Sitting of 14 December 1950

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'Clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Enemy Property (British Assets)
    Mr. Vaughan-Morganasked the President of the Board of Trade how many British subjects there are whose British assets are being withheld from them by the Custodian of Enemy Property; and for what reasons.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Harold Wilson): I regret that information as to the number of British subjects whose assets are still under control of the Custodian of Enemy Property is not available. The assets of a British subject resident in enemy territory who has no other nationality are released from control. But the assets of British subjects who have acquired an enemy nationality are only released in the case of British born wives who have regained British nationality and have returned to the United Kingdom for permanent residence.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: Will the right hon. Gentleman give earnest consideration to the difficult position of some British subjects who feel that they have been deprived of their right under the British Nationality Act and who wish to spend, as far as they are allowed to, their own money in their native land?
    Mr. Wilson: I have given very careful consideration to this matter, but it is governed by the Act. If anything can be done within the Act, we are prepared to consider it.

    Cutlery (Tariff Rates)
    Mr. Peter Robertsasked the President of the Board of Trade whether
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    he will give an undertaking that the British tariff rates on cutlery will not be reduced as a result of the tariff negotiations at present proceeding in Torquay.
    Mr. H. Wilson: To give information about individual tariff rates in relation to negotiations which are in progress would prejudice the success of those negotiations. I regret, therefore, that I cannot give an undertaking of the kind requested.
    Mr. Roberts: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind two considerations: first, the severe foreign competition to which this industry was subjected between 1923 and 1936; and, second, that the present tariffs afford a very necessary protection to our workers in the industry, in view of the lower wages paid to workers elsewhere?
    Mr. Wilson: All relevant considerations will be borne in mind during these negotiations and, of course, we have had full consultations with the trade interests concerned.

    British Standards Institution
    Mr. Albuasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has received the report of the committee which he set up to examine the British Standards Institution; and what action he proposes to take.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Yes, Sir. The report is now being printed and I hope to make a statement as soon as copies are available.
    Mr. Albu: Can my right hon. Friend draw the attention of all concerned to the many references in the Reports of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity to the advantages of simplification and standardisation?
    Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir. The Committee which has been looking into the British Standards Institution paid full attention to all the recommendations of this report.

    Raw Cotton Supplies
    Mr. Fortasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can yet assess the effect on the cotton textile industry of the detailed allocation of raw cotton exports made by the United States Government.
    Mr. Harrisonasked the President of the Board of Trade what means he has devised of obtaining additional supplies of raw cotton, in view of the reductions from the United States sources.
    Mr. H. Wilson: As I informed the House in answer to similar Questions on 30th November, I am not satisfied that an adequate share of the United States crop has been made available to us. The supplies which have so far been allocated to us, total only one-third of our imports from the United States in the year ending June, 1950. We have for some time been seeking to secure as much cotton as possible from sources outside the United States—including our own Colonies. We shall, of course, continue to do so, but I am hopeful that the representations to which I referred on 30th November, the importance of which has been underlined by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister while he was in Washington, will result in a fuller appreciation of our needs by the American authorities. Meanwhile, I do not feel that I should make any further comment.
    Mr. Fort: Can the Minister say what reactions the Americans are showing to the statements made to them by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister when he was in Washington, and what action is being followed with the American authorities at present?
    Mr. Wilson: I have said that I think we have succeeded in making the American authorities fully aware of our needs. Until they have had time to consider their position in relation to them, I feel that I ought not to make any further comment.
    Mr. Sydney Silverman: Can my right hon. Friend say what relation there is between the allocation of raw cotton to us and the allocation of raw cotton to our competitors in Japan? Will he bear in mind that the whole of Lancashire is watching this matter with the greatest possible anxiety?
    Mr. Wilson: The allocation to us so far has been 235,000 bales, and to Japan it has been 693,000 bales. I am fully aware of the anxiety in Lancashire, and I can assure my hon. Friend that those points have been made fully to our American friends.
    Sir Waldron Smithers: Is not the real answer to this question to re-open the Liverpool Cotton Exchange?
    Mr. Wilson: Since the hon. Gentleman will be fully aware that the Raw Cotton Commission and the Government are prepared to make full arrangements for buying far more cotton than we have been allocated, it should be clear, even to him, that the re-opening of the Liverpool Cotton Exchange would make no difference whatever to the present situation.
    Sir W. Smithers: On a point of order. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to say "It should be clear, even to him"?
    Mr. Speaker: It was not a reference to me, so I think it is all right.
    Sir W. Smithers: I am asking for your protection, Sir.

    Waste Paper Collection
    Mr. Nabarroasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the aggregate consignment of salvage waste paper to the mills during November, 1950, was at a rate commensurate with the national requirement of 1,000,000 tons during 1951; and whether he will state the tonnage of the aggregate November consignment to the mills.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Statistics of mills' receipts of waste paper for the month of November, 1950, are not yet available. In October, however, receipts were at the rate of 910,000 tons per annum, a record figure; but consumption was even higher, at the rate of 1,012,000 tons per annum. A considerable increase in collections is, therefore, still required.
    Mr. Nabarro: Would the right hon. Gentleman please bear in mind that the announcements made yesterday about the level of November exports and the ending of Marshall Aid on 31st December, are likely to prove that the figure of one million tons required next year is an under-estimate, and will he therefore make supplementary arrangements?
    Mr. Wilson: I am certainly aware that we shall need vastly increased supplies, but, of course, the October figures which I have quoted did not take advantage of the recent increases in supplies of waste paper under the Waste Paper Recovery Association's scheme.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: Could not the Minister consider offering a reward to the general public to encourage them to return their daily and weekly papers to some central depot?
    Mr. Wilson: As the hon. and gallant Gentleman will probably be aware, the Waste Paper Recovery Association is working out a scheme involving prizes to local authorities which do best under this scheme.
    Mr. Nabarroasked the President of the Board of Trade what response has been forthcoming to his recent appeals for a resumption of waste paper recovery on a national scale; and whether he is satisfied that such recovery is now proceeding at a rate sufficient to meet the demands of the defence programme and export trade during 1951.
    Mr. H. Wilson: It is too early to estimate the extent of the response to my appeal and to the new salvage contest which has only just been launched by the Waste Paper Recovery Association, but I understand that already some 50 local authorities have decided to resume collection. Existing supplies of waste paper should provide enough paper and board for the defence programme and the export trade, but unless waste paper collections are increased there may be inadequate supplies of paper and board for less important uses.
    Mr. Nabarro: Is it possible for the President to relate his statistics of the 50 additional local authorities to the number of local authorities which were collecting waste paper before, and state what is the figure of those now collecting?
    Mr. Wilson: I should like to have notice of that question.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will my right hon. Friend examine the extent to which waste paper is wasted through newsagents not being allowed to return unsold copies to the Newspaper Proprietors' Association?
    Mr. Keeling: Is the President aware that in rural areas one field of salvage which would yield hundreds of tons, namely, that of old telephone directories, is completely neglected, since neither the local authorities nor the Post Office will collect them?
    Mr. Wilson: I will look into that question.

    Tinplate (Exports)
    Mr. G. R. Howardasked the President of the Board of Trade how much tinplate of the quality used for canning was exported to Japan in the period April to September, 1950.
    Mr. H. Wilson: There were no exports of tinplate to Japan during April to September this year.
    Mr. Howard: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that no such exports will be made to Japan until there are adequate supplies to canners in this country?
    Mr. Wilson: We have very strict controls over the shipment of tinplate to other countries, and I should think that it would be unlikely that we should allocate tinplate for shipment to Japan during the condition to which the hon. Gentleman refers.

    Cinema Film
    Mr. Maudlingasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he intends to issue a direction under Section 5 of the Cinematograph Films Act, 1948, in respect of the film, "Green Grow the Rushes."
    Mr. H. Wilson: A direction under Section 5 (2) of the Cinematograph Films Act, 1948, may be made by the Board of Trade only after a recommendation by the Selection Committee appointed for the purpose. No application has been made for the Selection Committee to consider this film, and the question of making a direction does not, therefore, arise.
    Mr. Maudling: In view of the fact that the last time the President issued such a directive the results of the public exhibition were, to put it mildly, disappointing, will he exercise very great care about the issuing of any further such directives?
    Mr. Wilson: No, Sir. I will act in accordance with the advice of the Committee set up under the statute enacted by Parliament. I think it would be wrong for me or any other Minister to interfere in the matter of this film. We must rely on the advice of the committee set up under the statute.

    Monopolies Commission (Reports)
    Mr. W. T. Williamsasked the President of the Board of Trade when he proposes to make some further references to the Monopolies Commission.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Two new references were made to the Commission on 12th December. The subjects referred are, first, the supply and exports of certain semi-manufactured products of copper and copper-base alloys; and, secondly, the supply of insulin. In the first of these references, the Commission are asked to report only on the facts of the case; the reference of insulin is so framed as to require the Commission to report both as to the facts and as to their bearing on the public interest. I am circulating the full text of the references in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Sir Ralph Glyn: Can the President say how long these inquiries will take, in view of the extraordinary expenditure involved to the firms concerned?
    Mr. Wilson: I think there is another Question on the Order Paper dealing with the speed of the work of the Commission.
    Following is the text:
    (a) Semi-manufactures of Copper and Copper-based Alloys
    Whereas it appears to the Board of Trade that it is or may he the fact that conditions to which the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, applies prevail as respects:

    (1) the supply of the following products, that is to say (a) Brass strip, (b) Brass sheets and circles, (c) Brass wire, (d) Brass tubes, (e) Beadings and mouldings of brass or of other alloys containing not less than 50 per cent. by weight of copper, (f) Brass rods and extruded sections, (g) Phosphor bronze wire strip and sheet, (h) Copper strip, (i) Copper sheets and circles, (j) Copper wire, (k) Copper tubes, (l) Copper sheathing, (m) Copper plates for locomotive fireboxes, (n) Copper rods and extruded sections, (o) Copper rollers for textile printing, (p) Copper tapes, bindings and jointing sleeves, (q) Nickel silver strip, (r) Nickel silver sheets and circles, (s) Nickel silver wire, (t) Yellow metal sheets and circles, (u) Yellow metal sheathing, (v) Yellow metal condenser plates, (w) Zinc strip;

    (2) exports of such products as aforesaid from the United Kingdom either generally or to any particular market.

    Now, therefore, the Board in pursuance of Section 2 (1) of the Act, hereby refer to the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission for investigation and report the matters of such supply and exports.
    The Commission shall as respects such supply and exports investigate and report on—

    (1) whether conditions to which the Act applies in fact prevail, and if so, in what manner and to what extent;

    (2) the things which are done by the parties concerned as a result of, or for the purpose of preserving, those conditions.

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    Pursuant to Section 3 (3) of the Act, the Board of Trade think it proper in all the circumstances that the expression "supply" in relation to any such goods as aforesaid shall be confined to the supply of those goods by the manufacturer or importer thereof and this reference shall be construed accordingly.
    (b) Insulin.
    Whereas it appears to the Board of Trade that it is or may be the fact that conditions to which the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, applies prevail as respects the supply of all forms and preparations of insulin.
    Now, therefore, the Board in pursuance of Section 2 (1) of the Act, hereby refer to the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission for investigation and report the matter of such supply.
    The Commission shall as respects such supply investigate and report on—

    (1) whether conditions to which the Act applies in fact prevail, and if so in what manner and to what extent;

    (2) the things which are done by the parties concerned as a result of, or for the purpose of preserving, the conditions;

    (3) whether the conditions in question or all or any of the things done as aforesaid operate or may be expected to operate against the public interest.

    Mrs. Ganleyasked the President of the Board of Trade when the Monopolies Commission's report on dental goods will be published; and if he will make a statement about the report.
    Mr. H. Wilson: The Report was published today. With my hon. Friend's permission, I will circulate a statement on it in the OFFICIAL REPORT, but I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Commission for what is, I think, a very thorough and valuable piece of work. I hope all hon. Members will take an early opportunity of studying it.
    Mr. Crosland: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that, if this Report does, in fact, condemn certain practices in industry, the relative Government Departments will issue an order to the industry to desist, and that we shall not have to wait for any general legislation, which will take a long time?
    Mr. Wilson: The Report does call for the prohibition of certain practices which have been under review by the Association. The action to be taken is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health, and we shall have to consider whether to take action in this particular case or to await the general legislation

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    which is also mentioned in the Monopolies Commission's Report.
    Following is the statement:
    The Report is a very detailed document and I cannot do it justice in a short space. I will, however, outline the Commission's main conclusions. On the factual side of their investigation, the Commission report that the conditions to which the Monopolies Act applies do prevail in the dental goods industry on two grounds. First, the Association of Dental Manufacturers and Traders of the United Kingdom is an association of persons who control more than one-third of the supply of dental goods and who so act as to restrict competition. In fact, the Association controls about 90 per cent. of the trade. Secondly, the group of companies headed by the Amalgamated Dental Company is a group of inter-connected bodies corporate within the meaning of the Act and controls more than one-third of the supply of the goods.
    I come next to the Commission's findings about the effect of these conditions on the public interest. As regards the Amalgamated Dental Company's group, the Commission find that "the group has used with moderation the great power which it has derived from its substantial hold on the market." Nevertheless, the Commission think that the prices of certain lines in which the group have a substantial monopoly have been unduly high and recommend that the group should reduce them. The Commission also criticise certain restrictive agreements made by the group and recommend that these should be reconsidered. As regards the Association of Dental Manufacturers and Traders, the Commission take the view that the Association's use of exclusive dealing and the collective boycott as devices for enforcing resale price maintenance have had undesirable results in restricting entry into the industry, and for this reason, among others, are against the public interest. The Commission recommend that these practices should be prohibited in this industry.
    I should mention that two members of the Commission make a reservation about this recommendation. They point out that, as is common knowledge, similar practices are carried on in other industries and that it is purely fortuitous that this industry should have been investigated first by the Commission. They suggest, therefore, that it would be wrong to enact ad hoc legislation against this industry, though they would not recommend that it should be exempted from any general legislation. Various other rules and regulations of the A.D.M.T. are criticised in the Report and the Commission recommend that the Association should review them.
    I do not propose to say much now about the implementation of the Commission's recommendations. The first essential is that all concerned should now study the Report in detail and in particular, that the industry itself, towards whom several of the Commission's recommendations are directed, should consider very carefully how best to respond to the Commission's findings. I should perhaps mention that in so far as it may become necessary to invoke the remedial sections of the Act,
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    which can, of course, he applied to individual cases, the appropriate authority in this instance will be my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health.
    Mrs. Ganleyasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has now reviewed the machinery for dealing with inquiries by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission; and with what result.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Yes, Sir. I apologise for the length of this answer. The House will appreciate—particularly, I think, when hon. Members study the report on dental goods—that each of these inquiries demands the most scrupulous examination and consideration of a very large mass of evidence and that, in these initial stages of the operation of the Act, a new technique and procedure is being developed. There will also, I feel sure, be general agreement that, in view of the importance of the matters to be dealt with it would be wrong if thoroughness were to be sacrificed to speed. Nevertheless, I have felt it right to consider with the Monopolies Commission whether, in the light of experience so far, any action could now be taken which would facilitate the work of the Commission and, at the same time, relieve the burden on the part-time members which has undoubtedly been greater than was expected when they were appointed.
    As a result of these consultations, I have decided to increase the membership of the Commission from eight to the statutory maximum of ten. I am glad to be able to tell the House that Professor G. C. Allen has accepted my invitation to fill one of these additional positions in a part-time capacity and has already been appointed to the Commission. I hope to announce a further appointment shortly. At the same time the Commission have, I understand, reviewed their procedure, and, on the invitation of the other Members of the Commission, two of the part-time members, Mr. C. N. Gallie and Mr. Gordon Stott, have agreed for the time being to devote a greater part of their time to the work, with special responsibility for particular inquiries. This change, together with the increase in the total number of members, will have the particular advantage of making it easier to proceed simultaneously with the different inquiries. With these new arrangements, the Commission have told

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    me that they hope to be able to make a further four reports—after the report on builders' castings—by the end of next year, thereby completing the original six cases, and to make a start on two or three further cases.
    Major Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: While, of course, the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that one will have to consider the answers, especially in the light of the report, is he aware that anything which will expedite this work and prevent the delays which my hon. Friend mentioned will have the support of the Opposition?
    Mr. Crosland: While welcoming this small improvement in the work of the Commission, can my right hon. Friend say how far the enlarged Commission will be able to produce more reports per year in 1951 and 1952 than it would have been able to do without the addition of these two new members?
    Mr. Wilson: Without the addition of these two new members and the arrangement for greater time to be given by two of the other members, we would not have had anything life four reports next year, but I would not like to forecast the position for 1952 because that depends on the amount of work the Commission will have to do.
    Mr. I. J. Pitman: Has the right hon. Gentleman consulted his own Organisation and Methods Department with a view to looking at the organisation and staffing of this particular section of our activities? Is it not wise that if he is adding a couple of generals he should consider whether the adding of men and women of lower rank to do the advising, could not also be regarded as a most important factor for quick action?
    Mr. Wilson: I am glad to see this enthusiasm on the part of hon. Gentlemen opposite for increases in Civil Service staffs where necessary—and in this case it certainly is necessary—but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we took the necessary steps to increase the staff before increasing the number of what the hon. Gentleman calls "generals."
    Mr. Nigel Davies: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the report on management accounting by the Anglo-American Council on Productivity recom-
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    mended that a separate, independent investigation should be undertaken to consider whether restrictive practices and price-fixing arrangements by trade associations should be made illegal, and is he prepared to follow this recommendation?
    Mr. Wilson: I answered a Question on that last week, but, quite frankly, I think I ought to say that the time taken to deal with monopoly problems, which was agreed by both sides of the House following the war-time White Paper, has proved longer than many of us thought. It is a matter for consideration whether, instead of having every single case examined by the Monopolies Commission, we ought not to proceed to deal with certain bad practices on a wide front by legislation. I hope that hon. Members opposite who have shown this interest and enthusiasm will be similarly enthusiastic when we bring our proposals before Parliament.
    Mr. Leslie Hale: Am I to understand my right hon. Friend as saying that he is expecting four more reports by the end of next year, and, if so, is that not an alarming delay? Will he say which reports will be forthcoming, and, approximately, on what date, and does not he think this is a very surprising and regrettable delay indeed?
    Mr. Wilson: I think that when my hon. Friend sees the report on dental goods he will realise what a tremendous volume of work has to be undertaken by the Commission if, as I am sure the whole House would desire, there is to be a thorough, fatual and impartial report in order to ensure that the interests concerned are given full justice.
    Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider this point, that if we are to try to obtain and apply general principles from the reports it is obviously most desirable for all of us to have a series of reports from which we can draw the principles? Therefore, will he realise that it is the view of every quarter of the House that we ought to do everything possible to expedite the getting out of further reports so that we can all make up our minds and make our contribution to the subject? May I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the whole House will do all it can to help him?
    Mr. Wilson: I am sure that view is accepted by the whole House and by the Monopolies Commission, but when hon. Members study the report published today they will see an implicit recommendation by the Commission that, in respect of certain of the practices they are dealing with, the House might like to consider general legislation rather than specific action.

    Tariff Conference, Torquay
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the progress of the Torquay Conference.
    Mr. Nigel Fisherasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is yet in a position to give the House some information on the progress of the conference at Torquay.
    Mr. H. Wilson: I am not in a position to make a statement about the Torquay Conference at this stage, but, as I informed the hon. Member for Croydon, East Sir H. Williams) on 23rd November, I propose to lay before the House any necessary reports in due course.
    Mr. Russell: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when he will be able to make a statement? Will he have to wait until the end of the conference, and can he give any idea how long the conference will last?
    Mr. Wilson: I should hope that it will be possible to make some statement to the House about the first part of the conference, namely, the meeting of the contracting parties to the general agreement, early in the New Year, but I would not like to forecast now how soon there will be a report on the tariff negotiations.
    Mr. Fisher: Will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that while the House is kept in ignorance of what is happening no steps will be taken at Torquay to prejudice Imperial Trade or further to jeopardise Imperial Preference?
    Mr. Wilson: I have already made clear to the House on a number of occasions what are our views on Imperial Preference.

    Newsprint Supplies
    Mr. John Rodgersasked the President of the Board of Trade if he has yet taken any steps to discuss with the
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    Government of the United States of America the setting up of an international authority to handle the problem of newsprint supplies.
    Mr. H. Wilson: No. Sir.
    Mr. Rodgers: In view of the fact that we have the smallest newspapers in the world, will the right hon. Gentleman see that this question is raised during the forthcoming talks with 0.E.E.C.?
    Mr. Wilson: I have thought for a considerable time that it would be useful to have an international discussion on the fair supply of newsprint as between particular countries, but, in my view, it is necessary that we should first complete our negotiations with the Canadian suppliers before such a discussion is proposed.

    Utility Wool Cloth
    Squadron Leader Burdenasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will ensure that utility wool cloth made partly from fibre and any garments made therefrom are clearly marked with the composition of the cloth.
    Mr. H. Wilson: No, Sir. It has long been customary to make cloths consisting of a mixture of wool and other fibres, and woollen cloths of this kind have been permitted under the utility scheme from its inception. So far as I am aware, the existing regulations about the marking and description of such cloths have proved satisfactory, and I see no reason for changing them.
    Squadron Leader Burden: Is not the Minister aware that in the House last night his hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary stated that he would look into this question because he realised that something should he done about it, and is it not about time that the Minister let his right hand know what his left hand is going to do?
    Mr. Wilson: No, Sir. On the contrary, I think that the answer I have given shows the speed with which my hon. Friend's undertaking has been implemented.

    Industries (Dispersal)
    Mr. Ian Harveyasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps are being taken to effect the geographical dispersal of industries vital to the life of the community and our armament production.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Before approval is given to expansion schemes in any key industries, due consideration is given, among other things, to the desirability of dispersal. Plans exist for wider dispersal in the event of war.

    Sulphur Supplies
    Mr. Chetwyndasked the President of the Board of Trade what action is being taken to maintain supplies of sulphur for industrial purposes in view of the proposed cut in shipments of sulphur from the United States of America.
    Mr. H. Wilson: All known alternative sources of supply have been or are being investigated, but on present information it is unlikely that they will afford any substantial contribution to our requirements. In consultation with industry, I am considering plans for the extended use of other sulphur-bearing materials both in acid production and for the extraction of crude sulphur.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Do these measures include the development of supplies at home? Is my right hon. Friend aware of the large deposits of anhydrite in the area of Tees-side, and is he taking any action to get greater supplies of sulphur and sulphuric acid from this source?
    Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir, very much so. We have been impressing on the interests concerned for some time, before the present shortage, the desirability of considering plans for making sulphuric acid either from pyrites, which is in easier supply, or from our own native supplies. In the present situation, we shall press on much more strongly with these representations.
    Mr. Hollisasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a statement on the prospects for the import of sulphur into this country from the United States of America.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Sulphur was one of the commodities specially mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in his discussions in Washington on shortages of raw materials. We have secured some shipments for January and we are awaiting the announcement of the United States Government on export quotas for the first half of 1951.
    Mr. Hollis: Is it a fact that shipments for January amounted to merely 10,000 tons whereas the total amount we required in the past has been something in the nature of 400,000 tons, and that that is a very small contribution to the problem? Will the right hon. Gentleman make a statement as soon as possible?
    Mr. Wilson: I will make a statement as soon as possible. I have not the figures with me, but I think that the hon. Gentleman's figures are not accurate. We have secured some improvement in the shipments for January, and, of course, his requirement figures were not related to the month of January only, but to the whole year.
    Mr. Hollis: If the welcome news that we have had some improvement in the figures for January is true, could the right hon. Gentleman make a statement about the figures as soon as possible because that is very important?
    Mr. Wilson: I understand that this matter may be debated tomorrow, and I will see whether my right hon. Friend who is dealing with it can then make a statement about it.

  CIVIL DEFENCE

    Recruitment
    Mr. Donnerasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons have enrolled for Civil Defence since the Prime Minister's appeal for volunteers on the wireless.
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas): I regret that this information is not available from the recruiting returns, but during October and November the combined strengths of the Civil Defence Corps, Auxiliary Fire Service and National Hospital Service Reserve in England and Wales rose from 71,500 to almost 104,000.
    Mr. Donner: Do the Government intend to take any additional steps to attract more adequate numbers, such as a direct approach by the local authorities to all people who served in Civil Defence in the last war, in order to find out whether they are able or willing to serve again?
    Mr. de Freitas: A great deal of that is being done. I am only too anxious to hear such suggestions from hon. Members.
    Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: Is the hon. Gentleman satisfied that the machinery for dealing with those who volunteer by post is now acting sufficiently promptly, in view of the fact that I sent his right hon. Friend a case the other day of a constituent who applied, who has had great experience, and who had to wait three weeks for an acknowledgment?
    Mr. de Freitas: From time to time defects do occur in the machinery and organisation, and I am only too glad to look into any evidence I get about them.
    Mr. H. Hynd: Can my hon. Friend say whether a Civil Defence section is being organised in this House?
    Mr. de Freitas: That is not really a matter for my Department.
    Mr. Nabarro: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind the special position of rural areas which will be required presently as special reception areas and make provision for special literature for Civil Defence purposes in these areas?
    Mr. de Freitas: The particular function of rural areas in our plans is recognised and I will look into the last point made by the hon. Member.

    Lectures
    Mr. Toucheasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that owing to the fact that instructors in Civil Defence have to follow a detailed syllabus, they are compelled to make each lecture last an hour when in fact the actual instruction can be given and understood in about 20 minutes so that volunteers find that a large part of the hour is wasted; and whether he will give instructions that greater latitude should be given to lecturers in this matter.
    Mr. de Freitas: It is true that instructors are given the detailed syllabus and that the time allotted is an hour, but it has been made clear that this period is a guide and no instructor is compelled to make each lecture last an hour. In fact, the period given allows time for discussion after each lecture, and this discussion is particularly important. The whole system is flexible and instructors can use their discretion.
    Mr. Touche: Does the hon. Gentleman think that this arrangement is really flexible when one lesson has to last an hour and an instructor cannot pass to a second lesson in the same hour? At present many people find these lectures a great waste of time, and this is discouraging recruiting.
    Mr. de Freitas: I think that an instructor who studies, as some hon. Members have studied, the training pamphlet which has been issued will see that considerable discretion is allowed to him.
    Mr. Pickthorn: Will the Home Department consider lending out these instructors so that the art of compressing into 20 minutes expositions which generally stretch over an hour, could be imparted to the Treasury Bench?
    Mr. de Freitas: I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that that applies equally to both Front Benches.

    Air-raid Shelters
    Sir George Jeffreysasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will state the policy of his Department as regards the provision of shelters against air attack; and as to the maintenance, improvement or otherwise of shelters provided during the last war.
    Mr. de Freitas: My right hon. Friend made a full statement about this matter on 9th November in answer to a Question by the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer). The Home Office of the Scottish Home Department have now sent circulars to the local authorities concerned. I will let the hon. and gallant Member have a copy of the Home Office circular.
    Sir G. Jeffreys: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in some cases—in fact, fairly numerous cases—some of the shelters of the last war are still being removed or filled in, as the case may be? Ought not this to stop?
    Mr. de Freitas: I am very surprised to hear that, in view of the very clear statement of policy which has been made by my right hon. Friend that shelters of the last war should not be done away with. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will let me have particulars of cases where this has occurred, I will certainly look into them.

    Air-raid Warnings
    Mr. Ian Harveyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has now brought up to date the war-time system of early warning of the approach of hostile aircraft or self-propelled missiles.
    Mr. de Freitas: I cannot add to the answer given to the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Donner) on 9th November.
    Mr. Harvey: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the increased speed of these potential weapons makes it imperative that our developments should be pushed forward rapidly?
    Mr. de Freitas: We are certainly bearing that in mind and so is the Air Ministry, with whom we are having discussions.

    Local Authorities (Grants)
    Mr. Ian Harveyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether agreement has yet been reached with local authorities on the subject of financial grants to be made to them for Civil Defence purposes under the Civil Defence Act.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): At a meeting on 1st August last, I discussed with representatives of the local authorities proposals for regulations under Section 3 of the Civil Defence Act, 1948. There was a substantial measure of agreement between us, but the local authorities put forward alternative proposals on certain points which would involve amendment of the Act. Discussions on these proposals are actively proceeding and I will make a further statement as soon as I am in a position to do so. In the meantime, the local authorities' associations have assured me that the progress of Civil Defence preparations will not be held up.

    PRISONERS (ILLITERACY)
    Mr. Pitmanasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of juvenile delinquents and of men and women in prison are unable to read with understanding a newspaper or written instructions.
    Mr. Ede: About 1 per cent. of the total number of men and women received into prison during 1949 were reported, on a somewhat rough and ready assessment, as being either illiterate or able to read only imperfectly. I regret that figures for juvenile delinquents in general are not available.
    Mr. Janner: How many of these have been certified as educationally subnormal?
    Mr. Ede: That is no concern of my Department, but in the case of juveniles we try to get all the information we can about their educational background.

  ALIENS

    Interrogation
    Mr. Nigel Daviesasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the few questions asked of United Kingdom visitors to European countries, he will instruct that travellers from foreign countries should no longer be interrogated as to their destination in the United Kingdom, financial arrangements and funds available for return journey.
    Mr. Ede: The existing system of control at United Kingdom ports, which has the advantage of letting the foreigner know at once on what conditions and for what time he may land, is, I believe, the best for a country with sea frontiers. It is not always necessary to ask all the questions to which the hon. Member refers.
    Mr. Davies: In view of all that is said about the tourist trade, and also as a matter of common courtesy, would it not be possible for the right hon. Gentleman to consider some diminution of this interrogation, to which British visitors to many foreign countries are not subjected at all?
    Mr. Ede: In many foreign countries which have a land frontier the problems presented to the Governments of those countries are, of course, different from ours. They have a great deal more police supervision of the visitor after he has arrived than we do. I also have—and the House, on occasion, has quite rightly been very anxious that I should

    1333
    realise my responsibility—a great deal of anxiety as regards security matters in these days.
    Mr. Davies: Does the Home Secretary suggest that, tiresome as this may be to tourists, it is really helpful in the matter of security?
    Mr. Ede: Oh, yes. We can sometimes find out a great deal from an answer to a casual question.

    Soviet Trade Union Delegation (Visas)
    Major Guy Lloydasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many applications for visas he has received from persons wishing to visit this country as part of the Ukrainian Trade Delegation under the auspices of the Scottish Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Association; and how many of such applications he has granted.
    Mr. Ede: Six applications were originally received for visas to enable a Soviet trade union delegation, headed by the President of the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions, to visit Scotland under the auspices of the society mentioned. In all six cases the grant of a visa for a short visit was authorised. Subsequently, the leader of the delegation fell sick and an application for the grant of a visa to a substitute has just been received and has been authorised.
    Major Lloyd: Is the Home Secretary aware that many people in Scotland are very much concerned at this prospective visit, and that they profoundly distrust its motives? Is he further aware that they suspect it may be used for spying, and that they do not wish to show the location of their industries to people who might use that information for some other purpose?
    Mr. Ede: Before these visas were granted, I took the precaution of making such inquiries as were open to me, and of consulting the security services, and no objection was raised to the granting of these visas.
    Mr. Hamilton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in the mining areas, at any rate, we want to foster rather than discourage these visits?
    Major Lloyd: Since the right hon. Gentleman has now granted the visas, will
    1334
    he take special steps to watch these men, in view of the mistrust of the people in Scotland?
    Mr. Ede: The usual precautions will be taken. Every one of these cases is dealt with on its merits both before the people are admitted and after they come.
    Mr. John Hynd: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will be prepared to extend political asylum to any member of that delegation who does not wish to return to his country?
    Mr. Ede: I think my record in that matter is well known. Any application received will be considered, but we shall then inquire into the bona fides of the person who desires to remain in this country.
    Major Lloyd: In view of the very unsatisfactory answer and the grave suspicion of the people of Scotland—[HON. MEMBERS: "Which people?"I—I wish to give notice that when we resume after the Recess, I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    PRISON LABOUR
    Mr. Doddsasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will give details of work done by prisoners in His Majesty's Prisons since 1st January, 1950.
    Mr. Ede: I regret that the information asked for is not available. Certain information relating to work done by prisoners is, however, included in the Prison Commissioners' annual report for 1949 which was published yesterday; and I am also circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a table showing the various occupations on which prisoners were engaged during the 12 months ended 31st March, 1950.
    Mr. Wilkes: Will my right hon. Friend draw the attention of his colleagues to the fact that the Prison Commissioners' report shows that a very serious falling off from Government Departments has resulted in constriction of prison industries, which were being developed? The report goes on to say that there is a serious prospect of further decline in prison industries in 1951. Will he act with the Departments to see that that is reversed?
    Mr. Ede: I have been in touch with my right hon. Friends who are in charge of the appropriate Departments and I am very glad to say that I have their full sympathy and help, as far as they can give it.
    Mr. Heathcoat Amory: Can the Home Secretary assure us that the useless and purposeless nature of the work, which, in the old days, used to be part of the curriculum, has now been eliminated? Will he also say whether the practice of outdoor work under supervision is being developed?
    Mr. Ede: Yes, Sir. I am anxious to do all I can to ensure that that kind of work shall become increasingly available, because I am certain that it enables these men to get some sense of achievement from the effort they put forward, which is sometimes very difficult to get from ordinary routine prison labour.
    Following is the table:

    *EMPLOYMENT OF PRISONERS FOR THE 12 MONTHS ENDED 31ST MARCH, 1950

    Employment

    Average number of prisoners employed

    MANUFACTURERS:—

    Assemblers

    7

    Bakers

    86

    Basketmakers

    91

    Bedmakers

    122

    Bookbinders

    119

    Brush and mop makers

    144

    Carpenters

    226

    Knitters

    85

    Knitters repairers

    73

    Labourers

    82

    Mailbag makers

    2911

    Mailbag repairers

    1709

    Matmakers, coir and rope

    1129

    Moulders

    20

    Needleworkers and dressmakers

    304

    Needleworkers and dressmakers repairers

    36

    Netmakers

    13

    Pickers and sorters

    573

    Pouch—leather workers

    162

    Printers

    22

    Sackmakers and sailmakers

    74

    Shoemakers

    95

    Shoemakers repairers

    121

    Smiths, fitters and tinsmiths

    101

    Tagmakers

    42

    Tailors

    393

    Tailors repairers

    139

    Twine and rope makers

    6

    *These figures do not include the number of prisoners undergoing vocational training (312), appellants and those awaiting trial (543), those certified unfit for labour (34), those not told off for labour (348), the sick (800), and those undergoing punishment (65).

    1336

    Employment

    Average number of prisoners employed

    MANUFACTURERS:—cont.

    Weavers:—

    Cotton and linen

    115

    Rugs and mats on frames and looms

    38

    Woollen

    49

    Wire fencing makers

    32

    Wood choppers

    112

    Extra-mural work for County Agricultural Executive Committees

    443

    Extra-mural work for private firms

    34

    Extra-mural work for Government Departments

    181

    Total

    9,889

    FARM:—

    Attending cattle, cropping, market gardening, reclaiming land, labouring, bone-pounding, etc

    246

    BUILDING:—

    Bricklayers and masons

    120

    Carpenters and joiners

    77

    Electricians

    25

    Labourers

    611

    Painters and glaziers

    626

    Plasterers

    9

    Plumbers

    30

    Quarrymen

    22

    Slaters

    4

    Smiths and fitters

    56

    Whitewashers

    42

    Total

    1,258

    DOMESTIC SERVICE:—

    Cleaners, jobbers and labourers

    1618

    Cooks

    521

    Gardeners

    462

    Hospital orderlies

    85

    Stokers

    97

    Washers

    369†

    Total

    3,l52

    †Including certain washing done for other departments.

    Mr. Doddsasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he has yet given consideration to the resolution passed at a recent conference of magistrates calling for more efficient use of prison labour, details of which have been sent to him; and if he will make a statement on the matter.
    Mr. Ede: I am aware that a recent conference of representatives of prison and Borstal visiting committees and boards of visitors passed a resolution which expressed concern as to the efficient use of prison labour and the provision of

    1337
    vocational training in prisons, although the resolution has not yet been formally submitted to me, It is not possible to deal adequately with the problems involved within the compass of a reply to a Parliamentary Question, but I am hopeful that recent inter-departmental discussions will result in an increased number of orders for the products of prison labour. Opportunities for vocational training are available, or will shortly be made available, in all the training prisons.
    Mr. Dodds: Does not my right hon. Friend think that it would be much more desirable if a system were adopted by which these men would do more for their keep than they are doing at present?
    Mr. Ede: I can assure my hon. Friend that I do all I can to encourage them to do more for their keep, but some of them do not appear to be very responsive. I therefore welcome every opportunity that can be afforded of providing them with work in which they can be expected to he interested.
    Mr. Awbery: Will my right hon. Friend consider introducing legislation to make labour in prison a contract of service, so that a man will receive an insurance stamp, will be governed by the Industrial Injuries Act, and will not be penalised a second time after leaving prison?
    Mr. Ede: No. To do that would involve many complications.
    Mr. Niall Macpherson: Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is at least one part of our economy, where the Government has not secured full employment?
    Mr. Ede: But the employment is available.

    BRITISH COUNCIL (STUDENTS)
    Mr. Keelingasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many foreign holders of British Council studentships in this country have been expelled on account of subversive activities or have disappeared during the period of their studentships.
    Mr. Ede: The inquiries which I have made have not revealed any case in which
    1338
    a person holding a British Council studentship has been deported or has disappeared. If the hon. Member will give me particulars of any case that he has in mind I will make further inquiries.

    POLICE (RETIREMENT AGE)
    Mr. Vaughan-Morganasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether in view of the shortage of manpower he will consider amending the retirement age for the Metropolitan Police so that those who do not wish to retire can be retained for lighter duties such as traffic regulation and clerical work.
    Mr. Ede: A large proportion of the clerical work of the Metropolitan Police Force is done by civilian staff. Civilian school patrols relieve police officers of some of the less arduous forms of traffic control duty but other forms of traffic regulation call for high standards of mental and physical fitness. The majority of constables and sergeants, whom I assume the hon. Member has in mind, do not wish to continue to serve after the age of 55 but in all suitable cases the Commissioner of Police extends the age of compulsory retirement.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morganasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the shortage of manpower and of recruits for the special constabulary, he will consider abolishing 60 as the age of retirement and substituting tests of fitness and ability.
    Mr. Ede: There is no rigid rule prescribing the age of retirement of a special constable. In some cases 55 is regarded as the normal age of retirement, as it is in the case of a regular police constable, but my information is that individual cases are considered on their merits.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider issuing a statement to make this clear, because I think there are many middle-aged people who would like to enlist but who are not at all certain what the limits are?
    Mr. Ede: It is one thing to enlist a man who has never served before after he has attained the age of 55 and another thing to continue in employment a man who has already had experience in the

    1339
    service when he attains the age of 55 while in the service, but I am quite certain that every case will be considered by the respective police authorities on its merits.

    SHOPS ACT
    Mr. Padleyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he expects to introduce legislation to amend the Shops Act.
    Mr. Ede: I regret that I am not at present in a position to say when it will be practicable to introduce such legislation.
    Mr. Padley: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is now nearly four years since the Gower's Committee reported on desirable amendments to this legislation? Is he further aware that much of the legislation relating to shops dates back to the time when the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) was Home Secretary? Would my right hon. Friend therefore consider this as an urgent matter?
    Mr. Ede: I do not quite understand the last part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question, but, as he knows, I have had discussions with the interests concerned. A Measure has been brought forward for the consolidation of the law, which will help us, and I hope that it may be possible to deal with this matter.

    HOWICK PLACE, WESTMINSTER
    Mr. Keelingasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that the "No Entry" sign in Howick Place, Westminster, has never been prescribed or otherwise authorised under Section 48 (2) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930; and whether he will direct the Metropolitan Police to remove what is therefore an illegal obstruction.
    Mr. Ede: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given to the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) on 7th December.
    Mr. Keeling: Yes, but is the right hon. Gentleman aware that neither my hon. Friend's Question nor mine was then answered? Here is an illegality com-
    1340
    mitted by the Commissioner of Police. Should not the Commissioner of Police be the first to observe the law?
    Mr. Ede: I am grateful to the two hon. Members for the Questions they have put down, because they reveal that local authorities generally, in putting these experimental one-way streets into operation, have actually committed an infraction of the law. I admit that, technically, that is so. I think it is obviously to everyone's advantage that before a one-way street is definitely established by order, there should be an experimental period during which the scheme is tried out, and I should think it would be desirable, when we get an opportunity—I hope it will not be too long delayed—to give legal power to have an experimental period before the order is made.
    Mr. Keeling: Why did not the police ask the Minister of Transport for authority to experiment, as the law requires?
    Mr. Ede: As I understand it, there is no authority to make an experiment. If an order is made, it remains. One might perhaps hold an experiment for three weeks and then ask for the revocation of the order. What I want to do is to secure that there shall be machinery by which it can be legally possible to have a short experimental period before the order is made.
    Mr. Hollis: What happens if people drive down this street now?
    Mr. Ede: Being commonsense people they fall in with the suggestion at the end of the street.

    MAGISTRATE'S COURT, WESTMINSTER
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the congestion of cases in nearby and other Metropolitan magistrates' courts, he will arrange for the court at Rochester Row, Westminster, to be re-opened.
    Mr. Ede: No, Sir. This court is not usable because it was badly damaged during the war. As soon as the capital investment programme permits, it is proposed, in accordance with the recommendations of the Departmental Committee which reported in 1937, to begin the

    1341
    building of larger court houses in order to relieve the congestion at some of the courts, but I am afraid that this is not at present possible.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is my right hon. Friend prepared to consider a provisional arrangement by which these courts can be rebuilt? Quite a number of cases have to be adjourned three or four times, causing grave inconvenience to litigants and witnesses.
    Mr. Ede: I am quite willing to consider any arrangement, but what I cannot do is to re-open this court. The building is unsuitable.

  NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

    Tuberculosis
    Mr. Shepherdasked the Minister of Health the average time that a patient has to wait for a bed in a tuberculosis sanatorium in the Manchester Regional Hospital Board area.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Blenkinsop): The information is not available, but waiting periods vary so much according to individual need that to average them would have little meaning.
    Mr. Shepherd: Is it not a fact that some years ago the hon. Gentleman did give these figures? Are they not to be given now because the situation is worse? Is that the reason?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: The situation is, if anything, improving, although only too slowly, as we all realise. But these figures would convey nothing of any value to anyone.
    Miss Florence Horsbrugh: Could the hon. Gentleman say whether there are many cases where the person has to wait for less than 12 months?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Yes. In cases of special urgency it is true that provision can very often be made, but we all realise that in very many cases that are not so urgent, there are long waiting periods.
    Mr. John Rodgers: If the figures are not available, can the hon. Gentleman explain how he knows that the position is improving?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: I have said that we know the position is improving throughout the country. I have given figures about the general staffing situation in debates in the House, especially in Adjournment debates, on several occasions.
    Dr. Barnett Strossasked the Minister of Health how many cases of pulmonary tuberculosis were notified in Stoke-on-Trent in the years 1919, 1929, 1939 and 1949; and the number of deaths, without including cases where tuberculosis was secondary only to silicosis or pneumoconiosis.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: The numbers of cases notified in 1919, 1929, 1939 and 1949 were 748, 641, 269 and 422 respectively. The numbers of deaths, including deaths from pulmonary tuberculosis associated with silicosis and pneumoconiosis for which separate figures are not available, were 288, 291, 204, and 144 respectively, but the first three figures should be reduced by about 3 per cent. for comparison with 1949, because of a change in the method of classification introduced in 1940.
    Dr. Stross: Is my right hon. Friend aware that early diagnosis, suitable treatment and isolation are not enough in themselves, and that perhaps the best way of protecting the public is by maintaining full employment and a rising standard of life?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: We fully realise the importance of early treatment as well as full employment, and we also realise the value of the mass radiography service which has been developed so rapidly.

    Prescriptions
    Mr. Shepherdasked the Minister of Health if he has made inquiries into the extent to which quantities of medicine, etc., are supplied to National Health Service patients in excess of their real needs; and what instruction he has issued in regard to this matter.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Investigations are proceeding in a number of cases. If doctors are thought to have prescribed medicine in excess of what is reasonably necessary the case is referred to the local medical committee and, if the facts are proved, money can be withheld from the doctor's remuneration. The position is governed by Statutory Instruments 1948 No. 507, Regulation 12.
    Mr. Shepherd: Is it often a fact that these cases occur when the doctor does not prescribe the amount to be given to the patient, and would it not be a good idea to see that the doctor does prescribe the proper amount?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: The matter is under full consideration. I hope that these particular cases will be dealt with quite soon.

    Chemists (Earnings)
    Mr. Keelingasked the Minister of Health if he will estimate the average net profits made by chemists in the year ended 31st March, 1950, out of the average earnings per pharmacy of £2,244.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: My right hon. Friend cannot estimate the net profits. But about £1,153 of the £2,244 was paid in respect of the cost of drugs and containers, leaving £1,091, which includes the appropriate proportion of business overheads and wages.
    Mr. Keeling: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that some newspapers quoted this figure of £2,244, which was based on a statement by his Department to the Committee on Public Accounts, as if it were net profits? Would it not be better if, in future, his Department used the expression "gross receipts" instead of "earnings"?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: I appreciate the fact that there has been a misinterpretation of the figures submitted to this Committee and I am grateful for this opportunity to rectify it.

    COTTAGES, ESSEX (WATER SUPPLIES)
    Mr. Dribergasked the Minister of Health if he is aware that seven families, including eight children, resident at Friars Cottages, London Road, Black Notley, near Braintree, Essex, can get only a few pails of water daily for all purposes, since the water from a pump which used to supply them is now unfit to drink; and what steps are being taken to connect these cottages with the main water supply a few hundred yards away.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Yes, Sir. These cottages form part of the hamlet of Youngs End, which lies partly in the Braintree Rural District and partly in the
    1344
    Chelmsford rural district. The Braintree Rural District Council have prepared a scheme for extending to Youngs End a water main, which is at present being laid in the neighbourhood, and are discussing with the Chelmsford Rural District Council the question of sharing the initial cost.
    Mr. Driberg: Could my hon. Friend say how long it is likely to be before the water supply is actually there?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: I cannot give any definite date, but I sincerely hope it will not be very long.

    LOCAL AUTHORITIES (GRANTS)
    Mr. Amoryasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that the practice of withholding 10 per cent. of grants to local authorities until the district auditor's examination is completed involves local authorities in loss of funds for considerable periods; and whether he will consider instead paying grants in full and deducting any over payments disclosed from subsequent grants.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: This matter has been fully considered in consultation with the local authorities. My right hon. Friend regrets that he cannot accept the hon. Member's suggestion, but, wherever practicable, payments on account in excess of 90 per cent. are made.
    Mr. Amory: While I appreciate the convenience of the present arrangements to the hon. Member's Ministry, is he aware that his Ministry have a reputation with local authorities of being very slow payers? Is it possible that his rather excessive caution in this case is due to some fear that local authorities, if paid in full, may abscond?
    Mr. Blenkinsop: I certainly do not accept that implication. I understand that part of the difficulty arises from the length of time taken by some local authorities in making their claims.

    MINISTER OF WORKS (SPEECH)
    Mr. C. S. Taylorasked the Prime Minister whether the speech made by the Minister of Works on Sunday, 10th December, at Lowestoft, condoning Chinese

    1345
    intervention in Korea, represents the policy of His Majesty's Government.
    The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison): I have been asked to reply. My right hon. Friend had no intention of condoning Chinese intervention. To do so would certainly not represent the policy of His Majesty's Government.
    Mr. Taylor: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in "The Times" of Monday it says that, on Korea,
    "Mr. Stokes said he did not see how it could have been expected that the Chinese would remain quiescent with foreign troops of whatever nature reaching up to the Manchurian-Soviet frontier."
    If that is not condonation, what is?
    Mr. Morrison: I have had a conversation with my right hon. Friend and so has the Prime Minister, and certainly he had no intention whatever of condoning Chinese intervention. He put a point for consideration, but I think the House would be quite unwise to exaggerate this and to make it appear that my right hon. Friend was making an attack upon anybody.
    Mr. S. Silverman: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Minister of Works made a very similar speech a week earlier in my constituency, and that it was there received with the greatest cordiality and enthusiasm?
    Mr. David Renton: Is the Lord President aware that the speech to which reference has been made by my hon. Friend is not the only recent speech which has apparently been out of phase with Government policy? Is he aware that the principle of joint responsibility of members of the Government is vital to the working of our democratic constitution? Will he say whether that principle is being weakened or will the Prime Minister come here and tell us himself some time whether he intends to abide by it?
    Mr. Morrison: There is no question whatever about the joint responsibility of the Government, and certainly my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister would uphold it. On the other hand, I am bound to point out that nothing pleases Members of Parliament more than when they can find Ministers who do not give exactly the same answers.
    Earl Winterton: May we take it that the right hon. Gentleman's original
    1346
    answer was an apology to this House from the Minister of Works, through the mouth of the Lord President, for having made a statement which was in complete disaccord with the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government?
    Mr. Morrison: No, Sir. That would be an exaggeration. I have answered the Question with the full authority of the Prime Minister and I do not particularly wish to add to it.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Lord President aware that this speech was the most sensible speech we have had on Korea from any Member on the Front Bench and that the opinion of the country is that they wish we could have more speeches like it?
    Mr. Morrison: I have a sneaking regard for my hon. Friend, but if he is trying to elevate himself into a position in which he should brief Cabinet Ministers on what they should say, then I cannot quite accept that.

    COUNTY COUNCIL STAFFS, DURHAM (TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP)
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Prime Minister whether he is now in a position to make a statement as to the result of the discussions between His Majesty's Government and the Durham County Council on the subject of the latter body's intention to make membership of a professional association or a trade union a condition of employment by it; and whether he will make available to hon. Members the correspondence which has passed between His Majesty's Government and the council.
    Mr. H. Morrison: I have been asked to reply. My right hon. Friends the Ministers of Health and Education discussed this question with a deputation from the council yesterday afternoon. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister does not consider that any further statement is necessary at this stage. I will arrange to have copies of the correspondence laid in the Library in so far as correspondence exists.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In view of the imminence of the Recess, and the special responsibility which rests on the Government for having legalised this attitude in 1946, will the right hon. Gentleman give

    1347
    an assurance that any person who loses his job as a result of this decision of the county council, will secure the effective protection of the Government?
    Mr. Morrison: I am satisfied that the county council intend to take no precipitate action to enforce their policy upon their employees. If I may say so, the House would be well advised to leave it there for the time being.
    Mr. Awbery: Is my right hon. Friend aware that for many years it was a rigid law of many county councils and employers that men who were members of a union should not be employed, and that during that period the friends of freedom did not raise their voices against it in this House?
    Mr. Henry Strauss: Is the Lord President aware that the action condemned in the last supplementary question put to him, was made illegal by the Act of 1927?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Eden: May I ask the Leader of the House if he will tell us the business for the week in which we return after the Recess?
The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison): The business for the first week after the Recess will be as follows:
TUESDAY, 23RD JANUARY—Second Reading of the Town and Country Planning Bill; and of the Penicillin (Merchant Ships) Bill [Lords].
WEDNESDAY, 24TH JANUARY—Report and Third Reading of the Local Government (Scotland) Bill; and Committee stage of the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Bill.
THURSDAY, 25TH JANUARY—Second Reading of the Sea Fish Industry Bill, which is being presented today and will be circulated as early as possible; and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolutions;
Motion to approve the National Assistance (Adaptation of Enactments) Regulations.
FRIDAY, 26TH JANUARY—Consideration of Private Members' Bills.
Mr. Eden: May I clear up one point which the right hon. Gentleman referred to last week? In the event of the international situation requiring it, I understand that the House would be recalled, and that the Government would also give heed to any representations that we on this side of the House might need to make—I hope we shall not need to make—on that subject.
Mr. Morrison: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, there is a Standing Order which provides for this possibility, and, of course, if we received representations from the Opposition, or if we ourselves thought it right, we should certainly take those considerations into account.
Mr. Carmichael: Will my right hon. Friend say why the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Bill was not directed to the Scottish Grand Committee for the Committee stage, instead of to a Committee of the whole House?
Mr. Morrison: That would have been the alternative course, but this is a Bill of some importance and we thought we would elevate it to the importance of being taken on the Floor of the House, which, I am sure, will be acceptable to my hon. Friend.
Mr. Donnelly: In view of the startling revelations made in a pamphlet, "John Bull's Other Island" by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Horn-church (Mr. Bing), what time will my right hon. Friend give to debate the Northern Ireland reserved services? Would he consider arranging a Supply Day for that?
Mr. Morrison: Perhaps my hon. Friend would have a word with me and further enlighten me on that point. I am bound to say that I think any effort to stir up friction between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic is not a subject on which I enter with enthusiasm.
Mr. Janner: In view of the very considerable anxiety that continues to prevail with regard to the security of tenure of people in leasehold properties and shops will my right hon. Friend say when he proposes to take the next stage of the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Bill?
Mr. Morrison: I should have liked to take it during the week of our return, but there were representations that there would be some difficulty about Amendments appearing on the Notice Paper in time for them to receive proper consideration. On the whole, I thought we had better not take it that week, but I hope we shall take the Committee stage in the following week.
Mr. Henderson Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman said just now that the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Bill was being taken on the Floor of the House because it was a Bill of some importance. I hope that that does not mean that in the view of the Government, only Bills of no importance are sent to the Scottish Grand Committee.
Mr. Morrison: I am very much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I would not say that for one moment. Indeed, I think that the deliberations of the Scottish Grand Committee in relation to Scottish affairs are of the greatest importance, and that I have been helpful in increasing the status of that important Committee.

BILL PRESENTED
  SEA FISH INDUSTRY BILL
  "to make provision for the reorganisation, development and regulation of the white fish industry; to amend the law relating to fishery harbours, the catching and landing of sea fish and other matters affecting or connected with the sea fishing industry; to abolish the Scottish Fisheries Advisory Council; and for purposes connected therewith," presented by Mr. Thomas Williams; supported by Mr. Ede, Mr. McNeil, Mr. Webb, Mr. Jay, Mr. George Brown and Mr. Thomas Fraser; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 58.]
  ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS)
  House, at its rising Tomorrow, to adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd January.—[Mr. H. Morrison.]
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

  Prime Minister's Visit to U.S.A.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. R. J. Taylor.]
  3.36 p.m.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): I think there has been a general desire that with this debate I should give a fuller account of the talks which I had at Washington and supplement the fairly full report that was given in the communiqué. I should like at the outset to recall the circumstances in which I decided to pay a visit to the United States of America. It will be recalled that the House debated foreign affairs on 29th and 30th November, and that just at that time there were grave developments in Korea. I think there was in this country, and, perhaps, not only in this country, a good deal of anxiety as to where events were leading us, and the course of the debate indicated that the present time would be opportune for me to pay a visit to the President of the United States, which I had had in contemplation for some time.
  I accordingly made my suggestion to President Truman that I should visit him in order that we might in an intimate way take a wide survey of the problems which face us today. I think that that suggestion was welcomed; and the President, although beset with other preoccupations and engagements, very readily undertook to receive me. Let me say that. I did not expect that the result of this meeting would lead to any spectacular action or any dramatic announcement. What I hoped for, and what, I think, was achieved, was a closer understanding of the points of view of our two Governments.
  When I arrived in Washington on Monday, 4th December, the President in person. accompanied by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Harriman and other high officials, welcomed me; and throughout the talks, both in my meetings with the President and his advisers, and in other meetings that were held between officials at various levels, the attitude of the American Administration could not have been more cordial; they could not have shown themselves more anxious to be helpful. We discussed in a full, frank and friendly way the general background

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  of our policy and our attitude to the main problems which confront us in international affairs.
  I knew very well when I started on my journey that, like the people of this country, the people of America are profoundly concerned with the preservation of world peace. This was amply confirmed by all that I saw in that country. I should like to make it clear at the outset that my talks with President Truman were concerned with the relations of our two countries and the contribution which our two countries could make to the common cause. It was not for us, when military events were moving so rapidly in Korea, to try to take day to day decisions on the problems which confront the United Nations. It was not for us to prejudge the conclusions of our friends and Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Nor, of course, was it for me, as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to attempt to speak on behalf of our fellow members of the Commonwealth. But I have naturally been in close contact with the Governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth on these matters, and I conferred with their representatives both in this country and in Washington.
  We felt, as we sat there in Washington, that our task was to contribute to building a just and lasting peace. That is the objective of both Governments. On the Tuesday, I was given a very full report on the military situation, and, subsequently, later developments were outlined to us. While I was away, the Minister of Defence made a statement in this House, I think on 7th December, which dealt with operations up to that date. I should like to give the House the latest available information.
  There is no doubt that the United Nations Forces met with a very serious reverse. They suffered very heavily in both men and equipment. But the situation in the last few days has considerably improved, though, of course, there may be ups and downs. During the past week the United Nations have continued their orderly withdrawal in the west, with virtually no contact with the Chinese Communist Forces, and are in the process of stabilising their positions in the area of the 38th Parallel. It would appear that the reconstituted North Korean Army is now being infiltrated to the front line in
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  order to probe our positions while the Chinese Armies regroup in the rear. A significant feature of the past few days has been the movement south from Pyongyang towards our lines of some 20,000 to 30,000 refugees. Many of these are probably soldiers trying to infiltrate into our positions.
  By now the United Nations Forces which had been cut off in the Chosin Reservoir area, including our own 41st Independent Royal Marine Commandos, have safely reached the bridgehead of Hungnam and are being evacuated by sea. As already reported in the Press, United Nations Forces in this area have suffered heavy casualties. There is no doubt that the intense air support they received greatly assisted them to fight their way out in face of the tremendous odds against them. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade and the British 29th Brigade, who played a prominent part in the rearguard action covering the withdrawal of the 8th Army, are now being withdrawn into reserve in our new defensive positions.
  Though future Chinese intentions are not clear, they are continuing to move reinforcements of troops and supplies over the Yalu River. It is evident that on the Western front the southward movement of the large mass of Chinese forces has been greatly hampered by the lack of transport, limited road net and air bombardment of road and rail bridges and supply lines. For those reasons the Chinese Armies, while continuing to thrust forward with patrol elements, have not been capable of exploiting their initial success since the early days of their counter-offensive.
  Chinese losses are reported to have been extremely heavy. In the Chosin Reservoir area alone, their casualties have been estimated at 25,000. The Chinese supply problem has been most acute for them in this area. Many captured Chinese are suffering from severe frostbite and have stated that they had had no food for five days. The feeling at General MacArthur's Headquarters is that they are confident that the United Nations' Forces can retain a firm hold in the peninsula. It will be realised that the military situation during the past ten days has been fluid, and that it was against this changing background that our talks took place.
  Our first meetings were naturally concerned with the Far Eastern situation,

  1353
  and the communiqué brings out very clearly both the points of agreement and the points of difference between the two Governments. But it would be a mistake to over-emphasise those differences.
  We are at one in our support of the action of the United Nations in resisting aggression. Both Governments are profoundly desirous of preventing the war from spreading. Both seek to reach a settlement in the Far East and indeed in the whole of Asia. We in this country have great interests in Asia, where there are peoples who, under our care, are marching on the road to full self-government. We are united in the British Commonwealth of Nations with India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and with the southern Dominions who border on the Far East. We have our friends in the Middle East. We have long and friendly relations with the peoples of Asia, not least the Chinese; and it has been our consistent policy to meet the just claims of the Asiatic nations to be dealt with on terms of full equality. We have taken a realist view.
  When it became clear that the present rulers of China were in effective occupation of that country we gave them our recognition. We believe it is right that Chinese representation in the United Nations should belong to the present Government of China. We have been working for this, and I believe that but for the Korean episode this end would have been achieved.
  I stated our position in the course of our meetings. Korea is essentially a United Nations problem. Its outcome will have an important effect on the authority and prestige of the United Nations. It is vital that that authority should be maintained, and it is, therefore, of supreme importance that any settlement should be arrived at under United Nations auspices. As we are all agreed that an extension of the conflict must be avoided, there must sooner or later be a settlement, and the sooner that settlement can be arrived at the better, to bring to an end the sufferings of the people of Korea and to avoid further casualties.
  These matters are now being considered at the United Nations, and I should like to weigh my words very carefully. His Majesty's Government firmly believe that the first step in the solution of the Korean problem is to bring the
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  fighting to a very early end. They have, therefore, given their support to a resolution put forward in the United Nations by a number of Asian and Middle Eastern countries which provides for a cease fire. That motion was carried by an overwhelming majority in the Political Committee. It might give food for thought to some of those innocents who are apt to be led astray to know that the only opposition to this attempt to bring the fighting to an end was by the Soviet and its satellites, who are talking of peace.
  It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that the Chinese and North Koreans will respond to this initiative and thus bring the conflict to an end. I should like to take this opportunity of paying tribute to the statesmanlike initiative of these Asiatic and Middle Eastern countries, and in particular to the special efforts made by the Government of India and their representative at the United Nations. I would deeply regret it if anything said here should in any way impede the success of this initiative. I should also like to pay tribute to the work of the Minister of State and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, who have taken a prominent part in all these discussions.
  In our attitude towards the longer-term problem our objectives rest on the Cairo Declaration, which was agreed upon by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. We seek a free and independent Korea. Our ultimate aim is a Korea living on terms of peace and friendship with its neighbours and with the rest of the world. The Cairo Declaration, which was agreed on by all Korea's neighbours, expressed acceptance of two principles: non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. It is for the Chinese Government to make it clear that they accept these principles, for their recent actions have thrown doubt upon this.
  The question of Formosa, which was also dealt with in the Cairo Declaration, is one of the most difficult of all the problems facing us in the Far East. There are mutual fears and suspicions to be got rid of before a solution can be found. It is right that everyone should try to understand the point of view both of the Chinese rulers and also of the United States of America. Until China shows by her action that she is not obstructing the fulfilment of the Cairo Declaration in respect of Korea and accepts the basic

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  principle of the Cairo Declaration, it will be difficult to reach a satisfactory solution.
  The President and I agree that consideration of this difficult problem by the United Nations would be helpful. In the Far East, as in other parts of the world, there are two courses which are open to us in dealing with disputes and difficulties which may arise. Either we must try to negotiate a settlement based on the acceptance of normal standards of international practice and on the principles and obligations of the Charter of the United Nations, or, on the other hand, we shall find ourselves drifting inevitably towards war. There is no middle course.
  In applying this basic principle to the fact of Chinese intervention in Korea and to the facts of Chinese behaviour there and elsewhere in the last few months, His Majesty's Government believe that a solution must be sought by means of peaceful negotiations. We may seek a solution; we shall not find one unless, on the Chinese side, there is equal determination to use negotiation rather than force—to accept normal standards of international behaviour, to accept the obligations and principles of the United Nations' Charter. If there is such willingness on the Chinese side, His Majesty's Government are confident that solutions can be found compatible with the principles of the Charter. Nothing short of willingness on both sides to accept the principles of the Charter and to use peaceful means for the settlement of disputes can prevent perpetuation of international friction which, in turn, may lead to a breakdown of the United Nations and perhaps even to widespread hostilities.
  I should like to say a word about the arrangements for liaison between the American administration and ourselves in Washington. I should like to pay tribute to the really admirable work which is being done by our representatives in Washington, both by Lord Tedder on the military side and by His Majesty's Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, on the political side. Many of their contacts are, of course, informal. They depend for their success very largely on the friendly relations these men and their colleagues can establish with their American opposite numbers. I have high hopes that these valuable interchanges will continue, and indeed, that the relationships which
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  they have fostered will grow ever closer: but it would, to my mind, be a mistake to try to formalise these arrangements. Anything more formal might very well be misunderstood, and it would, I think, destroy some of the essential features on which their present success depends.
  The regular day-to-day work of liaison which is carried on in this way is supplemented and reinforced by the visits which Members of the Government have been able to pay to the United States. The Foreign Secretary, as the House knows, attended the Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers, and also the meeting of the Atlantic Council held in New York in September when the General Assembly of the United Nations was meeting. The Minister of Defence has taken part in meetings of the Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers in Washington, and, finally, there have been my own discussions with the President. Direct discussion across the table will always do more to clear up misunderstandings than the exchange of formal communications. The close working relationships which grow up in this way will do far more to harmonise our policy and actions than any written agreements about consultation.
  I think that here perhaps lies the answer to some of the doubts and misgivings which have been expressed on two important topics: first of all, the control of military operations in Korea, and, secondly, the use of atomic weapons. On the first of these topics, the House will remember what was said by the Foreign Secretary in the debate on foreign affairs at the end of November. He made it clear that it is for the United States Government who provide the unified command in Korea to ensure that no military action which had political implications should be taken without appropriate consultations with other governments. The House will recall that the Foreign Secretary gave an assurance that there had in fact been such consultation. As a result of my talks with the President, I am completely satisfied that the fullest weight will be given to the views of His Majesty's Government before instructions are issued to the United Nations Commander which have political implications.
  Questions have also been asked about the atomic weapon and the procedure by which the decision to use it will be reached if that ever became necessary. It is

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  generally known that there was a wartime partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in the development of the atomic weapon.
  Mr. Churchill: It was not limited.
  The Prime Minister: The nature of the arrangements which we made in war-time and the nature of the agreement between the Governments have never been revealed. It is also public knowledge that the co-operation between the countries continues for certain purposes in the atomic energy field. For example, the results of a Tripartite Conference on the declassification of secret material were recently made known.
  The position of the United States Administration in many of these matters is now regulated by legislation enacted in the United States since the end of the war. But it was in the spirit and against the background of that partnership that I was able to raise the vital question of the use of the atomic weapon, and it was in the same spirit and against the same background that I received assurances which I consider to be perfectly satisfactory.
  Mr. Churchill: We do not know what the assurances are.
  The Prime Minister: In our talks the President and I considered Far Eastern problems in the perspective of the world situation. We are concerned with the preservation of peace not only in the Far East but in South East Asia, in the Middle East and in Europe.
  The Government of the United States despite their concern with Far Eastern events are fully conscious of the need for defence against possible aggression in other areas. They recognise how vital is the defence of Europe. We discussed and reached complete agreement on Atlantic defence. We agreed that integrated forces for the defence of the Atlantic community must be established in Europe and that a Supreme Commander should be appointed as soon as possible. We agreed also that it was urgently necessary to increase Western defence beyond its present level. These matters and the question of a German contribution to her own defence in common with the rest of Western Europe have all been under discussion in London,
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  Washington, and Paris for the last three months.
  The North Atlantic Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers are meeting at Brussels on Monday and Tuesday of next week, when the effect of the implementation of the principles agreed upon by us in Washington will be fully considered. In view of these meetings I would prefer not to go into details now, but I am confident that the decisions taken will reflect the sense of urgency which inspired my talks in Washington, and will bring us nearer to what we hope to attain—a Western world strong enough to resist aggression, and therefore to prevent aggression and to preserve peace. Meanwhile, we shall neglect no opportunity of possible action to remove, by agreement, the differences which are disturbing the international scene and threatening world peace.
  In his statements in the House on 13th and 29th November, the Foreign Secretary explained the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Soviet Government's proposal for a meeting of the Four Powers to discuss the demilitarisation of Germany. Since he last spoke, a meeting of Ambassadors of the three Western Powers has been held in Paris and agreement has been reached on the draft of a reply to the Soviet Government. This draft is now under consideration by the three Governments. It would not be right that I should enter into details about its contents at this stage. But I can say that it is in close accord with the views of His Majesty's Government, as explained by the Foreign Secretary in his earlier statements, and that it reflects the common desire of the three Governments to examine all the possibilities of a fruitful discussion with the Soviet Government such as would offer a real prospect of removing the underlying causes of the prevailing world tension. His Majesty's Government are much gratified by the identity of views between the three Western Powers which was revealed in the discussions in Paris on this very important matter.
  To return to our talks. Having reached agreement on defence matters, the President and I turned to the consideration of the economic implications of the increased armaments on which we were agreed. It was clearly recognised that the needs of

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  defence would call for very difficult economic adjustments in both our countries, and, indeed, in other countries as well. It was fully appreciated that a healthy civilian economy is a necessary basis for adequate defence. Failure to maintain a sound economy would, in fact, defeat our whole purpose of building up the strength of the democracies. An aspect of this matter to which we devoted much attention was the supply and utilisation of raw materials.
  There is already heavy pressure on certain raw materials, and we have been feeling a great deal of anxiety about our supplies. But the demands for raw materials for defence must be considered in relation to essential civilian requirements. In the course of our discussions, we pointed out how vital this question was to the United Kingdom, whose economy is based on the import of raw materials and food and the export of finished goods to pay for them. Of course, this is well understood by the Administration in Washington, but it is quite difficult for people who live in a great continent with abundant supplies of raw materials, such as America, to realise just what is the economic position of Great Britain.
  In our discussions, we were concerned both with the immediate situation and with the need for co-ordinated action for the future in order to avoid dislocation so far as possible, and to enable us to prepare for difficulties before they are encountered. On the immediate position, we stated that the United Kingdom was faced with certain critical shortages which were likely to interfere with our production almost at once, notably zinc and sulphur. We found that the United States were also facing similar difficulties, but they fully understood our position, and they undertook immediately to see what help could be given us to meet this emergency. I very much hope that, as a result, we shall avoid the worst dangers which were threatening us in this regard. But in this field we ourselves can help the United States, and we undertook to continue discussions with them on the problems that are causing them immediate concern.
  Looking to the future, we found their thinking was proceeding on very much the same lines, and the result of our talks
  1360
  was most satisfactory. We both recognised that raw materials are just as vital to the life of all other free countries as they are to ourselves, and that these problems therefore cannot be solved by the United States and the United Kingdom acting alone. The first essential is obviously to increase supplies wherever, and as fast as, possible. We have agreed on a joint examination of this problem with a view to urgent action in cooperation with other countries, but we cannot expect that the shortages now confronting us can be quickly or easily overcome by expansion of supplies—that must take some time.
  We have to face the fact that over a considerable period there will have to be an equitable sharing out of what is available. That sharing out should be in accordance with the two principles of giving priority to urgent defence requirements and of maintaining healthy civilian economies. That is a hard problem, but we have agreed to work together in the fullest co-operation towards its solution. Before the visit to Washington, there had been some discussions on this question, both in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. But the problem is a much wider one, since our partners in the Commonwealth and our friends in other parts of the world are all deeply concerned both as producers and consumers. We have, however, a great wealth of experience derived from the last war to help us to solve this problem, and I believe we shall solve it.
  After the conclusion of my talks in Washington, I went to New York, and there I met the President of the Assembly of the United Nations, Mr. Entezam, and the Secretary General, Mr. Trygve Lie. I also had an opportunity of discussing matters with Sir Gladwyn Jebb and with my Ministerial colleagues, and of meeting the representatives there of the Commonwealth.
  As the House knows, I went on from there to visit Canada, where I had the pleasure of meeting the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, and his Cabinet colleagues. I was able to discuss very fully with them the subject matter of my talks in Washington, and there was helpful discussion on the official level of particular matters, especially action on this problem of raw materials. As always,

  1361
  I found our Canadian friends most helpful and co-operative, and we found our views generally in complete harmony. It will be realised, of course, that the Canadian Government stands in a very special position in these matters because of her partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and her very close relations with the United States.
  I was particularly glad to have had this talk with President Truman, in view of the fact that early in January we shall be welcoming the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at a meeting here in London. I shall therefore be able to enter into these discussions with the views of the United States Administration fresh in my mind. Throughout these difficult times we have kept in close touch with our fellow members of the Commonwealth. It is an enormous advantage to us that we are able to bring to bear on world problems the viewnoints of our fellow members of the Commonwealth. The knowledge thus gained is of the greatest help in enabling us to form right judgments on difficult problems with which we have to deal. Especially when we are dealing with the problems of Asia, it is very valuable to have the views of the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.
  In talking of international affairs, I cannot forbear referring to the great loss sustained by New Zealand and the Commonwealth by the death of Mr. Peter Fraser. I recall his steadfastness during the war. He was a true representative of his country in his loyalty and readiness to give everything for the common cause. I recall his wise counsel in times of peace, when he met here his fellow Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth. I, too, have lost in him a very close personal friend. I am sure the House will join with me in sympathy with the people of New Zealand and his relatives in their loss.
  In conclusion, may I once again say how vital to the preservation of world peace is close co-operation between this country and the United States. Nothing would please the enemies of democracy more than to see us estranged. There are mischief makers in both countries. Some people here constantly suggest that Britain is a subservient follower of the United States. There are people in America who suggest that the United States is misled
  1362
  by the clever diplomacy of Britain, They are both wrong. The United Kingdom and the United States are found acting in concert, because they are both nurtured in freedom and democracy. They draw their moral strength from the same sources. The people of both countries have the same profound desire for peace. If my visit has done anything to increase our mutual understanding it will not have been in vain.
  4.13 p.m.
  Mr. Churchill: I hasten to associate myself wholeheartedly with the tribute which the Prime Minister has paid to Mr. Peter Fraser. His part in the war was in every way worthy of the country he represented and of the magnificent New Zealand Divisions which served with honour in every field.
  We are all very glad to see that the military situation for the time being in Korea has somewhat improved. I hope also that there is truth in the reports that a measure of censorship is being established over the despatches from the front or from Tokio by the war correspondents of all the United Nations. I should think most of us agree with General Robertson's protest upon this point. When one sees set forth day after day the exact position, numbers, condition and intentions of the United Nations troops, very often unit by unit, one cannot but feel that it is hardly fair to the soldiers who are fighting that the enemy should be presented with such complete intelligence, whereas so little seems to be known by us about the other side, and such a large measure of ignorance prevails, among the general public at least, about the enemy's disposition, strength and movements. Indeed, the wildest estimates are given on high authority only to be contradicted and reversed a few days later.
  One instance, a small one, but not without significance, particularly struck me. A Centurion tank was damaged and left behind. This was immediately published and its importance emphasised. All the secrets were published of the latest British tank. Thus this vehicle, left behind among great numbers of no doubt other broken down vehicles, and in all the litter of retreat amid the snow, acquired instantly, in the enemy's eyes, an exceptional significance. I was very glad to read—I hope it is true—that it had been successfully destroyed from the air. That

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  would have been a very good tale to tell if true, after it had happened, but why was it necessary to attract the enemy's attention to this vehicle beforehand. That seems to me a particular illustration. We really must have tighter control over what is published. We all seek to prevent and limit aggression, and one of the additional deterrents which we might impose upon the enemy's aggression would be to tell them that if it goes on much longer we shall cut them off from these invaluable supplies of information.
  The Prime Minister's visit to Washington has done nothing but good. The question we all have to consider this afternoon in the House of Commons is, how much good. The Prime Minister spoke of the importance of renewing the series of meetings between the President and the Prime Minister which had taken place during the war and since the war. We all agree with that. We all agree with the advantages of direct discussion to which the Prime Minister has just referred.
  I must say it seems to me that five years is rather a long interval, and the decision when it came, was very suddenly taken. My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) spoke on 29th November and urged that we should have stronger representation at Washington at the highest level. I endorsed this when I spoke the next day. I did not wish to appear to reflect any more than he did, in the slightest degree, upon our excellent Ambassador in Washington, and I used the particular phrase,
  "Ministerial representation."
  That very evening we were told that the Prime Minister was going. During the afternoon there was some excitement caused in the House by the accounts of Mr. Truman's interview with the Press which appeared on the tape. But I understand that this was not the reason that led to the Prime Minister's decision to go and that this was taken earlier in the day. Certainly the decision was very hastily arrived at, after an interval of five years.
  Many will think that earlier meetings might have been held. Several recent occasions occur to one. When the Soviet-inspired aggression by the North Korean Government across the 38th Parallel took place, and when the United States intervened vigorously and actively with the approval of the United Nations
  1364
  Assembly and we joined with them at the end of June, that was certainly an occasion which the Prime Minister might have considered for talking matters over with our great Ally and friend.
  Again, after General MacArthur's brilliant counter-stroke, which gave us back Seoul and changed the whole aspect of the fighting up to that point in Korea, would have been, it seems to me, a good moment to talk over the next steps. At that moment many issues were open, which would have gained by having that direct discussion face to face between the heads of Government assisted by their military advisers. It is always easy to be wise after the event, but there were many people in this country who were wise before the event. I am by no means sure that His Majesty's Government and their expert advisers are excluded from that large number.
  Those who had this view felt that it would be wiser to fortify a line, if not at the 38th Parallel, at the waist or at the best military position in advance of it, thus leaving a broad no-man's-land in which we could reconnoitre and into which we could go with mobile columns and, of course, with the all-powerful air forces available while building up all the time a strong fortified line which we could hold while, perhaps, conversations went on.
  There is much to be said for strong fortified lines. If properly organised in depth, if protected in front by ever-expanding minefields and wire entanglements, and if developed week after week by concreted structures and excavations and firmly held with modern fire power, they would prove a terrific obstacle to the advance of infantry. All this becomes greater when both flanks rest upon the sea and the sea is in Allied command and when we have unquestioned mastery of the air. Such a position, once established, as it would have been possible to do, about 100 miles long, presents a very different obstacle to the advance and infiltration of masses of enemy infantry, from a moving front in hilly, rocky, scrub-covered country, then broadened to about 300 miles.
  I am speaking only of what has happened in the past. I do not attempt to say anything about what may happen in the future. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] It would be very unwise and

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  unnecessary to do so in military operations. To pierce a properly fortified line not only would masses of artillery have to be accumulated, but there would also have to be very heavy concentrations of armour. These would present admirable targets to overwhelming air power. It certainly seems that the Chinese armies, if they had attacked such a line, might well have renewed on an even larger scale the painful experiences which we ourselves so often suffered on the Somme and at Passchendaele and in other bloody battlefields of the First World War. I cannot help feeling that it would have been well if all these matters had been talked over at the right moment and in good time in Washington by the highest authorities in both our countries.
  We immediately approved the Prime Minister's decision to go when he did, and I feel sure that no one regrets it now. We welcome and wholeheartedly support the Prime Minister's statement about British and American unity and how their two flags will fly together however the winds may blow. That is, indeed, the foundation, as he said in his closing words, of our safety and the best hope for the peace of the world and for the survival of free civilisation. It is a great comfort in the darkening scene to feel that there are no party differences, or very limited party differences, in this country on this supreme issue, and that the task of trying to drive a wedge between us and the United States is left to the Communists and their fellow-travellers, aided perhaps, no doubt through folly rather than malice, by the usual Ministerial indiscretions.
  Another advantage which has come from the Prime Minister's journey has been the renewed explicit declarations by the United States emphasising the priority of the defence of Europe. We are glad indeed that General Eisenhower is to be appointed to the Supreme Command of the army—however it may be denominated—which is being constituted there. We were led to believe that this appointment would be made many weeks ago. Progress in European defence, which was tardily begun, continues to be lamentably slow. It is more than nine months since I pointed out that no effective defence of Europe was possible without the armed strength of Germany. The movement of opinion in that direction has been continual, but nothing has been done. No
  1366
  agreement has been reached, and meanwhile Germany lies even more undefended than do other European countries under the menace of Communist and Russian aggression.
  The months slip quickly away all the time. Several years have already been wasted, frittered away. The overwhelming Russian military power towers up against us, committees are multiplied, papers are written, words are outpoured and one declaration succeeds another, but nothing in the slightest degree in proportion to the scale of events or to their urgency has been done. When we return after our anxious Recess we shall require a full and prolonged debate upon defence, and we shall demand that a portion of it shall be in secret.
  It was with the danger of Europe in my mind that I said some weeks ago that I hoped that we should not get entangled in China. In order to protect myself from the charge of being wise after the event, I venture to remind the House that on 16th November, before these recent reverses in Korea had taken place, I asked the Minister of Defence a supplementary question, which I do not think he resented in any way:
  "… whether he and the Foreign Secretary will constantly bear in mind the great importance of our not becoming, and of our Allies so far as we can influence their actions not becoming, too much pinned down in China or in the approaches to China at a time when the danger in Europe is … occupying all our minds?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th November, 1950; Vol. 480, c. 1910.]
  I need scarcely say that I hold to that conviction still.
  In view, however, of what has happened since then in Korea and in the United Nations Assembly, I feel it requires to be stated with more precision and refinement. We must not at any time be drawn into urging a policy which would inflict dishonour or humiliation upon the United States or upon the United Nations. Such a course would be at least as full of danger as any other now open to us. We learn from the newspapers that the proposals for a truce or cease fire which were proposed by the 13 Asiatic and Arab states, have been opposed by the Soviet delegation. They certainly seemed to be very far-reaching proposals from our point of view.
  I will not say more about them, but, while the fullest priority should be given

  1367
  to the defence of Western Europe, it would be a great mistake to lose our sense of proportion and cast everything to the winds elsewhere. The only prudent course open to the United States and ourselves is to stabilise the local military position and, if the opportunity then occurs, to negotiate with the aggressors and at least make sure that we negotiate from strength and not from weakness.
  We shall no doubt hear from the Foreign Secretary tonight how the question of further conversations with Soviet Russia stands. There was, I think, fairly complete agreement in the House that no abrupt negative or merely dilatory action would be appropriate to the Russian request, and from what we have read in the newspapers, it does not seem likely that there will be any serious disagreement between us upon the procedure eventually to be adopted.
  I am strongly in favour of every effort being made by every means, to secure a fair and reasonable settlement with Russia. I should, however, be failing in frankness to the House, and to some of those who agree with me upon this matter, to whom I am much opposed in many ways, if I did not make it clear at this stage that we must not place undue hopes upon the success of any negotiations which may be undertaken. It is our duty—and a duty which we owe to the cause of peace and to our own consciences—to leave no effort unmade that wisdom and fair play can suggest, and that patience can bring forward. But on this side of the House we have never contemplated that if negotiations failed, we should abandon any of the great causes for which we have stood in the past, and for which the United Nations organisation stands today.
  The declaration of the Prime Minister that there will be no appeasement also commands almost universal support. It is a good slogan for the country. It seems to me, however, that in this House it requires to be more precisely defined. What we really mean, I think, is no appeasement through weakness or fear. Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.
  1368
  When nations or individuals get strong they are often truculent and bullying, but when they are weak they become better mannered. But this is the reverse of what is healthy and wise. I have always been astonished, having seen the end of these two wars, how difficult it is to make people understand the Roman wisdom, "Spare the conquered and confront the proud." I think I will go so far as to say it in the original:
  Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.
  The modern practice has too often been. "punish the defeated and grovel to the strong."
  Unhappily, except as regards the atomic bomb—about which I shall have a word to say before I sit down—we are in a very weak position and likely to remain so for several years. As I have repeatedly said, it is only the vast superiority of the United States in this awful weapon that gives us any chance of survival. The argument is now put forward that we must never use the atomic bomb until, or unless, it has been used against us first. In other words, you must never fire until you have been shot dead. That seems to me undoubtedly a silly thing to say and a still more imprudent position to adopt.
  Moreover, such a resolve would certainly bring war nearer. The deterrent effect of the atomic bomb is at the present time almost our sole defence. Its potential use is the only lever by which we can hope to obtain reasonable consideration in an attempt to make a peaceful settlement with Soviet Russia. If they had superiority, or even something like equality in this weapon with the United States, I cannot feel any assurance that they would be restrained by the conscientious scruples or moral inhibitions which are often so vocal in this country. It would certainly be a poor service to the cause of peace to free them from all cause of apprehension until they were in every respect ready to strike.
  The Soviet power could not be confronted, or even placated, with any hope of success if we were in these years of tension through which we are passing to deprive ourselves of the atomic bomb, or to prevent its use by announcing gratuitously self-imposed restrictions. Of course, when we say "we," we must not forget that we have been unable to make the atomic bomb ourselves. Our failure during five years of peace has astonished me very much when I remember how far we

  1369
  were advanced, not only in knowledge but in initiative, in 1942 and 1943.
  In the communiqué published last week by the President and the Prime Minister, President Truman stated that it was his "hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb," and he undertook to keep His Majesty's Government informed of developments "which might bring about a change in the situation." This assurance by the President contained in the joint communiqué is in very general terms. There is no guarantee in that assurance even of consultation. But in war-time we were on equal terms with the United States in the whole business of atomic research. Today the Prime Minister used a new phrase when he said that full weight will be given to any representations we may make. In 1943 I made an agreement with the President. Since then I understand other arrangements have been made. The Prime Minister tells us today that the same spirit and the same background are there in the present understanding, but he and one or two of my friends and former colleagues on both sides are the only ones in the House to know exactly what this means. I am sure that the Government would be wise to make a fuller statement upon this subject than we have yet heard.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: Would the right hon. Gentleman allow me
  Mr. Churchill: No, I would rather not, thank you very much. One can always take examples from what happens. The President of the United States the other day let himself be cross-examined freely during a Press conference on this very topic. In my opinion, one ought not to say anything upon the subject one has not very carefully considered beforehand. I certainly do not intend to be cross-examined by the hon. Gentleman, because I have considered carefully what I should say. I am strongly of opinion that the Government should make a fuller statement upon this subject, and that this would be beneficial both to our own position and to our relationship with the United States. After all, this matter has become one of very real and vital consequence to us since the decision of the Government to afford the United States the bomber base in East Anglia, which makes it all the more necessary that the
  1370
  position in which we stand should be clearly defined.
  We are debating this afternoon matters of supreme importance to ourselves and to the whole Empire and Commonwealth of Nations. We do so at a time when, on domestic questions, parties are evenly balanced and deeply divided. A continuance of these conditions is harmful to our national strength. The responsibility lies in the first instance upon the Government and in a special degree, of course, upon the Prime Minister. They decide the movement of our affairs. We respond to the action which they take in these matters.
  The Prime Minister has taken marked steps to increase the differences in home politics. I ask him, even now, if he will not reconsider—[interruption.] Hon. Members opposite can get ready to howl. They have not had much at which to cheer during the speech to which they listened earlier; now, perhaps, they will have their chance. I ask the Prime Minister, even now, whether he will not reconsider his decision to force the steel nationalisation Act upon us in the midst of all these storms and dangers. Not only should he consider that an abatement of domestic quarrels would be advantageous—
  Mr. S. Silverman: So that they can get the profits.
  Mr. Churchill: —but he should also consider the injury that will be done to our rearmament programme by taking this industry from the competent hands in which it now rests and placing it under the imperfect and inexperienced State management by which it is threatened. It really is not a matter for mere hilarity for uneasy minds and unsettled consciences below the Gangway.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Profits!
  Mr. Churchill: The Prime Minister spoke about raw materials and the arrangements which were being made for them, but steel is the mainspring of all effective rearmament measures. We wished the right hon. Gentleman well upon his Transatlantic mission, and we have recognised the advantages which it has secured, but I will say now that if he persists in his present attitude on steel nationalisation, he will fail in his duties

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  to the country as a whole. Although we approved of the visit of the Prime Minister to the United States, although we lent him full support on his mission, although the results have been helpful so far as they go, we cannot in these circumstances feel confidence in the loyalty of the Government to the people of this country. The Prime Minister is counting on our support, which will—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—which will not be withheld on issues of national importance abroad, while at the same time he is seeking to placate his political tail by acts of party faction at home.
  Mr. Frederick Elwyn Jones Mr. Frederick Elwyn Jones (West Ham, South) rose—
  Mr. Churchill: It is very doubtful whether these—
  Hon. Members: Point of order.
  Mr. Speaker: Does the hon. Member wish to raise a point of order?
  Mr. Frederick Elwyn Jones: Is it in order for the Leader of the Opposition to question the loyalty of His Majesty's Government?
  Mr. Speaker: That is a matter for the right hon. Gentleman and not for me. That is not a point of order.
  Mr. Churchill: As my voice was drowned by hon. Members opposite, I might repeat the sentence on which I closed—namely, that we think it is very doubtful whether—
  Mr. S. Silverman Mr. S. Silverman rose—
  Mr. Churchill: If there is any one man in this House who should hang his head in shame—[Interruption]—it is the hon. Gentleman, who won cheers by abusing the United States as shabby moneylenders.
  Mr. Silverman Mr. Silverman rose—
  Hon. Members: Sit down.
  Mr. Speaker: Is this another point of order?
  Mr. Churchill: —and now has to applaud with all his strength the tributes paid by the leader—
  Mr. Silverman: Mr. Speaker—
  Mr. Speaker: Does the hon. Member rise to a point of order?
  Mr. Silverman: Yes, Sir.
  Mr. Speaker: Then will the hon. Member put it?
  Mr. Silverman: I want to ask you, Sir, whether it is in order for the Leader of the Opposition to use his great opportunity on an historic occasion to accuse everybody in the world except himself of disloyalty.
  Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order. Hon. Members must not waste the time of the House by these mere party accusations.
  Mr. Churchill: As the hon. Gentleman went out of his way to interrupt me in what I was hoping would be the closing sentence that I should have to utter, I thought it right to point out what he had said in the past and to draw his attention—
  Mrs. Braddock: What has the right hon. Gentleman said in the past?
  Mr. Churchill: —to draw his attention to the very different sentiments which have been put forward today. I regret very much that the Prime Minister—[Interruption.]—I beg hon. Gentlemen opposite not to interrupt any expression of their feelings which they may desire to make, because it does not trouble or worry me in the slightest. It only prevents my getting on with what I have to say.
  Mrs. Braddock: If your gang had been in control, we would have been at war by now.
  Mr. Churchill: I am quite determined to utter my last sentence if I have to stand here half an hour. What I say is that I very much regret that the Prime Minister has not risen to the heights of his national responsibility, and I predict that he will encounter misfortunes and reproach on the discordant course to which he has devoted himself. [Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Hon. Members should be aware that booing is quite out of order.
  Mrs. Braddock: It is necessary—
  Mr. Speaker: If it occurs again, I shall suspend the Sitting for a short time.
  Mrs. Braddock: You need to, after a speech like that.
  4.50 p.m.
  Mr. S. N. Evans: For many years I have been not the least of the right hon. Gentleman's admirers, but I must say how sorry I am that, perhaps for the first time, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) has failed to live up to the level of a great and important occasion. We are standing at a very critical crossroad and I should have thought that if ever there were an occasion when we should all measure our words very carefully, it was today.
  The right hon. Gentleman complained that the Atlantic journey had been too tardy in its arrival. I take it that it was always open to the right hon. Gentleman to make representations through the usual channels if he thought there was all that urgency. For myself, and I think for the nation, we are all profoundly grateful to the Prime Minister for his statesmanlike conduct of the nation's affairs at this very critical hour. I thought the visit was remarkably well timed. I am the more surprised at the right hon. Gentleman because, over these past few weeks, his leadership of the Opposition has been really statesmanlike and we have all felt profoundly grateful for that.
  I will pass from today's events and hope that the House will take a more sober view of its responsibilities for the remainder of this Session. I agree with the Prime Minister about the importance of the Anglo-American alliance and I cannot understand those who draw no moral distinction between the liberal purposes of the United States as exemplified by Lease-Lend, U.N.R.R.A. and Marshall Aid and the savage, brutal vendettas of totalitarian Communism. It seems to me that to fail to make this moral distinction is intellectual and political dishonesty of a very high order. If ever this Anglo-American alliance fell apart, if the industrial power of Japan and Western Germany should ever be won for Soviet imperialism, liberty and toleration would have perished from the earth and a long night of totalitarian tyranny would have started. Those are my views and I state them.
  But other considerations present themselves, and here I address my remarks in particular to a few of my hon. Friends and in special relation to China. Foreign policy cannot be con-
  1374
  sidered in a vacuum. Foreign policy is the external instrument of a nation's internal needs and in these circumstances to fail to condition our political prejudices by a modicum of economic reality is again grimly dishonest. We must be idealistic in our approach but we must also be pragmatic in our actions.
  We are in the Far East for a number of reasons, not least of which is that it is from there that we are able to secure the income which enables us in turn to purchase dollar commodities without which the 50 million people who live in these islands could neither be fed, nor clothed, nor could their industries be furnished. If ever we were forced out of the Far East—and as for me, I say we are there, and there we are going to stay—if ever we were deprived of the dollar income that is derived from the Far East, then, inevitably, massive unemployment would follow in this country. Indeed, I do not think I exaggerate when I say that 20 million people would have to get out of Britain for the purpose of getting a living. This country would then be left as a super Stratford-on-Avon, a museum piece, like Vienna between the two wars.
  British foreign policy has to reflect all these stark, naked economic considerations at all times. Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Formosa, Singapore, are all cards out of the same pack, and to scuttle from any of these places ahead of a comprehensive and binding agreement, would be the height of folly. I could not lend myself to any such tactic, because surely if there is one lesson we have learned over the past terrible years it is that appeasement only breeds more bellicosity. The Far East is living through a period of nationalist, social and economic ferment much the same as that which afflicted Europe about 1845. But, just as it died down in Europe, it will die down in the Far East. Meanwhile, we have to recognise certain fundamental and very important considerations.
  Western civilisation, based on Christianity, is engaged in a contest for the ideological championship of the world which may well last 10 years. We have to recognise, and our friends have to recognise, that this contest cannot be won by a knockout; it can only be won on

  1375
  points. We have to consider very carefully what our tactics should be and to recognise certain facts, certain changes in the social set-up in the Far East. Having recognised those facts, we then have to ask ourselves some very difficult and searching questions. If we fail to ask ourselves those questions, we shall not arrive at the correct answers.
  All who have a part to play at this very important juncture of human history must recognise that the people of Asia are now emerging from a centuries old stupor and that the ideological struggle can be waged successfully only by a combination of economic, political and military policies. We and our friends across the Atlantic must recognise that freedom for feudal landlords and price speculators means empty bellies for hungry people. Men denied the chance to work, and forced to watch their wives and children starve, will not fight to preserve decadent, incompetent corrupt régimes such as those of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. A resurrected Louis XV has no answer to the problems that now confront us in the Far East. It was for these reasons that all the best elements in China in desperation joined the anti-Chiang Kai-shek crusade.
  It so happened that the Communists led the opposition, but had they called themselves atheists, bigamists or polygamists, it would have been just the same. China was absolutely desperate. Any change was better than none, and in all fairness I am bound to say that the present régime would appear to be the most efficient and the least corrupt that China has had for many years. I want to suggest that east of Suez the Western democracies' most powerful instrument is not the atom bomb but President Truman's fourth point.
  I shall have something to say in a few minutes about our relationship with China. Meanwhile. I should like to say that two Tennessee Valley projects, one on the Ganges and the other on the Yangtze, would do more for Western ideas, ideals and interests than a dozen atom bombs; 50,000 ploughs more than 10 million bullets, and a handful of rice would do more good than a hand grenade.
  It would be fatal to write off China as having passed finally into the Russian
  1376
  orbit. What are the instruments which the Soviet uses. The emotions appealed to by the Kremlin autocracy are hatred, envy, jealousy and a lust for power. But those are not characteristics of the Chinese people. The Chinese people have a strong tradition of the family and a philosophy based on the teachings of Confucius. The Chinese have much more in common with Western democracy than they have with totalitarian Communism. Russia requires China as an economic and military vassal—cannon fodder for the Kremlin. But what can Russia do for China? Russia, with a 25 million ton steel production, cannot meet her own requirements. Manchuria is of vital importance to China; but the Russians have a stranglehold on Manchuria.
  These are the real politics of the present Chinese set-up. What we need more than anything else is not an aggravation of the difficulties with China. No appeasement, as I have said, but what would be fatal would be a closing of the door. The job of diplomacy is to keep the door open wide. Economics will take charge, before very long. Time is on our side, not on the side of the Russians.
  I should like to say a few words about these Russians. For myself, I believe that they are staging the biggest bluff the world has ever known. Russia is a swollen octopus, not a coiled spring. Our job is to lop off a few of the tentacles. We made a start in Yugoslavia—a very good start. The recent development in Yugoslav-Anglo-American relations is a most heartening one. Much the same tactics should be applied to China. I take no pessimistic view of the present situation. For 90 per cent. of the people who march behind Communist banners in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw, the finest sight in all the world would be the white cliffs of Dover or the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbour. If the Russians were foolish enough to precipitate a third world war, what a time they would have on their lines of communication.
  But I am not at all sure that we are doing sufficient to give meaning and purpose to social democracy. I am not at all sure that we are doing enough to refute the tinsel half-truths of Russian propaganda. We must remember that social and moral progress needs constant

  1377
  attention, and this is a period of history in which the spiritual side of mankind is asking questions. That presents us with a great opportunity. What can totalitarian Communism offer to the world compared with social democracy? I do not believe that we are doing half enough to get our point of view over. Nor do I think that we are doing sufficient to "debunk" this Russian propaganda.
  The great rallying cry of the French Revolution was, "Liberty, equality, fraternity." This self-perpetuating political caucus in Moscow symbolises liberty by keeping 10 million political prisoners in concentration camps. These are the topics we ought to be talking about in the Far East and behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet equality seems to mean 35s. a week for Moscow crossing sweepers and £250 a week for doctors and lawyers in private practice; country mansions, American cars and houseboats in the Crimea for commissars, and 2s. 5¾d. a week for Red Army privates. This seems to be a most peculiar set-up for what is supposed to be the classless Socialist Utopia. Those are the comments we ought to be making.
  There is one other matter. The Kremlin propagandists are always saying to the workers that the capitalists will do everything except get off their backs. Since the war there have been three large loans floated in Russia, the last being for £2,000 million at 4 per cent. I should like to know who in this classless Socialist Utopia is able to get hold of a £2,000 million chunk of surplus value, and who will work to earn the 4 per cent. interest —1 per cent. more than the British bank rate. Part of Anglo-American strategy at this moment should be to revitalise our propaganda, and these are the sort of matters that we ought to be talking about.
  There comes a time in every nation's struggles when the faint-hearted grow weary and say, "Why go on?" Throughout our history, we British have always resisted that temptation. I hope and believe that very few people are going to be deceived by this peace propaganda instigated by Kremlin apologists drawing large salaries from British educational institutions. I do not think many will be deceived; neither do I think many will be deceived by this anti-American propaganda. Taking it at the low level of
  1378
  expediency, when in history did two parties to an alliance see eye to eye with each other on everything? Never; of course, not.
  I hope the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, to whom we owe a great deal for his conduct of foreign affairs over these last few years—more than some are prepared to recognise—will continue to do everything necessary to consolidate this present happy Anglo-American relationship.
  5.11 p.m.
  Mr. Clement Davies: I should like to begin, if I may, by joining with the Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) in paying a short, but very sincere, tribute to Mr. Peter Fraser. Not only has New Zealand lost one of its leading statesmen, a great Prime Minister who had won the affection and admiration of all parties there, but the Commonwealth, and indeed free democracy, has lost a warm friend and wise counsellor. We mourn with New Zealand at his early passing.
  Two days ago, I rose here not only to congratulate the Prime Minister but to express gratitude to him for undertaking his visit to America. It was essential that that visit should be paid, and the Prime Minister was quite right in saying that so much could be done—and better and more quickly done—by direct talks around a table than could ever be achieved by communications. However close these may be, they are not the same as personal contact. Like the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, I wish the Prime Minister had gone earlier, and had renewed the contacts established during the war, but I would like to say at once to the Prime Minister that I do not recall that anyone of us tendered that advice before the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) about a fortnight ago. All I can say is that I am glad the Prime Minister went.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman leaves that point, since he is joining with the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), may I ask him this question? Does he support the right hon. Member for Woodford in charging the

  1379
  Prime Minister with disloyalty to the people of this country?
  Mr. Davies: I am sure that that was not said by the right hon. Gentleman. At any rate, this is much too serious for any of us, on the other side of the House or on this side—
  Mr. Hector Hughes Mr. Hector Hughes rose—
  Mr. Davies: I expect that the hon. and learned Gentleman may get his opportunity to say what he has to say, but, today, we are discussing the serious gravity of the international situation.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: Is not that a serious—
  Hon. Members: Sit down.
  Mr. Davies: It is good to know from the communiqué and from the Prime Minister today that there was complete accord between him and the President upon the real objects of the foreign policy of both countries—the maintenance of world peace, respect for the rights and interests of peoples, strengthening the defences of the free nations and eliminating the causes of fear, want and discontent, and to promote the democratic way of life. It is well that we should know that, on these main principles and main aims, there was complete accord between the two democratic Governments. It is unthinkable that two nations which fought side by side and made such tremendous sacrifices through two world wars should have any cause for disagreement at this grave moment, when the world is face to face with a possibility—to put it no higher than that—of another world war.
  The situation in Korea, which had altered so much in the last three weeks, was one of such increasing and intense gravity that there was one question certainly in our minds, and I think it must have been in the minds of most hon. Members of this House; namely, what was now to be the action of the United Nations, and, in particular, the action of the United States of America and ourselves in the face of this increasing pressure? A new war could obviously have been started by the invasion of Korea by Chinese forces. The question was whether we would give way to the aggressors and seek a solution by way of appeasement.
  1380
  I welcome the firm declaration by both Governments that there could be no thought of appeasement or rewarding the aggressor, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Had it been otherwise, then we would have had to acknowledge that the United Nations organisation had completely failed, and that it was no more effective than the League of Nations, which had already broken down. The United Nations organisation has not hitherto been very successful. It has had a stormy and tempestuous passage during these last five years, but if it had had to acknowledge that it cannot stand up to aggression, then, indeed, it would have become a complete wreck.
  That at once brings us to the next question. Justice must be done, and, if I may suggest another addition to the suggestion put forward by the right hon. Member for Woodford with regard to appeasement, it would be that there can be no appeasement so long as injustice is done or injustice is allowed to remain. If I may put it in my own way, I think that justice must be done, that, if possible, peace must be preserved. It is quite certain that we all desire, if it is possible, to find a peaceful solution, and I am sure that that is the true desire of every hon. Member of this House, and not only of every hon. Member here, but of all the people throughout the country and throughout the Commonwealth. I will also add that it is my view that it is the desire of all ordinary people wherever they may be, even beyond the Iron Curtain.
  While the main danger is Europe, the immediate problem is Korea. The Prime Minister today very rightly paid a tribute to the Indian Government. Might I add one word to that? I should like to pay a tribute to the Indian representative, Sir Benegal Rau, together with the other representatives for the persistent, gallant and optimistic efforts they have made to obtain some form of agreement which might stop further firing and further slaughter. We are glad to find that their efforts have met with the support not only of the Asiatic and Arab countries, but of this country and the United States.
  It is significant that this very small though very necessary step towards a peaceful solution, has met with complete resistance by the Russians. The least they could have done was to stop fighting

  1381
  while the discussions were taking place. I hope that in spite of the action of Russia, China will agree to this "cease fire." If she does, then reason may prevail. If she does not, then there will be continued fighting, and nobody knows where that may end.
  Let us assume for a moment that she will agree, what follows then? Surely, in that case China must be a party to any discussions that take place. Her armies are already in Korea, and by the time the discussions begin they may be not only on the 38th Parallel, but south of it. She cannot be expected to withdraw her troops from Korea unless she is a party to any agreement that is made. We all recognise the difficulties confronting not only the United States Government but the United States people in any pressure we might bring to bear upon them for a recognition of China. The sacrifices that the Americans have already made on behalf of the United Nations and on behalf of freedom, and the severe casualties they have suffered are matters we should bear in mind.
  Mr. Molson (The High Peak): May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman one question? I am not quite clear about what he said. Presumably, he does not propose that Communist China should be admitted to the Security Council until her troops have been withdrawn?
  Mr. Davies: I was just coming to that. If this cease fire is agreed to, and if then negotiations start, there will have to be some recognition of the Government responsible for sending the Chinese troops into Korea. That begins the recognition, but how far that can then be carried forward at this stage, I really do not know. It seems to me that once we have accorded that much recognition, it will be very difficult to refuse complete recognition.
  I think we took the wise course, and that had that course been followed by all the other free nations, many of our difficulties to day would have been avoided. One recognises that the difficulties have been increased in these last few weeks by the invasion of Korea, the invasion of Tibet, the threat to Nepal, and the action that has been taken in Indo-China. These acts have all increased the difficulties, but, in spite of the difficulties, if I thought that without surrendering the cause of justice, and without giving away the real position
  1382
  of the United Nations, I could get peace, a true understanding and a better agreement by admitting China to the Security Council and the Assembly, I would be prepared to run that risk.
  I cannot understand why there should be any real objection to the admission of China, even today, when Russia is already there, and when the acts of which we are complaining have all been founded in Moscow. Moscow has been behind everything that has happened in Korea, Indo-China, and elsewhere. There is not one of us who has not said that while not using her own troops, Russia is encouraging others to go to war on her behalf. If we recognise Russia as part of the Security Council and are prepared to sit down and discuss matters with her, it is difficult to understand the objection to China.
  I think we are all agreed on one thing that nobody today would back up the possession of a seat by Chiang Kai-shek and his régime. What right have they to a seat? If one could only begin with these talks, then I think that the future of Korea and the very difficult question of Formosa might be dealt with in an amicable way. While making these statements, I still wish to emphasise that I recognise the difficulties and the sincerity of both the American people and the American Government, and that their desire, like our desire, is for peace throughout the world, that democracy should succeed, and that we should not give way to the aggressor.
  I will now turn for a few moments to Europe. I welcome the news received last night and repeated by the Prime Minister today, that an agreement has been reached with regard to an integrated force. I assume that following the communiqué, this, whenever the final agreement is made, will lead to the appointment of a supreme commander. But I hope that the agreement will go further because that in itself will not be enough. It is all very well for us to have these broad general understandings and expressions of good will, but we have got to keep in step, and we are not in step all the time.
  I am making no complaint about the speeches made by the Minister of Defence or by the Minister of Works. There is Cabinet responsibility, which is recognised, and there is a certain freedom of expression allowed in this country, and

  1383
  nobody knows that better than the right hon. Member for Woodford. I remember in the old days that Mr. Asquith had to stand at the Box and say that the right hon. Gentleman had given way to some poetic expressions which in no way involved Cabinet responsibility. I am only mentioning this matter for one reason. It just shows that we are not completely in step, although we may be from now on, thanks to the visit of the Prime Minister.
  Then there is the question of the export of materials. America has completely stopped the export of materials to Russia and her satellites, but she is perfectly ready to part with them to us. I heard of a case the other day where 40 tons of valuable material came to one of the ports of this country and was then sent to Russia. That kind of thing will not only lead to misunderstanding but to irritation, and we cannot afford even that. That kind of thing has got to stop. I would ask whether, having gone so far and the position being so threatening, it is not possible now to appoint not only the Combined Chiefs of Staff we had during the war but a Joint Commodities Board as well, so that we should know exactly where we are. That is the only way we can carry out the joint policy that the President and the Prime Minister said they had in mind.
  I agree, of course, and so does everybody else, with the premise that we all hope that world conditions will not call for the use of the atom bomb. But however much we may abhor its use, and while we are glad of this understanding that has been reached between the President and the Prime Minister, I believe all this recent talk about the bomb, its devastation and its use and non-use, has been playing straight into Russia's hands. Already the Russians are making use of it as part of their pseudo-peace propaganda. Only the other day there appeared in "Pravda" an article expressing joy that such a feeling had been roused against the use of the atom bomb amongst all people here and elsewhere in their desire for peace, that no government would now dare to sanction its use in any circumstances. That is real evidence, and the only evidence so far as I know, that hitherto the bomb had acted as a deterrent on the Russian Government. I prefer to leave the matter where it has been left by the Prime Minister,
  1384
  and I do not wish to press him to go any further than he has gone today.
  There is one matter which I regret was omitted from the Prime Minister's speech. I want to refer to a step which I consider to be likely to lead to an understanding and an avoidance of war. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman—and all of us agree—that we do not want such commitments in the Far East as will endanger our position in Europe. But all really comes back to Moscow. If Moscow were not dominating the situation, all this fear would collapse. Therefore, there is only one thing we can do by which we may take a step towards arriving at a better understanding. That is the one suggested by the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington when he spoke in the House a fortnight ago, by Lord Salisbury in another place, by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and, if I may add my small voice, by me in a suggestion I made in this House and in December, 1947, when I was a joint contributor to a letter in "The Times," asking for this very thing. This is a meeting between our Prime Minister, the Prime Minister of France, the President of the United States and Mr. Stalin.
  If we could get that, we would avoid all these legalistic questions and objections which are being raised in United Nations discussions and calling one another names and things like that. We would brush all those things aside. I know the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington urged that there should be a careful agenda, and that was accepted by the Foreign Secretary. What steps are being taken to prepare that agenda? I suppose the Prime Minister was referring to that when he spoke of the document which is being drawn up in Paris by the Ambassadors. But do not let us waste too much time on detail. Russia has already made suggestions in Prague, we are all agreed that there should not be a blank refusal, and I am anxious that the leaders should be brought together as soon as possible.
  There might be two conferences, one of which would relate to the Far East, and in which China would have to be a partner, and I imagine also India and Pakistan. We cannot pay too high a tribute to the part that is obviously being

  1385
  played in world affairs today by Mr. Nehru. The other conference should relate not only to Europe in particular but to the whole world. It is along those lines that I think we can best establish a firm basis for permanent peace, which is the desire of everyone.
  5.35 p.m.
  Captain Hewitson: It was with some sorrow that I listened to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) conclude his speech. During the war many people, like myself, looked upon him, and indeed we still do so today, as a great Britisher, yet today, when we are making a call to our Allies for a bond of unity similar to that which we had during the war, we had an outburst from him in concluding his speech that was not worthy of him and his glorious past.
  I do not intend to make any statement on the torch that is burning in the Far East. In my opinion, our danger lies in our weakness in Europe. We have suspicion rampant in Europe. When I visit the various countries of Europe I do not meet the leaders of Governments, I meet the ordinary humble men and women working in the factories. During recent years I have been able to discuss with them their ideas about the countries behind the Iron Curtain and the policy set forth by the free democracies.
  I must say, unfortunately, that this high rate of suspicion that is running through Western Europe comes from our own colleagues in the Social Democratic parties. There is suspicion in France. There is that great fear of another German rearmament and another German march. In Belgium, two weeks ago, I heard colleagues express that fear and suspicion at a conference. It is all very well to talk about rearming Germany, and it is all very well going to European conferences and saying, "Germany must be rearmed." The first essential is to get common consent within Germany to rearm.
  Since the war, I have had the privilege and opportunity of visiting Germany many times and of assisting in the building up of their new trade union movement. I can say, without hesitation, that tae trade union movement in Germany today is against rearmament in Germany. On the political side, which I do not think is quite as honest as the trade union
  1386
  side—I have not been brought up as a politician but as a trade union leader—
  Mr. John Hynd: You are one now.
  Captain Hewitson: Quite. On the political side we had the spectacle of politicians playing at politics. I remember visiting Dr. Schumacher's home just before his election. He was putting forward the basis of his policy for the forthcoming election, and he was wavering very much on the question of German rearmament. He was wavering because he did not know the policy of Dr. Adenauer and what line he was going to take during the campaign. One has a grave suspicion that in Germany there has been a lot of playing at politics and not so much sincerity on the political side with respect to rearmament. It is essential that Germany should be rearmed. That is my personal opinion.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Against her will?
  Captain Hewitson: No. We have to get her consent. But if we go into Germany on a recruiting campaign when the trade unions and some of the political parties in Germany are against rearmament, we shall get the Nazi class into the army and we shall form units of danger which could be fatal to democracy in the future. Who are more capable than our great trade union movement in this country to make the approach to the trade union movement in Germany and point out to them the need for establishing safety across Western Europe? As for the Social Democrats, who are more suitable than my own party to call a conference with the Social Democrats in Germany and point out the need for a great build-up to maintain our freedom across Western Europe?
  These things will have to be done; otherwise there will be danger from the rising general staff in Germany who will take every opportunity to re-establish themselves. Recently at Rüdesheim the German youth were marching again, and it made one feel cold inside, because that youth is awaiting direction. If the German Junkers come back to power they will take that youth and build it for themselves, in order to secure, if possible, the re-birth of that Nazism which we hope is now dead in Europe.

  1387
  Those are problems we must face seriously. All the bickerings in this House and outside, and all the cross arguments at international conferences, will not solve that problem in Germany. It must be solved by a sensible approach and by appealing to reason based upon common sense. We must approach the problem in that way and allay the fears rampant in France and Belgium by bringing them into consultation and getting common agreement. But there are dangers of repercussions within our own frontiers. We talk in this House of unity. We have done so today and in a debate at the beginning of the week; we had two Divisions in that debate to show our unity.
  There has also been an appeal for unity and more production outside this House. But the appeal will have to be made during the next year. As a trade union leader, I realise that the responsibility that we shall be placing upon the shoulders of the people in the country will have to be handled very carefully; otherwise we may find ourselves in a series of industrial upheavals which would be fatal. I ask hon. Members to visualise the picture confronting us at the beginning of the next year. The cost of living is rising; we are going to ask men and women in industry to agree to further restrictions; we are told that raw materials are going to be canalised and transferred from luxury industries to war potential industries. That will create pockets of unemployment, and that unemployment will have to be absorbed by war production industry.
  In other words, we are going to cause some upheaval in the homes of our people. In addition to that, it may be urgently necessary to bring back into operation orders such as the Essential Work Order, to ring-fence jobs and keep men in essential jobs where they are needed—such as the mining, engineering, agricultural and similar industries. It may also be necessary—indeed, it is being discussed at the moment—to extend working hours in order to increase war production.
  These problems will be facing us at the beginning of next year, and demonstrations of disunity in this House will not help the men and women who are attempting to secure that increased pro-
  1388
  duction. Also during the next year, when the first block releases are due under our National Service scheme, we may be asking for some extension of that service. That, again, will cause heartburning and some feeling in the country. If ever there was need for a demonstration of unity in this House, it is now. We should stop a lot of the shadow-boxing that goes on day by day in this Chamber.
  We should tell the people—and when I say the people I mean our whole population—that we are giving in this House a demonstration of working for the well being of the nation as a whole. I would even go so far as to make this suggestion. We are rising to-morrow for a month, and it would be much better psychologically in the country if we were only to go away for a fortnight. We are going to ask people to work overtime; we are asking them to work harder and produce more, and yet we ourselves are not setting a shining example. These are all small things which may have no apparent meaning—
  Mr. Paton: When my hon. and gallant Friend says that, does he mean that when he goes away, he does nothing at all?
  Captain Hewitson: I am not suggesting that at all.
  Mr. Paton: What does my hon. and gallant Friend mean if he does not mean that?
  Mr. Nigel Birch: Is this a demonstration of unity?
  Captain Hewitson: We are going away tomorrow on a four weeks' holiday, and I suggest that psychologically it will have a bad effect in the country. I suggest that my hon. Friend consults his constituents about it. We should show an example in this House.
  Mr. Paton: Hear, hear.
  Captain Hewitson: I would also appeal to hon. Members opposite to make some attempt to restrain themselves from making some of the silly statements which they utter in the country during the weekends. Members of the Opposition are fond of reading the speeches of some of my right hon. Friends and trying to make political capital out of them at public meetings. I suggest that those statements should be restrained in these times. If some restraint were not shown in industrial

  1389
  negotiations, we should be for ever having strikes, and if the right hon. Member for Woodford were an employer sitting on one side of the table, and adopted the methods which he adopted in the House this afternoon, he would have a strike on his hands every fortnight.
  Those are the problems which we face in the country during the next year, and I repeat that the example should be given from this House; we should give the example of unity to the country.
  Mr. Hamilton: Is my hon. and gallant Friend advocating a Coalition?
  Captain Hewitson: I must ask my hon. Friend not to put into my mouth words which I do not use. I am saying that we should give a demonstration of unity to the country which would be an example, psychologically, to help the people who will have to do this great work of increasing our production next year.
  5.51 p.m.
  Mr. Henry Strauss: There were passages in the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, Central (Captain Hewitson), with which I think probably all on both sides of the House would agree. He spoke of the very great seriousness of the position in which we find ourselves. As regards the appeal for unity, I hope that the House will be unanimously with me when I say, by all means let us express unity where we are unanimous, but do not let us pretend unity in those cases where we are not.
  I never remember a moment when I believed my country to stand in greater danger than it does today. That is the background against which this debate is being held. I believe that the hope of the survival of the civilisation in which the vast majority of us believe depends on our getting rid, now and forever, of the attitude of "Let's pretend." I think the time has long passed—indeed, I thought this from the beginning; I never regarded it as a wise attitude—when we should have any patience with the attitude of, "Let's pretend that we do not know what the Communists are after."
  For some extraordinary reason those of us who for years have continually written and spoken on the nature of Communist aggression, using long ago some of the language used in documents of the T.U.C.
  1390
  much more recently, are often denounced as war-mongers. But the people who tell the truth about Communist aggression are not the war-mongers. Rather it is those who say, "Peace, peace; when there is no peace," I say that the pretence, sometimes a lazy pretence and sometimes a wicked pretence, that we do not know what the Communists are after has already immeasurably helped them to enslave half Europe and to cause untold misery in Asia. If that attitude is continued any longer it will inevitably result in the destruction of freedom everywhere, and nobody but a fool will think that this country can contract out.
  There is no excuse for this pretended ignorance. As I have often reminded the House, we know precisely what the Communists are after from two independent sources, each of which gives us the same result. First of all, we know what they are after because we can read, and we ought to read, the sacred books of their dogmatic secular religion. The writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin are available and should be read—and, as I am reminded by one of my hon. Friends, the writings of Molotov. But one work would be sufficient. As lately as 1947 Stalin has published in English, in Moscow, his book on "Problems of Leninism," and I have said before, and I warn the House again, that it is as dangerous to suppose that Stalin does not mean what he has written as it was to make that mistake about Hitler.
  Mr. Paton Mr. Paton rose—
  Mr. Strauss: I cannot give way. There are so many hon. Members who want to speak that I do not think it would be fair if I yielded too much, and I do not think I have said anything very provocative so far, although I do not mind if I have. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about unity?"] I am not in the least seeking unity with the Communists. I know I shall not get it. I saw the Communist demonstration against my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and that was a sufficiently sickening sight to prevent my having the slightest desire for unity with the Communists.
  I could prove by quotations from speeches made on the Steel Bill precisely the importance of the attitude of hon. Members opposite to the Communists' desires. I could prove by quotations precisely the importance the Communists

  1391
  attached to forcing that Bill through the House and to bringing it into operation at a time when steel is so vital for rearmament. The hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. T. Reid), recently, and I myself in a speech on 23rd March last year, have given several quotations from Stalin's work proving the main propositions; how the Communists were working, and according to their doctrine inevitably working, for world conquest, with Russia as the centre and basis of the revolution. I shall not weary the House by further quotations from that book, which I commend to their attention, but I would give one quotation from a letter from Lenin which I think expresses in a single sentence the difference between the attitude for which I hope the vast majority of us stand and the attitude of the Communists. This is the sentence of Lenin, and it is from a letter to Gorki:
  "It would not matter a jot if three-quarters of the human race perished; the important thing was that the remaining quarter should he Communists."
  That gives some indication of the nature of the menace by which we are threatened.
  But, of course, even if the Communists had never written a single word, we should still know what they were after simply by observing what they have been doing for years in every country in the world. We have then only to apply the commonsense and admirable doctrine of the English common law, that men are presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions. By applying that to what the Communists have been doing, which we can see before our eyes, we should know the nature of their intentions.
  Most hon. Members who have taken an interest in these matters, as all of us should, are familiar with the common Communist technique by which country after country has been enslaved—the promise of free elections, then a short Coalition Government, followed by a Communist coup. I thought that when Czechoslovakia was finally enslaved, in March, 1948, those facts became clear even to hon. Members opposite, because the National Council of Labour published quite a formidable document which said that those who sought to condone that crime showed themselves false to all the principles of the party opposite and so forth. I am sorry to say that I have
  1392
  heard from hon. Members opposite, and seen in their speeches in the country, several attempts to condone that crime.
  That brings me to the cold war.
  Mr. Manuel (Central Ayshire)Mr. Manuel (Central Ayshire) rose—
  Mr. Strauss: I did not catch the hon. Member's contribution, but I hope very much that if he desires to make one he will get the opportunity.
  I now come to the cold war. I repeat three facts about the cold war. They are the same that I have been urging for years, and I believe that every one of them is true and important, and that each of the three is much too frequently forgotten. The first fact is that it is war—definitely war. I could quote from the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, if anyone wanted support for that proposition. The second proposition is this, that, as those who are being murdered in Malaya and elsewhere know, it is not a cold war. And the third proposition is this, that hitherto we have been steadily losing it. Now, the reason why we have been steadily losing it is that, on the whole, we have not been fighting it. The most certain of all methods of getting a third world-wide war is not to fight the cold war.
  I have noticed a book—I have not yet read it but I believe that it contains many admirable things, and that it is a very able work in many ways—a book recently published by Chatham House, called "Defence in the Cold War." The worst thing about that book, to my mind, is the title. The title "Defence in the Cold War" shows a failure, it seems to me, to indicate the nature of the problem. As long as we are considering merely defence in the cold war I do not believe we shall win it, or avoid the war that everybody wishes to avoid.
  Mr. James Glanville: The atom bomb?
  Mr. Strauss: On the atom bomb, I thought, there was an admirable passage in the Prime Minister's speech. I do not propose to say a single thing about the atom bomb. I take the view that all this talk about the atom bomb is started by Russia for the purpose of benefiting Russia. Everybody knows that the petition that was presented to this House a day or two ago was in response to a

  1393
  Communist agitation which got the petition, at last, condemned even by the Labour Party, although after a member of their executive had already signed it.
  Mr. Hamilton: And some Tories as well.
  Mr. Strauss: I do not—
  Mr. Hamilton: Yes.
  Mr. Strauss: In spite of all temptations to be frivolous I propose to continue with what, I think, most members know is a serious speech. Now, I say that the attitude sometimes summed up in the words "containing Communism," as though that were the ideal, shows a complete misapprehension of the problem before us. I believe that it is as foolish, as it is immoral, to assume that there is any chance whatever of Russia and China—and let us take Russia first—standing on their present line. They will certainly either advance or retreat. I believe we are being unrealistic as well as immoral when we suggest that every advance hitherto made by Communism is permanent.
  Let me come to Korea. When the United Nations first took action in Korea they did so, I thought, with the support of nearly the whole House. Certainly the leaders of all parties concurred in that action. But, apparently, some people concurred in that action because they believed the aggressor to be a small Power. Now that they believe the aggressor to be a great Power, many of them advance very far towards what they used to denounce as the policy of appeasing the aggressor.
  I agree, I think, with everybody, even with those who differ from me on many of these propositions, in thinking that the immediate problems in Korea and the Far East are extremely difficult; but I suggest to the House that there are two problems which we ought to keep completely separate. The first problem is the nature of the Chinese action. Are they making war in close association with Russia against the United Nations, and are they conducting undisguised aggression? That is the first question. The second question is, If they are, what ought we to do about it? Do not let us suppose that the difficulty of answering the second question is any reason at all for not being honest with ourselves about the first.
  1394
  On the first question, I do not wish to quarrel with what the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said some time ago about questions regarding Chinese action, on which he was endeavouring to keep an open mind. He may have been quite right; and I am sure that he was being honest in that endeavour. He may give us his further thoughts on that subject, perhaps, when he speaks tonight. But my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) gave formidable reasons for believing that the Chinese aggression was precisely what it appeared to be.
  There are three facts, I suggest, that it is very difficult to explain away, and I do not think we are being quite honest with ourselves if we try to explain them away. The first is the numbers with which they have invaded Korea, and the signs of long preparation. Nobody who heard the statement given in this House by the Minister of Defence can, I think, doubt the formidable nature of their preparations. But what is more remarkable than that in indicating their mind, I think, is the shameless invasion of Tibet. How is that to be explained away? The Government, to give them credit, have not attempted to explain it away. I wish those who do attempt to explain away Chinese aggression would pay some regard to the evidence of Tibet. Thirdly, there is the point which the Prime Minister and, I think, the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) the Leader of the Liberals, mentioned—the close accord—the very close accord indeed—between Russia and China in the United Nations—so close that they both use the same fantastic language.
  So much for the fact of Chinese aggression. What action should we take about it? Here I agree with what has been said from the Government Front Bench, and has been said for a long time with great force by the Leader and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, that we must never forget that the Far East and Korea are not the only theatres. They are not even the theatres in which the mortal blow can be most readily struck. There is Western Europe, which has been mentioned by so many; and I believe, although I will not develop the point, that there is a third, which has scarcely been mentioned at all, which is, in my view, of great importance—the Middle East.

  1395
  It is no dishonour for the United Nations to recognise the fact that their powers are limited. How best to use the forces of civilisation against the forces of aggression is above all a military problem; it is not primarily an economic, political or moral problem. If we are being attacked by the aggressive forces of Communism throughout the world, as I believe can be demonstrated, we require the coolest possible heads to consider how that menace shall be met. I agree with what was said by the Leader of the Opposition on what a tremendous setback it would be if the United Nations were defeated in Korea. But he made it clear today, as he has done before, that that is not the only sphere.
  What is our first duty here? I am glad to say that at all events we on these Benches find ourselves in agreement with the Prime Minister on one point, whatever some of the back benchers opposite may think. We believe it to be absolutely vital to maintain our unity with the United States. I agree, however, with the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans) that, of course, no two great peoples can hope to think alike on everything; and I was glad that the communiqué that came at the end of this meeting in Washington very frankly confessed that on some matters there was not agreement.
  I dare say that I shall not carry with me everybody, even on this side of the House, when I say that I have never been a critic of His Majesty's Government for the fact that they recognised Communist China. I have never regarded recognition as being primarily a matter of approving what a Government is doing. I have always thought that the important consideration was what power have they got, are they the real power in the country concerned? Therefore, I do not criticise the Government for having recognised Communist China. I did regret, however, as did many people, that they did not, or perhaps could not, secure more agreement among our friends so that more of us could have acted in unison.
  I also agree with His Majesty's Government on what I believe to be the legal consequences under the Charter of the recognition of the Communist Government of China. I agree with what was
  1396
  said the other day by the Under-Secretary of State that the membership of the original Members of the United Nations did not in the least depend upon their behaviour. Therefore, I agree with the view taken on legal grounds by His Majesty's Government that China is, under the Charter, a Member of the United Nations. The question accordingly is which should be the Government that represents it?
  Having said so much on that point, I am sure that hon. Members in all quarters see the force of the point put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington about the great difficulty in taking a vote on this subject at the very moment when the Government in question is engaged in defeating the purposes of the United Nations Charter itself. That is a genuine difficulty, and I can understand the perfectly honest difference of opinion between ourselves and America. But it is a subordinate difference compared with the overriding need that we should act unitedly. I welcome the statement in the communiqué of the Washington talks frankly admitting the disagreement.
  We should all realise one great defect in the Charter. The natural thing to do in the case of China would have been to say, "Yes, you are a member, but because you are deliberately breaking the provisions of the Charter you ought to be expelled under Article 6, which provides for expulsion." But unfortunately, by the curious provisions of the Charter, a Power like China can be expelled only with its own consent, because to operate the provision for expulsion under Article 6 requires a two-thirds majority in the Assembly and the assent of all the great Powers in the Security Council—comically so-called. Having said that, I do not consider that it follows in the least that any particular action must be taken now in the case of Formosa, or indeed that the Chinese Communists necessarily have a claim to Formosa.
  The second lesson we have to learn, apart from unity with America, concerns what I consider to be the incredible folly of strengthening Russia. I would only mention again one matter long since past because it is still defended by the Government on grounds that will not hold water. Let us consider the folly of the sale of jet engines in 1946. When we

  1397
  brought forward that example, the Minister of Defence said that that was in the honeymoon period of Anglo-Russian relations. But it was not, because the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his speech of 15th September, 1948, made it abundantly clear that he had known all along what the Russians were after, stirring up civil war in one country after another as an instrument of policy. He added, quite truly, that it was as old as Marxist-Leninism itself. Yet what did he do? Stirring up civil war in that way is a direct breach of an express term of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance; yet knowing of the breach, instead of complaining of it, the right hon. Gentleman offered to extend the life of the Treaty. That is not the way to secure serious attention from the Kremlin.
  We are told, and indeed there is support for it in all quarters, that there is, in all probability, to be a meeting of the heads of the great Powers, including Russia. I believe it is extremely important that hon. and right hon. Members should be clear about what they hope to achieve by such a meeting. I believe that it is not only necessary to agree on the agenda but to have quite a clear idea on what we hope to get from it, what would be a tolerable result. It is absolutely useless to get a further agreement in words only from a Power that is breaking all the agreements that we have with it.
  Russia is at present breaking the express provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to which she is a party, and the express provision of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance to which I have already alluded. I say, therefore, that no mere new agreement in words is of the slightest value. That does not mean that the meeting should not take place. It does mean that on that occasion we should require to be satisfied not by words only but by deeds.
  I wish to quote a passage from a speech made by the Leader of the Opposition outside this House, and which is for that reason not on the records of the House. Speaking on 9th October, 1948, he said, in a great speech which I had the privilege of hearing:
  "It is not only by verbal or written agreements that they—"
  1398
  the Russians—
  "must reassure the world but by actions which speak louder than words. Let them release their grip upon the satellite States of Europe. Let them retire to their own country which is one-sixth of the land surface of the globe. Let them liberate by their departure the eleven ancient capitals of Eastern Europe which they now hold in their clutches … Let them set free the million or more German and Japanese prisoners they now hold as slaves. Let them cease to oppress, torment and exploit the immense part of Germany and Austria which is now in their hands …"
  Then after a passage dealing with the blockade of Berlin at that time:
  "Above all, let them throw open their vast regions on equal terms to the ordinary travel and traffic of mankind. Let them give others the chance to breathe freely, and let them breathe freely themselves. No one wants to take anything they have got and what belongs to them away from them. After all, we are asking them to do no more than what the other victorious States have done of their own free will."
  I commend those words and those principles to the House. I know that hon. Members may say, "If that is how you put your claim, will you get the conference?" I would get the conference if I could, but I would rather not get the conference than that anyone should be under an illusion that these were not our principles.
  A couple of years ago, I had the honour to address a society on this subject of Communism. I concluded then, as I wish to conclude tonight. If we do our duty, our course will be neither easy nor safe. The path of honour seldom is. In the life of nations and of Empires, as in the lives of men, he who would save his life shall lose it.
  6.22 p.m.
  Mr. Rankin: I listened with the greatest possible care to the hon. and learned Member for Norwich, South (Mr. H. Strauss), and I must confess that when he had finished I was not a great deal wiser on whether he was desirous of going to war or preserving peace. I suggest that that is the big issue which we have to face tonight. I agreed with him thoroughly when he stated that what ought to occupy our attention was the undoubted gravity of the world situation. I am sure that there, at least, we have no difference of thought or opinion. But it seemed to me that after making that plea he went on to confuse the situation and to confuse it very deeply indeed. He seemed to me to mix it up with difficulties which, however interesting they

  1399
  may be as a matter of argument, are not material to the position in which we are now placed.
  He seemed to infer that there was a need to have unity with the Communists. I suggest that position does not arise tonight. The position which we have to face, and the one which the hon. and learned Gentleman did not face, was that we have to contrive a way of living in a world in which there are a great many Communists; and Communists who, so far as the backward nations are concerned, are making promises and in some cases fulfilling those promises of things which we in our day of power in the Far East might have seen accomplished.
  When the Communist Powers promise to the backward peoples the abolition of the moneylender and the landlord, who are their two chief enemies, is it surprising that those nations succumb to those promises? When the Communist Powers promise that they will return to the peasants the land of which they have been dispossessed, is it surprising that once again those people succumb to that particular type of promise? Those are the methods of propaganda and in many cases the actual facts of accomplishment which have paved the way to the success of Communist propaganda in the Far East. They are issues which, I submit with all respect, the hon. and learned Gentleman did not face tonight.
  He suggested that we had three duties. That we wanted to preserve unity with the United States of America. I do not suppose that there is anyone in any part of the House who will quarrel with that; but surely we want to extend that far beyond the scope of the United States. Our primary purpose ought to be to extend the power and influence of the United Nations organisation, and not merely to maintain, as he seemed to suggest, unity with the United States. Then he spoke of the folly of strengthening Russia, and went back once again to the sale of jet planes. He has had that matter adequately answered time and again in this House, and he has to bear in mind that that was a two-way traffic—that whatever was sent to Russia as a matter of trade, would return to this country in the form of necessary foodstuffs—
  Mr. H. Strauss Mr. H. Strauss rose—
  Mr. Rankin: I am sorry that I cannot give way, for I want to be as brief as possible. The hon. and learned Member referred to a matter of which I wholeheartedly approve and about which I shall say a word later—the need for a meeting of the heads of States. He said "How can we meet with a Power that breaks its agreements. What we want, first of all, is proof in the form of deeds and not words." He went on to point out that they ought to release their grip on the satellite countries. If we are going to achieve, what I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman is seeking to achieve—the spirit of peace within the world—then there is no use saying to any one Power, "You are the Power that ought to withdraw from particular parts of the world," because we ourselves can be met with a ready retort so far as that is concerned. We only need to recollect how often we have prided ourselves on the vastness of our own Empire to realise that we, too, could be asked to depart from those parts of the world in which we may have no particular claim to reside.
  I wish to put forward certain suggestions which could be helpful in creating that peaceful atmosphere in world affairs that we want to see. We can feel some satisfaction, from the words of the Prime Minister, that the position in the Far East seems to be easing to some extent. If we wanted to be a little vicious, we might say that the MacArthur myth has now been finally exploded. But I hope that this softening of the position in the Far East will not mean a hardening in Europe. We know, from what has been said, that there is a determination to concentrate on the European front. That means intensifying the situation in Europe. It means that we are prepared to cut our losses in the Far East so that we may be able to build up in the West.
  One suggestion made in this connection is that Germany should be rearmed. If that becomes a definite part of our policy, we are taking a step of the most grave and deadly nature. We are bringing Korea into Europe. Is it to be imagined for one minute that Russia will do nothing while Germany is being rearmed? If our object is to raise 20 divisions in Germany, will Russia merely wait until those divisions are ready? It seems to me that if we go ahead with that part of our programme, Russia will strike in Europe long before it is completed.

  1401
  The position in Europe—and I have seen something of it—is that there is not at this moment a nation that can withstand Russia for a single week—either Belgium, Denmark, Holland or France. We are doing our best to build up the fighting spirit of France, but I do not believe it is possible. I believe that France is finished with war. Because of that, we are looking to the Pyrenees as a barrier against Russia and reviving Franco Spain. That is why America is seeking to keep Spain on her feet. If it were not for the 100 million dollars recently poured into Spain, Franco would probably now be down and out. This is the position which can eventuate if this policy of rearming Germany is pursued. China gave us full warning of that in Korea. She gave full warning of what would happen if we went too near the Manchurian border. That warning was ignored, and we are now paying the price. Russia is giving the same warning now, and if we ignore that warning, we shall do so at our own peril.
  Captain Ryder: Is the hon. Member suggesting a policy of complete surrender?
  Mr. Rankin: The hon. and gallant Member should try to apply his intelligence and not show his lack of it. I am trying to face the situation that can be created in Europe in the near future.
  The result of Russia's striking power may be a Europe completely under Russian domination. Immediately this situation is reached, we have but one effective reply, the atom bomb. That means European devastation, and it also means that Britain will be equally devastated. I say that because we are proceeding on the assumption that Russia has no atom bombs, which I do not believe is justified. If we accept the statements that appeared in the Press last weekend, Russia has now a stockpile of 60 atom bombs. I do not profess to know how quickly this number is being increased. It means that the atom bomb is not in the hands of one side.
  The position is one of the utmost gravity, and therefore I say that the time has come now—not next week, or next year, but now—for the Prime Minister, having met President Truman, to seek in some way or another, to meet not only
  1402
  Stalin, but Mao Tse-tung. I include China because, if we seek to isolate China, we shall make her more suspicious and more difficult to deal with. [Laugher.] It is no use hon. Members laughing. If China has the suspicion that she is being isolated, we shall not get the peace we hope to secure in the Far East.
  To achieve world peace there are three things about which we must agree. Without exaggeration the world today is on the road to destruction. Armaments are piling up. Russia has a budget this year of £7,000 million, America over £4,000 million and this country nearly £1,000 million, in each case all for defence. These budgets are piling up and with them armaments. History has taught us in no uncertain fashion that the more we arm, the greater the danger and the more inevitable war becomes.
  We must reverse that process. We must try to get these budgets and armaments down. The first point on which there ought to be discussion is the reversal of that procedure and the limitation instead of a continual building-up of armed forces I have suggested a limitation in armaments. I know there are some who suggest complete disarmament. I am not going that length, because I believe that the world is not ripe for it. [Laughter.] I must confess that I do not see that that is a subject for laughter. Disarmament is a real policy.
  Mr. Nigel Fisher: Unreal.
  Mr. Harold Davies: And real Christianity.
  Mr. Rankin: Yes, a real policy. At the present moment I am suggesting limitation of armaments because it would command the greatest support among the nations of the world. That is one of the first points, and I am not suggesting whether it should be a percentage or not. I am putting it forward simply as a point, which I think ought to be discussed, and if we can get agreement, then there ought to flow from that a greater increase in trade among the nations, because materials which are needed at present for armaments would be released for trade.
  My third point is the de-militarisation of strategic areas like Korea, Germany, Greece and Egypt. By a policy of limitation and a greater freeing of trade, we might secure agreement about the strategic importance of those places and

  1403
  of others, and so reduce their military significance. I know a great deal of stress has been laid by many of us on economic and political considerations. I do not deny their significance, but I am sure we recognise the importance of the moral aspect of the problem facing us.
  I have seen something of Europe. When I saw the Ruhr, Berlin and Warsaw, I thought that what those areas needed was not only economic help and political rearrangement but a little more mercy in our own thought and action. The world wants peace. It needs pity too. There may be a good deal in our concrete arrangements which are open to the criticisms made by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Norwich, South, but do not let us forget the abstract things. As we ask for mercy, pity, peace, let us give them, too.
  6.45 p.m.
  Mr. Pickthorn: I think the hon. Member for Tradeston (Mr. Rankin) who has just addressed the House, and who now seems busy addressing someone else, is a symptom, and I hope that it may not be unreasonable to look at him a little in that light. He appeals for unity. We have had appeals for unity before; but there is one form of unity which I think clearly neither our country nor Parliamentary Government can survive much more of, and like my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, I think a preposition is a very good word to end a sentence with. That is the kind of unity which enables any Government of the Left, or any party of the Left which get 48 per cent. of the votes of a country, to govern that country for all internal purposes except, of course, suppression of crime, without being able to insist on the support of its own followers, without being able to rely on the support of their own followers for international affairs, but always feeling safe enough when it comes to international matters because it relies upon support from those who ought to be their opponents and the alternative to them. That is a sort of silly, woolly-headed form of Fascism, that there is to be one party which is to have the fun of Government but not the responsibility of facing defence.
  Some of these speeches, and a great deal of the cheering we have had from the
  1404
  other side for speakers on both sides of the House, and particularly the last speech to which we have listened, are extremely symptomatic of that sort of feeling. Does the hon. Member for Tradeston agree with the Prime Minister and with the Leader of the Opposition? The Prime Minister told us that action in Korea has been in support of the United Nations action in resisting aggression. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition spoke of Soviet-inspired aggression across the 38th Parallel. That is what we were asked to be united in resisting. Is that what the party opposite wishes to be united with us in resisting, because the whole tendency of the speech of the hon. Member for Tradeston was to deny that that is the situation? To deny that that is the situation and then to go on to do what is the worst of all things in considering international affairs, where some kind of war is already in existence and a worse kind of war is clearly threatening, by arguing that in any case we and any possible allies of ours are impotent—[Interruption.] He told us that it would be disastrous if Germany rearmed, and he also told us that France was never going to fight again.
  Mr. Harold Davies: He did not say that at all.
  Mr. Pickthorn: It will be within the recollection of the House that he said that the fighting age of France was over. He certainly told us that. I do not know what he meant to say, but I heard what he said quite clearly. He told us not to console ourselves with what has been held out to us so often as a consolation, the notion that our side is much superior if it comes to atomic warfare. He left us quite hopeless and defenceless. I thought that what we were supposed to be going to be united about was to stand up to aggression? I can understand the argument that if we do stand up to aggression, it will probably be the end of all of us. We ought to face the possibility of that. We ought not to assume that Providence will see that that is not so; but at any rate when we are told to stand up to aggression, we ought not at the same time to be told that we have nothing whatever to stand up to aggression with. For myself, I believe it not to be true.

  1405
  I want to return a little to the questions about China. I heard no doubts or denials when I suggested just now that what the United Nations are resisting in Asia is an aggression by China. I take it, therefore, that that is agreed and that that applies to Korea, and that it applies to Tibet, which, rather curiously, was not mentioned until quite late in today's debate. I want to say a word about the admission of China to the Security Council. I do not think that I can offer authoritative advice on this matter; but it seems to me that it is much more complicated than has yet been admitted, and, with respect, I do not think that the legal arguments of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Norwich, South (Mr. H. Strauss), even if they are entirely right, as for all I know they are, necessarily conclude the question. It is not people with prejudices like mine who have taught us all now to regard international relations as not what they used to be in the old simple days, relations between national states, but as relations between ideological entities. I did not want the world to get like that. I do not believe that the world has even now got so much like that as people often pretend. But right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite did want the world to get like that. They did proudly cast aside nationalist loyalties and so on.
  I do not know how many of them pore over, in the stilly watches of the night, those nasty little yellow books which gave them their greatness. If any of them do they may remember that the silliest, and, oddly enough, therefore the least successful—that always seemed to me very odd—of these little yellow books was one with a somewhat imbecile title like "Ten Thousand Million Allies"; something of that sort, hon. Members may remember. The argument was that all foreigners were Leftish and that if therefore we in time of war went Left fast enough, they would all come on our side, and they would all then arise and kick and squeal and they would kick the Germans out of Europe. That was the argument of the book.
  The relevance of it to the immediate situation is this, that if we are going to say that recognition is merely and purely a matter of who is actually in charge of a particular territory, then it is going to be difficult for us, in a political climate of opinion such as hon. Gentlemen opposite have created by books like that, and
  1406
  in a diplomatic system where the old concert of Europe has been replaced by the United Nations organisation, where that is so there is bound to be some kind of test of admissibility to be put to the governments before they are admitted. I should have thought that, quite clearly, these questions have to be faced about China. I dare say that the legal argument is right and that China must be in the United Nations; but that it must be in the Security Council seems to me to want considering on the lines which I have just indicated.
  Then I want to go on from that to the bigger question. Everybody, almost, today has said "Europe is what matters most," and, of course, Europe is what matters most to us. I think it not altogether unreasonable that we should think that it is what matters most to the world. Certainly it is what matters most to us. I thought there were one or two things in the Prime Minister's speech today, and there have been in recent speeches on the matter, which are a little disquieting. We still continually get the assumption that there is something called "Asia." So far as I know Asia is a name invented by European map makers. I do not know whether there is a word for it in any Asian language. The notion that there is some Asian civilisation which has a common and homogeneous ethos, a positive and common ethos of its own, different from other people's, is a very misleading notion.
  I think the second very misleading notion in approaching these problems is the commonplace of saying, "The best rampart against Communism is a high standard of living." There is really no evidence for it at all. I think that a high standard of living is a very good thing, and we may all desire it without thinking that that is the reason for wanting it. I think, further, that a rising standard of living may possibly be some slight guarantee against Communism, though I very much doubt that because, historically speaking—has the hon. Member for Tradeston gone?—
  Mr. Rankin Mr. Rankin rose—
  Mr. Pickthorn: I always know when anybody says that "history teaches us" this or that, that a piece of unusual nonsense, something rather sillier than what has just preceded it, is about to come; and sure enough it did when the hon.

  1407
  Member for Tradeston told us what history had taught him. Therefore, I am a little shy of telling the House what history has taught me, but there are two or three safe generalisations, and one of them is that on the whole revolutions tend to come more often where there is a rising standard, on the whole more often where things have been intolerable and where they are just beginning to get better, but are not getting better quickly enough. I am sure that we prepare for ourselves unnecessary mistakes if we too easily assume that standards of living are the defence against Communism.
  I want to pass, with these ideas at the back of my mind, to the general question of Europe. I was very glad indeed in our previous debates, when our Front Bench suggested that there ought not to be any going to a meeting with the Soviet authorities unless there were some previous agreement upon agenda. I was very glad indeed that that was accepted by a right hon. Gentleman opposite. I think it was the Foreign Secretary.
  Mr. Poole: That was announced a week ago.
  Mr. Pickthorn: I have not got the hon. Gentleman's point. What I want to make sure of is this, that we do not in drawing up our agenda so draw it up as to exclude from consideration what our fathers and grandfathers called the constitution of Europe. The fact is that the last war and the sequelœ of the last war—the deadful little diseases which come after the great big blood-letting—produced a condition of affairs such as our ancestors never dreaded even in their dreams, one great Power, demonstrably lower in standards of conduct and civilisation than Europe in general, dominating more than half of Europe. That has happened. We all know it has happened.
  Incidentally, it should remind us all not to say that the worst thing that can happen is war. It is a very foolish thing to say. Of famous last words it is almost the commonest. War is not the worst thing that can happen. History during the last 10 years has shown us that. Even those of us who have not seen war directly ought during the last 10 years to have learnt that more casualties, certainly more miseries, have been caused
  1408
  outside the war than inside the war. Take a numerically little thing—but it always seems to me it comes home to one's bosom sooner—the kidnapped Greek children. Nobody knows how many hundreds or thousands. How many Arabs were extruded from Palestine, pushed into holes in the mud?
  Mr. Orbach: Who told you that?
  Mr. Pickthorn: The hon. Gentleman might conceivably have heard of a well down which some were literally pushed, and that perhaps warned some of the rest to go across the border. Who told them to go there indeed—who allowed the people to come in who did come in? Who now remembers when was it that the Albanians murdered how many British sailors? Who knows? Does the Prime Minister know? Would the right hon. Gentleman who is to wind up this debate be able to tell us, unless he looked it up, what was the year or how many there were?
  I ask these questions for a very good reason: because it is perfectly certain that no new organisation of diplomacy, which is what U.N.O. sets out to be, can possibly survive unless by its fruits it looks worth preserving. And if the fact is that these methods of negotiation result in more such horrors—and I have only touched the fringe of them—than used to happen in the old days I believe actually far, far more such horrors, and that perhaps is not within the control of us, but what is within our control is, if it results in these horrors and nobody cares. It is difficult for the Table to know what questions can be asked. We are told "It is not a matter for His Majesty's Government. It is a matter for U.N.O. or G.A.T.T.O. or N.A.T.O. or somebody else, or it is a matter for the International Red Cross. We cannot answer that." And these things cause a deterioration of our character in both senses, both of the real qualities inside us and of our character in the sense of what people think of us. And these things are happening very fast indeed.
  It seems to me quite necessary to be sure that any agenda is so drawn as not to make it possible afterwards to argue: "Oh, well, we thought you accepted the map of Europe as it now is, and we

  1409
  thought you had accepted the new international habits we have established during the last six years." If the result of going on with an agenda is that Russia—perhaps it is better to say the Soviets—could have that argument at their disposal afterwards, that in my judgment would be an immense loss to all of us, and would immensely diminish the hope that is left. And it is amazing how much hope is left in Europe, even on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
  It seems to me that as long as we are to have the Soviet starting cold wars and warm wars wherever they like, too far away from us to get to, or immensely expensive for us to get there whether Korea, Malaya, Indonesia or the day after tomorrow somewhere in Africa while that is so, while we are always fighting a distant and difficult war and at the same time we are always terrified—and a good many are obviously terrified—of what might happen much nearer at home; so long as that is so, it seems to me that all the time their money is going up and our money is going down. Not in the strict sense of money, but their assets must be going up and our assets must be going down.
  I have been rather surprised that neither in the debate a week or so ago, nor in the debate today so far, has there been much in the way of insistence that we cannot balance the extreme West of Europe and the extreme east of Asia and think we can forget what happens in between. I hope that the Foreign Office and the Staffs are continually considering whether the best defence against the Soviets might not be a position from which the Soviets could be hit. There is only one place where that can be done and that is in the Black Sea region. And whether much the cheapest way for the Western Powers to make it certain that the Soviets will not invade Europe would not be to make it possible that in such case there will be a counter attack from the Eastern Mediterranean and from the Adriatic.
  Mr. Poole: Will the hon. Gentleman—
  Mr. Pickthorn: I am sorry, I cannot give way, I have been too long. In that connection I should like to ask whoever is to wind up how much thought has been given to making dead certain that we are making at least as many conditions about
  1410
  any help we give, for instance to Yugoslavia, as the Americans are making, or as we are making to our old and trusted friends in Greece or Turkey, for instance, or as if not formally at least effectively, the Americans have done in helping us.
  Sir Richard Acland: Transjordan?
  Mr. Pickthorn: And as hon. Gentlemen opposite are always saying should be done to Transjordan. We ought to be quite clear that, without trying to use the destitution in Yugoslavia in order to force a policy or a regime upon them—and I detest forcing policies or régimes, especially democratic ones—we ought to see what can be done by way of direction.
  We are on the Adjournment, Mr. Speaker, so I suppose that what I am about to say is in order, and I am sure that it is relevant, although it may not at first seem quite so. It is this. It is quite impossible to think we shall resist or counter-attack our enemies, we with interests—as the Prime Minister rightly reminded us, and the American Government and people the other day—spread all over the world, because we had been told over and over again these seven years that we have great allies, in some respects greater than us, and it is true. And we are in some respects greater than them, and even in some respects more indispensable to them than they to us. And it is our world-wide constitution, the heritage which we have got from the fact that for 200 years the movement of men and goods about the world was much cheaper and freer and easier and safer than it had ever been before, because we made it so—from which we have inherited these positions all over the world.
  I beg the House to believe that there is no hope they will have a defence policy, there is no hope they will find a financial policy, there is no hope they will find some way of using U.N.O., or even of making U.N.O. useful, which will protect that, without which these islands cannot be defended—there is no hope of those things being done on the basis of a disheartened colonialism; and colonial authority is being disheartened with extraordinary rapidity. I am amazed at the number of my pupils who come home to me from Africa, men of the utmost devotion to their flocks all the ones I know, and I do not suppose they are much better than

  1411
  the rest—men of an incredible and touching devotion to their flocks—they are so much more unselfish about the people they administer than you—not you, Mr. Speaker, but the rest of the House and I are about our constituents—
  Mr. Percy Wells: Speak for yourself.
  Mr. Pickthorn: Those men are being discouraged to the point where, whether colonial authority can be carried on, becomes extremely doubtful. Neither are those the only key men who are being discouraged. I have here a letter from a Chinese, a man of great courage and great abilities. He was writing, not with politics in mind, though he began about the Socialist Government having done their best—[An HON. MEMBER: "Read it out"] I think he thought worse of the intellects of the hon. Gentlemen opposite than I do—
  Mr. Harold Davies: Intellectual snobbery!
  Mr. Pickthorn: He says:
  "The memories of the Japanese occupation in the last war cannot be wiped out in a few years, and British prestige is something which only our generation can remember. Neither the Malays nor the Chinese, with the exception of the educated minorities, are politically conscious"—
  Sir R. Acland: Was not Sir John Simon responsible for that?
  Mr. Pickthorn: I do not think that is worth a laugh. [Laughter.] If hon. Gentlemen opposite think it possible to laugh at, or even to think there is a laughable answer to, the fact that a highly educated, extremely friendly, very able Chinese in Malaya can say that only the older generation can remember British prestige—his word does not prove that it is so, but it is a strong and striking piece of evidence. However wholly right the colonial policy of the last six years may have been, that is the sort of piece of evidence which must be taken into account. Unless His Majesty's Government—this or any other—can find ways of restoring courage, both among the Englishmen who serve in Colonial territories and among those persons born and brought up in those parts, who have cherished the British connection, then there is no hope that any diplomacy or
  1412
  machinery can hold our world-wide position.
  7.11 p.m.
  Mr. Pargiter: I hope that the hon. Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his somewhat academic speech. I thought that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set the tone in a factual statement on the present position which we are debating and that to some extent that was followed by the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), although the right hon. Gentleman fell away from it a little towards the end of his speech.
  The right hon. Member for Woodford referred in part of his speech to being wise after the event and implied certain wisdom before the event so far as he was concerned, when he suggested that we should have fortified the "waist" or the 38th Parallel, or something like that, from which we should have sent out columns before proceeding any further. I have yet to learn that the right hon. Gentleman acquainted the House of those facts at the time the forces of General MacArthur were surging forward; and I have yet to learn that he associated himself with the views which were expressed on this side of the House that we ought to make it quite clear that we were not going to the Manchurian border. So far as I know, the right hon. Gentleman was conspicuously silent on those issues, and I can hardly imagine that he can claim to be so wise on matters concerning events in Korea.
  No useful purpose is to be served by avoiding discussion on the points of disagreement with America. First of all, we might as well get the background quite clear. Following the statement made yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we have at least got rid of one of the principal propaganda tales which Communists have been able to use against us, that strings were attached to Marshall Aid and that those strings are implied in British foreign policy. The Communist Party must now think of another line instead of that one.
  Nevertheless, there are difficulties and it is important that we should recognise where we may go. We should recognise also the importance of the efforts of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to have a clear understanding with the American administration that Europe is

  1413
  still of vital importance so far as future strategy is concerned. It must be borne in mind that vast numbers of people in America will be much more concerned with the Pacific than with the Atlantic. They will have memories of Pearl Harbour, and in my view it is those memories which are dictating a good deal of the present policy of America so far as the Pacific is concerned.
  We should adopt a more forceful policy towards the admission of China to the United Nations. We should make it clear, to begin with, that Chiang Kai-shek should no longer have representatives in the United Nations or on the Security Council and, following that the People's Government of China should be admitted. That would be a prerequisite towards any peaceful solution in the Far East, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will pursue this point and course when he replies to the debate.
  I do not think that Formosa will be excluded from such discussions as we might be able to establish, and we should make it quite clear where we stand. We ought to be quite plain that we have not departed from the decision that Formosa should be handed back to China. When that decision was arrived at, it was not a decision to hand Formosa to Chiang Kai-shek—it was a decision that it should be returned to China. The fact that there has been a change of Government in China in no way invalidates the justice of the Chinese claim that Formosa should be returned to them. I agree that it would be highly undesirable to tell the Chinese people that they could walk into Formosa tomorrow, but a time limit could be fixed for the removal of Chiang Kai-shek and the disarming of the Nationalist troops there. If we clearly established the position in Formosa, there would be a real chance of getting co-operation with China.
  As regards Europe, I do not believe that it is the intention of Russia to attack by the normal method of armed force. Her chances, she thinks, are quite good without that. Russia thinks that if the world can be kept in a sufficient state of turmoil, if there can be sufficient uncertainty, and if the nations of Europe—Western Europe, in particular—can be forced to devote, a large proportion of their economy to arms, so much will the people's standards suffer and, as a result, Communist parties will be successful.
  1414
  The technique of Russia has been fairly clearly established. It works not through force of arms, but through internal dissension. I still believe, in spite of what has been said by one or two hon. Members opposite, that it is in conditions of uncertainty and in conditions of depressing the people's standards, that Communism flourishes. The maintenance of a good standard of living is essential for the maintenance of any resistance to Communism in Western Europe.
  Therefore, we ought to pursue the suggestion of the Four Power meeting of the Foreign Ministers with a view to discussing outstanding problems in Europe. No useful purpose is served by recrimination. An attempt should be made to make an agenda as quickly as possible to get the Foreign Secretaries of the four Powers together to settle the problems of Austria, and to follow that, if possible, with suggestions for settling the problem of German unification. I do not believe that there will be peace in Europe so long as there is a divided Germany, and it is essential that we should endeavour to come to terms with Russia upon the conditions on which Germany may be united.
  Mrs. Middleton: On what basis?
  Mr. Pargiter: Our present difficulties will continue until we can get a clearer understanding with Russia. I do not believe that any policy of containment will be sufficient to restrain Communism as an ideological force. We should get together and endeavour to obtain a mutual understanding so that peace may be preserved. The preservation of peace is of vital importance.
  An hon. Member opposite suggested that a war was not the worst possible thing. I beg to differ. I think that the worst thing that can happen at any time is that nations should be plunged into war. I believe it is in conditions of war that democracy does not survive. In fact the two world wars have proved that democracy has lost as a result of war and certainly has not gained. It therefore seems to me that there is everything to be gained by the maintenance of peace. It also seems to me that there is a sign of hope at the moment inasmuch as the Chinese forces seem to be adopting some thing of the same tactics as they adopted

  1415
  earlier on, in their first intervention in Korea. We recollect that the Chinese forces compelled our men to retreat, and then went away. At present, after forcing a still further withdrawal, they do not appear to be following that up at the present juncture, and that might be a hopeful sign. At least it is one which ought to be pursued with all the force and power we can command in order to come to an understanding.
  I believe it is vital that we should press for the admission of the People's Government of China to the United Nations Organisation and to the Security Council. I believe we should use every endeavour not to exacerbate feelings, either there or in Europe, and out of this may come a common understanding and peace may be preserved. Out of the present perhaps uncertain peace, a more certain future may be obtained.
  7.21 p.m.
  Mr. Fitzroy Maclean: If one is going to make a controversial speech, it is perhaps not a bad thing to start by trying to find something on which most of us are in general agreement; but I must say that, after listening to some of the speeches we have heard from the other side of the House, I have some difficulty in finding any point on which I could be said to be in agreement with hon. Members opposite, and the last speech was not an exception.
  I think that if there is anything upon which most hon. Members are agreed, it is that, in terms of world strategy, the defence of Europe is more important than the defence of the Far East and that we do not, if possible, want to get involved in a full-scale war with China at the present time. We are all agreed on that, and I think it is sound reasoning—sound reasoning as far as it goes, but the trouble is that it does not go very far. It does not face all the facts of the present situation.
  First of all, the question whether the scope of the war in the Far East is to be extended or not—and I use the term "war" because it is a war; the Prime Minister called it an episode and that is rather reminiscent of the "China incident" about which we heard before the last war; but it is in fact a war—does mot depend entirely on us. After all, we did not want to fight the Chinese in the
  1416
  first place. We did not ask them to come into Korea, or into Tibet. They started it. They are the aggressors. But hon. Members opposite seem to forget that, and are always saying what we should do to put things right. It never occurs to them that the other side should make a move. To suggest that the United Nations provoked China by going into Korea to put a stop to aggression there, shows a complete refusal to face the facts.
  In the same way, however anxious we may be to stop the war spreading, we have to remember that the Chinese, and the Russians who stand behind them, may have very different views on the subject. Even if we were to clear out of Korea altogether—and some hon. Members seem to think we should—we still might not achieve our object of limiting the conflict. Encouraged by their success, the Chinese might—in fact, they almost certainly would—turn their attentions elsewhere, to Indo-China, Malaya, Hong Kong, Burma and Siam. They are an expansionist Power; so are the Russians. What if they do that? Are we to let those countries fall one after another into Chinese or Russian hands? If that happens, it seems to me there is nothing to prevent the whole of Asia falling, India, Pakistan—the whole lot.
  It is perfectly true that the defence of Europe is much more important than the defence of Asia, but can we keep the two so completely separate?
  "The road to Paris"—
  Lenin once said—
  "lies through Peking. Asia is the back door of the capitalist and imperialist Powers."
  It is no good barricading the front door if we leave the back door wide open. What we have to consider is; would we really stand much chance of defending Europe once the whole of Asia, with its immense resources of manpower and material, was in Communist hands?
  There is another thing, quite apart from everything else, quite apart from our moral duties to uphold the principles of the United Nations—of which hon. Members opposite used to talk so much at meetings throughout the country when the organisation first started—and quite apart from the purely strategical aspect of the question; there is the psychological aspect to be considered. I have just come back from the Middle East. Everywhere I

  1417
  went, in Persia, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia—all countries which fringe the Iron Curtain, all countries living under constant threat of Soviet aggression—everywhere I found people watching Korea and following what was happening there from day to day. Their first reaction was one of relief that this latest act of Soviet aggression should not have been allowed to pass completely unchallenged. Now they are watching to see how it all ends.
  If it ends with a setback for the United Nations and the triumph of aggression and is followed by other successful acts of aggression elsewhere, they will know what conclusion to draw. They will know what to expect when they are attacked. For them it is a test case. If they get into their heads the idea that we are not prepared to resist aggression and that we do not mean business, that U.N.O. is a "busted flush," then the whole edifice of collective security will crumble and we shall be faced with potential friends becoming enemies and capitulating to the Russians right and left. And who is to blame them?
  Of course, if we can limit the war in the Far East and arrive at a valid settlement, so much the better, but there must be no appeasement—I do not mean appeasement, because one cannot have appeasement once war has started—there must be no capitulation. If we do reach an agreement it must be an agreement to protect our rights and the principles for which we are fighting. It must be an agreement which covers not only Korea but the whole of the Far East, and we must have some reason to suppose that the other side, the Chinese and the Russians, are going to keep their word. Let us hope that we shall be able to reach some such settlement.
  But I think we ought to consider what we are going to do if that does not happen, if the Chinese continue to show themselves quite unreasonable and if it becomes clear that they have no wish to come to terms but that they have simply decided to push ahead. Certainly when one listens to the rantings of the much sought after Mr. Wu at Lake Success, one has very grave doubts how any settlement can be made with that people.
  I have heard it said, and I have seen it written, by hon. Members opposite that we should at all costs avoid a conflict
  1418
  in the Far East. I wonder whether people who say that have really thought it out, and really mean what they say? Do they mean that we should, if necessary, let one country after another be overrun by the Chinese or the Russians, as Tibet is now being overrun, without stirring a finger, and that we should, if necessary, part company with the Americans on this issue? If so, the cost is going to be very high. Let us remember this. Once our enemies know that we will not fight, once they suspect that we and our allies are divided, they will take full advantage of that fact and exploit it to the utmost. That is one of the reasons why some of the speeches we have heard tonight are not really very helpful to the cause of peace.
  No, quite clearly, however anxious we are to avoid the explosion of a conflict in the Far East, we have got to make a stand somewhere. I think that we should make a stand in Korea, and I am very much encouraged by what the Prime Minister said of our prospects of doing that. However that may be, somewhere we must set a limit to Soviet expansion in Asia, and that may mean that, whether we like it or not, the scope of the present conflict will be extended, if not on land, at any rate by sea and in the air. It may mean that. It may mean the extension of the war, but, on the other hand, it may not, because it seems to me that, if our attitude is sufficiently resolute and we show that we really mean business, if we show that we stand firmly beside our allies, the Chinese may think better of it.
  I do not feel certain myself that either the Chinese or the Russians want a full-scale war at the present time. I do not think that, if they believe that their present policy of naked aggression, as it has been so well called, would lead inevitably to the devastation of their military bases, their ports and harbours and the centres of their industry and population, by the terrible weapons of destruction which the West possesses, they will be so keen to persist in that policy. Of course, if they think that they are up against people divided amongst themselves, who are not going to fight or who will fight with one hand tied behind their backs, I do not see what we can do about it.
  7.32 p.m.
  Mr. Paton: I consider myself fortunate in being called immediately after the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean) because, however we may differ on other matters, he and I have at least one object in common, or one interest in common, and that is the continued and sustained interest in Far Eastern matters which I share with him. I am unable, because I desire to speak as briefly as possible, to follow him in the arguments which he put forward, except for one, which has been put forward not only by him but by some other hon. Members on the Opposition benches several times during today's debate.
  It was that they challenged us about the view which some of us hold, and have expressed, that we did, in fact, in Korea provoke Chinese action against us. The point has been made several times, and, earlier today, there was something like an explosion of cheers when some hon. Members on the other side challenged my right hon. Friend the Minister of Works on this point. I say, quite deliberately, that we did, in fact, and with knowledge of the very dangerous and dire consequences that might follow, provoke the Chinese into the action which they took. Nobody must assume, when I say that, that I am in any way condoning the Chinese action. They have no rights in Korea, except the ordinary rights of any Power which thinks that its interests and security are threatened. Korea has never been part of China. China has never had any control over it, and so, therefore, there is no doubt that there was no moral justification at all for the action she took.
  But that should not blind us to the fact that, when that push was made to the Yalu River, it was known throughout the world, and had been discussed by publicists in every country, that the Chinese action might in fact be extremely violent and perilous. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chou En-Lai, has gone on record on a number of occasions in making the announcement to the whole world that, if these things were permitted to happen, the Chinese would be compelled to intervene. These are facts, and it seems to me to be the greatest folly for hon. Members of this House to try to blind themselves and the people of this country to these facts.
  1420
  The Chinese action in Korea was no better and no worse than the actions of any other great Power in history in similar circumstances. Why is it possible that hon. Members of this House can forget so easily the history of their own country? We have gone to war on more than one occasion to prevent hostile armies occupying the Low Countries or the Channel ports of France. Therefore, we have to realise that, after all, in this matter, there is a Chinese argument that we ought to understand, and we ought not to show ourselves too much in an attitude of self-complacency and high moral rectitude about the superiority of our own international policies.
  Lord Dunglass Lord Dunglass (Lanark) rose—
  Mr. Paton: I am sorry, but I cannot give way.
  There is one thing that we are all agreed upon, I am very thankful to say, and that is the agreement that extends far beyond this House, and, I think, reaches to every part of this country and the whole of western Europe. That is the agreement that none of us wants war with China, and that all of us will do everything possible to try to avoid it. That is something that, to me, is extraordinarily heartening, and I want, therefore, to see the proposal that has been made in Washington for a "cease fire" being accepted, and a cessation of these hostilities in Korea that we are all watching with such great anxiety, in order that there might come—what must come eventually, in any case—the opportunity for opening negotiations with China with a view to trying to secure a negotiated settlement and the restoration of peace in that area.
  I was extremely glad this afternoon to hear the Prime Minister say that in any contacts we might make in negotiating with the Chinese, we would be in the position of recognising them as full equals with us and the Western nations in the negotiations; that there would be no attempt whatever to try to talk to the Chinese as if they were, in some way, still in a subordinate position. I am very glad that my right hon. Friend made that statement, because it seems to me there is still far too great a, tendency by hon. Members in this House and by people outside to talk as if the Chinese were, in fact, still subordinate, and as if we

  1421
  were in a position of superiority, from which we could talk down to them.
  That sort of attitude will not do. The Chinese are a great people; China is a great country. It is now a great Power, and we must, first of all, before we enter into any conference, if we hope that the conference will be successful, approach it in the right attitude of mind. I hope, therefore, there will be no attempt made by anybody on our side in the negotiations from the United Nations to think that they can possibly dictate to the Chinese either the conditions of the conference or the subjects that will be discussed.
  Another thing the Prime Minister said was that we must all be careful in a debate of this kind not to say anything that would injure the unity that has been established between the Allies in the United Nations, and no hon. Member would deliberately say or do anything that might have that effect at this time. We are all agreed that in the dire peril in which we and the whole Western world find ourselves we must stand solidly together in defence of those things in which we believe. But I do not think that necessarily means that we in this House should be muzzled as to our utterances and should not be allowed to express criticism of some of the policies being followed by our Allies.
  I do not believe that the United States is so sensitive that she is going to get into a violent state of the jitters because some hon. Member in this House gets up and expresses what he believes is a proper and critical view of some of the policies of that great country. I do not believe that for one moment. On the contrary, I believe that we have a duty to express our point of view, that we have a duty to push our point of view, and that we have a duty and a responsibility to try to get that point of view accepted by our allies if we think it is right.
  I do not want to see any attempt at anything in the nature of horse-trading in this conference which I hope is going to come about; I want to see the Powers of the United Nations go into such a conference basing their case on right and justice, and not believing it necessary, knowing that something is right and just, that it should be held in the background because it might not be considered politic
  1422
  at this moment to put it forward. Chief among these issues, of course, are those of Formosa and of China's place on the Security Council. Many people are suggesting that we must keep all this in the background. As if we could!
  Does anybody in this House still cherish the illusion that we can get China, that great Power, flushed now with military victory, to go into a conference with us for the sole purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement in Korea and without discussing the necessity of the settlement of the Formosan issue and China's rightful place on the Security Council? Anybody who harbours that sort of illusion is not fit mentally to be a Member of this House or of any other. Of course these things are going to be raised at once; they are going, I have no doubt at all, to be part of the Chinese conditions for participating in such a conference.
  Therefore, it is necessary for us to make up our minds where we stand on this issue. I said that in anything we put forward we should take our stand on right and justice, and I suggest that if we accept that test for the settlement of these problems there is no doubt at all that on both the Formosan issue and that of the admission of China as a full member to the United Nations and to a seat on the Security Council she is in every way legally and morally entitled to get the verdict.
  After all, let us remember some of the facts of recent history. Until just before June of this year, when the Korean offensive began, there was no question in anybody's mind at all about the legal status of the territory of Formosa. It had been recognised and laid down at Cairo and Potsdam that this territory was Chinese territory, and must be considered part of the Chinese State. It was only when the invasion of Korea came about that there was a change of view, and let us remember why that change came about. It came because America believed it was necessary for the security of her forces engaged in the peninsula of Korea that she should neutralise Formosa by naval action in order that the movements of her troops and supplies could not be interfered with from the other side. That was the sole reason given by the United States for the unilateral action she then took, an action

  1423
  which was not assented to by any Power in the United Nations, but which most people recognised had some basis of justification in the security reasons advanced. But we must remember that they were purely security reasons while the Korean campaign continued.
  With the cease fire and with the successful issue of a peace conference, which I hope we shall have, that particular case goes by the board, and there is no reason at all why it should not be agreed at once that Formosa is Chinese territory and why it should not be put under the control of the de facto and de jure Government of China, the Government which we ourselves have recognised. As we all know, this issue is complicated by the position of Chiang Kai-shek and by the fantastic position that has been allowed to grow up in the United Nations by which the legitimate and legal Government of China have been refused their proper place in that Assembly. It seems to me that that situation is largely the work of certain powerful influences in the United States—the China lobbying which everybody knows is notorious in the United States.
  There is no doubt that operations of powerful pressure groups of that kind have led to this placing of hopes in that broken reed, Chiang Kai-shek, and his refugee army in Formosa. After all, none of us need waste any time on Chiang Kai-shek. The verdict on him and on the regime he heads, was given decisively by no less a person than General Marshall himself in his famous report which I think most of us have read. It was endorsed subsequently in a more devastating report by General Wedemeyer, so that there is no question at all as to the nature of Chiang Kai-shek himself and of the regime he heads. Nothing would be more fatuous than for anybody to try to put that Humpty-Dumpty back on the Chinese wall again. It cannot be done.
  Therefore, it seems to me that when we get to the point of discussion at a conference, these matters will be beyond dispute. There can be no legal or moral justification whatever for the exclusion of Communist China from its proper place on the United Nations. I hope, therefore, that when this conference comes about—and I hope it comes about speedily, and I think everybody would agree on that—
  1424
  this Government, in conjunction with their Allies, will try to look at this matter—indeed, on this question I am pushing at an open door so far as our Government are concerned, but I hope they will try to get the United States and their friends and Allies in the United Nations to appreciate the necessity of taking a completely realistic view of these matters. Nobody will dispute the fact that however much we may differ on other things, in issues of this kind, on which the peace of the world and countless millions of lives depend, there will be no forgiveness for all time, if there is any failure by any party in the negotiations to exercise every possibility of a peaceful solution.
  7.50 p.m.
  Mr. Derek Walker-Smith: I will come in a moment to the questions of Korea and the admission of China to the United Nations, which were discussed with customary emphasis and, if I may be allowed to say so, with customary dogmatism and assurance by the hon. Member for Norwich, North (Mr. J. Paton). My right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) this afternoon observed that no one could doubt that good had come of the Prime Minister's talks with the President, but the question was how much good. It seems to me that to arrive at the answer to that question the House must have regard to the' background against which these talks took place.
  On a frank and objective analysis, I think it must be confessed that the background and prelude to these talks was a failure of policy on the part of the American and British Governments. The American policy had succeeded in making the Chinese Communists not only an enemy but, at any rate for the time being, a successful enemy. The Americans had neither recognised them nor prevented them from coming into power. The British Government were guilty of a failure in policy because they differed from the American Government just sufficiently to embarrass them, but not enough to persuade them. Therefore, to some extent, it was a case of having the worst of both worlds. At the outset of these talks the stage was badly set, either for effective resistance to the Chinese Communists or for fruitful negotiations with them.
  Mr. Sorensen Mr. Sorensen (Leyton) rose—
  Mr. Walker-Smith: I hate to refuse to give way, but there is not much time and there are many hon. Members who wish to speak. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) knows that it is not my habit to refuse to give way, but I am refusing in the interests of other hon. Members, and I hope he will have an opportunity of speaking.
  It is right to measure the success of these talks by the contribution they have made to the specific and urgent problems which caused them to be held. They were not planned talks or routine talks; they were arranged at short notice because of the urgency of certain vital problems. As I see it, welcome progress has been made in general long-term matters, and in one or two specific matters; but there is an absence of definition and, indeed, a proclaimed difference of opinion on just those matters which are immediate and inescapable and which must arise in the very immediate future.
  Those matters, of course, are the question of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and the question of Formosa. As I understand it, at the talks and as a result of them, the British and American Governments substantially share the view that it will be a good thing to effect a ceasefire at the 38th Parallel, though that, of course, does place in jeopardy the proclaimed objective of the United Nations for a free and united Korea; and it may be that the fate of the Koreans on that basis of settlement may be worse than it was before the United Nations went to their rescue.
  So far as I understand it, there is unanimity of view between the two Governments in seeking negotiations, but so far as the scope of the negotiations are concerned, there is of course, a substantial difference of opinion. The American aim was to confine negotiations to Korea and in the event of the Chinese not coming to a settlement with them on the basis of Korea alone, they contemplated the possibility of engaging in what I think is called a limited war by naval blockade and sanctions against the Chinese Communists, as a last resort. It is not difficult to find criticism of that policy, because although one can limit a commercial liability it is
  1426
  very difficult to limit liability in war, and, of course, it would be likely to give Russia an opportunity, especially if it is true that the Russians have so great a strength in submarines.
  The British Government, while finding little difficulty in differing from that view, have not been able to define their own position very accurately. As I understand, the British point of view was to extend these negotiations to include also the questions of the recognition of China by the United States, her admission to the United Nations, and the future of Formosa. It is quite apparent that on the first two of these matters, whatever the British position may be, it is very difficult for the Americans to take those steps now, at a time when China has had certain military successes, as they were unwilling to take them as a matter of policy before. Indeed, it would be very difficult also, I should have thought, for the British to welcome Communist China to a seat on the United Nations when her conduct is still so out of keeping with the objects of the United Nations.
  But those questions, however difficult, are still less difficult than the question of Formosa. We have not had a very accurate definition of the Government's point of view. The Prime Minister says it is a matter for talks at the United Nations; but even where one hopes to solve a question by talks at the United Nations, it is necessary to have some idea of what one is going to say when one takes part in those talks. A similar reticence has not been shown by hon. Members behind the Prime Minister. The hon. Member for Norwich, North and the hon. Member for Southall (Mr. Pargiter) have no doubt about the solution of the Formosa problem. It must be handed over to the Chinese Communists, in their view. I am not nearly so certain in my mind as either of those two hon. Members, because it seems to me that the question of the right attitude to the Formosa problem depends entirely on the question of what are the ultimate intentions of the Chinese Communists and how far they are committed to participation in the Kremlin plan for the domination of the world.
  It seems to me unwise to take an unduly optimistic view about the intentions of the Chinese Communists. It is necessary, therefore, in spite of what the hon. Member for Norwich, North has said, to rank

  1427
  very high the security implications of this particular problem. If it turned out that Formosa were, as it were, traded in for verbal assurances from the Chinese Communists which hereafter proved to be bad, it would be a very sorry bargain indeed and a great betrayal of statesmanship on the part of the Government making it. The hon. Member for Norwich, North says that once there is a cease fire in Korea the strategic and security reasons for the United States being in Formosa will have gone. That is not so. He must have regard to what is happening in Indo-China and what may happen in Malaya.
  Mr. Paton: That is not what I said. What I referred to was a cease fire and successful outcome of the conference.
  Mr. Walker-Smith: With respect, that brings us back to the main question of what are the ultimate Chinese intentions. The hon. Member shrugs his shoulders, but if their intentions are to reinforce the Kremlin's plan, they will not go to the conference to say so. Even the hon. Member is not so ingenuous as to imagine that. We have to make an appreciation of this situation for ourselves. It would be very unwise to hand over Formosa to the Chinese Communists if the effect were simply to be to uncover Indo-China and Malaya and to lay the Far East at the feet of Communism.
  Mr. A. J. Irvine: How does the hon. Member propose to find out what the Chinese intentions are?
  Mr. Walker-Smith: It is very difficult to find out, especially for private citizens such as the hon. Member for Edge Hill (Mr. Irvine) and myself; but it does follow that we cannot take risks in a matter like this, and it is necessary—I know the hon. Member is a reader of the Scriptural—to walk like Agag, delicately, until one is assured of the position.
  Nevertheless, it is right to say that unless the Chinese military position is weaker than it appears from the other side of the world, they will expect some consideration for their agreement to a settlement in Korea. It is no good blinding ourselves to that fact. There, again, it is very difficult for a private Member to make an appreciation of their military position. We do not know, for example, just how great a deterrent to a further conduct of war their
  1428
  undoubted casualties have been. We do not know in how great a difficulty they are placed by the undoubted administrative difficulties which are already coming upon them in their campaign in Korea. Those are matters on which it is very difficult for private Members to express a confident view.
  But if we do negotiate with the Chinese, and if their military difficulties are not very great, or not so great that they will stop for that reason alone, what do the Government propose? I have sat here patiently all day, but I am still not clear what the Government would say to the Chinese Communists. What I would say is this: Whatever terms are proposed by them, having regard to the realities of the situation, we owe it not only to ourselves but to the future of peace and democracy in the world that the terms are not such as to create the impression in the Far East that aggression pays so long long as it is sufficiently large, ruthless, and formidable.
  I want to say a few words about the position regarding the atom bomb. Here it seems to me that our policy must have regard to the balance of forces in the world today, and that balance is basically at present unfavourable to Western democracies. The Communist Powers have the advantage in mobilised and mobilisable forces. They have the advantage in accessibility to the main theatres of possible conflict; and they have the advantage of five years' steady success, diplomatic and territorial, in the cold war. As against that, the Western Powers can put a long-term economic superiority which, unfortunately, is irrelevant from the point of view of 1951; and, secondly, the atom bomb. Therefore, the only relevant circumstance of superiority at present and in the near future is the possession of the atom bomb, It is for that reason unrealistic for people to proclaim now that in no circumstances could it ever be used, because by making that proclamation they are discarding the one present point of Western superiority.
  Having said that, I want to make it clear that in my view it is equally wrong to urge the use of the bomb in the Far East now in the doubtful hope of its improving a situation, which has arisen, at any rate, in part, owing to policy failures of the American and British Governments. It seems to me that one must take

  1429
  a middle course; that in the present circumstances the right to use the atom bomb must be reserved, but, of course, that right to be exercised only with the greatest reluctance and under compulsion of clear strategic necessity.
  Who is to be the judge of that? When we consider this, it is right for the House to remember that the Americans and the British have somewhat different viewpoints about it. The Americans have borne the main brunt of the battle in Korea and have sustained the heaviest casualties. There is a view amongst the public in the United States that the use of the atom bomb might in certain circumstances be justified to save American lives and to spare the flower of their young manhood. We take a somewhat different view—not least, I suppose, when it comes down to bedrock, because whereas America would expect to be at the sending end, we would expect to be, in part at any rate, at the receiving end. Further the people of this country have, of course, a far greater experience of the effect on the civil population of air bombardment than they have in the United States of America.
  Against that background we have to determine what should be the relationship between the two Allies with regard to policy in respect of the atom bomb. A good deal is said about consultation. In my view, the British have a right to consultation on the use of the atom bomb, but of course consultation could mean one of various things. There is, first of all, merely information—as it were, an indication of intention. Secondly, there is consultation, meaning the right of prior consultation with the United States having the power to disregard the advice given if they so wish; and thirdly, there is the right of prior consultation, and with it what amounts to the right of veto on the part of the country consulted.
  The first of these, I think the House will agree, would be quite inadequate for this country. I think it is the second of those that the Americans have conceded by the communiqué. It is true that the communiqué uses the word "inform" only, but it is interpreted as meaning the right of consultation, though reserving to the United States the right to have the last word. I do not think that we shall move the United States from that position to the next position of giving to this
  1430
  country a right of veto, at any rate until they are more satisfied about the intentions of this Government.
  On that I am bound to say that some hon. Members who support, or at any rate appear to support, the Government do an ill-service by some of the speeches they make. It is possible that we might get an even higher degree of consultation if hon. Members and supporters of the Government would refrain from some of the speeches and actions which excite apprehension on the other side of the Atlantic. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen) must be fair. He and others are very fond of urging statesmanship on the United States. They have a duty in return to practice, as far as they are able, statesmanship on their own account.
  I want to say a brief word about another aspect of the situation which has attracted a good deal of attention in this debate, and that is the question of the rearmament of Germany. As I see it, the questions there are two. First, should Germany be rearmed at all; and secondly, if so, what degree of nationalism should be permitted in her rearmament? It seems that the only argument which has been put today against the necessity of Germany being armed in her own defence was by one hon. Member opposite who suggested that we should refrain from that for fear of the Russian reaction to it; and I do not consider that to be a very valid reason.
  If Germany is to be rearmed, it seems to me that it is very difficult to deny her the right to a reasonable degree of nationalism in the arrangements of her army. To do otherwise would be to treat the Germans on the basis of a sort of foreign legion or as mercenaries, which is a basis that can appeal only to the militarily adventurous few in any country. Of course, if we treat people as mercenaries we run the risk that they, in their turn, will react as mercenaries towards us.
  After what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) about people who refer to history, I am a little diffident in doing so; but it seems to me that in regard to German rearmament we have to try to see the matter in a historical perspective. In saying that, may I give the House two very quick instances to show what I mean? One is from ancient history, from which it is

  1431
  well known that Sparta, Athens, and Thebes went on persevering in their own conflict long after, in the eye of history, it became clear that the real menace was Macedon. The other more recent and perhaps more obvious example is, that of our own relations with France. [Interruption.] I studied history side by side with the hon. Member for Edge Hill (Mr. Irvine), but wild horses would not drag from me the quality of his performance in those days.
  So far as our relations with France are concerned, we fought two major wars against her in the 17th and 18th centuries and, having defeated the French twice, after an interval we became firm allies. The point I want to make is this, however: long after the power of aggression and the intention of aggression had passed from France, the people of this country still feared the spirit of Bonapartism as being the main menace to world peace and to our national security. They continued to think so even after the Franco-Prussian War.
  The question which I think we have to ask ourselves in regard to Germany is this: Have we now arrived at the same position? Dare we hope that we have arrived at the same position in regard to Germany as that which we reached then in regard to France? Dare we hope that the Germans, too, having been twice defeated, have learned from that and from other circumstances and have abandoned the intention of military aggrandisement? I do not pretend now to know the answer, but that is a question which I think we must ask ourselves in order to define our attitude to German rearmament.
  It is true that if that is so, if we have arrived at that position, it has happened more quickly than in the case of France; but, then, events move very fast in this century. If the answer to that question is "Yes," it follows that there should be full co-operation with Germany in the matter of her rearmament. If the answer is "No," there must, of course, be safeguards. But even in prescribing those safeguards, we must have regard to the possibility that the fear of future German domination may give the opportunity for immediate Russian domination. I believe that the greatest threat of German domination
  1432
  would lie in a Communist Germany, and I believe that the withholding of confidence is the greatest sponsor of the growth of Communism in Germany.
  There are no problems today which are easy problems. Clausewitz, in his classic sentence about war, said that in war everything is simple, but the simplest things are difficult. Today we are denied even that qualified easement of our position. Today everything is complex and everything is difficult. I believe that two things on the political plane could bring some relief to our present position. The first would be more liberal statesmanship behind the Iron Curtain, and the second would be more effective statesmanship amongst the Western Powers. Unfortunately, it does not look as if we can hope for the first yet awhile. We shall dispense with the second only at our peril.
  8.15 p.m.
  Mr. Harold Davies: The House has followed with interest as it always does the arguments of the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Walker-Smith). Before I turn, very briefly, to the main points of my argument I should like to deal with the question of Formosa, to which he referred. The hon. Member must see that the arguments of China about her position in Korea are exactly the same arguments as those of the United States, so far as strategy is concerned, about the position in Formosa. We are, therefore, reaching a position where we may be saying that neither Communism nor democracy is prepared to accept a defeat in Korea.
  If neither democracy nor the Chinese Communist Government is prepared to accept a defeat in Korea, have we reached an impasse? I believe we shall have done so if we wipe out altogether the possibility of a completely new approach in regard to Formosa. I believe my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Mr. J. Paton) summed up the argument about Formosa, and I do not want to develop it.
  Turning next to Germany, I think Mr. Lippmann was right in an article which he wrote in New York on the 5th of this month. In an American paper he revealed what is American thought. Looking at this quietly, he told Americans that rearming Germany at the present time is something which would be looked upon by the Russians as a cause of war.

  1433
  Those were roughly his words. Secondly, to think of rearming Germany at the present time without defence in depth is impossible, for the Germans, looking upon the Eastern world and the Western world, know that it is their country which will be overrun. As a consequence, we are finding a very pacifist outlook inside the various German movements today. Where we do not find that, we find a most dangerous recrudescence of Nazism of the worst type. I am sorry that I cannot develop this argument, but I have not the time.
  I want to deal with two or three points about the Far East and I should like, first, to take up points raised by the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill). With all sincerity, one must point out to the Conservative Party that each time they have been approached, in a national crisis, to give their support, they have always made demands upon the Government in power. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman and the Conservative Party that they have always imposed conditions for their support for the national effort, and we should bring home to the country the occasions upon which they have done so.
  In 1914 they demanded the suppression of the Home Rule Bill. For Conservative support in 1916 they secured the removal of the right hon. Gentleman himself, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty. Today, at this critical period, they draw a red herring across national politics and say that for their support we should abandon the Steel Act, a subject which has been fought on the hustings of this country on two great occasions. We have said that we shall give effect to the Act exactly for the reason which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned—for the rearmament of Britain; because, when the steel barons were in power, they could not reach the production required in 1938 until the Government made greater efforts to urge them on.
  Are we realistic about the influence of the European in Asia? The Asiatic man refuses any longer to stand on the sidelines of imperialism. For the hon. Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) to say to the House that the Government have not considered the colonial problem is untrue. The Colombo Plan was a constructive approach—[Interruption.] The hon. Member with his pompous intellect-
  1434
  tual snobbery objects to interruptions from this side of the House—
  Mr. Pickthorn: No, I like them.
  Mr. Davies: If he will sit on the frozen mountains of his intellectual snobbery and not interrupt, I shall be able to proceed more quickly, and so enable some more of his colleagues to take part in the debate. There is no longer any hope for Western European imperialism in Asia on the old lines. I would quote to the House some words in "Eastern World" in September, 1950:
  "We have seen the retreat of the European nations under the impact of the nascent nationalisms of Asia. There has been a wholesale rejection of Western methods and Western ideals. When the West marched into South-East Asia it did so for commercial, strategic and tactical reasons. It used the area for replenishing its store of raw materials, the export of capital to those countries in the interests of the Imperial Powers, and as a means of maintaining the lines of communication between the home country and the overseas market. Western Imperialism distrusted the intellectualisation of Asia. It stood against the liberation of the Oriental mind from the rigid formalism of an anachronistic culture."
  That is quite true in India. One of the tragedies of India was that this House and business in this country refused to industrialise India. At the famous Delhi Conference of November, 1940, there was a refusal to allow India, despite the threat from Japan, to make internal combustion engines for fear that India would compete with the output of internal combustion engines by manufacturers in Britain, and those manufacturers in Britain, sought a monopoly of production of internal combustion engines and of that market, when we were threatened by the might of Japan in the Far East. These things are not forgotten by the people of the Far East as they desire to climb to equality with Western man.
  Another point. Despite the crying out and the writing in newspapers that it is all the influence of Russia, I say it is all poppycock to say that the Asiatic revolutions and agrarian movements are caused by Russia. I am not gainsaying that U.S.S.R. Communism may make use of them, but for anybody to say that Russia could cause the Indonesian problem or the Malayan problem or the Filipino problem at the present moment is utter rubbish. It is really, indirectly, the other way round, handing on Russian propaganda, which is not helpful to the truth or to the peace of the world.

  1435
  Let me illustrate that. With the Colombo Plan we say we want to invest money in South-East Asia. But there is a lesson here that some of us have tried to bring out in the colonial debates. When we invest money in those backward areas we have to bring into them also consumer goods, lest in the transitional period we get inflation that in itself creates poverty and misery. We have the example par excellence in the Philippine Islands at the present moment. Hon. Members may see it from the Bell Report on the conditions in the Philippine Islands.
  Thus we see that while the United States of America have poured into the islands 14 billion dollars, yet they have had 15,000 casualties, and the Hukbalahap are stronger than ever before in six of the nine provinces, and the revolutionary situation today, instead of being less than it was in 1945, is stronger and more fiery. Why is that? Because the United States of America made exactly the same mistake in backing puppets in the Philippines as it has made in backing puppets like Bao-Dai, Chiang Kai-shek and Synghman Rhee.
  These are facts which we have to note, and, while we are friends of America, we may remember that friendship means frankness. One of the tragedies of the United States is that at the famous Conference at San Francisco, before the United Nations Organisation was set up, it was not Russia but the United States of America that said, "We will have bases in the Pacific, U.N.O. or no U.N.O."
  In these debates on the Far Eastern problems we seem to miss out our great cousins in Australia and New Zealand, and I want to know if the Government, in coping with these vital problems, are constantly in touch with Australian and New Zealand opinion about the present competition from Japan over which MacArthurism and the Americans are dominant without control. Could we not have moved to a peace treaty more quickly so far as the Pacific is concerned? I hope that our Government keep in constant touch with, and will let this House know more about, what Australia and New Zealand are thinking about these problems in the Pacific area.
  Let me once again illustrate with statistics the tragedies of this area. If the
  1436
  Western nations and America warp the economy of Asia and South-East Asia like this, there is no hope for the Western social democratic way of life. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has recently given figures telling us that the population of South-East Asia has increased 10 per cent., that rubber production has increased 43 per cent. while food production is 6 per cent. less than it was in 1938. That way lies ruin. That is why I welcome this Colombo Plan which emanated from the co-operation of the Australian and British Governments' in that area.
  Time is not on the side of Western man in Asia, and if people talk loosely at the present moment of a bellicose approach to the problem of the U.S.S.R. it means that they have not thought about the loss that it would entail. The Pacific and the Far East would be cut off from us as never before were we thrown into a war with China. It is the duty of the Government, to the best of their human ability, to maintain peace with China.
  Secondly, I believe that the time has come for a breathing space for statesmen. I have always been in favour of non-secret diplomacy, but if ever there was a time in the world when high-powered conferences should be away from the glare of kleig lights and the headlines for a moment, it is at this juncture in the critical history of man in his tortured search for truth. I believe that if these conferences come, they should be private or should be conferences about which communiqués would be issued after the discussions rather than places where America, Britain or Russia can come to the rostrum and use those discussions as a basis for propaganda.
  Thirdly, we must get rid of the black market in words. One of the difficulties is the connotation of the word "Communism." If one takes its connotation in China, in South-East Asia, in Yugoslavia and in Moscow, one finds that it is a word meaning all sorts of different things and one about which people can quarrel, without really knowing what they are talking about. I would that we could somehow get rid of this black market in words and get a language of international diplomacy as scientific, for example, as the language of the hon. Member for Luton (Dr. Hill) in his professional work.

  1437
  That may be a long way off, but I believe it is highly necessary to achieve it.
  I would sum up by saying that the United States of America must realise what its stock-piling is doing to Western democracies. The entire work of the O.E.E.C. may be destroyed by the very stock-piling which is now going on. Some of us have asked Questions in the House this week about the shortages of zinc and sulphur. I sincerely hope that when these talks take place our Government will press upon the United States and the other Powers concerned the necessity for as free a flow as possible of the nonferrous metals.
  To understand Russia it is necessary to remember Pushkin's words. He said:
  "If you want to understand Russia remember this: she turns her European face to Asia and her Asiatic face to Europe."
  Let us remember that if we fail, we cannot blame the Asiatic people for looking to the U.S.S.R. for leadership. Up to now we have failed, and it is necessary for us to put our house in order and try our utmost to lead the world to peace, international understanding and sanity.
  8.32 p.m.
  Mr. Julian Amery: The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) allowed himself to attack the Bao Dai and Syngman Rhee regimes and characterise them as puppets. It is perhaps unfortunate that the political leaders in the Far East seldom reproduce the characteristics and opinions which we usually associate, for example, with the leader of the Liberal Party. While the hon. Member is entirely within his rights in criticising those regimes, it would have been more generous as well as more statesmanlike if he had also referred to the fact that the soldiers of those regimes are fighting in the line in Indo-China and Korea side by side with our own, and their leaders are on our side and not on the other. I think that the hon. Member will also agree with me that the challenge to Western statesmanship today is to find a peaceful solution to the state of the war which exists between China and the United Nations.
  So far as I have followed the debate, I think we would all agree that there are three issues on which a possible settlement could take place. One is the question of a seat on the Security Council for China. Another is the eventual solution
  1438
  of the question of Formosa. The third is an eventual solution of the question of Korea itself. I do not believe that we can admit China to the United Nations, as a concession given by itself, while she is carrying on aggression simultaneously in Korea, Tibet and, to the best of my knowledge, in Indo-China. Nor do I think there can be any question of handing over Formosa today under present circumstances. Quite apart from the very great moral issues at stake—and I shall have something to say about them in a few moments—Formosa, like Korea, is of immense strategic importance in relation to Japan, whose 80 or 90 million people will, one day, again play an important part in the development of the Far East.
  As I see the situation, the granting of concessions to China, whether in the form of representation in the United Nations or in respect of Formosa, cannot seriously be considered except in the context of a worldwide settlement between the Communist and non-Communist world which would carry with it satisfactory guarantees that the cold war would be discontinued.
  While I agree that we must always be ready to seek a settlement by negotiation, I do not believe that there is a prospect of such a settlement leading to a fruitful outcome until we are considerably stronger than is the case today. We have to be very careful that any policy of conciliation we may pursue should not be taken for weakness, that it should not awaken Chinese appetites to dominate South-East Asia. The insurrections in Malaya and Indo-China continue to increase in strength, and Chinese propaganda towards Indo-China has become increasingly menacing.
  Now, just as in the last war, Indo-China is the key to the whole of South-East Asia. If it should fall to Communism, we should be witnessing the beginning of a landslide the repercussions of which might well extend to the Indian sub-continent and even to the Middle East. I believe it is the duty of the Government at this time to reaffirm that we shall come to the help of the French with all our available forces if her armies and those of the lawful government of Viet-Nam are attacked by the Chinese Communist armies, whether volunteer or otherwise.

  1439
  What are the intentions which inspire the Chinese Communists? Some of us still cherish hopes that they may prove not to be satellites of the Kremlin. Certainly those who, like myself, take a darker view, would be only too glad if events proved us wrong; but it would surely be the height of folly and irresponsibility to found a policy on the hope that the Chinese will not be satellites of Moscow when all the indications which we have so far received suggest the opposite? To quote a famous phrase:
  "Why read the crystal when you can read the book?"
  After the failure of the first Soviet attempt to subvert the Weimar Republic, Lenin wrote to Clara Zetkin—I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. F. Maclean) has already used this quotation:
  "The road from Moscow to Berlin, Paris and London passes through Pekin, Shanghai and Calcutta."
  Lenin may well have been right in thinking that the road to the conquest of Europe lay through the Far East. If he was, then we have, somehow or other, to bar that way. I do not believe it is beyond our power to do it. On the contrary, I agree that it is within our power, even with existing forces, to contain Communist China, and, if it should be necessary, to inflict damage upon her.
  In advocating the building up of a situation of strength in the Far East, I shall be told no doubt that that would be to play into the hands of the Russians, that in committing troops in that part of the world we shall be denuding Europe of her strength. Let us look the facts in the face. Europe is without strength at present, and for long months to come only the atom bomb will protect her against invasion. The lesson we have to learn from the crisis in the Far East is that the breathing space which the atom bomb may still give us must be used for the raising of forces on a sufficient scale to enable us to meet the Communist power wherever it may threaten us.
  There can be no question of choosing between Europe and the Far East. In the struggle for the world we have to be able to defend both. We have got the resources; we have got the manpower. Does anyone seriously believe that we
  1440
  have not got the will-power as well? Of course, it is going to mean sacrifices—greater sacrifices perhaps than the Government have yet envisaged. It is not for me to attempt to make any concrete proposals on the scale of effort that is required. I should have thought that it would not be prudent to do much less than we did during the last war. Sacrifices will be required, but, after all, there are almost no sacrifices which are not worth making if peace can be saved thereby.
  I have heard it said, not by Ministers but by hon. Members opposite, that in this crisis we should not do more than out fair share in the common cause of the United Nations. I confess that I rather deprecate that attitude. I should have thought that in defence of the cause of freedom and of peace we would wish our country to put forth its utmost effort. To hang back at such a time would be consonant neither with prudence nor with honour. I urge the Government, therefore, not to be unduly perturbed by the many economic difficulties of rearmament, nor to make American financial support a pre-condition of going ahead with the fullest possible degree of rearmament.
  I believe that if we raise the forces and show ourselves ready to make sacrifices, the United States will not let us down, and if, as the result of those sacrifices, we find ourselves faced with a critical economic situation, we shall get something like Lend-Lease coming again. The American people, like our own people, can be relied upon, as a rule, to do the right thing in a crisis even though they hesitate to commit themselves beforehand. One must not forget that British rearmament and British leadership in defence are the conditions of successful participation by the Continental Powers in the defence of Europe.
  Most of us on this side of the House—and I suspect a good many on the other side as well—believe that the Labour Government missed a great opportunity after the war by not giving a more positive lead to Europe. There may never be "quiet confident morning again," but I believe that the Government have, in these last few days, been offered a second chance. Hon. Members who have followed the reactions of the Continental Press to the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, or

  1441
  who have been in touch with friends on the Continent, must have been struck, as I have been, by the wave of pro-British sentiment which it awakened. I am sorry that the Prime Minister did not say something about the conversation he had with the French Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister before he visited Washington.
  I believe that as a result of that visit there is a great new chance today, resulting more from the growing crisis than from any efforts which the Government have made, for Britain to take in Europe the lead which we should have given in the last few months. But the success of such an attempt will, I think, depend upon one condition. I raise it with the greatest possible reluctance, and only because I believe it is a duty to say it.
  I do not believe that the consolidation of Western Europe can be successfully undertaken by the present Foreign Secretary. I beg the House to believe that in saying this I am animated by no personal hostility of any kind. On the contrary, I share the great respect in which all of us hold the right hon. Gentleman, and I hope that in some other office he may continue to serve his party and his country; but, rightly or wrongly, he has become identified in the minds not merely of the public on the Continent but of the political leaders of Europe with a policy hostile to the consolidation of Europe. It is for this reason, and this reason only, that I believe that a new departure in the Government's policy towards the Continent will require the appointment of a new Minister to guide it.
  We have reached a turning point in our relations with the Continent. We have to make up our minds whether the Germans are to remain enemies or become allies; whether Germany is to be considered as occupied territory or friendly territory. I do not believe anyone can any longer regard the answer as being in doubt. The time has surely come to make peace with Germany, to bring her into the Atlantic Treaty and to treat her on a basis of full equality with all her neighbours. If we do this, we must also supply some compensating security to our friends in France. There can be no genuine Franco-German agreement or reconciliation without British participation. Assurances will not be enough.
  What I believe is needed is the creation of a European Army, within the North
  1442
  Atlantic defence system, to which we shall contribute some of our best troops and some of our best commanders. Impatience has been expressed in some quarters, and, I believe, by the Minister of Defence, at the reluctance of the French to accept new developments in plans for European defence. I believe that the French have moved much faster than we had any right to expect, given their experiences over the last 80 years. They have already made great concessions. I do not see how they can be expected to do more unless they receive much more solid assurances from this side. For my part, I believe that it will be our duty, as I am confident it is our interest, to stand by them in Europe and in Indo-China and to show that we are still true to the spirit of the offer of indissoluble union which we made to them in the dark hour of 1940.
  It is my belief that, if we build up sufficient strength, in the time that may yet be granted to us, to defend both Europe and the Far East, we shall be able to use that strength to negotiate a satisfactory and lasting peace. Until we are ready to negotiate such a large transaction, it is hard to see how we can make any concessions to the other side, either in Europe or in the Far East. Of course, if we despair of saving the peace, if we believe that war is inevitable, or that it has already begun, then it may be the right strategy to shorten our lines and cut our losses in the hope of winning a decisive struggle in the European theatre. For my part, I regard such an attitude as defeatist and wrong. I believe that the peace can still be saved; but to save the peace means upholding the rule of law, and resisting, indeed punishing, aggression from wherever it comes.
  The invasion of South Korea by North Korea was as blatant an act of aggression as there has ever been. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria 20 years ago, or Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia, were attacks by one country on another, but the invasion of Korea is an act of aggression of a far graver order. It is an open defiance not merely of the rule of law, but of the United Nations. There is a great principle at stake here, a great issue of right and wrong—the issue of whether collective security and the rule of law are to be upheld.
  In a democracy like our own, where nothing can be done without the active

  1443
  support of public opinion, to disregard the flouting of this principle, to minimise the moral issue at stake in the interest of diplomatic manoeuvres, may well be to undermine the morale here at home and in those many nations which still look to England, with fatal consequences to the whole of the free world.
  8.51 p.m.
  Mr. Orbach: There was hardly a remark made by the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Amery), with which I did not find myself in disagreement. Most of all, I deplored his reference to the Foreign Secretary, who, I suggest, has been making the most valuable efforts in the past few months to contain the war in Korea and to secure peace of the world.
  I have refrained from intervening in debates on foreign affairs for some years, and I have felt a sense of frustration while listening to many speeches that have been made from the other side and also some from this side. Probably Members will disagree with a great deal that I have to say, but I think it is cant and humbug to refrain from saying something about the policy which has now collapsed and from which we now find we have to extricate ourselves.
  The Prime Minister said that we were inextricably bound up with the United States in furtherance of the policy of the West, as against the policy that emanates from the Kremlin. If that is true, it is right and proper for the House to be critical of the United States and of the policies of politicians in the United States. Our foreign policy has been determined in these past few years by American theorists and by the domestic American political scene. I do not propose to participate in the current scapegoat hunt of a certain general. It is not for us to attack him, but simply to recognise that he is a political general who is not quite the architect of the house of cards which has collapsed. No one can do him more harm by word of mouth than he has done himself by the endless statements he has made.
  But we have refrained from speaking out aloud in the last few months because we have not wished to embarrass our friends in the United States during the recent elections. Senator McCarthy has
  1444
  frightened not only the American people with his wild and irresponsible statements and charges of Communist infiltration in the State Department and the White House, but has subdued us. At the same time, he has created a menacing bogy that has resulted in the Liberals being defeated in the recent elections.
  We have failed to understand the United States, and too many Members have equated their policy with our own and their people with our own. There are all sorts of ethnic groups in America, all of which have different ideas on how the national policy should be pursued, and we have been asked to accept the policy adumbrated by those who are most raucous. We have failed to understand that America has a frightening industrial potential, that she has the largest mercantile fleet, the major proportion of the world's gold and a wealth of raw materials, that she is a land untouched by the ravages of war, and that while she has a buoyant people, she has politicians who are adolescents and who refuse to work their apprenticeship.
  Although everyone will accept that the majority of Americans are a good and kindly peope—[Laughter.] I speak with some authority, having lived in that country for four years. Although they are a great and kindly people, their voices are stilled by the soda-fountain oratory of the McCarthy's and the Wherries. In the development of our foreign policy, we have listened too readily to the speeches made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill).
  I have always believed, and I believed it at the time, that the Fulton speech was a disaster, and his recent recantation in following the more measured footsteps of the right hon. Gentleman for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) is insufficient recompense for the harm he has caused in the world during these past few years. We have erred in the acceptance of illwill and in a refusal patiently and earnestly to attempt the substitution of good will in the affairs of the world. In considering Russia we have too easily accepted the idea of American professors, who are now retired from the State Department, that we could squeeze this great land mass and by containing her, reduce her to impotence. But this squeeze has meant a finger in every pie—in Turkey, in Iraq, in Greece, in Iceland, in Greenland, in Indo-China,

  1445
  in the Philippines, in Japan, and in Korea. As a result we have been weakened throughout the world and our balance upset.
  Even the Labour Party has been affected by this acceptance of the cold war. The clumsy encouragement of disavowed puppets, reinforced with dollars, is not the Socialist or the decent way to peace. The continuance of a policy of class domination and the partial acceptance of this policy by some members of my party, led to the query—is there methodism in our madness? We have come to the end of a chapter. We are dealing with the fate of the world, a world not only of free enterprise but of social democracy, and a world in which there is also Communism. We are dealing not only with a world of whites but where there are black, red and yellow people, a world where pigmentation may vary, but the need for security for food, for clothing, and for shelter is everywhere essentially the same.
  The Chinese, who have attended British and American universities, have learned one lesson, which they are trying to teach the rest of the world. If the frontiers of Great Britain are at the Rhine, the Elbe, Gibraltar or the Nile, and if the Monroe doctrine is sacred to the Americas, China considers Asia as sacred to the Asiatics. We cannot have a genuine United Nations and at the same time refuse to accept the fact that different points of view can be expressed without acknowledging that those differences of opinion exist. The last thing we can accept is that we can determine these differences by resolution, and by imposing sanctions upon a nation which we refuse to admit as a nation in the councils of the world. We cannot expect China to accept the rules of the club when she has actually been blackballed by the club. This is sheer nonsense and humbug.
  In conclusion, in the past few years in our foreign affairs we have only thought in terms of war, of averting war or of eventual war. I ask whether it is wrong to think of peace for a change. Cannot we get rid of this atmosphere of war, and in the next few days or weeks talk of peace in a sincere fashion. I can appreciate that this will be named appeasement. If it is appeasement to work for a peaceful settlement then I am for appeasement. The word has an ugly ring, because of Munich,
  1446
  where the small nations of the world were betrayed by the Opposition, who used it immorally to cover up their designs. Is it wrong for us to seek peace honestly? To our everlasting credit we appeased the peoples of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. By doing so we created a bastion of goodwill towards our own great nation. That was appeasement, but it was great statesmanship.
  So I ask even at this eleventh hour that we should not be put aside by Russian intransigence, American foolhardiness or Chinese dignity, but, with our faith in humanity, go forward in an attempt to preserve the peace of the world. The basic world problems can be solved provided we are prepared to recognise other people's rights and they are prepared to recognise their duties towards the whole of the world community, and if at the same time we appreciate the great need for a sustained effort to raise the standard of life of the people in the old oppressed areas while maintaining our social gains at home.
  9.1 p.m.
  Mr. Eden: The hon. Member for Willesden, East (Mr. Orbach), wound up his observations with a general appeal for peace. I did not quite think that the earlier part of his speech entirely fitted his later appeal because in nearly all the early part of his speech, as I understood it—it was not very easy to follow it—he did not seem to be satisfied with anybody's policy anyway. He was critical of the United States, which anybody is entitled to be, and he was critical of our foreign policy for having followed the United States. Everybody seemed to be absolutely wrong except the hon. Member. I was waiting to know what he wanted us to do, and when he got to his last sentence he said that he wanted us to make an effort for peace. So do we all.
  There is nothing whatever wrong in criticising the policy of the United States, but I doubt though whether I should like to call their statesmen "adolescents." We can always use such words about ourselves, and they are better applied at home than abroad. There is no harm in the criticism provided that we remember what the Prime Minister told us earlier this afternoon—I took the words down—which seemed to me fundamentally what unites us with our American friends, and

  1447
  that is that they are concerned, as we are concerned, to preserve world peace. That I truly believe. Of course, there is any amount of room for criticism between friends, but if we do not believe that, the dangers of misunderstandings are real.
  I found some of the metaphors of the hon. Member rather difficult to follow. No one on this side of the House has ever described the Foreign Secretary as "squeezing people by having fingers in every pie." That sounds to me an extremely uncomfortable physical position for anybody. I devoutly hope that the Foreign Secretary will be out of the pie before the night is over.
  Mr. Orbach: My metaphor may have been mixed, but we are in a very difficult physical position.
  Mr. Eden: All right, but if we have a finger in every pie, I do not see how we can squeeze people at the same time.
  I want to bring the House back to what I consider to be the very real issue of this discussion, which has been obscured in part by recent happenings and in part by events which we cannot control. There are certain facts in relation to the present situation which, I suggest, dominate it and which we must bear in mind. They are facts on which I hope I shall carry most of the House with me. The first thing we must remember is that the existing division between North and South Korea about which much has been heard, and no doubt will be heard, is an artificial one and is due entirely to Soviet action. It was the refusal of the Soviet Government to allow the United Nations Commission to work north of the 38th Parallel which resulted in this artificial division of the country and made all these later developments possible.
  The second point we have to bear in mind is that the situation of last June arose because of an act of aggression by North Korea upon the South. Such was the finding of the United Nations Commission on the spot, such was the United Nations' verdict unanimously on 25th June. The third fact we have to bear in mind is that North Korea certainly never would nor could have carried out this act of aggression without Soviet armament of her forces and Soviet connivance at her action.
  1448
  I do not say these things in order to make difficulties, but in order that we may keep our perspective clear when we get into the later stage of events. Indeed, the moment the United Nations came to the help of the South Koreans both the Soviet and Chinese Press and propaganda organs showed their hand openly in support of the North Korean action. In this connection I must remind the House, as I did last July, of the Soviet doctrine as they have themselves laid it down in respect of such acts of aggression. Mr. Gromyko made it plain in connection with the North Korean invasion. He said that "for the sake of national unity and democratic rights," armed aggression should be regarded as a legitimate act, and assistance by external powers to the attacked should be regarded as "a hostile act against peace."
  Now I submit to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that it would be difficult to explain more clearly our fundamental divergence of views on these matters. In the last few days Mr. Vyshinsky has underlined the point at issue. A few days ago he was arguing at Lake Success that there is no Chinese intervention in Korea. He used these words:
  "There is a great, mighty Chinese volunteer movement seeking to save the Korean people from the yoke of foreign intervention"—
  Mark these last words
  "in the interests of Chinese security"—
  Knowing they are fighting Korean people. The numbers of men involved, he argued, made no difference. He reminded the United States that under the Hague Convention the responsibility of a neutral power did not arise if private persons crossed its frontier to enter the service of one or other of the belligerents.
  I submit that that is indeed to make a complete mockery of the whole conception of neutrality. It also violates the spirit of the United Nations Charter, where the obligation is to resist aggression, not to connive at it, nor to encourage it by so-called private armies. All this had been made very clear by the recent correction by the Pekin delegation at Lake Success of Sir Benegal Rau. He, the House will remember, gave an account of what he understood the Chinese Communist position to be, and in the "Manchester Guardian" today there is a report of the correction that was issued by the delegation at Lake Success. It is

  1449
  important because it reveals what is in their minds. They said this:
  "Our position has always been, and still is, that from the very outset United States intervention in Korea has threatened China's security."
  No question of the last stages of advance into Manchuria—"from the very outset," from the moment the United Nations took action, that was the threat.
  The Foreign Secretary no doubt will agree that United States action was taken on the invitation of the United Nations, with their unanimous approval.
  Mr. S. Silverman: The action was taken first.
  Mr. Eden: No, no military step was taken without the prior endorsement of the United Nations. I think I am absolutely right in that but, if I am wrong, I have no doubt that the Foreign Secretary will correct me. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell me whether I am right or not in saying that at no stage has any action been taken by the United States except on the authority of the United Nations. It is important that the point should be cleared up, but that is the impression I have always had. That is the first point. Of course there could not have been any United States intervention in Korea if the North Koreans had not first attacked the South with Soviet equipment and assistance. That is the real point. That again, I think, is beyond dispute.
  It is also worth recording—again, I think I am right—that United Nations forces did not cross the Parallel until a decision had been voted by the United Nations Assembly, although they were militarily in a position to do so. I want this to be corrected if I am wrong, because it is important that we should follow the sequence of events, but I understand that this decision was implicit in the resolution of 4th October. [An HON. MEMBER: "7th October."] No, I think it was the 4th. It was sponsored by His Majesty's Government and seven other delegations, and it clearly specified that the purpose of the United Nations was to establish a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea and that all appropriate steps should be taken to ensure stability throughout Korea.
  That resolution was interpreted, certainly by most of the delegates, as giving
  1450
  instructions to go ahead across the Parallel. I have looked up the speech of Sir Benegal Rau where he expresses his doubts about the resolution precisely because it means, in his view, going across the Parallel. I am very glad we are all agreed about that, because it is only just to the Commander that if the account I have given is correct, we should not, any of us—I do not say that any of us want to—blame him for decisions which were in fact taken by the United Nations themselves.
  There is one other point in that connection which I want to leave in the minds of hon. Members. On 9th October, before he crossed the Parallel, General MacArthur called on the North Koreans for the last time to surrender. That proposal also was conveyed to the United Nations some days before, and this also was, I understand, approved by them. This shows, if my recital is correct, that the Foreign Secretary was right a fortnight ago when he said that all the action yet taken by General MacArthur was within the directives of the United Nations.
  A fundamental point which we must surely try to keep in mind in this discussion, which it seemed to me, as I listened to the debate this afternoon, was often lost sight of, is that we—that is to say, the United Nations—took enforcement action in Korea with a limited, but also with a definite, objective, which was to repel aggression and to restore peace in a unified Korea.
  Under Russian political pressure and under Chinese military action, we have to be more than ever on our guard against the danger that Anglo-American differences should be fostered and encouraged. It seems quite clear to me that from the very start that certainly has been the Soviet objective, and very likely the Chinese objective also. At any rate, they have managed to confront us now with simultaneous demands, which, whatever their individual merits—and some of them have individual merits—take on a very different complexion when the so-called Chinese volunteers are attacking United Nations troops who are only seeking to fulfil a United Nations resolution.
  In this connection the Prime Minister said this afternoon—I do not quarrel with it—that but for Korea, China might now be in the United Nations. I think that that is true and, that it would have been

  1451
  desirable, but the Prime Minister will agree that it is a very big "but." After all, who started the whole Korean business? It was not South Korea. It was not the United Nations. It was not the United States. It was North Korea, armed by the Russians, and the Chinese are now making it quite plain, as my earlier quotation showed, that their quarrel is with the original action of the United Nations in coming to the help of South Korea at all. They are complaining of the beginning of that action, not its later development up to the frontier of Manchuria.
  I make those points clear only because we want to see how well or ill our case is founded before we proceed to the next action we have to take. The communiqué which the Prime Minister signed with the President talked about a free and united Korea. That, I presume, means all Korea. That, I suppose, also means that we are not prepared to return to partition. That must surely be right, because to return to partition would merely mean to perpetuate the very dangers with which we have already been confronted, and all efforts so far made, would then have been in vain.
  I want to say something else on the question of settlement. In my view, no settlement in the Far East can be satisfactory which does not cover that area as a whole. For instance, suppose a compromise could be arrived at merely covering Korea and Formosa for the time being, that might only shift the weight of anxiety further south. That would be disadvantageous to us, to put it mildly. But, apart from our own interests, on the broader grounds, I cannot think that it would make for peace. Someone made a reference to Munich just now. That, of course, would be much more like Munich than anything that has happened so far. To make a partial arrangement covering a limited area would be far nearer Munich than anything the hon. Member was suggesting. I agree that if there is to be an agreement it must be a comprehensive agreement, a real agreement covering all the territories in the Far East. Negotiations to that end would, we hope, meet with satisfactory results.
  The House ought to understand something else which has not been much referred to in this debate, and that is how
  1452
  heavy is the strain of Indo-China on our French neighbours. It is not only a question of the numbers of forces engaged, but of the high proportion of skilled officers and experienced N.C.Os. serving in Indo-China. It is this which increases France's difficulties in building up a European army, and no doubt it is precisely intended that that should happen.
  Then there are the questions of Malaya and Hong Kong, both vital to us, and I repeat that if there is to be a settlement, it should cover the whole of South East Asia. As the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans) asked truly earlier today, without the resources of South-East Asia how could the economy of this country be maintained? Of course that is true. Therefore, if we are to face reality, an arrangement which both means peace and safeguards our own legitimate interests must cover much more than the local area at the present time.
  There are two aspects of international collaboration on a wider scale on which I want to comment. One is collaboration by the United Nations and the other is collaboration by the Atlantic Powers. The Prime Minister spoke today about the means of communication between the United Nations and their Commander in the field. I am still not happy about the position. It seems to me that some machinery requires to be created—it maybe a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee—so that there is some military filter for the political decisions of the United Nations.
  The Prime Minister spoke about the excellent relations of Lord Tedder and our Ambassador in Washington. Having been there lately, I would like fully to endorse what the right hon. Gentleman said. They are both doing excellent work, but that, as I understand it, is not the problem. The Prime Minister said that Lord Tedder's relations were informal. That is all right as far as it goes, but how, as a result, does General MacArthur get his instructions now? Is a United Nations Resolution just telegraphed to him as it is and left to him to interpret it as he thinks fit, or does any further guidance go to him with the United Nations Resolution? If so, who sends that guidance? That is something we ought to know and if there is any interpretative machine, I think there should be one between the general United Nations Resolution, or whatever it may

  1453
  be, and the Commander who has to put it into force.
  That is one aspect and there is another, which is much wider, about the need to co-ordinate allied effort on a world scale. We have an Atlantic organisation which deals with the defence of the Atlantic area. We have a United Nations effort in Korea itself. The statement of the President and the Prime Minister showed that the capital importance of Europe has not been overlooked. But we still have no means of agreeing what the priorities shall be on a world basis, and we ought to have it. If we do not have it, the results of the rearmament effort that each of these countries is being asked to make, and particularly the United States, Canada and ourselves, cannot be used to the best advantage.
  The United Nations forces are battling in Korea, but so are the French in Indo-China and we ourselves in Malaya, while India and Pakistan have their own causes for apprehension in Tibet. There ought to be, as I am afraid I have wearied the House by saying many times, an overall strategic concept, which has now got to be wider even than the Atlantic zone of defence. Incidentally, I would not imagine that anyone could doubt that such an over-all strategic concept does exist throughout the Communist world, and it certainly looks to me as if it is a pretty wide one.
  The Atlantic organisation is a different organisation because its sphere is limited, and I do not think that a body of 12 members is suitable for this kind of work. It is a very different argument upon which I am now entering, but I think the matter is important and that I should submit it to the House. What I think is required is a smaller body of control than the Atlantic Council, with its 12 members and limited area. This body might easily begin with three, four or perhaps five Powers in the first instance—ourselves, the United States, France and Canada—but this kind of work, or some of it, I suggest, might even be carried on by the United Nations Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. But we have not got that. The organisation that I now suggest should propose priorities on a world basis. Then, perhaps, we shall all move in step, because we are not doing so now. How-
  1454
  ever kindly the remarks we make about each other, we are not doing so.
  I will give one example. The other day I read in a newspaper that Canada as well as the United States have stopped all trade with China. I think that is right; I mean that I think the information is right. That must be a pretty big decision for France and for us, as well as for those two countries. It may be right or it may be wrong—and I am not arguing at the moment that that step should be taken—but surely, if it had to be taken, it ought to have been as part of a general plan. How much better would it be if all these nations were trying to move together. I do not know at all whether any consultations took place before the United States and Canada took this step. I am not blaming them; I am only trying to see what the position is. If there was no consultation between us, I think there ought to be. Perhaps if there had been, the United States themselves would have taken one step and we another, but I would like to feel that there is machinery for that sort of consultation between the principal Powers on a world basis. I should like to see some of the existing committees disappear and see that kind of organisation created.
  I turn for a moment specifically to Europe. The last time I spoke, a fortnight ago, the House may remember that I made a suggestion, in connection with the vexed question of German rearmament, and I suggested that we should propose a general investigation by the four Powers—that is, the United States, France, Soviet Russia and ourselves—on either side of the Iron Curtain, to see what is going on now. I still think that that would be a useful proposal, and hope it will be followed up. If it were accepted, it certainly would contribute to lowering the international temperature. It would also, perhaps, put an end to some of the wild charges now being bandied about, and, maybe, also allay some fears genuinely held. I do not consider that this suggestion need wait on a general reply to the Russian note which is now being prepared by the Allied Powers. I still ask that it should be pursued.
  Mr. J. Hynd: The right hon. Gentleman should be aware, I think, that that has already been tried, but with the proviso that the four-Power Commission should not be allowed into the Soviet

  1455
  zone, and when the charges made by the Soviets were rejected by the investigating team, it did nothing at all to reduce the temperature.
  Mr. Eden: I propose it at this moment in view of what is in our minds in respect of German rearmament and in view of our Allies' proposals regarding German rearmament, and that seems to me to be all the more reason why we should make this particular proposal at this particular time. Of course, the Soviets may reject it, but if so, we shall at least have done our best to get an examination on both sides of the frontier. I cannot see what harm could accrue. We have nothing to hide on our side as to what we are doing. I think that this particular juncture is a good time for this move.
  Finally, I want to say how glad I am that the Government are preparing their agenda for the reply to the Soviet Government, and I endorse very much what my right hon. Friend said this afternoon about that negotiation. I do not complain that the Government are taking a little time about their answer, because the important thing is that before we go into discussion with the Russians, if discussion there is, we should have cleared our minds and reached agreement between ourselves on a number of possible hypotheses which may well arise in these discussions. I do not think it would be serving any useful purpose if I were to enumerate these possible hypotheses now, but they are probably in the minds of most hon. Members. We can all think of quite a number. But the essential thing is that this conference should be well prepared, not only in respect of an agenda, but in respect of the clarity of our own thought and the reality of the agreement with our friends.
  Let me conclude. The times are very grave, both East and West. We must maintain our guard, and we must increase our defence. There are hostile alignments and a violent onslaught of propaganda which must be dangerous, to say the least, if it continues indefinitely. But there may also be, if I am not mistaken, a certain flexibility about the present situation. If that be so, this is just the time when diplomacy has its chance; if that be so, let us not fail to seize it.
  9.30 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I should like to thank the House for the constructive, businesslike way in which these great world problems have been approached in this debate and during the last few weeks when foreign relations have occupied more of our time. I quite agree with the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) that we are living in grim times, but I do not believe that they need lead us to war. I do not believe, despite the blackness of the situation in all its aspects, that there is not a chance of establishing peace.
  Two factors have been operating since 1945, the close of the war. One has been the expansionism of Russia and of the Slays generally, and that has had its effect. The other has been their feeling out whether their object can be gained by their usual methods or whether it will involve war. If they come to the conclusion that pushing too far involves war I very much doubt whether they will take that plunge. It is for that reason that we have tried to pay great attention, both in the diplomatic and the defensive field, to making ourselves strong.
  In the diplomatic world, there is no doubt, as far as we can gather, that the Chinese, however much they work up their usual antagonism to the foreigner, cannot work up any great hostility against Great Britain. All our indications are that Soviet propaganda has not been so effective in that field, which leads me to believe that there is a great field open for well-directed propaganda and for the dissemination of the facts, and the right treatment of the Chinese, to keep them from lining up permanently with Soviet Russia.
  I also believe that the new part that India is playing in the world is a tremendous factor in the leadership of Asia which is not now exclusively Western. During this controversy, I assure the House that while relationships with the United States and the exchange of views that have gone on between the United States administration and ourselves have been most cordial, equally there have been the same kind of relationships, in a triangular fashion, between India, the United States and ourselves. There was some misunderstanding. There was some

  1457
  difficulty as there always is, and prejudice, but gradually those have been worked down.
  I personally feel very happy that the attitude of Mr. Pandit Nehru, together with the assiduous efforts which have been made by his representative at the United Nations, have had a great effect in keeping things steady and in teaching the West what is so important, that is, to understand the East. It is extremely important that that should be maintained. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) will remember, in the Coalition days there were visitors from the United States to India and their visits were not very helpful in producing the relationships that were so essential at the end of the war. But all that has been disposed of, and the understanding is better now than it has ever been.
  Mention has been made of the divergence between the United States and ourselves over the admission of China to the United Nations. I could not bring myself to believe it was the right policy to adopt a line such as I am afraid we adopted with Russia in 1917–18. I am not criticising, I am trying to examine the effect of what we then did. When the Russian revolution took place, I am afraid we acted for too long in a way which made Russia feel she was a nation at bay. We did not take advantage of the opportunity of establishing relations when the change took place and the new economic policy had to be introduced. We got in a bit too late.
  One has to learn lessons from the past, and His Majesty's Government said that if we made a mistake then, we would not commit it again in this case, that we would try not to become obsessed with the Communist conception of China but rather bear in mind that the mass of Chinese scarcely understood what Communism means, and try, if we could, to bring them along and keep them in association with the other nations of the world. We believed that the effect of that would be to make them feel that they had more friends than merely one country. That has been the course that we have followed.
  Of course, those in power for the moment may come to the United Nations and use abusive language and imitate Mr. Vyshinsky and some other people, but I am glad to say that the United Nations Assembly is rapidly developing a temper
  1458
  very much like that of the House of Commons. When gentlemen forget themselves they shout a bit, but no one really takes any notice.
  Another feeling I have about the China-Russia position is that, although it may seem strange, I never believed that Russia wanted China in the United Nations. I think Russia kept putting her up in the belief that the Western nations would turn down the idea, so that Russia could use that fact to make more enemies for the Western nations. I never believed that the walking-out business was anything more than a set of stage supers playing a very poor part. We are sticking to that line. I realise the truth of what the right hon. Gentleman said just now, and that when the United Nations has been resisted and when His Majesty's Government have taken the line they have in Korea, we may be misunderstood if we cast our vote for the Chinese to enter the United Nations. I am going to exchange views with my colleagues in Brussels next week on this very difficult question of tactics.
  I do not want to fall into the error of creating now a situation which I think we avoided in the early part of the year. If I am not in a position tonight to give a final decision on what His Majesty's Government will ultimately do, I can say that up till now events have been such that we have not altered our view. The incident to which attention has been called several times in the debate may have a great effect on China, and we know pretty well from all our information that China really wants to stop this fighting.
  How tightly is she tied up with Russia, and to what extent does Russia want to continue the fighting? Is it Russia's strategy and policy that just as we do not want to be bogged down in China with a China war, so Stalin wants to use China to force us to fight? I think it is. I believe that those are the tactics which the Kremlin is following at the moment. It would suit them, by a policy of having not a single soldier in the battle themselves and by using Chinese manpower, to get the United States involved, thus committing the United States forces, and then keeping Europe clear for themselves.
  This matter should be handled with extreme care and I am not going to be

  1459
  dogmatic about it. The Americans have their view; we have ours; and I think it is a good thing that, following the Prime Minister's visit we know that the Americans have been taking stock of things from their point of view, just as we have been taking stock of things here and hearing the suggestions and opinions which everybody has put up—it is a good thing that the American Secretary of State and I may be able to meet and talk things over soon in the light of all this.
  With regard to Korea, the right hon. Gentleman was quite correct in the sequence of dates about when the fighting took place, about the decisions of the Security Council, and the sponsoring of the Resolution. I happened to be in New York at the time and I took a hand in it. I have always considered the Korean problem on the basis of the Cairo Declaration, and in particular on the paragraph which says:
  "The aforesaid three great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."
  Now, there was no 38th Parallel in that Declaration at all. I offer no apology for that Resolution, to which I was a party at the United Nations, and which left out all reference to the 38th Parallel, which, of course, was artificial. I also visualised that if we perpetuated the 38th Parallel we should be in the difficulty, for a long time to come, of having two armies lined up, one each side of it.
  I have sympathy with the argument in the war itself, about halting at the line of the waist in Korea and having a no-man's-land, and I do not think the United States will mind if I say that when the Prime Minister and I had the advice of our own Chiefs of Staff on the strategy in that case, we forwarded our advice to the United States and asked them to take it into account. We were also very gravely concerned at the time of the last offensive as to whether it was not a case of running one's head right into trouble—trouble which eventually occurred.
  But I cannot say any more about that; although I am just giving an indication that prior to its being made public, our Chiefs of Staff, who had been following matters very carefully, made their repre-
  1460
  sentations. We do not complain that these views were not accepted and that the Chiefs of Staff in the United States, who had to give the directions, did not quite accept that particular view. All of us who have been involved in war cabinets know that different views are held at different times and that one view may be right and one may not. If this had not been mentioned publicly I should not have said anything about it, but there is a feeling which has been spread about that the Government had been asleep and did nothing at all.
  Mr. Eden: This is very interesting, especially what the right hon. Gentleman has said about advice. I think my right hon. Friend indicated that he thought that that advice had gone from here, and there is no dispute about that. What troubles me still is this. What were the channels between the United Nations and General MacArthur? The right hon. Gentleman has spoken about the American Chiefs of Staff. I should have thought that our Chiefs of Staff and the American Chiefs of Staff would be together.
  Mr. Bevin: Well, up to now the United States have found the Chief Commander. It was at the request of the United States that the communications are channelled to him through the United States Chiefs of Staff. That is the arrangement. In arriving at their conclusions the views of other countries and their representations are all taken into account. We have not formalised this arrangement in a Chiefs-of-Staff organisation as we did in the war, when, virtually, it was our two countries alone who constituted the principal military forces. Now with the United Nations it is not quite like that. The American Chiefs of Staff are the channel of communication, and the final decision is theirs. But representations are made in the ordinary way.
  The right hon. Gentleman knows that in the relationships between the soldiers of the United States and ours there is not consultation of the sort where one makes representations and then walks out. It is a question of always attempting to agree. It is one of those unwritten things. It is pretty effective, and there are many incidents I could cite to show how courses which have been adopted have been those which we had advised. [Interruption.] We are not in the position

  1461
  in which we were in the war. I heard what the right hon. Gentleman said.
  Mr. Eden: I am not ashamed of what I said.
  Mr. Bevin: I quite agree. Foreign Secretaries never are.
  The next point was to get the Chinese to understand our position in the Korean conflict, and I took the step of sending His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to see the Foreign Under-Secretary, as hon. Members no doubt saw in the papers, to make it quite clear to him that there was going to be no aggression against Manchuria. In my opinion, anybody who is fool enough to attack Manchuria is bound to produce a world war almost immediately. The history of the place, the conflict that went on there with Japan, the feelings of the new China, and of Russia—I believe that put together all these factors would almost certainly result in a great conflict if Manchuria were attacked, and there is no intention of attacking Manchuria. The propaganda that went on, however, reinforced by memories of the Japanese occupation, suggested that it was the United States policy—the Anglo-United States policy—again to carry out expansion in Manchuria and this was having a marked effect all over China. Therefore, we sought to correct it. I think that we have checked it. Little has been heard about it since.
  We came to the conclusion that there must be a "cease fire" in Korea first, and then a settlement by negotiation, there being no interference with Chinese territory; but that, equally, there must be no interference by China with Korean territory—that both territories must be inviolate. We cannot depart from the principles which we set out to defend, which were those of the United Nations. We accept what, I believe, is the view of the whole House—that there must be no reward for aggression.
  That brings me to this awful word "appeasement." If one compromises with somebody to get a settlement I do not regard that as appeasement. I suppose I have had to make compromises all my life, or else no one would ever have gone to work. A settlement has to be made by trying to understand one another's points of view and then arriving at proper conclusions which would enable people to work together.
  1462
  Then there is the vexed question about China being a party to the negotiations. I take the view strongly that she must be, because if a settlement is made which is merely a resolution of the United Nations, there will be no guarantee that it will last. If negotiations do take place, then we must, I think, have China there as a party to the settlement, and I hope it will be one by mutual consent.
  Another matter—I do not know whether there is any need to reply to it—is the habit there seems to be in debates—I suppose it has always been done—of accusing the Government of having no initiative and of having done nothing since the war ended. I have heard that so many times. When I look back and think of all the conferences which I have attended and all the statesmen I have met, and the day to day grind in carrying out this job of recreating peace, I do not accept that statement.
  Another question is that of Formosa. Part of the Declaration of Cairo concerns Formosa. I can see no reason for going back on the Cairo Declaration, but I am bound to recognise that this is not an appropriate moment to settle the matter. There is Chiang Kai-shek, there is the other party which is now in power in China, and there is the conflict with the United States. We have taken the line that it will be very helpful if there is a discussion of the whole problem in the United Nations, with an exchange of views by independent minds at the appropriate time. But it has to be said that there is a great strategic conflict. It is no use disguising that. There are great problems associated with Formosa, and I shall not come down in a dogmatic way and say that we will do this, that or the other.
  I feel that if the parties concerned can be got together, and if, as was said just now, we can, as is intended by the Iraqi-Syrian resolution in the United Nations, really get back to the position of the five Powers surveying all these difficult questions, it may be possible to solve this one among others. It is said that we ought to push on with this at the moment, but I rather disagree with that view, because I am afraid that feelings are running too high. But I do not rule out the suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman. In fact since he made it I have looked at it several times to see whether it would be the right moment to try it. But the

  1463
  right hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do, that in foreign affairs, timing is one of the most important factors. If one goes wrong by putting out one's proposals at the wrong time, one might incite the world instead, especially when feelings are running high as they are at present.
  On the question of Asia generally, I do not take a pessimistic view. There are there nearly 1,000 million people. It has been possible to deal with all those—possessions is probably the wrong word—territories associated with Britain almost without civil war. There has been one exception; in Kashmir there has been difficulty. But it is marvellous that we have been able to carry out that great transfer of power—
  Mr. Churchill: Four hundred thousand killed in the Punjab alone.
  Mr. Bevin: Well, there was no war with us. There was no position similar to that in Korea. This transfer was made in an orderly manner, [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen can go on laughing at India—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] This ascendancy mentality! If ever hon. Members opposite return to power in the end and do not learn to treat correctly these people emerging now, this country will pay the price for it. A statement was made today about arrogance in the handling of power. One thing Labour has learned through her long fight for power is how to handle it now she has got it.
  May I turn, in the few mintues at my disposal, to the question of the North Atlantic Treaty. It has been suggested that we have not given proper attention to defence. I make no boast, but I played as big a part as anybody in creating the North Atlantic Treaty. I did not accept the position of Europe standing alone. I could not; it was too weak. I thought that the resolution carried at Strasbourg was a great mistake, I think that it misled Europe. I thought that it was thoughtless in view of what was going on elsewhere. I felt that the right thing to
  1464
  do was to associate the United States and Canada with us and with Europe.
  Mr. Churchill: The resolution at Strasbourg mentioned them particularly.
  Mr. Bevin: Yes, the right hon. Gentleman mentioned them particularly, but he did not provide the organisation to include them. He told us that the United States would not work with the Labour Government and all the rest of it, and yet everybody in the last two days in this House has been congratulating us on our good relations with America.
  Now the situation that has developed is a difficult one. It concerns German rearmament; it involves France in a break with her traditions, and there is a good deal of political difficulty to be overcome. But I believe that, while we have to watch Russia on the one side and we have to build up these great defences on the other, we are well on the way to a final solution of this problem. We had to launch out with almost nothing to support this great defence organisation at the beginning. That is what made me so grateful for Marshall Aid, which enabled us to keep the economy of Europe going, and without which we could not now have started on the great defence programme on which we are now working.
  Europe, we agree, is our main concern, but I do not want to over-emphasise this great concern of ours for Europe and create the idea in the minds of the people of the Middle East and Far East that we are deserting them or weakening in our interest in their defence or their affairs. But there is a great difficulty. The change that has come over the scene in regard to manpower has created a problem which will take an enormous amount of solving if these great forces are to be produced, if equipment is to be provided, and if peace is to be developed.
  It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed without Question put.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  SUNDAY CINEMATOGRAPH ENTERTAINMENTS
  Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Urban District of Withernsea [copy presented 8th December], approved.
  Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the County Borough of Swansea [copy presented 8th December], approved.—[Mr. de Freitas.]

AIRMET SERVICE
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn." [Mr. Sparks.]
10.1 p.m.
Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: The subject to which I wish to draw attention is fairly small compared with the subjects that have been under discussion during the day. It is not, however, a matter of any insignificance, and therefore I will not apologise to the House for raising it. Since the abolition of the Airmet radio meteorological Service last March, there has been a large and increasing body of feeling generated throughout the country. It is what can be fairly described as an outcry.
I do not think that the value of this service has been sufficiently appreciated by the Government. A petition will be presented to the House in due course, and I see from the columns of the magazine "Weather," that some 20,000 signatures have been obtained. These signatures are divided among various extremely wide activities. An analysis discloses that 27 per cent. are concerned with agriculture, 21 per cent. with sport, 21 per cent. with aviation, 14 per cent. miscellaneous, 7 per cent. with industry, 6 per cent. with education and 4 per cent. with science.
It was, of course, for aviators that this service was originally introduced, and they have found it an invaluable service. In spite of the centralisation of civil aviation, this service has been used to supplement the ordinary telephonic and teleprint service to a very large extent. We know that Service and commercial pilots have their own forecasts, but it is
1466
perhaps not realised that pilots have chosen to be tuned in to Airmet because, no matter how accurate the forecasts, they needed this up-to-the-minute information, which was put out every half hour. That was one of the salient points of the service. I know a senior officer in the Fleet Air Arm who always relied on this service because, however accurate the radio forecasts may have been, the advantage of this service was that information was kept up to date. That is the essence of the complaint against the abolition of the Airmet Service.
Our climate, more than any other climate in the world, is subject to swift and unpredictable changes. The atmosphere is always about 100 per cent. saturated with moisture, and it is just luck whether it becomes visible moisture or not. I can remember three occasions, when, flying as a pilot, starting off in good weather with a good weather forecast, I have found myself in trouble with the weather. On one occasion I ended up among the Downs with the cloudbase just overhead, and had to pull up and climb through 9,000 feet of solid cloud to get out of the death-trap. That was in the days before we had blind flying instruments. I also flew as a passenger on a clear, cloudless day from London to Liverpool and on to the Isle of Man, where we ran into another situation which was bad enough to be lethal. It was only good pilotage which saved us. Even when he is equipped with route forecasts, the aviator desperately needs this service.
The seaman is another man who needs the service badly. When I first brought up the question of the abolition of this service, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation was somewhat shocked because I said it was a matter of life and death. I adhere to that. I do not confine it to aviation. I want also to draw attention to the need of the seaman. How one proceeds at sea is a matter of great seriousness even when it is not a matter of life and death. I speak on behalf of professional seamen, and I have here a letter urging the value of Airmet from a man who is an inshore fisherman and a crabber and lobster man:
"My work is controlled completely by the weather. In unsettled weather our work is very much of the nature of tip and run, and short-term forecasts are invaluable."

1467
We have also the large, and, I am happy to say, ever-growing, world of those who call themselves yachtsmen. They are not to be despised as being sybaritic and luxurious; they are the innumerable little chaps who go to sea in highly unseaworthy motorboats, learning about motors as well as the sea, and it is their inexperience which makes them so extraordinarily gallant. I know very many of them. They are my associates on the coast. They are always liable to get into trouble. I want also to draw attention to the fact that there is at this very time the prospect of a reduction in the coastguard service. Lives have been lost and very many boats have been lost which could perhaps have been saved had a sufficiently short-term meteorological service been available. I have here a letter from a group captain who says:
"I have cause to thank Airmet for its timely warning of a gale when we were waiting in Le Havre to cross the Channel in May, 1948. Another English yacht which left that day suffered very severely."
I have had similar experiences in the Channel. I am sure that other hon. Members have also, and that they will be able to endorse what I said.
There is also the very large percentage of farmers. I have sent the Minister of Agriculture a variety of letters which I have received from farmers all over the country apropos the service. Here is one from a farmer near Aylesbury:
"I am convinced that on the majority of farms, as on the farm where I work, the continued use of the Airmet forecast could have reduced the cost of harvesting and the amount of crops spoilt of both the hay and the corn harvests this year."
I have another from Westmorland. It says:
"We used Airmet every day and are going to feel its loss keenly during the winter months. Last winter our milk cows were only kept in on six days as we were able to turn them out each day on Airmet forecasts."
I have another from Hungerford in Berkshire which says:
"If you tell a countryman the weather prevailing at a given point to windward, together with the wind speed it is of infinitely greater value to him than the ambitious long-range forecasts, so often completely contradicted a few hours later."
I have an assurance from the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Agriculture that he has taken serious cognisance of
1468
these letters and very many others. We know that weather forecasts have been transmitted by the B.B.C. and have been supplemented with warnings about rain and frost, which have at least done something in connection with the seriousness of this problem.
Other people interested who may surprise the House are the pigeon fanciers. The "Racing Pigeon" magazine has written to say:
"On behalf of the 150,000 pigeon fanciers we desire to associate ourselves with the protest against the suppression of the Airmet broadcasts."
Airmet is also of interest to astronomers. I have received a letter from a doctor at the University Observatory, Oxford, who says:
"The met information helps one to plan and prepare for observing programmes."
We have also had large numbers of letters from those humble but often forgotten people, housewives, who are very much concerned with this. This may again be very surprising. I have here a letter from a gentleman who says:
"I can assure you that in this house at any rate"—
meaning, of course, his own house—
"there has been much binding since Airmet ceased to transmit its programme, and in the interests of washing day information, photography, picnics, runs to the sea, holidays and, just interests, my wife and family join me in. hoping for a speedy renewal of Airmet."
Another housewife said:
"As a housewife and one very interested in the weather, I am writing to join my humble voice to those more entitled perhaps than I am to make themselves heard, but I know that many people found it not only interesting, but very useful to know nearly always. accurately what to expect within the next few hours. One's day could be planned accordingly, whether to shop this morning or this. afternoon; is it worthwhile hanging out the washing today or not? These things, trivial as they sound, are anything but trivial to most of us who these days get very little help in our homes."
So it goes on. Ordinary citizens have been protesting. I have here a letter from Helston in Cornwall which says:
"You don't know me, and I don't know you. I am only an old pongo and retired with 100 per cent. disability at that. But I wish to thank you for the letter you wrote last week to the 'Daily Telegraph' and to hope that your efforts … may be crowned with success."
That, I hope, indicates the very broad basis of the protests on the abolition of

1469
this service. I should like to add that on top of all these people, we have also the protests of one man with whom I have every sympathy nowadays in the present weather, that is, a nudist.
Why was this service lost? Was it a surprise? I can say it was no surprise to me, for the Copenhagen Agreement was bound to come. In November, 1949, I received a circular from a firm of paint manufacturers giving details of the Airmet Service and saying that in March the wavelength would be altered. But it was not altered; it disappeared.
I should like to ask the Assistant Postmaster-General whether a new wavelength for this service was forgotten or overlooked? If it was not sought, why not? These are questions to which the whole country requires an answer. As it is we now have a situation where we have gone back to five-hourly intervals in the matter of weather forecasts, and we know what can happen in five hours to our weather, in spite of the most learned broadcasts. We have a period of 13 blank hours in which there are no forecasts. In the B.B.C. programme we get a regional broadcast, which is good, but it is hopelessly inadequate once a day in the evening. We should have similar broadcasts before work begins in the morning. We could follow the progress of squalls or rain belts across the country which can tell us what is due, and how the weather will affect our activities.
What are the solutions to this? I submit that the wavelength which existed previously is not entirely over-lapped by the transmissions from Lahti, that a screened aerial could supply the necessary information somewhere near the 1,150 metre mark if Finland were consulted. There is a second alternative, that the Third Programme wavelength might be used part-time.
Mr. G. P. Stevens: All the time.
Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: I am not sure that the highbrows would appreciate that altogether. Others have said to me that the Light Programme might be used all the time. Then, again, the Ministry of Civil Aviation have a number of frequencies. Why not take one of theirs? If all the ordinary broadcasts are crowded out, why not use the short-wave? What is wrong with the 49-metre band?
1470
Much the least good possibility is the prospect of having interpolations on the B.B.C. every hour, on the hour, or something like that. All I assert is that the meterorological service is valuable or we would not have weather broadcasts at all, and that we have taken a serious retrograde step. Can something be done to restore this valuable service and to give us information which we need so badly?
10.17 p.m.
The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Hobson): We have had a friendly and interesting discussion on what is indeed a very important subject, namely, the provision of an Airmet Service. The debate is based on restoring Airmet on a frequency which can be received by the normal broadcasting receiver. That is a desirable service, nevertheless I think the hon. and gallant Gentleman would be the first to agree that it is a limited requirement in relation to the 12,300,000 broadcast receiving licence holders in this country. The magazine "Weather" is organising a petition, and the latest information which the hon. and gallant Member gave us was that only 20,000 people—not licence holders of necessity—out of a population of, say, 50 million have seen fit to sign this petition which, from the point of view of the hon. and gallant Member, is all-important.
The people primarily concerned are obviously the maritime interests, the aviators and the land interests, chiefly the farmers. The maritime interests are catered for partly by the existing B.B.C. weather forecasts but mainly by the nine Post Office wireless stations around our coasts, which not only give weather fore casts and warnings of gales, but also navigational information which is highly important.
Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Is it not necessary for the mariner to be able to read Morse in order to receive these signals?
Mr. Hobson: No, not of necessity. The ships can be fitted with radio telephone, and many are. I was on a Clyde "Puffer" recently which was fitted with radio telephone. The stations make regular broadcasts, and it is in the interests of people who go to sea to provide themselves with a set capable of receiving the wavelengths emitted from our Post Office wireless stations around the coast. It is interesting to note that it is compulsory for ships of

1471
over 1,600 tons to carry this necessary radio equipment. As far as smaller vessels are concerned, I urge them in their own interests to have the necessary wireless apparatus.
The hon. and gallant Member raised the question of aeronautical interests. Meteorological broadcasts are made on frequencies appropriate to the aeronautical services. It would seem that for traffic control and safety purposes, the case for having sets capable of receiving transmissions on these wavelengths is on all fours with the need for mariners to have wireless sets to receive messages on their ships.
I come now to the third point, concerning land interests, which are chiefly farmers. The existing weather forecasts already help farmers, and there is a quite recent development in the Home Services, which is to give regionalised broadcasts. Furthermore—and this is often forgotten—there are facilities for any farmer or any member of the community—for example, the housewife who wants to do washing on a Tuesday, or a vicar who is having a garden fete and wants to know whether he should erect the marquee—to telephone the nearest meteorological office and have up-to-the-minute information of the prospects of having a fine day. I do not think, therefore, that farmers, or even people who want to know about the weather for social purposes, are suffering any great distress or inconvenience. This service is free except for the premium which my right hon. Friend collects for the making of the call.
The problem of the B.B.C. is that they have to cater for a tremendous number of people. It is difficult for them to cater for specialised interests. This is a very real problem. The content of their programmes is a matter solely for the B.B.C.
What is the real problem? Why cannot this service be given? The reason is the shortage of wavelengths in the long and medium wavebands, which are limited by the available space in the spectrum. Wavelengths have, therefore, to be allocated internationally. This was done at Copenhagen quite recently. Great Britain was allocated one long wavelength and 13 medium wavelengths, essentially for the purposes of domestic broad-
1472
casting. They were allocated to Great Britain for that specific purpose, and it would be quite wrong for us to allocate for aeronautical use or for an Airmet Service wavelengths which have been allocated to us internationally for domestic broadcasting.
The cardinal principle of the Copenhagan Conference was to deal with wavelengths for domestic broadcasting. Therefore, if we were to allocate for Airmet purposes a wavelength which was earmarked for domestic purposes, we would jeopardise our interests at any future international conference. This is an important point and will, I am sure, commend itself to the whole House.
What have the Government tried to do? If we have sat back and done nothing, we are entitled to be criticised. We have, however, made every possible endeavour, as has been indicated by my right hon. Friend in reply to Questions and by myself in conversation with hon. Members, to do all that we could. We have made approaches to Finland for the use of the Lahti frequency of 254 kcs., but Finland were unable to agree. I do not blame them, because that is the only wavelength allocated for their exclusive use.
It may be asked what other methods we have tried. I am advised by our engineers that it would be impossible to use any other foreign frequency without causing serious interference. Therefore, nothing can be done in that direction. As for the Third Programme and the Light Programme frequencies, during the hours they are not used for domestic broadcasting, those frequencies are used by the B.B.C. Overseas service, that is to say, the Third Programme before 6 p.m. and the Light Programme before 9 a.m. It is interesting to note that the Airmet Service never used a domestic broadcasting wavelength. We cannot afford to depart from that practice.
If there were to arise a situation in which additional frequencies became available to the British Broadcasting Corporation, the B.B.C. would use them to improve existing broadcasting reception throughout the islands. That is a very important point because we have had many questions from all sides of the House complaining about poor reception of broadcast programmes. If frequencies become available we shall use them, not in the interests of the 20,000

1473
who signed this petition as potential users of Airmet, but in the interests of the 12 million who hold broadcast receiving licences.
We have already made approaches to the B.B.C. and got their co-operation, and that is indicated, as the hon. and gallant Member pointed out, by the fact that there has been an alteration in the form of the 5.55 p.m. weather news on the Home Service. I think that is proving a great advantage. The hon. and gallant Member might be interested to know that there was also a feature programme on, I think, 5th December, stressing the importance of weather reporting. It was quite a big feature at 8 o'clock at night on the Home Service which, I am informed, is a heavy listening time. One would have thought that as a result, if there were an imperative need for the Airmet Service, the B.B.C. would have received something in the nature of a "fan mail," but in fact hardly any letters were received. But we did have information to the effect that the change has been well received, particularly in the West and South-West.
This is a very difficult problem. With our present resources with the limitations of the frequencies available to us, it is utterly impossible for us to allocate any available wavelengths specifically for an Airmet Service. The hon. and gallant Member was good enough to ask me to get the information in regard to the 49 metre band. This, as he knows, is 6,000 kilocycles, a short wave. This waveband is used internationally for long distance broadcasting and we are using it in that
1474
way. But I am informed that even if we could allocate a wavelength on the 49-metre band, the propagation characteristics are such that during certain hours of the day in summer it is likely that there would be no coverage inside a radius of 200 miles from the transmitter station, although strong signals would be received at about 1,800 miles. That would be an impracticable proposition as far as Great Britain is concerned, as the station would have to be situated, say, in North Africa. This suggests an international service, but there would be all sorts of complications including language.
We have explored this problem and gone into it with the Post Office engineers and with the B.B.C. There is no question of caprice or of my right hon. Friend's Department not desiring to help. We would help if we could but, unfortunately, because of the shortages of wavelengths and the vital fact that these matters have to be allocated through international conferences, I am sorry to have to inform the hon. and gallant Member that nothing can be done at this stage. We are always prepared to look at the problem de novo, but in the present light of our information the advice of skilled radio technicians in the Post Office and the B.B.C. is that we are in an impossible situation.
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'Clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at Twenty-Nine Minutes to Eleven o'Clock.

TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Canadian Footwear (Tax)
  Canadian Footwear (Tax)
  Imported Timber (Dollar Expenditure)
  Imported Timber (Dollar Expenditure)
  Utility Cloth (Pyjamas)
  Utility Cloth (Pyjamas)
  Cardiff (Timber Imports)
  Cardiff (Timber Imports)
  TAXATION OF PROFITS AND INCOME (ROYAL COMMISSION)
  TAXATION OF PROFITS AND INCOME (ROYAL COMMISSION)
  MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (REPORT)
  MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (REPORT)
  AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (REPORTS)
  AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (REPORTS)
  BROADCASTING (COMMITTEE'S REPORT)
  BROADCASTING (COMMITTEE'S REPORT)
AGRICULTURE
  Marketing
  Marketing
  Feedingstuffs (Ration Scales)
  Feedingstuffs (Ration Scales)
  Wool Clip (Profit)
  Wool Clip (Profit)
  Bees (Foul Brood)
  Bees (Foul Brood)
  Cider Apples
  Cider Apples
  Ryan Committee (Report)
  Ryan Committee (Report)
  WHITE FISH AND PILCHARDS (SUBSIDY)
  WHITE FISH AND PILCHARDS (SUBSIDY)
FORESTRY
  Clear-Felled Land (Replanting)
  Clear-Felled Land (Replanting)
  Land Acquisition (Commission)
  Land Acquisition (Commission)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Purchase Tax
  Purchase Tax
  Post-War Credits (Payment)
  Post-War Credits (Payment)
  Industrial Profits
  Industrial Profits
  National Union of Manufacturers
  National Union of Manufacturers
  Film "Wonders of the Deep"
  Film "Wonders of the Deep"
  Departmental Vehicles (Markings)
  Departmental Vehicles (Markings)
  Social Services, Northern Ireland
  Social Services, Northern Ireland
  Central Office of Information (Report)
  Central Office of Information (Report)
  Motor Cars (Taxation)
  Motor Cars (Taxation)
  CIVIL SERVICE (DISABLED PERSONS)
  CIVIL SERVICE (DISABLED PERSONS)
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
  Hearing Aids
  Hearing Aids
  West Wiltshire Hospital Committee (Land Offer)
  West Wiltshire Hospital Committee (Land Offer)
  Doctors (New Cars)
  Doctors (New Cars)
  Mental Hospitals (Nurses' Salaries)
  Mental Hospitals (Nurses' Salaries)
  Hospital Registrars
  Hospital Registrars
  Bromley Hospital (Child Patient)
  Bromley Hospital (Child Patient)
  Hospitals (Registered Disabled Staff)
  Hospitals (Registered Disabled Staff)
HOUSING
  Private Enterprise
  Private Enterprise
  Derequisitioning (Owner Occupation)
  Derequisitioning (Owner Occupation)
  Requisitioning
  Requisitioning
  Solid-Fuel Appliances
  Solid-Fuel Appliances
  House Purchase (Local Authorities)
  House Purchase (Local Authorities)
  Shoreham
  Shoreham
  Leyton
  Leyton
  Lancaster
  Lancaster
  Repair Licences, Battle District
  Repair Licences, Battle District
  Tied Cottages (Evictions)
  Tied Cottages (Evictions)
  L.C.C. Estates, Essex
  L.C.C. Estates, Essex
  Allocations
  Allocations
PUBLIC HEALTH
  Evacuation (Congested Areas)
  Evacuation (Congested Areas)
  Sewage Scheme, Ticehurst
  Sewage Scheme, Ticehurst
  Day Nurseries
  Day Nurseries
  Food (Clean Handling)
  Food (Clean Handling)
  Tuberculosis (Treatment in Switzerland)
  Tuberculosis (Treatment in Switzerland)
  Outfall Sewer, Doncaster
  Outfall Sewer, Doncaster
  Haddon Isolation Hospital, Bakewell
  Haddon Isolation Hospital, Bakewell
  Atmospheric Pollution, St. Marylebone
  Atmospheric Pollution, St. Marylebone
  Cancer (Publicity)
  Cancer (Publicity)
  Refuse Tipping, Maldon
  Refuse Tipping, Maldon
  DURHAM COUNTY COUNCIL (GRANTS)
  DURHAM COUNTY COUNCIL (GRANTS)
EMPLOYMENT
  Statistics
  Statistics
  Accidents (Scaffolding)
  Accidents (Scaffolding)
  Textile Industry (Incentive Schemes)
  Textile Industry (Incentive Schemes)
  Electricity Industry (Saturday Working)
  Electricity Industry (Saturday Working)
  Redundant Workers, Lancing
  Redundant Workers, Lancing
  NATIONAL SERVICE (STUDENTS)
  NATIONAL SERVICE (STUDENTS)
EDUCATION
  Wentworth Woodhouse (Adaptation)
  Wentworth Woodhouse (Adaptation)
  Classes (Size)
  Classes (Size)
  Assisted Students
  Assisted Students
  Kent
  Kent
  Teachers' Salaries (Training Colleges)
  Teachers' Salaries (Training Colleges)
  New School Buildings
  New School Buildings
  Independent Schools
  Independent Schools
  ARMED FORCES (RETAINED PERSONNEL)
  ARMED FORCES (RETAINED PERSONNEL)
BRITISH ARMY
  Rest Camps, Korea
  Rest Camps, Korea
  Catterick Camp (Conditions)
  Catterick Camp (Conditions)
  Centurion Tanks, Korea
  Centurion Tanks, Korea
  DISABLED WAR PENSIONERS
  DISABLED WAR PENSIONERS
FOOD SUPPLIES
  Meat Purchase
  Meat Purchase
  Meals in Establishments Orders
  Meals in Establishments Orders
COAL INDUSTRY
  Cordwell Valley (Opencast Prospecting)
  Cordwell Valley (Opencast Prospecting)
  Stocks, Gloucestershire
  Stocks, Gloucestershire
FUEL AND POWER
  Nationalised Undertakings (Research and Development)
  Nationalised Undertakings (Research and Development)
  Load Shedding
  Load Shedding
TRANSPORT
  Road Improvement Schemes
  Road Improvement Schemes
  Omnibuses (Boarding)
  Omnibuses (Boarding)
  Railway Freights Rebates
  Railway Freights Rebates
  LAND, ESSEX (HOUSE-BUILDING)
  LAND, ESSEX (HOUSE-BUILDING)
ROYAL NAVY
  Colliery Workers
  Colliery Workers
  Naval Establishments (Security)
  Naval Establishments (Security)
  YUGOSLAVIA (ECONOMIC AID)
  YUGOSLAVIA (ECONOMIC AID)
  COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PUBLICITY)
  COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PUBLICITY)
TELEPHONE SERVICE
  Cheltenham
  Cheltenham
  Stockton-on-Tees
  Stockton-on-Tees
MINISTRY OF SUPPLY
  Surplus Military Stores
  Surplus Military Stores
  Iron and Steel Industry (Houses)
  Iron and Steel Industry (Houses)
ROYAL AIR FORCE
  National Service Men
  National Service Men
  Transport Planes (Production)
  Transport Planes (Production)
  Huts, Enniskillen
  Huts, Enniskillen
  HOLLESLEY BAY COLONY (ESCAPES)
  HOLLESLEY BAY COLONY (ESCAPES)
  CAMEROONS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
  CAMEROONS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
  CYPRUS (MALTESE CAMP)
  CYPRUS (MALTESE CAMP)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the
Woolsack.

Prayers

  SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932
  2,34 p.m.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, there is nothing particular in this Order to which I need to call the attention of the House, as the provisions of the Sunday Entertainments Act have been complied with. Therefore, I beg to move that the Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made under the Act by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending Section one of the Act to the Urban District of Withernsea, be approved. — (Lord Shepherd.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the same conditions apply to this Motion as to the previous one. I beg to move that the Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made under the Act by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending Section one of the Act to the County Borough of Swansea, be approved.—(Lord Shepherd.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE WASHINGTON TALKS
2.36 p.m.
EARL FORTESCUE EARL FORTESCUE rose to call attention to the communiqué issued from Washington at the close of the conversations between the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, and to the statement on this subject made by the Leader of the House on Tuesday last. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I will not delay the House by speaking to the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper. It is designed simply to give His Majesty's Government an opportunity of making an expanded statement on the important subjects dealt with in the communiqué issued from Washington, after the recent meeting of the
982
President of the United States and the Prime Minister, and in the statement made by the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, in your Lordship's House on Tuesday last, both of which are now before the House in the convenient form of a White Paper.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HFNDERSON): My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for providing the House with an opportunity to have this debate. The Motion which has just been moved by the noble Earl calls attention to the communiqué issued at the end of the Prime Minister's conversations with President Truman at Washington and to the statement on this subject made by my noble friend the Leader of the House on Tuesday last. This sets the general scope of the debate, and there is no need for me to repeat in detail the contents of those two statements, especially since, as the noble Earl has told the House, to meet the convenience of noble Lords here and of Members of another place the two statements have been published in the form of a White Paper. I propose, therefore, to confine my observations to some of the major issues which were dealt with. The communiqué was wide in its scope and informative in its treatment of the subjects discussed—more than usually so following intimate discussions of this sort, and noble Lords will realise that there is little room for amplification.
I think that we all agree that the Prime Minister rendered a great service by paying his visit to Washington. In the light of the world situation it was well timed, and I do not think it can be doubted that the visit and its results have had both an encouraging and a stabilising effect. We all recognise that it is of supreme importance to avoid Anglo-American misunderstanding or divergent attitudes developing under the impact of fast-moving international events or hostile pressures. We must beware of those of ill-will who seek to sow the seeds of discord and disunity between us. We must guard against those whose insidious propaganda is directed, for example, to persuade us that America is "dragging" Britain into support of "imperialist designs" and to persuade America that

983
we are "appeasers." I believe it is recognised on both sides of the Atlantic that any possibility of danger of dissension or division arising, has been reduced to a minimum by the Truman/Attlee talks. That belief is supported by the statement that "the unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions."
Millions of ordinary men and women in many countries felt relief to their anxieties when it was announced that the Prime Minister was to pay this visit to Washington. The United Nations forces in Korea had suffered a heavy setback. No one knew how heavy that setback would prove to be. No one knew what the intentions of the Chinese Government were, nor what part Russia was playing behind the scenes. It was, I think, the feeling of the ordinary man that the time was ripe for a meeting between the heads of the Governments of the two great democracies, so that they might take counsel together and consider how the crisis could best be met and how what appeared to be the darkening clouds of war might be dispersed.
The atmosphere is considerably better to-day than it was a fortnight ago. On the military side, the reverses suffered by the United Nations forces in Korea are beginning to be seen in proper perspective. On the political side, the full and frank discussions which have taken place between the President and the Prime Minister have resulted in what the free world was above all hoping for— namely, a reaffirmation that these two great democracies stand side by side in their resistance to aggression and that they see the world as a whole and that there is no divergence of objectives. That, I think, was the biggest thing which came out of the Washington talks: the expressed agreement on basic objectives and basic principles of international conduct, because mutual trust, active co-operation and a common purpose between these two great Atlantic partners are indispensable to the security of the free Western world and to the maintenance of world peace. The second was the frank realisation of the importance of building up the strength of the whole free world. It is, I think, very important that these results of the Washington talks, which are of over-riding importance to our way of life and to our future, should not be overlooked in our natural anxiety to consider the
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present situation in the Far East and the crisis in Korea.
As regards Korea, the Washington talks revealed identity of view between our-selves and the United States on the major issues. It was agreed at Washington that every effort must be made to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading and becoming a conflict with China from which might flow a world war. Peace and the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations are still the overriding objectives of both Governments in their foreign policy.
Next, both the President and the Prime Minister declared their readiness to seek an end to the hostilities in Korea by means of negotiation. If the same willing-ness to negotiate is shown by the Chinese Government, then there is no doubt that a solution can be found and that a free, unified and independent Korea can be established, which will threaten the security of none and which will enable the sorely tried peoples of Korea to develop their own institutions and their own way of life in conformity with their own traditions. In these matters it is not possible to lay down a detailed blue-print covering every stage in the solution from the first to the last step. But at least the first step is perfectly clear.
The first step must be a cease-fire, which will open the way to negotiation, and I warmly commend the initiative taken by a number of nations of Asia and the Middle East to bring this about. A resolution has been tabled at the United Nations with the overwhelming support of the great majority of members, calling for a cease-fire. If, on the Chinese side, there is the same willingness to use the methods of peaceful negotiation as has been displayed by so many members of the United Nations, then we may have good hopes that we may proceed to the next step, which will be consideration of a settlement in Korea by peaceful means.
The principles on which such a settlement must be found are already known. They were first set out in the Cairo Declaration which referred to a free and independent Korea. They have subsequently been reaffirmed in a number of resolutions of the United Nations regarding the unification and rehabilitation of the country. In the view of His Majesty's Government, a free and independent Korea cannot be firmly established unless

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proper regard is paid to the development of good relations between Korea and its neighbours, and between Korea and the rest of the world. At the same time it is of first importance that the authority and prestige of the United Nations in Korea, as elsewhere in the world, should be maintained. Indeed, Korea is in a very special sense the responsibility of the United Nations. For over three years commissions of the United Nations were in Korea charged with the task of bringing about a unified, free and independent Korea. In the last six months the United Nations has exerted the greatest efforts on behalf of Korea. We must bend every effort to ensure that the objectives of the United Nations are achieved under the auspices of the United Nations.
If a solution to the Korean problem is to be reached under the auspices of the United Nations, on a basis of taking into account the interests of the neighbours of Korea, it would surely be better to ensure that Korea's neighbours are effectively represented in that Organisation. In the view of His Majesty's Government, developments in Korea confirm the sound-ness of our policy in regard to the representations of China at the United Nations. If the United Nations is to be a living institution, it must be what it purports to be—that is to say, it must effectively represent the Member States. Delegates to it must be the delegates of Governments which can effectively speak for these Member States. It is therefore still the view of His Majesty's Government that the delegates of the Central People's Government of China, which is the only effective Government of China, should occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations. As your Lordships know, this was the only point of difference recorded in the communiqué.
I have referred earlier to the Cairo Declaration. That Declaration did not deal only with Korea, although the pas-sage relating to Korea is the most important of the passages still remaining unfulfilled. There is also in the Cairo Declaration a reference to Formosa. His Majesty's Government adhere to the principles of the Cairo Declaration. But Formosa offers several exceedingly difficult problems. In the first place the signatories to the Cairo Declaration are not agreed as to which is the legitimate Government of China. In our view, that Government is the Central People's Gov-
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ernment of China but this is not the view of all the signatories. In the second place, this Cairo Declaration sprang from the recognition of certain principles which are stated in the first paragraph of the Declaration. These principles are principles of universal validity. They are the principles of non-aggression and the renunciation of territorial ambitions.
In the third place, the Chinese Government is at present obstructing the fulfilment of the Cairo Declaration in regard to Korea by allowing so-called volunteers to intervene in Korea. It would be difficult to justify the immediate fulfilment of the passage in the Cairo Declaration relating to Formosa when the beneficiary of such a policy was a Government which was obstructing the execution of another passage in the same Declaration. I think that your Lordships will agree with the statement by the President and by the Prime Minister in their communiqué, that the Formosan issue must be settled by peaceful means, and that, in view of the difficulties to which I have referred above, consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute.
So far, I have spoken only of the problems which face us in the Far East. Not-withstanding events in that region, we have always felt that the focal point of our efforts must lie in the West. The Prime Minister was able to confirm in Washington that the United States Government take the same view, and complete agreement was reached there between our two countries on the principles of Atlantic defence. There was agreement, first, that an integrated force must be formed for the defence of Europe and a Supreme Commander for this force appointed without unnecessary delay; secondly, that the present defence effort of the West must be speeded up; and, thirdly, that Germany should make a contribution to the common defence of Western Europe.
These matters are now under discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and, as will have been seen from the Press to-day, the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers and the Military Committee met yesterday and reached agreement on recommendations to be submitted to the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic countries who are meeting in Brussels early next week. I cannot anticipate

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their decisions, but I believe that final decisions will be taken there which will bring us nearer to our common aim, which is to ensure that the defences of the Western world are strong enough to deter aggression and thereby to ensure the preservation of peace and uphold the way of life in which we believe and for which we have already made so many sacrifices in the past.
I should also like briefly to mention the discussions on economic matters at Washington. The Prime Minister was most anxious to talk over with the President means of enabling us to bear the increasingly heavy burdens which our large defence programme is imposing on us. No effective defence effort is possible without a healthy economy, and one of the first essentials for this is an adequate supply of raw materials. The United Kingdom is being much hampered by a shortage of certain vital materials, notably zinc and sulphur. The United States, too, have their own difficulties, but the whole problem was fully discussed, and we are hopeful that arrangements resulting from these discussions will help us to get over the critical period.
But as well as remedying immediate shortages, it is vital to bring a lasting improvement in the raw material position. This is not a matter only for ourselves and the United States: every country in the world is affected by it. The fact must be faced that for some time to come there are going to be shortages, and we shall have to share supplies as evenly as possible. One of the first needs, clearly, is to increase supplies as and when we can. I am glad to say that agreement was reached at Washington that means of meeting this need should be fully examined, and the initial steps are already being taken to this end. It is hoped that as a result we shall be able to take speedy action in co-operation with the other countries concerned.
Then there is the question of the atomic weapon. As your Lordships will know, a partnership grew up during the war between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada on the development of the atomic weapon. By agreement between the Governments the exact nature of the arrangements has never been revealed. Your Lordships will also know that co-operation between the countries
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continues for certain purposes in the atomic energy field—for example, the results were recently made known of a Tripartite Conference on declassifying secret material relating to atomic energy. The position of the United States Government in many of these matters is now defined by legislation enacted in the United States since the war. But it was in the spirit of this partnership, and against that background, that the Prime Minister was able in Washington to raise the vital question of the use of the atomic weapon. As he said in another place, the Prime Minister is perfectly satisfied with the assurances which he received in that spirit and against that background.
I believe that your Lordships will wish me to say something about the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the four Powers. A meeting of the Ambassadors of the three Western Powers has recently been held in Paris, and they have drawn up a draft reply to the Soviet Government. This draft is now under final consideration. Beyond saying that it reflects the desire of all three Governments to consider all possibilities which might lead to a fruitful discussion with the Soviet Government, there is little that I can say at this stage about the contents of the draft. But I should like to assure your Lordships that the discussions in Paris revealed a general identity of view on this subject between the three Western Powers.
My Lords, in conclusion I will add only this. I am confident that this debate will demonstrate once again to the world the strength of our national unity; that it will show that both Parliament and people stand firmly with the Government in their determination to play their full part in building up the unity and strength of the peace-defending nations; and that this country is resolved to give continued loyal support to collective effort under the United Nations to deter aggression, to see the rule of law respected and to establish lasting conditions of peace and security.
2.57 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I should like first to thank the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, for the statement he has just made, with very much of which I imagine we shall all

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find ourselves in full agreement. As your Lordships know it is less than a month ago since we in this House held a debate on the foreign situation. But no one, I am sure, will regret that a further Motion has been put down on this subject, for during that month there have been two outstanding developments—one bad, and the other good—which have profoundly altered the position.
First, there has been the intervention on a massive scale by China in the Korean War. That, as I see it, is wholly bad, from a moral and from every other point of view. When we last debated these topics most of us—indeed, I think all of us—were uncertain what were China's intentions. We knew that they had large concentrations of troops on the Korean-Manchurian frontier, but we had no definite indications that they intended to use these in any warlike sense, unless the United Nations Forces showed signs either of carrying the war into Manchuria or of destroying the hydro-electric installations, which I understand are concentrated in that area. Now the Chinese plans have been more fully exposed. They were not defensive in character; they were offensive in the fullest sense of the word. China has entered the war on the side of North Korea. She has made her-self a party to the North Korean aggression. She has engaged, I do not say her whole strength, but certainly a vast amount of strength in an all-out effort to drive the forces of the United Nations at any rate beyond the 38th Parallel, and possibly out of the country altogether. That, I think we must all agree, is an event of a very formidable character. It has a profound bearing, not only upon the position in Korea itself but on the very existence of the United Nations. It has brought a general war appreciably nearer.
In such a situation as that, it seems to me that this duty of all of us, in what-ever part of this House we sit, is perfectly clear: it is to stand shoulder to shoulder in support of the world peace organisation. There has, I know, been a tendency in certain irresponsible quarters to try to unload responsibility for the present situation on somebody else—to blame General MacArthur; to blame the High Command in Korea; to try to find a scapegoat somewhere, any-where, for our recent setback. A deplorable example of this, I thought, was the
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speech of the Ministsr of Defence ten days ago which was so promptly and so rightly repudiated by his colleagues. The same, I think, is true of the speech last week-end of the Minister of Works, whose motto in future, if I may say so, might very properly be, "Works not words." If he took that as his guiding spirit, I think it would be a much happier position for us all. Indeed, one cannot help wondering why these Ministers, after such an exhibition as that, are allowed to continue to occupy, or indeed wish to retain, their present responsible positions in the Cabinet. They must have caused the greatest embarrassment to their own leader, the Prime Minister, in the delicate negotiations which he was conducting in Washington. Such effusions as theirs, and similar suggestions from some of the less responsible organs of the Press, can do nothing but harm to the cause of world peace, and I am sure that every one of us hopes that there will be no repetition of them. This is surely a time, if ever there was one, when each one of us, to whatever Party in the State he belongs, should do all in his power to avoid rocking the boat. And, so far as I can, I propose to try to follow that course to-day.
Happily, the recent reverses in Korea, however serious they may be in them-selves—and they are serious—have led to one good result, a result so important that it may well more than counterbalance our temporary setbacks. They have led to the visit of the Prime Minister to Washington, from which we are all happy to know that he has returned safely, and to his conversations with President Truman, of which he made a report in another place two days ago. None of us, I am sure, regrets that visit; indeed, if we have any regrets it is that it did not take place months ago, as many of us urged. The Government, I am sure, will forgive me if I say that I am afraid that time of supreme value has been lost by those months of delay. Although no doubt during this period extremely useful work has been done on the technical plane by Ministers and officials yet, when great decisions of policy have to be made, and above all when complete solidarity of view has to be proclaimed to the world, nothing can take the place of meetings of heads of Governments.
However, I do not want to indulge merely in carping criticism. The great

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thing is that the meeting has at last been held. I happen to have a family motto which reads: "Sero sed serio," which may be fairly, if somewhat freely, translated as meaning "Better late than never." That is certainly true in this case. Not only has the meeting been held, but it seems to have been followed by most fruitful results. In particular, as I see it, it has re-established three great principles as the basis of the joint policy of the two nations. These are stated in unequivocal terms in the communiqué which was issued after the meeting. I will quote the words of the communiqué. The first of these principles to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has already referred is this:
"The people of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace."
The second is:
"The military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom should be increased as rapidly as possible."
And, to balance these two, there is a third principle:
"We shall do everything we can, through whatever channels are open to us, to seek a peaceful solution of existing issues."
If the United States and the United Kingdom live up to those principles, the way is now open to that balanced policy of firmness and conciliation which some of us advocated in the House a month ago.
I made bold to say on that occasion that I hoped that a not entirely negative reply would be sent to the Russian Note. I maintain that view most strongly. I still hope that in due course it may be possible to arrange a meeting with the Russian Government at the highest level, and however unpropitious the prospects may be—and I cannot say that I regard them as bright—I still feel that efforts should be made to see whether some basis of agreement can be discovered which might give a hope of relieving the present tension. But by an agreement I do not mean just any agreement, peace at any price; I mean a real, solid, enduring agreement, honourable to all concerned. An agreement that did not safeguard the vital principles and interests for which we stand would not be worth having; it would merely give to the British people an illusion of safety which would be more perilous than anything.
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But I would reemphasise that there are two essential prerequisites to that policy for breaking the present deadlock. The first is careful preparation. We, as well as the Russians, must have a world plan. We must know what we want, and have some idea of how it is to be achieved. Secondly, there must be complete unity between the Western Powers. And, finally, there must be intensified rebuilding of our defence forces, pending a successful outcome of negotiations. In short, we must be united and we must be strong; otherwise there is no possibility of talking to Russia on any basis of equality—and that is absolutely essential if fruitful results are to accrue. If any-one in this country thinks (and here I strongly agree with what has been said by Lord Henderson) that we shall increase the chances of an agreement with Russia by detaching ourselves from the United States, he is living in a world of illusion, and dangerous illusion at that. On the contrary, we should immediately bring war very near indeed. For that reason, I think we must all welcome the broad agreement of principles between Britain and the United States to which the Wash-ington talks have led, and the spirit of mutual confidence in which the conversations were conducted.
No doubt there were certain matters, matters very important in themselves, on which an identity of views was not attain-able. There are the twin questions to which Lord Henderson has referred—first the recognition of the Communist Government of China, and second, the admission of that Government to the Security Council, Your Lordships already know my views on this subject, and I have already said that I will try not to be controversial to-day, I know that I shall not convert the Government to my view, and they certainly will not convert me to theirs. But whatever views we may individually hold on this subject, I hope we shall all recognise that to take such steps at this very moment, when the Chinese are actually fighting United Nations, would be regarded, both in the United States and, I believe, throughout the Eastern world, as a flagrant example of appeasement out of weakness.
We have all welcomed the forthright declaration of the President and the Prime Minister that there "can be no thought

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of appeasement or of rewarding aggression." I can only hope that that declaration will guide the actions of His Majesty's Government on this and on other questions.
Apart from everything else, I would remind the Government that the strength of public opinion on this subject in the United States should alone make us pause in continuing to advocate a policy at this very juncture which is so abhorrent to them.
Lord STRABOLGI: There is public opinion here too.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: The noble Lord must face the fact, which I thought was universally recognised, that a united front between the United States and us is vital if war is to be avoided. That, to my mind, is the most important principle of British policy at the present moment. This danger of a split, or of a lack of sympathy leading to such a split, between English and American opinion was, as your Lordships will remember, my main preoccupation when the question of recognition was first discussed in this House. I agree that arguments can well be adduced in favour of de facto recognition of the Communist Government of China, even though I myself still hold the view, which may not be held by others, that there too it is vital to move step in step with the United States. I feel that if we had waited a little, and tried to get them to move along with us, our situation would be happier to-day. But in my belief, there is nothing to be said for having granted de jure recog-nition—and in spite of what the Minister of Works said in his speech last week-end, it was de jure recognition and not de facto recognition that His Majesty's Government granted to the Government of Mao Tse. As some of us warned the Government at that time, that act of de jure recognition was bound to mean the risk of driving a wedge between British and American opinions; and subsequent events. I would diffidently suggest to your Lordships, have tended only to confirm that view. The remark of the Prime Minister in the House two days ago, with reference to differences over China, that
"this point of difference only serves to emphasise the underlying unity of our objectives in world affairs as a whole,"
is, I am afraid, much too subtle for me.
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In these circumstances I would beg the Government, whatever their view—and I am not suggesting that they should alter their view in any way— to do nothing now, at this moment, when the United States are, after all, bearing the main burden of the fight in Korea, to increase the difficulties with which that country is faced. The same applies to Formosa, to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, also referred. I note that it was agreed at Washington that this matter should be referred to the United Nations. I am quite certain that is right. But it is equally vital that, when it comes up for discussion at the United Nations, as it must do at some time, we should not take up an attitude that is bound to cause friction between ourselves and our American Allies. I was not clear from the speech of the noble Lord exactly what the Government propose to do when this subject comes before the United Nations. I am not intending to press them to make a declaration to-day; but I would urge them to walk very carefully in this matter. I am sorry to continue to urge this point, but I feel that friendly relations between Britain and America are of such vital importance that they ought to take precedence over anything else. Moreover, in any case, of course, Formosa is only one facet of the whole Chinese problem. To deal only with Chinese admission to the Security Council or merely with Formosa might well be to pave the way to further difficulties later on.
I imagine that we all hope that the time will come, and will come soon, when more moderate counsels will prevail in China and Russia. Then a general settle-ment may become possible of all the outstanding issues between us and them, which might cover the question of entry into the United Nations, the Security Council and everything else. I am sure that is what we all want, and in my opinion, that should be the ultimate purpose of any cease-fire arrangement such as that to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, referred. But while the Chinese are actually in arms against us, to make concessions of this kind—and I would emphasise this in view of what the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has said— would be ultimately regarded as giving way to blackmail. That never pays anyone in the long run, and may go far to destroy the unity between ourselves and the United States.

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So much for the Far East; but, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, there are other matters of equal importance which were dealt with at the Washington meeting. There is the position in Europe. Here I think the references in the com-muniqué may fairly give solid ground for satisfaction. One might well have feared that the present preoccupations of the United States Government in the Far East would have diverted their eyes from the potentially greater perils on the European continent. Happily, it is now clear that that is not the case. The Government of the United States agree fully with us —and it is greatly to their credit, in my view, that they should do so—that Europe is the supreme danger spot. They have emphasised with us that every effort will be made to strengthen the forces of the Atlantic Treaty Powers in that area. I do not ask to-day for details which can-not be publicly given, but I think it is fairly evident that there was no difference at all between the two countries, at any rate on this aspect of world affairs. I hope that the machinery which is envisaged in the communiqué is already in operation to give effect to the conclusions which have been reached or, at any rate, very soon will be.
Arising out of these conclusions, it is evident that two matters came very much to the fore in the course of the discussions at Washington. First, there is the question, to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has already referred, of the fair allocation of raw materials upon which both the rebuilding of our defence forces and the provision of a healthy economy depend. With all deference to the noble Lord, I could not help feeling, as I listened to him, that in this particular sphere His Majesty's Government have been considerably at fault. I should have thought that they should have provided themselves with adequate supplies of these really vital materials long ago.
Lord STRABOLGI: By what means?
The Marquess of SALISBURY: By whatever means it could be done. I was in trouble with the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor in a recent debate over the question of one of the parables; but perhaps he would allow me to remind him of another, the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins. The foolish virgins, I should have thought, might well
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have argued that the wise virgins had been (to use a fashionable phrase) stockpiling in oil, but I have never heard the wise virgins criticised by moralists on that account. No doubt it is very true that we and other European nations now find our-selves short of vital raw materials: but whose fault is that? If the Americans, with more foresight than we, have made better preparations than we have—
Lord CHORLEY: With more money than we have.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: It may be with more money, but we were taking quite a lot of money from them at the time and spending it on different objects. That is only evidence, in my view, that we started far too late to prepare ourselves for the present crisis. But, what-ever we may feel about that, it does not alter the fact that, if we are to rearm, we must have the means to do so. There-fore, I am extremely glad to know that steps are now being taken on an inter-national scale to increase the supply of, and I hope allocate, existing stocks of vital raw materials. No doubt, there are some of which there is a general world shortage. In other cases, it may be possible with existing stocks, to enable the whole of the Western World to play its part in the necessary steps to be taken. The communiqué does not say whether it is proposed to re-create the Joint Purchasing Board which did such good work during the war. I shall be glad of any information on that or any other machinery it is proposed to build up for this purpose.
Finally, there is the vexed question of the atom bomb, which is exercising the minds of so many of us at the present time. Here, if I may say so with all deference, I do not think the communiqué was quite so happy in its wording. The Prime Minister, with obvious gratification, said in his statement in another place two days ago that he was "completely satisfied" by his talk with the President on this subject. That in itself is very good, so far as it goes; but it is a statement of an extremely general character. I recognise that it is stated in the communiqué that the President will "inform" the Prime Minister of any changes in the situation which might call for the use of the atom bomb. That is, at any rate, something. But I confess that I should have greatly preferred that the word were not "inform" but "consult."

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After all, the atom bomb is different in one essential respect from any other weapon. Its use might entirely transform not only the military but the political situation. Its use, therefore, is not merely a military but a political act. If we in this country and the United States are to move together in a united foreign policy, I feel most strongly—and I speak as a wholehearted friend of the United States —that we should be taken into consultation before any decision is taken about actually dropping the bomb. I hope and believe—and I really do believe it from the Prime Minister's statement—that that, in fact, is what will happen. I believe that one must come to that conclusion from what the right honourable gentleman said in another place. In view of the obvious delicacy of this subject, I do not, therefore, intend to press the Government any further on this matter. But I wish that it had been more specifically dealt with in the communiqué.
My Lords, such, quite briefly, are the thoughts that arise to one's mind in considering this communiqué and the statement of the Prime Minister, which I will not say amplified it, but at any rate reaffirmed it. We all rejoice that the meeting has been held, and we all congratulate the Prime Minister on the part he has played. We are all glad that the meeting has led to such broad unity of view. The next step is to implement it. As I see it, nothing must stand in the way of this —no considerations on our side of the House of Party politics; no considerations on the part of the Government of their own popularity. Hard things will inevitably have to be done. New sacrifices will have to be imposed on all sections of our population. On their capacity to face facts, and not merely to do what is expedient in their own interests, both the Government and the Opposition will be judged. It is for us, on both sides of this House, to see that we do not fail.
3.24 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, I do not propose to attempt to cover so wide a ground as has been traversed either by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, or by the noble Marquess. I will limit myself to two matters, the events in Korea, and their consequences, and the question of the atom bomb. We all listened with great interest to the statement of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. For my own
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part, I see nothing in it from which I should wish to dissent. I was proposing to make somewhat the same criticism as the noble Marquess—namely, that the visit of the Prime Minister has been so exceedingly useful that one regrets that it was not made earlier. It was rather a belated visit. Five years have passed since the two heads of Government met, and if it was possible to achieve so much so quickly might it not have been possible to avoid a good deal of harm by having the visit take place earlier? The noble Marquess quoted his family motto, "Better late than never." I was greatly interested in that. I presume that it is good Conservative doctrine to have just two alternatives in life: either you are late or else you do not start at all. One would have thought that there ought to be a third choice—to be in time. How-ever, it became evident that the British, and American efforts were a little out of gear at the highest level, and that difference has now teen put right. But there are some who think that there may be a case for an even better adjustment than there is to-day at the levels lower down. Whether that is so I cannot myself say, because I have no first-hand know-ledge in the matter. But I have been told that possibly in military, and almost certainly in economic, matters there is still room for an even closer adjustment, such as happily prevailed during the years of war.
The visit of the Prime Minister is another example of the great service to the world that is rendered by the very existence of the British Commonwealth, with its interests scattered all over the globe. The President and Pekin are wide asunder; but Mr. Truman can talk to Mr. Attlee; Mr. Attlee can talk to Mr. Nehru; and, in his turn, Mr. Nehru can talk to Pekin. And so we have that chain of communication which brings the whole world together and makes a general negotiation more possible. As the noble Marquess said, and as we all know and have emphasised again and again, it is vital that the United Kingdom and the United States should march together and should be in no way divided. At the same time, that does not imply that on no occasion should our own Government exercise an independent judgment on matters of policy. I do not think that the United States would wish that. Nor

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should we be so useful to the grand alliance if we did suppress our own clear conviction merely for the sake of avoiding any possible breach in unity.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did not suggest that. What I said was that if we had not acted so precipitately there was a chance that we might have moved side by side with the United States possibly over de facto recognition, and that, I believe, would be more satisfactory.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: As has happened previously in our debates, I find to my regret that here I take a divergent view from that of the noble Marquess. I propose to deal with that point more fully. But we have to remember that, while on the one hand we are in the closest relation to the United States, on the other we are also in very close relation with India, and also with Australia, a country which at the moment is perhaps more vehemently anti-Communist than any other country in the Commonwealth. Yet Australia is most strong in favouring full recognition of China. Further, there are the interests of New Zealand and of Malaya, all of which have to be taken into account. As members together of the Commonwealth it would be most unfortunate if in the United Nations it were found that Great Britain took one course and India, Australia and most of the rest of the Commonwealth took the opposite course. That also is a factor not to be forgotten, and for my own part I believe that it is at all events possible—no one can speak with any assurance in hypothetical matters— that if China had been fully admitted to the comity of nations, and had been given a seat in the United Nations Security Council before any of these events occurred, very possibly there might have been no Korean affair at all. I say no more than that it is a possibility. But I go further, and say that on grounds of general principle it is essential for the successful working of the United Nations as an institution that its membership should be completed.
In his distinguished career the noble Marquess has rendered many useful ser-vices, but I think he will agree with me when I say that he has never rendered more useful service than in participating in the San Francisco Conference, which was the foundation of the United Nations.
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That was a great event in the history of the world. But would he have imagined at that time that if a great country like China was to be represented in the United Nations in the conditions that exist to-day, the Government of Chiang Kai-shek should have a seat and the Government of Pekin should be excluded—the Government of Chiang having no status except de facto occupation of Formosa? That in present circumstances is its only claim to sit in the Security Council and speak in the name of China. The Charter of the United Nations begins with words to this effect: "We, the representatives of the peoples of the world." Can the representative of the Chiang Government claim to fulfil that first requisite of a right to representation? At San Francisco the question arose whether it was better to have Russia a member, with a power of veto which she might exercise in her own interests, or whether it would be better to have the United Nations more homogeneous and to keep Russia out. The general consensus of public opinion there and throughout the world—certainly in this country—was that it was better that Russia should be in than aloof and apart. I do not believe at all in this principle of screened admission to the United Nations, as though we were choosing members for a select club. There are now fourteen countries which are not in the United Nations at all—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount is moving now to another subject. Before he does so, I should like to ask him whether his argument is that China should have in the past been admitted to the United Nations and given a seat on the Security Council, or is it that at this moment she should be given a seat on the Security Council?
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My argument is purely general.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is entirely academic.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: It is not in the least academic, because it affects several other countries at the same time. They ought all to be dealt with, possibly simultaneously, and as a general rule. There ought to be no question of appeasing China, or of approving the Franco regime in Spain. There ought to be no question of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania failing to shoulder their obligations with regard to

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human rights. These fourteen countries are now outside the United Nations. Three of them—Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania, have been black-balled by us. Others have been black-balled in reprisal by Russia, among them such important countries as Italy, Eire and Switzerland, and everyone has black-balled Spain. That is really the principle of the one-Party Legislature—"Unless you agree with us in general, you shall not come into our Parliament at all." It is the totalitarian principle that everyone must conform to certain principles and that no one else should be allowed even to stand for election. It is not democratic. The democratic principle is that everyone should have equal rights, whether you agree with them or whether you do not.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I really cannot accept that. What the noble Viscount is saying is that it does not matter whether a nation sub-scribes to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or not; it ought in any case to be a member of the United Nations. I cannot agree to that. It is not a question of totalitarianism at all. It is a question whether a nation accepts certain basic standards of conduct for international behaviour.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: It is laid down in the Charter that the nations should be peace-loving.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That does not apply to China.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: There is nothing even in the Charter about freedom-loving nations. The Russians would certainly claim to be in favour of what is their idea of democracy. If you say "Nothing of the sort," you are assuming a right to declare whether people should be allowed to consult with you. I think that the noble Marquess's principle is wrong from the very foundation. It is not our business to try to determine the character of the policies of all the countries of the world. Each one of us finds it hard enough to manage our own policies. If we say that we will not allow A, B, C, D, E, and F, to sit, that means that Russia will say: "In that case we will not allow H, I, J, K, L and M, to sit." This sort of thing has brought the United Nations into an impossible position. China is only one case among others. If China had at an earlier stage been given her rightful place
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—the present Government of China represents some 500,000,000 or 600,000,000 people—many of these difficulties would never have arisen. The question is, in fact, is the United Nations to be an alliance of anti-Communist States, or is it to be a Parliament of Man. That is the vital question. The danger would really come if Russia were formally to withdraw now from the United Nations and China were to refuse to join. That would be a great danger to the world. So far from China refusing to join, her exclusion is against her vehement protest, and it has been effected by the Western nations, principally by the United States. It is of vital importance that all should be got together for discussion in one room and round one table, in the full blaze of world publicity; and that they should there defend their causes at the table in a single organisation responsible to mankind as a whole. That, and that alone, is the general principle to be applied.
It is assumed, of course, that China, because she is Communist and Russia is Communist, will be a satellite of Russia in the United Nations, in the same way as the countries on the perimeter of Russia in Europe have proved to be very docile satellites. Those who know the Chinese people well do not believe that. The Chinese are a very proud people with an ancient civilisation; they had a high standard of culture when Russia was still in the depths of barbarism and Western Europe was not very much better.
A NOBLE LORD: And we also.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I had the pleasure last year of taking part in the celebration, under the auspices of the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Institute in London, of the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Confucius. Confucius still remains, with his ethics, which include the Golden Rule, the author of one of the wisest of the ethical codes of mankind. If the Chinese are Communist to-day it is because they have been engaged in an agrarian revolution; in freeing the peasants of China from the misery, oppression and neglect which they have suffered for generations. In fighting that, they think that they are fighting for a holy cause, and I do not know that anybody is entitled to say they are wrong.
The Chinese also are lighting against foreign control. For generations their great country has suffered the indignity

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of continuous interference from Europe and of her people being regarded as mere barbarians. Therefore they are deter-mined to free themselves. After years of warfare, immense sacrifices and heavy casualties, this Party and these Armies have won their war and have established themselves. They are giving China probably a better administration than she has had for long years past. Then they find that when the destinies of States on their immediate border, such as Korea, are being settled, it is all to be done with-out taking any notice of them. They are not even to be invited to sit at the table on equal terms with others in order to decide these questions. Is it to be wondered at that they are indignant? The Chinese gave notice quite publicly to all the world that if the Forces of the United Nations advanced to the frontier of Manchuria, they would not be indifferent and would not stand aside. This was publicly proclaimed weeks ago. No notice was taken of that. So far as one can imagine, those responsible for the United Nations campaign regarded it as mere bluff and as a means of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear. It was nothing of the kind. The Chinese meant what they said, and they did what they had announced they would do. There is this to the good: they have informed the Indian Government that their wish is to stop fighting. They do not want a war à outrance, which is very wise.
As for the rather absurd fiction that their great armies, with all their organisation and equipment, are composed of volun-teers—which is a transparent figment— that also may be a good sign, because it seems to be implied that the Government of China do not want to be committed irretrievably to an international war, an official war against the Forces of the United Nations. They do not want to engage their prestige. They do not want to send the United Nations an ultimatum or almost to compel the United Nations to send them an ultimatum. They want to keep the situation fluid; and surely that is an excellent thing. Why should we not lend ourselves to this fiction, although we know that these people are not volunteers at all, and the Chinese know it, and know that we know it? There is a Chinese maxim—and many Chinese proverbs are exceedingly pithy and cogent, and some of them humorous—which says:
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"When a neighbour is in your fruit garden, inattention is the truest politeness."
So when we denounce this invasion from Manchuria into North Korea, they say with a bland smile, "Oh please, do not think we are so rude and unneighbourly as to invade North Korea, but the feelings of our people are so strong that we could not possibly restrain them from doing this. If you have something better to propose, then we will willingly consider it." Very well, if that is the way they want to approach the question, then let them approach it in that way: I do not think it will do any harm. The important thing is that the situation should be kept fluid and the clash between us not made so definite and obvious that it would be impossible for us to extricate ourselves from the situation without loss of prestige, either on one side or the other.
I have one other observation about these events, and it is this—and again I am speaking not necessarily of the single instance only but of this instance as one of the rules one can draw from the experience of history—it is very unfortunate when generals in the field assume the duty of making political pronouncements. The whole world is exceedingly grateful to the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United Nations in Korea for the promptitude, the energy and, up to a point, the success with which he retrieved the situation at the beginning, before it became desperate; and no one would wish for a single moment to make him a scapegoat for the untoward events that have since occurred. But it is a sound rule that strategy and tactics require the military mind, and statesmanship requires statesmen. Our difficulties might have been less than they have been if there had not been some impulsive pronouncements which received world-wide attention and which did not, I think, command the assent of the United Nations as a whole, and certainly not of public opinion in this country. It should be remembered that it is legitimate for us to make these comments, if we believe them sincerely, because the Commander-in-Chief in Korea is not only the servant of his own Government and responsible to his own President, but is also the agent of all the nations of the United Nations, under whose flag he and his Forces are fighting.

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I turn now to my last point, which relates to the atomic bomb. This matter has been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury; it has been included in their survey. I do not think the atomic bomb would have received so much attention at this juncture had it not been for an unfortunate observation by the President when he was undergoing that strange practice by which the head of the Government is submitted to cross-examination by newspaper reporters. A statement "slipped out," as The Times put it, which led the world to think that President Truman regarded the use of the atomic bomb as his personal responsibility, although he would be guided by the advice of the Commander-in-Chief. That probably was not his intention, but the thought that it was caused intense alarm and, I think one might say, justifiable alarm in this country, and no doubt elsewhere, because people thought that possibly next week, or possibly to-morrow, they would read that the United States had used the atomic bomb in the Korean campaign in order to get out of their grave difficulties there. The responsibility is not that only of the Com-mander-in-Chief; it is not that only of the President; it is not that only of the United Nations: it is the responsibility of the Parliaments of all Member States. And what is the responsibility of the Parliaments is the responsibility of the individual citizen. So every man's conscience is engaged, if the bomb is unleashed in this campaign.
The Prime Minister said that he is completely satisfied with the results of his conversations, and I accept that statement without hesitation. I do not agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that we should have wished him to say something more specific, because if he had done so it might have given rise to great political complications and difficulties, especially within the United States. Anything he might have said of a more definite character might have caused great controversy. For my own part, I feel certain that the Prime Minister would not have said, not only that he was satisfied, but that he was completely satisfied, with the assurance given to him, unless we could all feel at ease on that point.
With regard to the use of the atomic bomb at any time, and the policy to be
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pursued, there are many who think that there is nothing to be done; that wars are inevitable; that there always have been wars and always will be—we all know that miserable catch-phrase—and that the wickedness of man is such that no rules are of any use, no assurances are valid. It is said that once a war is started, all restrictions are laid aside and war becomes total war. Well, that is not true. It is not the case. We have had two great wars and that has not happened. The Geneva Convention of the International Red Cross has, on the whole, been observed. There have been many infractions but in the main it has been observed in both wars. In ancient times all prisoners were massacred almost as a matter of course. Read Thucydides, and the Old Testament, where it some-times say; "Put every man, woman and child to the sword." Look at the. Egyptian memorials and. you will see depicted upon them the piles of massacred soldiers conquered by the Pharaoh. But now that is not so; it was not even in Japan in the last war. I have a son who was a prisoner of war in Japan for nearly four years and he has no complaints to make, although we know that in other places in the Japanese theatre of war the grossest mismanagement and cruelty occurred. International Red Cross parcels were received by our prisoners in Germany. Many young men obtained university degrees because they had their books and were able to pass examinations while prisoners of war.
Taken as a whole, the Geneva Convention was observed. Prisoners had the help of the Red Cross everywhere. Hospital ships, brilliantly lit at night; travelled over all the seas of the world: a few were attacked, but an exceedingly small proportion. And when there were real crimes, when there were massacres, for the first time in history we had an international tribunal established, and this country had the honour of having one of our own Judges, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Oaksey, appointed as Chair-man, in which post ho rendered a most distasteful service most admirably and to the credit of us all. These men who were guilty—not only the lower agents, but those at the top—were sentenced to death and "hanged by the neck till they were dead." That is proof that the world will not tolerate unrestricted war. Therefore, I say that if the world wishes to prevent

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the use of the atomic bomb, it can do so, and I believe it will do so.
Let me take another example—namely, the use of gas. In the First World War poison gas was used. There was an Inter-national Convention at Geneva in 1925 which forbade the use of poison gas, and forty-five nations signed it, including all the great Powers except Russia. In the Second World War gas, for various reasons, was not used. The belligerents may have thought it was strategically useless, or they may have been afraid of reprisals—and probably were. But, also, the obligation was there. If there had not been that Convention, then on the first day of the war someone might have started using poison gas. So we may believe with regard to the atom bomb that there can be, and to my mind there should be, international control. I had a Resolution to put forward to your Lordships making that proposal. I did not bring it forward for debate because I found that there was a difference of opinion in the House, and it was evident that a declaration of difference of opinion here might do more harm than good. But certainly now that this matter is to be brought forward we ought to resume discussion of this problem, which has been before the United Nations for three years, and come to a solution.
Nobel, the fiftieth anniversary of whose death was being commemorated lately, wrote, as was quoted recently in The Times:
"I wish I could produce a material or a machine so terrifyingly destructive on a large scale that war would become completely impossible."
It may be that there is some force in that observation, so long as we do not hasten to use that terrible weapon. If Hitler had succeeded in discovering the principle of the atomic bomb and making that appliance; if he had been able to use it in 1942, 1943 or 1944 when he was hot on the track; if those bombs had been dropped here in London, and this precinct, the Abbey, Westminster Hall and St. Pauls had been levelled to the around and per-haps 500,000 or 1,000,000 killed; and if the same had happened in Paris and New York, I am not so sure that those of us (if any) who had survived or our successors, if we were now meeting in some other place, would discuss the ethics, the strategic value or the political usefulness
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of the atomic bomb with quite the same calm detachment, weighing all the pros and cons, which we find in this House to-day. It is said that the atom bomb must be used as the only effective defence of Western civilisation. I am profoundly convinced that if the atom bomb is used it is more likely to lead to the disintegration and destruction of Western civilisation than any other one thing could do. It might conceivably win a speedy victory for one party in a war. But what would happen in the war of revenge that would come afterwards?
What is now the course that we should desire to see taken in these matters? I feel that we should probably agree that what has to be done should be done by stages, as in the case of Germany in 1945 and the following years. First, if we can, we should get an immediate cease-fire, in order to save life. Then we should start negotiating, and not wait to negotiate until the other party has agreed beforehand to our main terms. That is what either party is frequently tempted to do: to say, "We will talk to you, but of course, it is to be understood as a preliminary that you must agree with us in this, that and the other." Such a course is almost impossible, and makes it unlikely that negotiations can even be begun. As for the atom bomb, that should be included in the discussions, but, to my mind, no pledge of any kind that we would surrender the use of the atom bomb should be given unless there was a general international under-standing. I do not think we should take action unilaterally. I am not one of those who think that our scientists are doing a wicked thing in continuing the production of atom bombs. On the contrary, they are doing their patriotic duty and enabling us to stand up against aggression if it should come to an actual conflict.
Formosa should also be included, not perhaps in the first negotiation, but with a view to later settlement. We ought not to pledge ourselves to return Formosa to China at once until we are assured that she will no longer be aggressive. On the other hand, we should not pro-claim our intention to sustain the Government of Chiang Kai-shek at all costs and indefinitely. In the statement that has been made by the Prime Minister and the President it says that they think the question of Formosa should be dealt with by the United Nations. To that we should all subscribe. Indeed, it is

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in the United Nations that our hopes must rest. If there had been no United Nations, now and before now there would have been open, widespread war in the Balkans, in Indonesia, in the Middle East and perhaps elsewhere. The very pivot of the policy of Britain and the Commonwealth is still to lend their utmost support to the peacemaking efforts of the United Nations.
3.59 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, it is always a pleasure to listen to the wise and persuasive words of the noble Viscount who has just spoken, and the present occasion has been no exception. The Prime Minister's visit to America and his talks with President Truman have underlined the crucial importance of the partnership of the United Kingdom and the United States within the framework of the United Nations. Together we must stand, but it must be within the framework of the United Nations. At the same time, Britain's responsibilities for leadership side by side with the United States are beyond doubt. What Britain can give in wisdom, experience and frankness to the common cause is of inestimable worth.
As Chairman of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, I have during the last two weeks been in close touch with representatives of Churches in the United States. Their attitude and that of Churches in Great Britain to this intervention of China is once again very similar. It is also clear that the influence of the Churches on political leadership in the United States is an influence for moderation and restraint. Like us, they are seized of the importance of building up the strength of the whole free world, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, put it; and they are also convinced that, grave as the position is, a Third World War is not an inevitable event. At the same time, as the communique itself says, we must not expect any easy or quick solution to the crisis, and we are obliged to anticipate that the struggle, in one form or another, is likely to be prolonged. If we are bent upon creating a world atmosphere in which conflicting ideologies can compete peacefully, we cannot expect a speedy conclusion. We must guard against impatience. It is largely because of this lack of patience that some contend that Communism can be successfully
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fought by military power alone. If there were to be a global war, the result of such a war, even if we were victorious, would probably be to spread Communism far more quickly and more widely than has been possible hitherto through the Soviet tactics of infiltration and deception.
One of the wisest courses for which American churchmen are contending with their own political leaders is an avoidance of unilateral action which rejects a moral judgment as reflected by the majority opinion in the United Nations. All the members of the United Nations, small and great, are involved in the conflict and the responsibility. The United States undoubtedly possesses vastly preponderant power, but its leadership in a United Nations undertaking of such vast significance should cause it to submit its actions to full international consultation and decision. The day when one member nation, however powerful, true to the principles of the United Nations, has the right by itself to declare war on another is past.
Again, it seems to me that we must guard against the prejudice which refuses to see evil wherever it exists, whether on the side for which the United Nations is engaged or on the side of the enemy. Distinctions of this kind whether between good and bad in the enemy, or between unjust actions and just actions on the side on which we are engaged, are proverbially hard to make. But let me give an illustration. The United Nations action in promptly resisting North Korea's aggression was plainly right. But approval of that action cannot be taken to cover also subsequent mistakes or injustices. An humane and un-prejudiced public opinion is bound to be shocked by atrocities committed by South Koreans no less than those perpetrated by North Koreans, and it is our duty to insist that our principles of law and justice are applied equally in both North and South Korea. I think it should be plain, too, that approval of United Nations' action does not carry approval of the total programme of the South Korean leader, Syngman Rhee; care will have to be taken to secure, for example, that the benefits of land reform effected in North Korea should be considered in the end, though the injustices in the process of instituting those reforms are not to be passed over. Also, pro-

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vision should be made for North Koreans freely to exercise their electoral right in determining the Government of a free and unified Korea.
This leads on to the duty, where just cause is shown, of our own Government and that of the United States, and also of the United Nations, to review their policy, especially as that policy may apply to particular situations. On our side, we should always show ourselves ready for open-minded and effective negotiations. No doubt the conditions upon which such negotiations could commence are of first importance, but we should leave no doubt in the Com-munists' minds as to our readiness to enter into negotiations, as to the character of our conditions and our awareness of the need of moderation. Surely, we must keep in the very forefront of our consideration the suffering Asiatic countries themselves—the desolation of Korea, and the future of Korea and its neighbours. I personally am very glad that the Prime Minister made so plain the British view about the Pekin Government's member-ship of the United Nations. I do not wish to involve myself in the controversy between the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I will content myself by saying that I am wholeheartedly on the noble Viscount's side, and I hope that the United States will be able in the end to agree to the persuasion of our Prime Minister.
Further, it seems to me that we ought to review again the implications of resistance to North Korean aggression—how far resistance ought to go or to have gone—and we ought to be willing to consider some alternative method such as —as a temporary measure, and until complete unification is possible—the creation of a neutral strip under the United Nations. We ought also, as fair-minded and wise people, to be ready to give full consideration when offers are made by the smaller member nations— Asiatic and Arab—to negotiate differences between the greater Powers, and to show our readiness also to respond to proposals by Soviet Russia which may hold promise of an effective solution. Above all, it is necessary to keep a firm hold on moral perspective and political wisdom. When imminent danger faces them, people
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quickly cast reason and judgment to the winds. We have to take long-term views, build for the distant future; and we must take warning from the immensely in-creased difficulties confronting the Allies, arising, as many feel, from the demand for unconditional surrender in the Second World War and the policy of obliteration bombing—a policy which, whatever else may be said about it, is the subject of continual controversy and doubt among historians and students of war at the pre-sent time.
This question of moral perspective is acutely raised by the atomic bomb. No paragraph in the communique was more closely scrutinised than that which said:
"The President slated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb."
The communique went on to speak of the President's desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed. Atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs involve force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale as to imperil the very basis on which law and civilisation can exist. It is imperative that atomic energy should be controlled by an international agreement, and that the use of atomic bombs should be forbidden, but at present the efforts of the United Nations Commission to find a way are opposed by Soviet Russia, while the proposals of Soviet Russia are opposed by other members of the United Nations. As these are the two parties most involved, agreement seems far off.
There arises, therefore, the question referred to by the noble Viscount at the end of his speech—namely, what is the right policy for people to take before international agreement? In a situation which is so deeply beset with difficulties, every man's conscience, as the noble Viscount said, is engaged. The Prime Minister asks that, if it is used, the atomic bomb should be used only with the agreement of the United Kingdom. On any reasoning, unilateral action by the United States Government in so tremendous a choice cannot be right. But a further question lies behind: can it be right in any circumstances to use the atomic bomb against people who have not used it against us? War generally has developed rapidly in the direction of total war, but there are two meanings to the term "total war," and these can be distinguished. The

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first meaning of total war is that all human and material resources are mobilised when hostilities break out. The whole nation, both military and civilian, is involved in this kind of total war, and that cannot be avoided if we have war at all. But total war also has a second meaning. In this meaning, total war is a war in which all moral restraints are thrown aside and all purposes of the community are fully controlled by sheer military expediency. We must recognise that the greater the threat to national existence the greater will be the temptation to subordinate everything, all civil rights, belief of con-science, all moral judgments regarding means to be used and all consideration of post-war international relations, to the single aim of military victory. It is, I believe, impossible for the humane-minded man to consent to total war in this sense.
The only justification that war has is that it offers a possibility of achieving a moral result (however imperfect) to pre-vent an overwhelming moral evil, and to offer a new opportunity for men to live in freedom and decency, and in just and merciful relationships. The way we fight and the means we use are of crucial importance. The dilemma, then, with which our statesmen are faced is very grave. Is the atomic weapon not to be used, as a preventive of further evil, against nations who have immense military power and use it to the full, but who have not used the atomic bomb against us? The argument is that our use of the atomic bomb is the only means of preventing the imposition of world tyranny, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it is the only means. Its first use by us, involving a counter-use by our enemy, would be be-yond all doubt a signal for a holocaust of destruction, desolation and horror be-yond the grasp of our imagination.
The atomic bomb may or may not be different in kind from other weapons of mass destruction, but the difference in scale is vast, and recourse to the atomic bomb may properly be described as an immeasurable sacrilege against nature and against the human personality. It is not only the physical but the psycho-logical and the moral consequences of its use that are unpredictable. The moral revulsions which its first use on United Nations initiative—I stress the words "first use" and "initiative"—would create in the minds of those most deeply
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devoted to the cause of freedom and justice would far outweigh the immediate apparent military gain. We ought to consider the Asiatic countries, India and the rest. A great deal of Asia is on our side. The attitude of many countries in Asia to the first use of the atomic bomb by the United Nations would be an attitude of deep disapproval, melancholy and despair. We cannot afford to take an action which would so deeply repel them.
I am not claiming that Britain and America should refrain from making or possessing atomic bombs so long as hostile Powers make and possess them. Although I would urge that one of the most important elements in an overall settlement of outstanding international problems is an international agreement for the control of atomic energy, and the prohibition of atomic bombs and the inspection of atomic plant, what I am claiming is that in no circumstances should the British and the Americans, and their associates in the United Nations, take the initiative in using the atomic bomb against people who have not used it against them.
4.20 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken, I should like to express a universal gratitude to the Prime Minister for the visit he has made to the United States of America and for the general agreement which he has been able to achieve with the President. I do not agree with the noble Marquess or the noble Viscount that this visit should have taken place earlier. I think it took place at the right psychological moment, and if it had taken place earlier it might very well have misfired. I feel that most of us would like to examine what was the purpose of the Prime Minister's visit and see the extent to which he has succeeded. I hope that if in these very critical times some of us speak fearlessly and frankly, and not in terms of complete agreement with everything that has been said or done, we shall not be accused by the noble Marquess of "rocking the boat." I can assure the noble Marquess that my ultimate objectives are very much the same as his; and even if I do not agree with the methods by which we are going to try to attain those objectives. I am not rocking the boat.
What were the purposes of the meeting, so far as most of us who were anxious

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that the meeting should take place are concerned? I think it was largely two-fold. We hoped that the Prime Minister and the President would arrive at an understanding as to how we could cut across the international difficulties which had over-set us. The easy way, of course, is to make war, but nobody wants that. What alternatives were open to us? How could we approach the Soviet Union or China and get some form of discussion? I think most people who welcomed the Prime Minister's visit to America hoped that somehow a discussion between the Prime Minister and the President would provide an answer to that question. Secondly, a great many people felt that it was necessary to exercise some restraining influence over the hysteria, in the case of a great many people in the United States, which was making itself felt throughout that country and endangering the peace of the world.
I feel that it is necessary to judge the joint statement in the light of the success with which it has met in dealing with those two objectives. I personally can-not help feeling a sense of some disappointment at the joint statement, not so much in its recital of objectives as in its general tone, spirit and emphasis. It strikes me as being much more devoted to steps for increasing and coordinating our arms and our weapons of war than to steps for securing some kind of negotiation. It gives me the impression that the Prime Minister and the President have reconciled themselves more or less to the position that negotiations are hopeless and that war is inevitable. It also accepts the view, by implication, that in such a war we must inevitably fight both the Soviet Union and China. On this latter point I agree very much with the noble Viscount, that it is by no means certain that the Soviet Union and China are inextricably united.
The noble Viscount has dealt with the matter from the cultural point of view, but there is the point of view of self-interest. There are a great many points of potential conflict between China and the Soviet Union. I need only mention a few—Port Arthur, Dairen, the China-Changchun Railway, Tsing-kiang, where there is a common frontier of over 1,000 miles, the question of Manchurian equipment and a great many other problems of that kind
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which, in spite of the Treaty which was made last February, still remain unsolved in their essential details. The Treaty pro-vides, for instance, that Port Arthur and Dairen are to be surrendered to China by 1952, but it leaves open the terms upon which that surrender is to take place. There are many other questions of that kind which remain unsettled between China and the Soviet Union. In my judgment, we make a very great mistake in assuming that inevitably China and the Soviet Union must fight together.
We also appear to be ignoring the fact of China's present economic position. She is desperately short of practically every kind of raw material and of food, especially rice. Her production in the industrial area of Manchuria is only about 30 per cent. of what it was before the war. She has sought help from Russia and, under a treaty which was made last February, China is being provided with a credit of 300,000,000 dollars over a period of five years, which is really a drop in the ocean compared with China's requirements. Apparently that is the utmost help she can expect from the Soviet Union. It represents in terms of money less than the amount of Marshall Aid which we have received from the United States in the past six months. Therefore, there are immense possibilities of creating good will between ourselves and China through her normal necessities of life and through her requirements of raw materials. I very much fear that the attitude which is being taken—and with which, I am happy to say, we do not altogether agree—is likely to throw China into the arms of the Soviet Union, whether or not she wants to go.
I should like to make one or two comments in detail on the statement which has been published. I do not want to read the statement as a legal document, but one must assume that it has been carefully prepared and that it means what it says. One of the objectives stated in this document is that "it is intended to advance the democratic way of life." If it had said "to protect our democratic way of life," it would have been perfectly correct and could not possibly be criticised; but to "advance it" sounds as if we were presuming to dictate to other countries what should be their way of life. How are we proposing to advance our democratic way of life? Is it by propaganda?

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This document is not a statement of the propaganda principles that we and the United States should follow. As I read it, it assumes that, if necessary, these objectives will be carried out by all the means open to us. Surely, the very thing that we are criticising the Soviet Union for is endeavouring to spread their way of life; yet here we ourselves are saying that it is our objective to spread our democratic way of life. If we do not mean that, then in is a pity that the document has been phrased in that way. Does my noble friend wish to say something on that point?
LORD STRABOLGI: I did not mean to interrupt the noble Lord; I was speaking to my noble friend beside me. But as the noble Lord has given way, I said that it could also mean that we meant to improve our own way of life.
LORD SILKIN: I doubt whether it was necessary for the Prime Minister to go to the United States for that purpose. It did seem to me that it could be interpreted by the Soviet Union, who are already in a sufficiently suspicious frame of mind, as meaning that we are proposing to endeavour to impose upon them our conception of democracy.
The other question is Formosa. In this respect the joint statement seems to me to be quite inconclusive. After all, we and the Americans have twice declared, at Cairo and at Potsdam, that Formosa is to form part of China. We ourselves have recognised the present Chinese Government. On what ground, then, do we suggest that this is a matter which should be left to the United Nations? It seems to me inexplicable. Obviously, we cannot dictate to the United States what their action should be, but surely we ought to have the courage of our own convictions, and be prepared to carry out our own principles and what we believe to be right. It seems to me to be running away from the issue to suggest that, in spite of the recognition of China, and in spite of these statements twice made, at two separate Allied conferences, we are not expressing our opinion but are proposing to leave this question to the United Nations.
I do not propose to follow the right reverend Prelate or the noble Viscount in their statements about the atomic bomb. The paragraph in the joint statement is a little vague and inconclusive but, like the
1018
noble Viscount, I am prepared to accept that as being, perhaps, a diplomatic way of suggesting that it is impossible to be more definite about it; and if the Prime Minister really is satisfied, in spite of the way in which it is put, that there is no question of using the atomic bomb on the authority of one member of the United Nations only, and that we shall be fully consulted before any question of using it arises, then I am satisfied. What is the policy that we ought to adopt? I feel that there ought to be greater readiness to negotiate without any preliminary conditions at all. I know how difficult that is. I noticed that the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said that, and then proceeded to set out a number of conditions upon which we should insist before negotiating.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I think I mentioned only conditions which we should abstain from urging.
LORD SILKIN: I think that when the noble Viscount comes to read his speech he will find that it set out certain things upon which we ought to insist before we negotiate. I do not wish to misconstrue the noble Viscount, but that is how I understood him. I feel that the only hope-ful way in which we can really get down to negotiations with the Soviet Union or China, is to enter into these discussions without any conditions at all. I noticed that some weeks ago the Foreign Secretary made a statement that he would require some evidence of the sincerity of the Soviet Union before he was prepared to negotiate —for instance, that they should sign the Treaty with Austria. We must always bear in mind that this suspicion, this doubt, is not unilateral, but that, rightly or wrongly (I am sure wrongly, but at any rate quite definitely), the Soviet Union and China are as suspicious of us—and perhaps even more of the United States—as we are of them. In those circumstances, if we really desire to negotiate it is absurd to ask them to give us evidence of their sincerity, and to assume that there is no obligation upon us to give evidence of ours. I think it is much wiser to leave this evidence alone, to let the negotiations take place and let them speak for themselves as to whether or not there is sincerity.
Moreover, my Lords. I am afraid that we are getting somewhat intimidated by the use of the word "appeasement." Appeasement has a definite significance. Of course it is appeasement to give away

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another country in order to secure temporary peace; but it is not appeasement to be ready in the interest of peace to make concessions without sacrificing one's principles. If I may say so, there is a good deal of nonsense spoken about appeasement—as if any offer or any con-cession that we may make is to be regarded as appeasement. In the interests of peace we may well have to make con-cessions. If you consult the people of this country I can assure you that they would feel it well worth while in the interests of peace to make a great many concessions, so long as they are not con-cessions of principle. I feel that we are much too modest in regard to this question. We are hopelessly underestimating our own influence—I do not know whether it is the effect of having had to accept help from the United States of America for some years. We still have a great influence throughout the world, even in some of the Eastern countries that are regarded as satellites of the Soviet Union. They still pay very great attention to what we say and what we think. And if we are prepared to take the lead, do what we think is right, and do not necessarily act as if we were in the wagon behind the United States; if we have a mind and a will of our own, and a policy of our own, we shall find that we shall meet with a great deal of support throughout the world, and that we shall be able to exercise a great deal of influence. I do not mean by that, necessarily, that we should act as a bridge between the Soviet Union and the United States. I feel, by and large, that our interests do lie with the United States, and that we have got to try to carry them with us and agree with them all along the line. But it is not necessary for us to agree with them automatically; and it is not, as the noble Marquess said, "rocking the boat" if one expresses disagreement even in the strongest possible terms.
I believe that true responsibility for the peace of the world to-day rests on us and on the British Commonwealth. I think that we alone can preserve it. We certainly must try, and we have to be willing, if necessary, to make concessions. It may be that, in the last resort, we shall have to fight, and we must be ready for that. In any case, we seem to be in for a long period of rearmament. I wish to stress to your Lordships the
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fact that we have to pay great attention to the morale of our people. They have had eleven and a half years' experience of shortages, deprivations and high cost of living. Some people are already saying that these burdens are almost unbearable to-day, and we are told in all quarters that we are in for even more difficult times. I believe that our people will, nevertheless, be prepared to face these greater difficulties if they are satisfied we are not standing on our dignity, and that everything possible has been done by us to prevent this catastrophe which is threatening the world. In these circumstances, I beg His Majesty's Government to be courageous, to be fear-less. I beg them not to be afraid to express their own opinions, not to be afraid at times even to disagree with the United States of America, and, if necessary, to take the lead in trying—possibly for the last time—to hold out the hand of friendship and fellowship to those who are at the moment our opponents. Let us not forget the Chinese maxim which enjoins us to behave to our enemies as if one day they will be our friends.
4.43 p.m.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My Lords, like the noble Lord who has just spoken, and, indeed, like every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate, I begin what I have to say by admitting unreservedly the value of the Prime Minister's journey. It is a definite gain to have it categorically stated by the Prime Minister and by the President of the United States that the Western front is a decisive front, that the President and the Prime Minister agree over the use of the atom bomb, and that, whilst there is to be no surrender in Korea, both the United States and the United Kingdom are ready for any negotiation that is likely to lead to good results. But behind this considerable field of agreement there are, obviously, certain very important differences not yet harmonised.
There is the question—to which attention has already been given this afternoon —of the recognition of the Pekin Government, and of its entry into the United Nations; and there are certain other questions connected with the future of China. The fact that these very substantial difficulties still exist make it very important that we here in the United Kingdom, to whatever Party we belong,

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should approach these questions with the greatest caution, with the greatest prudence and with the greatest reticence. There is still, even after the Prime Minister's visit, much inflammable material left upon the ground, and it might well be that a spark irresponsibly thrown into the arena might break the unity of the Anglo-American front and play the game of the Soviet and our opponents in the United Nations. On that account, I do most heartily support what my noble friend Lord Salisbury said at the beginning of this debate, that Ministers must be extremely cautious in their public statements. I am not going to repeat what he said about certain recent speeches—the speeches, for instance, of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Works—but I would commend to Lord Henderson and to the Lord Chancellor the plan that was adopted before the war, which I believe worked very well, that when Ministers who were not connected with the Foreign Office wished to make speeches about foreign affairs they should send the script of their speeches to the Foreign Secretary and so make certain that what they were proposing to say did not cut across his policy. I say no more than that upon this point to-day. I emphasise only in a sentence the need for the greatest caution in view of the fact that the international atmosphere is extremely sensitive and extremely inflammable.
That being so, I would venture to approach some of these questions that we have been discussing this afternoon not upon the lines of the greatest resistance but upon the lines of the least resistance. I would avoid for the time being questions that are likely to divide the Americans and ourselves. I may be pessimistic, but I take the view that negotiation over the entry of the Pekin Government into the United Nations at this moment is not going to succeed—I say that frankly. I hope that I am wrong, but I believe that it will not succeed. If this is so, I would not concentrate our attention upon that matter; I would concentrate our attention on certain other aspects of the problem upon which, it seems to me, there is more likely to be general agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. In particular, I would begin at this moment at the military end in Korea.
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Listening to the debate this afternoon, it seemed to me that some of the observations which have been made have been made almost in vacuo, and their speakers have not realised the fact that in Korea we, the Americans and the United Nations are involved in a very grim military operation, an operation in which our American friends have suffered very heavy casualties. We are profoundly thankful that the situation at present does not look so desperate as it appeared a fortnight or three weeks ago. None the less, it is still filled with great danger. To my mind, the first need at this moment is to make certain, whatever may be the eventual end of military operations in Korea, that they do not end in disgrace or disaster for the United Nations. Let us remember that we still have great military advantages. I feel that perhaps in recent weeks we have been apt to underrate them. We have the undisputed command of the sea, and we still have the undisputed command of the air. Further than that, we still possess, in the areas of the United States and the Commonwealth, great resources of which China is in urgent need. Let us not forget these great advantages, and let us make certain that, whatever may happen with any negotiation, we make sure of the military situation.
At the same time, let us look with great sympathy at the efforts of the Government of India and of the Asian States. Even though, as I believe, their efforts may not end in immediate success, I take the view that it is a gain of great value that this group in Asia and the Middle East is making its influence felt, and is showing for the first time in the Continent of Asia that there is a third force besides the forces of the Europeans and the Soviet. I hope that I have said enough to make the point I am trying to emphasise—namely, that if I am right in thinking that in present circumstances negotiation is not going to succeed, that is no reason why we should not concentrate on the points upon which we are agreed and make certain at least that the first stage, success in the military operations, is not endangered.
I take much the same view with the many problems connected with the future of Germany. I imagine that the Prime Minister and the President discussed at some length the future of Germany, and

1023
particularly the question of German re-armament. I have noticed, and I suppose other noble Lords have noticed, with satisfaction that in the discussions among officials that have recently taken place a certain measure of agreement seems to have been reached upon the question of German rearmament. I hope that upon a higher stage they may also succeed; but there, too (and again I am afraid noble Lords will feel that I am approaching all these questions from a pessimistic angle), I am doubtful whether in present conditions, and in the immediate future, they will succeed. I well remember—as, no doubt, do many other noble Lords— the years between the two wars, when successive British Governments made effort after effort to reconcile the French demand for security with the German demand for equality. We made these efforts year after year, and in the end what really happened was that we embroiled ourselves with both France and Germany, and we gave the impression to our potential enemies of a disunited front.
Looking at these German proposals without any official knowledge and simply as a spectator, it seems to me that France and Germany are a long way from agreeing to anything we could call a settlement. The Powers of the Brussels Union and the Atlantic Pact have agreed upon certain proposals for a limited Ger-man contingent for a Western Army. And we shall see whether the Germans regard that as a proposal which they can accept. I am afraid that, if they do accept it, they will merely take it as a palliative for the moment on which to base some further proposal. Looking back at the experience before the war, I am inclined to think that the wise course is not to press questions of this kind, when it is unlikely that a fundamental settlement will be reached, but to leave them for the moment, hoping for a better atmosphere in the future, rather than to press constant irritants between the countries of the Western Union.
Meanwhile, our duty is obvious: to press on upon the points of agreement, and to press particularly the need for much more extensive and swift Anglo-American rearmament. If the Anglo-American forces could to-day be much stronger in Europe than they are, a great
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deal of the fears and suspicions now excited by German and French policies would be removed. One of the troubles of the past was that we were not strong enough, and therefore the French were all the more nervous of Germany. The same kind of situation exists to-day. Perhaps to-day the French are more nervous of Russia than they are of Ger-many. The Germans are asking them-selves whether it is to their advantage to come into a system that cannot give them any reasonable guarantee of security. The answer to these suspicions and hesitations is an Anglo-American force in Europe so strong that it will give a confidence in France and Germany which at present does not exist.
That brings me to a theme that I have pressed time after time in this House— namely, the need for a much more vigorous programme of rearmament than we have had hitherto. It may be that my information is now out of date; it may be that in recent months we have made considerable progress. In any case, I have expressed the urgency time after time. Our difficulty is that we know nothing about what is happening. We do not know to what extent the increases foreshadowed by the Minister of De-fence in the debate in the House of Commons in September are being carried into effect. We do not know whether the programme that he foreshadowed for the early months of next year will be fulfilled. We know a little about the small number of divisions that are being formed, the almost negligible reinforcement that we are making to the armies in Germany; we know one or two things about ships that are building, but we know nothing about what I believe to be the predominant arm in Western Europe, the air arm. I do not intend to turn this debate into a rearmament debate; I merely say that it is rearmament swift and sufficient which is the answer, at any rate at the present moment, to many of these questions that are otherwise discussed in vacua. I say to the representatives of the Government to-night that, whilst we cannot press them upon this point further in this debate, I hope very much that this House will have an early opportunity after Christmas of having a full debate upon this question, and will then be able to obtain at any rate some of the information that is at present lacking, without which it is impossible for

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the Government, or anyone else, to raise a great national movement behind the rearmament programme.
5.3 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, be-fore I make the comment or two which I will eventually make on the interesting speech of the noble Viscount, I want particularly to hank the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition. Whenever we have a Foreign Affairs debate in this House and the noble Marquess leads off, as he speaks I feel the years falling off my shoulders; I get younger and more combative in spirit, and when he has finished I feel thirty years younger and full of fight. I feel like that to-day. I am glad he is here on this occasion so that I can make a comment about his speech. I agree very much with the noble Viscount's remarks about German rearmament, and one or two other matters, and I want to support his plea for a full dress debate in the House on the question of arms. The noble Marquess also delighted me by his extraordinary remarks in criticising His Majesty's Government for lack of foresight in stockpiling raw materials. We have been hearing for months from his Leader and his colleagues, and I presume from himself, though I have not followed closely his speeches outside this House, about the iniquities of hampering trade and putting shackles and unnecessary controls on private enterprise. Stockpiling means the control of all raw materials from the beginning. This is a case of "Satan rebuking sin." The noble Marquess cannot have it both ways. He can-not demand, "Set the people free "—and I suppose he supports his Leader in an-other place in that parrot cry—and, at the same time, suggest that this most stringent of all controls, stockpiling and Government bulk purchase and accumulation of raw materials, should have taken place.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am glad to hear that the noble Lord agrees with me to-day but I am sorry that his own Party have not lived up to that.
LORD STRABOLGI: I do not agree with the noble Marquess. I think His Majesty's Government were right in the first place. We had not the necessary free currency, and dollars particularly, to stockpile, and, for another thing, we should have stimulated this artificial boom in the price of raw materials which is hampering manufacturers and mercantile
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operations all over the world. The Government were right and the noble Marquess is wrong both ways. There is another comment I think it desirable to make on the noble Marquess's speech. I am touched by his solicitude for American public opinion. I am not sure it would not be a good thing to send the noble Marquess on a lecture tour through the Middle West of the United States. But there is such a thing as British public opinion as well, and. on this particular matter of China, public opinion in Britain, I can assure him, if he does not know it already, is very strong indeed. The democracies have tremendous ad-vantages. They always begin badly in war but they last longer in spirit and they win in the end. But you have to carry your democracies with you, especially if you are going into total war; and you have to pay attention 10 public opinion in this country. I think if we show a little healthy independence, as Lord Silkin suggested, it may not be misunderstood in America and may do a great deal of good.
I am sorry that Lord Samuel has been called out of the House. I am sure many of your Lordships were delighted with his speech, and I should have liked to congratulate him on making it when he was obviously suffering from a bad cold. I hope the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has counselled him to go home early: he cannot afford to play any tricks with his health In this uncertain weather. I find myself agreeing with several of the sentiments expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, who describes the international situation as sensitive and inflammable. I think that is perfectly true. We have been hearing a great deal about a cease-fire in Korea. I wish there could be a truce to abuse between nations on both sides. The continual abusing and insulting that goes on is, I am certain, doing nothing but harm. A plea has been made by Premier Nehru for some sort of "cease-fire" of the insults and abuse. I wish we could have that and I wish it could start in your Lord ships' House. A good deal of harm has been done by insulting speeches from he other side of the House abusing friendly Powers. Until recently the Chinese were apparently friendly to us. It will be agreed, I think, that there is no evidence that there were any hostilities last summer or when we recognised the new Government in Pekin.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: They actually shelled the "Amethyst" all the way down the Yangtse.
LORD STRABOLGI: They were not a Government then but one side in a civil war. They were holding one side of the river and the Nationalists the other. We made a great mistake there by not notifying them—because we refused to recognise them at that time as belligerents —that the "Amethyst" was making a perfectly legitimate passage. Of course, there was trouble; the whole thing was a blunder. It was redeemed by the magnificent conduct and bearing of the "Amethyst's" captain and crew. But, fortunately, the Foreign Office found its feet and it did one of the few sensible things I have known it do in my lifetime; it recognised the new Pekin Government. I am sure we are perfectly right in that recognition.
I do not want to appear unreasonable. I agree with what the noble Marquess said about General MacArthur. I do not think it is correct conduct to look for a scapegoat in General MacArthur in the trouble in which we find ourselves. We had little criticism of him when he retrieved what looked like a disaster at the beginning of the Korean business, and carried out some brilliant strategical moves which, but for other circumstances, into which I will not go at the moment, might have cleared the whole country. He is undoubtedly a remarkable leader of men and a very fine soldier. The responsibility lies much higher up than General MacArthur. He is carrying out the orders of his President and through the President, I presume, the orders of the United Nations.
I venture to mention this matter of General MacArthur as I feel that tribute should be paid—it has been paid before by other noble Lords and by me—to the magnificent valour in most difficult circumstances of the United Nations Forces in Korea. When the full story comes to be told of that retreat in Northern Korea from the Chiang-yen reservoir, in which I am glad to say the Royal Marines played a very noble part, it will be one of the great military sagas of all times. It is a most remarkable example of endurance and courage under terrible difficulties. Your Lordships will have noticed the casualties. The United States Marines, a remarkably fine force, with a great history behind them, had 30 per cent, casualties
1028
in that ghastly retreat: the Royal Marines —and I am sure it will be one of their proudest battle honours in future— suffered 50 per cent, casualties. There have been tributes to their high morale at the end of that extraordinary military episode.
Having said that, I must repeat that I believe there has been a woeful lack of what I may call political warfare in Korea. I cannot help returning to this theme, upon which I engaged last summer when we first discussed this matter. The political blunders have been appalling. I am not blaming General MacArthur now; I am blaming whoever was responsible for the whole conduct of the campaign on its political side. I am not criticising at this moment the decision to cross the 38th Parallel—there may have been strong and compelling military reasons for that—but the stupid blunder was to set up the Syghman Rhee regime north of the 38th Parallel. That was the one way to rouse up in arms against us, at any rate, the more popular as well as the Communist elements in Korea. We should at all costs have kept the administration above the 38th Parallel in the hands of the United Nations Commission there, instead of, apperently for convenience, allowing the Syngman Rhee regime, discredited, as I fear it is, to appoint its governors and officials.
The other political blunder, which still persists, was in not making clear to the people of Korea—indeed, to the people of all Asia—why we were there and what we were doing. There have been declarations at Lake Success, in London and in Washington, but that is not the same thing as leaflet propaganda and using every other means to reach the people and show them why we are there: that we are there not to restore a corrupt and oppressive regime, but to liberate the people and allow them to choose their own destiny. In this connection also—and here I speak with great diffidence, because I believe I am right in saying that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Ismay, is to speak later—I notice a lack of understanding in all these arrangements, in the comings and goings and negotiations and even in de-bates in both Houses of Parliament, of what we were taught when I was made to study military and naval strategy—namely, the difference between what we used to call limited and unlimited warfare.

1029
I was made to read, as no doubt were many of your Lordships, the ponderous but valuable works of the Prussian General, General von Clausewitz. His masterpiece, Vom Krieg, is no doubt known to those of your Lordships who had to begin your lives with a military or naval career. He, for the first time, I think, drew a clear distinction between the limited war for limited objectives and the unlimited war. The Crimean War is one of the clearest examples of a limited war which, incidentally, was a rudimentary attempt to resist aggression. On that occasion Britain and France went to the rescue of Turkey, to prevent Russian aggression in the particular area, but without any intention of carrying the war into the heart of Russia or bringing down the Russian Government—or, in other words, of waging unlimited war. This Korean campaign is also an example— a much more highly-developed example— of resisting aggression, and should have again been a limited campaign, with limited objectives, That should have been made clear.
That distinction is most important, and I believe it has a bearing on the controversy on the use of the atom bomb, in regard to which I should like very much to support what has been said by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. The atom bomb is obviously a weapon of un-limited warfare. Once an atom bomb has been dropped, the Third World War has begun, and atom bombs will be dropped on this country almost for certain. It would be very optimistic to presume that your potential enemies have not possession of the atom bomb, or, indeed, have not manufactured a stock-pile, though perhaps not as large as that of the United States. The obvious target is this country. Therefore, the use of the atom bomb is of direct interest, to every man, woman and child in this country; and we, as Members of Parliament, have a direct responsibility. I must confess that, in company with my noble friend Lord Silkin. I am not at all satisfied with the statement we have had on this particular point. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister is stated to be in complete agreement with the President. In complete agreement on what—on whether to use the atom bomb, or not? Obviously the policy here is that if the atom bomb is to be used, it must be with the con-
1030
currence of those States Members of the United Nations who are supporting the campaign of resisting aggression. I do not think it is politic to invite our people to support a policy which, without the consent of their chosen representatives, can land us in a Third World War, with all that that would mean.
I hope that my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, when he comes to reply, will be able to give us some clarification on this point. I am not at all interested in arguments about the delicate diplomatic situation, and of not annoying American public opinion. If things go badly again, this may be a question which in a matter of days or hours will decide the future of civilisation, and particularly the future of our country. We have a responsibility, and we cannot slough off that responsibility by taking refuge in the need to treat the Americans gently, to be diplomatic, and so on. If American opinion has gone hysterical on this Korean matter, and if, as I hear is the case, there is heavy pressure to use the atom bomb, not only on China proper but on Russia proper, then I believe the sooner the Americans know what is the real opinion of the people of this country (I am sure the right reverend Prelate had every right to express it) the better. The best way to cure hysteria is a good douche of cold water, and a good douche of British cold water might do good here. When I speak of hysteria, I do not in any way refer to the responsible leaders of American opinion; I refer to the irresponsible leaders and demagogues in the United States who, I believe, are the greatest danger to the world to-day. I believe they are a minority in that country, and I hope that they will remain so.
I venture to make a further remark on what fell from the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, with regard to the rearming of Western Germany—I think I understood him here—when he advocated caution and pause. If we really begin upon the rearmament of Western Germany, it will make it much more difficult to come to a general agreement between the four leading Powers con-cerned—I do not mean Germany; I mean between the three Western Powers and Russia.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My argument was slightly different. It was merely

1031
that I do not think any agreement is likely until the Americans and ourselves are very much stronger. I think that would have the effect of lessening French suspicions and making Germany see that it is with the West that her future lies.
LORD STRABOLGI: I have no doubt that the noble Viscount is right there, but I dare say that restraint is required. At the same time, there is this difficulty, and that is that the Lett Wing elements in Germany—I do not mean the Communists, but the Liberal elements— appear to be bitterly opposed to the re-armament of Western Germany, and the Right Wing elements—what we used to call the reactionary elements—will agree only upon what they call terms of equality, which means Army Corps and a General Staff. That would certainly alarm our friends on the Continent, and it would certainly draw still closer into the Russian grip the little countries round the borders of Russia. The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, said that the French are more alarmed by the Russians than by the Germans. I doubt even that, but I will give the noble Viscount that point. But certainly the Czechs and the Poles are much more frightened of a rearmed Germany than they are of Russia—I do not think there is any doubt about that—and it will only draw them still closer into the Moscow system. If we can secure a general all-round settlement, this problem will really solve itself. I think the noble Viscount made that argument, and I venture to support it.
In that connection, I wish that some means could be found—and here I address myself particularly to my noble friend Lord Henderson, as representing the Foreign Office—of speeding up the machinery of diplomacy. We are not living in the days when the post-chaise was the only way of communicating with countries in Europe. We have the inter-national telephone, aeroplanes and air-mails, and rapid means of travel and communication of all kinds. Why does it take so long, for example, to answer the' Russian Note on this very question of Germany about which the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, was speaking, and about which I am speaking now? There were only three Governments concerned—the United States.
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France and ourselves. In those three Governments there are not many men who have to take the decisions. It is now a month since the Note was received, and their deputies have only just drawn up a plan, which is to be considered next week. How long will it be before the reply goes? I think some means must be found. I do not put the blame upon Downing Street. I dare say they move as quickly as the Quai d'Orsay, but I do wish some means could be found of speeding up the machinery of diplomacy in these difficult times, because the machinery of diplomacy is peace-making and now moves very slowly, while the war-makers can act very swiftly, with terrible results to the world.
If I may say so, I think that the debate which we have had this afternoon has served a good purpose. I think that it has shown that there is an underlying unity of feeling in your Lordships' House. We do wish to find a way of solving these troubles. We do wish to find a way of agreeing with our present enemies and perhaps of making them our friends. I do not think there will be dissent from that. There may be differences of opinion about methods, but of the general desire of your Lordships' House, as expressed so far in this debate, for a peace by negotiation arising out of the Korean troubles, and also the even more important West European troubles, I think there can be no doubt.
5.25 p.m.
LORD ISMAY: My Lords, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has already given expression, far more effectively than I could, to the views which I thought of venturing to put before your Lordships if opportunity arose. Therefore, it remains for me only to add a few commentaries. The noble Marquess said, and your Lord-ships agreed, that we could not hope to negotiate with our potential enemies un-less we were strong. Now that is profoundly true. But it is equally true that we cannot expect to have a decisive or even a very big say in the counsels of our friends unless we develop the greatest possible strength commensurate with our resources. That was proved time and time again during the last war. In the twilight war, there were many of us who did not agree with General Gamelin's plan that we should leave our fixed defences and march forward into Belgium if Germany attacked the Low Countries. But who

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were we, with a paltry handful of divisions, to argue with the great French General Stiff?
Again, there were a number of natural but very fundamental arguments with our American friends. They wanted to go across the Channel very much earlier than we did—in 1943. We pressed hard for North Africa, and at that time we were certainly pegging more than level with them in the forces that we had deployed against the enemy. We had no hesitation in pushing our arguments to the limit, and beyond; and we won our case. The same thing happened after North Africa had been cleared. The Americans wanted to bring all the troops back to Europe for the invasion of the Continent. We wanted to take Sicily, cross over into Italy and fight it out there, thus containing German divisions which would otherwise have opposed our landing in Normandy. We were still pegging level. We still had a mighty contribution to make. Again we had no hesitation in pressing our argument to the limit, and again our view prevailed. But mark what happened later. The Americans wanted a landing in the South of France- at Marseilles and Toulon. That meant denuding General Alexander of troops. We wanted General Alexander to press forward right-handed to Vienna. What was the military position? We had our fifteen divisions with which we started, and it was all that we could do to maintain those. The Americans had their original fifteen divisions, and were being reinforced at the rate of five divisiors a month. We no longer felt that we could press our arguments beyond a certain limit, and the American view prevailed.
I am not attempting to argue which was right and which was wrong. I am only repeating that if we are to have a decisive voice in the counsels of our friends we must dispose of the greatest possible strength militarily. What that strength should be must be decided by His Majesty's Government, on the advice of their experts, but I do hope that we shall not work out the sum the wrong way. I hope that we shall not say. "What can we afford?" and then "Let us buy just that amount." I hope that we shall say:" What should our contribution be? Let us provide it, whatever the sacrifice."
May I say just one word with regard to the atom bomb? I happened to be present
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at a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Potsdam when a telegram was brought in and handed to General Marshall. He read it and put it down. When the subject under discussion had been finished he asked for the room to be cleared, and we went into secret session. He told us that the experiment of the atom bomb had been completely successful. I will admit that my own feelings were of horror, amounting almost to revulsion, and certainly not of exaltation. I had always had a sneaking hope that nobody would solve the problem of atomic energy, but I admit to a considerable relief that the enemy had not done it first. The fact remains, however, that the atom bomb is here, and it has come to stay as a weapon of war. possibly decisive. It is scarcely arguable that it is the only thing that stands between the Soviet forces and the Channel and Biscay ports.
Therefore, do not let us tie ourselves down. Do not let us enter into any agreement never to use it in the ultimate resort —I repeat in the ultimate resort. To put it at the very lowest level, the atomic bomb costs a lot of money, and if we are not going to use it we had much better try to put all that money into a particularly novel form of bow and arrow, or some-thing like that. But, seriously, does any-one really believe that whatever agreement was reached, Russia would refrain from using that bomb, if she had it, when-ever it suited her? If we remain united amongst ourselves, if the British Commonwealth remains united, and if, above all, we stick close to America, if we do not tie our hands by agreements that bear no relation to reality, then I am convinced that this twilight war will not end in the black darkness of unlimited war.
5.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, with his immense expert knowledge and his high professional standing, has stirred very deep waters. I shall refer to that aspect later in my speech, but in the meantime I want to make one or two observations, more on the political level, dealing with the subject before us to-day. First of all, we rejoice at, and we are grateful to the Prime Minister for, his courage in the middle of winter in taking a journey to the United States for the purposes in view. I should also like to say how very much

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we admire the pluck and devotion of his wife in letting him make those perilous journeys, after ten years of holding office and five years of being Prime Minister of this country.
I understand that his purpose was to inform the United States as to the feeling in this country. It is not necessary for us to tell the United States how much we admire the devotion of their Armed Forces in Korea, because they know quite well that for one and a half years we ourselves carried alone the burden of the last war, and for six months with no assistance but that of the Russians. Therefore, we should in no way hang our heads when we go to the United States to speak about military sacrifices. The second reason is this. His purpose was to inform the United States that public opinion in this country must be taken into account. We have learnt— in fact we know—that the policy of the President is very much governed by the conflicting or competing pressure from different groups in the United States— an election here, a return of someone there, a move by the Republican Party, and American policy, which is the most vital thing in the world, is changed, altered or deflected. At least we in the British Commonwealth of Nations can let the President know that the British Commonwealth must also count as a pressure group, although to listen to the speech of the noble Marquess one would imagine that we were entitled to do nothing but tail in behind the United States, not fully as a forty-ninth State, but as a new territory. We do count because of our own record. We count because of our own public opinion, which is an experienced public opinion.
But there is another reason, and it is this. This war—or this, I might almost say, imminent war is being fought, or will be fought, in Asia. What has been most striking about the debate to-day has been that few noble Lords have spoken about this subject as primarily an Asian affair. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, to whose speech I would pay a tribute, stirred almost a wistful feeling in the heart of a renegade. It seems to us that the fewer his numbers, the greater his strength: and We wish a long life to the octogenarian Gideon who leads the Liberal Party. I say that we are in a special position. The noble
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and gallant Lord, Lord Ismay, who spoke, spoke purely as a soldier about the value of weapons. You must use weapons, but there are other forces in the world besides weapons. Weapons and material forces are not the only things that count in the world. There are the influence of peoples and the mass of public opinion; there are the moral forces that underlie movement in the world.
In Asia a remarkable thing has occurred. Nearly all the Asian countries, and most of the Middle Eastern countries, have united in an initiative which is independent of the initiative which was taken by the great Western Powers of the Atlantic Pact. There is Indonesia, with its 80,000,000. There are India and Pakistan, with their 400,000,000 people — the total is beginning to mount up. There is China, with its 400,000,000. One would say that one should count a little on the beliefs and opinions and proposals of these people. Our own position in this is remarkable. The greatest triumph of this Government or of this country—I will not say of this Government because everyone joined in it—was the settlement in India. That is a most remarkable thing. The position in which it has put us, between Europe and India is—I will not say a bridge (all this jargon had better be discarded, because it merely confuses thought), but a position of extraordinary importance. It is a remarkable thing that while we have heard a great deal about what the Middle East thinks we have heard little about what Pandit Nehru thinks. Yet Pandit Nehru is one of the key men in the whole business. I say that one of the most gratifying experiences one could have (and for various reasons I have had a good deal of experience of it) is the touching and also the humble discipleship under which they are willing to follow our advice. That is a very great force when dealing with this dreadful question which affects the Asian Continent.
Also, I think there has to be remem-bered—I have often been told about it by my Indian friends—that the Asian bears in mind the long history of Western domination of the Pacific; and in this debate to-day some noble Lords have been speaking as if we were about to put down the Boxer rising or assault the Taku forts. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, in his

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brilliant speech said that was one of the reasons for the revolt in China. Why should China accept this foreign domination? Attention is paid when an American senator speaks, yet when Pandit Nehru ex-presses an opinion we think little of it. In our position we can mobilise incomparable strength and influence.
This has been a most interesting and, in many ways, a very refreshing debate. It has shown—I say this with the greatest respect—a great independence of thought. It has been the House of Lords at its best. The fact is that we may be standing on the verge of a world war. I do not know now what the noble Marquess means about the position in China. Does he or does he not want China in the United Nations? So far as I remember, in a letter to The Times, and afterwards in this House, he denounced the recognition of China. This is a denial of what she considers to be her rights. That produced a stale of mind in China which was one of the elements—I do not say more than that—which conditioned this Korean disaster. When that had happened, the noble Marquess came forward and said he deplored the Chinese aggression, which destroyed the chance of putting China where she should be and where her presence would be very useful indeed. I do not know much about China; I went there and met the Nationalists years ago. But again I was very impressed by the scholarly way in which Lord Samuel treated this subject.
Take a Chinese of fifty years of age. His recollection of his dealings with the West is something as follows. He was an ally in the First World War. But so were the Japanese. He remembers that in 1921 the Japanese put their claws into Shangtung and made the Twenty-One Demands which were intended to begin the Japanese infiltration into China. He then remembers that in 1931 there was what was called the Manchurian "incident," and he remembers that he received no help at all from the West. The League of Nations examined the question and did nothing about it. He remembers that in 1937 the Japanese opened a full-out war; and from 1937 until practically this day China has been engaged in war. Then with regard to the help from America which was given, and which was most welcome to the then Government of China, as the situation developed inside the country—as hap-
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pened in many other countries—there came about a revolutionary, as well as an external movement, and he found that American arms were being used to resist the popular movement. And, finally, he found what he refers to as a renegade clique sheltered in an Island protected by the American fleet.
Then General Wu comes to Lake Success and says that 1,000 aircraft have violated the Manchurian frontier on 200 occasions. Is that true or not? I do not know. He says that the Chinese were willing to have a neutral zone, but that the unfortunate offensive was precipitated so that there was no chance of this neutral zone being established. Is that true or is it not? If these things are true—and we should know—then what becomes of the noble Marquess's plea that China is an aggressor? What does the noble Marquess mean? Does he want to go to war with China? Does he think we should meet Chinese aggression by force?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am sorry that I was not here before, but I take it that all Parties in this House agree that the United Nations were right to oppose the aggression of North Korea against South Korea. I do not know whether the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, shares that view, but that is the view held generally by the Government, as well as by the Opposition. In fact we never crossed the Manchurian frontier. It is a matter of opinion whether we should have stopped there. I have my doubts whether it was right to go so far. But we never did cross the Manchurian frontier, and the Chinese have in fact come in in support of the North Koreans. They are therefore coming in against the United Nations whom we are obliged to support. I regard them, therefore, as having become a party to North Korean aggression. I think that is undeniable.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Then may I ask the noble Marquoss a plain question —namely, does he wish war declared on China?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That is not the point. China intervened in a war in which we were already taking part. It is not a question of whether or not we declare war; the fact remains that at this moment the Chinese are attacking our men.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I do not think the noble Marquess fully realises that if war is declared between this country and China the military treaty between China and Russia becomes operative, and a world war has begun. All that I am suggesting is that we should examine the circumstances, and see what this so-called head-on aggression of China amounts to, and how far there are other causes, including the refusal of the noble Marquess and his friends to recognise China for a seat in the Security Council.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount has asked me a question. Whether or not we should have recognised the Communist Government of China is a matter of policy and of opinion, and I should have thought the noble Viscount would be the last person in this House to say that people should not state their honest opinions upon important matters of policy.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: All that is extremely interesting. Of course we should all express our opinions. But the point is this: Does not the issue of peace and war depend upon the inclusion of China on the Security Council? I think it does. That is what the Chinese say, and I am asking the noble Marquess whether he is prepared to face a war with China which, by military treaty, involves a war with Russia. There are many interesting speculations, but we are on the verge of great dangers. General Wu has been asked to come and represent probably the best Government that China has had for many years, and a united China, and he has to sit like a prisoner in the dock of a police court whilst the President's seat is occupied by a person, Dr. Tsiang, who, in General Wu's judgment, is merely a renegade Chinese protected by American arms. I say that that is trying China too highly. I say that the first step towards peace should be some move by the Government. I applaud the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in this matter, not only for the way in which he made his speech but for making it clear that one of the terms of British co-operation in this matter is that China should receive her rights.
Finally, my Lords, I come to the question of the atom bomb. Bombing is a horrible business. In the old days I believe there were certain protests when
1040
the arquebus was introduced as a weapon instead of the bow and arrow. But there have always been agreements about undefended towns. As I see it, the distinction is between what is and what is not a target. In bombing you get stages. You attack a definite military target with a bomb or a gun. You get the munition factory. You get the workman who is working at the munition factory or dump, or who lives in a house near it. You may consider those are military targets. But atom bombing affects places which may contain no targets. The atom bomb is a weapon of terror, and is meant to spread terror. No one can say that an atom bomb is directed at any target. It is a weapon of terror, and it is going to leave thousands of people, if they are not exterminated, writhing in poisoned areas. I say with respect to my noble friend Lord Trenchard, who has been a champion of military bombing, that there is all the difference in the world between aimed weapons and a weapon which, because of its nature, is not a weapon of war at all, but something which will spread terror amongst men, women and children.
That is the crux of the matter. I do not blame the Prime Minister and the President in not wishing to commit them-selves. The Prime Minister says he is certain that Mr. Truman is all right. Lord Henderson says that he is certain that the Prime Ministers knows that Mr. Truman is all right. The noble Marquess said that he knows that Lord Henderson knows that the Prime Minister knows that the President is all right. Therefore, for reasons of high policy, that is the way we get out of deep water and a delicate situation. We say no more. But that does not absolve any individual from making up his own mind on this matter. I say that it is a farce to have Nuremburg trials. Suppose that 10,000 people were sent into the gas chamber. What then? This atom bomb obliterates the whole countryside. The war crimes trials at least gave a hope that there would be some moral principle introduced into warfare instead of the view of the military man that what he has to do is to destroy the enemy and win. When the enemy has been destroyed it will still not solve the problems; it will probably only lay the seed for another war. Therefore, I would venture to put a few questions to the Government.

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The first question is: What is the Government's policy for getting China into the United Nations? How are we going to do it? Are we going to take some definite action; or are we going to be content to leave the matter and to say: "These differences show only greater unity." In one thing I agree cordially with the noble Marquess—he said he did not know what that means at all. Surely that is the first question: Is China to be put on to the Security Council or not? If she is not, are we going to chance a war in which the atom bomb will be used? It is no good saying of the atom bomb that it is a thing at large. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, told us not to rock the boat. I ask him not to sink the ship. This is not a matter which is just a consideration at large.
Did any of your Lordships read the account of that interview with Mr. Stassen? It occupied a column in The Times. Mr. Stassen is not an un-important person. He has been a Presidential candidate. It was stated in the interview (which expressed directly the views of General MacArthur, and General MacArthur is a brilliant journalist) that it was the view of the General that the thing to do was to evacuate the land forces from Korea, then get other forces together and go up and down the China coast for a year, bombarding military and industrial objectives. Someone asked: "With what weapons?" He said: "I mean with all weapons." Can you imagine what the effect of a statement of that sort is likely to be on the public of countries in Asia? Can you wonder that people fighting against the United Nations in Korea are suspicious and nervous when you ask them to cease fire? One can imagine them saying: "Cease fire!—look at that interview."
Therefore, I would ask the Government first to tell us whether they intend to make it clear to the United States that opinion in this country is determined that the price of co-operation shall be fair treatment of China. We are determined to pursue a policy which we believe to be right. The second request I make of His Majesty's Government is that we should make up our minds on this great moral issue, especially in the case of people like the Chinese and Koreans, now hastening over the hillsides with few or no aircraft to support them (they have no aircraft at all
1042
and we have been area bombing). Is it proposed to take the vast expanse of China and subject the people therein to a process of chemical extermination? I say that the moral wickedness of carrying out such a plan, whatever the military advantage it might give us, would immediately bring us to shame and would divide Asia and the West for ever. Nothing is clearer than that.
LORD ISMAY: The noble Lord seems, to think that I have been advocating dropping the atom bomb on the Chinese. I have done no such thing. All I said was, "Do not tie your hands, because you might have to use it in the ultimate resort."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: If, owing to my natural hesitation and the embarrassment of making a speech in your Lordships' House, my glance fell in the direction of the noble Lord, it was not meant to indicate that I was directing any attack to him. I am sure he will under-stand that. I say that so long as the people of Asia hear of views such as those I have mentioned, they will remain apprehensive. Read what the Indian newspapers say; see what Lester Pearson says. So long as they are told that "We must not tie our hands," and that the bomb may be used, they will be likely to think that they are the people on whom the bomb will be dropped. It is difficult enough to live down a century of Colonial exploitation of Asia—bat that is a matter into which we need not go just now; I think we shall be getting deep into historical matters if we do, and the Opium Wars will suffice for the present. I say it would be fatal to let this idea get abroad. It would divide us from the people of Asia, many of whom are now beginning to respect us and even to have some affection for us.
Then there is the reverse side of the shield. If you alienate the good will of these people, where would they go? If they are driven away, then, indeed, you create a very great bloc. You would certainly answer Mr. Bevin's doubt. He said he did not know whether there was a Russo-Chinese combination. There would certainly be such a combination then. Therefore I urge the noble Viscount the Leader of the House to make it clear that we are determined to press for a seat for China on the Security Council. I also

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ask him to say on behalf of the Government that we will use the atom bomb only if it is used first by someone else; that we will not initiate a war in which it is to be a weapon. I plead for some statement of that kind, which will re-assure the consciences of the people of this country and allay the fears of the people of the Far East.
5.56 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: I follow the impassioned and eloquent speech of my noble friend Viscount Stansgate with a great deal of trepidation. With regard to that speech I make only two points. It should, I think, have been obvious to the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, that the attack which Viscount Stansgate was making was directed to Mr. Stassen. That was a terrible interview, and the reading of it certainly sent a shock through the great majority of English people who saw it. One other thing I would add to what my noble friend said. Among great masses of people in Asia, not only the ordinary, plain people, but educated and leading people—certainly in India—the view is held that the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki be-cause the people in those towns were yellow-skinned; they were Asiatics; and the bomb would not have been dropped in Europe. That is the sort of feeling which I have heard expressed by Indians of very high standing. It shows that we have to try to understand and to put our-selves into the skins of these people if we are to deal with the situation which exists in the Far East and to deal with it in any sort of way which can show a prospect of success.
A month ago we had in this House a most interesting and, I thought, useful discussion upon this problem, which was marked particularly by a speech by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. That speech, and two points in particular, made a great impression on those of us who sit on these Benches. The noble Marquess advocated a policy of conciliation and firmness, which, as I said, seemed to be a sort of leit motif running through his speech. I regret very much that conciliation seems to have been dropped out of the noble Marquess's speech to-day and to have been superseded by a degree of firmness which seemed to me to be getting
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near to fierceness. Perhaps I am a little unfair to him, because there was in what he said plenty of conciliation for the more reactionary sections of American public opinion. I am very sorry indeed, be-cause, on the occasion of which I have spoken, the noble Marquess made an appeal to the Government which I hoped the Government would accept—as indeed they did—that negotiations should be started at the highest level.
I have read the noble Marquess's speech more than once since he made it, because it impressed me so much. On no fewer than three occasions did he ex-press anxiety that discussions at the highest level should take place, and it is clear, particularly, perhaps, from the passage at column 284 of Hansard, that he felt the need for such discussions to be urgent. I should like to read it to your Lordships. It runs thus:
"I believe, too, that the time has now arrived when another effort might well be made at the highest level—it must be at the highest level, no other level is any good—to reach a settlement."
Following him later in the debate, I said that I was very glad that Lord Henderson had, in fact, agreed that the Government were anxious that such discussions should take place, and I urged that there should be a little more urgency about them. That was a month ago but, apart from the fact that the Ambassadors have met in Paris, nothing seems to have happened. I entirely agree with what was said by my noble friend, Lord Strabolgi. The situation is urgent, and when the world is on the eve of war it is absurd that it should take weeks for Ambassadors to meet in Paris. What I should like to see is the Prime Minister, whose imaginative flight to Washington has seized the admiration and the affection of the whole of the people in this country, and of Western Europe and indeed of the world, make a similar demarche towards getting a similar discussion at the very high level to which the noble Marquess referred in his speech.
It is no good, after weeks of preparation, to have a meeting of Foreign Secretaries who have been meeting each other continuously over recent years, glaring at each other across tables and making distinctly impolite remarks about each other. They are not on the highest level. The highest level is that of Prime Ministers and Presidents. I should like to see

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the Prime Minister propose a meeting with President Truman and Marshal Stalin, say, at Delhi, or, if they wished to be on completely neutral ground, at Teheran, where these matters can be discussed face to face by the only people who can really come to decisions about them. I agree that some preparation is necessary, but it seems to me that over-preparation is as dangerous, if not more dangerous, than absence of preparation, and it should not be difficult to sort out in a very short time the essential problems which need to be discussed at a meeting of this kind. I do not propose to discuss the question of what proposals should be included in the agenda of such a meeting, and whether it should be con-fined to European problems. It might be difficult to bring in the Far East, be-cause that would mean that Mao Tsetung would have to be invited to the meeting. We should have no objection to that, I am sure, but it would obviously give rise to difficulty with America and, therefore, is probably not practical politics.
I do not wish to discuss any of the thorny problems which arise in Europe, except one. I should like to say some-thing about the proposal which has been referred to in more than one speech this afternoon, and particularly by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood—that is, the question of German rearmament. I noticed not very long ago that an American film magnate described the atom bomb as "just dynamite"—an under-statement which is perhaps among the most magnificent which have ever been made. I certainly do not think that the importance of this problem of German rearmament is capable of over-statement. In a number of remarkable articles published a week or so ago in the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Lipmann, one of the shrewdest and most capable of American commentators, drew attention to the fact that in the Soviet Note of last October they used a very strong expression in regard to the rearmament of Wes-tern Germany. They said that it would not be "tolerated." The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, has drawn attention to the fact that the Foreign Minister of the present Chinese Government used a similar expression at the time the United Nations Forces were on the point of crossing the 38th Parallel, and, as he
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pointed out, that was in effect disregarded, or taken as mere bluff or something of the kind. Is it not possible that in using that similar expression the Soviet Government had something similar in mind? At any rate, it is a matter to which very careful attention should be given.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: In saying what he has been saying about the Russians and German rearmament, has the noble Lord not forgotten that the Russians have reorganised a large police force and organised and equipped it as field formations in Eastern Germany?
LORD CHORLEY: I have not for-gotten that. It is obviously one of the matters which would inevitably be discussed at the sort of meeting I have in mind. What these forces are like is obviously a matter of differing opinions. An interesting article in the Manchester Guardian recently threw a great deal of doubt on the value of these forces and indicated that the Russians themselves do not regard them as very formidable. However that may be, that is the type of proposal which obviously should be threshed out at the proposed high level.
I should like to say a further word about the question of German rearmament. This was an American proposal which it seems to me our own Government have supported much too easily. One would have expected that before a proposal for the re-militarisation of Wes-tern Germany was made, some sort of effort would have been made to discover what the Germans themselves thought about it, not only the Government of Western Germany but also the common people of Germany. Is it proposed that the people of Western Germany should be conscripted into this new army? What would be the use of a conscript army in Germany in a war this year, next year or the year after? A volunteer army, I submit, would be the only army of any value whatever. What do the German people, who would become the cadres of that army, think about it? When we were discussing this matter on the last occasion I ventured to make some observations founded on materials which came to me from people who know a great deal about Germany. I said then:
"Knowledgeable and acute observers of the German situation who have been spending much time there in recent months, tell me that

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the feeling in Germany is that she is not pre-pared to be a bastion for Western European defence against the East on the basis of being a bastion to be abandoned when the time is thought fit by dominant Powers further West. It is very natural that the Germans should not wish to have their country fought over just, so to speak, as a delaying action. On the other hand, if Germany is brought genuinely into a Western European defence scheme, as an integral part of it, that is an-other proposition. I have been told that Germans would not be prepared to volunteer, and might even resist conscription in a German Army of the old type …"
That observation has been borne out in a remarkable way since that time. Probably your Lordships saw an article in the Observer last Sunday exactly to the same effect. So were the articles by Walter Lipmann to which I have referred. Then in the current number of the Economist there is an interesting and revealing letter from a Mr. Walter Fliess of Frankfurt, referring to a poll taken by the non-partisan Frankfurter Abendspost. The figures were: against any form of rearmament, 68.25 per cent.; for remili-tarisation on principle, only 3.36 per cent.; for German units within a European Army, 17.37 per cent.; for an independent German Wehrmacht, only 8.26 per cent. These figures are most significant. Mr. Fliess also refers to a meeting of a large number of young people held in Frankfurt, where the greatest applause went to a speaker who said that "all young men of his age had made a vow never to take up a gun again. "That may be a temporary feeling, but it is obviously not possible to conduct a re-armament of Western Germany while that type of feeling is widespread throughout the country. Is it not absurd to give what is possibly a casus belli to Russia for the purpose of obtaining military assistance which is as valueless as this would obviously be? This is perhaps a stronger statement of the point of view which the noble Viscount, Lord Temple-wood, put forward in his speech. To build on that sort of basis is to build without foundations, to build castles in the air.
I should like to turn now to the question of Korea, which has been so much debated this afternoon. On the last occasion that I addressed your Lordships on this problem I had occasion to make some rather drastic criticisms of American
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policy. I shall have to do so again this afternoon. I cannot accept the view which has been advanced by the noble Marquess that we must not in any sort of circumstances criticise what is done in America because that would, in effect, be to sow dissension between the two countries. I do not believe that that is so at all, and I have been glad to find that on this side of the House, at any rate, I am supported by a number of other speakers who feel the same way. Americans themselves will always tell you that they prefer complete frankness, and if there is one thing to which they object it is that one should have an arrière pensée —a reservation at the back of one's mind —and not tell them exactly what one is thinking. I am sure that if we tell them clearly, and with complete frankness, they will respect us much more than if we pretend we are 100 per cent. in agreement when we are obviously nothing of the kind. We must not forget that in America itself there is a large body of public opinion which is exactly in line with the opinion of our Government, and what I believe to be the opinion of the great mass of the people in this country. At the moment this body of opinion in America is to some extent submerged under an hysterical mass feeling which has been deliberately worked up over the last months and years. It is waiting for a lead, and it is looking with anxiety to what is happening in this country and the lead which will be given from here.
It seems to me that American policy in the Far East is quite clearly calculated —though not deliberately, of course—to weld Communist China and Communist Russia indissolubly together, and that if it is not changed before very long that will happen. And the result of that for the world will be fraught with the most terrible disaster. Only a few weeks ago, as it appeared from the speeches of Secretary of State Mr. Acheson, there was a chance that the American policy towards the recognition of China was to be changed. Unfortunately, there was then the advance beyond the 38th Parallel and the very natural reaction of China to that event. I am not going to repeat the criticisms that I made on the last occasion of General MacArthur. I should like noble Lords to realise that they were made before these disasters. It is inconceivable that the decision to move across

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the 38th Parallel was reached by the United Nations without consultation, and without the advice of General MacArthur. Although it may well be that, technically, the United Nations is responsible for that movement, I am sure that in the pages of history General MacArthur will bear a considerable degree of responsibility. However, I do not wish to go further into that matter. The point is that this chance of a rapprochement between the United States and China, which was obviously a real one, was lost, but it does not mean that it cannot be regained.
I entirely agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that this is the burning point in the East at the present time; and therefore it seems to me that we must concentrate all our efforts on trying to get American public opinion, and the views of the American Government, changed in respect of this particular matter. The old League of Nations was wrecked very largely because the United States refused to corns into it. There seems to me to be a very grave danger of the present United Nations Organisation being equally wrecked be-cause the United States is not only in it but, being in it, is attempting to dominate it. That is the impression one gets at the present time. She controls an enormous block of votes in South America in the Assembly, and seems to be ready to refuse everything unless she gets her own way. I hope that is only a passing phase, because if it goes on I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, that it will mean that all sorts of nations who cannot be relied upon to vote the right way will not be accepted into the United Nations Organisation, which is entirely wrong.
LORD HAWKE: I think the noble Lord ought not to make these accusations against South American countries, because it will cause exceedingly bad blood if his remarks are reported in South America.
LORD CHORLEY: I am not the first to make this observation.
LORD HAWKE: But it has not been made before in your Lordships' House.
LORD CHORLEY: It is an observation which anybody who studies what hap-pens at the Assembly is perfectly entitled to make. At any rate, what has in fact
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happened has been that the United Nations Organisation has tended to get itself divided into two antagonistic sections, and the result of that has been that the work which it ought to be doing is being completely prevented.
If this problem in the Far East is to be solved it can be solved only by negotiation. The Americans themselves have taken the view that that negotiation must take place through the United Nations Organisation, and yet they will not have in the United Nations Organisation the people with whom they ought to negotiate. They establish a dilemma which, on the face of it, is insoluble. Surely there must be negotiations with China, and to adopt the sort of ideological point of view that you will not negotiate is really quite contrary to the ordinary hard-headed attitude of American businessmen. If American businessmen were handling this problem as a matter of business, in-stead of politicians handling it as a matter of politics, there would be no difficulty in getting them round a table, and there would probably be no difficulty in hammering out some sort of reasonable solution to the problem.
As it appears to me, there are three points which are worrying the present Chinese Government. One is the problem of Korea, which has been sufficiently de-bated this afternoon, and I will not refer to it further. Another is that of Chinese entry to the United Nations, which has also been discussed sufficiently. And the third is the problem of Formosa, which has also been referred to to some extent, and which it is quite clear is, from the Chinese point of view, absolutely in the centre of the picture. Formosa is regarded by the Chinese as just as much a part of China as the Isle of Wight or the Isle of Man is regarded as part of this country. That Chinese claim was admitted by all the other nations, and was put into the Declaration of Cairo, and I suggest that there might be some sort of a declaration that the Cairo decision stands. It may not be possible to implement it at the moment, but it might be a good thing if the United States were prepared to make the declaration that the Cairo decision stands; that, as soon as the general problem of who is to be recognised as the Government of China has been satisfactorily dealt with, Formosa will be handed over; that there is no

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intention that Formosa should go to Japan—which is the thing the Chinese fear—and that there is no intention of setting it up as some kind of independent republic to be dominated by America and used as an American base.
Before the situation had become so difficult President Truman himself issued a statement to the effect that the Americans would not use it in that way. I think it would go a long way towards pouring oil on troubled waters if it could be stated that the Cairo Declaration still stands. I am sure that in these ways it should be possible to establish an atmosphere in which negotiations could take place and take place successfully. Un-less and until these negotiations do take place, the prospects will remain terribly black, and at any moment we may be confronted with the outbreak of war.
6.20 p.m.
LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: My Lords, we have had a long, interesting and animated debate. I, for my part, do not intend to follow some noble Lords into their interpretation of the views of Communist China. To my mind, as I look upon the international scene, since the war there have been two outstanding features: first, the Communist expansion under Russian leader-ship, and secondly, the strengthening of the Anglo-United States friendship which was begun in the struggle against Germany. I should like to join noble Lords on both sides of the House in welcoming the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, and I must say that I share my noble Leader's regret that it did not come about earlier—I believe I said so in support of the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, in July, so that I can claim not to have been wise after the event. I believe that some of the fears that were expressed on that occasion have been justified by the joint Truman-Attlee declaration. Noble Lords will recall the remarkable speech made in July by the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, which I think the noble Viscount the Leader of the House welcomed. Lord Ismay called for an over-all strategic concept.
Like some noble Lords on the other side of the House, I believe that Great Britain and the Commonwealth have an immense contribution to make to the
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defence and peace of the free world. I do not under-estimate in the least the part that has been, and is being, played both by Great Britain and by the Dominions. I believe, too, that besides our great combined man-power and resources, we have both knowledge and experience to offer; but I do most wholeheartedly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, said about putting our actual contribution in men and materials first, and on that basis being able to offer our contribution in advice and experience. There is no limited liability in this struggle. Those of us— and I think on the whole we are in the majority in this House—who regard Anglo-United States friendship, solid and indivisible, as the sole hope of peace, order and freedom in the world, must be careful of the slightest assumption of superior wisdom in our dealings with that great country.
In spite of remarks that have fallen from some noble Lords, I believe, too, that we must be realists about Formosa. I was particularly interested to hear the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, about the Cairo declaration. Although I am no lawyer, and certainly no international lawyer, I think it worth while putting on record that at that declaration those taking part—namely. President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Churchill—explicitly declared that they coveted no gain for themselves and had no thought of territorial expansion. In the present circumstances, with the Chinese forces, whether "volunteer" or otherwise, in Korea, I cannot but think that the terms of that declaration have not been fulfilled. I said, "Let us be realists." We must realise that we ourselves have our interests in the Far East. The Chinese have already declared their intention of "liberating" Tibet—in fact, they are already in the process of doing it—and one day they may have similar ideas about Hong Kong.
My noble Leader, Lord Salisbury, has already referred to the remarks of two colleagues of noble Lords opposite, and I do not intend to refer to them again, but because of those remarks I think it is most essential that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Wool-sack should take this opportunity of once more stressing that our Government and people do support the United States and other nations in the part they have played

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in carrying out the task of the United Nations in Korea. Another reason why this is necessary is the attitude, as expressed in some periodicals, and one in particular, of some who are at least nominal supporters of the present Government. I refer to an article in last week's New Statesman and Nation. It is headed "Positions of Strength?" This is what it says:
"The military containment of National Socialist Germany was physically possible, first, because the non-Nazi world was amply strong enough to build an iron girdle round Germany, and, secondly, because National Socialism was not a liberative or revolutionary force in any part of the world."
I hold that those who regard Communism as a liberative as well as a revolutionary cause are really ranging themselves with the opponents of our free society, a free society which at least a majority of noble Lords in this House support. We on these Benches, and noble Lords on other Benches, abhor not only the methods but the ends of Communists.
But the article to which I have referred is right in one respect: we are fighting a movement. So we find at one moment that China declares herself to be a free, independent sovereign State, and to be the heir to the rights of her predecessor, the Republic of China, but at the same time she is the protector of that dogmatic secular religion, Communism. Who can doubt that it is with her connivance and help that the present anti-French movement in Indo-China is being reinforced? You cannot claim the rights and privileges of a sovereign State and yet, by covert action, deny them to other States. That is what I see as the heart of the matter. It is useless for us to put ourselves in the shoes of China in her relation to Formosa and in the invasion of Korea, unless we are at the same time going to uphold all her actions in the East. The cease-fire in Korea could—and, indeed, we hope it would—save lives in that country, but it certainly would not put an end to the great struggle which has been waged ever since the war. It is not just Asia where the war is being waged; the struggle is going on throughout the world.
It seems to me that some noble Lords speaking today were most unrealistic. I felt that they forgot that the Minister of Defence last May (I think it was) told us that the Russians had 175 divisions, a great many of them within the borders
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of Poland. They seemed to forget that Western Europe, as the Prime Minister and the President so rightly said, is a vital area, and that that area is gravely threatened. They seemed to forget that the strategy of Russia and her satellites, as is now generally admitted, has been to spread our forces over the Far East. To regard that as one theatre set apart and unrelated to the rest of the world is un-realistic and will give a completely false picture. The noble Lord, Lord Silk in, talked of negotiations How can you have a conference which has no agenda? How can you have a conference with people who are admittedly in wrongful occupation of territory? How can you have a conference unless these matters are to be discussed and are on the agenda? I wholeheartedly support the attitude of the Government in this matter. We must pray God that in this struggle Europe will not again become a battleground. But it will certainly require on our part great sacrifices, great courage and great persistence. I believe that if we combine our resources and the resources of our great Commonwealth with those of the United States, not only will our strength be greater, but our sacrifices will be less.
There is a great struggle in the world. I think there is a great struggle and difference of opinion within our own country, and the difference is between those who pursue the free way of life: and those who look to Communism as the salvation of the world. If we believe and have faith in our way of life, we must be prepared to give sacrifices equal to those given by people who believe in Marxist doctrine. Therefore, we support the Government in the declaration which has been made, although we may criticise it in detail and in certain important exceptions. We hope that they will give that leadership for which we are all looking. We hope that they will look upon the whole free world as a unity and base their resources and strategy upon that unified conception.
6.32 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT): My Lords, I am sure that this has been an interesting and useful debate—useful, because, after all, what is the function of this House? It is that members of this House, frequently speaking from a ripe experience, can fearlessly put forward views which they

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believe to be right, in order that they may lead and guide opinion. It always seems to me a pity that to-day, owing perhaps to the shortage of newsprint, or for some other reason, our debates are not so widely reported as they should be, so as to have their full effect upon public opinion.
Nevertheless, I believe that debates in your Lordships' House do have a profound effect on the formulation of opinion in the country. Those who are concerned in matters such as those which we have been discussing to-day certainly read our debates, take notice of them, and understand the various points of view that have been put forward. Indeed, the usefulness of the debate would be complete if it stopped at this moment and did not receive any answer from me at all. In regard to giving an answer, I find myself in a position of slight embarrassment. The noble Marquess, and the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, have both enunciated a rule which I think a very sound rule—namely, that any Minister who is going to speak on the difficult matter of foreign affairs, even if he does not actually submit his speech in writing to the Foreign Secretary, should at any rate ascertain whether the Foreign Secretary is entirely at one with the statements he proposes to make. I shall bear that suggestion in mind. I have not submitted this speech to the Foreign Secretary because I am not quite sure what this speech is going to be. But I have a bump of caution, highly developed, and I am bound to say that if ever there was an occasion when it was desirable to give full scope to a bump of caution I think it is the present.
It is idle to deny that the situation which confronts us to-day is a very grave one, and it is essential that we should think out clearly where we are going and what is going to happen. For my own part, however, I should like to start by saying this. In view of some of the things which have been said about the United States of America one might hardly realise that through these last years they have been our firm friends; that we owe to them more than we can readily express, and that in our opinion (I believe both sides of the House will agree with me here) the future prospects of this world depend upon a happy collaboration between the United States of America, on the one hand, and
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the States forming the British Commonwealth, on the other. That is the great ideal which we must keep before us—not as an exclusive ideal; it is not that we want to dominate the world, any more than I believe the United States wants to dominate the United Nations, but that we want at all costs, and in spite of all difficulties, to steer through to a peaceful world.
Of course, in the material sense we in this little island cannot make so great a contribution as the United States can make in material forces—obviously not. When Lord Ismay suggests that we must not trouble in the least what rearmament costs, he will forgive me for saying that we have to support the economy of this country. It is no good our not being able to get the food or the raw material or the clothing for our people, even if this country is bulging with bombs. Obviously we must have regard to the whole position in seeing what we can do. But clearly we must make as great a contribution as we can to the strength of this country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations; and I quite agree with what Lord Stansgate said in his eloquent speech, that we must not for one moment think we are going to get out of the troubles of the day merely by material strength, disregarding altogether moral issues.
What does friendship with the United States involve? The Russian papers always refer to us as "the lackeys of the United States." That means that in various spheres we are not allowed to express any opinion of our own, or are not allowed to differ from the United States. Surely, this White Paper shows that, whatever else we are, we are not the lackeys of the United States. We are perfectly free to express our opinion, and we shall continue to do so. That, surely, is the real test of friendship. If you have a friend who is such a half-friend that you have to pretend you agree with him when you do not, then his friendship is not worth very much. But if you know him well enough to be able to stand up and state clearly what you think, then such a man is probably a good friend. Surely, it is in that sense that one must read the passage which gave trouble to the noble Marquess and, I think, to Lord Silkin that
"this point of difference only serves to emphasise the underlying unity of our objectives."

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When we say that we agree on various matters it shows that we really are agreeing and expressing truth, because when we differ, we do not hesitate to say so. In that sense, I think the point of difference does emphasise our underlying unity.
Before I leave this topic I should like to say this. Reference has been made to the work done by Mr. Nehru and the Asian countries. I should like to express our very warm appreciation, I am sure on behalf of all Parties in this House, of the efforts which Mr. Nehru has made in the cause of peace.
That, then, is our relationship with the United States. Do let us remember that we have gone into this war in Korea as a constituent member of the United Nations. We are doing our part there as a member of the United Nations, but in conjunction with the United States who are also acting as a member of the United Nations, and, of course, making a far greater contribution than we have been making. Other countries are sending their contingents there, too. We have an expression in this country about a man whom you do not quite trust. You say he is "not a good fellow to go tiger shooting with." By that you mean he is likely to run out on you in times of danger or difficulty. What we must above all make plain to the world is that we are not going to run out on the United States because of such a difference. I am sure your Lordships will agree that that is absolutely fundamental.
The next point I want to make is in saying that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, rather distressed me—for I have a great opinion of his judgment—when he said that on reading the White Paper he found too little emphasis on negotiation, and a point of view which he described as being to the effect that war is inevitable and negotiation is no longer any good. With the greatest respect to him, if language means anything to-day I should have thought that the White Paper emphasised the exact contrary. Throughout the whole of the White Paper it states that the ideal is to maintain world peace and respect for the rights, freedoms and interests of all peoples. The noble Lord's opinion is based apparently upon the use of the one word "advance," because the sentence concludes:
"to eliminate the causes of fear, want, and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life."
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Does not the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the Party to which he and I have the honour to belong stand to advance the democratic way of life? Do we not all hope and believe in the ideal of progress, however difficult it may be to attain it? Do we not all hope that in years to come everyone in this country will have an easier time than those who are here to-day? Of course we do. That is what I understand by advancing the democratic way of life. Surely, in the context from which the noble Lord took it, it does not mean advancing it at the expense of some other country. We all recognise that we have the right to live our lives in our own way and, just as we do not want anybody to interfere with us, neither do we want to interfere with anybody else. Throughout this White Paper we emphasise our determination to do every-thing we can by negotiation to solve these problems.
That leads me to say something more about Korea. We may have been right or we may have been wrong in our views, but we advanced beyond the 38th Parallel, we advanced beyond the neck and we went further north. Then came the Chinese answer and the setback to our Forces, which are now obviously more happily placed than they were a short time ago. China is both a young and an old country with a great history and great traditions. She has been through an ordeal and is emerging with the enthusiasm of youth. As a great nation she is now openly taking her place in the world. Surely we wish her well. In view of her history and the contribution which she has made to history, a place cannot be denied to her. There is a long-standing friendship between this country and China. We want, and our Allies the United States also want, to do everything we can to make it possible to bring about the termination of these hostilities by friendly negotiation, always provided that we do not have to indulge in—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that the word is loosely used— appeasement, in the way in which we used to speak of it, when it conveyed the idea of something which was discreditable or the idea of running away and giving way on essential points. But negotiation, yes. Therefore that wise man Mr. Nehru, because foreign affairs depend so much upon timing and going step by step, thought to himself: "Well,

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the first thing to do is to try to get a cease-fire and, when you have got a cease-fire, these other things may be added thereto." That most certainly represents what we desire. Do not try to take all your fences at once. Take the first fence first, and then very often you find the second fence much easier. The first fence is to try to bring about a cease-fire. We are very ready to try to bring about that cease-fire and will do everything we can to achieve that end. Here let me say, in parenthesis, that I agree with the observations of several noble Lords: I see no reason to suppose that China is necessarily committed to the policy of Moscow.
So much for Korea. Let all of us be realistic about the question. Korea is not the main point of trouble. The centre, the seat, the real source of anxiety, of course, rests in Europe. It is idle to pretend that the situation there is easy. Your Lordships will see in the very near future the reply which we are sending to Russia about the meeting. I hope it will make plain that, no matter how many times we have tried and failed in the past, we are prepared once more to try to bring about a settlement of the problems. I really cannot see why, given good will, it should be impossible. The consequences of war would be frightful to everybody. Why should we not come to an agreement? Why is it impossible? It is the fact, and we all know it to be the fact, that we do not want to interfere with the Russian way of life. It may be difficult to convince them of that if they are in doubt about it—I do not know—but we all know it is the fact. If they do not want to interfere with our way of life, then surely we can settle this problem by negotiation, because ultimately, at long last, it has to be settled by negotiation, even if there has been a war or two or three wars in the meantime. Therefore we are very ready to try to see what we can do. Here, again, I agree that there is always a danger of giving the impression that we are negotiating from weakness, and so it is plain that we must do what we can to make ourselves strong.
My Lords, on the question of German rearmament I have listened with very great interest to what your Lordships "have said, and I think I should be wiser
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if on this particular matter I said nothing at the present time. I am afraid that I have said nothing about the atom bomb. I think perhaps I had better not. Of course, the responsibility of anybody who contemplates in any circumstances the use of that frightful weapon is very great, but I am not prepared at the present time, and I have no authority, to go beyond what the Prime Minister said in another place and what appeared in the White Paper. Your Lordships will see that he expressed his satisfaction at the statement which President Truman made to him, and I am afraid that I must leave it there, telling your Lord-ships that from what I have heard from the Prime Minister I can well understand that he was satisfied. My Lords, I thank you for the encouragement, help and criticism which you have given in this debate, and I will certainly see that the suggestions which have been made are passed on to my right honourable friend.

REINSTATEMENT IN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
RESTORATION OF PREWAR PRACTICES BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.

ADJOURNMENT MOTION: PERSONAL STATEMENT BY LORD MERTHYR
6.55 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in moving that the House do now adjourn, may I remind your Lordships that to-morrow we meet at eleven o'clock, and not at twelve o'clock, as previously-announced? I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.
Moved, That the House do now adjourn.—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD MERTHYR: My Lords, before the House adjourns, may I have the leave of the House to make a personal statement? My attention has been drawn to a sentence in the speech I made last evening during the debate on yacht facilities in the Thames and other water-

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ways. In the course of that debate I am reported in column 970 of Hansard as saying:
"I have seen a letter written this year by the Port of London Authority to a well-known yachting organisation, saying in effect: 'Please do not encourage foreigners to come to London in 1951, because we have no facilities for them'."
My Lords, I admit quite readily that those words were spoken without my having the letter in hand. They were uttered from memory, and it was taken from a very brief précis of a letter which I had seen. In order to shorten any discussion as to whether or not I misinterpreted the letter, and with your Lordships' per-mission, I think the only proper thing to do is to read the letter, which is not very long. It is dated October 17, 1950, and is from the Port of London Authority to The Cruising Association. It is as follows:
"Your letter of October 10 has been considered and I have to inform you that owing to the heavy demand in all the Port Authority's Docks for normal traffic it will not be possible to accept any yachts in connection with the Festival of Britain.
There will be some accommodation for cabin cruisers in ranks alongside each other at St. Thomas' Hospital Barge Roads but only for short periods and providing their
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masts lower and they draw less than six feet. Longer yachts could anchor for short periods off Greenwich or Gravesend but you will realise that if the demand is large it may be necessary to divert them still further down river.
If you could give me some idea as to the probable number of yachts that intend coming or wish to come to the Thames it would be most helpful if I knew the proportion of various sizes.
In any correspondence you have with foreign yacht clubs I think it would be better if you sounded a distinct note of warning that the Thames is a highly commercialised river and that even with the best will in the world it is impossible to make it a really pleasant river for yachts, or in fact render many sites available for their exclusive use."
My Lords, that is the letter. If in any way I have misinterpreted that letter I apologise to the Port of London Authority. As I said before, I gave a very brief précis, spoken from memory, without having the letter in my hand. If that was a wrong thing to do, I again apologise. I thought it only right to read the letter. I am sorry to have taken up so much time.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned accordingly at five minutes before seven o'clock.