Sitting of 17 December 1953

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'Clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PETITION

  R.A.F. Station, Horsham St. Faith's
  Brigadier Medlicott: I desire to present a Petition on behalf of over 2,600 residents of the parish of Hellesdon in the county of Norfolk. The Petition states that the use of the Royal Air Force Station at Horsham St. Faith's as an operational air station has brought increasing disturbance and anxiety to large numbers of the residents in this area; that the flying activities are reducing the amount of sleep available to workers both by day and by night and have also interfered seriously with education; that the nearness of this air station to so many houses and schools is a source of danger not only to the residents but also the pilots and crews of the aircraft, to whose courage and devotion to duty your petitioners pay tribute; and, lastly, that with the increase in the speed and power of aircraft, all these tendencies will be increased with a consequent worsening of the conditions of which your petitioners complain.
  It concludes with this Prayer:
  "Wherefore your petitioners pray that the Horsham St. Faith's Royal Air Force Station be no longer used for operational purposes, or in the alternative, that the runways nearest to the parish of Hellesdon be replaced by runways as far distant as possible there from, and your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray."
  To lie upon the Table.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  EMPLOYMENT

    Industrial Rehabilitation Units, Tees-side
    Mr. Slaterasked the Minister of Labour how many industrial rehabilitation centres have been set up by his Department on the Tees-side for industrial workers; and what steps he intends to take in this area to extend such facilities for those industrial workers who are recommended to take such courses of rehabilitation.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Harold Watkinson): No industrial rehabilitation unit has been set up on Tees-side as the numbers likely to require these facilities do not justify it. Residential facilities are available at units elsewhere.
    Mr. Slater: Is the Minister aware that this question of industrial rehabilitation has been causing concern on Tees-side? Is he further aware that here is one of the most highly industrialised parts of this country, and does he not think that further consideration should be given to such a project as this on Tees-side?
    Mr. Watkinson: We are very sympathetic to the point raised by the hon. Gentleman, but our difficulty is that to make it possible to have an industrial rehabilitation unit we want an annual demand of about 600 people for these facilities. I have no evidence at all that this kind of demand can be expected.
    Mr. Marquand: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the existence on Tees-side of a former mansion which was bought by a private hospital and has never been used for this purpose, and would not the opening of such a place by his Department mean that many men who have now to go to London would receive their treatment on Tees-side?
    Mr. Watkinson: The same answer applies to the right hon. Gentleman. We have not—though we are quite prepared to look at this again—enough evidence at the moment that there are the cases to justify opening a centre.

    Drop Forging Industry (Committee's Report)
    Mr. Higgsasked the Minister of Labour what steps he proposes to take to secure the implementation of the report of the committee on conditions in the drop forging industry.
    Mr. Watkinson: Factory inspectors are bringing the report to the attention of employers during their visits. Its recommendations are being widely publicised by the industry, and in accordance with a suggestion in the report the Chief Inspector of Factories is setting up a Standing Joint Advisory Committee, which will keep under review the progress made.
    Mr. Higgs: Is the Minister aware that this excellent Report is welcome on both sides of an industry in which relations are good, and that his announcement of the action being taken will also be welcomed? Will he keep the matter constantly under review in order to see that that Report is implemented?
    Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving it this additional publicity.

    Lorries, Corby (Sale)
    Mr. Mitchisonasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that the proposed sale in lots with premises in or near Leicester of most of the 74 lorries at present used for the distribution of Stewart and Lloyds' tubes and accordingly located at Corby will put out of employment men engaged in driving the lorries and as depot staff; and what steps he proposes to take to obviate this un employment or to find other employment for the men in question.
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not accept the implication that the sale of these lorries will necessarily lead to unemployment among drivers or depot staff. If, however, any of the workers concerned become unemployed, the employment exchanges will do everything possible to help them to find other suitable work.
    Mr. Mitchison: Is the Minister aware that this is the tube works where, recently, partial unemployment has arisen for the first time? In these circumstances, is he not prepared to put his head together with those of his colleagues in the Ministries of Transport and Supply, both of
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    whom are concerned, and use their active influence with the Transport Commission and the Road Haulage Disposals Agency, to find a better means of disposing of these lorries than by this piece of improvident folly?
    Mr. Watkinson: I should be delighted to put my head together with those of any of my colleagues. This Government works as a team. I think I should tell the hon. and learned Gentleman—and I am very glad to say it—that unemployment at Corby is still only 0.5 per cent., which is a long way below the national figure.
    Mr. Callaghan: Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that, owing to the consequences of the Transport Act, 74 lorries which have been operating efficiently as a unit have now been split up among half-a-dozen smaller depots, merely to satisfy the requirements under which they must be sold under the 1953 Transport Act?
    Mr. Watkinson: That will be a matter for my right hon. Friend and not myself.

    Engineering and Shipbuilding Workers (Pay)
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister ofLabour if he will recommend a short-term settlement of the dispute in the engineering and shipbuilding industry based upon a substantial increase in wages to be made restrospective, the restoration of the pre-1931 basis for piece-work calculation of earnings, and a special advance for the highly-skilled craftsmen, pending the appointment of a court of inquiry who shall issue a report which shall form the basis for negotiating a long-term settlement.
    Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir. The basis of payment of workers in the engineering industry is a matter for the employers' organisations and trade unions concerned.
    Mr. Pannell: On a point of order. With great respect, Mr. Speaker, do we understand that, on a fundamental question such as the one raised in this Question, no supplementary questions are to be permitted?
    Mr. Speaker: I had my eye on the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith), who nodded and did not seem to want to ask one.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: The answer completely knocked me out.
    Mr. Speaker: Perhaps that will suffice also for the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. Pannell).

    Factory Inspectorate Recruits (Background)
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour whether he is satisfied with the industrial and scientific background of the recruits to the factory inspectorate.
    Mr. Watkinson: It is not necessary for all recruits to have such a background, but I should welcome an increase in the number who have.
    Miss Ward: Is my hon. Friend fully satisfied that the terms offered for the recruitment of new inspectors for the factory inspectorate are sufficiently satisfactory to attract sufficient men with the proper background to perform the duties which these inspectors have to carry out?
    Mr. Watkinson: We are looking carefully into that, but, since putting down this Question, my hon. Friend has written to me, and I should like to give her a detailed reply, which I am sending to her.

    Notification of Vacancies Order
    Mr. Errollasked the Minister of Labour the reasons for retaining the operation of the Notification of Vacancies Order, Statutory Instrument, 1952, No. 136, as amended by Statutory Instrument, 1952, No. 1402.
    Mr. Watkinson: The Order is designed to provide opportunities for employment exchanges to inform persons seeking employment, or a change of employment, of the jobs which most need to be filled in the national interest. There is still a big demand for labour for vacancies of national importance, particularly on export work, and the Order is continuing to assist substantially in getting these filled.
    Mr. Erroll: As the Order is disregarded on a very wide scale, could not the Minister consider discontinuing or, at least, modifying it so that it does not apply to the whole working population, as it does today?
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not accept my hon. Friend's view that it is being largely disregarded. I think it will put the matter into proportion if I say that we are placing nearly 250,000 workers every four weeks. As long as we get that sort of flow through the employment exchanges, I think we need to have this Order.

    Building Workers, London
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Minister of Labour what steps he will take to find alternative employment for building workers dismissed by local authorities in London as a result of cuts in the housing repair programme.
    Mr. Watkinson: The employment exchanges will do everything possible to find suitable employment for any unemployed workers who register for employment. I am, however, not aware of any general cuts in housing repair work in London likely to lead to dismissals by local authorities of appreciable numbers of men from their building labour forces.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Lambeth Borough Council, for example, are having to sack 50 building workers this Christmas because the Minister of Housing and Local Government has cut down the repair programme for requisitioned property? Will the hon. Gentleman have a word with his right hon. Friend, who is apparently increasing unemployment as well as the number of houses in need of repair? More people out of work and more slums will be the result of this lack of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government.
    Mr. Watkinson: The hon. and gallant Member refers only to requisitioned houses. I hope that he will vote for my right hon. Friend's Bill, to make up for it.

    Railwaymen (Earnings)
    Mr. Callaghanasked the Minister of Labour the increase in average wage rates and earnings since 1939 for all workers and for railwaymen.
    Mr. Watkinson: It is estimated that at the end of November, 1953, the average level of full-time weekly rates of wages

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    of adult male manual workers was between 121 and 124 per cent. higher than at the beginning of September, 1939, for the principal industries and services taken as a whole. For adult railwaymen in the conciliation grades of British Railways it is estimated that average wage rates rose between 126 and 127 per cent. over the same period.
    Average earnings relating to April, 1953, show that for adult males employed in industry generally (but not including the railway service) there was an increase of 169 per cent. since October, 1938. For adult railwaymen in the conciliation grades the average weekly earnings rose by about 154 per cent. between March, 1939, and March, 1953.
    Mr. Callaghan: In the new rates that yesterday's agreement proposes should be worked out is contained the phrase, "Worked out after consultation with the Government." Does that mean that there is to be an increase in fares or a subsidy given by the Government?
    Mr. Watkinson: That question does not arise out of the one on the Order Paper.
    Mr. Callaghan: As the British Transport Commission has been given the duty of paying its way and has said that it cannot do so, and as the Minister of Labour has been the Minister who has been in charge of those negotiations, will not the Parliamentary Secretary be a little more forthcoming and tell us whether this phrase means anything at all, because upon it the agreement hinges?
    Mr. Watkinson: To the agreement concluded yesterday, which was reached after long and very difficult negotiations, we owe a very great deal to the skill and patience of my right hon. and learned Friend. I think that the whole House welcomed that agreement and I thought that the whole House now wanted the railways and the British Transport Commission to get on and do their job of increasing the efficiency of the railways. Although the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question does not arise out of the Question on the Order Paper, perhaps I might say that I think that that is the main task in front of us and not going into all these details.
    Mr. Callaghan: If any consideration of a subsidy arises to be paid by the taxpayer, will the Minister represent to the Government that they should suspend the operation of the Transport Act, 1953, and so keep £7 million in the hands of the public?
    Miss Ward: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind, as I am sure he will, that on this side of the House we are just as interested in paying good wages to railway workers and to every other industrial worker as are hon. Gentlemen opposite? Is it not rather a pity that when I asked a Question about comparative wages and average earnings a fortnight ago I was referred to the Ministry of Labour Gazette, and that an opening has now been given to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) to make party capital out of what we think is a very satisfactory piece of work on the part of the Ministry of Labour.
    Several Hon. Members—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate the matter now.
    Mr. Callaghan: Suspend the operation of the Transport Act.

    Strike Action (Secret Ballots)
    The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
    Mr. Osborne: To ask the Minister of Labour if, after consultation with the Trades Union Congress he will introduce legislation to make secret ballots compulsory before any strike action is taken.
    Mr. Pannell: On a point of order. Do I understand that Question No. 15 has been withdrawn, Sir?
    Mr. Speaker: Yes.
    Mr. Pannell: I want to protest about a Question containing an innuendo being withdrawn in this way. The withdrawal of the Question has prevented my making a request to the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) that he should prove some of these statements. This Question, with these imputations, is slanderous.
    Mr. Speaker: I see nothing slanderous in the Question at all.

  COST OF LIVING
  Miss Burtonasked the Minister of Labour if he will conduct an inquiry into the cost of living of old age pensioners at the present time.
  Mr. Watkinson: The comprehensive household expenditure inquiry which began in January covers a large and representative sample of all types of households in the country, including those with old age pensioners.
  Miss Burton: Is the Minister aware that this is really a very serious position? Is he aware that, in Coventry on Saturday last, I had an old age pensioner to see me who is now receiving National Assistance, who has no savings, and who told me himself that he had to pay an increase of 2s. 6d. in price for the same amount of coal between October and November, had to pay another 8s. 9d. to have his shoes repaired, and that he just had not got the money?
  Mr. Watkinson: That is exactly what we are doing, and that is why we are carrying out a full-scale inquiry in more than 20,000 households, in a reasonably large number of which there are old age pensioners. These are exactly the kind of facts that we are now collecting.
  Sir G. Lloyd: Is it not the duty of the National Assistance Board to take all these factors into account, including those involved in the hon. Lady's supplementary question?
  Mr. Gowerasked the Minister of Labour if he will set out the changes in the retail price index for each half-year since the beginning of 1947, stating all figures in terms based upon a 1947 figure of 100.
  Mr. Watkinson: As the reply includes a table of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the Official Report. My hon. Friend might like to know, however, that the average figure for 1953 shows no change.
  Mr. Gower: Does not the fact that there was no change make nonsense of extravagant Opposition propaganda, calculated, as it is, to stimulate unreasonable demands for wage increases and pensions?
  Following is the reply:
  The Interim Index of Retail Prices was introduced in June, 1947, and figures in this series cannot be given for the first half of 1947. Taking the level of prices in June, 1947, as represented by 100, the following are the averages of the index figures for each half-year since that date, together with the changes compared with the previous half-year:

  Half-year

  Average index figure

  Change since previous half-year

  1947–2nd half

  102

  —

  1948–1st half

  107

  +5

  2nd half

  108

  +1

  1949–1st half

  110

  +2

  2nd half

  112

  +2

  1950–1st half

  114

  +2

  2nd half

  115

  +1

  1951–1st half

  121

  +6

  2nd half

  128

  +7

  1952–1st half

  134

  +6

  2nd half

  137

  +3

  1953–1st half

  140

  +3

  July-Oct.

  140

  Nil

  NATIONAL SERVICE

    Farmworkers (Deferment)
    Mr. G. Jegerasked the Minister of Labour whether he is now in a position to state the result of his review of the present system of deferments of farmworkers, with a view to allowing a change of employer within the industry.
    Mr. C. Hughesasked the Minister of Labour if he has now arrived at a decision regarding the call-up for National Service of farmworkers who transfer from one farm to another; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Watkinsasked the Minister of Labour whether he will make a further statement about the proposed call-up of farm workers who have transferred from farms after their deferment and for which further applications for deferment are pending.
    Mr. Watkinson: My right hon. and learned Friend has already explained the difficulties of principle that he feels about this problem. Nevertheless, we recognise the strength of the representations made to us that it would be a

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    serious set-back to production on the small farms if we were to start, at this stage, refusing all applications for further deferment of men who have had deferment on one farm and change their employment. Accordingly, for these practical reasons, we are prepared to allow the old practice to continue for the time being. We propose, however, to review the position again towards the end of next summer in the light of further experience.
    Mr. Jeger: Will the hon. Gentleman consult the National Farmers' Union and the unions catering for agricultural workers on this question? Does he realise that there is a great sense of grievance and injustice about tieing men to specific farms or farmers, instead of to the industry generally, which would be an advantage.so far as production is concerned?
    Mr. Watkinson: That does apply under the present arrangements.
    Commander Donaldson: Will my hon. Friend also take into consideration the great concern in Scotland on this subject, and make it clear that the answer he has just given applies to Scotland as well?
    Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir.
    Science and Mathematics Teachers (Exemption)
    Mr. Morleyasked the Minister of Labour if he will consider taking measures to exempt intending teachers of science and mathematics in secondary schools from military service.
    Mr. Watkinson: My right hon. and learned Friend has not yet received any representations on this matter.
    Mr. Morley: Is the Minister aware of the very great scarcity of science and mathematics teachers in secondary schools, and of the fact that that scarcity will be considerably increased when the post-war higher birth-rate affects the secondary schools in three years' time? Would it not be in the national interest to give some such inducement as this to science and mathematics graduates to take up the teaching profession?
    Mr. Watkinson: We still have had no representations.
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Are we to assume that the Minister of Education has not made the Minister of Labour aware of the difficulties experienced in this field?
    Mr. Langford-Holt: Will my hon. Friend undertake to reconsider the whole question of calling up in peacetime, at considerable expense for training, those who, in no circumstances, would be required to serve in the Armed Forces in wartime?
    Mr. Watkinson: We are always only too pleased to look at any of these problems, and if my hon. Friend and any other hon. Gentleman likes to make any representations we will certainly consider them.
    Mr. Marquand: Will the hon. Gentleman ask his right hon. and learned Friend to review again the work of the Hankey Committee on technical personnel during the war, and to consider whether the time may not have come for possibly a temporary resurrection of that committee?
    Mr. Watkinson: We will certainly have a look at that.

  NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

    Rehabilitation Centres
    Mr. Slaterasked the Minister of Health how many rehabilitation centres were taken over by his Department through the introduction of the National Health Service Act; and what plans he has for extending this service.
    The Minister of Health (Mr. Iain Macleod): On the introduction of the National Health Service, in addition to some 300 hospitals with facilities for rehabilitation, eight residential rehabilitation centres were taken over; seven residential centres for the rehabilitation of miners have since been brought within the Service. There are now 475 hospitals with facilities for rehabilitation, and hospital authorities are encouraged to develop these facilities so far as their resources allow.
    Mr. Slater: Would the Minister circulate a statement in the Official Report to show where these rehabilitation centres are that have been taken over, and his proposals for extending these services?
    Mr. Macleod: I am very happy to take any convenient way of giving the House information. If the hon. Gentleman puts down a Written Question I can then circulate the answer in the Official Report.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Is the Minister aware of the anxiety expressed by the Tees-side hospital authorities about the shortage of adequate facilities which have resulted in tens of thousands of man hours being lost each year in that area and has he received any representations from Newcastle-upon-Tyne?
    Mr. Macleod: No representations have been received, so far as I am aware. The figures I have given of increase from 300 to 475 hospitals are most impressive. There may well be difficult periods. If the hon. Member likes to write to me about the matter I will take it up.

    Old Age Pensioners (Chiropody)
    Miss Burtonasked the Minister of Health if he is aware that many old age pensioners cannot afford the necessary chiropody treatment even where this may be offered at a reduced charge; and if he will consider providing chiropody services as part of the National Health Service.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): My right hon. Friend regrets that under present circumstances it is not possible to extend the limited chiropody service available under the National Health Service.
    Miss Burton: Is the hon. Lady aware that the Coventry central committee for old people's welfare feel that for old people chiropody is as important as dental or medical treatment? Is she further aware that although some reduction of the charge has been made in Coventry, it does not cover all old age pensioners? Will she look into the matter again?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: I agree that this is a service which, if the finance were available, we should like to be able to provide. I accept the very real benefit of this service to old age pensioners where it is available. But the hon. Lady is aware of the many claims for the extension of existing priority services, and in the present limited economic circumstances we do not think it possible to extend a new service, especially when many other schemes for priority services.
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    which are often suggested by hon. Members on both sides of the House, still remain unfulfilled.

    Mental Hospitals (Nurses' Pay and Pensions)
    Mr. Mellishasked the Minister of Health what proposals he has for improving the wages and conditions of staff employed as nurses in mental hospitals.
    Mr. Blenkinsopasked the Minister of Health what effort has been made to make the rates of pay of trained mental nurses more attractive, in view of the shortage of trained staff.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: I understand that the rates of pay in mental nursing, including the rates for trained staff, are being referred for settlement by arbitration.
    Mr. Mellish: The Minister will be aware that the Parliamentary Secretary gave an undertaking during an Adjournment debate a little time ago that hospital authorities would be instructed to give increased wages and improved conditions forthwith, but that this undertaking has not been complied with. It would appear that the management side of the Whitley Council argued that these suggested increases should not be given to the fully paid staff. Can the Minister say what line he took with regard to these negotiations?
    Mr. Macleod: The hon. Member, who has great experience in this field, knows that it is not proper to go into details regarding Whitley Council negotiations. This matter has been referred to arbitration. The terms of reference are being arranged, and I hope that a speedy settlement will result.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the Minister aware that during that Adjournment debate the Parliamentary Secretary gave the impression that, in fact, this matter was coming to an early and final conclusion, and that, indeed, only some two days before that debate, this reference to arbitration had taken place? The offers from the management side did not meet the case at all.
    Mr. Macleod: That is precisely why the matter is being referred to arbitration.
    Mr. Mellish: Will the Minister be good enough to tell us the terms of reference of the arbitration?
    Mr. Macleod: They are at present being negotiated.
    Mr. Blenkinsopasked the Minister of Health whether his regulations provide that every year the mental hospital nurse serves counts double for pension purposes.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: In calculating the pension of a mental hospital nurse under the National Health Service (Superannuation) Regulations, every year in excess of 20 years' contributing service as such a nurse under the National Health Service is counted as two years. Earlier mental nursing service counts towards this period required before double reckoning is allowable, subject to certain conditions set out in the Regulations.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the Minister aware that, again, a rather misleading impression was given by the Parliamentary Secretary in the debate on this subject? According to Hansard, she said that every year served by a mental nurse counts for extra pension. That gives a wholly misleading impression to the country of the advantageous position of mental nurses. Does not that fact strengthen the necessity for giving more speedy attention to the matter of the wages paid to mental nurses if we are to solve this very real problem?
    Mr. Macleod: We must certainly look at the whole problem, but I think the hon. Gentleman is making rather heavy weather over the first half of his question. Very many experienced people, with a wide knowledge of mental health problems, were present, and none of them was misled. Indeed, I am informed that my hon. Friend used qualifying words to indicate that there were conditions before the double service counted.

    Old Age Pensioners (Prescription Charges)
    Mr. Gowerasked the Minister of Health if he will take steps to enable old age pensioners of modest means, who are not in receipt of National Assistance, to be relieved of the liability of paying the charges levied in respect of medical prescriptions; and if he will make a statement.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: No, Sir. This matter was fully discussed in the debates
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    on the National Health Service Act last year, and I cannot add anything to what was said in that discussion.
    Mr. Gower: Does not my hon. Friend agree that pensioners who are in receipt of only modest means are, at the end of the week, no better off than persons who receive National Assistance? That being so, should not their needs be given very sympathetic consideration?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: I think that my hon. Friend is under a misapprehension, because, if those old age pensioners are in no better position than people in receipt of the standard rate of National Assistance, then they can apply for a refund.
    Mr. Fernyhough: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that apart from the hardship to pensioners the Is. prescription charge is causing hardship to an ever growing number of people? Has not the time arrived when this unwarrantable and immoral imposition should be abolished?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: All our inquiries and investigations about the payment of this prescription charge have produced no evidence to bear out the hon. Gentleman's allegations. In some of the largest hospitals, in very congested and highly industrialised areas, there is no evidence to show that those who do not qualify for the refund, or who are not in receipt of a supplementary pension, find it any great hardship to pay the prescription charge.
    Mr. Marlowe: Is there any evidence that the hon. Gentleman opposite thought this proposal immoral when his Government introduced the necessary legislation?
    Mr. Fernyhough: Read Hansard.
    Mr. G. Thomas: On a point of order. The hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) has raised an important point of principle, and I wonder whether you, Mr. Speaker, can guide us in the matter. When an hon. Member is sorry for the way in which he has cast his vote and wishes to modify it, what redress is open to him to explain that he voted for this charge to be put on pensioners?
    Mr. Speaker: That does not seem to be a point of order.

    Aliens (Treatment)
    Mr. Speirasked the Minister of Health the number of aliens who have had free treatment under the National Health Service during the 12 months to the nearest convenient date, and, in particular, what was the number of persons of Egyptian nationality who have so benefited.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: I regret that this information is not available.
    Mr. Speir: Is there any information to show that many foreigners are coming here specifically for the purpose of obtaining free treatment? In the interests of the taxpayer, has not the time come to see that this free service is somewhat restricted?
    Mr. Macleod: There is not a great deal of evidence of that. The Socialist Party, when in office, took powers under the 1949 Act to make regulations in regard to that and those powers are still available if there is any widespread evidence of abuse.

    Mental Defectives, Derbyshire (Care)
    Mr. E. Wakefieldasked the Minister of Health if he will give details of the scheme prepared by the Derbyshire local health authority, and approved by him, under Section 28 of the National Health Service Act, 1946, giving power to the local health authority to take action, as indicated in circular 5/52, in connection with the short-term care of mental defectives in cases of urgency.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: The local health authority have not submitted any scheme to my right hon. Friend in relation to this circular.
    Mr. Wakefield: Can my hon. Friend say whether, even in the absence of such a scheme, the local health authority in Derbyshire have the power to make short-term arrangements for taking charge, for instance, of mentally defective children when their parents are in a state of collapse?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: If the local authority takes advantage of the powers under Section 28 it can board the children out and pay for their maintenance; or arrange for admission to hospital in
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    suitable cases, for which no special power is needed.
    Mr. Champion: In the absence of any action by the Derbyshire County Council to provide these facilities, what action is the Minister taking?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: To establish the existing arrangements I would require notice of a further question, but it is within the power of local authorities, and within their local knowledge, to apply for the powers if they feel it is necessary. If the hon. Member desires further information he will, no doubt, put down a Question.

    Expectant Mothers, Hove (Accommodation)
    Mr. Marloweasked the Minister of Health why he has refused a local inquiry into the closing of the Portland Road, Hove, annexe of the Sussex Maternity Hospital, and why expectant mothers in Hove who require lying-in accommodation cannot obtain such accommodation under the National Health Service within their borough, but must go to the county borough of Brighton or the urban district of South-wick.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: I do not think I can usefully add to the reply I gave to my hon. and learned Friend on 26th November, 1953.
    Mr. Marlowe: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in such matters a non-county borough is in a difficult position, because these decisions are made at a county level where the borough is hopelessly outnumbered? The responsibility, therefore, is all the more on the Minister to see that the non-county borough is able to voice its opinion properly. A local inquiry would have done so. My right hon. Friend has never answered that question.
    Mr. Macleod: I am satisfied that the decision was a correct one. Although I appreciate my hon. and learned Friend's point about the distinction between a county and a non-county borough, this is not a local authority matter but fundamentally a regional hospital board matter. I have discussed it with the chairman of the regional hospital board, who is satisfied that the decision is right.

    Hospitals (New Towns)
    Mr. Sparksasked the Minister of Health in which new towns new hosiptals have been built.
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Minister of Health if he will make a statement with regard to the provision of hospital facilities for the new towns.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: It is for the regional hospital boards to plan the development of hospital facilities, and I know that the boards for the regions concerned are aware of the needs of the new towns and take them into account. Present limitations on hospital capital development generally have so far prevented any large scale new building to meet these needs and no new hospital has been built. Meanwhile, reliance must be placed on existing hospitals, at many of which additional facilities have been provided.
    Mr. Sparks: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is a growing deficiency of hospital accommodation in the new towns, and that the building of new hospitals really ought to keep pace with the increase in population? Will he keep this matter under his very close attention, because the service is definitely lagging behind?
    Mr. Macleod: Yes, certainly. I am well aware of the difficulties.
    Mr. Robinson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that special consideration has been given by all other Departments to other essential services in the new towns? Why is his Department falling behind in this respect? Is he aware that this is quite beyond the powers of any regional hospital board to cope with this problem out of their normal capital resources?
    Mr. Macleod: Certainly, and in the region which the hon. Member has in mind I have agreed to meet a deputation to discuss this. It is true, of course, that the cost of a new hospital, which is now anything from £1 million to £4 million, is far too big for it to be possible for a region to provide from its own funds. When new building becomes possible it will have to be met out of central funds.

    New Hospital Construction
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Minister of Health how many new hospitals are
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    under construction in England and Wales, showing mental hospitals and mental deficiency hospitals separately.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: One new mental deficiency hospital near Southport, for which preliminary site works are in progress.
    Mr. Robinson: Will the right hon. Gentleman not agree that that is a very disappointing reply? Does he not also agree that this country is steadily falling behind practically every other European country? Is he not aware that in France, Italy, Switzerland and all the Scandinavian countries there are excellent modern post-war hospitals?
    Mr. Macleod: I am certainly aware that it has not been possible to build new hospitals since the war; but, after all, none was built in the six years in which the party opposite were in power. At least we are now making a start.
    Mr. Marquand: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that he told me only a week or two ago, in a Written answer to a Question, that during the first two years of his Government's administration there was less capital expenditure each year for hospitals than in the previous two years?
    Mr. Macleod: The right hon. Gentleman must study the allocation for next year.
    Mr. Paget: Has the right hon. Gentleman sufficient staff for his existing hospitals?
    Mr. Macleod: In many cases the problems of staff are not so much those of total number as of distribution. There are, and remain, very considerable problems in sanatoria and in the mental field. That is one of the matters that we were discussing earlier in relation to a pay claim that has now gone to arbitration.

    Children's Spectacle Frames
    Mr. E. L. Mallalieuasked the Minister of Health whether, in accordance with the terms of his recent letter to the Joint Emergency Committee of the Optical Profession on National Health Service lenses in non-National Health Service frames, persons up to and including the age of 15 years may now be supplied with frames outside the standard range specified in Part III, Section A, and

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    Part IV, Section A, of the Minister's directive, E.C.N. 102; and what charges are applicable.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: This would be within the terms of my right hon. Friend's recent letter, but he trusts that parents will select suitable sturdy spectacle frames for their children, and that opticians will encourage them to do so. The charges for frames supplied privately would depend on private contract.
    Mr. Mallalieu: Is this not an alteration of the Act since, under the Schedule, children were formerly only allowed to be supplied with frames under Part IIIA, and two frames under Part IVA?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: There was some doubt about that, and therefore, executive councils have been invited, on the ground that the regulations were in some doubt, not to take action against opticians who did so supply frames. It is not illegal to supply children with adult types of National Health Service frames under the regulations.
    Mr. Mallalieu: If there is some doubt about this, surely the Minister should not attempt to alter the Act merely by means of a letter.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: He has not altered the Statute. He has given what is regarded as a better interpretation.

    Prescription Costs (Redaction)
    Mr. G. Longdenasked the Minister of Health whether he can give any information about the results of the steps he has taken to encourage doctors to reduce the cost of their prescribing in order to release funds for improvements elsewhere in the National Health Service.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: Yes, Sir. While the average cost of a prescription has hitherto increased progressively every year since the National Health Service started, I am glad to say that in August the estimated cost fell to about 1½d. less than in August, 1952. This was maintained in September and there was a further reduction to 2d. in October.
    I am glad to have this opportunity to thank the Joint Committee on Prescribing for their valuable work in classifying preparations, and the General Medical Services Committee of the British Medical Association and the whole body of general practitioners for their co-operation in producing this encouraging result.
    Mr. Longden: Can my right hon. Friend say whether this very satisfactory result follows upon the advice given to general practitioners about prescribing drugs of doubtful therapeutic value?
    Mr. Macleod: It seems almost certain that the two are linked, because the letter to which my hon. Friend refers was sent out by my Chief Medical Officer on 18th July, and the first noticeable drop was in the month following.
    Dr. Summerskill: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider giving instructions to doctors not to prescribe certain drugs if there is an equivalent in the National Formulary?
    Mr. Macleod: I think that would be too big an interference with the ordinary discretion of doctors. In view of the satisfactory results of co-operation, I think we should continue along these lines.
    Mr. Hamilton: Is the Minister aware that this is precisely the practice in Scotland?
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Can the Minister say, in judging what sort of savings have been effected, whether the number of prescriptions has gone up or down?
    Mr. Macleod: My impression is that the number itself is about the same, but I will give details if the hon. and gallant Gentleman wants them.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH

    Old People's Homes
    Miss Burtonasked the Minister of Health what progress he has made in collecting information from local authorities concerning the services and amenities offered to old people resident in homes run by the local authorities as mentioned by him on 26th October last; and if he will consider publishing a booklet containing this information for the benefit of local authorities and of Members.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: A comprehensive picture can be drawn from the reports of my right hon. Friend's inspecting officers. My right hon. Friend does not feel that publication of a booklet as suggested by the hon. Lady would be the best way of making use of this material, but he is considering including in the Annual Report of the Department for 1953 a

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    short section showing progress and developments since the National Assistance Act came into force in 1948.
    Miss Burton: While thanking the hon. Lady for the last part of her reply, may I ask whether she is aware that these services and amenities vary very much from local authority to local authority and that the more bias the authority has towards the pensioner the better use the old folk can make of the small amount of money left to them? Will she try to make the reference as comprehensive as possible?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: I agree with the hon. Lady that there is great diversity in local authority homes as well as diversity in the type of resident, from the extremely infirm to the comparatively able-bodied. We feel that a better result can be achieved by the inspecting officers, who can pass on and recommend the better practice of the good areas to the less good areas and probably achieve more by so doing than we could by publishing a booklet.

    Artificial Limbs (Repair)
    Mr. Simmonsasked the Minister of Health why Mr. C. E. S. Joyce, Ottershaw, had to wait from 29th April, 1953, to 27th October, 1953,for his artificial arm, which was delivered at Roehampton for repairs on the earlier date.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: The delay was due to the need for major repairs, the abnormal volume of repair work falling on the contractor, and a shortage of staff in his Department owing to sickness. I should add that a duplicate, said to be satisfactory, was available for use, and as soon as this was reported early in October to be uncomfortable, immediate action was taken to complete the repairs.
    Mr. Simmons: Six months is rather a long time. I have since heard of an officer, a Mr. Denham, of the British Limbless Ex-Serviceman's Association, who waited 3½ months for an artificial, below-the-knee leg. Cannot the Minister get his Parliamentary Secretary, who, in my constituency advertised her knowledge of "old sweats," to go and talk to some of these "old sweats"?
    Mr. Macleod: I very much regret this delay, which was far too long, and I am
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    genuinely grateful to the hon. Member for drawing it to my attention. I will look into it myself.
    Mr. Simmonsasked the Minister of Health the average time taken, from delivery at Roehampton to return to the amputee, for repairs to artificial arms during the periods January to July, 1953, and August to November, 1953.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: The average time taken for repairs to artificial arms was 50 days and 70 days respectively.
    Mr. Simmonsasked the Minister of Health the average time taken, from delivery at Roehampton to return to amputee, for repairs to artificial legs during periods January to July and August to November, 1953.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: The average time taken for repairs to artificial legs was 30 days and 35 days respectively.
    Mr. Simmons: Is it not apparent that, since the Ministry of Pensions has ceased to have responsibility for these repairs, there has been a longer time lag? Will the Minister do his best to see that Roehampton is not penalised by the change in administration?
    Mr. Macleod: I will certainly do my best, but I really think that to suggest that a firm which is providing artificial limbs for ex-Service men is going to alter its skill and time of delivery purely because there has been a Departmental change is quite unworthy of the hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Simmons: I am making no imputation at all against the firm, but against the change in administration, because, after all, they have to work under the administration of the right hon. Gentleman's Department.
    Major Legge-Bourke: Can my right hon. Friend give us an absolute assurance that the fact that the two Ministries have merged has no relevance whatever to the increased time involved in repairs?
    Mr. Macleod: None at all.

    Water Supplies (Fluoridation)
    Mr. Doddsasked the Minister of Health with which local authorities he has been able to arrange experiments in the fluoridation of water supplies before

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    a decision is taken as to whether it should be generally adopted.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: This matter is still under consideration, and no authority has yet been approached.
    Mr. Dodds: In view of the importance of this matter and the fact that several weeks ago it was announced in the House that arrangements would be made with local authorities, can the Parliamentary Secretary say when progress is likely to be made?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: I do not accept the implication that no progress has been made. In choosing a particular area for a study of this kind, great care has to be taken regarding the size and compactness of the area, and also its water supply. That study is now being carried out, but the decision as to the exact areas has not yet been made.

    Disabled Persons (Motor Tricycles)
    Captain Ryderasked the Minister of Health if he will prescribe separate regulations and conditions of issue of motor-propelled tricycles for limbless and other badly wounded ex-Service men, distinct from those for National Health Service patients, so as to ensure that any necessary restrictions and economies in connection with this scheme for National Health Service patients do not have adverse repercussions on the much smaller numbers of war-disabled pensioners affected.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: My hon. and gallant Friend appears to be under some misapprehension. This matter is not governed by regulations and I am not aware of any restrictions or economies which have had or are likely to have the effect he foresees.
    Captain Ryder: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that this is not my own apprehension, but the apprehension of the very severely disabled ex-Service men who feel that their claim may well be overlooked and swamped by the very much larger claims of the civilian population?
    Mr. Macleod: I understand the point which my hon. and gallant Friend is putting to me, but he will be aware that, with the exception of cars, there is no
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    differentiation between war pensioners and those who suffer such disabilities in the ordinary way of life.

    Day Nurseries, Middlesex
    Mr. Sparksasked the Minister of Health if he will take steps to transfer the administration of day nurseries from the Middlesex County Council to those county district councils of Middlesex who are willing to accept the responsibility.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: No, Sir, and in any case the county district councils have no power to provide day nurseries.
    Mr. Sparks: That is precisely what I am asking the right hon. Gentleman to take powers to do. Is the hon. Lady aware that when the Middlesex County Council took over the day nurseries from the district councils they showed great indifference, and even hostility, and that their administrative policy is leading to a disintegration of the service and, finally, to its elimination? Before that stage of elimination arrives will the hon. Lady give the district councils the opportunity to take over these day nurseries again so that they may continue?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: My right hon. Friend is satisfied that the Middlesex County Council will continue to meet the needs for this day nursery accommodation as necessary. He does not feel it advisable to introduce what would necessarily be legislation to meet the extension for which the hon. Gentleman has asked.
    Mr. Sparksasked the Minister of Health if he will give a direction to the Middlesex County Council that the children of Service men shall not be excluded from day nurseries where the wife is compelled to seek employment because of the inadequacy of the Service allowance.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend is satisfied that Service families have their needs considered by the county council on the same grounds as other families.
    Mr. Sparks: Under the new formula for admission that means, in fact, that children of Service men will be put outside the day nurseries of Middlesex.
    Hon. Members: Question.
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member should ask a question, and not make a statement.
    Mr. Sparks: Is the hon. Lady aware of what I have said, that she is really misinformed on this point, and that if she will make inquiries she will find that there is some substance in the Question I have put down?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: From the information at my right hon. Friend's disposal we have an assurance from the Middlesex County Council that their new proposals will not alter their existing priority categories for admission to day nurseries, so the position of a Service family should be in no way worsened from its former position.

    M.O.H. Service (Recruitment)
    Mr. Snowasked the Minister of Health whether he is satisfied with the number of newly-qualified doctors entering the two-year training period prior to qualifying for acceptance as medical officers of health.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: My right hon. Friend understands that there has recently been some increase in the numbers, but he would be glad to see a still larger number of doctors taking this qualification.
    Mr. Snowasked the Minister of Health to what extent the appropriate authorities are having difficulty in filling vacancies in the medical officer of health service.
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: I am informed that the difficulties which were experienced shortly after the war in filling vacancies to the public health service are now much less, but my right hon. Friend is keeping the position under review.
    Mr. Snow: Although the difficulties may be less, is the hon. Lady aware that they are still causing considerable concern in responsible professional circles, that in the past there has been a tendency in the medical profession rather to look down upon the doctor who goes into public service of this type, and that this situation should be rectified by Government encouragement?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: The hon. Member will be aware that post-graduate training is under the universities and does
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    not come under the Ministry, but we have had not representations from local authorities, county councils, or the like, that they are experiencing any great difficulty in filling vacancies of this kind. Were we to receive such representations they would be seriously considered.
    Dr. King: Is the Minister satisfied that the salaries paid to medical officers of health compare fairly with those earned by the profession outside and by other local government officers?
    Miss Hornsby-Smith: That is very much another question and has many implications. Perhaps the hon. Member would like to put down a Question.

    Tuberculosis, Wales
    Mr. Gowerasked the Minister of Health why information and statistics about tuberculosis and its incidence in Wales, which were collated by the Welsh Board of Health and published by his Department before the last war, are no longer available; if he will arrange for such information to be published in the same way as formerly; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Iain Macleod: Separate information and statistics about tuberculosis in Wales continue to be available, but, like other general information relating to the health services, they are not separated when published in the Ministry's Annual Report for England and Wales. I will certainly consider my hon. Friend's suggestion.
    Mr. Gower: Will my right hon. Friend seriously consider this matter? Is he aware that the Welsh Tuberculosis Campaign Committee is sadly handicapped in its work by the lack of information which was formerly available?
    Mr. Macleod: I will certainly consider it. It will, of course, add greatly to the length of the Report to give the information in the terms suggested. My right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary has said that there is to be an annual digest of Welsh statistics, and it may well be that it can find a useful place in that.
    Mr. G. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that these figures were published before the war, and in any digest to be published will he give the figures of those who have

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    to pay for their medicine although suffering from T.B., because they would be new figures?
    Mr. Macleod: I am not sure that that particular division is a feasible one, but I will certainly consider this matter and see how best the information may be given.

  ATOMIC ENERGY

    Fissile Material (Military and Industrial Uses)
    Mr. E. Fletcherasked the Prime Minister on what basis the amount of fissile material estimated to be available in 1954 will be divided between military purposes and civil purposes, respectively.
    The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): I am advised that it would not be in the public interest to answer the hon. Member's Question.
    Mr. Fletcher: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the great concern that is felt, not only among scientists and workers in nuclear research but among the public generally, that in the interests of world peace the greatest possible amount of fissile material should be available for industrial and economic purposes?
    The Prime Minister: Yes, I will certainly bear that in mind.

    Exchange of Information
    Mr. E. Fletcherasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had at Bermuda with President Eisenhower with regard to enlarging the exchange of information between this country and the United States of America about atomic weapons and atomic research.
    The Prime Minister: That is just what I am going to tell the House a little later.

  EDUCATION

    Technological Institutions (Grants)
    Mr. W. Wellsasked the Minister of Education (1) on what grounds her Department is rejecting applications for a 75 per cent. grant in respect of courses in architecture in technological institutions;
    (2) on what grounds her Department is rejecting applications for a 75 per cent. grant in respect of courses in interior decoration in technological institutions;
    (3) on what grounds her Department is rejecting applications for a 75 per cent. grant in respect of courses in dietetics in technological institutions.
    The Minister of Education (Miss Florence Horsbrugh): The special rate of grant is intended to encourage the development of advanced courses in technology which will lead directly to an increase of industrial efficiency and productivity. I regret that I cannot regard the subjects mentioned by the hon. Member as satisfying these conditions.
    Mr. Wells: In view of the importance of the design of buildings to industrial efficiency, is not this a wrong interpretation of the Minister's own directive? Secondly, in view of the national importance of the other two subjects mentioned, is not the whole regulation in need of redrafting and widening?
    Miss Horsbrugh: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the 60 per cent. grant is already being given, and I am not aware that the provision of courses for architects, interior decorators and such is inadequate. I understand that sufficient numbers are being trained for these professions.

    Expenditure
    Dr. Strossasked the Minister of Education the total expenditure on education in England and Wales for the years 1952 and 1938.
    Miss Horsbrugh: The total expenditure from the Exchequer and rates combined on educational services within the purview of my Department was about £97·4 million for 1938–39 and about £339·5 million, on the basis of the pre-audit returns of local authority expenditure, for 1952–53.
    Dr. Stross: In terms of a percentage of the gross national income, is not that roughly 2 per cent. for 1938 and about 2·2 per cent. for current spending? If the Minister agrees that that is the case, will she not press for further financial assistance to see that education is given higher priority?
    Miss Horsbrugh: Education is given a high priority, but while listening to the

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    hon. Gentleman's supplementary question I have not yet had time to do the arithmetic and work out the percentage.
    Miss Bacon: Could the right hon. Lady give the figures for the number of children in school on those particular dates?
    Miss Horsbrugh: Certainly, if the hon. Lady will put a Question down. I have not the numbers with me now.
    Mr. Llewellyn: Could my right hon. Friend give the statistics separately for England and Wales without undue administrative trouble?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I will certainly look into that.

    Teachers (Professional Status)
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Education whether she will set up a committee to consider generally the salaries, conditions and professional status of teachers.
    Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. It is the function of the Burnham Committees which have been set up under Section 89 of the Education Act, 1944, to consider and make recommendations on the subject of teachers' salaries.
    Mr. Willey: I fully recognise the importance of the work of the Burnham Committees, but does the Minister appreciate that, owing to the very desirable widening of access to other professions, there is a case for improving the general status of the teaching profession?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I do not think that the suggestion which the hon. Member makes will go very far towards improving the status of the teaching profession. Its status has been increased, and those who are serving on the Burnham Committees are looking into the question.
    Mr. K. Thompson: Is the Minister aware that there is not universal satisfaction with the make up of the present Burnham Committees? Will she keep that part of this subject under review?
    Miss Horsbrugh: I think we would all agree that there is not absolutely universal agreement within many committees, but that these Committees with their panels of employers and employees, are doing their work extremely well.
    Sir W. Smithers: On behalf of myself and the whole House, I should like to be allowed, if I may, to congratulate you, Sir, on your very nice Christmas present—the arrival of your grandson.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The intervention of the hon. Member was highly irregular, but very agreeable.

  FEDERAL ASSEMBLY, RHODESIA AND NYASALAND (GIFT)
  Mr. Attlee(by Private Notice)asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations whether Her Majesty's Government will take any steps to mark the inauguration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the establishment of a Federal Assembly.
  The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. John Foster): Yes, Sir. Her Majesty's Government have authorised me to propose to you, Mr. Speaker, that you should on behalf of this House offer the gift of a mace to the Federal Assembly. The gift would be a token of our good will and welcome to the new Parliament, and it would carry with it our warm congratulations to the peoples of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and our best wishes for their future happiness and prosperity.
  Mr. Speaker: If the House desires, I shall be very happy to undertake that duty.
  Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal to state the business for the week after the Recess?
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for the first week after the Christmas Recess will be as follows:
TUESDAY, 19TH JANUARY—Second Reading: Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.
Committee stage: Money Resolution.
Second Reading: Licensing (Seamen's Canteens) Bill [Lords].
WEDNESDAY, 20TH JANUARY—Committee stage: Housing Repairs and Rents Money Resolution, until about 7 o'clock;
Afterwards, we propose to consider the following Scottish business:
Committee stage: Housing (Repairs and Rents) (Scotland) Money Resolution.
Report and Third Reading: Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Bill.
THURSDAY, 21ST JANUARY—Second Reading: Mines and Quarries Bill.
Report stage of the two Housing Money Resolutions.
FRIDAY, 22ND JANUARY—Conclusion of Second Reading debate on Mines and Quarries Bill.
Committee stage of necessary Ways and Means Resolution relating to the Bill.
As the House is aware, provision already exists for the House to be recalled if an earlier meeting should be necessary in the public interest.
Sir H. Williams: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether any opportunity will be given to discuss the Report of the Committee of Privileges, which has become available today?
Mr. Crookshank: As my hon. Friend rightly says, that Report is now available. Of course, reports from the Committee of Privileges are not always discussed in this House by any manner of means. Perhaps, on further consideration, the House may agree with the Committee
576
itself that the dignity and the interest of the House would be best looked after by leaving the matter where it stands.
Mr. Stokes: May I ask the Lord President of the Council whether he has yet given consideration to the Report of the Committee on Accommodation and Amenities, and whether he is aware that not much can be done until the Report has been approved or disapproved by the House?
Mr. Crookshank: In my personal capacity I have, naturally, looked at it, but it is all part and parcel of a larger problem, and I am not able to make any statement today.

BILL PRESENTED
LONG LEASES (SCOTLAND) BILL
"to enable lessees and sub-lessees occupying residential property in Scotland under certain long leases to obtain a feu right of such property on certain conditions; to extend and amend the Registration of Leases (Scotland) Act, 1857; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid"; presented by Mr. James Stuart; supported by the Lord Advocate and Commander Galbraith; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 52.]

ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS)
House, at its rising Tomorrow, to adjourn till Tuesday, 19th January.—[The Prime Minister.]
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr Buchan-Hepburn.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
3.35 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): The curious fact that the House prefers to give two days to the television White Paper and only one day to foreign affairs may be noted by future historians as an example of a changing sense of proportion in modern thought. It is, however, also a proof of how great a measure of agreement exists between our established parties on the present handling of foreign affairs. I shall not, therefore, need to consume much time in a debate which we are told may also have among its features the explanation of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) of his latest journalistic activities, and, possibly, his further reproof at the hands of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell).
Our relations with the United States, the international structure of Europe, our attitude towards the mighty power of Russia, and even the future of atomic energy and atomic weapons must indeed be dealt with, but I shall try not to allow them to bulk too largely upon our limited and crowded time. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will wind up the debate and will endeavour, when he presents his general survey, to supply all the gaps or details which I may omit. He, too, must keep his eye on the clock.
The Egyptian question raises differences among all shades of opinion on both sides of the House. I do not feel any sense of hurry. When lastI spoke on foreign affairs, on 11th May, the Egyptians had broken off their formal conference with us and were indulging in a cataract of most offensive threats. I said on that occasion:
"Naturally, we do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000 men at a cost of, it might be, over £50 million a year discharging the duty which has largely fallen upon us, and us alone, of safeguarding the interests of the free nations in the Middle East, and also of preserving the international waterway of the Suez Canal."
Further, on the same occasion, I said:
"Our hope is that negotiations will be resumed. In the meanwhile, we may await the development of events with the composure
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which follows from the combination of patience with strength."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 886–889.]
That is what we have done. Since then, informal discussions have been resumed, but I made it clear at Bermuda that there was no prospect of any modification of our position. There has been this flood of insults and boasting and a constant stream of minor outrages; otherwise, no change has taken place. We remain convinced, however, that it is in our interests, military and financial, to procure a redeployment of our forces in North Africa and the Middle East.
On some future occasion I may, perhaps, be able to welcome an opportunity of dealing with this subject fully, but I shall not attempt to do so today. All that I can say is that our action will be based on a careful and faithful study of the merits of the problem, and will not be dictated either by the violence of our foreign enemies or by the pressure of some of our best friends. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] There is no vitality in a party unless there are differences of opinion. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]
I was very glad to bring about the conference at Bermuda, although it was largely my fault that it was delayed for six months. I felt it most important that I should have long, intimate, secret talks with President Eisenhower, with whom I have worked on terms of close and growing friendship for over 11 years, about a lot of things which are easily settled if Britain and the United States understand one another and are in accord. We had some good talks.
I use the word "secret," by which I mean that everything said is not the subject of what is called a "handout" or even "guidance" to the world Press every evening, or necessarily embodied in a communiquéat the end. The results of conferences or private talks of this character should be conveyed to Parliament in the regular manner—as I am doing now—and should also manifest themselves not so much in words as in policy and action and improved relations as the months go by. This is, no doubt, very hard upon the Press. Having earned my livelihood by writing for them from my youth up, I have keen sympathy for them, but I am afraid they have got to realise that the tendency for keeping the world Press out of international conferences between

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heads of States or Governments is likely to increase with the march of time.
Science confronts us with fearful problems, yet at the same time marvellous improvements in locomotion have rendered personal intercourse between responsible people easy and swift to an extent never known before. If such a meeting as we had at Bermuda—I travelled back in 11 hours of flying time—or as, I hope, we are going to have in Berlin next month could have taken place between Germany, Austria, France. Russia and ourselves in 1914, as Sir Edward Grey desired, after the murder of the Archduke at Sarajevo, I believe, having lived through it all rather near the centre, that the First World War might have been, if not prevented, at any rate delayed, even though any communiqué published at the end of the conference would very likely have been both cryptic and platitudinous. This would not have applied in the same degree to the Second World War, because we were dealing with a ferocious maniac by whom the German nation, to its sorrow, had allowed itself to be gripped.
Now in every land the prime desire is for peace, not only in the hearts of the people, but I believe in the hearts, as it is certainly in the interests, of their Governments and rulers, and there will have to be many patient international conferences. The object of these will be to look at all we have in common as well as at our many differences. We must not expect too much of any of these conferences. We must cherish the hope of taking the nations out of the rut of machine-made haggling. Success will in all cases best be measured by easement rather than by headlines. I expect I shall be somewhat scolded for saying these things, but in old age popularity does not seem to be as important as in the days of youth, while, on the other hand, a little abuse on occasions may prove a necessary and invigorating stimulus.
With these introductory words, let me say that I went to Bermuda hoping to render ever more cordial and lively the vital relations between Britain and the United States. It would be a great pity if these were to be increasingly expressed in what I may call McCarthy-Bevanite terms. It would be very discreditable to the English-speaking world and disastrous
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to the whole world if this particular manifestation were to be regarded as other than a proof of our faith on both sides of the Ocean that in free communities free speech, however misused, can find its own correctives. It may be that the case I have mentioned will in the end prove the crowning example of the way democracy can overcome many of the necessary evils which it has to suffer in its progress.
At any rate, I can assure the House that the first object of the Bermuda Conference was to nourish Anglo-American friendship and co-operation; and that, I am sure, has been achieved. It was also a great pleasure to me and my right hon. Friend to welcome our French friends and to meet M. Bidault again, and for me for the first time to make the acquaintance of M. Laniel.
M. Laniel's very clear statement on his return to France effectively disposed of a lot of gossip and rumours, quite unfounded, which appeared in some French newspapers. I do not need to refer to them today. I must make it clear, however, that I learned in Bermuda that if E.D.C. were not ratified without undue delay by the French, the alternative solution of a wider N.A.T.O., including Germany, to which I had looked in this deplorable contingency, was likely to be beset by many difficulties, possibly by even fatal difficulties. There are many in the United States who share Dr. Adenauer's objections to the creation of a German national army, and, of course, President Eisenhower attaches the utmost importance to the formation of a European Army on the lines worked out after so much discussion and delay, and to which he has given such important personal service.
It was evident that the question of what might happen if E.D.C. were not accepted by the French had become for the time being unanswerable. I thought it my duty to give warning to our French friends at the conference of the gravity of the situation which might then occur. Germany must make her military contribution to the safety of Europe. We cannot, in any case, expect a robust and valiant people of 60 million to rest unarmed and defenceless in an unstable Europe for an indefinite period of time. These facts have got to be faced whether any of us in any country like them or not. All this

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has now been discussed in Paris. My right hon. Friend will be in a position to give a direct account to the House later in the debate of the work of N.A.T.O. and the recent conference.
Mr. Foster Dulles has stated in public the facts which were in my mind after having learned very plainly what the American position was. The phrase used by Mr. Foster Dulles about the situation possibly having to be "agonisingly reappraised" seemed to me most formidable. I must say personally that when the safety of France, indeed of Europe, depends upon the policy of the United States, all the possible consequences of abandoning E.D.C. should be placed squarely before the French people. I should not like it to be slurred over as a matter of little importance. It is of vital importance.
I must make it clear, however, that at Bermuda I was not trying to convince M. Bidault or M. Laniel of the need for E.D.C.; they are both ardent patriots who fought in the Resistance, and both have argued the case for E.D.C. in the French Chamber. The French Chamber, divided into so many parties, with all their intricate convictions and rivalries, may well find it difficult to come to any decision in favour of the policy which was so largely their own idea and in the hopes of which the wider security of Western Europe has been delayed for over three years.
At Bermuda I made it clear that we should keep our troops on the Continent at least as long as the American troops were kept there. I am still hopeful of a favourable solution for our difficulties, and I do not propose this afternoon to expatiate more than I have done, which is only suggestively, upon the various gloomy possibilities which imagination can so readily suggest. Hon. Members in all parts of the House have, I am sure, given enough thought and study to these matters to be able to speculate about them for themselves, though I hope these will not be their only thoughts during the Christmas festivities.
We were very glad that the Russians had at last accepted our invitation to meet us on the problems of Germany and Austria early in the New Year. We had no difficulty in agreeing among ourselves that this meeting should be held in
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Berlin, as proposed by the Soviet Government, and we suggested that it should begin on 4th January. We have not so far received their reply.
I used the opportunity of the conference to emphasise the view which I expressed here on 11th May that the Soviet Union is entitled to assurances against aggression after what she suffered at Hitler's hands. I think I was successful in impressing upon my colleagues at Bermuda the justice and the advantage of such a course, even though Russian strength is so vast. It is my hope that from the Berlin meeting there may emerge some means of providing the Russians with a sense of security arising from other facts than mere force. The whole world is in need of that.
Apart from the formal meetings of the three Powers, we took the opportunity of holding informal bilateral talks on matters of concern only to two of us. There were talks between the Americans and the French and between ourselves and the French as well as talks between ourselves and the Americans. As was to be expected, much of our time was devoted to the discussion of current difficulties in the Far East and South-East Asia. It is no secret that in this part of the world there have been some divergences of policy between the Western Powers. We discussed such questions as trade with China, recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, the admission of China to the United Nations organisation, Korean problems and even such awkward personalities as Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. I hope I shall not tempt hon. Membersin any part of the House to ask questions which in the present circumstances it would not be in the public interest for me to answer.
However, I can assure the House that on all these difficult problems which have so often been discussed here and which play their part in questions and answers, we were very glad to have this opportunity of making our views clear to the United States Administration and were grateful to them for the attention with which they heard us, even when they did not entirely agree. It would certainly be a great gain if there could be a rather close alignment of policies in this part of the world, and I hope that at Bermuda

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we may have laid foundations on which we can build with advantage over the coming months.
We naturally did not overlook questions connected with Persia and Trieste. About Persia I have only a word to say, but it is easier for me to talk about it than it is for the Foreign Secretary, because he deserves a compliment on the subject. Old friends like Britain and Persia sometimes have estrangements, but it is not right that these should continue for longer than need be. I am sure, therefore, that the House would wish to express its pleasure at the resumption of diplomatic relations with Persia and will join me in paying tribute to the perseverance of my right hon. Friend which, together with good will in Teheran, has ended the breach which has wasted so much Persian and British wealth.
Now I come to Trieste, which we also examined in the tripartite talks. Let me first welcome the steps which the Italian and Yugoslav Governments have agreed to take to bring the situation on their common frontier back to normal. This we regard as a happy augury for the success of the efforts which the Foreign Secretary, in close collaboration with the American Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister, has devoted to solving this stubborn problem. I have no doubt that, given time and good will, he and his distinguished colleagues will succeed in their task.
For what is our interest in this quarter? It is simply to withdraw our troops in conditions which will consolidate the forces of peace in that area and enable us to co-operate still more closely with our two friends whom this problem divides. We offered a solution which we thought both would accept. We are striving now to bring them to the conference table on mutually acceptable terms. It is our hope, and I think I might go so far as to say our expectation—we have to be awfully careful in these foreign affairs, but I think I can say our expectation—that they may find a way of reconciling their national interests with the requirements of international peace.
I was asked a question on the next subject this afternoon, and I am now
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proceeding to answer it. I discussed with the President a number of points about the atomic problem affecting our two countries. Lord Cherwell made definite progress in the autumn when the Americans agreed to exchange information with us about the affects on various targets of atomic explosions. As they have made 43 atomic tests against our three, they have a great deal of knowledge of these matters, so that this agreement is of considerable value. I hope that it will soon be put into effect. It was what may be called ratified at Bermuda, but it was made beforehand, and I hope that it will soon be put into effect.
The other important matter we discussed was the exchange of information on intelligence matters. We hope to enlarge the area over which these exchanges can take place without in anyway infringing the McMahon Act which has so often prevented co-operation between our two countries. It is this Act, of course, which sets limits to the exchange of technical information. But this is all getting into an easier atmosphere.
We in Britain have already discovered almost as much as our American allies, and it is probably true that our Russian fellow mortals—because that is what they are—may well know almost as much as either of us. At any rate, I hope that results will in due course become apparent which will bring Britain and the United States into closer, more agreeable and more fertile relationship upon atomic knowledge.
Secondly, the President and I have asked Lord Cherwell and Admiral Strauss, who are very good friends and may in some ways be considered opposite numbers, to prepare a record of the history of Anglo-American co-operation in the atomic field since the subject first cropped up during the war. When this compilation is completed, the President and I will consult together about publication, of course guided by our Governments.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition need not be at all concerned, because I am sure it will be shown that any error which could be attributed to him in negotiations was eventually and largely repaired by the technical activities which he promoted, in spite of the parliamentary lapses which

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have entailed, and which, as one who admires the causes for which Hampden died in the field and Pym upon the scaffold, naturally cause me painful reflection. However, we are in many ways following the precedent he has set.
After the President's arrival, in one of our earliest talks, he informed me of his intentions to deliver a speech to the United Nations on a new proposal for the future of atomic energy for industrial or for peaceful purposes. He gave me a copy of this document upon the policy of which many months of American thought in the highest circles had been concentrated. I asked his permission to show it to Lord Cherwell. Mr. Dulles had already given a copy to my right hon. Friend.
When I had received Lord Cherwell's report—and I had only a very short time to do it in—I wrote to the President saying I welcomed his proposal, as I thought it ended a long period of deadlock and might afford an opportunity for contact with the Soviets on the highest level. I suggested one or two alterations, not of course in the theme but in the preliminary and surrounding matter. I discussed with the President, but I was not aware when he left Bermuda what alterations he would make.
While we were at Bermuda all sorts of statements were made by the Press, whose fertility and imagination were remarkable. On the one hand, I was charged with trying to prevent the President from making his speech and, on the other, with having largely written it for him. I brought home the two opposite efforts, published in the clearest terms, in case the House should manifest any interest in this form of public entertainment. I can assure the House that I would never presume to write a speech for the President—I have quite enough trouble to make up my own. I did not see any of the Press myself or attempt to correct their stories; I thought it better to reserve this simple factual account for the House.
I consider this speech of the President as one of the most important events in world history since the end of the war. A few weeks ago, I spoke to the House about the ever-increasing destructive power which has now come into human hands, and also about the almost limitless
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material benefits which science can for the first time give to a peaceful age. As I meditated on the President's proposals, limited though they are in scope, and shrouded in technicalities as they are for laymen, I could not help feeling that we were in the process of what might prove to be a turning point in our destiny. I fervently hope that the Soviet Government will not ignore this beam of light through much darkness and confusion. I am sure of the sincerity and altruistic good will by which it was inspired, and I trust that they will advance with the confidence to which their own strength entitles them along a path which certainly leads in the direction of expanding the welfare and calming the fears of the masses of the people of all the world.
4.7 p.m.
Mr. C. R. Attlee: We are all glad to see the Prime Minister back from his journey and stay in Bermuda. He began by commenting on the length of time allotted for this debate. When we first heard that he was going to Bermuda, we thought it wise to stake out a claim for a two-day debate. But when we had the communiquéfrom Bermuda, it did not appear to us that there was enough material in that for two days. I thought that perhaps it might be a little filled out by the Prime Minister, but I really cannot think he has taken us much beyond the communiqué.
I thought that it was a very agreeable and a very seasonable speech; but he was, in effect, a Father Christmas without any presents. Therefore, I do not think that it would really be very useful, when there are not many new points to be dealt with, to repeat the debate which we had only a few weeks ago. Our position at that time was made very clear by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil), and there has not really been very much development since.
I think the right hon. Gentleman kept his only present until the end, and that was really President Eisenhower's. We are all agreed in welcoming this new-approach to the problem of atomic energy. It is hard for any of us to work out the details, the applications; I think the essence of it is that it is trying to create a new approach to the whole problem, and as such I am sure we all welcome it.

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I am glad, too, that there has been a very full talk, I gather, on the exchange of atomic information in hoping to get over the McMahon Act, which was such a hindrance to us. The right hon. Gentleman talked about repairing defects. He had forgotten that we had to repair certain defects in the Quebec Agreement and that has taken a pretty long time, but I do not want to go into any detail on those matters, except to say that we always considered that this was a matter in which we did need the closest collaboration with our American friends, and that we can claim that this country—it is sometimes forgotten—may make an enormous contribution in the development of atomic energy through our scientists.
We have shown proof that we have our resources in scientific knowledge and their application. In fact, I think that, despite the fact that, for reasons which everybody knows, the whole matter of atomic energy was committed to the United States during the war, we have actually caught up, and I think it is greatly to the credit of our scientists and our Administration.
As the Prime Minister has said, this has always been rather a secret matter. He rather inclined to attribute that secrecy to me. I can assure him that it was an inheritance from the wartime Government. In fact, we were all kept in the dark about this; and no doubt he acted on the same advice as we did from our military advisers as to the need for the greatest secrecy. Therefore, I have nothing to complain of there.
I should like to say just one thing, however, because I thought that the Prime Minister said one thing which might be depressing to Members of the House who were hoping to become leaders of political parties. It is always thought that Pym was the first great Parliamentary leader: it would be regrettable if it were thought that he died on the scaffold. I understand that he died in his bed.
The Prime Minister: "The causes for which Hampden died in the field and Sidney upon the scaffold."
Mr. Attlee: I think it was a slip of the tongue—
The Prime Minister: It was a slip of the tongue and not an exposure of ignorance.
Mr. Attlee: As a matter of fact, I think that Sidney died on the scaffold not strictly on Parliamentary matters but because he was a fervent Republican. However, that may be one of the right hon. Gentleman's causes some time in the future.
I turn to one or two other matters. There is this matter of Egypt. I hope that we shall hear more on that from the Foreign Secretary, because these talks hang on for a very long time. I am not attributing blame to the Government in this; goodness knows, I have reason to know how difficult the Egyptians are in negotiation. But I am quite sure that we are right to try to get a settlement on this. Therefore, we on this side of the House have no sympathy with those who are suggesting that the negotiations should be scrapped, quite apart from the fact that, as everyone who has studied it knows, the 1936 Treaty is not an awfully good thing to fall back upon.
What we want to see is that in these negotiations there should be no hanging out because of minor and unimportant matters. There is always a danger in negotiations, as there is a contest to and fro, that one side or the other will attach far too much importance to some quite minor point. But there are certain major points which we should like to stress once again.
There is, first of all, the position of the Suez Canal as an international waterway. It is really quite monstrous that the Canal should have been closed at the will of the Egyptian Government. Second, we do not want to keep masses of fighting troops in Egypt. On the other hand, we are vitally concerned with the whole peace of the Middle East, and it would be a dangerous thing if our going out were to lead to an undue accession of strength to one of the Middle Eastern States.
Then, I should like in that respect to say that we have had these recent troubles again between Israel and Jordan. One would like to see some initiative taken to try to get a greater settlement in this area. I think there is no doubt that at the present time there is a good deal of unrest, and in fact the Egyptian negotiations have caused a certain unrest in Israel, and it might be a good thing if there were a reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

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As everybody knows, that was one in which the three Powers concerned—ourselves, France and the United States of America—said quite clearly what would be done in the event of aggression. It would be just as well if that were reaffirmed. It does mean, of course, that inevitably one has to realise that somewhere or other, not necessarily in Egypt, there must be forces at hand. I think we should explore that very carefully. It is a very difficult problem in that area, and I do not want to lay down anything dogmatically on that; but we all hope that these Egyptian talks may succeed, because there is one of the most dangerous areas in the world, and one where we had our interests for a great many years.
I should like to turn from that for a moment to the Far East. The right hon. Gentleman did not say anything much about the progress or lack of progress at Panmunjom, but these negotiations are being dragged out, and I think that on this occasion the trouble is caused mainly from the Communist side. I think that the representative of the United Nations, Mr. Dean, was fully justified in the strong line that he took. One cannot hang out these negotiations for ever. One has to see whether they are genuine or not.
I would stress again, however, what has very often been said in these debates, that the question of the prisoners is only one preliminary item in the settlement of the Korean question, and that the settlement of the Korean question is only a preliminary to dealing with the whole of the Far Eastern situation. I do not know how far—the Prime Minister has not told us, naturally perhaps—we are approaching any agreement on the settlement in the Far East between ourselves and the United States of America because there are these divergencies and it is best to face them. They cannot be glossed over, but the more we can discuss them in the larger atmosphere of the international situation, I think the nearer we shall get to an agreement.
Then there comes the next point, and that is what is going to happen if we get the conference at Berlin. I rather expected the right hon. Gentleman would have said something about that because, although this meeting at Berlin is perhaps a thing of not very great moment, it has resulted really from his speech of 11th May. It is not what we wanted. I
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expressed my doubt at that time as to whether a meeting of Foreign Secretaries would be productive of anything very much. Again, we suggested there that we wanted to discuss that in the larger context of the settlement of Europe and the larger question of trying to reduce the heavy burden of armaments.
But I do not believe that it was ever suggested that the conference is bound to fail. It may be that we can make some progress. It depends a great deal on the spirit in which we enter into this conference. There have been some encouraging signs because, when first the proposals were put up, there was a reply from Russia which seemed to be going to close the door. It was followed by another in which a number of the prerequisites were swept away.
We have also in our minds certain matters on which we cannot give way. We cannot give way on the need that, for a unified Germany, there must be free elections. I do not want to run through all these, but I should like to call attention to what I thought was a very wise passage in a leading article in "The Times" today. It says:
"There is, however, a danger that the western Powers may treat the conference merely as an exercise to prove the Russians wrong and, therefore, simply as something to be over and done with as soon as possible in order to clear the way for E.D.C. If that were to be the approach, and if the western Powers were to have not only firm minds (which they must have) but closed minds, the conference would fail even in its limited intention. French and other European opinion would be left unconvinced that the west had met fairly or had really explored the possibilities of agreement, and many hesitations about E.D.C. would remain."
E.D.C, again, is one of those matters which are not really in themselves of absolute prime importance. It is a contribution to the security of Europe. It is a contribution to the building up which we have had to do which was forced on us as part of the Atlantic community.
But I am sure that the most hopeful suggestion, although not worked out, of the speech of the Prime Minister of 11th May was the conception of some kind of Locarno, some kind of mutual agreement, so that we could get rid of the fears not only of ourselves and the Western nations, but also of the Russians.
Therefore, while I am not suggesting for a moment that we should say that we

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will throw everything aside and go into the conference, so to speak, naked and unarmed, yet when one does go into a conference one wants to go in as far as possible untrammelled by absolutely obstinate commitments. One wants to see if there is a better way or not. That applies equally strongly on the Russian side. It is no use their saying, "You must throw over your bases before we talk." If this is to be at all hopeful, it depends very much on the approach.
I do not want to say more at this time than that when the Foreign Secretary goes to this conference he knows that in the efforts to try to ensure the peace of the world he will carry with him the good will not only of hon. Members opposite but of hon. Members on this side of the House, and indeed of the whole country.
4.25 p.m.
Captain Charles Waterhouse: First, I should like to express my gratitude for the kindly remark that the Prime Minister made early in his speech about vitality. With greying hairs one becomes the more appreciative when one is referred to as a member of a group with vitality. I assure my right hon. Friend that we had no thought of exerting pressure on him when we put down our Motion.
[That this House, while recognising the obligation on both Great Britain and Egypt, after 1956, to co-operate in a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936 nevertheless, in view of the breaches by Egypt of the recently signed Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan which have been repeatedly condemned by the Foreign Secretary, of the persistent denial of free passage through the Suez Canal to cargoes destined for Israel and of the continued Egyptian acts of hostility towards Great Britain, urges Her Majesty's Government in these circumstances for the time being to suspend negotiations for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty forthwith, to withdraw such terms as may already have been offered, and for the present to retain in the Canal Zone sufficient armed forces to discharge our responsibilities for the defence of the Canal.]
We sought to give him kindly guidance, to put under his shoulder our friendly hands so that, should he on his arduous
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way make a slight stumble, we would be at hand to help him. I do not want to delay the House for too long, but I want to make it clear that I approach the whole question of Britain's position in the world in what is called a robust way.
I believe that our guidance and leadership are still needed. I believe the Commonwealth to be the greatest force for peace that the world has ever had. I believe that the Empire—and the Colonial Empire too—is the best means of guiding backward people to economic, social and political development. I therefore make no apology for standing foursquare behind our Empire today, and I glory in the word, "Empire."
The whole system gets a twofold challenge. One is from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) and his friends, who take the view that the colonial system is wrong, that the Empire is an anachronism and that the whole shooting match ought to be destroyed. He takes the opportunity of expressing that view in an Egyptian paper. Naturally, I do not like what he wrote, and I do not think that it was very appropriate that the right hon. Gentleman should so express himself in a foreign country, least of all in a country where intricate negotiations were taking place.
When the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale replies, he might perhaps deal with the rumour which reached me the other day that Major Salah Salem had been approached by him to write an article for "Tribune" but he refused on the ground that that publication was not quite wide enough in its circulation to justify it.
The other challenge is from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and his friends, who say that we are no longer powerful enough to hold our position as a great Empire and, therefore, we have to fade away. I remind the House that we have now in the field a larger Army than we have ever had in peace-time; apart from the United States, with whom armed contest is out of the question, our Navy is relatively stronger than ever it has been, and our Air Force is leading the world at least in design.
But Britain's position in the world was not built up on armed forces. It was built up on the wisdom and character

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of our people, on our ability to face and surmount difficulties and on our courage and determination to stand firmly when firmness was necessary. These are the bases on which British prestige has rested and continues to rest today. I think it very sad that at the moment of victory, when we were led by my right hon. Friend across the battlefields of Africa and Europe to Berlin and the final defeat of our enemies, hardly had that victory been won when we started a retreat in almost every field. We evacuated Burma, let her slide from the Empire, and this action was followed by a fearful civil war. We came out of India in a most untimely way. [Laughter.] It is no good hon. Members opposite laughing unless they are also prepared to laugh at a million dead bodies in India and 10 million people left homeless by their actions.
This country gave no moral support to the Dutch when they were in trouble in Indonesia, and to no small extent our troubles in Malaya may have arisen from that. We left Abadan at the behest of a nation which was breaking its treaties, and immediately we had great trouble in Egypt. All that was the legacy to my right hon. Friend from right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. It is my right hon. Friend and his colleagues who are doing their best to try to remedy these disasters with which they are faced. I do not blame my right hon. Friends at all in this matter. Least of all do I blame any individual among them. The particular one who is sometimes blamed wrongly in this matter is my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who, unhappily, has through illness been absent from the House during many of these recent events to which we take some exception.
We formed an agreement 12 months ago with Egypt over the Sudan. I do not call that a retreat, but I do call it an error, and I believe that all of us on this side of the House believe it to be a great error. It was agreed to in good faith by Her Majesty's Government, because they hoped that by so doing they might get better terms of agreement on the Canal. It is now suggested in certain quarters that we should be easy in our terms on an agreement on the Canal in order that we may get better treatment elsewhere.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Is the right hon. and gallant Member asserting that the agreement to give independence to the Sudan was a mere manoeuvre in order to improve our situation in Suez? Is that not a dastardly attack upon this House?
Captain Waterhouse: If the hon. Member would listen and not always attribute the worst motives and the most foolish ideas to everybody, he would understand perfectly well that I said nothing of the sort.
Mr. Crossman: The right hon. and gallant Member said it.
An Hon. Member: The right hon. and gallant Member is reading his speech.
Captain Waterhouse: I assure hon. Members that I am not reading it, but I feel that I am talking on a subject which is considered serious to Members on this side of this House, although anything to do with Britain and with the Empire is a matter of ridicule to some hon. Members on the other side and a full note is desirable.
I was saying that after this long series of retreats and withdrawals, some time we must decide that we have got to call a halt, and I say now that that time has come. It seems to me that should we withdraw today even under the appearance of pressure in Egypt, it would have a disastrous effect throughout the whole of the Commonwealth, and, for that matter, throughout the whole of the world. It might well be taken as a signal that "Britain has had it" and is no longer going to trouble to stand firm. It might be taken as being that; I am not for one moment saying that it really would be that.
What would be the effect throughout the Commonwealth? What would be the effect in India, whose allegiance to the Commonwealth today is by no means too sure? What would be the effect in South Africa, who, I believe, have promised a division for the Canal in case of trouble—and that is no small promise following the great efforts that South Africa has made in the last two wars. What would be the effect in Australia? I ask my right hon. Friend to have in mind the very remarkable letter that Mr. Casey wrote to "The Times" on 2nd May, in which he stressed the great efforts that Australians have made in that zone in

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two wars and the great importance which they now place on our position there.
I suggest that if we appear to retreat in face of pressure, we would give a signal to the Middle East that we are intending to get out and to relinquish our responsibilities. We would give a signal to the Sudan that our protecting hand, which has guided them for 60 or 70 years, is no longer behind them. What is more important still, I believe we would give a signal throughout the whole of Africa and our great possessions there that Britain was tired of her responsibilities and intended to withdraw.
On what terms are we today negotiating? We do not know. This House has never been told. The country has never been told. We are having to base our arguments, our fears and our hopes on what appears in the papers from Egyptian sources. We are told that all armed forces are to be withdrawn within 18 months. That is, literally as soon as they could be got out of the country. We would not shift 80,000 troops and their equipment in materially less time than that.
We are told that 4,000 technicians are to be left and that their number is to be gradually reduced. Are they to be armed? Are they to be officered by British or by Egyptian officers? We are told that we are negotiating for the freedom of the Canal. The Leader of the Opposition made a protest about the freedom of the Canal. It is surely extraordinary that we should be negotiating for the freedom of the Canal in the future with a country which is in breach of the freedom of the Canal today. We are negotiating about the rights of re-entry in time of war—the right, in other words, for the third time in our lives to come again to the assistance of the Egyptians in guarding their own country.
What do the Egyptians say? They refuse these terms. They say that our troops may not be armed and that we may have no entry at all. But what if the Egyptians accept? What if General Neguib and his friends decide to swallow their words, to sink their pride, to accept a loss of face and to take our offer, if this is the correct offer, at its face value and to accept it? How would we be placed then? But I do not think that the Egyptians would do that. I think they
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will rely on the experience which they have got from negotiations in past years and will hope for even better terms, and that they will hold out. But we have got to face that possibility.
And then what happens? For how long do these terms remain open? I should like the Foreign Secretary to be good enough to deal with that point. We are met by insults and assurances that our terms will never be accepted. Are we to leave them there indefinitely or are we to say, as in any ordinary negotiation, that after a certain date, if our terms are not accepted, they die and we start again on a fair and level basis—all bets are off?
What trust can we place in Egypt today? What hope have we that any agreement signed by her will be honoured? We have seen her in breach of the Convention of 1888, which guarantees the freedom of the Canal. I remind the House that in face of very grave provocation by Italy when she attacked Ethiopia, we maintained the freedom of the Canal, and yet the Egyptians are refusing oil to the refinery at Haifa. They have denounced the Treaty of 1936. I wonder what most Members of the House felt when they read about that denunciation. The Leader of the Opposition referred to it, but what really did he mean?
I want to repeat what Nahas Pasha said to the Egyptian Congress when he was recommending the Treaty to the politicians in that country. He said:
"No one thinks that it implies serious restrictions on our independence. I consider for my part that it is a question of necessity imposed upon us by the state of our military forces, for we have—not at the moment sufficient forces—to assume sole responsibility for the protection of liberty of navigation and the security of the Suez Canal…That is why we must accept the assistance of an Ally…We have of our full will and free will authorised the English to maintain a garrison on the Canal."
Can anyone say that the situation in Egypt is so changed that there is any evidence that they can now maintain the freedom of the Canal? If this were true when Nahas Pasha spoke 15 years ago, it is no less true today.
We have got the example of the agreement with the Sudan which has been broken, both in fact and in spirit, by the Egyptians within 10 months of the signing of it. The Foreign Secretary has

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twice had to come down to this House and condemn them roundly for those breaches. They are attacking our posts every night. They are killing our soldiers.
I do not say that one must never make an agreement with an untrustworthy person. One has often to do it in private life. I have not one code for my country and another for myself. Countries and individuals have got the same fundamental code of honour, and if one has to make an agreement with someone one does not completely trust, what does one do? One puts it in such a form that redress can be had from the courts, if necessary. In this case, there is no international court to which we can appeal. The only means we have of enforcing the Treaty is to maintain a force sufficient for its permanent enforcement.
That is what I understood was going to be the position after my right hon. Friend spoke in the House in May of this year. He said this:
"Suffice it is to say that if accepted in good faith they would render possible the reduction of the British Forces in the Canal Zone from 80,000 to a small fraction of that number."
Then there is a full stop. He went on:
"There would be left technical personnel discharging their functions with the good will of the Egyptian monarchy, republic, oligarchy, dictatorship, or whatever it may turn out to be."
I may have misunderstood my right hon. Friend, but I thought there was going to be a small fraction of the Armed Forces left. Are these technicians to be in the position of an Armed Force? That is to say, are there going to be 4,000 British soldiers after the others have left who will be fully armed, fully armoured, equipped, mobile, trained? If they are, that is a very considerable force on which to rely; or are they going to be spread throughout the whole of the desert area in sections, with the men going about in dungarees directing Arab labour in the yards. If they are, then I have fears for them.
All that we have seen suggests that in 18 months when our Armed Forces have left the country, if these technicians are going to be scattered about the desert and about the Canal Zone, they will be subject to far worse attacks than they are subject to now. The position may well become intolerable, and then what can we do? We must face up to things. Are
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we going to withdraw them? We cannot leave them to be shot down. Or are we going to say, "We are going to support you" and re-enter in a warlike action. [An Hon. Member: "That is war."] Yes, that means war or an ignominious withdrawal, and that is why I am resisting this proposal.
How long is the present position going to be tolerated? Again, in that most admirable speech by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in May he spoke of the attacks on our people in the Canal Zone. He said:
"Of course, if the boastful and threatening speeches of which there has been a spate in the last few months and in some instances, even in the last few hours, were to be translated into action and our troops in the Canal Zone were to be the object of renewed attacks by saboteurs or even by the Egyptian Army, which is being aided and trained by Nazi instructors and staff officers in unusual numbers, and our soldiers were being killed, we should have no choice—and I am sorry to say this to the House but we must face facts—but to defend ourselves."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 887–888.]
Those are serious words.
I quote from "The Times" of 25th November:
"There has been a disturbing increase in incidents in the Suez Canal Zone, which rose in the week ended November 21 to 29 compared with 15 the previous week. On November 19 a British soldier was killed…"
For how long is this going on? At what point will we say that no more British soldiers shall be killed without taking action? At what point are we going to say that insults to the British Army or men wearing Her Majesty's uniform must cease? I believe that the time has now come when we must make a stand. Can one wonder that troops are getting browned off in such conditions. I do not for one moment believe—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: The troops do not want war.
Captain Waterhouse: The troops do not want war, but they want to have the right to protect themselves. This is not a state of affairs started by any action of my right hon. Friend; it is a trend started by right hon. Gentlemen opposite which we have to face and remedy.
I am not going to deal at length with the Treaty. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition mentioned that subject, and I think it is perfectly clear that the Treaty does not end in

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August, 1956. It is then open for revision and it has got to be revised in accordance with certain definite stipulations. What could and should be done? It would be idle to get up and make the sort of speech I have done unless we have got some ideas of what course should be taken. We do not pretend to know all the facts, but I would point out certain things and make suggestions which Her Majesty's Government might consider.
We are occupying a vast and straggling base. It is 100 miles long and in some places 30 or 40 miles wide. It really means that our two divisions out there are trying to hold as long a line as we in the First World War held with the whole of the British Army in France. No wonder there are raids and no wonder our people are attacked. In that base there are two great ports, a large town and hundreds of miles of roads and rails. There are hundreds of acres of shedding and workshops. Before the war there was no base there at all. We had a garrison of 10,000 men. This present base was formed during the war in order to fight a great war in North Africa and to support 20 divisions advancing across the desert.
Into this base since the war has been poured the munitions from Palestine and to a considerable extent the munitions from India. The base is far larger than is needed today. It is no longer in proportion to the present position or to future probabilities. It is not for me to say how or what material ought to be removed from it, but I suggest that much ought to go.
I suggest that some of the material might be sold to N.A.T.O. and, possibly, to other countries round about. And that much might well be scrapped. I suggest, too, that we should leave there, in some part to be chosen by those who understand tactics, a small British armed force. By "small" I mean something like a brigade fully armed, fully equipped and with an air field available. It should be left at some strategic point. One military authority with whom I recently had the pleasure of talking suggested that the best place for it would be in or near the port of Suez, where it would support a re-entry into Transjordan in case of trouble, and exert an influence throughout the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and North and Central Africa.
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I believe essentially that with firmness and patience an agreement with Egypt is still possible, but we must have proper safeguards for that agreement. We can offer a lot to Egypt. A suggestion such as I have outlined would be no threat whatever to Egyptian sovereignty. As I say, we have much to offer Egypt. We can give her security, we can give her financial assistance, we can offer a market for her cotton, we can promise to help her in a fair deal about her water, and we can give her back a vast proportion of the area which we are now occupying.
Mr. R. T. Paget: Is it the proposal of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that the brigade should stay there with the consent of Egypt—in which case we would all agree with him—or is it to be there to conduct a war with Egypt all by itself?
Captain Waterhouse: My suggestion is that the brigade should stay in Egypt and that the Egyptians should be made fully aware that it is going to stay there. [Laughter.] It is all very well for hon. Gentlemen opposite to laugh, but they laugh at everything which tends to the greatness or to the sustenance of our country, our Commonwealth and our Empire. I say that a base could be found which would be tenable by a small force. If I am wrong, the Foreign Secretary will put me right. Whether it be one battalion, or five or six does not matter, but it should be a small force and one which could defend itself in the face of a hostile attack. My belief is that with such concessions and with real determination Egypt would not long remain hostile.
We have had agreements in the past. They have never been easy to arrive at. The late Ernest Bevin tried hard to get an agreement just after the war. He failed and in 1950 in this House he uttered half-a-dozen remarkable sentences. He said:
"The Egyptian Government have stated that they wish all British forces to be withdrawn from the Canal Zone in time of peace. The principle of common defence measures in time of peace has been accepted by all the Western powers and is fully compatible with national independence and sovereignty. Other countries in the Middle East are co-operating in this way. This is not a matter which merely concerns the United Kingdom and Egypt. What is at stake is the safety and independence of other countries also."

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This last sentence is the most important of all:
"His Majesty's Government have no intention of taking steps or agreeing to any measures which would leave the Middle East defenceless, or would needlessly prejudice the safety of free and friendly countries in that area and elsewhere."—[Official Report, 20th November, 1950, Vol. 481, c. 36.]
I have every reason to believe that what he said then is still the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government today. I rely on them to stand firm by such a policy and to show our friends in the Persian Gulf and in Africa that we are still willing, ready and able to come to their aid.
4.55 p.m.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: I want in the first place to apologise to hon. Members in all parts of the House for having to speak in this debate, because it means that there will be three speakers from the Opposition Front Bench. That, of course, is hard for hon. Members to bear who want to take part in the debate as we already have only ashort time at our disposal. I believe, however, that hon. Members will also agree that there is no other course open to me than to speak today. I was advised by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) that he intended to make references to me, and I have been warned by the hon. Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay) that he will refer to me and my Press articles in the strongest possible terms. I am not certain whether that is a warning to me or to Mr. Speaker.
I want first to say that there is a tradition in this country that when we have differences of opinion the people who hold them should be given the opportunity of stating the facts. We may hold them intensely and we may speak forth-rightly about them, but what is not fair is that one person should be attacked and not given the opportunity either of replying or of enabling the public at large to make up their minds on the facts.
In the last week or so I have been maligned, abused and attacked in language most of which was libellous—[An Hon. Member: "Take an action for libel."] But it is impossible for most of us to take libel actions against wealthy newspaper proprietors. You have to be very rich to do that. Most people cannot
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afford that. At the same time not one single copy of my article has been made available to the public of Great Britain, not a single newspaper—and it is only the most discreditable of them that have indulged in this—has seen fit to put its readers in possession of the article which they attacked.
Mr. Martin Lindsay: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. Is he aware that the only reason for this is the censorship of his friends in Cairo, who have not permitted the papers to come to this country?
Mr. Bevan: The hon. Gentleman may be going to use strong language, but he will have to talk better sense than he did in that interruption if he is to make his case at all. The fact is—and the fact could have been found out quite easily—that the article referred to was published a month before in three Indian cities—New Delhi, Madras and Bombay. Therefore, the articles are available. They have not been suppressed by Cairo. They were published before and no notice was taken of them at all. The article was supposed to be so deadly, so mischievous, so much opposed to British interests that not a single British newspaper took the slightest notice of the article until its publication in Cairo. That is the first point I want to make.
Therefore the only reason why the attack was made was because the article was published in Cairo and because the Conservative newspapers wanted some means of diverting public attention from the revolution in the Conservative ranks. It is not the first time that this has happened as has been suggested. The "Daily Express," the newspaper whose proprietor is so friendly with the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister—
The Prime Minister: I think I first met the right hon. Gentleman at his house.
Mr. Bevan: Indeed, that is perfectly true. [Laughter.] I see no occasion for laughter. It is well known. In fact, I confess at once to the House that one of the reasons why I found those visits so helpful was because they gave me an insight into the character of the right hon. Gentleman, which has stood me in good stead ever since.
Therefore, the first substantial point which I wish to make is that the people

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of Great Britain ought to have been put in possession of the article about which the attacks have been made. That seems to me to be fair. But it is not the first time that some newspapers in Great Britain have attacked public men, including Members of Parliament, for things that they were alleged to have said in the House of Commons and elsewhere and have not given the readers an opportunity of reading what they said. This is an extremely bad practice. In addition to that, the B.B.C. has also offended in the same way.
Sir Thomas Moore: Break the monopoly.
Mr. Bevan: There was the broadcast on which certain questions were asked of "the team," as I think they are called on the radio. I have never heard the programme myself. They were asked about this article. Members of the team, including the right hon. Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot), who had himself not read the article, gave an opinion about it in the most offensive language. Surely the first thing that should be done is that people should acquaint themselves with the article and not get their impression from sensational headlines and from extracts which falsify the contents of the article. Hon. Members are entitled to have protection from that. When millions of people are told in the country that a Member of this House has been guilty of betraying the country the facts of the betrayal ought to be known.
That is what we have described as McCarthyism. That is McCarthyism—to smear, to try to establish guilt by association, to attack people without giving them a chance of defending themselves. [Laughter.] I thought that I heard the Prime Minister say that I am defending myself now, but one has to judge by previous experience, the newspapers which made the attack will not print the defence tomorrow.
The first part of the attack made on me is that a Privy Councillor ought not to write articles to be read abroad by nations with whom the Government are engaged in delicate negotiations. That is one of the charges made. I have therefore been amusing myself by looking up some pre-war articles written by the present Prime Minister in the "Evening
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Standard" and the "News of the World." He declares in them with great pleasure that they are syndicated all over Europe and therefore everybody will have the chance of reading them. These articles cover a number of years.
The Prime Minister: Volume four.
Mr. Bevan: Therefore, there is nothing improper in any Member of Parliament, including a Privy Councillor, writing articles which are syndicated in foreign newspapers. Is that agreed? [Hon. Members: "Answer."] Yet in another place it has been suggested that it is highly improper. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is nothing wrong?
The Prime Minister: If I were to try to deal with it I would rather deal with it in connected form and not accidentally.
Mr. Bevan: The right hon. Gentleman wrote articles regularly before the war in which he attacked the Prime Minister who was then his own leader, in which he attacked the foreign policy of the Government which he was returned to support; and he did it in the most direct language. Not only that, but he did it at a time as critical and delicate as today. On 17th April, 1936, he said:
"All the power was in his hands."
That is Mr. Baldwin's.
"…the General Election was fought under the most favourable conditions for Mr. Baldwin.…It was therefore with an intense spasm of surprise and disgust that Parliament and the public found themselves confronted with the Hoare-Laval proposals to reward the Italian aggressor with a great part of Abyssinia.…
Great Britain…strengthens the force and prestige of the German Nazi regime…
We have been led…into a contradiction of purpose as hazardous as it is grotesque…
Unless Mr. Baldwin is prepared to take some effective action which will actually help the Ethiopian people,…he and his Ministers should not presume to offer guidance to Europe."
In the "Evening Standard" of 11th December, 1936, the right hon. Gentleman said this:
"When I first went into Parliament, now nearly 40 years ago, it was ingrained upon me that the most insulting charge which could be made against a Minister of the Crown, short of actual malfeasance, was that he had endangered the safety of the country and

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neglected its defences for electioneering considerations. Yet such are the surprising qualities of Mr. Baldwin that this dismal doctrine has now been elevated into a canon of political virtue."
Then the right hon. Gentleman goes on to say in the same article of 11th December, 1936—[An HON. MEMBER: "Deal with your own."]—that:
"Here they are again, those years which passed so lightly, so agreeably away, amid loud cheers and large majorities; years when the people must not be disturbed from their contentment and complacency, nor aroused from idle dreams by ugly truths.
These were the years when Ministers assured us that all was well, when all warnings were rejected, when those who uttered them were mocked at as jingoes and scaremongers,"
Sir Robert Boothby: True.
Mr. Bevan: Yes, quite true.
The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East ought to listen to these words, because they are very encouraging to him. The sentence goes on:
"when the docile Parliamentary battalions trudged through the Lobbies in that faithful 'footwork' which Mr. Baldwin has eulogised as among the first of political virtues."
This establishes the fact that it has long been constitutional practice in Great Britain for Privy Councillors as well as others to write articles attacking the policy of their Governments and countries and to publish them abroad. As hon. Members will notice, I am not referring to remote incidents like the Lloyd George articles, nor even referring to the fact that the Prime Minister regularly syndicated articles in American newspapers hostile to Great Britain. Nor am I referring to the fact that after the war the British people learned, for the first time, of his own Private Session speeches from magazines that have always attacked this country.
The right hon. Gentleman today has asked for it, and he is going to get it. In the next place—and this is strictly apposite to what has been said by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East—the right hon. Member the Prime Minister referred many times in his articles and speeches to India. Reference was made to India today. It has been said that a part of my guilt lies in the fact that the articles, when published in Egypt, create a most hostile climate
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for our troops there and are, therefore, likely to endanger their lives. We had troops in India holding down the Indians. This is what the right hon. Gentleman wrote on 16th April, 1937:
"Pandit Nehru is a Communist"—
The Prime Minister: He admits that he has intellectually Communist views.
Mr. Bevan:"Communist, Revolutionary, the most capable and most implacable of the enemies of the British connection with India.…Congress has declared its united resolve to make the Constitution unworkable and to court, or even in some cases create, an absolute deadlock…the Government of every Province must be carried on from week to week, and the Governors have ample power in law and in fact to enable them to discharge this prime responsibility. Such is the crude, harsh, issue which is now emerging."
In other words, he advocates governing India by local Governors behind whom the right hon. Gentleman put the Forces of the British Crown, as now in British Guiana.
"…England…has done its best for the Indian political classes. It will stand by its word in spirit and in letter; but it will go no further. It will enter upon no new slippery slope. Britain has done her best. Others now must make their own sincere contribution…
Meanwhile, as if to strike a note of realism to Pandits, Mahatmas and those who now claim to speak for the helpless Indian masses, the Frontier is astir; and British officers and soldiers are giving their lives to hold back from the cities and peace-time wealth of India the storm of Pathan inroad and foray."
This is the language by which the right hon. Gentleman was making the peaceful government of India at that time more difficult for the British Crown. I could go on.
The right hon. Gentleman has a very good precedent for his negotiations with Egypt. The right hon. and gallant Member who spoke before me said that we have not accumulated the Empire by force but by wisdom. [Hon. Members: "No."] By accident accompanied by wisdom, but never, apparently, by force. He should listen to the words of his own leader. I want to read from the book written by the right hon. Gentleman about his father, Volume I:
"The gradual withdrawal of European powers and the final retreat of France left Great Britain alone to confront the growing anarchy of Egypt. A medley of conflicting impulses and incidents, moral obligations and material interests, the Suez Canal, the coupons

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of the Egyptian debt, Arabi's national movement and the massacre of June—culminated in the bombardment of Alexandria of 11th July, 1882, by the British fleet. Mr. Bright resigned from the Cabinet; but the House of Commons broke into general cheering at the news and only eight Radicals testified to their principles by their votes. Large military operations followed."
This is where the wisdom comes in, without the force:
"Twenty-five thousand British soldiers descended upon Egypt. Arabi and his national movement were stamped out under the heavy heel of the British Grenadier and England became responsible for the fortunes of the Nile Valley."
More wisdom—
"Their intervention was to carry the Government further than they expected. The misrule which had produced in Egypt the National movement of Arabi had created the rebellion of the Mahdi in the Soudan. The inhabitants of vast regions were aflame with military fury and religious fervour. Yusef Pasha had been overwhelmed. The army of General Hicks was being collected for its fatal effort."
The Prime Minister: This is 40 years after.
Mr. Bevan: Forty years after.
The Prime Minister: I was writing 35 or 40 years after the event. What has that to do with the right hon. Member, who has committed an act which is directly relevant to the difficult and dangerous existing situation?
Mr. Bevan: I am in the House of Commons replying to a speech made by the leader of the rebels against the Prime Minister and, in the course of that speech, a statement was made that we ought to resume our traditional behaviour towards the Empire and the Colonies. I want to know—[Interruption.] I must finish the quotation:
"Inch by inch and hour by hour the Liberal Government was dragged deeper and deeper in the horrible perplexities of the Egyptian riddle and the Soudan tragedy. At each detested step they resolved to go no further. Every act of interference was to be their last. Every day they looked forward to an early evacuation. To get out of the country in the shortest possible time and upon any conceivable justification was their constant and controlling desire; and after every struggle to escape they found themselves more hopelessly and inextricably involved."
He goes on to say:
"The war was—in his eyes—a wicked war, an unjust war, 'a bondholders' war.' And as he felt, so he spoke."
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The right hon. Gentleman goes on:
"While the fighting was actually in progress criticism was necessarily ineffective;"
In other words, this criticism of his father against British policy in Egypt was uttered when there was fighting in Egypt.
The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman has hitherto been trying to hide behind me. Now I gather he is endeavouring to hide behind my father. I am sure we can both take care of ourselves.
Mr. Bevan: Surely the right hon. Gentleman ought not to reproach me for reminding him of the virtue of his ancestor? [Hon. Members: "Withdraw."] Indeed, I started by saying that in point of fact the right hon. Gentleman was pursuing what I thought was the right course.
Now I come to the article.
The Prime Minister: Ah!
Mr. Bevan: Ah! As I see that the right hon. Gentleman is about to leave the House, I think of what Shakespeare said:
"What private anxieties we have ye know not."
To continue, in the course of the article there are three references to Egypt and only three. This is one of them,
"The presence of the troops of another nation on one's own national soil is a circumstance to be borne only when it is voluntarily conceded."
It was conceded in the 1936 Treaty. But the 1936 Treaty is being negotiated. Egypt may, we do not know, voluntarily concede something. But nations will not abide the presence of other nations on their soil unless their presenceis freely negotiated. What is wrong with that? Does any hon. Member opposite deny it? I go on to say:
"Even then, it has definite disadvantages. The presence of American airmen is tolerated in Britain but not accepted."
[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—yes. [Hon. Members: "It is not true."]
"If their presence comes to be actively resented, then they will have to withdraw."
Is that denied? If actively resented by the British people, do hon. Members opposite say that American troops would still stay here?
Mr. Cyril Osborne: But it is not.
Mr. Bevan: I say
"…they would have to withdraw; and for much the same reason as we shall have to withdraw from Egypt, because a military base is useless if it is surrounded by a hostile population."
Does anybody seriously deny that? It is not only mentioned by me, it has been mentioned this morning in "The Times" leading article. If it is not possible to call upon the voluntary labour reserves of the Egyptian population, it is not possible for us to remain there. Is not that an obvious proposition?
In the other parts of my article where reference is made to Egypt, I am merely arguing—and I think correctly—that the great struggle in the world today is not a struggle between two or three imperialisms; it is a struggle between the national idea and the imperial idea, a nation's desire for independence against domination by other nations. I said:
"America did not take over India—it was India. Who wields the sceptre once held by Britain on the Gold Coast? The inhabitants. When the British walk out of Egypt, the Egyptians, and only the Egyptians will walk in. It is true that the Soviet Union"—
and this part has not been quoted by any newspaper—
"in defiance of the trend of history, and in violation of its stated creed, did reach out and clutch to her many of the smaller nations on her borders. But they move restlessly in the hug of the bear and nothing is more certain than that they will never be reconciled to their oppressors."
Is it not clear? Have we not said—Ihave said it in this House when I was a Member of the Government and I have said it in the country—that in my view when the Soviet Union took over Eastern Germany, and when she embraced Czechoslovakia in addition to the other nations on her borders, she went beyond her sociological frontiers. She conquered, but she cannot digest, and never will be able to digest, because people nowadays will not accept a decree at the hands of a foreign dictatorship. This is indeed the hope, the one on which we rest our case, that the desire of the people on Russia's western borders will bring about a peaceful modification of Russia's foreign policy. That has been our desire. If it is our desire that the States on the borders of Russia should assert their independence why should we deny it to other nations who are dominated by British troops?
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If it be true, and it is true, I have been arguing here not only what is the British Labour Party's case, but what is the case, apparently, of the majority of hon. Members opposite. Otherwise, what are the rebels rebelling against? Here is a case put for the Government, put for the right hon. Gentleman, in modern langauge, therefore better than his own. It is very difficult to see why the attack is made on me. What is the purpose of it? As I said earlier, it is obviously an evasive attack. It is an attempt to try to divert attention from domestic anxieties inside the Conservative Party.
I can, of course, if hon. Members wish, read the whole article, but I think I have read enough to show the tenor of it. I apologise for taking up so much time, but it was necessary to make those quotations. I should like to say to hon. Members opposite, that I think they are making a very great mistake in some of the policies they are now adopting. When I was in the Far East in the early part of this year it seemed evident to me and to every one I spoke to who had authority to speak on African affairs that we shall have to adjust our policies to the rising nationalism of Africa and the Far East.
Grave mistakes are being committed at the present time, grave blunders, which could be the precursors of a third world war. We on this side of the House—indeed, I think the vast majority of the people of Britain and Europe—intensely resent the protection and countenance which the United States still give to Chiang Kai-shek. It is digging a gulf between the United States and Great Britain, and it would not be friendly to the United States not to say so.
The people of Great Britain believe that China would never accept a conqueror, even of their own race, armed by a foreign Power. They believe that the People's Government of China has come to stay and they believe that recognition of that fact and the bringing—[Interruption.] This is a Foreign Affairs debate, and hon. Members should contain themselves.
We believe—it has been said elsewhere—that the inclusion of the Republican Government of China in the Security Council of the United Nations would be a giant stride towards the pacification of the world. We believe that. We also

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believe that a serious attempt ought to be made to reach agreement with Russia about Germany before the irrevocable step is taken of re-arming Western Germany. That is our officially stated view.
It is our view that we shall not be able to adjust the policies of this country to the necessities of the world unless we can put ourselves abreast of those movements of ordinary people everywhere who are trying not only to raise their material standards but also to throw from their shoulders an imperial yoke which has been there too long.
5.31 p.m.
Mr. John Maclay: The speech which we have just heard has been an astonishing one for the first part of a foreign affairs debate. During the last 10 minutes we may have heard something about foreign affairs, but the rest of the speech was nothing more than a personal statement. However, I am not objecting to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) taking the opportunity of dealing with some of the things which have been said about him in the newspapers.
Mr. Bevan Mr. Bevan rose—
Mr. Maclay: I will give way when I have finished. But, among the right hon. Gentleman's other major offences, when he takes 20 minutes to speak about himself and dares to compare his own prose with that of the Prime Minister, he expresses a megalomania which becomes a menace to this country. My remarks spring particularly from the right hon. Gentleman's article. I have read it. The complete document is in the Library in the present issue of the "Tribune." Is that the correct article?
Mr. Bevan: Yes.
Mr. Maclay: It is thoroughly mischievous in content and style. The right hon. Gentleman must have had some idea where the article was going to be placed by the syndicate to which it was sold. Can he imagine a worst possible time for doing something of this nature than in the middle of delicate negotiations? There is no comparison with anything which happened pre-war. How could the few phrases which the right hon. Gentleman
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himself has quoted possibly have helped the negotiations?
The article did not hurt my feelings very much. I regarded it as one of those horrifying masses of woolly phrases which have caused so much trouble throughout the world among people who do not know as much as we in this country know about the right hon. Gentleman and his manner of thinking. The article contained the old theme of imperialism—that we were dominating foreign countries in order to pursue our own aims and interests.
If the right hon. Gentleman was thinking of Egypt when he wrote the article, did he remember that our imperialistic aims in Egypt over the last 70 years have included having our troops there in order to make it possible foran enormous number of ships of every nationality to pass through the Suez Canal? Does he realise in the slightest degree that the presence of our troops in the Canal Zone made it possible for more than 100 million tons of shipping to pass through the Canal during the last 12 months?
Mr. Crossman Mr. Crossman rose—
Mr. Maclay: I will give way in due course. Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that if British troops had not been in Egypt over the last 70 years, the orderly development of the Canal could not possibly have been achieved? It should be realised not only by the right hon. Gentleman but also by other hon. Members and by some other nations that if proper stability in the Suez Canal area cannot be achieved, neither we nor anyone else will have continuing use of the Canal.
Take, for example, one of the problems at present facing the Suez Canal company—the steadily increasing size of tankers. If bigger and bigger tankers are to be built, drawing more and more water, the company will need to deepen the Canal. But it cannot be deepened without widening it, and vast technical problems are involved. The technicians of the Suez Canal company can only work if they know they have long-term security of tenure and know that their work will not be interrupted by sporadic strikes or civil disturbance—no matter what its cause—which may happen if there is no one there to exercise reasonable control. It is not a question of the

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troops digging the Canal; it is that the people who have to do the work must know they have in front of them years of peaceful conditions in which the work can be carried out.
I am not arguing about, and do not question, the strategic decisions of the Government, but I contend that if anyone thinks the Suez Canal problem is simply one of strategy or imperialism or any of the other funny words which people use, he is talking nonsense.
I want also to draw attention to the international importance of this matter. There is another nation which could be helping us, and that is the United States. I say this as a great friend of the United States. The United States could be helping us more than it is at the moment in this very difficult and delicate matter. I would remind the United States that over 16 per cent. of the 100 million tons of shipping which passed through the Suez Canal during the last 12 months was represented by ships carrying the American flag. The De Lessep's concept of the Suez Canal was of a new link between the West and the Far East. It was an idealistic concept at a time of high ideals in international affairs. What has happened is that over the years Britain has made the implementation of that concept possible.
Anyone of any party or from any country who makes the task of the British Government more difficult when they seek to conclude proper long-term arrangements with Egypt is pursuing a very dangerous policy. In this I am not to be taken as attacking the views of some of my hon. Friends; they have their sincerely held views; but my belief is slightly different from theirs.
If Her Majesty's Government, followed by the Governments of other nations, in any agreement that is made with Egypt, cannot find some means of guaranteeing the continuing stability of the Suez Canal area in the years to come, every Government involved will be carrying a desperately grave responsibility.
5.38 p.m.
Sir Richard Acland: I am sorry if I have to carry the House in to what may seem to many hon. Members to be something of a digression from the exciting personal issues which we have been discussing, but the fact is that I believe that the line of foreign and military
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policy adopted in 1950–51, step by step leading up to and enshrined now in the Bermuda communiqué, even if it was right at the time it was initiated, has, in the light of events, now become substantially wrong. I want to say why that is and to elaborate what I believe to be the alternative.
I believe that the policy is wrong because under it the activities into which our resources are ever-increasingly poured are in large measure irrelevant to the main event which is taking place in the world today. I believe that is how our rivals want us to be. When I say "rivals" I undoubtedly mean the Kremlin leaders of the Soviet Union. I do not regard them as nice Social Democrats with whom we could easily make agreements if only we trusted them. I believe that they believe it to be their duty as time goes on to bring about the total world victory of Communism. In pursuit of that aim, I think their chief desire is that our actions and attitude shall be irrelevant to the main event which is going forward.
What is the main event in the world today? What is the situation which we have to confront? After all, that is the question which the humblest platoon commander is trained to ask himself before giving a single order or before planning any military operations. It is a question which I and my two hon. Friends, the Members for Eton and Slough (Mr. Fenner Brockway) and Old-ham, West (Mr. Hale), have attempted to answer in a pamphlet called "Waging Peace" which we have brought out in the last couple of days. In order to approach it on the scale of history—and this is important in considering the great framework of foreign policy—let us consider how the question might have been answered if asked of bygone periods.
If we ask what happened in the third to the sixth centuries, we would answer the decay of the Roman Empire. If we ask of the Mediterranean basin what happened from the seventh to the tenth centuries, the answer would be the rise of Islamism. Asking the question of our time, that is to say of all the time from the middle of the 19th to the end of the 21st century, the answer surely will be the awakening of anything up to 200 million people who are determined

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to free themselves from the poverty and contempt which they and their predecessors have endured down many past centuries.
It is not merely, as the Colonial Secretary remarked yesterday an awakening in order to grasp the dazzling marvels displayed to them by the West, but an awakening to throw off the overlords under whom they have endured poverty and contempt for so long. I believe that that is the force that is driving the great social revolution of our time. It is a complex process in which wealthy leaders and powerful groups which, at one stage, take the lead in freeing their people from a hated foreign yoke, may turn themselves into the indigenous tyrants whose rule has to be thrown over at the next stage. But I must not pursue the many complexities of that kind.
There is an important question which I want to ask about this process today. Where does Russia stand in relation to this social revolution? The Russians claim that they stand on the side of all the ultimate winners. That, I think, can be disputed, but what cannot be disputed is that they stand resolutely against all the ultimate losers. The Communist may not be the most desirable or desired comrade for the Arab in Tunisia who is struggling to free himself from French settlers. But, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the Communist is the most ruthless and literally the most bloody-minded opponent of all the sultans, nabobs, feudal landowners, extortionate money-lenders and functionless shareholders who have been so rightly condemned in a published letter by the late Archbishop. In that sense, it is true that the Communists are on the side of the great revolution that is going through the world in these times, and that is, in the long run, a far more alarming statement to make about our rivals than anything that can be said about Soviet tanks, Soviet submarines, or Soviet atom bombs.
Subconsciously, hon. Members opposite have been accepting a great deal of the Communist case about this social revolution in recent debates. Have we not heard them saying in recent weeks that the leaders of the awakening peoples must not expect or demand social progress at such a rate as frightens away
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the inflow of finance capital, without which the necessary economic development cannot take place? Hon. Members will recognise that as being orthodox Toryism and complete Conservative rectitude. But that is exactly what the Communists say. If there is anyone—African or Caribbean—so minded as to co-operate with the British, and mentions that to a Communist agent, the first thing which the latter will say to him is, "You co-operate with the British, and your country will only make the quantity and quality of progress that can be tolerated and financed as a by-product of big business profitability."
It ought to be a part of foreign policy in the next 25 years not only to deal with armaments, alliances, agreements, treaties and all those things, but to take such steps as will prove in action that the Communist line about the rate of social progress is untrue. That will be an extremely costly task. And that is a dangerous thing for me to say, because somebody will make the reply that I and my hon. Friends are regarding this problem solely in terms of pouring out masses of money. We fully do realise that it has many aspects, and that it requires many things besides money—a changed attitude, detailed planning, sympathy and understanding of peoples and enough humility to understand all that is meant in that great judgment coming from Herbert Agar: that there may be in the next 25 years the last chance for the white race to join the human race. But when all that has been said and accepted, there is no way in which we can put ourselves in line with this great social revolution of our time, which is not going to cost a great deal in skilled manpower, materials and in finance. And all of this is an integral part of foreign policy.
It is said that we are doing much already under the Colombo Plan, the Commonwealth development plans, and so on. But the Colombo Plan is only the repayment of debt, and everything which we have given, invested and lent in the assistance of others in the last 12 months is only just over half of what we have borrowed from our own Colonies in the same period, so that we are not making any very magnificent contribution.
Others will point to President Eisenhower's great speech of 16th April, the point of which has now been enshrined

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in a United Nations Resolution, which says:
"We…stand ready to ask our people, when sufficient progress has been made in internationally supervised disarmament, to devote a proportion of the savings…to an international fund…to assist in development…in under-developed countries."
If I saw in the Bermuda policy any early hope that the Russians and Americans would soon reach a modus vivendi for a disarmament treaty, guaranteed by international inspection of Soviet armaments, leading to the establishment of peace throughout the world, I would say, "Finish the job and get on with the real tasks in front of us." But does anybody expect that? Even if there be more agreement than anybody honestly expects about Germany arising from this forthcoming conference, I believe that such are the governing philosophies of the Soviet Union, and such the influential public opinion of the United States of America, that those two giants, the only militarily independent Powers remaining in the world, are bound to confront each other in attitudes of mutual strain and tension for a long time to come. In all that time, and all over the world, the Communists will be, to the extent that I have already described, driving forward this inevitable and worldwide social movement; and we, unless we can change our attitude, will be doing relatively nothing about it.
What should we do? That is a question on which I could quite easily, before some other audience and with a different chairman, elaborate for a couple of hours. Let me be reasonable and select two quite concrete points; for it is reasonable that those of us who try to think and speak on the scale of history should also answer correctly the question, "What could we do now?" I will give two answers to that question.
The first I have mentioned in the House before. It is that careful investigation shows that 43 million dollars per year could be spent on the practical requests now currently coming forward to the United Nations Technical Assistance Board. The actual income in 1953 was 23 million dollars and it looks like being 25 million dollars in 1954. Our fair share of it ought to be £950,000. We shall actually contribute £550,000. How magnificent—
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting): The hon. Baronet has got his figures wrong, as he usually does in these matters. We are in fact contributing £650,000 unconditionally in the coming year.
Sir R. Acland: I accept the correction, which means that our contribution moves from 5½ to 6½. That does not affect my main argument, nor has it interfered with my suggestion which is: how magnificent it would have been if we had bridged the whole gap between the budget and the amount which could have been usefully and practically spent. It would cost us £6½ million. Governments of countries containing nearly a billion people would have received within a month messages relating to requests for assistance which have been postponed and turned down telling them to get busy and to make all their own necessary preparations to receive at an early date the assistance that they had asked for.
Somebody may say, "We cannot afford £6½ million to produce that result." But can that be sustained in a year in which we have afforded £7¾ million to subsidise the Arab Legion? What an extraordinary inversion in the sense of values it is to think that of those two purposes on which approximately £7 million could be spent, it is better to spend it in subsidising the Arab Legion than in the way which I have just suggested and which would win for us prestige, good will and friendship from countries with a population of nearly a billion men and women. Yet this is quite a small point I am making in comparison with foreign policy as I think it ought to be.
Let us go back to the Resolution of the Economic and Social Council which I have just quoted. Did millions of people in the undeveloped countries thrill with joy to know that, perhaps 30 years in the future when all the strains and tensions of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. will have been smoothed out with international inspection of the Soviet arms industry and so on, then some of the savings on armaments would be devoted to helping them? Is that how they reacted? Not at all. The "New York Times" report of 19th October said:
"Representatives of 17 smaller nations agreed today to push the proposal for a

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new internationad economic development fund. They acted despite the stand taken by the United States last week that it could not support such a project at the present time. The smaller nations, which met informally in closed session to plan how to keep the proposal alive, appointed a three-member group to confer…"
and so on. We could have given leadership to those nations, not only by helping to draft resolutions, in which I believe we did help them, but we could have started the fund. It would have cost us 250 million dollars, or £89 million of convertible sterling. I do not doubt at all that we could have the co-operation of the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Scandinavians, the Swiss and the Dutch, and could call in such men as Ralph Bunche, Hernan Santa Cruz, Hugh Keenleyside, Arthur Lewis, and such men as the Indian general who rendered such service to humanity in Panmunjom. We could have set up an institution which would give light, leadership, and above all hope of peace, to millions of men all over the world.
Again, someone will say, "We cannot afford £89 million." But can this be maintained in a year when we are spending £36 million on giving ourselves the luxury of abolishing the sugar ration, and in which the consumption of the British people mostly among those of them whose incomes put them in the wealthier half of the community, has increased by £400 million? Do we say that we cannot afford this kind of thing? Of course we can, if we have the will.
I have dealt only with two proposals, but there are many other activities in which I think we could seriously engage if we pursued a policy which could be seriously regarded as waging peace. All of these would be costly, too. And if it be argued, as it might be, that we could not finance them all by cutting consumption, then I must say, speaking on my own behalf and of the two hon. Gentlemen who have joined me in writing the pamphlet, and of others who have joined in giving it general support in principle, that in the coming year £200 million or £300 million, and in the year after that £400 million or £500 million, less spent on arms, in order to spend corresponding sums on all the processes of waging peace, would not only be more moral but would also enable us to make a far greater contribution to peace, and would leave us, on balance, actually safer in the
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world than we are or shall be under the policy enshrined in the Bermuda communiqué.
5.58 p.m.
Viscount Lambton: It is one of the traditions of this House that one should always follow some of the arguments of the previous speaker. I did try very hard, when the hon. Baronet the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) started, to understand him, but I found him so incomprehensible that I turned to my neighbour and asked whether the hon. Baronet was speaking in Welsh.
A little later I did manage to listen to some of the words which the hon. Member was saying. I should like to refute one thing he said. It was that subconsciously certain hon. Members on this side of the House had been accepting Communist thought during the last few weeks. I tried to write down what the hon. Gentleman said after that, but he speaks with such incredible rapidity that one needs to have a knowledge of shorthand to be able to do that. Subconsciously I have not been accepting Communism, but quite consciously not doing so.
Sir R. Acland: If I did actually use the word "accepting," and as there are senses in which that word is undesirable, I should like to withdraw it. What I meant was that the Conservative philosophy, coming naturally to hon. Gentlemen opposite, leads them to conclusions which are exactly in tune with what the Communists say about the capitalist finance of economic development in under-developed countries.
Viscount Lambton: The only other thing said by the hon. Gentleman to which I wish to refer, was that he could address another audience for two hours. I do not know what the effect of that would be, because even the speech which he has just delivered seemed to me to last for at least two hours. I would certainly attempt to dissuade him from doing anything like that.
I want this afternoon to follow not so much the arguments which have come from hon. Members opposite as some which have been put forward on this side of the House by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse). I very much regret

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that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is not present because I sent him a note telling him that I disagreed with, and that I would try to contradict, some of the things he had been saying. I can only hope that he will come in before I finish my speech.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman seemed to make two propositions about Egypt. The first was that the Government's policy was strategically wrong, and the second that great harm would be done to our prestige throughout the world were we to withdraw our Forces from the Canal Zone. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman made many severe criticisms of the foreign policy which the Government are attempting to follow at this time. I regret that, though he made these criticisms, he at no stage made clear the greatest difficulty of all which is standing in the way of any settlement of the Egyptian problem at the present time.
The first proposal put forward by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was that it was essential to hold the base, though he never at any time mentioned the question of Egyptian labour, which is at the root of this trouble. During the last war, I believe that over 100,000 Egyptians were employed at the base, and that in 1951 over 50,000 were employed. At the present moment there are, I believe, well under 20,000—probably no more than 10,000—so employed. That means that at the moment the base is not being properly run and is deteriorating, and, as other hon. Members have said, that roads are disappearing and that ammunition is not being lifted as it should be.
That is not all, because, just as the present base must depend upon hired Egyptian labour, so any future base of any considerable size must also depend upon such labour. This shows, I think, that if we are to have a lasting and successful association with Egypt, it is essential that this country and Egypt should co-operate at the present time. Without such co-operation there can be no lasting agreement at all.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman suggested that the base force should be reduced to a brigade. But a brigade or any such small force could be nothing but a source of permanent irritation, and the members of it would never cease to be in the most dangerous situation. Some
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hon. Members might declare that we could then import foreign labour to take the place of Egyptian labour. I can imagine no more difficult situation than that we should introduce into Egypt a large amount of foreign labour. If we are to keep this base, then we must trust and co-operate with Egypt.
The other point which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman attempted to make was that it was strategically in our favour to put this small force there. I want to make a comparison which I think deserves the attention of the House. We are fortunate in having in the country at this time two of the greatest soldiers of this generation, who are still serving the country and whose advice is available to us. We have also, I am glad to say my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister who is, perhaps, the greatest military strategist of the last 200 years.
These men are working together on one side while, on the other, the only military expert whom anyone has spoken of today is the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East. We should remember that when we consider the matter. I have no doubt at all that to retire in strength is of far greater value than to linger in weakness. We shall do far greater damage by staying and providing a source of irritation than by retiring with the best wishes of that country.
Then there is the question of prestige. We are quite seriously told by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that we shall suffer greatly in prestige, and that the situation in the rest of Africa will deteriorate as the result of our withdrawal from the Suez Canal. I do not think that the troubles in the rest of Africa have arisen from our so-called weakness concerning the Suez Canal. Those troubles are merely symptomatic of a general nationalistic movement which is going on everywhere throughout the world today.
However, if we maintain Suez as a sore in the side of Africa, then every little trouble in Africa will have its repercussion in Suez, and every irritation in Suez will have its repercussion in every trouble spot in the Middle East or Africa. It is always better either to clear out of a situation completely or to remain in force. There is an argument for staying there in strength, but none for staying there in weakness. I can appreciate the argument of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman,

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who, I regret to say, has not condescended to come back to hear my speech this afternoon.
One other thing. Before I entered politics, I was always told that it was the duty of the Opposition to oppose. It seems to me that the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East is trying to teach me another political maxim, which is that it is the duty of the excluded to complain.
Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: The hon. Member should withdraw that remark.
Viscount Lambton: I have not the slightest intention of withdrawing it, and I only regret that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is not here as I requested him to be.
Mr. M. Lindsay: Cheeky young pup.
Mr. Hirst: I think that the noble Viscount should give credit for sincerity to those who hold the views of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) in the same way, as we are trying to give it to him, although we quarrel very much with what he is saying.
Viscount Lambton: I have not the slightest intention of withdrawing. I believe that this is an association of different elements, and that there are some among those who oppose what I am saying who have acted with the best of intentions and who have the highest possible moral integrity, and also a religious belief in the Empire. But there are others who have done it because they think it is a step up the ladder. I think that the third group about which I have spoken have done this because they have not been included in Her Majesty's present Government—[An HON. MEMBER: "Monstrous."]—and that continued opposition does nothing at all towards increasing the smallness of the Government's majority.
Mr. George Wigg: On a point of order. Within the hearing of the whole House the hon. Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay) referred to the noble Lord as a cheeky young pup.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): If the hon. Member used the expression he should withdraw it.
Mr. M. Lindsay: I did use the expression, Sir, and I shall be pleased to withdraw it.
Mr. Charles Williams: As my name was put down among others signing that Motion, may I say that I have been here a very long time, I have never held office, and I, and almost everybody who signed it, have done so because we really honestly believe in it. We have all taken part—even the Prime Minister has taken part in his time—in opposition to the Government which we support. May I assure the noble Lord that it is not very wise to accuse other people of motives simply because their views do not happen to be his own? Such things do a very great disservice.
Mr. Charles Pannell: On a point of order. Would you please remind the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) that he is no longer Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means?
Viscount Lambton: I gave the hon. Gentleman three choices and he can choose whichever he likes. I should like to conclude—
Mr. Crossman: May I point out that one never concludes a speech of that sort without reference to a stab in the back?
Viscount Lambton: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman speaks for himself.
I should like to conclude by once again mentioning that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom I thought it necessary to make these remarks has not been here during my speech. I repeat that I gave him warning of my intention and expressed the hope that he would be here. I only hope that at a future time the right hon. and gallant Gentleman may have the opportunity of replying to me and will in no way take my remarks as offensive to himself.
Lord John Hope: On a point of order. May I ask, without ill-will to my noble Friend who has just sat down, whether it is not better and usual, however strongly we feel, not to attribute motives to an individual?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I listened very carefully. The noble Lord did not attribute motives to any individual. He was very general.
6.14 p.m.
Mr. John Paton: I am sure that the whole House is interested in the noble Lord's expressions, and that all of us are willing to place confidence in his judgment, because we know that he must know his own friends. I do not want to elaborate on his theme, but rather to examine the German problem.
I should like, however, to make a general remark about the position presented to the House today by those who have spoken about Egypt. It is, of course, one of those family quarrels from which the wise outsider usually stands apart—a quarrel between two sections of the Tory party with, of course, the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan) intervening. It is essentially a family quarrel, and I am sure that the Foreign Secretary tonight will deal very faithfully and well with those of his friends who have put their names to the Motion on the Order Paper.
I listened with very great care and interest to the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house). It was a type of speech at one time familiar in this House from Conservatives in the olddays, but which we have not heard from any Tory voice for a number of years now. It was a speech profoundly reactionary in spirit, and one which, if accepted, would have consequences profoundly disastrous not only to this country and to Egypt but to the whole world.
Its logical outcome would be, of course, war upon the Egyptians by British Forces. There is no possible escape from the logic of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's argument. It would mean a policy leading to complete disaster and would earn for us at once the inveterate enmity of every Arab State in the Middle East, destroy the main part of the British policy out there, and destroy the friendship of the greatest Moslem community, Pakistan. It is a policy which seems to me to be completely bedlamite, though put forward today by a responsible man.
Tories in this House today have reverted really to what is their basic conception with regard to the Commonwealth, and have rent the veil which has concealed those objectives during the last
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few years. I am sure that the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East has done the House a service in making that speech. With that, I will leave the subject and turn to the main matter upon which I want to address the House.
Major H. Legge-Bourke: May I remind the hon. Gentleman that all my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East was asking was that we should continue to play our part under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936. Article 8 of that Treaty reads:
"The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt."
Mr. Paton: The whole argument was directed to the idea that we should maintain our position in the Canal Zone by force, if necessary. It is really an expression of nostalgic memories. It is what they would like to do with the modern world. It is also a revelation of their complete loss of contact with the world as it exists today. The kind of world that would have permitted that kind of Tory activity has gone, and those on the other side—including the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), who giggles at that—have no real conception of the kind of world they are now living in. Fortunately, there are enough Members in the Conservative Party taking a properly responsible view of their position, and having a better sense of realities, to make this attempted revolt a very minor thing indeed.
What I wanted to talk to the House about is the Bermuda Conference, with particular reference to the German problem. I think that the Egyptian debate is an intrusion. I listened to the Prime Minister this afternoon telling us of his resentment about the almost universal attitude of the Press to the Bermuda communiquéwhen they called it a collection of platitudes. From what he said, I am sure that that expression had stung him somewhat, because I noticed that he attempted to explain away the communiqué. What he did not attempt to do was to add anything whatever to its content. I have always understood that it is not possible to make one nothing added to another nothing into

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something. So the speech of the Prime Minister this afternoon added nothing whatever to the empty document which was issued after the Bermuda Conference.
From that document only two things emerged. One of them was the fact that it was the final burial of the Prime Minister's imaginative idea expressed in his speech of 11th May. The Bermuda Conference has seen the end of that, because what is to take place at Berlin has no relation whatever to the conception that was promulgated by the Prime Minister on 11th May and which caught the imagination of the whole world. Therefore, one positive thing, in that negative sense, did emerge—the burial of the conception of the Prime Minister's proposal of 11th May.
The second thing that emerged from the document is the reaffirmation, as the signatories of the document view it, of the proposal to go ahead with the European Defence Community and the rearmament of Germany. Not only did the document itself reaffirm that, but we have since had the speeches of Mr. John Foster Dulles in Paris underlining this with the heaviest of emphasis in order that we should not possibly mistake it. I regret that the Prime Minister this afternoon appeared to give the impression of finding excuses for the performance of Mr. John Foster Dulles in Paris. I viewed that performance with the profoundest disappointment, and I think many people in this country and in other countries resent as deeply as I do this hunting and harrying of our old friend and ally France in the way that we have witnessed in the last year or two to try to drag her into a decision which she is most reluctant to accept.
Now we have had this final exhibition of bullying and open coercion, the threat that if France did not toe the line quite shortly all the American troops would be withdrawn from Europe, and France would be denied any of the money which would be available under mutual security aid. I view that performance with the profoundest misgiving, and I want to express my resentment in this House at the first opportunity. No one could possibly feel the slightest confidence in the leadership of a statesman from the United States who was capable of adopting an attitude
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of that kind to a proud and sensitive people like the French.
In this matter of E.D.C. and the rearmament of Germany, we have something which is the core of the whole German problem. I believe that this attitude, as it has been expressed in the E.D.C. and by Mr. Foster Dulles, is one of those obstinate refusals which were referred to by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition when he spoke this afternoon. Does anybody in this House who looks at this matter with a sense of reality believe that the rearmament of Germany, the European Defence Community into which the rearmed Germany will be integrated, and the reunification of Germany, are compatible things? In my view, they are incompatible.
Let us remember in this connection that when people talk about German rearmament—and the phrase is always "German rearmament"—they are really talking about the rearmament of West Germany. If the rearmament of West Germany does take place, it will inevitably mean that the present division of Germany will become permanent and there will then be no solution of the German problem by negotiation. In the end there will only be a solution by war. It is because I believe that this is the real situation that I want the House to bear with me while I state some of my arguments in support of that view.
First, I want to quote from an article in last Sunday's "Observer" written by Sebastian Haffner which, whether or not one agrees with all his conclusions, was undoubtedly an extraordinarily clever analysis of the German situation. He said:
"Nothing could be more dangerous and self-deceiving than to take literally the diplomatic fiction which calls Western Germany 'Germany,' to forget the existence of East Germany and its 18 million, and to think that a successful integration of Western Germany in the Atlantic system will have settled the German question. This German question will be with us until the Germans are in one way or another reunited, and all the time it will hang as a menace over the peace of Europe, as it did from 1848 to 1871. If the Great Powers prove unable to settle it, the Germans will do so one day in some way of their own, and the world has few more urgent interests than to see to it that it is not eventually once more settled by blood and iron."
If we create this army of Western Germany and support its integration in the European Defence Community, how is it

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possible for anybody trying to take a realistic view of the situation to imagine that Russia could possibly accept a situation of that kind and agree to the reunification of Germany and the merging of East and West Germany? It seems to me that anybody who believes that is living in a world of complete unreality.
When I speak of the rearmament of West Germany, I am not thinking of 12 or 15 divisions of German soldiers. The rearmament of West Germany and its integration into the European Defence Community is a far more important economic question than a military one, because it would bring to the service of the Western Allies the whole of the gigantic complex of industry in the Ruhr and, combined with the manpower resources of Western Germany, it would give the Western Powers the decisive military balance of Europe. It would tilt the balance absolutely decisively for the West, and make it utterly impossible for Russia in any way to challenge it by military means. It seems to me, as it has always seemed, that if we insist upon the rearmament of Western Germany and its integration into the Western European Defence Community, we can at once give up any hope of reaching a settlement of the German question by negotiation with Russia.
I want to say a few words about the arguments which have been advanced against this point of view. One such argument was advanced recently by Dr. Adenauer, in a speech made in Paris, when he was discussing the question of trying to reach a solution of the German problem on the basis not of a military alliance with a rearmed Germany, but of a neutralised Germany. According to a newspaper report, when asked what would happen if Germany were neutralised, he said that he did not think that the United States or Britain would keep forces in Germany permanently to maintain the neutralisation of the country; in that case Russia would take the lead and Germany would be turned into a Russian satellite:
"within the shortest time by means of subversion, bribery and coercion…"
That was the statement of Dr. Adenauer, and it is very important to note that in that statement he did not suggest that a neutralised Germany was going to
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be overrun by Russian armed forces. He was suggesting that the people in Western Germany are brethren so weak in the faith that they will fall victims to subversion, bribery and coercion by the Russians if our troops are removed. Surely Dr. Adenauer may be permitted to know and speak for his own people. Yet it is those people who, as Dr. Adenauer himself says, are so weak in their democratic faith that they would readily fall victim to Russian wiles—not armed force—who are now asked to become the military bulwark of European defence.
The Prime Minister made great play with the idea that Germany must make her contribution to the safety of Europe. He went on to say that we cannot keep 65 million Germans unarmed, and suggested that we had to find some means of providing the Russians with a sense of security other than by means of force. But would the rearming of Germany make for the security of Europe? Would it give the Russians a sense of security? Has everybody here forgotten the history of Germany, and its traditions? Is everybody blind to its geographical position? Has everybody forgotten the fact that, just a short time ago, we were conscious that she was now ringed by territories which had been divorced from her by force, and that there is in Germany a very big and growing feeling that those territories must, by any and every means, be returned to Germany?
If we rearm Germany, what kind of Germany will it be, if it puts into its rearmament the kind of effort that we have seen put into the re-creation of the German economy during the last three years, with all the power of German industrial equipment behind it? It will present a military force that will absolutely dominate the Continent of Europe. I am told that it is impracticable to keep the Germans neutralised. Is it not an extraordinary thing that, only five years ago, not a single Member of this House, and no statesmen in the United States of America, France, or anywhere else, had the slightest doubt but that Germany could be kept permanently neutralised?
The change came about—and all these difficulties about a policy of neutralisation were evolved—only after the United

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States had changed her conception as to who was her enemy. A little more than five years ago I had the privilege of discussing the neutralisation of Japan with the heads of the American Military Mission in Japan and Korea. They were universally of the opinion that there was no difficulty whatever in keeping Japan permanently de-militarised—"neutralised"was the term they used—because at that time their minds and eyes were still focussed upon Japan and Germany as the enemy.
Now, as a result of the change in their attitude and point of view, Japan has become a friend, and Americans are extremely desirous of rearming her, but they are up against the fact that they compelled Japan to insert in her Constitution the provision that she would never again be an armed State. We have exactly the same position in Europe. There has been a change of opinion within a few years, and yesterday's enemy is today's friend—and tomorrow will be our most important military ally.
In support of my argument, and in rebuttal of the argument of Dr. Adenauer, I want to quote the words of another German, who, in my view, is destined to have a place in history at least equal to that of Dr. Adenauer, if not higher. He was a German whose patriotism could never be impugned. I refer to the late Ernst Reuter, who was for so long the mayor of the City of Berlin. In probably the last thing that he ever wrote he said:
"It won't be possible to frustrate much longer the most fervent desire of 65 million people in the middle of Europe."
He was referring to the reunification of Germany. He went on:
"Indeed, there is a definite danger that the German masses will again swing to the Chauvinist Right if their most legitimate claims remain unfulfilled. Many of [the Allies] tend to subordinate everything else to the E.D.C. and to suspect all Germans who fear that the E.D.C. might jeopardise their chances of reunion of being soft towards Russia. It seems to me that exactly the contrary is true. E.D.C. is essentially a static concept that more or less resigns itself to Russia's permanent presence on the Elbe. By contrast, German reunion fits into the framework of a more dynamic policy that is trying to obtain Russia's withdrawal behind her own borders through negotiation."
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These are the words of a very great German, who, in the last few years before his death, was right in the middle of the front line—a German who had no reason to love the Russians, but who loved his own country and people. That German believed, as I believe, that if only we would go into the conference inBerlin casting aside inhibitions that come from our past actions, if only we would go in with flexible minds, prepared to discuss anything which it is essential to discuss in order to try to reach a negotiated settlement, there would be much more hope of a successful outcome. I commend Ernst Reuter's point of view to this House.
6.40 p.m.
Mr. Martin Lindsay: The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) began his speech by mentioning the terms in which I had given him notice that I was going to refer to him today. I thought it only right to let him know that I did not intend making merely a casual reference to him, so that he could make up his mind whether he wished to hear me or not. I hold extremely strong views about the articles that he has written for "Al Goumhouria," the newly-launched organ of the anti-British revolutionary movement in Cairo. I believe that they have done considerable harm.
I should like to deal with the explanation that the right hon. Gentleman gave to the House. The first thing he said was that he had been greatly maligned and libelled, and that he could not afford a libel action against wealthy proprietors of newspapers. All I can say is that that is not a consideration that has ever weighed with the hon. Lady the Member for Liverpool, Exchange (Mrs. Braddock). There is not the slightest doubt that the right hon. Gentleman, if he really honestly and sincerely thought that he had been libelled, would have taken the matter to the courts.
Then the right hon. Gentleman said we ought to judge these articles by reading them. I assure the House with the greatest sincerity—and I have been to the Egyptian Embassy to get the full facts—that not a single copy of the newspaper containing these articles had been permitted to come to this country until today. It was only with the greatest difficulty that I got hold of one. No

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newspaper correspondents have been allowed to send one, and they have been permitted to send only short approved summaries of these articles.
Mr. Crossman: Did the hon. Gentleman, perhaps, ask my right hon. Friend to lend him a copy, which he could easily have done?
Mr. Lindsay: The right hon. Gentleman, no doubt, is in a special position in regard to this particular newspaper, but I certainly did not ask him to lend me a copy.
The second point that the right hon. Gentleman made was that there was no impropriety in a Privy Councillor writing for newspapers overseas. My answer to that, of course, is that it all depends on the timing and it all depends on the articles. I do ask the House to note that the difference between the Prime Minister's pre-war articles, which the right hon. Gentleman referred to, and his own articles is this: the Prime Minister's articles were designed to encourage His Majesty's Government to deal more firmly with the King's enemies, whereas the right hon. Gentleman's articles are calculated to encourage the Queen's enemies to deal more harshly with Her Majesty's Government. That, I submit to the House, is a very real difference indeed.
Mr. Tom Driberg: Would the hon. Gentleman take note of the fact, which I do not think was very strongly stressed by my right hon. Friend, that the Prime Minister's articles to which he referred appeared in 1936, 1937 and 1938 throughout Europe in Nazi German and Italian Fascist newspapers, thus encouraging the Nazis and the Fascists against the British Government of that day.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch): Oh, good heavens.
Mr. Lindsay: I am really not interested in what happened in 1937.
Mr. Driberg: The hon. Gentleman cannot answer the point.
Mr. Lindsay: I am dealing with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale. The next point he made was that these articles were written for India and not for Egypt. But he did not deny that he had authorised their publication in Egypt. He said that one ought to note
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that there were only three references in them to Egypt. I think that is the excuse of the girl who had an illegitimate baby and said that it was only a small one.
Mr. A. C. Manuel: That is an old story.
Mr. Lindsay: I have read these articles. I can assure the House I have read them many times with great interest and care to be fair, and they are thoroughly anti-Britain in her rôle as an Imperial Power.
Mr. Crossman: Hear, hear.
Mr. Lindsay: What is important is not so much what the right hon. Gentleman wrote in these articles as the fact that he has associated himself with this newspaper which is the organ of the revolutionary anti-British movement in Egypt. What the right hon. Gentleman has done is this. He has sold to the Egyptian revolutionary movement the sponsorship of a British ex-Cabinet Minister for anti-British and anti-Imperial sentiments. That is exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has done.
Here is the paper in my hand. Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that it is a rabid anti-British newspaper? Does he know what was said in the editorial leader which introduced him to his new Egyptian public? The article is headed, "Into Battle." It states that it is
"leading the militant nationalistic fight against imperialism."
It refers to this country as
"…the viper which is England."
That is the right hon. Gentleman's introduction to the Egyptian public. He did not mention that today when he spoke of the contents of his article. Not only that. He permitted another article to be published in this paper subsequent to that anti-British introduction in that newspaper, and this is what—
Mr. Bevan: Did the hon. Member know that the articles to which I referred today, syndicated by his leader, were paid for by Fascist and Nazi papers in Europe?
Mr. Lindsay: I am referring to the right hon. Gentleman's own sin, and not to any possible sins of my right hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend is perfectly capable of looking after himself.
I say to the right hon. Gentleman that he has done his uttermost to wreck the

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negotiations which are now proceeding between the British and the Egyptian Governments. What we want in this House is an agreement with Egypt. As to what the terms of the agreement are and the best way of getting it is a matter upon which we may all have perfectly legitimate differences. I do not doubt that they exist on that side of the House as well as on this side. I did not personally sign the Motion referred to, and I do not agree with it, but my right hon. and hon. Friends who did sign it may well be right in thinking that the best way ultimately to get an agreement with Egypt would be to suspend negotiations at the present time.
We are prepared to make new dispositions in the Middle East if we can obtain the guarantees which will safeguard our international rights of passage through the Canal and its future protection and that of the Middle East. I take those words from the recent speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) because I am glad to be able to demonstrate in that way that there is common ground between the two sides of the House, except only for the small number of Members for whom the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale speaks.
I was only surprised that the right hon. Gentleman was permitted to speak from the Front Bench today, because the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington only last Sunday on the subject of Egypt, said that the right hon. Gentleman spoke only for himself. The position is that the whole of the Conservative Party and most of the party opposite want this agreement, but our attitude to this question is that we must obtain the guarantees which we require, and that unless we can obtain them it is our duty to stay there.
Now what does the right hon. Gentleman do? At this very critical juncture, just when these delicate negotiations are going on, he writes an article in the Egyptian press which states we are going to leave in any case.
Mr. Bevan: I did not say that.
Mr. Lindsay: I simply cannot imagine anything more likely than that to encourage General Neguib in his demands for British total surrender.
Mr. Bevan: Will the hon. Gentleman quote that?
Mr. Lindsay: I will quote it with pleasure:
"We shall evacuate Egypt whether we like it or not."
Mr. Bevan: That is not in the article.
Mr. Lindsay: Of course it is.
Mr. Bevan: I challenge the hon. Member. Will he give way?
Mr. Speaker: We cannot have two hon. Members on their feet at the same time. If the hon. Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay) wishes to give way, he can sit down. If he does not give way, nobody else should stand.
Mr. Lindsay Mr. Lindsay rose—
Mr. Bevan: Quote. Quote. Quote.
Mr. Lindsay: If the right hon. Gentleman will try to contain himself, I will tell him that I was prepared for him to challenge me by his saying that these are purely tendentious reports cabled back from Cairo. I therefore took this article to an Egyptian official in this country and I got a great deal of it translated by him. He is not a member of the Tory Party or a newspaper correspondent, and I entirely satisfied myself that the reports which had been sent back from Cairo and the translations of the right hon. Gentleman's article are accurate. I could not do more than that, and I am quite satisfied that the translations I have been given are accurate.
Mr. Bevan: This is a very serious thing and I wish to inquire about it. It may be that the article when it is translated into Arabic is not properly translated. I must find out. I do not speak Arabic or write it, and the hon. Member is quite right in drawing my attention to the point. But it is known that the article is in the Library. He has made a quotation from the article, which is a quotation alleged to be from the Arabic translation but not from the original article.
Mr. Lindsay: The right hon. Gentleman says he has been misrepresented.
Mr. Bevan: I did not say so.
Mr. Lindsay: The right hon. Gentleman says he has been misrepresented by the translation.
Mr. Bevan: No.
Mr. Lindsay: What else did the right hon. Gentleman expect but to be misrepresented when he has been paid to write for a rabble-rousing anti-British newspaper? He has no answer at all on the score of misrepresentation.
Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South- East)Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South- East) rose—
Mr. Lindsay: I am not going to give way again. I have already been speaking for longer than I intended.
As I said, I cannot imagine anything more calculated to encourage anti-British demands for total surrender than the right hon. Gentleman's articles. The one certain way of making sure that one gets no terms at all is to say that one is going to clear out in any case.
I believe that the righthon. Gentleman is guilty of an even more serious crime. I believe that the effect of these articles will be greatly to inflame the passions which already exist. I, for one, cannot forget that these are the people who have trained saboteurs under German instructors to kill and maim our people, and I cannot forget that there have been over 100 attacks with firearms or explosives upon British life and property in the last year. Of one thing I am quite certain: whatever supporters and friends the right hon. Gentleman used to have in the families of Service men in the Canal Zone, he will not have them after these articles in Cairo.
We ourselves are used to the right hon. Gentleman's sneers against the British Empire and the United States, and perhaps they do not do much harm here because we know him for the sawdust Caesar that he is. We remember the right hon. Gentleman's advice to us in a critical stage of the war to put Polish generals in command of the 8th Army.
Mr. Bevan: I did not say so.
Mr. Lindsay: We do not forget his failure to build the houses. We in this country are quite accustomed to his bombast and malice. But he is not as yet so discredited in countries overseas. Overseas he has the high position of being an ex-member of the British Cabinet and a Privy Councillor. And in giving his sponsorship and encouragement to the revolutionary movement in Egypt, I think
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the right hon. Gentleman has done a dastardly thing and forfeited the respect of this House and of his fellow citizens.
6.55 p.m.
Mr. Tom Driberg: I shall not deal at length with the dreary, vindictive, and contemptible nonsense to which we have just listened from the hon. Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay) because he made no new point at all and had been answered adequately in advance by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). It was interesting, however, and symptomatic of his attitude, that the hon. Member kept telling us of the things that he could not forget, many of them deplorable and regrettable things indeed. He was rather like the Bourbons in that respect: people who forgot nothing—and learned nothing. That, of course, is the trouble with some hon. Members on the back benches opposite; they forget nothing and they learn nothing.
It was rather terrifying, in a way, that the first speech from those back benches, by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house), should have been the kind of speech it was. It is terrifying that the leaders of Her Majesty's Government, who, whatever their party, do gradually begin to learn something about the hard facts of life when they hold office and attend international conferences, should have to sit through such arrant nonsense and listen respectfully to it, because the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is, of course, very influential in the Conservative Party in the country. It is terrifying that members of the Government should have to listen—apparently with attentive respect—to these Piltdown politics.
This debate is not exclusively about Egypt, although one might suppose that it was from some of the speeches which have been made, but before I pass to more general topics I should like to say a word about that part of the world. I want to refer particularly to the Sudan; but what I have to say may have some bearing on what has been said about Egypt.
There has just been an election in the Sudan, and I imagine that the result of it was something of a distasteful shock to many people in this country and on both sides of this House, perhaps especially to the Foreign Office and Her

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Majesty's Government, because the election went overwhelmingly in favour of the more pro-Egyptian parties and against the Independence Front, led by the Umma party, who, although they were in no sense stooges of Her Majesty's Government or of Britain, were thought of here as our friends.
In my view, one of the main reasons why that Sudanese election has gone in a way which most of us, and certainly, I imagine, the Government, deplore or regret—although, of course, the Sudanese people have a perfect right to vote as they like—is the continued presence of British troops in Suez. I had better explain why I say that. It is because all the Sudanese, of whatever party, have for many years wanted to get rid of the British from the Sudan. When I say "all the Sudanese" I mean all the politically literate Sudanese. I do not refer to some of the more primitive and backward people in the south. All the politically conscious Sudanese, of whatever party, have wanted to get the British out of the Sudan.
There was, however, a considerable split between them on the best tactics and the best method of doing it, and those who formed the more pro-Egyptian parties, the pro-Egyptian front, as against the straight independence front, were actuated originally, and I think still are, not by any desire to replace subjection to Britain by subjection to Egypt, but simply by their view of Egypt as a neighbour who stood in a quasi-Colonial relationship with Britain. It seemed to these Sudanese politicians that if they collaborated with Egypt, and learned from Egypt the techniques of resisting colonialism, they would be able to achieve their own independence more rapidly. I do not know whether they are right or not, but I venture to offer that as one explanation—not the only one—of the result of the Sudanese election.
While I am on the subject of the Sudan, it is perhaps not inappropriate that somebody in this House should say a word—perhaps even the Foreign Secretary, in winding up, might say a word—about the position in the Sudan of the British officials still serving there, and about the Sudanisation of the public services. What is its prospective rate likely to be over the next few years? I would like personally to add that, although, of course,
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our position in the Sudan depended originally on imperial and strategic considerations, none the less those British officials who have served and are still serving there—at present under very great difficulties—are not the traditional exploiting imperialists whom we know of in some parts of the world: they are the most unselfish and dedicated body of civil servants to be found perhaps anywhere in the world, with very high standards of service indeed.
I now turn to the Prime Minister's speech, which he himself described as simple and factual. It was simple in the sense that a vacuum is simple. It was factual in the sense that our Votes and Proceedings are factual; it was certainly not a Hansard of the Bermuda Conference and, indeed, for reasons which the right hon. Gentleman explained, that could hardly be expected as yet. Nevertheless, it was, I think, disappointingly light and jejune, and hardly told us anything more than we had learned from the communiqué. Its general tone was agreeable, but it was marred by that very silly sneer at my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale—the "McCarthy-Bevanite" sneer. It was a most fatuous and stupid thing to take two men who are the exact opposite of each other in every way, and to link them together in that infantile manner.
My right hon. Friend has, incidentally, been in the wars quite a lot recently. You, Mr. Speaker, may have noticed that there were some pejorative allusions to him in another place yesterday. I cannot help feeling that if that kind of thing is to go on, we shall have to ask you, Mr. Speaker, to consider what the relations between the two Houses ought to be. We here have no right to ask questions of the Government about matters for which they are not in the least responsible, departmentally or officially—matters relating to Members of another place—and Members of another place ought not to abuse their privilege of not having such strict Standing Orders as we have here.
There was in the right hon. Gentleman's singularly empty speech one very significant phrase. He said—and I think all of us agreed with him—that the Soviet Union was entitled to assurances of reasonable security after the immense suffering endured at the hands of Hitler's

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armies. That is a truism which, I suppose, would be accepted by every hon. Member on both sides of this House. The curious thing is that the Prime Minister, weighing each word carefully—because he was reading from a carefully prepared script—felt obliged to add: "I think that I was successful in impressing this on my colleagues at Bermuda." How extraordinary to have to struggle to impress such an obvious truism on our allies and colleagues! What a picture it gives of the enormous chasm between British and American foreign policy and outlook on world affairs, that it should be necessary to have to struggle to impress this on the Americans at Bermuda! Of course, in America they take far more than we do here what may be called the apocalyptic view of Soviet Russia. It is the great bogy-man, the Prince of darkness, the source of all evil. That is what McCarthyism, as it is called, lives and feeds on.
A rather curious converse process has been going on. During the last few years, since the war, great international issues have been determined far too often in the light of American domestic politics, not on their merits at all. One could give many instances of that—South Tyrol, some aspects of the Palestine issue, and so on. Now the reverse process is also taking place, and American domestic politics are being and, I suppose, will be determined very largely by the state of affairs in the world in general. The more tension there is in the world, the worse the situation between East and West, the more McCarthyism will grow and flourish: conversely, McCarthyism would probably wither away overnight if there could be a real détente, a real easing of tension between Russia and the West.
It is, therefore, in the interests of Senator McCarthy and those who think like him—a group by no means without power and influence in the United States—to do everything possible to inflame and aggravate ill-feeling between the West and Russia, and it is extremely disturbing that the Republican administration seems of late to have been so terrorised by Senator McCarthy that it has even sunk to using some of his methods.
Mr. Osborne: Is the hon. Gentleman now saying that he honestly believes that
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the differences between the East and the West are caused more by the action of any section of the American public than by Russia?
Mr. Driberg: I was not saying anything of the kind. I am very sorry, but I will say it again, and try to say it as nearly as possible in words of one syllable. It was rather a difficult antithesis.
Mr. F. M. Bennett: That is a good start.
Mr. Driberg: What I did say, quite seriously, was that since the war international issues have very often been settled, not on their merits, but in accordance with how they may or may not influence the domestic vote in America. I also suggested that the reverse process was now going on. International issues themselves are having and are likely to have their effect on voting in America. For instance, President Eisenhower's electoral victory may very well be attributed in part to his offer to fly to Korea to see what could be done to stop the war. Whatever one may think of that offer, I think it had its effect on the election. Similarly, McCarthyism tends to be built up more and more when the international situation is at its worst, because McCarthyism lives on the Communist bogy. That was the point I was making. It was, as the hon. Gentleman will agree, quite a different point from the one that he accused me of making.
The trouble about America is that there is always an election pending. Some people might add that the trouble about Russia is that there is never an election pending. But, of course, when we are having delicate international negotiations or arguments in the full light of publicity, as in the United Nations Organisation, the electoral atmosphere makes things very difficult. It makes it difficult for the delegates of the electorally infected nation to contribute sensibly and argue issues on their merits.
When I was in New York recently, I spent a good deal of time at the United Nations building. I am bound to pay a tribute to our own delegation there. I found that many friendly Americans, and others, gave high marks to the United Kingdom delegation, both now and in the past. They say that the great thing about

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our delegation is that it is the only, or practically the only, Western delegation that does not keep one eye on its electorate all the time. I do not say that I always agree with all the decisions taken and all the contributions made by our delegates there, but at least they do try to argue sensibly on the merits of the case and in accordance with general policy, and do not merely keep one eye on theirown parishes, their own constituencies, their own votes at the next domestic election. This is the great defect of our American Allies, as I have already said.
The great American over-simplification on this issue of East-West relations is to equate Nazi Germany with Soviet Communism, to say that this is exactly the same thing all over again, or worse, that there is no difference in principle between the two. That, of course, is nonsense, for a number of reasons which I will not bother to detail now. But the right hon. Gentleman himself gave one—to mention only one—in his speech, when he said in that very interesting passage that World War I might have been avoided by negotiation, but that World War II could not have been avoided because we were dealing with what he called a "ferocious maniac." Whatever anybody, even the most ardent anti-Communist, can say about the present leaders of Russia, nobody could suggest that they are ferocious maniacs. They are perhaps calculating and scientific politicians, but they are not ferocious maniacs. Therefore, it is always possible to negotiate. There is no such situation as confronted us at the beginning of World War II.
I wish to say a few more words about this menace called McCarthyism. Some Americans—and I have no doubt that hon. Members opposite who have been to the United States recently, as I know that some have, will confirm this and maybe even agree with it—some Americans are apt to say, "You people in Britain, and overseas generally, exaggerate the influence of Senator McCarthy. You build him up into too big a thing." I honestly cannot accept that view. Quite apart from the fact that a man of his record, with the extraordinary things that have been proved against him and are on record—how he stood for the Senate, for instance, quite unconstitutionally—can
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hold such an official position and impose a kind of reign of terror on so many people, as he does—quite apart from all that, if one talks to ordinary Americans it is extraordinary how many of them say about him, "Well, he may have made some mistakes, but he has certainly done a lot of good. He has dug up a lot of facts about these spies"—and so on.
This is quite untrue, of course, but the confusion and chaos of conflicting radio voices and newspaper headlines in America is such that it is extraordinarily difficult for the average citizen to remember, amid the welter of denials, counter-denials, and contradictions, what the simple bare facts are about any particular case, or trial, or investigation, or hearing.
It is dangerous and alarming that so many of the ordinary people one talks to in America speak of Senator McCarthy in the way in which ordinary, average, quite decent Germans used to speak of Adolf Hitler before he came into power, or even after he had come into power. Indeed, some people compare the position of McCarthy in America now with the position of Hitler in, say, 1930. I can only hope that the essential decency and good sense of the American people will react against these influences. It would be disastrous for the world if McCarthy were to achieve the Republican candidature in 1956—which is said to be his ambition—and if, heaven forbid, he should actually be elected President.
In 1946, when I last visited America, I had the privilege of making a speech in this House which excited a good deal of critical comment. It was the kind of speech which is always described, rather too loosely, as anti-American. I ventured on that ocasion to try to warn the House of some of the tendencies in American civilisation which seemed to me dangerous. Looking back, I think that I was justified in doing so. I should, however, now like to issue a supplementary warning against the kind of merely stupid anti-Americanism of which we find traces here and there in this country. I am strongly in favour of what is now the official policy of the party to which I belong, that we should adopt an attitude more independent of Washington and of American policy. We should return to the midway position defined very well soon after the war by my right hon. Friend

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the present Leader of the Opposition, when he said that in many respects we stand midway between these two great Power blocs of America and Russia: that we agree with the Americans on some issues—on civil liberties, and so on—and that we agree with the Russians on some other issues—the collective organisation of industry, and so on.
We have drifted far too far away from that middle position in the years that have lain between, for reasons which are well known and which I need not go into. It ought to be possible for Britain in the West to be as independent as India is in the East. That is certainly the policy that I and many of my hon. Friends on this side of the House aim at all the time. Independence does not mean hostility. It is perfectly possible to achieve a relationship of friendly independence with the United States of America. I certainly am opposed to total or stupid anti-Americanism. There is no reason to go to war with the Americans, or any nonsense like that.
Mr. Osborne: We hope not.
Mr. Driberg: Of course not. We must continue to trade with America and to try to understand them better, because there is a great deal of misundertsanding of America in Britain, and vice versa. It is extremely important that we should understand each other better. Moreover, if that is important of two countries which have in some respects so strong a natural basis for understanding—in language, for instance—how much more important, and yet how much more difficult, it is of this country and the Soviet Union. There is far more misunderstanding and far more lack of real knowledge there.
I had the privilege in New York of quite a long private talk with Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Malik. I hope that it will not embarrass the Minister of State if I say that I put in a good word for him with Mr. Vyshinsky. In that conversation—which I cannot repeat here, because it was confidential—theyshowed, I thought, an absolutely genuine, passionate desire for peace and understanding, coupled with a good many particular misunderstandings of the British position and of what goes on in this country. It is extremely important that there should be far more mutual enlightenment about the facts, both between ourselves and
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America and between ourselves and Russia.
As has already been said from the Front Bench on this side of the House, we wish the Foreign Secretary well in the conference that he will be attending in the near future. We hope passionately that the conference will succeed, but it will fail—it is bound to fail—unless the restraining influence of Britain on American policy is more manifestly effective than it has been in the past, and it will also fail if Western German rearmament is thought to be irrevocable.
7.22 p.m.
Mr. Charles Williams: I hope that the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) will excuse me if I do not follow him very deeply into Anglo-American relationships, but I might perhaps say this. One of the best illustrations that one could possibly give of the difference of opinion and feeling between ourselves and the Americans is that the Americans feel that the Panama Canal is essential to them—which, of course, it is—and many British people feel very much the same about the Suez Canal. It is difficult for the Americans to realise that point of view, and vice versa.
I agree with the hon. Member that there is an essential need of good relationship between America and ourselves. I would take an even stronger line than did the hon. Member in saying that I want to see the best possible relationship with Russia also; but that goes for the whole of my party.
Earlier in the day we had a lively and interesting speech by my noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). I feel sure that everyone in the House will hope to hear him often in the future. His speech was not necessarily of the type which one would expect from someone who had been in the House for a long period, nor was it over-polished. At any rate, he spoke his mind. He laid down certain rules that some of us should follow, and possibly not wrongly. I would add another, that he never makes a speech either in the House or outside, which in any way reflects on a Member of his party; and for that reason I say that his speech was most interesting, most charming, and one which would make his constituents say that they have a very good Member of Parliament. I hope he

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will continue to represent them for a long time.
I would not have spoken had I not been stirred by my noble Friend's speech. He rather took the line that certain people whose names were down to a Motion put their names to it only because, to his mind, of a blind idea that we simply did not want to evacuate the Canal. That is not what is moving me and many of my hon. Friends. What moves us is that we feel today that in the Middle East we have an absolute necessity for much closer co-operation with the various nations and a very much stronger defence system. That is the key to the position today. We are not happy that we are making as good progress there as we have made in other parts of the world.
We are told by the highest military authority that it is necessary to have a base there, and we are told that the best base is near the Suez Canal. We know that we have equipment there. We are met, therefore, with this difficult position of the natural feeling of the Egyptians, which I can understand perfectly, because I am a Cornishman, although born in England.
That being the case, and speaking entirely for myself, I want to show where I think an advance can be made. I realise the feeling and the discontent that is stirring up in the world, as do many other hon. Members. If we are to have a stronger organisation in the Middle East and if we must have a base, surely the best solution is to try to get those nations who are most affected into it. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary may be able to tell us, because it is essential that we should know more about the Middle East defence than we know so far. Is it not possible in any way, because we realise the necessity for the defence of Turkey, to work Turkey in and so to get this balance of favour of the Moslems in that part of the world for helping in the defence of the Canal? A base in that country would undoubtedly be of very great value to Turkey, and if there is to be a strong United Nations policy for that area, she must play a leading part.
We had earlier a very interesting speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay) on the ship-
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ping possibilities of the Canal. It was a well-informed speech, as one would expect of him. In the earlier part of my life, I happened to see something of the Canal and something of the Australian Forces there. They were there in two wars, and it is almost inevitable that if the worst happened and another war came, Australian and New Zealand Forces would require bases in that part of the world.
When we are faced with a difficulty such as this, and when some of us know that the highest military authorities recognise that we need the best base, and the Suez area is that base, would it not be possible as a solution of this great difficulty, which I see as plainly as anyone else, to work out a base with the co-operation of those nations that are likely to be interested in the future defence of the Middle East?
I make that suggestion, not as representing a group or in any way as a detailed method of dealing with the problem. It seems to me, however, that if we are building up in that area, as every one of us wants, a stronger union for the defence of that area, the key base of which is Suez, we should have consultations between those nations who are most affected and are most likely to have to take part in that defence.
I apologise to the House for having taken time in a foreign affairs debate, but I am one of the few people left in the House who took part with the Australians and saw their work and that of other nations in the First World War in that part of the world.
Those of us who have our names to the Motion have no intention whatever of hurting the Government. Our one idea is to focus attention on the important subject of the Canal, because we believe that the solving of the problem is essential. None of us has any intention of hurting the Government, but we believe very strongly that one of the great difficulties of today is the defence of the Middle East and all that it stands for, and I should like to see the nations which will be affected by its defence in the future brought into the consultations so that a solution to the Canal problem may be reached. Upon that solution will very greatly depend the security of the Middle East and the peace of the whole world in the future.
7.31 p.m.
Mr. Denis Healey: I have very little difficulty, I am surprised to say, in following the suggestion of the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams), and I imagine that very few hon. Members have. It has been the policy of successive British Governments to try to solve the Suez Canal question through the creation of some sort of Middle Eastern defence organisation which would include Turkey as well as other Middle Eastern countries. If many of his hon. Friends signed the Motion of rebellion with the same ideas in view, perhaps the rebellion is less serious than it seems to be at first sight.
I want to make one or two comments upon a point raised by the hon. Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay) when he quoted some remarks by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) at the week-end and claimed that they were representative of the overwhelming majority of my party. The Leader of my party has spoken unequivocally on this question this afternoon, and he has made it clear beyond any doubt that there is no support on these benches for the Tory rebellion against the British Government on this issue and that the Conservative rebels will get no support from these benches on this issue.
I might also remind the House that a large number of my right hon. and hon. Friends, almost half of them, have recently signed a Motion supporting the Government in its negotiations with Egypt, and I hope that a note will be taken of this fact by those Members of the Cabinet who would like to seize any excuse for stabbing the Foreign Secretary in the back on this issue.
Mr. Osborne: There are no such Members.
Mr. Healey: I wish now to confine myself largely to the question of the Bermuda Conference, the Paris Conference of the N.A.T.O. Council and the forthcoming meeting in Berlin. I am afraid that I cannot give unqualified approval—very few of us could—to the results of the last fortnight's international meetings. It seems to me that there is one very great advance that we can claim, and that is in the clarity of vision of the Governments concerned. I am very glad to notice that there is now very much less
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wishful thinking than there was about the meaning of the changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union this year.
But, although there is a great gain in the clarity of vision with which Governments see these international problems, I am afraid that the recent meetings show a very obvious step backwards in both strength of purpose and unity of policy. It is a sort of flagging of will in the Western Alliance, on the causes of which I wish to spend some time later.
First of all, let me take the good side. It is extremely valuable at the present time that the major members of the Western Alliance should reaffirm, as they did in the Bermuda communiqué, that N.A.T.O. is, and will remain, the foundation of our common policy. Recent developments in the United States in this direction are also extremely encouraging. We must all have been extremely glad to note the way in which the American Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, and the United States President reacted to the recent challenge by Senator McCarthy and stated unequivocally and in the clearest possible terms that they recognised that America's needs for allies is paramount and that allies can be won only by persuasion and not by bullying. It is fitting that we should register our strong approval of the stand which the United States Administration is now taking on this issue.
Having recently visited the United States, I feel that the explosion of the hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union has had a profound and, on the whole, extremely healthy effect on United States political thinking. First, it has put the United States for the first time in the same boat as her European allies regarding the dangers and effects of a possible third world war. In a sense, that is all to the good, because the United States is now much less likely to be tempted into risky gambles in foreign affairs than she might have been in the past. Secondly, I believe that Americans are coming to realise that space is now essential to them, that they cannot have space without allies, and that they cannot have allies without consent. All that is very much to the good.
I believe that there has also been a great advance in clarity of thinking in France, too. One of the most encouraging things to me recently was M. Bidault's statement in Paris the other day in which

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he very clearly said something which has seemed to me for many years to be a most important element in the framing of Western policy. That is that there can be no European unity and no lasting co-operation between France and Germany unless it takes place within a greatly strengthened Atlantic community of which Britain and the United States are active permanent members.
But, having said those words of praise about an advance in the clarity of vision of the Governments concerned, I am afraid I must suggest that there has been very little progress in policy along those lines. The strengthening of the North Atlantic Alliance is admitted by all the Governments concerned to be a precondition of any progress in the future. So far as we can tell from the communiqué issued in Paris yesterday, the only real step forward in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance was the adoption by the countries concerned of a standardised round for a new automatic rifle. I should be the last to minimise the importance of this agreement—it is, indeed, extremely important—but against it must be set some extremely worrying deteriorations in both the political and the economic attitudes of the main Atlantic allies towards their co-operation.
There seems not to have emerged, either at Bermuda or in Paris, any real unity of policy towards the major international problems which the Atlantic allies will have to face in the next six months, such as the negotiations with Russia on the German question in Berlin next month or, far more important in my view, the crisis which is developing in Western relations over France's reluctance to ratify the European Army Treaty. The plain fact—it can give no one pleasure to state it—is that political relations between the main members of the Atlantic Alliance are worse now than they have been at any time since 1947.
Also, the main military result of the recent meetings in Paris was a decision by all the countries concerned greatly to reduce their military strength, mainly, though not entirely, because the main Governments concerned are subject to pressure to cut taxes which, for political reasons, cannot be done by cutting domestic expenditure. It seems to me that a re-assessment of Soviet intents and the
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possible importance of new tactical atomic weapons were only of secondary importance in determining this reduction in N.A.T.O.'s military strength.
Thirdly, and most important of all, there is developing the most terrible crisis in the Western Alliance since the war over the European Army Treaty. During the last week we have seen an astonishing sight: the Foreign Secretaries of two of the most important members of the Western Alliance, America and France, bandying threats with one another in public about their possible actions if the European Army Treaty is not ratified. We have seen the American Secretary of State threatening to withdraw American troops from Europe and the French Secretary of State threatening to make a deal with the Russians if this happens.
I do not think that any of us can feel any satisfaction about the progress of policy in the Western Alliance when such things are possible, and they are only an indication of the far graver troubles which may arise during the coming year. It seems to me that this position is a poor basis on which the Western Allies must meet the Russians in a fortnight's time in Berlin for some of the most important high level negotiations which have taken place in recent years.
We may face in Berlin a most important change in Soviet policy which has, indeed, been forecast in the recent Soviet Notes. Inrecent years the main aim of Soviet policy in Europe in international negotiation has been to try to win the support of the German people by trying to offer Germany unity on some terms which might be considered acceptable. Now that policy is changing, and I think that the main aim of the Soviet negotiators in Berlin will be to try to win the support of the French people, not so much by offering German unity, as by offering the French the illusion of a security pact to keep Germany weak and, possibly, divided also. There is no evidence, either at Bermuda or in the recent Paris N.A.T.O. meeting, that the Western Allies have put themselves into an adequate posture to deal with this possible new strategy.
The main reason for this deterioration has already been referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg). It is that in France and the United States governments have in the

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last few years moved far ahead of popular and, in particular, of parliamentary opinion. Both the American and the French Governments are now trying to carry out policies which do not have the wholehearted support or understanding of the majority of the members of Congress or of the French Chamber.
Another reason for this is that in all the arguments which I have been mentioning Britain has played no evident rôle. I am certain that the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister had a great deal to say in private to the Ministers of foreign governments, both at Bermuda and in Paris, but since the main cause for the coming crisis in the Western Alliance is the trend of public opinion, it is not sufficient to say these things in private to heads of governments who, in any case, are known to be in agreement in advance with what we are going to say. The main diplomatic battle in Western policy in the coming months, and perhaps years, will be a battle for public opinion. That is where the British Government particularly have been lacking for many years—to be quite honest, both the present Government and the previous Government.
I shall end by suggesting two ways in which it might be possible to counter the damage which is now developing in public opinion inside the Atlantic Community, first on the question of the way in which British policy is put in the international arena at the present time. No one can blame a Foreign Secretary for confining himself largely to platitudes when he makes statements about delicate diplomatic problems. Indeed, I think that when Foreign Secretaries diverge from platitude into precision, they sometimes do more harm than good, as Mr. Dulles has shown us several times during the last few months. And, of course, we all recognise that the Foreign Secretary is greatly hampered by the fact that his chief, the Prime Minister, often makes statementswhich have great effect on public opinion but which are possibly totally irrelevant to the main aims which the Foreign Secretary is trying to pursue.
The Prime Minister, particularly this year, has confined his public speeches largely to scattering a number of thunder flashes which dazzle the audience for a moment and then leave it shrouded in smoke for month to follow. It is difficult
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for the Foreign Secretary. One must have sympathy with him in trying to conduct a campaign of explaining his policy to public opinion under the circumstances. But, of course, we have to live with this kind of situation. If the Japanese have learned to live with earthquakes and the Italian peasant can live happily on the slopes of Vesuvius, I see no reason why a British Foreign Secretary should not survive under the leadership of the present Prime Minister.
The main problem for any British Government at the present time is to try to get its underlying aims and methods understood by its own public opinion and by public opinion in foreign countries. Often in recent years where the British Government have surrendered to the American Government on an issue of policy, the underlying reason has been that the American Government have been able to quote a restive Congress, whereas the British Government have no public opinion mobilised behind their policy. Britain will be at a great disadvantage so long as in her diplomatic dealings she sticks to the conventions of an age when public opinion played little or no part in the formulation of foreign policy.
My concrete suggestion is that in future Her Majesty's Government should make much greater use of the extremely fine body of diplomatic correspondents who serve the British Press and broadcasting, and give the spokesmen of the News Department much greater freedom in explaining and interpreting and forecasting British policy. It is impossible for Britain to stand up on equal terms in these questions with France and the United States when French policy is being publicly ventilated for months in advance of the decisive conference by leakages or by statements from the Quai d'Orsay, American policy is being similarly ventilated by spokesmen of the State Department, and yet our own policies, which may often be extremely sensible and capable of winning wide support both in the United States and France, are kept secret until a decision is finally taken.
To take just one example—it is not a partisan one because it occurred in the period of the late Government—I believe that during the period when there was great discussion over whether or not to advance to the Yalu, the British Government of the day strongly urged that the

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United Nations armies in Korea should stand at the 39th Parallel, the waist line, as a compromise between the 38th Parallel and the Yalu. I am certain that if this suggestion had been publicly ventilated it would have won wide support in the United States. The fact that it was not so ventilated until after the decision had been taken, robbed the British negotiators of the strength of their position.
Sir R. Boothby: What grounds has the hon. Gentleman for that assertion? According to my information, the British Government were in favour of going over the 39th Parallel on to the Yalu—including the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). The hon. Gentleman now asserts the contrary. Has he any grounds for that assertion?
Mr. Healey: The fact that the hon. Member and myself disagree on this issue strengthens my case. I cannot quote my ground for my belief any more than he can quote the ground for his, but I think that the misunderstanding between us on this issue is sufficient evidence of the importance of the point which I am making.
Sir R. Boothby: I know who is right.
Mr. Healey: I pass to the much broader question of public opinion in all the countries of the Western Alliance. There is no doubt that at the moment there is great public apathy in every country towards what is now described as the main basis of Western policy—the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Very reluctantly, and against much personal experience in Strasbourg, I have come to the view that there is a very strong case for the establishment of some sort of Parliamentary assembly for the principal countries of N.A.T.O.I believe that this proposal has already been made by the Norwegian Government and that it received strong support at a conference of international organisations supporting N.A.T.O. which, with Government support, took place in Copenhagen earlier this year. It seems to me that there are very strong arguments for setting up some sort of Parliamentary debating assembly which is common to all the N.A.T.O. countries.
First of all, it will greatly improve the understanding, at least in Parliaments, of the real national positions of the various
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countries. I am quite convinced, especially after my last visit to the United States that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon said, the motives and structure of American opinion on many major issues at the present time is totally misunderstood on this side of the Atlantic. I am equally certain that the basis of the British and French position on many important international issues is equally totally misunderstood in the United States, not least by United States Senators and Congressmen. So for this reason, to begin with, there is a very strong case for some sort of Parliamentary assembly, particularly as United States Senators and Congressmen are as a body very much more isolated from public and world opinion than are members of most European Parliaments.
Secondly, if we genuinely believe that N.A.T.O. must be the basis of Western policy there is a strong argument for setting up a public institution to embody that idea, because institutions exert great influence upon the thinking of their members and they also create vested interests in the survival of the concept which they exist to represent—things which we who attend the Council of Europe meetings at Strasbourg have noticed very much.
Thirdly, it would be extremely valuable to have a small official public forum in which major issues facing the Western allies can be debated in public. I know that this suggestion will make many officials in the Foreign Office shudder with fright and even disgust, but these great issues on international affairs are now discussed in public inside the countries concerned, perhaps much more in the United States and in France than in Britain. I do not think that any foreign affairs debate in France is ever as poorly attended as such debates are here. There is a strong case for having these arguments, which must be thrashed out separately in any case, thrashed out together.
There are many lessons to be learned from experience of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. There is a case for considering whether the Council of Europe itself might not be absorbed into a wider Atlantic body, because now that even the French have become convinced that there is really nothing of importance internationally in between "Little Europe"—the Continent—and the Atlantic community, the existence of a body

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which contains Little Europe plus Scandinavia and Britain but without the United States has very little to commend it.
The essentials which should govern the constitution of such a body is that, first, it should not be a legislative assembly or appear to be one, so that it does not spend its first years of life like the Strasbourg Assembly in fighting a committee of Ministers or some ministerial body for powers which it was never intended to have. Secondly, and most important, the United States Congress must be a full member, represented on exactly the same basis as all the others. We do not want any more discussions with Europe in which the United States representatives play the part of cross-examiners of Europe about its enthusiasm for certain ideas. We must have an assembly in which everybody takes part as equal members. That would give us one more arm for combating the public apathy which is one of the obstacles to the development of Western policy. If that is not done all the goodwill of Governments, as expressed in Bermuda and Paris, may prove ineffective in face of the indifference and opposition of Parliamentary and public opinion in the countries concerned.
7.54 p.m.
Mr. H. A. Price: Although I have been in this House for nearly four years, this is the first time that I have ever dared to trespass on the field of foreign policy. I do so, quite frankly, and I hope briefly, to ride a hobby horse, and in doing so to touch upon a topic which I regard as tremendously important but which has hardly been mentioned today. It is the proposal contained in the speech which President Eisenhower made on the 8th of this month for setting up an international organisation for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
One newspaper said of that speech that if it was possible for one man to stop World War III, then Eisenhower had done so. That may be true. I hope it is. Another newspaper referred to it as a new and constructive project. That is not so true. If I may say so without sounding pompous, this is a project which I have done my little best to promote ever since I became a Member of this House.
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Three impressions about atomic fission are uppermost in my mind. I am sure that the House will share the first two with me. The first is the frighteningly destructive power of the atom bomb. The second is the enormous prospects of economic and social improvement in the development of atomic power for peaceful purposes. I am not so sure that I shall carry the House with me on the third, which is that the general public is far more conscious of the first than of the second. For every one member of the general public who has the slightest inkling of the prospects that are opened to us by the peaceful use of atomic energy, there are 99 who think of the atom only in terms of the atom bomb.
I have always regarded that not only as eminently unsatisfactory but positively dangerous, and some two and a half years ago I began writing to the Press in an attempt to persuade them to do what they could to switch the searchlight from the atomic bomb to the peaceful application of atomic energy. I even went so far as to outline tentatively an international framework, but I completely failed to awaken any interest in the national Press. But in October, 1951, as a result of the General Election, my right hon. Friend became Foreign Secretary and on 19th November, 1951, I wrote to him sending him a copy of the letter which I had been writing for the Press. I have my right hon. Friend's permission to refer to his reply. My right hon. Friend began by acknowledging my letter
"…about the formation of an international organisation for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."
It may be that there are some hon. and right hon. Members who recognise the great similarity of that wording with the wording of the appropriate passage in President Eisenhower's speech. Towards the end of the letter, my right hon. Friend said:
"…while something on the lines you suggest might well be the ideal for which we should aim,"
I found that very flattering. But in between there is this comment:
"meanwhile it would not be possible to establish an organisation on the lines which you advocate without making available either directly or indirectly, to the Russians, information which would be of value to them in the manufacture of atomic weapons. This is a risk which I am afraid we could not run in the present state of political tension."

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That was on 27th November, 1951. In December, 1953, we are apparently prepared to run the risks which we were not prepared to run two years ago. I cannot help wondering why.
There are two possible explanations which occur to me. One is that Russia now knows so much about the atomic bomb and similar weapons that we no longer run any risk of betraying any secrets. The second is that we are satisfied that in the interim there has been such a change in Russia's attitude towards the West that such risks as are involved in this policy can safely be run. Whatever the answer, I want to urge my right hon. Friend—if he needs urging—to give this project the importance which I am quite certain belongs to it. Indeed, I doubt whether I am over-stating the case when I say that if it should prove possible to set up such an international organisation, it would be the biggest single step towards the security of the world since the setting up of U.N.O. itself.
It seems to me that the more we can get people thinking of the possibilities of economic and social advancement by the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the more unthinkable becomes the use of the atomic bomb for destructive purposes.
8.3 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I was going to confine myself wholly to a speech on Egypt and the Suez Canal, but the hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. H. A. Price) has enticed me to say a word or two on the atomic bomb. I cannot claim to have written a letter to the Foreign Secretary which resulted in theEisenhower Plan; indeed, I am not an expert; but what has struck me about the plan is the political aspect.
When considering the international control of atomic energy, I have been depressed since 1946 by the way in which the Western world has put forward plans so grandiose and ambitious that they had no chance of being agreed. Indeed, a cynic has observed that the only danger was that if, by an inconceivable chance, the Russians accepted any of those plans, the Americans would have to reject it because it would violate American sovereignty so completely. The idea that
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we could jump in one leap to a world authority which would at the same time control the greatest weapon of war and the greatest instrument for peace was quite unrealistic in view of the relations between the East and West.
I think the reason we on this side would agree with the Prime Minister in saying that the Eisenhower broadcast was far more important than anything which happened at Bermuda was that the President put forward a moderate and small proposition, the sort of thing which Russia could conceivably accept or at any rate discuss. If one studies the broadcast on atomic energy, one sees that the President deliberately stripped out of his proposals every one of the aspects of the Baruch Plan which were so objectionable to the Russians. When I contrast the Eisenhower broadcast of April last—in which the President answered the Russian peace proposals and laid down that Russia must perform certain clear and specific acts before there could be any question of talking to her at all—with the broadcast of December, which did not contain the demand for clear and specific acts by the Russians as a pre-condition, and consider that he is now seeking desperately to get discussions on atomic energy, we begin to realise how much has changed between April and now.
I should like to believe—in fact I am sure it is true—that the great speech of the Prime Minister on 11th May played a great part in that change, but I am afraid that the fact that the Russians now have an H-bomb played an even greater part. It is clear that the Americans want to discuss atomic energy and do not want to discuss Korea and Germany, because they feel so desperately insecure. So here is one subject on which they are prepared to negotiate because the balance of atomic power is so even, whereas in Korea and Germany they feel that an agreement would tell against them.
Mr. H. A. Price: I am obliged to the hon. Member for giving way. There is nothing political in this. Would he agree that the setting up of a European organisation for nuclear research, which we joined in July this year, is one step forward?
Mr. Crossman: Yes, but it is not quite the same thing. What, after all, we in

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this House want is high-level talks between East and West. It looks to me as if this proposal for talks on peaceful atomic development might be a tiny opportunity for talks between East and West. I congratulate the President on his discovery that the Chinese have no atomic power and that he can exclude Communist China without excluding Communist China—
Mr. Paton: Communist Russia.
Mr. Crossman: —exclude Communist China without formally excluding Communist China, simply by limiting the conference to those Powers which have atomic energy. This does indicate a willingness to talk on the part of the Americans which was not apparent as long as they regarded only their allies as threatened by atomic annihilation. It shows that in a world like this an equilibrium of power is safer than an unbalance of power, even if the superiority is on our own side.
I now turn to what back-benchers have made the subject of the debate, the question of the Suez Canal. I turn to it for the reason that all other speeches which we may make will not make much difference, but on the subject of Suez the way the debate goes this evening may indeed decide the fate of the British Commonwealth of Nations. If the debate went in a way which gave the Government Front Bench the feeling that they could not go ahead with the negotiations without fearing a combination of their rebels and the Labour Opposition, then the Commonwealth would be in danger.
The fact is that, unless and until we can achieve an agreement with Egypt on Suez, the whole position of Britain in the Middle East will continue to go from bad to worse. I have heard speeches from the rebels on the other side of the House in which they have said, "Of course, we want co-operation with the Arab world." If they want co-operation with the Arab world, the beginning of co-operation is an agreement about the Suez Canal Zone. It is not only we who say that—ask any diplomatist or military expert out there. There has never been such unanimity on the part of the experts as the unanimity that a base is useless in a hostile territory and that Suez must be evacuated unless an agreement can be achieved. There is unanimity upon
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that among all the experts I have met. I did not find in the Canal Zone one General who denied that; I did not find anyone in the British Embassy in Egypt, or in the Foreign Office, who denied it. The only people who have denied it are the people who are bearing the standard of the true blue Tory Party below the Gangway.
Sir R. Boothby: Did the hon. Member say a true blue rebel?
Mr. Crossman: I said below the Gangway, but there are one or two hon. Members who are now sitting below the Gangway who, on this occasion, do not belong there; there are other rebellions, which are not reactionary rebellions, in which the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Sir R. Boothby) takes part. If the hon. Member would sit on the other side of the Gangway, it would clear the air. I notice that he has now moved, but he has not yet got the position quite right—
Sir R. Boothby: I am a P.P.S. at last.
Mr. Crossman: The hon. Member is making the very point I wanted to make. I watched the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary while they were listening to the speech of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and it is a strange fact that, while the Foreign Secretary sat there with considerable embarrassment listening to what he felt was a speech which belonged to a different century, the Prime Minister—in so far as he could hear the speech—automatically and gently nodded his emotional approval. It was fascinating to watch the pair of them.
This was a very important distinction. "Ah!" said the Prime Minister to himself, and nodded his head. I had the distinct feeling that he was thinking to himself, "That is the sort of speech I am used to." As I watched, I thought that those two right hon. Gentlemen represented two different generations.
What determines one's attitude to politics is the experience of one's youth. The Prime Minister's youthful experience was of the days of Omdurman and the Foreign Secretary's was that of the massacre on the Somme. Probably the difference between them is the difference between a man whose youthful wars were

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gay adventure, when war was something good and jolly with a few natives to shoot at and a cavalry charge, and a man like the Foreign Secretary who lives in a world where war means the Somme massacre. One was putting together an Empire, partly for bond holders, partly for missionaries, partly by accident; and the other was seeing if it would stick together. The Foreign Secretary represents the pessimist because he is a Conservative who wants to hold on. The Prime Minister is an optimist because he is still living in the spirit of Omdurman—when he is allowed to by the rest of the Cabinet.
With the Egyptian negotiations strange things happened. They were going on nicely last winter and spring, until the Foreign Secretary fell ill and the Prime Minister took over and made that tremendous speech insulting the Egyptians. Then there was that mysterious airman who was captured, and we put out troops in the Suez area. The tanks rolled out for two months and then came back again, and negotiations were resumed—because nothing had happened as a result of the march of our troops, except the discovery that we had to negotiate. The Prime Minister learned the bitter lesson which everyone learns in turn and which is that one has to negotiate about the Canal Zone because there is no alternative. If we do not get agreement by 1956, we have to get out whether we like it or not.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: Would the hon. Gentleman identify the passage in the Treaty which makes it clear that we have to leave within a year?
Mr. Crossman: I will deal with one or two other illusions before I come to the major illusion the hon. Member refers to. I want to deal with what was said by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East, the great upholder of the British Empire. He said that it is a simple thing: we do not need a base—that is something we have never heard before; "get rid of the base; get the equipment out." There is only £500 million worth of equipment there, including an enormous signalling installation and vast airfields; of course that can all be packed on lorries and moved out; and then a jolly brigade will sit somewhere near the Suez and maintain British prestige. I was astonished to hear that.
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The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had the right rebellion, but the wrong period—the date really is 1881 and Majuba. And there would be the most disastrous results—if I may say so—if we carried it out.
But if there is not to be a base, if we do not require it, what is the reason for staying in the Canal Zone? That is the second illusion—that we must keep the troops there, to keep the Canal open. We have had 85,000 troops in the Suez area for some time. We had only a brigade there before the war, but now we have 85,000 men, and every day the Egyptians stop any ship they like. I remember that when the party opposite were in opposition the present Foreign Secretary said that if he were Foreign Secretary he would get the oil tankers through to Haifa; he would prevent the Egyptians from stopping ships.
In the two years in which they have been power—the Tories who were going to clean up the Middle East—the Egyptians have blockaded the Canal and, what is a worse insult, the Gulf of Aquba in defiance of 85,000 British troops. So what is the use of Tory rebels saying that the Canal will be closed by the Egyptians if our troops are not there. It is being closed while the troops are there. And why? Because the troops are there. That is why they close it—because they do not like the troops being there, and because we cannot do anything about it, although the troops are there.
May I say to the Tory rebels that the most humiliating thing an imperialist can do is to have 85,000 troops for two years in the Suez area and allow the Egyptians to maintain their embargo on everything that goes through? Could there be a greater waste of money—£50 million a year—to maintain British prestige? And we see ourselves as poltroons every day.
The third illusion is that about 1956, which is a bit of legalism. It is all in the treaty according to this illusion. We wrote a clever treaty in 1936, in the days when you could tie up a people and destroy their freedom by formal restrictions. We tied up the Persians. We said we would never allow them to get their oil. We made such a clever contract. We said we would never get out—and we are out. We said about the Suez Canal agreement when it was signed that it would be in force until we agreed to

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sign something else. We said, "You will never be able to get us out because we shall always delay signing until you consent to what we want."
I say to hon. Gentlemen opposite that that kind of thing was all right in 1910; it was just about possible in 1936; but now, after the Second World War, it is out of the question. We have signed the United Nations Charter, and international lawyers may have observed that countries signing that Charter accept national self determination and take sovereignty seriously. I would ask hon. Gentlemen opposite what they consider would be our chances at the International Court at The Hague if we deliberately stayed on after 1956 and argued that we could stay as long as we liked until the Egyptians signed whatever terms we liked in the revised treaty?
Mr. Maitland: This is a most important point on which there is much confusion in the minds of the public. If I have understood the hon. Gentleman aright, he is suggesting that after 1956 Egypt, under the terms of the treaty, can go to the United Nations.
Mr. Crossman: I said they would go. Whatever the treaty says, they will go to the United Nations and accuse us of an act of aggression. The Egyptians are free to go to the United Nations and claim that this is an issue endangering the peace of the world. They will get it on the agenda of the United Nation.
I warn hon. Gentlemen opposite not to be too good lawyers. They may have a perfect legal case in terms of 20 years ago and yet not stand a chance in the forum of world opinion or when they get to the United Nations or even to the International Court at The Hague.
Mr. Maitland: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for giving way again, and I appreciate his courtesy in doing so. He has suggested that Egypt will, willy nilly, go to the United Nations, and that a purely juridical argument would not be sufficiently convincing either before that body or world opinion.
Mr. Crossman: I said, first, that we should stand very badly at the bar of world opinion if our case were based on purely juridical points that we had tied up a nation in a treaty which made it impossible for it to achieve its freedom. Secondly, even from a juridical
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point of view, our signature of the United Nations Charter has fundamentally changed our own position towards treaties which we negotiated 20 years ago. Really, we must have respect for national self-determination, and it is quite impossible to maintain that, after we have had the 20 years, we can then say to a country which we have occupied for that time, "You have no right to throw us out until you persuade us to sign a treaty." Then we merely have a war with that country.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) mentioned the analogy of the Americans. Let us imagine that the American bases in this country had been here for 70 years—and they got here more honourably than we did in Egypt; we asked them in, but the Egyptians never asked us in. Imagine that during the last 20 years public opinion in this country had been demanding the withdrawal of American troops. Imagine that, because we were short of dollars, we had signed a treaty with a trick in it under which we could not, at the end of the 20 years, legally get them out without making another treaty under which they would not dream of moving. Does anyone think that any British person would regard that as internationally moral or legal? Of course not. We would fight against anybody who exploited the situation in order to maintain a position of force in our country.
This brings me to the reality of the Egyptian situation. It is that, because we have signed the United Nations Charter and because we accept national self-determination, we must concede unconditionally the withdrawal of our troops from Egypt by 1956. We have no case against that whatsoever. If we have not made an agreement with the Egyptians by 1956, then we must get out.
Major Legge-Bourke: Rubbish.
Mr. Crossman: I can only suggest that the reason the hon. Member for Farnham (Mr. Nicholson) says "Rubbish" when he has just come into the Chamber and almost before he sits down is because he is filled with post-prandial excitement.
Major Legge-Bourke: I think that the hon. Member is attacking my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham (Mr. Nicholson)

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in mistake for me, because it was I who made the remark, but I have been here for several minutes.
Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: May I say that it is most unworthy of any hon. Member to accuse another hon. Member of post-prandial excitement, especially as I am very hungry and have not yet had any dinner.
Mr. Crossman: I will finish the point. We must accept as a principle that we have no case for staying in Egypt after 1956 unless we stay by agreement, for, after that time, we stay only by pure right of conquest. In doing that, we violate the Charter of the United Nations and make it quite impossible for ourselves to object to aggression by other people. By doing that, we should find it quite impossible to object to the Russians saying that they have occupied Poland in order to protect the Poles from the Americans. We would have no right to object to conduct of that sort if, after 20 years of the treaty, we then stayed by force and started legalistic arguments to show why we ought to be there.
Brigadier Ralph Rayner Brigadier Ralph Rayner (Totnes) rose—
Mr. Crossman: I would give way to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but I want to get on.
Having conceded the principle of evacuation, I would say this to Egypt: "We can do it in two ways. We can take out everything that we have got here. We can destroy all the signals and all the radar equipment and we can blow up all the docks." That would be evacuation. But, if the Egyptians want the things which we have built up, then that is a matter for negotiation. We could say to them, "We accept the principle of evacuation, but if it is more sensible to work out a plan of withdrawal in which you benefit by our leaving the things on which we have spent millions of pounds, then we ought to negotiate on that." But we ought to say that in the atmosphere created by our admitting that we have no right to be there after 1956.
I say to hon. Members opposite that if they want to stay they must be prepared to go, because they can only get
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an agreement with the Egyptians when the Egyptians' demand for national sovereignty has been satisfied. That means an unqualified acceptance by us of their right to get rid of us by 1956, and the recognition that we have not very much time in which to negotiate this agreement. Time is not on our side.
The next thing I would say to hon. Members opposite is that what matters is what one negotiates about. It is absolutely idiotic to spend weeks and weeks talking about what sort of uniform the technicians shall wear. The Government are doing that because they are not negotiating really. They are talking while they are making up their minds whether to take the plunge or not. The issue is quite clear. The broad lines of agreement are the same as those which Sidky Pasha and Ernest Bevin agreed in 1946 as being the only practical way of co-operating with the Egyptians. And on this the experts of both sides agreed. The Government have left two little things about which to negotiate while they make up their minds, just two little points to keep the pot boiling while the people on the Government Front Bench, who know that it is their duty to do this, decide whether they have the courage to tell some of their Omdurman survivors the truths about the modern world. Once that has been done, everybody in this House would agree on how to settle with Egypt.
Do not let us go on worrying about all these irrelevancies. They are the things invented by the Government Front Bench. This river in which they are dangling their toes is unpleasant What did they say to the Labour Government about scuttle? How odious have been some of the things said irresponsibly by them about us when they were in Opposition? I sympathise with the poor Foreign Secretary. He has always hated being hated. It has been the great weakness of his life. He has liked being liked so much that he has not often had the courage to do something unpopular but necessary.
Mr. Nicholson: He did resign once.
Mr. Crossman: Except on one occasion and we have all given him credit for that act. I should like the Minister of State to mention to the Foreign Secretary that there are a number of things which we think the British should be very concerned to negotiate about—and they are not about uniforms for technicians.

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The first is the security of the other countries in the Middle East. On these benches there is a real anxiety and understanding that the position of Israel is extremely alarming. Israel is entirely surrounded by hostile States, and is very much aware that if we create a vacuum in Egypt she is in danger. We are all aware, I think, that it is one of the duties of this country, which was responsible for the utter muddle of Palestine, and the scandal of it, not to produce any more sorrow out there.
We should be vitally concerned that agreement with Egypt about Suez does not jeopardise the security of any other country in the Middle East. But I want to say to some people who are as friendly and passionately attached to Israel as I am, "Do not forget that peace with Egypt is a basic need for Israel, and it will be a great mistake for Israel to make demands about her security which make peace with Egypt totally impossible." It is futile to demand that we should write into a treaty with Egypt specific guarantees that Egypt will not attack Israel. Why Egypt? Every other Arab country is concerned with this matter and why should we select Egypt and say, "You should give the guarantee" when what we have to get is a guarantee from all the Arab countries which are grouped as one against Israel?
We had it in the guarantee of 1950—the Three-Power Declaration—but I think it is reasonable for Israel to say, "This Three-Power Declaration was made in 1950, but if you sign an agreement with Egypt you change the whole situation," and I think it would be essential that, in the same week as we signed the agreement with Egypt, America, France and ourselves should reaffirm that guarantee as applying to the new situation. It is not the same thing to say, "That treaty is there, do not let us worry about it; you have the guarantee." They have the right to say, "We want it specifically reaffirmed, in terms, that after the withdrawal it holds good just as much." It is much more important to them to have the guarantee when our troops are not there, than to have it now.
Secondly, there is our responsibility in regard to Jordan. We virtually control Jordan; we finance Jordan as much as America finances Israel, so we have very special obligations to ensure that actions by Jordan do not jeopardise the security
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of her neighbours. I say no more than that, but we have a special responsibility there and can be helpful there.
Thirdly, while on the question of security, we should seriously consider the Gaza strip, which is the strip occupied by the Egyptian Army in Southern Israel. The Gaza strip has 120,000 Arab refugees, a certain amount of water and no port. A token force of American and British troops in the Gaza strip would have a great influence, because neither nation could then attack the other without the risk of killing British or American soldiers. That would be one of the best guarantees we could have of keeping the peace. To send those troops would prove we had a genuine interest in Israeli security and not a mere tactical aim of exploiting pro-Israel sentiment to serve our own ends. Let us have a couple of battalions of our troops in Gaza, let the Arab refugees build the barracks, and let the two nations get together.
I think by now that I have pretty well blown up the rebels' case. I want to speak a word about the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, because they are almost as bad as the rebels. What were we told was the Government's policy today? "No hurry," says the Prime Minister, "about negotiations—plenty of time for them." Has he learnt nothing from the last eight years of policy? What is the reason for the catastrophe of British policy in the Middle East? I will tell him. We wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up to save an untenable position. In Palestine we waited, and failed to make up our minds until the position became so intolerable that we did the most ignominious scuttle in British history. We said, "There is no hurry. Put another condition in. Let them think it over again. These are only Arabs and Jews. They can wait." So we waited, and what happened? They blew up on us.
What about Persia? We waited for something to turn up. We waited until our only friend, Rasmara, was murdered because we would not sign a contract which was generous enough. Does anyone tell me that if we had given the Persians, in 1946, a quarter of what we were willing to concede in 1951 we would not have the Iranian oil today?
Or consider Sudan. I often wonder what would have happened if the Sudan

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elections had gone the way they did under a Labour Government. This is probably the greatest political reversal that this country has had in any part of the Commonwealth since the war, and it is directly the result of the vacillation, prevarication—
Mr. Wigg: And cowardice.
Mr. Crossman: —and cowardice; I am obliged to my hon. Friend. Let us look at the facts and consider what happened. We thought we had the Sudan tied up and on our side, because the Egyptians wanted to conquer them and we could protect them from Farouk, so we would not give them independence. We gave them self-determination and arranged elections. We fixed up which political party should win the elections. It was all fixed. Then a telegram came from Neguib saying, "Look in at Cairo on your way back." The political leaders dropped in at Cairo and were given a plan for independence in three years. We had been outbid.
Then the Foreign Secretary spent four months haggling about the Neguib plan. I was out in Egypt last winter when he was doing it. The best friends of Britain said last January, "You are losing the Sudan elections while you haggle. Every week of haggling convinces the Sudanese that you do not want independence and that Neguib does."
The Sudanese are of two sorts—those who use the Egyptians to get rid of the British, and those who use the British to get rid of the Egyptians. What we did was to let the pro-Egyptians get rid of the British, and thus win an overwhelming victory. Neguib showed that he knew a lot more about the Sudanese than Khartoum did.
People in this country laughed at one of Neguib's men because they said he had behaved like a "dancing dervish." But what matters is what is thought in the Sudan, not what is laughed at by people over here. If one has to dance like a dervish to win over the Sudanese, then dance like a dervish, even though there may be some jokes about it in the House of Commons.
I suppose we are too superior to get on with the southern Sudanese. Unfortunately, these men know the Sudan.
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They went to Gordon College. They know what it is all about. While these leisurely cables passed between London, Khartoum and Cairo asking, "What shall we try next with Neguib?" they were getting on with the work. We were too superior to win the elections, so we lost them.
Mr. Edward Wakefield: In what sense does the hon. Gentleman say that "we" lost the elections?
Mr. Crossman: I shall not goover my argument again, but I will just say that the party which has won the election in the Sudan is the party which chose to use Egypt against us, and there is no question that our excellent officials who are working out there will be out long before the three years are over. Independence will come far too soon. We had a chance when Neguib made his offer. If we had accepted the offer overnight and had outbid him on the subject of independence we could have held our position in the Sudan. We lost it by saying, "No hurry."
What do we get this afternoon? The Prime Minister says, "No hurry" in the Suez Canal Zone. In 1956 we have to be out. The Egyptians are not foolish negotiators. Every month we go on waiting their terms will rise. Does anybody deny that we could have got better terms before we lost the Sudan election and even better terms a year ago before Neguib made his offer to the Sudan? Every victory the Egyptians have strengthens their position. Every delay brings us nearer the final date and makes negotiation more difficult—and still the Government say, like Micawber, "No hurry. Wait for something to turn tip which will allow us to avoid making a decision and telling our back benchers the truth about the 20th Century."
I beg the Minister of State to tell the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister that, although these 37 of his supporters may be fine in the House of Commons, outside in political public meetings attended by an educated electorate they will be no serious menace to the Government. On this occasion I beg the Government to carry on the policy they inherited from us, but for God's sake let them do it in time.
8.41 p.m.
Mr. Fitzroy Maclean: The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) has obviously enjoyed the comparatively novel experience, for him, of trying to drive a wedge between the Government and their supporters. He usually confines his activities to his own side of the House. He managed to get in a few pretty nasty digs, not only at the Government and the signatories of the Motion on the Order Paper, but also at his own Front Bench, for their conduct of Egyptian and Middle Eastern Affairs. In fact, the only person with whom he seemed to possess a certain affinity was the "Dancing Major."
Mr. Crossman: I did not say that I could dance. I said that if I could I should be a good District Commissioner in Southern Sudan.
Mr. Maclean: I hope that the hon. Member will take dancing lessons at the very first opportunity. I want to deal with some of the points which the hon. Member raised, but before doing so I want to do something which he did not do, which is to address myself to the actual terms of the Motion standing on the Order Paper in the names of some of my hon. Friends and myself, calling for the suspension,for the time being, of negotiations with Egypt.
I do not think that anybody in his senses would dispute the very grave difficulties which face the Government at the present time. I do not think that anyone in his senses would dispute that the best solution of the present dispute with Egypt would be an agreement satisfactory to both parties. I do not think that anyone would deny the difficulty of reaching such an agreement, or of staying in the Canal Zone without an agreement. But, for all that, there is another side to the picture.
I feel myself that the dangers of allowing ourselves to be pushed out ignominiously outweigh, on the whole, the difficulties of staying. I have not arrived at that conclusion easily. I have arrived at it as a result of a great deal of painful thought.
As to the immediate problem, I have always been taught that one should never negotiate under duress, that one should not do a deal with somebody who keeps kicking one in the shins. If one is not
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prepared to kick him back, one should at least wait until he stops kicking and starts behaving a bit better.
The purpose of our Motion is simply this; to urge the Government to suspend the present negotiations with the Egyptian Government for as long as the Egyptian Government are in their present frame of mind. In this connection, I was much encouraged by the Prime Minister's assurance that the Government felt "no sense of hurry," as I was also very much encouraged in May by the assurance which he gave the House then on this same subject.
It seems to me that everything that has happened during the past few months must weigh against the early conclusion of an agreement with Egypt. There have been first of all the Sudan elections. The Foreign Secretary himself has complained more than once of the utter disregard shown by the Egyptians for their Treaty obligations. What is happening and what is going to happen is not self-determination, which we should all welcome; it is simply an anschluss. I am surprised that some hon. Members opposite, I am surprised that hon. Members of the House at all, should feel able to approve such a monstrous travesty of democracy.
Second, there have been the blatant infringements of the Suez Canal Convention to which the Leader of the Opposition made such a strong reference in his speech, the constant interference with shipping. Finally, there has of recent weeks been a considerable and obviously deliberate increase in the physical violence and attacks on British civilians and soldiers in Egypt.
I cannot feel myself that we ought to be in any hurry to conclude an agreement with a Government who are behaving like that, a Government, let me remind the House, who came into power by a military coup ď état and who stay in power by dictatorial methods, and who, it is my contention, represent the Egyptian people no more than their predecessors did, if as much. My noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) said, among other things, that we must trust Egypt. I cannot see that it is possible to trust Egypt at the present time in view of the way in which it is behaving. I cannot help feeling that my noble Friend shows in that connection a somewhat excessive faith in human

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nature which he has certainly not displayed in another connection.
I also find it very difficult to understand the exact meaning of the Motion that some hon. Members opposite have put down, urging the Government to continue the negotiations in the spirit in which they were begun. As far as I can remember, the spirit of these negotiations was thoroughly bad from the start and has remained thoroughly bad ever since.
What we want, if we are to negotiate, is an entirely new spirit. If the Egyptians show signs of behaving better, if they behave more in the spirit of the alliance which they concluded with us of their own free will, and which was approved not only by the supporters of the then Egyptian Government but, with one small exception, by representatives of every other Egyptian party—if they show signs of behaving in the spirit of that alliance, then let us by all means negotiate with them.
Even then, we have to bear certain considerations in mind. I should be very sorry to see us pull out of the Canal Zone altogether without any assured right of re-entry. Under the Treaty of 1936, we have the right, indeed the obligation, to remain there until the Egyptians are capable of defending the Canal. After the utter calamitous defeat of the Egyptian Army—the well-equipped Egyptian Army—at the hand of untrained Israeli levies, I do not think anybody could possibly maintain that the Egyptians are capable even of defending themselves, let alone defending the Suez Canal.
We have to remember that at present we not only face the threat of a hot war but are actively engaged in a cold war. Surely that is not the moment to allow ourselves to be pushed out of a vital position which we have every right to occupy. Some hon. Members opposite have said during the debate, "What would you do?" I have done my best to answer that question. I would certainly not allow myself to be pushed out of the Canal Zone. I would stay there and negotiate with the Egyptian Government when they come to their senses or when they are replaced, as they may well be, by another Government who take a different view.
I would remind hon. Members opposite that they were in power for six years
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and that during that time they did not scuttle. If they would like to be reminded of the reasons why they did not scuttle they will find them very ably and eloquently set out in Hansard in a speech which was made by the late Mr. Ernest Bevin in 1946.
Mr. G. R. Mitchison: The hon. Member has spoken about being "pushed out." He has said that we are entitled and bound to keep troops in the Canal Zone until Egypt is capable of defending it. Would he deal with this point? If Egypt says she is capable of defending the Canal Zone she is entitled to arbitration. Does he suppose that the arbitrators would find that the existence of another country's forces inside Egypt, against the will of Egypt, is still to be maintained?
Mr. Maclean: The hon. and learned Member knows much more about the intricacies of the law than I do, but I have carefully studied the Treaty of 1936 and my view, and the view of a great many people much better qualified to speak than I am, is that it entitles us to stay there not only until 1956 but, subject to further agreement, after 1956.
Mr. Mitchison: Subject to agreement.
Mr. Maclean: Subject to further agreement within the framework of the alliance. Further arrangements should be in the spirit of that Treaty. The way in which the Egyptian Government are behaving at present is not in the spirit of the Treaty.
I have no means of telling what terms the Government are considering accepting, but after all they have said and all that has been said in the past, I cannot believe that they would allow us to be pushed out of a vital position, which we have every right to occupy, in the middle of a cold war and under the threat of a hot war.
Quite apart from the military considerations of which I do not profess to be a judge, I am quite certain that such an event would have most disastrous political and phychological repercussions throughout the whole of the Middle East and also throughout the whole of Africa. I think that if we were to pull out of Egypt with ignominy it would set up a general reaction—and we have already seen something of the kind happen—

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which would have incalculable results, and which might lead to chaos and a power vacuum which would mean the end of any order or security throughout the whole area.
I have said that I fully realise the difficulties which confront the Government at the present time, and I equally do not think that anyone in their senses will deny that there are dangers in reaching an unsatisfactory agreement or in pulling out without an agreement. It is the thought of these dangers which is worrying me very deeply indeed. It is the thought of these dangers that has led me to put my name to the Motion on the Order Paper, and I can assure the House that I would not have put my name to that Motion unless I had been very profoundly disturbed indeed, as a great many other people in this country are.
What I feel myself has been expressed far better than I can ever express it by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in a speech which he made in May, 1946. My right hon. Friend, speaking with his immense experience as a strategist, had spoken in the earlier part of his speech of the vital importance to us of the Suez Canal Zone and of the absolute necessity of our remaining there. He concluded his speech with these words, and I remember thinking at the time how much better they expressed what I felt than I could ever express it myself, and I am encouraged and reassured by the thought that they express what I feel no less admirably at the present time:
"It is a strange thing to call upon brave soldiers to travel thousands of miles across the ocean to fight for great strategic objectives, all well-defined and fully declared, and then to turn round immediately afterwards, and discredit altogether those strategic objectives—or apparently do so—for which so many men, at our request and under our leadership, have come so far to give their lives. Apart from the interests of Britain, apart from the danger to Imperial communications in the Eastern Mediterranean, I say a shock has been given to the British self-governing Commonwealth, and their confidence in the guidance and leadership of the Mother Country has been painfully and injuriously affected by the apparent casting away of those interests which we have hitherto declared to them were vital.
It always looks so easy to solve problems by taking the line of least resistance. Again and again in my life I have seen this course lead to the most unexpected result, and what looks like being the easy road turns out to
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be the hardest and most cruel. No nation is so remarkable as ours for the different moods through which it passes, moments of great abjection, moments of sublime triumph, heroism, fortitude and then exhaustion. What has been gained with enormous effort and sacrifice, prodigious and superb acts of valour, slips away almost unnoticed when the struggle is over. I earnestly hope that the Government—with whom I do not attempt to pick a quarrel, but to whom I am giving a serious warning on this matter at this moment—will realise that there is only one safe resting place for this country, and that is the firm maintenance of the Treaty of 1936."—[Official Report, 24th May, 1946; Vol. 423, c. 778–9.]
9.0 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth Younger: This debate was originally announced as a debate on the Bermuda Conference, and it is to that subject that I wish to return the House. We have spent a lot of time today, first, on attacks from the other side on my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). The critics, few of whom are at the moment in the House, have had their answer, and a very effective one, and I leave it at that.
Wehave also spent a lot of time, usefully, I think, on the vexed problem of Egypt. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition stated clearly the attitude of this side of the House on the main points in dispute, and my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) also made a powerful contribution, with which I was broadly in agreement. For the rest, on the topic of the Middle East, I leave the Government to answer the roaring of their own prehistoric dinosaurs.
There is very little in the Bermuda communiqué on which one can bite, and virtually nothing was added to the communiqué by the Prime Minister today. I do not altogether complain about that. On the whole, I broadly accept what he said about limitations on publicity when heads of State meet. I mention this not so much to complain as simply to explain that such a lack of information, coupled with our knowledge that a Four-Power Conference is, we hope, impending, conditions what one can say on an occasion like this from the Opposition side.
It seemed to me that the Prime Minister's vagueness was coupled with a certain optimism. Whether that was only because of the beginning of the Christmas Recess or there was something

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more behind it, I do not know, but I was glad to notice his optimism. I hope that the Prime Minister was right in appearing optimistic about the way that things might develop, but for those of us who do not have access to the secret minutes of what occurred at Bermuda, the signs do not at all support it; and it is my duty tonight to express some of the genuine misgivings which my right hon. and hon. Friends on this side of the House feel, arising from the way in which the Conference was prepared over the last four or five months and even more, from some of the views expressed in fairly responsible circles, to some extent in this country, but even more in America.
One of our major misgivings arises from the lack of any real sign that on the Soviet side there is much readiness to change substantially the attitudes we have come to know so well about Germany, Austria and Europe. If I do not refer to that, it is simply because, obviously, the duty of this House is much more to examine the policy and intentions of our own Government than those of a Government whom it is so exceedingly difficult to influence.
I remind the House that the original invitation to Bermuda planned that there should be a conference which was to be a stepping stone for a meeting of four heads of State. As we understood it, it was to be a meeting where we would probe for information about what the new Soviet regime might be thinking, that we should give as much information as we could about our outlook on world affairs, and that we should give whatever assurances we could to encourage the new Soviet regime to adopt a new policy. The House will also remember that the Prime Minister said that there should not necessarily be any hard-faced agreements.
By the time that the second invitation to Bermuda was issue—one week after the delivery of the least favourable of the various Soviet notes—it seemed to me there was a very real danger that the new Bermuda Conference would be used for a precisely opposite purpose: not for probing with a view to further negotiations, but, as many responsible organs of the Press suggested, for deciding to give up the search for Four-Power agreement, in order that we might all get on with
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Western integration, E.D.C. and the building up of our strength in the old way.
That was not only my view. It was expressed particularly in the American Press. I remember especially an article in the "New York Herald-Tribune" by Ned Russell, a very responsible writer, saying that Washington regarded the future Conference as a turning point in that very sense. To some of us it seemed that this Press opinion looked like being somewhat confirmed by the precipitate haste with which the three Western Governments seemed to interpret the least favourable—the worst, if I may so put it—of the Soviet notes as being an out and out rejection of all negotiation.
When our Note went back very quickly to the Soviet Government saying that we could only conclude that the Soviet Government did not wish at the present time to enter into any negotiations which might have positiveresults, it seemed to many of us that there was a little too much keenness on the part of many people to find that they did not have to go to the Conference after all because the other side had turned it down. I see the Foreign Secretary shaking his head. It may well be that he did not share that view, but I can assure him that there were many signs that that was a widely held view.
When the later Soviet Note appeared, the tactics and the tone of much of the comment changed, though I have to admit that we still do not know whether the Soviet Union intend a conference which will have positive results. All we know is that they appear to be determined that there shall be a conference.
I hope the Foreign Secretary will not feel aggrieved if I say to him that it is still somewhat hard to judge the real intentions of the various Governments who, we hope, are going to Berlin. One notices that many of the very influential people in this country, as well as in the United States, who are known never to have liked the Prime Minister's initiative in May and never to have thought it was a promising move, are now demanding that at the coming Conference Europe should make a clear-cut decision between on the one hand, as the "Economist" put it, an alliance with the United States and the building up of the Atlantic community and, on the other hand, a Soviet alliance which would mean the subjugation of Europe to Soviet

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wishes. They are saying that, since in their view there can be no major or sensational agreement among the Four Powers, there must inevitably be a major disagreement, a split Europe, and the building up of rival alliances on each side of the Iron Curtain.
It is because we feared that this attitude might develop that we criticised the Washington communiqué of July, with all the conditions it laid down which seemed so different from the ones which the Prime Minister had envisaged. We feel it is better that we should have no conference at all rather than that we should go to one merely taking with us terms which we know are almost certain to prove unacceptable, in the hope that the other side will give us an excuse for following a course which we intended to follow in any event. That is putting it very bluntly and crudely, but it is a fear which is genuinely felt.
What assurances did the Prime Minister give us in his speech today? He said two things which seemed to add a little to the Bermuda communiqué, and I welcome both of them. First, he said that there would have to be many patient international conferences and that we must not hope too much of any one conference. I hope that by that he means that the British delegation, headed by the Foreign Secretary, at the Four-Power Conference will use all its influence to prevent impatience and to prevent a decision by the Western Powers to bring the thing to a close and to declare that the negotiation is off simply because there seems to be slow progress.
The second thing which the Prime Minister said was that he had impressed upon his colleagues at Bermuda the need for assurances to the Soviet Union. I want to probe that a little further. We all remember how the Prime Minister in May launched the idea of a new Locarno. Many people thought that was not an awfully happy way to formulate it. Nevertheless, the idea behind it was essentially sound, namely that one of the things motivating the Soviet Union was, clearly, her own security and that some way ought to be found of giving her an assurance about her security. I should like to know whether anything has emerged from that thought during the last six months. I see no indication of it in the communiqué.
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I cannot help noticing that one of the things which Mr. Dulles said at his Press conference in Paris, when he was asked whether he had any idea aboutgiving some guarantee or undertaking, was that he did not see why the United States should say all over again what it had already said in general terms in the United Nations Charter. I do not know what the Foreign Secretary can tell us about that. Maybe he cannot tell us at all—I shall understand it—what he is proposing to put forward if he goes to Berlin. If afterwards we learn that absolutely no constructive proposals at all have been taken by the United Kingdom delegation to Berlin, he cannot count in advance upon our approval.
I want to ask something more about the remarks of Mr. Dulles in Paris. There is no doubt that the manner of those remarks shocked a large number of people. I am not going to comment on that aspect of the matter. I do not mind blunt speaking between allies, and provided the remarks represent what Mr. Dulles really meant, he may well have been right to make them. I am not complaining about the manner of them. I want to ask about the substance.
If one can sum up in a sentence as fairly as possible what seems to have been intended from a number of remarks scattered throughout his speech and the Press conference, what Mr. Dulles was saying to Europe, and particularly to France, was, "You had better form the European Defence Community, and form it quickly, or else the United States is liable to leave you to stew in your own juice." I dare say that last phrase covers a multitude of possibilities deliberately left vague. The only specific thing he said was that he would not drop the North Atlantic Treaty, but clearly the inference intended was that something unpleasant for his hearers was likely to happen.
That is a presentation of United States policy in an altogether too capricious light, almost a frivolous light. The United States interest in the defence of Europe does not depend, and never did depend, upon the E.D.C. My right hon. Friend said it was not of itself of absolutely prime importance, and I think that is correct. The Americans did not commit themselves in Europe for the sake of the French or for our sake, but because they

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thought it was the major interest of the United States. Indeed, if I did not think that was the reason, I would not put much faith in it. I do not think they will jettison their own major interest as frivolously as those remarks seemed to suggest. Also, I do not think that friends of the United States will be impressed. Like Mr. Dulles, I think they believe in co-operation with their allies, to use his own words—
"so long as they pursue sane and sensible policies."
I do not think the unreal "either, or" which he seemed to present was sane or sensible policy from the point of view of the United States or of anybody else.
Apart from that, what bearing, if any, does the Foreign Secretary think those remarks were intended to have on the Berlin Conference? If we are to take those statements at their face value, they certainly show the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a somewhat unconvincing partnership, and they show relationships between the members which are neither as cordial nor as stable as I believe them to be. Further, they must suggest to the Soviet Government that they have only to find some means of ensuring delay in the ratification of the European Defence Community to ensure that the Americans draw back, in some way from their participation in Europe. Many of us think that this is one of the things which has been an objective of Soviet policy for a long time.
All those implications are somewhat dangerous. One thing is dear, that Mr. Dulles does not intend that any discussions on the European Defence Community should be expected at this conference. One must infer that, because one cannot talk to an ally in the terms in which Mr. Dulles talked to France about the European Defence Community, only to go four weeks later and bargain about it in a conference elsewhere.
This insistence on the European Defence Community as something beyond Four-Power discussion has made me wonder just what kind of negotiations Her Majesty's Government envisage when they get to Berlin. It has become fashionable to suggest that anyone who envisages any kind of Four-Power agreement which does not include the final conclusion of the E.D.C. Treaty and the
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bringing into force of this conception, must inevitably be a wishful thinker about Soviet intentions or careless about Western defence or in some other way a dubious character.
Because that is a general belief, if the House will bear with me I want to read two short extracts from a posthumous article written by the late Dr. Ernst Reuter, the Mayor of Berlin. I have taken them from the United States magazine "World" which published the article in November, 1953, after his death. Normally I do not quote in my speeches, and I am only doing so now for two reasons: first, because Dr. Reuter is less open than any other European to the charge either that he is a wishful thinker about Soviet aims or intentions or that he does not care about Western defence; secondly, because I do not think that the public in this country has had the opportunity to hear even such short extracts as the few sentences I shall quote from this rather important article.
The first is this, referring to the attitude of the Allies to the E.D.C. and Germany:
"Many of them"—
that is the Allies—
"tend to subordinate everything else to the European Defence Community and to suspect all Germans who fear that E.D.C. might jeopardise their chances of reunion of being soft towards Russia. It seems to me that exactly the contrary is true. E.D.C. is essentially a static concept that more or less resigns itself to Russia's permanent presence on the Elbe. By contrast, German reunion fits into the framework of a more dynamic policy that is trying to obtain Russia's withdrawal behind her own borders through negotiation."
The second extract is:
"None of us will ask the Allies to sacrifice the defence of Western Europe to German unity, for that would leave all of us in the lurch. On the other hand, there is no point in going to the conference table with the firm resolve to eat one's cake and have it too. If the Soviets are allowed to get the feeling that they arc cornered, they are liable to seek desperate solutions.
What seems essential to me is that the Allies approach the issues at stake with an open and elastic mind. They must be prepared for a give and take agreement without ever forgetting their objective: German unity and peaceful Soviet withdrawal. Neither E.D.C. nor neutrality should be treated as a sacrosanct dogma in such negotiations, for each means different things to different people."
There are many other quotations like that which I could give if I had the time,

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but I think that those views, expressed by such a person as the late Dr. Reuter, are entitled to respect, and I believe that those views are very widely shared by many of my hon. and right hon. Friends.
Whether this problem of E.D.C. is part of the negotiations or something to be kept outside the negotiations, how it will be handled in Berlin will be one of the things affecting our verdict, after the event, upon the policy followed by our own Government. I am afraid that I may sound in all this a bit carping, but the Foreign Secretary will appreciate that we have been given nothing very positive to go on, because there is nothing in the Bermuda Conference communiqué or in the Prime Minister's speech today. It was right, therefore, that I should express these misgivings in the hope that the Foreign Secretary would give me assurances on some of them and pay attention to some of the arguments which I have advanced.
I should like to end on a more optimistic note. Despite the fears which I have expressed on this matter I believe that President Eisenhower's speech on atomic energy is something to be very much welcomed. I frankly do not know how practicable or how important in the sphere of atomic control are his suggestions for such things as a bank of atomic energy, but I welcome a number of the remarks scattered throughout his speech which indicate a real turn in United States thinking towards the need to find a way of co-existence with the Soviet Union, the acceptance of the need for patience and for a long-term as well as a short-term policy, and the specific statement that the Americans will not shun the conference table.
All these statements encourage me to hope that the Western Powers in Berlin, even if, as I think, they have left themselves rather little room for manoeuvring, intend to make some progress and that, whatever else may emerge, they will not say in Berlin, "That has failed, and we can now go back to the straightforward policy followed in the last two or three years of building up strength, which does not involve any of the troubles and moral dilemmas which are inevitably involved in negotiations. I hope that the Foreign Secretary can give us some reassurance on some of these points now
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but, whether he can or not, it will inevitably be by performance in Berlin that the policy of Her Majesty's Government will eventually be judged.
9.19 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Eden): The right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) has made, as he always does, a very thoughtful and constructive speech, and where it was critical I have no cause to complain. I welcome that speech the more, as also the speech of the Leader of the Opposition earlier this afternoon, because I personally think we are at a very grave and critical turning in international affairs.
I have had some years' experience of these matters now, and I find that the position in which we stand now—this is how I feel—is one where there may be far-reaching, hopeful developments if everybody will try to approach their task in that spirit, or where we may get into the greatest difficulties and entanglements if the spirit, shall I say of the Palais Rose—I do not refer merely to one country—were to prevail.
I should like first, in reply to the right hon. Member, to make a reference to what he said in respect of tactics in regard to the exchange of notes. I thought he was perhaps a little less than fair to the Western Governments in that respect. We said in effect, as I remarked to this House in our last debate, that we are perfectly ready to meet and discuss Germany and Austria at any time and at any place. I do think the fact that we took that position, a very clear and very free position, did have its influence—that is my judgment—in, I shall not say forcing, but encouraging, the Soviet Government eventually to reply yes and to suggest a place of meeting.
I do not think it would be right to say that any blame attaches to the Western Governments in this matter. In fact, I rather hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would have felt it to have been—I shall not say a British diplomatic success, I do not claim that, but—a Western diplomatic success. The Russians felt they had no alternative but to say yes, which is a word which, from his experience, the right hon. Member knows they find difficult to pronounce.
I wish to make a comment on what the Leader of the Opposition had to say

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about President Eisenhower's remarks on atomic power. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that these matters are technically extremely difficult. Nothing is easier than to get enmeshed into every kind of tangled technical pronouncement so that one can scarcely hope to find one's way through them. But I thought that perhaps the main quality of President Eisenhower's announcement was that he tried to get away from all that. What he offered was, in effect, that the countries of the West—the United States, ourselves and Canada—who have first-hand technical knowledge of this subject, and Soviet Russia from behind the Iron Curtain, should go into a meeting, which could be a private meeting, in order to try to work out and discuss these matters. It seemed to me that this was the first initiative since the famous Bernard Baruch proposals, to which the Leader of the Opposition referred.
I hope, and Her Majesty's Government hope, that the Soviet Government will treat these proposals in the manner in which we know they were intended, as a serious effort to get out of the very dangerous position in which we now are. I believe that if they are so received then there is a chance for statesmanship to cope with this terrible power, this terrifying power, which the more one learns about it the greater alarm one feels. I believe this is a chance for statesmanship. I am quite confident—I know that the Prime Minister will endorse what I say—that if the Soviet Government will come to these discussions, which have no preconditions of any sort or kind, to discuss these proposals under United Nations auspices, from what we know of the United States Government position, they will not find them ungenerous in their attitude.
So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned—and who can doubt that it is the position of the Canadian Government, too?—we shall do everything that lies in our power by contribution, direct or indirect, to bring about the success of these discussions on atomic issues. I can tell the House that we felt—I know that I did and I think my right hon. Friend did also—the impact of this topic so tremendous on the whole of our thought and discussion that some of the things we have discussed—Foreign Office problems
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of detail—important though they are, seemed puny pawns in comparison with the great danger that these master chessmen present to the future of the world. I wanted to say that to the right hon. Gentleman, because I think it is our biggest issue in international relations.
I must deal with a number of topics, but I wish to reply to one other question raised by the right hon. Gentleman. He asked me about the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. I am able to tell the House that when I last met my French and American colleagues in London, we reaffirmed that Declaration. It remains the basic policy of Her Majesty's Government and there is no change in respect of it.
I wish to deal now with our negotiations with Egypt. Though I am not going into any detail about it, I must recapitulate a little recent history, and only very recent history. In May of this year, the Egyptian Government broke off discussions which had then been proceeding for, I think, about three weeks. They were discussions on an attempt to replace the Treaty of 1936. Then, in July, General Robertson returned to Cairo, and thereafter we began what have been called informal talks with the Egyptians. I must mention that it was in accordance with the wish of the Egyptians that discussions took this form.
I understand that there can be strong feelings on this topic in the House, and, indeed, on both sides of the House. It is an extremely difficult issue upon which to defend the conclusions, and to balance all the varying interests and feelings that it arouses. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition referred to his own experience in these negotiations, and I make no complaint if my hon. Friends have strong feelings on this matter. I willingly grant to them the same sincerity in their feelings as Her Majesty's Government have in theirs. But I think it of the first importance that we understand what at present we are trying to do.
We are not—I repeat, not—now trying to revise the Suez Canal Convention which has no terminal date at all. We are trying to discover whether there is sufficient agreement on principle to make possible the negotiation of a treaty—
Mr. Bevan Mr. Bevan rose—
Mr. Eden: I assure the right hon. Gentleman I am quite right. I only want

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to distinguish in the minds of hon. Members between the Suez Canal Convention and what we are now doing, which is an attempt to negotiate an agreement of principle to replace the Treaty of 1936. It is quite a different exercise, and much of the confusion in the speeches to which I have listened this afternoon is due to the belief of hon. Members that we are doing the two things at one time. But they are completely separate targets. At the moment all we are trying to do is to see whether we can settle the heads of agreement—that is what they are called.
Admittedly that is often the most difficult part of any negotiation. But if we succeed in reaching heads of agreement agreeable to the Egyptian Government then, of course, they will be announced to this House, and a full opportunity will be given to this House to debate them.
Mr. Julian Amery Mr. Julian Amery (Preston, North) rose—
Mr. Eden: Just two seconds, and then I will give way to my hon. Friend. I think it is important that the House should understand what it is asking about, and if after that my hon. Friend does not understand I will gladly give way. Some of my hon. Friends have asked for an assurance that the House will have an opportunity for further discussion, and Ithink I had perhaps better deal with that before giving way. I regret that we are not prepared to give these assurances. We are not willing to break off discussions with the Egyptian Government in existing circumstances. In our judgment negotiations should continue. Now I will give way to my hon. Friend.
Mr. Amery: When I rose to interrupt my right hon. Friend, he had said that he was aiming to negotiate a treaty with which to replace the 1936 Agreement. Does that mean that we have abandoned all idea of revising the old Agreement? Is it a now agreement at which we are aiming?
Mr. Eden: With respect to my hon. Friend, I do not really think that there is a great deal in that. The 1936 Agreement goes on without dispute until 1956, except that the Egyptian Government have denounced it. We do not accept their denunciation. I would like to negotiate an agreement which would come into operation and take the place of the 1936 Agreement which runs out in 1956. What I am telling the House is that if we reach
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these heads of agreement, then the House will have every opportunity to discuss them, but there cannot be any details of a treaty until the heads have been reached. The promise which I will not give to the House is that if we reach the heads of agreement, we will not go on and try to prepare the treaty.
Therefore, the position of the House is doubly safeguarded. Normally, a Government and a Foreign Secretary have the perfect right to sign a treaty without any sanction from this House at all, and then, if he is a wise Foreign Secretary, he brings the treaty in due course to the House for its expression of opinion. As I say, here the House has a double safeguard. We have not yet begun to negotiate the actual terms of the treaty. We are trying—because that is the method which the Egyptians prefer—to reach the heads of agreement. If we get them, the House will then have an opportunity to debate them, but I am not prepared to postpone negotiations or delay the matter over the Christmas Recess.
Mr. J. Enoch Powell: I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. He referred to the heads of agreement. Can he confirm or deny that the evacuation of troops from the Canal Zone and other important matters would begin to take effect from the conclusion of the heads of agreement, and would not have to await the ratification of the treaty?
Mr. Eden: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. I am pretty certain that no action of any significance would occur unless the treaty had been signed. I honestly do not believe that the House of Commons has ever been given fuller assurances about any agreement. The ordinary practice that I adopt is that the Government are responsible for the treaty and that the House either ratifies or approves it.
I am now telling the House—or part of it—that the moment we get the heads of agreement, a public statement will be available and the House will have an opportunity of debate. The assurance I will not give is that we shall delay reaching the heads of agreement, if we think it right to do so, during the Christmas Recess. Now, is that satisfactory to everyone concerned, and, if not satisfactory, at least fair?

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I must tell my hon. Friends that I am most reluctant to discuss details of these negotiationsnow. If one does that while negotiations are in progress, it is always a most unhelpful thing to do to oneself, because if one is not very careful it gives the Power with whom one is negotiating both an advantage and a grievance. I am afraid I cannot further develop my speech with a rumbling comment behind me—I am sorry, but it makes it most difficult, and this is a very important topic.
It is well know that there are two major points which are at present outstanding, and neither of them is what the right hon. Gentleman would refer to as, I think he said, minor points about which people get worked up. One concerns the avail ability of the base in time of need and the other, uniforms. Both of these are major points. On both—although I need not explain why because I think the House knows it—we have made our position clear to the Egyptian Government some weeks ago, and that position stands. It may be that we shall not reach an understanding. If so, I and my right hon. Friend think that this will be a misfortune, because an Anglo-Egyptian treaty can be a real advantage for both our countries and for peace in the Middle East.
Now, for our country, I submit to the House that the advantages will accrue by an opportunity to redeploy our Fighting Forces for the defence of the Middle East, and for the discharge of our responsibilities in that area in a manner more in accord with the strategic needs and conditions of our times. We can also hope for some financial easement, and I think that anybody who does not want this agreement to be reached ought to bear in mind the possible financial consequences. As for this redeployment, which I ask the House to consider, we must bear in mind the change which has taken place since N.A.T.O. came into the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey are now both members of N.A.T.O., and the position of Turkey is decisive in this Near Eastern theatre; they are now the southern buttress of N.A.T.O.'s defence.
I would ask the House to think of this. Suppose our hands were entirely free tonight, the position of Greece and Turkey would play a dominant part in
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the disposition of our forces. But we are not entirely free, and why? Because of the problem of the base in Egypt, some of which, at any rate, is physically immovable. Our concern with this base, like our concern for the Canal—and let me add that one does not defend that merely by sitting on it—is not a selfish or an old-fashioned imperial interest. It is a responsibility which we have to discharge effectively in relation to the modern needs of Middle Eastern defence. That is what an agreement could mean for us.
What could it mean for Egypt? It could mean an end of a period of confusion and strain and maybe, if the Egyptians desired it, a resumption of relations such as those we had after the 1936 Treaty. Economic advantages for Egypt might also flow from this. For the Middle East as a whole, this could open a new era. It could be a decisive step towards increased co-operation and general security. Therefore, we do not want, and we do not intend, to abandon our responsibilities in the Middle East.
If, however, we cannot get an agreement we shall have a new situation, and we shall have to reconsider our whole position in the light of our needs, our interests and our obligations. I can assure the House that we shall face that situation resolutely if it arises, but our firm policy is first to see if it is possible to achieve a reasonable settlement. That—no more, no less—is what we are trying to do at present.
References were made to the Sudan and the result of the elections. We have been told that the British lost the elections. What are the facts? We have kept our word to the Sudanese to bring them rapidly to the stage of self-government as a prelude to self-determination. That promise has been made repeatedly in this House ever since 1936, without challenge from anybody. We kept that promise. So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, we have abstained from interference in any way in the Sudanese elections and we have done our best to see that they should be free and impartial elections. The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) said that we have lost them. We did not consider that we were taking part in them. That is only one stage. There are other stages

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to come before the Sudanese can decide their future. Our whole purpose is still to see that they should have a free choice, and that purpose stands, independent of the question of the agreement on the Canal Zone.
There have been suggestions that our prestige has suffered as a result of the Sudanese elections. I do not accept that. It can be read in many ways. It has to be realised that there are new forces of nationalism stirring in the world today, and they are as strong in Arab countries as they are anywhere else. Her Majesty's Government do not believe that it is a wise policy to try to suppress these movements or to hold them back by force of arms.
Mr. Crossman: Hear, hear.
Mr. Eden: The hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear," but he was complaining that we lost the Sudanese elections.
Mr. Crossman: What I said was that, as a result of leaving Neguib for three months as the sole man claiming to give independence, and not granting it quickly but haggling, we lost the advantage.
Mr. Eden: I thought the hon. Gentleman's charge was that we lost the elections. If he says that we won them, I do not mind.
Mr. Crossman: We lost them.
Mr. Eden: We have not lost them, because we have not been taking part in those elections. I should have thought that a Member of the Opposition party would have understood that the whole tradition of our handling of these matters is that the future must be decided by the country itself. The hon. Gentleman criticised us, but I noticed in a Turkish newspaper the other day an article discussing this very question, and I read something which the hon. Gentleman did not say. It praised Her Majesty's Government for British honesty and impartiality in the elections. I think that tribute is worth more than any criticism that the hon. Gentleman can make. This is exactly what we want to ensure in all the countries where we have special responsibilities for stewardship. I think that in all these countries our record is a very proud one.
There are other examples besides this. What about Iraq, for whom at one time
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we had a full mandate, to whom we gave freely and by agreement her now complete independence which she has long enjoyed—a country with whom we have friendly relations? What about the far more recent example of Libya? [An Hon. Member: "British Guiana."] I do not think that is the fault of Her Majesty's Government here. I thought that had been debated before. The hon. Member can put that out of his mind, and think of Libya, a country in North Africa inhabited by the Senussi—[An Hon. Member: "India."] Hon. Members might let me continue—a country to whom we offered independence in the war, who has now attained her independence and with whom we have a treaty. Those are in complete accord with the tradition which we have tried to observe.
I have a great deal to say about Europe, but I must utter one sentence about Persia. My right hon. Friend dealt with it, but I want to add this. I am sure that this House will endorse our conviction that to resume relations with Persia will strengthen the ties between us, and our hope is that it will shortly lead to a settlement, satisfactory to both of us, of all our common problems. The Persian Government may be sure that we approach those problems in a spirit of good will. We are following with very real interest and sympathy General Zahedi's Government's efforts to restore Persia's prosperity and bring happiness to her people. I must express our thanks, too, to the Swiss Government, who looked after our relations during that unhappy period, and also to the United States Ambassador in Teheran, Mr. Henderson, who played a most selfless and helpful rôle in bringing about an improvement in relations.
I was asked some questions about Korea which I must deal with. This political conference, which we are very anxious to settle, was discussed exhaustively at U.N.O., in August. We had a distinct view which was not the majority view and was not accepted by the United Nations, but we abided by the resolution which the United Nations passed. In October there was a deadlock. We played our part—my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State in particular—in trying to resolve that deadlock. As a result of the joint efforts of all concerned, we reached agreement for this meeting at Panmunjom.

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Mr. Dean has represented the United States, and countries which fought under the United Nations' flag, very well and very patiently in these negotiations. I was glad to hear the tribute which the right hon. Member paid him. He has given a remarkable example of the new art, in this strange modern world, of handling publicly all the most detailed and complicated technical details imaginable, and his patience has been outstanding.
A number of concessions have been made by him, one after the other, to try to meet the Communist point of view. The Communists have made no concession. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, on this occasion, that there can be no doubt where the fault lies, but that does not prevent us from still being most anxious that the conference shall meet, and we shall do all in our power, as we have done heretofore, to bring it about.
I must say something about the prisoners of war. The period of explanations ends on Christmas Eve, and 30 days after that, unless the political conference has come to an agreement about their future—that is, the future of the prisoners who have not chosen repatriation—the Commission's period of custody comes to an end. Our view is that that is the position, whether or not the political conference meets before 23rd January. I am glad to understand from the right hon. Gentleman that that is also the view of the Opposition Front Bench. We are in consultation now with our friends and allies about that situation, and only this afternoon my right hon. Friend had a discussion on this matter with the Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Krishna Menon, who is on his way home from New York today.
On the wider question of a Far Eastern conference, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. But we want to get an agreement to set up a political conference and to deal with the question of prisoners of war. After that agreement we shall work to secure a wider settlement of Far Eastern problems, including that of Indo-China.
I have less time than I should have allowed myself to deal with a number of complicated questions and the Berlin Conference. My right hon. Friend spoke of the work we did at Bermuda. Since
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then I have had meetings, as the House knows, with the Foreign Secretaries, who are my principal colleagues, and with Dr. Adenauer. I want to give the House, first, the broadest conclusion which I have derived from all these talks and from my experience since I came back to the Foreign Office. I have come to the conclusion that the policy which we have been following broadly—I am not dealing with detail now—over these last years is substantially right and does not need to be changed. All our allies and friends are agreed upon that.
I would add that, by and large, it is true that this is a policy which we have inherited from the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, and I do not quarrel with that. An hon. Member mentioned that fact in the last foreign affairs debate. I am not at all ashamed that there should be a continuity of British foreign policy. Broadly, our aim has been twofold, and it still is. It is to build up a deterrent to aggression and to establish a position of strength, from which we can negotiate at least an easement of tension and, if possible, a settlement of disputes with the Soviet Union.
There are quite a number of chapters in this story. The most important is N.A.T.O., a remarkably successful international experiment. I should like very much opportunities to be given for Members of this House to know more of the work and achievements of N.A.T.O. In relation to other international organisations it has much less than the fame that it deserves. Now it is an effective working organisation which fills a real international need. Four men, four names, come to my mind, within the organisation for that achievement. First there was General Eisenhower, as he then was; Lord Montgomery, who has worked from the very beginning in N.A.T.O., willingly accepting a subordinate capacity; General Gruenther; and Lord Is may who, on the Political side, has worked a remarkable improvement of the whole of our arrangements within N.A.T.O.
Here I come to the point that the right hon. Gentleman asked me at the conclusion of his speech. Within N.A.T.O. it was intended and is still our hope that E.D.C. should work. I would recall that E.D.C. was originally a proposal put forward by our French friends. It was put forward to meet the accepted need for a German

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military contribution as long back as September, 1950.It was then that N.A.T.O. passed its resolution. Since then there has been varied progress, till we signed the Treaties last summer, varied progress towards ratification, and, of course, France in particular has still to take her decision. M. Bidault has more than once made it clear to us that this is a dramatic and far-reaching step which France has to take. I think we have sympathy and understanding with her in this decision.
Many hon. Members of this House have spoken of alternatives to N.A.T.O. The more one examines those alternatives in detail, the greater do the difficulties become. Let me just give the House one example. E.D.C. has in itself any number of safeguards and restrictions that various countries, members of E.D.C., voluntarily entered into.
It has a common programme for armaments and for control of the armaments industry, and that is immensely important, including control of exports and imports of raw materials and atomic production. All these things are dealt with in agreement between the E.D.C. countries, and the cumulative effect of this is to hobble national adventure and encourage international co-operation.
Does the House really think it would be possible in any short period of time, or any period of time, to integrate all this difficult agreement which has been more than a year in preparation into N.A.T.O., which has so much a looser setting altogether? Frankly, I think it hard to believe how it could be done.
Now as to our position. We have given six specific guarantees in treaty form to France. We are now considering further arrangements between us which will take the form of a new protocol which is being negotiated by the six Powers. Our discussions are still going on, and I shall give the House full information as soon as we have reached agreement. We are anxious to help to any extent we can. I do not think there is any new chapter in which there is any further contribution we can make, but the House must remember that among the supporters of E.D.C. are the small countries of Europe, even those who are not members, not least the Socialist Governments, for instance, of the Scandi-
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navian countries who are constant supporters of E.D.C. because they believe that is the only method by which the problem can be settled.
Mr. Healey: The Norwegian Government, too?
Mr. Eden: The Norwegian Government are certainly strong supporters of E.D.C. If the hon. Gentleman has any doubt, let him send a postcard to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. I have no doubt whatever of the answer he will get.
I must deal with our thoughts in connection with Berlin. There is an argument, and I must face it, that we should not proceed with these arrangements when Russia is at last showing, or shall we say may be showing, signs of willingness to meet us around the council chamber. I cannot altogether accept that argument. Russia has long since completed much more rigid and complicated alliances in the East with her own satellites, whom she rearmed long ago in defiance of her own treaty obligations, and she has long since armed the East Germans and built up a formidable military force.
But it may be, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, and as my right hon. Friend indicated in his speech of 11th May, that the problem of security is one of those which Russia has in mind. It may be that, in spite of the fact that we have all undertakings towards her under the United Nations Charter and in spite of the continuance of the Soviet Treaty with us and other engagements—it may be that in spite of all that Russia feels the need for further security assurance. If that is so, and if we are able to make some progress in our discussions in Berlin, then I think we shall be able to find some means of helping that situation. We are discussing these matters now, and not altogether unsuccessfully.
But what I must say to the House about Berlin, in conclusion, is this: the right hon. Gentleman just said to me, "Do not bring these discussions to an end if you are making slow progress." Incidentally, I must not go on too long; I must not make the mistake which was made the other night. The right hon. Gentleman said, "Please do not bring the discussions to an end if you are making slow progress."

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I beg the House to believe that of course we shall not do that. If there is any kind of progress at all, however slow, I am perfectly confident that none of the Western Powers will want to bring those discussions to an end. At the end the right hon. Gentleman very generously gave me the good wishes of the House in the work which I have to do. I have no illusions about what are likely to be the difficulties of these negotiations. I know the story, I have read the record, of some of the meetings in which Mr. Bevin had to take part, but I am not going solely weighed down by the thought of what has always happened before but in the hope that if we make a serious and earnest attempt we shall be met in like spirit.
Only two undertakings I will give the House. If we see an opening anywhere to make progress we shall take it. I truly believe that is the mood of all the Western nations. Of course there is some scepticism. Of course we can find examples of it from time to time in the Press of any country which we read. We cannot have been through all these experiences without people knowing a little about how Soviet Russia often negotiates.
But on any sign of willingness to meet us on any point, we shall be ready to do our part. Although I admit the auspices are not entirely favourable, although I know how immensely complex and difficult it is, how hard the course will be to steer, we shall go there in the New Year, if the Russians will meet us, not in a spirit of defeatism or scepticism, but in an earnest attempt to meet what at least all the peoples of the world desire—a lasting settlement of peace for Europe.
It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

TEACHERS (SUPPLY AND TRAINING)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Kaberry.]
10.0 p.m.
Mr. George Thomas: I wish to raise tonight the question of the supply and training of teachers. It is common knowledge that there is a crisis in the schools of Britain at the present time. For the past 18 months the Minister of Education has been warning the nation that, far from lowering the size of classes in our State schools, she can only envisage an increase in the size in the foreseeable future.
Her problems are two-fold. First with regard to the supply of buildings, and second with regard to the supply of teachers. I am not concerned in this debate with the supply of buildings. That is too large a subject to combine with the supply of teachers in an Adjournment debate. There is a terrible temptation for the Minister of Education and for the authorities concerned to debase the coinage or to lower the standards of qualification in the profession when they are anxious to increase the numbers.
The National Union of Teachers is so concerned on this question that for the past four years they have at their national conference unanimously passed a resolution dealing with this subject. At Easter of this year the N.U.T. passed the following resolution:
"Conference reaffirms its opposition to any lowering of the standards for entry into the teaching profession and declares that at the normal age of entry into the profession candidates should possess not less than the minimum qualification required for entry into a training college or university. At the same time, in view of the increasing shortage of teachers, Conference urges the Ministry of Education and Local Education Authorities to take urgent measures to increase the supply of such qualified teachers."
Mr. Ronald Gould, who is general secretary of the N.U.T., underlined that resolution in his annual report to the Conference. He declared:
"It is too much to expect a high status for the teaching profession unless quality is maintained. It is too much to expect university status for training colleges unless they are as careful about academic standards as are the universities themselves."

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He continued, in referring to exception entries to college:
"we shall make sure that the exception is really exceptional, or the professional standards of teachers will be debased."
During the past few weeks I have been questioning the Minister of Education about the number of students admitted to training colleges for teachers without possessing the normal academic qualifications. I understand that in 1950, 216 such students were admitted; in 1951, the figure went up to 454; in 1952 up to 775; and in 1953, it dropped a little to 624. In a matter of four years 2,069 people have been admitted to the teaching profession without any known academic qualification.
The Parliamentary Secretary, who is to reply to this debate, is as well fitted as anybody in the country to appreciate the importance of the proper academic qualifications being forthcoming from entrants to the teaching profession. But the profession itself has not been niggling on this point. It has recognised that there are outstanding people with outstanding gifts, and that special cases call for special treatment. There is, however, an anxiety lest too many are entering the the profession in this way. Some of these people may well have qualifications better than a good general certificate of education, but the majority will be lower.
I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to break down the figures that the Minister has given to the House and to say how they have been arrived at. Perhaps he will tells us how many entrants have been admitted with foreign equivalents to our school certificate, and how many have entered training colleges solely on the basis that they are good at music, art or physical training. The Ministry of Education must know these figures; it certainly had them broken down a year ago. I trust the Ministry has them for the present time in order that the teaching profession, which has co-operated well with the responsible authorities, shall know what is happening to the profession in this regard.
The teaching profession has a right to know whether dilution is taking place, if I may mix my metaphors, through the back door.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Mr. Kenneth Pickthorn): That is all right.
Mr. Thomas: If the Parliamentary Secretary says it is all right, I am quite at ease, because I know he is keen on that sort of thing. I ask him what relationship, if any, there is between the high incidence of exceptional entry into colleges in certain areas and the low proportion of grammar school places available in the same areas. In Manchester, 15·5 per cent. of the school children can enter a secondary grammar school. Manchester admitted 110 women under this exceptional clause without any known academic qualifications. Lancashire's figures as a whole are fairly low for the number of grammar school places available.
In Wales, an average of 33 per cent. of places is available in the grammar schools for the children. We admitted only seven under the exceptional clause. In Birmingham, I understand, 14·8 per cent. of the places are available upon a percentage basis of the child population. Birmingham has admitted 92 women to college under this exceptional clause. It is interesting that over the country as a whole, the grammar school places available vary from 9 per cent. in Gateshead to 69 per cent. or thereabouts in Merioneth, in Wales.
Can the Minister tonight give the House an assurance that the children in Gateshead are having a fair chance to take this general certificate of education to get into the training college? Otherwise, it is quite easy to understand why the exceptional figures are higher in some areas than in others.
I should like to draw the Minister's attention to two other points, and shall do so briefly because I know that one of my hon. Friends would like to speak. The Minister will be aware that this year again there are vacancies in the training colleges. I believe that 250 places in the women's colleges were unfilled. The hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth (Miss Ward) will well appreciate that one of the reasons why there are 250 vacancies in women's colleges is that she and those of us in this House who join with her have been unsuccessful in persuading any Government to grant equal pay and thus help recruitment to the profession.
I understand that the housecraft and physical training colleges are full. It is the general colleges which still have 250 vacancies. What steps is the Parliamen-

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tary Secretary taking to provide suitable candidates to fill those vacancies? He needs the teachers. Even if every place were filled, the size of classes in our schools would still be far too large.
Is the Parliamentary Secretary satisfied that the inconsistency between the grants given to the teacher and the university student in training has not a very serious effect on recruitment to the training colleges? I understand that, on an average, the student who enters the teachers'training colleges receives £70 a year less than the equivalent student who enters a university to go into one of the other professions. But it costs the student in the training college just as much to live and just as much for his books and his sports subscription as it does the other, and if he is living away from home, the burden is quite as severe.
Recently a joint meeting was held of representatives of the Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education and the National Union of Teachers. The meeting took place on 20th November. It considered the inadequacy of grants paid by the Ministry of Education and local education authorities—who are a jolly sight worse than the Ministry, although I say it reluctantly—to students in training colleges. The organisations stated afterwards that the inadequacy of the grants results in a shortage of applicants for admission to the colleges and also in a number of withdrawals from those who have already accepted. They also drew attention to the fact that hardship is caused to some students because of the insufficiency of the part of the grant which is within the purview of local education authorities. In the opinion of the two organisations, an adequate supply of candidates for teaching depends upon the grants being comparable with those given to students at universities.
I hope that tonight the Parliamentary Secretary will be as forthcoming as possible, for in dealing with the teaching profession he is dealing with a body of reasonable people who have, as I said, gone out of their way to be helpful towards the Ministry and the local authorities whenever they can. Teachers are not given to being "niggly" when it comes to the great issues of education, but they have a right to expect that the Minister
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and the Parliamentary Secretary will take them into their confidence and tell them what is happening to the profession, whether their standards are being protected and whether the future holds the possibility of the three-year course being begun by 1960, which I understand is suggested by the Minister's Advisory Council.
10.15 p.m.
Mr. Ralph Morley: My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) has raised an important subject this evening and has dealt with it in his usual attractive manner—the subject of securing in the right manner a sufficient number of entrants into the teaching profession. My hon. Friend has rightly emphasised that there is strong opposition amongst organised teachers to any attempt to lower the standards of entry into this profession. Any lowering of those standards would necessarily lower the quality of the teachers obtained by such methods, and in a short time it would have an adverse effect upon the education of the children. Far from asking for the standards of entry to be lowered, teachers are asking that, whenever it is possible, the standards of entry should be made higher. My hon. Friend has indicated, for example, that instead of the usual two-year course at the teachers' training colleges it should be changed to three years as soon as possible.
Hon. Members on both sides of the House will be agreed that the worst fault in our national system of education is the large number of very large classes which we have at present. We have over 40,000 classes in our State schools containing more than 40 each on the roll, and among those there are more than 1,000 with more than 50 on the roll. In my humble judgment, the most urgent reform of all in education is a substantial reduction in the size of classes, and it is generally agreed by all educationists that there should not be more than 30 children in any class. In order to bring down the size of classes to a maximum of 30 on the roll, there would need to be at least 50,000 additional teachers. I am anxious to know, therefore, what programme the Ministry has to secure this additional number of teachers so that the size of the classes can be reduced.
Most intending teachers stay at the grammar school until they are 18 years of age and then either take a two-year

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course at a training college or a four-year course at a university. Unfortunately, more than 50 per cent. of grammar school children leave the grammar schools at 16 years of age or earlier, and among those are some of the cleverest children, so my friends who are teachers in grammar schools inform me. I should think it might be possible, without lowering the standard of entry into the profession, to devise a scheme by which some of those children who have left at 16 and gone into various occupations and employments, after a few years' time might be given a refresher course which would bring them up to the standard necessary to enter into a training college and to qualify as teachers.
I am wondering whether we can get the additional teachers we need altogether by the present normal method of entry into the teaching profession. If we could find an additional method of entry which would not involve any lowering of the standards of those who enter the profession, that would be useful, and it would enable us to get the large number of additional teachers that are required if the classes in our State schools are to be brought down to manageable proportions and to a size at which a decent education will be possible. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will deal with that point in addition to those raised by my hon. Friend.
10.20 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Mr. Kenneth Pidrthorn): I am very willing to take hon. Members into my confidence which is, I will not say recondite, but profound; I do not see how I can take them very far intoit in the time which they have left me, but I will do my best. I hope that they will do me the justice of admitting that they have heard me in debates of this kind before, and that I have tried to make a debate and not simply recite my own piece. But on this occasion I have things which I wish particularly to say, and I think that almost all of them do meet almost head-on the points which they have made. Therefore, I shall spend less time than I normally should on the things that they said, merely permitting myself one or two remarks about them.
I am glad that the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) thought that the supply of buildings was too big
706
a subject to discuss. I think indeed that it is. I think that a good many heads have been broken against that subject; the hon. Member's head is no doubt worth preserving, and it would not do itself any good by running itself any longer against brick walls—though I permit myself the view that God would not have allowed walls to be built if he had not intended heads to be run against them.
I sympathise with the anxiety of hon. Members about the teaching profession. There are Germans and even Frenchmen who have described our epoch as the age of "Angst." It used to be called "accidie," and it is an emotion which has been with us for a long time; but it has never been a very constructive emotion.
No doubt our teachers are very anxious about their profession, but some of those who speak for them and are anxious that the administration should keep up to the mark in this matter get near to asserting their desires as if they were part of the eternal verities. Their desires are not part of the eternal verities, and I ask them to reflect on some simple arithmetic in these matters. I do not know what they think the proportion of teachers to the total population should be. I am sure it should not be 10 per cent. I doubt whether it should be 5 per cent. I do not know what percentage hon. Members opposite think the population would stand of idle unproductive persons.
Let me not be misunderstood. I speak hare in the sea sense, in the sense of the idle watch. Those who are neither on the starboard watch nor on the port watch are called the idle watch. It does not mean that they do less or more work than other men. But there is a critical percentage of the population engaged in what seems to others not directly productive work, and that may seem to them too high a percentage of idleness.
I do not put too much on this, and I should not like to be cross-examined on it, but something between 1½ and 2 per cent. of the working population of England and Wales are teachers of one sort or another. Therefore, we have to face the fact that this enormous and difficult problem of getting enough teachers is not to be solved very easily, or by dint of saying that this is scandalous or that is wicked.

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I agree with hon. Members opposite in their view that they and their friends are reasonable people. No doubt the N.U.T. is a body of reasonable people, although many philosophers have held that there is no such thing as a reasonable body of people. That is too deep a question for me at the moment but it is a matter on which they might well reflect.
Now I come as quickly as I can to the things which we must speak about tonight. Some 11,300 men and women have been recruited to teaching this year. That is the number going to training colleges, and it is a larger number than in any previous year, and if we add to them the 3,100 who take professional teaching after university courses, the number is 14,500. That is more than anyone has ever had before.
I always hate to make any kind of boast or optimistic prophecy, either in my personal or public affairs, but I think we can safely say that it now seems likely that we can keep up this sort of momentum. If we can keep up this momentum, there will not be any serious deterioration of national staffing standards whilst the children born in the prolific post-war years are passing through the schools. That does not mean that they will all be as well taught as I should like my grandchildren to be taught. Nevertheless, it is an achievement for which I think any Minister of Education in the last few years is perfectly entitled to take credit. I do not think any Minister could have done perceptibly more.
As to the exceptional admissions to training colleges: the area training organisations were given, in 1949, authority to consider such cases. I do not think it is disputed of those who are admitted by right of performance in the General Certificate of Education Examination that they have passed a hurdle as difficult to get over as in the old days under the School Certificate Examination. I would not dare to say which is the more difficult, but I do not think anyone says that the standard is any lower than before. Therefore, if there has been any degradation, it is not with them that we are concerned, but it is with those admitted exceptionally. Those admitted exceptionally were less this last year than the year before, as the hon. Member said. They amounted
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to something over 5 per cent. of all those admitted. Not all of the exceptionally-admitted students are without academic qualification. I cannot analyse them exactly, as was asked, for various reasons—mainly because I have not the information—but, even if I had, I think it would perhaps be a dubious enterprise to enter upon. I can analyse them to some extent, and I can say that, of the 624 such students, 124 possess Irish, Scottish, Army or other academic qualifications. The Scottish qualifications may be as good.
Sir William Darling: Better.
Mr. Pickthorn: We are discussing English education and Welsh, and we want no interference from my hon. Friend. Another 241 had some General Certificate or School Certificate qualifications, although not those within the Regulations. So that means 259, considerably less than half the students in question, who did not come into one or other of these categories. Those are tested by the area organisations, some by interview, some, I was also going to say, by ad hoc examination, but the Duke of Wellington, when asked by a Parliamentary orator how he should perform, said, "Say what you have to say, don't quote Latin and sit down," so I withdraw "ad hoc."
Some enter subject to a special examination and some—I say this with diffidence—are subjected to something like the "country house" inquisition, to which certain budding civil servants have been subjected. In any case, I think it can be agreed that one cannot get a definition of the written examinations which would be perfect in itself and cover all people whom we might want to get in. I think that must be admitted, and such evidence as we have collected—I do not say very much, but it is all there is—shows that the exceptionally admitted students do as well on the average in passing examinations and are as well thought of by the authorities as the ordinarily admitted students.
The Question having been proposed at Ten o'Clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at Half-past Ten o'Clock.

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  BERMUDA (ORDER OF PRECEDENCE)
  COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
  COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
  WEST AFRICAN TERRITORIES (EDUCATION)
  WEST AFRICAN TERRITORIES (EDUCATION)
  INDUSTRIAL WAGE CLAIMS
  INDUSTRIAL WAGE CLAIMS
  FOOTPATH, AINTREE (UNCONFIRMED ORDER)
  FOOTPATH, AINTREE (UNCONFIRMED ORDER)

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

CONSOLIDATED FUND BILL
3.7 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (THE EARL OF SELKIRK): My Lords, this Bill is in the usual form. It is the third Consolidated Fund Bill of the year. If your Lordships agree, I should like to take it through all the remaining stages this afternoon. I beg to move that it be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.— (The Earl of Selkirk.)
On Question, Bill read 2ª; Committee negatived.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 10), Bill read 3ª, and passed.

BRITAIN AND EGYPT
3.8 p.m.
LORD RENNELL LORD RENNELL rose to move to resolve, That in any new arrangement with Egypt it is essential for this country to maintain a position which is consistent with our commitments and responsibilities. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper, or rather the wording of it, is inspired by a remark made by the great Lord Cromer, the founder of Modern Egypt. He said:
"A great nation cannot throw off the responsibilities which its past history and its position in the world have forced upon it."
What are the commitments and responsibilities referred to in the Motion which is the subject of the debate in your Lordships' House this afternoon? To my mine, they fall into two categories. The first is the Suez Canal and what that means as an international waterway—and I will come hack to that. The second is the Nile Valley and Nile water, and what that means.
In speaking, as I propose to do, on the Suez Canal and the Middle East Base in that neighbourhood, I want to touch only on what that means to a world that is at peace. or more or less at peace. I do not want to raise the military implications of the Middle East Base—no doubt other speakers will do so. To my mind, however, what transcends in importance every other subject in Egypt and in the Middle East is the Suez Canal itself. It has practically no parallel or analogy in the world, except possibly the Panama Canal, and there is a vast difference between the two. They have this in common: that they are a link in international traffic and international world trade. But the Suez Canal, from that point of view, is vastly more important than the Panama Canal.
When the Panama Canal was first conceived by de Lesseps, who built the Suez Canal, it also was conceived as an international waterway which would remain open to the whole world for ever. De Lesseps and the original company did not: finish the canal: it had to be finished by the United States of America; and it is worth pausing a moment to contrast the handling of affairs relating to the Suez Canal and the handling of affairs relating to the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal, when it was built and completed by the United States, was, in fact, annexed by the United States; and the Panama Canal Zone became the sole responsibility, militarily and otherwise, of the United States, who proceeded to fortify it, garrison it and govern it. In view of the strategic importance of the Canal to the United States, I think that few Members of your Lordships' House would quarrel with that decision. But it was not the original conception.
The Suez Canal, when it was completed, was of paramount military, strategic and economic importance to this country—more so then, probably, than it is now. We maintained a garrison in Egypt, it is true, having assumed responsibility for the reorganisation of the Egyptian Government as a Government under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire; and we still have a garrison there. But we never annexed or even internationalised the Canal Zone, which remains an integral part of Egypt. In the course of the years which have elapsed since those early days the Canal has been kept open to those who wished

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to pass through; and it is perhaps worth while to remind your Lordships that at a time when Egypt was under the suzerainty of Turkey, neither the Turkish Government nor the Turkish representatives in Egypt, nor the Egyptians themselves, showed any desire, or made any move, to close the Canal, even during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 and 1912. It will be within your Lordships' more recent recollection that even during the period of sanctions against Italy over the Abyssinian war the Suez Canal was not closed to Italy. The Canal was never closed on those occasions, or on occasions since, to the legitimate passage of people who could get there, including neutrals of all countries during the two great world wars, thanks to the police force which we kept in that country, which kept it open. The Suez Canal was more important to us than the Panama Canal was to the world, or perhaps even to the United States.
May I remind your Lordships that the Panama Canal, in the last year for which figures are complete—that is to say, from July, 1952, to June, 1953—had 8,700 ships transiting. The Suez Canal had 12,000. During that same period, the Panama Canal carried 36,900.000 (say, 37,000,000) tons of cargo. The Suez Canal carried 83,900,000 (say, 84,000,000) tons. Of the ships passing through the Canal to-day, approximately 30 per cent. are under the British flag. Probably the next highest, and perhaps even the highest—it is difficult to say—after that are United States ships, not necessarily under the American flag. A great deal of American tonnage, as your Lordships know, sails under the flags of Panama, Colombia and Liberia. One of the principal users of the Canal, in fact, is the United States, for the very good reason that the United States, like ourselves in this country, has come to depend more and more on the oil wells of the Persian Gulf, Arabia and Iraq. It is possible that one of these days pipe-lines from those areas to the Mediterranean coast will substantially diminish the oil traffic through the Canal, which amounts to about two-thirds of all the shipping tonnage that goes through.
Nevertheless, so far as we can see, the value of the Canal as a means of communication for international trade must
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go on many years after all of us have passed away. The effort to keep that Canal in condition, requiring as it does the most highly trained technical organisation possible, staffed from countries all over the world, needs above all for its effective maintenance and its effective operation the security of the personnel there. Without that security, families of nations from all over the world are unlikely to want to go on living there —indeed, the occurrences on the Canal in the last two or three years have already had the effect of causing premature resignations of people who, for fear of what may happen, are asking for their pensions, to go home before their time.
The first break in what might be called the neutrality of the Canal has occurred within the last few years, when the Egyptian Government have applied sanctions against Israel in the administration of the Canal. That first break in what might be called the neutral and the impartial administration of the Canal is one which can easily go a great deal further; and it requires, I submit, a police force which is not subject to the control of a fickle and mercurial Government to ensure that that neutrality is preserved. The second event, which perhaps is a small one but which has a distinct bearing on what I have said, is the evidence which has been produced in the Press of the trial of Serag ed-Din in Cairo. As a defence against the charge of corruption, Serag ed-Din boasted of the effort which he had contributed to stirring up trouble on the Canal at Ismailia and elsewhere; and he went so far as to claim credit for a plan to mine a ship in the Canal, effectively to block it, so as to put pressure on us.
I do not want to make too much of an incident like that. Serag ed-Din does not necessarily represent the Government, or any other Government, in Egypt; and a loud-mouthed speaker does not represent or mean a Cabinet, or even a shadow Cabinet. None the less, it is evidence of the way in which for only too long minds have been working in Egypt. That alone seems to me to justify the maintenance of a police force there to secure, not only for us but for the world generally, what the Canal was intended to be—the greatest international waterway and means of communication between India, the Far East and the Antipodes. Happily,

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with modern methods of communication, we ourselves are less dependent on the Canal than many others. Transport by ship to Australia round the Cape is only a few days longer than through the Car al and down the Red Sea. As is well known to your Lordships, passenger communication is now substantially, and will inevitably be increasingly in the future, by air; and it will be possible to overfly Egypt and all its troubles. But there are countries, including the United States, with its oil interests in the Persian Gulf, and India, with its vast trade in raw materials for Europe, which are intimately dependent upon the maintenance of that waterway as a free communication to all who conic. I believe that free communication can be maintained only by an effective police force.
The second group of responsibilities and commitments which are referred to in the Motion which stands in my name, are those which affect the Nile Valley as a whole. The Nile is a problem for Egypt, but the Nile is not an Egyptian problem. Egypt depends entirely on the waters of the Nile, but Egypt depends on the water which comes down from the Sudan, as the Sudan depends on the water which comes down from Abyssinia, from Upper Egypt, from the Upper Sudan (which is substantially a different country from the Lower Sudan, and inhabited by different people) and, finally, Uganda and the Great Lakes. This question of the Nile and Egypt, aid, I submit, our responsibilities and commitments there, involve the recognition by all the inhabitants of the Nile Valley from, end to end, that the Canal cannot be the responsibility of any one Power or any one nation. Both we individually, and communities as a whole, are never independent of each other; we are all interdependent. As Egypt is dependent upon the Sudan and the Sudan on what goes beyond it, so we are dependent on the trade and the relations which we have with the Nile Valley, and they with us. There is no such thing in the world to-day—probably there never has been—as any country or any community being independent of everyone else; it just: does not happen any more.
With your Lordships' permission, I want to say something which is perhaps personal. My friends in Egypt are, and
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have been, numerous. It is said that if you have ever drunk of the waters of the Nile you will always go back and drink them again. I am told—I have no distinct recollection of it—that I first drank the waters of the. Nile when I was six weeks old, and I have been there, back and forth, ever since. I have had some of my best friends in Egypt, and am one of those who have always liked the Egyptians. I have been happy there; I have got on with them, I think. I do beg of all my friends in Egypt, and all those people who live there, to accept what is so painfully obvious: that they are not, and cannot be, independent about what goes on, above stream and below it. I believe that the Nile Valley, or Eastern Africa, can be run only as a partnership between all the many people involved: and among those people are ourselves.
I do not believe—I never have believed—that all the agitations which, unfortunately, have been the common form in Egypt for the last twenty years, becoming growingly aggravated, necessarily represent what the Egyptian people really think. It has been the experience of all those who have had to deal with Egypt that agitations against us are notoriously the product of the political bankruptcy of any Government which is in power. It has always been the last resort, when that Government has felt that it can no longer carry its majority or its authority, to turn on the tap of propaganda which, illogical as it may appear (and I suppose that all human politics are to some extent illogical, but nowhere more so than in Egypt), reflects a sort of veneer of emotion, but does not reflect, as I believe, the true feelings of people in Egypt. Nevertheless, with the effect that it has on public opinion in this country and elsewhere, it inevitably has a damaging and difficult influence on efforts to work out what is obviously an extremely difficult problem. The experience which we have had in the last few months has been substantially aggravated by that veneer of emotionalism which I would beg the Egyptian Government to call back under control. We have done what we can to make agreements possible. We went a great deal further than some of us, either in this country or elsewhere, thought it was proper to go in the Agreement over the

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Sudan; and that went a great deal further in result than perhaps we expected.
To me it seems strange that in the offer made to the Sudanese about their political future, only two effective alternatives were offered: one was independence and the other was a closer link with Egypt. Why was the third course of an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese condominium not offered as another possibility? Having regard to the position of Egypt, and trying to put oneself, as far as one can, in the place of an Egyptian, it is apparent that an independent and a possibly hostile Sudan was a solution which could not be acceptable. The condominium which was instituted in the Sudan after the last decade of the last century was perhaps a brilliant, and a brilliantly successful, practical solution. Is it not one that might have been continued? Is it not one that might have been offered as a possibility? The responsibility for that, to an undue extent, lies at the door of Her Majesty's Government.
In effect, what has been the outcome? The outcome has been an intensification of the vilification of this country in Egypt, of incident after incident, which I know, as your Lordships know, cannot conduce to better relations. It is idle for certain Egyptian leaders and politicians to say: "You know I have to say these things. I do not really mean them. I have to say them because that is what is expected of politicians here." If the Government in Egypt to-day are strong enough to make a new Agreement, they are strong enough to give leadership to the people of Egypt. Unwillingness to do so must throw doubt on the ability of the Government to maintain themselves without the propaganda on which other Governments have attempted to base their strength, and must also create doubt, which is widespread, I believe, in your Lordships' House and in many other parts of the country, of either the ability or the willingness of the present Egyptian Government to carry out an Agreement after it has been entered into. The first principle of an Agreement involves two parties being willing and able to implement it. Do Her Majesty's Government believe that the present Egyptian Government, whom they have recognised only de facto—as the noble Marquess told us
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in June last—and to whom no de jure recognition has yet been accorded, are able and willing, in the face of the symptoms, in the face of the propaganda which they are individually carrying on, to make an Agreement? It is that doubt in many people's minds, including my own, that leads me to wonder whether the present moment is the right moment to continue discussions preliminary to an Agreement.
Having tried to outline the reasons for this Motion, and the commitments and responsibilities, as briefly as I am able, and without going into further detail, I must come to the last part of what I am going to say, which is: where do about from here, if you feel as I do about it? It appears to me that there are, in fact, only two courses open. The first is to maintain the status quo, with a garrison on the Canal and a great Middle East Base, until such time as spirits are more reasonable in Egypt, and they can assure us that they are willing to enter into an Agreement which takes account of facts, of our necessities and of other people's necessities as well as their own —the other people's necessities that I have outlined in what I have said previously. The second course is to clear out. I have no doubt which course I should like to see followed—that is, to maintain the status quo and wait for things to quieten down, if they do, and not to try to negotiate an Agreement which, if negotiated, would be negotiated with people who are under the stress of violent emotion and who, on the evidence available to us to-day, do not appear likely to play their part in maintaining an Agreement.
The alternative of a compromise solution is not one which commends itself to me, and I believe it will commend itself little to most of your Lordships. The compromise solution is one that has been aired in various parts of the world in the Press. It is progressively to remove the troops we have in Egypt and to leave the Middle East Base with, it is said, a body of some 4,000 unarmed technicians —with what security for them?—and, for our own strategic purposes and those directly connected with the defence of Western Europe and the Allies of the N.A.T.O. group, to maintain a military force, in bits and pieces, scattered about in the neighbourhood of the Canal, such that no one piece without the other would

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be an effective military force. The second course, to clear out, means, to my mind, the removal and the dismantling of the Middle East Base within the period when the existing Treaty comes to an end in 1956, say, in about two and a half years' time. That, to my mind, means removing the Base, taking away everything which is worth removing, and in no circumstances leaving an unarmed force of technical people at the mercy of a Government which may he fickle and may institute the so-called "police measures" advocated by Serag ed-Din—namel", sending into the Canal Zone so called policemen in order to agitate. What guarantee is there that, in those conditions, either the technicians or the Forces would be safe?
One alternative, I repeat, seems to me to be to clear out, and to begin clearing out now. The first alternative, as I have said, is to come to an agreement about the maintenance of troops on the Canal and the Middle East base, for the purposes which I have tried to describe, and that involves an Agreement with a willing party on each side of the table, and a party on the Egyptian side of the table which is willing and strong enough to carry it out. I have no doubt, in my own mind, which of the two alternatives I should prefer. I am fully aware that my argument involves the discontinuance of negotiations in the present atmosphere and in the present frame of mind. May I remind your Lordships of what is perhaps relevant at this moment and in this debate, that we are not willing to exclaim, as Mark Antony did to the Queen of Egypt:
"I have offended reputation, A most unnoble swerving."
I should not like to see anyone in this country a party to clearing out and abandoning responsibilities and commitments we have inherited from the past, and which we cannot rightly hand over. May I add that I hope never to have to say of this country, as also mark Antony said to the Queen of Egypt:
"O, whither has thou led me, Egypt? See How I convey my shame out of thine eyes By looking back what I have left behind 'Stroy'd in dishonour."
I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That in any new arrangement with Egypt it is essential for this country to maintain a position which
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is consistent with our commitments and responsibilities.—(Lord Rennell.)
3.42 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, a good deal has been said in the political world about a Government difficulty and a Government crisis. The Prime Minister is reported to have told his own supporters that in times when a Party is in office with a small majority those who hold strong views, as the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, does, must be prepared to make concessions in the interests of the stability of the Government. That is not the case to-day. Perhaps noble Lords have noticed that in another place a Motion was put down yesterday by a number of Members of Parliament—to wit, 100—pledging themselves to support the Government in their present policy of attempting to make a reasonable settlement with Egypt. So one argument that cannot prevail is that if we do not concede what the noble Lord asks we are in some way endangering the life of the Government. That cannot he the case because the Government are assured of an enormous majority should it put the issue to another place, which, of course, is the governing body.
I listened to the noble Lord's speech with great attention. It was majestic and, of course. sincere, but it was a speech that was at least fifty years out of date. The only thing Egyptian about it was the Egyptian night in which the noble Lord's mind appears to dwell. He spoke as if the existence of a convenient trade route gave anyone the right to take it. He spoke as if the fact that the Nile ran through several countries gave an outside country the right to dominate it. Finally, he spoke as if we could make no agreement in any case with the Government of such a country, proceeded to say that we must 20 on as we are, and added, I thought rather optimistically, that we must wait until things quieten down.
I have put down a note to mention moral issues but I will not do so, because it will probably embarrass this debate; instead, I will take up the practical difficulties of what the noble Lord proposes. He says that we must stay in Egypt. If so, we must have a police force. How many? Has the noble Lord any idea? It has been found that to maintain our position there requires a force of 80,000 soldiers. Does the noble Lord agree that

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that is the right number when he talks about adequately maintaining our police on the Canal—although it has little to do with the Canal? How many does the noble Lord mean? It is no good criticising the Government unless you have some practical plan to put in the place of their policy.
Then, if we have a force there, and have a Base there, I would ask: is it of any military value? Of course, I am standing in the presence of the greatest living British soldier. No doubt he can explain this, but even Field Marshals have to work with civilians in uniform when war comes, and as one who has been a civilian in uniform I think I am entitled to express an opinion in these matters. What is the value of this Base which requires 80,000 men to maintain it in peace, with none over to fight the Russians? That is what I cannot understand. What about the communications, the sweet water canal, and the food supply? I do not know what the population of Egypt is, but if there are, say, 19,000,000 Egyptians all sabotaging our efforts, is this Base of any value at all? What about this wonderful dump, the area of which, I am told, is eighty miles by twenty miles? I should like to hear the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, on this point. I think that even an American pilot could hit a dump like that. I wonder what is the value of it. If it is going to be defended, who is going to defend it? Is it going to be defended by aircraft, or by antiaircraft artillery: and if the latter, are they going to be left behind? There are no answers to these questions—merely a rumbling in the Conservative back woods. There is no intelligible idea brought forward as an international policy.
These are not merely difficulties that have occurred over the last year. They occurred after the First World War. I remember that General Bulfin had the task then of clearing up all the mess of sabotage that existed all over Egypt—and I remember how difficult and how costly in casualties that task was. I have heard soldiers say that if we want to have a strong point in Egypt—and there is no nation since the time of Napoleon which has not coveted a strong point in Egypt—it would be much better to send an army to take it when we want it rather than
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I attempt to maintain this absolutely indefensible mass of troops all the time, of no practical value and at an enormous cost—I think it cost about £60 million a year.
These are my ideas about what might occur. But we are not working in a mental vacuum; we are working in a world of realities. We have had all this before. This little tragedy was played out last year. At the beginning of the year we had the encounter of Centurion tanks in Ismailia. It is good country for tanks, sandy and flat, but rather hard on the Egyptians, if armed only with sticks and stones and rifles. But the Centurion tank is the best way of exhibiting "firmness." The tanks pushed down to a village somewhere down Suez way. Later, in Ismailia, there was a police force, together with a force of auxiliary police, about 600 out of the 700. They were attacked by tanks in a building called the Bureau Sanilane, and after two hours of hard fighting, a number of men, mostly armed with rifles, emerged. Forty-four were killed. We could not have a better example than that of the type of firmness for which the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, asks.
What was the result? And what did it advantage us? What was the sequel? There was a police strike. The auxiliary police said that they were not going on when they were not supported; and when Cairo was burned, the police looked on. All this is on record in the Press. The sack of Cairo resulted in the revolution—in the dismissal of Farouk and the setting up of a military dictatorship under General Neguib. The setting up of the military dictatorship and the defection of one who was supposed to be one of our greatest friends, Abdul Rahman, resulted in the loss of the Sudan. Now it is this military dictatorship, unquestionably backed by unanimous public opinion, which demands certain rights for their country.
I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, this question, as he has great experience of civilian administration after a war. It was contemplated in January, 1952, I think, or 1953, that we should set up an administration in Cairo and take over Cairo. The Times said:
"Plans are being developed for an advance into Cairo should conditions there deteriorate still further."

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The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, must address his mind, in his reply, to how some of the questions that are being put will fit into his great plan for firmness and waiting for things to quieten down. If things do not quieten down, is he going to recommend the occupation of Cairo? Does he think that we can reoccupy Cairo and retain undimmed the position we hold in the world? What will be the effect on India; and what will be the effect on Pakistan? Supposing you are engaged in a war with fellow Moslems in Egypt—a bloody war it would be—will Pakistan stand by idle? I do not say she would take action, but I am sure she would be sympathetic. Do you suppose she would stay in the Commonwealth under conditions of that kind? All this talk about the link with the Empire is out of date. The link was with India when we held India and Pakistan. Now, we do not hold India and Pakistan, but they are members of the Commonwealth. The effect of using violence on the Egyptians at this moment would be to alienate the largest, and, as I think, two of the most important, elements in the Commonwealth.
But as we are talking practical common sense, let me ask who will support us in. this. Does the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, say that American opinion will support us? There is not a trace of it—not even on that silly plan—of all the silly plans that ever existed—to set up a Turkish, French and American international force in order to please the Egyptians. When we remember that Ibrahim Pasha nearly took Constantinople, and that Mahomet Ali "kicked out" Napoleon, to think that by bringing a few French and Turks back we could please the Egyptians, was a masterstroke of absurdity; but we shall get no help front the United States. However much we should like to live in the twilight of the Kipling age, as the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, does, we cannot do it. We are now living in 1953. Our Viceroys and proconsuls used to think that they were great fellows, and could manage things; and they have all written books about it, most of which have proved inaccurate. All they had to do was to ring a bell and a battleship emerged from Malta. But the battleships are not there now, and they cannot emerge. These proconsuls were sitting o iron horses not of their own making. The fact is that we
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must take the world as it is. Certainly, to go back to the old conception of force as a means of ruling the people is impracticable; it is also morally wrong. The best dispatch, in my opinion, of the many dispatches on Egypt, was written by Mr. Bright in July, 1882, to Mr. Gladstone, on his resignation. He said:
"I cannot accept any share of the responsibility for the acts of war which have taken place at Alexandria. I cannot say to what they may lead, and I know not to what greater wrong and mischief they may force the Government."
As I say, in my judgment, that is the best dispatch that was ever written on Egyptian affairs. In the end, morality will win. It is a peculiar thing, but it always does win. It won in India; it won in Ireland, and it will win in Egypt. But let us "base ourselves on reality." The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, must answer some of these practical questions as to how, in practice, this policy of firmness is going to work out.
That is one side of the question. I may he asked: "Have you anything practical of your own?" It is easy, particularly in this House, to laugh at anyone who indulges in speculation, and especially at anyone from this side of the House; but I think if we look back we can see where we went wrong in our Egyptian policy. In 1919, at the end of the First World War, we liberated the Arab world. A little later we liberated the Indian world; and the British influence in Asia to-day is greater than ever it was before, because we were the instrument of their liberation. But when we liberated the Arab world, what happened? The noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, was down the Red Sea at the time when the revolution was taking place against the Turks, and I rather fancy he was in a ship next to ours. We liberated the Arab world, and put Feisal on the throne. In fact, at that time it was to be a united Arab world. But what did Lord Curzon do with Egypt? He subjugated. Egypt, and declared that it was part of the British Empire, because we took it from the Turks, of whom nominally it had been a protectorate. And when Zaghlul asked permission to lead a Wafd delegation to London to meet his Lordship, he was packed off to Malta. He, Sidky, Mahmoud and other people on whose goodwill we subsequently had to depend,

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were put in a British gaol. That was the beginning of the Arab movement in the Arab world. That was where the mistake was made. People had got into the way of trampling on Egypt, and thought that the best thing to do was to continue trampling on Egypt.
If I may digress for a moment: Egypt is a small country, but Egypt is a proud country. The record of the dynasty of Mahomet Ali is a remarkable record. I mentioned the fact that Ibrahim nearly took Constantinople. His achievements in Syria were majestic. As a matter of fact, in the last war we fought against the Russians—I put this in to please noble Lords opposite—the Egyptians took part on the Turkish side in the trenches at Plevno and even sent troops to support the Emperor Maximilian in Mexico, which was French Indo-China in those days. Ismail Pasha had rather modern views on finance and introduced the Welfare State in Egypt rather before its due time. They are a proud people. But all you did was to say that they were part of the Empire, and a Protectorate, until Lord Allenby declared that it was impossible, and that you could not go on. You gave them independence, and you reserved the four points that constitute the independence of any State.
If you look back—and I can look back over that country; it is fifty years since I first climbed the Great Pyramid—you will see that the failure was one of moral conception. We should have seen that the Arabs were coming forward, and British policy should have been gradually to lay aside the policy of arms of past generations, and to take up the policy of the spirit of emancipation. If we had been friendly with the Arabs, then most of the problems of the Middle East would have been solved. But instead of that, we hung on to this antiquated notion that somehow we had to have a strong point somewhere in those parts and the Foreign Office played the Arabs and the Israelis the one against the other, which has been a devastating failure. But the idea was that we had to keep a hold in the Arab world in Egypt. We could not let go there. All we could do to please the Arabs was to be a little harsh with the Israelis.
Let me tell you, my Lords, something said to me by a famous diplomat—he is
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dead now, so let no one ask me his name. He said, "You know I am a churchwarden and I have to read lessons in church. When I read that passage about the ransomed of the Lord shall return. it sticks in my gizzard. "He went on," As a matter of fact the Old Testament has been a disaster for British policy in the Middle East." The truth is that, had we had enough foresight to see what could be done, not only should we have inherited the same sort of moral strength that we now have in South Asia, but we should have done something to solve the Arab and Israeli problem.
I want to say a word about this matter, because I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, said about the Canal and the blockade. Friendly as I am with the Egyptians, I say quite clearly that you cannot make a Treaty with Egypt if you are going to make her stronger to pursue a vendetta against Israel. As a matter of fact, there is not a hard way out: you could let the blockade fade away; you could have the list of contraband made so small that it did not matter. Certainly under the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 you could not do anything to increase the arms of the Arabs without correspondingly increasing the arms of the Israelis. But what a ridiculous thing it would be to start a little arms race in the Middle East in order to equalise the mistakes in your policy! Can we have peace? We have to go a long way back for this, and certainly it is impossible at present. The most we can hope for is a sort of armistice and quietness. The real thing would be to try to go back to the conceptions of Weizmann and the Emir Feisal thirty years ago. I do not want to worry your Lordships with a number of extracts, but there is the famous letter written in 1919 from the Emir Feisal to Dr. Weizmann in which he says:
"We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements"—
that is, the Arab movement and the Israeli movement—
"complete one another. The Jewish movement is national and not imperialistic. Our movement is national and not imperialistic; and there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed, I think that neither can be a real success without the other."
That letter was written a long time ago, but if that spirit could be recaptured,

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what a wonderful victory it would be for peace in the world and for understanding in the Middle East!
The Jews have never suffered from the Moslems. It is not the Moslems who have persecuted the Jews; it is the Christians who have persecuted the Jews. The Egyptians have never persecuted the Jews. Neguib himself has shown a most remarkable tolerance, especially in the difficult circumstances of the day, towards the Jewish subjects in Egypt. You may call this theorising, but at the same time, I am perfectly certain that it is the only way in which British influence—to which we attach so much importance—can be used for the good of the world. I recognise the glorious Gladstonian rotundity of the noble Lord's Motion. I could not make out what it meant. It is going to be accepted by the Government, and no Motion which is accepted by the Government can possibly have very much meaning. I was hoping that this debate would invite the Government to pursue their course and lead us towards something which will be a real and just peace in the Middle East.
4.4 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, speaking in support of the Motion, in spite of what my noble friend who has just sat down has said, I want to insist that in an) future negotiations on the Suez Canal Zone Her Majesty's Government should pursue a much more robust but not less friendly attitude than hitherto. I want a policy more consistent with the proper discharge of our commitments and responsibilities in the future than in the past, and consistent also with our position as the head of the Commonwealth and as one of the leaders of the free world. Before I come to that, if I may make a slight personal explanation, I want to say that my remarks do not reflect in any way on any of the distinguished public servants who have been faithfully carrying out, under considerable difficulties, the Government's policy in Cairo. Secondly, I want to say that I am not speaking as a director of the Suez Canal Company or on behalf of that company, or that I have any authority to speak on their behalf. As the President of the company has frequently said publicly, the company takes no part: in political questions, and its relations with the Egyptian Government are governed by statutory instruments which were brought up to
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date in the Agreement of 1949. I speak, then, solely on my own responsibility as a Cross-Bench Peer with more than fifty years of varied experience of Egyptian problems in their British, imperial and international aspects, and I rely solely on public sources of information.
As a sincere friend of Egypt, with many Egyptian friends in all grades of the population, and as a firm believer in Anglo-Egyptian co-operation, I deeply regretted, and still regret, that on assuming office General Neguib and his colleagues felt constrained to treat this country as public enemy number one instead of Egypt's most sincere friend, as I believe we are. But they were in a difficult position, as heirs to formidable problems, including a violent anti-British agitation, and they had few assets or resources to back their negotiations. So not long after receiving British de facto recognition, the General and his adherents started openly and without any concealment to shout us out of the Canal Zone by repeating every day, ad nauseam, the stale old slogans of the Wafd: "Immediate, total and unconditional evacuation of the British Forces," with threats of forcible expulsion if we did not go voluntarily, and war-like preparations, including the formation of commandos under German Nazi officers. Reiteration is the secret of conviction, and this method of cold warfare made great progress. The statements were never contradicted, and before long public opinion, and even our own friends in Egypt, began to think that the story was true.
That was the situation which confronted me when I visited Egypt last January. The British Forces were indignant—some furious. They said some very harsh things about those responsible here, which I shall not repeat to-day. I felt that there must be some explanation, but I was not reassured by a brief visit to Cairo. The Sudan negotiations were continuing without the least apparent realisation that all the time all over Egypt, from the Upper Nile to the Delta, from the Western Desert to Sinai and Gaza, public opinion was being poisoned against this country. The most fanatic elements in the population were being whipped up to danger point, and the pitch was being completely queered for the coming negotiations on the Suez Canal

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Zone. A more humiliating prelude to a great negotiation on vital national and international interests it would be difficult to conceive. It was an attempt on Egypt's part to get a settlement by what Mr. Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference called "public clamour," which he never would stand for. The Egyptian negotiators, by their slogans, inhibited themselves from any give and take: it had to be a very one-sided
negotiation.
Just before I left Egypt, General Neguib publicly took an oath to the constitution which began in this way:
"Oh God, thou lovest the strong and detesteth feeble characters"
and ended with an appeal for "Unity, Discipline and Strength. "Obviously, that was not the man, for all his amiable qualities (to which I can personally testify), to deal with on a basis of appeasement. I felt I had to do something; and on arrival home I reported to Ministers that we were heading for catastrophic disaster. That was my first warning. Some protests were made against Egypt here in Parliament, and by others in Cairo; but naturally they had very little effect without a sanction. I felt then and I feel now that negotiations ought to have been stopped, for a time at any rate, or else transferred to London—as has happened again and again, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, will remember.
Soon after that, the Prime Minister took charge of the Foreign Office owing to the Foreign Secretary's illness; and there was an immediate improvement here and in Egypt. Very reassuring in his speech in another place on May 11 (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 515, col. 886) were the references to
"… the duty which has largely fallen upon us, and us alone, of safeguarding the interests of the free nations in the Middle East and also of preserving the international water way of the Suez Canal"
and the observation that
"if agreeable arrangements can be made to enable this latter service"—
that is to say the Canal—
"and also the solid maintenance of the strategic base to be discharged by agreement with Egypt, it would mean great saving of our men and money."
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Even more heartening was the absence, apart from a laudable desire for a large reduction of numbers, of any hint of the withdrawal of the whole of the British fighting forces and also his advice (col. 888) that
"… we may await the development of events with the composure which follows from the combination of patience with strength."
If we had acted on those precepts, I think the situation would have been very much better now. But alas! the Prime Minister also fell ill, and during the Recess, when the Parliamentary watch-dogs were scattered, the situation seemed to drift. We seemed to be on the verge of dangerous concessions on points of principle. Once more, on September 5, I felt constrained in the public interest to warn the Ministers of catastrophic disaster approaching. That was my second warning. The consternation of other people interested in this question was as great as my own, and was reflected in the correspondence and leading articles of important newspapers and magazines, at the Conservative Conference at Margate and, a little later, in Parliamentary debates in another place. Your Lordships will see in a moment why I had to make this rather long digression.
I come now to the results of the talks, so far as we know them. The object of these so-called "informal" talks was not to prepare a Treaty but only to establish some agreement on principles as a basis for a formal Conference to draft a Treaty. But, of course, if you agreed on principles and they were embodied in the Treaty, it would be exceedingly difficult to get away from them. We got very little information from Her Majesty's Government—practically none —on the trend of these discussions, and public relations officials gave the impression that their function was to conceal rather than to inform. I cannot help thinking that that was a mistake, because, whereas the Egyptians have tried to whip up tremendous public opinion against us, our public were not sufficiently informed to express themselves until comparatively recently, so that the Egyptian negotiators would get the impression that there was not much public opinion behind our negotiators.
I come now to vital interests. I do not think there is any doubt about those. Here I differ a little from the noble Lord,

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Lord Rennell, but I take these vital interests from the Prime Minister's speech on May 11: the international waterway of the Suez Canal, including of course the shipping using it; the strategic Base, and the British personnel left behind to look after that strategic Base if and when the Fighting Forces are evacuated. I will examine those briefly in turn, but as a preliminary general observation I would say that under the proposed principles, owing to projected evacuation of the Fighting Forces these vital interests would be completely at the mercy of the present or any future Egyptian Government be it totalitarian, as at present, Communist, fanatical or some middle-Party or combination—which would probably be as good as anything.
I turn to the vital interests individually. Lord Rennell has already given a great deal of information about the importance of the hundred-mile Suez Canal through the Desert and the Lakes, and I can only dot the "i's" and cross the "t's," if he will allow me to do so. For the purpose of comparison, the 86 million tons net of shipping which passed through the Canal in 1952 compare with the 78,250,000 tons net which entered United Kingdom ports in 1951. That is to say, the traffic passing through the Canal is actually a little greater than the whole of the shipping using our ports. Thus has been fulfilled Lesseps's vision aperire genibus terrain— to open the earth to the nations—and that peaceful function is still the most important. But I would add that in 1952 númerous naval units, large and small, and transports to and from the various theatres of war carrying 237,000 troops, mostly British and Allied, traversed the Canal; and, of course, the huge quantity of oil is also of great strategic importance. But, beyond that, I do not want to go into the strategic question because it might overload my speech. We might with advantage deal with that one day in one of our debates on Defence. As Mr. Donald Anderson, Chairman of the General Council of British Shipping, has repeatedly insisted:
"A carefully maintained and properly managed Suez Canal is vital now and always to British shipping and British trade to the East"—
and, I would add, to international trade.
In the endless struggle with gales, fogs, sandstorms, the ever-trickling sands,
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breakdowns of steering gear and the human element, in order to secure a safe and speedy passage for ships whose size, draft, tonnage, and number is always increasing, the indispensable need is security for the personnel engaged, European and Egyptian, including pilots and experts and their wives and families, offices and communications of all kinds. They must have security. That security has in the past been ensured in the last resort by the British Forces stationed in the Zone. How necessary that is, as a deterrent and for actual protection, was strikingly demonstrated exactly two years ago, when the forces of disorder, under Egyptian Government stimulus, broke loose. Egyptian police protection failed, the Egyptian Army, for understandable reasons which it would take me some time to explain, stood aloof; and, but for the presence and efficiency of the British fighting Forces, the European quarter of Ismailia, where most of the people connected with the working of the Canal live, might, and very likely would, have suffered the fate of Cairo. Rooms which usually occupied out there, for instance, had bullet marks in them when I got back last year. Traffic through the Canal would unquestionably have ceased. I could explain that in great detail but, again, I think it would overload my speech. Then, of course, there is the incident of the mine which occurred at that time, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Rennell.
For emergencies of that kind, the reported heads for a Treaty, given the withdrawal of the whole of the fighting Forces, make no effective provision. Neither do they provide any safeguard against an extension of the interference already exercised by Egypt over ships and cargoes destined for Palestine and other nations with which Egypt might be in dispute: it might be Great Britain, over the Base or the Sudan; or France over her North African Territories, or something Of that sort. Another contingency which is not provided for is that at some future date an Egyptian Government, under some unpredictable internal or external pressure—and in that part of the world there are a great many internal and external pressures—might seize and occupy the Canal before the end of the concession in 1968. Their motive might well be the same as Mossadeq's, namely,

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aggressive nationalism and to obtain the whole of the proceeds instead of the large part to which he was entitled.
Perhaps it will be argued that the provision, said to be included in the heads of agreement, for a declaration by Egypt of responsibility for maintaining and discharging her obligations under international conventions for securing free use of the Canal is appropriate and right. However, it is less important than it seems at first sight, because Egypt has for years been bound by the Constantinople Treaty of 1888 to preserve the free liberty of the Canal for the ships of all nations at all times, in peace no less than in war. In fact, this unilateral declaration, in evil hands that might be in charge, could serve as a pretext for seizing the Canal and its installations, nominally in order to facilitate her task. We cannot shut our eyes to such risks when we recall that only two years ago Nahas Pasha, in tabling the decrees abrogating the 1936 Treaty, cited eighteen precedents for unilateral denunciation of treaties, several in recent times.
Now I come to the strategic Base. The reported heads of agreement do not offer any better security for the £300 million strategic Base, provided out of the pockets of the hard-pressed British postwar taxpayers, than for the Suez Canal. If the Suez Canal is exposed by the withdrawal of the British fighting Forces to grave risks, so is the Base in equal degree, since the guarding of the Base is to be entrusted to the Egyptian Army, if reports are correct. It is also difficult to believe that it can be maintained in an efficient state. According to reports, as the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, has mentioned, some 4,000 British technicians will be employed for seven years or so to overlook and supplement —I do not know whether it is 40,000; it used to be 60,000—Egyptians. Like the rest of the Egyptian population, these 60,000 men will have been exposed for months, if not years, to this intensive and uncontradicted propaganda that we are a degenerate nation, and so forth. They will have seen our fighting Forces shouted out of the Zone and they will not forget that Egyptians who had served in the British Forces have been sentenced to death and other severe penalties. I ask your Lordships, what prospect is there for good teamwork in such conditions, especially
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as, according to common report, there will be a divided command, an Egyptian Commander-in-Chief and a British Technical Director? The prospect of friction will stand at a premium, and what incentive will these Egyptian workers have to maintain the Base in a state of efficiency for a foreign State which has been decried? Even the safety of our technicians will not be secured, not even if they are allowed to have small arms, because the Egyptian Army will have tanks, artillery and aircraft. Our technicians will be merely potential hostages in case of trouble.
I ask a crucial question: would the occupants of the Government Front Bench, or would any of your Lordships, he happy to see a son or a grandson serving in those conditions, particularly if times were disturbed, as in fact they are disturbed? Can the Government hope to obtain competent volunteers for this service: and, in default, can they order men to undertake it? Is it not certain also that, even if the Egyptian Government accept this obligation in order to get rid of our fighting Forces, they will repent of it when they realise that responsibility for the Base destroys the neutrality for which, rightly or wrongly, they yearn? In fact, they are always pressing this point of neutrality. They could even use the same tactics towards the Base as they used towards the rest of the story: this cold warfare, this shouting campaign and all the rest of it. I suppose we shall be told that these and other risks will be safeguarded by arrangements for the return of the Forces in case of emergency. I am afraid the only emergency which has been mentioned in the public Press—there may have been other references, of course—has been a major international emergency, and there is understood to be a difference of opinion still as to the conditions.
All that discussion, however, seems to me to be sheer waste of time until someone has given an effective answer to the Prime Minister's comment on a similar proposal in Parliament, in 1946, which, with your Lordships' permission, I will read (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 423, col. 774):
"The Great Power with whom we shall be in dispute would, of course, say to the Egyptian Government, 'We should regard any movement into the Canal Zone of British Forces

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as an unfriendly act.' Can anyone suppose that the Egyptian Government, confronted with this situation and not desiring anyhow to have British troops or air forces in the Canal Zone, will not refuse permission for us to reenter …? Can one imagine the British Government in such a situation, when the dread issue of peace or war in a renewed world struggle, may be hanging in the balance, forcing the issue…? It is a positive act, an act which will be widely regarded and denounced as an act of aggression, …an act destroying the last hopes of peace…"
I have never been able to discover an answer to that, and I have asked a great many people. Well, my Lords, return in the eventuality of some hostile action by Egyptians, or some failure on their part to restrain the forces of disorder, would obviously be even more impracticable. I think it worth mentioning, that in making the same criticisms on our with drawal from the Southern Irish ports in 1936, Mr. Churchill described it as an "improvident example of appeasement." That is exactly what some people are saying of our present policy.
Another defect in the prospective heads of agreement bearing on the same issue of withdrawal is that they do not provide against the danger which was so strongly felt by the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, and expressed in a speech in the same series of debates, if not: in the same debate, as Mr. Churchill's quotation in 1946, which, with your Lordships' permission, I will read. Mr. Bevin said this:
"There must, not be a vacuum. If the Egyptian Government try to force a situation in which there is a vacuum—meaning that we have gone and that there is nothing there for security instead, regional defence or any other organisation—to that I can never agree…"
As I understand it, the prospective arrangements would provide a permanent vacuum. While we were wrangling with Egypt or the United Nations as to whether our forces are entitled to return, our enemy could have landed sufficient troops by air to put both the Canal and the Base out of action, and maybe to occupy the whole Zone. There must be enough British or equivalent armed forces to stiffen their Egyptian comrades in resisting air attack and, until Egypt has settled clown, to deter the forces of disorder. I am sometimes told that none of these things would happen if we withdrew, because there would be no more difficulties with Egypt. We should be living in a fool's paradise if we believed that. Just think of all the possible sources of friction that remain—the position in the Base,
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the Sudan, the possible threat to Palestine—recently mentioned very forcibly in another place. Pan-Arab, and even Pan-African, ideas have been hinted at in recent Press correspondence and, above all, there is the complicated eternal political position in Egypt, which, as my noble friend Lord Rennell has said, has been the bane of most earlier negotiations, as your Lordships can find if you study the words spoken in Parliament to explain them.
Now I come to my conclusions. Appeasement is too great a gift to Communist and other hostile propaganda. Any sign of weakness or retreat is seized on and spread all over the world. The results of Palestine, Abadan and the rest, however inevitable our actions were at the time, are a factor to-day in the situation in Egypt and the Sudan, in Kenya, Malaya, British Guiana, and in the unrest in many parts of the Colonial Empire. After the final evacuation of Abadan on October 1, 1951, a writer in the Egyptian Wafdist newspaper Al Balagh (at that time the Government newspaper) commented:
"This is an example that we must follow in our struggle with the British. It is only the weak whom they oppress. Their prestige in the East is finished."
I have shown how faithfully Egypt has followed that advice. I have two or three other quotations to the same effect. This propaganda is widespread, and it is a natural thing for Communists and critics to act upon it.
If we cannot hold the lifeline of the Empire and Commonwealth until we can vet a better settlement, what can we hold? By evacuation, far from concentrating our forces elsewhere for better training facilities or amenities, far front solving our manpower problem, or our political problems in the Middle East or elsewhere, far front saving money, our forces will b e scattered more and more all over the world to stop the rot. We shall not be worth while as an Ally. We shall deserve the fate of Akhnaton, the pacifist Egyptian Pharaoh, of whose reign his biographer records:
"In the space of a few years Egypt had been reduced from a world power to a petty State, from the richest country known to man to the humiliating position of a bankrupt kingdom."
That is not my idea of a policy for the Elizabethan Age in Coronation Year. We must study more closely the firmness of our predecessors, of whom I can give a

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long list, in very similar circumstances. I could mention also a long list of Prime Ministers of the Dominions who have recorded the importance they attach to the Suez Canal, up to and including the meeting in June, 1953, when the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth recognised
"the international importance of the Suez Canal and of the effective maintenance of the military installations in the Canal Zone."
I noticed that on August 11 Dr. Malan, in the South African Assembly, reflected the same idea when he said:
"We have undertakings in the Middle East, and it is essential for us that the Suez Canal should remain open."
My Lords, the time is not ripe for a sudden withdrawal of the whole of the British fighting forces. We must be absolutely firm on that. Reduction, I agree, is infinitely desirable, though I know the difficulties. But it must be gradual, tested in stages by trial and error. For the moment, the talks should be suspended and the offers we have made withdrawn. When Egypt has become sufficiently stable to justify de jure recognition, and realises that we too have a public opinion which insists on the fulfilment of our international commitments, and when she adopts a genuinely friendly attitude, a fresh start can be made. A friendly attitude is the essential point. We shall never get anything until we get that. Even if we have to wait a bit, I feel that it will be worth waiting for. It may not necessarily be very long, but in the meantime we shall have to continue, as so many British Governments have had to do so many times, to stand on the Treaty of 1936, with such gradual reductions of forces, unilaterally I suppose, as from time to time may be deemed safe.
4.40 p.m.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I venture to address your Lordships for the first time. I venture to do so on this important topic only because it was my fate during the war to spend nearly two and a half years on the banks of the Suez Canal, on the staff of the Admiral who dealt with all problems of the maintenance and functioning of the Canal, of its defence against possible land, airborne, mining, bombing and other attacks. I think that in the speeches one has heard about the Canal there is sometimes shown a slight lack
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of appreciation of the help which we received from the Egyptian Government and people during the war. I can speak from personal experience of how we got it, from the Military Governor at the top, through the Egyptian police, right down to the constables, the Frontier Force, the customs, the telephone and telegraph services, the railways, the junior Canal Company employees of Egyptian nationality, and the labour of the docks. Unless we had received their active and friendly co-operation—as we did in full measure—we should never have been able to maintain the Middle East campaign.
When the most serious attack of all came, the mining of the Canal, my particular job was to spot where every mine fell—quite a task on a dark night, along a canal extending over a distance similar to that from, shall we say, London to Birmingham. And if we did not spot accurately where a mine fell—and once or twice we did not—a ship was blown up and the whole function of the base came to an end. At first we had the Brigade of Guards on this job. They could be spared for only a short time, however, and the job was then taken over by the Egyptian army. They went at it enthusiastically; in fact they were so keen to shoot down Italian machines that we had to take away the rifles from half of them, to make sure that they would spot the mines, rather than shoot at the machines—and, be it remembered, they were supposed to be neutral. After some months I worked out statistics relating to the percentage of accurate reports received, and I found that the percentage of accurate reports from the Egyptian Army was exactly the same as the percentage from the Brigade of Guards.
The whole anti-aircraft defence of the Fleet at Alexandria was dependent upon the Egyptian Army, though they were supposed to be neutral. We all had the happiest relations with their forces, and I feel sometimes that the British Government and British historians have been somewhat unappreciative of the help and co-operation which we received from Egypt in the war, and the good will which was shown to us. It is tragic, from the point of view of people like myself, who enjoyed throughout those very difficult days the helpful co-operation of Egyptian Government officials and personnel, to see this lamentable deterioration in the

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very places where we used to go unarmed—except, perhaps, for a 12-bore gun with which to shoot snipe. When one remembers the good will and prestige we had during the war, I could follow Lord Rennell in quoting from the same play of Shakespeare:
"O, wither'd is the garland of the war."
Why has this deterioration in the British position occurred? The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the Government of which ha was a member, must accept great responsibility for some of the developments—though some preceded that period—and if I venture to go back in history it is not to apportion blame, but to see what we can do now to remedy the position. After Alamein had been successfully won, lack of imagination was shown in not getting our troops out of the citadel at Cairo and the Kasr-el-Nil barracks, and there was slowness in getting our troops out of. Cairo and back to the Canal Zone. Then, as I have said, there was our lack of appreciation of Egyptian co-operation in the war. But, above all, there was the lamentable story of Palestine, the disastrous wobbling of the British Government of that period, and our desertion of our responsibilities to tie local inhabitants, whose rights we were pledged to observe under that Mandate, and the desertion of our responsibilities for the Holy Places of Christianity which we left to be fought over.
I find it hard to understand how Lord Stansgate can talk about morality. I have never been able to see the morality of the policy of getting out and allowing the peoples there to fight it out. There was a lot to be said for a policy in Palestine of partition and compulsory transfer of population. There was nothing to be said for getting out and allowing this ghastly refugee problem, to be created, which has since bedevilled our relations with the whole Middle East. We did not win the affection of the Jews: they felt that they had won in spite of us. We did not win the affection of the Arab world: they felt that they had lost in spite of what they thought were our pledges. Incidentally, if we are talking about the Treaty, the 1936 Treaty pledges us to go to the help of the King of Egypt if he is ever involved in war. I did not notice that Lord Stansgate and his Government rushed to help King Farouk during the Palestine Campaign.
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We have suffered a loss of face with the Arab world, which has since felt that in the eyes of the United Nations possession is nine points of the law; that, no matter what Count Bernadotte and Doctor Bunch or other arbitrators said, whatever Israel could manage to grab, they could hold on to; and that their influence in Washington was great enough to prevent them from being pushed out again. Now, one million Jewish refugees have been pushed into Palestine, and nearly a million Arabs have been pushed out, leaving a refugee problem as big and as severe as before, only more concentrated, and involving a people less organised, less rich, and probably less public-spirited in their readiness to help each other. There lies the danger of Communism in the Middle East. Israel may be as Left wing as they like, but so long as they depend for their food during ten months of the year on private and public subscriptions from America, they are not going to go out of the Western camp.
I venture to suggest that our relations with the Arab world are the crux of the matter, and the Suez Canal problem only a part. Our aim must, be to get strong, settled, united and prosperous Arab nations. We must go back to the war conception of dealing with this region as a whole. One of the tragedies of the Palestine episode was that it meant the virtual break-up of the Arab League. Now we have tile ridiculous situation of Kuwait with more money than it can spend, and Jordan with no money but all the refugees. Her Majesty's Government must take some responsibility for this return to parochialism. During the war we had the Offices of the Minister of State and the Middle East Supply Centre, which dealt with the area as a whole, and did economic planning, for the area as a whole. What happened? It was killed after the war by the Socialist Government. I do not blame them; of course, it was the Foreign Office who killed it, because the Foreign Office loathe all regional organisations. They always have done and they always will. One cannot blame them; they are intelligent, conscientious chaps, and they like to make a decision in their own rooms. If a decision is made either below them in Cairo or in a supranational organisation in Luxembourg, they cannot help feeling that it is notbeing made as well. So we whittled down our

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entire regional organisation, and a minor official of the Ministry of Health replaced a member of the War Cabinet. If we are to tackle this refugee problem and win back the good will of the Arab world, I venture to suggest seriously to the Government that they should consider again having a Minister of Cabinet rank on the spot to view that important area as a whole.
They should also revive the Levant Consular Service in some form. Nowadays the Foreign Office like the all-purpose, utility diplomat, who can go anywhere and do anything; who can be First Secretary in Paris, Commercial Secretary in Caracas or Resident in Aden. But in an area like the Arab world, the advantage we had in the past of having specialists who spoke the language fluently, understood the people's mentality and background, was very great, and we saw how, in Iraq during the war, there were times when the all-purpose diplomat got into trouble and the Foreign Office had to send for the Arab specialist again. We made a great mistake in abolishing that trained corps of Middle East specialists, and the Foreign Office might well think over that again. They must also make sure that the people they appoint in the Middle East, if we are going to try to revive our prestige by policy rather than by force, should be people of strong personality. It is not always the clever bureaucrat and scholar who makes the best person in the Arab world, but the man of outstanding personality and presence. If we get the machinery right, then we can tackle the refugee problem over the years. Once we have done that, the main obstacle to good relations with Israel, and good relations between this country and the whole Arab world, will have been taken away. Once we have done that, we can look forward to peace with Israel, though perhaps the Government of Israel will have to accept that they must give some compensation for the loss of private property. They are receiving compensation from Germany for the evils done to private Jews, so they also might give compensation for the hardship inflicted on private and in offensive Arabs who have lost their ancestral homes in the Middle East.
If we are to adopt this policy of reviving our prestige, it is essential that we should maintain the closest co-operation
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with the United States. In the war we saw the lamentable results of the divergence of French and British policies in this area. They diverged at the top and at the bottom, and both the Jews and the Arabs were remarkably skilful in playing off the French and the British, one against the other. They will do the same with the Americans and ourselves, unless at all levels we maintain a close co-operation on the formulation and execution of our Middle East policy. I think that with our experience of President Eisenhower during the war we may hope for loyal co-operation.
I apologise to your Lordships for having diverged from the point. Returning to the Canal, I feel that previous speakers have been inclined to confuse the Canal Convention with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was to safeguard the Canal against outside attack. It did not give us the power to station troops on the Canal to see that the Egyptians obeyed the letter of the Convention. These are completely different things. I know that we can prolong the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty by various devices in the text. But are we in such a strong legal position when, in fact, we have 80,000 men there, and the Treaty allows us only 10,000? Can we afford to sit and wait? There is no maintenance in progress on all the buildings and barracks in the Canal Zone. No roofs are being repainted; no gutters repaired. No money is being spent, and there is a deterioration of buildings and equipment and of morale. Are we quite sure that, with a hostile Egypt, we could keep the Canal working? From my humble experience in the war, I venture to doubt it. Is this Base, perhaps, like Singapore, a base which would have been good in the conditions of a previous war, but having little relation to the tactical and strategic necessities of any war in the future? In the end, Singapore fell, because its water supply had fallen into hostile hands. Every drop of water in the Canal Zone comes from the Nile, and it could well be diverted or tampered with in various ways. Do we believe that if a Russian ship left a delayed action atomic mine in the harbour of Port Said, we could continue to keep the Canal going? I cannot help believing that there are some grounds for thinking the Canal Zone might be as dangerous a trap as Singapore proved to be in the last war.

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If we had been convinced that the Canal Base was the answer to our strategic problem we could have kept it oily if we had gone out after the war in an all-out, pro-Arab policy. We did not do that, and the time for that is past. I feel that the Government are right in pursuing these negotiations. I am not suggesting that they should give everything away. We have many cards in our hands, financial and commercial as well as strategic, in making a deal with the Egyptian Government. But when the noble Lords, Lord Rennell and Lord Hankey, say that we shall gain by waiting, I am not entirely convinced. What Government is likely to succeed that of General Neguib? So far as I know, there is no Jacobite movement to restore King Farouk. I cannot see the discredited and rather corrupt politicians of the last régime being brought back by popular acclaim. What is left?—Communists and the more extreme Moslem Brotherhood. Surely General Neguib's movement, with all its faults of inexperience and extremism, is still the best hope of pulling Egypt out of the corruption, out of the social disparity of wealth, and out of the population problems. And a movement so strongly based on the Moslem religion is not likely to feel the attractions of Communist atheism. Whilst I support the Government's policy, may I conclude by saying how sad it is for those of us who knew these countries and loved the people, and who have so many happy memories of them, to see this deterioration in our relations, and by expressing a hope that next year we shall re-establish not only a sound Treaty but also the good will which ought never to have been lost.
5.0 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, by a happy accident of the batting list, it falls to my lot to congratulate the noble Viscount who has just resumed his seat upon his maiden speech. He spoke from a great fund of experience and intelligence. As regards his experience, I have heard naval officers of high rank under whom the noble Viscount served in Egypt say what great value they attached to his services: and as regards intelligence, anyone who has enjoyed the friendship of the noble Viscount has never been under any doubts. I am sure I am voicing the opinion of all your
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Lordships when I say that we hope his experience and intelligence will frequently be at the disposal of this House in future debates. I should like to say a few words about the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—that vivacious and impressive speech. I would only ask him to look at one point again. If he were to do so, I think he would find that Mr. Dulles has shown himself much more in sympathy with our position in Egypt, and with our difficulties there, than a good many people seem to imagine.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Perhaps the noble Lord will permit me to interrupt. I have no doubt that that is so, and hope that we shall remain on good terms with the Americans. What I asked was: When the tanks go imp action again, as they are going in a few months' time, are the Americans going to help us?
LORD WINSTER: I am not so pessimistic as is the noble Viscount about the tanks going into action again, but I am sure from what Mr. Dulles has put on record that we shall enjoy considerable sympathy from him in whatever may be the future in Egypt. In one of his wartime speeches Sir Winston Churchill said that he had not assumed the office of Prime Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. Well, the Canal Zone is not the British Empire, but I hope that the Prime Minister has no thought in his mind of coming out of a position which is essential, not merely to the British Empire, but to the free world. At the present moment we get a lot of advice upon how to run our affairs. For instance, Mr. Nehru is very free indeed with his advice to us, as well as, so far as I can see, to the rulers and Prime Ministers of every other country in the world. But I wonder whether Mr. Nehru appreciates what would be the possible economic results to India if the passage of the Suez Canal were not completely secure.
I do not think the present position can be fully evaluated without a glimpse backwards at the record, though not, perhaps, so far back as fifty years. I feel that there are two essential points to remember. The first is that our position in the Canal Zone rests upon Treaty rights which are legally unassailable; and the second is that when in 1922 we declared the British Protectorate over Egypt at an end, there were four reserved

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points, and two of them were the security of the communications (including the Suez Canal) of the British Empire, in Egypt, and the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression. I do not think we can judge this situation properly unless we keep those two points fully in mind. In fact, the record shows that we have adhered closely to them up to this time.
To go back as far as 1924, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said:
"No British Government could divest itself of all its interest in guarding the Suez Canal."
A little later, Sir Austen Chamberlain, when speaking to Sarwat Pasha, said that these reserved points—that is, the points I have mentioned—were
"so essential that every British Government in the future, whatever its complexion, would be obliged to insist upon them."
And, in fact, subsequent British Governments have done so. To move on a little to 1946, Mr. Ernest Bevin was then the Foreign Secretary, and he agreed to discuss with Egypt a revision of the 1936 Treaty. But he said that the lessons of the Second World War emphasised—and these are his words:
"the essential soundness of the principles underlying the Treaty"—
that is, the Treaty of 1936. In the same year, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, I do not want to say weakened but, I think, modified that attitude a little by offering to withdraw all British Forces and
"to settle in negotiation the arrangements to make possible mutual assistance in time of war."
I would read that as implying a willingness to evacuate the Forces before discussing the arrangements for possible mutual assistance.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Is the noble Lord going to continue and read the Treaty to which the Labour Government of that day was a party, which provided for evacuation, under which all the troops would have been out by 1949?
LORD WINSTER: The noble Viscount speaks from a vast store of knowledge, but I am dealing with only one point, and that is, an apparent willingness to withdraw the Forces before discussing possible mutual assistance. I am not criticising it, but merely quoting the fact. In the
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same year, however, Mr. Herbert Morrison revealed that we had acceded to an Egyptian request for a decision on withdrawal preliminary to the study of the future of the Anglo-Egyptian Alliance. I am coming to other things that Mr. Herbert Morrison said, which, I think, reveal how firm and good he was on this subject; but that is what he said at that time. Thereupon Mr. Attlee said that if the matter broke down there was still the 1936 Treaty on which he was prepared to take his stand in negotiations. Some remarks of Mr. Ernest Bevin have been quoted, about our not agreeing to come out of Egypt and leave a vacuum behind; and remarks made by Mr. Churchill, which really amount to saying that if we once evacuate all our Forces from the Suez Canal there will be no chance of our re-entering the Zone. Those two statements have been quoted by my noble friend Lord Hankey, and again, I feel, they are of great importance and are two essential points to remember in discussing this matter.
I said I would quote other remarks made my Mr. Herbert Morrison, and I have great admiration for what he said. His words were:
"The presence of British troops in Egypt is not a purely Anglo-Egyptian problem. We are a Power bearing responsibilities in the Middle East on behalf of the Commonwealth and the Western Allies. We have assumed a great burden to make the world safe for those countries. We invite Egypt's partnership as an equal in this common effort."
Those words were not only most generous to Egypt, but they emphasised what I think is the essential point in this matter —namely, our international responsibilities in this affair, which, in my view, should be placed even above the strategic problems about the Base, and so on. To my mind, that is the essential point. Then again, in 1952 the Conservative Government followed exactly the same line, and said that they regarded the 1936 Treaty
"as remaining in force and intend fully to maintain their rights under the instrument."
It will be seen that in the past we have most clearly asserted that we will not withdraw from Egypt leaving, as Mr. Bevin said, a vacuum behind us, and that if Egypt would not be reasonable in spite of the generous offers made to her we would stand on the 1936 Treaty—a statement which I can only interpret as meaning that we would remain in Egypt.

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We must see how these firm words tire upheld by what the Government do today, when these negotiations appear to be drawing towards their conclusion. Of course, what is done will be done over the head of Parliament. The noble Wryness, Lord Reading, in replying to Questions yesterday, said, quite rightly of course, that the constitutional practice is that the Government conclude a Treaty and then it is brought to Parliament far ratification. I asked the noble Marquess whether he could quote a case under that procedure of a refusal by Parliament to ratify a Treaty. One Treaty with Egypt, over the Sudan, has, of course, been presented to us without prior consultation. Are we going similarly to have an agreement with Egypt over the Canal presented to us without any opportunity of discussing its terms?
To get this matter in perspective, I think we might look a little more closely at what Mr. Morrison said, as Foreign Secretary, on this subject. If I may sty so with respect, I think that what he said is of the greatest credit to him. He tock a very good stand indeed—I say that in no patronising spirit, but merely as a statement of the opinion I hold. He went to the Foreign Office in 1951, when the position was regulated by Mr. Bevin's declaration of 1950 that:
"The British Government would rest on the 1936 Treaty until it was changed by mutual consent."
Now Mr. Bevin had said that he hoped to give the Egyptian Government final proposals for a settlement of the defence question which, he said, would provide for mutual respect and equality—you cannot go very much further than that—and guarantee the defence of the Middle East, and he hoped to present those proposals to the Egyptian Government within a short space of time. Most regrettably, Mr. Bevin's health broke down and there was a change of Ministers. As a result of this change Mr. Morrison got into the saddle, and these proposals were not presented until April, 1951.
The proposals embodied these things: first, to start a withdrawal of our troops within a year of signing an Agreement—, that, to my mind, is a great advance upon agreeing to withdrawing our troops before, discussing an Agreement—and to complete the withdrawal by 1956. The Canal
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Zone was to be controlled by an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board. The words used were, "in accordance with British military policy" and with British civilians performing essential duties. The readmission of British troops to the Zone, with all the necessary facilities, was to take place—,these were the words:
"In the event of war, of imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency."
These proposals were based on the principle that we could, not agree to any arrangement prejudicial to our ability to contribute to a successful defence of this region against an aggressor, which would be possible only if tie Base were kept immediately available in war. That, surely, is not standing for a purely British interest; it is standing out for something of vital concern to the free world.
These reasonable and, in fact, generous proposals were rejected by the Egyptian Government in toto and in detail. Upon that happening, Mr. Morrison defined British policy in Egypt to the House of Commons in what I think were very fine words indeed. He said that the presence of British troops was no longer only an Anglo-Egyptian affair; we had responsibilities on behalf of the Commonwealth and the Western Allies—and indeed, that is true. Our position in Egypt is not an affair of "John Bullism"; it is an affair of geography. Napoleon went to Egypt long before the Canal was dug. Why was the Battle of the Nile fought? It is geography which determines the importance of Egypt in these matters.
As Mr. Morrison pointed out, Egypt is a bridge between two continents, and a vital link in sea communications between the Eastern and the Western hemispheres. Remember also that Egypt is an inevitable objective for an aggressor in the Eastern Mediterranean or in the Levant. Mr. Morrison said in his speech:
"She can no more stand alone in the defence of her territory than we can in the defence of our country."
He said that he wanted:
"Egypt's partnership as an equal in a common effort to make the world safe."
The reply of the Egyptian Government was a threat to abrogate the 1936 Treaty. New proposals on the lines indicated by his speech were presented, offering Egypt participation as art equal in a Middle East

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Command. Five days before those proposals were presented, and although the Egyptian Government had been warned that they were on their way, Nahas Pasha tabled the unilaterial abrogation of the 1936 Treaty. At that time there was a General Election here, but in spite of such outrageous behaviour, offending every canon of diplomatic procedure, the new Conservative Government said that they were still willing to negotiate. They could hardly have bent backwards further—not that I for one moment criticise them for doing so. I think that fact does show the spirit in which we have approached this matter. Let us bear in mind that we are not endeavouring to defend, or defending, selfish British interests in Egypt alone. It is an international interest. The International Convention at Constantinople in 1886—
LORD HANKEY: 1888.
LORD WINSTER: I am sorry; I am adrift by two years. I thank the noble Lord for the correction. The International Convention guaranteed freedom of passage for all nations at all times, in peace and war. That guarantee may be to some extent intertwined with our strategic affairs and I do not say for one moment it is not. I say it is the predominant interest, and our Governments have shown it so. The international side of the matter was emphasised by the Prime Minister in his speech of May 11, this year. He said:
"The duty…has fallen on us, and us alone, of safeguarding the interests of free nations in the Middle East and also preserving the international waterway of the Suez canal."
Indeed, we have done that. During the riots of 1952 and the bestial violence which accompanied them, only the British Navy kept the international traffic through the Canal going. Throughout its history the Canal has in fact been kept open thanks to the presence of British forces. Even apart from that, experts have agreed that the Egyptians alone could not operate the Canal.
I hope I have not quoted at too great length, but I think the facts I have quoted are essential to an understanding of the situation. They are all, I believe, completely fundamental to the point. At this time, however, all who are concerned
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with British responsibilities and our interests in the Canal Zone are living in a state of considerable anxiety. Since Neguib seized power, he has consistently demanded that every British officer should quit the Zone. All I have heard, to my dismay, has left me under the impression that evacuation has already been conceded in principle, and that the only points left at issue concern how many European technicians may remain: for how long; who shall control them, and whether they may wear uniform or dungarees and "sneakers."
May I ask the noble Marquess one question: have the Dominion Governments been consulted at all stages on this matter? If we are to withdraw from the Zone, I fear that, following our retreat from Abadan, the blow to our world prestige will be a very heavy one, and there will be no minimising it. The concession under which the Suez Canal Company operates the Canal expires in 1968; but if British forces are withdrawn, that Company will replace the British forces as a target for abuse. The campaign will at once start, an agitation for terminating the Company's concession. Neguib will then be in a position —if he is still in office—to levy toll on the world's trade. Abadan was bad enough, but it was, at any rate, mainly a British concern; the Canal concerns the world. I have no doubt that to get British forces withdrawn Egypt will promise anything; but history does not show that Egyptians have any great respect for Agreements which have ceased to be convenient to them.
Neguib has not been asked to do anything derogatory to Egypt's dignity. On the contrary, he has been invited to assume joint responsibilities which would give Egypt a world status to which, perhaps, her past history, and especially her past military history, do not entitle her. It is a very brittle and difficult situation, but do not think we have much to fear, provided that we are firm and at the same time, as we always have been, perfectly reasonable. I do not think that Neguib's position is very strong. He reminds me of the story of the little dejected-looking man who was seen following up an unruly mob during the French Revolution. A friend said to him, "Whatever are you doing in this?

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Why are you here?" He answered," I must be; you see, I am their leader, "I feel at times that Neguib's position gets more and more like that.
But although, as I have said, I view these events with some dismay, I do not view them entirely without hope, since I saw some words which were used by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury—whose absence through illness to-day we all greatly regret. In speaking to the Conservative Party at the recent Conservative Conference at Margate, after warning his hearers that he could not say very much on the subject, to my great surprise he went on to make what I regarded as some extremely significant remarks. He defended the retention of the 70,000 troops in Egypt on the ground that (I am quoting from the report in the Daily Telegraph, which is usually so accurate in these matters, but if there a slip I apologise in advance to the noble Marquess):
"…in the view of our military advisers, that was the minimum with which we could maintain our position if faced by an unfriendly Egypt. This problem is different from Abadan."
Lord Salisbury went on:
"…there was a point beyond which we could not go. If the Egyptian Government cannot come so far to meet us we should have to face the necessity of a permanent continuation of the present position."
Those words seem to me to be quite inconsistent with any idea of evacuation of our forces from the Canal. I have always noticed that the noble Marquess, though he speaks firmly and strongly, never stretches his arm out any further than he has authority to do. On this occasion, moreover, his words were specifically endorsed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden. If I were called upon to give advice to the Government I should say, "Go back to Mr. Bevin: you are not going to come out of the Zone leaving a vacuum behind." In that connection, I would bear in mind the words of the Prime Minister, that:
"Once out, you will not be able to get hack, whatever the crisis."
I would go back to Mr. Morrison and his very generous remarks and proposals. I would reaffirm those, and I would stand by what Lord Salisbury said when he was speaking at Margate.
5.28 p.m.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, it is with considerable qualms that I rise to address you for the first time. I do so in the hope that the indulgence to newcomers for which your Lordships' House is well known will be extended to me in full measure, for I shall surely need it. I thought it appropriate that the first occasion on which I rose to address your Lordships should concern Egypt. We have had little information on the purposes or the progress of the negotiations which are taking place in Cairo. Therefore it may be hoped that it is not too late for the considered opinion of this House to be taken into account before the negotiations reach their final stage. In newspaper articles which have been published in this country—and there is little else to guide us—various suggestions have been made as to what terms will be acceptable to both sides. Which of these suggestions are most likely to be correct, if any, I should not care to guess; but in most of these articles it seems to be assumed that British troops will be withdrawn from the Canal Zone. This impression may be due to the reticence of those responsible here who, by their silence, have allowed inspired leakages of information in Cairo to take more than their fair share of publicity. This would not be the first time that such an occurrence has taken place in the long history of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.
I would remind your Lordships that British intervention in Egypt, both civil and military, was most reluctantly entered upon. It was only on the insistent request of the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government appointed a Commissioner to the Egyptian Commission of Public Debt in 1877, from which grew British intervention in Egyptian civil administration. Again, it was only when Egypt was in an almost complete state of anarchy after the mutiny of the Egyptian Army—and not the first mutiny at that—that British troops were landed in support of the Khedive and defeated the mutineers.
During the period of British occupation of Egypt, from 1882 until the end of the First World War, Western ideas of Government and administration were gradually introduced and superimposed upon what was a backward Middle East country. Until this time it should be remembered that all the positions of

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authority in Egypt were occupied by other than Egyptians—for the most part, by Turks. It was, therefore, necessary not only to introduce a new system of administration and government but also to educate and train sufficient Egyptians to make the system work. It is one thing to transplant Western ideas and systems which suit the Western mind and temperament to a Middle Eastern country and to install sufficient European officials to make them work according to the Western idea of how they should work; it is quite another thing to educate and train sufficient of the indigenous people of the country for them even to want to put Western ideas into practice, let alone to instil in them the ability to make them work.
Gresham's Law certainly applies in political thought. Debased popular ideas will always tend to supplant the sounder but less popular principles, and this is particularly so in a case where the educational standard is very low. There is, after all, a constant conflict of this nature in the highly civilised democracies of the West, in spite of the firm foundations on which the political edifices of the West are built. Where a large superstructure is erected on shallow foundations in sand, when the scaffolding is removed the building will start to slip before it eventually tumbles. In Egypt, the complaint is made that the scaffolding was not removed quickly enough and that, in any event, the contractors have left some of their equipment in the garden. Of course, this argument is not based on facts. It was, as has been mentioned this afternoon, Great Britain that freed Egypt from Turkish suzerainty, and it was after the Egyptians had failed to agree to the proposals of the Milner Mission who, by unilateral declaration, declared Egypt an independent sovereign State.
In spite of British recognition and appreciation of Egyptian aspirations for complete freedom, it took from 1919 to 1936 to negotiate a mutually acceptable Treaty and this probably would not have been possible, even then, had it not been for Egyptian fears of Mussolini's intentions in North Africa. Had British influence been withdrawn in 1919, as Egyptian extremists wanted, it is not improbable that the Egyptian question, in more or less the same form as it was known in the
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latter half of the last century, would have been recreated. If nothing else was learned during the years between 1919 and 1936, the one lesson which stands out is that it is quite impossible to come in haste to any satisfactory arrangement with the Egyptians. The Treaty that was signed in 1936 was, as your Lordships are aware, signed by the leaders of the Government and by the leaders of all the chief political parties in Egypt, and was ratified by a freely elected Egyptian Parliament with an overwhelming majority. In spite of this, the 1936 Treaty was unilaterally denounced. Today, there appears to be a suggestion that British troops should be withdrawn with the right of re-entry in certain circumstances. In view of the renunciation of the 1936 Treaty which, I should remind your Lordships, had wide popular support in Egypt—to such an extent, in fact, that on the news being announced of its signature, British troops were cheered in the streets by the Egyptian populace—surely it is not possible to rely on any arrangements which may now be made with a revolutionary Government contingent upon the most indefinite circumstances.
The terms of the Treaty of 1936 are well known to your Lordships, but I am surprised that the point has not been brought out so far that the Treaty does not expire in 1956: it is perfectly specific in the Treaty that it conies up for review, and there is a large body of opinion in this country which does not seem to be aware of that fact. In Article 8 of the Treaty, although the Suez Canal is described as an integral part of Egypt, it is also described as a universal means of communication and as an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire. I should like to remind the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that, although he may not consider India and Pakistan as part of the Commonwealth to-day, our friends in Australia and New Zealand are not to be disregarded. Until such time as both parties agree that the Egyptian Army can, by its own resources, defend the Canal against an aggressor, then, as we know, British troops have a perfect right to be in the Zone. Surely, it cannot be said that the Egyptian Army is to-day fitted to defend the Canal against the only major Power who might wish to attack it.

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It is fashionable to-day to say that, in this age of air transport, the sea communications of the Suez Canal are not of the same importance as in years gone by. To a limited degree that argument certainly may be true, but the noble Lords, Lord Rennell and Lord Hankey, have both produced figures which portray very graphically the enormous importance of the Canal in communications to-day. In this connection, it should not be forgotten that the Canal was built by French inspiration and for the most part with French money, in the face of considerable opposition from Her Majesty's Government of the day; and when Great Britain decided to intervene in Egypt, she assumed responsibility for safeguarding the Canal. To make any agreement with Egypt affecting the Canal without prior consultation with the French Government would be highly irresponsible.
In 1936, it was considered that 10,000 troops and 400 pilots, together with an appropriate number of ancillary personnel, were adequate to safeguard the Canal against aggression. To-day, it is reported that there are between 70,000 and 80,000 British troops in the Canal Zone. I think it is agreed by everybody that it is impossible that such numbers of troops can be maintained there indefinitely. But surely this should not be necessary. British troops are not in the Canal Zone in time of peace to defend the Canal against attack by the Egyptians. We want the Egyptians as our partners in the defence of the Canal against an aggressor. In fact, far from wishing to violate Egyptian sovereignty, we want Egypt to play more fully her part in international affairs which, after all, was always the ultimate aim of British influence in Egypt. Egypt's refusal to accept the 1951 proposals was, I consider, an indication of her political immaturity, and showed that as a nation she had not yet learned the lessons which the Pashas, as individuals, had most unwillingly had to learn: that privilege carries with it responsibility. The leaning towards neutrality which is reported in The Times to-day is another indication of complete unreality.
In view of the international character of the Canal, it is of course, logical that the responsibility for the defence of the Canal should be placed on an international basis under which Egypt, as
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would be her ambition, would play a full part. Until Egypt comes into an international organisation such as N.A.T.O. or a Middle East Defence Organisation, I am of the opinion that Her Majesty's Government would be failing in its responsibility if the British troops were withdrawn from the Canal Zone. British troops are in the Canal Zone as of right, and we should be failing in our duty if we threw over our responsibility for the empty satisfaction of being able to say that we had reached an agreement with Egypt.
5.42 p.m.
VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I deem it a very special pleasure to be allowed, I am sure on behalf of the Whole House, to congratulate the noble Earl on the thoughtful maiden speech which he has just delivered. He bears an honoured name, and when we think of the past connections of our country with Egypt we have reason to be proud of the list of names of men of our own race and stock who rendered immense public service to Egypt. Baring and Boyle, Wingate and Allenby, Lloyd, Russell Pasha, and Lampson— there is a list of names of men who outside our Island have contributed all that they could towards the progress of the Egyptian people. I am particularly glad that the noble Earl made the reference which he did to the Treaty of 1936. It was signed not only by the leaders of every Egyptian Party, but also by a long list of British names, in order to show that it was an Agreement reached with the full assent of representatives on both sides. I entirely confirm his account of the effect of the Treaty. I signed it, at Mr. Eden's request—and I never signed a document of which I was more sure that I understood its meaning and effect.
I rise, not for the purpose of joining in this general debate, but merely to raise two points, to each of which I hope the noble Marquess who speaks for the Foreign Office may make some reply. The first point is this. I read in the public Press that our Ambassador to Egypt is just returning there, and it is indicated that he is likely to take up again the discussions in which he was previously engaged, and carry on a certain negotiation. The topic of negotiation is said to be the settling of certain preliminary points, and in some quarters this is sharply distinguished from negotiating

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the Treaty itself. I want to put this question, and I hope the noble Marquess will be good enough to consider what answer he can give: what is the purpose of negotiating what are called "preliminary points," in order, I presume, to reach agreement, unless these points, when agreed, are to enter into the Treaty itself? Take, for example, the discussion as to whether there should be 4,000 technical people left in Egypt, and whether they should wear uniforms. That, I believe, is regarded as one of the preliminary points. Supposing that the discussion on this preliminary point is carried forward and agreement is reached, is not the inevitable effect that the decision on that point becomes part of the Treaty itself? Therefore, I get no comfort from being told that the Ambassador is not at present engaged on behalf of the British Government in negotiating the Treaty but only in adjusting certain preliminary points, because I cannot see how that preliminary discussion and negotiation is related to the Treaty which it is said at present is not being negotiated at all. If my noble friend the Marquess of Reading can explain this to me and satisfy me, I shall be grateful.
The other observation I venture to make is of a very general character. I would venture to put to the noble Marquess this question: is not the real lesson of the history of diplomacy in the last fifty or sixty years that, whereas in the old days when a State entered into a Treaty the obligations of it were regarded as being like commercial obligations, which bound the parties, a great change has now come over the scene? I recall having read that in 1872 there was an award in an arbitration between this country and the United States of America, which was called the Alabama Arbitration. The award was against this country, and was for the payment of over three millions of money. Mr. Gladstone in that day insisted that we must pay, and the reason we must pay was because this country had entered into a bargain with the United States and we were bound to stand by our bargain.
If I go back in my own memory to the first days of the first German War, I recall that vast numbers of citizens in this country supported the Government in their determination to go to war. Why?
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Because they felt that this country was a signatory to a Treaty, and they were not prepared to repudiate a "scrap of paper." That was the old tradition, and I think upon the whole it was well observed by the practice of our country. In international affairs the proposition was truly asserted. The international law used to teach (I dare say it is in the books now) that a Treaty bound, because pacta sunt servanda—promises are to be kept. And the practice in the old days complied with the Biblical declaration about:
"He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and disappointeth him not:
Though it were to his own hindrance."
That was the ancient view of contracts made between State and State. Does not the noble Marquess think that in this last half century the sense of obligation has been frittered away? It may well be that the originator of this new view was Hitler himself. If Hitler made a pact of nonaggression with his neighbour, it was always the kiss of death, for he regarded the making of Treaties as a mere matter of policy.
Lord Winster referred just now to Abadan. I had responsibilities in negotiating the Treaty with Persia which was broken by the Persian Government. That Treaty contained a clause which bound the Persian Government, by its own signature, neither by its Parliament nor by its Executive to seek to nationalise the oil installation. That Treaty was ratified by the Persian Legislature. It was shamefully disregarded later on when it suited Persia. It appears to me that, unhappily, we have reached a position where the fact that something is promised in a Treaty is no sort of guarantee that the promise will be carried out. This observation of mine has a bearing on this question, because, I understand, we are invited to accept proposals for the withdrawal of British troops because the Treaty we are going to sign with Egypt will contain a promise that we are to be allowed to go back. I am afraid I regard such a promise in such a Treaty, whatever Government makes it, as open to some question. I referred just now to the "Alabama" case and how we paid the money. There was a subsequent arbitration with Albania, in which we claimed that they had no right to strew mines in the Corfu Channel and blow up our destroyers, and the award was in our favour. Has Albania paid?
A NOBLE LORD: No.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I therefore feel that it is dangerous to build upon promises which are so easily disregarded. The present Prime Minister, I believe, has pointed out, in this very case of Egypt—I think the noble Lord, Lord Hankey quoted it—that Egypt would be in the greatest difficulty in fulfilling such a promise. Suppose some major Power, at the time, was threatening war, and suppose that Egypt was willing to keep her promise and let us go back: what would happen if the major Power informed Egypt that they would regard the readmission of British troops as an unfriendly act? Those are the considerations which make me anxious as to what is now going to happen. I put the greatest confidence in the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, and their colleagues. But the value of debate in your Lordships' House is that, when we are filled with a reasonable anxiety, we should state the reasons for that anxiety, plainly and firmly and courteously. Those are the reasons why I am anxious about this situation, and why I am glad that my noble friend, Lord Rennell, should have raised this debate to-day.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Before the noble and learned Viscount sits down, since he has emphasised—and we agree with him—the importance of the plighted word, would he make any observation on the fact that we plighted our word to restrict our troops to 10,000 and we are now occupying Egypt with 80,000?
VISCOUNT SIMON: I do not want to discuss that, but I think that the plain meaning of the Treaty of 1936 is that we are not required to leave the situation there when the Treaty itself expires, but that a new Treaty should be negotiated; and the number of troops now there, I presume, are there because it is felt that to discharge our other obligations under the Treaty such a force is needed. I do not offer an opinion on a military question, but I hope it is the case, and I believe it is the case, that my country is observing its Treaty obligations as I wish other people would observe theirs.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: May I draw the noble and learned Viscount's attention to the Treaty? It states quite plainly that the force which the King Emperor can maintain in the vicinity of the Canal
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shall not exceed a land force of 10,000 men. The noble and learned Viscount speaks about keeping our word; why do we not keep our word in this matter?
LORD KILLEARN: May I perhaps intervene upon that point? Is no regard to be paid to the attacks on British subjects and property in Cairo? Such attacks undoubtedly must call for reinforcement of our Forces. Surely, whatever the limitation in the Treaty, there is full justification for reinforcement of our Forces when there has been deliberate attack on the life and property of British subjects.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: What the noble Lord is saying that the situation is such that we should invade Egypt independently of the Treaty, in order to protect our nationals.
LORD KILLEARN: I am saying "reinforce" not "re-invade."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Reinforce in defiance of Article 8?
5.59 p.m.
LORD VANSITTART: Like the noble and learned Viscount who has just sat down, I intervene in this debate because my anxiety exceeds my reluctance but in view of the thoroughness with which the ground has been covered already. I shall be extremely brief. I wish to confine my remarks to one point, which carries rather further something which the noble and learned Viscount has said. One essential point is that this proposed new Treaty should be considered in direct conjunction with the Sudan Treaty. In the Sudan Treaty we went far to mollify the irreconcilables. I fear, quite frankly, that we may have compromised the progress achieved in over fifty years by the finest and most selfless body of men in the world—the Sudan Civil Service. I fear that we may have let down the Southern Sudanese, because these primitive tribes know very well that they are not fitted to hold their own with the scheming politicians of the North, and they would have liked us to stay on for quite a considerable time, at least for ten years afterwards. I am afraid, also, that the Sudanisation of the whole administration in three years may prove to be a chimera, because the men are not there, and no miracle can make them.
Anyhow, those concessions were made, and what was the result? The Egyptians

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flouted and violated that Treaty at every turn. The Foreign Secretary himself has given some particulars. Her Majesty's Government have protested, I think twice, but certainly once, without the least effect, because the tricksters had never the faintest intention of keeping their word. We have had one lesson. Are we going to court another with our eyes open? Doubtless we thought that acquiescence in the Sudan would bring sweet reason in Suez. But it has brought nothing of the kind. It has brought a snarling Anglophobia which goes so fat as to hang and imprison for life those who have served their turn to us. I see from this morning's newspapers that "the Dancing Major" has even made violent anti-British propaganda out of our attempt to help his sick son. The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, alluded to what I might call the "Jelly boys." Until quite recently I thought that they were the sort of safe-blowers whom the Lord Chief Justice condemned to thirty-nine years in jail; but the Jelly Boys occupy a much superior social position in Egypt. The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, mentioned that an ex-Minister had pleaded as a virtue that he had been concerned in endeavouring to blow up a British ship, in order to block the Canal, but he omitted a significant feature, which was that when the ex-Minister had said that, the presiding judged bobbed up and said, "Look here, you are not going to get away with that. The real ' Jelly Boys ' are me and my mates in the present Administration; and don't you forget it." I think your Lordships might also be unwise to forget it.
In the face of all that—and this is my chief apprehension—we are being asked to trust again. I cannot recollect offhand any parallel situation in diplomatic history. I have known heaps of broken Agreements—in fact, in dealing with totalitarians, I have never known anything else; and this is a totalitarian régime in Egypt: there is no doubt of that. What I have never seen before is a dupe doing what we have been doing over the Sudan Agreement, asking, in the full process of dupery, in mid-market and at midday, to be deceived again. I should like to refer to what the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, said in relation to Hitler, and in that connection may I recall a phrase that I used over
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and over again in the thirties?—that those who ask to be deceived must not grumble if they are gratified. That, I fear, may prove to be our experience. I have never believed in concluding Treaties when we know in advance that they are going to be broken. These are not Treaties they are traps. Therefore I feel that there is a great deal of force in what the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, said, when he suggested that the negotiations might at least be deferred until there is a little better evidence of good faith and good will. I do not intend to detain your Lordships longer, because you have already heard so much wisdom of others; but I think that point is at least worth bearing in mind.
6.4 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, the hour is getting late. I think your Lordships will agree that it has proved very desirable to have this debate on Egypt, rather than submerge the issue in a general debate on foreign affairs, as was originally suggested. Apart from anything else, it means that we cannot be told later on that we were slow in putting forward our point of view and our objections. For as we know, our Ambassador is on his way to his post, and Parliament does not meet again until January 19, so I am sure your Lordships will agree that it is a good thing that we have this opportunity of making, our views clear before we depart for the Christmas holiday. I spoke on Egypt in the foreign affairs debate on April 23 last. I still adhere to what I said then—that is, in paraphrase, that a friendly Agreement with Egypt is highly desirable, but not at the cost of sacrificing anything which is vital to us; nor should it be at the dictation of the other party. From what we have seen in the newspapers (and they are our source of information—almost entirely from the Cairo end, may I say) it is not negotiation but dictation which we are experiencing.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (VISCOUNT SWINTON): What is?
LORD KILLEARN: The terms which apparently, according to the Press, we are engaged in discussing. The reason I cannot put them specifically is that we at this end have not been told what they are.

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There are three main points in connection with this question of Egypt with which I should like to deal. The first is that there is astonishing ignorance about the date of the termination of the Treaty. It is astonishing how few people realise that the Treaty does not automatically lapse on December 22, 1956. It does nothing of the kind. It is true that it has been denounced, but we have denounced the denunciation, so to speak—we have said that we disregard it; we do not admit it. The terms of the Treaty are perfectly clear. No doubt your Lordships have them in mind. I have a copy of the Treaty here, but I do not propose to inflict the whole of it on your Lordships. I will put its contents shortly. The first Articles establish the alliance. Article 8 establishes the conditions under which our troops are in Egyt without the infringement of Egyptian sovereignty. The Annex to Article 8 lays down how many troops we can have there: 10,000 land forces and 400 pilots; together with the necessary ancillary personnel and apart from civilian personnel—clerks and so forth.
Article 16 prescribes how the Treaty is to come up for revision after twenty years by mutual consent and the way in which it is to be revised. I would call your Lordships' attention to the all-important proviso to that Article, which says:
"It is agreed that any revision of this treaty will provide for the continuance of the Alliance between the High Contracting Parties. …"
So far from the life-span of the Treaty coming to an end automatically in 1956, the actual text provides for the continuance of the Alliance in some form or another at the end of the twenty years. I know well that the Treaty is not necessarily the final word: but at the same time I think it is very unfortunate that the general public have not the foggiest idea of when this Treaty does or does not expire and, entirely misunderstanding the situation, are firmly convinced that it naturally and automatically expires in 1956. It does not. I am sure that is correct, though I am not a lawyer; I think that will be borne out by other and better authority.
Bearing on this point, I have been looking up my papers, and I would remind your Lordships that in 1947 Egypt
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took the Treaty to U.N.O., in the hope of having it modified, or abolished. We were represented by Sir Alexander Cadogan. I should like to quote from this small volume I have here, which I commend to your Lordships. It is Information Paper No. 19 published by Chatham House, entitled "Great Britain and Egypt 1914–51." From page 102 I take this summary of what Sir Alexander Cadogan said before the Council. He pointed out
"that the 1936 Treaty could legally be revised before its expiry in 1956 only by the consent of both parties. The Egyptian argument that the removal of the Axis threat to peace had altered the circumstances of the Treaty was an invocation of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine which would find no support in any international tribunal.
"As for the assertion that the presence of British troops in Egypt was contrary to the United Nations Charter, the wording of the resolution of 14 December, 1946, which Egypt had invoked had made an exception for the presence of armed forces by consent 'freely and publicly expressed in Treaties…consistent with the Charter.' He"—
that is, Sir Alexander Cadogan—
"demonstrated by a series of quotations that the Treaty had in 1936 been almost unanimously welcomed in Egypt; and the rule pacta sunt servanda"—
to which the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, has just referred—
"was a primary principle of international law."
Then, later, Sir Alexander Cadogan spoke as follows—this is the official report from U.N.O., are it is worth quoting, as it is of some interest. He said:
"Nokrashy Pasha replies that the Security Council must not be ' stymied by the legal rights of the parties.' it "—
that is the Council—
"must put aside Treaty rights whenever the party to a given Treaty says that it dislikes its obligations enough to be ready to allow its people to create a menace to the peace rather than accept them. Egyptian politicians have been stirring up feeling against the Treaty with the deliberate intention of gaining their wishes. It is they who are creating the threat to the peace if there is any."
Those remarks apply with full force now. As your Lordships will remember, the Egyptian appeal to U.N.O. in 1947 was talked out, so I need not refer further to that matter.
I feel that I have adequately covered the Treaty position, and I will get on to my next point, which is the question of the reliability of the other side—what I

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might call their credentials or reliability. The example of bad faith (there is no other term for it) over the Sudan has already been brought up by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart; in any case, it has been fully covered before Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I am going to put to your Lordships what, so far as I know, is a new point in connection with the 1936 Treaty itself. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, and I were both signatories to that particular document, as also was the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, who is not present to-day. I make bold to say that no one who signed, negotiated, or had anything to do with that Treaty had any other idea in mind but that, in the event of war, each country should come to the assistance of the other as a co-belligerent. There was no doubt about that.
First of all, with whom was that Treaty signed? As the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, has said, it was signed with a properly constituted, properly elected and fully representative Egyptian Government. It was countersigned, if I may so put it, by the heads of every Egyptian political Party. Yet what happens? War looms up. The Egyptian Prime Minister is kept fully informed of developments, of threatening danger, as, of course, he should be. Then the time comes when war is on us. What happens?—I speak here with personal experience, because it was I who had to do the job. The Egyptian Prime Minister comes along, and what does he say? He says, "Well, yes, but there are certain points we should like clarified"—Home goes a telegram: "They are making these difficulties. Can I meet them? The answer is," Yes, certainly. "The telegram comes in very late at night, as I remember well. It was at Alexandria. I walk down the long hotel corridor to the room at the end where the Prime Minister is. I say to him: "Excellency, I have brought you the assurances you want." He says: "Well, I have just had a telegram from London." When I express some surprise, he says: "I have just had a telegram from London describing a conversation between the Egyptian Ambassador and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
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in which the Egyptian Ambassador elaborated the advantages which would lie in the neutrality of Egypt, as thereby Egypt would be able to serve as a bridge between you and the Americans." I was considerably taken aback, but I said: "Anyhow, that does not really affect the matter: I have brought you your assurance." To "cut the cackle" (if I may use a vulgar term), the Egyptian Government were abdurate, and Egypt did not come in as a co-belligerent. That is historical.
The point of the incident I have put before your Lordships is this. We are now dealing with somebody who has no constitutional authority, so far as I know; whose régime, so far as we can judge, has gone back, within six months, or less, on an Agreement which they signed. Yet Her 'Majesty's Government, apparently, are going to sign with them something which seriously modifies our existing Treaty rights. Even with a properly constituted Egyptian Government, look what happened. In such conditions are we wise in going ahead and dealing with the present regime? The facts I have given to your Lordships are quite accurate, and are on the official file. My point is that even a fully constituted, properly elected Egyptian Government, backed by all the political Parties, still goes hack on its word. That is irrefutable, and it is not a good augury. Of course, on the question of the actual position, all we have is from the newspapers. On the other hand, it seems generally agreed that there are three particular points at issue at the moment. One is the right of re-entry—I believe a horrible word "reactivation" has been used. That has been dealt with earlier in this debate, and, in the words of the Prime Minister, already quoted by Lord Hankey, I should think fully disposed of. I believe there is jibbing over whether war involving Turkey should be adequate or not. Then there is the question of the duration. I am told it would be for seven years, but I do not know whether that is right or wrong. Lastly, there are the 4,000 technicians who apparently are not to be uniformed and not to be fully armed.
I do not want to abuse the patience of your Lordships, but you will remember that our policy was outlined as long ago

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as 1924 in that well-known dispatch—might I perhaps quote it to you?—from Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, writing as Foreign Secretary to the High Commissioner in Cairo. He said:
"It is no less true to-day than in 1922 that the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt remain a vital British interest and that absolute certainty that the Suez Canal will remain open in peace as well as in war for the free passage of British ships is the foundation on which the entire defensive strategy of the British Empire rests. The 1888 Convention for the free navigation of the Canal was an instrument devised to secure that object. Its ineffectiveness for this purpose was demonstrated in 1914 when Great Britain herself had to take steps to ensure that the Canal would remain open."
Then comes a phrase already quoted:
"No British Government, in the light of that experience, can divest itself wholly of its interest in guarding such a vital link in British communications. Such security must be a feature of any agreement come to between cur two Governments, and I see no reason why accommodation is impossible given good will."
Contrast that with the terms we are commonly reported to be now considering.
I devoutly trust that Her Majesty's Government will not commit themselves to the proposal to leave 4,000 unarmed or semi-armed technicians. I have just had a letter from a British resident of long experience and knowledge, and I cannot refrain from reading an extract because it does bear on this question. He said:
"Whatever the terms of any Treaty with Egypt, and if and when any Egyptian Agreement is reached, unless we are physically present (i.e., troops) there is virtually no prospect of the terms being carried out. The fact that an attack on Turkey is not acceptable as a case for re-occupation shows how utterly unrealistic they are. To hope that 4,000 technicians will be allowed to maintain the Bas, to our satisfaction is an absurdity. I need not describe to you"—
he knows that I know—
"the procedure and methods likely to be adopted by the Egyptians to make the situation impossible. You will probably agree that in a very short time the 4,000 would find themselves unable to cope and we should have to withdraw them—possibly even rescue, them—no doubt after we had perforce delayed action long enough for the Base greatly to deteriorate. It would then be a matter for abandoning the Base or rescuing it."
I saw another eminent member of the British community in Egypt the other day, and he said the same thing. It is not encouraging.
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Your Lordships may well say: "It is all very well to get up and talk like this, but what course would you suggest?" That is a very natural question. I personally still hanker for the proposal to set up in all good faith a Middle East Command under N.A.T.O. It was a thousand pities that Nahas Pasha so summarily threw that down and trampled on it. I should still have had hopes that we might have got something of that kind, something which would save Egypt's face and if you like, save our face, and establish what we want in the way of adequate security. It may be that we have gone too far. But that would be a way out. Short of that, I should be tempted to announce that we were going to get back gradually to strict Treaty limits as regards numbers, and that if, in the meantime, there, were attacks—well, as the Prime Minister said in another place the other day, if the troops are attacked they know how to hit back. That is how I feel about it.
Let me conclude. There are times for nations as well as individuals to take vital decisions, when it is a question of deciding between the natural instinct to prefer a quiet life and a resolve to stand on your rights and take the consequences, believe this to be one of those occasions, for in my view what is at stake is not only our whole position in the Middle East but our position in Africa and our position in the whole world.
6.28 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, this has been a most interesting and, indeed, remarkable debate—remarkable by reason of the fact that we have had two of the best maiden speeches I have ever heard. No one listening to the orators would have had the least idea that they were not accustomed to debates in our House, although I think it was Disraeli who said that persons who succeeded in one House nearly always failed in the other. I am happy to think that we shall hear both these noble Lords on many occasions dealing with matters such as this hi the charming way they did.
I do not intend to keep your Lordships for more than a moment or two, but I thought it might be useful if I stated—although my noble friend Lord Stansgate has already stated quite plainly—what is the position of the Party with which I

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am associated. I propose presently to initiate a few propositions in order to find out whether there is any difference between the view which the Government are taking and the view which we are taking. At the present moment I do not think there is. Much has been said about the dreadful conditions of to-day. Of course, it is a most deplorable thing that, instead of this strict observance of the principle pacta sunt servanda, it is only too common to find that they are not observed. That is a most deplorable feature of modern life. It happened occasionally in ancient times, too. That being so I ask: So what? Are you then going to say, "Treaties are no good; do not let us bother about Treaties any more. Let us bestride the world like a Colossus and then we shall be all right." But the trouble is that to bestride the world like a Colossus takes a great deal of money and a great many soldiers. To my mind, we have got to be realistic about this matter, and the prime merit that I found in the maiden speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, was that he was being completely realistic.
What, then, are we to do? Are we to base ourselves in Egypt on a situation which we have arrived at by agreement with the Egyptians, or are we to base ourselves on a situation arrived at by force, whether they like it or not? Do be realistic and consider which it is to be. I find it a little difficult myself. It is not possible to place reliance on the Treaty, because the Treaty said quite plainly that the number of people we may station there was not to be above 10,000, and we have got about 80,000, because, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said at Margate, it was found that that number was necessary to maintain ourselves safely there. It is a little difficult to rely upon a Treaty which says that the number must not be over 10,000 when you have got 80,000 there.
I find it difficult also to rely on the proposition that the Treaty does not come to an end. The provision in Article 16 is like an Agreement to make an Agreement in the future. Therefore, what is the position of Her Majesty's Government? I think it is this. It is a mere platitude to say that the peace and
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security of the Middle East is of the utmost importance to us, to the Commonwealth and to Western defence. That is obvious. I believe in trying to be a realist and I believe that that peace and that security can best be secured at present by friendship and co-operation between Britain and Egypt. That seems to me to involve that a Treaty, an Agreement, should be negotiated between the two Governments, taking care of certain points. The first point, I think, should be this: that the Base itself and the stores it contains should be satisfactorily maintained and carried on, though for this purpose it is not necessary to continue the presence of British armed Forces. Indeed, if we are realists, we must recognise that in present circumstances, the presence of these troops is a dangerously unsettling factor, causing feelings of resentment and hostility on the part of the Egyptian people. It may be deplorable that that should be so: I think it is deplorable; but if we are realists, we know that that is a fact. I think we shall probably find that Egypt is quite unwilling to extend the right for these troops to remain there.
What, then, must we do? We have to secure, so far as we can, that in case of war or imminent danger of war, we must have immediate and effective reactivation (that is the word, I suppose, one must use, though I know how horrible it is) of the Base secured. There must be a plain statement that the right of passage for all ships of all nations on their lawful occasions through the Suez Canal should be guaranteed. And, lastly, the Tripartite Agreement made in 1950 between the United States of America. France and the United Kingdom, the object of which was to secure the maintenance of peace between Israel and the Arab States, should be reaffirmed. But, as my noble friend, Lord Stansgate, has said, we must be careful to see that the balance of defence forces between Egypt and Israel is not disturbed so as to constitute a new threat to Israel, thereby endangering the whole peace of the Middle East. Believing, as I do, that those are the broad principles which Her Majesty's Government are going to try to secure, I have to tell them that if they go on these lines which I understand they are taking, they will have the support of Her Majesty's Opposition.
6.35 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, this debate on the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, has, I feel, been of considerable interest, and, I cannot help thinking also, of considerable enjoyment to a certain number of noble Lords to whom it has brought some degree of restoration to full health from the disabilities under which they have been suffering in the recent past. It has enabled them to get off their respective chests a weight of repressions and inhibitions, the departure of which I trust they will soon find greatly to their benefit. There have been two notable maiden speeches, as the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, said: one from a noble Lord whose title to speak for the first time on a Motion of this kind is best designated by the title which he himself bears; and the other from a noble Lord who has occupied a place, and has had great experience, in another place and who is now, obviously, going to bring to the debates in this House much valuable counsel and experience.
I am greatly obliged to the noble and learned Earl, for the speech which he has just delivered. I think there is little, if anything, between us on the main lines of the subject. The debate has at times ranged rather wide—and I think it was right and inevitable that it should. In my view, it would be wrong to look at the problem that we are discussing to-day, merely within the narrow limits of a discussion on Egypt itself, or within a limit which is perhaps less narrow, the context of the Middle East. It is a mush wider problem than that; it is part of the problem of our relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; it is part, indeed, of the world-wide pattern of our commitments and of our responsibilities. It is in that light, and not in the more parochial atmosphere with which it has been surrounded by some noble Lords, that I suggest we should look at and discuss this subject.
I think it is true to say that one of the main preoccupations of those concerned with foreign policy in these days is a preoccupation which may not have been equally present to Foreign Secretaries, and their assistants and coadjutors, in the more spacious and wealthy days of the past. To-day, one of the main problems of all foreign policy in this
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country is to match our resources and our responsibilities to the greatest advantage; and that test is one which we have endeavoured to apply in arriving at the lines which we are following, and propose to continue to follow, in regard to this particular subject. We have at the moment a considerable number of men under arms—larger, suppose, than any number we have ever had before in peace time. We have men in Malaya; we have men in Kenya; we have men in Korea. We have men in Germany and elsewhere overseas though not engaged in active operations. We have a considerable force in Egypt. There, we have 80,000 men. Is it not obvious that, both on economic and on strategic grounds, it would be to our advantage to reduce the numbers of those men and the consequent expense involved if—but only if—we can do so by means of an Agreement which meets our essential requirements?
I go back for a moment to the quotation from my right honourable friend the Prime Minister's memorable speech of May 11, in which he referred to this particular topic and said (OFFICAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 515, col. 886):
"Naturally, we do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000 men at a cost of, it might be, over £50 million a year discharging the duty which has largely fallen upon us, and us alone…"
He went on:
"If agreeable arrangements can be made to enable this latter service and also the solid maintenance of the strategic base to be discharged by agreement with Egypt, it would mean a great saving of our men and money."
So, obviously, it did; and although that was six or seven months ago, the situation has not materially changed. We should still wish for; an Agreement, provided still that we can get that Agreement on satisfactory terms. It is, I think, important that at this stage we should be quite clear, and your Lordships should understand, what it: is that we are at present endeavouring to do. My noble friend Lord Rennell who moved this Motion devoted a good deal of time—though not by any means an excessive amount—to an interesting study of the situation with regard to the Suez Canal, and also with regard to the question of the Nile Waters. We are not, in the discussions which we are having with Egypt at the moment, trying to revive the Suez Canal Convention. We are discussing the Suez Area base. We are

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attempting in those discussions to try to find out, by comings and goings and talks in the normal way, whether there is sufficient agreement between us on the fundamentals of the problem of our future relations to lead us to think that we can get a Treaty which would be satisfactory to us and equally satisfactory to the other side—because it is no good having a Treaty which is satisfactory to one side only. Those preliminary conversations, of course, are often—it is by no means unique—the most difficult part of the negotiations. Whether that proves to be the case in this particular instance, time may show.
My noble and learned friend Lard Simon found himself in some difficulty in understanding what was meant by the talk of "Heads of Agreement." It is not, I think, a matter of such difficulty to follow, because what we mean, and what we are trying to do, is, as I say, to start by seeing whether we can arrive at what I think is not unknown in similar circumstances in law as "Heads of Agreement": agreement on the main principles; and if we can get to that stage, then it will be necessary to fill up the inevitable gaps which have been left in dealing with those agreements alone, and to pursue the matter on different lines until, at some stage, it takes on, as we hope, the actual form of a Treaty. There is, I think, nothing sinister or very difficult to understand in the particular procedure which has been followed, a procedure which was followed, if my recollection is right, at the instance of the Egyptian Government, who said that they would prefer to conduct the negotiations on that basis, rather than have a more formal full-dress discussion in the early stages. That is what we have done and, with certain interruptions, we have been making progress.
There has been an hiatus now far some time, but the Ambassador is on the point of returning—I think, in fact, he has actually returned now—and we shall see whether it is possible to resume. The return of the Ambassador leads me to this slight digression. Two noble Lords have made some capital out of the fact that our recognition of the Egyptian Government is, so far, only de facto and not de jure. If it is any satisfaction to them —I am not sure that it will be —I may say that with the return of the Ambassador who will then present
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his credentials, that will constitute a de jure recognition. The Egyptian Ambassador here has already presented credentials, so that the mutual steps will then be complete.
The noble Lord who opened this discussion pleaded, although he realised the expense, in men, materials and money, of keeping a large force in Egypt, for what he called the maintenance of a police force. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, also made some reference to that idea. It is one which appeals to a certain number of people, but if it means keeping the present number of people for the Base as it stands, and if the Base as it stands is not considered as usable, or likely to remain usable, with a smaller number, then I cannot understand what part in the defence of that area a police force—which must anyhow be a skeleton force, compared with the forces that we have now—can play.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I did not make that suggestion.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I did not suggest that the noble Viscount did. I said that he made some reference to what my noble friend Lord Rennell had said in his opening speech. These negotiations on the basic position have, as I said, been going forward. I do not propose to-day, although reference has been made to them on a somewhat speculative basis by a certain number of noble Lords who have spoken, to enter into any of the details of the terms which are being discussed. I think that at this stage of the negotiations it would be unwise and improper so to do. That does not mean that I have any fears of revealing anything that is being discussed. It simply means that, when you are negotiating, it is an act of folly to disclose everything that is being talked about, because you bring all sorts of outside complications in and make the whole matter more difficult.
I confess, having listened to a number of noble Lords' speeches during this debate, that I was rather surprised at the sort of suggestion which came up time after time: that in some way, if we entered into these negotiations, we should be weakening British prestige in that part of the world. I should have thought, and I should have imagined that noble Lords would have taken the same view, that British prestige was reasonably safe in the hands of the present Prime Minister, the

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Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence; and I confess that with me that argument carries very little weight indeed. The Base is a very large organisation and it would be a mistake, if we needed it again in time of war, to wait until that war arrived before we did our best to make some arrangement to take it ever again. That has been the basis upon which we have been proceeding with these negotiations. We must know in advance what the position will be if a moment comes when the Base has to go through that ugly-sounding process of being reactivated in time of war.
A number of your Lordships have taken up points with which I will try to deal very briefly in passing. The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, was disturbed because no offer was made to the Sudanese of some new form of condominium which, as I understand, should be an Egyptian-British-Sudanese combined condominium. One reason why no such suggestion was made was that it was reasonably clear, long in advance, that the Sudanese would never have looked at it. It is the express wish of all Sudanese to have their own representative institutions, through which they themselves should gradually assume control of the government of their own country and decide for themselves on their own future, and any suggestion of reestablishing even a tripartite condominium would surely have been regarded by them as a retrograde and not a progressive step. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, dealt with much of the history from fairly intimate experience of a great deal of what had happened. There is only one passage in his speech upon which in particular I should like to take him up, and that was where he talked about there being nothing more colossal than the failure of our policy in the Sudan. I think one should be perhaps a little restrained and hesitant in talking about the "colossal failure" of our policy in the Sudan. All that the elections which have just taken place have done has been to set up a Legislature in the Sudan. What comes later, and at any time in the three years that the Sudanese so command, is the step which will lead to self-determination.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Would the noble Marquess allow me to say that what I meant was that the candidates who stood for us were defeated, but the candidates who stood for Egypt were victori-
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ous—and I have not the least doubt that the presence of the Lincoln bombers in Kenya made its contribution to that result.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, if I may suggest it, it would perhaps he wiser not to talk yet about the candidates who stood for us and the candidates who stood for Egypt, but about the candidates who stood for different parties of Sudanese who have their own future to work out when the time comes. I think the noble Viscount was also concerned with the position of Egypt in regard to Israel. That is a point which we have to keep very much in mind, and that we fully recognise. But, again, what we are discussing here is the problem of the Suez Base, and although I agree that it might have repercussions on a wider scale, still we are not for a moment forgetting that that tripartite declaration to which this country and the United States and France put their names is in existence, and that that is not only a guarantee of the position but is also a prohibition against an arms race being entered upon. We have every intention of seeing that that agreement is preserved from both these points of view.
Some of the speeches which have been made this afternoon have dwelt upon our departure from Egypt and have suggested that the whole area will be left unprotected, that there will be nothing and nobody there and that we are thereby abandoning our rights and our duties. My Lords, why assume that even if we did, by agreement, move out of the Canal Base, it means that we are going to disappear from the Middle East? If we moved out, one of the objects might well be to redeploy our forces. I have said nothing, and I do not think noble Lords would find anything elsewhere in any other speeches on this subject, to indicate that the intention is to surrender either our international or our Commonwealth obligations in that part of the world and to move right out of that area. Yet a number of noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon have seemed to indicate that they thought that that was the next step. I think the noble Lord, Lord Winster asked me a question in regard to the position of the Dominions. The Commonwealth Governments have been kept closely informed of the course of these negotiations, and indeed, from time to time, certain of them have offered

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advice and counsel in regard to the matter to which we have always been very glad to listen.
One or two noble Lords took up another line. They said: "You are only appeasing the Egyptians. All that is going on is that you are being dictated to in Egypt." They are taking the line that we were out only to conciliate the Egyptians. My Lords, if we had been content to appease (whatever that word means in that context) or to be dictated to by the Egyptians, we could presumably have done that last April, when the discussions began. But, as it is, we have continued these discussions from April until now, with various intervals when relations were a little chilly, and we have continued them because, although we wanted to get agreement in the end, if we could get a proper one, we were not prepared either to appease, or to be dictated to by, the Egyptians; and to say now that all the negotiations have shown is a desire to appease is surely a complete contradiction of the position. I think I have dealt with the first of the points raised by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, as regards the Heads of Agreement. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, I thought dealt very effectively with the second point.
A number of noble Lords who have spoken in this debate have said that we ought to stay where we are at all costs. Others have said: "You have chosen the wrong moment; you ought to wait until a suitable moment occurs; you ought to break off your negotiations for the moment, and wait patiently until the time comes when you can resume negotiations with the Egyptians in a better atmosphere, when the Egyptians have become more friendly and amiable and forthcoming." I wish I felt that that was a probable happening. For my own part, so long as the present situation continues I am afraid that I do not see that change in the relations coming unless we come to some satisfactory agreement with the Egyptian Government. And in the present circumstances, to wait for the situation to improve seems to me, unfortunately, to mean waiting for something that is not very likely to occur.
There is, of course, in many of the countries of the Middle East, at the present moment, an outbreak of what we
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are often tempted to call "nationalism." It is epidemic in some of those countries, and we hope that it will not become endemic. However little we may like it, however poor an opinion we may have of it as a force, we cannot disregard it. We cannot treat it like a tiresome insect, which can be brushed away with the hand, and go on our way undisturbed. It must be treated seriously. We cannot just attempt to stamp it out by violence or other means. We do not consider that it would be right, or indeed possible, to take the line of trying to suppress a movement of this kind or forcibly to eradicate it. Therefore, we hope that, if we arrive at the kind of Agreement which we have in mind, we shall produce a situation in Egypt not dissimilar from situations which we have produced by following not dissimilar policies in other countries. We once had a Mandate over Iraq. We have gone from Iraq, which is now an independent country; but still our relations with that country are of the friendliest. We made an undertaking during the war with Libya. Libya is now an independent country, and we have recently had the gratifying situation in which she has, of her own free will, as an independent country, entered into an arrangement with us. The making of those arrangements is a great deal firmer assurance for the future than any of the, perhaps, more obsolete methods which some people might, from time to time, wish to adopt.
It is said that it is impossible to enter into an agreement with this particular Government of Egypt. It is said that they have done this, and that they have done that. Certainly we have had some unattractive experiences of their activities in the recent past, and I must just pause to say this. I saw a report, to which some reference has been made to-day, in which it was indicated that one member of the Egyptian Government took the view that we had allowed a British doctor to treat a child of his only as a matter of subtle policy and intrigue. My Lords, whatever the limits nationalism may attain, medicine, fortunately, remains international; and if it was possible for a British doctor to attend to that particular child, it was willingly done in the name of science and humanity, and not obscurely done as a matter of subtlety and intrigue.

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The whole of the basis upon which we have acted is, as I have said, that it is a better policy to try to conclude an Agreement with the existing Government of Egypt. Although we have had to make protests about the Sudan elections, it is worth remembering that this was the first of all the Governments with which we have tried to deal in recent years that had sufficient sense of realism and courage—although there had been agitation in Egypt in the very recent past, and, indeed, expressed determination not to consider any conditions which did not recognise the Sudan as part of the Kingdom of Egypt—to say: "We are not going to persist in that determination," and to say, at a later date, "We should like to discuss the question of an Agreement with you on the Canal Base." If we are going to carry on our international relations, we have to do it by means of agreement. I suggest to your Lordships that in discussing the earlier stages of this Agreement we have been and are fully justified.
May I now, after various digressions, come back to the actual Resolution which is upon the Paper. The noble Lord who moved it drafted it no doubt intentionally, in very wide terms—so wide that although I may, and indeed do, disagree considerably with the content of a number of speeches which have been made in support of the Resolution, I can accept it in the form in which it stands upon the Order Paper. Indeed, to reject it, might be taken to imply that Her Majesty's Government do not propose to maintain, in regard to Egypt, a position which is in our estimation, "consistent with our commitments and responsibilities." whereas the maintenance of such a position has been, is, and will remain, the essential basis upon which our discussions with the Egyptian Government proceed.
But I would add this. The fact that I accept a Motion of this very general kind, will not hereafter entitle anyone, in this House or elsewhere, to seize upon some aspect of the situation which he may, in his own mind, choose to regard as one of our commitments or responsibilities, and to assert that, by accepting this Motion, I have agreed to accept any and every individual view of what is or is not consistent with our commitments
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I and responsibilities, and, therefore, essential to the maintenance of our position. As I think the House will agree, it is not for individual noble Lords, or others, to interpret to Her Majesty's Government their various versions of these commitments and responsibilities. It is the duty and the task of Her Majesty's Government to come to their own conclusions as to what those responsibilities and commitments are, and to take what action they consider necessary to uphold them. If an Agreement is ultimately reached, it will be one which, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, is consistent with those commitments and responsibilities, and it will then be for Parliament to say whether it accepts that view. I think it is scarcely necessary for me to add that in all their dealings with this matter Her Majesty's Government will be vigilant, zealous and resolute in safeguarding what in their judgment constitute the vital interests of this country and in discharging their manifold obligations to the free world.
7.11 p.m.
LORD RENNELL: My Lords, at this late hour obviously it would be out of place to comment on the many interesting speeches that have been made, whether I agree with them or not. Therefore I should like to say only this: that, for my own part, I accept fully everything that the noble Marquess has said in accepting the Motion. It can be the responsibility only of Her Majesty's Government to determine what their responsibilities and commitments are and how they can best be incorporated in whatever arrangements are come to in Egypt. I should like to leave this debate and this last day in your Lordships' House this season on the note which was echoed in the remarks of the noble and learned Earl and very much brought out in the remarks of the noble Viscount. Lord Astor, of how much most of us realise the value of the friendship of Egypt. We appreciate the services that Egypt has rendered to our cause and hope that whatever the negotiations and whatever the outcome of them, they will contribute to the renewal of those friendly relations which we have had in the past.
On Question, Resolution agreed to.
House adjourned at twelve minutes past seven o'clock.