are complaining bitterly about the contamination of wool with tar, pitch and paint. The petition of persons in the West Riding of Yorkshire, presented to this House 200 years ago, on 10th January, 1752, complained of the iniquitous practice of the wool growers of this county in laying upon the fleece excessive quantities of injurious marking stuff. Unfortunately, Parliament did nothing to help; the iniquitous practice has persisted, it has become more widespread recently, and I hope that the Minister will put forward useful ideas for discouraging this troublesome and wasteful practice.
1.47 a.m.
Mr. William Paling: The subject of this debate has created quite an interest in the woollen textile areas. I am happy to associate myself with my hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Rhodes) on this matter, because I come from an area where much wool is used. Although my last speech on textiles was on shoddy, we also use much wool. I come from an area which also makes many blankets and rugs, and the wool used there is of such a nature that, very often, pitch, tar and paint is found, which causes a considerable amount of trouble in the industry.
They use skin wool—that is, wool obtained from the skin of sheep which have been killed for meat—and although the puller is supposed to pull and sort this wool, on many occasions, despite great care, a lot of wool passing into the mass of the wool growing industry is smeared with tar or paint, and it inevitably gets into the product which is being made up. A patch of tar of the size of a 3d. piece will break up in the course of manufacture into many many scores of pinheads—quite tiny specks.
Much of this wool causes a stain in the heat and wet processes of scouring

1501
and milling, and that is where the industrialists and workers in the woollen mills have to face up to the problem. In one factory, I have been told, 20 operatives are employed who do nothing but remove the tar and paint staples which have come out.
The Minister of Materials (Sir Arthur Salter): Is the wool about which the hon. Member is complaining produced in this country or in other countries?
Mr. Paling: Very much of it is wool pulled from skins; it is British wool. However, I am coming to the other shortly.
As one might imagine, a very considerable cost is involved in operatives having to go through the product and sort out, cut out or clean out, wherever they can, the stains that have shown up in the process of manufacture. It is fair to say that the trouble is not confined to British wool. The particular firm I have in mind have productions of what is called New Zealand slipe wool and they have tar and paint patches in the locks just the same, so the same difficulty occurs. Anything the Government can do to help the woollen industry in ridding themselves of this difficulty, and in helping them to reduce costs by not having to employ staff to cut out all these tar stains, will be of great assistance to the woollen industry and a great help to the export schemes they are trying so hard to further.
1.52 a.m.
The Minister of Materials (Sir Arthur Salter): The hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Rhodes) speaks, as is known to all of us, and as he explained, with direct, personal and expert knowledge on this subject. The hon. Members for Batley and Morley (Dr. Broughton) and Dewsbury (Mr. William Paling) also represent constituents who are very much interested in this problem and obviously spoke with great technical information at their disposal. I can add very little, by way of describing the problem, to what they have said, and certainly nothing to their knowledge.
The question is: what should be done about it, and how? I did not understand the hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne to ask me or this Government to take any action; and while his two hon. Friends suggested that perhaps this Gov-
1502
ernment might do something, they rather asked for suggestions than made them. I will make only these few comments. Quite obviously, in one form or another this is a trouble that has persisted for a very long time. The hon. Gentleman went back at least two centuries. The trouble has persisted in a very varying form and degree, but, as he said, at present it has recurred in a rather more serious form. I think he realises the rather narrow limits of my responsibility and power of action in this matter, certainly so far as the trouble arises in wool produced in other countries.
The hon. Member gave some reasons, which he said he thought were convincing, as to why the wool trade had refrained for the greater part of the two centuries to which he referred from asking for action from the Government. Either at some periods they thought the Government was so good it did not need prodding, or at others it was so bad that it was useless to prod. I will not inquire which would be the more relevant consideration at the moment.
The trouble to which he refers can sometimes be, and perhaps sometimes is, very serious indeed. It involves loss and waste of the kind the hon. Gentleman described, and it is highly desirable that anything possible should be done to put an end to that. The action required is representations by the consumers to the producers. The representations may be more effective perhaps if they are made by trade organisations than if they are made solely by individual consumer to individual producer. So far as Government action is required or desirable, the action is, of course, action by the Government of the producing country. If action which is not now being taken in the interests of wool consumers, represented, for example, by the British Wool Federation, is desired to be taken by this Government as regards wool produced in this country, I should be very glad to see the suggestions if the trade thinks desirable. I will say nothing, of course, in anticipation of any such specific request.
I very much agree with one remark of the hon. Member, that while, on a narrow view, the immediate interest of the producer may seem to conflict with that of the consumer—he wants something which will give an indelible branding and

1503
in the pursuit of that purpose uses a material which causes a great deal of trouble to the consumer—on the longer view, looking at the interests of producers in general, it is obviously very much in their interest to do their utmost to eliminate that trouble. If action by the Government of the producing country is required, that Government has an interest in seeing that whatever is practicable is done.
This question has been raised actively recently and in regard to the principal producing country the hon. Member had in mind very active discussion and investigation are taking place. I should be quite sure that the Government of every producing country would desire to eliminate the trouble and that the producers as a whole would desire that. It is in their interests, as well as in the interests of the consumers, to see that every possible help is given to research associations which are trying—not entirely without success—to find a material which would meet the purpose of the
1504
producer in getting something which is reasonably indestructible and therefore serves to identify the animal, but also something which does not give trouble to the wool consumer later. The hon. Member will be aware of the production of the material known as lanolin basic emulsion in the research industry of this country, which is used to a considerable extent and which perhaps can be used more by producers in other countries.
All I can say is that if specific proposals are made by those who represent the wool users in this country as to action which they think it desirable that this Government should take we will very carefully consider such suggestions, recognising, as everyone who has been in contact with this problem knows, that it is extremely important to do everything that is humanly possible to eliminate this source of loss and waste.
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at One Minute to Two o'clock, a.m.

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Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  INTER-CHAMBER CONTROVERSY
  2.35 p.m.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT WOOLTON): My Lords, at the end of Question time yesterday the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, under the heading of a point of Order, asked certain questions to which I said I would reply to-day. In the first place, he asked what was the position following a ruling that had been given by Mr. Speaker in another place. I have taken advice on the matter, and this is what I am advised: that it is not proper in this House to comment on a ruling on a point of Order made by Mr. Speaker in another place. That is the concern of that House only. Each House is the custodian of the manner in which its own business is regulated, and the noble Viscount can be assured that this House will adhere to the well-known principles governing Ministerial responsibility and the relations between the two Houses.
  The second question which the noble Viscount addressed to me he really answered himself, in his concluding remarks—which was very obliging of him. He asked whether, when Mr. Butler and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had given assurances that the Acting Foreign Secretary, the noble Marquess the Leader of this House, would make statements in this House, they had authority to do so. The reply is that they had the express authority of the Acting Foreign Secretary to make the statements made in another place.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his explanation, which is as I expected. Mr. Butler and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd would hardly have made those statements without authority—indeed, I said so. I do not wish, nor would I dare, after my life, to impugn the authority of Mr. Speaker in another place—very far from it. What I am asking is something quite
  1012
  different. It is: What is the view of the Leader of this House about the answering by Members of this House of attacks which are made upon them in the other House? I am not speaking about Mr. Speaker's ruling. I am asking: What is the view of this House? After all, the House here governs its own Rules of Order under the direction of its Leader. The old Rule was that we do not reply to speeches made in the other House by private Members—I am not speaking about Government statements. I asked whether that had been altered by this new observation made from the Chair of the other place. To that, the noble Viscount has, so far, made no reply.
  THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, the question is really addressed to me, so perhaps I had better answer it. The answer, as I see it, is this. Broadly speaking, it is quite true that no answer should be given in this House to statements made by private Members in another place, though, of course, reference may be made to points raised in debate which might equally well have been raised anywhere else. But when it comes to a violent personal attack, then I should have thought the man attacked would have the right to reply to it. I am not proposing to take that course in any strong measure to-day, but I should have thought that it was a fair and reasonable ruling by the Speaker that, where a personal attack has been made, the man attacked must be allowed the opportunity of making some reply to it.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the reply of the noble Marquess really means that we have abandoned, in some measure, the old practice between the two Houses. That is clear from what he said, and I regret it. Further, what he did say, which disappointed me—and I am sure it will also disappoint Members in another place greatly—was that he was not going to reply to the attacks made upon him, which means that, on Foreign Office policy, as Mr. Morrison, I think, said, Members can be "fobbed off" with the statement that a speech will be made in another place; and now the noble Marquess says that he does not propose to make such a speech.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Viscount had better listen to my speech, which is very long, I am afraid, but quite detailed. I did not say that I was not going to reply to statements that had been made. I said that I was not going to reply at any length to personal attacks which have been made. That is a different thing. I think that is undesirable.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Certainly. I do not approve of personal attacks.
  SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I have never made a personal attack in my life, and I do not approve of them. I have never suggested that personalities should be introduced. What I asked was, whether questions put by elected Members in another place can be turned aside by Ministers saying that they will be answered in this House, yet when the noble Marquess has the opportunity to do so, he says he does not propose to answer them.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do propose to answer the points that remain. Let me make this clear. Suppose that somebody in another place were to say of a noble Lord here," This noble Lord is a traitor." It is a privileged place in which he makes that statement, if it is made in another place. It would be absurd for the noble Lord in this House not to be able to make any reply to that at all. I am sure that would be the general good sense of both Houses.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, surely the Rule to which the noble Viscount refers is, primarily, a Rule that we should not conduct controversy by long-distance exchanges between a private Member of this House and a private Member of the other House. What has that to do with the conduct of Ministers? What happened here, I gather, was that in the debate in another place there was an attack made upon the noble Marquess. As I gather, the attack was replied to by his colleagues in the Commons, who went on to say that there was to be a debate in the House of Lords, and they had no doubt that the noble Marquess would then deal with the matter. What is wrong with that? The Rule, as a Rule, is a very good Rule—that you should not have exchanges between private Members of the two Houses. But that has nothing to do with Ministers. Suppose
  1014
  the case were the other way round. Suppose that somebody in this House in a debate made an attack upon the Prime Minister, who is a Member of the Commons. Are not his colleagues here entitled to reply to the attack, and to say that there is going to be a debate in the Commons and that the Prime Minister will no doubt say what he is going to say? That is exactly the same thing turned upside down. There is nothing in this point of Order at all.

  DUTY ON IMPORTED MACHINERY
  2.44 p.m.
  LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, complementary to the large public funds indirectly being made available for the erection of new factories, they are yet able to indicate their intention to return to the earlier basis of permits for the import of machinery duty-free, where such machinery is of a prototype not currently made in this country, and where its installation would contribute to lower operating costs.]
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, an independent Committee has been set up to review the question of duty-free entry of machinery. The terms of reference of the Committee are:
  "To consider and report whether it is in the national interest to provide for the duty-free admission into the United Kingdom of machinery, either by classes or in individual consignments; and, in this connection, to review the provisions of Section 10 of the Finance Act, 1932, and their administration, and to recommend what changes, if any, should be made."
  The Chairman of this Committee is Sir Henry Wilson Smith, and its other members are three industrialists with experience mainly as makers of machinery, three with experience mainly as users of machinery, a trade union representative and one independent member. If it is to the convenience of the House, I will arrange for the names of the members to be printed in the OFFICIAL REPORT. This Committee began its work immediately on its appointment, and as soon as its report is presented Her Majesty's Government will, of course, consider the

  1015
  matter in the light of the Committee's findings and recommendations.
  Following are the names of the Committee referred to:
  Chairman: Sir Henry Wilson Smith, K.C.B., K.B.E.
  Other members:

  R. Bird, Esq.

  T. F. A. Board, Esq., C.B.E.

  M. A. Fiennes, Esq., M.I.Mech.E.

  C. H. Grist, Esq.

  E. Grove, Esq.

  S. J. Harley, Esq., B.Sc., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.P.E.

  A. V. Symons, Esq.

  J. Tanner, Esq.

  The Joint Secretaries to the Committee are Mr. D. P. Brearley (Board of Trade) and Mr. D. M. J. Gwinnell (Ministry of Supply).
  LORD BARNBY: My Lords, arising out of that reply, which establishes the fact that duty-free import is not possible now whereas it was earlier, may I ask the noble Lord how soon he expects that the Committee will be able to report, and whether he can see his way to representing in the proper quarter that because of the amount of money spent on buildings it is important that the duty-free import of machinery should be restored? And will he bring home the necessity for an early report?
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I understand that the Committee hope to report in about November or December of this year. But, as the noble Lord will appreciate, the matter is a complex one, and that hope may be a little optimistic. With regard to the second half of Lord Barnby's supplementary question, I will see that the point he has made is brought to the notice of the Committee.

  PURCHASE TAX COUPON SCHEME
  2.47 p.m.
  LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government if, with regard to the Purchase Tax coupon scheme for overseas visitors, on which it is now understood the investigating committee duly appointed has reported as being unsatisfactory, they can now announce their intentions for the early removal of this paraphernalia, the effect of which has been materially to reduce possible exports against dollars.]
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, the working of the purchase tax coupon scheme has now been carefully reviewed. The Government are satisfied that the imperfections inherent in this experimental scheme now outweigh the benefits derived from it, and that on balance of advantage it should be discontinued. It has not been possible to devise any alternative arrangements which would be free from the defects of the present scheme and would also incorporate adequate safeguards against abuse and loss of revenue. But although the purchase tax coupon scheme will therefore be terminated at the end of this year, the personal export scheme will, of course, continue to provide its valuable facilities for tourists.
  LORD BARNBY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Earl for that reply, may I point out that he has stated that the present procedure is ineffective and that he holds out no hope that anything is to be substituted for it. The adverse Report of the Board of Trade Committee established the fact that great inconvenience is caused to visitors to this country and that the sale of a large amount of merchandise against dollars is thereby stopped. It seems unreasonable that the Board of Trade, while admitting that fact, should put forward no proposals for any alternative procedure. May I ask the noble Earl whether he can give any hope of something definite being done?
  EARL JOWITT: My Lords, may I add that it seems to me that it is disadvantageous to this country that this scheme should be done away with altogether. Surely it is to the advantage of citizens of this country that foreign visitors should be encouraged to make their purchases here. If this scheme is unworkable, I hope that steps are being taken to find out whether there is not some workable scheme to enable that to be done.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I do not think anyone questions the objects which this scheme envisaged. The noble Lord, Lord Barn by, used the word "paraphernalia," and I think it adequately describes the process by which this scheme works. There has been a well-informed Committee who, with the assistance of the Dollar Export Committee, have gone right into the question. They have been unable to find an alternative method of carrying on this scheme with-

  1017
  out bringing equal disadvantages. I will not go into the disadvantages, but they are fairly extensive. They amount to considerable abuses. Many people who do not get the advantage of it are annoyed—South Americans, and other members of the Commonwealth—and I am informed that even those for whom the benefit is given grumble a good deal about the inconvenience which is caused by form-filling and other methods. In these circumstances we have not been able to find any alternative which would meet the requirements, and whilst I should welcome any suggestion which the noble Lord has to make, I regret that I cannot hold out any hope at the moment that any useful scheme will be devised.
  LORD CALVERLEY: Will the noble Earl at once order his Committee to reassemble and try to find an answer to this conundrum?
  LORD BARNEY: While thanking the noble Earl for his reply, may I suggest that the time has come when the Government should take the risk of introducing a scheme in spite of its being abused?
  LORD GIFFORD: Is there not a very simple answer: that is, to produce the passport at the time? While there might be abuse, I think the chance would be so small that it would not be worth worrying about.
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: It would, I think, be a little too easy to allow anyone to make retail purchases in this country, free of purchase tax, on the mere presentation of an American passport. I suggest that would really be asking for trouble.

  THE TELEGRAPH SERVICE
  2.51 p.m.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they propose to take action to reduce the deficit in the Telegraph Service shown in the Post Office Commercial account.]
  THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (EARL DE LA WARR): My Lords, I have certainly been thinking about the telegraph service a great deal. For very many years this has had to be carried at a
  1018
  loss, as a service needed by the public. As the Bridgman Committee put it, the inland telegraph service, which is the heart of the problem, is between the upper and nether millstones of an expanding telephone service and a postal organisation which offers a 24-hour service to most parts of this country. In spite of technical improvements, and adjustment of staff numbers to the continuing decline in traffic, the costs of the inland telegraph service have been rising so steeply that we expect to lose over £4½million this year
  This problem has been looked at repeatedly by my Department, and in February last I appointed a small group to give undivided attention to it. So far as I can see, after making allowance for every possible economy in working, we may well find ourselves faced with a choice between a continuing heavy subsidy from the users of other Post Office services or else higher charges for inland telegrams. Both courses are unpalatable, and I intend to give the matter very careful further consideration before coming to any final decision.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  EARL FORTESCUE.: My Lords, on behalf of the noble Marquess the Lord President. I beg to move the Motion standing in his name.
  Moved, That leave be given to the Marquess of Reading to advance his Motion for an humble Address to Her Majesty respecting the international Organisations (Immunities and Privileges of the International Wheat Council) Order, 1953, now standing for Tomorrow, to this day.—(Earl Fortescue.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

  INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COUNCILS ORDER, 1953
  2.54 p.m.
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING)THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING) rose to move, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges of the International

  1019
  Wheat Council) Order, 1953, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Thursday last, be made in the form of the draft laid before Parliament. The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I am sorry to have to interpose this piece of business before the debate on Foreign Affairs, but there is an element of urgency about it which will become apparent in a moment. The purpose of this proposed Order in Council is to make it possible for Her Majesty's Government to fulfil their obligation under Article XVII, Paragraph 7, of the International Wheat Agreement of 1949. Her Majesty's Government has been a party to that Agreement, and thus a member of the International Wheat Council established by it, since it came into force on July 1, 1949.
  Paragraph 7 of Article XVII provides that the Government of the country where the seat of the Council is situated shall grant exemption from taxation on the salaries paid by the Council to its employees, but at the same time it permits an exception to be made in the case of the nationals of that particular country. Now, the seat of the Council has been in London since the commencement of the Agreement in 1949;and therefore the obligation to which I have referred, of granting exemption from taxation to its employees, falls on Her Majesty's Government. The draft Order is to be made under the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act of 1950, which your Lordships will remember. Under that Act the Government are empowered by paragraph 2 (c) of Section 1 to:
  "confer upon…such other classes of officers and servants of the organisation as may be specified in the Order, to such extent as may be so specified, the immunities and privileges set out in Part III of the Schedule to this Act."
  And the Schedule, to which reference is made in its turn, lists among these immunities and privileges which can be or must be granted
  "Exemption from income tax in respect of emoluments received as an officer or servant of the organisation."
  My Lords, I want to be very short on this, but there are one or two points on which I think I must give a brief explanation. In the first place, some of your Lordships may wonder why the Order comes to be presented now, in view of the fact that Her Majesty's Government will actually cease to be a member
  1020
  of the International Wheat Council at the end of this week, when the Wheat Agreement of 1949 expires. You may also wish to know why the making of this Order has been somewhat substantially delayed. The reason why it is necessary to make the Order at this time is that the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act of 1950 provides in Section 1, paragraph 1 that an Order in Council may be made only in respect of an international organisation of which Her Majesty's Government is actually a member. As Her Majesty's Government will cease to be a member of this Council after July 31 it will not be possible to make the Order after that date. If the Order is not made, the result will be that Her Majesty's Government will be in breach of its obligation under the Wheat Agreement, because the employees who will be affected by it will be liable to United Kingdom income tax. I should make it clear that it is not the Order which expires at the end of this week; it is the power to make the Order, because the power to make the Order exists only so long as Her Majesty's Government is a member of the Organisation.
  As regards the delay, I have, of course, no responsibility for the delay before the events of October. 1951, a period of two years but perhaps neither Her Majesty's present Government nor the late Government are entirely blameless in this matter. Since October, 1951, we have been reviewing the whole question of this extension of privileges and immunities to international organisations. As a result, we have had under consideration the presentation to Parliament of a number of Orders under the Act which will fall to be made and in order to save Parliamentary time, we had intended to present them in a body, so that the principle governing them all can be discussed at one and the same time and not re-discussed in a whole series of individual Orders. Some Orders, however, are not yet ready. This particular Order in regard to the Wheat Council had been delayed in order to give an opportunity of bringing in all the Orders in a body; but for the reason which I have given—urgency—it is now necessary to bring forward this Order as a separate entity.
  Another matter which may cause your Lordships concern is the specific exclusion from the exemption given by the Order of citizens of the United Kingdom

  1021
  The exemption extends only to those employees who are not citizens of the United Kingdom and the Colonies. The reason for that is as follows. Section 1, paragraph (2), of the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act contains a proviso which precludes the making of an Order in Council which confers on any person any immunities or privileges greater in extent than those which, at the time of the making of the Order, are required ("required" is in that context the operative word) to be conferred on that person in order to give effect to an international agreement. Under the Wheat Agreement, Her Majesty's Government are required to grant exemption from taxation on lie salaries paid by the Council to its employees, but by the terms of the Agreement are only permitted—"permitted," not "required"—to extend that exemption to cover the case of citizens of the United Kingdom and the Colonies. Therefore, under the terms of the Agreement, coupled with the section of the Act, we have no power to extend the exemption to citizens of the United Kingdom or of the Colonies.
  Article 2 of the proposed Order makes the exemption effective in respect of emoluments retroactively as from July 12, 1950. That is the date on which the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act came into operation. Unless the Order were thus made retroactive, it would not apply to immunities received previous to the date of the actual making of this proposed Order; therefore, we have to date it back in that way. The practical significance of the Order is, perhaps fortunately, small—in terms of revenue, amounting to only a few hundred pounds. The staff is small: there are only some seventeen members, of whom I think only two, or possibly three, are affected by this particular Order. But, if this Order is not passed, and we cease to be members of the Organisation, as we do to-morrow, without having made arrangements to safeguard those few persons, they will, in fact, be deprived of the exemption which Her Majesty's Governments, both present and past, have agreed that they ought to receive. I am sorry to have been so long but the matter is slightly intricate. I hope that, with these explanations, your Lordships will approve the Order. I beg to move that the Order be approved.
  Moved, That an Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges of the International Wheat Council) Order, 1953, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Thursday last, be made in the form of the draft laid before Parliament.—(The Marquess of Reading.)
  3.3 p.m.
  EARL JOWITT: My Lords, I rise as a guilty party—far more guilty than the noble Marquess who has just spoken, but, at the same time, I want to say this. There were, in the past, and have been since the war ended., many cases where these immunities have been granted. A grant of immunity to one person, referred to as a "privilege," is, in fact, a deprivation of rights to others. Therefore, this is, to my mind, a tendency that needs to be carefully watched. This instance is not nearly so bad as some—as, for instance, in the case of the Post Office, who, when they came, over here for a Conference, used to ask for immunity for anybody who ran down anybody in a car, or anything of that sort. I hope that this House is going to watch this sort of thing very carefully indeed. I did the best I could in my humble position in the Government. I hope that the noble Marquess, supported by the Leader of this House, will do the best he can to prevent this sort of thing from being done almost as a matter of course.
  It is obvious that we must pass this Order, for we have made a bargain that we would; our good faith is at stake, and we cannot do anything about it now. But I hope that we are not going to pass these Orders—and I trust that here I speak for all sections of the House—as a matter of course in the future. I hope that the Government will be very chary of bringing them in. As it is, I do not know whether the fault is mine or that of the noble Marquess, but I do not like this scheme whereby, at the very last moment, a measure is introduced which has the effect of granting these people immunity from income tax as from July 12, 1950—which is more than three years ago—during which time, I suppose, income tax was exigible and perhaps should have been paid. But, having made my protest and having admitted quite frankly that I did the same thing in the past, I only hope that noble Lords will be

  1023
  warned by my frightful example and will try to see that they do not do this thing in future. I have nothing further to add except to say that we shall not oppose this Order.
  On Question, Motion agreed to. The said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

  LICENSING BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to without amendment.
  SCHOOL CROSSING PATROLS BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to with an Amendment: the said Amendment considered and agreed to.

  THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
  LORD HENDERSON LORD HENDERSON had given Notice of his intention to call attention to the international situation; and to move for Papers.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in order to facilitate Business and to permit the noble Marquess to speak first, I beg, on behalf of my noble friend, Lord Henderson, formally to move the Motion for Papers standing in his name.
  3.6 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, in opening this debate on foreign affairs, I should like, first of all, to give my warm thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in whose name the Motion stands, for his readiness to move formally so as to enable me to make the initial statement. For, as it is largely concerned with what happened at Washington, I have felt that perhaps the House would like to have the information I can give as soon as possible.
  As your Lordships know, it has for some years, almost ever since I have been in this House. been the custom in this House to have a debate on foreign affairs towards the end of July, before we separate for the Summer Recess, to review the situation as it has developed and to provide an opportunity for that expert opinion, which is so well represented in
  1024
  this House, to give to the Government of the day the benefit of their advice on all the issues which are facing us. That, I think it will be generally agreed, is an admirable practice, and I hope it will always continue. But on this occasion. I submit, there are special reasons for such a debate; for it so happens that the date almost coincides with the announcement of the Armistice in Korea, of which I gave the glad news to your Lordships on Monday, and it also follows closely on those recent Three-Power talks in Washington at which some far-reaching decisions were taken. Your Lordships will no doubt wish me, whose fortune it was to be the Government's representative at those talks, to give the background of our conclusions in the light of the situation which we found there. If my speech is somewhat longer than usual, I hope your Lordships will forgive me. There is a good deal of ground which has to be covered.
  In what I have to say to-day I hope to be as uncontroversial as possible. In this House, at any rate, we have always tried to keep foreign policy as much as possible outside Party politics. Moreover, I do not want to do anything that I can help which is contrary to those high traditions of Parliament to which the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, referred earlier this afternoon. For that reason, it is not my intention to attempt to reply at any length or, I can assure your Lordships, with any heat to a number of slightly personal reflections which were made upon me in the debate in another place last week, except just to say this. I noted with some interest that I was described as a kind of Jekyll and Hyde, a kind of schizophrenic, at the same time feeble, weak, limp—"limp" I think was the word—and deep, dark and dangerous. Personally, I do not want to go into that. I am quite content to leave my character in the hands of your Lordships.
  But there is one matter on which I must say a word, and that is a specific charge which was made that I have always been against Four-Power talks with Russia and that I did my best to prevent them. I am sure that there was no intention to mislead, but your Lordships will know that that simply is not true. On more than one occasion in the last years I have made very strong pleas for talks with Russia. I should like to quote just

  1025
  one, which I think particularly apposite, from a speech which I made in March, 1950, after that General Election, when the present Prime Minister made much the same proposal as that which the Labour Party are to-day greeting with such enthusiasm. On March 7, 1950, I said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 166, Col. 39):
  "It is not a position where one can afford just to sit still and hope for the best. As I see it, it is the duty of any Government and every Government, of whatever political colour it may be, to take any steps that are possible to avoid a further deterioration. No stone must be left unturned. It is for that reason that many of us, irrespective of Party, have deeply regretted the completely negative attitude taken by the Government"—
  that is, the late Government—
  "to the proposal of Mr. Churchill for a further approach to Generalissimo Stalin to try to resolve the present deadlock between Russia and the Western Powers."
  My Lords, those were my words in March, 1950, and I am very happy to think that the Party to which noble Lords opposite belong, have in another place at last found out that the Prime Minister is not so black as they painted him at that time. Nor have I personally changed my mind since then. Indeed, as I think my right honourable friend the Minister of State said in answer to a Question in another place on Monday, if there was at any time any divergency of view between myself and the other Foreign Ministers at Washington, it was, I can assure your Lordships, because of my continued advocacy of the Prime Minister's proposal of May 11.
  And now I would turn to more serious matters. Let me first say frankly that on the whole I was not dissatisfied with what was accomplished at Washington. The original Bermuda meeting which had so unhappily to be postponed was a meeting at a very high level indeed—the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and a French representative of equal stature. If anyone was ever in a position to take big decisions it was they. The meeting at Washington, on the other hand, was a meeting only of Foreign Secretaries, and even of acting Foreign Secretaries, and in the nature of things it could not be so authoritative. What we could do was, first, to review all recent developments in the international situation as they affected the common policy of the three Powers; secondly, to see how far it was
  1026
  possible to iron out differences that existed between us, if indeed there were any differences; and thirdly and lastly, to reaffirm the broad identity of policy between the three countries with regard to the main issues of the day. That would be by no means a negligible result in any case, if it were possible to achieve it, and it would, of course, keep open the door for a further "Bermuda" meeting later on when circumstances allowed of it. It was, in fact, likely to be an "intermediate" meeting, and it was described as such, I think, by the representatives of all three countries at the time when we began our work. I did, indeed, press for four-Power talks with Russia, for that was the settled policy of Her Majesty's Government; but it was by no means certain that it would be possible to bring this about at the present stage.
  That was the atmosphere in which we started our labours. Our first task was to examine the situation in Russia and the satellite countries, with the object of assessing recent developments and trying to interpret the meaning of the new slant in Russian policy, internal and external, which seemed to be showing itself since the death of Generalissimo Stalin. My Lords, I say frankly that this was not made much easier by die news of the fall of Monsieur Beria, which was received in Washington on the very morning of our first meeting. With regard to this event I can tell your Lordships that though we in the Foreign Office have received many reports from those in a position to speak with knowledge about Russia, those reports very often conflict, and, in my view, they are none of them quite conclusive. I should therefore even now be very reluctant to dogmatise on the subject. In my view, only with the passage of time will it be possible to decide finally whether the reasons for the fall of Monsieur Beria were political or personal, or perhaps a mixture of the two.
  But, at any rate, the three Ministers were definitely agreed that there was nothing which had happened which involved any stiffening of our policy towards Russia, though of course it was obviously far too soon to consider a slackening of the tempo of Western rearmament, Above all, there was no intention (and this was made quite clear) on the part of the Western Powers merely to embark on a pin-pricking policy

  1027
  against Russia and the satellites. That, in our view, would only invite reprisals, which would do no good to the subject peoples themselves. Nor, in our view, was such a policy necessary; for there is, I think, increasing and moving evidence that that spirit of freedom which the Russian Government in the past have been at such efforts to suppress and which some believed was quite dead, is in fact alive and, I firmly believe, indestructible.
  This brought us to a discussion of our joint future policy towards Germany, where also there had been new developments, with special reference to the prospects of German reunification. It was generally thought that the recent events in Eastern Germany, and in particular the riots and troubles in East Berlin and elsewhere, had brought the possibility of reunification nearer. It also seemed to us clear that until the reunification was achieved the ferment in the Eastern Zone would continue, and with it a friction between the Eastern and Western Zones and between the Eastern Zone and Western Europe, which could only be to the detriment of the relations between Russia and the Western Powers. We therefore felt that we ought to do anything we could to help reunification, to which in any case we were all of us pledged.
  It seemed to us that the best help that we could give at present towards the reunification of Germany was, first, to continue to build up our material strength, and secondly, to continue to press for free German Elections and a free all-German government. But, of course, desirable though those aims may be, one thing is certain: it would be impossible to achieve them peacefully without Russian co-operation. It was in this connection that the all-important subject of Four-Power talks with Russia came up for further consideration, with particular reference to one of the most important of recent developments in the international situation, the proposal of the Prime Minister in his speech of May 11 this year. The House will remember the genesis of that proposal. It was made in a speech in another place on the date which I have mentioned. It had not yet been discussed with the other Allies, and their views were not yet known. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the Bermuda Conference was to obtain those views.
  1028
  When, owing to the Prime Minister's unhappy illness, Bermuda had to be abandoned, I went to Washington, among other things for the same purpose. I went to recommend his proposal to the attention of the other Foreign Ministers. We had a full discussion in the light not only of the proposal itself but also of other developments which had occurred since, and, notably, recent events in Eastern Germany and the dismissal of M. Beria, to which I have already referred, and which, of course, introduced a new element of uncertainty into the situation. In the circumstances, I personally should not have been very surprised—though I should have been extremely disappointed—if the other Ministers had shown themselves shy of Four-Power talks at the present juncture, and had thought that they ought to be postponed until the situation was clearer.
  But, as the discussions proceeded, I was glad to find that both the other Ministers were ready to consider Four-Power talks, and the plan which eventually emerged, and which finds a place in the communiquéwhich your Lordships have seen, is the result of our joint consultations. It was not, I imagine, what any of us would ideally have wished for. But it represented the greatest common measure of agreement on a fair balance of views. It really is no use people in Parliament, or outside, behaving as if we had no Allies—or, at any rate, had no need to pay the slightest attention to them. That is not the way in which Alliances are maintained: there must be give and take. Indeed, anyone, I am sure, in Washington will bear me out when I say that there was not the faintest chance of a Three-Power invitation being sent to Russia at the present stage, except on the basis which is found in the communiqué. The Prime Minister's proposal was, of course, not ruled out for the future. It was by no means ruled out. But the immediate choice was not between that and the proposal of the communiqué;it was between the proposal of the communiqué and no invitation at all.
  There may well be those who will say, quite sincerely, that it would be better, in those circumstances, to have no talks. I do not agree. If I had come back to England having refused to take part in Four-Power talks with Russia—talks in

  1029
  which the United States and France were ready to join, and of which the Federal Government of Germany were also in favour—I believe that I should have been very seriously to blame, and should have been very rightly criticised. Whether or not this is what any of us would ideally have wished, it is, as my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly emphasised in another place last week, not a step backwards. It is a very considerable step forward that the three Western Powers should have agreed to enter into talks with Russia. I should have thought that the Labour Party—I am not talking of noble Lords in this House, who have always behaved with great wisdom and understanding—would have done their best to help this initiative along, instead of doing their best to kill it. Moreover, in attacking it so furiously they have been, if I may say so, plus royaliste que le Roi. For the Prime Minister himself told me when I came back—and he has authorised me to say the same thing to-day—that he thought that in the circumstances we had got the best results possible. He added that he regarded the proposed meeting as affording valuable opportunities for contacts with Russia, and not in any way as closing the door on his proposals of May 11. I think it is right that that should be said to the House.
  After all, what do the criticisms of this scheme amount to? I should like, if I may, to examine them in some little detail. First of all, there is the criticism which has been made in some quarters, that the scope of the talks should have been widened to include disarmament. I do not want to say a word against disarmament. I spent a good many months of my life at Geneva before the war working for just that object. But what was the hard lesson which, I think, all of us who were there learnt at that time? It was this. It is no good asking nations to disarm until one has made at any rate some progress towards solving the problems which make armaments necessary. The main reason why the Disarmament Conference failed in the years before the war was that all her neighbours were apprehensive of Germany. That, too, is one of the main contributory factors in the minds of the Russian Government and the Russian people, and, to some extent, of the Government of
  1030
  France and the French people now. To try to put disarmament before the solution of the German problem is, therefore, in my view, to fly in the face of all experience.
  Then there is the, criticism that the communiqué throws too much emphasis on positions already taken up, and what has been described as a tendency to "stand pat." I am not quite clear what that means. Does it mean, in plain words, that we ought to go into conversations with Russia prepared to repudiate prior obligations which we have solemnly undertaken? If so, I can assure the House that that certainly was not in the mind of the Prime Minister when he made his speech on May 11; and to my mind it would be quite inconsistent with our honour as a nation. Or does it mean, by the words "too much emphasis" that, even if we are not prepared to repudiate our obligations, we ought to have given the impression to Russia that we are? If that is the meaning, it seems to me it would have been deliberately misleading—I will not use the word dishonest. We solemnly pledged ourselves, as your Lordships know—and that I understand was also the position of the late Government—to the principle of free German elections and a free all-German government. That view was also blessed by the German Bundestag by the resolution which they passed on June 10 of this year. Is it suggested that we should now prepare to abandon that position? I hope that is not a policy which would be advocated in any quarter in this House.
  I had always understood that all of us—the Opposition as much as the Government—are behind the policy of N.A.T.O. If so, what is there wrong in saying so? Or look at the European Defence Committee, which is, as your Lordships know, one of the main pillars of Western policy. Is it proposed now to go back on this policy, which is accepted by all the main nations of Western Europe, to which we pledged our own support and which, for instance, was ratified we were very glad to see, by the Dutch Government only last week? I cannot believe that anyone responsible would make a suggestion of that kind.
  Of course, I should agree with the critics of the Government that if the only purpose of these talks was to unify Germany as part of a militant Coalition

  1031
  against Russia—if that was the purpose of the talks—one clearly could not expect the Russian Government to be very enthusiastic about accepting an invitation to take part in them. But, as I see it, that is not the purpose of the talks at all. The purpose of this meeting, which I hope will take place, is to discuss the future of Germany in an objective and, I hope, friendly spirit, and to try to find means of achieving the reunification of Germany, to which we are all pledged, without threatening the security or arousing the enmity of her neighbours, including Russia. That, I submit, is a logical and sensible policy, and it is clearly the only policy on which we can hope for successful talks with Russia.
  It is in relation to this policy that I have just described that we must, I submit, look at the question of the implementation of the European Defence Community. The suggestion has been made, I understand, that
  the raison ďêtre of the European Community was to deal with an imminent military threat and to meet the urgent need of a German contribution.
  Of course, there is a considerable element of truth in that—I do not for a moment dispute it. But that is not nearly the whole story. The E.D.C., as it has come to be known, was, it is true, partially conceived as a method to enable Germany to play her part in Western defence without reviving the fears which past experience of an independent German army must arouse among her neighbours. But as I see it, it is much more than that. It offers new means of ending the age-long feud between France and Germany which has been the cause of so many wars in the past. Its purpose is, in fact, not a temporary one, to deal with immediate threats, but a permanent one, to help in removing, once and for all, a cancer which, if it were allowed to continue, might once more bring untold misery upon Europe and the world.
  If I may be allowed to say so, it should in this way provide an additional safeguard not only for France and the countries of Western Europe but, in my view, for Russia as well. It is not, indeed, surprising that this apprehension of Germany should persist in the minds of our old Allies, the French, and of other countries—indeed, it is not at all absent from our own minds. Germany is a
  1032
  mighty, virile nation, immensely industrious, immensely courageous. It is like a rushing, roaring river, which twice in our own lifetime has overflown her banks and spread disaster and ruin far a field. But, happily, by her readiness to join the European Defence Community, the Coal and Steel Community and the European Political Community, she has now shown herself willing to assist in providing a safeguard against such a thing happening again. For I am sure your Lordships will observe that in the framework of the European Defence Community, Germany will no longer be an entirely independent entity. She will be part of an international organisation, closely integrated, and decisions taken by that organisation will depend not only on her but on her fellow members, many of whose national interests will imperatively demand peace.
  That, I should have thought, ought to provide a very real safeguard, and I sincerely believe that when the agreement is ratified, as I hope it will be, by all concerned, it will be a considerable step in the right direction and should give reassurance, as I have said, not only to the countries of Western Europe but to Russia as well. I believe this to be true—and I would say this with special reference to the intervention by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, the other day: that whether Germany is divided or reunited, in both cases the decision will be a joint one of all members and not dictated by the ambition of a single people.
  In this connection, I feel that we ought to think specially of France, who has suffered so grievously in two great wars. We should not forget that her lands have been occupied and ravaged. We, who fought by her side as a faithful ally, should not underestimate the difficulties facing the French people in coming to decisions on problems such as this, involving their whole security. Of all the Foreign Ministers at Washington, I think M. Bidault had probably the hardest task in steering the right course. If I may say so with great deference, he showed throughout great-skill and tenacity in the interests of his country. Moreover, we must not forget that the European Defence Community solution involves for France, as for other members of the community, sacrifices of national sovereignty which are quite new in European history. It is natural that they should wish

  1033
  to think this over carefully and weigh well what they are doing. But, after till, the European Defence Community itself is a product of French genius. It is one which I firmly believe offers the only possible solution to what is perhaps one of our greatest problems and may well bring new and badly needed hope to Europe.
  Now I have come to what I believe to be another safeguard for Russia, as for France, to which perhaps too little attention was given in the debate in another place last week. I refer to the United Nations. As we know, the United Nations have been a good deal blown upon in recent years, because the member States, and, in particular, some of the greatest member States, have not always acted in the true spirit of the Charter. Russia herself has certainly not been guiltless in this respect. But the main purpose of the United Nations remains—to maintain peace, and, if peace is broken, to protect its members against aggression. It is for that the organisation, above all, exists, and it is for that principle that for two years our troops have been fighting so gallantly in Korea. And do not let us forget that Russia, as a member of the United Nations, if she is a victim of aggression, is as fully entitled to the support of her fellow members as any of the other members of the organisation, nor in such an event, were she the innocent victim of aggression, would, I am sure, she be denied that support.
  Finally, there is that further thought which was in the mind of the Prime Minister on May 11, when he said:
  "I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia."
  This general conception, as your Lordships will have seen, has been in other minds as well. The German Federal Chancellor, in a letter to the three Foreign Ministers in Washington, which has now been published, has launched the idea that the European Defence Community might be the basis of a security system which would meet the security requirements to of all European peoples, including the Russian people. He added that this system could be fitted into the system of general disarmament and security within the framework of the United Nations which was proposed by President Eisenhower on April 16.
  1034
  This, I hope your Lordships will agree, is a valuable and helpful contribution to the study, and one may hope to the eventual solution, of this thorny problem. It is certainly in complete accord with the Prime Minister's master thought.
  Your Lordships will not expect me to elaborate in detail how these hopeful ideas might be worked out. That is clearly a matter for most careful thought and eventual consultation between the interested Powers. I would only say to-day that Her Majesty's Government are giving much careful thought to this problem in the hope of finding a practical solution acceptable to all the countries concerned. All these and other matters which touch the security, both of Russia and of Western Europe, can well be discussed at a meeting on the basis agreed at Washington. Indeed, in my view, sonic reassurance to the neighbours of Germany might prove an essential pre-condition for any agreement for German rearmament. Therefore, I should have thought they are not ruled out at such a meeting, which indeed, I should imagine, would provide an admirable opportunity, both for the exchange of views and for the appreciation by all concerned of each other's difficulties; nor, as I have said earlier, does it in any way rule out at a later date, the type of meeting which the Prime Minister had in mind. In any case, talks on Germany should give a pretty clear indication of whether we are likely to achieve any success in a wider field.
  I am afraid I have kept the House rather a long time on this subject, because I believe that it is important to define the purpose of the Four-Power talks as envisaged in Washington. I believe they might well be of a first value to the future of Europe. Whether they will take place or not, I do not know—I hope they will—but there are certainly some people in this country who have done their very utmost already to kill them. It is notable that an article in Pravda of July 23 produced almost verbatim some of the arguments which were used in another place. I am certainly not going to suggest that Pravda put these arguments into the minds of Members of another place—indeed, it certainly could not have done so, because the article came out after the debate. But I do suggest that the arguments used by honour-

  1035
  able Members may well have fortified Pravda in its arguments. If so, and if there are those in this country who give the Russians an excuse to destroy what I believe to be the most hopeful initiative for talks of this kind since the war, they will have a very heavy burden of responsibility to bear, and I believe that their fellow citizens will not easily forgive them.
  The House will, I am sure, expect me also to mention the question of Austria, which is referred to in the communiqué, but I will do so only very briefly, because the facts are not new and they are all already at the disposal of your Lordships. I would therefore only say that this is a problem which should not be incapable of an early solution, and if it could be solved, it would undoubtedly be a most valuable contribution to European peace.
  Now, my Lords, I come to the subject of the Far East, where the recent developments were also under review at Washington. At the time when I was in Washington, the position was of course, still rather obscure. In this situation, we felt that there was only one course before us, and that was to make it clear that we stood firm behind the United States in her efforts for peace, and that we would give as much latitude as possible to the United States Government and the United Nations High Command to play a hand which no one else could play for them: and I submit that that policy has been fully justified by the event. As your Lordships know, the Armistice has already been signed and came into effect on July 27. The wish of the United Nations to put an end to the fighting in Korea has long been manifest. It has also been made clear recently that the Communists on their side were keen to get an Armistice. Some people, your Lordships will know, have argued from this that because the basic policies and aims of the Communists are opposed to ours, therefore an Armistice must necessarily be to the disadvantage of our cause. But I submit that that is an entirely false line of reasoning. The truth is that the Korean Armistice is a very good example of the sort of limited agreement between the Communist Powers and the free world which is possible, even in the present state of world tension. It may indeed be that the motives and objectives which led the
  1036
  Communists to conclude the Armistice differ from those which prompted us. But what is really important is this: in spite of the difference in our aims and objectives which undoubtedly exists, the Communists and ourselves have nevertheless, within a limited context, found an area of agreement. The Korean Armistice is common ground between us. That, my Lords, I submit, is an encouraging precedent. We may hope—I at any rate do hope—that limited agreements may also prove possible in respect of other outstanding problems; that the area of agreement which we have already reached in the Korean Armistice may through our efforts be widened and extended.
  As I said to your Lordships on Monday, we are determined that this Armistice shall form a turning point for the better in the Far East. It was for this reason that we felt it necessary, in the Washington communiqué, to stress the dangers which would flow from any breach of the Armistice by the Communists. It would indeed be a tragedy for the progress made if this Armistice were to be imperilled by any failure on our part to show the strength of our resolution, and I hope that in the communiquéwe have made this abundantly clear. But it may be said—I think it was quite fairly said by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, the other day, and he asked me, I think, for an answer—"What happens if the Armistice is broken by the action of the South Korean Government, by the action of the Government of President Rhee?" In that case, I should like to make it perfectly clear that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, we are uncommitted. There is no doubt that it would constitute a very grave situation, and I have no doubt at all also that we all hope that that situation will never occur. But, if it did, I imagine that the first step would be consultation between Her Majesty's Government and the fellow members of the United Nations. I hope that I have made that point clear, because I share the view of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that it is important.
  And now I should like to turn to the question of the immediate steps which will become necessary following the Armistice. As your Lordships will already know, the General Assembly has

  1037
  been specially convened for August 17 to resume consideration of the Korean question. That is, of course, in accordance with the Assembly's Resolution of April 18 last. It has always been our intention that the Assembly should meet again as soon as possible after the conclusion of an Armistice in Korea. For resistance to aggression to Korea was, as we all know, based on the United Nations. It flowed directly front the Security Council Resolution of June 27, 1950. It is therefore right that the Assembly should meet to take note of the termination of hostilities.
  The special meeting of the Assembly will also have the task of putting into effect the recommendations of Article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, that within three months of the conclusion of the Agreement, a Political Conference should be held to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We expect the Assembly to pass a Resolution setting up this Political Conference. The precise form in which this will be done has still to be decided. The important point is that the United Nations' connection with the Korean question should be continued, and that the Political Conference, when it meets, should be in some suitable way associated with the United Nations. The composition, terms of reference, and the agenda of this Conference are already under examination. We have been exchanging views for many weeks past with the Commonwealth, with the United States, and with other members of the United Nations. On the whole of this question, our concern is and will remain, first, that the principles on which we stand in international relations should be observed; secondly, that the arrangements should be workable; and thirdly, that they should have the best possible chance of reaching a useful result.
  As regards the composition of the Conference, it seems clear that those who take part must necessarily include the North and South Koreans, the United States, who were entrusted by the United Nations with the unified command, and the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, both of which have a common frontier on the Korean peninsula. We ourselves, of course, expect to play a part, and we think that Australia, too, and also India, as a great Asiatic Power with special responsibilities in the Korean
  1038
  Armistice, should be there. As regards the Agenda, there has been a great deal of discussion whether the best course would be for the Conference to be confined entirely to the Korean political settlement or broadened to make possible the consideration of other problems in the Far East. There is a great deal less difference between these two alternatives than might at first appear. Whatever the terms of reference of the Conference, it must obviously give first priority to the political settlement of the Korean problem. That settlement must be reached with reference to the realities of the situation in the Far East. It must not have the effect of upsetting the balance of security in that area. On the contrary, it must aim at strengthening peace and security in the Far East generally. In our view, therefore, if the Political Conference makes real progress towards a settlement of the Korean problem, there is no reason why it should not move on to consider other outstanding problems in the Far East.
  Now I want to return for a few moments to Korea itself. There is, as I see it, only one basis for a permanent settlement of the Korean problem, and that is, by some means or other, the unification of the whole country by peaceful means. I am not saying anything new in saying that. It has, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, will know well, been the aim of the United Nations since they first became concerned with the Korean question in 1947; and it has, I think, been reaffirmed in every resolution passed by the General Assembly since then. In the Washington communiqué we reiterated our aim,
  "to pursue every effort to assist the stouthearted and sorely-tried Koreans to re-unite peacefully under institutions of her own choosing."
  I do not say that this can be accomplished all at once. In this, as in other matters, we must be realists. But it is the goal towards which we must all of us work.
  There are, in this area of the Far East, two other problems about which I might perhaps say a word. They relate to the questions of relaxations of trade with China, and the position of Communist China vis-à-vis the United Nations in the event of an Armistice. These were the subject of preliminary, but not very detailed discussion. In both these cases,

  1039
  the Three Powers agreed that it would be premature, and indeed quite impracticable, that there should be any immediate or automatic change of policy. But they equally agreed that the questions could come up for further examination in the light of experience in the period following the armistice. I hope the House will agree that that was as far as it was practicable to go at this stage. But the position has been kept absolutely open, and we can raise these matters again whenever we think proper. That, I am sure, is right. For none onus knows whether this more moderate slant in Russian policy, of which some signs are now apparent in Europe, may not be adopted, too, in Russia and China in the Far East. Were that to be so, it would no doubt open new doors to better relations between the Communist and the non-Communist world. But at present it is impossible to tell. One can judge of that only in the light of future events, and in the meantime I would say once more that we must keep an open mind.
  There is one more word that I would say with regard to trade with China, about which I believe one noble Lord spoke on Monday. With regard to our trade with China, noble Lords will be aware that our policy is based on the embargo on the supply of strategic goods—which we are carrying out rigorously—and the development of trade within the non-strategic field. Any change in the strategic control—which I may say we have rigidly observed—could, of course, be carried out only in co-operation with the other Governments which follow the same policy. With regard to non-strategic materials, which are not subject to embargo, there is, so far as I know, no reason why we should not trade. I could not admit that by doing so we have in any way gone beyond what is right and proper. I am glad to make this clear, in view of certain suggestions which have I understand been made.
  EARL JOWITT: Before the noble Marquess leaves this matter, I should like to ask this. The resolution which we are observing in regard to China was in accordance with a resolution of the United Nations, was it not, in support of which both Houses and the United States Government voted?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think there is any difference of opinion about that resolution. As I say, we have been at great pains to observe it; indeed, we have gone further in that direction than some other nations.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: As the noble Marquess will remember, I raised the question at great length on April 23. What I pointed out was that, although the United Nations had said that there was to be an embargo, they had not said upon what articles the embargo was to be placed. Although they said there was to be an embargo, they had not made a list of the articles upon which the embargo was to be placed. It is upon that that there has been objection.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I think I am right in saying that the noble Viscount is unintentionally wrong about that. There is a list. However, I would rather leave that to be dealt with more fully by my noble friend Lord Reading when he replies, because I have kept your Lordships a long time. There is a list, and it has been agreed.
  LORD WINSTER: Would the noble Marquess allow me to point out that we have gone far beyond that list? We have quite voluntarily added a great number of items which were not on that list at all, and our doing so has involved us in the loss of many millions of pounds of trade.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Everything that has been said bears out my statement that we have been scrupulously fair over this matter. I am glad that that should be made clear.
  Now a word about Indo-China. This is inevitably linked with what happens in Korea. For the French Government are naturally anxious lest, in the event of an Armistice in Korea, the whole heat of the Communist attack might be turned on the Associated States. It is for that reason that there was included in the communiqué a phrase which, as your Lordships know, says:
  "The Foreign Ministers were of opinion that an armistice in Korea must not result in jeopardising the restoration and the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia."
  The French Government at Washington were able to give us an account of far-reaching steps which they are taking to

  1041
  grant self-government to the three Associated States. They made it clear that they are well aware of the vital importance of such steps in rallying the public opinion of the States to their side. The military situation was also discussed in the Conference, and I believe, also, in other talks between the French Government and the United States. There was full agreement between all concerned as to the necessity for restoring the military situation. It would be folly, of course, to ignore the difficulties with which the French forces are faced in this strange campaign, which conforms to no ordinary pattern that has ever been known before, so far as I know. But we shall, I know, wish them all success in their task, for victory in it may well affect not only the future of Indo-China, but also the whole of South-East Asia.
  Finally, if your Lordships can bear with me a few minutes more, I should like to say a word about Egypt—and it will be a very brief word. This was not mentioned in the tripartite talks, but it was the subject of bilateral conversations between the United States and us. Throughout there was strong evidence of a desire of the United States to see a peaceful outcome of differences between Egypt and this country. We explained once more the nature of our interest in me problem: we explained that it was not national, and it certainly was not imperialistic. There is, I think, general agreement—and an agreement which no doubt would be shared on the other side of the Atlantic as well as here—as to the necessity of maintaining a base in this strategically vital area, so that it may be readily available in the event of war. For this, certain practical arrangements are required, as your Lordships know. As a result of our talks in Washington, I hope and believe that broad agreement was reached on an approach to this problem. I ask the House not to press me to go further than that to-day. Open diplomacy is a very good thing, but too much publicity is not always very helpful to further negotiations. I would, therefore, only add this. Her Majesty's Government are ready, as has already been made clear on several occasions, to resume negotiations—whether they be formal or informal—if the Egyptian Government wish. General Sir Brian Robertson came with me to Washington, where his wisdom and experience were invalu-
  1042
  able, and he has now returned to Cairo. Personally—I hope that I am not too optimistic—I still believe it is possible to thresh out a solution which safeguards the principles which I have enumerated, if the good will be there; and I hope most sincerely that such a solution will be reached, consistent with the honour of both countries.
  I have tried at some length, but I am afraid very inadequately, to give an account of the proceedings of the three Ministers at Washington, and the reasons which brought us to the conclusions to which we came. No doubt, other views might have prevailed. For instance, we might have come to the conclusion that it was premature to make an approach to the Russians and that we should wait longer until the position was clearer. But the more we examined the situation, the more I think we all became convinced that, with recent developments in Russia and with the situation in Germany developing as it is, it would be useful, if possible, to hold such a meeting at an early date, if only to see what is the new climate of international relations on these vitally important topics. Personally, I believe that is right. The climate is as likely to be favourable now as at a later date, and perhaps more so. And there is always a danger that by waiting too long we may miss an opportunity which may not recur.
  It will, I think, be generally agreed that this is one of those moments in the affairs of nations which are specially pregnant for good or ill. For nearly twenty-five years Russia has been within the iron grip of Generalissimo Stalin, one of the most powerful and probably, in his way, one of the most ruthless men who ever lived. Now suddenly, by the act of death, that grip has been removed. What may come after we do not yet know. What may be the policy of his successors (as I said at the beginning of my speech) is not yet clear. There are signs of a new hand at the helm, both in Russia and in the satellite countries. But whether it represents any real difference of outlook, or whether it is merely that the new rulers of Russia want a quiet time in which to find their feet, it is impossible to tell at present. It is clearly far too soon to assume that there has been any real change of heart. On that, all the authorities seem to be agreed. We can-

  1043
  not, therefore, in any case, as I see it, slow up our plans for the defence of the West. But are we to ignore altogether these few faint fluttering gestures towards a greater liberalism? I cannot help feeling that that would be foolish. It seems to me that we must feel our way forward, not relaxing our vigilance but alive to any new turns in the situation of which we can take advantage, to lessen the tension between East and West. That, as I see it, was the purpose of the Washington talks, and as such I commend their conclusions to the favourable consideration of this House.
  4.4 p.m.
  LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, as the noble Marquess said at the beginning of his speech, this debate is taking place one day before the House goes into the long Summer Recess, and for several weeks the vigilant attention which Parliament is able to give almost day by day to international affairs will be suspended. I think we all agree that it is important that we should have this debate to-day, and that it should have been opened by the noble Marquess. In the enforced absence of the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden—the news of whose progress towards recovery of health we all welcome—the noble Marquess has undertaken the heavy duties of the Foreign Office in addition to his normal duties. We all sympathise with the noble Marquess in this period of what I may call "hard labour," however long or short the sentence may be. We, on the other hand, are fortunate. For the first time since, I think, 1940, when the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, was in charge of the Foreign Office, we have been able to hear at first hand from the Foreign Secretary a personal account of his own part in recent important international discussions, and he has been able to deal also with other important matters.
  The noble Marquess has taken full advantage of the opportunity. He has delivered an important statement with his usual clarity and persuasion, and we have all listened to him with the deepest interest. He has explained the decision which emerged from the recent Washington conference, and expounded the policies set out in the communiqué, and in the Note which he sent to the Soviet
  1044
  Government. There was much in his speech which is welcomed by noble Lords in all parts of the House. But there are also important matters on which we on these Benches retain our original reaction of disappointment to the result of the Washington conference. It surely cannot be doubted that, between the debate in another place on May 11 and the issue of the Washington communiquéon July 14, the hopes of the people of this country and of many other countries for a new initiative to break the cold war deadlock had been raised only to be dashed again. The Prime Minister's speech reverberated all over the world. It appeared that he had again risen to the occasion. It recalled to my mind his famous announcement on another historic occasion, June 22, 1941, when Hitler launched his armies against the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister's initiative at that time had a profound effect on the course of world events. It seemed that his speech on May 11 might also lead to momentous results. Instead, it would seem that the Prime Minister's initiative has been put in cold storage.
  The noble Marquess made some reference to the late conversion of members of my Party to the idea of high-level discussions. But no doubt he will recall that in a debate in your Lordships' House as long ago as November 21, 1951, I myself said that I had come to be in favour of a top-level conference if it was impossible to get things moving by normal conferences or political methods. The noble Marquess will therefore realise that I have some personal feeling of support for what the Prime Minister has tried to do, because I think he was right in choosing the moment. The Prime Minister said in his speech:
  "The supreme event which has occurred since we last had a debate on foreign affairs is, of course, the change of attitude and, as we all hope, of mood which has taken place in the Soviet domains and particularly in the Kremlin since the death of Stalin."
  The Prime Minister was anxious that nothing in the presentation of foreign policy by the N.A.T.O. Powers should, as it were, supersede or take the emphasis out of what may be a profound movement of Russian feeling. He did not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of the Western World was insoluble.

  1045
  And then he made his now famous proposal, which was set out in a brief, much-quoted passage. I will quote only three sentences of it. He said:
  "I believe that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading Powers without long delay. This conference should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda….It should meet with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion."
  That was the Prime Minister's great conception. Therein lay the new initiative. Where are they now? The top-level talks are in effect discarded. We are to have a Foreign Minister's conference with a restricted agenda. I cannot agree that the proposed Foreign Minister's conference is not a reversal of the Prime Minister's intentions. It is most unfortunate that the Prime Minister's illness made it impossible for him to carry forward his proposal personally. The first blow to his hopes was that his illness prevented the Bermuda Conference from being held. I recall the many expressions of sincere concern which his illness evoked in the United States. But I also recall the expressions of relief that the Bermuda Conference would have to be postponed indefinitely.
  The Prime Minister's speech was delivered with the full knowledge and agreement of his Cabinet colleagues. We have been told so—not, I think, that we needed to be told. For myself, I have not: doubted that the noble Marquess went to the Washington Conference with a view to securing the agreement of his. United States and French colleagues to the holding of a top-level conference on the lines proposed by the Prime Minister. I was sure that he pressed strongly for their agreement but that he had been unable to carry his two colleagues with him; and in consequence agreement could be reached only on a proposal that the four Foreign Ministers should meet for the purposes set out in the Note which the noble Marquess later addressed to the Soviet Union. The fact is that his American and French colleagues would not play on the Churchill wicket.
  It has often been said that while Russia can decide her policies by herself the three Western Allies have to concert their policies, and that, of course, is not always easy. If there are strong differences of view on policy or on the timing of action, there must obviously be give and take—
  1046
  to use the noble Marquess's own expression—otherwise the differences may grow more acute and endanger Western unity. It may be that even if the Prime Minister had been able to go to Bermuda and bring all his great influence to bear he might not have succeeded in winning over President Eisenhower and the French Prime Minister to support the proposal. I do not know: it is possible; but it is idle to speculate. I agree, therefore, that if the best could not be obtained by agreement, it was better to adopt the second best than to do nothing at all. If what was agreed was all that was possible, it may be the second best; it is certainly not the best in a different form. It represents something entirely different from the Prime Minister's idea of a new initiative. I see nothing of a new initiative about it. Indeed, there is nothing in the communiqué and nothing in the Note giving any sign of recognising the possibility of important changes in the world situation—to what, in fact, the Prime Minister called "the supreme event."
  Even if the Prime Minister's plan was not favoured, it is difficult to understand why the original plan should have been altered so drastically. Was it necessary to revert to the old gambit of proposing the agenda submitted and so leave an opening for a resumption of the old haggling about the terms of an agenda, which has gone on for so long? It is four years since the last Foreign Ministers' Conference took place. In the interval much time and effort has been spent, both in Conference and by Notes—there are already four White Papers of them—in fruitless endeavours to agree on the basis for a meeting. I would seriously ask the Government whether they have any real expectation of the Russians entering a conference in September on the proposed agenda.
  We must be realistic. Point 1 of the Note sets out terms for free all-German elections, which the West has consistently and rightly held to be indispensable. Point 2 refers to the establishment of a free all-German Government with freedom of action in internal and external affairs. We agree that that is the right policy; but for the Russians to agree would involve, as we all know, important concessions from the position which they have long maintained. And the reunification of Germany cannot be secured

  1047
  except by arrangement with the Russians. The truth of that cannot be ignored by either the Western Allies or by the Germans themselves. As The Times said yesterday:
  "Germans in general know that the friendship of the western occupying Powers is vital to their country, and while they hope that the Soviet Government might be persuaded to set the eastern zone free if sufficient inducement could be offered by the west, they understand that it cannot be forced to do so."
  My Lords, mark the words "if sufficient inducement could be offered by the West." I believe that that is a correct appreciation of the position. We know from the Note what concessions are needed from Russia to get agreement. But we do not know what inducements the West are ready to hold out to Russia. There can be no doubt that deep disappointment—I will put it no higher than that—has been caused by failure to follow up with the Prime Minister's initiative. There will be impatience as well as disappointment if the alternative proposal leads nowhere.
  The Prime Minister sensed that a propitious moment had arrived to attempt to break the deadlock. German reunification, of the highest importance itself, is really part of the problem of divided Europe. There are large issues which will always hover in the background of a restricted Foreign Ministers' meeting limited to German unity and the Austrian Treaty. The Prime Minister's informal talks would have provided an opportunity to gain some understanding of the Russian mind on some of these back ground issues. For example, are the Russians genuinely concerned about their security? Are they genuinely concerned about a united and rearmed Germany, associated with the West? Would they be ready to work in co-operation with the West if we could convince them that the Western Defence Pact is entirely non-aggressive; that the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Community Treaty are open to Russia and the other Eastern nations to join on equal terms, and so make a grand alliance of mutual security against aggression? Would they be ready to co-operate to lift the heavy burden of world armaments? Could peaceful co-existence be made a political, economic and non-aggressive reality? The Prime Minister has projected the idea of something on
  1048
  the lines of the Locarno Pact. The German Chancellor, as the noble Marquess reminded us, has said that the E.D.C. should be the point of departure of a security system which met the requirements of all European peoples, including the Russians.
  It is great background problems of this kind that could have been discussed informally and privately in top-level talks. I am extremely doubtful whether they can be effectively discussed in a Foreign Ministers' Conference on the proposed agenda, despite what the noble Marquess has said about the possible wide range of its discussions. I agree that E.D.C. and other matters are inherent in any discussion to arrange all German "freedom of action in internal and external affairs." It is well that the noble Marquess has made this perfectly clear, because there were some who considered that E.D.C. was ruled out by a somewhat ambiguous reference in the communiqué. I agree that the European Community is to be looked upon as necessary in itself, as a long-term constructive arrangement in the permanent interests of Europe. I also agree that E.D.C. is designed with a view to removing the historic conflict between France and Germany, by bringing a Federal German armed contribution as an integral part of the integrated forces of the European Community. This purpose would also be served if an all-German Government were to join it, but its accession would not be automatic. A new decision would have to be taken. It could not be bound by any of the international engagements entered into by the Federal Government. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the French have not yet ratified the Treaty, and we cannot say when they will do so. I agree, therefore, that discussion of an enlarged E.D.C. would not be impossible in the Foreign Ministers' Conference, but I remain doubtful whether that is the right place for such discussions in the first instance.
  What response may we get from the Soviet Union? They may accept the invitation—I hope and trust that they will and the possible width of discussion indicated by the noble Marquess may encourage them to do so. They may return the same answer as the Note of last September—that is, none—but I think that events in East Germany and Eastern Europe make that unlikely. They may

  1049
  propose a different agenda. If they do, is there to be a return to the fruitless exchange of Notes which was suspended last September? There is another possibility. They may propose a conference
  "on the highest level…which shall not he overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda."
  What would be Her Majesty's Government's answer? The noble Marquess has told us that the Foreign Ministers' Conference does not preclude a meeting at the highest level. If that is the case, I hope that, if such a Note should be received, the decision of the Government will be "Back to Churchill."
  With the signing of the Armistice in Korea, the fighting has ceased—we hope not to be resumed. We share with noble Lords in all parts of the House the feelings of thankfulness and pride which have been evoked by the vindication of the United Nations' policy of collective armed resistance to aggression. As the noble Marquess has told the House, this is the first time since its formation that the United Nations has taken up collective action in resisting aggression. And it has taken it successfully. It was never a purpose of the United Nations to carry on the war in Korea until the aggressors submitted. It was never its purpose to unify Korea by force—indeed, it was the Communist resort to force to achieve that goal which caused United Nations' collective resistance. The aggressor is back where he started his aggression. He has suffered fearful casualties in the process. Aggression has not been allowed to succeed. It has no profits to show. Here is an historic achievement which stands as a warning and a deterrent to any would-be aggressor in the future.
  We all recognise, of course, that the war is not ended by the Armistice; that will have to wait upon a peace settlement. The soldiers have done their part; it is now up to the political conference to get a peaceful agreement. For this triumph of United Nations' policy and action, credit and thanks belong overwhelmingly to the United States, which has borne by far the greater part of the sacrifice of life and limb, and of the burden of effort and military responsibility. The free world, which seeks peace and security for all and threatens none, and which values its own freedom and wishes freedom for all, owes an immense debt to the people, of the United States which ought never to be forgotten. If one name more than
  1050
  any other should be linked with this historic endeavour, it is that of ex-President Truman, now living in retirement, whose courageous and far-sighted initiative brought United Nations' collective resistance into action.
  My Lords, we welcome the fact, as stated by the noble Marquess, that the United Nations Assembly is to meet in New York on August 17. It is vital that it should take overall charge, now that political discussions are to be undertaken. Its first duty is to see to it that the Armistice is fully respected by all the forces which have operated under the United Nations High Command. It will have to appoint the United Nations' representatives to the Political Conference, and. I was glad to hear the noble Marquess say that representatives of Australia and India should be amongst those selected.
  The noble Marquess referred to the fact that the peaceful reunification of Korea was our common goal. I think that we are all in full agreement with that and wish to see it achieved. But the Prime Minister may have been right about the difficulty of this problem, when he said:
  "I doubt very much whether there could be any agreement at the present time on a united Korea."
  It may be, as he suggested, that it would require the healing touch of time. The noble Marquess also expressed some apprehension of the difficulties of the problem. On the other hand, I would remind your Lordships that the revised resolution by the Soviet Union on November 23 at the United Nations Assembly, which proposed a Commission of eleven States, the names of which were stated, included the following:
  "To instruct the said Commission to take immediate steps for the settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the unification of Korea—to be effected by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of the above-mentioned Commission."
  This would seem to indicate that the reunification of Korea is not, in principle, opposed by the Communists. But of course it may prove difficult, or even impossible at this stage, to get agreement for reunification at an early date after the peace settlement. But this achievement should be assured in due course by agreement at the Conference.
  We welcome the Government's declared determination to see that the Conference is a success. I think it is a pity

  1051
  that Mr. Dulles does not adopt a similarly constructive approach in public. Noble Lords will have seen that he is reported to have said yesterday that the United States had assured Mr. Rhee that if, after ninety days, the political Conference had proved a sham and was showing no signs of being productive, the American delegates would walk out. They would do so on their own initiative, and the decision would not be decided by the South Korean attitude. Why should such an assurance have been given to Mr. Rhee? By what test is the Conference to be proved a sham? By whom is it to be so judged? Surely this is a matter for the United Nations Assembly, and not for a particular delegate. Will the United Nations representatives be United Nations delegates, or will they be delegates of their respective countries? That is a matter of the very highest importance, because it seems to me highly unsatisfactory if any United Nations representatives can walk out on their own initiative, on grounds and on a date of their own choosing. This curious statement of Mr. Dulles lends point to a question asked in another place yesterday. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked whether the British delegation to the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly would do their best to ensure that the United Nations delegation which will go to the political Conference in Korea will work to a United Nations common policy and not on national policies. Mr. Butler said that he realised the importance of the point. Can we have an assurance to-day that the British representatives will be instructed to take the line suggested at the Assembly? It ought not to be left in doubt.
  Then, my Lords, Mr. Dulles also referred to the possible use of the veto by the United States in the event of there being any proposed concession over Chinese admission into the United Nations. I gathered from the report which I read in The Times, that his statement was made in reference to the Korean Peace Conference. This is an issue that will surely have to be settled by the United Nations after there is a Korean peace settlement formally putting an end to aggression. That is, I take it, the position of Her Majesty's Government, as I believe it was the position of their predecessors. That is in accord-
  1052
  ance with the United Nations resolution, and it is not easy to understand why Mr. Dulles should have made such a public statement at this moment. I only hope that, when it arises, at the appropriate moment, there will be no doubt about the attitude of the British Government in supporting the proposal.
  My Lords, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will keep to their intention of doing their utmost to make the Conference a success. We are at a vital stage in international affairs. Much may turn on the success or failure of the political Conference in Korea. Peace there may prove to be the beginning of a wider settlement covering the whole of the Far East and South East Asia. We want to see an end to the fighting in both Indo-China and Malaya, as has happened in Korea. I do not think it can be doubted that the key to overall peace in that large area of the world is to be found in a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem; and in the coming weeks and months Her Majesty's Government will, I am sure, bend all their energies to see that the key is provided.
  4.37 p.m.
  LORD LAYTON: My Lords, may I begin by referring to that part of the subject which was referred to last by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson? I would observe that clearly the dominating factor of this debate, the thought that is in all our minds, is, as he said, that this very week a shooting war has stopped—and not a small war, but one which, by any standards, even in this half-century of world wars, was a great war, a war which absorbed a very high proportion of the military resources of the United States, and one which produced casualties on an enormous scale, both military and civilian.
  But even that is not so important as the outstanding fact that this Armistice brings to an end a war which, for the first time in history, is the outcome of an experiment, the first experiment in collective security. Lord Henderson has observed that for the fact that that experiment was made the world has to thank the people of the United States who, for the first time in history, have taken the initiative in international affairs and have shouldered the great international responsibility which the evolution of the world has thrust upon them.

  1053
  There may be things said in criticism of the United States during the course of this debate—there have been during the course of the debate in another place—but we should do well to remember all the time that the situation that we are in, the fact that there is an organisation which can act to check aggression, has been proved to be effective by the decision of the people of that country. As the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, that particular event will always be associated with the name of President Truman. We must hope and pray that never again will civilised countries take part in any war except a war of that type, which is a collective war against aggression.
  My Lords, I will make only a few brief comments on the question of Korea. The first is that the signing of this Armistice does not, of itself, prove anything about the attitude of the Communist world, but we can, at least, draw from it the negative conclusion that the change that took place after the death of Stalin has not changed in an opposite direction. The other comment I have to make is that we Liberals associate ourselves in general with the remarks just made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in regard to some statements that have been made in relation to political discussions on the Far East. In particular, we agree with him regarding the suggestion that the United States should veto the admission of China to the United Nations, a statement, I regret to observe, which has been subscribes to by that great American, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, yesterday.
  We on these Benches take the view that all nations should be admitted to the United Nations. It would be quite possible to organise on a guaranteed democratic basis; and, indeed, we have done so in Europe, to a certain extent, because membership of the Council of Europe is subject to a test of democratic belief. In the case of the United Nations, however, whatever the original intention, that in practice has not been done, and the result is that it remains a platform on which it is still possible for East and West to meet. And if that is right for Russia, it is also right for Communist China. It is obvious, of course, that it was impossible to accept China during the War, or even immediately afterwards but we hope that the admission of China
  1054
  will be the goal of any agreement on the problem of Korea and in the Far East.
  I turn to what is the main purpose of this debate—an expression of views on the Washington Conference. I should like first of all to express our appreciation of the admirable exposition given by the Acting Foreign Secretary this afternoon. Two main criticisms have been made of the proceedings of the Conference, one of which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. The first is that the Conference retreated from the attitude taken up by the Prime Minister on May 11. For my part, I have the feeling that the excessively sharp terms in which this view has been expressed in the Press and in the debate in another place was due to a large extent to the high hopes—what I consider to be the exaggerated hopes—built upon the Prime Minister's speech.
  I, too, like the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, am sorry that Sir Winston Churchill and President Eisenhower are not going to meet the Russian leaders in the near future, for I believe very greatly in the value of personal contacts and contacts at the highest level in international affairs. The history of the war proves how immensely valuable to us and to the Allied cause was the relationship established between Mr. Churchill and such differing personalities as President Roosevelt, on the one hand, and Marshal Stalin, on the other. If Sir Winston Churchill and President Eisenhower could establish a basis of confidence between themselves and the Russian leaders, the state of the world would be greatly improved. But The Prime Minister's proposal was an extremely personal and characteristic one. One cannot imagine anyone other than Mr. Churchill actually filling that rôle between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin during the world war, and the same is true to a certain event now. This is not something which you can appoint someone to undertake, and it really was quite right that the scheme should be postponed when Sir Winston Churchill fell ill. Not only that but, as the noble Marquess said, it became inopportune when Mr. Beria disappeared and doubt was thrown on who were the effective heads and people in authority in Russia. We regret the postponement, but it really was due to events and not to Her Majesty's Ministers. In the circumstances

  1055
  I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, that the proposal outlined in the communiqué was the only alternative.
  It is true that there are some who hold that it would have been better to do nothing and wait until an opportunity for top-level talks recurred. My own view is that to do nothing at all would have been the worst of all possible courses. It would have produced a maximum of disappointment. But most of the critics, and I think this is true to a certain extent of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, have put forward a second criticism. Hardly anybody has suggested that the Foreign Ministers should be given a roving commission over the whole of the world—that is not a task for Foreign Ministers—but many have suggested that in selecting Germany as the high point of the Conference the Ministers made a grave error in laying down conditions both in the communiqué and in the invitation itself. On that point I find myself much more closely in agreement with the noble Marquess than with the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. It is quite true that it is useless to go into negotiations with the Russians, or indeed anybody else, if you have no intention of trying to meet their preoccupations, allay their suspicions and deal with reasonable claims, and are in no sense prepared to modify your own policy. It is no good going into negotiation on that basis. But that does not mean we must start with a clean slate or give the impression that everything is open to debate.
  The point I wish to make in this context is this. If there are matters on which there is no room for compromise, it is the wisest course to say so at the outset. The communiqué might have been couched in warmer terms. But it was right to indicate, and to insist on, certain principles. The noble Marquess said that if we had given any other impression it would have been misleading—he hesitated to use the word "dishonest," but, in fact, that is the word which I think exactly fits the case. I entirely agree with the noble Marquess on this.
  I want to emphasise that at this moment we need to lay down the principles on which any settlement must be based. Reading the Report of the debate
  1056
  in another place, I gathered the impression that some speakers regarded the unification of Germany as the sole issue. Unification is, indeed, one of the essential conditions of the final pacification of Europe. The noble Marquess underlined it very appropriately, and he called attention to the fear of degeneration in the relationship between East and West and the situation in East Germany if it were not achieved. But unification is not the only condition, or even, necessarily, the governing condition. I would remind your Lordships that a German treaty is not merely a device for relieving tension between Russian and the Western democracies. It is also the last chapter in the world war that we are proposing to write: it is the document that will settle the peace-time relations between Germany and her former enemies. It must not be a dictated peace, but it is equally not possible to have a peace in which Germany decides everything for herself. If it is to be a lasting peace and not a perpetual irritant, it must, after negotiation, be fully accepted on both sides.
  What, if any, are the principles on which we are entitled to insist when Germany is about to be restored, by treaty, after a war, to a status of equality in Europe? I put the question in this form, rather than in the language of the communiqué, in order that we may see where there may be room for manœuvre and for bargaining. I believe that there will be general agreement on two principles—certainly on the first, and I hope on the second. The first principle is that we must insist on the democratic régime. The second principle is that the integration of Germany's military force in some form of international framework must be a condition of our acceptance of the rearmament of Germany. As to the first of these, insistence on a democratic régime, we are right to insist on free elections. We cannot bargain or make terms with the Government of Eastern Germany as it exists to-day. Moreover, we cannot, and must not, take any sort of responsibility under treaty for the types of Government that have been set up in Eastern Germany and in many of the satellite States. On that, there can be no sort of compromise.
  In this matter of the political régime, the German Federal Republic has gone very far. It has a free Parliamentary

  1057
  régime, and it has ratified the Convention on Human Rights, which gives every party to the Convention the right to intervene if there is a breach of these rights—that is to say, the German Federal Republic has voluntarily accepted the right of its partners in the Convention to intervene if there is any breach of that short, but vital, list of human rights. That Convention is not yet a binding document but it will become so when the last two ratifications have been deposited—probably in October of this year. Western Germany has agreed from that date to accept and to undertake those responsibilities and to make them collective and joint responsibilities. The Russians should have no difficulty in agreeing to that. After all, they accepted at Yalta the principle of parliamentary government. It is quite true that something very different has happened to what was agreed on at Yalta, but they accepted it; and in the last few months they have taken out of the pigeon-holes the Soviet Charter of 1936, in which is enshrined and put on paper most of that list of human rights. There is no room for compromise there.
  The Defence system of Germany presents a more complicated problem. There are here five variations. First, there is a possibility of neutralisation. I do not think there is much support for this. There was little in another place, and I am assured by my friends in Europe that the policy has far less support than is often supposed. Secondly, at the other extreme, there is complete freedom for Germany in regard to armaments. Again, no one is prepared to accept that. Thirdly, there is the possibility of unilateral limitation and control of Germany's armaments, as proposed by Russia in the correspondence last year. That discrimination might last for a short time, but it is inconceivable that it would last for any lengthy period. Fourthly, there is the possibility that, if and when you get to controlling armaments, Germany would be free to have her own armaments and her own forces, but subject to a limitation that applied all round. That is far ahead. Fifthly, there is the possibility, to which I have already referred, of integration in some international framework of defence. The choice, I believe, is clearly between 2 and 5. Number 2, as I have said, is complete freedom in regard to arms for Germany,
  1058
  and number 5 is an integration within an international framework.
  I do not propose to discuss E.D.C. It was expounded and defended by the noble Marquess with far greater ability than I possess. And I was delighted to find so strong a defence of it from the Government Front Bench. Technically, the issue as between E.D.C. and N.A.T.O. is important. Possibly one day we may discuss it, but it is not relevant at this moment. I am concerned to consider the criticism that to require Germany to enter into any international system in the West will automatically end any prospect of agreement with Russia. It may be so. But the noble Marquess gave sonic very interesting arguments why it may not be so. We should hesitate to be dogmatic about any such questions at this time in regard to what Russia will do.
  I would add two or three reflections on that point. First, if the Prime Minister should succeed in establishing personal contact and confidence between himself and the President of the United States and the Russian leaders, when that point is reached it might well be possible to persuade the Russians that N.A.T.O.-cum-E.D.C. is a defensive and not an aggressive organisation. Secondly, it is a fact, even though Russia may not be ready to admit it at this moment, that, in the long run, Germany in an E.D.C.-cum-N.A.T.O. setting will be a far less danger to Russia than Germany with sovereign powers over her own armaments. A composite group of nations with varying races will never be as militaristic as a single sovereign country fired by aggressive intension. Thirdly, under the E.D.C., the size of Germany's armaments, as well as those of other members, will be fixed by mutual agreement and will be subject to a common budget. The whole system will be ort the table and under control. It would be possible for Russia to have something to say about those figures if a limitation of armaments came about either with or without a security pact, such as that suggested by the Prime Minister.
  It is in the relations between the Western nations, as a whole, and the Soviet Union, with its associated countries, that there is room for manœuvre and bargaining. That, as I see it, is where there is force in the point put by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson,

  1059
  in urging that, just as it will be necessary, in any political conference on the Far East to emerge from Korea into the wider area of the Far East, so in the conversations between the Foreign Ministers on Germany, dicussion will broaden out. Exploratory discussions will quickly show that the German problem cannot be settled except in this wider field. I feel that the conference was right to lay down certain essential terms on which there can be no compromise. It might have been made clearer that outside of this sphere there is a large area in which there is room for concessions to the other side's point of view. It is in this field that it is our desire to meet them half-way for our mutual advantage; and if there has been a change of heart in Russia, then they will come to meet us.
  5.4 p.m.
  EARL JOWITT: My Lords, in a foreign affairs debate it is no easy task to follow my noble friend Lord Henderson, because he always takes such infinite trouble about preparing his speeches, and deals with the matter so completely and so rightly from the point of view of Her Majesty's Opposition, and I think I may add, so fairly from everybody's point of view. I shall merely try to follow and emphasise what he has already said. I should like to express my gratitude to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, for the full, but not too full, account that he gave us. I am not sure that he quite realises the extent to which the country was profoundly disappointed at the result of his labours. I am not making a personal attack—I never have and never shall; that is always far from my mind. I, myself, when I read the pronouncement, felt a profound feeling of disappointment, and I believe that feeling was shared by a great number of people up and down the country not of my Party at all.
  It may be, as the noble Lord, Lord Layton, rather suggested, that the Prime Minister, in his great speech of May 11, drew a picture which was really an impossible one and altogether too optimistic. I do not know. The Prime Minister is a genius, though I think sometimes a rather erratic genius, and it is sometimes given to him to see a solution which is not apparent to the ordinary person. In that
  1060
  speech, if I may remind your Lordships of it once again, the Prime Minister referred to the
  "internal manifestations of an apparent change of mood,"
  in Russia, which he said he thought was significant. He was anxious
  "that nothing in the presentation of foreign policy by the N.A.T.O. Powers should…supersede or take the emphasis out of what may be a profound movement of Russian feeling."
  Then he referred to
  "the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe,"
  which he thought not to be insoluble. How I could wish that in this Foreign Office statement there had been some statement of our anxiety to try to reconcile the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe! The Prime Minister referred to Locarno and said
  "the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia…."
  And he said
  "Russia has a right to feel assured that…the Hitler invasion will never be repeated, and that Poland will remain a friendly power…though not…a puppet State."
  That was the statement of the Prime Minister, and your Lordships will see that time and again there was emphasis on Russia, on Russian security, on the necessity of Russia feeling assured, and on Locarno. That was the conception, and it was new ground. It was hopeful. It coincided with the change of heart of which there were some signs in Russia. So what did he recommend? He recommended that the Conference should meet
  "with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion."
  And with that, I respectfully agree entirely. He said that even though we did not arrive at any hard-faced agreements we might get a general feeling among the peoples who might slowly begin to realise that they might be doing something better than tearing themselves to pieces or ruining themselves by an armaments race. At the worst, we should make more intimate contacts and at the best we might win a generation of peace.
  That was the conception which I, for one, in my ignorance, believed possible. Compare these two pictures: the picture of what the Prime Minister said, with

  1061
  what happened, whether we take it from the statement of July 14 or July 15 or the statement which the noble Marquess made to the House as a short summary of his efforts on July 21. How different, how profoundly different, the two are! Russian security, Locarno, all these things have gone; the agenda is restricted; conditions sine qua non are postulated in advance. There is no recognition of a Russian change of heart, if it exists; no word of Russian security. It has been said that the noble Lord had limp hands, cold feet, a frozen heart, and all the rest of it. We know him better here. I knew—I was perfectly certain—that it was a case of a good man struggling with adversity. With refreshing candour he has told us quite frankly that that was the position, and that though he tried to get something on the lines of what the Prime Minister suggested, as I felt sure he would—for, the statement was made with the full authority of the Cabinet of which he is a distinguished Member—he could not do it. Of course one cannot criticise him; it was not his fault that the Prime Minister was taken ill. It was not his fault that the French had a Government crisis and that they were without a Government for some weeks. There could not be the highest level meeting at that time. Whether and when that will be possible depends, of course, on the recovery of the Prime Minister from his illness, which we all hope will be speedy and complete. It would be idle to blame the noble Marquess or the Government for that.
  But although he was a good man struggling with adversity, yet I could wish that this Note or explanation which was sent by the Foreign Ministers had been illumined by some shaft of apparent sympathy with the new situation in Russia, instead of being, as it is, rather the sort of nagging rebuke of an elderly spinster aunt. What is going to happen? I devoutly hope that Russia is going to come in. I am not deterred from saying what I think because this may appear in Pravda (I do not suppose it will) but I am sure the noble Marquess would agree that although we must hope that foreign affairs will not become a bone of contention between the two Parties, if we can possibly avoid it, yet, on the other hand, our criticism about the conduct of foreign affairs must not
  1062
  be half-hearted or mealy-mouthed. With that I am sure he would agree.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: May I say that the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, I thought very fairly, that it was not the best, it was the second best, but that the second best was better than nothing. That was not the impression that was gained from the debate in another place last week.
  EARL JOWITT: I want to say quite clearly that I could not rut this as high even as the second best. It is third, fourth or fifth. I cannot think that there may not have been some room to make this communiqué rather less restricted, rather less reproving, rather less grudging, less hesitant, than in fact it was. The harm has been done. I ask myself whether in the circumstances it would have been better to say nothing at all. I wish they could have taken the text of the Prime Minister's speech; I wish they could simply have said, "Let us proceed to work out the immense problem of securing the safety of Russia, and at the same time securing the freedom and safety of Western Europe." They might have come. As it is I only hope that they will still come.
  It was said yesterday in another place by Mr. Crook shank that this statement was a mere prelude to the bigger meeting. It would have been better if it had been said to be a prelude to the Four-Power Meeting. There is not a word in this statement to suggest that there is going to be a Four-Power Meeting except the negative statement that nothing precludes there being a Four-Power Meeting thereafter. If this was intended as a prelude, why not state that it is a mere prelude to the Four-Power Meeting? That was the intention—we were told so yesterday. Why did not the statement make that intention plain? Much harm would have been avoided had that been done. For the rest, I deny entirely that in asking people to a conference and trying to make the conference palatable to them you are necessarily being disloyal or disavowing agreements to which you have come. I take it that our position is quite plain.
  Several speakers on both sides of the House in another place referred to E.D.C. as though E.D.C. were dead. I do not know that E.D.C. is dead at all. It is for the Germans to say what they think,

  1063
  and the elections there will tell us what the German view about it is. I wish we could have rather more definite information on what France thinks about it. That passage in the noble Marquess's speech appealed to me entirely. It is relatively easy for us to dogmatise on these things, but very difficult for France. When we think what France endured in 1870, in 1914, and in 1939, I think we must all have the greatest sympathy with the French people in their frightful difficulty. We must do everything we can to stand by them, and we must remember that our disasters in recent years have taken place because we became separated from France. Let us draw a lesson from that.
  I feel, however, that we ought to say now that we are not going to contemplate giving up E.D.C. unless, of course, E.D.C. breaks in our hands, and then it will not be our fault. But no one shall ever say that we have walked out on the plan for E.D.C. Indeed I agree that E.D.C. should be strengthened. Why should the cornmuniquéhave taken the opportunity of the invitation to a Conference to emphasise that fact without emphasising the other fact as well? A Conference is one thing, a summons to a Conference is another thing, and a statement of policy is another and wholly different thing. Why on earth you should, in a summons to a Conference, select from your policy all those particular items which are going to make the Conference more difficult to achieve I cannot understand. I deeply regret that I have to make these criticisms. I do not doubt for a moment that the noble Marquess went out to try to achieve the object of the Prime Minister's speech. I do not doubt that he found he could not do so, and that he came to the conclusion that it was either this or nothing. Well, I wish he could have got something a little better. I cannot criticise the other Ministers who were there, so I am afraid the only course I have is to apply my criticisms to the noble Marquess.
  One word more on Korea. Here I should like to express my complete agreement with what was said by Lord Layton. If we are sometimes inclined to criticise the United States of America for mistakes that they have made, well heaven knows! we have made enough, too. Let us remember this. I doubt whether in world
  1064
  history any nation has made a greater contribution to world peace and security than the United States did by taking the lead in the endeavour of the United Nations to end aggression. That was a profound service which the United States rendered to the United Nations. I hope, having said that, that in any criticism I make hereafter I shall not be thought to be unaware of that fact. I profoundly hope that the noble Marquess will use all his influence now to make it plain that this affair is a United Nations affair. The settlement should be in the hands of the United Nations and the people who are going to make peace should be the United Nations. I believe that there is a danger of our not being taken fully into consultation, and I would urge the noble Marquess to press at the first moment, and keep pressing, our claim, that although our contribution has been quite small as compared with the American contribution, yet it has been a contribution, and a real contribution, as serious for us as was theirs for them, and that we have a right to be taken into consultation and we expect to be taken into consultation at every stage.
  For the rest I agree again with Lord Layton. This complicated question of the recognition of China is a burning question in the United States. Mr. Bevin—I think there is no harm in saying this now—used to think that the United States would never agree to it, but that the time would come when they would be thankful if it was imposed by the United Nations and that they would agree to it in that way. After all, as the late Lord Perth used to point out in the old days, China is a member of the United Nations. The only question is: Who is China? I cannot bring myself to think that, looking at it in that way, there can be any doubt at all but that the Communists are the Government of China. I personally regret it; I do not like Communists. But if I pretend that the Communists are not the Government of China, and that Chiang Kai-shek is, it seems to me that I am doing what the ostrich does, when I understand it buries its head in the sand. It is not the fact.
  I read recently in the New York Times, which is one of the most representative and responsible papers, these words:
  "The time may come when a new China, under a régime which has a firmer hold on the country than mere control through force and

  1065
  terror, may qualify for membership. Until that time arrives, the real interests of China are in better hands by being represented by the Nationalist Government than by the Soviet puppets who now rule the Chinese mainland."
  That is an absolutely hopeless point of view. Once you have determined (whether you like it or not) that these people, the Communist Government, are the Government of China, and are in control of China, it seems to me that you have no option but to recognise them—whether de facto or de jure I am not in the least concerned. There is in our Library in this House a most interesting book by a learned American jurist, who makes out that there is an obligation in International Law, plainly laid down by the United States themselves, that once the factual question of who is in control is answered, there arises an obligation in International Law to grant recognition to the person so in control. I confess that on this point the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and I have had many a little bout in the past. He will remember that I once referred to this topic as his King Charles's head. He was quite frank in saying that the attitude he took at the time was not quite consistent with the attitude of some of the other members of his Party. For it was the fact that one of the reasons why we decided to recognise China in the last Government was that Mr. Churchill made a speech in which he pressed us to do so, pointing out that the mere fact that people were difficult was all the more reason why those people should be at hand, so that they should work openly, and not secretly.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I must say this for Mr. Churchill, as he is not here. I think I am right in reminding the noble and learned Earl that the Prime Minister was never in favour of the de jure recognition of China. He may have diverged from my personal view at that time, but he was not in favour of de jure recognition. That was the cause of the breach between the United States and us on this question.
  EARL JOWITT: I do not mind about de jure recognition. In fact, the consequences are the same even if the recognition is merely de facto. They would be at the United Nations, and so on. I thought the view that the noble Marquess had was even wider than that. However, it does not matter. I hope we shall now
  1066
  use our influence, for what it is worth, to try to get China admitted to the United Nations. The Prime Minister was asked about this on May 11 of this year, and he answered in this way (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Col. 906):
  "It would make a great difference if the firing stopped."
  Well, the firing has stopped. I do not see what you gain by not having them there. It may not be possible to achieve much even if they are there, but there is at least a chance if somebody is there upon whom influence can be brought to hear; it is a chance of understanding them and getting to know them better, and they have the chance of getting to know the other side better. I hope that, in season and out of season, we shall press this matter. The United Nations Association of this country sent me a resolution which they passed unanimously last week, in which they resolve,
  "That, as soon as the armistice was concluded Her Majesty's Government should be requested to propose that China be accorded the right to be represented in the United Nations."
  I very much hope that the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will be able to deal with this point. I know how difficult and delicate it is. At the same time, there is a great body of opinion in this country which believes that only if that is done shall we be able to get a satisfactory solution of the Chinese problem. It is no good waiting to see whether we can get a satisfactory solution first, and then asking China to join the United Nations.
  There are one or two other questions. Very little has been said about Egypt. The noble Marquess himself was not anxious to enlarge upon the topic, for reasons which I can understand; and I do not propose to say anything about it, except to echo his wishes that there may be a happy solution out of this difficulty which does not in any way derogate from the status of Egypt, Dr from the fact that we have a useful base there. I hope that it will be solved by some agreement. There is another question on which I periodically ask questions, and the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, frequently says that somebody is going to America and he will tell me about it in due course. Somebody has now teen to America, and no doubt he can tell me. I refer to A.N.Z.U.S. An agreement was made

  1067
  between Australia, New Zealand and the United States—hence the name A.N.Z.U.S.— for a specific Pact, and this country was not a party to it. We always wanted to be a party to that Pact, and from what Mr. Menzies said on his return to Australia recently I think he would like us to be a party. But his position is—and I can well understand it—that he does not want to give up the great benefits that he gets from the United States of America for his security. It would not be reasonable to ask him to do so.
  It therefore becomes a question of whether the United States would allow us to join, either directly or indirectly, formally, or perhaps informally; because, taking the rather old-fashioned view of our Commonwealth of Nations, and looking upon them as a family, I do not very much like the feeling that we are out, and that the United States are in, a Pact dealing with the security of Australia and New Zealand. If it were possible to deal with that situation by representations, I think it would be satisfactory to us, to Australia and to New Zealand. But, of course, it is quite wrong to ask Australia and New Zealand to make the running on this thing, or to put them into the position where they have either to give up their security or to give up their contention. I hope the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will be able to deal with this matter. I asked him about it on the last occasion when we had a foreign affairs debate, which was some time ago, and he assured me that somebody was going to America. No doubt I shall get an answer now.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not think I said anything about America on the last occasion. What I did say was that there was going to be a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers here.
  EARL JOWITT: I will not be certain about it. My recollection is—it could easily be verified—that he said somebody was going to America. Be that as it may: if he can say something about it to-day, I shall be grateful.
  5.39 p.m.
  LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, when international issues are judged by the criteria of domestic affairs the results
  1068
  are apt to be acrimonious. Thus, the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, when he went to Washington, seemed to me to have a fair wind and a favourable Press. But, since he has come back, he has been under heavy fire from a number of different quarters, and some of the comment has been quite unnecessarily rude, seeing that we all know perfectly well in our hearts that we are pursuing the same ends. A very bad and rather typical example of what is going on in the country at the present moment was in the Daily Mirror yesterday. They said:
  "The Foreign Office is staggering along under Lord Salisbury, who meekly climbed down in Washington."
  I greatly deprecate the practice of making the Foreign Office a sort of Aunt Sally for any internal politics. The Foreign Office has never staggered along, and it is not staggering along now. On the contrary, it is staffed by men of the highest ability and integrity, who have given of their best to the State and to whatever Party is in power.
  After the speech of May 11, Mr. Herbert Morrison urged that no one should say anything which would "check or chill"—those were his exact words—its possible consequences. I thought that a very reasonable and statesmanlike utterance, and, therefore, when an almost immediate opportunity occurred for speaking in your Lordships' House, I forbore. But now that the whole controversy has burst wide open—particularly in the debate last week which, I think, was an unhappy one—I do not feel obliged to refrain any further from saying that on the whole I prefer the Prime Minister's second thoughts to his first. The first seemed to provide for a Conference without an agenda. I do not suppose that anyone in this House has done—if that is the correct verb—as many Conferences as I have, beginning at the outset of the century with one on cod, and proceeding rapidly to another on the preservation of elephants and rhinoceroses. For the next thirty years I really never stopped. I thought most of us had arrived at the conclusion that the conferences most likely to succeed were those that were the best prepared. I do not want to be dogmatic about it, but on the whole, instead of roving discussions—which the French have vainly sought to

  1069
  dignify and embellish by calling tours ď horizon—it is better to concentrate on crucial and practical problems.
  That, as I understood it, was exactly what Mr. Eden proposed when he first returned to office. He used language which led me at least to assume that, while not expecting spectacular results, he hoped that, bit by bit, and with great patience, he might build up an area of agreement. Why, therefore, should Mr. Eden be praised for that, as he most rightly was (there was nothing particularly novel or original about it, but everybody said it was practical statesmanship), and the noble Marquess vilified for exactly the same thing? I am a little surprised myself at all this outcry, because since May 11 some important arid serious developments have taken place. In the first place, there was the heroic uprising of June 17 against tyranny, and after that the terror set in. Boys and girls were shot in cold blood. At the present moment there is a purge of Socialists going on in Eastern Germany, and I should have thought that it would possibly move—I am sure that it does—noble Lords of the Left. Norms of labour have not been diminished. The right to strike has been again denied and the unfortunate ex-Minister of Justice, Herr Fechner, who did suggest that there might be something to be said in justification of the strike, has been declared an enemy of the people, arrested and is likely to lose his life.
  Moreover, there are thousands of trade unionists lying in gaol and exposed to the judicial brutalities of the most evil judge that any totalitarian country has yet produced. I think those are factors which should be weighed in the balance and which might conceivably lead towards the conclusion to which I incline now—that there is every justification for going as far as we have gone, and not so much for going further at the present juncture. Perhaps to the noble Lords of the Left, who still think that we do not go far enough, I might offer this thought in consolation. If there were any prospect of an all-round discussion with the Soviet Union, I should feel in honour bound to come to this House and put down a Motion asking for assurances, not only from the Government but from the Opposition as well, that they would conclude no general agreement with Russia which did not provide for the human
  1070
  rights and liberties of the enslaved countries. That is something that I think no honourable, human or decent man could refuse.
  Just look at what has happened. Before the war, there were only 1,000 Communists in the whole of Roumania; fewer than that in Albania, and8,000 in Bulgaria. In Poland, with a population of 27 million, there were only 20,000 Communists. We have witnessed in our time one of the most horrible injustices of history. These people have, in fact, been betrayed, and I say again that I do not believe that any honourable man would again be a party to a renewal of that betrayal without at least making an effort on their behalf But your Lordships all know perfectly well that at the present juncture, if that point were raised, general negotiations would come to a stop, because a Pharaoh more arbitrary than any that built a Pyramid would not let the people go. Again, there is something more than that. After the death of Stalin I made a speech, not to this House—for the reasons already given—but to a very representative body of men, in which I said that the Russians would need a pause while they were deciding who was to rule whom. I said specifically that that might mean who was to kill whom; and that is what has happened. We seem to be getting near to the morality of the purges in which Stalin liquidated his possible rivals, and I cannot see why at present we should be in such a hurry to meet the winner before we know who the winner is. I ardently desire that this meeting should take place. I am not quite sure that it will, because an inevitable result of all this acrimony at home must necessarily be to suggest to the Russian mind that they should refuse, and therewith provide a stick for the beating of Her Majesty's Government. I hope that will not be the effect, but it is certainly a considerable danger, and our prospects are thin indeed.
  The noble Marquess mentioned the subject of Austria. I, too, of course, desire to see a settlement there, but we have pursued that object for seven years now, and got no nearer. Our last Note on the subject was treated with contumely by the Soviets. The more we disagree among each other, the less likely they are to be tempted to come to an agreement with us. As to Germany, it is a problem which

  1071
  bristles with difficulty. I think we should have the utmost reluctance—and I should press the point if I thought it was in any way in danger—in agreeing to a neutralised and defenceless Germany which would put Germany immediately at the mercy of Communist Russia. I should still more object to a unified but evacuated Germany, which would be even more at the mercy of Communist action, because in that case you might have a collapse both in France and Italy, where the political situation is most precarious. If that collapse took place, you might find that this country was indefensible, even with American help. It is just as well to face these things squarely.
  I would also hope that we should adopt no policy in regard to Germany which would add to the embarrassments of Dr. Adenauer. For almost the first time in our history we have has to deal with a convinced Westerner; we owe him a great debt of gratitude—all Westerners do—because, but for him, we should have had a much worse Germany to deal with, and it is still a pretty uncertain one. I do not think my hopes are likely to be realised, because I foresee that he will probably lose the next election. The tendencies are, on the one hand, towards the Socialist and, on the other, to the Right; and I, since long before the First World War, have had ample reasons for mistrusting both. I had hoped that Dr. Adenauer would succeed in guiding Germany towards the way of wisdom and the West. I am not sure that he will succeed in doing that, and there are the gravest doubts whether anybody else will be able to do it, either.
  Another reason why I frankly wish him to endure is this. Like the man in the fairy tale I should like to have three wishes, and one of them would be that this man was twenty years younger. One reason for that is that he has a healthy scepticism of Totalitaria. If any noble Lord thinks he is over-sceptical, I beg him to step down to the Terrace after this debate, look across the River, and imagine that between the South Bank and the South Coast there are two million armed men who have already twice invaded his country and raped every woman up to eighty. That is enough to make most people a little sceptical. No one has ever answered my question as
  1072
  to how a change of heart is possible in any totalitarian Power without a change of doctrine. What we have at present is evidence of a change of tactics; I do not think that we have very much more than that. I should wish to see more.
  Let any noble Lord who disagrees cast up his own balance sheets. If he does, he will find in the debit column the abomination in Eastern Germany of which I have spoken. What have we in the assets column? We have the release of some prisoners, which was overdue—well and good. We have a little more liberty of movement for diplomatists—well and good. We have the restoration of relations with Israel—which ought never to have been severed. We have the withdrawal of claims against Turkey which ought never to have been formulated. But these are relative trivialities, not fundamentals. As I watch that asset and that debit column, I maintain my independent conviction that so far there has been no change of heart. By believing in these facile changes of heart we have already nearly lost the world twice: once in the case of Hitler and again at Yalta. Let us not repeat that experiment.
  We should be cautious in this matter. I feel strongly that we are doing the right thing by pressing forward now—but not pressing forward too far. I realise that all political Parties in this country are much more inclined than I am to believe that there has been some change of heart. Well and good. Let them make their approaches on practical and direct grounds, and good luck to them! But let us not go too far yet on ground that only wildly wishful thinking would depict as solid. Above all, do not let us blame the Leader of the House for following a perfectly sound and wise policy.
  5.44 p.m.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, we always listen with admiration and envy to the noble Lord who has just sat down. He speaks as a passionate champion of enslaved peoples. I share his passion to help enslaved people under Communist control. I, I hope, have an equal desire with him for the advance of human rights, but I fear that my view as to the best way of helping enslaved peoples under Communist control to get into a happier position will not meet with any greater sympathy from the noble Lord than did my efforts to help the

  1073
  enslaved peoples under the Hitler régime before and during the war. I note with some satisfaction that his views about the Hitler régime, or rather the sufferers from the Hitler régime, have undergone some considerable change since those days.
  I venture to speak not only as an English Bishop but as one to whom contacts with Churches of many nations, East and West, have brought exceptional powers of gauging general Christian opinion on the international scene before, during, and since the war. It was the unanimous judgment of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam in 1948 that the greatest threat to peace to-day comes from the division of the world into mutually suspicious and antagonistic blocs. This threat is all the greater because national tensions are confused by the clash of economic and political systems. Five years later the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, at Lucknow, in January, said:
  "The Central Committee, therefore, welcomes the expressed willingness of the highest authorities of certain great Powers to hold personal discussions, and trusts that the essential preliminary conditions of successful consultation may be satisfied."
  When, therefore, the most powerful secular voice in the world proposes a conference on the highest level between the heads of four great States, and, while declaring that free nations must not relax their comradeship and their preparations, says that they must nevertheless try to do something to end the deadlock, it is no wonder that the Churches and ordinary people in all countries should applaud. Weeks after, we have witnessed a considerable slowing down of the pace. There were doubts at Washington long before the noble Marquess went there. There was the failure in Paris to find a Prime Minister; there were divisions in Moscow, and there was the Prime Minister's illness. In these circumstances, it is very satisfactory, I think, that the Foreign Secretaries of the three countries should have met, and very satisfactory that they should have got somewhere towards an agreement, in view of the greatness of the difficulties. The reason why the noble Marquess could not get further, as the Leader of the Opposition has said, is that he was pledged to act with others.
  And yet disappointment is inevitable—disappointment for the great body of
  1074
  peoples in many countries. We have to contrast the speech of May 11, when the new proposal was put in the forefront, while not concealing the need to maintain unity, fidelity and vigilance. In the communiqué of July 14, the old suspicions and the need for the defence of the West and for safeguards for the West were in the forefront, and the hope of a "gentler breeze blowing upon this weary earth" was almost completely obscured—in fact, the very thing that the Prime Minister deprecated when he referred to the "change of attitude and perhaps of mood in Russia since Stalin's death" has occurred. I assure the noble Marquess that there is no desire upon the part of those who differ from him in certain respects to go back on N.A.T.O.; but we remember the words of the Prime Minister's speech:
  "I am anxious that nothing in the presentation of foreign policy by the N.A.T.O. Powers should, as it were, supersede or take the emphasis out of what may be a profound movement of Russian feeling."
  The real questions of the present pregnant hour are these. Are we Western Powers willing to enter into a fruitful conference with Russia or not? During the last 300 years at least, there have been two conflicting trends in Russian policy. One springs from the conviction that Russia will most surely survive if sealed off from all foreign influences. Peter the Great said:
  "Europe is necessary to us for a few decades and then we can turn our backs upon her."
  It is the policy of isolation, of a bloc against Europe. The other springs from a firm belief that the path of advance for Russia is by way of friendly relations with Europe and a free interchange in cultural and economic spheres: in other words, the policy of co-operation with Europe. There are signs of the second trend to-day. There are these amicable gestures of the new Government; there are these actions both internally and externally. There is an improvement in the position of the Church in Russia, and a remarkable improvement in the position of the Church in the Eastern Zone of Germany. The Prime Minister said:
  "It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to avoid by every means in their power doing anything or saying anything which could check any favourable reaction that may be taking place and to welcome every sign of an improvement in our relation with Russia."

  1075
  I do not at all dispute what the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, has just said, that there are purges going on. God forbid them! There have been many purges before, and purges continue. But side by side with the purges, which are lessening, there is this new movement which may be—that is all that is said—a profound movement and change in Russian feeling.
  I believe that the policy which the Prime Minister expressed deserves the most vigorous support of the Western peoples. I believe that the Western Powers should be ready to meet Russia in fruitful conference while still maintaining their vigilance. To send Russia back behind her cordon sanitaire, to do anything on our side to clamp down the Iron Curtain, is disaster. I say this because I—and many others also, of course—detect two conflicting trends in Western leadership to-day. There are, on the one hand, those who are fundamentally opposed to any real negotiation, who think, consciously or unconsciously, in terms of total surrender. And there are those, on the other hand, who believe in the duty of realistic negotiation. There should be no doubt where the Churches and ordinary people stand, and where the interests of humanity point. Again, the real question is—I emphasise this: Do we want to confer with Russia in a fruitful way or not? The noble Marquess has said in a very modest way, and in a speech which we all admired, that "It was this or nothing. Would you prefer that I should have come back with nothing?" He also said that what he brought back was not what any of us would ideally have wished. I do not want "nothing," but I want a little more than this. When I say that "I want a little more than this," I do not think I shall incur the noble Marquess's censure by suggesting that it is not necessary to discuss disarmament yet. I certainly would not wish those with whom we are in contact to repudiate any of the obligations that are behind N.A.T.O.; nor do I believe that it is the purpose of the Washington document to unify Germany against Russia. But to offer a meeting of limited duration on the subject of Germany is to set about this matter of fruitful conference in the wrong way.
  I do not know whether your Lordships will pardon me if I venture, in Good wood Week, to borrow a famous phrase coined
  1076
  by the noble Marquess's illustrious grandfather, in quite a different context, of an event of just one hundred years ago, that to deal with Russia in this way is to "put your money on the wrong horse." If you look at Part III of the communiqué, you will see the word "reunification" mentioned twice, the word "unification" once, and the words "unity re-established in freedom" once. But those phrases immediately raise fundamental questions. By "reunification," the Western Powers mean one thing. They mean, it is suggested, the spread of their sphere of economic, military and sociological influence over the Eastern Zone. Whatever others may suggest—I am not suggesting it—the Western Powers, by "reunification," certainly mean the extension of free democratic rule over the Eastern Zone. The Russians, by "reunification," mean quite a different thing: they mean the spread of their sphere of economic, military and sociological influence over the Western Zone and the extension of Communist control over the Western part of Germany. This is really the crux of the matter. The Germans mean quite a different thing from both. The Germans would extend the Eastern Zone to control some or all of that part of pre-war Germany which is now under the control of Poland or in the possession of Russia.
  Now look again at the subjects of discussion in the Acting Foreign Secretary's letter to the Soviet Ambassador. He puts first the matter of free elections—we all agree with that, though there are many difficulties about the basis—the relations of Federal to Central, the powers of the Upper House and the like. But it is in item (2) that the real problem lies. The words are
  "conditions for the establishment of a free all-German government with freedom of action in internal and external affairs."
  To the Germans, "free all-German government" means old pre-war Germany. The Eastern Zone, under its present Government, may give up the claim to a revision of frontiers on the East, but does the noble Marquess really suppose that Western Germany, with its 9 million refugees expelled from the East, with all the difficulties of local politics inside the Federal Republic, is likely to give up the claims to revision of the frontier? Will it be content with any other definition of "all-German" (however wrong it may

  1077
  be) than "pre-war Germany"? And remember what that consists of. It is a quarter of Germany's former territory. The north part of Eastern Prussia belongs to the U.S.S.R., and the south part of Eastern Prussia, Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia and Pomerania, are all under Polish control.
  My Lords, I have been a fervent anti-Nazi. In spite of being a fervent anti-Nazi, I have, like my noble friend, Lord Hankey, spoken often in favour of the release of war criminals. But I am very much on my guard against a Nationalist revival in Germany, and it is impossible to deal with a "free all-German Government with freedom of action in internal and external affairs," without taking up the whole question of Poland. I wish that the Federal Republic would make, an offer about its moderated attitude to Poland and about its moderated attitude to the eastern side of what was Germany. I wish that the Federal Republic would give up its dream of irredentism; it is bound to lead to trouble. But it is impossible to deal with a "free all-German Government, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs," without dealing with the fears of France.
  As the noble Marquess said, Germany is a mighty and virile Power. It is right to be afraid of such a virile and mighty Power, France having suffered what she did—and we too having suffered. But it is also impossible to deal with a "free all-German Government with freedom of action in internal and external affairs," without also recognising the greatness of the fears of Russia, which has put this virile and mighty Power in the very forefront of the matter in conversations and discussions for many years since the war ended. Russia's insistence on safeguards is a very proper insistence, and I am sure that speakers, listeners, readers and statesmen in Russia would all recognise, with some deep sympathy, the Prime Minister's reference to the justice of Russia's claim to security. He said:
  "I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insoluble."
  However, my Lords, my main point is that it is unpractical, unreal and, therefore, in the true sense impossible, fruitfully to deal with conditions for the establishment of a "free all-German
  1078
  Government with freedom of action in internal and external affairs" at a conference table of Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom, the United States, Soviet Russia and France, with Chancellor Adenauer, not so far away, from which not only all these questions but also questions relating to other neighbours of Western and Eastern Germany are excluded at the start.
  I was not quite clear what the noble Marquess meant when be spoke of the possibility of other matters coming up beyond those set out in the letter to the Soviet Ambassador. I was not quite clear whether such points as those which I have raised could be fitly brought into a discussion opened under those auspices. If that is possible, and it could be so stated, it would remove some considerable portion of the difficulties; and my plea is that if, as I hope and believe it will, the Soviet Government, in reply to the Western Foreign Secretaries, will ask for an extension of the agenda and for greater flexibility to include its own proper insistence on the need for safeguards for its own security and the like, the Western Powers will accede to such a request.
  I am not suggesting (and here I especially address the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart) that there are no grave issues, moral and spiritual, as well as political and social, which divide the Communist régime from the free democratic Governments. Nor am I suggesting that these grave issues can be determined at a stroke; or that the settlement of one or two of our difficulties is something which we should disdain. But I repeat, the real question is: Are we willing to confer with Russia in a fruitful way? If we are, we must go much further than the Washington communiqué has gone. It is within the orbit of a new outlook that individual problems are most fruitfully approached. What should that new outlook be?—not one of nation against nation, not one of a world of arms, but one of a world regarded as a family of people intended to live together as good neighbours, with something better to do than to tear one another to pieces. If we approach this new problem, this new situation—for that, as the noble Earl pointed out so clearly, is the real heart and beginning of the situation in which we find ourselves—with a wish to settle,

  1079
  and a determination and persistence in that wish, then I see great hope. But without a wish to settle, endless and inexhaustible variants can be proposed, and there can be only perpetuation of the state of frustration. But, given time and a wish to settle, the difficulties, formidable as they are, can be overcome. Do we want to confer fruitfully with Russia? A new opening has been given by the events in Moscow and beyond Moscow itself. We have all given a wholehearted welcome to the initiative of the Prime Minister, and therefore I would plead that any new Conference between either Foreign Secretaries or heads of State should be informal, private and secluded, wide in range, and flexible in development.
  6.9 p.m.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, if it is not presumptuous, I should like to take this opportunity of saying how glad I am to see the noble Marquess back in good health. It was a very public-spirited job that he undertook. Those of us who, like myself, have seen him ever since he entered Parliament were not surprised that he did not fail in his public duty. Having said that, I am afraid I have almost exhausted everything upon which the noble Marquess and I shall be in agreement. Whilst Sir Winston Churchill has had a good day, certainly the Government and the noble Marquess have had a very bad day. I do not think anyone dealt a truer blow than the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. With his sincerity and his deep knowledge, he has really demolished the situation. He said that he hated the Russians. He added that the Russian régime is bad, cruel and tyrannical. With all that, we agree. He also said the one thing you must do is to keep Dr. Adenauer in power.
  LORD VANSITTART: I do not think I used the expression "I hate the Russians." I said I mistrust all totalitarians, and history has borne me out very thoroughly that those who trusted them have "gone down the drain."
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I accept immediately, of course, what the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, says. What he said was that he did not believe in negotiating with the Russians at all. He also said he was glad we had kept close to Dr. Adenauer.
  LORD VANSITTART: I did not say at all that I did not believe in negotiating. I said "By all means go on," but the ground for going further was not solid. I want a meeting to take place; but with all the acrimony about it, I think it will not. I want it at the level proposed, but no more.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am extremely anxious not to misrepresent the noble Lord in any way, but I gather that he was not a warm enthusiast for the Four-Power Meeting which Sir Winston Churchill suggested. The second point was that he referred with particular approval to the fact that we were keeping close to Dr. Adenauer. That is a matter which comes late in my notes, and I shall be very brief. I had prepared a marked copy of Sir Winston Churchill's speech, thinking that what he said would warm people's hearts, but of course every word has been repeated time and time again in the debate to-day. The plain fact was that after six years of international tension, when everybody on both sides appeared to be putting the worst possible interpretation on everything that was done by everybody else, Sir Winston Churchill made a speech which suddenly put into the hearts of the people of this country that feeling of proud confidence in his leadership that we had at the time of the Battle of Britain. He gave us the warning that it would be a most fatal moment for the free nations to relax their comradeship and preparation. He spoke about the pledges we had given to Germany. He said:
  "Dr. Adenauer is to visit us here in a few days and we shall assure him that Western Germany will in no way be sacrificed or—I pick these words with especial care—cease to be master of its own fortunes within the agreement we and other N.A.T.O countries have made with them."
  The whole point, when we come to them, will be how far the proposals of the White Paper are really obligations to which we are presently in honour bound.
  Before I refer to them I want to mention one possible defence the Government might make, and that is that the big partner in this is the United States of America. They have been our Allies; they have borne the brunt in the Far East. Yes, but for a whole year from September, 1939, and until the infamy of Pearl Harbour, this country gave

  1081
  "martial aid" in a real sense to the great States of America. I do not believe they object to our striving to make our influence felt. I believe this country is an essential part of the American Alliance. I believe they consider we can interpret Europe to them. They have the touching idea that our Foreign Office is very clever, much cleverer than they are—(I hope this will foster international goodwill). But also they need us, and one of our complaints against the noble Marquess is that no word in the published records I have been able to see, either in newspapers or in documents, has yet stressed the British point of view as against the flood of emotion especially on the Far Eastern question which is overwhelming the United States at the present time.
  The second point I should like to make is this. It is commonly supposed that the Government of Russia is what is called monolithic; that it cannot do anything but one thing. I do not like the word "monolithic," much less "monolithicity"; but is it true there is any such solid object? There is a strong, centralised, autocratic tyranny, but is it true that they are not susceptible to impressions, one way or the other? And is not the real task of foreign diplomats to appraise the tendencies of the time, and support those that are good and discourage those that are bad or give them no opportunity to take control?
  The Prime Minister referred in terms to this. He said:
  "It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to avoid by every means in their power saying anything which could check any favourable reaction that may take place."
  I am concerned to prove that we are not doing that. Though there have been favourable signs, we ourselves, to a certain extent, have been silent. But on the other side the most powerful member of the Ministers meeting, Mr. Dulles, and his associates, have been doing everything in their power to influence opinion. First of all they said: "We want deeds, not words." The noble Lord, Lard Vansittart, referred to one particular case; I will refer to several. I thought everyone would know that since the death of Stalin there has been a cascade of concessions on the part of the Soviet Government. The first and most striking was their part in the Korean Armistice:
  1082
  they conceded the point, on which we insisted, of no forceful repatriation, and they stuck to the Armistice despite the flagrant bad faith of Dr. Syngman Rhee. They showed a hotter interest in the United Nations, which made it possible to elect a Secretary General. They have intimated recently that they might participate in the functional organisations of the United Nations, which is important, because they depend on universality. They have begun to make up their quarrel with the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister has said he would like to see more, but it is the first time for a long time that there has been an Ambassador in Belgrade. The tone of their broadcasts has also altered.
  Further, in the Middle East—and this is where I wanted especially to refer to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart—I would say they have taken steps which are indeed deeds, and which have done something to stabilise the Middle East and to remove the fear of war from that quarter. Take Israel: after the fantastic "doctors' plot" had been repudiated, the Russians resumed relations with Israel. That was a very important thing indeed. The breaking off of relations with Israel was a very serious thing indeed for Israel, and the Prime Minister and all of us agree that the resumption of relations is a stabilising factor in the Middle East. The most important thing for Israel is that they should not be "de-recognised" by Moscow. Then there is Turkey. Let me run over the history of this Turkish question, because really somebody should speak plainly about it.
  There is an area on the South side of the Black Sea called Kars and Ardahan. The history of that area is this. After the Czar of the day, who was an aggressor and pursued an aggressive Russian policy, had beaten the Turks, he made the Treaty of St. Stefano by which certain provinces were taken over. The noble Marquess's grandfather at the signing of the Treaty of Berlin allowed the Russians to retain those provinces in 1878. They did retain them. In 1920 the Conservative Party were engaged in trying to destroy the Soviet Government. They supplied material and gave substantial support to General Denikin, Admiral Kolchak, General Yudenich and others. They invaded the South of Russia, and so weak

  1083
  was Lenin's position that he had to look round for friends, and the first friend whom he sought was Mustafa Kemal. Lenin agreed to hand back territory which had been ceded under the Berlin Treaty. Then came the last war. Although Turkey was an ally of ours she did not give any assistance at all to the Russians when Stalingrad was in danger, and the whole question of Russian survival was posed to the world. What could be more natural (I stand subject to correction; the noble Marquess will no doubt tell me if this is wrong) than that when Russia began to build up her strength again, she should look to the territories which she lost in those circumstances?
  That was the situation up to a few months ago. Then the Russians gave way and said, "We will renounce these claims." Surely that is something that should be recognised and should receive some word of praise. What other country has renounced territorial claims? But what do we do in these circumstances? I put this to the noble Marquess as a head of the Foreign Office. We arrange to make a naval demonstration at Constantinople—first the American fleet, and then the British fleet. It is within the Montreux Convention that an invitation for naval vessels to pay visits of courtesy may be extended in this manner. But many ships paying a visit of courtesy is quite a formidable affair. Was the British Foreign Office a party to this? I should like the noble Marquess to give me a reply.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, if I may say so, I see no disadvantage in a courtesy visit being paid to Turkey, an Ally of ours, with whom we are in the closest relations. If any unfavourable complexion is put on this as being hostile to Russia—which it certainly is not—it is being put by the noble Viscount, and by no one else.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I will come to that. The noble Marquess has made general remarks about people favouring other countries, not their own; and he has made them not for the first time. To try to understand the interests of other countries is a vital matter if we are to protect the interests of our own country.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have said that about the noble Viscount; I did not say it to-day.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No—let that be. I am not saying that this was a hostile demonstration against Russia. But it was an assembly of warships at the gates of Russia. It is a matter of great importance, when we are seeking to enlist public support in the world, if the Russians are put in a position of being able to say, "See what they have done. At the moment when we have renounced our claims to this land they assemble their fleets at Constantinople." It is not, of course, that these forces are going to invade Russia, or that Russia is in any way menaced in a military sense. But think of the effect on the opinion of tens of millions of people the world over as to what is the position. This is a vital matter as I hope to show later. I am well aware that if I make a case which is not just a case of servile support for the Front Bench opposite, I shall be charged with being a friend of other countries. But one has to put up with that. I do not think it is a very high-class type of controversy, but I must leave it at that. Certainly I should never indulge in it myself. I know that the noble Marquess's motives are perfectly sincere, and that his integrity is unimpaired.
  To resume what I was saying—what happens? Again, I take Sir Winston Churchill's speech, in which he says:
  "It certainly would do no harm if for a while each side looked about for things to do which would be agreeable instead of being disagreeable to each other."
  That seems to me to be common sense. It seems to me to clear the way for understanding. But now let us see what sort of things have been said on the other side. I take a statement by Mr. Dulles. Possibly, Mr. Dulles is a great trouble to the noble Marquess, and if the noble Marquess were to say, "I wish I could keep him quiet" I could quite understand it; and I think many other people would also. On July 1 Mr. Dulles, as reported in The Times, spoke of the stresses and strains behind what he called the "Iron Curtain" and said that how to exploit them properly it would be one of the major tasks of the Foreign Ministers to decide. It certainly would do no harm if for a while each side looked

  1085
  about for agreeable things to do. The charge which we are making against the noble Marquess is a charge against his opinions and convictions, not a personal charge. He thinks that this is the way to act. He really believes that it is the way to do it.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount, it seems to me, mixes me up with Mr. Dulles. I am not answerable for Mr. Dulles. The noble Viscount quotes something said by Mr. Dulles and then says that that is what is so bad about me.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I have much too high a regard for the noble Marquess to say anything of that kind about him. I hope this will not impair Anglo-American relations in any way. But what I say is that the world situation is being very much damaged by these utterances. There was a remark made by the President of the Foreign Relations Committee of the same kind—I will give the gist. The general tone has been that "the whole show is breaking up, and we must keep it on the run." But that is not the Churchill policy. All we are asking the noble Marquess to do is to say something to assure us that we are standing to the Churchill policy and not indulging in this major task of exploiting the difficulties of other countries.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I must say something here, although I do not want to interrupt the noble Viscount again, for he was very kind to me and did not interrupt me. In fact, he has not dealt with the constructive part of my speech at all; nor has any other speaker on that side of the Chamber. The main point I made was that it was not the slightest use asking Russia to come to a conference of this kind unless you were able to offer her a balanced policy with security for her. I gave three or four examples of the sort of thing I had in mind, to do with E.D.C. and to do with the United Nations—which, as in the other place, has never been mentioned by the Opposition in this House—and finally, the proposal of Dr. Adenauer for a mutual security treaty. I stated that they were all very proper things to be discussed. I believe with the noble Viscount that it is only if you can put a fair proposition to the Russians that you can expect them to come to the
  1086
  conference. I tried to put a fair proposition. It appears to me that every speech made up to now from that side of the House was made up before I spoke, and has been delivered exactly as it was made up.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am delighted that the noble Marquess should make a second speech. I thought he was not going to speak again, and that we should have to refer to the House of Commons to get further answers. I am flattered that he has honoured me by making another speech. I do not think it has impaired any of the arguments which I am trying to present, but I did feel that in his speech he was trying to help. I was saying that the sort of thing I have mentioned is doing infinite harm. Let me take once again the text on which we are working:
  "I believe that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading Powers without long delay, and should not be overhung by ponderous or rigid agendas."
  There are two conferences under way: one on Korea and the other this Conference on the highest level and without a ponderous agenda, for which the Prime Minister asked. Mr. Dulles—I hope that I may mention him in this debate without offence to the noble Marquess—says, speaking of the Korea Conference, as reported in The Times this morning, that
  "There had been very little exchange of views between Governments on the form of the political Conference."
  I thought that was what the Conference met at Washington to do. Mr. Dulles is going to see Dr. Rhee and is going to Seoul for a week to talk things over.
  "On the United Nations side"—
  he said—
  "there were at least two indispensable parties"—
  my heart rose—
  "the Republic of Korea and the United States."
  That seems a little queer. I do not want to appear a bouncing Imperialist, but I should have thought that we might have been included among those whose presence was indispensable. As to the conference without a rigid agenda, Mr. Dulles says
  "that the Administration had no intention of buying Korean unification at the price of admitting Communist China into the United Nations."

  1087
  In the communiqué there was a reference to our honest desire to unite Korea, and I ventured to ask the noble Marquess about this. He replied that it was not a pledge; it was something we hoped for and were working towards. But Mr. Dulles is not working towards it. We cannot get peace in the Far East, and what we want really is a recognition of Communist China by accepting the unity of Korea. Mr. Dulles says that he is not going to buy the unity of Korea at the expense of the recognition of Communist China.
  On this point about Korea, I should like to ask the noble Marquess whether his views are what they were two or three years ago. If he says that they are not, I have nothing more to say; but we all remember that he took a very strong view about the recognition of China. I do not know whether that view was his own personal view, or that of the Conservative Party. But six months before the beginning of any trouble in Korea, the noble Marquess described the recognition of China as "a particularly futile example of appeasement." I am saying this, I hope, without offence. It is because this is the way in which he looks at international problems that we consider the mission to Washington was a failure, and we consider that a renewal of operations of that sort can lead to nothing but a dead end. It is just as well to say that plainly. It is not a question of a little here and a little there. We do not believe that we are marching on the right road, and we do not believe that the noble Marquess is the proper person to lead the march.
  I want to say a word or two about the Conference on Germany. In his speech the Prime Minister laid it down very clearly that we were going to stick to our arrangement with Dr. Adenauer. What we want to clear up is how far the promises that have been put in the White Paper are promises which had already been made, and how far they are something different. When the Bonn contracts were negotiated, the noble Marquess induced the House to ratify them because he said we must take the lead. It was only half Germany that was to join the Western Union, but that was the best we could do for the moment for the defence of Western Germany. Now the
  1088
  proposition is that there should be a united Germany. I believe that the desire for a united Germany is one of the real passions that shake Europe to-day. I do not believe we can ever have a solution that does not mean a united Germany. But the Germans, and Dr. Adenauer himself, exhibited no great desire for a united Germany until the election. Then it became necessary that he should claim that there should be a united Germany. It is a great disadvantage to Dr. Adenauer, because it brings into the new total Germany a large number of Protestant Germans now excluded and a large Social Democratic element. I am going to ask the noble Marquess what conversations went on in Washington about Germany with Herr Blankenhorn.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I can say that I did not see Herr Blankenhorn. He was not there officially. I suppose he came to Washington, as anybody had a right to come to Washington. I did not see him. The talks were confined to the three Powers.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Was the letter which Dr. Adenauer wrote sent to the noble Marquess or to President Eisenhower? The noble Marquess said that it had been published. I have seen statements in the Press about it. It would be very interesting if the paper could be laid. Herr Blankenhorn, I understand, was just visiting Washington to see Lincoln's Tomb and things of that kind. But it is a fact that what came out was an agreement which happened to be of advantage to Dr. Adenauer in the coming elections.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Is the noble Viscount suggesting that the agreement was reached because it was an advantage to Dr. Adenauer? The agreement was reached because it was the greatest measure of agreement that could be come to. It is perfectly true that the Federal Government of Germany have said that they agree with this approach to Russia in this form. But I hope that the noble Viscount is not going to suggest that the agreement was reached for that reason.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I know the Social Democrats are opposed to this business. They want a United Germany and talks with Russia, but they do not

  1089
  agree with this plan. Of course, I do not suggest that there was an evil motive. It happened to suit Dr. Adenauer, just as it happened that Herr Blankenhorn was in Washington at that same time. And that is where we must leave it. I would make this practical point. If we force a united Germany that is armed into the E.D.C., does the noble Marquess really say there is more hope of solving the other problem, which is the major problem—namely, the withdrawal of thirty Russian divisions from Eastern Germany? Of course that is not suggested. That is what fills us with despair and many people with anger. Is this a plan which is in accord with Winston Churchill's great advance or has it sunk back into the Foreign Office rut?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount has made a provocative statement. Am I to understand that the noble Viscount is against the E.D.C.? Because his Party are not?
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am very satisfied with my Party to-day. I think the speeches of my noble friends have been absolutely splendid. What I am saying is that the E.D.C. with Western Germany is one thing, and the E.D.C. forced to include a united, armed Germany is another thing. That is all I am saying. I would ask the noble Marquess two questions about this E.D.C. business. Would he put his hand on his heart and tell us that this side of Christmas we shall see the necessary ratifications? What about Italy? Has the noble Marquess heard what happened to Signor de Gasperi? We got him into power in 1948 by the Pope threatening hell-fire, and Mr. Kevin promising Trieste. But this time it has all come to naught because the Italian workers feel there is more chance of peace on the other side than on this. What about France? It is no good weeping crocodile tears over France. France has suffered the necessity of spending one-third of her military budget and enduring endless casualties in Indo-China—in order to do what? To set up Bao Dai, who will then be detached from France and turn into another Syngman Rhee in South-East Asia. That is a very poor prospect for France. I have never met any responsible person nor read any responsible statement which suggested that France is likely to ratify the E.D.C. at all.
  1090
  If that is so what is the next step? That is a fair question to ask. If it is a fact that France cannot ratify the E.D.C. because of her obligations in Indo-China, and if it is a fact that Italy has not got a Government, then what is left?—Germany. So that then you will renew the prospect of a united Germany, an armed Germany, facing Europe—and backed by America. That is the big difference from other days. Germany backed by America becomes the dominant factor in European politics. I simply say that that seems to many people to be the prospect before the world.
  Is it a prospect of peace? Is it in any sense the road which was marked out by the Prime Minister? I say, No. The noble Marquess says, "We have experienced men. Give us a little time." There is one thing that is against us: time is against us. The world is looking on and everywhere there are signs of decay. People will not pay for N.A.T.O. There is a common complaint that the enthusiasm for N.A.T.O.is dying. Take Denmark. You will find the Danes saying "If you do not defend Schleswig-Holstein you cannot have your bases in our country." In Iceland the people who oppose the American occupation won two seats in the election. Greece explains that her Budget will rot stand it. Israel declares for neutrality. India will have nothing to do with either bloc. If you do not show that you have some scheme which promises world peace, then the world will leave you and you will be left with your military machine inoperative, weak and useless. Therefore I put it to your Lordships that what we want is a return to the inspiration of the Prime Minister, and in that respect I applaud entirely the phrase used by my noble friend Lord Henderson, "Back to Churchill." Otherwise I can see nothing but a dreary road ending in a stalemate.
  6.43 p.m.
  LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, it seems that on these occasions we cover a vast field of inquiry, and I am wondering if there is any place for a contribution which represents a study of a particular problem. Nevertheless, at some risk I am concentrating my remarks entirely on one part of the world; and that is a corner around which history has been written in the past and is mast certainly being re-written to-day—Egypt, and the Suez

  1091
  Canal. In doing this, I certainly do not want to say anything that would embarrass Her Majesty's Government at a time of very delicate negotiation, but it seemed to me that perhaps in being fair to Egypt we should also be fair to ourselves. This was certainly brought home to me very forcibly in America where there is a complete misconception as to our motive; and it is with a view to redressing the balance, saying something about our motive, and making some comment on the immediate situation that I am concentrating on Egypt.
  In this House it would be an impertinence, where many of your Lordships have forgotten more about this than I shall ever know, to stress overmuch the nature of the problem. The land bridge between Africa and Asia, the great artery of Empire and Commonwealth, the defence of the future oil reserves of the world—all those things are involved; and, within these last years, not so much the interests of a Europe watching jealously over her new toy, the Suez Canal, or even of a Commonwealth, fearful for her lifeline, but a free world with doubts as to the intentions of a potential enemy of overwhelming strength, and more particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Powers in their suspicions as to the safety of their very vulnerable Eastern flank, in their deployment in Europe. Set in the midst of this concentration of international interests is modern Egypt—Egypt, a country which it could be argued owes its present form to a team of Englishmen, to one Englishman in particular, working in the country since 1882. I think that that argument could be sustained but I have to admit that there is little profit in dwelling on it. Only rather wistfully, when in the past we have watched Egyptian students expressing devotion to their country by overturning trams, have we wondered whether they had ever heard of Lord Cromer and his associates.
  We seem lately to have slipped into a habit of framing our arguments around the 1936 Treaty. The Treaty was, of course, abrogated by the late Egyptian Government, and the attitude of the present Egyptian Government appears to be (so far as it is apparent) to quote the Treaty when it suits them and to repudiate it when it does not. I am not
  1092
  one who would believe that the written word is sacrosanct and I certainly think we have to avoid what might be termed "a pound of flesh mentality"; but the Treaty has been quoted so freely, both in Egypt, and in this country, and as our position is, I understand, that we have not yet recognised Egyptian abrogation officially, it is as well when we quote it to insist on accuracy. Article 8 of the Treaty authorised troops to be kept in the vicinity of the canal
  "until such time as the high contracting powers shall agree that the Egyptian Army can by its own resources ensure the security and liberty of navigation of the Suez Canal."
  In passing I make only this comment. In 1936, the potential enemy was Italy, or Germany, or both. In fact both it proved to be. In 1946, the potential enemy was the might of Soviet Russia with such additional forces of Communism as she might care to command. Was it real in 1936, and was it real in 1946, or has it been real ever since to suppose that the Egyptian Army could ever by its own unaided resources defend the area against such potential enemies? The implication surely was that we were on the Suez Canal until a new era of international confidence should dawn. That being so, perhaps it might have been as well if we had written some tangible understanding of that position into the terms of the Treaty.
  To continue this Treaty dissection, the same Article continues by saying that
  "the presence of these Forces shall in no manner constitute an occupation and shall not prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt."
  Those were the words, and at the time they were not merely passively accepted; they were welcomed by the overwhelming majorities in both the Egyptian Houses of Parliament. One can only comment that perhaps some memories are short. Then we come to a very controversial aspect of Article 8 which says that if the two contracting powers should not agree at the end of the period of twenty years, Egypt can undertake the security of the area, the matter can be
  "submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, or to such person or body of persons as the two Powers may agree."
  Our strict interpretation of that would be that if in 1956 by common consent it was felt that we could not afford to relax our vigilance, we could, if we thought it

  1093
  helpful (and if in the meanwhile no settlement had emerged) take this matter to international arbitration. I am not suggesting that it would be necessary or desirable. I wish only to make the point that the principle of international arbitration, in certain circumstances, was recognised. I do not think that we should discard entirely, in certain circumstances, some limited application of that principle.
  To conclude this particular matter, may I refer to one more controversial corner, the numbers authorised. The Annex to Article 8 laid clown the limit of a land force of 10,000 and an air force of 400 pilots. Having laid down those limitations, in the same sentence, after the word "pilot" there is a comma, and the sentence then concludes with these words:
  "together with the necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties."
  The sentence is open to doubt, if one is looking for doubt. I suggest that one doubt—and that even on a perfectly normal interpretation of the sentence—is that the ancillary forces were regarded as being separate from, and in addition to, the combatant element. That being so, the numbers required to support a land force of 10,000 and an air force of 400 pilots would certainly be in the nature of 80,000, which is the number usually quoted as being on the Canal to-day. Having said that I would say that there is, in fact, no need to invoke a legal interpretation of the Treaty, because the size of the present force was changed in 1951, when additional numbers had to be sent into the area owing to Egyptian action. There was an additional situation, an additional emergency, demanding additional troops; and if our rights under the Treaty were to be maintained—and I think it was made clear by the Foreign Secretary in October, 1951, that we should maintain our rights—then the additional force was necessary.
  I have been talking of the Treaty and its legal interpretation. But, of course, we all realise that the situation needs to be watched carefully, continuously and sympathetically, with a thorough appreciation of Egyptian reaction to the presence of foreign troops on her soil; reaction which we may regard as deriving from a highly concentrated national
  1094
  pride, emotional, misguided, but nevertheless not to be neglected or ignored for those reasons. So we ask ourselves: What should be our attitude towards all this rhetoric, this soap-box oratory, rot from street corner orators, but from the leaders of the land—this talk of "blood which must flow"? I think it is fair to clam that a visitor going through Egypt to-day, wandering through the Delta and the two great cities, would not be conscious of the presence of a single British soldier in the land. The training area, where the troops are more or less confined these days, consists mostly of desert and constitutes one-five hundredth of the total area. In such circumstances, I suggest that it is almost (I hate to use the word) dishonest to speak of Imperialism and slavery. I stress this, because it seems to me that we have too often handed the privilege of indignation to the other side.
  But let us discard for a moment the words of the extremists, and turn to the view of the liberal-minded Egyptians—and there are many of them. I think such a person would say: "Are not the days gone when you necessarily defend the Canal by sitting on it? What matters is that, if your soldiers do not sit on it, nobody else's shall. That being so, would it not be better to go outside our country, and have written into the terms of a new Treaty an understanding, such as is written into the terms of the present Treaty, by which you can come back in times of a great emergency? Would it not be better to do that, and to rescue a little Egyptian good will while there is time?" I think the answer of the Englishman would be just this: "We have, in fact, agreed to withdraw all our troops. There is no fundamental difference left between us. Differences, such as they are, are matters not of quality but of degree. But if a great base which has cost the British taxpayer some £500 million is to be maintained for the purposes for which it is intended to use it in war, we would ask that its final technical control should remain in the hands of only a few of those who established it in peace, and who would have to use it in war."
  There are the two views. It is perhaps some compensation to know that, with soldiers in control in Egypt, there is at last an appreciation of the need for a

  1095
  base. The question immediately arises as to what force General Neguib associates with that base in its use in war. Here, it seems to me, we come to a field of some confusion. Only a short time ago Colonel Nasir was saying that on no account would the return of British troops be permitted to the area—that was the attitude until a short time ago. Then suddenly there appears to have been a change of attitude. Perhaps I may put it in the form of a question: Can we assume that behind this smokescreen of oratory the three main actors on the Egyptian stage to-day, General Neguib, Colonel Nasir and Major Sale Salem, have, in fact, accepted the substance of a permanent and practical plan such as would satisfy us? Is it that, with an Army dispensation, there is now an appreciation of the fact that Egypt, in war, would be a priority target, and that, consequently, there is the need to establish a secure, efficient and foolproof base? Not only that, but is it true that the leaders in Egypt are now prepared to realise that you cannot separate the question of the protection of the base from the protection of the surrounding Egyptian soil—in other words, that it is all Egypt which would be involved in war? I am suggesting that in fact the substance of those conditions has been accepted in Egypt, with one proviso, of course—namely, that in some form Egyptian control should be conceded. Satisfy Egyptian pride, and all else will follow. That appears to be the attitude. I leave it vague, because I do not wish to embarrass the Government in what are obviously delicate negotiations.
  The question then becomes this: Are we prepared to accept the risks of an apparent form of hand-over of final responsibility, in the confidence that the substance of all that we require of the Base will follow after that risk has been taken? It may be argued that any agreement we make with the Egyptian Government to-day may be negatived by another Government in Egypt to-morrow. I say that that sort of argument will get us nowhere. If we accept that situation we shall have to maintain 80,000 troops in Egypt to the end of time. I am suggesting that the time has come when we can afford to take some measure of risk in Egypt and accept a plan which the
  1096
  Egyptian leaders can "sell" successfully in Egypt. In such a plan obviously talk of a twenty-five year period for British control would play no part. If we take that step, I suggest that we, in turn, can make one condition, and that is, that all this hateful, soap-box, oratory, this attack so venomous against us, must cease. Egypt must stop talking to us with two voices—the one pleasant and good-mannered in private conversation and the other spiteful in public utterance. In place of that, I think we are entitled to insist that the Egyptian Government must face their sober responsibility which has too long been neglected—and that is, to start to re-educate the Egyptian people to forget this long tradition of neutrality in war in which they have been reared for so many years, and to accept thoroughly the fact of a base and all that that implies, with the obvious indication that British troops will return to Egypt in time of war.
  I believe it is too soon to know whether we can put behind us this fear which has haunted us for the last six years. I suggest that in so far as this fear has dictated policy in the Middle East, perhaps we have been in danger of becoming "Maginot-minded" in connection with this ribbon of water in the desert with which we have been associated for so long. May I quote an analogy from another part of the world. For fifty years on the Indian Frontier we were unable to decide whether to go forward to the Durand Line or come out of the country. A political officer would venture in and receive a bullet. A force would go in; a road would be made to maintain the force, and the force would then be kept there to protect the road. We became the servants rather than the masters of policy. It is that kind of drift which we want to avoid in considering this Suez Canal problem.
  When we have achieved agreement with Egypt, when we have fitted Egypt into a Middle-Eastern defence scheme in a very important rôle, there will still be the need to maintain troops somewhere in the area in connection with that other far more enduring problem, the problem of Arab-Israeli relations. America, France and ourselves have guaranteed to preserve that very controversial frontier between Jordan and Israel. Now Egypt has been able to command some considerable measure of success in rallying the Arab League be-

  1097
  hind her in the present case of the Canal. If we and America are ever going to be able to influence the Arab world in connection with that other more enduring problem of Israeli-Arab relations, we have first to satisfy the Arab world concerning this situation in Egypt. Indeed, we cannot tackle that second problem until the first problem is behind us.
  If all else fails, I would suggest that we should be justified in spreading the net of consultation wider, certainly in invoking the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers. It is sometimes forgotten that that great oil reserve of the Iraq Petroleum Company which lies only 300 or 400 miles from the Iron Curtain is jointly owned by four nationals, all of them of nations who are signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. The spreading of the net of consultation wider would at least have the effect of creating some more effective absorbent for all this hate which is engendered. As for tie personal relations between ourselves and Egypt, I am told by Arab friends that there is still individual friendship for the individual Englishman; and while we still have that, I do not think we need abandon hope. Perhaps we could all profit from an old wisdom which came out of the East and which says, in effect, that he who asks for the perfect friend usually remains friendless.
  7.6 p.m.
  LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am sure that the last speaker will forgive me if I do not follow him along his interesting line, about which he knows much more than I do. I have not ventured to inflict myself on the House in a foreign affairs debate for about a year, and on that occasion I suffered from the painful obligation of distinguishing my attitude from that of my noble colleagues. To-day, I find it much easier to follow the line laid down so authoritatively and effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt. My noble friend Lord Stansgate will forgive me if I say that I do not regard myself as finally and irretrievably committed by every single word that fell from his lips. Indeed, in one respect, perhaps, he committed the rather surprising sin of being almost too slavish in his admiration of Sir Winston Churchill. He treated every word that fell from him as Holy Writ and talked
  1098
  about his speech—which was very fine—as the text from which we are working. Well, it was a great speech, an historic speech; but there was another speech, fiat of Mr. Attlee, and we on this side of the House regard that perhaps as equally authoritative, if not more so; we regard Sir Winston's speech as the Old Testament and Mr. Attlee's as the New, At any rate, I am sure that the noble Viscount will forgive me for drawing attention to that.
  Since the noble Viscount is such a devoted admirer of Sir Winston Churchill—for whom we all wish, of course, a complete recovery—Iwould just recall a few of the inspired words that fell from Sir Winston on the subject of Dr. Adenauer, and which, I am sure, the noble Viscount will echo just as devotedly. Sir Winston said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 515 (No. 106), Col. 893):
  "Dr. Adenauer may well be deemed the wisest German statesman since the days Bismarck. I have greatly admired the perseverance, courage, composure and skill with which he has faced the complex, changing, uncertain and unpredictable situations with which he has been ceaselessly confronted."
  He made similar references of that kind. I feel that if the noble Viscount is going to accept part of the speech, the least he can do is to accept those words as well.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Would my noble friend explain whether he would defend the morality of Bismarck's policies?
  LORD PAKENHAM: I have often lectured on Bismark, and I will not do so now. I would say that his policies were about as moral as the policies of most of the leading European statesmen of that time. I did not hear the last interjection of my noble friend Lord Stansgate properly, but I would say that Sir Winston was intending to pay Dr. Adenauer a great compliment. He obviously refers to him as a fine man, and while I do not want to join in German internal politics at all, it seems to me that the noble Viscount should not have picked out merely those passages of Sir Winston's speech which appealed to him but should follow the whole of it.
  I wish to refer to the noble Marquess. Lord Salisbury, but he is not with us at

  1099
  the moment and perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, would take note of anything I say in his absence. We all have the highest respect for the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I think that goes without saying. In the words of the noble and learned Earl who leads us here, "he is a good man struggling with adversity." The defence of the noble Marquess seemed to me to fall under three heads. On the one hand, he argued that for one reason or another it was impossible to organise a meeting on the highest level and, therefore, rather than have no meeting at all it was desirable to have a meeting of Foreign Secretaries in the meanwhile. Well, that seems to me a sound point and I never thought that there was much quarrel between the two sides of the House as to whether a meeting of Foreign Secretaries was desirable pending a higher-level affair. So that, I should have thought, would be readily conceded.
  But then he might have argued—and I am not quite sure how hard he did argue on this point—that a limited agenda, an agenda limited in the first place to Germany and Austria, was preferable to a wider agenda. I am not quite sure how far he personally considers that a limited agenda was preferable. Perhaps the noble Marquess would elucidate that in his reply. I gained the impression from the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that he would have preferred a wider agenda on the lines suggested by Sir Winston Churchill but that he was out-voted by his foreign colleagues. Perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, would confirm that. All that we on this side of the House can say is that a wider agenda would have been vastly preferable to a limited agenda. I think the view of all of us here—and I believe Mr. Attlee in another place indicated it—is that what is surely obvious, particularly after the very searching speech of the right reverend Prelate, is that an agreement on this question of German unity is going to be extremely difficult. It may be that an agreement on other subjects would be easier, and for that reason it seems to me a pity to concentrate on a most awkward topic if we want to get agreement with the Russians. I certainly gained the impression that the noble Marquess did struggle for a wider agenda but that he was defeated.
  1100
  We cannot, of course, criticise Mr. Dulles; we cannot haul him up here and tell him what we think. We cannot criticise other Foreign Ministers. We must direct our criticisms to the noble Marquess, and we can say that we regard it as unsatisfactory that there should have been this limited agenda instead of the readiness to talk about all matters which Sir Winston Churchill clearly envisaged. Supposing the Russians say, "We are not going to confine ourselves to a limited agenda; we want to talk about everything, or at any rate about some other things," may we take it that we shall reply, "Of course that is not an obstacle; we will talk about anything you want"? I hope the noble Marquess will be able to say something on that subject, because it would reassure us if we felt that there has been nothing in the way of a closed door and that a wider agenda would be possible if the Russians suggested it.
  Finally, we come to the language of the communiqué. I regard the criticisms made from this side as much more than linguistic criticisms, because in these matters we are bound to gauge the intention by the language. We are bound to estimate the degree of importance and interest which the Western Allies attach to the higher level talks by the amount of attention paid to them in the communiqué. Here I follow the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, most faithfully, when he pointed out to us the lamentable fact that in this famous, or infamous, communiqué there was no indication of the fact that these Foreign Secretaries' talks were to be the prelude to the Churchillian talks envisaged later on. I do not know whether the noble Marquess will be able to add anything further, or make any further defence. But looking at it with some objectivity—for I have not always taken a highly partisan view on foreign affairs in this House—I remain astonished that in this communiqué all reference to the Churchill talks was omitted. I would ask Lord Reading whether he can think of any better defence than has so far been put up. The defence offered so far seems to us remarkably unconvincing.
  So much for the question of the psychological approach, which, of course, is vital but these are not the only matters

  1101
  for our discussion. There are also concrete issues, material and human, which will have to be discussed, however good or bad the atmosphere may be when these talks take place. As I am to some extent a specialist on German matters—though heaven forbid that I should lay down the law on them to your Lordships!—perhaps the House would allow me to offer a few wider reflections about the question of British policy towards Germany, more particularly our German policy at the present time. As I see it, there have already been two British policies towards Germany since the war. There was the Potsdam policy—I am not saying that that was purely a British policy, but it was a policy to which we contributed. There was the policy of combining with America and Russia, and later with France; of controlling Germany, demilitarising her, keeping her production down, and generally running her affairs for an indefinite period. That policy is clearly dead; its death warrant was sealed some years ago.
  Looking back we can probably date the emergence of a new policy from the end of 1947 and the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers at that time. At some date such as the end of 1947 we can see the emergence of a new policy in a Western system, including a defence system, against the Communist menace; and within that system Germany is gradually admitted to an ever more equal place. At first Germany's rôle is to be purely political and economic; but from the autumn of 1950 it is accepted that Germany must be called upon to make a military contribution. So from the autumn of 1950 we can see the building up of the whole Western system, whether the Atlantic system or the European system, which contains as a very important element the idea of ultimate German equality, including equality of arms.
  In addition to that idea of a German contribution, military and economic, there is also the idea of Germany's integration within the Western world so as to give her equality with the other countries, but at the same time rendering it impossible for Germany, if she ever took the wrong road again, to do a mischief to her neighbours. That has been the gradually emerging policy on the Western side. I agree with what has
  1102
  often been said from both sides of the House: that, quite apart from the Communist menace, there is much constructive virtue in the Western system. There is one aspect of it to which the noble Marquess alluded which interests particularly my noble friend Lord Henderson and myself. There is the promise which it holds out for the complete reconciliation between Germany and her neighbours; and I know that the right reverend Prelate, who began to befriend Germany before any of us in this House, is particularly interested in that idea. Therefore, whatever happens between East and West, we must insist on having this reconciliation. On no account must we throw away the promise of better things to come that lie within this Western effort.
  In this year 1953 it is becoming fashionable to say that a new situation has arisen, and I do not dispute that language. The gestures of the Russians, coupled, of course, with the fact that they are now under new leadership, places on us a new duty and gives us every excuse for rising hopes. Those hopes may be cheated in the event, but there is undoubtedly an obligation on all of us to test to the uttermost the precise intentions of the Russians in this year 1953. I think, indeed, that many people, in this House and elsewhere, are inclined to feel that the moment has now come for a third British policy towards Germany. Perhaps that third policy would be most easily summarised in the sort of words that were used by Mr. Attlee in another place, when he said that
  "Germany has to be given freedom. I suggest that the only possible way of discussing this matter is in the larger context of the future of a peaceful Europe."
  I feel that we are all determined to find out whether this Western reconciliation within which Germany is to play so important a part, can itself be transcended in some wider reconciliation. That, I think, was in the mind of the right reverend Prelate. What we all feel, surely, about this, is that it is most desirable in every way, if it could be brought about—a united Germany, U.N.O. working as we all hoped to see U.N.O. work, a united Europe, not just East or West Europe but the two parts of Europe coming together. That must be the dream and the ambition, the daily resolve of all of us who have any kind

  1103
  of concern, whether high or low. But the real difficulty, as it seems to me, is that none of us knows whether in fact that is possible of achievement in the immediate future. We must hope and pray for it, but we cannot be sure about it. And there is this very difficult transitional period. Because, when all is said and done, the reason why Europe is divided, why there is an Iron curtain, why the unity of Germany laid down at Potsdam has never come about, is the action of Russia. That is an historic fact which nobody can deny. I know, as does my noble friend Lord Henderson from the time when we sat at the Council of Foreign Ministers for weeks, that Mr. Ernest Bevin really killed himself in the effort to try to bring about a united Germany.
  The real question is whether Russian policy has changed sufficiently to make that third policy attainable in the immediate future. We all hope and pray that it has changed to that extent, but no one can be certain. I do not mean to dwell on the various difficult problems of balance and bargaining that will arise when these talks, as we all hope, take place. Put in its simplest form, I would say the problem can be reduced to terms of this kind. In its simplest form, the difficulty is to give a united Germany freedom without the Russians calculating that such freedom is bound to lead to a united Germany associating herself with the West. The right reverend Prelate touched on a further difficulty about frontiers, but I do not wish to detain your Lordships, so I will not go into that to-day. He would be asking rather a lot of any German Government to expect an agreement on that point within the next few months. Would it really be wise to try to clear up perhaps the most difficult political question in the world in the weeks and months that lie immediately ahead of us? I put that point to the right reverend Prelate. But, quite apart from frontiers, I am clear in my own mind that there is real difficulty.
  I have little doubt—I do not think any of us who try to follow these things doubt—that if Germany were given freedom to-morrow, or in the very near future, and she were then allowed to conduct her foreign policy, there would be an overwhelming vote for association with the
  1104
  West. I have little doubt about that. I have no doubt that the Russians make the same calculation. Then what can one expect of Malenkov? Let us assume he is a man of much greater good will than some of us have assumed in the past. Even assuming great good will on the part of Malenkov, assuming he has tired of all this hostility between East and West, it is a most difficult problem for him to accept this free, united Germany without neglecting, as he might think, the vital interests of his country. I have no doubt that great difficulty lies there and—the noble Marquess was out of the Chamber, and therefore I venture to repeat it now—I am all the more sorry (there may be excellent reasons at which I can guess but which are not known to me) that it has been decided, in the first instance, to concentrate on the unity of Germany, which is a tremendously difficult problem. I should have hoped to make a start with problems which were easier.
  But, at any rate, however we start, I feel that a start must be made. I should feel, if I may put it with some impertinence—and we should all feel, if we were members of the Government—a sense of double responsibility. And, surely, in the Opposition, our attitude in criticising noble Lords opposite should be based on the responsibilities that we ourselves should feel if we occupied their places. We should be bound to feel, if we sat opposite, that any talks, however promising the atmosphere, might fail. We should be bound, therefore, to continue preparations for defensive purposes in the interests of this country and the West, on a supposition that the talks might very well fail. I therefore recognise that these essential steps must be taken. I appreciate the words of the noble Marquess that "A great vigilance must continue to be practised."
  We should also feel—and from the final words of the noble Marquess, it appears that he feels it too—that this may be a year of destiny. It may even be the last year in which, for many years to come, an agreement is possible. It may be that that is so. I think the noble Marquess said we must try to grope towards the Russians, and it may be that they are trying to grope towards us. I should feel a terrible responsibility, if I sat opposite and if in years to come I

  1105
  felt that we had not stretched ourselves to the limit, and a little beyond, to reach any agreement that might be possible. I suppose that, compared with some of my noble colleagues here, I am a pessimist about Russia—not a fatal pessimist, not a continuing, firm pessimist, because the Russians are human beings, possessed of immortal souls. But I am pessimistic about Russia. Yet I have the feeling that the more pessimistic one is, the more difficult these issues seem, the greater then appears the responsibility for meeting these people, for trying to understand them, and for striving to persuade them that there is not the danger that they so foolishly imagine exists.
  Therefore I would say to the noble Marquess there is this double duty, this double policy. I think the noble Marquess mentioned in his final words the double duty of continuing to make preparations in case these talks go wrong but, at the same time, looking here, there and everywhere for any ray of light in the situation. The double policy is always harder than the single policy; the double duty is more difficult to conceive to apply and to stick to; but noble Lords opposite are as anxious as we are to perform their duty. I know they will forgive us if, while criticising them for what we do not regard as a satisfactory achievement recently, we point out their duty as we see it, and we leave it to them to discharge it, as we know is their sole wish.
  7.29 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down said, in the course of his interesting speech—and I think that all speeches in this debate this afternoon have been of an interesting nature—that he thought that this might be a year of destiny. No doubt he was referring particularly to the situation in the West, but there is no doubt in my mind that this will be a year of destiny in relation to the Far East, about which I propose to say a few words to-day. Perhaps it is because my associations with Far Eastern affairs have been of a somewhat lengthy nature, since I pursued bandits with a mounted infantry company on the Manchurian border over forty years ago, that my remarks on the subject will be as brief as possible.
  I carry my mind back to 1919, to the debate in another place on the Treaty
  1106
  of Versailles Peace Bill, in which I had the privilege of making a speech, the bulk of which was devoted to pleading the case of China. If I may briefly refer to the speech I then made, it will be remembered that at the Paris Peace Conference China had been denied what she asserted to be her right—namely, the restoration to her of the territory of Kiao Chow and the Port of Tsing tao, which had been seized by the Japanese during the course of the 1914–18 war. During the course of my speech, I suggested to the House that unless this territory was restored to China it would serve as a footing on the mainland for Japan, round which she would pivot into Korea and into the Northern Provinces of China, and that it would serve to strengthen her efforts to dominate the Pacific. My Lords, exactly that took place. The Peace Conference at Paris refused to listen to the Chinese demands; China refused to sign the Peace Treaty; and the inevitable took place—Japan started on her quest for domination in the Pacific.
  At that time, China was helpless, but the China of to-day is not helpless. We are dealing with a very different China to-day. That leads me straight to the question of the Political Conference which is to be set up following the truce which, happily, has recently been arranged. The Armistice agreement recommends to the Governments of both sides that
  "to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, within three months of the signing of the Armistice a Political Conference of a higher level of both sides be held to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, et cetera."
  It seems to me that: the political future of the Far East may well rest in the innocent words "et cetera" with which the Korean Armistice agreement concludes. That renders it all the more important that the Political Conference which is to be set up should comprise all those countries bordering on the Pacific around which the future of the Pacific area is to turn. The noble Marquess, in his speech, gave us a little formation on this point. I may say that since he was in Washington the situation has galloped ahead, so he was not able to give us any information which resulted front any talks which he has had since Washington. But he said that China ought to be represented, that Australia

  1107
  ought to be represented, that India ought to be represented, and that Russia ought to be represented. I think those were the countries he named.
  I ask the noble Marquess this question: May we assume that the United Kingdom will be represented at this Political Conference at the highest level? So far as China is concerned, she not being a member of the United Nations, and the United States having made quite clear that, so far as the United States can hinder it, she is not to be allowed to be a member of the United Nations, there may be some difficulty, to which I will refer in a moment. But I should like to ask the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, this: Are the countries which the noble Marquess mentioned the only countries that he and Her Majesty's Government have it in mind to be represented at the Conference? Looking at the vast interests in the Pacific, I do not see how you can leave out any of the countries. Russia is entitled to come in—I think the noble Marquess mentioned Russia. Japan is entitled to come in. How are you going to settle the question of the Northern Pacific waters without Japan? For the last hundred years at least, Korea and the Northern Pacific waters have been bones of contention between Russia, Japan and China.
  Korea is not just a little peninsula jutting out into the sea. It may be that Korea is a little country, but it is a point ďappui of immense strategic importance. As was proved in the hands of Japan, it provided an entry for Japan to the Northern Provinces of China. From the point of view of Russia, it has been a stepping-stone, or an attempted stepping-stone, to the warm water port for which she is perennially longing; and from the point of view of Japan, occupied by a Western Power, it is a dagger at her heart. Under these little words "et cetera," all these problems are bound to arise for settlement at the Political Conference, and I think it would be impossible to arrive at any settlement of a lasting nature unless, in addition to China, and Russia, Japan were at the Conference, and also New Zealand. I think the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, did not mention New Zealand. He mentioned Australia—Australia having already, as we know,
  1108
  said that she had a right to be represented. I take it that New Zealand will also express that right.
  I do not want to take up too much time, but this question is now arising at the United Nations, which is to meet on August 17 in order to decide which countries are to be represented at the Far Eastern Political Conference, and to draw up the proposals to be offered by the United Nations at that Conference. China is to be represented at the Conference, and yet is not a member of the United Nations. May I say at this point, having regard to what has been said by speakers from the Opposition Front Bench to-day, that I hope Her Majesty's Government will maintain the position which I feel sure is in accordance with the wishes of this country: that China is entitled to a seat on the United Nations: and I hope that there will be no "let down" on that particular matter from the point of view of Her Majesty's Government.
  What is the set-up? I make this suggestion: if this Conference is to be called, and if it is to be composed, as I hope it will be, of all countries bordering on the Pacific and China, she not being a member of the United Nations, then I suggest some sort of strings should be attached between the Conference and the United Nations in order that when the moment arrives for the admission of China to the United Nations—which must come some time; and the sooner the better—no difficulties will arise vis-à-vis the United Nations and the policy of admitting China to a seat on the Security Council. There is a good deal more to say on that matter, but I do not want to detain the House. All I would say is that these vast problems which lie for solution can be settled only by good will on both sides. I hope that we shall have an end to slanging matches. Let us put it in plain language. I do not want to make specific references to speeches by statesmen, particularly on the other side of the water; but let this Conference be conducted in a spirit of peace and good will, and then there may be some hope that these troubles will come to an end, and that peace in the Pacific may ensue.
  There is only one other thin, to which I would refer, and that is the question of trade with China. I should not have raised it if the noble Marquess had not

  1109
  brought it up himself, but he raised it and I interpolated a question with reference to a speech I made on this subject in this House on April 28. I was then not quite correct, but the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will remember I said that when the United Nations had placed their embargo they had not issued a list of articles. I do not want to enlarge upon that. What I said was not quite Correct, but actually the position was this. On April 28 I quoted from an answer given by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, to this effect: that unfortunately many other countries do not carry out their part of the bargain with the same scrupulous accuracy as we do. That has been the source of much of the trouble. I then asked this question: Who is to determine the standard of accuracy? In my submission, that is where the United Nations failed in regard to their resolution. It was for the United Nations to determine the standard of accuracy which other countries, imposing an embargo, could have lived up to. With great respect to Her Majesty's Government, I cannot subscribe to the view that that was the right method of imposing an embargo. Under that method, in my view, British trade has suffered at the expense of foreign countries, and has suffered very seriously. Unless there is some change in policy it is going to suffer more seriously still.
  There are increasing signs that other countries, like France, are not acting up to the embargo in the same strict manner in which we in this country are doing. I suggest also that some American firms are already in negotiation to break into the China market. In this House, only a few days ago, I quoted an instance where Senator McCarthy was strongly criticising British traders and British shipping firms: yet last year America bought from China goods to the value of nearly 28 million dollars. That is not going on at the present moment, but it will increase, to the detriment of British trade and British industry. So far as Japan is concerned, Japan does not hesitate to say, as was said by her Prime Minister Yoshida, a few months ago, that the political ideology of Communist China had nothing to do with Japan-China trade. "Business is business," he declared. Business between China and Japan is increasing every month, and Japanese trade with China is similarly
  1110
  increasing. It has increased very significantly this year, and everything points to a further rise.
  On the occasion of the debate on April 28, the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked Lord Mancroft whether or not, when a truce took place in Korea, that would end the embargo, and the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft said he thought it ought to. He was at once contradicted in another place. What is the position now? Can the noble Marquess tell us to-day? There are numerous traders and businessmen throughout the country wanting to know where they stand on this matter. Are the British Government going to continue this embargo indefinitely? This Political Conference will not end for another year or more. What is the policy of Her Majesty's Government? Are they going to allow other countries like France, Germany and Italy, to step in and take the trade which ought to be ours? I hope the noble Marquess will be able to give us a satisfactory answer on that. I see no reason at all, and no businessman can see any reason, why trade should be conducted with China by other countries at our expense. I hope the noble Marquess will be able to give us some satisfactory answer on that matter.
  7.49 p.m.
  LORD BARNBY: My Lords, the noble Viscount who has just sat down is so seasoned a speaker in Parliament that he will condone my not attempting to connect his speech with my own. I wish to make a number of remarks on economic matters. Before I do that, I cannot refrain from expressing indignation at the presentation, or mispresentation, in some sections of the Press of the visit of the noble Marquess the Leader of this House to Washington. To that I would tack on my feeling of impatience at the speeches which have been made by the Opposition, without referring to any individual, in order not to risk provoking further delay at this moment. They seemed so devoid of realism and so impractical that it is difficult for many Members of the House, and certainly for the public generally, to understand exactly what it is they would have wished to be done.
  LORD STRABOLGI: The noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting, but may

  1111
  I ask whether he is referring to the Opposition in this House or in another place?
  LORD BARNBY: I tried to make clear that my indignation, in the first place, concerned the Press, or parts of it. I suggested that with my indignation went a feeling of perplexity as to what the wish of some speakers would have been. I am perplexed what it is they think ought to have been done that would be different from what has been done.
  LORD STRABOLGI: In this House?
  LORD BARNBY: If the noble Lord will permit me, I say that I have that perplexity. The point to which I wish to refer is this. Much of what I have referred to seems to be in the nature of criticism of the United States. Since the United States is a dominant partner in recent activities in Korea, apart from policy in Europe, my own feeling is that such expressions are imprudent, dangerous, and misguided. How Russia can be compelled to come to any Conference, and, once there, to accept what is desired by the Opposition, is beyond my understanding. I am among those who do not believe that there is any change of heart in Russia, and, in this connection, I associate myself entirely with the remarks which we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, to-day. The matter of the Austrian Treaty affords an example of what I mean. If the Russians are really anxious for progress towards peace they could start on that. Much has been said about Korean unification by peaceful means. I am one of those who have been all through Korea and through Manchuria, and I should say that there can be little doubt that unification is wanted. But I am not among those who believe that it is likely to take place without permanent occupation of Korea, and I do not think that is a proposal which even the Opposition would support as a likely solution of the problem.
  To come to the point which I particularly wish to make, I believe that economic sickness causes political unrest and Communism. It is for that reason that I want to refer to the in-balance of the dollar trade with the rest of the world. After all, the Foreign Office is the dominant authority in all arrangements with regard to international trade. The sug-
  1112
  gestion that we want a fall in prices is being heard all over the world. But in the case of Malaya we have had an illustration as to what happens as soon as that occurs. In Malaya there has been a fall in the prices of rubber and tin, and the consequence is a very difficult situation, with regard to which it is not necessary to go into details.
  I should like also to mention barter as an illustration of the trend of current trade. It is very disadvantageous to this country. Reference has been made in the House recently to certain barter arrangements for which Her Majesty's Government have declined to have any responsibility, notably barter arrangements with Brazil. But there are other arrangements suggested in many directions, and Russia is very active in this matter. For Russia, trade is certainly, not business it is a political weapon. That is why it is right that such a matter should be raised in a political debate. The overriding in-balance of the dollar with the rest of the world is represented as a problem requiring for its solution that the United States shall lower her tariffs. That is urged by speakers of authority in the United States, as well as by speakers on behalf of Her Majesty's Government—or at least by speakers of importance in economic affairs in this country. I am one of those who believe that this is purely wishful thinking. There is no more ground for thinking, that the United States, with the Republican Party in power, will reduce their tariffs voluntarily, to the extent that there will be a danger of unemployment, owing to the relatively low wages paid in this country, than there is that we shall not have protests in due course if Japanese competition comes very sharply against British trade while Japanese wages are so very much lower than British wages. The political machine in Washington is so strongly entrenched behind traditional procedure that it seems to me most unlikely that these concessions will be made. If it is replied that the United States must make such concessions, in order to ensure her own security economically, I say that you might as well say that France must vote for two years' military service or balance her Budget, or immediately subscribe to the E.D.C.
  Finally, I wish to make a point with regard to trade with China. One of the

  1113
  serious grounds of difficulty between the United States and Britain at the moment arises over trade with China. I believe that this is intensified by the insufficiency of the definition of what are strategic materials and what are non-strategic materials. Protests are widespread, and it is evident that something could be eased there. I commend this to the noble Marquess with the suggestion that further consideration should be given to this question of definition. I think that if some steps were taken to put this right, that would be one way of easing the many causes of dissatisfaction and danger to the United States and the United Kingdom.
  8.0 p.m.
  LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Lord who has just sat down for raising the last subject mentioned in his speech. If I may support him with great diffidence, I would say that there is indeed much dissatisfaction about the uncertainty now prevailing with regard to what is strategic material subject to these embargoes and what is non-strategic material. It is a matter which is affecting our merchants and our manufacturers interested in foreign trade very seriously indeed. As to the first part of the noble Lord's remarks, I have heard all the speeches which have been made from the Opposition Benches in this debate. None of us attacked the United States at all. We do nothing of the kind. We attack Her Majesty's Government for not maintaining the British situation of independence against the United States policy. We do not attack the United States Government, or the Secretary of State, or anybody else. Their policy is their own business.
  LORD BARNBY: Representations voiced in advance against what is likely to be the policy of the United States at a Peace Conference are of the character of criticism.
  LORD STRABOLGI: No, we do not attack what is their business. We do not agree with it. Our attack is upon our Government for not maintaining our standpoint. That is a very great difference. I am sorry that the Acting Foreign Secretary is not here, because my heart bleeds for the noble Marquess. He was set an impossible task. He was sent out to Washington to bend the bow of
  1114
  Achilles and could not do it. I doubt if Achilles himself—in this case, Sir Winston Churchill—could have brought off the whole of his proposals or imposed cur views of foreign policy completely in the present state of opinion in the United States. I think he would have got the top-level Conference, but the noble Marquess could not nave got it, because he is not Achilles and could not bend the bow.
  An American friend of mine, a very experienced man, who has a great admiration for Senator McCarthy but otherwise is quite sane, and who has just come over to this country, told me, "What we all say in the United States is that Dulles made a monkey of your Marquess of Salisbury." That is not the language I use myself; I only quote it. But that seems to be the general opinion among business men and men of affairs in the United States. I am very sorry for the noble Marquess. It is rather like the case of the son of the Vicar of Wakefield who was sent to the fair to sell a horse, and who, after various barter deals, came back with a bag of spectacles. I think that sums up accurately what happened to the noble Marquess when he went to Washington and fell among American politicians. I am sure I will carry the whole House with me when I say that I hope that the arrow that flies by night has not caught Achilles in the heel, and that lie will soon be able once again to exercise authority in the councils of this nation.
  I felt great sympathy with the Government and with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who has great responsibility in this matter, when I read the two columns in The Times to-day from their Washington correspondent, quoted by my noble friend Lord. Stansgate. These give a full and interesting account of the views of the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, on the forthcoming Peace Conference on Korea. When I read that, I was sorry indeed for anyone in charge of the British or French Foreign Offices. If that is really the view that has to be put forward to placate the American Congress, I should despair. I will not quote this article at length—my noble friend referred to it, though all too briefly—but it is of great importance. If I may epitomise it,

  1115
  it says that the Secretary of State says there will be no concessions of any kind to China, but if there is no progress in ninety days, then the whole thing is off. He starts by giving no concessions and adds that if there is not a complete surrender, out he goes. That is Mr. Dulles' affair, the State Department's affair; but I am extremely sorry for the British Foreign Office if that is their real attitude in the U.S.A.I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, that we should have a clear understanding on this matter, and I hope we shall have something definite in reply as to where we are going to be in this forthcoming conference. At present, judging by this report by the usually reliable Times Correspondent in Washington, it seems to be confined to the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, and the President of the South Korean Republic.
  I read with great astonishment in the White Paper which the Government have been good enough to issue following the Conference in Washington, this astonishing statement:
  "The common policies of the three Powers towards Communist China should be maintained."
  What common policies? There are no common policies between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government and the United States Government with regard to China. We believe in recognising the fait accompli; it is the Government of China and we recognised it—much against the opposition of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, but we did it nevertheless. Apparently, on no account are the United States prepared to give similar recognition either at the present time or in the foreseeable future. We believe in trading in non-strategic materials, in harmless goods. I agree with Lord Barn by that we must have a definition of this. The Americans on the surface prohibit all trade with China, though, as the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, points out, apparently very elaborate preparations are being made by some of the leading manufacturers in the United States to get right into the China market at the earliest opportunity. Still, on the surface, that is American policy—to prohibit all trade with the enemy, "with the wicked people who are killing our
  1116
  sons"—an attitude we can all sympathise with in view of their heavy casualties. To talk about common policies is curious indeed and I do not understand it. Perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, can explain these curious words.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I am not clear about the place from which the noble Lord is quoting.
  LORD STRABOLGI: It is from page 5 of the White Paper, the third paragraph down. It says:
  "They considered that, in existing circumstances and pending further consultation, the common policies of the three Powers towards Communist China should be maintained."
  Unless it is a misprint or in these difficult times it was necessary to make a small joke, I can see no other explaantion.
  What my noble friend Viscount Stansgate and the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, if I understood him rightly, and I certainly want is that we should use our influence and mobilise our friends in the United Nations and use all our means of public education and propaganda to try to persuade the Americans to change their point of view for the sake of the peace of the world and the welfare of humanity. That is not criticism of America. That is urging on Her Majesty's Government to use greater endeavours and to use their brains and energies to try and get a change in a situation which is most dangerous and which may lead to a world-wide upheaval and irreparable disaster. That is what we are trying to get.
  LORD BARNBY: May I interrupt the noble Lord? There is justification for both sides in thinking their policy is right.
  LORD STRABOLGI: I hope the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, as a staunch Conservative is supporting his own Government. His own Government's policy is sound enough with regard to China, but they cannot impress it on our good friends and Allies on the other side of the Atlantic. Our complaint against the Government is that they are bad advocates; they mean well and they have a good brief but they cannot put it across. Lord Barnby knows the United States very well indeed, and he knows how necessary it is to use very high-powered salesmanship to change a policy of the

  1117
  United States once Congress has adopted it.
  Now, I referred to this, statement in the White Paper about continuing the cold war—which is what it really comes to—after the Armistice. I think that is most questionable. After all, the cold war, the blockade, is a form of hostilities; it is an act of war. After the shooting and the bloodshed have ceased in Korea I should think that Lord Mancroft's original statement in this House showed the path of statesmanship in saying that there should be some considerable relaxation.
  In this connection I ventured on Monday to ask of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, a supplementary question which I understood might possibly be answered to-day by the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, and that is whether, at any rate now that the shooting has ceased in Korea, we could, in agreement, of course, with our fellow members of the United Nations, remove the embargoes on medicinal drugs and medical stores which are so badly needed in North Korea. I understand that the sufferings of the child population in North Korea particularly have been acute for all these years. The mortality among the children has been appalling and there is a great need of a vast salvage operation in North Korea to save the remnants of the child population there. In South Korea the situation has also been serious but there there have been various organisations sent by the United Nations and by the Quakers and others who have done wonderful work and have perhaps saved many thousands of children who otherwise would have died. In North Korea, however, partly owing to the disruption of communications and other causes, I am told the sufferings of the child population particularly have been most serious, and I think that every one of your Lordships would like to see them relieved. Therefore I hope it is possible to allow medicines and the like to go in. In fact, I should like to see a great effort made by either the Red Cross or the Red Crescent—it does not really matter which—or the Quakers, or any body of that sort, to do what we did after the first war and the last one, when we got going the movement of food and medicines and saved the lives of thousands who would otherwise have died of starvation.
  1118
  I would refer to the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, as to the different treatment of this trading embargo by the Governments concerned. I want to quote particularly the case of the order for medicinal drugs that was placed by the Chinese Government in June of last year and held up and eventually prevented altogether by the Board of Trade. It was an order for two million pounds' worth of penicillin, streptomycin, and the three sulpha drugs. Those live curative drugs were apparently in very short supply in China—this was not for Korea it was for China—and two million rounds' worth were ordered from British manufacturers in June, 1952. The order was repeated in October, 1952. The Board of Trade refused to allow those drugs to go. The matter, I think, has been raised in another place, and the President of the Board of Trade wept bitter tears but said he could not help it; he regretted very much but they had to stop it. Now what has happened? The French manufacturers of synthetic drugs have been allowed to supply this order of two million pounds' worth and they have fulfilled the order. I am very glad they have, because I do not want anybody to suffer unnecessarily; but I am sorry for our own manufacturers. More extraordinary still, the Chinese have begun to manufacture penicillin themselves, and small blame to them. So there is a market gone.
  The truth of the matter with regard to this cold war is this. The cold war is a luxury which the great economic units like the United States of America, and Russia, and presently China, practically self-contained vast territories with huge populations with their own assured home markets, can indulge in, as a rich man can indulge in gambling. But for the mercantile nations, people who have to live by trade and commerce—ourselves, the Germans, the Japanese, and the French—it is a fatal thing. It is at present injurious and if' it is continued it will be fatal; it will disrupt our whole economy. I am very regretful, therefore, to read in the White Paper that apparently we are continuing the present policy in regard to China in the mercantile field.
  Now for a few moms its I should like to refer to the speeches made by my noble friends, Lord Henderson, Lord Jowitt and Lord Pakenham, and say that

  1119
  I really wish only to reinforce what they have said. I do, however, want to bring forward one argument that has not been stressed in this debate, not even by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. We have all tried to keep our speeches short and no doubt this was in the minds of all my noble friends. The weakness of the situation disclosed by the speech of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, today, and the speech of Mr. Butler in another place last week, is that we have agreed to go into a conference of the Foreign Ministers with an agenda which, if it is accepted and adhered to, and if we restrict our discussions to that agenda, is bound to lead either to a refusal by the Russians to enter into it or to their humiliation. Now you cannot expect to humiliate a great Power in a strong position such as that in which the Russians are. You can humiliate an enemy whom you have beaten in the field and whom you have reduced to impotence; but you cannot (or at least it is very bad policy to try, and it is certainly bad diplomacy) afford to enter into negotiations with a great Power in a strong position, without leaving a mode of escape so that prestige and reputation can be saved. In this case this is the weakness of the whole situation. In this case you have, by insisting on discussing the German problem from a certain angle, made it impossible for the Russians to accept without facing humiliation.
  Therefore you start off in a very difficult situation in which it is hard to see how there can be success. Therefore the diplomacy has been utterly deplorable. In a case of this sort you should, as has been pointed out already by my noble friends, particularly by my noble and learned friend the Leader of the Opposition, try to look on the better side of things, to use very polite language, to avoid wounds that already exist and into which you do not wish to pour more salt. You must try to find the sound places, and try to find the areas of agreement in the first place—that is, if you want to succeed and to lead the way to the top-level conference on which everything depends and in which you hope everything will be resolved. If, on the other hand, you do not really want to succeed, if you think you are in such a position of strength—
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Is the noble Lord suggesting that that is the Government's position?
  LORD STRABOLGI: Allow me to develop my argument and I will explain exactly to the noble Marquess what I do mean. It will not do him any discredit, I can assure him. But, on the other hand, there are certain powerful elements in the United States that make no secret of the belief that we are now so strong and that certain weaknesses are exposing themselves in the satellite States and perhaps in Russia itself, with internal dissension, as to make this the time to keep up the pressure of the cold war and the threats of other actions, and therefore not a good time to negotiate. If that is what you believe, you have gone the right way about it. I do not say that the Government believe that. I give full credit to the Acting Foreign Secretary for doing his best with the brief that he had, and I am sure it was a good brief. He was out of the Chamber when I said that I could not blame him for not being able to bend the bow of Achilles. I dare say he bent it a little way, but he could not bend it very far.
  The complaint I make is that we were not more successful in pressing our view, as to what should be done now, on our friends in the United States who, as the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, has reminded us, have a different view on important and vital questions. In other words, our bargaining has been poor and our diplomacy has been miserable. And the results may be most serious, because, as has been pointed out by my noble and learned leader, this may be our last chance for a long time to get agreement. As my noble friend Lord Pakenham said, can we really expect the Russians, without some alternative, some concession and some safeguard, to accept the substitution for a Western Germany, allied, in effect, to the N.A.T.O. Powers—with all its weaknesses —of a united Germany and an armed Germany also allied to the N.A.T.O. Powers? Can you expect the Russians to accept that, on their feet, so to speak, without any concessions or safeguards? I should have thought that what we want is wise diplomacy. I think of an ancestor of the noble Marquess who is so often quoted in this House, when he was Foreign Minister, or some of our great Foreign Ministers of later days; and I

  1121
  sometimes sigh for the experience and wisdom of the late Lord Curzon, who, at any rate, knew something about diplomacy and was not altogether unsuccessful.
  Surely, the real policy to-clay should have been to avoid at the beginning the difficult questions appearing on the surface. If you have to do it that way—we do not agree—then get your Foreign Ministers together, but go with an open agenda, and avoid the difficult questions you know you will trip over at the beginning: try arid find an area of agreement; and, above all, try to find the formula and the safeguard to Russia for the re-emergence of a united and powerful Germany, which can be a menace to Russia, as it can be a menace to the French, too. You have to find some means which will satisfy the Russians that this united Germany, this Germany with its Government elected by free elections, and so on, is not going to be an automatic ally in an aggressive policy against them. That, I should have thought, was the way in which you could have hoped to get some success. This way, I regret to say—I must agree with my noble friends who have already spoken, and with my Leader in another place—will lead us nowhere.
  Suppose, for example—and this matter was also touched upon by my noble friend Lord Pakenharn—in the future a strong and united German Government of an armed Germany raised the question of the Eastern frontiers. Apart from the United Nations, or the Prime Minister's suggestion of an Eastern Locarno, what means have you of preventing a solution there by force, with all the consequences that would flow from that?
  LORD PAKENHAM: Since the noble Lord has been kind enough to refer to me, I have no reason whatever to suppose that a united, armed Germany would be more aggressive than any other country. Personally, if they were integrated within any Western system and, in addition, were members of the United Nations, I feel sure they would not only be well controlled, but also self-controlled.
  LORD STRABOLGI: I am grateful for that interruption. Obviously I did not express myself clearly. I did not suggest aggressive designs on the part of the Germans. But there is no German to-day who willingly accepts the
  1122
  present Eastern frontiers. It is a terrible irridenta, and it is likely to endanger the peace of continents. You have to find a peaceful solution, and I want to find a peaceful solution. That is a problem which I am afraid was too much for the noble Marquess and his advisers. We cannot blame him; I am only sorry for him.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Does the noble Lord refer to me? He suggested two possible lines by which Russia could be reassured first, by some strengthening of the United Nations; and the other, as I understood it, by some form of Locarno Pact. If he had listened to my speech, he would have known that I put forward both of those proposals. He then said that the Government should do that instead of what they are doing. I have just suggested the noble Lord's policy—indeed, it is almost the only time I have found myself in agreement with him.
  LORD STRABOLGI: That part of the speech of the noble Marquess was impeccable. But why did we not pursue that line in the White Paper and the Note to the Russian Ambassador? Why did he not persuade his colleagues in Washington to take that line? If we had had that speech made by Secretary of State Dulles, then we could have seen some brightness on the horizon. As I say, the sentiments of the noble Marquess are admirable, but he could not get them over to his colleagues in the United States. That is our complaint. I do not want to labour this matter further; it has been well hammered in by much more eloquent speakers, both here and in another place. But we are living in serious times. This may well be the year of destiny. I only hope that better counsels prevail.
  8.28 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, it falls to me to make the concluding speech from this side of the House. I think, first, that the noble Marquess who opened the debate will be satisfied that no personal imputations have been made against him—I believe that every speaker from this side of the House has gone out of his way to make that perfectly clear. Secondly, I hope that we have not attempted to deal with this most difficult problem in any partisan spirit. There

  1123
  are differences which divide us, but they are genuine and sincere differences, and we have felt it our duty to state in clear terms where we disagree with Her Majesty's Government, and, of course, where we agree. I should like to say, also, that I hope it will be appreciated that the differences are not merely procedural, but are much more fundamental. I do not think it matters greatly whether you have a high-level Conference, or whether you have a Conference of Foreign Secretaries. What is important is the spirit in which that Conference takes place. Where we are extremely disappointed is that the spirit in which the Conference of the Foreign Secretaries is proposed is so different from that in which the Prime Minister put forward his proposals.
  There is one other thing I should like to say as a preliminary. I believe that if the speech which the noble Marquess made to-day had been printed as the White Paper, instead of the White Paper which was actually published, and if some of the conclusions of policy at which he arrived in his speech—such as, for instance, the emphasis he laid on the United Nations and of security for the Soviet Union, and the likelihood. I think I am justified in saying (that was the impression that I got) of a high-level Conference at some time—then I think we might have taken a somewhat different attitude. We have to look at what is placed before us, and what are the conclusions arrived at by the Washington Conference, as evidenced by the published documents. Those, I am bound to say, are profoundly disappointing, and I should like to associate myself in the strongest possible terms with the speeches which have been made from this side of the House.
  As I have said, our differences really lie in our approach to the whole problem. We have to look at what has been happening in the last few years in the relationship between East and West. I am reminded by my noble friend Lord Henderson that it is four years since the Foreign Secretaries of the countries of the East and West actually met in Conference, and when they did meet it was not a very successful occasion. There was a later meeting of deputies, which again was a prolonged and most disappointing affair. They never reached the point of
  1124
  agreeing upon an agenda for a subsequent conference. I will not say on this occasion who was to blame. It may be that both sides were somewhat legalistic and fighting for position. Apparently, the position of an item on an agenda is as important as the items themselves. At any rate, that was the impression we got from this long and difficult discussion at the Palais Rose some years ago.
  The fact remains that for years past the relationship between East and West has now been overlaid by a mass of suspicions, fears and misunderstandings. No conference on the old basis at the present time is likely to lead to any better result than those which have taken place in the past. It was because the Prime Minister seemed to approach this matter from an entirely new angle, with an attempt to get through this mass of misunderstanding and fear, and with some concrete proposals for doing so, that we laid such great stress on the high-level Conference. Indeed, it is my view—and in this matter we are all expressing, to a certain extent, a personal view—that no conference can be of any real value until we have got rid of this suspicion, fear and misunderstanding. Therefore, to propose a Conference with specific items on the agenda which are bound to be the subject of dispute by the East, seems to me to ask for failure right from the beginning.
  I do not know whether the noble Marquess really expects that the Soviet Union will accept the invitation to the Conference on the terms that have been put forward so far. If he were on the other side of the fence, I wonder whether he would do so. Here we have an alignment of the three Western Powers who have got together at Washington and made up their minds, as a result of a discussion, what they want to talk about. They have no doubt made up their minds as to the line they want to take on that particular subject, and they then offer to the Soviet Union discussions on those matters upon which they themselves have decided. There is no attempt to say to the Soviet Union: "Is there any way in which we can get rid of all this misunderstanding and difficulty?" There has been no attempt to discuss matters which might be of interest to the Soviet Union themselves. We know that one of the things which is troubling the Soviet

  1125
  Union is what they regard as an encirclement; a getting together of a number of countries of the West, by means of N.A.T.O. and E.D.C., with United States bases all over the world. They regard that as a definite threat to them. They may be wrong, but they certainly regard it as a definite threat. In the proposals which we have put forward we have done nothing at all to dispel those fears. On the contrary, we have done whatever it is possible to do to increase them. Therefore, our first criticism of Her Majesty's Government is that this is the wrong kind of Conference. Our second criticism is that if we are to have a Conference, this is the wrong kind of agenda. In my view, we should have been much wiser not to have suggested an agenda at all, but to have suggested merely that we should meet and have discussions.
  What are the difficulties which are confronting us? What are the things that we can do to ease the situation which exists at the present time? There is a general belief that there is a possibility, at any rate, that the Soviet Union would be susceptible to an approach of that kind. All the evidence is that they would be. We could have talked about a measure of disarmament. We could have talked about East-West trade; and with the relief of tension, of course, we could have talked about Germany and Austria, and everything else, because we have to settle the question of Germany—there is no doubt about that. But is there really any hope of getting the Russians to sit down with us and agree to discussing a reunited Germany on the basis that Germany is to remain a member of the E.D.C., with the assumption that she will definitely line herself up with the West: that she will be allowed to rearm, and that these armaments are to be available on the side of the West? Is there really any hope that the Russians would agree to that? And not merely that, but—as my noble friend Lord Strabolgi pointed out—instead of a nation of about 40 million being joined to the E,.D.C., with the reunited Germany you would get a nation of 70 million. It seems to me utterly unrealistic to have put forward proposals of this kind, proposals which we might have known would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union.
  1126
  Even if they do agree to a Conference, it is most unlikely that any practical results will come out of it. I want to say at once that I hope I am wrong. I hope that the Soviet Union will be prepared to agree to a Conference, and I hope that those who enter into the Conference will be prepared to widen the terms of discussion to include such matters as a reassurance to the Soviet Union as to how they, as well as ourselves, can feel secure, for unless we all feel secure there is not much hope of continued peace in the world.
  That brings me to the question of Germany. It seems to me obvious that we have got to settle this question of Germany. I think there is agreement on all sides about that; there is even agreement on the part of the Soviet Union that there should be a reunited Germany. They have no particular objection, so far as I know, to free elections and -to Germany deciding her fate for herself. But there is the problem of what would then be the position so far as armament is concerned. Obviously, a free Germany which has had its election and set up its own Government must be free to decide for itself the level of armament and the alliances that it will make with other countries. We are assuming that a free Germany will, of necessity, ally itself to the West.
  My noble friend Lord Pakenham, who speaks with great authority about Germany, feels pretty certain that that will be the case. Well, my Lords, I do not myself feel at all certain which way a free Germany would go; and I feel that we are making a wrong assumption if we take it for granted that Germany would necessarily side with us. I do not know what Germany's interests are. She would certainly decide on the basis of her own self-interest; and it may well be that the Soviet Union is in a position to offer a reunited Germany more favourable terms than we could. After all, the Soviet Union has certain bargaining counters at its disposal. One of them, as I think the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, hinted, is the question of the lost territories. I think the noble Mar-guess referred to the German lost territories in his speech.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: No.
  LORD SILKIN: I am sorry. But they have been referred to in the course of the debate. At any rate those are very important bargaining counters which the Soviet Union has at its disposal. Even from our own point of view it would be a mistake to assume that what we are proposing is necessarily going to be to the permanent advantage of this country.
  The important part of the policy that we are adopting is what might be called liberation. In the White Paper we attach considerable importance to the liberation of the satellite countries, and our policy is directed to that end. I should like to ask whether we are quite sure that, as between the Soviet Union and Germany, the satellite countries would really prefer to be liberated, since the result of that would be that they would be at the mercy of Germany. I have had an opportunity of finding out something about the way the Polish people feel, and I know that they dread far more than the influence of Russia the possibility of a further attack upon them by Germany. So it is with Czechoslovakia. If I may express a view on the matter, it is that the link between these satellite countries and the Soviet Union is strengthened by the fact that it is their only hope of defence from Germany. Unless we are prepared to give the satellite countries security against possible attack by Germany, I think we shall find that the satellite countries would prefer to remain under the influence of the Soviet Union rather than be what we call "liberated."
  Therefore, the criticism of the agenda which has been prepared and submitted to the Soviet Union is that it is unrealistic; that it holds out little or no prospect of success; and that it seems to me inconsistent with our ideas and with the views that we express: that it is possible for the Communist system and our own to exist side by side. I think it is very largely dominated by anti-Communism, rather than the desire to obtain security for ourselves. I think that a writer in the Observer of July 19 has very well described this agenda as very narrowly circumscribed and somewhat one-sidedly selected. On all these questions of Germany and Austria, Russia would have to make considerable concessions and the Western Powers would have to make none.
  1128
  I do not wish to say more on this aspect, because it has been fully and adequately dealt with by my noble friends who have spoken from this side. I want to turn now to an entirely different subject, and that is the question of the negotiations that are to take place in Korea, following the Armistice which we all so greatly welcome. Several noble Lords have referred to a report in to-day's Times by the Washington correspondent, which sets out in considerable detail the policy which is apparently to be followed by the American Secretary of State. It has been referred to by both the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi. I think it is right to quote that report at somewhat greater length than these two noble Lords have done. I should like, and I am sure the House would like, to have the views of the noble Marquess who is going to reply on these particular matters. Of course, the policy of the American Secretary of State is his own affair, except in so far as it impinges on our own interest and on questions of world peace. I think your Lordships will agree, when I have read some of these extracts, that it does in effect do so. The Times said:—
  "Mr. Dulles also announced that he would leave for Seoul next Sunday to co-ordinate American policy, in preparation for the forth-coming political conference, with the South Korean President. The purpose of the talks, which would probably last about a week, would be to work out agreed policies on how to achieve the twin goals of unification of the peninsula and the removal of all foreign troops."
  It is true that America will be entitled, by virtue of her membership of the United Nations, and by virtue of the fact that she has played a leading part in the fight against aggression, to have a considerable say in these matters—but by no means the only say. I thought these talks were to be talks of the United Nations in the discussion on the Security Treaty. Mr. Dulles hopes to be joined by two leading Senators from each Party, and he gives the names of these Senators. I hope that the same procedure will apply here. I hope that two leading Senators, or their equivalent, from each Party will accompany whoever goes from this country to represent us, in order to make quite certain that our own representative goes straight and acts in accordance with the

  1129
  proper national line. The Times report goes on:
  "In the course of subsequent questioning, Mr. Dulles confirmed that the United Sates had assured Mr. Rhee that if after 90 days the political conference had proved a sham and was showing no signs of being productive, the American delegates would walk out. They would do so on their own initiative."
  These negotiations are not the Americans'; they are the United Nations'. One hopes that that does not mean that the United Nations would walk out. After all, if no agreement is arrived at in ninety days, it may be the fault of the Chinese and the North Koreans, or it may be the fault of the negotiators on our side. Mr. Dulles also said, according to this report,
  "that the United States was not intending to bargain with China at the conference and would approach the talks on the assumption that, as Peking was also committed to Korean unification, the question of the United States making concessions did not arise."
  You cannot enter into a conference and say that you will make no concessions, whatever proposals may be put up by the other side. If that is the case, there is no need to attend Seoul at all. Mr. Dulles can simply send his proposals by post and say: "There we are, and we make no concessions."
  In passing, I should like to ask the noble Marquess whether we have been consulted about all this. After all, we and the Commonwealth are vitally concerned. These are matters which affect us. Then the article says later, referring to Mr. Dulles:
  "He said the United States had assured Mr. Rhee that it would be glad to consider a provision similar to the one in the Japanese security treaty, which gives the United States the right to station troops in and around Japan. When asked how such a treaty could be squared with the avowed purpose of arranging the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the peninsula, he admitted that he was not clear himself on what Mr. Rhee wanted."
  I would say again that these are United Nations' negotiations, and not Mr. Rhee's. If our policy is the withdrawal of all troops from Korea, and if that is also the policy of the Chinese and the North Koreans, how is that consistent with the United States having troops in Korea in the same way as they have" in and around Japan." Mr. Dulles thought
  "that it might be possible, as was the case with Japan, to have a treaty which gave the Americans the right to maintain troops in Korea, but not the obligation, thus enabling them to comply with any agreement to remove troops from the peninsula which might be reached at the political conference."
  1130
  That seems a little difficult to understand, too. How is it possible to agree to remove troops and yet reserve the right to have your troops there, and riot to regard that as a breach of an agreement to remove your troops? I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I make one more quotation from this illuminating article.
  If, however, the categorical statement by Mr. Dulles that the United States would not 'buy Korean unification' was more than a political phrase, simply designed to send congressmen home next week with a clear conscience, and was instead a formal indication that the United States will refuse to negotiate on any of the outstanding issues at the forth-coming political conference, it was clearly an utterance of very considerable importance."
  That is, of course, the comment of the person who writes the article and, indeed, it is "an utterance of very considerable importance."
  I have read these extracts at some length because I hope that the noble Marquess will be able to give us some explanation. At any rate, he can no doubt tell us whether Her Majesty's Government have been consulted on all this: whether Mr. Dulles is speaking for himself or for his associates at the Washington Conference, or whether he is speaking on behalf of the United Nations. I should like also to ask the noble Marquess for an assurance that Her Majesty's Government do not accept this policy and will strenuously resist it. I fear that if this is the policy that is going to be insisted upon at the forthcoming negotiations, then we are undoubtedly asking for the breakdown of these negotiations and for a renewal of the conflict. I am sure that is the last thing that we should wish.
  We in Parliament here are parting for nearly three months, and a great deal may happen in that period. Therefore, as the noble Marquess said in opening the debate, this debate on Foreign Affairs has been fully justified. I believe that the next three months—my noble friend said the next year, but I believe the next three months—arefraught with the greatest possible difficulties, and I venture to hope that Her Majesty's Government will bear in mind the desirability, in the most difficult discussions and negotiations that confront them in the very near future, not of appeasing our opponents but of trying to understand their point of view and their difficulties. They have a point of view, and I am quite sure that if Her

  1131
  Majesty's Government would really make a sincere attempt to understand the point of view of the Soviet Union and the Chinese and the North Koreans, and would try to meet them so far as they legitimately could, then we might well come back in October with this country and the world in a far happier position than they are to-day.
  8.59 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, your Lordships have now for a number of hours very usefully debated the present foreign situation, and it remains for me, not I am afraid exhaustively to pick up every question that has been asked in the course of the not inconsiderable discussion that has taken place, but at least, if I may, to reply, in so far as I can, to the more salient ones amongst them. I will endeavour to perform my "answers to correspondents" as briefly and concisely as I can, but the debate has covered a considerable field and I may have to take more time than I should have wished.
  The general attitude which appears to have been taken on the other side of the House has been one of disappointment. The word has been freely used by a number of noble Lords who have spoken on that side about the results of this conference. The two things that struck me in listening to their speeches were these. The first was there were indications in several speeches several times over that they thought these proposals had been put forward with the intention that they should be rejected.
  LORD SILKIN: May I just make quite clear what I think is the attitude, certainly of myself, and probably of my noble friends. It is, not that the proposals were put forward with the intention of their being rejected, but that that will be the almost inevitable consequence.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: What was said was that they were so bad that they must be rejected.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is it.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not think that is very far away from what was said. The other thing I am not at all sure about, having listened to this debate, is whether or not noble Lords on that side of the House want to see
  1132
  the proposals rejected, because they go on making remarks about the offers made being so hopeless, about the diplomacy behind them being so deplorable, and about the mistakes that have been made. Do they consider that an encouragement to those to whom an invitation has been extended to accept that invitation? I am bound to say that many of the speeches that I have listened to this afternoon I should have taken as a definite expression of view on the part of noble Lords opposite that the Russians would be wiser to refuse the invitation.
  LORD HENDERSON: If I may interrupt the noble Marquess, I cannot recall anybody on this side of the House making any suggestion that the terms have been put forward in the hope that they would be rejected nor can I remember anybody on this side of the House saying that he wanted to see them rejected. I do not think that anything has been said to justify what I regard as a most unfair insinuation on the part of the noble Marquess.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not think it is an unfair insinuation. I did not say what the noble Lord has just tried to put into my mouth. What I said was that the condemnation which has been levelled at these proposals has been such as to give encouragement to the Russians not to accept them. In those circumstances, it being the view and the desire of Her Majesty's Government that they should be accepted, I can only regard it as unfortunate that they were so condemned by noble Lords, and that their disadvantages to the Russians were so emphatically pointed out in speech after speech.
  My Lords, I think the whole position on this has been perfectly plainly put by my noble friend in opening this debate. It is said that we have now departed from the line which the Prime Minister originally took. I think it was the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, who referred to the great disappointment that was felt throughout the country. I think there was disappointment in the country, but the disappointment was at the inability to carry out the Bermuda plan. That was what brought home to the country the feeling of disappointment. I believe it is true to say that the country had set great hopes on the original plan,

  1133
  as put forward by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, and inability from various causes to carry out that policy, to put that plan into action, undoubtedly caused disappointment to the country. However inevitable, for various reasons, the postponement of a meeting of that kind may have been, I think it was genuinely regretted by the country. But that being for the moment, and only for the moment, necessarily out of the way, we have to see what is the next step that can be taken.
  My noble friend Lord Salisbury has said that he went to Washington, that he returned with the decisions which are embodied in the White Paper, and that those decisions were decisions with which he was satisfied and with which the Prime Minister, in the terms in which his view was expressed to your Lordships this afternoon, was also satisfied. It is said. "But this is only a poor substitute for the original, in so far as it is too concentrated upon one subject—too confined to one subject; and not only is it a wrong Conference, but it has a wrong agenda." It is said, "But you ought to have started with something easy." Well, as I say, the country was, I think, anxious to see something carried out on the lines of the Prime Minister's proposal. If my noble friend had come back from Washington with a proposal, as one noble Lord suggested, that there should be a Conference on East-West trade, do noble Lords think that that would have stimulated a great expression of uplift and relief on the part of the public? What he did come back with was this offer to the Russians to discuss the position in Germany and Austria. It is said "You ought to have offered something very easy as the first stage." My Lords, given good will, Austria ought to be easy, and the inclusion of Austria in those proposals was not in any way tied up with the German proposals; it was a separate thing. And if there is a desire to arrive at a conclusion, it ought to provide at least one method of advancing a step.
  Germany is certainly a difficult proposition, but not on that account to be shirked; and if you have got to deal with a difficult proposition, it may not be the worst tactics in the world, it may not be the most deplorable diplomacy, to start by trying to settle what is the most difficult problem you have, and then to open out
  1134
  from that and pass to the others. I think the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, asked what would happen supposing the Russians said, "We do not like this—this is too restricted a Conference—but we are prepared to come and talk to you on wider terms, without restriction." My Lords, obviously, we should have to discuss that matter with our Allies and colleagues. But I would not say that, because these terms have been put forward, a wider discussion, if it were suggested, would inevitably be ruled out. It would be a matter for discussion, according to the terms which were offered for the wider discussion.
  EARL JOWITT: May we ask for information here? This matter must have been discussed. What we should like to know is: Has there been a discussion as to what the answer will be if the Russians say" We will come into a talk, but not on this narrow agenda"?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, it may well have been discussed, but I do not think the noble and learned Earl would really expect me to say at this moment what tactics we and our Allies propose to adopt in a hypothetical case which has not yet come to light. I think it would be extremely ill-advised to take up any definite position. I have said that if there were a suggestion we should have to take it back to our friends and consider it; but it would then be considered according to the terms in which it was put forward.
  The European Defence Community has come in for a good deal of unfavourable comment in the course of the day. In particular, I am a little puzzled as to what was the situation with regard to the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in winding up. Whilst he did not seem to like the European Defence Community, and the inclusion in it of a unified Germany, at the same time he pointed out the fears, which he regarded as legitimate, of the satellite countries which he said were more fearful of Germany than they were of Russia. From that point of view with a unified Germany in E.D.C., or sonic comparable organisation, surely we are providing a reassurance, not only to Russia but to the satellite countries as well; for their fear is the fear of Germany. Those fears will certainly be assuaged by the fact that there is this element of control over the

  1135
  German armed forces that would be provided by her membership of a community of this kind.
  There is a considerable field, looking back over this debate, with which I had meant to deal, but I cannot possibly hope to cover the whole position. I agree with a great deal of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Layton. At the beginning he pointed out how great a contribution had been made by the United States, and certainly all of us, however, critical we may be of other aspects of the proceedings in Korea, must, I think, pay a great tribute, not only to the original initiative, which was in itself an imaginative thing, but to the solid determination which has not let that initiative peter out but has kept it going until the time when an Armistice has been reached.
  Two main questions in regard to the Far East have come up in the course of this debate. First, the question of trade with China; and second, procedure in regard to the Political Conference following upon the Armistice. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, seemed to be under the impression that there was no list of articles which had been at various times declared to be subject to the embargo, but in fact there is a list which was made public.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: I thought I made that quite clear. I was previously quoting from the debate when I had made my mistake in saying there was no list.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I only wanted to clear up the matter, because in the original discussion the noble Viscount said, without any qualification, that in fact there was no list. Of course there is a list. It was published as long ago as 1951 by the then President of the Board of Trade, and, so far as this country is concerned, we had to consult with our Allies and friends in this matter as to what articles were to go into this list: whether any particular articles which were the subject of discussion at any particular moment were or were not articles which ought to be within the list.
  As regards the question of whether the embargo ought to cease automatically, so to speak, on the signing of the Armistice,
  1136
  and the coming into operation of the cease-fire, I must remind noble Lords of the position. The distinction between strategic and non-strategic goods was the result of a resolution, not of the Government of this country alone but of the United Nations. That being so, we should consider it our duty not unilaterally to abrogate an arrangement of that kind but to have it considered with our other colleagues in the United Nations, at the appropriate time, in order to see whether or not the moment had come when that embargo on strategic goods could be lifted. To say that it operates automatically because it was only for the period of hostilities is to ignore the fact that it was not a decision by one country but a decision by a very large number.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Will the noble Marquess allow me to interrupt him for a moment? This embargo was laid on to prevent strategic materials from being sent to China when our men were fighting in Korea. It has now got to be continued because there is an economic interest in maintaining it. The noble Marquess says that we have to wait for the consent of others, although it is correct that the aggression is finished. We have to await for a large number of people who have a large number of reasons, some economic, and who wish to hamper our trade. That is the situation.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I am afraid I do not accept the noble Viscount's version of the situation. He says that it is purely economic; it is a good deal more than economic; it always has been and still is.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: The noble Marquess misheard me or I expressed myself badly. It was to prevent arms from going and being used against our own people that the embargo was imposed; it is being maintained by a number of people who see an economic advantage in its maintenance after the military need has ceased.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: That is what I understod the noble Lord to say: that if the embargo is continued after the fighting has come to an end it is being done on economic grounds.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: That is correct.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: That is where I profoundly disagree. We are talking less than a week after the Armistice has been signed, and the last thing that one would like to see would be the Armistice come to an end for any reason. But we have to watch the situation a little and to be quite sure that the Armistice is safely launched on its way before we start relaxing restrictions which were imposed in the interests of our troops.
  The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, talked about the cold war being a luxury. It is a luxury; I do not quite know to whom: it is a luxury which we have endeavoured to afford in the interests of, among other people, the Commonwealth Division and the other troops who have been fighting in Korea. From that point of view it is a luxury which we have readily sustained.
  LORD STRABOLGI: I was referring to the cold war on the question of East-West trade, not in relation to the embargo in Korea. The trouble is this—I do hot know whether the noble Marquess is thoroughly seized of it. There are a great many articles which are borderline. Some are allowed to go to China and some are not. I understood from Lord Mancroft's answer to my question some months ago that, once the Armistice was signed, there would be a considerable relaxation.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think I said just now that the situation changes. Of course, the whole situation will be looked at. The mere coming into force of the Armistice cannot in itself act as a relaxation of restrictions which have been imposed—as the noble Lord will agree—for very good reasons. Lord Strabolgi asked again to-day, as he asked the other day, about the position of certain pharmaceuticals. The position, I think, is this. All our restrictions on exports to China and North Korea have to be considered as a whole, and considered in consultation with other people, as I have said before. The position as regards medicaments of this kind is no different from that. I would acid this. If it can be shown convincingly that the North Koreans do need such supplies from Western sources—I am not altogether sure that the noble Lord's information about this need is correct—and they
  1138
  can make arrangements to take them, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to take a lead in endeavouring to produce a situation in which those articles can be placed at the disposal of the North Korean Government. It would first be necessary to satisfy the Government that they were needed. I am not so clear in my mind as the noble Lord was in his that there is at the moment any particular dearth of these things.
  LORD STRABOLGI: I am very much obliged to the noble Marquess for that answer. I think it is very satisfactory.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, asked me, among other things, a question which had a certain ring of familiarity about it; he inquired whether there was anything further to be said about the position under the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty. Refreshing my memory, I am glad to say that my geographical memory was more accurate than his. It was a question more of the Commonwealth than of people going to America. When the noble Earl raised this question before, during the debate on April 23, I referred to the reply of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place, in which he said that the matter would be among those that would be considered between him and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers when they were over here for the Coronation. Advantage was taken of the Coronation visits of the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, in this context, to discuss Pacific problems which affect those two countries and ourselves, and it was decided, on the invitation of Australia and New Zealand, that one of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff should visit those countries at an early date in order to discuss defence problems of that area. The noble Earl, in putting the question, himself referred to the statement which had been made by Mr. Menzies on his return. What Mr. Menzies said was
  "It has seemed to us all along that what is needed in the Pacific is not a fruitless difference about the constitution of A.N.Z.U.S. but, on the practical level, a co-ordination of defence planning in a realistic way between the relevant Pacific Powers."
  As your Lordships probably know, our military representatives in the area maintain regular contacts on military planning matters with Australia and New Zealand,

  1139
  as well as with the American and French military authorities; and, in concert with those Commonwealth Governments of Australia and New Zealand, we are working towards a closer association of this country with the other Powers in this area, and for the general compiling and dissemination of our material information on defence and matters of that kind.
  EARL JOWITT: What I really wanted to know was whether any representations had been made to the United States to the effect that we obviously ought to be in a Defence Pact which concerns Australia and New Zealand. That is susceptible of a very simple answer—a monosyllabic answer.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Does the noble Earl mean since these original discussions?
  EARL JOWITT: I mean ever, at any time.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Not recently, I think, is the answer.
  EARL JOWITT: When they were last meeting?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I could not help the noble Earl on that.
  The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, made some very interesting comments upon the situation in Egypt, and gave an interesting view in the light of his own considerable experience of that country. But he will not, I think, expect me to answer the questions which he put, because, indeed, when they were put, he deliberately put them, it seemed to me, in a rhetorical form, which admirably illustrated what was in his mind but perhaps did not actually call for a reply. He will he the first to agree—although I do not suggest that anything he said was other than useful—that perhaps the less I say on the subject of Egypt at this stage the better it will be.
  I ought, perhaps, just to say this one thing about a point which has been raised on the general position in regard to one matter concerning Germany—it is a matter to which my noble friend did not refer, and I think that I ought to mention it. There has been a change made in the procedure for dealing with German war criminals, and that change has been made as a result of decisions
  1140
  which were taken at Washington during my noble friend's visit. The position up to this moment has been that no Germans have been associated with the review of these cases, or with any recommendations made in that regard. Eventually, of course, the Bonn Convention contemplated certain arrangements which in all three Zones would be undertaken by one mixed board of three Germans and one representative of each of the three Powers. That was the arrangement set out in the Bonn Convention covering the three Zones. This Board would make recommendations to the convicting Power in regard to its findings. What was decided at Washington was that something was required by way of an interim step, before the Bonn Convention arrangements came into force, to be taken pending the entry into force of the Bonn Convention arrangements.
  It was felt that there would be an advantage in having some interim arrangement whereby Germans could be associated already, in advance of the Bonn Agreement, with reviews of war criminal cases, and it was agreed that each of the three Powers should set up in its own Zone (there would, therefore, be three separate Boards) a consultative Board which would be composed of representatives of the particular Power concerned with that particular Zone. The purpose of these boards will be to make recommendations for clemency or parole for war criminals in that Zone, but these recommendations will not be binding. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, will remember that under the Bonn arrangements, if there was unanimous agreement, a recommendation was binding. None of these recommendations is binding. They are merely recommendations arrived at by these new boards, to which for the first time Germans are admitted; but the ultimate responsibility of advising Her Majesty on prisoners held in the British Zone will remain as at present with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I think noble Lords will agree that that is a useful step forward towards associating Germany more closely with the various war criminal procedures which have been worked out from time to time.
  Going back to the question of the Far East and the next stage, we certainly should expect to attend the political conference which would arise. In his open-

  1141
  ing statement my noble friend gave an indication—not an exhaustive indication, but an indication—of those counties whose presence he thought was indispensable at these meetings. The United Nations Assembly is meeting on August 17 to consider the regulating of the procedure at that political conference. There, again, we have been discussing matters. We have our own view about it. We certainly expect to be present. But at the moment I can say no more than that we have a very great interest in the conference which is to take place.
  The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, read a large number of extracts from a report of a press conference by Mr. Dulles. Perhaps it is right that I should say that, so far as I understand the position, the only commitment we have entered into as regards the post-Armistice situation is the one set out in the White Paper—that is, that we will assist the Koreans, and if the Communists should renew their aggression in Korea after the Armistice and again threaten peace the three Governments, as members of the United Nations, would again support the restoration of peace and security. Beyond that there are no commitments which the Government have undertaken in regard to the post-Armistice period.
  LORD SILKIN: Will the noble Marquess not agree that the statements that have been made are extremely grave and serious?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Mr. Dulles' statements?
  LORD SILKIN: They appear to commit the rest of the members of the United Nations. Could the noble Marquess tell us whether the Government were informed of these statements that have been made, and what their view is about them?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: It is perfectly plain that not having seen them until this morning, we have not had long to consider them. I agree that they are serious statements, but I take them to be made by Mr. Dulles in his capacity as United States Secretary of State and not in any other capacity. When he talks about the security pact, for instance, he is talking about an arrangement content-plated between the United States and the Southern Korean Government and not between the United Nations and the Government of Southern Korea.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Dealing with the question of representation on the political Conference, the noble Marquess has said he expects this country will be represented. I think this country will expect to be represented at a very high level at that Conference.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I do not think there is very much between the noble Viscount and myself. We certainly shall expect to be represented. By whom we shall be represented is for Her Majesty's Government to decide in the light of the surrounding circumstances when the moment comes. What the noble Viscount said about a very high level is a little difficult to define in advance. But, of course, we expect to be there. We realise that the people of this country expect that we shall be represented and, of course, it is the duty of the Government to see that we are suitably represented when the Conference takes place.
  LORD SILKIN: May I take it from the fact that the noble Marquess says he saw these statements for the first time in The Times this morning that the Government were not consulted on the policy set out in the Press statement?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: No.
  LORD SILKIN: I take it that the Government have views on the matter, and if a question were put on the subject I hope the noble Marquess would be able to make some statement.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Her Majesty's Government have views on the subject and they are perfectly ready to discuss with their associates what matters should properly be handled at this conference. There will be opportunities, before the conference takes place, to discuss these matters. That is the way in which I think these matters could be discussed. Certainly we have views upon them. My Lords, I realise that I have only dealt with a limited number of subjects out of a very large field.
  LORD HENDERSON: I put one question to which I attached a great deal of importance. That was whether the British delegation to the Assembly in New York will do their best to ensure that the United Nations delegation that goes to the political conference will work on a United Nations basis and not on national policies.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I apologise to the noble Lord for omitting that, in a considerable mass of manuscript. Of course, they will go as members of the British delegation, but one would naturally hope that it would be the policy of the United Nations which would be put forward at the conference.
  LORD HENDERSON: My point is that, when the British delegation go to the Assembly in August, they will press that the United Nations delegation to Korea shall work on a United Nations common policy and not on national policy—either the British part of the delegation or any other national part of the delegation. This is particularly important in the light of what has been said this afternoon.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I agree that it is important. I shall not commit myself to a definite answer now, but I fully understand the importance of it. All these are matters which we have the duty to work out in the next few weeks and which certainly are very much in the forefront of our minds in connection with what obviously is going to be an extremely important Conference. My Lords, I am quite conscious that I have dealt at this hour with only a limited number of the questions that have been asked.
  LORD SILKIN: Perhaps I ought, as a matter of courtesy, to tell the noble Marquess that I intend to put down a Private Notice Question to-morrow on the question of this statement in The Times, in the hope that the noble Marquess may be able to make a fuller reply.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I am obliged to the noble Lord for having given me that fair warning of his intentions. When we see the form of his Question we can see whether we can supply him with the kind of information he desires.
  It is not easy at the end of a debate which ranges over the entire world to pick out—and I hope I say this without disrespect—what one may call the bits and pieces of debate which have emerged. I have done my best to answer the more serious questions but not to re-embark upon an argument upon the main thesis which was so fully expounded at the
  1144
  beginning of this debate by my noble friend. We very much hope that the rather gloomy prophecies of some noble Lords that the Russians are not going to accept this, and that it is going to be a stalemate, and that no progress will be made, and so on, may be shown in the light of events to be unduly pessimistic, and that we may find that these decisions which have been taken at Washington, and the proposals which are now embodied in this White Paper, may prove to be one—perhaps the first—of these various moves forward in the progress by stages which we have always contemplated as the most hopeful way of improving relations between the Russians and ourselves. If that comes to pass, if it proves that this is, as we hope, acceptable as a step on the way, then this afternoon's debate, in spite of its somewhat gloomy tone in some quarters, will have marked the beginning of an extremely important event in the history of this country and in relation to all the problems which are at this present moment engrossing and threatening the world.
  9.42 p.m.
  LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, we have had a long and useful debate, and our points of view have been expressed frankly but firmly. There are one or two points in the closing speech of the noble Marquess upon which I am tempted to comment, but it is late in the day, and there are not many Members left, and therefore, on the whole, I feel that it would be better if I did not carry the debate any further. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

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