Sitting of 7 November 1949

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'Clock
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
MESSAGE FROM THE KING

  DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF ORDERS
  The VICE-CHAMBERLAIN OF THE HOUSEHOLD (Mr. POPPLEWELL)reported His Majesty's answer to the Addresses, as follows:
  I have received Your Addresses praying that the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Basutoland) Order, 1949; the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Swaziland) Order, 1949; and the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Bechuanaland Protectorate) Order, 1949, be made in the form of the respective Drafts laid before Parliament.
  I will comply with your request.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  MINISTRY OF WORKS

    New Concert Hall (Building Labour)
    Mr. Bossomasked the Minister of Works the number of operatives, both skilled and unskilled, that will be required to enable the proposed concert hall on the South Bank to be ready for use in time for the 1951 Exhibition.
    The Minister of Works (Mr. Key): The number of building and civil engineering operatives (including off-site preparation) that will be required at the peak of construction of the concert hall will be about 700, of whom about half will be skilled.
    Mr. Bossom: Is not the right hon. Gentleman giving us a rather low estimate in this case? Would it not be far better if these men were helping the millions of people who are waiting for houses, and who were told that they would get them in double quick time?
    Mr. Key: No, Sir; I am assured that this estimate is quite correct. As has been said before, this work is not being done in any way at the expense of building labour devoted to housing.
    Mr. Marples: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that operatives working on power station contracts are being attracted to work on the South Bank scheme by the inducement of higher subsistence allowances, which are tax free and which are permitted by the authorities? Does he propose to take any action to stop the flow of operatives from essential work to the South Bank?
    Mr. Key: That does not fall to me.
    Sir Waldron Smithers: Is it not true that the satisfaction of Socialist vanity has involved a callous disregard for the housing problem?
    Mr. Key: There is no question of Socialist vanity here, but of satisfying a great need in London.

    Garages, Nevilles Court
    Mr. Orbachasked the Minister of Works whether he will release for the use of the residents of Nevilles Court, Dollis Hill, N.W.2, the garages attached to that block of flats which have until recently been used by his Department, and which are now standing empty.
    Mr. Key: The garage at Nevilles Court was derequisitioned on 8th October last.

    Building Materials (Distribution)
    Mr. Charles Smithasked the Minister of Works (1) what action has been taken, and what further action is proposed, other than the reference of certain items already announced to the Commission on Monopolies and Restrictive Practices, to give effect to recommendation (3) of the Report on the Distribution of Building Materials;
    (2) what action has been taken, and what further action is contemplated to give effect to recommendation (2) of the Report on the Distribution of Building Materials, which deals with the control of distributors' margins on building materials and components;

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    (3) whether he can make any statement about steps taken to carry out recommendation (1) in the Report on the Distribution of Building Materials, presented to him in March, 1948.
    Mr. Key: Recommendation (1) in the report was addressed to the builders' merchants and I called the attention of their organisation to it. Without a detailed inquiry I cannot say what improvements merchants have made in their systems of accounting, methods of stock control and other matters to which their attention was drawn, but I hope they will continue to effect improvements wherever possible.
    As regards recommendation (2), further reductions of margins have taken place since my replies to my hon. Friend on 24th January and 2nd February, 1949, and my Department is now carrying out an investigation of margins to ascertain what more can be done.
    Recommendation (3) was a long-term measure to eliminate restrictive practices in the field of distribution of building materials. I hope that objective will be reached through the machinery established by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act and I must await the report of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission on the items already referred to them before deciding what further action may be desirable.
    Mr. Smith: So far as recommendation (1) is concerned, will the Minister seek from the trade associations concerned some sort of progress report on what has been achieved? On recommendation (2), and the present investigation into margins which the Minister has just announced, can he say when that investigation will be completed by his Department?
    Mr. Key: This is a continuing practice. With regard to investigations into margins, in the answer which I have already given I have said that in respect of between 30 and 40 items the margins were reduced.
    Mr. Smith: Will the Minister consider publishing a schedule showing precisely what margins have been reduced?
    Mr. Key: I have already dispatched a reply with particulars, and I am prepared to send my hon. Friend a copy of it.

    New Building, Theobald's Road
    Sir W. Smithersasked the Minister of Works the superficial area in feet of the new building in Theobald's Road, Holborn, about to be occupied by the Board of Trade; what is the number of people it is designed to accommodate; and, in view of the economic and housing situation, if he will consider abandoning this scheme.
    Mr. Key: This building has a superficial area of 135,000 square feet, excluding storage space, and will accommodate approximately 1,600 people. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.
    Sir W. Smithers: Why provide accommodation for some 1,600 bureaucratic drones when there are more than 2,000 worker bee families in the Orpington division waiting for homes? Will the Minister try to get the Minister of Health to reverse his decision as to the issuing of licences?
    Mr. Speaker: The Question only asked what was the superficial area.

    Building Industry (Working Party)
    Mr. Marplesasked the Minister of Works when it is now expected that the working party on the building industry will present its report.
    Mr. Key: I am informed that there are reasonable prospects of the report being completed by the end of the year or soon after.
    Mr. Marples: Can the Minister assure the House that there has been no official hint from his Department to the working party to delay its report?
    Mr. Key: There is absolutely no necessity for me to do that.

    Government Departments (Office Building)
    Mr. Molsonasked the Minister of Works to what extent the new economies will result in modification of his programme of office building for Government Departments amounting to 2½ million square feet in central London and 3 million square feet in the suburbs.
    Mr. Key: This matter is at present under close examination. Considerable modifications in the timing and scope of the programme will be necessary but the details are still being worked out. One result must be a delay in the release of the requisitioned premises which the new offices were designed to replace.
    Mr. Molson: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that I have been trying for a very long time to get from him particulars of this programme and always in vain? Will he therefore give some further particulars if I put a Question down at some time that is convenient to him?
    Mr. Key: Particulars in regard to this matter are almost impossible to give because it covers almost every town in the country, so far as requisitioned premises are concerned. The London programme cannot be stated without due regard to requisitioned premises in other parts of the country.
    Mr. Molson: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question whether he would be prepared to give some further information on the subject in answer to a Parliamentary Question, when he has gone into the matter? In the past he has refused to give me any information, on the ground that it would give civil servants too much work.
    Mr. Key: I am prepared to give whatever information it is possible for me to give.
    Sir W. Smithers: Would it not be better to stop issuing licences for Government buildings than to stop licences for homes for the people under private enterprise building?
    Mr. Key: The hon. Member for Orpington (Sir W. Smithers) is making a very big mistake. The buildings to which he refers are not Government buildings. They are privately owned and leased to the Government. They are not being done at the expense of the taxpayer.
    Mr. Marples: Is the Minister not aware that contractors who conduct negotiations with his Department are told that they cannot get licences for private office building unless they are willing to lease the buildings to the right hon. Gentleman's Department?
    Mr. Key: I am not aware of that, because it is not true.
    Mr. Marples: The right hon. Gentleman has said that my statement is not the truth. May I point out that I myself went to the Ministry of Works and that was my own personal experience?
    Hon. Members: Withdraw.
    Mr. Key: There is nothing to withdraw. As a general practice what was said is not true. In particular cases there may be reasons for refusing a licence.

    Property, Northallerton
    Sir W. Smithersasked the Minister of Works what was the price paid by him for Newby Wiske Hall, Northallerton; and for what purposes it is to be used.
    Mr. Key: This property has not yet been purchased and the price is still being discussed. If acquired, the property will be used as a police training centre.
    Sir W. Smithers: Is it the duty of the Government to provide not only jobs for the boys but stately homes for the boys, at the expense of the millions of people who want small homes?

  COAL INDUSTRY

    Face Workers' Earnings
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what is the average earning of a face worker in the mining industry working on the basis of five shifts a week.
    The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Gaitskell): It is estimated that on the average a coal face worker working five weekday shifts would earn £10 10s. a week; including the value of allowances in kind.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Would the right hon. Gentleman pass that information on to the Ministry of Labour who are advertising in an attempt to get recruits for the mines on the basis of £7 to £9 a week?
    Mr. Gallacher: Is the Minister aware that these men could not continue digging the coal or earning their wages if it were not for a very large number of men working on the basic rate of £5 per week? The new men who are called in will get the new rate of £5 a week.
    Mr. Gaitskell: I was just going to say that the basic rate of wages paid to a man when he enters the industry is far below the rate mentioned. In any case it is, I suggest, better to put the figure too low than too high in advertisements of this kind.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: Is the Minister aware that the wages compare very unfavourably with those of on-cost workers?
    Mr. Gaitskell: It is not my business to determine the wages structure of the coal-mining industry.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Will the right hon. Gentleman look at the advertisements circulated by his colleague in the "Sunday Pictorial" of 16th October, in which it was stated that £7 to £9 maximum could be earned?
    Mr. Blackburn: Perhaps the Minister could also give the figures of mine wages 18 years ago, when the party opposite had responsibility.

    Exports, Scandinavia (Quality)
    Sir W. Smithersasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what complaints he has received from Scandinavian countries concerning the price and quality of British coal; what action he has taken and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Gaitskell: The few complaints from Scandinavian countries about the price or quality of British coal exports which have been brought to my notice have been referred to the National Coal Board, who are responsible for negotiating and executing their own commercial contracts.
    Sir W. Smithers: Has the Minister's attention been called to a statement by Mr. Hoffman that it is wrong in principle to raise the price of exports and not to raise the prices of domestic supplies? Has the Minister not heard Quern Jupiter vult perdere, prius dementat?
    Mr. Gaitskell: Without being able to interpret the hon. Member's Latin quite so rapidly, I am aware that the O.E.E.C. are investigating the question of the dual price system. The House would make a great mistake if they thought that this system only occurred in connection with
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    British coal exports. It is far more widespread.
    Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: Was it the case before the war that there was this difference between domestic and export prices of coal?
    Mr. Gaitskell: I am afraid I could not say without notice.

  LOST PETROL COUPONS (REPLACEMENT)
  Squadron-Leader Sir Gifford Foxasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what instructions have been given to regional petroleum officers in cases of motor car owners losing their standard ration books or their petrol coupons through the fraud of a third party.
  Mr. Gaitskell: Regional petroleum officers have authority to replace lost supplementary petrol coupons where they are satisfied this is justified. Cases of lost standard ration books are dealt with at headquarters. The coupons would be replaced if it was clear that their loss was due to fraud by a third party.

  MOULDERS' UNION MEMBERS (NEWSPAPER REPORTS)
  Mr. William Wellsasked the Attorney-General whether, in the interests of public order, he proposes to initiate prosecutions for criminal libel against the newspapers and persons who published or procured or were accessory to the publication of reports that members of the Moulders' Union employed by Messrs. Harvey Matthew and Co., of Walsall, sought to prevent their fellow-workers from reading the newspapers of their choice.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Hartley Shawcross): Whilst the reports referred to are, if untrue, highly objectionable, I do not think the institution of criminal proceedings would be justified.
  Mr. Blackburn: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. May I point out, as a matter of very great importance, that a Question has been submitted to the Table and rejected by the Table in which I asked what inquiries the Minister had caused to be made into the allegations

  869
  that a strike had been threatened? I am not quarrelling with the Ruling, but merely pointing out that this is the Rule. I have been told that I have to adopt this allegation which has been made by the newspapers, which the Ministry assure me is utterly unfair and completely false. Therefore, I am in the situation—I imagine my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall (Mr. W. Wells) is also—that I cannot ask a Question about this matter unless I am prepared to accept a lie already told by the "Daily Mail." It is an impossible position for an hon. Member to be in that he cannot ask a Question about this matter in such circumstances.
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman has made a long statement and I could not follow it all, but I understand that he wanted to put a Question which was an allegation. Allegations are not admitted in Questions. If the hon. Gentleman has any matter to submit to me, I shall be glad to consider it, but quite frankly I could not follow it.
  Sir Jocelyn Lucas: May I say that I put down a Question on this very subject and it was accepted by the Table, but I withdrew it because I could not substantiate any allegations.
  Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Further to the point of Order. The hon. Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) first stated allegations and then referred to "lies told by the 'Daily Mail.'" Surely that is not in Order.
  Mr. Speaker: It is too complicated for me. I would like to have notice of it.
  Mr. W. Wells: Adverting to the original Question, is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that this story was published in the "Daily Mail" and the "News Chronicle," and that it has been characterised on behalf of both the management and the workers in this highly respected firm as being a complete fabrication from beginning to end, and will my right hon. and learned Friend have some further inquiry made into the matter?
  The Attorney-General: I understand that the matter is at present the subject of inquiry and that there are two Questions in regard to it on the Order Paper for tomorrow, which will be dealt with
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  by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour. In those circumstances I did not think it proper to form any judgment on the truth or otherwise of the reports, since on any view it was not an appropriate subject for criminal proceedings.
  Sir Lucas: Is it not a fact that the whole idea was that "Dalrymple" was 20 points ahead of "Templegate" on the naps?
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: Does the reply of my right hon. and learned Friend mean that unfounded and manufactured statements of this kind to the prejudice of a large number of people can be printed and circulated without those people having any legal remedy at all?
  The Attorney-General: That was not the Question which was put to me, nor did I answer to that effect. I was asked whether the circumstances of these reports were such as to justify proceedings for criminal libel. I saw nothing in them to justify such proceedings.
  Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: How is it that the Attorney-General interests himself in statements made by the newspapers and charges against newspapers? Will he look into the most unfounded allegations which were made by the Minister of Health that certain newspapers published untrue reports when they reported literally what was said?
  Mr. Gallacher: If it had not been the "Daily Mail" but the "Daily Worker," you fellows would have been yelling.
  Mr. Driberg: Is not this another illustration of the urgent necessity for setting up a Press Council, as recommended by the Royal Commission and by both sides in this House, to investigate such gross deceptions of the public?
  Mr. H. D. Hughes: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that solicitors on behalf of the firm denied all the facts published in the national newspapers six days ago? Have any of the national newspapers responsible since made any correction whatsoever, and if not, what redress has the public against the dissemination of false information?
  The Attorney-General: I have no jurisdiction over these matters unless a criminal offence is involved. None is involved here.
  Mr. Henry Strauss: Is not the answer of the right hon. and learned Gentleman strictly confined to the question which was put to him regarding proceedings for criminal libel? Is it not possible that, if these statements were false, there is a remedy in the civil courts?
  The Attorney-General: I do not think that I ought to give legal advice to private litigants on a matter of this kind.

  FOOD SUPPLIES

    Fish (Meal and Manure)
    Air-Commodore Harveyasked the Minister of Food how much fish was used for manure and how much sold to the fish meal works for the months of July and August, 1949.
    The Minister of Food (Mr. Strachey): Six thousand eight hundred tons of white fish were sent to the fish meal works in July and 3,500 tons in August. The quantity sold for manure in the two months, at ports where there are no works, was about 30 tons. In the same period about 4,500 tons of herrings were processed into oil and meal.
    Air-Commodore Harvey: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that these figures are very high indeed, and will he say why, when this was taking place, many Icelandic trawlers were landing their catches in German ports at guaranteed prices while the British trade was suffering?
    Mr. Strachey: No, Sir. I cannot see that there is anything wrong with us producing fish meal. In fact, many hon. Members for agricultural constituencies have urged us very strongly to produce more of it.

    Dried Fruit (Christmas)
    Air-Commodore Harveyasked the Minister of Food to what extent supplies of raisins and other dried fruit will be available this year in time for Christmas; and if he will take steps to ensure that they are obtainable everywhere.
    Mr. Jannerasked the Minister of Food how much dried fruit such as currants, sultanas and raisins will be available for Christmas; and when such fruit will appear for sale in the shops.
    Mr. Strachey: An allocation of currants, sultanas and packeted dates has just been made and should reach the shops in good time for Christmas. Owing to the failure of the Australian crop there will be no raisins before Christmas. The quantity of dried fruits allocated is the same as in October last year. As sugar registrations form the basis of distribution for almost all dried fruit for household consumption, supplies will be evenly distributed.
    Air-Commodore Harvey: Does not the Minister of Food agree that this will be a great disappointment to the housewife, who wants to make her Christmas puddings now? How does the right hon. Gentleman account for dried fruits being available on the Continent and not in this country?
    Mr. Strachey: The quantity of dried fruits will be about the same as last year in this country. It is true of raisins because of the bad crop in Australia.

    Meat (Price)
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Food whether he has any statement to make as to the future price of meat.
    Mr. Strachey: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the hon. and gallant Member for Eastern Norfolk (Brigadier Medlicott) on 31st October.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As that reply conveyed the minimum of information, can the right hon. Gentleman now give even a limited assurance that there will be no increase even over quite a limited period?
    Mr. Strachey: No, Sir. I never speculate on the future of food prices or the level of rations.
    Mr. Royle: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that before there is any rise in the price of meat, he will examine the costs of distribution, which are very extravagant?
    Mr. Strachey: They may well be extravagant, but they are much lower than they were before the war.

    Carrots (Price Control)
    Mr. Hollisasked the Minister of Food whether he is aware that officers of his Department were, as late as 28th September, giving advice that there was

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    no likelihood that carrots would be controlled either this season or next season; and what action he proposes to take to compensate producers for any loss caused to them by the proposed reimposition of controls.
    Mr. Strachey: I know of a letter to this effect from one of my officers to a grower, which I regret. But our intention to control prices was published on no fewer than five occasions between January and October and I cannot agree that any question of compensation arises.
    Mr. Hollis: Will the right hon. Gentleman at any rate take very stern steps to see that officers of his Department do not indulge in unauthorised prophecies to members of the public?
    Mr. Strachey: Certainly, Sir, but this officer has been to the grower in question and apologised for his mistake, and I understand that the grower has told him that he suffered no loss.

    Feedingstuffs (Imports)
    Mr. David Ecclesasked the Minister of Food whether he will add feedingstuffs to the list of goods submitted by His Majesty's Government to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation in respect of which an open general licence to import is now granted.
    Mr. Strachey: I do not think we can do this at present. In any case the O.E.E.C. countries are on balance not importers of feedingstuffs.
    Mr. Eccles: But does not the Minister think that he should take a step in this direction? For example, does he not think that private traders might pick up small parcels of feedingstuffs in, say, North Africa, since any little extra we can get would be a good thing?
    Mr. Strachey: We import quite considerable quantities of grain from North Africa, but I do not think that the opening of the trade with Europe to private traders in this matter would have any practical consequences.
    Mr. Baldwin: Is the Minister aware that the members of the Baltic Exchange are doing a considerable business in coarse feeding grains all over the world, with the exception of this country?
    Mr. Strachey: We are doing a considerable business in the importing of coarse grains into this country.
    Mr. John Paton: If the purpose of the Question were carried out, would it not be at the expense of our partners in European co-operation?
    Mr. Strachey: In so far as they are net importers, that is the case.

    Restaurant Meals (Price Control)
    Mr. Keelingasked the Minister of Food what action he proposes to take on the representations made to him by the Tourist and Holidays Board that the maintenance of the 5s. limit on meals is detrimental to the development and improvement of hotel and catering services.
    Mr. Strachey: I appreciate the importance of helping the catering trade to earn dollars but I cannot see my way to relax the price control on meals for the present.
    Mr. Keeling: Is the Minister of Food aware that this regulation is the only one the removal of which would immediately increase the dollar yield without having to import any extra raw materials? Is there anything behind this order except prejudice?
    Mr. Strachey: I do not think I should agree that there was only prejudice behind it. There is an important political principle behind it. I appreciate the importance of the dollar argument, but these two things have to be weighed against each other—fair shares or the earning of extra dollars.
    Mr. William Shepherd: Will the Minister say what is the use of subsidising this Tourist Board, as the Government do, if, when they tender advice, the right hon. Gentleman simply ignores it?
    Mr. Strachey: Certainly not. We have considered their advice carefully but it has to be weighed against the maintenance of fair shares in food, which is important.
    Mr. Butcher: Can the right hon. Gentleman explain how fair shares are related to price, because shares are controlled by rations and not by price
    Mr. Strachey: No, in the case of many unrationed foods in restaurants, the price is the only controlling factor.

    Cereal Storage (Ships)
    Mr. Rentonasked the Minister of Food how many tons of cereals are at present lying in the holds of ships in British ports owing to there being no storage space available; and what has been the cost this year, up to the latest date for which figures are available, of storing cereals on board ships lying in port.
    Mr. Strachey: Three ships were hired because they would otherwise have been lying idle and it was cheaper to use them than to store on land. The cost for 17,398 tons, down to 3rd November, was £4,291.
    Mr. Renton: Is it not a fact that the Ministry of Food stores all over the country have been so full of corn in recent months that the Minister has been driven to use these ships for storage, and would it not be better to free the distribution of cereals to a greater extent, thereby enabling food producers to have more food sooner?
    Mr. Strachey: I am glad to say our stocks of cereals are large and that we have been able to make the increases in animal feedingstuffs rations which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture announced the other day.
    Colonel Gomme-Duncan: As we understand that there has been considerable shipping difficulty in getting groundnuts away from West Africa, could not these ships have been used for that purpose? The right hon. Gentleman said they were empty and could not be used.
    Mr. Strachey: The hon. and gallant Gentleman misunderstood. There is no shipping difficulty in West Africa, although there has been a difficulty in rail transport. Railways are not ships.

    Wholesale Meat Supply Associations (Commission)
    Mr. Leslieasked the Minister of Food what sum of money is paid per ton to the Wholesale Meat Supply Association for their services as agents between his Department and the retail buying groups; and if this tonnage payment has varied from year to year.
    Mr. Strachey: The average rate of gross commission paid in 1948–49 to the
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    eight Wholesale Meat Supply Associations was £2 5s. 3d. per ton. The rate of commission has varied from year to year owing to fluctuations in expenses and in the tonnage handled.
    Mr. Leslieasked the Minister of Food the amount of money paid each year to the Wholesale Meat Supply Association for their services as agents between his Department and the retail buying groups.
    Mr. Strachey: As the answer is a table of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Leslie: Is there any time limit for the ending of these payments, which retailers consider a wicked waste of public money?
    Mr. Strachey: No, there is no such time limit, but perhaps my hon. Friend has read the programme which is under consideration by the Labour Party, saying that we are all in agreement that a time must come when these payments shall end.
    Mr. Royle: Can my right hon. Friend say what percentage of the amount paid to the Wholesale Meat Supply Association goes in salaries, wages and expenses, what percentage is left for dispersal as dividends or compensation, and whether it is not time that we looked into the question of jobs for the old boys?
    Mr. Strachey: Not without notice, but I repeat that none of us on these benches regards the present situation as satisfactory, and that is why we have made proposals to end it once and for all by nationalisation.
    Mr. Baldwin: Is the Minister aware that these old boys would be only too pleased to get back to the jobs which were taken from them when the war started and the Minister of Food was only too pleased to make use of the machinery?
    Mr. Strachey: Yes, in principle there are only two things that can be done in the end: complete decontrol or operation on public account by a public corporation. One thing or the other will have to be done.
    Mr. Piratin: Can the Minister give the House an assurance that no meat wholesaler is being imbursed by the Government for doing nothing at all?
    Mr. Strachey: No, certainly not.
    Following is the statement:
    The total gross commission paid to the eight Wholesale Meat Supply Associations in each of the last nine financial years was as follows:

    £

    1940–41

    …

    …

    …

    4,102,535

    1941–42

    …

    …

    …

    3,447,667

    1942–43

    …

    …

    …

    3,231,708

    1943–44

    …

    …

    …

    3,149,890

    1944–45

    …

    …

    …

    3,135,283

    1945–46

    …

    …

    …

    3,291,568

    1946–47

    …

    …

    …

    3,666,838

    1947–48

    …

    …

    …

    3,687,995

    1948–49

    …

    …

    …

    3,708,771

    Bread Subsidy
    Mr. Keelingasked the Minister of Food whether he has any further statement to make in respect of the comparison between the annual rate of the combined flour and bread subsidy before devaluation and at present.
    Mr. Strachey: Yes, Sir. The figures I gave in reply to the hon. Member's Question on 24th October understated the amount of the total bread and flour subsidy both before and after devaluation. The annual rate of subsidy is now estimated at £99.3 million, against a rate of £98.8 million immediately before devaluation. But I must warn the hon. Member that these are estimates and the actual figures realised will depend upon the rate of consumption and the price of future purchases of wheat and flour.

    Tallow (Stocks and Prices)
    Major Legge-Bourkeasked the Minister of Food how much edible mutton tallow is at present stored in the United Kingdom; how much is going rancid; and what is the cause of this deterioration.
    Mr. Strachey: We import tallow both for making dripping and for making soap. The hon. and gallant Member may rest assured that any tallow which does not prove fit to eat will be used for the latter purpose. Tests of our stocks are made as required and the final use of the tallow settled by their results. For the reasons which I have repeatedly given to the House, I am not prepared to give the level of stocks.
    Major Legge-Bourke: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what has happened to the 400 tons or more of edible mutton
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    far which went rancid in June or July or thereafter, and has that been sent to the soap manufacturers who have already indicated they cannot use it?
    Mr. Strachey: I could not agree with the facts as stated by the hon. and gallant Member.
    Major Legge-Bourkeasked the Minister of Food why the price offered by his Department for tallow was reduced on 1st October, 1949; and what effect devaluation has had on supplies coming to the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Strachey: As to the first part of the Question, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to his Question on 31st October. As regards the second part, there has been no effect so far.
    Major Legge-Bourke: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that his Parliamentary Secretary did not give me an answer to the first part of the Question? Further, why has the price been reduced, despite the fact that it has been running at £70 more per ton than the local price in Australia or the price in America?
    Mr. Strachey: The price was reduced because we were able to sell it without loss at a lower price, so we passed on the advantage.

    Miners (Special Rationing)
    Mr. Raikesasked the Minister of Food why the grant of a special meat allowance to miners to stimulate the output of coal has not been extended to persons engaged in the mining of metals or in other heavy work for the production of goods for export.
    Mr. Strachey: I am afraid that we have not enough meat to extend special rationing in this way; moreover there is a great deal to be said for devoting increased supplies of food as they occur to the ordinary domestic ration.

    Meat Bonus, London
    Commander Nobleasked the Minister of Food when the people of London may expect to receive the 6d. meat bonus now six weeks overdue.
    Mr. Strachey: As the House knows, negotiations between the employers and the trade union regarding the dispute that has arisen over the distribution of the 6d.

    879
    meat bonus for the London area have been unsuccessful, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service has now set up a committee of investigation. I should prefer not to comment while the matter is, in this sense, sub judice, but I hope to make a statement at an early date.
    Commander Noble: Could the Minister say why we have had to wait so long for this committee, and when does he expect that we shall hear some of their findings so that the people of London can have the meat to which they are entitled?
    Mr. Strachey: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman wishes to know the date of the report of the committee, he had better put down a Question to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service.
    Captain Crookshank: Does that mean that until the committee have reported it will not be possible for the people of London to get the rations to which they were entitled by the bonus?
    Mr. Strachey: Yes, Sir. The committee of inquiry will not be a long-drawn-out affair. I understand from my right hon. Friend that it will be only a matter of days before we get the report.
    Captain Crookshank: Even so, that does not answer my question: do we have to wait until a committee has considered a particular dispute before the people of London can get their rations?
    Mr. Strachey: What is holding up the meat is this dispute, and therefore the meat cannot be distributed until the dispute is settled.

    Overseas Food Corporation
    Mr. Wilson Harrisasked the Minister of Food what advances he has made to the Overseas Food Corporation since 31st March, 1949.
    Mr. Strachey: Eight million pounds has been advanced to the Overseas Food Corporation since that date.
    Mr. Wilson Harris: Does that make with £29 million?
    Mr. Strachey: That is so.
    Mr. Piratinasked the Minister of Food whether, in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the financial report of the Overseas Food Corporation, and that it fails to observe the terms of the Companies Act, 1948, he will institute an inquiry into the finances of this body.
    Mr. Strachey: No, Sir. The Overseas Food Corporation have stated in their report why it was not found possible to maintain during their financial year 1948–49 accounts and records which for all aspects of their operations conformed to the best commercial standards. I understand from the Corporation that they are confident that the measures which they are taking will correct these shortcomings, which have been discussed fully by them with their auditors. The Overseas Food Corporation are not bound by the terms of the Companies Act, 1948. Their responsibilities, duties and obligations are defined by the Overseas Resources Development Act.
    Mr. Piratin: Does the Minister's reply mean that when this correction of the account takes place it will be done retrospectively in order to include the past period, so that it will be possible to break down the account submitted in the report?
    Mr. Strachey: No, Sir. I think it would be impossible to say that the accounts of the next year can cover satisfactorily the period of transfer from the managing agency to the Overseas Food Corporation, which is really the period mostly at issue.
    Mr. Gallacher: Can the Minister tell us whether, in view of the failure to keep proper accounts, anybody is to get the sack, or is it just when workers do bad work that they are sacked?
    Mr. Strachey: There have been changes, of which hon. Members have complained, in the personnel of the executive of the Corporation.

    Milk (Industrial Use)
    Sir G. Foxasked the Minister of Food the number of gallons of milk used in the production of plastics and other commercial uses, respectively, during the last 12 months or any convenient period; what percentage this represents of the amount used for human consumption; and if he will divert the milk used for

    881
    industrial purposes to provide an increased supply to the housewife.
    Mr. Strachey: No liquid milk is provided for the commercial production of plastics and similar industrial products. Seventy per cent. more milk than before the war is sold for liquid consumption and whenever supplies are available they are used in baby food, rationed cheese and other essential foods.
    Sir G. Fox: Are we to understand from that reply that milk of any description, after being processed for cheese, is used for plastics? Are plastics a byproduct of cheese?
    Mr. Strachey: No, Sir. Except for certain medical purposes, no milk is used for these purposes at all.

  BONDED STORES, NOTTINGHAM (RUM)
  Mr. Marplesasked the Minister of Food what is the total quantity of rum stored by his Department in Nottingham; how long it has been stored there; what he proposes to do with it; and when he expects to remove it.
  Mr. Strachey: About 13,000 gallons of rum which we took over from the Services has been stored in Nottingham since March, 1946. It is being steadily cleared, and we hope to dispose of it all within the next six months.
  Mr. Marples: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think he could accelerate the clearance of this rum?
  Mr. Strachey: No, Sir. There is a good deal of other rum being imported from Jamaica and it would be unfair to throw this all on the market now. This is old war stock.
  Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Is this Jamaica or Demerara?
  Mr. Strachey: It is naval stock of various kinds.
  Mr. Harrison: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the storage of this huge quantity of rum in the City of Nottingham is no detriment to the City of Nottingham and that the source of the complaint is one of the sloppiest in the City?
  Mr. Marplesasked the Minister of Food what is the area of the bonded warehouse accommodation in Nottingham occupied by his Department; what percentage is this of the total bonded warehouse accommodation available; and when he expects to derequisition the accommodation now used in storing rum.
  Mr. Strachey: My Department is using some 3,700 square feet of bonded accommodation in Nottingham representing about 17 per cent. of the space available. None of it is requisitioned.

  ALGERIAN WINE (SALE)
  Sir John Mellorasked the Minister of Food whether he made a profit or a loss upon the Algerian wine sold to the German wine trade after allowing for all expenses of purchase, transport, storage and sale; and what was the amount expressed in sterling.
  Mr. C. S. Taylorasked the Minister of Food how far the profit on the sale of Algerian wine to Germany covered the costs of carriage of the wine from Algiers to this country, the landing charges, despatch fees, rent while lying in warehouse, the bottling charges, insurance, and subsequential shipping to Germany, and all other outgoings.
  Mr. Strachey: We expect the proceeds of the sale of the remaining stock of Algerian wine to cover the purchase price, but not by itself to cover the charges mentioned by the hon. Members. However, the amount by which it fails to do so will certainly be smaller than the profits which we have already realised on other transactions in Algerian and other wines. I therefore repeat that we shall make a small profit on our buying and selling of wine, which has now been completed.
  Sir J. Mellor: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean, therefore, that he made a profit on the sale of wine to the British and a loss on its sale to the Germans, and would it not have been better if it had been the other way round?
  Mr. Strachey: Some of these transactions were with overseas buyers and some with home buyers. The essence of the matter is that, taking the transactions as a whole, they have covered the expenses. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the taxpayer?"] The British taxpayer did

  883
  not pay. I do not know what the hon. Member means. I am sorry to disappoint hon. Members who think they have discovered some great loss. It is simply not the case.
  Mr. Bossom: Could not the Minister give the actual figures and prove the case?
  Mr. Strachey: Until this recent sale is completed and all the wine delivered, it is impossible to give the actual figures.
  Mr. Henry Strauss: When the right hon. Gentleman bought this wine was he, in the immortal phrase of his Parliamentary Secretary, "pandering to an acquired taste"?

  TRANSPORT

    Road Vehicles (Regulations)
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Transport why, by the Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing) Regulations, 1949, Statutory Instrument, 1949, No. 1618, he has discontinued the provision permitting members of His Majesty's Forces to be given lifts in vehicles used under limited trade licences.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. James Callaghan): These regulations replace in one code 13 sets of regulations made between 1941 and 1947. When they were being made the opportunity was taken to omit words relating to certain temporary war-time concessions, which were no longer considered to be necessary, and which had, in fact, probably already ceased to be effective.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Can the Parliamentary Secretary say why this particular concession should be deemed to be unnecessary at a time when hundreds of thousands of National Service men are serving at some distance from their homes, and is he aware that this concession has proved of the greatest practical advantage in enabling men to take advantage of short leave at home?
    Mr. Callaghan: That is not my information. These trade plates are very restricted. The numbers of people using them in circumstances in which Service men could take advantage of them are very small.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In that case, why withdraw the concession?
    Mr. Callaghan: Because it was no longer considered to be necessary.

    Motor Vehicle (Fitness Certificate)
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodgeasked the Minister of Transport what has been the outcome of the experiments made in London by his Department as to the suitability for general use of the single-deck motor vehicle known as the Crellin Duplex pullman coach.
    Mr. Callaghan: No such experiments have been made by the Ministry of Transport. The makers have lodged an appeal with my right hon. Friend against the refusal of a certificate of fitness for a vehicle of the type referred to, and he will announce his decision to the parties in due course.

    Arterial Roads (Public Conveniences)
    Mr. Wilson Harrisasked the Minister of Transport whether he will arrange for the provision of public conveniences on arterial roads.
    Mr. Callaghan: My right hon. Friend has sympathy with this proposal, but he has no powers to carry it out, as the provision of public conveniences is the responsibility of local authorities, subject to my right hon. Friend's consent in the case of trunk roads.
    Mr. Wilson Harris: In view of the fact that these establishments are hardly less needed in open country than in the towns, could not the hon. Gentleman make representations to local authorities on the subject?
    Mr. Callaghan: I think local authorities are very well aware of the need.

    Train Staffs (Reliefs)
    Mr. Pickthornasked the Minister of Transport the numbers of train-men who left trains on running lines in each of the 12 month periods ending respectively on 31st January, 1947, 1948 and 1949, in a form comparable with the figures given on 11th February, 1946, for the 12 months ended on 31st January, 1946.
    Mr. Callaghan: This information is not now available in the Ministry of Transport as the matter is a day-to-day responsibility of the British Transport Commission.
    Mr. Pickthorn: Does than mean that, although the looking after this matter may be a day-to-day responsibility, the general upshot of it is generally regarded as outside the proper purview of the Minister?
    Mr. Callaghan: Day-to-day matters are delegated by the Act to the Railway Executive.
    Mr. Pickthorn: Is the hon. Gentleman denying that questions of public safety depend on this, and are not matters of public safety the responsibility of the Minister?
    Mr. Callaghan: There have been no allegations made, as far as I know, that public safety is not being observed.

    Area Consultative Committees
    Colonel J. R. H. Hutchisonasked the Minister of Transport whether the division of the country into areas as provided for under the Transport Act has been decided upon; in how many such areas have consultative committees been set up; and in how many they remain to be appointed.
    Mr. Callaghan: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply my right hon. Friend gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield (Mr. Ernest Davies) on 25th July.
    Colonel Hutchison: How does it come about that nearly two years have been taken to appoint all these area consultative committees? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that many of the questions going to the central council are in fact questions which should go to area consultative committees, rather than to the central council?
    Mr. Callaghan: If they go to the central council, I have no doubt that there is machinery for sending them on to the committees.

  MAJOR INDUSTRIES (EXPORTS)
  Mr. Austinasked the Prime Minister whether he will consider setting up under governmental authority an inquiry into industry for the purposes of assessing potential export prospects in major industries, identifying units in industry unwilling to co-operate in this direction, and surveying and reporting on large-scale industrial establishments, both privately and publicly owned, not being fully utilised in the national interest, and on other correlated issues bearing on the export trade.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): No, Sir. Government Departments concerned with particular industries are in constant touch with them about their export prospects and the ability of individual firms to take advantage of export openings. Departments are also giving industries every possible help to expand their export capacity.
  Mr. Austin: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind, in consideration of the matters raised in this Question, that where appeals and exhortations have been made to certain sections of private enterprise over four years there has been little or no response, and will he now replace those with economic sanctions which may affect the profit-making sectors concerned and make them understand the vital needs of the industry?
  The Prime Minister: That is another question.
  Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Is the Prime Minister not aware that accusations of this sort are being hurled about in a rather irresponsible manner by his Ministerial and other colleagues, and would it not be fairer to the individuals, interests and firms concerned if these charges could be either set at rest or authenticated?
  The Prime Minister: That would be an entirely different question.
  Mr. Nicholson: Not at all.

  EGYPT (BRITISH TROOPS)
  Mr. Platts-Millsasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in view of the undertaking in Annex 3 to the Papers

  887
  regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 (Command Paper No. 7179), and having regard to the present economic difficulties, if he will now propose the evacuation of British troops from Egypt.
  The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mayhew): I have nothing to add to the statements made by my right hon. Friend in a Debate in the House earlier this year, nor to the statement I made last year in reply to a similar Question.
  Mr. Platts-Mills: As the Foreign Secretary agreed these terms with the Egyptian Prime Minister in October, 1946, and undertook to recommend them to the Government, are we to take it that this long delay is another addition to the sorry tale of the Foreign Secretary's broken undertakings?
  Mr. Mayhew: No, Sir, the negotiations were broken off at that time and agreements which had been initialled are not binding on either Government.

  DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS (PETROL)
  Mr. Platts-Millsasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the total allocation of petrol that has been made to each foreign mission in London this year in respect of their motor cars that have been granted duty-free licences, in consideration of their diplomatically privileged ownership.
  Mr. Mayhew: I will, with permission, circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement showing the allocations of petrol made to foreign diplomatic missions in respect of motor cars in diplomatic ownership during the period from 1st January, 1949 to 31st October, 1949.
  Mr. Platts-Mills: If the supply made available to our American allies is increased by the 600 per cent. by which their cars have been increased, can that matter be drawn to the attention of the Ministry of Supply?
  Mr. Mayhew: If they are buying much petrol, they are buying it with good dollars.
  Following is the statement:

  Diplomatic Mission

  Petrol (Units)

  Afghan Embassy

  …

  600

  Argentine Embassy

  …

  7,294

  Austrian Legation

  …

  1,452

  Belgian Embassy

  …

  7,053

  Bolivian Embassy

  …

  890

  Brazilian Embassy

  …

  4,596

  Bulgarian Legation

  …

  750

  Burmese Embassy

  …

  1,651

  Chilean Embassy

  …

  4,125

  Chinese Embassy

  …

  5,816

  Colombian Embassy

  …

  1,530

  Cuban Legation

  …

  750

  Czechoslovak Embassy

  …

  3,039

  Danish Embassy

  …

  3,070

  Dominican Legation

  …

  545

  Ecuadorean Legation

  …

  304

  Egyptian Embassy

  …

  2,886

  Ethiopian Embassy

  …

  577

  Finnish Legation

  …

  929

  French Embassy

  …

  12,500

  Greek Embassy

  …

  2,823

  Guatemalan Legation

  …

  680

  Haytian Legation

  …

  430

  Hungarian Legation

  …

  898

  Icelandic Legation

  …

  1,800

  Iranian Embassy

  …

  2,832

  Iraqi Embassy

  …

  3,492

  Israeli Legation

  …

  302

  Italian Embassy

  …

  3,800

  Jordan Legation

  …

  1,498

  Lebanese Legation

  …

  1,105

  Liberian Legation

  …

  300

  Luxembourg Legation

  …

  1,151

  Mexican Embassy

  …

  2,140

  Nepalese Embassy

  …

  808

  Netherlands Embassy

  …

  7,680

  Norwegian Embassy

  …

  7,247

  Panamanian Legation

  …

  1,130

  Paraguayan Legation

  …

  680

  Peruvian Embassy

  …

  1,190

  Philippine Legation

  …

  1,200

  Polish Embassy

  …

  6,480

  Portuguese Embassy

  …

  2,410

  Roumanian Legation

  …

  860

  Salvadorean Legation

  …

  420

  Saudi Arabian Embassy

  …

  3,546

  Soviet Embassy

  …

  12,000

  Spanish Embassy

  …

  4,549

  Swedish Embassy

  …

  5,221

  Swiss Legation

  …

  6,000

  Syrian Legation

  …

  965

  Thai Embassy

  …

  2,613

  Turkish Embassy

  …

  5,515

  United States Embassy

  …

  48,840

  Uruguayan Embassy

  …

  2,570

  Venezuelan Embassy

  …

  1,802

  Yugoslav Embassy

  …

  4,420

  BERLIN AIR LIFT (HONOURS)
  Air-Commodore Harveyasked the Prime Minister if he will now recommend the award of a General Service Medal to Service personnel, and a suitable medal for civilian aircrew, who took part in the Berlin air lift.
  The Prime Minister: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Newark (Mr. Shephard) on 25th May, to which I have nothing to add.
  Air-Commodore Harvey: Why did the Prime Minister, when I put a supplementary question to him last week, tell me to put the Question down again, if he is going to keep to the same answer? Does he not agree that the Service and civilian aircrews, at great loss of life, extricated our own and Western European countries from a very grave situation, and why does he not recognise the services rendered in the same way as he has recognised the Yangtse incident?
  The Prime Minister: I gathered that the hon. and gallant Member wanted to have something more said on this point. It was very fully explained at the time that campaign medals are not given except where there is a war.
  Sir W. Smithers: Will the Prime Minister consider issuing a special medal to people like the Lord President of the Council and the Minister of Transport, who are beginning under force of circumstances to tell the people of Britain the truth?

  JAPAN (INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS)
  Mr. Platts-Millsasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what was the nature of the conversations recently held in Tokyo between General MacArthur and the United Kingdom Commissioner-General in South-East Asia.
  Mr. Mayhew: Mr. MacDonald's visit to Japan was one of courtesy, and his conversations with General MacArthur were purely an informal exchange of views and information on subjects of common interest.
  Mr. Platts-Mills: Was "The Times" correspondent in Tokyo not correct when he expressed the opinion that we are agreeing with General MacArthur the terms of a treaty which will be directly contrary to British interests, and when he asserted that the terms will be that the Americans will have permanent bases and their occupation troops will not even be reduced in number under this so-called peace treaty?
  Mr. Mayhew: I am not aware of this "Times" report, but certainly those questions did not arise out of these purely informal conversations.
  Mr. Ronald Chamberlain: Can we take it that the principles agreed at Canberra in September, 1947, represent the policy of the Government in this whole matter?
  Mr. Mayhew: That is an entirely different question.

  PASSPORTS (APPLICATION FORMS)
  Mr. Vernon Bartlettasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why an applicant for a passport now has to state whether his or her marriage has been dissolved; and what other changes have been made in the new forms of application.
  Mr. Mayhew: As the reply is lengthy, I will with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Mr. Bartlett: Can the hon. Gentleman assure the House that if an applicant for a passport refuses to give information about divorce, it would make no difference to his or her right as a British subject to have a British passport?
  Mr. Mayhew: I believe that the question of the children of divorced parents comes into this, and I would not like to give that assurance without careful study.
  Following is the reply:
  An applicant for a passport has for many years been required to state whether he or she is married or single or whether his or her marriage has been dissolved. This inquiry, although primarily intended to reveal the precise marital status of the applicant, is also designed to ensure that where the name of a child is included in the application the passport is not issued, through ignorance of the dissolution of the parents' marriage, without the consent of the parent or guardian who has legal custody of the child. The information is not now recorded in the passport itself and, in common with all information given in connection with the issue of a passport, is treated as confidential.
  The passport application form was remodelled in 1947 in connection with the arrangements for enabling applications to be made through the offices of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. A number of other changes were introduced at that time, including the issue of detailed instructions for completing the application form. Changes of an entirely different character were necessitated by the passing of the British Nationality Act, 1948, which introduced new nationality distinctions based on citizenship and effected a radical change in the position of married women. The form has also been revised in some of its less important details to ensure that the applicant is not required to furnish information or evidence which is not strictly germane to the purpose of obtaining a passport.

  GERMANY (BRITISH PERIODICALS)
  Mr. Skeffington-Lodgeasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, as a measure to counter the anti-British propaganda in Western Germany, he will consider the establishment there of a journal akin to the "British Ally," published in Moscow.
  Mr. Mayhew: No, Sir. Several British sponsored publications which act as the counterpart of "British Ally," as well as British newspapers and periodicals, already circulate freely in Western Germany.
  Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: As these are not adequate to deal with the serious anti-British propaganda rapidly spreading in Western Germany, will my hon. Friend look into the situation again, especially as no fewer than 77 pan-German papers have recently sprung up in the Ruhr, all expressing an anti-British viewpoint?
  Mr. John Hynd: Will my hon. Friend give an assurance that these replies to anti-British propaganda will be published in America as well as in Germany?
  Mr. Anthony Nutting: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that a firmer and more positive policy by His Majesty's Government in Germany would do far more than any British or Allied
  892
  publications in Germany to explain away the feebleness of our present policy?
  Mr. Mayhew: Of course, I cannot accept the assumptions of that question. The efforts we are making to bring home the British point of view are, as I think the reply shows, very effective in many directions.
  Mr. Wilson Harris: Would the hon. Gentleman consider that the publication of a British paper which was obviously British propaganda would completely defeat its own object?
  Mr. Albu: Is it not a fact that "Die Welt" is British controlled and would it not be better to say so on the front page?
  Mr. Mayhew: That is a different question.
  Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Owing to the seriousness of the position in Germany in regard to the Press, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter at the earliest opportunity on the Adjournment.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Flower Imports
    Mr. Douglas Marshallasked the President of the Board of Trade what imports of flowers he proposes to permit in the first six months of 1950.
    The Secretary for Overseas Trade (Mr. Bottomley): The total amount of permitted imports of cut flowers provided for under bilateral agreements for 1949 is 895 tons. Imports under these arrangements come in at any time up to 30th April next.

    Imports (Low-Priced Goods)
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodgeasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps the Government intend to take to safeguard the employment of British workers, having regard to the recent relaxation of import restrictions and the risk that low-priced goods resulting from sweated labour in Europe and elsewhere may now arrive here in large quantities.
    Mr. Bottomley: I have no evidence that unemployment is arising, or is likely to arise, in this country as a result of competition from goods produced by sweated labour in O.E.E.C. Europe, or other countries to which the recent relaxation of import restrictions extends. His Majesty's Government would, of course,

    893
    consider what action to take if and when any such difficulties appeared likely to arise. It is the policy of the Government to do all they can in the international field to promote fair labour standards.
    Mr. John Hynd: Will the Minister try to persuade his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary that a great contribution can be made to this problem by bringing Germany into full membership of the I.L.O., and thus preventing sweated conditions of labour arising there?
    Mr. Austin: Further to the original answer, is my hon. Friend aware that exports of textiles and textile machinery have already been seriously affected by manufactures from Japan?
    Mr. Bottomley: I have not that information.
    Mr. Charles Williams: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the whole Tory Party are expecting him to safeguard British industry in this way?

    ALL FIGURES TO NEAREST THOUSAND TONS OF 2,240 LB.

    Year

    Production of Steel in the United Kingdom

    Imports of Steel into the United Kingdom

    Production of Crude Steel (Steel ingots and Steel for castings)

    Production of Semi-Finished Steel (a) (c)

    Imports of Crude Steel (Ingots)

    Imports of Semi-Finished Steel (a)

    1929

    9,636

    7,242

    42

    991

    1930

    7,326

    5,648

    35

    1,093

    1931

    5,203

    3,295

    22

    1,250

    1932

    5,261

    4,174

    5

    739

    1933

    7,024

    5,775

    3

    314

    1934

    8,850

    6,931

    6

    455

    1935

    9,859

    8,008

    6

    362

    1936

    11,785

    9,705

    6

    548

    1937

    12,984

    10,715

    33

    588

    1938

    10,398

    8,437

    23

    351

    1939

    13,221

    *(b)

    24

    806

    1940

    12,975

    *

    488

    1,581

    1941

    12,312

    *

    563

    1,732

    1942

    12,942

    *

    481

    1,118

    1943

    13,031

    *

    498

    964

    1944

    12,142

    *

    298

    701

    1945

    11,824

    *

    36

    80

    1946

    12,695

    *

    75

    309

    1947

    12,725

    *

    112

    212

    1948

    14,877

    *

    19

    188

    1949 (first 9 months Annual Rate).

    15,449

    *

    11

    404

    * Not available.

    Notes:—

    (a) "Semi-Finished Steel" includes billets, blooms, slabs, sheet bars and tinplate bars.

    (b) The collection of statistics of production of semi-finished steel was discontinued in 1939 since the figures served no very useful purpose. An estimate of the production in later years may be made, by taking 85 per cent. of the corresponding figures for crude steel production.

    (c) Production of semis from home-produced ingot and imported ingot.

    Mr. Driberg: Has not my hon. Friend heard of the great industrial recovery of Western Germany—on a purely capitalist basis, with mass unemployment and very low-paid labour?

  STEEL (PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS)
  Mr. Warbeyasked the Minister of Supply whether he will publish a table showing the quantities of raw and semi-finished steel respectively, produced in the United Kingdom and imported from abroad during each of the years 1929–48 inclusive; and for the year 1949 the imports and annual rate of production to the latest convenient date.
  The Minister of Supply (Mr. G. R. Strauss): Yes, Sir. I will circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Following is the statement:

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  MARRIED WOMEN (RESTRAINT UPON ANTICIPATION) BILL [Lords]
  Order for Second Reading read.
  3.29 p.m.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Hartley Shawcross): I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."
  The object of this Bill, which I cannot help thinking has been the subject of some misapprehension in many quarters, is to prevent the further application of a legal device, which, by a complete perversion of an old, equitable, doctrine which was intended to protect married women, now operates, almost invariably to their disadvantage, by preventing them so long—but only so long—as they remain married, from dealing with their property as their own. It is a device which, moreover, 14 years ago was considered so inimical to the public interest that Parliament then forbade recourse being made to it in any deeds, instruments or wills executed after that date.
  The Government are satisfied by the experience in the 14 years since that time, by the totally changed circumstances which exist today, that even in the case of instruments executed prior to 1935 the device has become an unjust and anomalous anachronism and they propose by this Bill to put an end to it so that all married women will be on exactly the same basis, in exactly the same position as each other, as spinsters, as widows, and indeed as men, whether single or married.
  I am painfully conscious of the fact that I am about to make a long and tedious speech. One of the misfortunes of being a Law Officer is that one is often involved in the explanation of rather technical matters and perhaps led into the delivery of what may seem very like a lecture. It is just as distasteful to me to have to deliver a lecture as I am sure it will be tedious to you, Sir, to have to listen to it. But this is rather a technical matter and it may in the end be for the convenience of the House if before I explain why the Government have thought it expedient at this moment to introduce this legislation and how they propose to deal with the matter, I told the House something
  896
  about the origin and nature of the restraint upon anticipation itself.
  The history of the matter really begins in mediaeval days when under the Common Law of England all the property of the wife belonged to her husband. I do not know whether in those days, as now, the husband on marriage undertook to endow his wife with all his worldly goods. The fact was that the wife got nothing; on the contrary, all her pre-marriage property and all the property which she acquired during her marriage became solely the property of her husband and under his complete control. That was the original and fundamental rule of the Common Law.
  The inconvenience and perhaps the injustice of the fact that married women were not able to deal with property which had come to them gradually became manifest, and the Chancery courts sought to mitigate the harshness of the old Common Law rule about the matter. The first inroad which they made upon the husband's position in this respect was by their invention of a device whereby property might be vested in trustees for the separate use of the wife. That prevented property which was dealt with in that way from becoming automatically the property of the husband and it left the wife free to deal with the property in any way she might desire.
  In those days it appears that husbands were able to exercise a greater influence over their wife's desires than is the common experience nowadays. Whilst a married woman was by this device of the Chancery courts enabled to dispose of her property as if she had been single, there was the danger that by one means or another—"by kicks or by kisses," the phrase was—the husband might induce her to dispose of the property, to deal with it, to mortgage it or sell it and hand over the proceeds to him. The husband exercised the dominating influence at that time. Consequently, the ingenuity of the Chancery lawyers was then directed to protecting the wife against the importunities of her husband. It is said that in the 18th century Lord Thurlow was the first judge to discover the process and to get it adopted by the Chancery courts in the interests, so the story goes, of a relative of his own whom he thought to be in need of protection from her husband.

  897
  At all events, by the end of the 18th century it was well established in the Chancery courts that property could be settled upon a woman, whether married at the time or not, subject to a "restraint upon anticipation," as it was called. It operated in this way: when land or other personal property was settled upon a woman, it might be by her father, by some other ancestor or relative, by her prospective husband or by his parents—or it might be and not infrequently was, by the woman herself effecting a settlement of her own property. When such a settlement was made by deed or by will, a clause could be inserted in the instrument effecting the settlement by which the woman was prevented, if she married, and only so long as she remained married, from anticipating it, that is to say from disposing of the property or from charging the corpus, or the income from it in any way before its receipt by her.
  The effect of that device, and that is the nature of the device which still continues, is that so long as the marriage continues the woman whose property is subject to that restraint cannot charge it, cannot dispose of it, and can only receive the income from it as and when the income falls due. But as soon as the marriage comes to an end—if she is divorced or if her husband dies—she can dispose then of the property and deal with it as an unmarried woman in any way she chooses, unless indeed she later marries again, when again this restraint suddenly springs up. That was the device and its sole purpose was, not to assure that the married woman would have an income in any circumstances, as I think the Amendment in the names of certain hon. Members suggests.
  [That this House, while willing to provide for an extension of the existing relief from restraint on anticipation in cases where such relief in justified, declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill, which would restrospectively nullify in every case a provision deliberately made by a father to secure that his daughter, while married, should have an annual income of her own in all circumstances.]
  If that were the purpose, in so far as it operated against creditors, as indeed this device does, it is merely a licence to cheat. The sole purpose of the device, as
  898
  it was invented by the Chancery courts, was to protect the wife against the importunities of her husband.
  That was the device and so the law remained until 1882, when the Married Women's Property Act of that year provided that the property of a married woman should no longer go to her husband but was to form her separate estate. That did away with the need for any trust to the separate use of a married woman. Married women were, I suppose, still not fully emancipated. There was still occasionally a danger that a wife might be unduly influenced by her husband. At all events, and this is the real point of the story about this restraint, by that time the clause providing for restraint against anticipation had got into the lawyers' precedent books and continued to be used as a matter of common form whenever a deed or will was executed settling money or property upon a woman, with or without the interposition of trustees, subject to a limited discretion given to the court to lift the restraint for a particular purpose and in a particular case. I shall say something about that later. Subject to that power the nature of the restraint remained from that time until 1935 very much as it had been originally.
  The point that I want to emphasise at this stage is, of course, that this restraint involved a departure from what was, and is, the fundamental rule of our law, namely, that when one gives a person property or an interest in property—a life estate or whatever it may be—one cannot put upon him or her any fetter or clog as to the way in which that property shall be used. It involved a departure from that fundamental rule which arose only, and in a sense perhaps fortuitously, if the owner of the property happened to get married. And it remained only so long as that particular marriage continued. I mention that because the device was something quite different from the practice which existed, and still exists, and will continue to exist, of settling property subject to a discretionary trust. That is something quite different and useful, and which will not be interfered with in any respect by this Bill.
  In that case, where a discretionary trust arises, the father or other relative

  899
  who is proposing to settle money on the son or daughter says to himself as a matter of deliberate consideration "This girl"—or boy—"is not fit to have the sole control of this property." Perhaps she is improvident, perhaps she is intemperate, perhaps she is extravagant, perhaps she is weak and likely to be unduly influenced not only by her husband, but by her aunt or friends or other people. "Therefore because of the particular circumstances relating to this girl, I think it would be better in her case to vest the money or property in trustees and give them the absolute discretion as to how and when they should advance it to her. I will not put it under her sole control, because I do not think she is a person who, for one reason or another, ought to have the full control over it."
  That discretionary trust method is something which will remain open to fathers or others who settle money on their sons or daughters, and they will be able to avail themselves of it in appropriate cases. But that is a totally different matter to the so-called restraint on anticipation. In the case of the restraint, however improvident a woman may be, no restriction whatever arises on the way in which she controls and uses her capital while she remains single. If she chooses—and the suggestion is not so preposterous as it sounds—if she chooses because of her financial arrangements and because a restraint exists, to live in sin instead of getting married, she can "blue" the whole lot of her money at any time she wishes. If she is divorced for misconduct she can deal with the property exactly as if no restraint existed. If her husband dies she can employ the property in any way she seeks to. But if, in the wisdom and maturity of later years she decides to marry again, and if any of the property is left, this restraint will again rest upon her.
  It may be thought that it is no wonder in those circumstances that in 1934 the Law Revision Committee which was sitting at that time—a very distinguished committee, if I may say so—made this recommendation:
  "We have come to the conclusion that how ever useful the restraint may have been over a century ago … its continuance is no longer consistent with the present position of married women, to whom alone it applies and it should be abolished by legislation as regards all settlements,
  900
  whether made by deed or will, which take effect after such legislation comes into force."
  I am going to deal with that point. Of course, that is the purpose of this Bill. In 1935 Parliament proposed legislation with that effect. But that legislation has left the curious result that the older married women whose affairs were regulated by deed or wills taking effect before 1935 are left, in the totally changed circumstances of today, without the possibility of using their property as they themselves think best in their own circumstances; while their younger and perhaps less experienced sisters are left in complete freedom to do what they like.
  Circumstances have greatly changed since 1935. I know of a case where money was settled, subject to a restraint, in the early 1920's, but where the income from that money today, owing to changes in taxation, is only one-twentieth of what it was on the date that the settlor imposed the restraint on anticipation of the income. That settlement cannot be altered. The settlor is dead, and the dead hand of the donor consequently remains effective although the circumstances as to the amount of income have wholly changed; although I venture to think that nobody could doubt for a moment that if that settlor were still alive he would be the first person who would wish to see the restraint removed to enable his daughter to meet the circumstances with which she has become faced.
  That is not an isolated case. There are a great many other cases where the existence of restraints of this kind are causing hardship and even bitterness against the law, bitterness against the settlor who allowed a clause like this to creep into the deed or will; sometimes even bitterness against the marriage itself, the continuance of which is the sole reason why these women are unable to deal with the money which they need. We think that the time has come to allow living people to regulate their own affairs as they think best, freed from the dead hand imposed on them, almost always as a matter of common form—copied out by the lawyers from the precedent books, without any kind of deliberation by the parent or settlor as to what the effect would be, and without any kind of appreciation or realisation of the change in circumstances which has occurred since 1935.

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  It would be disingenuous on my part if I did not tell the House what led the Government to decide that this moment was opportune for general legislation on this conduct was the introduction in another place of what is called a personal Bill dealing with the estate of Lady Mountbatten; although the case of the Mountbatten estate, as I shall seek to show in a moment or two, is very different from the typical case with which this Bill is concerned. It would not be right or proper for me to say anything at all about the merits of the Mountbatten Bill, but I want to explain to the House the dilemma which arose in consequence of its passage through another place.
  Lady Mountbatten desired to remove a restraint on anticipation which arose under a deed executed some 20 or 30 years before. She said that circumstances which had occurred since, the great increase in taxation, reduced an income amounting to, I think, £80,000 net in the early 'twenties to £4,500 in 1948—an illustration of the great change in the distribution of wealth which has taken place in recent years. To that end she introduced a personal Bill into the House of Lords.
  Under the rules and traditions of Parliament these personal Bills are quasi-judicial in their nature. They are introduced in the House of Lords. There they are first of all heard before a special committee. In this case, if I may say so with respect, it was a very distinguished special committee which contained, for instance, Lord Hailsham, the late Lord Uthwatt and Lord Simonds, in addition to other distinguished members of another place. Before that special committee the procedure is—and it was followed in this case—that evidence is given and counsel are heard. That was done, and the special committee reported in favour of the Bill.
  Subsequently the Bill was unanimously passed by the House of Lords. Then it came to this House, and then this dilemma arose. Certain hon. Members opposite, imbued, if I may say so, with a spirit of egalitarianism which one welcomed very much coming from the source it did, put down a Motion in which they invited this House to refuse a Second Reading to a Bill
  902
  "to secure an Amendment of the law which, if justifiable, should be made by public Act for the benefit of all whom it may concern."
  That resulted in a position of considerable constitutional difficulty. As I said, these personal Bills are quasi-judicial in their nature. In this House we are rarely in a position to hear evidence or Counsel in regard to them, and in the past it has been the invariable rule that personal Bills sent down in that way from another place have been passed in this House. There is no doubt that as a matter of strict law we could in this House have rejected the Bill, but if we had rejected it that would have involved a departure from the established practice and convention by which we have hitherto, dealt with Bills of this kind. There has been one such case only in the past century.
  In those circumstances the Government would have felt obliged, if the matter had come to this House, to advise the-House that in accordance with the normal practice that personal Bill ought to be passed. On the other hand, we felt very great sympathy with the view expressed in the Motion standing in the names of hon. Members opposite. We thought that the law ought to be altered generally, and we realised also that if the Mountbatten Bill were passed it would be difficult to refuse the passage of further personal Bills introduced with the same object by people wealthy enough to afford the expense of Parliamentary procedure, while the position of the great majority of those who are adversely affected by these restraints—people who could not by any means afford to bring in personal Bills to get the restraints removed—would be in no way mitigated.
  We therefore decided to use the Parliamentary time which would otherwise have been involved by a discussion of the Mountbatten Bill for the introduction of this general Bill which is now before the House. Subsequently, as the House knows, the Mountbatten Bill was, by leave, withdrawn, although I think it right to say that there was no kind of arrangement or bargain or even negotiation about the matter. The Bill was withdrawn, but the Government have introduced this Bill because they believe that this Bill with its general proposal is right.
  I should like also in that connection to make this further point. Indeed, I give

  903
  the point to anybody, if there be anybody, who thinks that this proposal is an appropriate occasion for the exercise of demagogy. There may be a handful of other cases comparable to the case of Lady Mountbatten where wealthy heiresses will have their position affected by the proposal in this Bill, but that is by no means the typical case of those affected under the existing law by these restraints on anticipation, nor was it the Mountbatten Bill which first directed the attention of the Government to the desirability of altering the law in this respect.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: Would the Attorney-General guide the House on this point? The personal Bill was dropped. I should like to know whether there was any request from any body of people—any legal organisation or any body of judges—stating the need for this Bill at this moment?
  The Attorney-General: That is just the point I was coming to. I was saying that it was not the Mountbatten Bill which directed the attention of the Government to the desirability of having this Bill. I personally first had the matter forcibly drawn to my attention by the National Union of Women Teachers, which is not, I fancy, a body specially concerned with the more wealthy section of our community. I was personally canvassed in the matter by an influential committee—I think at one time the chairman was Mrs. Cazalet Keir though she is not now—the Status of Women Committee. That is a committee which comprises a very large number of women's organisations. The fact was that for many years past a large number of important women's organisations have been pressing for an alteration in the law. It was because Parliamentary time was in any event going to be taken up by discussion of this matter in the personal case of the Mountbatten Bill that we thought it appropriate to use that time in order to bring about a general alteration in the law which we thought was a meritorious alteration. We thought that it was a merritorious alteration because in the typical case great hardship is being caused to quite small people by the existence of this restraint. As the "Law Times" put it:
  "A restraint was practically invariably attached to life interests given to women
  904
  before 1935.… The device, originally doubtless intended for the wealthy women, was generally adopted by conveyancers …"
  Not by fathers, relatives and not by settlors; but, and this is the truth, because it was a matter of form—
  "… was generally adopted by conveyancers for those in very humble circumstances."
  I should like to tell the House of one or two instances known to me. This is the common typical case now affected by this restraint. It is the case of the little middle-class woman whose parents had left her their life savings or perhaps their house in a will drawn up by a solicitor in common form containing this clause, the effect of which the parents have not in the least understood, and if they have noticed it and inquired about it, in all probability they have been told, "This is the common form. It is always done."
  I know of a case of a married woman who was left a sum of £5,000 by her father on his death. It brought her in, subject to taxation something of the order of £150 a year. She was married to a teacher earning £500. At the time that will came into operation those two people jointly had to pay Income Tax of £45. Today they pay jointly £121. The cost of living has risen and their position is obviously very different from what it was at the time when the father left that money in his will and made it subject to restraint on anticipation. Those people now want to realise some money.
  We are seeking to alleviate the position of these ordinary little people. We are seeking to enable them to realise their own money and to spend it as they will. In that case, perhaps they want to give the children a better chance in life. If they have the money, why should not they use it to do that? Perhaps they want to provide some special nourishment or treatment for a husband who is ill. Why should not they use their own money for that purpose?
  I know of a case of two young people, a young couple, where the husband is gravely ill with tuberculosis. The wife has money settled on her subject to restraint on anticipation, and that is practically all they have got. The doctors say, rightly or wrongly, that if he was sent to Switzerland he would recover. She cannot get her money because it is subject to the restraint.
  Mr. Gage: Would not that be an appropriate case for application to a judge of the Chancery Court who would grant it?
  The Attorney-General: Does the hon. Member really think that? This woman cannot afford even to pay for the extra food and nourishment that her husband needs today. What is the hon. Member suggesting? First of all, she would have to go to counsel and get advice on whether she could with success make an application to the Chancery Court and how much it would cost. He would not be able to advise her whether the application would be successful or not, but perhaps he would say that she would have a good case.
  What is the next step? If it was an application to the Chancery Court, it would cost anything from £50 to £100. She has not got the money, and it is completely illusory to say that this hard case, which is the typical case, of people who have very little money can be met by application to the court. She will get this money free in a year or two, but it will be too late to deal with it for the particular purpose for which she most wants to use that money, and it must lead to bitterness—biterness against the law, against her father, whom she thinks made a mistake in bequeathing money so that she could not lose. It may lead to unhappiness which might continue for the rest of her life because of the fact that she knows that she has money which, had she been able to use it, would have made such a difference to her life. Who would not say, in a case like that, that the father, had he been alive—and he is not—would not have been the very person to say that she should be able to make use of that money?
  That is a typical case, but there are others. There is the case of a fairly old couple where there is money invested, subject to the restraint, belonging to the wife, and bringing in 3½ per cent., and the couple themselves are paying 4½ per cent. on a mortgage and just scraping along. The husband is retired. If they could realise that capital sum, they could pay off the mortgage and buy a joint annuity for the remainder of their lives without the pinching and scraping which is necessary now. These are the typical cases, and, in discussing this matter, let us deal with typical cases and not be misled by
  906
  talk of wealthy heiresses and of the possible loss of Sur Tax to the Revenue.
  In these circumstances, the question is: What is to be done? I believe that everybody agrees that something ought to be done. The only question is what. What are the alternatives that have been suggested? So far as I know, there are two. One is that we should enlarge the powers of the court, and no doubt that would appeal to the hon. Member for South Belfast (Mr. Gage).
  Let me say a word about the present position of the court in this matter. The court can, under the existing law, raise the restraint for a particular purpose if it considers that it is in the interests of the married woman so to do. The discretion that the court has has been very narrowly construed, and courts are inclined to isolate married women from the family and to consider the matter from the strictly financial point of view and decide, more or less as a matter of accountancy, whether raising the restraint would result in some benefit, and they are not always able to take account of all the human considerations which arise in connection with a matter of this kind. In addition, the procedure is very expensive. But it is said that we should enlarge the jurisdiction of the court and say that the restraint must be lifted unless it appears to the court that it is not in the interest of the married woman so to do.
  That might meet the case of the wealthy heiress, but it would not meet the case of the little teacher whom I mentioned. How could she afford the expense of an application to the court when she can hardly manage to pay her own living expenses? The great Chancery lawyers, if I may, with respect, so describe them, who spoke about this matter in another place were agreed that application to the court was an inadequate remedy for the present situation, and I invite anybody who thinks it is to study the speech made in another place by Lord Simonds about this matter.
  Alternatively, it is suggested that we should give the trustees a discretion to advance money in any particular case. Sometimes, it is the wife herself who is the trustee, and that would raise a curious and anomalous situation. Often, trustees are complete strangers, not appointed or even contemplated by the

  907
  testator. They may be all sorts and conditions of people, and the exercise of their discretion would manifestly be far more capricious than that of Chancery judges. They will have no principles to guide them, and they might, with no possibility of appeal, refuse to raise the restraint for altogether unworthy motives.
  The vast majority of women who are affected by this restraint are quite as well able to decide what is for their benefit as the Chancery judge or as a couple of trustees. Why should the vast majority of women be penalised by having to go to the Chancery Court or to seek the consent of trustees simply because of a very small minority who, perhaps, cannot be trusted to exercise so wise a discretion? We urge the House to do away with this anomaly altogether, in order to avoid the expense and the inequality and the uncertainty of a discretionary power, whether vested in the court or trustees, and in order that all married women shall be placed on the same basis, able to plan their arrangements themselves and control and use their own property.
  What objections remain to that course? It may be said, and indeed it is said, that this proposal involves retrospective legislation. That sounds substantial, but, really, in the circumstances of this particular matter, it is not. Retrospection exists now in the power to go to the court and get the restraint lifted, and, if anything is to be done—and everybody agrees that something must be done—retrospection would be involved in it. It applies to the alternative proposal to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court. As was said by a noble Lord in another place:
  "You have substituted for the will and resolution of the testator the will and resolution of an old gentleman sitting in the Strand."
  Mr. Oliver Stanley: It is out of Order to quote speeches made in another place.
  The Attorney-General: I have done it now, and I must apologise for any breach of the Rules regarding quotations from another place.
  We propose to substitute the will and resolution of the testator's own flesh and blood, and we propose to do it in those cases where, nine times out of ten, the restraint was put in by the lawyers as a
  908
  matter of common form, often in respect of infants and sometimes in respect of a child still unborn, and usually without any contemplation at all of what might happen to the woman upon whom the restraint was imposed, and without any conscious deliberation at all by the donor or testator who was creating the settlement. We propose to remove it because, at least, in nine cases out of ten, the circumstances are so changed from those before 1935 that testators would only too gladly lift the restraint themselves if they could. It is idle to say, as the Amendment rejecting this Bill says, that these restraints have arisen because fathers have deliberately wanted to ensure that their daughters would have an income in all circumstances. If there was any deliberation about it—and in nine cases out of ten, perhaps in 99 cases out of a 100, there was not—the intention was to protect the daughter against the husband, not to create a protection in all circumstances.
  As I said—and I wonder if any hon. Member opposite or on this side will contradict it—if the intention was to protect the daughter "in all circumstances," to ensure that "in all circumstances" she would have an income, it would be merely a licence to cheat and defraud creditors who supplied her with goods on the basis of what appeared to be a large income and who when they found she refused to pay could not attach her income for payment. The Law Revision Committee which considered this aspect of the matter pointed out that the restraint was sometimes discreditably used for the purpose of defeating creditors.
  Sir John Mellor: Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman overlooked Section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, which says:
  "Where a married woman who has been adjudged bankrupt has separate property the income of which is subject to a restraint on anticipation, the court shall have power, on the application of the trustee, to order that, during such time as the court may order, the whole or some part of such income be paid to the trustee for distribution amongst the creditors."
  The Attorney-General: That is a provision with which I am not unfamiliar and which is useful only in a small minority of cases especially those in which a married woman has been engaged in trade. It does not greatly affect this position. If the hon. Gentleman has

  909
  any doubt about it, I would refer him to the report of the committee of 1934 and to the speech made by Lord Simonds in another place the other day in which it was said that this device can be used, and sometimes is used, as a discreditable device for defeating creditors.
  Mr. Leslie Hale: I think that my right hon. and learned Friend is overlooking Section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, which limited bankruptcy to a married woman on carrying an a trade or business. That Section was repealed by the Act of 1935, and, therefore, that particular trouble has been dealt with.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels rose—
  The Attorney-General: My hon. and learned Friend will have an opportunity of adding anything he cares when I have finished this already all too long speech.
  The point about bankruptcy remains in practice as I stated it, and that was the view of the Committee which considered the matter in 1934, of Lord Simonds, and, I am told, also of Lord Maugham in another place the other day, that this device could be and is used in that way. If it is not used in that way, and if the only purpose of the device is not as the Motion says, to assure income in all circumstances, but to protect the wife against the importunities of her husband, then I say that in the 20th century that is a hopeless anachronism which nobody can properly support.
  Finally, it is said—and I must say that this is indeed a most unworthy argument which would be quite improper in a court of law—that if the restraint were lifted, it might enable some married women to avoid part of their previous tax liability. Well, in the case of a wealthy woman, it might—
  Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrew: It would.
  The Attorney-General: No, it might. If she sold some of her interest, her income would be diminished to that extent, and to that extent she would no doubt be relieved of some Surtax liability unless she re-invested the proceeds of sale in some different and more remunerative security. If she mortgaged her income, the interest she had to pay on the mortgage would be deducted for Income Tax purposes,
  910
  and so she would get some relief in that respect. Whoever received the income would, of course, have to pay tax on it, but it might be that the tax would be on a different basis, and that there would be some net loss to the Revenue. I am quite prepared to concede that in particular cases it might involve some loss to the Revenue. That must depend on the facts of each particular transaction, but the Board of Inland Revenue and my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor do not consider that that is a ground on which any objection can properly be made to this Bill.
  Indeed, it would be a very novel principle of taxation if people were to be compelled to keep property in order that they should be liable to pay tax on it. This may happen in the case of any taxpayer. Any disposition of his property, mortgaging it, selling it, or whatever it may be, may result in a reduction of his Income Tax liability. But that right to deal with one's property in that way has not hitherto been challenged, and if it is to be challenged now, let us challenge it generally, and not simply in the case of persons who fortuitously, so far as the Revenue are concerned, happen at the time to be restrained from anticipation because they are married. If anybody wants to say that dispositions of capital should be made illegal because they involve a loss to the Revenue, we shall give careful consideration to that view, but let us do it generally and not in relation to this limited class.
  If an argument of this kind were raised in a court before which an application for the removal of the restraint were being made, it would most certainly be ruled out of order. If any court acted on such a view and refused to grant the lifting of the restraint because a loss of revenue would be involved, I have no doubt that the decision would be upset on appeal. But I give the point for those who want it both ways that an application were made to the court on the ground that the lifting of the restraint would enable the married woman so to readjust her affairs as to save taxation, then almost certainly that would be something in her interest, and the court would grant the application. That is the position. I venture to ask the House to regard this question of the effect on taxation as an incidental result which, whatever material it may provide for the

  911
  demagogue, is quite irrelevant to the real problem which this House has to consider and which is simply this.
  At this time, in the middle of the 20th century, in circumstances which are so manifestly different from those which existed when these restraints were imposed 20, 30 or 50 years ago, are married women, because of their marriage, to remain grouped in the legal text books along with infants, convicts and lunatics as persons with a special disability? We are not dealing in this Bill with children and not, for the most part, with individuals who have been thought incapable of dealing with their own affairs. We are dealing with grownup people, and we ask the House to say that their happiness and their future should not be allowed to be controlled by dead hands stretching out from the grave. Set them free and leave them free to deal with their own financial affairs in whatever way, rightly or wrongly, seems best to them.
  Sir Wavell Wakefield: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman sits down, could he state how many people he thinks would be affected by this proposed Bill? Would it be hundreds, thousands or tens of thousands?
  The Attorney-General: It is extremely difficult to give an estimate of it, and I can only give what is not much better than a guess. It is not hundreds, but thousands. I should doubt whether it is tens of thousands. That is the best way I can put it.
  4.20 p.m.
  Mr. Oliver Stanley: I feel a great temerity as a layman in flinging myself into what seems about to become a typical lawyers' battle. It certainly was so in another place, and there is every sign of it so developing in this House. I am quite confident of the risks I run, and before I start I should like to disarm possible interrupters. If anybody should get up and ask me what Lord Thurlow said in 1800 I should have no idea. If anybody were to ask me about the decision of Lord Cottenham in Milne v. Craig I should not know what he decided or why. If anyone were to refer to the Bankruptcy Act of 1914, I should be quite unable to distinguish between Section 52 and Section 125.
  912
  But, despite the speech of the Attorney-General which—as he warned us beforehand it would—covered a lot of legal technicalities, I wonder whether the issues are so impossible for the ordinary man to understand or so difficult for him to decide. I have a feeling that the issue in this case is quite simple, although I agree that the decision to be taken between the two conflicting points of view is a very delicate and difficult one to take.
  I think all of us in this House recognise that in this Bill no great political principles are involved. There is certainly no party interest on one side or the other, and I think there is neither electoral gain nor electoral loss in any decision that we take upon this Bill. It is a matter in which it is perfectly possible for sincere men, striving to arrive at what they consider the right decision, to take directly opposing views upon this matter, and I am conscious of the fact that certainly among my hon. Friends, and it may be among hon. Members on the opposite benches, those different views are taken. They were taken in another place and they may well be taken here. I think that in a matter of this kind it is right that they should be taken, and that people should be free to put forward the views at which they themselves have arrived. Therefore, so far as my hon. Friends are concerned I want to make it clear that the views I am going to put forward quite shortly, and I hope simply, are nothing more than my own personal views and do not represent in any way a considered party decision.
  I would like to begin by making the same appeal to hon. Members as that which the Attorney-General made in one portion of his speech; that is, to decide this matter on the question of principle which is involved and not to be actuated by the circumstances of any particular case. We cannot, of course, ignore the origin of the Bill which the Government now bring forward. It originated, as the Attorney-General said, in the Mountbatten Bill, and although we are assured that under pressure from various societies his mind was already leaning that way, I think we must regard it as rather an extraordinary coincidence that he should arrive at this decision at just the same time as the Mountbatten Bill was dropped.
  The Attorney-General: I do not want any misunderstanding about that. I do not think I said that. I say quite frankly that I do not think we would have had this legislation had it not been for the Mountbatten Bill, but what I said was that our attention had been drawn to the desirability of this change, and the Mountbatten Bill involved us, in any event, in the use of Parliamentary time. That is why we introduced this Bill.
  Mr. Stanley: Then there is no disagreement between us at all. This Bill did originate in the Mountbatten Bill. As hon. Members will recollect, that Bill passed through another place under the Personal Bills procedure, and when it came to this House a Motion was put upon the Paper, I think rightly, by certain hon. Friends of mine, who said that this Bill allowed one particular married woman to do certain things, and if it was right in her case it should be right in all cases; they, therefore, urged the Government, without committing themselves as to whether the Bill was right or wrong, to make it of general application.
  I think the Government, in view of that Motion, were quite right to take the course they did, and to substitute for the Private Bill the Public Bill which we are now discussing. But even though that is the origin of this Bill, if we are to come to a proper decision we must exclude from our consideration the particular circumstances of the Mountbatten Bill. I thought that the Attorney-General in dealing with this was perhaps a little ingenuous. I think it is much better to face the facts fully. It was the obvious, and indeed the express object of the Mountbatten Bill—I will not say to evade because that has unpleasant connotations, but to avoid the effect of Supertax on some part at any rate of the applicant's income. Some people have expressed surprise that the Government and presumably the Chancellor should, in introducing this Public Bill, be facilitating such a transaction. I feel very strongly myself that that is no real argument against the Bill now being introduced. If it is wrong for people, if they are rich, to use this device for selling part of their income to an institution, which does not have to pay Supertax, and thereby obviously to acquire a much
  914
  bigger capital sum for the income they are selling, then it ought to be wrong for everyone, and the Treasury—I am not expressing my view as to whether it is right or wrong—should take the necessary steps to stop it.
  I cannot feel that it is right for the vast majority of people to be permitted to do it if it suits them, while a small minority are prevented from doing it, not because of anything to do with this particular taxation problem but because of an anachronistic term in the particular settlement under which they live. But even though this may have been the object in the Mountbatten Bill—and I would not even regard the fact of that being the object as a bar to this kind of legislation—that is an exception and not the generality. There must be very many cases in which relief is required and desired not for any purposes of taxation at all but to meet changes in circumstances in a person's life which can only be met in some way such as this. The desire to go into business and have some capital to employ in it, the effect of unexpected and expensive illness, which in the case of a person with small income can only be met out of capital, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman said—
  Mr. Gallacher rose—
  Mr. Stanley: The hon. Gentleman is not going to ask me about Lord Eldon, is he?
  Mr. Gallacher: The argument which the right hon. Gentleman is putting forward is a very good argument not for this Bill, but for post-war credits.
  Mr. Stanley: That may very well be so, but that interruption does not seem quite relevant to the discussion.
  It is for that reason that I believe the only safe way is to put individual considerations aside and to regard this purely from the broad principles which are involved. I think those principles are quite simple. On the one hand, we have the supporters of the Bill, who are able to call in aid the Committee of 1934 and to show that, as a result of that Committee, the House of Commons unanimously decided to stop this practice for the future on the grounds that it was out of date and that it was no longer in the national interest.

  915
  They say, and I think they are entitled to say—"Why, if it is wrong for the future, was it right for the past? If it is admitted by all that it was right in 1935 to put a stop to the practice then, why is it that certain people, whose settlements happen to fall before that date, have to continue under an admitted handicap which more fortunate women, after 1935, no longer have to suffer?" As the years proceed and as our economics become even more fluid, it is quite clear that this practice is even more out of date now, in 1949, than it was adjudged to be in 1935. So much for one side—the supporters of the Bill.
  On the other side, the opponents of the Bill argue—and I admit with great force—that, first of all, their objection to this is that it is restrospective legislation. They protest against retrospective legislation as a matter of principle. They regard it as bad in general. But they are able to add, in this case, a particular argument against retrospection in these provisions. They are able to argue that, whereas after 1935 a settlor, who knew that a restraint on anticipation was no longer legal, was able to look round and decide what other protection he might give to his daughter, or to any woman upon whom he intended to make such a settlement, there was no such chance for any one before 1935; the restraint on anticipation disappeared without its being possible to substitute anything in its place.
  I do not think I have been unfair in trying to set out, quite simply, the two conflicting views, which can be shorn of a great deal of the technicalities which have surrounded them. As far as we are concerned, we take no party view on this matter at all but, having taken part in this Debate, I should feel it wrong not to express what is my own personal position as between those two alternative issues which I have tried to set before the House. Frankly, my own view is in support of the Bill. I should like briefly to give to the House the two reasons which lead me to that support.
  The first reason is, I think, at best not wholly logical, not wholly rational. I happen to have a great suspicion and a very great dislike of the "dead hand" being allowed to intrude and protrude too
  916
  far into the future in controlling the living. It may well have been that such procedure was not only practicable, but desirable in the old days. I am not only talking of restraint on anticipation but on other tight controls left in wills or imposed in settlements, and it may well have been, in the nineteenth century, that the economic future seemed so clear that a man could foresee not only the events immediately in front of him, but over a range of time and so could take steps to protect, say, his daughter over that period.
  It may well have been true in those days that a clever, well-informed man of business could lay down for his daughter rules upon which her finance should be conducted during her lifetime which were practicable and would be to her advantage. But I suggest that those times have long gone by and that it is impossible for any man now, however intelligent he may be, however far-sighted, to try for one moment to lay down not only for his own lifetime—which is difficult—but for the life of another generation how their finances are to be conducted. It is impossible to do that without running the gravest risk of producing exactly the effect one does not want to produce.
  There are many instances in my own personal knowledge, not only in these questions of restraint on anticipation, but even more in some of the more archaic trusts—the impossibility in any circumstances of touching any of the capital, for instance—and I know how often they have led to results quite different from what the settlor would himself have desired and have imposed hardships upon those whom he wished to protect.
  I feel, therefore, that the whole trend of settlements and testamentary dispositions over the past 20 or 30 years has been in the direction of greater and greater freedom. It is impossible for anyone to look back into the minds of people who made settlements 20 and 30 years ago, but my own conviction is that in almost every case, with the passage of time, with the difficulties which now exist, with the deterioration of economic stability, the probability is not that they would maintain—and certainly not that they would extend—the restrictions which they put in but that they would have followed the modern practice of relaxing them.

  917
  Turning to the question of retrospection, which I consider is the only valid argument against this Bill, I agree in general with the views sincerely held by many of my hon. Friends about the badness of restrospective legislation. I believe that in most cases it creates great unfairness. People do certain things in the knowledge that they are, in fact, perfectly legal, but restrospective legislation suddenly makes their act illegal, usually very much to their own disadvantage.
  In this case, however, I cannot feel that the retrospective character of this legislation will have an injurious effect upon anybody at all. It will certainly not hurt the object of the settlement—the woman who is now under a restraint of anticipation—because this Bill merely legalises anticipation; it does not force anticipation upon her, and no one need take advantage of the opportunities provided by this Bill. Nor, of course, can it impose any material loss whatsoever upon the settlor or the testator. The most we can say is that it ignores the express wishes that the settlor or testator made, perhaps, some years ago in quite different circumstances.
  But I would point out to some of my hon. Friends that to ignore the wishes of the settlor is not the unique prerogative of the method proposed in this Bill. The Amendment put forward in another place which would have enabled the courts, after hearing cases, to give this relief, involves thereby the ignoring of the wishes of the settlors. The idea put forward that trustees might be able to vary such a settlement also ignores the wishes of the settlor. No advance of any kind can be made unless it does involve ignoring, at some time and in some circumstances, the wishes of the settlors who made the settlements. Frankly, if that is to be so—and I think that that is the case—I regard this as the best way, really, to achieve that end.
  There is one other reason which makes me support this Bill. The Mountbatten Bill went through another place under the Personal Bills procedure. It was examined, as the Attorney-General said, by the Personal Bills Committee, and was passed by them, and went through another place without opposition. Now, of course, it is quite true that the House of Commons has the power, if it so desires, to reverse a decision of the House of Lords Personal Bills Committee. But,
  918
  in fact, for over 200 years it has never done so. It has become a tradition that that power is not exercised. I happen to be a great believer in tradition. I believe in tradition because it is nearly always found that beyond tradition there is some sound basis either of common sense or of sentiment, which is another reason why tradition—
  Miss Jennie Lee: May I then, suppose that I shall have the support of the right hon. Gentleman in leaving the House of Lords exactly as it is in composition?
  Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: And powers.
  Mr. Stanley: I am sure the people in another place will be delighted to hear that the hon. Lady at some time or another intends to lead a campaign to make certain that the House of Lords retains, without any diminution, its existing powers—
  Miss Lee: I meant the new circumstances.
  Mr. Stanley: —and when the hon. Lady leads that campaign she can certainly count on my utmost support. But if I may return for a brief moment to the subject of this Debate, I believe that there is a sound basis for the tradition that the House of Commons has not challenged for so long the decisions of the Personal Bills Committee. It is that the Personal Bills Committee, dealing here not with great national questions, not with great political issues, but with personal issues based on particular circumstances, is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. It can call witnesses; it can hear counsel; and it can come to a decision on the facts of the case. The House of Commons, having no such procedure in this case, no such opportunity, has been content, in those circumstances, to accept the decisions of the Personal Bills Committee.
  At any rate, I am impressed by that tradition, and, so far as I am personally concerned, if the Mountbatten Bill had come to the House of Commons I, for that reason should have felt compelled to vote for it. I ask myself, when this general Bill comes, "Is there any way in which I can distinguish the Mountbatten case from any others? Is there any way? Yes, it is quite

  919
  true that the Personal Bills Committee, going into the particular circumstances of the Mountbatten case, came to the conclusion, which I should have felt bound to support, that in that case relief was justified; but it does not mean to say for one moment that in other cases less deserving they would have come to the same conclusion."
  Frankly, my feeling is that the Mountbatten case is the least deserving of sympathy of any of the cases which are going to come up under this procedure; and that if the Personal Bills Committee felt bound to assent to the Mountbatten case, then all the other cases, which might have come before it if the people could have afforded to bring them before it, would undoubtedly have received its assent. I could not, therefore, put myself into the position that, while knowing I should have assented to the Mountbatten Bill, I, by voting against this Bill, refused similar relief to the numerous other cases whose claim, I am sure, would be more worthy of consideration. I have tried to put, quite simply, and in a personal capacity, what I conceive to be the issues, and I shall support the Bill the Government have introduced.
  4.45 p.m.
  Mr. Gage: I beg to move to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead:
  "this House, while willing to provide for an extension of the existing relief from restraint on anticipation in cases where such relief is justified, declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill, which would retrospectively nullify in every case a provision deliberately made by a father to secure that his daughter, while married, should have an annual income of her own in all circumstances."
  My hon. Friends and I, I confess, find it a little curious, to say the least of it, that only a few short weeks after the Government exhorted us all—and, I think, quite properly—to curtail our personal expenditure and to live more frugally, we should be asked by them today to pass a Measure which, in the main, results in giving increased spending power to a number of people—and a number of people with comparatively useful private incomes.
  Though I agree with the Attorney-General that the majority of those people probably are not people with enormous
  920
  incomes, certainly it is not correct to say that the majority of them are people who are only just above the bare subsistence level. I think the truth lies somewhere between those two extremes; because I think that, generally speaking, the married women who are affected by this Bill are people who could be described as being pretty comfortably off, and there can be no doubt that this Measure will enable them to capitalise to a large extent their incomes, and to spend them, at this particular juncture, in any way which they think right.
  The Attorney-General explained the Bill to us with his usual grace and eloquence, but he would have had a very much more difficult task, I think, explaining this Bill to trade unionists asking for an increase in wages. He understands the Bill, but I am doubtful if all right hon. Gentlemen opposite understand it, because I saw in "The Times" on Saturday last that the Secretary of State for War had made a speech in Durham, in which he said:
  "In Labour's next period of office—and, in spite of the snarls of the Tories, a victory for Labour is certain—we must make an organised attempt to iron out the differences in standards of living. Some people still have too much while the majority have too little. Those on the higher level, no matter who they are, must come down. This struggle to narrow the gap between rich and poor will go on as long as the Labour Party is in existence."
  I suppose it is too much to hope that the right hon. Gentleman will go back to Durham next week and tell the people there that he forgot to mention that the first Measure that the Government of which he is a member were going to pass this week would be one which would increase the standard of living of some people who certainly could not be described as the very poor.
  It was not, however, to score those kinds of points off the Government that my hon. Friends and I put down this Amendment. We believe that this Bill is wrong in principle. We think that it is nearly always wrong for a Government to interfere with private dispositions of property which have already been accomplished. That is a good general rule to adopt when examining matters of this kind.
  Before the 1935 Act, a man, as we have heard, was entitled when leaving property—usually when leaving property to his

  921
  daughter—to say that she should have the income from year to year, but that while she was married she should not be able to anticipate any part of her income. The reasons for that were, I think, quite obvious. I do not accept the statement of the right hon. and learned Gentleman that they were invariably put in because some Chancery draftsmen had them in their book of precedents, wrote them down, and nobody noticed them. I, like the right hon. and learned Gentleman, do not practise on that side of the Strand, but, as I understand the position, people who made settlements were usually alive as to how and why they were settling matters.
  In a great number of cases the reason why these restraints were put in was in order to protect a daughter to whom perhaps a fairly large fortune was being left, from a possibly predatory husband, although the right hon. and learned Gentleman spoke as though the days of predatory husbands were completely gone. I should not have thought that there was any evidence for that assumption. There might be a further reason. A father might want to prevent the risk of his daughter being completely dependent on her husband during marriage without having a secure income of her own.
  I do not think that most of the restraints such as those were particularly disreputable. After 1935, the legislature decided, probably rightly, that the settlors should no longer make dispositions of that nature, but they were very careful not to interfere with settlements that had already been made. When a Labour Lord Chancellor dealt with that matter in another place, he was specifically asked—it is some little time since I looked at the report, but I think I am correct in saying that he was specifically asked: "What about the settlements already made?"—and he then said that they had been carefully considered by the Government and they thought it quite inexpedient to make any alteration in regard to them. I think that he was right because people before 1935 had made their private dispositions in the light of the law as it then was and without any knowledge or idea that the law might be changed.
  Now, quite suddenly, 14 years later we are being asked to alter that law altogether. I think that we may well ask
  922
  why. If it was not right for a Labour Lord Chancellor to do it in 1935, why is it right for a Labour Government to do it now? The answer that has been given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman is that conditions have changed, but the real change in conditions is the increased burden of taxation. Are the Government saying that that burden of taxation has now become insupportable to people dependent on private incomes, no matter how large they may be?
  That is really the argument that is being put up. I know that not all incomes are enormous, but there is no doubt that some of them are very large indeed. If that is the case, surely the right method is not to pass a Measure such as this, but to introduce some taxation relief for people who find themselves in this predicament, and not to enable women to capitalise their income so that they can pay arrears of taxation or spend their capital in order to exist.
  We have heard of the merits of this Bill, but is it really so very meritorious? If it is, why have we had to wait 14 years for it? During four at least of those years we have had a Labour Government. I accept what the Attorney-General said—that he had been considering these matters beforehand, and that then came the Mountbatten Bill which drew attention to them and its withdrawal gave him time for this Measure. But I am fairly convinced that had that Bill gone through all its stages we would not have heard a word about this Bill, and the unfortunate wife of the schoolmaster, whom the Attorney-General told us about so movingly, would still be in the unfortunate predicament that he described.
  We realise that sometimes real hardships attach to those people whose incomes are restrained, but they have always been able to go to the Chancery judges. The right hon. and learned Gentleman spoke as though going to the Chancery judges was in itself a dreadful thing to do. He said that, in the first place, it would cost £50 to £100. I cannot say how much it would cost because barristers, generally speaking, are not so knowledgeable about costs as solicitors, but I confess that I should be amazed if a simple application to a Chancery judge in chambers, supported by an affidavit, cost anything like £50.

  923
  In any event, I should have thought that in all normal cases the costs would be allowed out of the capital money of the trust and would not in fact fall on the income of the person applying. I understand that although the Chancery judges have a fairly broad discretion, under, I think, Section 169 of the Law and Property Act, they are rather confined by judicial decisions. If that is so, I think, as do many of my friends, that is a very good reason why we should not enlarge their discretion in this way.
  I believe that there was an Amendment, which was negatived, in another place and which, had it been added to this Bill, would have made it quite unobjectionable. I take the view that instead of being asked to sweep away all this restraint, the proper way to deal with these matters is to deal with each case on its merits. That is exactly what a Chancery judge can do, provided his discretion is not too restricted. I should have thought that could quite easily have been done.
  I understand that it now works as a rule quite fairly, that judges take the view that they will not lift a restraint where it is solely for the benefit of a married woman—because I understand that by judicial authority they have to take that view—and that they will not lift it where they think that a married woman has by her extravagance contracted debts which she ought not to have done. They lift it in proper cases such as that in which women have just sufficient for themselves to live on and whose husbands do not make very much money, and who perhaps want to educate their sons more expensively than they could otherwise afford to do.
  In a case like that it would be lifted now, and that seems to me to be very reasonable. There does not seem to be any great hardship in that, or in the way in which married women are dealt with. But if there is, then the proper way to deal with it is to increase the discretion of the judge. I realise, of course, that that could only be done by us, because it would be very expensive for a married woman to go to the House of Lords to have these decisions reversed. I should have thought that the Chancery judges, in the light of present knowledge, even if they were not helped by precedents of
  924
  judicial decisions, would be able to deal with the matter quite easily. But I can well understand that many people do not want to incur the expense of going to the House of Lords in order to have their discretion widened.
  We are really being asked to cancel dispositions of property made by private people over 14 years ago, when they had every reasonable expectation that those provisions would be carried out. If we do that, it seems to me that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is not right in saying that we are putting these married women in precisely the same condition as their sisters or their daughters for whom trusts were made after 1935.
  As I understand it, people who were minded to impose a restraint upon anticipation, being unable to do so after 1935, cast about for other means of dealing with the matter. They then made use of the discretionary trust, which of course had always been known to the law, though I quite agree that it was not so rigid, or, as it were, so hard as the restraint upon anticipation; they thought it would in some measure assist them in what they had in mind.
  I quite agree that a discretionary trust does not achieve all that the restraint upon anticipation achieves, or anything like it; but those people, finding that they could not use the latter method, used the discretionary trust—which was, after all, a trust in which the trustees were given a discretion to pay to the beneficiary until a certain stated thing might happen. They used that method instead. But now, if we sweep away all these cases in which restraints upon anticipation had been imposed, there is no discretionary trust to be imposed, and all these women will get their money without any form of restraint whatsoever. It seems to me fairly natural that a father who before 1935 would have imposed a restraint of anticipation, after 1935 would have imposed a discretionary trust.
  The Attorney-General: Perhaps I could assist the hon. Gentleman in his argument here. We have made some inquiries into that, and the position, as I believe it to be, is this: that whereas in settlements and wills prior to 1935 there was almost invariably a restraint upon anticipation, in settlements or wills subsequent to 1935 there was very rarely a discretionary trust.
  Mr. Gage: I of course have not access to the same information as the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I do not know, I am sure; if he says so no doubt it is perfectly right, but I should not have thought that it made very much difference to the argument. It might assist the right hon. and learned Gentleman on his argument that these provisions were put in rather as a matter of precedent, but I do not think it does any damage to my argument, which is that a father who before 1935 would have been minded to put in a restraint upon anticipation—and probably did—would after 1935 have certainly imposed a discretionary trust. Now we are going to sweep all those away.
  It is all very well to say that the settlor would have wanted that done, but anyone who is a lawyer knows that it is difficult enough to get at the mind of the testator in a given set of circumstances; it is difficult enough to understand what he intends; but to say that one can get at the mind of a testator in a wholly hypothetical set of circumstances which were not present when he made the settlement seems to be stretching matters much too far. I do not think for one minute that we can say the settlors would certainly have agreed to do away with these restraints. I think that is carrying the matter much too far.
  Mr. Henry Strauss: Perhaps my hon. Friend would allow me to point out this, which may greatly strengthen his argument. Before 1935 it was by no means uncommon for a settlor in the case of a daughter to impose a restraint upon anticipation, but in the case of a son to impose a discretionary trust.
  Mr. Gage: I am glad my hon. and learned Friend has drawn attention to that, because I was going to deal with the different positions of a son and a daughter. I understand it was indeed the case, that restraints upon anticipation were imposed in the cases of daughters but discretionary trusts in the cases of sons. Now, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, we are doing nothing about discretionary trusts, so that if we pass this Bill daughters will be in a better position than sons, because the sons will still have the discretionary trusts but the daughters will have no restraints of any
  926
  sort. It seems to me, therefore, that to that extent this legislation is unfair.
  Mr. David Renton: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman does not want to overstate the position. It is, of course, possible for a discretionary trust to have been imposed in the case of a daughter; and it very frequently has been done.
  Mr. Gage: Oh, yes, but I do not see that that makes any difference to my argument. Of course, it was done. I am quite certain that before 1935 there were people who did not agree with restraints upon anticipation, who thought they were too hard and too rigid, and who therefore did not impose them but imposed instead discretionary trusts. But there were other people who wished to impose restraints upon anticipation, and who did impose them; and it is with their settlements that we are interfering today.
  Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth: When the hon. Gentleman speaks of discretionary trusts, does he mean a protective trust under Section 33 of the Trustee Act, or a discretionary trust in the strict sense of the words?
  Mr. Gage: I cannot say I am glad that my hon. Friend has asked me that, because he is very familiar with trusts, springing uses and other exciting Chancery matters. I had always understood, no doubt quite improperly, that there was very little difference between a discretionary trust and a protective trust. If I am wrong in that, I am happy to say that, on reading the Debates in another place, I find that many noble Lords who know very much more about it, certainly confused the two and spoke of them as if they were very much the same. I am referring to the trust imposed whereby a woman or a man is paid an annual sum until the occurrence of some future event, which is very often the making of an arrangement with creditors, or something of that nature, when the trustees are empowered either to continue to pay or to divert the money to some other source. That is what I have always understood to be a discretionary trust.
  I said earlier that I and my hon. Friends take the view that this Measure is wrong. There are many hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House who have

  927
  given a great part of their public lives to the betterment of the poor and needy. Now it cannot be said that owing to the burdens the nation has to bear, the people for whom we are today legislating come into that category. How, at this particular juncture in our affairs, can we go back to the needy people, who in most cases unfortunately form the greater part of our constituents, and say that we have been passing a Measure of this nature, designed to increase the spending power of people who are fairly well off, which will enable many women, if they wish, to repair the consequences of their extravagance, and will to some extent diminish the national revenue? The truthful answer is that we cannot justify it to those people and, what is more important, to our own consciences.
  5.10 p.m.
  Captain John Crowder: I beg to second the Amendment.
  Although this Debate is somewhat technical in character, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) that the substance of it is not very difficult to understand. The real question is whether it is right, by retrospective legislation, to do something that may be justified in particular cases, by a method which may be wrong in a great many other cases. This Bill, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Belfast (Mr. Gage) said, nullifies the restraint clause in all marriage settlements made before 1935. These settlements were made in good faith for a specific purpose, and when they were made the clause we are now asked to strike out was effective. It is now too late to substitute another clause that might have been effective, if the settlor at the time he was making the settlement had thought Parliament would come along today to strike out the clause which he thought was effective when he made the settlement.
  Do Members really think it is right and fair, simply because it is felt in some cases relief should be given owing to a change of circumstances, that we should pass a Bill of this nature, taking away the restraint clause in all cases? Is it right to say that in order to help a few deserving cases we should abolish the clause retrospectively in all cases? That is what we are being asked to do today. I am not a
  928
  lawyer, and no doubt the Attorney-General will correct me if I am wrong, but the position seems to me to be this. A father, prior to 1935, found that his daughter wished to get married. He did not know very much about the young man, and perhaps the young man had no great resources, being the poorer of the two parties. In these circumstances the father went to his lawyer because he wished to make a settlement to ensure that his daughter had an independent income so long as she was married. The money provided for the settlement was, of course, the father's money.
  Members have suggested that it is unfair not to allow the married woman to use her own money as she thinks fit, but it is not her money but her father's money which he has given to her on certain conditions—that she shall have the income for life. If the father puts in a clause to the effect that she shall not sell her life interest, the daughter cannot sell or do what she likes with the capital. Whatever might happen in the future, the father wanted his daughter to have something to live on during her married life.
  In many cases the husband himself asked for this sort of clause, because he wanted his wife to be independent and have a separate income. Perhaps the father wanted to make certain that his daughter was not over-persuaded by the husband to sell her life interest for a capital sum and give it to him to invest in some speculative venture where he could lose the lot and leave the daughter penniless. I agree with the Attorney-General that few understood what was meant by the words "without power to restrain," but the fact is that many people who wanted their daughter to have a fixed income for life independent of her husband on condition that she could not touch the capital, told their lawyers to put it into the legal jargon necessary to achieve that end.
  The recognised way of doing that before 1935 was to insert the clause it is now proposed to nullify, which many of us feel is not just. But the father was doing nothing wrong, selfish or unsocial, and, as I have said, in many cases the father agreed with the husband that this should be done. If the father had suspected that Parliament would sweep away this clause, he would no doubt have employed other means to do what he

  929
  wanted, either by a protective or some other clause—no doubt my hon. Friend the Member for South Hendon (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) would have been able to draft something to carry out the settlor's wishes.
  It is quite wrong to say that this Bill equalises the law between men and women, because if the father some 15 or 20 years ago was going to provide for his son and daughter and wished in both cases to see that the income was not anticipated, he might have done it in the case of the son by what is called a protective or discretionary trust, and by way of this clause which it is now proposed to nullify in the case of his daughter. The result will be that the restraint on the married woman disappears but remains in the case of the man.
  The 1935 Act laid down that the restraint on anticipation clause should not be the effective means after 1935, but if the Committee had thought it was right, proper and desirable to cancel the clause for settlements already made, surely they would have said so. I am told on very good authority that no one suggested or dreamed of putting in such a clause. By the 1935 Act existing contracts were respected, and marriage settlement is a contract. What the previous Parliament thought right was in my view properly limited to future contracts.
  These are the reasons why we are opposed to the Bill in the present form. The alternative proposal we have to make is based on the Amendment that was defeated by only five votes in another place, namely, to provide for each case to to be judged on its merits and to give the courts much wider powers to lift a restraint if they think it would benefit not only the married woman but her husband, her children, or collateral relation.
  I have been asked what happens to the wishes of the settlor. I have been arguing that something has to be done but that we should not sweep away the clause in every settlement. I presume that no court would allow a wife to anticipate the whole of her income, whereas if this Bill is passed she will be able to sell the whole amount and give the capital to the husband which he can lose in a matter of a few weeks. The alternative proposal is to extend the power of the court
  930
  to remove restraint altogether, whilst binding the wife's interest for the purposes of a particular transaction or transactions. Other provisions could be added to give more power to the Chancery Judge, taking into account the fact that since the restraint was imposed, there had been a substantial diminution of income. I ask the Government to withdraw this Bill and produce another which would allow a court to consider each case on its merits.
  There is one further point—the cost of proceedings. It is said that proceedings would involve a considerable expense, but opinions differed in another place as to their extent. In any case, the Government need not produce this Bill to cheapen legislation in Chancery courts. It is gratifying to see them so intent on saving public money and not spending so much on lawyers. That I appreciate, but I am told on a very good authority that proceedings will not be expensive. It is not a case of litigation with counsel in their wigs and the judge sitting on the bench in full array—
  Mr. Hale: I can assure the hon. and gallant Member that there is no extra charge for wearing a wig, but I would point out that to people living in Newcastle-upon-Tyne wishing to make an application to a court in London it might mean the employment of two firms of solicitors, one expert counsel, the preparation and submission of affidavits and probably a second application. It can be an expensive business.
  Captain Crowder: Even if it costs up to £100, I believe that if the trustees agree, the money can be taken out of the capital fund of the trust. At 2½ per cent., less 9s. in the pound Income Tax, that would not hurt the beneficiary very much.
  There is too much restrospective legislation these days, and it is about time we called a halt to it. I hope the House will reject this Bill, because I think it will cause injustice and unfairness. Some months ago my hon. Friends and I put an Amendment on the Order Paper for the rejection of the Mountbatten Estates Bill [Lords]. That Amendment said:
  "That this House declines to give a Second Reading to a personal Bill promoted to secure an amendment to the law which, if justifiable, should be made by a public Act for the benefit of all whom it may concern."

  931
  The fact that this Amendment appeared on the Order Paper seems to have influenced the Government to bring in this Bill following the withdrawal of the Private Bill.
  Of course, the all-important words are "if justifiable." After reading the speeches made in another place and consulting lawyers—who gave me their opinion for nothing so I value it all the more—and reading the excellent letter in "The Times" of 30th July, which put our case very clearly, my hon. Friends and I do not think it is justifiable to alter the law in the way suggested in this Bill. I have great pleasure, therefore, in supporting the Amendment for its rejection.
  5.24 p.m.
  Mrs. Leah Manning: Much of the Debate so far has been very refreshing to me although, like the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley), I have not a clue to the legal meaning of the arguments which have been advanced. To me this is a simple matter of principle, and I think many of us must feel very grateful to Lady Mountbatten for having acted as a pilot for a Measure which many women outside this House will regard as a simple act of justice. Indeed, I have never heard from the Government Front Bench such passionate pleas for equality of women as I have heard today; I can only wish that they had been on a very much broader basis than the narrow one we are now discussing. If these passionate pleas had been made in connection with equal pay for women, for instance, a case of equality with men which women are constantly putting forward, they would have been even more welcome. Nevertheless, I am glad that we are gaining one of the equalities and freedoms for which women have been asking ever since the 1935 legislation.
  I do not know what is so objectionable in the Bill to some members of the Opposition. They have said many things which are not quite in keeping with their general character. I wish I knew what the real reason was, because it would make it much easier for me to argue my case.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: Members on this side of the House are expressing their personal views, and they are flat all in agreement in this matter.
  Mrs. Manning: Yes, I quite understand that: some of the views are very personal.
  What I rose to say more than anything else was that—although it may come as a great surprise to many hon. Members to learn it—since the legislation of 1935 nearly every women's organisation in this country has been pressing one Attorney-General or the other to rectify what is, after all, a grave injustice to women. All this talk about predatory husbands and terribly extravagant wives sounds to me very much like an Ouida novel. I cannot help thinking that the minds of some hon. Members, probably on this side of the House as well as on the other, are cast in the mould of the 19th century so far as women are concerned. It makes us realise that these restraints are an anachronism, and that the time has come when we ought to have a new Statute of Mortmain for the benefit of women upon whom restraints have been placed by the dead in these kinds of testaments.
  The main objection put forward from the Opposition benches today is not one of principle at all. It is because the opposers of the Bill feel that the testaments which were made before 1935 might have been cast in a different form if the testators had known that this legislation was coming forward. One or two rather odd arguments have been put forward by the opposers of the Bill on this point. To begin with, I should like to point out that no woman is obliged to do away with the restraint even if the Bill is passed; she is not obliged to capitalise her property. If she has a predatory husband, one whom, she thinks, will help her to "blue" her capital in a few years and leave her in poverty, she will be wise enough not to take advantage of this new legislation. Apparently, the hon. and gallant Member for Holderness (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) thinks that if he had such a wife he would be able to force her to his will.
  Once again, I say that the minds of those hon. Members opposite who oppose the Bill are cast in the mould of the 19th century. They believe that they could force their wives to capitalise her income; and put it at their disposal so that they could "blue" the lot. If this Bill is passed, as it will be, it will not be necessary for any woman to take

  933
  advantage of it if she feels herself to be in a dangerous position.
  I am sure that the majority of women who will be affected by this Bill will not be a handful of wealthy women like Lady Mountbatten, but many who are in the lower middle class. Many of the women concerned are those who belong to the kinds of organisations to which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food and I belong, and of which we are very ardent members, professional and middle class women interested in the rights of women. The kind of things which they want their money for are those very schemes suggested by the Attorney-General in his opening speech. I have known quite a large number of married teachers and women in small businesses who wanted to use money left to them by their fathers either to expand their businesses, or to give their children a better education than they could otherwise get, or to emigrate and start life afresh in a new country. Those are largely the kind of women who will be helped by this legislation.
  As I have already said, the Lady Mountbattens of this world are few in number and the number is decreasing rapidly. The kind of people who, we believe, will be greatly helped by this Bill are not people who are going to add enormously to the amount of money that is being spent at the present time. That argument formed a large part of the case of hon. Members opposite. They feel quite rightly that in these times people should not have more money available for spending in their hands. In general, we agree on that point, but I am sure that this Bill will not result in the frivolous spending of fortunes right and left as some people seem to imagine. The money will be spent largely on quite legitimate and necessary expenditure.
  There is one other point about the question of sons which has been raised. It seems to be thought that an injustice will be done in regard to the continuance of discretionary trusts which fathers have put into their wills in regard to sons. The people who were unaffected by the 1935 legislation are a rapidly diminishing number—and that applies to the sons for whom a discretionary trust was imposed, as well as for the wives for whom the restraints are
  934
  removed. The numbers get less and less. Therefore, I do not think that very great hardship will be done, and if I may say so, it is, generally speaking, much more important to have a discretionary trust as far as the son is concerned than it is to have a restraint for the daughter. It may be necessary to look after an improvident son, but in these days wives know very well how to look after themselves, and therefore these restraints are not necessary.
  5.33 p.m.
  Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth: The attention which has been brought to this intrinsically unimportant Bill both inside and outside the House is a recognition of the importance of preserving the integrity of our property law. It would probably be no exaggeration to say that the freedom of our institutions and the prosperity of our commerce has been due in the past, and still is due to a large extent, to our having fundamentally sound property law. Although this may be only a very small part of it, it is still important and we should be certain that we deal fairly and properly with this particular aspect.
  My reason for wishing to take part in this Debate is because for a number of years I was practising at the Chancery Bar, and I had something to do with the particular matters with which this Bill deals. It fell to me fairly frequently to give advice to those making wills or settlements as to what they should put into those settlements or wills. Indeed, I was engaged in doing that before the year 1935, when the law was changed by the Act which this Bill seeks to amend.
  I should like, first, to offer some general comment on the principles of this Bill. When people make elaborate arrangements for tying up their property they are nearly always wrong. They are wrong from the point of view of the public interest and more often from the point of view of their own private interests. I do not wish to strike a discordant note, but private planning of this sort is rather like public planning. It is a very bad thing when it is done in excess. The results are not usually those which are looked for; anomalies and inequities are created; and, what is even more important, there is a bad psychological effect on those very individuals

  935
  for whom it is sought to plan. That I believe to be true generally, and it is certainly true in the case or those who try to deal with their property after it has actually passed into the possession of the person to benefit. For that reason, when called upon to give advice in these matters I personally always gave my client advice against imposing any restrictions unless such restrictions were quite necessary for the purposes that they sought.
  There is one other point I should like to make in this connection. The Attorney-General, in the course of his remarks, did a little less than justice to the legal profession and particularly to solicitors, in that he suggested—I think it was accidentally—that they did not always fully explain to their clients the effect of the technical language which they were putting into documents, either settlements or wills. I do not think that that is so. I think what happens is this. A lay client asks a question as to what is the meaning of certain words and when he is told they are technical words, which have the result of ensuring that his daughter will get the income for the rest of her married life he does not pursue the matter any further. In other words, solicitors quite often tender advice to lay clients, which is simply not apprehended by those clients.
  For that reason I am quite sure that there are many settlements made inter vivos or by will, in force today containing expressions restricting a woman from the use of her heritage which originally the settlor or testator as the case may be never really intended to put into those documents. For these reasons I find myself broadly sympathetic to the purpose of this Bill.
  There is another side to the picture. Restrictions are sometimes most necessary. It is entirely wrong for any father or other persons disposing of property to assume against a child or beneficiary that he or she will be improvident, but there are occasions in which the parent knows perfectly well from his experience of the individual child that that child is either improvident herself, or has an improvident husband who is likely to waste the property. There are relatively rare cases where it is perfectly proper for a settler
  936
  or testator to make special provision for a child of his. As I think was indicated by the hon. Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning), cases of that kind are just as commonly cases involving a son or a male person as cases of a daughter or a woman.
  Mrs. Manning: I would say that they are more common.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I would not go quite so far as that with the hon. Lady, but I would agree that the cases are on both sides and are probably in about equal quantities. As the Attorney-General has explained, it was because the Court of Chancery had invented the restraint upon anticipation to cover the case only of a female that conveyancers invented a different system to cover the case of a male. They invented the protective trust, although not by that name. That name came in only with the introduction of the Trustee Act in 1925. The system by which a man is prevented from anticipating his property was gradually built up by conveyancers.
  Having regard to what was said by the hon. Member for South Belfast (Mr. Gage), perhaps I might say that there is a very subsantial difference between the protective trust and the discretionary trust. In the case of a protective trust the beneficiary is entitled to the income until he either tries to anticipate the income or goes bankrupt; until then the trustees are bound to pay over the whole income to him. In the case of the discretionary trust, a discretion rests with the trustees throughout as to how they should dispose of the money. I agree with the Attorney-General that the protective trust is a much harsher and clumsier device for attaining the purpose required, but the intention in both cases is precisely the same.
  The Attorney-General: I hope the hon. Baronet will forgive me for interrupting him, but surely he is not suggesting any historical connection between the restraint and those two devices, the protective trust and the discretionary trust, which did not arise because of the restraint on anticipation by the Chancery Court but have a totally different purpose. They have nothing to do with marriage at all. They go on for the whole lifetime. The discretionary trust and the restraint upon anticipation are totally

  937
  different. The trust does not ensure the income until the woman marries. If she is thereafter divorced, it provides no protection.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I agree that historically there is no connection between the two. I said that it was the absence of the possibility of restraining a man from anticipation which gave rise to the invention of the alternative form of trust. I would go so far as to say—I hope that the Attorney-General will agree with me—that the protective trust is usually a bad device and that it often works quite as badly and harshly as the restraint upon anticipation. I do not know whether it will be in Order at a later stage of the Bill, but if it should be so, I hope that it will be possible to put down Amendments dealing with the case of the protective trust just as with the case of restraint upon anticipation. I believe that it is quite as desirable to deal with the one as with the other. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am glad to note that I have some support from the Government side in this matter.
  It is of interest to read the long Title of the Bill, where the Bill is described as
  "An Act to render inoperative any restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached to the enjoyment of property by a woman."
  The words "or alienation" have perhaps crept into the Title because of the limitation in the law of property, but the Title as it stands is misleading. If the Bill abolishes all restriction upon alienation in the case of a woman, it would be necessary that it should seek to abolish the protective trust.
  This touches the very weakness of the Bill. Where, before 1935, a father had good reason to restrict a daughter's power to anticipate her income when she was marrying a man of whom he disapproved, he might do it perfectly effectively by imposing a restraint upon anticipation. Since 1935, the only means he has had has been the protective trust. It is a serious question whether, in a number of these pre-1935 cases, a father making a marriage settlement—the common case—would not have used the device of the protective trust instead of the restraint upon anticipation if he had known of the impending legislation of 1935 or of this Bill. I believe there are quite a number of cases where he would have used a protective trust.
  938
  There is a question which I wish to put to the Government. It may not concern a very meritorious type of case but I think it will show the inherent defect of the Bill as drafted. What will happen in the case of a married woman who enjoys an income subject to a restraint upon anticipation if she is an undischarged bankrupt at the date of the passing of the Bill? We must have a clear answer from the Government on that question. At the present time that woman is entitled to the enjoyment of that income without the slightest risk of being shot at by creditors, except under the Act which has been referred to and about which the Attorney-General said there were many cases in which it was quite impracticable to apply it. That was, I think, his argument, and I am disposed to agree with him. If that is so, it will be seen that the passing of the Bill will at once lay that woman open to proceedings by her creditors to seize her income in payment of her debts. If that is so, I would like an answer from the Government.
  The Attorney-General: I think that is so. I see no reason why a married woman should not pay her debts.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: Although she may have been for three, four or five years, strictly in accordance with the intentions of the settlor who made the settlement, enjoying her income?
  The Attorney-General: I cannot accept that. It could be neither the intention of the settlor, nor of the courts which approved this doctrine, that married women should be protected against their creditors. As has been pointed out, they are not fully protected even under the existing law, because an application may be made under bankruptcy law for the income to be attached. I am sure that this device would never have been recognised by any court if it had been one for protecting a woman against her creditors. No one would attempt to justify a device of that kind.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I think that is exactly the point which is in issue. Where the married woman has run up debts in defraud of her creditors, relying upon the appearance of being a wealthy woman, I would agree with the Attorney-General. But another kind of case often occurs. A married woman, knowing very little about

  939
  business, incurs substantial debts on behalf of her husband's business, and it transpires that her husband is a thoroughly bad business man. We shall find that creditors will now be able to come down on the married woman, as her husband's partner, and seize exactly the provision which has been made for her by the settlor and intended to be safe against her husband's follies.
  The Attorney-General: They could under Section 52.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I do not think so. At any rate, I do not wish to pursue this matter at great length. It is obviously a matter which can be dealt with more properly in Committee. The point I wish to make is that it indicates some weakness in doing what is proposed to be done by the machinery in the Bill. As has been mentioned in the Debate, the court has already some very substantial measure of power to lift a restraint under Section 169 of the Law of Property Act. All the applications to the High Court to exercise the powers under that section are made in chambers in camera and no one outside knows what occurs in those proceedings. The result is that it is impossible for us to know at all how the courts, generally speaking, have exercised the powers.
  Those of us who have practised in the Chancery Division have some measure of knowledge because we have seen a certain number of cases. I asked a learned conveyancing counsel what was his experience of the jurisdiction of the courts under section 169 of the Law of Property Act, and he told me that in the 20 years in which he had seen a great number of these cases dealt with in chambers, he had never known a court turn down a single case unless there was some perfectly good reason which anyone would say was a valid reason why the court should refuse to exercise its power, the kind of case where the evidence clearly discloses that the woman in question is under the influence of her husband and intends to do exactly the thing which the settlor intended to prevent.
  I believe that the powers of the court have been exercised on the whole widely and wisely under this section, but, on the other hand, there have undoubtedly been cases where the court has taken a somewhat
  940
  narrow view. I imagine that the case which gave rise to the Bill in the first place must have been one of those. We have no knowledge of it here and it would be quite wrong for us to discuss it. One can only speculate, and one must assume that. That being so, I would agree that it is necessary to amend the section which enables this restraint to be lifted in past cases. I think it could best be done by the kind of device which has been mentioned this afternoon, namely, by recasting the Section into a negative form and obliging the court to take action unless it is shown that it is not in the interest of the woman to have the restraint lifted. That would be the fairest way.
  As to the expense—a sum between £50 and £100 payable out of capital has been suggested; if the application is a proper one, it is payable out of capital—it amounts to a matter of shillings a year at present rates of interest and Income Tax, so it is not really an intolerable burden on those concerned. There is no reason why in the case of small estates—those not exceeding £5,000 or something of that sort, the type of case which the Attorney-General described—jurisdiction should not be given to the county courts. They could quite easily be dealt with at a cost of a pound or two. That would be a sounder way of dealing with this sort of case than by the complete wiping out of all these provisions contrary, in some cases certainly, to the intentions of those who made them in the first place.
  I believe that the Bill should be amended in order to give an appropriate power to either the Chancery Division or the county courts to deal similarly with protective life interests where it can be shown to be in the interests of the person enjoying the income from the property to lift that protection also. That is the proper way to deal with the Bill, and I should be perfectly happy to meet the wishes of the hon. Lady the Member for Epping that that form of jurisdiction should be applicable not to women only, but to both women and men. I believe that it is necessary in both classes of case. I believe it is possible to amend the Bill on the sort of lines which I have described, and because I think that is so and because I find myself in full agreement with the general intentions of the Bill, I shall vote for its Second Reading.
  5.56 p.m.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: I find the atmosphere of this discussion most unusual in this place but, nevertheless, most congenial. Even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) was quite subdued and so was my hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning). What we are trying to do is really to catch up with the provision which the Chancery Court made on behalf of women over a hundred years ago. The proposal with which we are dealing, restraint on anticipation, is a complete anomaly in modern conditions, and it is for that reason, and that reason only, that I support the Bill.
  It is of vital importance that we should fully appreciate the anomalous nature of the provision. Hon. Members have, quite rightly, talked about Income Tax provisions and the intentions of testators and so on, but those are really not the considerations which are most material to the provision with which we are dealing here. We are dealing only with the restraint on anticipation. Therefore, it is necessary to reinforce what my right hon. and learned Friend brought out so clearly in his opening remarks, and that is the origin and the purpose of the restraint on anticipation. As my right hon. and learned Friend said, originally at Common Law the separate property of a woman passed to her husband and he could do as he liked with it. It was to protect women that the Courts of Chancery—courts which have been so often abused in so many places over so many years—intervened and said that if property were settled on a woman to her separate use, it should be her separate property.
  The difficulty then was that under social conditions as they were at that time, women being so much under the domination of their husbands, as now they are not, the women were in danger of transferring their property to their husbands, and therefore this ridiculous position resulted. Equity had intervened in order to say that the separate property of a woman should belong to a woman free from the machinations of a husband, and then the woman was free to give her separate property to her husband. It was in order to deal with that that equity intervened again and said that if the settlor definitely stated that the woman
  942
  should not be free to anticipate her income, then she should not be free from the restraint, and that is restraint on anticipation. That is the sole purpose of restraint on anticipation—protection against the husband.
  The position today is entirely different. There is no more room for the restraint upon anticipation. Because the restraint was imposed merely to protect the woman against her husband and not anybody else, then, as my right hon. and learned Friend said, when a woman was not married—either when she had become a widow or before marriage—she could get rid of the restraint upon anticipation, she need pay no regard to it, and she could deal with her property in exactly the same way as a man or woman who was not married. So it was never the purpose of restraint upon anticipation that it should be a protection against creditors or that it should serve any other purpose except to protect the woman against her husband. Then it got into the precedent books, and it was imposed in settlement after settlement; it was introduced regularly by those who drew up settlements in Lincoln's Inn as a matter of course.
  Now the discretionary trust to which it has been likened is an entirely different matter. Above all, the discretionary trust was imposed, not as a matter of course for the protection of a married woman against her husband, but to protect the person to whom the interest was given against all the world, not the husband only. Therefore, the discretionary trust and the protective trust were imposed generally where the beneficiary was of such a kind that he needed protection against all the world as contrasted with the restraint upon anticipation which was introduced for protection against the husband only—a survival from an age when married women required that particular protection.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: May I interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman for moment? Is he saying that the protective trust has only been used in the special type of case where the person is a spendthrift? Has it not been used in a much wider range of cases?
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: I was just coming to that point. There may be some difference of experience between us on this, and I allow that at once, but,

  943
  speaking for myself and those with whom I have discussed this matter, protective trusts are imposed deliberately where required in a certain case, because the character of the beneficiary is such that he needs protection against all the world, and not otherwise. It is perfectly true that nowadays we are in danger of having the same kind of development with protective trusts as we have had with restraint upon anticipation. They are not just in precedent books but they are in the statute and they find their way into common form settlements. The danger we are in is that protective trusts will be adopted as a matter of common form in the same way as restraint upon anticipation. I am in complete agreement with the observations made by the hon. Member for South Hendon (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) that, if not now, in course of time protective trusts will probably raise a problem which will have to be dealt with if not in the same way, then in some way similar to that in which we are now dealing with restraint upon anticipation.
  When the position of women changed—and this is the significant development of the restraint upon anticipation—at the same time measures were taken to deal with the restraint upon anticipation. As long ago as 1881 we have the court given a discretion to deal with the restraint upon anticipation and to bind the interest despite the restraint. Points have been made about retrospective legislation. Really "retrospective legislation" has become a catchword and a fetish in this House. There is no objection to retrospective legislation merely because it is retrospective legislation. I agree completely with the observations made by hon. and right hon. Members in the course of this Debate that we have to be careful, where retrospective legislation is involved, that it does not undermine confidence, whether it is dealing with contracts or whatever it happens to be. Retrospective legislation becomes objectionable when it undermines that confidence and affects the state of mind of the people who are dealing with matters under consideration.
  That is the objection to retrospective legislation, but it is not merely enough to say that because this is retrospective legislation, therefore we must not touch
  944
  it. That is not a conclusive argument. The fact of any legislation being retrospective is merely one of the matters which have to be taken into consideration in considering whether or not the particular legislation is desirable. Actually, as my right hon. and learned Friend pointed out, in this case we have retrospective legislation after retrospective legislation. In 1881 we had the courts being given the power to bind the interest which is subject to the restraint upon anticipation taking effect upon settlements made before 1881, perhaps thwarting the intentions of the testator or settlor who imposed the restraint upon anticipation before that year, so that all the arguments on that score which have been made against this Bill could equally have been made in 1881 against the introduction of Section 39 of the Conveyancing Act.
  That provision was incorporated and extended by the Law of Property Act, 1921—a further piece of retrospective legislation—and now one hon. Member opposite has suggested that the extension of the discretion which the courts have should be applied to settlements in operation before 1936. Again, a further piece of retrospective legislation. I fail to follow the logic of those who base their opposition to this Bill on the ground that it is retrospective legislation and then themselves, here and in another place, introduce provisions which involve retrospective legislation.
  Mr. Gage: Surely the effect of that would be that each case would be considered on its own merits and in the light of the peculiar facts of that case, whereas here we are being asked to deal with every one without considering the merits of each.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: I do not want to be rude to the bon. Member but that observation is utterly irrelevant. The point I was making was that the suggestion made by those who are supporting the Amendment, both here and in another place, equally involves retrospective legislation though I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is not as severe a case as the case involved in the Bill.
  Now I come to the objections to giving the court discretion in a case of this kind. Expense has been mentioned, and I agree with the estimates given. The expense

  945
  will, of course, vary in different cases. It may involve expert evidence, as doubtless it will in the instance given by my right hon. and learned Friend of the woman whose husband was ill and wanted to provide for going abroad to recover. In that kind of case, and in marginal cases of that nature, obviously expert evidence would be involved, it may be on more than one side. Infants might be involved; even cross-examination might conceivably be required. It is very difficult, therefore, to say it can be provided that in each case the cost would be very restricted. It depends on the case. To my mind, however, there is a greater objection than cost.
  Mr. Gage: May I interrupt the hon. and learned Member before he leaves the question of cost? A great deal has been said about cost, but the hon. and learned Member will remember that we recently passed the Legal Aid Act, which has been postponed because of the exigencies of the economic situation. When that Act comes into force, surely it could be applied to these needy cases.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: No, because in these cases a fund exists which might exclude the operation of the Act.
  To my mind, an even more important objection than cost is the giving of a discretion to the court in this nature of case. I personally have the utmost admiration for the—
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: Before my hon. and learned Friend leaves the point about costs, would he make this clear? In what way does that case differ from any other case where a person has to go to court? Is there any special ground why it should be exempted as against any other case?
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: I find some difficulty in following the observations of my hon. and learned Friend.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: I have no difficulty in finding the reason why my hon. and learned Friend does not understand my remarks. He is making the point that by going to court on an application of the kind he has described, the applicant is incurring costs. In what way does that differ from any other application to the court on any other matter which always incurs costs? If there is any special reason why this sort of case should be
  946
  exempted, will the hon. and learned Member say so?
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: I am not suggesting that it should be exempted. All I am saying is that we are dealing with the case where a proposal is made that it should be dealt with by the court. What I should have thought was a perfectly obvious objection to its being dealt with in that way was that it involved costs. I am not suggesting exemption from costs in this case more than in any other.
  What I consider the more important objection to this matter being dealt with by the courts is that the court would have a discretion in dealing with it. Chancery judges, in their exercise of discretion, have the most sincere admiration of those who practice before them. It is astonishing how humanly and wisely Chancery judges deal, for instance, with the most difficult and sometimes heartrending cases about infants which come before them. I have nothing except unreserved admiration for their exercise of the discretion which they have in those cases. To my mind, however, it is a function of legislation so far as possible—I know it is not always possible—to avoid giving a discretion.
  An instance of where the legislature has given a very wide discretion to judges, including Chancery judges, is the Inheritance Act. That Act has imposed upon Chancery judges a discretion which is so wide as to involve the greatest difficulty in its exercise and which must cause anybody who tries to administer the Act the utmost concern. The legislature should avoid giving discretion so far as it can possibly do so. In the present instance, if discretion is given, it would be discretion of the widest possible kind. The hon. Member for South Hendon said that under the Law of Property Act discretion was exercised on a wide basis and very widely interpreted. On the other hand, he referred to the Mountbatten case and others where he said that the discretion was very narrowly interpreted. It is certainly the experience of some practitioners in the law that it has been narrowly interpreted. What it means is that where a discretion is exercised—and, above all, in chambers, where cases are not reported and, therefore, it is not possible, or at any rate not reasonably practicable, to work out readily a body of principles for its

  947
  application—indeed, the discretion would be so wide as to make it in any case difficult to work out such a body of principles.
  In cases of that kind, the decisions must inevitably, through no fault or shortcomings on the part of anybody involved, be apt to vary; and it is most undesirable that there should be a variation in the decisions given in the cases of this kind, or, indeed, in any cases. Therefore, I personally, if I may say so with respect, share the views which have been expressed elsewhere about the exercise of discretion by judges, however eminent. That, to my mind, is the fundamental objection to the exercise of discretion in these cases.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: Would it cover the point which the hon. and learned Member is making if, instead of having a discretion to lift the restraint, the Clause of the Bill were so framed that it was mandatory upon the judge to lift the restraint unless evidence were adduced to show that such a course was contrary to the benefit of the woman concerned?
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: That would not do away with the discretion, which, although it would be exercised in a different way, would still remain.
  That brings me to my final point. I find some difficulty in understanding the precise grounds upon which those who oppose the Bill base their case. It has been argued from the other side of the House that it is bad because it will enable persons to reduce their Income Tax liability and so on, and for reasons of State. It has been argued, on the very contrary, that what is desired is to extend the reasons for which the court can exercise its discretion in favour of the beneficiary—and, perhaps, collateral relations—in order to benefit the beneficiary.
  What is the test? Let me crystallise the matter in this way. Supposing a case arises where it is obviously beneficial to the beneficiary to have the restraint lifted in order to dispose of his property in such a way as would reduce his liability for taxation. Where, then, do those who support the Amendment stand? Would they then say, "We come down in favour of the State," or would they decide in favour of the beneficiary? Unless they answer that question, they expose themselves
  948
  to the suggestion that their opposition to the Bill is not sufficiently well thought out and not sufficiently well founded.
  For those reasons I support the Bill. The questions of Income Tax, the discretion of the court and all the rest are really mere incidental matters. The fundamental point is that restraint on anticipation is a special provision which has long outlived the period and purpose for which it was conceived.
  6.20 p.m.
  Mr. Wilson Harris: I suppose it is inevitable that a Debate in this House on this subject should resolve itself into what the late Marquis Curzon of Kedleston would have called a legal "Beano." That eminent man had only seen the abbreviation for "beanfeast" in print and applied his own characteristic pronunciation to it. I desire to intervene in this Debate, not because I am a lawyer, but precisely because I am not a lawyer. I agree with the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) and the hon. Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning) that this matter raises a comparatively simple principle, which is not at all fundamentally a legal principle and, at the risk of shocking the Attorney-General, I will enunciate it.
  For the sake of brevity, I confine myself to the case of the father who is settling something on a daughter on marriage. It should be remembered that he is under no obligation to settle anything on her at all; he can keep the money in his pocket. But if he does make a settlement I contend that he is fully entitled, knowing his daughter and all the circumstances of the marriage, to make the settlement subject to certain restrictions which he considers are in her own interests. Conditions have changed very much in the last few generations. Three or four generations ago as we have been reminded, a woman had very little say in the matter of choosing her husband. Those matters were arranged then "through the usual channels," with results which were sometimes satisfactory and sometimes not. One result was, of course, that the husband got all the wife's money, that usually being his principal reason for marrying her.
  But the situation now, the situation with which we have to deal today, is

  949
  substantially different. Today a young woman goes to her father and says "Will and I"—or "Hart and I"—or whatever names they like to choose, "have clicked." The father says, "Well, my girl it is your funeral, not mine; I hope you will be happy. I will do what I can for you, but I shall have to tie it up a little; I can't have this young man playing ducks and drakes with it." That seems to me perfectly justifiable. The father may know that the daughter, though she possesses all the other virtues, is not good at handling money, or that his prospective son-in-law is not good at handling money, or does not know whether he is or is not good at handling money. In those cases it is perfectly proper for him to attach certain restrictions on the use of the money if he considers, rightly or wrongly, that it is in the daughter's interests. It is not a question of the rapacious, the predatory husband, but also of the feckless husband. Women rather like feckless husbands; I am very well liked myself. Like Mr. Pecksniff, I am a parent and all the proper paternal emotions are seething in my breast.
  Unfortunately I have only one daughter, but quite a good one. When she married, I gave her very little, simply because I had very little to give. Not being ready to incur the expense incidental to any operation involving the legal profession, I transferred to her one or two of my few securities, but I took the precaution of keeping the share certificates in my own hands. I am not certain what the legal effect of that was, but, at any rate, it necessitated argument before action. The arrangement, I ought to add, has now lapsed, because I am satisfied that the necessity for it no longer exists.
  Now what is the position today? We have had this committee of 1934 and the Act of 1935 which while laying it down that restraints on anticipation shall not be invalid, leaves existing settlements untouched. But we are dealing now with a comparatively small number, and a rapidly decreasing number of cases, because the number is decreasing not merely at the normal rate, but at double the normal rate, since this instrument is voided not only if the husband dies, but also if the wife dies. The Attorney-General has said that the cases probably run into some thousands and certainly not tens of
  950
  thousands. In a short time they will be reduced to hundreds and it will not be long before they are reduced to vanishing point. When retrospective legislation is involved, we should make certain that a grievance is so acute and widespread that it is appropriate to adopt this extremely objectionable method of action.
  It has been said by the Attorney-General that the circumstances have entirely changed, for example, the cost of living has increased and Income Tax has gone up. If he thinks married women are the only people who suffer from those particular disabilities, I ask him to consult people as old as I am who remember when Income Tax was 1s. 2d. in the £, and there was no Surtax. These are not disabilities suffered only by married women; they oppress every citizen. One way of getting rid of the trouble would be to reduce taxation and I suggest the right hon. Gentleman might convey that to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
  I could not help feeling that, contrary to normal practice, the right hon. and learned Gentleman was rather vulnerable in some parts of his argument. For example, he called attention again and again to the decision of Parliament in 1935 to put an end to this particular kind of restraint, but, although he mentioned that, he did not give equal weight to the obvious fact that Parliament decided inferentially that existing settlements should stand.
  Let us take these existing settlements. Either the settlors are alive, or they are dead. If they are alive and take the view which the right hon. and learned Gentleman so eloquently expressed that these restraints ought to be removed, I imagine, layman as I am, that the resources of the law are equal to securing their removal. If, on the other hand, the settlors are dead, what, or who, are we to say that though they made a decision in an individual case, knowing all the circumstances of that individual case, and having particular reasons for wanting the restriction, the restriction shall none the less be removed, even though a short lapse of years will put an end to the whole matter?
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman talked of the "dead hand," and I was sorry to hear the right hon. Member for West Bristol also refer to the "dead

  951
  hand." That is constantly invoked to break a certain prejudice. If we are going to argue against the "dead hand," let us argue against it all the way. After all, it was the dead hand which made the gift in the first place, and if we are going to abolish the "dead hand" we had better abolish the settlement altogether, return the money to the settlor's estate—though no doubt the Chancellor of the Exchequer could find some means of impounding it on the way.
  I deprecate, too, the argument based on authority. The Attorney-General quoted Lord Simmonds and Lord Uthwatt and so on in support of his case. If I were free to disclose a private conversation, I could quote the names of two eminent judicial authorities, just as weighty, on the other side. I suggest that appeals to authority should be wiped out. I cannot agree with the light view taken by the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas) of retrospective legislation. For one thing it indicates a lack of respect for the law.
  I see from the papers that there was issued today some statement by the Church of England which deprecates the idea of people going forward hurriedly into marriage with the idea that there is always divorce available to get them out of it. Similarly it would be unfortunate if we in this House passed laws lightly and irresponsibly because we knew that we could repeal them with retrospective effect whenever we chose to. That seems to me to bring the law into disrepute.
  It is because I have a profound respect for the law that I dislike retrospective legislation. Think where is might lead us if we extended that principle. I believe it is the case that the Law Officers of the Crown now have to confine themselves to their unsubstantial salaries and not as formerly supplement them by equally substantial earnings. Supposing we had retrospective legislation embodying that principle: it would not affect the present Law Officers in this House—I am afraid—but it would certainly affect the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the present Lord Chancellor. Gratifying though it might be to see the retrospective impoverishment of those right hon. Gentlemen we could hardly defend the principle on that
  952
  ground. It is open to similar objections in this case.
  I was rather sorry to hear the Attorney-General quoting and making his own, the reference in another place to "old gentlemen sitting in the Strand." As the whole legal administration in this country is administered in its higher ranges by "old gentlemen sitting in the Strand," for the Attorney-General to quote that rather disparaging phrase, seems to me seriously detrimental to the respect which we all entertain for the law.
  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Glenvil Hall): The quotation came from one of the Chancery judges himself, who spoke of his colleagues—I presume he included himself—as "old gentlemen sitting in the Strand."
  The Attorney-General: I should be very loth to allow it to be thought that I had said anything in disparagement of "old gentlemen sitting in the Strand," most of whom incidentally are in these days quite young gentlemen. I quoted what was said by one of the most eminent Chancery judges in the country when he pointed out that what we were doing was to substitute for the discretion of the old gentleman who had made the will the "old gentlemen sitting in the Strand," and that was retrospective. I hope that it will not be thought for a moment that anything I said was by way of disparagement.
  Mr. Wilson Harris: I am not for a moment impugning the Attorney-General's motive, but was merely deprecating the effect which it might have on public opinion for anything to be said in this House in disparagement of the "old gentlemen sitting in the Strand."
  It will have been gathered from what I have said, that I am not wholeheartedly in favour of this Bill. I regret that it has been introduced, and since it has been I should like to see the Amendment carried. We spend much time here in passing laws; we give long and anxious consideration to the process, and we ought to give equally long and anxious consideration to any question of repealing the law. We ought to give doubly long and anxious consideration to any question of repealing a law retrospectively. It is only when overwhelming reasons for that can be adduced that we should be willing to assent to such a

  953
  course. This is a narrow and a narrowing grievance which will shortly disappear, and for that reason it is utterly wrong here to invoke the retrospective process in respect of something which will rapidly cure itself by the efflux of time.
  6.35 p.m.
  Mr. Bowen: I rise to support the Bill. I do not think that I should be justified in going into detail in respect of the arguments in favour of it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) expressed my sentiments on this subject. However, I should like to deal with one or two of the arguments which have been advanced by those who are opposed to the Bill—by the junior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Wilson Harris) and by other hon. Gentlemen, including the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment. As I understand it, their opposition to the Bill is based on two grounds, and I think that the junior Burgess for Cambridge University developed the arguments on those lines. The first is that there is virtue in this instrument, which is known as restraint upon anticipation. The second is, in particular, that they object to the retrospective effect of this Measure.
  I can see some force in the second arugment, and I hope to make some observations about it. With great respect, however, to those who have advanced it, the first point, namely that there is virtue in the instrument which has always been known as restraint upon anticipation, is, I feel, quite wrong. The Hanworth Committee dealt with this matter very fully and came to the conclusion that it was time to make a clause of this kind in a settlement or will illegal. The legislation to which reference has been made, the Act of 1935, laid down that in future a provision of this kind would be illegal.
  Mr. Hale: Is it not a fact that the Hanworth Committee recommendations and the Debate of 1935 were based on the position that it could be used to defeat creditors and scarcely dealt with the position of married women as a matter of justice and equity?
  Mr. Bowen: I do not agree. Both the Hanworth Report and the Debate in this House on the Second Reading of the Act
  954
  of 1935 dealt with the change in the status of women and the emancipation of women, taking account of the fact that they were now entering into trade and business and that there was now not the same need to protect them.
  Now that the hon. Member has raised the matter I would refer to what was said by, if I remember aright, the only Member who spoke against the Act of 1935 on its Second Reading, when he spoke about there still being need to protect women against the optimism, influence and control of their husbands. The arguments advanced by the Attorney-General of that time, and incidentally by one of our present Deputy-Speakers, was on the ground that it was quite inconsistent, quite out of tune with the present position of womenfolk in society that it should be within the power of persons making settlements or wills to introduce a clause with a view to restraint upon anticipation.
  I am completely opposed to those who now attempt to justify such a power, by adopting this attitude they attack the recommendations of the Hanworth Committee and are against the provisions of the law as it stands today; that is to say, they think that the provision in the 1935 Act which made a clause in restraint upon anticipation illegal should not have been introduced. My view is that such clauses were originally introduced to protect women against their husbands. The effect was not only to protect them against their husbands but for some time at least to protect them also against creditors and against themselves.
  The protection so far as creditors are concerned has been dealt with to some degree, though there is some dispute as to how far, by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914. I feel that the case was made out in 1935 that married women were certainly now in such a position as not to require to be placed in a category apart from other members of the community requiring special protection either against their husbands or themselves. To my mind that part of the argument against this Bill has no real force. The other argument, that it is meant to be retrospective, that it will be retrospective in its effect, is a much more substantial one. The learned Attorney-General rather underestimated the significance of this Bill from that point of view.

  955
  There can be no doubt, though it may be in only a few cases, that the effect of this Bill when it becomes law will be that the intentions of a number of people, some in recent years, will be vitiated. It may well be that there are some cases as late as 1934 where a father has made a settlement, subject to a restraint upon anticipation perhaps after his daughter has married, with all the circumstances within his own personal knowledge and having very good grounds for making provision of that kind. But under this Bill when it becomes law that intention, clearly expressed by a person who fully understood what he was doing, will be rendered void.
  That, in my opinion, is the only real and valid attack which can be made upon this Bill. To suggest that that is not being done is quite wrong. The number of cases may be very few, and some of them are due no doubt to the fact that this clause was frequently put in as a matter of common form. But making all allowances in that respect, there will be some cases still where we shall be interfering with the wishes of a testator or settlor clearly expressed for good and adequate reasons.
  It was with those cases in mind that I hesitated before deciding that I could support this Bill. I do not share the view of the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas) with regard to retrospective legislation. I consider that any attempt to interfere in those circumstances is something which should be examined with extreme caution. A sentimental argument has been advanced—I do not use the word "sentimental" in any disparaging sense—by the learned Attorney-General and the hon. Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning). That argument, although it naturally appeals from a sentimental point of view, does not really advance the case, because the same argument could be applied with regard to trusts generally, protective trusts, and for altering testamentary dispositions under any circumstances.
  I feel that a case is made out for saying that in the overwhelming majority of cases where this clause operates today it is operating to cause hardship and great inconvenience, in most cases contrary to the wishes of the person who inserted that
  956
  clause. That is, of course, entirely a matter of opinion, but I am happy in my own mind that in the overwhelming majority of cases that is the state of affairs. The objection to the Bill on the ground that it is retrospective is weakened by the fact that retrospective action in this sphere has already been taken two or three times before—in the Bankruptcy Act, certainly in the Law of Property Act of 1925. That was a retrospective Act which interfered with the discretion and wishes of the testator or settlor.
  Hon. Members who are opposed to this Bill undermine their own case when they suggest that the matter should be dealt with by an extention of the provisions of the Law of Property Act. All they are saying is, "We are prepared for the wishes of the settlor or testator to be interfered with, provided they are interfered with by separate applications and by a judge of the High Court." To my mind, once we accept the principle that we are going to interfere with the wishes of a testator or a settlor in this way there is no particular merit in saying that it should be done by the extention of the Law of Property Act.
  Mr. Donovan; Except that it is looked at in every individual case.
  Mr. Bowen: I agree that there is that virtue in it and that he could take into account all the particular circumstances. But to my mind—and this is why I have come down on this side after some hesitation—the position of womenfolk today, their status in society, the experience financially and in business matters which they have gained, is such that in the overwhelming majority of cases the object which the testator or settlor had in mind when placing this restraint has already been achieved by the developments in society itself. The testator wished to protect his daughter against her husband, or against herself but she has now equipped herself sufficiently to protect herself without recourse to legal stipulation. It is for that reason that I support this Bill.
  There is another aspect to it expressed by the hon. Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning). It is one of the numerous, but certainly not the most serious, illustrations of the invidious position in which married people still are under the law. An example is to be found in the pro-

  957
  visions of the Agricultural Holdings Act. Under that Act we were reminded that in regard to property held by women subject to a "restraint" condition, when it came to be dealt with under that Act, the woman had to obtain the consent of her husband. Perhaps as a bachelor I cannot appreciate as well as some hon. Members, but I can appreciate that women on principle object to processes of law which produce those results. Despite my hesitation in regard to the retrospective aspect of this matter I feel that on the whole this Bill is the logical conclusion to the Bankruptcy Act of 1914, the. Law of Property Act, the Act of 1935 and the present position and status of women in society.
  6.48 p.m.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: I oppose this Bill, although the grounds of my opposition have nothing to do with the points mentioned by the hon. Member for Cardigan (Mr. Bowen). I oppose the Bill on the ground that it is a piece of class legislation, and that it has been brought to this House in the most undesirable context. It is all very well for the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas) and the learned Attorney-General to give a disquisition on this very ancient and, I am quite prepared to admit, somewhat outworn doctrine of restraint upon anticipation. But, in my submission, that is not the real issue which we have to consider. The real point which affects this particular matter is the moment at which it is sought to introduce this Bill upon the Statute Book. If it were a question of pure law, a matter that I had to decide in normal times, then I admit that the conclusion to which I should come would be quite different.
  Let me tell the House why I oppose this Bill. I wonder what the Civil Service thinks about this sort of legislation. I wonder what the railwaymen think about it. This is an important consideration in deciding whether we ought to support this Measure. We are in a very serious economic situation and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has asked everyone to save and to cut expenses. Recently he made some very important cuts. He has even economised on school meals, and a charge of 1s. for each prescription taken to a chemist is to be imposed. That is the essence of
  958
  our present economic life. We are asked to spend less and produce more. That is why I ask what the members of the Civil Service, who have just had their claims for increased wages refused, think about this matter when their claims were refused on the grounds that they must not have any more money to spend because of the consequential inflationary effect. The same applies to the railwaymen. In addition, the Trades Union Congress have asked workers in every industry not to apply for more wages; and the Government are doing precisely the same thing.
  That is the context of which this Bill comes before the House. Make no mistake about it, that is what we Members of Parliament, particularly my hon. Friends on this side of the House, have to consider. That is the view which we have to uphold. In that light, let me consider the object of this Bill. Can anyone deny that the one main object of this Measure is to release money? There can be no question about that. It is designed to help certain people to spend money which they cannot now touch. That cannot be denied. No case of hardship has been made out. It is all very well for the Attorney-General, whose advocacy is usually most admirable and effective, to say in a sort of general way, "I have had letters from so and so. Certain women's organisations have said so and so." That proves nothing except that there is agitation going on here just as there is in a hundred other directions. It does not prove that there is any specific case of hardship. No attempt has been made to specify any particular case which requires this Bill to be passed.
  Mr. Dodds: Yes, there has.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: I say that there has not, and I have listened most carefully. The case of a teacher has been mentioned but that is not an example which could be said to be outside the limitations on income and spending laid down by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
  Mr. Dodds: A husband with tuberculosis was mentioned.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: My hon. Friend must not think that I am as naïve as that. Of course, I will come to that. That is peculiarly a case which should and does

  959
  come within the legal machinery set up by statute whereby anyone in such a case can go to a court for relief. I will deal with that in due course.
  Let me compare that situation with the origin of the Bill. As it affects any question of hardship, the origin of this Measure is somewhat unfortunate. It comes here because of a personal Bill initiated in another place. As a result, the Government were placed in a dilemma. Certain hon. Members thought that the Bill was objectionable. They said that it did not include everybody, and that it was not fair that we should cater for one person and leave out everyone else. That was a good point.
  The Government appreciated that here was a deep injustice, and therefore they had to do one of two things. They could either proceed with that Measure or drop it. But in order to achieve what that Bill sought to do it was then necessary to introduce this legislation. There is not the slightest doubt that the personal Bill was designed specifically to get rid of a fetter which prevented the beneficiary from freeing money which under present conditions cannot be touched. That is a proposition which I defy anyone to contradict. The origin, the beginning, the inspiration of this legislation was that case. That is not even denied. The money could not be touched. But for that, I assert that this legislation would not have been before this House today.
  In times like these the only possible justification for facilities to increase income or to spend more can be found in specific cases—and I emphasise this—of urgency and hardship. That proposition is exactly the same as the one embodied in the White Paper on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices. I ask anyone who wants to be fair and just to compare the two principles. They will discover that the two are identically the same. What the White Paper states is exactly the proposition I have made—that no case except where there is the most urgent hardship should be given the exceptional relief which is asked for here.
  Let us consider the public generally. I do not think anyone denies that among wage earners there is an urgent need of money. The cost of living is going up. The same point applies to professional people. They are probably more hard
  960
  up than they have ever been before. The same conditions apply to the middle-class. They are all in the same boat. But, of course, I agree that it is in the national interest that their demands for more money, at the present time, should be deferred until we get out of our economic difficulties. I do not suggest that they should be helped, but I also insist that we ought not to have class legislation in order to help one special class of people as against another.
  One exception to that doctrine is conceded by everybody. I refer to the people who earn very low wages. The reason is that there is real hardship. Admittedly, their wages are below the dead-line level. A case like that ought to be conceded. But no example of similar hardship has been given to the House. In any event, the personal Bill which caused this legislation was not a case of that kind. I am certain that many people would find their lives unbelievably brightened and magically transported if they were able to enjoy similar conditions to those enjoyed by the party concerned in that personal Bill.
  I should like to consider the point of which so much has been made, about applications to the court. Of course, there are hard cases and it is because there usually are that legislation was introduced in 1881 to make it possible to go to court by way of application and ask the judge to give relief from the restraint upon anticipation either entirely or partially. The judge has power to deal with the whole of the matter or to deal with part of the trust funds. That procedure has been working quite satisfactorily ever since 1881. It is perfectly true that the court has to scrutinise these cases very carefully; but so have the National Arbitration Tribunal and the Industrial court to scrutinise the applications for increase in wages by work-people at the present time. Therefore, the relief in these hard cases that have been referred to is secured in that way.
  So far as the costs are concerned, I cannot understand why any point is made about the costs involved. Of course, there are costs involved; there always are. I do not know how anyone, except by some system of legal aid, can make an application or bring an action, whether in breach of contract or breach of trust or for whatever purpose, without costs being

  961
  involved, but what I want to know is why this particular case for relief should be selected for special treatment. It is special treatment, in the sense that it is suggested that these particular persons ought not to have to incur costs by having to make an application for relief to the court. It is sought to do away with the law altogether and thus get rid of the costs. As a matter of fact, in this particular case the party is better off than in most other cases, because here there is what is called a corpus and if it is a proper application the judge can say that the costs shall come out of the trust fund or income, so that the question whether the applicant is poor or not does not come into it at all. If it is a proper application, then the costs come out of the fund; if it is not a proper application, then it should never have been made.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: What would happen if, in fact, the income of the person was derived from capital which belonged to somebody else?
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: My hon. and learned Friend can submit all sorts of legal conundrums. [Interruption.] Well, then, assuming that there is a case of that kind, the position is no worse. There is still income—
  The Attorney-General: Surely, my hon. and learned Friend appreciates that, in that case, which is the common case, the costs would come out of the income and the income of the married woman would be thereby reduced? It is perfect nonsense, if I may say so with respect, to say that the costs will always come out of the estate and that the married woman would suffer only to the extent of a pound a year. It may well be, and it is often the fact, that she actually pays the whole of the costs.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: All I can say is that the Attorney-General is reducing this to an absurdity. It means that the estate would be absolutely worthless. There may be such an estate, but the testator should himself have been under restraint if in such a case he had done that. I do not accept that as a fair illustration at all.
  The ordinary average case which we are discussing now is the case where there is a corpus, where there is capital and income and an adequate sum to meet the costs, if necessary. In any case no
  962
  specific illustration has been given showing why this particular money is needed. I have heard it said that sometimes the money may be wanted for business, but I do not share that view at all, because businesses today are fairly successful. I do not think there is need for the wife to be drawing on her money in order to provide more money for her husband in business. That is not what happens today at all.
  Most businesses today are fairly successful, and, if they are not, it is not because they want capital, but because they are not the right sort of businesses to have at the present moment. That is what we find in practice—that money in that sense—money from a wife's trust—is not ordinarily needed today for business purposes. In any case, one cannot go opening up any business that one likes, and that is quite right, because as long as there is the Control of Employment Order and as long as the Ministry of Labour has powers of direction, then it is perfectly right that people should not be able to do what they like so far as the opening up a new business is concerned. If we are going to lay down handicaps for people generally, we cannot cut out one class for special treatment.
  Mrs. Manning: May I point out to my hon. and learned Friend that his statement about businesses not requiring money today is completely untrue?
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: I would like to come to my next point, which is the question of tidying up the law. Speaking as a lawyer, I am in favour of that, but I am not in favour of tidying up the law in order to enable a special class of people to spend more money at a time when it is injurious to the national economy. The cases envisaged by this Bill are not an exception to that proposition. One has to consider the financial conditions prevailing today. People's money is tied up everywhere, and, in present conditions, this is quite right. The other day, I saw that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was making it impossible for legacies beyond the sum of £500 to go to hard currency countries, and that is literally going to tie up millions of pounds. Last year, the amount of money connected with legacies of that kind was over £10 million.

  963
  There are numerous other examples. Let us take the case of bonuses. Firms and companies cannot issue bonuses, and dividends are restricted. Companies are not allowed to pay dividends which, in fact, their earnings would justify. It has been mentioned earlier that people cannot get payment of their post-war credits, and many of us know that business people cannot get payment of their war damage claims. If all that is right, why segregate those subject to the restraint on anticipation for preferential treatment? I should have thought it would have been much more worthy if facilities had been provided for the Married Women (Maintenance) Bill, which seeks to increase the amount of maintenance for women up to £2 from the miserable pittance which it is at present. That would have been a much more worthy thing to do.
  Another point which has been put forward for this Bill was made in another place, when it was said that it helps towards the equality of the sexes. Really, that argument will not do.
  Mrs. Manning: Why not?
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: It is within my recollection, and I am sure within the recollection of the House, that when the question of equal pay arose here, the present Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said: "Oh, yes; we agree with the principle, but it is not the sort of thing that ought to be done at the present moment." That is exactly what I am saying about this particular legislation. It is no use talking about this Bill being intended to attain equality of the sexes. That is not the real reason for this particular legislation at all.
  Then there is the question of taxation. It was said in the other place that if it is justifiable legislation, one ought not to allow any question of taxation to stand in its way. That, of course, is not the salient point of substance here at all. The crucial objection to the Bill, in my submission, is that it is committing a glaring inconsistency. It is doing for a particular class of persons precisely what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has asked everybody else not to do, and that is why the Bill has raised resentment.
  There is not the slightest doubt that it has raised resentment, as can be seen
  964
  from the Press and learned from those to whom one talks about it. The reason for this resentment is because it is undoubtedly a piece of class discrimination, and such a thing at the present moment is absolutely deplorable. Why the Government were asked to espouse it seems to me to be absolutely beyond intelligent understanding. It certainly has no links with Labour Party policy, and no one is going to suggest to me that there is any mandate from the country for it.
  The significant thing is that no legal organisation—the Law Society, the Bar Council or any body of judges—has asked for this amendment of the law. In fact, a very important legal journal has criticised it very strongly indeed. In those circumstances, are we, at a time when everyone in the country is being asked to save, to retrench, and not to spend more than is absolutely necessary, really going to put upon the Statute Book a piece of legislation which will be the means of allowing a certain limited class of people to increase their spending power in this way? I really cannot think that it is right to do that, and I certainly cannot think it is right for a Labour Government to do it.
  It may be all very well for the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) to give his support to this Bill, but then he is a Member of the Opposition which wants to "set the people free." That is understandable, because that is precisely what this Bill is going to do. It is going to set a limited class of people free to do what nobody else in the country can do. In those circumstances, I do not think that this Bill should be supported.
  7.14 p.m.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am glad to have the opportunity of following the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) after the speech he has just made. I may say that it is not my intention or desire to do anything to bring this Debate to a conclusion, but finding myself unfortunately on this occasion not in complete agreement either with my right hon. Friend the member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) or with the mover or seconder of the Amendment, I should like to state my reasons why I am not at present dis-

  965
  posed to go into the Division Lobby and vote in favour of this Bill.
  Before I come to that, I should like to say a word about the very courageous speech made by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester. He regarded this Bill as a piece of pure class legislation. It is, of course, undoubtedly clear that a number of wealthy women will, in consequence of this Bill, if it becomes an Act, be able to gain control over sums of money which are not at the present time at their disposal. That, I think, is absolutely clear and was conceded by the right hon. and learned Attorney-General in moving the Second Reading of the Bill.
  It is also clear that the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester was on a good point when he said that this Bill had not been asked for by any body of judges, any committee, the Law Society or the Bar Council. We have grown accustomed in this House, when any legal Measure of a non-party character is introduced by the right hon. and learned Attorney-General, to hear it said that he has consulted the Law Society, the Bar Council or the judges. But I noticed that in his speech today he was silent on all those matters.
  I wonder why this Bill has been introduced without such consultation first taking place. The reasons put forward by the right hon. and learned Gentleman were very interesting, and it was apparently the case that the Government, realising that time would have to be taken up in this House with a Personal Bill and having regard also to the Amendment tabled by my hon. Friends, decided to convert that Personal Bill into a Bill of general application. I do not propose to answer all the questions put by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester, but I hope that the Financial Secretary, if he is going to take any part in this Debate, will answer the very pertinent economic questions which the hon. and learned Gentleman asked. Apart from those two matters, I must say that I thought the hon. and learned Member's plea as a member of the Common Law Bar for further employment for members of the Chancery Bar was not unattractive.
  I was astonished by two arguments put forward by the Attorney-General when moving the Second Reading. He said that this Bill put married women on the same basis as spinsters and men, and no
  966
  doubt, chiefly on that account, it was welcomed by the hon. Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning) on the grounds that it provided further equality for women. Of course, that is a quite inaccurate ground, and in welcoming the Bill for that reason the hon. Lady was really showing her touching faith in the increasing virtue of man because she is inferring by what she said that the predatory instincts of man have decreased since last century.
  Of course, it does not follow at all from this Bill that married women will be put on the same basis as spinsters, and that ought to be made quite clear. It is not the case that since 1935 married women have all been free to deal as they like with money put in trust for them. A great many of them, I have no doubt, are subject to protective or discretionary trusts, and all those who benefit under settlements or wills made before 1935 are, of course, subject to the restraint upon anticipation
  Mrs. Manning: Am I not right in suggesting that this makes for equality because men have never been subject to restraint, but to a discretionary trust?
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: The hon. Lady is really not right on that because this Bill only affects settlements made before 1935. The other restraints have already gone. Take the case of the married woman. That is itself inaccurate because a great many of the women who have married since 1935 will be subject to protective or discretionary trusts.
  The Attorney-General: If the hon. and learned Gentleman will allow me, that is not quite right. They may be subject to protective or discretionary trusts, but those trusts will have no relation to the fact that they are married. They will be subject to such trusts whether married or not. The point of this restraint is that it only relates to the period of marriage.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: The trust will be applied whether they are married or not, but I am sure that in a great many cases, if not all, the trust was created in anticipation of marriage.
  The Attorney-General: That may be so, but it affords no protection against the husband. It affords a general protection, and in that respect widows, spinsters or married women will be on exactly the

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  same basis as men. The position of marriage will have no effect on the protective trust.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: I was not suggesting the contrary. Indeed, I was not dealing with the point as to whether the protective trust was wider in its ambit than the restraint upon anticipation, but it is obviously wrong to suggest that the effect of this Bill is to put all married women on the same basis as spinsters and men. It does not. What this Bill does is to destroy any protection given to married women in settlements or wills made before 1935 without giving any power to provide alternative protection to those very same women.
  The second proposition which the right hon. and learned Gentleman put forward, and which rather surprised me, was his statement that 99 cases out of 100, had been cases where settlements had been entered into without any proper consideraby the settlor. I would like to know on what basis he arrived at those figures. I am prepared to assume that in a great many cases before 1935 the settlor executed the settlement or his will without full consideration of the effect of the restraint upon anticipation, but I have no grounds for supposing that it was 99 cases out of 100 or any number like that.
  What I should like the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the House to direct their minds to is this. In some cases, no doubt, that restraint upon anticipation was imposed without proper consideration, but in other cases—and there may have been a considerable number—it may have been imposed after the most careful consideration, and in some of those cases I would suggest that any reasonable individual looking at the situation now would say that it would be right that some protection should still exist. We are agreed—and I think the hon. Member for Epping would agree—that there are some ladies who still need some protection against their husbands and perhaps against other people as well. The hon. Lady would be taking away all protection from those ladies in respect of whom trusts were created before 1935 without any possibility at all of putting in their place a discretionary trust.
  Mrs. Manning: Is not the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the vast majority of those wills were made at a time when a father had no idea whether his daughter would need protection or not, or whether she would even be married, and that they were probably made when she was a baby? There is thus created in marriage bitterness and bad feeling which need never have existed.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am not prepared to accept that the majority of restraints upon anticipation are contained in wills. Most of them come into marriage settlements in anticipation of marriage. Nor am I prepared to assume that when the wills are made the children are all small babies. I do not accept the view that the mere inclusion of a restraint upon anticipation is something which is bound to evoke bitterness between married parties or between a child and parents.
  While the hon. Lady may be right in thinking that the virtue of men has increased, does she still think that all men are so good that there is no need for any protection for these women who are protected under the pre-1935 trusts or wills? There have been cases in this century where restraint upon anticipation has defeated the designs of husbands, and if this Bill goes through, the rogue who wishes to marry a rich widow will be very careful to ask, in addition to proposing marriage, whether the marriage settlement for her first marriage was made before 1935.
  Mrs. Manning: I meant exactly that. I should like the hon. and learned Gentleman to realise that I do feel that the social conscience, general social behaviour and patterns of behaviour of this century are quite different from those of the 19th century, both in regard to the roguery of men and the innocence of women.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: I shall not be led astray by the hon. Lady into discussing those subjects in any detail, but I am sure she will agree that there are some cases where there is need for protection of women against their husbands. I discussed this matter the other day with another lady, a Chancery barrister, and I think she put the point clearly when she said, "It would not be necessary if some men were not such cads." I should have

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  thought that if the hon. Lady thought there was need of protection, she would have voted not for the Bill but against it for the reasons which I am about to put forward.
  My objection to this Bill is this. While I agree that, generally speaking, there should be much greater power of giving relief from restraint upon anticipation in regard to pre-1935 settlements, I think that that restraint should not be abolished in all those cases without securing in some way or other, some retention of protection for the few cases, it may be, where protection is really required against the husband and perhaps against other people as well. This Bill as it now stands takes away all the protection which the settlor originally intended his child to have.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: In the case of protection against other people than the husband, does the hon. and learned Gentlemen think that that should continue after the termination of the marriage or not?
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: From 1935 onwards there has been no power of putting in a resettlement restraint upon anticipation. This Bill takes away restraint in pre-1935 settlements and wills and leaves people affected by those settlements without the protection which could be given to them after 1935.
  That is why I am critical of this Bill. Just as now there may be individual cases where the right hon. and learned Gentleman would think it desirable that there should be a protective trust, I feel sure that if the same case had occurred before 1935 the right hon. and learned Gentleman would then have said that there should be restraint upon anticipation. He is now taking away that restraint upon anticipation and leaving the woman concerned without any protection whatsoever. That is my objection to this Bill. I do not know how many cases would be affected by it, but it may result in great hardship for individual women.
  As I have said, I, personally, think that the case for relief against this restraint upon anticipation is overwhelming, but at the same time I should like to see that some of those cases still have some protection. I believe it would be possible to draft a Bill which would meet my two objections satisfactorily, which would allow relief but at the same time secure protection where protection was really
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  desirable. There are two possible ways of securing that protection. One which has already been suggested and dealt with in some detail relates to application to the courts for the removal of restraint.
  A lot has been said about the expense of such applications. Of course, if the Legal Aid and Advice Act had not been deferred, perhaps there would not have been such force in those arguments, but I am not wedded to that particular method. I am not at all sure that the better way would not be to say that the trustees should have power to put on one side the restraint and yet have the power of referring the matter to the courts for guidance if they felt in any real difficulty about doing what the beneficiary wanted them to do.
  I had hoped that it would be possible for me to vote for the Second Reading of this Bill—so that we could do something about restraint on anticipation, and also explore in the course of the Committee Stage the possibilities of removing restraint, while retaining a certain amount of protection. I understand that under the terms of this Bill it will not be possible to table any Amendments, which are likely to be selected, in order to discuss the possibilities of applications to the courts on consent of the trustees so as to make sure, while meeting the case of "the little teacher" and all those other cases which are very real, that protection is not completely done away with in the 50 or 60 pre-1935 settlement cases where there may still be real need of protection.
  It is because I understand that these matters cannot be raised on the Committee Stage that, much as I dislike the present restraint on anticipation, I feel bound to vote against this Bill in the hope and in the belief that if it is not carried, the Government will have to think again, as they did after the Personal Bill dealing with the Mountbatten Estate, and introduce a Bill of a more comprehensive nature which will meet the difficulties about which I feel so strongly.
  Mrs. Manning: Before the hon. and learned Member sits down may I ask him one question in order to make this point clear? Is it a fact that, because he cannot so amend the Bill as to afford protection to a small number of pre-1935 cases, he will vote against the Bill and so penalise the very large numbers of women who would otherwise be relieved?
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: The hon. Lady has followed my argument, but she has not quite concluded the argument. After this matter has been ventilated in this way, I do not believe the Government could, if the Bill were defeated, leave the position where it now stands. Just as was the case after the Personal Bill, I believe the Government would have to introduce a Bill; and that they would be compelled to do so as a result of the pressure from both sides of the House. They have given way to pressure before today and it is my hope that we should be able to bring sufficient pressure on them to make them introduce a Bill which will meet the points raised.
  7.33 p.m.
  Mr. Leslie Hale: I am sure the House enjoyed, and was grateful to my right hon. Friend for his opening statement which was lucid, cogent and 99 per cent. accurate. We appreciated it. I thought I detected at one stage that the placid waters of Lake Success had not been ruffled at all by the storms of our own economic crisis and that, in the comfort of the Turkish bath, he had not become more fully acquainted with the efforts of the Treasury to deal with the question of settlements altogether. There have been a great many attempts by the Treasury and by Income Tax authorities, both retrospectively and otherwise, to deal with the question of settlements which may be made with the intention—sometimes successful—of avoiding tax—some made so successfully that now it is only by charging fairly high fees for advising people about avoiding tax that I am able to pay my own.
  I think the Debate has been a credit to the House. I want quite humbly to put one point, but still to be somewhat dogmatic about it. This is not a retrospective Bill in any sense of the term and I am really surprised that the hon. Member for Cardigan (Mr. Bowen) talked of it in those terms. There are two objections to retrospective legislation. Of course, the fundamental objection and the one which we always make—and even then we often fail to persuade the House of its importance in the particular circumstances—is in criminal law: making a thing which has happened an offence. That, of course, is very much against one's instincts and conscience, but, nevertheless, in these times, it has sometimes to be done.
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  The second objection, as one hon. Member said, is doing something which will shock public confidence in the stability of affairs and the stability of the law. But if it is really suggested that a Bill which, from the time it becomes law, enables contracts to be varied without the consent of the original settlor or the original vendor or purchaser is retrospective, then the plain answer is that every conveyancing Act which has been passed during the past 700 years has done it.
  It was done in the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, and it was done in the Mortmain, 500 years ago, to which the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Wilson Harris) made a belated opposition in his speech this afternoon. It was done in absolute detail in the Conveyancing Act of 1881. It was done, root and branch, by the Settled Land Act of 1882, by the whole of the Acts of 1925, the Conveyancing Acts and Trustee Acts which did it fully. We have done it in our Town and Country Planning Acts and we do it in the Rent Restrictions Acts. It is a recognised Parliamentary duty to protect people from the consequence of their own acts and from the effects of economic storms and the economic circumstances, or alterations in the law, or shortages and so on. It is not retrospective legislation.
  It is rather a curious thing that the Hanworth Committee did not deal with this point at all. They said, "On the whole, we suggest an Amendment of the law with reference to contracts or settlements made after the Act comes into force." So far as I can remember, there was no other observation about that at all. In the opening speech of the then Solicitor-General, later to become much more famous as Minister for Co-ordination of Production, there was only one reference to it.
  The Attorney-General: Co-ordination of Defence.
  Mr. Hale: I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I think I am right in my recollection that there was only one reference to it in one sentence: "we propose to alter these contracts from the date of the Act," or words to that effect. The word "retrospection" was never used in the Debate, although in fact it was restrospective with regard to wills, pre-

  973
  sumably on the principle that where a testator had not died they could be altered, assuming that the testator had read the Act although probably he had not. There is no valid objection here on the grounds that it is retrospective.
  Mr. H. Strauss: I think I am right in my recollection, which is confirmed by studying the Lord Chancellor's speech in another place, that the Committee unanimously recommended that in all future instruments a clause retaining the restraint should be void; and that they refrained from recommending the abolition of a restraint in instruments already executed. Does not that really mean that they decided in favour of the one and against the other?
  Mr. Hale: I think that is a fair point and I think the hon. and learned Member will agree that I made that point clearly. I said they made no comment except to say what should happen in future instruments. I hope I said that quite clearly and I quite accept it; one must, of course, assume that when they put in the word "future" it meant something and that they had resolved on balance not to affect existing contracts. Dealing with the case put to the House in 1935, it is curious to recollect, in view of the time we are taking today at this very busy period in our legislation, that this exceedingly important law reform, which dealt with a wide variety of Measures, which were very welcome—there were many variations of the law relating to joint tortfeasors and married women and, indeed, the bankruptcy of married women—passed its Second Reading in a little over an hour and its Committee stage, Report stage and Third Reading were taken "on the nod." So far as I can recollect the issues that are now being put were not then put at all.
  I have listened with sympathetic attention to the proposals of hon. Members—principally hon. Members opposite—who suggest that this problem could be dealt with on the basis of the suggestions put forward in the Amendment tabled on Second Reading, if the Committee stage does permit those Amendments formally to be put down. I do say with reserve but with real sincerity that I am really convinced that hon. Members on both sides of the House do not really appreciate the approach to litigation of any kind of the average person. My hon.
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  and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) seems to think that one goes to the Chancery Division much as one goes to Keith Prowse to buy a ticket for the theatre. People do not. They dread it. They dread even going to their solicitor. I get letters in my post-bag, as, I am sure, other hon. Members do, and other lawyers do, from people who are afraid even to go to the county court about compensation or money matters. They are frightened. There is a certain horror about going even to their local solicitor. The solicitor's bill, as though it were something incomputable, may be a burden to them all their lives. They want a great deal of reassuring on these questions.
  That is the first point. The second point, on the question of expense, is this. If a person came to me as a solicitor and asked advice as to the procedure to be followed to obtain a relaxation of restraint, and as to the probable result, I could do no more than say that, on the whole, it is the sort of thing that is likely to be granted, but that it might cost £50 or £60 or £70, and that I really could not promise anything, and could not guarantee that the relaxation would be given and that unless the client had money it would be a rather dangerous thing to go on with.
  Captain Crowder: Surely, the cost could be paid out of the capital of the trust fund?
  Mr. Hale: No, it could not. I shall come to that in a moment. Let me finish this sentence. If people in, for instance, Leicestershire or Nottinghamshire want an application in the Chancery Division, the local solicitor has to send the papers on to his agents, who may take another line and brief counsel in London who is not known to him; and they may have to go personally to hear the case, for the court may want to interview them. All that adds to the expense. Nevertheless, I do not want to exaggerate costs. These things can be done cheaply, and this procedure is one which is, generally speaking, as cheap as possible.
  Now, as to the question of the corpus. Here my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester really made it quite clear that he was not really

  975
  acquainted with the position with which we are dealing today. We are dealing today with settlements made on marriage, generally speaking, or settlements made by will, by which the money is limited to a married woman during her marriage, and afterwards during her widowhood, and, after death, to somebody else. I would venture to say that this is what happens, in at least nine cases out of ten. It is limited to her with power to appoint or power to nominate, but, in general, she is not entitled to the capital at all, and never will be, whether the marriage ceases or not. All she is entitled to is the income, and all she has the right to under this Bill is the right to mortgage, or to hypothecate the future income to which she is entitled under the settlement during such limited period as can normally be hypothecated. That sort of immediate need is generally the sort of case which allows that question to arise. So, generally speaking, it cannot be paid out of the corpus. That being so, we have to consider, I think, two other matters.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: The hon. Gentleman says that, generally speaking, it cannot be paid out of the corpus. If the matter goes to the court, the court can order the costs to be paid out of the corpus of the property.
  Mr. Hale: I accept that, of course; but I venture to suggest that the court normally would not. If a lady enjoying an income asked for a mortgage settlement of the income, the court would not say that the costs of application had to be borne by the children. Normally, it would not—unless the purpose of the mortgage was for the benefit of the children, or something of that kind.
  Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: It usually is.
  Mr. Hale: That argument rather defeats itself, because in the sort of case which the hon. Member is visualising an application can be made now. In the sort of case where the application is for relief for special objects, provision is already there. So it is in the sort of case we are now considering, where a special case does not apply, where the applicant is trying to deal with the principle, not a case of special hardship, that we should
  976
  not get costs of restraint paid out of the corpus.
  Captain Crowder: May I ask the hon. Gentleman a question for the sake of information? I understand—I may be wrong—that the court can only give relaxation if it is for the benefit of the married woman. The court cannot give relaxation which is for the benefit of the husband or the children. Therefore, we want to extend it. Is that right?
  Mr. Hale: With respect, I accept the proposition the hon. and gallant Gentleman makes in his concluding words: that discretion is very limited, and that if we leave it on the basis of discretion it needs extension. I would not agree that the meaning of the words would preclude a judge from saying it is for the benefit of the woman that the children should have education according to their station, and so on.
  However, I want to deal with the point my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester made, and which, I am sure, is in the minds of some of my hon. Friends on these benches. It is said—and it is not said wholly without reason, because there was some Press publicity on this point—that the original Bill presented as a personal Bill in the Lords was primarily to avoid the consequences of high taxation; and it is said from this side that one should not pass legislation to enable people to avoid taxation. Well, now, the answer to that is, that, whoever said it, this Bill does not enable anybody to avoid any taxation—except, of course, in so far as anyone may avoid taxation by throwing £100,000 down the drain to reduce interest. It is perfectly clear that the woman would be fully liable for taxation on the settlement funds if she made a hypothecation of future income. It is clear that under the Act of 1946 the Revenue authorities have full power to deal with settlements made for the purpose of avoiding taxation if the instruments were primarily for that purpose. Then it is equally true that there are other safeguards so far as taxation is concerned.
  The matter on which I should like my right hon. and learned Friend to give the House some guidance is this. We should like to be assured that these provisions will be strictly enforced, and that, if discretion has been exercised, the atten-

  977
  tion of the Revenue authorities will be drawn to it under the existing law, and to the fact that the existing law must be carried out in detail, and that there must not be any tendency to exercise discretion in matters of this kind.
  I have now to deal with the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester, because he put forward some propositions all of which, I think were completely incorrect. I am sorry to make these observations in his absence but I was not aware that he was not to be here. His first proposition was that everybody today was much worse off than he ever was before—which struck me as being very surprising indeed. His second proposition was that private enterprise is so successful that it cannot succeed if capital is not found for it—which is not one to which I entirely subscribe. His third proposition was that one can always get costs paid out of the. corpus, which I have said is wrong. His fourth was that this will save Income Tax, whereas, in point of fact, it does not affect the Income Tax law at all. His fifth point is one I have already dealt with—that people go happily to the Law Courts.
  Now I come to the objections to the Bill. I object, first, to its drafting. I always dislike attacking the Parliamentary draftsmen, but I am one of those people who are charged from time to time with finding out what the law is. I have not completely succeeded, but one has to go through the motions of trying to find it out from time to time, and this business of an Act of 1935 which inserts one sentence in an Act of 1925, and of passing another in 1949 which pulls it out and inserts another makes the job of finding out what the law is an extremely complex one, so that we have got to such a state that we need the most elaborate card-index system in the world, or a sort of Scotland Yard fingerprint index system, to enable anyone to discover what the law is at any given moment.
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester said there was no Socialist principle in this Bill. The principle in this Bill is that women are to be treated on the same basis of men, and that is a fundamental Socialist principle, and that is why I shall vote for the Second Reading of this Bill without
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  hesitation. It is right it should be done, and whatever may have been the argument in 1935 for the exceptions, there can really be no reason now why we should not say that what I have always regarded as a degrading provision should be abolished completely.
  Why are we dealing only with this little bit of it? I would like to refer with reserve and propriety to the able speech made in 1935 on this matter by an hon. Member of this House who now occupies so exalted a position that he would not speak from either side of the House. Reference was there made to the taxation position as an issue of fundamental importance. That is the law which says that a husband can be assessed for his wife's taxes. There used to be a time in our history when an impecunious member of the aristocracy could go to New York, wed a wealthy bride and return with her here. Plainly the position now is that he cannot afford to do that, even if the supply is available. It is impossible for a man of modest income to marry a wealthy woman, because the taxation position becomes hopelessly impossible. The wife cannot maintain her existing position, and the husband cannot run the risk of increasing his financial burden of taxation. It is because of this, I think, quite wicked anomaly, that we have this taxation question arising on settlements of this kind. That is an important issue.
  There are in my own constituency many thousands of ladies enjoying an income today with a restraint upon anticipation. That income is normally 16s. or 26s. a week. The restraint on anticipation is created by the fact that the corpus of the fund belongs to His Majesty's Government and the old-age pension is paid out week by week. That income is aggregated with the husband's income for the purposes of taxation, and I think that is monstrous. I could have agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester if he had made his point in that way, and had said that in dealing with the question of relief from the burden of taxation, we should first consider the greatest hardship on the old-age pensioner having to bear tax on income provided by her own or her husband's industry, on which she has to live and which is being taxed now, contrary, I think, to all our conceptions of ethics.
  There was an argument in the days of unemployment that, on the whole, it was

  979
  not a good thing for a husband or wife to work if it kept an unemployed man out of work. Today when the Government are urging people to work and to go on working up to an advanced age, this anomaly is a very important one, and I hope that we shall have some assurance that it will be considered in the light of this Bill.
  In conclusion, I regret that this Bill deals only with one small point. It is remarkable that we should have spent a day on one point of law reform when so many points arise for consideration. Reference has been made to the Inheritance Act, which is virtually a dead letter. It was an Act of great social significance and importance passed to help the married woman and to protect her from an improper settlement, but it has rarely been brought into force because of the limitations on its use. There is the type of case to which I have objection whereby a husband disinherits his wife on second marriage. That is in general a revolting provision, although I can well understand the exceptional case where it could be justified. I wish that we had the opportunity of considering some of these matters. At the same time, I have no hesitation in saying that this Measure is in line with our other Measures of social reform. It is approved by the trend of social advancement and learning. There is no objection to it in principle or in detail, and it is fully entitled on its merits to a Second Reading.
  7.55 p.m.
  Mr. David Renton: I am in favour of this Bill for personal reasons. In saying that, I do not mean that I have any personal interest in the effect of it; I mean that I do not in any way commit hon. Members of my party by what I am about to say. The hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale), who is always interesting whether one agrees with him or not, has made a speech with which, in the main, I agree. I was, however, surprised to hear him say that he did not consider this Bill to be retrospective, and I was all the more surprised when he gave his reasons for saying so. I think that even those of us in favour of the Bill must agree that it is retrospective in its effect: but we can justify the retrospective action
  980
  which it proposes. I shall return to that point later.
  The Amendment makes it clear that the opponents of the Bill are willing to apply relief to the cases concerned where such relief is justified. What has puzzled me about the Amendment is that it is very difficult to think of or to find any case in which relief would not be justified. The hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller), in his speech in opposition to the Bill, mentioned a number of cases which, I think, he was merely assuming would be cases in which relief could not be given. But even in the kind of case which he had in mind, namely, the case of the woman with the overbearing husband, the court might consider it necessary to give relief; and the fact that the husband was an overbearing person would be taken into consideration by the court. Nevertheless, the court might decide that some kind of relief from the restraint on anticipation was necessary.
  If we take the position which I am asking the House to accept that the courts would in fact grant relief in every case, or would not refuse to grant it in any case on a pre-1935 will or settlement, we reach the conclusion that the real and only practical effect of this Bill is to save the delay and expense involved in going to the courts. In other words, by a very simple process we are saving people from delay, expense and uncertainty, besides, as has been rightly said by so many speakers, removing from our law an anomaly, which I would go further and call a piece of nonsense. If it is a fact, that the only real and practical effect of the Bill is to save the trouble of going to the courts to get relief and to grant that relief by legislation instead, then it cannot be said that the Exchequer would lose any money at all.
  I was surprised to hear the Attorney-General, in his lucid opening speech today, concede the point that there would be a loss to the Revenue in some cases; for it seems to me, particularly with regard to the kind of case which the Attorney-General had in mind, that the courts would most certainly grant relief and, having granted the relief, arrangements which are envisaged in such cases would have been made with the sanction of the court, instead of with the sanction of this House.
  The Attorney-General: I agree that in some cases the court might sanction the lifting of the restraint with the result that an arrangement might be made which would affect Income Tax liability. I said that might also happen under this Bill. An interest might be sold for a capital sum and a liability for Surtax might thereby cease. It all depends on the circumstances of each particular case.
  Mr. Renton: I would suggest that the loss to the Exchequer is much more hypothetical than real and that in practice the Exchequer might lose practically nothing by this Bill. That is a point for consideration.
  A point which has been the subject of some conflict of opinion this evening is whether restraints were deliberately inserted before 1935. I must say, having listened to most of the speeches, that I come down in favour of the view—and the weight of expert opinion is very strongly upon that side—that as often as not, restraints were put in merely because they were a matter of precedent. As lawyers know so well, precedents can often obtain a firm stranglehold on the throat of reason; and the addiction to precedents has very often resulted in clauses being inserted in wills and settlements merely because it was "the done thing" at the time. At that time it was the current practice, and people did not think carefully enough about it; that is why they are there.
  I was therefore not at all surprised to hear the Attorney-General say that in his opinion, and on the information that he has, in nine cases out of ten the clauses were just inserted as a matter of form. I therefore say that the insertion of a restraint upon anticipation before 1935 was very often due merely to the use of a worn-out custom; and, if I may add without causing any offence,
  "the slaves of custom are the sport of time"—
  and so they have shown in the course of time, which is largely why we are here this evening discussing this matter.
  But assuming that I am wrong about that, assuming that restraints were always deliberately and carefully imposed after taking legal advice and considering all the pros and cons of inserting them, even assuming they were put in because the father was anxious to protect his daughter
  982
  by providing her with an income in all eventualities, we are still up against this question: would the donor have used the method of restraint upon anticipation to secure that income if before 1935 he had known what the circumstances would be today? To my mind the answer to that is too simple for words. I say without hesitation that no donor before 1935, if he had really been able to see into the future, would have been so unwise from his daughter's point of view as to insert a restraint upon anticipation. I go further and say—and I hope I am not out of Order in saying so—that if deceased donors could be with us in the House tonight, they would be urging us to vote for this Bill.
  I know that what is really worrying hon. Members on both sides of the House about the Bill is its retrospective effect. I agree we should be very reluctant indeed—and to this extent I disagree with the hon. Member for Oldham—to pass laws which specifically have a retrospective effect. But—and to this question I have never vet received an answer when discussing the matter with people who disagree with me—are we to assume that circumstances can never change to such an extent as to justify interference with the wishes of somebody who did something a long time ago? Surely there is no absolute bar about this. To use an analogy, it can only be a discretionary bar to our action passing retrospective laws. I suggest we have a discretion in this matter; there is no immutable law about it; and, bearing in mind the circumstances, which I will not go over again, I say that we are perfectly justified in passing retrospective legislation on this occasion, as an exception to the general rule that we should not do so.
  The hon. Member for Oldham, in his account of previous retrospective laws, did not mention the doctrine of frustration, which has of course been embodied to some extent in legislation. By means of the doctrine of frustration, which was a doctrine of common law before this House took a hand in it during the war, we have to a very great extent interfered with existing contracts simply on the ground that circumstances have changed. There was a rule of the ancient Roman Law which came down through jurisprudence as the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus—the doctrine that contracts are

  983
  assumed by the implied intention of the parties to remain binding only so long as the circumstances remain substantially the same as they were at the time when the contract was passed. Now that doctrine has not been accepted in English Common Law; but it is a doctrine which nevertheless has its advantages, and the fact that it has existed for so many thousands of years and been accepted in some countries is surely a factor which we are entitled to bear in mind when using our discretion on an occasion like this.
  Let me now turn to the question of the timeliness of this Bill. I think that there are two answers to be made to those who consider that this Bill is untimely. The first is that if a Bill removes an anomaly and drives some sense into the law, then any time is a good time. The second answer I think I have already dealt with, and that is on the question of the cost to the Revenue. If there be a small cost to the Revenue, then I say that our equalitarianism should not go quite so far as to deter us from achieving the main object of this Bill, which is to drive some sense into the law. In any event, for reasons I gave earlier, I would say that the cost to the Revenue would not be very great.
  In conclusion, I would remind the House that we are here doing something which is very much overdue. Sir William Blackstone in his "Commentaries" said that husband and wife are one in law, and he added that that one is the husband. Since then, very slowly indeed but resolutely, Parliament has tried to introduce a doctrine of equality. We have not succeeded yet by any means; but we do know that in many ways women are acquiring capabilities which formerly only men could claim. I would go so far as to say that women are responding in an exceedingly sensible way to the moral stresses and strains of modern life, and we owe it to them to treat them with that equality which has for long been considered their due.
  In financial matters in particular I dare say it will be within the experience of many hon. Members that women, especially married women, show a very great sense of caution—though husbands sometimes think it to be too extreme a sense of caution. The position we have reached now is, I suggest, even worse than has
  984
  already been described by the Attorney-General and others, because not only is the woman ruled from the grave by the person who left her the money, but she is in the ridiculous position that she can from her grave decide just what is to be done with the money although she cannot have a say in it during her lifetime. To my mind, that such a situation should continue is just too ridiculous for words, and I am grateful for this opportunity of getting rid of it.
  8.10 p.m.
  Mr. Donovan: I confess that I have been sitting on the fence in this matter. I have read the very cogent speech of Lord Simon in another place against the Bill and was convinced by that, and then on reading the equally cogent speech of Lord Simonds I was in turn converted by that. And so I came to the House today in a neutral frame of mind. The arguments for and against the Bill are, I think, very nicely balanced. On the one hand it is asked why should we interfere with the wishes of settlors, there being no general demand for the Bill. I myself, at any rate, have not had anything in my postbag about it. Although the protection is a limited one, why should it be taken away? After all, the committee which sat in 1934 recommended the abolition of this restraint for future years, but left existing settlements alone.
  It is however such a curious "in and out" protection. The married woman is protected while she is married, but when she becomes a widow is not protected. The moment she is married again she is protected or restrained again. I have come to the conclusion that most testators adopted this device not after mature and informed consideration, but because it happened to be the precedent which lawyers used when told to draft the settlement.
  I have a daughter, and if I were to sit down—that is before 1935—and settle something on her, which is purely hypothetical, it would never occur to me to say that I must protect my girl while she is married, but that I need not protect her while she is unmarried. Probably I should not even know who her husband was to be. But I should know my daughter, and I should know whether she was reliable or unreliable. If I were going to protect her, the last thing I would employ would be a restraint on

  985
  anticipation because that would not protect her except against her husband. I feel therefore that there is substance in the argument that most of these restraints on anticipation have got into settlements because they are in the precedents of the Chancery Bar.
  Then it is said, and I rather agree with this too, that this restraint on anticipation is out of date. It dates from something like 1786 at a time when the moment a woman married, her property, unless settled to her separate use, became that of her husband. This is not the only thing that dates from the seventeen hundreds. We also have the circumstance that the incomes of a husband and wife are aggregated for Income Tax and Surtax purposes. I entirely agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) said about this, except for one thing. He hoped that the Government would deal with the Income Tax position of married people, but he can take it from me that no Government of any complexion will ever deal with it; because the Inland Revenue has only to go to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day and say "Do you know how much it would cost to abolish this aggregation?" And the Chancellor then shrinks from the loss of revenue involved.
  I very much doubt, also, whether wives need the protection against their husbands that they needed prior to 1882. The alternative that is proposed is to give a judge the discretion to remove the restraint entirely if he thinks it would be for the benefit of the married woman, her children, her husband or her collaterals. The objection to that seems to me to be that different standards would be applied by different judges which would not lead to justice for everyone. What induces me to come down on the side of the Bill is the fact that Lord Simonds and Lord Maugham, who spent long years in the Chancery Division and speak from their experience, have said that they are convinced the change proposed is beneficial.
  But there is one point which troubles me and that is the case where a pre-1935 settlement has been made, and it is known that the moment the daughter can anticipate her income she will go and spend it unwisely. I should like to see some protection in the Bill for that special case. I do not know whether it is practicable or not, but I should like to see
  986
  some amendment made to the effect that it shall always be open to the trustees of a settlement to go to the court to establish that restraint ought to be retained. In other words, it would mean reversing the different proposal which would make all persons go to the courts to get the restraint removed.
  I believe it is thought that if this Bill is passed taxation can be avoided. As regards Income Tax, clearly that is not so because the income will arise to someone and bear tax at the standard rate. As regards Surtax, before 1946 it was possible, by selling the top slice of income to an insurance company to get a capital sum which cost the vendor only 6d. in the £ if he were liable to taxation at 19s. 6d., in the £. The House passed a provision in the Finance Act, 1946, Section 28, whereby if that is done now the income which has been sold is deemed to be the income of the vendor for Surtax purposes, and that applies to any settlement made after the 1946 Budget. "Settlement" is defined in terms which would include any agreement by which income is so sold and as long as that Section is enforced, there is no question now of selling income to a company for a capital sum, and thereby avoiding Surtax. If the income is sold to another individual he would merely have to pay the Surtax which has been avoided by the seller, and the net result to the Treasury would be about the same. My present conclusion is that this Bill should be supported on Second Reading.
  8.18 p.m.
  Mr. Henry Strauss: The hon. and learned Member for East Leicester (Mr. Donovan) has rightly drawn our attention to the excellence of the speeches made in another place and the difficulty of deciding between them. We have had the advantage of hearing from two practitioners in the Chancery Division, the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas) and my hon. Friend the Member for South Hendon (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth), speeches to which the House listened with great interest, as it always does when Members speak on their own subject. I understood the conclusion of the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry because he came down wholeheartedly in favour of the Bill, but I confess that

  987
  I was puzzled by my hon. Friend, because he desired a totally different Bill; instead of total abolition of restraint on anticipation, he desired a greater power of applying to a Chancery judge and other reforms. My hon. Friend said that he proposed therefore to support the Second Reading, but I think he overlooked the fact that, if the Bill is read a Second time, none of the Amendments or reforms he desires will be possible under our Rules of Order on Committee stage.
  The reason why I propose to vote against the Bill is because it wholly ignores the wishes of testators and settlors. Many Members have said, and I agree with them, that this is not a thing we should do lightly. I do not wish to argue too long whether the Measure is retrospective, although it has been described as retrospective legislation by great lawyers and the word "retrospective" naturally occurs both to laymen and to lawyers in describing it. The hon. and learned Member for East Leicester mentioned that certain noble Lords with great experience of the practice of the Chancery Division had come down in favour of this Measure. I think he will have noted also that, although he did not speak in the Debate, Lord Radcliffe voted in the minority, and I think he will also have noticed the weighty letter of Mr. John Sparrow in "The Times," dealing with the objections to the Bill as seen by practitioners on the Chancery side. I do not think the hon. and learned Member will find that a predominance of legal knowledge, even on the Chancery side, is in favour of this Measure.
  Mr. Donovan: If the hon. and learned Member is not careful he will lead me back to that state of uncertainty from which I thought I had escaped.
  Mr. Strauss: That is my object. I desire to convert the hon. and learned Member, whose intervention, earlier, gave me some hope that he would come down on the same side as myself. I hope that he will at least maintain a neutral state of mind as long as possible, before coming to what I am sure will be an honest conclusion on the facts as he sees them.
  I do not think it is disputed that this Bill, in wholly sweeping away the provisions put into settlements and wills by
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  settlors and testators before 1936, quite ignores their intentions. It is very difficult to speculate on what would be their intention now, though, if the Attorney-General had been present, I would have reminded him, because it would not hurt him owing to his being so young, of a speech I once heard from a Chancery judge, now, I am sorry to say, no longer with us. He said he was reaching an age at which he would shortly have to cross the River Styx, and he saw before him a host of indignant testators whose wishes he had misinterpreted and whose charity he had diverted into channels which they never suspected.
  I cannot help thinking that a similar result will flow from this Bill, as a result of the wholesale sweeping away of the restraint on anticipation in pre-1936 settlements and wills. I agree entirely with the Attorney-General and, I think, with the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry that there are obvious differences between this restraint on anticipation and the protective and discretionary trusts or forfeiture clauses which are put into settlements. But what is important is that when, after the 1935 Statute, settlors and testators knew that it would no longer have any effect if they put restraint on anticipation into settlements and wills, a very much greater use was made of these other devices. Although they are quite different they did meet the wishes of testators and settlors who had been deprived of the power to impose a restraint upon anticipation.
  The Attorney-General quoted, as has often been quoted, the joinder of infants, lunatics and married women as people enjoying an exceptional status under our law. I am rather surprised that neither the Attorney-General nor anyone else who has spoken in the Debate has quoted what I have always thought perhaps the greatest insult to married women, namely, the title of the Statute of 1935—the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935. No one seems to have worried much about that title.
  It is, of course, futile to say that some sort of equality is introduced by the Bill. The point has been made repeatedly that a restraint on alienation may be imposed on men, because, if they attempt to alienate, there is a forfeiture clause. On the other hand, women relieved by this

  989
  Bill will be relieved of restraint on anticipation and will enjoy the property absolutely free from any of these restrictions. I was wholly in favour of the 1935 Act which abolished this doctrine for the future. I agree with everything that has been said by hon. Members on both sides of the House that that is obviously wrong for the future, which was why it was abolished in 1935. I have not heard any arguments put forward why we should wholly disregard all testators and settlors before 1936. The only argument which has been put forward was that this Bill did not differ in kind from what we had already done in one or two statutes, and what some of my hon. Friends were proposing to do as an alternative to the proposal in this present Measure.
  If hon. and right hon. Gentlemen will look into the matter a little more deeply they will find that that is not the case. In all the previous cases, which I think are quite wrongly called retrospective legislation, the change made in the law was designed to enable the court to carry out what might be presumed to be the testator's or settlor's wishes. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Llandaff and Barry made a very material contribution to our Debate by citing Section 39 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881. If I might read that Section, I am sure the House will see at once that it makes no such wholesale change, and does not override the wishes of testators and settlors as this Bill does. This is what it says:
  "Notwithstanding that a married woman is restrained from anticipation, the Court may, if it thinks fit, where it appears to the Court to be for her benefit, by judgment or order, with her consent, bind her interest in any property."
  The thing the court has to look at is the interest of the married woman, and that is also what the testator or settlor had in mind when he inserted restraint on anticipation in the settlement or will. To complete the history, that is a provision which stood until the Conveyancing Act, 1911, which by Section 7 made some addition and repealed Section 39 of the 1881 Act. The provisiog in the 1911 Act is word for word that which we now have in Section 169 of the Law of Property Act, 1925. All settlors and testators who will be affected by this Bill made their settlements and their wills with the full
  990
  knowledge that those provisions were on the Statute Book. No great outrage would be done if we made a further small Amendment in that provision if we thought fit, but that is utterly different from the proposal to sweep away all restraint and all protection altogether.
  Within the last few years this restraint on anticipation has, in fact, saved married women from losing their fortunes. There are no practitioners on either side of the Bar who are not familiar with cases where that has happened. They have also the further knowledge that a testator or settlor since 1935 has been enabled by taking legal advice to secure even better results by other methods than those secured by the restraint on anticipation. That has been done since the 1935 Act was put on the Statute Book.
  Therefore, the only people who will be freed from all protection are the beneficiaries of pre-1936 wills and settlements, and we should be freeing them from that protection wholly disregarding, in a way unexampled in our legal history, the wishes of the testators and the settlors. The only other matter to which I would draw attention is, as I said, that I agree with everything that has been said against this doctrine of restraint on anticipation. That is why I was wholly in favour of the abolition for the future in the Act of 1935.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman's purpose in maintaining restraint to protect the woman against her husband or the woman against her creditors, or both?
  Mr. Strauss: The main thing is to protect her against her husband. The hon. and learned Gentleman made such an interesting speech that I willingly yield to him on any point if he wishes to intervene, but I should explain that I was wholly in favour of that reform of the law.
  I should also be in favour of a further reform of the law on the lines of an Amendment which was proposed in another place, or of alternative methods which might be considered in its place. Unfortunately it will not be possible to discuss a single one of those alternatives if we give the Bill a Second Reading.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: As the hon. and learned Member was insisting so much

  991
  upon our complying with the wishes of testators, I am sure he fully appreciates that if he supports the Amendment suggested in the other place it would not be for the benefit of the woman the testator had in mind, but of her husband and her collateral relatives.
  Mr. Strauss: I am not thinking of discussing, nor do I think it would be in order to discuss, the wording of that Amendment. I agree with the suggestion that the courts may have rather narrowly construed the power that they have had since 1881, and still more since 1911. I agree that any change we make in the law enabling the courts to modify the Settlement or Will may go against what the settlor or testator might have wished if he had lived. There is always that possibility, but, if we take sufficient care in our Amendment of the law, such as was taken by the framers of the provisions which I have cited, we shall not go far wrong. Wholly to sweep away a protection which many fathers have, with no unworthy motive at all, put into marriage settlements and wills, is to do something which will inevitably destroy confidence in those who make wills or settlements in the future. It goes against the traditions of our law. It may do far greater damage than those who at present defend the Bill have realised.
  8.39 p.m.
  Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: It was inevitable that this Measure should attract hon. and learned Gentlemen on both sides of the House, many of whom have addressed us with their usual ability and eloquence. I am in agreement with the plea of the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) against continued legislation by reference, which is very difficult for those who have to refer to old Acts of Parliament. I wish to address myself however not so much to the legal as to the financial aspect of the matter, from the point of view of the Exchequer.
  The hon. Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning) comforted herself with two reflections. The first was that this was good feminism and second, that large numbers of married women in small or reduced financial circumstances will benefit. Whatever may be said for the first of those contentions, I dispute the second.
  992
  Without doubt, the Bill will benefit primarily and almost entirely very large estates. It is almost a Surtax payer's Bill. I say that because where small incomes and small amounts of capital are involved, such as envisaged by the hon. Lady, they are not tied up in this manner; it is not worth while. The object of those wills, bequests and marriage settlements is to provide a considerable income, and one cannot provide a considerable income without considerable capital. I think it unlikely that there are many cases of the kind envisaged either by the hon. Lady or by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and I shall adduce further evidence in support of that in a moment.
  The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) reminded us that no one could claim that the Government have any mandate for this Measure. I have searched in vain the pages of "Let us Face the Future," what has now become an almost pre-historical document, and I also searched the Gracious Speech from the Throne delivered at the commencement of this Session. I have read both documents again in vain. There is apparently some urgency about this Measure. It is being introduced just after the official announcement of our economic crisis, and one wonders whether it is the first of the Government's measures for restoring our financial equilibrium. I find it a little difficult to believe because when my hon. Friend the Member for South Belfast (Mr. Gage), in moving the Amendment, gave it as his opinion that had the Mountbatten Estate Bill passed through both Houses this Measure would not have been introduced, I noticed that the right hon. and learned Gentleman nodded, as he does now. I thought it was rather a destructive nod, because, if that is so, what becomes of the claim made by him and the hon. Lady that this is a Measure which will help all married women with small incomes?
  The Attorney-General: The hon. and gallant Gentleman does not seem to realise that that Bill did not pass through this House because we considered that the Motion put down in the names of certain of his hon. Friends that there should be general legislation was right, and we therefore introduced that general legislation.
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: That is true, but surely, with the greatest respect to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, that knocks the bottom out of his claim that the Government had this matter under consideration for a very considerable period of time. I repeat that had the Mountbatten Estate Bill passed, it is most unlikely that this Bill would have made its appearance at all. If that is so, with great respect to the hon. Lady, I believe she is mistaken in her view. I see that she is now here.
  Mrs. Manning: I came into the Chamber because I understood that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would make some reference to me. He very kindly told me that he would do so. I do not think he is knocking the bottom out of my case. The fact that the Attorney-General has said that but for the Mountbatten case we should not have found time for this now does not mean (a) that there are not a large number of women who are not in the Lady Mountbatten class, or (b) that organisations to which I belong have not been approaching the present Attorney-General and his predecessors about it for a long time. The hon. and gallant Gentleman may remember that I said that I wished it could have been on a broader basis, but we have to inch these things out bit by bit from the Government and we are glad to take what they offer us.
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: The hon. Lady a little anticipated my restraint in giving way, but I am glad to hear her effort to reconcile her conscience. If she reads the Debate she will find a little difficulty in doing so. Anyhow, I do not think we shall quarrel on the basis that this Bill is the heir, or perhaps I should say the heiress apparent of the Mountbatten Estate Bill recently deceased.
  Now the right hon. and learned Gentleman seeks to bring within his embrace vast numbers of heiresses. I wonder why? He is, of course, the acknowledged Adonis of the Treasury Bench. It is not so long since a young lady, having spent two hours in the Strangers Gallery, described him to me afterwards as "Heart-throb No. 1." The right hon. and learned Gentleman is perhaps in search of further heart-throbs but I should have thought his time was more fully occupied than that.
  994
  This is a curious Measure to come at this time following the statement in this House by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 14th July. May I remind the Financial Secretary, who I think was sitting cheek by jowl with the Chancellor that afternoon, of what his chief said when sketching the gravity of the times. These were the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer:
  "At the same time, and side by side with our attempt to reduce prices by greater efficiency, we must avoid all countervailing increases in our costs due to rising personal incomes, especially so at a time when each and all of us is called upon to do our utmost and to put forward our best efforts.
  It is only those with a total disregard for their own future welfare and that of their country—or those who have the active desire to destroy our economy—who will at the present time press for general wage, salary or profit increases. I must again warn the House and the country that unless the maximum restraint is shown in this matter by all sections of the community we shall indubitably find ourselves unable to surmount our difficulties."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th July, 1949; Vol. 467, c. 697.]
  This is an odd Measure after an appeal like that. Should this Bill become an Act I believe I am right in saying that one estate alone will result in a loss of revenue to the Exchequer of £40,000 per annum.
  Mr. Wyatt: Would the hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me to interrupt?
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: I want to get on with my speech and I will give way to the hon. Member a little later, but perhaps I may complete this one argument before I do so. The figure may be perhaps not entirely accurate but in an intervention just now the Attorney-General told us that in some cases there would be a loss of revenue under the heading of Surtax should this Bill become an Act.
  Mr. Wyatt: I was only wondering if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would feel happier if a capital levy were introduced to counterbalance the incidence of this Measure.
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: I shudder to think what your view would be, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, if I endeavoured to debate a capital levy on the Second Reading of this Bill. I think that none would be more restive than hon. Gentlemen opposite.
  The Attorney-General: Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member will make clear to the House whether he is advocating the retention of this restraint in order to protect the Revenue or in order to protect the married woman?
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman will listen, he will find that it is in order to protect both, but primarily the Revenue. I said that I would devote my speech primarily to the Revenue aspect.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman give way—
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite indicated dissent.
  Mr. Ungoed-Thomas: The hon. and gallant Gentleman realises that he is on delicate ground.
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: Nonsense. I listened to the hon. and learned Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas) for a long time without any interruption, much as I was provoked, but I thought he should deliver his speech and I hope that I may be allowed to do the same. Hon. Members opposite cannot say that I am not generally ready to give way.
  Surtax payers will get considerable relief under this Measure. I am not opposed to the relief of Surtax payers in certain circumstances which I shall indicate presently. On only two occasions have I crossed that sacred frontier into their midst; only in two financial years. However, I recall that in 1931 when the emergency measures were introduced, the increased Surtax was the only one which was not later restored when the financial circumstances of the country improved.
  I am not against Surtax payers as such, but, surely, the point is that this Measure can only be interpreted as a disincentive to thrift. I say that no hon. Member who goes into the Lobby tonight in support of this Bill can ever again decently ascend the platform in connection with the National Savings Movement, and I say that in the plainest possible language. Let us see what it does. Three or four days ago, as we have already been reminded in the Debate tonight, 60,000 civil servants—who are certainly not in the Surtax sphere of taxation—were refused, under arbitration, it is true, an
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  increase in salary. Disability pensioners are not even to have—
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Milner): I really cannot see what connection either of those two items has with the Bill now before the House.
  Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: I was merely pointing out that neither—civil servants with pension rights nor disabled pensioners wounded in the war—are in a position to anticipate these capital sums. There is a restraint of anticipation imposed upon them by the Government. However, I use those cases merely as an illustration, and I now pass on to the next point.
  Everybody will have to pay more in one way or another in order that these reliefs may be given to these ladies. Every taxpayer, large or small, will have to do something of that kind. When I was talking about Surtax, I thought I saw the Attorney-General smile in a superior manner. I will tell him what I have in mind. I wish to see a general relief of all taxation, direct and indirect, falling upon all sections of taxpayers—Surtax, Income Tax and, particularly, indirect taxpayers. I desire to see the release of post-war credits. It seems extraordinary to me that this particular section of the tax-paying community should be singled out for this special treatment. What would the Chancellor of the Exchequer say if anybody on this side of the House went to him and said, "We cannot live on £3,000 net. We are unable to carry out our public responsibilities, and we really must have some relief"?
  I shall go further. What would hon. Members opposite say were a Tory Government to introduce a Bill of this sort at this time? I want to ask that in as unprovocative terms as I can. What would they say? I can imagine the speech which would be made by the hon. Member for Epping. I shudder even to imagine the winding-up speech which might be made from this Box by the Minister of Health in circumstances of that kind.
  Are the Socialists really in favour of this Measure? Are they really going to put this through—the "Lucky Ladies Bill"—at a time when their own devaluation of the pound has cut all wages in this country by 10 per cent., and the social services as well. The Financial Secretary,

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  who will be replying shortly, may tell us that no revenue at all is involved in this proposal. But that is not what the Attorney-General said. Even if that were so, I suggest that it is a most unfortunate thing for it to go out to the country from this House tonight.
  I do not want to take up to the time of the House any longer, but I would urge some of my hon. Friends who appear to be in support of this Measure, and also hon. Members opposite, to think twice and thrice, before they go into the Lobby tonight in support of this Bill, a Measure which ought to be rejected, and will certainly cost dear at the General Election any hon. Member whose name appears as voting in its support.
  8.55 p.m.
  Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: The new-found zeal of one or two hon. Members opposite in favour of what appear to be Socialist principles will not convince many of us on this side of the House of the validity of the arguments they have put forward. When this Bill was discussed in another place I think it must be generally agreed that the fiscal aspect was regarded as the least important of the considerations with which the other place was called upon to deal. No one in the course of this discussion has argued in favour of the unimpaired continuance of the principle of restraint upon anticipation. Everybody has made it quite clear that to a greater or lesser degree he is prepared to modify the situation as it exists today.
  I admit that the House is handicapped by two factors both of which are unknown to us as we deliberate upon this matter. The first unknown factor is that no one can possibly say exactly what was in the minds of testators or settlors when they made the arrangements before 1935 which this Bill seeks to abrogate. Anybody's guess on that subject is as good as mine. It may well be that had they known that in 1949 we were going to abolish the principle of restraint upon anticipation they would have embarked upon some other method. Therefore, I do not see what real value can be attached to the argument that we do not know or that we are going to disregard the wishes of settlors or testators whose arrangements are still operating as far as a limited number of married women in this country are concerned.
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  Even my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General is unable to give the House any firm indication of how many women are involved. He thinks there may be a few thousand. As far as I am able to estimate, the number may very well be less, and it is a diminishing number; so that even if the House does not pass this Bill the problem that this Bill is trying to remove will be solved by mere effluxion of time. As we do not know how many women are involved and how old they are, it is impossible to make any estimate on that basis. It is, therefore, impossible to argue that by passing or not passing this Bill we are going to impose any great degree of hardship.
  Then there are other Members who take a half-way position and argue in favour of leaving it to the discretion of the judges on the individual merits of each case. I need add nothing to what was said on that point by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas). The extent to which we should leave matters of this kind, or matters of any kind, to the discretion of judges should be restricted to within the narrowest possible limits. People want to know what their rights are under the law. They do not want to know how their interests may or may not be affected by the mood in which a particular judge may happen to be on the day that he is deciding upon the special circumstances of their case. I do not accept that as a rational solution of the problem with which we are now called upon to deal.
  I think it is universally admitted in all quarters of the House that this restraint upon anticipation is an anachronism and an anomaly, and the sooner we get rid of it the better. I can think of larger numbers of people who are interested in much more serious anomalies than the one which we are now discussing and who are not so successful in persuading my right hon. and learned Friend that these other legal reforms, to which it would be out of Order for me now to refer, should take priority over the present proposal. The fact that I may appear a bit upset and more concerned about something which I consider more important than this does not mean that this wretched anomaly should not be blotted out at the earliest possible moment.
  9.0 p.m.
  Mr. Joynson-Hicks: May I, first of all, apologise to you, Sir, and to hon. Members that circumstances have prevented me from hearing the whole of the Debate. I very much wanted to offer some observations to the House, but not without having heard those who spoke earlier. Unfortunately, that was impossible. I want to make certain references to an aspect which does not seem to have gained the same prominence in the speeches I have heard as have the aspects to which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Holderness (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) referred—the Treasury side and the fiscal side—and the purely legalistic side, to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Combined English Universities (Mr. Strauss) referred. I want to refer to the purely human side of this question.
  My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Holderness was quite wrong in saying that there are practically no settlements of comparatively small sums which will be affected. In my professional experience I do not know of any settlements of a comparatively large sum which will be affected, but I know of a considerable number concerning comparatively small sums—sums producing between £500 and £1,000 a year. They are not very large sums compared with the amounts with which my hon. and gallant Friend was dealing, and certainly they will not create any substantial losses to the Revenue from the Surtax point of view because the beneficiaries are not Surtax payers in any event.
  The fact, as I see it, is that it would be far better if it were possible to avoid a complete abolition of the restraint. I was very much attracted by the argument of the hon. and learned Member for East Leicester (Mr. Donovan) who suggested that we should put the present situation into reverse and allow the beneficiaries of these trusts to break the restraint unless the trustees made an application to the court that the restraint should be continued. I had previously tried to visualise something on those lines as a possible way out of the difficulty, because I personally am inherently opposed to contradicting the wishes of any testator or settlor.
  There are, however, practical difficulties in the suggestion of the hon. and learned
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  Member which could never be overcome. I am perfectly certain that in practice not once in a hundred times would the trustees feel themselves able to make such an application. The relationship between the trustees and the beneficiary is an exceedingly close one. They are practically always very good friends, whether the trustees are professional trustees—banks, trustee corporations—or personal trustees.
  To go against the wishes of beneficiaries is, in practice, something which trustees will not be prepared to do when they have to come to the point of making an application to the court. They will use all their personal influence, all their persuasive powers and any moral sanctions available to them to persuade the beneficiary to do what they think is right, but rather than go to the courts I believe that in the vast majority of cases they will say, "If you want to do that I shall resign from the trusteeship." When they had resigned from the trusteeship what would happen would be that the beneficiary would look around to find some friend who would take on the trusteeship and would be agreeable to fall in with her wishes. That is what would happen in practice if we adopted that system of enlarging the provisions so that the trustees had a right of stopping the action, so to speak, by making an application to the court.
  As to the other line of argument which was advanced in another place, that the courts' existing powers should be considerably increased, that the scope of their discretion should be widened so that they might understand that provided the matter was one for the benefit of the husband or the family or the collaterals, they should be free to break the restraint—how is that to work out in practice? I believe again that the court is going to say, "Parliament has laid down that the principle which we should follow should be to allow the restraint to be broken if it can be established to us that it is for the benefit of any of that pretty wide circle of possible beneficiaries."
  On that basis the court is going to say, "Where on earth are we to draw the line? We have been given what is virtually a free hand among all that wide scope of people. It is impossible for us to say that one or another of them is not going to benefit. In practice, we have to give

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  it to all of them." It would mean, in fact, that, so long as any case could be put up to the court, the court would be practically certain to have to give the benefit of any doubt there might be in its own mind, to the applicant, and the restraint would be broken. So I do not believe there is any safeguard in that line of thought, either.
  Therefore, so far as I can see, one comes back to the only possible alternative, and that is that, in order to overcome the very real difficulties which exist at the present time amongst what I believe is a far wider body of people than hon. Members on either side of the House are inclined to suppose it to be, the only possible course is to break, or to give the right to break, this ban on anticipation. After all, it is not an unreasonable thing. Most of the people concerned are now elderly or, at least, middle aged. The circumstances in which they have been living hitherto have been steadily declining.
  When these settlements and trusts were first made, they were, generally speaking, made with a strict investment clause which authorised investment in trustee securities alone, regarding which there has been very great depreciation in the yield of the income which is enjoyed by the beneficiaries. In addition to that, the cost of living has steadily risen, and, in the majority of cases with which we are dealing, the beneficiaries have no alternative source of income. Consequently, their standard of living has steadily been falling, and I for one cannot visualise the case in which the testator or settlor, if he could see the circumstances in which his beneficiary—his daughter, or whosoever it may be—is now living would not say to himself, "Why did I put on this ban for the benefit of some other people, in whom I am not nearly so interested as I am in my daughter? Why did I tie her up in such a way that, while her standard of living has been steadily falling, she still cannot touch the capital at all, because it is reserved for someone in whom she is not greatly interested, and in whom I am obviously not so greatly interested because I made the trust primarily in favour of her, and not of the other people?"
  Then again, I cannot help thinking that it is not wrong to make this change now. I appreciate the argument that in
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  1935, when Parliament arrived at its decision, it arrived very sensibly and reasonably at the decision to ban the restraints for the future but to leave the wishes of the testator sacrosanct in so far as they had already been expressed. There again, circumstances have so greatly changed that I believe that we should be more observing the wishes of testators and settlors, were they able to express their wishes today, if we made this change now, than if we did not make it. That is all I have to say, but I feel that this is a matter in which we shall be doing right if we extend the opportunities for these people to gain the benefits which I believe the settlors and testators would have wished them to gain.
  9.10 p.m.
  Mr. Wyatt: I want to take up the time of the House for only a few moments. I think that it was on the whole a mistake to introduce this Bill at this particular time because there are more important uses for Parliamentary time But the Bill, having been introduced, should be considered on its merits and without any other considerations being allowed to interfere. It is obviously a common-sense Bill and it removes a rather senseless anomaly directed against married women which cannot be directed against males.
  It has been said on the other side of the House that if it were not for the fact that there had been a Private Bill called the Mountbatten Bill, this Bill would not have come before us in this shape today, and we should not have had to waste a Parliamentary day in considering it. That is quite true. If the Bill had been related, for instance, to the Stanley family and not to the Mountbatten family, it would have gone through like a dream and without a murmur. The reason why there is so much opposition to it from the other side of the House has nothing to do with the merits of the Bill at all. It is based entirely upon personal, political animosity against a Member of another place who was a very fine Viceroy of India but who happened to carry through a policy in which be believed and in which hon. Gentlemen on the other side did not believe. This is the way in which they attempting to pay him out.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: If the hon. Gentleman had been listening to the

  1003
  Debate today, he would not have heard that suggestion put forward from anyone on this side of the House. The suggestion about the Stanley family, I should have thought, was entirely unwarranted and completely unjustified.
  Mr. Wyatt: I would not expect to hear the suggestion made openly; that would have been a rather foolish way of approaching the matter. One hon. Gentleman went so far as he felt was reasonable or advisable in that direction; and this is the truth of the matter. Had it not been for the fact that Lord Mountbatten had been a very successful Viceroy of India, carrying through a policy of which the Opposition did not approve, this day would not have been wasted, and the Bill would have gone through straight away. We have heard all day a process of mealy-mouthed rationalisation of this despicable underhand action directed against a member of their own social class because Members of the Opposition have felt he had in some way betrayed them. This most disgusting, sickening parade of hypocrisy, dressed up in legal terms, has been produced in order to justify something which dead-end kids would be ashamed of doing.
  Mr. Martin Lindsay: On a point of Order. I wish to ask Mr. Deputy-Speaker, whether the hon. Gentleman is entitled to impute motives of hypocrisy to this side of the House?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not think that the remarks were addressed to any particular individual, and I understand the Ruling to be that if remarks are addressed generally there is no objection to them.
  9.14 p.m.
  Sir John Mellor: I agree with the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) that this Bill has been introduced at the wrong time. From the rest of his remarks I differ most definitely. I think it would be well if I read the terms of the Motion which my hon. Friends and I put down when the Mountbatten Bill came before this House, in order that it may be perfectly clear that our objection to that Bill had no regard to persons whatsoever and would have been put down to any Bill which came to this House, whether it came from persons mighty or humble. The terms of our Motion were these:
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  "That this House declines to give a Second Reading to a Personal Bill promoted to secure an amendment of the law which, if justified, should be made by Public Act for the benefit of all whom it may concern."
  This Bill is designed to make retrospective a provision which the 1935 Act deliberately refrained from making retrospective. I was rather surprised to hear the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) and others deny that this Bill is retrospective, for that seems entirely absurd. The Law Revision Committee presided over by the then Master of the Rolls, and having a very formidable membership, quite clearly recommended that the Bill which they foreshadowed should not operate retrospectively. They recommended that
  "restraint upon anticipation should be abolished by legislation as regards all settlements, whether made by deed or will, which take effect after such legislation comes into force."
  Following upon that, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Sankey, in moving the Second Reading of the Bill said—and I think I am entitled to quote what he said, as it was a statement of Government policy:
  "The Committee's recommendation is that the abolition of the restraint should be confined to future settlements. To break in by retrospective legislation upon innumerable existing settlements and wills that are already in operation and cannot be altered by the testator would, it appears to me, be unjust and would produce endless confusion. Power already exists under the Bankruptcy Act whereby the Court can make the income, although subject to the restraint, available for the creditors of the bankrupt married woman, and under the Law of Property Act to lift the restraint when the Court considers that so to do would be to the benefit of the married woman and she consents to the operation. But further than that I am not prepared to recommend your Lordships to go."
  If to include the pre-1935 settlements would have been retrospective then, it is still more retrospective now; and if it would have been unjust then it would be equally unjust now. The reason why—and I think this is evidenced from the Debates which took place in that year—it was considered that it would have been unjust was because the testators and settlors, if they had realised that their provisions would be rendered inoperative by legislation, could have—whether we call them protective trusts, discretionary trusts, or other provisions for forfeiture, and so on—taken steps or made other dispositions which would have as near as possible secured their intentions.

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  The Government appear to be trying to take credit this evening for being the emancipators, in a financial sense, of married women. Well, I do not think that any Government—I repeat, any Government—should claim that they are emancipating women financially unless they are prepared to remove the iniquity of joint assessment of husband and wife for taxation. Until that is swept away there will be no true emancipation of married women.
  Much has been said about the anachronism of the restraint upon anticipation as it applies to pre-1935 wills and settlements, and a good many people have spoken reproachfully of the dead hand. People seem ready enough to accept benefactions under wills, but whenever those benefactions are in any way restricted by conditions they seem to dislike it very much and to be very ready indeed to bite the hand that has fed them.
  Members have said that this Bill is justified because of the change of circumstances, but in most cases settlors and testators have not put in the provision of restraint upon anticipation having regard so much to possible circumstances as to human nature. Although in the past 15 years circumstances have changed, I do not think human nature has changed so very much. The main circumstance which at the moment is creating difficulty is the great burden of taxation, but are we to assume that the present rates of taxation are to remain indefinitely? If the present Government remain in power they may get worse, but with a change of Government we have considerable hope of alleviation.
  My hon. Friends on this side of the House have more than once pointed out that there has really been no demand for this Bill. Certainly I have not been aware of any demand, although I have received a certain number of letters, the writers appearing to think that their cases would be remedied by this Bill, although in every case they were mistaken. It is perfectly clear that if the Mountbatten Bill had passed through this House without check, this Bill would not have been introduced, and there we have most clearly its origin.
  9.22 p.m.
  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Glenvil Hall): We have had a full discussion and a great many
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  learned arguments from those who are experienced in the law. I have listened to most of the Debate, and I think I carry the House with me when I say that no material point on either side of the case has not been voiced. It is impossible for me to find any new argument to place before the House in winding up this Debate. The speech of the Attorney-General left nothing more to be said, and, having listened to it carefully, I was rather surprised that some Members opposite had the temerity to put the opposite point of view. It seemed to me that the Attorney-General covered the ground completely and answered in advance every criticism that has since been levied against the Bill.
  The difference between those who support and those who oppose the Bill is confined to one consideration only. Few, if any, have upheld the doctrine of restraint as a matter of principle. All who have spoken have spoken against the principle as such. The difference that has shown itself between those in favour and those against has been whether we should legislate in retrospection and nullify the desires of those who have made settlements on their dependants.
  I unhesitatingly agree with those who take the view that retrospective legislation is undesirable. It is generally undesirable, and particularly is it so when it upsets the wishes of the testator or settlor. If that proposition is sound—and I think it is generally agreed, in spite of what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Llandaff and Barry (Mr. Ungoed-Thomas) said—it follows that the reasons which now make it necessary to legislate as we propose in this Bill must be of such a character and weight as to over-ride all other considerations.
  The only question for us to ask ourselves before voting tonight is whether what we have heard from the Attorney-General, and from Members on both sides who have supported the Bill, is of such over-riding importance and character as to lead us to believe that is our bounden duty to nullify the wishes of those who have died, and to lift this restraint from those upon whom it is imposed at the moment.
  The right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) said he thought this was a non-party matter, and to a very large extent speeches from both sides have

  1007
  shown that that is so. Two speeches from the Opposition benches in favour of the Bill were excellent, both in argument and persuasiveness—those of the right hon. Member for West Bristol and the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Joynson-Hicks). I must, however, correct one point made by the right hon. Member for West Bristol. He said that he thought the reason why the Mountbatten Estates Bill had been promoted was that Lady Mountbatten wanted to avoid paying Surtax. That is not true. We are not dealing with that Bill now, and I do not want to refer to it more than is necessary, but I can assure the House that that Bill was not promoted to enable anyone to dodge paying a fair share of tax. It was promoted because changed circumstances and modern taxation made it absolutely essential for Lady Mountbatten to have greater control over the money which had been left to her.
  I should now like to deal with the Inland Revenue point. It has been said, particularly by those opposing the Bill, that if the Bill is passed there will be a diminution of revenue from Income Tax and certainly from Surtax. The speeches made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Leicester (Mr. Donovan) and the hon. Member for Chichester should dispose of that suggestion. In any case, supposing it were true, it is no argument against the Bill. It is not, and never has been, the view of the Inland Revenue that persons should be compelled to retain property so that they would have to pay tax upon it. If hon. Gentlemen opposite desire that policy to be embodied in the law of the land, they can put the proposal forward at the proper time. Up to now, so far as I know, no responsible person has ever suggested or wanted, on that ground, to cripple an individual and take away his freedom to do what he would with his own property in order solely that he should continue to be taxed upon it.
  I should like to say a word about the joint assessment of husband and wife. Several hon. Members on both sides have referred to this. It may be that at the proper time some Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he is inclined, will make a change in the way in which husbands and wives are assessed. But husbands and wives can, now, if they are so
  1008
  minded, have separate assessments. What they cannot do is to take advantage of the fact that they are married and have a joint household. If one income serves them both or two incomes are jointly held, the couple cannot enjoy these advantages and at the same time those of being single. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] A single person is entitled to certain allowances. He gets an allowance of £110. If a man is married, for himself and his wife he gets an allowance of £180, and it would be grossly unfair if they were allowed £110 each although, they were, in fact, living together.
  There is another consideration to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. Surtax only begins when a person's income reaches the £2,000 mark, and it would be quite possible if separate assessments allowed a certain manipulation of the husband's income to take place, for a man with an income of £3,900 so to arrange matters that neither he nor his wife paid any Surtax at all. The Inland Revenue for its own protection has to watch these things. That is one of the very sensible reasons why the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir J. Mellor) cannot be acceded to.
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) struck the only discordant note on this side of the House. He said, amongst other things, the policy behind this Bill ran counter to the White Paper policy on personal incomes, and he committed himself to the assertion that, whilst people are being asked to cut down expenditure, this Bill, in fact, invites them to spend. A short answer to my hon. and learned Friend is that the removal of restraint, which this Bill seeks to carry through, involves no extra charge on industry, as wage increases would undoubtedly do.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: That is not my point at all. My point was that this was, making more money available in that particular case for spending if it were wanted, which is against what the Chancellor has said should apply to everybody else in the country.
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: My hon. and learned Friend is now telling me that he did not say what we think he said. I am delighted

  1009
  to find that he did not. If my hon. and learned Friend will cast his mind back I think he will remember that he made references to the railwaymen and to other people in industry. To us, there could have been only one implication to place on what he said, and that is the implication I have put upon it.
  Mr. Manningham-Buller: Are we to take it from what the Financial Secretary has said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement, when he referred to personal incomes, only meant wages?
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: I am coming to that point. If I may, I will make my speech in my own way.
  Mr. Derek Walker-Smith: The right hon. Gentleman has been several minutes dealing with the point which his hon. and learned Friend did not make. Will he now deal with the point which his hon. and learned Friend did make?
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: I think that the hon. Gentleman has only recently come into the House. There may be good reasons for that, but, unless he contradicts me, I am going to assume he did not hear the speech made by my hon. and learned Friend.
  Mr. Walker-Smith: The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) has put, with admirable lucidity and brevity, a point which he now wishes the right hon. Gentleman to deal with. I am asking whether or not the right hon. Gentleman intends to deal with it.
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: I was saying that I was about to deal with the point which my hon. and learned Friend made in his interjection, but before I had time to do so the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Walker-Smith) pressed me to answer it. I assure him that I have no intention of running away from the point. I was about to answer it, and if I may now do so, I will. The answer is that the removal of restraint does not itself invite spending. It enables a woman to deal with her own property, subject to general White Paper policy. We are not, because we lift this restraint from certain married women, inviting them immediately, one and all, to go in for an orgy of spending.
  Mr. Turner-Samuels: What the right hon. Gentleman has said was not an answer to my point. I did not say that the Bill invites anybody to spend any money. I say that it is increasing the amount of money over which these people are to have power, if they want, to spend it. That is the very antithesis to the proposition which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put forward.
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: No one denies that the very act of lifting this restraint will liberate certain sums which, if the owners are so minded, will be spent; but hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, as well as my hon. and learned Friend are jumping straight from that point to the supposition that the money will in fact be spent. My point is that there is no reason why women who suffer under this restraint—it is unjust and that is why we are lifting it—will act as is suggested. We must not conclude that we should not do an act of justice because certain events may possibly follow in certain circumstances.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) put a point to me which I did not altogether follow. He asked me if I would give him an assurance that the Inland Revenue does not use its discretion in favour of Surtax payers. If by that he meant, as I think he must have done, that in certain circumstances where a Surtax payer finds a great diminution in his income when he is faced with Surtax, the Inland Revenue out of sympathy lets him off, I have to tell my hon. Friend that the Inland Revenue have no legal right so to do and that they do not do it. Where a man dies and it is quite obvious that his estate cannot bear the Income Tax, the Inland Revenue may eventually write that amount off, but when it does so it has to report the matter to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and in the end the Public Accounts Committee deals with it. Therefore it is quite impossible for the Inland Revenue to use a discretion in the sense in which I believe my hon. Friend meant it; they have, like other people, to comply with the law.
  To sum up, it seems to us who support the Bill that this restraint, as has been said more than once, is an anachronism and a strange anomaly. It applies only to women, only to married women, and only to some married women. It was designed originally for

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  one purpose and one purpose only, and that was to circumvent the old Common Law rule which gave a husband complete control over his wife's property. This principle has ceased to apply for quite a long time, and under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, when a married woman's property became her own, it was quite obvious that this old rule of equity, the Chancery rule, ceased or should have ceased to have any validity. Therefore, when in 1935 Parliament in its wisdom decided that for the future this provision should not apply and that it should be void even if it were put into a settlement or will, it was only one further step to the proposals which are now being made, particularly since, in the Conveyancing Act, 1881, Parliament, again in its wisdom, gave those upon whom this restraint was being imposed for certain limited purposes the right to go to the court.
  Therefore, although none of us likes retrospective legislation, retrospective
  legislation in this matter already applies. It seems to us, and it has been said with great force and clarity by more than one speaker during the Debate, that the time has come for us to make a clean job of this and to sweep this anomaly away once and for all. With great confidence I therefore invite the House to vote for the Second Reading of the Bill.
  9.44 p.m.
  Mr. Baldwin: I have no interest in the Bill except on one point. It is interesting to see the sympathy of the Treasury for some of these women who may have an income of £3,000. I am wondering whether the Treasury will now have some sympathy with those women whose fathers or husbands have died and left them post-war credits which they are not entitled to have until they become 65 years of age.
  Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.".
  The House divided: Ayes, 180 Noes, 47.

  Division No. 272.]

  AYES

  [9.48 p.m.

  Acland, Sir Richard

  Field, Capt. W. J.

  Linstead, H. N.

  Adams, Richard (Balham)

  Follick, M.

  Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

  Allen, A. C. (Bosworth)

  Fraser, T. (Hamilton)

  Longden, F.

  Allen, Scholofield (Crewe)

  Freeman, J. (Watford)

  Lucas-Tooth, Sir H.

  Alpass, J. H.

  Ganley, Mrs. C. S.

  McAdam, W.

  Awbery, S. S.

  Gibson, C. W.

  McEntee, V. La T.

  Ayles, W. H.

  Glanville, J. E. (Consett)

  McGhee, H. G.

  Ayrton Gould, Mrs. B.

  Gordon-Walker, P. C.

  McKay, J. (Wallsend)

  Balfour, A.

  Grenfell, D. R.

  Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N. W.)

  Barton, C.

  Grey, C. F.

  Macpherson, T. (Romford)

  Battley, J. R.

  Grierson, E.

  Mainwaring, W. H.

  Bechervaise, A. E.

  Griffiths, D. (Rother Valley)

  Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

  Be, H.

  Guy, W. H.

  Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping)

  Beswick, F.

  Hale, Leslie

  Mathers, Rt. Hon. George

  Blackburn, A. R.

  Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil

  Mellish, R. J.

  Blenkinsop, A.

  Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. R.

  Middleton, Mrs. L.

  Bowden, H. W.

  Hannan, W. (Maryhill)

  Mitchison, G. R.

  Bowen, R.

  Hannon, sir P. (Moseley)

  Moody, A. S.

  Bramall, E. A.

  Hardy, E. A.

  Morgan, Dr. H. B.

  Brook, D. (Halifax)

  Hare, Hon J. H. (Woodbridge)

  Morley, R.

  Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

  Harrison, J.

  Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, E.)

  Brown, T. J. (Ince)

  Hastings, Dr. Somerville.

  Moyle, A.

  Burden, T. W.

  Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)

  Neal, H. (Claycross)

  Champion, A. J.

  Herbison, Miss M.

  Oliver, G. H.

  Chetwynd, G. R.

  Holman, P.

  Orbach, M.

  Cocks, F. S.

  Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)

  Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Wentworth)

  Coldrick, W.

  Horabin, T. L.

  Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

  Collindridge, F.

  Houghton, Douglas

  Palmer, A. M. F.

  Collins, V. J.

  Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.)

  Pannell, T. C.

  Colman, Miss G. M.

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Parker, J.

  Cooper, G.

  Hynd, H. (Hackney, C.)

  Parkin, B. T.

  Corlett, Dr. J.

  Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

  Paton, Mrs. F. (Rushcliffe)

  Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

  Irving, W. J. (Tottenham, N.)

  Paton, J. (Norwich)

  Deer, G.

  Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

  Pearson, A.

  Digby, S. Wingfield

  Jeger, G. (Winchester)

  Popplewell, E.

  Dodds, N. N.

  Jenkins, R. H.

  Porter, E. (Warrington)

  Donovan, T.

  Jones, J. H. (Bolton)

  Porter, G. (Leeds)

  Duthie, W. S.

  Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

  Proctor, W. T.

  Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

  Kenyon, C.

  Pursey, Comdr. H.

  Edelman, M.

  Kinley, J.

  Randall, H. E.

  Edwards, W. J. (Whitechapel)

  Lawson, Rt. Hon. J. J.

  Ranger, J.

  Ewart, R.

  Lee, Miss J. (Cannock)

  Reeves, J.

  Farthing, W. J.

  Lindsay, M. (Solihull)

  Renton, D.

  Ridealgh, Mrs. M.

  Studholme, H. G.

  Wells, W. T. (Walsall)

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)

  Summerskill, Rt. Hon. Edith

  Wheatley, Rt. Hn. John (Edinb'gh, E.)

  Rogers, G. H. R.

  Swingler, S.

  Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.

  Royle, C.

  Sylvester, G. O.

  Wigg, George

  Scott-Elliot, W.

  Taylor, H. B. (Mansfield)

  Wilkins, W. A.

  Segal, Dr. S.

  Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)

  Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)

  Shackleton, E. A. A.

  Thomas, D. E. (Aberdare)

  Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

  Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (St. Helens)

  Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)

  Williams, W. R. (Heston)

  Silverman, J. (Erdington)

  Thomas, John R. (Dover)

  Wills, Mrs. E. A.

  Smith, C. (Colchester)

  Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)

  Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

  Smith, Ellis (Stoke)

  Thurtle, Ernest

  Woods, G. S.

  Smith, S. H. (Hull, S. W.)

  Tolley, L.

  Wyatt, W.

  Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

  Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.

  Yates, V. F.

  Sparks, J. A.

  Ungoed-Thomas, L.

  Young, Sir R. (Newton)

  Steele, T.

  Usborne, Henry

  Younger, Hon. Kenneth

  Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)

  Wallace, H. W. (Walthamstow, E.)

  Stokes, R. R.

  Watkins, T. E.

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Stubbs, A. E.

  Weitzman, D.

  Mr. Snow and Mr. George Wallace.

  NOES

  Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

  Granville, E. (Eye)

  Pickthorn, K.

  Baldwin, A. E.

  Harris, H. Wilson (Cambridge Univ.)

  Pitman, I. J.

  Barlow, Sir J.

  Harvey, Air-Comdre. A. V.

  Robertson, Sir D. (Streatham)

  Bossom, A. C.

  Hollis, M. C.

  Ropner, Col. L.

  Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.

  Hurd, A.

  Sanderson, Sir F.

  Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. J. G.

  Keeling, E. H.

  Shepherd, W. S. (Bucklow)

  Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.

  Lambert, Hon. G.

  Strauss, Henry (English Universities)

  Challen, C.

  Lancaster, Col. C. G.

  Thorp, Brigadier R. A. F.

  Conant, Maj. R. J. E.

  Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

  Turner-Samuels, M.

  Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

  Lennox-Boyd, A. T.

  Wakefield, Sir W. W.

  Crowder, Capt. John E.

  Lucas, Major Sir J.

  Walker-Smith, D.

  Darling, Sir W. Y.

  Manningham-Buller, R. E.

  Wheatley, Colonel M. J. (Dorset, E.)

  Dower, Col. A. V. G. (Penrith)

  Marshall, D. (Bodmin)

  Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

  Fox, Sir G.

  Morrison, Maj. J. G. (Salisbury)

  Fraser, H. C. P. (Stone)

  Neven-Spence, Sir B.

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Gates, Maj. E. E.

  Nicholson, G.

  Mr. Gage and Sir John Mellor.

  Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

  Peto, Brig. C. H. M.

  Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House for Tomorrow.

SCOTTISH C.W.S. (EMPLOYEES)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Pearson.]
9.53 p.m.
Sir David Robertson: I desire to raise an important matter concerning the freedom of employed men and women to spend their wages where they like without interference from their employers or anyone else, and also the right of every one of us to register for rationed foods where we like and with whom we like. In May of this year, an attempt was made by the Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society to interfere with both these rights in a letter dated 17th May, which I beg leave to read to the House. It is headed, "Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited. Retail Branches. Northern Area Office. Golspie. 17th May, 1949. To all Branches," and reads:
'Dear Sir. It has come to the notice of the Undersigned that some of our employees
1014
have not been fully registered with their respective Branches. We are more than disturbed to find this situation, and we wish to point out that if employees do not set an example, how can we expect the members to be loyal? On the other hand, as Branch Manager, you are entitled to expect the full support of all employees and their families.
"We would ask you to investigate the position and ascertain the employees who are not supporting fully all sections of your Branch, and forward details to this office. We are determined that where an employee does not consider it his or her duty to support the organisation, then we will require to take up a similar attitude. Where there is a fleshing department we again would expect the support of all employees.
"You will appreciate that there will require to be a very good reason given for employees not being fully registered with grocery and fleshing departments. In this connection, might we also state that one would expect general support for our drapery and footwear sections, and we ask you to analyse the position and let us have the benefit of your observations. Yours truly, for, Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, J. A. Scott, Area Manager."
That letter reached me from a small trader who had been previously supplying registered foods to persons employed by this great Co-operative Society.
I immediately sent that letter to the Minister of Food and put down a Ques-

1015
tion to him. I received his acknowledgement in writing, but when the Question came up for answer, oddly enough it was down to the Minister of Labour who had a very high number of Questions that day and I had to take a written answer. In the first Question which I put down I asked the Minister of Labour what action he had taken with the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society in regard to a letter of 17th May, a copy of which had been sent to him, threatening employees of the Society's retail branches who registered with and shop at private traders. In reply the Minister said that he understood that the letter in question was written without authority and had now been withdrawn.
Mr. Dodds: Quite right.
Sir D. Robertson: Quite illegal. I was dissatisfied with that answer and I put down another Question to the Minister of Labour, but oddly enough that was transferred to the Minister of Food. Strangely enough, he had a high number of Questions that week, and I was obliged to postpone it so that ultimately I could get a verbal answer, which I got on 11th July. I asked the Minister of Food if he would inform the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society that their employees enjoyed the same rights as all other citizens to register for rations and other goods with traders of their own selection, and that threats of compulsion must not be used against them.
The Minister of Food replied that as the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society already allowed their employees complete freedom of choice of retailers when registering for rationed foods, he did not feel called upon to take any action. I asked whether he denied that the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society wrote to their workers threatening them with dismissal unless they registered with, and purchased from, them. In reply the Minister said that that letter was withdrawn. He added that as he understood the circumstances, the manager of one branch wrote the letter which the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society immediately repudiated.
I asked whether there was any reason why there should be any misunderstanding in his mind, because I had sent him
1016
the letters in question. It was signed by the Northern area manager and was addressed to all branch managers, and it concerned all the employees of the Society in that area. The Minister replied:
"As a matter of fact, it was the manager of the Golspie branch."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th July, 1949; Vol. 467, c. 15.]
I regard that as extremely unsatisfactory. The Minister had had the letter weeks before. He knew that there was a letter circulating, issued from an area office, to all of the society's branches in Caithness, Sutherland and Ross-shire, which are controlled from Golspie. I am sorry to say this, but it became apparent to me that both the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Food were playing down my Questions and the very important issues raised. The Minister of Food completely misrepresented the matter.
It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed without Question put.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Hannan.]
Sir D. Robertson: The Minister of Food completely misrepresented the situation to this House when he said it concerned one branch. I recollect that day very well and when I protested that it was a large area with many branches he shook his head. That is not recorded in HANSARD, but it was reported in the daily Press. It concerned not just one branch, but it emanated from Golspie and it concerned all the branches. I also found the Minister's statement a somewhat pompous and arrogant statement—that the Board of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society "allowed" their employees freedom of choice. I cannot conceive a more ridiculous statement. It is not in the power of that board or any other board, or any other group of people, to interfere with the freedom of choice, and for the Minister of Food to get up in this House and make a statement of that kind is quite amazing. It would be entirely illegal for them to attempt to interfere. Long before any Socialist Member came to this House the Truck Acts of 1831 and the Amendment Acts of 1887 stated—and I am quoting from Wilshere and Indermaur's Common Law:

1017
"Provisions are made prohibiting payment for work in goods or otherwise than in current coin … or contracts with workers obliging them to spend their wages at any particular place."
Here we have a Minister of the Crown telling hon. Members of the British Parliament that this Board of the Co-operative Society "allow" their members to do something which it is their inalianable right to do and which was laid down over a century ago. The Minister of Labour said the letter was issued without authority and was withdrawn and the Minister of Food said it had been repudiated. Presumably the right hon. Lady the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food is to reply tonight, and I am sorry that she has to take the burden of this Debate. If she replies I hope she will tell the House exactly what form the withdrawal and the repudiation took, because that is very important to all these employees who have been threatened. Every one of these employees has been threatened. They know the wishes of the area manager, who is still there today.
Mr. Coldrick: Are the employees still there?
Sir D. Robertson: This man sent this out in writing—writing for and on behalf of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society.
Mr. Coldrick: How many employees?
Sir D. Robertson: Does it matter whether there were three or 300? The principle must be the same.
Mr. Coldrick: I should like to ask the hon. Member whether the employees are not also still there?
Sir Wavell Wakefield: What has that to do with it?
Sir D. Robertson: The hon. Member for North Bristol (Mr. Coldrick) wanted to know something. I am sorry I did not hear him.
Mr. Coldrick: The hon. Member said the manager is still there and I asked him, politely, are the employees not there also?
Sir D. Robertson: I hope they are and I should like to say that if any employees of this society are dismissed because they have not registered with the society and that reaches my ears, I shall see that something is done about it.
1018
It is most important that this House should be told tonight exactly in what way that repudiation and that withdrawal were effected. I should like to know the extent of the publicity, whether the letter was circulated to all branch managers and whether it was circulated to all employees. Was any reference made to it at all in the literature which the Co-ops issue? I have suspicions in this matter and I knew the Co-operative Society quite intimately—professionally—as a young apprentice many years ago. My chief audited the accounts of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society and I assisted in a very junior capacity. We conducted the audits of many retail societies, and it was then the policy of the Society to get more and more members. The drive was always on. Quite commendable. But the only people who were going to benefit from the economic compulsion of those employees were the Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society.
Mr. Dodds: Why?
Sir D. Robertson: Because of the increased purchases by and increased profits from new members. It is not a very good advertisement for a Co-operative Society if its employees shop in small Highland towns and villages elsewhere. I can see all the reasons for applying the pressure, and I am rather inclined to take the view that the manager's offence was being found out.
The next aspect of this unsavoury business is the attitude of the Ministers in playing-down my Questions and in soft-pedalling their answers. I have read them all out to the House, so hon. Members must be able to form their own judgment. In my judgment the Ministers acted like counsel for the defence.
Sir W. Wakefield: They are.
Sir D. Robertson: I wonder how they would have acted if my Question had concerned a private enterprise chain store. I can see those benches opposite aflame with indignation—and rightly, too. As it was, there was not a word from them when I asked my Question.
Mrs. Rideaigh rose—
Sir D. Robertson: I will give way in a minute. The Minister of Food shook his head, playing-down the Question.

1019
What was his motive in playing it down? What was the motive of the Minister of Labour? I think I can tell the House. The Co-operative Societies are valuable political allies, who contribute a great deal of money to Election expenses and for Socialist propaganda. I am told that something between £300,000 and £500,000 per annum is contributed from that source. I feel that that was the motive.
I recollect—and I am sure that the House will, too—that about a year ago the Minister of Food suddenly took the decision to give a preferential allotment of imported turkeys, imported poultry and rabbits, to the Co-operative societies, without consultation with the Government controlled company, controlled by this Government, which was responsible for these foods—without any prior consultation with them at all. The shareholders of the company, representing big, powerful wholesalers—not small traders—protested to the Minister of Food and they were allowed commission on the special allocation. So they were bought off, and no further noise came from them, but only from the small, unorganised fishmongers and poulterers and butchers who were going to suffer.
The Minister of Food in this House—actually, I think it was the right hon. Lady—said the reason for this extraordinary preference was that the meat registrations at the Co-ops had gone up by so much per cent., but it was admitted that no attempt was made to find out if the meat registrations of private enterprise traders had also gone up. It was a crude, ruthless blow at all the rest of the industry in favour of the Co-ops. I suggest that the Minister of Food was paying a very good dividend to his political and financial allies, but it was done at the expense of the small private traders and their customers, for the fishmongers and poulterers are the people who, all the year round, sell poultry and rabbits, unlike the Co-ops, who, before the war, were notorious for the few number of shops at which they were selling poultry.
That is why their allocation is quite a small one. They get what they are entitled to, the same as everybody else. But the grievance I have and that I think the House had at the time was that if the allocation was changed it was not changed for everyone. We are all "Jock
1020
Simpson's bairns" so far as the Minister of Food is concerned, or so far as any other Minister is concerned, but it was grossly improper for the Minister of Food to show favour to the Co-operative societies.
Mrs. Ridealgh: The hon. Gentleman said that he knew the Co-operative movement very well. Can he tell me of any other instance in the whole of the 100 years of the Co-operative movement when this thing has happened?
Sir D. Robertson: If the hon. Lady had listened to my remarks I said that I believed that the constant policy of the society was more and more members. This inexorable drive for customers went on. I do not find any fault with that, and I think that a great deal of credit is due to the Co-operative societies for the great commercial success they have obtained, but I do find fault with their very one-sided association with the party opposite and greater fault with the methods which I have already described.
I am attempting to say that there was a definite motive which actuated the Minister of Food in playing down, my Questions and in giving an unwarrantable and unjustifiable allocation of foodstuffs at Christmas to the Co-op. Ten per cent. is an enormous quantity of game, rabbits and poultry. Recently a speech was made by Lord Shepherd, who is Chief Whip of the Socialist Party in another place. The Minister of Food comes into this, too. "The Times" of 19th October carries this article:
"The Co-operative Union was surprised at a recent statement by Lord Shepherd that Government shops might be opened as a step towards reducing retail prices by competition. At a meeting of the union's central board on 15th October it was announced that an explanation would be sought from the Labour Party as soon as possible.
The Co-operative movement's view is that it is its function to achieve the object explained by Lord Shepherd, and that economic democracy can be established by means other than direct State enterprise."
The Minister of Food spoke on the same day at Manchester when addressing the Co-operative shop managers. "The Times" stated:
Mr. Strachey was asked for his observations on a statement reported to have been made by Lord Shepherd in a speech at Cambridge
Mr. Strachey replied to his questioner: I believe I am speaking in the name of the

1021
whole Government when I say that retail distribution would be regarded by us as one of the last and least promising fields for direct State activity.'"
Mr. Speaker: I think that involves legislation and therefore we cannot discuss it.
Sir D. Robertson: I am only quoting and not suggesting that should be done.
Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: Would I be correct in asking if the hon. Gentleman intends to allow any time for other Members to take part in the Debate or if he intends limiting what time remains to a reply from the Minister?
Sir D. Robertson: The hon. Gentleman is only wasting more time by his interruption. This is a statement made by the Minister of Food:
"We regard the great co-operative distribution system as a vital factor in the field of retail distribution, and it is that great and growing co-operative sector of our retail distribution system which is one of the factors which makes us regard with very great hesitation any direct approach to retail State trading methods."
I have for a long time taken the view that the avowed policy of the Socialist party was to use the ready-made Socialist machinery provided by Co-operative societies, wholesale and retail, for the distribution of foods and goods of all kinds. I do not think that clearer evidence could be got from the Minister of Food speaking on behalf of the whole Government. The evidence which I have already given of the extraordinary playing down of my Questions, the special turkey, poultry and rabbits allocations, and now this statement which I have read clearly indicate to me that the policy of our present rulers and of the Socialist party is the complete Socialist State controlling production, exchange and distribution by this great and growing democratic economic machine which the Minister of Food referred to. That is the view I take. Happily the people will soon have a chance to save our country from such a fate.
10.15 p.m.
Mr. Irving: I have to begin by declaring my interest. I am a member of the Co-operative Society, and also an ex-employee of the Co-operative movement. I have had many employers in my time, but I cannot hope to have a better one than the Co-operative
1022
movement. I never knew an employer to show the same tolerance to employees and to stand for justice in the same way as the Co-operative movement. I have persuaded hundreds of my friends and fellow trade unionists to join the movement, not by using coercion but by using moral suasion. [Laughter.] No doubt moral suasion is something entirely new to hon. Members opposite. I shall have more to say about it in a moment.
I can understand the enthusiasm of the employee referred to. Because he was enjoying the benefits of Co-operative employment and Co-operative trading he wanted to spread them. I also understand that the moment his employers knew what had been done they repudiated the circular and asked this man to apologise to the members concerned. I cannot imagine any capitalist employer doing the same thing. The hon. Member for Streatham (Sir D. Robertson) made a very unfortunate choice in quoting the Truck Acts, because it was the operation of those Acts which brought the Co-operative movement into being; Robert Owen and his friends saw what the Truck Acts were doing and persuaded men and women to support the Co-operative shops instead of the Truck Act shops.
Probably this man's father or grandfather told him about the development of the Co-operative movement, and how Tory Government after Tory Government had placed restrictions on its development, and no doubt his enthusiasm on this occasion went a little too far. I need not remind hon. Members of the steps taken in two wars against the Co-operative movement by means of food control and the raw deal it got. Under this Government it has been remedied to some extent. However, we have not yet got full justice, and we shall press the Government until we do. I need hardly remind the House of the penal tax placed upon the Co-operative Society.
I think the hon. Member for Streatham is likely to get into some trouble with the party boss over this Debate, because the party boss, Lord Woolton, has been sweethearting the Co-operative movement lately: he wants us to come into the Tory Party—the party which down the ages has restricted the development of our movement. His wooing will meet with refusal. The Co-operative movement shows more tolerance than any

1023
other movement I know. It is a movement which stands for tolerance. But what about the Tory Party? Last month, after the Leader of the Opposition had staged a pre-election campaign for an election which did not materialise, Lord Woolton made a speech in London, addressing the Conservative Club members, in which he said, "This is no time for tolerance," because certain nonmembers of the Conservative Party had got into the Conservative Club. The hon. Member for Streatham comes to the House and complains that we are trying to bring people into our movement while Lord Woolton is throwing people out of the Conservative Club. Is that tolerance?
Ever since I have been in this House, there has never been an opportunity lost by Members opposite to attack the Co-operative movement. Every time, of course, they have failed, and they will continue to fail so long as the co-operators of this country have confidence in a Labour Government, and that confidence is stronger today than ever before. We shall link up with the Labour Party at the next General Election to protect the Co-operative movement from such attacks as those which have been made tonight.
10.21 p.m.
Mr. Coldrick: I am afraid I have no time to go into all the matters referred to by the hon. Member for Streatham (Sir D. Robertson). I think that he has made "much ado about nothing." Let me make it abundantly clear that it is perfectly correct that an over-zealous manager covering a particular area—and for the benefit of the House I would point out that there are 15 retail societies in the area to which the hon. Member made reference—sent out the circular suggested. This branch manager—
Sir D. Robertson: He was an area manager.
Mr. Coldrick: He is termed a branch manager as far as the S.C.W.S. is concerned, and I know as much about its constitution as any Member opposite. Immediately the chief executive officer was aware that the circular had been sent out he withdrew it, and as far as the area manager was concerned he took the responsibility, with his assistant, to visit
1024
each one of the branches to see that the offending circular was at once withdrawn. We were not content with that. We immediately got into touch with the general secretary of the S.C.W.S., and we had it authoritatively from him that he strongly disapproved, and the whole board disapproved, of the action taken by this branch manager.
Seeing that the circular has been withdrawn, and it has been made abundantly clear to everyone concerned that we rely on persuasion and not compulsion in the Co-operative movement, the board of the S.C.W.S.—[Interruption.] I have attempted to make abundantly clear what is the exact position as far as the society is concerned. In order not to take up the whole of the remaining time, let me say authoritatively on behalf of the whole Co-operative movement that the movement never seeks to impose upon its employees the obligations suggested by the hon. Member. We have no intention whatever, so far as the future is concerned, to adopt a policy of that nature. I conclude by saying that we have—
Major Gates: The hon. Member is repeatedly using the word "We." Has he some interest to declare in this matter?
Mr. Coldrick: I have made it abundantly clear that I have an interest in this respect as a member of the Co-operative movement, but all Members on this side of the House would have to declare an interest, and no doubt a substantial number of Members opposite also belong to the movement. I have attempted to set out the facts. I deprecate the attempts made on the Adjournment to denigrate the Co-operative movement, when the hon. Member could have obtained very easily the whole of the facts without wasting the time of the House and attempting to create the impression that favouritism has been shown.
10.25 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (Dr. Edith Summer-skill): The hon. Member for Streatham (Sir D. Robertson) made an emotional speech tonight, which betrayed his hatred of the Co-operative movement. Because I think he was overcome by his desire to be venomous and malicious he was unable to see this incident in its proper perspective. I ask the House now to be

1025
rational and to regard this incident as an incident. I am sure that when they leave the House the large number of Members opposite, almost unprecedented for an Adjournment—I am accustomed to speak at this time to empty benches opposite—will go away realising that they have been gravely misled by the hon. Member for Streatham.
Sir D. Robertson: Is the right hon. Lady entitled to accuse me in this House, where I do my public duty in raising a matter of very great importance, of being venomous? I submit that that is entirely contrary to the tradition of this House.
Dr. Summerskill: I have three minutes left. I listened very carefully to the hon. Gentleman, and perhaps he will kindly let me have these last three minutes in order to assure the House that—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] If the hon. Gentleman feels hurt about being called venomous I withdraw it, but I ask him to think about his words tonight and look at himself in the mirror, and perhaps he will agree that my diagnosis is correct.
Sir D. Robertson: The right hon. Lady withdrew her remarks and then suggested that I should look at myself in the mirror. It seems to me that that is outrageous conduct from any Minister.
Mr. Speaker: I have never known "venomous" to be ruled out of Order. One, after all, has got to take the cut and thrust of Debate.
Dr. Summerskill: In the two and a half minutes that I have left I want to assure this House that at no time did my right hon. Friend try to gloss over this matter, and my hon. Friends behind me have quite fairly described the incident that took place. I want to endorse briefly what they said on this matter. One individual, a Mr. Scott, in this area, overcome perhaps by excessive zeal, decided
1026
to circularise with a letter the managers of 15 branches in his area. When this was discovered by the board they immediately repudiated it. The hon. Gentleman quite rightly asked, what proof is there of that? The Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Society, whom I know very well and who is a very responsible individual, wrote in these terms:
"I have been asked to state that the action taken in this respect was without the knowledge of my Board, and, indeed, as soon as our attention was drawn to the position immediate steps were taken to have the situation corrected and the circular withdrawn. It has always been our firm conviction that the expansion and development of the Co-operative movement could best be achieved by methods of persuasion rather than those of compulsion."
Sir D. Robertson: What is the date of that?
Dr. Summerskill: It is 6th June, immediately after the incident. I have no desire to evade this issue, The House never finds me trying to indulge in sharp practices. What happened to the man Scott? He was reprimanded and then told to go to each of the managers who had received this letter, and personally to demand a return of the letter. Either he or his deputy did this, but I think the House will agree that the Board of Management showed that they had no desire to conceal what they considered was a wrong action of this employee. For some reason or other the hon. Gentleman opposite, who must have known these facts, refrained from making the careful investigation—
The Question having been proposed at Ten o'Clock and the Debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at Half past Ten o'Clock.

MINISTRY OF WORKS
  Buildings, Horsham (Dismantling)
  Buildings, Horsham (Dismantling)
  Building Materials (Prices)
  Building Materials (Prices)
FOOD SUPPLIES
  Poultry (Price Control)
  Poultry (Price Control)
  Overseas Food Corporation (Advances)
  Overseas Food Corporation (Advances)
  Condemned Food
  Condemned Food
  Canned Tomatoes (Points)
  Canned Tomatoes (Points)
  Catering Establishments (Meals)
  Catering Establishments (Meals)
  BRITISH ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY (REPORT)
  BRITISH ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY (REPORT)
  FORCES, MALAYA (GALLANTRY AWARDS)
  FORCES, MALAYA (GALLANTRY AWARDS)
TRANSPORT
  S.S. "Adviser" (Crew's Quarters)
  S.S. "Adviser" (Crew's Quarters)
  Fatal Accidents
  Fatal Accidents
  FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN
  FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN
  ARCHBISHOP OF YORK (MEXICO)
  ARCHBISHOP OF YORK (MEXICO)
  ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONS
  ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONS
  FARMS, YORKSHIRE (RENT DISPUTE)
  FARMS, YORKSHIRE (RENT DISPUTE)
  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES (SICK PAY SCHEME)
  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES (SICK PAY SCHEME)
  MONOPOLIES COMMISSION (SECRETARY'S VISIT TO U.S.A.)
  MONOPOLIES COMMISSION (SECRETARY'S VISIT TO U.S.A.)
  INDUSTRIAL CIVIL SERVANTS
  INDUSTRIAL CIVIL SERVANTS
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Privately-Owned Industries (Aid)
  Privately-Owned Industries (Aid)
  Banks (Closing Days)
  Banks (Closing Days)
EDUCATION
  Building Projects (Cost)
  Building Projects (Cost)
  Teachers (Recruitment)
  Teachers (Recruitment)
Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  JUSTICES OF THE PEACE BILL [H.L.]
  2.35 p.m.
  Order of the Day read for the House to be put into Committee on re-commitment of the Bill.
  Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee. — (The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House in Committee accordingly.
  [The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
  Clause 1:
  Residence qualification of justices
  1.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be appointed justice of the peace by the commission of the peace for any area, nor act as justice of the peace by virtue of any such appointment, unless he resides in or within seven miles of that area.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT)THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT) moved, in subsection (1) to omit "seven" and insert "ten." The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment is put down as a result of a suggestion made on the Committee stage by my noble and learned friend Lord Maugham. It is to substitute ten miles for seven miles as being the radius within which a magistrate of a borough must reside. Perhaps I may say a few words on this Amendment and the next, standing in Lord Llewellin's name, because they rather hang together. I am quite certain of this: that if there is to be a qualification test it must be a fairly obvious test, so that we can tell whether or not the qualification is being carried out. I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has included in his Amendment the words, "is gainfully employed in that area." He wants the right to sit to apply not only to the employer but also to the employee. If we confine it to an office or warehouse we tend to confine it to the employer. On the other hand, there
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  is an air of ambiguity about his phrase. I should not know how to apply a test as to whether a man was gainfully employed in an area."
  Take the case of Manchester. A Middlesex professional cricketer goes to play at Old Trafford and is paid for his services in playing there. Is he "gainfully employed" in the area of Manchester? Then what about a distinguished member of the northern circuit who lives in London but who habitually goes on the northern circuit, and who habitually has briefs to go to Manchester? Is he "gainfully employed" in the area of Manchester? If there is to be a test and qualification, it must be a qualification which can be readily discerned. A commercial traveller who travels all over the country may, I suppose, be said to be "gainfully employed" in every area to which he goes. I suggest that the phrase is altogether too indefinite.
  In the original clause of this Bill, as I pointed out on the last occasion, I precisely follow the recommendation of the du Parcq Commission. There is no magic about the word "ten," and I do not suppose that Lord Maugham, who suggested it, would maintain that there was. The "seven," of course, was a distance which was suggested before the days of the internal combustion engine. I am quite prepared to make it "fifteen" if that makes it any easier. If that suggestion commends itself to your Lordships, I would ask leave to substitute the word "fifteen" for the word "ten." That I could do by withdrawing this Amendment and moving a Manuscript Amendment. I do not suppose that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, would have any objection to that, and it might be that it would meet not only this Amendment but also the one following. For the moment, I formally move that we substitute the word "ten" for the word "seven."
  Amendment moved—
  Page 1, line 10, leave out ("seven") and insert ("ten").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I would say only a few words on this matter, and they are again of a purely mathematical character. It so happens that the area comprised in a circle—if it is a case of a circle—depends upon the square of the radius. The result of that is that seven

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  times seven is forty-nine, and ten times ten is one hundred. The Amendment which my noble and learned friend has moved would alter to one-half the area with which we are concerned.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: As the noble and learned Viscount has referred to my next Amendment I will explain why I put it down. The Lord Chancellor is right in saying that I proposed to add "gainfully employed" because I like—as I imagine every noble Lord does—to see every section of the community available for appointment as justice of the peace. I did not want my Amendment to infer that it was only a person who owned an office, a warehouse or a business in the place, who could come into this wider definition. In Liverpool, forty-five existing justices, as well as new appointments, would be disqualified by subsection (1), as it stands, unless the Lord Chancellor exercises power under subsection (2). In addition to the forty-five from Liverpool, thirty-five from Manchester and six from Newcastle-upon-Tyne would also be ineligible to sit. I am referring to boroughs, of course—it is the qualification in respect of boroughs that we are altering. Previously in regard to boroughs a person was eligible who occupied a house, warehouse or other property in the borough. The six referred to at Newcastle-upon-Tyne include the chairman of the juvenile court panel and the deputy chairman of that panel. At Sunderland, where two justices would be disqualified, one of them would be the chairman of the Lord Chancellor's advisory committee there.
  Altogether, in the towns which I have quoted 112 people would be disqualified because they reside outside the seven miles. I appreciate the arguments put forward by the noble and learned Viscount about what is to be the test of being "gainfully employed." I suppose the Middlesex cricketer would be gainfully employed in the area for only three days a year, and it might not happen that he was appointed a justice on one of those three days. The commercial traveller is, of course, a more difficult problem, but I should not have been frightened of that because we should be ensuring that the selection was not restricted, and unless a man was habitually in a place I do not suppose the advisory committee 'would send his name forward or that the Lord
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  Chancellor would appoint him. What I was trying to do was to ensure that there was not such a large degree of disqualification. I am told that if we increase the ten miles to fifteen miles, in the case of Liverpool and Manchester it would include most of the existing justices, who live in the suburbs and come in every day, and who are in the main, I believe, extremely good justices of the peace. So far as I am concerned, if the noble and learned Viscount would substitute "fifteen" for "ten" it would satisfy me, and I would not move my Amendment.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That would he quite satisfactory to me, and I gather that there would be no objections from any quarter. I would ask leave to withdraw my Amendment and then to move it in the new form.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 1, line 10, leave out ("seven") and insert ("fifteen").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  On Question, Whether Clause 1, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
  LORD SCHUSTER: Before we pass this clause may I say that many of us had depended upon the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, which we thought of some importance. If the Lord Chancellor feels there is difficulty about the word "employed," I think it can be met by inserting the word "habitually." If a man carries or business in Manchester and goes there every day of his life—perhaps he lives fifteen miles away at Chelford—he may still be appointed as a justice of the peace for the borough, although, of course, it does not follow that he will be. So far as I am concerned, I was very distressed that the noble Lord should so easily withdraw his Amendment.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I entirely agree with the Royal Commission on this point. I think the Royal Commission were absolutely right. I always resist the idea of appointing magistrates for the mere purpose of signing documents. I say that my existing magistrates are sufficient to sign documents. If I am to have magistrates living more than fifteen miles away, they will not be able to sign documents in the evening. But I will say this to the noble Lord, Lord Schuster, and perhaps it

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  will console him. I have a dispensing power and I intend to use that power, particularly with regard to legal qualifications. If I am told that there is a magistrate, a chairman of a juvenile court or a member of my advisory committee who is rendering useful service, I shall, without hesitation, avail myself of that power and so prevent his being disqualified under this rule. I hope that with that assurance the noble Lord will agree to follow the advice of the Royal Commission.
  LORD GODDARD: If the noble and learned Viscount follows the advice of the Royal Commission, will he not keep in the words "carries on business in the borough"?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: No, that is what they were against.
  LORD GODDARD: It seems to me that people who carry on business in a borough should be eligible. However, if the Royal Commission were against it I will not press the objection.
  Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
  2.48 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved after Clause 1 to insert the following new clause:
  The Mayor as a justice
  ". Subsection (7) and (8) of section eighteen of the Local Government Act, 1933, shall be amended as follows:—

  (a) the mayor of a borough shall not under subsection (7) be a justice of the peace for the borough during the year next after he ceases to be mayor;

  (b) subsection (7) shall not apply to the mayor of a borough not having a separate commission of the peace, and he shall accordingly be a justice for the county under subsection (8) but not for the borough;

  (c) subsection (8) shall not apply to the mayor of a borough having a separate commission of the peace, and he shall accordingly be a justice for the borough under subsection (7) but not for the county."

  The noble and learned Viscount said: This is a new clause to deal with the position of the mayor. We had a discussion last time about the question of ex-officio justices. Your Lordships will remember that there were differences of opinion on the matter, and you will remember that the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, made a strong speech and was countered by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, sitting next to him, who
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  made an equally strong speech in the other direction. I mention that only to show that there are no Party lines in it at all. The Amendment was carried by one vote. I was asked particularly to see what I could do about the position of the mayor. The mayor, under existing law, becomes an ex-officio magistrate not only for his year of office, but also for the year following his year of office. He is, therefore, an ex-officio magistrate when he has no office. I was asked in all quarters of the House to look at that matter, and here I am following the recommendations of the du Parcq Commission—not that that in any sense precludes us from following another course, but on the other hand it is a fact we ought to hear in mind. They said, in paragraph 158:
  "The special position of the mayor does not however require that ex-mayors should continue to be justices for a year, or that the mayor of a borough with a separate commission should be a county justice, or that he should be entitled to preside at ordinary magistrates courts."
  In various parts of this Bill we have dealt with all these three measures. I am here saying in paragraph (a):
  "The mayor of a borough shall not under subsection (7) be a justice of the peace for the borough during the year next after he ceases to be mayor."
  Paragraph (b) says:
  "subsection (7) shall not apply to a mayor of a borough not having a separate commission of the peace, and he shall accordingly be a justice for the county under subsection (8) but not for the borough;"
  I think it right that the mayor should be a justice for somewhere. But in paragraph (c) we make it plain that if there is a separate commission for the peace for the borough, then he becomes a justice for the borough and not for the county. If we did not give him, as we propose to do in paragraph (b), the right to become a justice of the peace, we should be putting him in a worse position than a chairman of a county council or a district or urban council.
  I do not want to go back to this question of ex-officio justices. Perhaps I may sum up in this way. I admit quite frankly that if we were doing this merely from the point of view of the administration of justice and nothing else, I should be in favour of abolishing ex-officio justices, for this reason: that although I do get a certain number of

  213
  candidates who prove themselves during their year as ex officio magistrates and whom I find useful and put on the corn-mission, yet, on the other hand, in view of what we all hope, that there is now going to he some kind of training for magistrates, it would not be right to make a man who is going to be a magistrate for only a year, submit himself for training; and so you would get the untrained mixed with the trained. At the same time, there is behind this the question of local government. None of us can overlook the fact that we must be very careful at the present time before we deal what might be regarded as another blow at local government. This conception of mayors and chairmen of councils becoming magistrates for their year of office is the creation of a local government Statute: the Local Government Act of 1888 enacted it for the first time. The whole problem of local government is knocking at our door, and no Government should attempt to deal with it rashly.
  But, whatever Government may be in power in the next few years, this problem of local government must be dealt with; and when it is dealt with, that might be the time to consider the whole matter. For my part, however, I am reluctant to take now a step which I know front my correspondence would be regarded as another blow at local government, depriving authorities of a right which they have had for a long time. Although I am not prepared to do that in this Bill (and herein I am differing from. the Royal Commission's Report) I am prepared to put the mayor on an equality with the other chairmen: I am ready to prevent his being a justice of peace after his year of office has ceased, to prevent him from being a county justice if he can become a borough justice, and prevent him, as we do later in the Bill, from being chairman of the bench. In that way I hope I have done something which will commend itself to the great majority of your Lordships. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 1, insert the said new clause. —(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD CALVERLEY: I personally am gateful to the noble and learned Viscount for what I consider is a fair compromise. Our difficulty on the Royal Commission
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  was that the mayor is looked upon as the chief magistrate, whether it be in a small borough or in a large city. In the large cities usually the chief magistrate has not the time to sit on the bench.
  This compromise will cut into about half the number of ex-officio justices, at any rate in the boroughs throughout England and Wales. Therefore, I hope the Committee will accept it.
  2.55 p.m.
  LORD MERTHYR: This matter was debated on the last occasion, when an Amendment which I moved was narrowly defeated. Perhaps I may be allowed to try to make the position clear now so far as my Amendment is concerned. The Amendment which we are now discussing has three paragraphs: (a), (b), and (c). I entirely agree with paragraph (a), and I do not think there can be any substantial dispute about it this afternoon. I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the concessions he has made to those who think differently about certain points in this Bill—this being one of them. I cannot quite agree with paragraph (b). In boroughs where there is no separate commission of the peace this Amendment puts the mayor on the county bench. The Lord Chancellor said that he did not want to deal with the subject because it is a local government matter and not a justices of The peace matter. But I respectfully suggest that the weakness of that argument is that the Lord Chancellor has dealt with it by his own Amendment. If the Lord Chancellor is right, that this should be left to a Local Government Act, then I respectfully suggest that he should not himself have put down an Amendment, as he has this afternoon.
  Furthermore, was not this one of the terms of reference of the Royal Commission?:
  "To consider and report whether any alteration is desirable in the law or practice as to ex-officio Justices of the Peace."
  If it is the view of His Majesty's Government that this ought not to be dealt with except by a Local Government Act, why was this included in the Royal Commission's terms of reference? It ought to he dealt with now. If it is left to be dealt with in a Local Government Act, it will inevitably be submerged in many other things. After all, it is not local govern-

  215
  ment but justice which is here concerned. The powers or duties of local authorities are not concerned; so far as local authorities are concerned, this is merely an appendage. Therefore, I invite the Committee to divide on paragraph (b). I do not know whether the rules of your Lordships' House will allow us to divide on one paragraph of an Amendment and not on the other two. If not, I must ask the Committee to divide on the whole Amendment—making it clear that I am not disputing paragraph (a) or paragraph (c). I am not trying to keep the mayor off the bench in his own borough, although I do not like the idea. I want to make that clear in order that there shall not be any misunderstanding in the minds of noble Lords taking part in the Division.
  There are one or two matters I should like to stress. If a man is likely to make a good magistrate, there are abundant ways of putting, him on the bench without making him an ex-officio magistrate. This matter is all the more important because, under this Bill, the benches are to be smaller and there will be, I hope, a maximum number of justices to sit on the bench. If there is a bad magistrate—and we say that many of these ex-officio magistrates are not at all what they should be—then it makes more difference if the benches are smaller. I say again that the whole of this scheme of training magistrates is going to be thrown to the winds if they are to be allowed in by the back door without any training at all.
  I need not repeat all that I said about having ex-officio justices with any sort of character coming on to the bench, and having at the same time an elaborate system of sifting antecedents in order to try to get good men. I feel most strongly that it is objectionable that a man goes on to the bench merely because he holds another office. It cannot be denied that in an ever-increasing number of cases his appointment is made as a reward ford political or public services, or both. The noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor himself (I think I am right in saying) told the Royal Commission that a magistrate's office should not be considered to be an honour, but rather that it should be considered to be a burden and a duty. I respectfully agree. But that principle is largely destroyed if
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  appointment to the bench is made a reward for public service especially when —and, as I said last time, it is becoming more and more common—chairmen of local authorities are appointed for only one year.
  I should like to quote three lines from the Report of the Royal Commission, paragraph 156, page 40. The Commission had been examining the short time during which the chairmen of local authorities sit on the bench ex officio and they say:
  "These figures…show quite clearly that an ex-officio justice (who is not also a justice named in a commission) has little chance of gaining much experience in magisterial work."
  I entirely agree, and I think that that is a conclusive argument. On the last occasion the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, suggested that somehow having the ex-officio justice was a good way to get country people on to the bench. Surely everyone knows that a country magistrate has just as much chance of being appointed in the ordinary way. I am a country magistrate, and I am sure it is not the case that a man is more likely to get on the bench ex officio than by his being appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Therefore I respectfully suggest that there is nothing at all in that point. I do not want to repeat what I said, but I urge the House to oppose paragraph (b) of this Amendment.
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: May I suggest that the right way of dealing with the matter would be for the noble Lord, by leave of the House, to move a Manuscript Amendment to the Lord Chancellor's Amendment—namely, to delete paragraph (b)?
  LORD MERTHYR: I entirely agree and, with the permission of the House, that is what I should like to do. I beg to move accordingly.
  Amendment to the Amendment moved—
  Leave out paragraph (b) of the proposed new clause.—(Lord Merthyr.)
  LORD SALTOUN: I should like to say a few words in support of my noble friend Lord Merthyr, because I was part of the minority who were defeated by one vote on the last occasion. I think the Lord Chancellor has practically admitted that it was a more or less open

  217
  secret that the victorious majority were moved by considerations which were not strictly those of the Justices of the Peace Bill. I went home rather sorry for what had happened and I did some reading to console myself. I came across an argument which I will submit because it has net yet been used in this House. The author was writing about language and she said:
  "Language … began with whole sentences."
  She goes on to say that the Tierra del Fuegians (and your Lordships will perhaps know that the Tierra del Fuegians are among the most primitive of human races):
  "have a word, or rather holophrase, mamihlapinatapai, which means 'looking-at-each-other, hoping-that-either will-offer-to-do-something-which-both-parties-desire-but-are-unwilling-to-do '."
  I respectfully submit to your Lordships that it is very interesting to find that the difficulties of your Lordships' House exist also amongst the Tierra del Fuegians. I also respectfully urge upon your Lordships that our way of settling them should not be those of this primitive people.
  3.5 p.m.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: May I say something on the Manuscript Amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord. Lord Merthyr? I think he must have moved that under a misapprehension because up to date mayors have been on the commission of the peace for their boroughs and now, in the case of mayors who come under paragraph (b), there will be no 'borough commission of the peace. It will be only a county commission of the peace. So the man has either to be on the commission of the peace for the county or not a justice of the peace at all. Under paragraph (c) he can become a justice of the commission of the peace for the borough, because there will still be a commission of the peace for the borough. We are dealing with those who now come under paragraph (b). They will still he able to sit on the bench which meets in their borough because that is where they will he living. They will be in that petty sessional division and they will adjudicate mainly on cases coming from the borough. It may be that, by the recommendation of some magistrates' courts committee and action by the Secretary of State, the borough
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  boundaries are widened, and the justices may sit for a slightly widened area.
  What we are doing by the Lord Chancellor's Amendment is to ensure that these mayors shall still be able to sit as justices of the peace, not for but in their borough. At the time when by this measure we shall be depriving a lot of those boroughs of their separate commissions of the peace, it would be a bit "steep" if we were to provide that the mayor of a borough which retains its commission of the peace shall be qualified to sit, but the mayor of a borough from which we have taken away its commission shall be removed. I hope that we shall deal with all mayors in the same way, and that your Lordships not accept the Amendment which my noble friend Lord Merthyr has moved to the Lord Chancellor's new clause.
  LORD ROCHESTER: I do not want to delay the Committee, but I would like to say a word or two on this matter. I voted with my noble friend Lord Merthyr on the narrow Division on the first Committee stage when it was decided by only one vote, but the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has made the point that I wanted to make—namely, that we do not want more differentiation. I feel that this suggestion of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is a fair compromise. I hope that nothing will be done in this debate that will be another blow at local government. I would urge that the Lord Chancellor's Amendment be accepted by your Lords
  LORD MERTHYR: I am not under any misapprehension. I would just like to explain. I too want less differentiation. If paragraph (b) stands, there is my next Amendment which seeks to deprive the chairmen of district councils from sitting on the bench. I think it is wrong that a mayor should sit on a county bench while the chairman of a district council does not. On the last occasion, the Lord Chancellor said that we must go through with all of this or none. I quite agree.
  I admit that the Royal Commission did not agree. I never could discover why. I have still been unable to discover why the mayor of a small borough or any borough that has not a separate commission of the peace should sit on the county bench—maybe twenty miles away may be in his own borough—while the

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  chairman of an urban district council, which may cover a far larger town, is not allowed to sit on the bench, as I hope he will not be. I agree with those who say "all or none." I do not like the mayor sitting as a justice in his borough. I do not oppose paragraph (c), although I do not like it. If I refrain from opposing paragraph (b), then when I come to move my own Amendment it would mean differentiation. I would remind the House that some of these boroughs are extremely small and some urban districts extremely large. I have quoted one instance already. There is one borough which has a population of under 9,000 and there is one urban district which has a population of 217,000. Why should the mayor of that borough sit on the county bench, when the chairman of that urban district council does not? I do understand that at all. Therefore I do press my Amendment to the Amendment, and I do so under no misunderstanding.
  VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: I find myself in some difficulty. It is difficult to differentiate between one part of this question and another. Let me then tell the Committee my general feeling in regard to these questions. As to the position of the mayors, I realise that there is a good deal of historical tradition behind the office, and I therefore draw a distinction between mayors and chairmen of urban or rural councils. I am prepared to accept this difference between mayors, who have been chief magistrates in their boroughs for generations, and chairmen of the smaller councils which were created almost by chance a generation ago. That is the first point that I would like to make. It shows how difficult it is to divide one point from the others. Again, I draw a distinction between the chairmen of county councils and the chairmen of rural district councils. It may he that if one looked at the list of the chairmen of county councils one would find that almost without exception they are already on the bench.
  When we come to the next Amendment on the Paper, I shall certainly support my noble friend Lord Merthyr if he presses it to a Division. Let me say in that connection, in answer to the argument which the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, advanced with such power a few moments ago—the
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  argument that we should be taking a great interest out of local government if we took these chairmen of councils off the bench—that I do not differentiate between one kind of local government and another kind of local government. I regard the local magistrates as an essential part of local government. I believe, looking at local government as a whole, that it would be well if we took this opportunity to raise the status of the magistrates. I venture to make this intervention with a view to stressing, first, how difficult it is to divide one side of this question from another, and also to say that, so far as the mayors are concerned, I am prepared on historical grounds to accept what I recognise to be an anomaly. On that account I advise my noble friend to keep his guns for the next Amendment.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I intervene with very great diffidence on this point. I have not taken any part in the discussions on this Bill, and I was not here when the matter was discussed before. In view of the speeches that have been made, I feel that perhaps I should say a word in support of the Lord Chancellor's view, with which I personally, without any technical or professional experience, agree. As I understood Lord Merthyr, he attacked the Lord Chancellor for confusing local government with justice, and he said that this was purely a matter of justice and not a matter of local government. As I understood the Lord Chancellor, he never said that it was only a matter of local government; what he said was: "This would be generally regarded throughout the country as a blow at local government." If I may say so, I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, in the speech he delivered to-day, took sufficient account of that aspect. I do not think it is one which we can ignore. He was obviously and naturally concerned with the technical aspect. He looked at it with great experience from the professional point of view. I do not seek to compete with him on those lines at all, but I think that we, as Parliament, before we agree to a very considerable change, ought to have some evidence that the ex-officio magistrates do their job badly. If there were evidence that they were making a complete failure of their task, that would be a matter we must

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  take into account; but I have not heard a word this afternoon even to seek to suggest that. That is not an argument on which the change is supported.
  Moreover, appointment as a magistrate, has been referred to as an honour, and it is said it ought not to be an honour. I do not regard it merely as an honour; I regard it as an extension of the function of this office, and personally I do not think it is an illegitimate extension. These mayors and chairmen of local benches are presumably intelligent men, otherwise they would not be where they are, and unless it is proved to the satisfaction of Parliament that there is urgent need or even material need for this change, I do not think, taking into account the other considerations which I have suggested, that the change would be justified. I do not dispute the suggestion the Lord Chancellor makes under paragraph (a), which is a different point altogether. That is a case of a man who is no longer mayor. The point of local government does not arise there. He having ceased to be mayor, I think it is obviously right that he should not continue to enjoy this particular extension of the function of that office. It has been suggested that it may be possible to make some differentiation, as has been mad & this afternoon, between the mayor and the chairman of the local authority. While I think that is an argument which may well be put forward, for the reasons stated I do not make that differentiation myself. If one is fit to sit, the other is probably fit to sit. Therefore, I do not hold that view. But I do urge the Committee to think carefully before making a very considerable change which would cause utmost resentment and which I do not think is justified by the existing facts.
  LORD LATHAM: I would like to support the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor. As one who has some experience of local authorities which is not confined to the London County Council, and who has had the privilege of serving as a member of an urban district council and also when it became a non-county borough, I would venture to warn the Committee against the danger of seeking to differentiate between mayors, whether of county boroughs (many of whom, of course,
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  have historical charters), of non-county boroughs (which do not really differ in any great essential from urban district councils, whether as to powers or otherwise), and chairmen of urban district councils or, indeed, of rural district councils.
  The noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, referred to an urban district council having a population of some 217,000. I believe there are several with populations in excess of 150,000, and the responsibilities of those chairmen are not less but certainly equal to, arid in many cases more than, the responsibilities of a small county borough—an all-purpose authority with a population in some cases of substantially less than 30,000. While, therefore, I support the Amendment moved by the noble arid learned Viscount, I regret that I shall be unable to stay and vote against the next Amendment standing in the name of Lord Merthyr, who seeks at this stage to differentiate between mayors and chairmen of district councils. I think that differentiation would be most unwise. There may be a case for saying that neither the mayor nor the chairman of a local authority shall have any special right to be a member of the bench—that is a clear case which one can argue. But I can see no case for seeking arbitrarily to differentiate between a mayor and the chairman of an urban or rural district council.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I am most unwilling to prolong this debate, but Lord Merthyr and I have striven together on this subject for so many years and we have both dealt with so many recommendations that it would be cowardly to keep silent. Furthermore my noble Leader has provoked me to do what neither Lord Merthyr nor I were disposed to do —namely, to give positive reasons why an ex-officio justice should not be upon the commission of the peace. The first reason, which I think may be some guide to the Committee, is that one Commission and one Committee have each exhaustively considered this matter, have considered plenty of evidence on the subject and have brought to it great experience; and they have recommended that these people should not he upon the commission of the peace. The second is that which probably all of us who have had to do with magisterial benches know perfectly well, and it was considered as long ago as the time of Lord James of Hereford's

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  Committee—namely, the retention or introduction, directly or indirectly, of the elective principle in the appointment of magistrates. Lord James of Hereford's Committee did not recommend that those ex-officio justices who were already there by Statute should be taken off. They considered very carefully whether the list should be enlarged; they pronounced against the principle; and they pronounced in favour of retaining only those who were there, because they were there.
  Everybody knows now that a great mass of the work that comes before any bench, whether in a borough or county, originates in one way or another with the local authority, and many of us hold that for that reason, if for that reason only, the local authority should be very sparsely represented, if at all, on the bench. I say "very sparsely represented." Of course, in effect, they are not represented at all, because anybody who sits upon a bench represents nothing. What I meant was that, particularly in regard to the borough bench or the county bench, there will always be a great number (and in some cases perhaps a majority) of justices who 'have taken in the past or are at the present taking part in local government. It is by taking part in local government that, as a rule, a man manages to engage the attention or catch the eye of the advisory committee. He is given an opportunity of showing that he takes an interest in public affairs—it may perhaps be even an impartial interest in public affairs, though that by no means follows. He then gets on the bench. Supposing all advisory committees do their duty, which probably we must assume, and under the guardianship of their chairman they come to the conclusion that he is a right person to be put upon the bench, they recommend him to the Lord Chancellor, in whose hands there rests complete dominion as to whether he shall or shall not be appointed. That is a very different thing from reaching the bench by way of either direct or indirect election—unless you say that the Lord Chancellor is indirectly elected.
  It is very inconvenient indeed on any bench, whether borough or county, that there should be a number of people who are disqualified for dealing with cases which come before the bench. It is easy
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  enough to say that the mayor or chairman should stand down when there is a summons which is issued on behalf of the corporation, the urban district council or the rural district council, and it may be right to say that one or perhaps two justices, can 'be spared though some benches are so considerably cut down now that it will not be quite so easy as in the past. But the chairman also has colleagues, and there are many cases in which those colleagues are also subject to that technical bias—I am not making any unpleasant suggestion—and it may be difficult to man the bench. For those two reasons, because I think the thing is wrong in itself as being the elective principle; because it is likely to weaken the bench when they have to deal with many cases which come before them, and also because it appeared to the Commission and the Committee of which I have spoken, on substantial reasons, that this change should he made, I say that these ex-officio justices should not be upon the bench.
  I was going to make an appeal to Lord Merthyr myself (although it is difficult to do so after listening to Lord Latham) and suggest that if the mayor were left ex officio, though Lord Merthyr and I would be departing front the principle for which we have striven, we should not be doing much harm. The mayor would be one ex-officio member, and one only. He would come with the historic prestige of the old charter that put him there, and we should be showing reverence to history, which it is particularly fitting for this House to do. But when it comes to these other people—about whom I do not wish to speak disrespectfully—it is an entirely different matter. They are the creation of the Statute passed sixty years ago. And when it comes to a question of a county bench situated in areas which are composed largely of urban districts there may well be on the bench a majority of local authority ex-officio magistrates. Therefore, what I have pressed upon my noble friend Lord Merthyr—though his stern spirit is such that he will not give way to me—is that we should make no attempt to remove the mayor but should be satisfied to have it conceded that he shall be kept off the bench during the year after his term of office; we should, however, make an effort to remove the chairmen of urban and district councils.

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  I am bound to repudiate in the most explicit manner, the suggestion made by Lord Latham that there is anything illogical about such a course. But even if there were I should not worry. Logic does not enter into this matter at all; our institutions are not founded on logic; they are founded on questions partly of history and partly of expediency of the moment. We cannot go back over the past now and begin worrying over whether these things in their origin were logical or illogical. The question which we have to consider is what is the best set-up for the particular need which now faces us. Therefore, with great respect to Lord Latham, and while paying tribute to his great experience and knowledge I would ask the Committee to disregard the particular argument which he raised on this matter. No doubt it will seem very disrespectful of me to be talking like this, when I ought to be up supporting my noble Leader, whose steps I have for so long followed with diligence and reverence, but this is a question to which I have devoted much time and, so far as my brain is capable of it, a great deal of thought; and I could not see my noble friend Lord Merthyr stand alone in this matter. What I want to suggest to Lord Merthyr now is the possibility that we might "speak with our enemy in the way" and arrive at some arrangement whereby the mayor is left to disport himself on the county bench so long as we get rid of the urban and district council chairmen.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I would like to ask the Lord Chancellor one question before he replies. If paragraph (b) were deleted from his new clause would not a mayor still go on sitting as a county magistrate? So far as one can see, everyone else is to continue on the local commission of the peace.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I must say that I feel that this is a very difficult question, and it is one which has given me a great deal of anxiety. I do not believe that we should differentiate. It is the fact, of course—let me recall it to your Lordships' memory—that the du Parcq Commission did differentiate. They differentiated between the mayor and the chairmen of the county and district councils. On the other hand, as the noble Viscount Lord Swinton said, and as
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  I also said—for I hastened to agree with him—I do not believe that we should differentiate. Let me tell your Lordships of my own experience. I have, of course, had cases of mayors who have not been fit to sit on the bench. There have been some mayors whom I would never have dreamt of appointing if they had not gone on to the bench by reason of their holding the mayoralty. But I must say that in my term of office I have not had a chairman of a county council, or so far as I can recollect for the moment— save one —a chairman of a district council, whom I considered unfit to sit upon a bench. Therefore I should not assert a priori that one of these ex-officio magistrates would be worse, or would be likely to be worse, than one of the magistrates appointed by me (I have to rely upon my advisory committee in making appointments, of course; I myself know nothing about these men); nor do believe that anyone else could.
  It seems to me that if we are to differentiate, so that mayors continue to sit on benches and these others go off, that would be likely to be more resented than anything else. After all, in England chairmen of county councils were put on the bench by the Local Government Act of 1888, arid chairmen of district councils by the Local Government Act of 1894. In Scotland, chairmen of parish councils were put on by the Act of 1894. When district councils which replaced parish councils were set up in Scotland, by the Act of 1929, chairmen of district councils were made ex-officio magistrates. I believe that we shall be wrong if we differentiate between one group of these people and another. I think that either they should all be on the bench or all be off. I have already expressed my view that this cannot be considered solely from the point of view of the administration of justice.
  LORD MERTHYR: Will the noble and learned Viscount forgive me for interrupting him? I suggest that mayors were made county magistrates in 1894, and not before.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the noble Lord has looted that up, then I am sure that that is right. That means that they were made magistrates at the same time as chairmen of district councils, which may well be so.

  227
  Lord Llewellin asked me a question to which the answer, I think, is this. The actual effect of Lord Merthyr's Amendment would be to leave the mayor in a borough that did not possess a commission of the peace a justice for the county. The Amendment of Lord Merthyr does not make the proposed change in the Local Government Act. It seems to me a rather unsatisfactory state of affairs because this matter is regulated, of course, by the Local Government Act. That Act says that a mayor of a non-county borough shall, in addition, during his term of office, be a justice of the peace for the county in which the borough is situated. The effect of my Amendment is to alter these two clauses. If the clause to which I have referred is left I suppose the mayor will still be a justice of the county. The matter will be in a complete state of obscurity and confusion. I therefore suggest to your Lordships that we should not accept Lord Mertahyr's Amendment, which would make the whole matter obscure, and that when we come to the later Amendments, just as we have preserved the position of the mayor for his year of office so also we should preserve the position of the chairmen of county and district councils.
  LORD MERTHYR: May I say, first of all, that I have an Amendment down on the next page of the Marshalled List which puts that last point right. If paragraph (b) is left out and my Amendment on page 2—which is complementary—is carried, the position will be made clear and put right. May I add just a few words on one or two other small points? First, let me say that we are not dealing with local government but with the administration of justice. If it were suggested in a debate on local government that the chairman of the justices should ex officio be a member of the council, there would be some point in discussing the matter. But whatever we decide this afternoon will not make the slightest difference to local government one way or another. No part of the work of any council will be affected in the slightest degree. In the second place, great play has been made of the value of tradition in this matter. I heard the principal defender of tradition in your Lordships' House, the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, applauding when this was said. But the
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  tradition which the noble Lord was so valiantly defending is not so old as he is himself. It was only under the Local Government Act of 1894, that the mayor was made a justice of the peace for the county. Therefore, I submit that the whole point about tradition—it was so well dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Schuster—does not apply at all in this particular connection.
  Thirdly, I would plead "not guilty" to the charge of differentiation, of which the noble Lord, Lord Latham, accused me. If the noble Lord will look at my Amendments on page 2 of the Marshalled List, I think he will agree at once that I do not differentiate. I treat the mayor, the chairman of the district council and the chairman of the county council all alike. I wish to see them all removed from the bench. It is only because I have put down two Amendments, instead of one, that the impression of differentiation has been created. Finally, may I ask your Lordships to pay attention to what was said on the last occasion by the noble and learned Lord Chief Justice, whose arguments should carry great weight. The vast majority, if not all, of the lawyers in this House want this Amendment, and I think there are cogent reasons why their views should be heeded.
  LORD HARLECH: Having taken part in the previous discussion, I should like to say a word. I want this Bill; but we have to be practical politicians. Therefore, though I support a good deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, says, the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor has managed to some extent, certainly as regards mayors, to meet us, and I think that is the most we can achieve. I do not believe this is the final word. As I am on my feet may I answer the noble Lord, Lord Latham? I profoundly regret that this Government have scrapped the Boundary Commission, because there is great difficulty in considering this matter of ex-officio justices. On the one hand, there are large district councils, some of which have sufficient population to be made county boroughs, and, on the other, there are many fantastically small rural and urban district councils, often of less than 1,000 population and in some cases well under 2,000 where, under the tradition of democratic local government, the chairmen

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  change every year. There are instances of a little county town which has a separate urban district council of its own and which is surrounded by a rural district council; and the chairmen of both these councils, however unqualified, are ex-officio magistrates on the same local bench that meets in that little county town. And that, arising from that perpetual change of chairmanship, there will occur cases of unsuitable ex-officio magistrates is inevitable.
  Therefore, I should like to see a reconsideration of the size of the local government authority (it may not be possible under this Bill) whose chairman is allowed to be an ex-officio magistrate. So long as we perpetuate this huge number of tiny local authorities, we shall have bad administration of local government, as well as this impingement on the administration of justice. Further than that, as between the chairman of a county council and the chairman of one of these small district councils, there is often a vast difference in the quality of the men. Those of us who are concerned with the administration of distant counties—I am not speaking of great counties like Middlesex, which is highly urbanised—hope that this is not the last word of the noble and learned Viscount. On this occasion, in spite of my sympathies with the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, I am disposed to take everything we can get in the direction of differentiating between the administration of justice and local government, because increasingly it happens that local government is a party to all too many matters that come before the magistrates' courts. That alone will make a change in all these matters. I see it happening daily. On this Amendment, I feel I must support the noble
  and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, but I hope that, if not in this Bill then on some other occasion, there will be some reform, either of the local government system or of the ex-officio rights of members of urban or rural district councils, in order to remove the worst anomalies that exist at the present time.
  LORD WINSTER: I am hound to say that in this matter I support the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr. What we appear to be discussing is whether certain gentlemen who have attained a certain office in the local authority shall be appointed ex officio to the bench by virtue of having attained that office. Surely these gentlemen have been in public life in the locality for many years. During that time either they have not commended themselves to the advisory committee for recommendation to the Lord Chancellor as justices, or the Lord Chancellor has not seen fit to endorse their recommendation by the advisory committee. Now it is suggested that we should say, because, owing to seine twist or turn in local politics, these gentlemen are elected to a certain position, that either the action of the advisory committee, in not recommending them or the action of the Lord Chancellor in not accepting the committee's recommendation shall be overturned, and that ex officio they shall be placed on the bench. I cannot believe that is right. I cannot believe that that is in accordance with the principles on which justice should be administered from the bench.
  On Question: Whether paragraph (b) shall stand part of the proposed new clause?
  Their Lordship; divided: Contents, 30; Not-Contents, 7.

  CONTENTS>

  Jowitt, V. (L. Chancellor.)

  Maugham, V.

  Gifford, L.

  St. Davids, V.

  Goddard, L.

  Addison, V. (L. Privy Seal.)

  Greville, L.

  Leicester, L. Bp.

  Harlech, L.

  Exeter, M.,

  Winchester, L. Bp.

  Hawke, L.

  Salisbury, M.

  Holden, L.

  Balfour of Inchrye, L.

  Hylton, L.

  Fortescue, E.

  Brassey of Apethorpe, L.

  Kershaw, L. [Teller.]

  Grey, E.

  Calverley, L.

  Llewellin, L.

  Halifax. E.

  Chorley, L.

  Rochester. L.

  Howe, E.

  Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clan-william.)

  Shepherd, L. [Teller.]

  Wright. L.

  Long, V.

  NOT-CONTENTS

  Carlisle, E.

  Merthyr,L. [Teller.]

  Saltoun, L. [Teller.]

  Monkswell, L.

  Winster, L.

  Boyle,L.(E. Cork and Orrery.)

  Schuster, L.

  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  Resolved in the affirmative and Amendment to the Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
  3.56 p.m.
  LORD MERTHYR LORD MERTHYR moved, after Clause 1, to insert the following new clause:
  Chairman of County and District Council not to be justice of the peace ex officio
  (". Subsection (5) of section three of the Local Government Act. 1933 (which provides that the Chairman of a County Council shall by virtue of his office be a justice of the peace for the County) and subsection (5) of section thirty-three of the Local Government Act, 1933 (which provides that a Chairman of a District Council shall by virtue of his office be a justice of the peace for any county in which the district is wholly or partly situate) shall cease to have effect.")
  The noble Lord said: I do not want to waste the time of the Committee, but I wish now to move the first of the next three Amendments standing in my name. In order to clarify the position, may I say this. I shall not move the third Amendment, nor shall I move the second, because that is consequential upon the Division which has just been taken. There remains only the first Amendment. This deals exclusively with the chairmen of county councils and the chairmen of district councils. It does not deal with mayors in any way at all. I understand there are some noble Lords who would like to see the chairmen of county councils on the bench, but not chairmen of district councils. I do not wish to alter this Amendment now, but if any noble Lord wishes to do so, it can be done either now or on the Report stage. I wish still to be consistent as regards the chairmen of county councils and district councils. As I understand there are a number of noble Lords who, with the Royal Commission, desire that chairmen of district councils should not he on the bench, in spite of the fact that mayors are, I move this Amendment. I think the arguments are by this time familiar, and I do not wish to repeat them.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 1, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Merthyr.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think we have threshed this matter out. I devoutly hope that in our Division Lobbies we may succeed in reaching a total of thirty; if not, by the Rules of the House, all further proceedings on the Bill are adjourned, and the Bill is finished. I regard the time we are taking as most serious from the point of view of destroying the slender chance of getting the Bill through. Therefore, I will say what I have to say quite simply. I believe it is wrong to differentiate. So far as chairmen of county councils are concerned, if they are not already on the bench (I have not checked up, but I imagine they often are) I should think they would be able to render quite useful service. I am certain that to take off the chairmen of district councils would be regarded as a blow to local government. For my part, if that is to be done, it will be done by somebody other than myself.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  Clause 2 [Disqualification in certain cases of justices who are members of local authorities]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is merely a drafting Amendment. Paragraph (a) will now be included in the definition clause. I am moving a new Amendment to cover the point. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 31, leave out paragraph (a).—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 3:
  Supplemental List.
  (2) A person who is appointed justice of the peace by the commission of the peace for any area, but whose name is for the time being entered in the supplemental list kept in connection with the commission, shall not by virtue of that appointment be qualified as a justice to do any act. except as mentioned in the next following subsection, or to be a member of any committee or other body.
  (8) This section shall apply to a person who under the Local Government Act, 1933, the London Government Act, 1939, or the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, is a justice of the peace for any area by virtue of his office as mayor, lord provost or provost or chairman of a local authority as if his appointment as justice by that Act were an appointment by the commission of the peace for the area.
  THE MARQUESS OF EXETER: I put down this Amendment once again, because last time the noble and learned Viscount said he would consider the point. I merely put it down in order to jog his memory. It is with regard to justices, when they reach seventy-five years of age, being debarred from sitting on standing joint committees. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 28, at end insert—
  ("Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent or be deemed to prevent a justice of the peace whose name is so entered on the supplemental list from continuing to be a member of a standing joint committee.")—(The Marquess of Exeter.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My memory did not need to be jogged, because I have looked at this point. The noble Marquess will remember that when he made his observations and I said I would look at it, the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, said that he hoped sincerely I would not. I have looked at it, and I have come to the conclusion that I cannot help the noble Marquess on this point. I hope that both he and the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, will be satisfied.
  The main function of the standing joint committee, after the magistrates' courts committees have taken over their responsibilities in relation to magistrates' courts, will be that of the police authority for the county. We feel that it would be better that the justices on the corn-mince should be justices below the age of seventy-five. If they are regarded as too old to administer justice, it is to be presumed that they are likely to be less effective members of the committee than younger men. The fact that county councillors are subject to no such limitation of age is no reason for making an exception in the case of this particular committee to the provisions of the clause, which apply to membership of all committees on which justices are represented. Indeed, to select the standing joint committee for exception would suggest that
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  there is some special reason why aged justices should sit on this committee, though precluded from sitting on other committees. The noble Marquess's Amendment would allow the justice to continue, if elected, up to any age. I agree that it is rather hard luck that a justice now over seventy-five and doing good work should be turned off. But we cannot give existing members of the committee a charter to be members for their natural lives, and it is not worth while preserving their membership for the period for which they are appointed, because that is generally one year, or at most three years, and if they have to go off then they may as well go off now. I am sorry that I cannot accept the Amendment. I realise it is very hard luck in some cases, and that there are many exceptional cases of men well past the age of seventy-five who are still capable of performing their functions with the greatest efficiency, but I think we must feel that they are the exception which proves the rule.
  THE MARQUESS OF EXETER: I thank the Lord Chancellor for what he has said. He has not met my point at all, but still that does not matter. A further point is with regard to subsection (2) where it says:
  "…except as mentioned in the next following subsection, or to he a member of any committee or other body "
  It seems to me that that covers parish councils and magisterial or judicial bodies.
  LORD ROCHE: I called attention to this subsection and asked what it meant. I do not know now. Apart from the question raised by the noble Marquess, it is very undesirable that an Act of Parliament should be so obscure as this.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will try to find better words.
  THE MARQUESS OF EXETER: If the Lord Chancellor will look at it again and see whether he can make this matter a little clearer, I am quite prepared to withdraw my Amendment.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I remember my attention being called to those words and I thought they had been dealt with. I think they do offend, and I will see if I can get them improved.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment tries to meet a point suggested by the Lord Chief Justice, who pointed out that one of our most distinguished judges in criminal matters is over the age of eighty and has presided over trials for murder and the like. It does seem rather ridiculous that he should be enabled to do that and should not be able to sit as a magistrate in order to try somebody for riding a bicycle without a light. It is to meet that position that I have put down this subsection. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 4, line 40, at end insert—
  ("() This section shall not apply to any of the following persons as justices of the peace, namely, the Lord Chancellor, any Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, any judge of the Supreme Court, the Lord Justice General, the Lord Justice Clerk and any judge of the Court of Session.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD GODDARD: The Lord Chancellor has not quite met the point I raised. I understand that as long as a judge is a judge, he would remain on the commission of the peace. What I ventured to suggest was that if a judge ceased to be a judge he should be allowed to sit as justice of the peace after he retired. I ventured to suggest—I thought I had made it clear, but I could not have done—that the disqualification imposed by the age of seventy-five should not apply to a person who holds or has held high judicial office, so that a retired judge could still sit on the local bench in the area where he lived. I do not know whether the Lord Chancellor will accept the words, "hold or have held the following offices."
  LORD ROCHE: That is what I wanted. This Amendment would rule me out, but I am not in the least concerned about that, because I do not want to sit. I ceased to be a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in 1938, after I became seventy-five. I was still holding the office of magistrate and I hold it now, although I am past seventy-five. That is not by my own desire, but at the suggestion of many of the magistrates of my county, who said, "Do not retire, because it may be that in the case of illness we shall want you to go to quarter sessions to sit as chairman." I had made a note to ask the Lord Chancellor the question which the Lord Chief Justice has asked—namely, whether it
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  should not read, "who hold or have held the offices."
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If that is desired, let us put it in. Let the Amendment read as follows—and perhaps the Lord Chief Justice will check what I am saying:
  "This section shall not apply to persons who hold or have held the following positions, namely, Lord Chancellor, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Judge of the Supreme Court, Lord Justice General, Lord Justice Clerk and Judge of the Court of Session."
  I am a little inclined to think that perhaps I had better move this on Report stage, because I shall then have it in more precise language. Drafting in this way while on one's feet, one is apt to make a mistake.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: Should it not be
  "…all or any of the following positions…"?
  LORD GODDARD: I suggest also:
  "…or have held high judicial office as defined in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act…"
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Let us leave the matter until the Report stage and I will look at it. I must say I am inclined to accept it, but I do not wish at present to commit myself absolutely. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 3 agreed to.
  Clauses 4 to 7 agreed to.
  Clause 8:
  Area of commission
  8.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be a separate commission of the peace for every county for every county borough, and there shall not be a commission of the peace or justices of the peace for any other area.
  4.12 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1), after "borough" to insert:
  "and for such non county boroughs as satisfy one of the following conditions, that is to say—

  (a) that at the end of June nineteen hundred and forty-eight the borough had a separate commission of the peace and a population of fifty thousand or over;

  (b) that at the end of that month the borough had a separate commission of the

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  peace and court of quarter sessions and a population of twenty-five thousand or over;

  (c) that after the coming into force of this section His Majesty grants a separate commission of the peace to the borough under section one hundred and fifty-six of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. on a petition made by the council at a time when the borough has a population of seventy-five thousand or over."

  The noble and learned Viscount said: We come now to an Amendment which is likely to give rise to a good deal of discussion. I have attempted here to reproduce a suggestion that was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roche, in an earlier discussion—with one qualification. I think the noble and learned Lord was picking up something which I myself had said. The suggestion is that I should have some kind of dispensing power. Having thought over the matter very carefully, I confess that the more I think of it the less I like it. I think it would place me in a most embarrassing position unless I were able to apply some definite canon. If I had to consider each particular case I should have to receive deputations, and it would be thought that I had been unfair in this or that respect. Therefore I have not incorporated that suggestion.
  LORD ROCHE: Perhaps it would help the noble and learned Viscount if I say that he had misunderstood me. I did not make the suggestion and I do not approve of the idea; I agree with what the noble and learned Viscount is saying now.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble and learned Lord did suggest it.
  LORD ROCHE: I did not mean to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I cannot judge what the noble and learned Lord meant, but he did say it. I think, as I have said, that he was seeking to meet a suggestion which I myself had made. I therefore hold him not guilty of any malice aforethought. I thought it right, as I was not precisely reproducing the results of the discussion, to make the distinction clear—not only for the noble and learned Lord, but for members of the Committee, for I am addressing the Committee. So long as we are all agreed, I am satisfied. Perhaps I might say a word or two about this suggestion. The noble and learned Lord will find what he said recorded in Col. 1121 of Hansard. His words were:
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  "We might well get rid of most of the quarter sessions in boroughs of under 25,000, subject to the discretion of the learned and noble Viscount the Lord Chancellor if the thought there was an important exception."
  LORD ROCHE: Yes, as regards quarter sessions, I agree.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Let us examine this position. I have no doubt, and I believe that nobody who has held my position would have any doubt, that it is most desirable to get rid of separate commissions of the peace. In these comparatively small boroughs everybody knows everybody else's business—I am including Winchester, to which city it applies just as much as anywhere else. One of the essentials is that the proceedings of the advisory committee should he absolutely secret. If persons know that their names are put up to the advisory committee, and canvassed and discussed and turned down by that committee; or if they know that their names, having been discussed and passed by the advisory committee, are turned down by the Lord Chancellor, there is naturally a good deal of heartburning. In the latter cases they write to the Lord Chancellor and say, "What have I done? My name was passed by the advisory committee and when it comes up to you it is not accepted. What have you got against me?" That happens, inevitably, much more in a small borough than in the counties. I am not saying that it does not happen in the counties—I wish I could say that. But in the experience of all of us it happens much more in the small boroughs. Therefore, so far as I can, I want to get rid of separate commissions; and under the Roche Amendment, if I may so call it, I get rid of separate commissions in the boroughs with populations of under 50,000, except in the particular cases which are here mentioned, of which I think there are about fourteen.
  The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin suggests in his Amendment that I should get rid of them even in those cases; and in that regard I confess that I prefer Lord Llewellin's Amendment to the one I am now moving, which reproduces what Lord Roche said on the last occasion. But that is not a very important matter, because it affects only some fourteen boroughs. I mention Lord Llewellin's Amendment because to discuss the acceptance of that Amendment involves a discussion of the

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  whole principle. It brings in a new idea —that is to say, an appeal to a recorder, the recorder being based or standing upon a separate commission. This, of course, is a wholly new conception. The suggestion originally came from me. Lord Llewellin, in his drafting of the Amendment, has been assisted by Parliamentary draftsmen whom I lent him for this purpose, so I am not speaking with any disrespect of the Amendment. The noble Lord makes it quite plain that in the case of boroughs retaining quarter sessions without commissions of the peace, it
  "…shall be the same as if the area of the borough extended to the whole of the petty sessional division or divisions in which the borough or any part thereof is situated:"
  That is to say, there will be no cross-committals or cross-appeals. If, for instance, Winchester is extended by the magistrates' courts committee to include a large area of Hampshire, it would follow under Lord Llewellin's Amendment that all appeals from that area which used to embrace the borough of Winchester would go to the Recorder of Winchester, and all committals which did not go to sessions would, equally, go to the Recorder of Winchester.
  That is the conception. It seems to me—and I have thought this matter over a good deal—that it has this great drawback: that if you are going to have the whole county considered again by the magistrates' courts committee, it might well be that they would be reluctant to arrange the county in the way I have suggested, knowing that any extra area given to Winchester would involve appeals being taken away from quarter sessions and going to the Recorder of Winchester. It might or might not be something which would operate on the minds of the magistrates' courts committee: I should myself imagine that it would.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: It might operate both ways.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I agree; but that is a factor which one must bear in mind. That is all I have to say about them. I do not think there is any substantial difficulty in providing, as Lord Llewellin seeks to do with his Amendment at the bottom of page 17 of the Marshalled List, that there shall not be
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  cross-appeals or cross-committals. I have received a great deal of correspondence about this matter, but in no single case, except that of Winchester, has any objection to my knowledge been made to the abolition of the separate commission of the peace. The objection which has been made is to the abolition of the recorder-ship. I still say that I cannot see what grievance anybody will have if, instead of having a separate borough commission, a borough justices' court becomes a division of the county.
  Then there is another matter I must mention. I think the facts are significant, and I want to deal with them. Lord Llewellin's Amendment, which is the only alternative possible here, involves that twenty-four boroughs having recorders shall retain them—that is to say, that twenty-four more recorders shall continue in office; and they would function, of course, in what is now a county area. Your Lordships will find them enumerated at page 22 of the Marshalled list. Let us see what is the position of these twenty-four. I have analysed them carefully. There are eight—Barnstaple, Bideford, Faversham, Tiverton, Chichester, Oswestry, Wenlock and Berwick-onTweed—which, in the whole of 1947 and 1948, had a total of under eight cases each throughout the eight quarter sessions; that is four each year. The greatest number at any one place was at Berwick-on-Tweed, which had seven cases for trial. I include, of course, appeals and cases.
  LORD ROCHE: In two years?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In two years—that is to say, in eight quarter sessions—Berwick-on-Tweed, which was the highest of them, had five cases for trial in 1947 and two in 1948, making a grand total of seven. Wenlock had six, Oswestry five, Chichester five, Tiverton four, Faversham two, Bideford one and Barnstaple one. So it is obvious that the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has cast his net too wide. What is the good of keeping, for instance, Barnstaple which had one appeal—and no case for trial at all —in the year 1948 and nothing in 1947; and Bideford which had one case for trial in 1948 and nothing in 1947? Then, if we pass over those eight, the next five come into the category of not having, on the average, two cases for each quarter

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  sessions. They are: Stamford, Pontefract, Windsor, Warwick and Grantham. The highest that any of them had for the two years was fifteen. Your Lordships will observe that, in order to average two cases for each quarter sessions, there must have been sixteen cases.
  The next group of boroughs—Newark, Bury St. Edmunds, Deal, Carmarthen, Banbury and Abingdon—had on the average fewer than three cases for each of the quarter sessions. The highest was Abingdon with twenty-two and your Lordships will see that three cases or appeals—I treat them equally—for each of the eight quarter sessions would make twenty-four. The next two are Newbury and Lichfield. Newbury had twenty-five and Lichfield had twenty-eight, spread over two years, which of course is under four for each quarter sessions. The only three I am sorry to see go, the three which seem to have made the most effective contribution of those on the list of the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, are: Andover, forty-one; Penzance, forty-two, and Bridgwater, forty-four. Those three do seem to have made a substantial contribution. But, on the other hand, those which are condemned by everybody and which have to go (being under 10,000), include Devizes. And Devizes contributed eighty-nine, which is twice as many as any town on Lord Llewellin's list. Beyond argument, Devizes would go under both these Amendments. I cannot help feeling that it may well be that, if quarter sessions take over these cases, there is no reason why the sittings should not be at various places in the county. It may be that quarter sessions would sit at Bridgwater and Andover, and dispose of cases there. I do not know what circumstances may arise. That is a matter for consideration.
  I think that what your Lordships felt about the undesirability of these very small recorderships is this. First, if the recorder is dealing with a criminal and wants to know what sentence he should give, since the proceedings last only one day as a rule, he cannot conveniently remand the case in order to hear further evidence or to obtain an expression of view from somebody as to what should be done. It is all very difficult, of course. But neither, in the nature of things, has the recorder time to "sleep on a case and think about it. That is
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  another drawback to these small recorder-ships. A third factor is the criticism that juries have to be drawn from such a small area that they know too much about the case before they come into court. I have sympathy with the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, because, from my point of view, having to appoint (as I shall if this Bill ever passes) not only judges and county court judges but also stipendiaries, metropolitan magistrates and recorders, it is rather useful for me to be able to start these recorders in a small court to see whether they make good. Then I shall know more of my material and I shall be more likely to be right when I appoint them to a bigger court. There is that point of view of which your Lordships must not lose sight.
  I am anxious to achieve the largest measure of agreement that I can on this Bill—that is why I am conducting it in the way I am—because it is my only chance of getting it through. If we send this Bill down more or less as an agreed Bill, I gather that there is still hope of getting it through another place. because all Parties there want it. Having regard to the weighty observations which were made by those who know very much more about this matter than I do, I thought I would reproduce in an Amendment the suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roche, at the end of our earlier discussions. It is simple; it is easily understood. That being so, I commend it to your Lordships, although I sympathise with the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, and I can fully understand his reasons for putting down the other Amendment which, indeed, I suggested to him as a fair compromise at an earlier stage of the Bill. On the whole, I now recommend your Lordships to accept this Amendment. At any rate, I put it down for discussion in order that we may see what your Lordships think about it.
  Amendment moved.—
  Page 7, line 11, after ("borough") insert the said words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD SCHUSTER: I would like to ask the Lord Chancellor a question. I am afraid I am in a muddle. Winchester has a population of 27,000.
  LORD ROCHESTER: Yes, and it thus escapes.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I thought the Lord Chancellor was talking about Winchester in his speech. I could not understand why he took Winchester.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I took Winchester as an illustration.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I am sorry.
  LORD GODDARD: I hope your Lordships will accept the Lord Chancellor's Amendment, which would mean that Lord Llewellin's Amendment would not be accepted.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: No, it does not.
  LORD GODDARD: I should imagine it would follow logically—if we are logical for once—that we would not accept Lord Llewellin's Amendment.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: May I interrupt the noble Lord? My Amendment can be accepted equally as well as the Lord Chancellor's. I am all in favour of the Lord Chancellor's Amendment, and if it came to a Division on that I should vote for it. My Amendment does not in the least contradict the Lord Chancellor.
  LORD GODDARD: Perhaps I should reserve what I have to say about the retention of these small quarter sessions until Lord Llewellin moves his Amendment. With regard to the Lord Chancellor's Amendment, I hope the Committee will accept it, because I think it is not only a fair compromise but is the right thing. We shall keep the quarter sessions at the places that really need quarter sessions. We shall keep quarter sessions where there are a fair number of people who can be considered for appointment as justices of the peace and a fair number of people from whom juries can be drawn. I am glad that the Lord Chancellor has not taken any dispensing power himself. If he did, I think life for him would be made even more intolerable than it already is. I therefore hope your Lordship will accept the Lord Chancellor's Amendment as it stands.
  LORD ROCHE: May I say exactly the same? I support this Amendment.
  LORD MAUGHAM: I, too, am in favour of the Amendment by the Lord Chancellor.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: So are we all, which is a very happy state of affairs, but we are all overlooking the fact that the Lord Chancellor's Amendment is far better, in all our views, than the words in the Bill as it originally came to us, which would have done away with all commissions of the peace of courts of quarter sessions other than those for county boroughs. That provision is now to be altered, I hope, in the way the Lord Chancellor's Amendment suggests. But, even so, on the Lord Chancellor's Amendment we are doing away with thirty-eight or thirty-seven existing courts of quarter sessions and recorders. We are depriving a number of men of income, without paying compensation to a single one. That is one thing we are doing, and we should realise that we are doing it. Although most of them are perhaps properous members of the Bar, we are suddenly taking away a part of their income by what we are doing in this measure. Now let us remember when we are dealing with these recorderships that the question of the abolition of the courts of quarter sessions has never been considered, either by the Roche Committee or by the du Parcq Commission. They did consider the size of commissions of the peace, but they never directed their attention or made any particular recommendations in regard to the abolition of the recorders and the courts of quarter sessions. And when I make that remark I am quoting the remarks made on Second Reading by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice. He went on to say:
  "Abolish small boroughs if you will, but do consider which of these boroughs are doing really useful work with their courts of quarter sessions."
  He further said:
  "Remember this, if I may say so with respect; the work of county quarter sessions —indeed, of all quarter sessions—has enormously increased in recent years."
  Then he quotes himself as a young man going to Salisbury and draws attention to the fact that a number of those who man county quarter sessions may not have the time to go and sit there and take in the extra work which will come to them if there is too great a slaughter of existing courts of quarter sessions and recorders.
  Now the noble and learned Viscount, who spoke quite fairly about these matters, said that if a recorder had only one or

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  two cases in his list, he seldom put a prisoner over for the next day. But, if a recorder does not try that man, who is going to do it? The court of the county quarter sessions? But those courts have to deal with prisoners in one day's hearing, because they can seldom muster the, same bench to sit on the second day. Obviously, it is important that all the persons who have heard the evidence and what the police or probation officer or whoever else has been called, have had to say, should form the same bench. But it is seldom that the whole of that bench is present if the quarter sessions goes on for a second or third day.
  The noble and learned Lord Chancellor said he had attempted to reproduce what Lord Roche had suggested, with one exception, which he pointed out. I find myself in exactly the same position in regard to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor. It was the Lord Chancellor's suggestion that a good compromise would be getting rid of commissions of the peace for non-county boroughs with populations of under 50,000. and keeping recorders for boroughs with populations above 10,000. I appreciate that since then he has been able to go more accurately into the figures than perhaps he had been when he made the suggestion. But what is going to happen? It may sound all right, but we must analyse these figures a little more closely than has been done. We have to find how many of these cases would go to and choke up a county quarter sessions, because they may make a great deal of difference to the local county quarter sessions. Therefore, whichever method is adopted to deal with these cases can he attacked in some way and it can be said that there is an anomaly.
  If one looks at the number of cases that have been heard at, let us say, Canterbury, one would find immediately that great relief had been afforded to the Kent Quarter Sessions. It could probably be said that each of these places had made a contribution of only four or ten or whatever the number may be, but altogether they are making a real contribution which I believe will help us still to preserve the county quarter sessions without a great number of paid chairmen and paid officials running them. I still believe in having our justice administered non-professionally in a large number of courts in this country.
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  The second thing it will do, as the noble and learned Viscount said, is to make a training ground and trial ground for more of the recorders. The third thing which I believe it will do is this—and here anybody is as good a judge as I am. Speaking as one who spent sixteen years in another place, I must warn you that if you take away the recorders from thirty-eight towns there will be at least thirty-eight Members of Parliament who will get up and talk about it, and they will probably get some other Members for the county to talk about it also, and you will be faced with a kind of controversial Bill: whereas if my Amendment were accepted the Bill would, I am certain, have much more chance of passing through both Houses of Parliament this Session. Until now we never heard of any great injustices occurring in these places, or of difficulties in getting a jury. With great respect to noble Lords who have commented on these juries knowing too much about the case, I would say that I believe that the ordinary Englishman does his duty when he is called to serve upon a jury and solemnly to swear an oath to do justice "between our Sovereign Lord the King and the prisoner at the bar." I rather resent these innuendoes that because a man lives in a small borough he is less likely to keep to the terms of his oath than a man who has not heard so much about the case. I believe that juries do their best impartially to administer justice.
  What we are faced with to-day is really a fight, and an important fight as I believe, to see whether we are going to offend all these ancient boroughs, some of them rather small, by taking away from them a court of quarter session which they have had in some cases for three or four hundred years and about. which the Roche Report and the Report of the Royal Commission say nothing as to their being abolished, or as to their being in any way a blot on the administration of criminal law in this country. Therefore I think we ought not to abolish as many of these recorders as we shall de if even the Lord Chancellor's Amendment is accepted. I believe they still perform an extremely useful service in the country. I agree with the Lord Chancellor that it does no harm to a borough magistrate to find that in future he will be on the commission of the peace for the county and not on the commission of the peace for his small

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  borough; but I believe that it will cause great resentment in all these towns if they are deprived of their own court of quarter session and their own recorder.
  In regard to my Amendment, the Lord Chancellor has kindly drawn attention to the fact that it avoids any question of a cross-appeal from the same bench, or appeals to two different places. He is probably satisfied that this is a workable method. I believe that, having regard to the fact that nothing has been said against them in any of these Reports, we should not be content suddenly to abolish the offices of some thirty-eight men without any compensation and to deprive thirty-eight towns of a court they have had for years—a court which has been of real relief to county quarter sessions and a good trial ground for many men who afterwards have become successful High Court Judges.
  If it is convenient, I would like to leave out the first Amendment in my name on the Marshalled List, as I am told it is in the wrong place, but to move my second Amendment which I am told should be to page 7, line 12. That is the main Amendment we have been discussing on this matter. If I may, I will move that Amendment.
  LORD ROCHESTER: May I suggest that we should get rid of the Lord Chancellor's Amendment, because Lord Llewellin's Amendment is an addition thereto?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I moved my Amendment. I do not know what is right in the matter of procedure. It is not the case that Lord Llewellin's Amendment is an addition; it is really a subtraction or a proviso which takes out a good many boroughs which otherwise would be included. However, I want to correct one point if I may. I told the Committee that apart from Winchester I had not received any letter of complaint about the separate commissions of the peace. The Committee might naturally think that I was talking for my office. I am told that in the office we have had one or two, but that the Home Office have been inundated with them. I should be giving a wrong impression unless I made it plain that I was speaking for myself in my personal capacity.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: Was I wrong in trying to move my Amendment at this stage? If so, I apologise.
  LORD ROCHESTER: I desire to speak to the Lord Chancellor's Amendment. I was disturbed and distressed by the Bill as it was first introduced, and I am indeed grateful to the Lord Chancellor for his Amendment, which I support without reservation. Having said that, I desire to say a word about Lord Llewellin's position, because I feel I am indebted to the noble Lord—
  LORD GODDARD: Not yet. He has not moved his Amendment yet.
  LORD ROCHESTER: Forgive me. I feel most indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, because in his original Amendment he inserted the figure of 25,000 which is now adopted by the Lord Chancellor as part of his Amendment. I sought to see whether there was any way of helping Lord Llewellin, in his list, because he has helped me, and I found three instances, strangely enough, the three mentioned by the Lord Chancellor—first Andover with 41 cases; second, Penzance with 42 cases; and third, Bridgwater with 44 cases. I wondered whether if the number in the Bill were reduced to 20,000 it would help Lord Llewellin; but then I found that in the case of Andover the population is only 14,000, so it would not help them. It would cover only Bridgwater and Penzance. I looked at the figure of 20,000 because the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, in his original speech—I am quoting from the OFFICIAL REPORT for October 20, Column 1083—said:
  "I would like to see a figure of 20,000, or something like that—"
  Though he was moving an Amendment embodying a limit of 25,000—
  "as the qualification for having a recorder in the town."
  When I looked at the 20,000 which he then suggested, I found that it did not save his position. I feel, therefore, with the best will in the world, that I am unable to support Lord Llewellin's Amendment. I agree that I am anticipating its being moved, but I want to emphasise that I feel that the Lord Chancellor's Amendment is a very fair compromise and has gone a long way to meet the situation in which we find ourselves.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER: May I say this, on the Amendment which has been moved by the Lord Chancellor? I also feel deeply grateful to him for the courtesy and consideration with which he has dealt with this subject, and for his exemplary patience throughout. Your Lordships must be sick of the mention of the name of the city of Winchester, but I beg you to believe that in references I have made to it I have been interested not in that one city but in the general principles of which it offers us a convenient example.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I have made my speech, and I beg to move my next Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 7, line 12, at end, insert—
  ("Provided that this subsection shall not affect the existing grant of quarter sessions to a borough having at the end of the said month a population of ten thousand or over.)"—(Lord Llewellin.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I say this in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rochester? I think the noble Lord was being very irregular, in speaking as he did, and I suspect that I am being irregular now. If we moved down to the 20,000 limit it would save the following six boroughs which are in Lord Llewellin's list: Pontefract, which has a population of 23,000; Windsor, which has a population of 22,000; Grantham, which has a population of 23,000; Newark, which has a population of 23,000; Bridgwater, which has a population of 22,000, and Deal, with a population of 23,000. It would not, so far as I can make out, save Penzance, which, according to the estimate of the Registrar-General, has a population of 19,600. Unless you are going to take the 20,000 and say "the borough which has a population to which that is the nearest round figure," Penzance will not be in.
  LORD ROCHESTER: I was taking the figure which the Lord Chancellor gave to the noble Lord, Lord Schuster. The figure given for Penzance was 20,000.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Those figures are to the nearest thousand. The actual figure for Penzance is 19,600.
  LORD ROCHESTER: With regard to the other point on boroughs with a
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  20,000 population I was taking only those boroughs that had had over forty cases, I felt that that helped in trying to justify further inclusions.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Andover is out because it has a population of only 14,000. Penzance is out for the reasons which I have given. The only one that comes in is Bridgwater.
  LORD GODDARD: Perhaps I may throw a little light on the reason why Andover, Penzance and Bridgwater seem to have contributed so much. I am convinced that you will not find, if you go into the matter, that the cases they tried were borough cases. Penzance being right away in the west of Cornwall, and the Cornish quarter sessions being held at Bodmin, the most easterly part of the county, there is, of course, a great tendency to send cases from the west of Cornwall to Penzance. The real remedy is for Cornwall to hold quarter sessions at Truro—which is the proper county place. It is true that the court there is not so good as the Bodmin count, which is not in itself an especially good one. Bridgwater, again, is not a very criminal sort of place, but it happens to be the only town in the county of Somerset, with the exception of Bath, that has a recorder. There again, a great many county cases are sent there. Andover, of course, is near Salisbury Plain, where there are many young soldiers; and cases are sent there—it may well be that they are sent there perfectly properly—in order to get speedy trials.
  As I ventured to suggest on the last occasion when this matter was discussed by the Committee, the Act of 1925, which enables county cases to be sent to borough or other sessions which would not otherwise try them, was never intended as a county sessions relief Act. It was intended merely to enable cases to be tried more quickly. A man might be sent for trial and the ordinary court of trial would be the county sessions or the county assizes. But if the county sessions or the assizes has just been held, it is possible under this Act for him to have his case tried at some other court. We have to find some yardstick by which this question is to be resolved. One person says 50,000 and another 25,000, and so it goes on. Lord Llewellin would like 10,000. while the Roche Committee expressed the opinion that a borough

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  with a population of 25,000 was the smallest borough that should have a separate commission. I still think it is illogical and undesirable to have recorders unless the town has a borough commission. If we accept the Lord Chancellor's Amendment we keep to a sensible plan. It seems to me that all boroughs of 25,000 population with commissions, if they are quarter sessions boroughs, should keep both borough commissions and their recorders.
  Lord Llewellin almost drew tears from some of your Lordships, I imagine, by pointing out how we are depriving recorders of a source of income. My withers are not wrung by that—and for this reason. In these small boroughs the remuneration of the recorder is very small, and by the time he has paid his railway fare and, if necessary, his hotel bill, there is precious little left. That is recognised at the Bar, as Bar counsel have told me. The recorder is not allowed to deduct his railway fare for the purposes of income tax. It was, I believe, decided in the case of the Recorder of Portsmouth, who was good enough to allow his case to be treated as a test case, that the only thing that the recorder could deduct was the cost of any stationery which he might use and something towards the wear and tear of his robes and trousers. That is all that can be deducted. In these days of increased railway fares and so forth, in the case of a recorder who is in receipt of a salary of £40 or £50 a year we are really doing a real service to him by taking away his recordership. As long as it remains, cases from the county will be sent to him. He will have to pay his railway fares and, as I have said, he cannot deduct them for income tax purposes, so that his recordership becomes almost an absolute loss. Therefore I do not think that that is a matter which need be considered at all.
  One real point, which I still maintain ought to weigh with your Lordships, in spite of what the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has said about jurymen sworn to do justice between their Sovereign Lord, The King, and the prisoner at the bar, is that in these small courts there is a very real danger over the question of juries. A good many years ago, I went down to one of the boroughs which the noble Lord has put down in the Schedule as one of the boroughs to be retained—I
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  am not going to mention which one—to defend a man on a charge of embezzlement. I went down with the idea that I should have to advise my client to plead guilty, because I could not think of anything to say for him. But when I got there, I was told I need not worry. I had only to put up a show and all would be well. And all was well. It was obvious from the interlocutory remarks which the jury made as soon as the case was opened that the jury knew exactly what they were going to do, whatever the evidence. And they did it. And I received a certain amount of credit for it, I suppose, as well as my fee!
  Seriously, I believe that these small boroughs are not satisfactory places in which to have separate courts of quarter session. As I said last time, we cannot have any reform without interfering with some vested interest or treading on somebody's toes. We have to settle this matter somehow, and I venture to think that if we accept the Lord Chancellor's Amendment for the figure of 25,000, that is the most satisfactory thing that can be done.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I feel very strongly on this point. Of course, I went down to 10,000 only because I was taking up a suggestion made by the noble and learned Viscount opposite. I still feel that 25,000 is too high. Because the last thing I want to see, as all your Lordships know, is failure to get on with this Bill, I suggest it might be convenient to your Lordships to see whether we could not obtain complete agreement before Report stage on some figure of 20,000 or upwards, which at any rate would preserve one or two of these courts which are doing a very useful job of work. Everybody has the right to put down an Amendment on the Report stage, but we had agreed that we should bring forward as little as possible to the Report stage. I should be very sorry if by taking this to a Division now, we did not get ahead with the Bill and on that understanding I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The next Amendment explains itself. Obviously there must be some standard by which to judge, and the standard I suggest is that the population shall be ascertained according to estimates of the Registrar-General. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 7, line 40, at end insert—
  ("() For the purposes of this section the population at any time of a borough shall be ascertained according to the estimates of the registrar-general.
  () The boroughs retaining their existing commissions of the peace by virtue of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of this section are those named in the Schedule (non-county boroughs retaining commissions of peace) to this Act.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 9 [Justices and courts in London]:
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved to add to the clause:
  Page 9, line 4, at end insert—
  ("(9) Section forty-two of the Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 1839 (which limits the cases in which fees may be taken in proceedings before justices in the metropolitan stipendiary court area), shall cease to have effect, but justices acting for arty petty sessional division of the county of London (not being metropolitan stipendiary magistrates) shall comply with any order of the Secretary of State as to the classes of proceedings which should or should not be taken by them.
  (10) Nothing done by any such justices shall he invalidated by reason of any non-compliance with an order under the last foregoing subsection.
  (11) Any such order shall be made by statutory instrument and may he varied or revoked by a subsequent order.")
  The noble Lord said: During the Committee stage the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, moved the repeal of Section 42 of the Metropolitan Police Courts Act of 1839, pointing out that it was anomalous that lay justices' clerks in London should be prohibited from taking fees in the ordinary way for work which they did as justices' clerks. The noble Viscount's observations were supported by the noble Lord, Lord Schuster. My impression was that the view of the noble Lords was that these fees went to the justices' clerks themselves, whereas they go to the local funds.
  LORD SCHUSTER: That is a very curious impression, because the justices' clerks tell me they receive them.
  LORD CHORLEY: My information is that they are paid into the local funds out of which justices' clerks are paid.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I think the bankers of the justices' clerks are under a different impression.
  LORD CHORLEY: Be that as it may, the Government appreciated the force of the Amendment in respect of fees being paid for work which is done. The objection to the noble Viscount's Amendment was that by removing the restriction under the words of his Amendment, it would open the work of these courts to the lay justices on the same basis as in the stipendiary courts. I think the noble Viscount saw the force of that and agreed to withdraw his Amendment, provided at the next stage the Government would put down an. Amendment to deal with the position. This Amendment has been drafted with that aim in view.
  Your Lordships will see it provides that the delegation of work between the lay justices and the stipendiaries shall he carried through on the basis of a decision made by the Home Secretary. Perhaps I ought to explain that under the Report of the Maxwell Committee it is hoped that in due course it will be possible to have the lay justices and the stipendiaries sitting in the same court-house so that there will be the possibility of an inter-charge of work. That would obviously lead to a considerable improvement in the administration of justice and in the general efficiency of the courts. Without some provision of this kind people would be able to choose whether they should go to a lay justices' court or a stipendiary's court, which I am sure your Lordships will agree would be an undesirable thing. It would also mean that various services, such as the work of the probation officer, would have to be duplicated, which would be an unjustifiable expense at the present time. In these circumstances, I am sure your Lordships will agree that the method chosen to deal with this matter is the right one. I hope your Lordships will accept this Amendment as now drafted
  Amendment moved—
  Page 9, line 4, at end insert the said new subsections.—(Lord Charley.)
  LORD SCHUSTER: I was entirely mistaken when I contradicted the noble Lord. I was thinking of another Amendment in which I have a deeper interest, in which case the fees are not paid over. In this case the fees are paid

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  over to the local fund. I am very grateful to the noble Lord.
  LORD CHORLEY: I am obliged to the noble Lord. His information confirms what I have been told.
  Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
  5.10 p.m.
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, after Clause 9 to insert the following new clause:
  Licensing authorities for non-county boroughs
  ".—(1) For the purposes of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, as respects licensing districts being non-county boroughs—

  (a) the licensing justices shall be for all purposes the borough licensing committee;

  (b) the confirming authority shall be a committee of the borough justices; and

  (c) the compensation authority shall be the county confirming and compensation committee of the county in which the borough is situated.

  (2) Section forty of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, as set out in the Second Schedule to the Licensing Act, 1949 (which relates to the disqualification of justices), and section twelve of the Licensing Act, 1949 (which relates to the constitution and procedure of licensing authorities in county boroughs), shall apply in relation to a non-county borough having a separate commission of the peace and to the confirming authority in such a borough as they apply in relation to a county borough and the confirming and compensation committee in a county borough.
  (3) The justices of any non-county borough shall be entitled to appoint one of their number to act on the county confirming and compensation committee when the committee is discharging functions as compensation authority (whether for the county or for any borough situated therein), and for the purpose of those functions any justice so appointed shall be deemed to be an additional member of the committee."
  The noble Lord said: This Amendment makes provision as to licensing authorities in non-county boroughs. The Licensing Act, 1949, which was before your Lordships' House recently, made no provision for non-county boroughs, because at that time it was uncertain whether any non-county boroughs would continue to have their separate commissions. The provisions which are made in this case will apply to all these non-county boroughs which retain their commissions. I am sure your Lordships will agree that this is a necessary Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 9 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: This is obviously a point that had to be tidied up if we continue the commissions of the peace in non-county boroughs. We support this Amendment.
  Clause 10 [Size and chairmanship of bench]:
  LORD CHORLEY: I would like to deal with the next Amendment and the succeeding one together. During the Committee stage, your Lordships will remember, the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, moved an Amendment for the purpose of inserting in the Bill a requirement that the election of chairmen and deputy chairmen of benches should be carried out by secret ballot. As the clause stands this provision could be made (and it was, in fact, my noble and learned friend's intention to make it so) by secret ballot under the rules for which the Lord Chancellor will in due course be responsible. My noble and learned friend did say that he would be willing to provide in the Bill itself for the election by secret ballot, but he thought the right place for such provision was at the end of subsection (2) of Clause 10. The first of these two Amendments carries out the Lord Chancellor's suggestion. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 9, line 11, at end insert ("by secret ballot").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD O'HAGAN: I should just like to say how much I appreciate—as I am sure all noble Lords do—the way in which the Lord Chancellor has met us over this matter. I have no doubt that the form of words suggested is much better than that in the Amendment which I put down.
  LORD CALVERLEY: I should like to say that the Commission were unanimous on this point. Even Lord Merthyr supported us.
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment is really consequential on the last. It provides merely that the actual method of election should be in accordance with the rules when they are promulgated. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 9, line 29, leave out ("manner of") and insert ("the procedure at an").—Lord Chorley.)
  Clause 10, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 11 agreed to.
  Clause 12 [Rule committee and rules of procedure]:
  LORD CHORLEY: The two amendments to Clause 12 are purely drafting Amendments. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 10, line 39, at end insert ("and the reference in the last foregoing section to paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule to the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, shall be taken as a reference to this section").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 4, after ("1906"), insert ("and in section thirteen of the Money Payments (Justices Procedure) Act, 1935").—(Lord Charley.)
  Clause 12, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 13:
  Establishment of magistrates' courts committees
  (2) There shall be a magistrates' courts committee for each county and for each county borough:
  Provided that—
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, in subsection (2), at the end of proviso (b) to insert:
  "and
  (c) there may be a separate magistrates courts' committee for a non county borough having a separate commission of the peace, if at the time of the establishment of the committee the borough has a population of seventy-five thousand or over.
  (3) Where a non county borough has for the time being a separate magistrates courts' committee, the jurisdiction of the borough justices as respects matters within their commission shall he exclusive of that of the justices for the county to the same extent as if the borough did not form part of the count."
  The noble Lord said: The Roche Committee envisaged as your Lordships have heard only too frequently, that commissions of the peace of boroughs of under 25,000 population would be abolished, that boroughs with separate commissions between 25,000 and 75,000
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  population would he included for magistrates' courts purposes in the county, and that boroughs over 75,000 should have a separate magistrates' courts committee. In paragraph 103 of their Report they say:
  "In boroughs with population of 75,000 and over (which will not some within grouping schemes, unless they wish to do so) the justices should be given such of the powers of a magistrates' courts committee as are applicable."
  This Amendment carries out the Roche Committee's suggestion that boroughs over 75,000 having a separate commission of the peace should be eligible to have a separate magistrates' courts committee. They will not have it as of right, and the Third Schedule in its new form provides that such a borough shall have a separate magistrates' courts committee if, but only if, it is for the time being so directed by an order of the Secretary of State, which can be made only on the application of the magistrates for the borough.
  Whether the borough will be given a separate magistrates' courts committee will depend upon circumstances—for example, whether it has a whole-time clerk, and whether or not it seems desirable that the clerkship for the borough should be combined with any of the clerkships for the surrounding petty sessional division of the county. It can be said, however, that unless a non-county borough with a separate commission of the peace has a provision in its Charter excluding the jurisdiction in the borough of the county justices, the county justices have jurisdiction in the borough. Subsection (3) provides that where a non-county borough has by the order of the Secretary of State been given a separate magistrates' courts committee the borough justices' jurisdiction as respects matters within their commission shall be exclusive of that of the justices of the county. This is desirable because the possession of a separate magistrates' courts committee means that the borough is to have complete independence of the county in matters relating to magistrates' courts, just as a county borough has. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 36, at end insert the said new worth.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I am not at all sure about this Amendment. I thought

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  the whole point of these magistrates' courts committees was to see that the right arrangements were made throughout a county. If a non-county borough which has a population of 75,000 and a commission of the peace is given a separate magistrates' courts committee there can never be any alteration in its petty sessional division between it and the county. That is the first thing that must be remembered. The second is that you will never get a combined clerk for that area and the area of another magistrates' courts committee to take on another function. Thirdly, you may well get put up to the county council—because they are the people who have got to pay, so far as I can make out—two different scales of salaries for the justices' clerk. I think it is rather a retrograde step to give people a vested interest in the magistrates' courts committee from the start, when there is no such interest existing, because these are completely new bodies. I would have liked to see the magistrates' courts committees co-terminus with the county boroughs, so that the scale of salaries, and everything like that, should he uniform right through the county. I must say that the noble Lord who moved the Amendment was not very convincing as to why this addition to the Bill had to be made like this. I should have liked the non-county boroughs, whatever their commission of the peace, to be brought in for these purposes so that the county as a whole formed an entity.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I add this to what my noble friend Lord Chorley has said? This Amendment implements a provision of the Roche Committee. It relates only to three boroughs, because there are only three non-county boroughs having a population of more than 75,000—Luton, Cambridge and Poole. Paragraph 103 of the Roche Committee says this:
  "In boroughs with populations of 75.000 and over (which will not come within grouping schemes unless they wish to do so) the justices should be given such of the powers of a magistrates' courts committee as are applicable."
  Non-county boroughs have their separate magistrates' courts committees, and many of these are far smaller than these three great non-county boroughs. This seemed to us fair, and to carry out what we understood to be the recommendation in
  260
  Paragraph 103 of the Roche Committee's Report.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I think we did recommend that, but with some hesitation, so far as I remember. I feel great hesitation about it now, but I do not see the answer to what is proposed sufficiently to press the matter the other way. I see great difficulties on both sides, as I think does the Lord Chancellor. I do not propose to take any part in the discussion, one way or the other, except to say what I have said.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I would like to ask the Lord Chancellor whether he can enlighten us about this. If it was recommended by the Roche Committee why was it not in the original Bill?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think it was simply an oversight which we are now trying to correct.
  LORD CALVERLEY: Some of us put the point that the anomaly would be that Cambridge, which is an assize town, would not have a magistrates' courts committee which, so far as I understand it, is to ensure that proper accommodation is available for the courts. I hope the House will accept the Lord Chancellor's proposal.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is little more than drafting. The subsections involved are replaced by the Amendment to the Third Schedule, at page 41, line 42, which sets out the constitution and establishment of magistrates' courts committees. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 37, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 12.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I looked upon this Amendment with some suspicion. When I first saw it on the Order Paper, I thought that it might mean some reversal of the decision, but I then found that the matter was satisfactorily dealt with in the Third Schedule, which is obviously a better place.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment relates to the Amendment about the 75,000 population. If we are to have a number like that there must be some stipulation of how it is to be assessed. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 24, at end insert ("and the population at any time of a borough shall be determined according to the estimates of the registrar-general.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
  Clauses 14 and 15 agreed to.
  Clause 16:
  Appointment and conditions of service of justices' clerks
  "(12) Subsection (1) of section forty-nine of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910 (which prohibits justices' clerks from acting professionally in connection with proceedings at licensing sessions) shall apply in relation to the general annual licensing meeting, transfer sessions and petty sessions held for any district as it applies in relation to those held for the clerk's district, and the words excepting the preparation of notices and forms from the operation of the subsection shall cease to have effect."
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment meets a suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, and is really for the sake of improving the grammar. He thought the word "single" was better than the word "entire." I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 14, line 23, leave out ("an entire") and insert ("single").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is to meet a suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, that before removing a clerk his representations must be heard and considered. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 18, at end insert ("and before approving the removal of any such clerk shall consider any representations made to him by the clerk.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I am obliged to the Lord Chancellor. That completely meets the point I made.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential on the proposal that some non-county boroughs should retain their separate commission of peace. As the Bill was drafted this was not possible. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 18, at end insert—
  ("(10) The two last foregoing subsections shall apply to a non-county borough having a separate commission of the peace but not a separate magistrates' courts committee as if it were a petty sessional division of the county of which it forms part.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: This Amendment is also dealt with in the next Amendment in the name of the Lord Chancellor. I understand that this will be accepted. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 34, after ("apply") insert ("to a justices' clerk appointed after the coming into force of this section").—(Lord Llewellin.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We can accept this Amendment.
  5.28 p.m.
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, in subsection (12) to leave out "cease to have effect" and to insert:
  "not have effect in the application of the subsection to a clerk appointed after the coming into force of this section."
  The noble Lord said: As my noble and learned friend has pointed out, we need both this Amendment and the one which has just been accepted from the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin. This Amendment is in consequence of an Amendment put down by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, in order to protect the position of justices' clerks in London who rely for their livelihood upon earnings which they receive for preparing forms and notices for the brewers in respect of licensing applications. There was some discussion as to how far the Roche Committee went in respect of this matter, but it is now found that the Roche Committee were quite definite in their view that justices' clerks ought not to be allowed to do work of this kind. They say in paragraph 85:
  "The prohibition should extend to all classes of work performed for bodies or persons directly interested in licensing matters in the area of his court including conveyancing and the preparation of forms which is expressly excepted from the present disqualification."
  It is clear, therefore, that the position of the London justices' clerks ought not to be met by abandoning this very important principle.
  Moreover, I think your Lordships will agree that it would be quite wrong to make an exception of favour of justices' clerks in London and to leave justices' clerks elsewhere subject to the prohibition. We felt that the best way out of it was to suggest the compromise contained in this Amendment, by which the case will be met by providing that the prohibition on preparing these forms shall be limited in its effect to clerks appointed after the clause comes into force. I hope your Lordships will think this is a reasonable way of dealing with the matter. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 38, leave out ("cease to have effect") and insert the said new words.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. The position, of course, is that to a considerable extent some of these justices' clerks relied upon this source of income, as it was known they would do when their salaries were fixed. In regard to any new appointees to this office, a man taking up the appointment will know that he will no longer get these fees and therefore he will have to settle the salary with the committee accordingly. He will have had this warning and will have to make his own bargain.
  LORD SCHUSTER: This is the Amendment to which I was trying to refer when I misled the Committee some minutes ago. I should like to repeat the apologies I then made. This Amendment is quite satisfactory to those concerned.
  Clause 16, as amended agreed to.
  Clause 17:
  Qualification of justices' clerk
  (3) A person not having the qualification as barrister or solicitor which is required by subsection (1) of this section may be appointed a justices' clerk if—
  (a) he has served for not less than ten years in one or more of the following capacities, that is to say, clerk to a stipendiary magistrate, clerk to a metropolitan stipendiary court, clerk at one of the justice rooms of the City of London, assistant to any such clerk as aforesaid and assistant to a justices' clerk; and
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved in subsection (3) to leave out "if—(a) he has served for not less than ten" and to insert:
  "(a) if at the time of appointment he is a solicitor of the Supreme Court and has served for not less than five."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment gives effect to one moved by the noble Lord, Lord Morris, during the Committee stage and which I then accepted in principle. The proposition on which it was based is that an assistant to a justices' clerk who takes the trouble to become articled, pass examinations and qualify as a solicitor ought not, if he has already a substantial period of service behind him, to have to wait five years before he can be appointed justices' clerk, on account of the requirement of the clause that a solicitor must be of five years' standing for such an appointment. The effect of the Amendment is that if he has five years' service in a clerk's office he can be appointed a clerk as soon as he is qualified. Most assistants who qualify as solicitors have, of course, far more than five years' service to their credit.
  Lord Schuster's Amendment at page 16, line 20, deals with the same point but in a different way. He would confine the concession to those assistants who have five years' service before the Act comes into operation. This would mean that no person who joins the clerks' staff after the Act comes into operation, and who in due course qualifies as a solicitor, could benefit by the provision; he would have to wait until he has five years' standing as a solicitor. I think this would be unfair. The point was explained when we discussed Lord Schuster's Amendment on the Committee stage, and I suggest what we are doing here is a fair way of meeting the case of these people who have become solicitors of the Supreme Court and have had five years' previous service to their credit. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 16, line 6, leave out from ("clerk") to ("years") in line 7, and insert the said new words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD SCHUSTER: I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. I shall not move my Amendment.
  LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved, in subsection (3) (a) to omit "to any such." The noble Lord said: When I originally read this clause, I wondered whether the words in the Bill were not rather too wide and whether they did not include such people as the typist or the office boy. What we all have in our minds, of course, is that the words should apply only to the man who sits in court, taking the place from time to time of the clerk. It is for that reason that I have put down this Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 16, line 11, leave out from ("assistant") to ("clerk").—(Lord Llewellin.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The effect of this and the consequential Amendment would be to make the subsection read as follows:
  "…clerk at one of the justice rooms of the City of London, assistant clerk as aforesaid and assistant justices' clerk…"
  I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, that all we want is to find a term which covers a responsible assistant and not the office boy. But the terms "assistant clerk" and "assistant justices' clerk" are not known to the law, nor have they any generally accepted meaning. I am afraid it is impossible to confine the category of assistants who are eligible for appointment as justices' clerk under the paragraph, because all the clerk's staff are his assistants. The real safeguard against office boys or other subordinate members of a clerk's staff being appointed justices' clerks is in paragraph (b) of the subsection, which requires both the magistrates' courts committee and the Secretary of State to be satisfied that there are special circumstances making the appointment a proper one. If an office boy were appointed there would obviously be special circumstances making the appointment an improper one. We cannot satisfy the requirement of "special circumstances" unless the persons we have in mind are persons who have taken responsibility on behalf of the justices' clerk—that is to say, who have been taking the court in his absence. But the term "assistant to a justices' clerk" is that used in the existing Statute relating to the appointment of unqualified men. Therefore, although I sympathise with what the noble Lord has in mind, I am afraid that I cannot accept the Amendment.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I have no intention of pressing this matter. I fully understand that paragraph (b) provides a safeguard. Phrases become "terms of art" only after they have become incorporated in some statute. There was no doubt a time when "justices' clerk" was not a term of art. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This next Amendment gives effect to a proposal I made during the discussion of this clause on the previous Committee stage, that we should have some period, to be stated in the Bill, before the bar on the appointment of unqualified men as justices' clerks came into force. Its effect is that to be eligible for appointment as a justices' clerk an unqualified man must have completed ten years' service in one of the capacities specified in paragraph (a) of the subsection, before January 1, 1955. So it gives him substantially five years, and thereafter the door is closed. Until January 1, 1955, anyone who has ten years' such service at the time of his appointment can be appointed. This preserves the eligibility of those who are qualified now by length of service for such appointments, and of those who now have at least five years' service in a justices' clerk's office. No one who has less than this service, or who in future enters for the first time the service of a justices' clerk, will be eligible for appointment as a clerk unless he qualifies as a solicitor. I hope your Lordships will consider this a fair compromise. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 16, line 12, leave out ("and") and Insert—
  ("or
  (b) if before the time of appointment or the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fifty-five, whichever is the earlier, he has served for not less than ten years in one or more of the said capacities, and").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD SCHUSTER: I hope I shall be forgiven if I say that it is a little difficult to see how the clause will look when all these Amendments have been made. I gratefully acknowledge the action the noble and learned Viscount has taken, but I should like an opportunity of looking at the clause in its new form before I say that it meets the desires of

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  those who are interested. I have reason to believe that it does, however; certainly, those with whom I have consulted and who have asked me to take action in the matter are satisfied. I am not only satisfied but grateful.
  Clause 17, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 18 agreed to.
  Clause 19 [Superannuation of justices' clerks and their stag]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential upon the proposal that certain non-county boroughs should retain their commission of the peace. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 19, line 6, leave out the second ("county").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 19, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 20 [Existing and former justices' clerks, etc.]:
  5.41 p.m.
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "in any area immediately before the date of the first establishment of a magistrates' court committee to act for that area shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have been appointed by that committee," and to insert:
  "immediately before the date of the coming into force of section sixteen of this Act shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have been appointed by the magistrates' courts committee."
  The noble Lord said: This is rather a complicated Amendment. Clause 20, as is stands, provides:
  "A justices' clerk hording office in any area immediately before the date of the first establishment of a magistrates' courts committee to act for that area shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have been appointed by that committee…"
  The change which is proposed by this Amendment is to substitute for the date of the first establishment of a magistrates' courts committee, the date of the coming into force of Clause 16. Your Lordships will perhaps remember that Clause 16 is the one under which the justices' clerk will be paid a personal salary. It is proposed that the magistrates' courts committees shall be brought into existence everywhere on a date which
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  will be some months before the beginning of a financial year, and Clause 16 will be brought into force at the beginning of the financial year. In the intervening period, the magistrates' courts committee will have a great deal of work to do and, for example, after consultation with the local authority, will settle the salary of the clerk to the justices. It seems most desirable, therefore, that this provision in Clause 20 should be altered in the way the Amendment suggests, in order that the effective date may be the date when Clause 16 operates and not the date which is laid down in the clause as it at present stands. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 19, line 26, leave out from ("office") to the end of line 29 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment is consequential upon the last Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 20, line 1, leave out from ("the") to ("or") in line 3, and insert ("said date has been a justices' clerk").—(Lord Chorley.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment. By error, we have referred to a non-existent Act. The London and Middlesex (Improvements, etc.) Act of 1936 has been repealed by the Middlesex County Council Act, 1944. This Amendment is suggested in order to put that right. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 20, line 24, leave out from beginning to ("by") in line 25 (The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment deals with the same point. Section 418 of the Middlesex County Council Act, 1944, made special provision for the application (with certain amendments) of the Local Government Superannuation Act, 1937, to justices' clerks and their staff in Middlesex. The result is that Section 20 of the Act of 1937 (the general provision which brought justices' clerks and their staff within the Act of 1937) does not apply in Middlesex, and the purpose of this Amendment is to substitute in subsection (5) of Clause 20, in relation to the Middlesex clerks, the appropriate references to

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  the Middlesex County Council Act, 1944, for the references in that subsection to the Act of 1937. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 20, line 27, at end insert ("and in relation to a person who has been a contributory employee by virtue of section four hundred and eighteen of the Middlesex County Council Act, 1944, subsection (5) of this section shall apply with the substitution of references to that section for references to section twenty of the 1937 Act and of a reference to paragraph (f) of the Fifth Schedule to the said Act of 1944 for the reference to paragraph (g) of Part 111 of the Second Schedule to the 1937 Act").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, after Clause 20 to insert the following new clause:
  Clerk in proceedings for rates in London
  ".The provisions of section seven of the Vestries Act, 1850, relating to the recovery of rates shall not require or authorise the town clerk of a metropolitan borough to attend on or advise any justices as their clerk."
  The noble Lord said: The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, had an Amendment at the Committee stage to repeal the provisions of the Vestries Act, 1850. He was good enough to withdraw it when I assured him that we accepted the principle and would put down an Amendment to deal with the matter at a later stage. The matter arises in this way. Under the Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 1839, which prohibited justices' clerks in the metropolis from taking fees, there was an exception in favour of fees taken by vestry clerks in rating cases. Under Section 7 of the Vestries Act, 1850, which is repealed in the rest of the country but is still in force in London, a vestry clerk is in fact required to prepare and issue the necessary process for recovery of arrears of rates, to procure the summons to be served, and to attend the justices when they are hearing the case. The effect of these provisions is that in London there is a statutory duty on the vestry clerks, who have in the interval become the town clerks of the metropolitan boroughs, not only to prepare the summons in these rating cases but to act, in effect, as clerk to the justices in the cases where as town clerks they are responsible for the proceedings. I am sure your Lordships will agree that that is an anomalous situation. I understand that for some time past arrangements have been made so that it does not in fact
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  work out in that way. However, it is desirable that the position should be cleared up, and the Amendment which has been tabled has been drafted in order to secure this end. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 20, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD SCHUSTER: I do not know whether I said anything about this matter before, but it is a point about which I have always been most eager. I am grateful to the noble Lord for the action that has been taken. The situation really was, to all intents and purposes, a scandal. This Amendment will remove it.
  Clause 21 [Duties of county and county borough Councils]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 20, line 31, leave out ("county borough") and insert ("of each borough having a separate commission of the peace").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This again is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 20, line 39, leave out ("county borough") and insert ("of each borough having a separate commission of the peace").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential on the proposal that certain non-county boroughs should retain their commissions of the peace—the matter which we discussed to-day. Unless such a borough is allowed to have a separate magistrates' courts committee, under the Amendment we have recently dealt with, it will form part of the county for magistrates' courts committee purposes. The effect of this Amendment will be to enable the expenses of the magistrates' courts committee to be duly apportioned between the county council and the councils of the non-county boroughs which are included in the area of the county magistrates' courts committee. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 20, line 42, leave out ("for a joint committee area") and insert ("acting for the area of more than one such council").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD CHORLEY: During the Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, asked whether the provisions made in the existing clause include provision for payment of any damages which may be awarded by a court against justices, and the answer is that it does not. This Amendment is therefore designed to make provision whereby costs or damages awarded against the justices can be paid by the local authority. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 21, line 13, at end insert—
  ("and
  (d) any costs or damages awarded against any of the county or borough justices in such proceedings as aforesaid in so far as the magistrates' courts committee determine that they ought not to be borne by the justice personally.")—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD MERTHYR: I am obliged to the noble Lord for inserting this Amendment.
  Clause 21, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 22 [Supplementary provisions as to power and duties of councils]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Pace 22, line 2, at end insert ("or councils").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is consequential upon the proposal that certain non-county boroughs should retain their commissions of the peace. The existing subsection is confined to cases where there is more than one county council involved by reason of there being a joint committee area. The new subsection covers also the case where there is more than one council involved by reason of non-county boroughs with separate commissions being included in the area of the magistrates' courts committee of the county. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 22, line 4, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
  ("(2) Where the expenses of a magistrates courts' committee, or the sums payable to or in respect of a justices' clerk holding more than one clerkship or to or in respect of staff provided for any such clerk, fall to he borne by more than one council, any question as to the manner in which they are to he borne by the councils concerned shall be determined by agreement between those councils").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The next Amendment is consequential, I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 22, line 15, leave out ("hereof") and insert ("of this section, or under paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of the last foregoing section.").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is also consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 22, line 18, leave out ("the") and insert ("any")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This, too, is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 22 line 19, leave out ("foregoing subsections") and insert ("last foregoing subsection").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 23 [Application of fines and fees, and payment of expenses of courts]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 23, line 11, leave out the second ("county").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 23, line 13, leave out ("of justices at") and insert ("as chairman, deputy chairman or member of a court of").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The next two Amendments are consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 24, line 24, leave out ("clerk to county borough") and insert ("justices' clerk, not being a clerk to county").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 24, line 26, leave out ("those justices when acting as") and insert ("the").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a little more than a drafting Amendment. In the City of London there are two separate offices, that of clerk at the justice rooms, who advises the aldermen in their exercise of summary jurisdiction, and that of clerk of special sessions, who acts as clerk to the licensing justices. These offices may be combined in one person, arid it is understood that they are so combined at present. These duties of these offices are, elsewhere than in the City, all duties of the justices' clerk. The Bill provides on the one hand that all fees taken by a justices' clerk come into the pool and on the other, that the justices' clerk's salary is paid out of the pool plus the Treasury grant. This applies, as the Bill is drafted, to the clerk at the justice rooms of the City, and the Amendment makes it apply also to the clerk of special sessions. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 25, line 4, after ("London") insert ("a clerk of special sessions").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is consequential. I beg to move:
  Amendment moved—
  Page 25, line 8, leave out ("county borough") and insert ("any borough having a separate commission of the peace").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 24 [Appointments in non-county boroughs and urban districts]:
  LORD MERTHYRhad given notice of several Amendments to Clause 24. The noble Lord said: I have a number of
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  Amendments to this clause, but I observe that the noble and learned Viscount has put down a new clause to take the place of the existing Clause 24. I should like to acknowledge freely that some of the grievances which I formerly entertained with regard to stipendiaries are met by this new clause and by following Amendments, and it will not be necessary for me to move all my Amendments. I have one big grievance still to make, however, and what I want to say can be condensed under two headings. I think it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I do not move these present Amendments to Clause 24 but say what I want to say on the Lord Chancellor's Amendment with regard to the new clause. On that understanding I will not move my Amendments to Clause 24.
  5.53 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, to leave out Clause 24 and insert the following new clause:
  Appointments onside London
  " —(1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty to appoint a barrister of not less than seven years standing or a solicitor of the Supreme Court of the like standing to be a stipendiary magistrate for any of the following areas—

  (a) any borough having a separate commission of the peace;

  (b) the whole or part of any county exclusive of any such borough as aforesaid:

  (c) a district (in this section referred to as a "joint district") comprising two or more areas for which separate appointments might be made under the foregoing paragraphs.

  (2) A stipendiary magistrate appointed under this section shall hold office during His Majesty's pleasure and shall by virtue of his office be a justice of the peace for any county, and for any borough having a separate commission of the peace, which includes his area or any part of it.
  (3) Any appointment of a stipendiary magistrate under this section shill be of a person recommended to His Majesty by the Lord Chancellor.
  (4) No appointment (whether original or on a vacancy) of a stipendiary magistrate under this section

  (a) shall be made for a borough having a separate commission of the peace except on a petition presented to the Secretary of State by the borough council; or

  (b) shall be made for the whole or part of a county exclusive of any such borough except on a petition so presented by the county council; or

  (c) shall be made for a joint district except on a joint petition so presented by the borough and county councils who might

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  present separate petitions under the foregoing paragraphs for the several parts of the joint district.

  (5) The salary of a stipendiary magistrate appointed under this section shall be paid by the council or councils on whose petition he was appointed and, where he was appointed on a joint petition, each of the councils shall be liable to him for the whole salary but it shall be borne by them in the shares from time to time agreed and the joint petition shall specify the shares agreed at the time of its presentation.
  (6) Before presenting a petition under this section a council shall consult the magistrates' courts committee acting for their area, and the Secretary of state before submitting the petition to His Majesty shall take into account any representations made to him by the committee.
  (7) Where a stipendiary magistrate is appointed under this section on a petition presented by a county council (whether alone or jointly with other councils), the Secretary of State shall (where necessary) make an order constituting the area for which he is appointed, or that part in which the county justices have jurisdiction, a petty sessional division or divisions of the county and making consequential provisions as to the remainder of the county, and subsections (4), (6) and (7) of section fifteen of this Act shall apply as if the order were an order under that section.
  (8) A stipendiary magistrate appointed under this section for an area consisting of or including the whole or part of a county shall not act as a member of any court of quarter sessions for the county, nor act for any petty sessional division of the county other than the division or divisions in his area.
  (9) The grant of a commission of the peace to a borough forming part of an area for which a stipendiary magistrate has been appointed under this section shall not affect the appointment of the magistrate or the liability for his salary of the council of the county which includes that borough.
  (10) More than one magistrate may be appointed under this section for the same area.
  (11) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply to the City of London or the county of London.
  (12) Section one hundred and sixty-one of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, shall cease to have effect and this section shall apply to any magistrate appointed on a petition under that section who is in office at the coming into force of this section as if the petition had been a petition under this section."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: As I told your Lordships on the original Committee stage, it became obvious that Clause 24—it was then Clause 22—would have to be taken back for consideration because of the changes which were proposed to be made in the Bill. I have
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  drafted a new clause. I have drafted it, quite frankly, with a view to meeting the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, so far as I can. The new clause provides that there shall be power to appoint a stipendiary for an area in a county, whether it is an urban district or not. Subsection (1) of the new clause gives power for an appointment to be made for any borough having a separate commission of the peace, for the whole or a part of any county exclusive of such borough, or for a joint area consisting of two or more of the above-mentioned areas. By subsection (4) of the clause the appointment is to be made on petition of the borough council or county council for the several parts of the joint area.
  Subsection (3) is intended to meet Lord Merthyr's proposal that the appointment of a stipendiary should be on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, and with the Amendment which I am going to move to Clause 26 the Lord Chancellor will no doubt be the Minister responsible for recommending appointments of stipendiaries throughout the country, including the metropolitan magistrates. I confess that I have been most reluctant to take on this duty, but in view of the pressure placed on me by the Committee I thought I ought to do so. But I do so only on this understanding. I want to be perfectly frank with the Committee. I am not going to be responsible for the administration of these courts. I cannot do that; that will remain with the Home Office, as is the case to-day. But as to the appointment of the man who is to occupy this position, that will be my responsibility in the future, and no longer that of the Home Secretary. All questions of pensions and salaries and so on, and the areas of the court and the sittings of the magistrates, will be dealt with by the Home Secretary and not by me.
  Lord Llewellin suggested that the magistrates' courts committee should be consulted about any proposal to appoint a stipendiary in their area. I think that is right, and accordingly I make provision for that in subsection (6) of the new clause. I think the rest of the clause requires no further comment from me; it is substantially in accordance with the old Clause 22. Opportunity has been taken in subsection (12), however, to repeal Section 161 of the Municipal

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  Corporations Act, 1882, which provides for the appointment of stipendiaries in boroughs, since this is now superseded by the provisions of this clause. The question of fixing the salary of the stipendiary by the central Government, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, is dealt with separately in the new clause on salaries that we inserted after Clause 26. I have gone as far as I can to meet the Committee. I have gone perhaps further than I ought, and I hope that that will be credited to me for righteousness and that the Committee will accordingly accept this clause. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Leave out Clause 24 and insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: I am very glad to hear what the Lord Chancellor has just said. I was one of the members of the House who pressed him to take over these judicial appointments. I am sure that he is taking the right course. I sympathise with him in having another duty put upon his shoulders but, as I said in our last debate, I do not think that it will be a very onerous additional duty, for my remembrance in connection with this question when I was Home Secretary was that the Home Secretary always consulted the Lord chancellor in cases of this kind. I hope, therefore, that while he will now become definitely responsible for these appointments, the actual work put upon his shoulders will not be substantially increased. I am glad that he has extended this proposal to the metropolitan stipendiary magistrates, and I am also glad that in a later clause he deals with the question of salaries and pensions. I hope the Committee will agree with the new clause and will regard it as a definite improvement to the Bill.
  LORD MERTHYR: I think that the decision of the Lord Chancellor to take over the appointment of stipendiaries will be widely welcomed throughout the country, and I wish to acknowledge, as I said before, that he has gone a long way to meet some of the points which have been made on this part of the Bill. As I said, however, I am afraid I have still one very big grievance—I refer to subsection (5) on page 10 of the Marshalled List. The first two lines of that subsection say this:
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  "The salary of a stipendiary magistrate appointed under this section shall be paid by the council.…"
  The point I want to make is that it is wrong that the salaries of stipendiaries in the country should continue to be paid by the local authorities. It becomes even more wrong, in my humble opinion, when you consider that the salaries of the London police magistrates are paid by the Treasury. The noble and learned Viscount said, the last time we were on this Bill:
  "They"—
  that is, London magistrates—
  "are stipendiaries in everything except the technical sense."
  Why, then, does this Bill differentiate on several points between the London police magistrates and the other stipendiaries in the country?
  I am sorry to detain the Committee over this, but I cannot understand it, and I cannot leave this Bill without making this point. I think it is clearly unfair that the stipendiaries in the country should be a burden on the local ratepayers, and on nobody else, whereas the London magistrates who, after all, have not been demanded by the local authorities in London, should be paid gratuitously out of the Treasury. I know the reason why it happened—namely, because of certain "rackets" that went on in London some 200 years ago or thereabouts. But that is no possible justification for the continuance of this anomaly. As this anomaly means a considerable amount in cash, I do not think it can be continued because it is traditional. With the exception of the fact that it pays them pensions, this Bill puts stipendiaries in a worse position than they were before.
  If the Committee will look at Clause 23 (2) they will see that the Treasury are to pay nearly all the expenses of the local authority in the administration of justice so far as petty sessions are concerned. The Treasury are to pay the expenses under Parts III and IV of this Bill, but not under Part V. That, I think, is clearly unfair. It becomes even more unfair when I point out that, whereas at present the expense of a stipendiary in the country is largely met by the amount of fines collected in the court and devoted to the local authority in recompense, after this Bill is passed those fines will be taken away

  279
  and paid to the central authority in London. Therefore, the position of a local authority which employs a stipendiary will be much worse than it was before, with the undesirable consequence that the stipendiary will be more dependent upon the will and the whim of the local authority.
  May I quote very shortly from paragraph 233 of the Report of the Royal Commission? I think I have the Royal Commission with me on this point. They say in line 5:
  "The Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks…recommended a new system which would include a grant from central funds to meet certain deficits. If that system is adopted we think that the salaries of stipendiaries should be considered as an expense that would be brought into account in claims for grants."
  LORD LLEWELLIN: There is one more sentence.
  LORD MERTHYR: I will gladly read it. The Report goes on to say:
  "Subject to this, we think that local funds should continue to pay the salaries."
  That has been adopted under this Bill, but the recommendation of the Royal Commission that the payment of stipendiaries' salaries should be included has not been adopted, and I think that is extremely unfair. The only possible argument I can think of for paying the London magistrates, but not the country magistrates, out of the Treasury is that London is such a cosmopolitan place, that a lot of foreigners live in it, and for some reason or another there is likely to be more crime. But I do not accept that for a moment. What about such big ports as Liverpool and Cardiff?
  I would hazard a guess that there is a greater proportion of foreigners in Liverpool and in Cardiff than in London. I am not prepared to prove it, but I am pretty sure that that is so. So there are two large cities in which the cost of the stipendiaries is paid entirely out of the local rates with no grant from the Treasury, and the position will be made worse and more unfair after this Bill is passed. I do not wish to detain the Committee longer on this point but I cannot see any possible justification for this extraordinary differentiation between London and the country. Coming, as I do, from the country, I would like to complain in the strongest possible way.
  LORD CALVERLEY: Surely the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, will recall that the history of this matter extends over a long period. I do not know exactly how long, but I think the noble Lord, himself, made some mention of two hundred years. These metropolitan magistrates are appointed at the present time by the Home Office; I suppose that in future they will be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. And they are appointed for, shall we say, St. Pancras, or anywhere else, whether the local council want them or not. I myself have had occasion to present a petition to His Majesty's Government to appoint a provincial stipendiary. We have acted on the old adage "Pay for your own pots," or, as we also say, "If you break a window you must pay for it yourself." If our petition is granted then the local council has no right to complain. There has been a measure of complaint, but not so much by the local councils. I speak with knowledge of a fairly good number of these stipendiaries—there are only about fifteen of them in the provinces. The only sense of grievance has been because the Lord Chancellor makes magistrates "clock on," so to speak, to show that they have been in attendance. But, as we were told by the Home Secretary, once our petition has been granted we have nothing to do further with regard to a stipendiary except to pay his salary. That is all. If we have acted with our eyes open, I do not see that we have any right to complain about paying stipendiaries salaries so long as those salaries are adequate.
  With regard to what has been said once or twice by the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, to the effect that the local council sometimes will not raise the stipendiary's salary because he has given decisions against them, I can only say that after nearly twenty years' experience I have never come across the slightest suspicion of anything of the sort.
  LORD MERTHYR: If the noble Lord will forgive my interruptina him for a moment I should like to ask him to quote the passage from Hansard in which I am reported as saying that. I have certainly no recollection of saying anything of the kind.
  LORD CALVERLEY: In that case I withdraw it. It must have been said by the noble Lord in a conversation off the

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  record which I have no right to quote.
  I unreservedly withdraw—but I still think he said it. As I was saying, stipendiaries are being placed in an anomalous position in regard to the matter of salaries and pensions. There is a strong case for giving these stipendiary magistrates adequate pensions. We had to keep a man on at the age of eighty-seven because there was no provision for a pension for him. We "held his hands" as I think the hands of Joshua were held.
  LORD SCHUSTER: It was Moses, not Joshua.
  LORD CALVERLEY: Then we induced the council to make him an ex gratia grant. I believe it is most important that we should see that justice is done to stipendiaries. We should see to it that a stipendiary is put in a position to retire like anyone else, and that he has the opportunity of being careful. For these reasons I support the new clause.
  LORD LLEWELLINhad given notice of an Amendment to insert, after Clause 24, a new clause providing for the transfer to the Lord Chancellor of certain functions in relation to stipendiary magistrates. The noble Lord said: This point is completely covered by the earlier Amendment which has been passed and the one which I presume the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, is going to move next. I am very much obliged to him. I only hope that by inducing him to take on this burden we have not added that "last straw" about which he spoke on a former occasion. I am much obliged to him and I shall not move my Amendment.
  Clause 25 agreed to.
  Clause 26 [Qualification for appointments under previous Acts.]
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I now move this Amendment. I am grateful for what your Lordships have said. I have discussed the subject of this Amendment recently, and without further words I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 26, line 45, at end insert—
  ("(4) Any appointment of a stipendiary magistrate under any Act passed before this Act shall be of a person recommended to
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  His Majesty by the Lord Chancellor.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD CALVERLEY: I have been considering moving an Amendment, if in order, that we insert a clause setting up a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Lord Chancellors.
  Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.
  6.16 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 26 to insert the following new clause:
  Salary
  ".—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a stipendiary magistrate other than a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate shall be paid a salary of such amount as the Secretary of State may front time to time direct after consultation with the authority or authorities liable to pay the salary.
  (2) The amount of the salary shall not be greater than that of the salary for the time being payable to a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate other than the chief magistrate.
  (3) The amount of the salary shall not at any time be reduced without the consent of the stipendiary magistrate.
  (4) A stipendiary magistrate in office at the coming into force of this section shall, until the Secretary of State otherwise directs under subsection (1) of this section, continue to receive the salary to which he is then entitled."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment is designed to meet a point which was raised, I believe, by the Royal Commission, that there should be some oflicer—I think they suggested the Lord Chancellor—who should concern himself about the amount of a stipendiary magistrate's salary. The new clause follows, I think, the recommendation of the Royal Commission (paragraph 236 of their Report) except that it leaves the task to the Secretary of State and not to the Lord Chancellor. The Commission's recommendation was that it should be given to the Lord Chancellor. That is the position. The Commission further recommended that the stipendiary's salary should in no case exceed that paid to county court judges or metropolitan magistrates. On the basis that administrative matters, as I said before, are to remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State, the authority to fix the salary is given by the new clause to him. I am prepared to accept the burden of appointment. Before directing the amount of the salary which a stipendiary is to be paid, the Secretary of State is required to consult with the authority or authori-

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  ties liable to pay the salary. Metropolitan magistrates are excluded from the clause because—and I agree that this is an historical anomaly—their salaries are a charge on the national fund. Subsection (2) limits the maximum amount of the salary to that which is for the time being payable to a metropolitan magistrate other than the chief magistrate—which is at the present time £2,000 a year. Subsection (3) gives effect to another Amendment moved by Lord Merthyr to the effect that a stipendiary magistrate's salary should not at any time be reduced without his consent. The new clause will apply to all stipendiary magistrates appointed outside London including those appointed under the provisions of the new Clause 24. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 26, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Clause 27:
  Compulsory retirement and superannuation
  27.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a stipendiary magistrate—

  (a) shall vacate his office at the end of the completed year of service in the course of which he attains the age of seventy-two; but

  (b) shall, from the date on which he ceases to serve as a stipendiary magistrate, be entitled to be paid an annual sum by way of pension by the authority paying his salary in the office or last office in which he so served.

  (10) Where subsection (1) of this section applies to a stipendiary magistrate by virtue of a notice given under the last foregoing subsection, half only of his service before the coming into force of this section shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the amount of any pension under this section, and if he has attained the age of seventy-two before giving the notice the said subsection (1) shall apply to him with the substitution of a reference to the year of service in the course of which he gives the notice for the reference to that in the course of which he attains the said age.
  LORD MERTHYR LORD MERTHYR had given notice of an Amendment to subsection (1) (b), to leave out all words after "pension" and to insert:
  "charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom or the growing produce thereof."
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  The noble Lord said: This is a matter concerning the pensions of the stipendiaries. I was going to make another point here, for I had a considerable grievance, but I am glad to say that partial relief is afforded by the first parts of the Lord Chancellor's Amendment which appears at the top of page 13 of the Marshalled List. May I put the position shortly? Under the Bill, as framed, stipendiary magistrates were to have only half their years of service counted for pension, whereas the London magistrates have had the whole of their service counted since 1929. I feel that it is most unfair to make that distinction between country and London magistrates. I still think that the Bill is wrong in this respect, because it perpetuates that distinction. But I tried to make that point on the last clause, and I do not want to make it all over again. I acknowledge that it is to a considerable, though not to an entirely satisfactory, extent met by the Amendment the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is about to move. As he will no doubt explain, if it is passed as I hope it will be, the local authorities will have the option of putting the matter right.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not want the noble Lord to be misled. I am proposing to ask leave to withdraw my Amendments at page 27, line 10 and line 15. It is not those on which the noble Lord is relying.
  LORD MERTHYR: The one on which I am relying is at page 28, line 37. The first five lines of that Amendment go some way to meet my point. I cannot say I am satisfied, but it goes a long way and I do not want to labour the point any further. I therefore shall not move my Amendment.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: had given notice of his intention to move, in subsection (2), line 10, to leave out "Secretary of State" (where that term first occurs) and to insert "Lord Chancellor." The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment and the next I propose not to move and it is right that I should explain why. I do not want to do any administration. It is not easy to draw a line but I may fairly say that this is a matter of administration. I am responsible for appointing a barrister or solicitor as a stipendiary, but, when he comes to

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  retire, the question of whether he should have his period of office extended depends on such circumstances as whether he is doing his work satisfactorily or whether Old age is beginning to affect his faculties. These are matters about which the Home Secretary is likely to have more information, or is more easily able to obtain information, than I am. If the Amendments were made it would he possible for the Lord Chancellor to be advised on these matters by the Home Secretary, but on the basis that the Lord Chancellor is not proposing to take over any work of an administrative character, I would prefer to leave the subsection as it is. I should prefer, therefore, not to move this Amendment and that immediately following, which deals with the same point.
  The next Amendment is consequential upon the Amendment made in subsection (4) of this clause, on Lord Raglan's Amendment to insert "as well in any other office as in that office."
  Amendment moved—
  Page 27, line 20, after ("magistrate") insert ("whether in that or any other office")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to subsection (10):
  "Provided that this subsection so far as it relates to the extent to which any service is to be taken into account shall have effect subject to any determination of the authority liable for the pension that the whole of the service or a part of it larger than a half shall be taken into account.
  (11) Where a stipendiary magistrate has held office in a joint district within the meaning of section twenty-four of this Act, then

  (a) each of the authorities paying his salary in that office shall be liable for any pension payable to him on his retirement therefrom or for any contributions in respect of his service therein to a pension payable to him on his retirement from any other office as a stipendiary magistrates; and

  (b) where they are liable for his pension,—

  (i) they shall together determine anything which under this section is a matter for the decision of the authority so liable;

  (ii) they, or the one paying the pension, shall be entitled to contributions thereto under subsection (6) of this section in respect of his service in any previous office; and

  (c) they shall share among themselves the net liability for the pension (after allowing
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  for any contributions received under the said subsection (6)), or the liability for contributions payable under that subsection, as the case may be, in such manner as they may agree or as in default of agreement may be determined by the Secretary of State."

  The noble and learned Viscount said: The first part of this Amendment is intended to meet the point made by one of the Lord Merthyr's Amendments, which proposed that all stipendiaries who elected to come within the superannuation provisions of the clause should be entitled to count the whole of their past service. As the clause stands, they can count only half their past service. I cannot agree to make the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, suggests—for this reason. When a new superannuation scheme is started, those persons already in office who have undertaken office without any superannuation rights should riot be allowed the same rights as persons who take office after the scheme comes into force. So far as I know, this principle has been observed in all superannuation schemes, although there are many precedents for allowing such persons to count back service at half-rate. Although the amount involved is comparatively small, I am told that the repercussions to which the counting of the whole service might give rise would be most dangerous and might involve a very large sum of money.
  Of course, it is a variant or extension of the old argument: "I agreed with you for a penny a day." If a stipendiary is engaged and no provision is made about pension, and he has entered into the service on these terms, arid later, a pension scheme comes to be provided, surely it is not right that he should be treated on exactly the same basis as those who enter into the service with a pension scheme. I submit that we are not treating these people unjustly. Having no rights in the matter at all, their past service is reckoned by only a half. Frankly, I would rather that we could do it for the whole service, but in view of the fact that I am sure that would have serious repercussions, I cannot recommend such a course to your Lordships. I think half is a fair compromise and I ask your Lordships to accept it.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 37, at end insert the said new words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I am sorry the Government could not see their way to go the whole way. These repercussions do not always take place, and in the meantime we have a number of stipendiaries who are staying on to an age at which some of them ought to have retired. The Bill restrains an ordinary justice from sitting after seventy-five years of age. I do not know the age of the oldest stipendiary at the present moment, but I think he is ninety or thereabouts, and the reason why he stays is largely because there is not an adequate pension. It is not a good thing for justice that he should go on so much longer than the ordinary voluntary justice can go under the terms of this Bill. I would suggest to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor that he has another "go" at the Chancellor of the Exchequer to see whether this cannot be made to place stipendiaries in the provinces in the same position as the Metropolitan stipendiaries.
  LORD MERTHYR: I should like to support what the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has just said. I am informed that, at most, the cost of making all the years count will be £2,000 a year, and probably less than that, because the burden will not all fall at the same time. If it were confined to this, it would cost the country £2,000 a year, which I submit is not much. I think the provision as it stands will have the opposite effect to that intended. Surely, the purpose of introducing this pension scheme is to enable very old stipendiaries to retire. In the case of those who have held office for a very long time it may be effective in so doing, because they have done so many years that even if only half count they will get the maximum pension.
  I do not want to mention names, but there is one very elderly stipendiary who has been in office since 1910. He will be enabled to get the maximum in any event, whatever happens under this Bill. But there is another stipendiary to which that does not apply. He is nearly as old, but by reason of the fact that his service is very much less it will make a considerable financial difference to him—something over £300 a year. His income will fall very substantially by reason of the passing of this Bill. After all, although it is true that he is offered a pension under the Bill and he does not get it
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  now, this Bill makes it almost imperative for him to retire, whereas if it were not passed he might go on for some years more. I would like to reinforce what Lord Llewellin has said and ask the Lord Chancellor to reconsider this matter, while acknowledging that something has been done by this Amendment in throwing the option on to the local authorities. I have one further point. I listened carefully to what the Lord Chancellor said, but surely provision was made in the case of the London magistrates. I think that in 1915 an Act was passed giving them pensions, and half the years counted. But in the year 1929 that was amended, and since that year the whole of their service has counted, although it is non-contributory. I still ask this question: If it can be done for London, why cannot it be done for the country?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am afraid that I cannot answer the historical researches the noble Lord has made. Frankly, I do not know what was done about the metropolitan police magistrates. However, I am satisfied that it cannot be done here—at least, I cannot get the Treasury to do it. I feel there is some consolation in the fact, as your Lordships will observe, that if the local authority choose they may pay more than this. They may, if they like, say that all service shall count, at full value, and not at half value. The half is really the minimum. If the local authority choose to say that the whole shall count, so it will be. I assure your Lordships that I can do no more on this matter. I am told that the repercussions will be serious, and we are not in a position to-day to stand serious repercussions in these matters.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I know it is no use pressing this against what the Lord Chancellor has said. I am more interested in the repercussions than in the actual proposal itself. I think there are many cases in which unestablished people on becoming established are not allowed to count their back service. To my mind, that is most unfair. This is only one instance of many—they are all unjust—and I think in this particular case it would be well if it were put right.
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment, and the succeeding one at page 29, line 3, are drafting Amendments. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 42, leave out from ("service") to ("contributions") in line 46 and insert ("as a stipendiary magistrate shall be taken into account as if it were service as a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate and").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 3, at end insert—
  ("Provided that half only of any service before the coming into force of this section shall be taken into account by virtue of this subsection and, in the case of a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate appointed before the coming into force thereof, no contributions shall be payable in respect of that service.")—(Lord Chorley.)
  Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 28 [Sittings of stipendiary magistrates]:
  LORD CHORLEY: The next Amendment is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 9, leave out ("or occasional").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This also is a drafting Amendment. I might say, by way of explanation, that the clause as it stands allows for directions to be given only on the appointment of the magistrate. It may be desirable to give similar directions subsequently. The Amendment, therefore, provides for such directions to be given from time to time. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 11, leave out from ("State") to end of line 12 and insert—("from time to time:
  Provided that the number of days in a week on which a stipendiary magistrate may be required to attend shall not, without the consent of the magistrate, be increased beyond that determined by the directions given on his appointment.")—(Lord Chorley.)
  Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.
  Clauses 29 to 31 agreed to.
  6.36 p.m.
  LORD CHORLEY: This, too, is substantially a drafting Amendment. It is necessitated by the new arrangements which have been brought into effect. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 31, insert the following new clause:
  Place for holding county quarter sessions
  (".Courts of quarter sessions for a county may be held in any borough forming part of, surrounded by or adjoining the county, notwithstanding that the borough is not part of the area for which the courts are held.")—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD ROCHE: I simply do not understand this Amendment at present and I should like a little more explanation or further consideration of it. As I understand it, courts of quarter sessions for a county may now be held in any borough forming part of the county. In Dorchester they sit at the borough of Dorchester. In Oxford we have sat for years in what is the City of Oxford—but it is still the same position. I do not understand why this is necessary.
  LORD CHORLEY: I will give your Lordships the whole of the material with which I have been provided on the subject. The new clause replaces paragraph 17 of the Second Schedule, which is being deleted. That paragraph was confined to provision about county quarter sessions being held in county boroughs. The new clause provides also for county quarter sessions being held in non-county boroughs. For example, to take the case of Cambridge, which will retain its commission of the peace under the Bill, if it is allowed to have a separate magistrates' courts committee, the new subsection (3) which is being added to Clause 13 (which has already been dealt with) provides that the jurisdiction of the Cambridge borough justices shall then be exclusive of that of the justices of the county. This would mean, but for the provision of this new clause, that the Cambridge Quarter Sessions could not be held in the borough of Cambridge, as they have always been held in the past. I hope that explanation will satisfy the noble Lord.
  LORD SCHUSTER: It does not satisfy me in the least, but I suppose I have to be satisfied with it, having regard to the time of the evening.
  LORD ROCHE: I would ask only that it be looked at again before the Report stage. I do not believe it is necessary. It is really a formal point, but I should like the noble Lord to undertake that it will be reconsidered.
  LORD CHORLEY: If the noble Lords feel it is unnecessary, we would be the last people who would desire to put it in. I will undertake to have it looked into.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: Where is the provision that a court of quarter sessions must sit only within the area of its own borough? If there is such a provision it may be necessary, but I have never heard of one.
  Clauses 32 to 35 agreed to.
  Clause 36 [Expenses and payments into Exchequer]:
  LORD CHORLEY: The two Amendments to Clause 36 are drafting Amendments. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 9, leave out ("police") and insert ("stipendiary").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 14, leave out ("police") and insert ("stipendiary").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.
  6.40 p.m.
  Clause 37 [Interpretation]:
  LORD CHORLEY: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 23, at end insert ("'court of quarter sessions' includes any committee by which the powers and duties of such a court are exercisable by virtue of any Act;").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This next Amendment, although a new provision, is substantially drafting. Clause 8 of the Bill makes new provision about the areas for which commissions of the peace will exist in future, and involves the abolition of the commission of the peace of many non-county boroughs. It may be some time after the passing of the Act before this clause can be brought into force, because an Order in Council will be necessary making various transitional provisions. It may well be that it will be found desirable to bring Clause 17, relating to the qualifications of justices' clerks, into force at some date before Clause 8 comes into force. Clause 37, as it stands, defines a justices' clerk as
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  "a clerk to the justices for a petty sessions area."
  None of the clerks mentioned in this Amendment come within this definition—for example, justices of the Isle of Ely and for the Soke of Peterborough are justices for liberties and not for counties, and a liberty is not a petty sessions area. In those circumstances, it is necessary to have this Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 25, at end insert ("and in relation to a time before the coming into force of section eight of this Act includes a clerk to any of the justices for a riding or division of a county, for the Isle of Ely or for the Soke of Peterborough;").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: The next three Amendments are consequential upon the proposal that certain of the non-county boroughs shall retain their commissions of the peace, which we were discussing earlier this afternoon. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 26, leave out ("county borough") and insert ("a borough having a separate commission of the peace").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 31, after ("county") insert ("(other than a borough having a separate commission of the peace)").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 43, leave out ("county borough") and insert ("borough having a separate commission of the peace").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 38:
  Commencement
  (4) Provision shall be made by Order in Council under this section with respect to the remuneration to be paid to justices' clerks in office before the establishment of magistrates' courts committees for the period before their salaries under section sixteen of this Act are determined in accordance with section twenty-two thereof, and the provision so made may include in particular (but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing subsections) provision for securing that, pending the determination of a justices' clerk's salary as aforesaid, subsections (2) to (6) of section sixteen and subsection (8) of section eighteen of this Act shall apply to him only to such extent and subject to such modifications as may be determined by or in accordance with the Order.
  LORD CHORLEY: This next Amendment is largely consequential on the Amendment to Clause 20, and reference has already been made to the provisions of this Amendment. It is intended that as soon as they are established magistrates' courts committees should get to work to determine the clerk's personal salary and other matters of a similar nature, their determination to take effect when Clause 16, which requires that a personal salary shall be paid, as opposed to the old method of remunerating the clerk, is brought into force at the beginning of a financial year. This arrangement will greatly help towards a smooth transition from the present system of inclusive salaries to the new system of personal salaries, and also to the transference to the magistrates' courts committees of responsibility in matters of salaries, expenses and other things of that kind. If all the negotiations with the local authorities were to be undertaken only after the requirement of payment of a personal salary to the clerk had come into force, there would be great delay before the clerk's salary was finally agreed and determined. This matter is covered by the Amendment before your Lordships and I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 34, line 33, leave out from ("section") to ("subsections") in line 40, and insert ("for securing that so far as practicable questions as to the salaries under section sixteen of this Act of justices' clerks holding office immediately before the date when that section comes into force, and other questions arising under that section on its coming into force, shall be determined before it comes into force and, so far as it is not practicable for any such clerk's salary to be determined as aforesaid, for securing either that the subsequent determination thereof shall have effect from the coming into force of section sixteen of this Act or that pending the determination thereof").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD SCHUSTER: Is this Amendment to determine the remuneration of the clerk? At an earlier stage of the proceedings an Amendment was moved to the effect that when the new salary was fixed, account should be taken of the fact that he was compelled to accept the duty of collecting officer or that he had lost the collecting officer fees. The Government found themselves unable to accept that Amendment, for reasons which I readily understand. If we are to make provision of this kind with regard to remuneration, something ought to have been said with
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  regard to one of those two cases—that he is either losing the collecting officer fees or that he is having the duties placed upon him. Perhaps the noble Lord will look into that point between now and Report.
  LORD CHORLEY: I will certainly have that done. The magistrates' courts committees will have to take all these matters into account. That is raised in the Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin. I suggest that it is not possible to meet all these points.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I would he glad if the noble Lord would look at it before Report. He will understand how anxious we are that these people should not suffer an injustice in the matter.
  LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved, in subsection (4), to leave out "and subsection (8) of section eighteen." The noble Lord said: This and the next Amendment go together, and deal with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Schuster. It is quite true that we talked about it at the previous Committee stage. We now come to a part of the Bill which deals with the transitional period, and the part of this clause which I am seeking to delete reads as follows:
  "…subsections (2) to (6) of section sixteen and subsection (8) of section eighteen of this Act shall apply to him only to such extent and subject to such modifications as may be determined by or in accordance with the Order."
  On the last occasion the noble and learned Viscount said that what he wanted to perpetuate was the payment of these people in part by the fees they collected, and with that we agree. If I delete that part and put in my words, the effect will be to put whoever is concerned more quickly on the proper salary basis than if the Order provided that he should continue getting part of his salary by way of the fees he collected. That is the purport of my Amendment. We all want to see these clerks dealt with fairly. We want to see the system by which part of their salary is obtained from the fees they collect abolished, and these men put on a proper salary. Moreover, we want that change to take place as quickly as possible. Because my Amendment seeks to do those three things, I commend it to the Committee. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 34, line 41, leave out from ("sixteen") to end of line.—(Lord Llewellin.)
  LORD CHORLEY:I have already agreed to have this matter looked into again in the light of the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Schuster. But I should say that under Clause 18, the collecting officer's duties are duties of the clerk by virtue of his office; and, as I suggested in my earlier reply, the magistrates' courts committees are bound to take that into account when dealing with the question of the personal salary of the clerk. As at present advised, I am not satisfied that there is any need for the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin. Under this Amendment an Order in Council would be required either to make these modifications or else to provide for the increase of the clerk's remuneration, so as to compensate him for any loss sustained by him and to remunerate him for the additional duties which he undertakes as collecting officer.
  This is not a real alternative, because the whole purpose of the provision about modifying the extent of the modification of the application to a particular clerk of Clause 18 (8) is to secure that, pending determination of his personal salary, any necessary adjustment of the salary he is receiving is made in consequence of the duties of collecting officer becoming part of the duties of his office. Lord Llewellin's Amendment seeks to write into the power to deal with this matter by Order in Council provisions which are more appropriate to the terms of the Order in Council itself. The words in the clause are quite wide enough to enable what the noble Lord wishes to be done. Moreover, his Amendment seems to imply that if the clerk's remuneration has to be adjusted by reason of separate payment for collecting officer's duties, whether by percentage on monies collected or otherwise, being abandoned, he must have his salary raised by the amount of the commission or other payment which he is losing. This was the proposal in the Amendment which the noble Marquess, Lord Exeter, moved on the Committee stage and which was firmly rejected by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. I regret I cannot accept this Amendment.
  LORD ROCHE: I regret the noble Lord's reply, which seemed to me unsympathetic. There is a real point here, and there is a danger that the Act may be misunderstood. I would implore the noble Lord, if he wishes this Bill to go through Report stage quickly and easily, to put right what some of us believe should be put right. The noble Lord says that it is implied in the Bill that these collecting officers' payments should be taken into account. It may be implied if you dig deeply, but it is not at all clear to my mind, and I can imagine some magistrates' courts saying, "The collecting officer's duties are taken away from him, but he is still the magistrates' clerk and is the collecting officer if we want him to be. There is nothing about his having to be paid, and therefore, we shall get him for nothing." I am sure this can be made quite plain, and the passage of the Bill be made very much easier, if the noble Lord will look into the point and see whether he cannot get the matter more sympathetically regarded than is suggested by the reply he has just given.
  LORD CHORLEY: I have already agreed that this matter shall be looked into. I gave my observations only in order to indicate what is the prima facie view of this matter. It may well be that the matter can be made more explicit, and I shall certainly see that it is examined.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I thank the noble Lord for what he has said. I should like at the same time to express my apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, for anticipating him. It is rather difficult, with all this mass of Amendments, always to see clearly what each one means, and I am afraid I had not apprehended the matter fully.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, for his last remarks, though I thought the ones he read out were not quite so good. I think we all want the same things. First, we want these clerks to the justices to go on performing these services. Secondly, we want them to be specifically remunerated. Thirdly, we want, if they are offered a salary plus these fees, to ensure that the fees cannot be taken into account in discussing what is the appropriate salary, and in discussing the salary account

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  should be taken of the loss the clerks have suffered by not being able still to get the fees. The fourth thing we want is to see that these things are clearly set forth in the Bill for the guidance of magistrates' courts committees. The only difference between us is whether it is sufficiently clear in the Bill as drafted, or whether it is not. I should be obliged if the noble Lord would look at it and see whether we cannot put some words in the Bill which will secure that all magistrates' courts committees, over the country as a whole, act in the way that the noble Lord and I and every noble Lord wishes them to do. On the undertaking the noble Lord has given, I now beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 38, as amended, agreed to.
  Remaining clause agreed to.
  First Schedule agreed to.
  Second Schedule [Provisions consequential on Changes in Commission of the Peace]:
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved to leave out paragraph 1 and to insert:
  "Interpretation
  1.—(1) In this Schedule in relation to a time before the coming into force of section eight of this Act—

  (a) the expression 'county' includes a riding or division of a county having a separate commission of the peace, the liberty of the Isle of Ely and the Soke of Peterborough, but does not include a county of a city or a town;

  (b) references to the county in which a borough is situated, in the case of a borough which is a county of a city or a town, refer to the county by which it is surrounded or which it adjoins.

  (2) In this Schedule the expression 'Hampshire' means the administrative county of Southampton and the expression 'county of Southampton' (except in this sub-paragraph) means the entire county of Southampton inclusive of the Isle of Wight.
  (3) In this Schedule the expression 'borough losing its commission' means any non-county borough which has an existing commission of the peace but is not mentioned in the Schedule (Non-county boroughs retaining commissions of peace) in this Act.
  Continuance of existing commissions, etc.
  (2).—(1) The existing commission of the peace for any county and the supplemental list kept in connection therewith shall have effect for the county within the meaning of subsection (1) of section eight of this Act, and any existing appointment made in connection with
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  the commission (including that of custos rotulorum and of any justice appointed otherwise than by the commission) and any existing appointment made by or in connection with any court of quarter sessions for the county or any division thereof shall have effect accordingly.
  (2) The schedule to any existing commission of the peace for a borough losing its commission, or for the liberty of Ripon, and the supplemental list kept in connection with any such commission shall be treated for the purposes of the foregoing sub-paragraph as having formed part respectively of the schedule to the existing commission of the peace for the county in which the borough or liberty is situated and of the supplemental list kept in connection with that commission.
  (3) The foregoing sub-paragraphs shall apply in relation to East and West Suffolk, to East and West Sussex and to Hampshire and the Isle of Wight as if they had been separate counties for the purposes of justices before the coming into force of section eight of this Act, and as if the existing commissions of the peace for the counties of Suffolk, Sussex and Southampton respectively had been issued separately for each of the two divisions thereof referred to in this sub-paragraph and the supplemental list kept in connection with any of those commissions had been a list for each of the two divisions.
  (4) With respect to any such appointments in the counties of Suffolk, Sussex and Southampton as are referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph the following provisions shall have effect:

  (a) the appointment of a custos rotulorum shall have effect as if made for each division of the county;

  (b) any other appointments relating to the whole county shall have effect in Suffolk and Sussex as if made for each division thereof, and in the county of Southampton (subject to the following provisions of this Schedule) as if made for Hampshire;

  (c) appointments made by the court of quarter sessions for the county of Southampton shall have effect as if made by a court of quarter sessions for the division to which they relate or, if they relate to the whole county, by a court of quarter sessions for Hampshire."

  The noble Lord said: This is a very long Amendment of a drafting character. It is mainly consequential on the retention by some non-county boroughs of their commissions of the peace, and also on the decision that the Isle of Wight should have its separate commission and court of quarter session. I think those are the two main elements in this rather long and technical Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 36, line 25, leave out paragraph 1 and insert the said new paragraphs.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I have read this Amendment through carefully, and so far as I am concerned—I do not speak for any other noble Lord—I do not think there is anything controversial in any part of it.
  LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, in paragraph 2 to omit "shall have effect for the county" and to insert:
  "and that for the borough and cinque port of Dover shall have effect for the."
  The noble Lord said: I am much obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, for what he has just said. There is a whole group of consequential and drafting Amendments which go together with the one which I am now moving. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 36, line 40, leave out from ("Hastings") to ("borough"), and insert the said new words.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 1, leave out paragraph 3.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 25, at end insert ("and the existing petty sessional divisions of the county of Southampton, except the Isle of Wight division, shall form petty sessional divisions of Hampshire").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 28, leave out from second ("borough") to ("and") in line 29 and insert ("losing its commission").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This also is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 33, leave out "3") and insert ("2").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 38, at end insert—
  ("(3) Sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph shall apply to the boroughs of Ryde and Newport in the Isle of Wight, notwithstanding that the Island is not otherwise divided into petty sessional divisions, and the remainder of the Island shall become a separate petty sessional division thereof").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 40. Leave out ("county borough") and insert ("borough having separate commission of the peace").—(Lord chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This also is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 46, at beginning insert—
  ("(1) The justices' clerk for any existing petty sessional division of a county shall become justices' clerk for any petty sessional division formed out of the first mentioned division or any part thereof under paragraph 5 or sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 6 of this Schedule.")—(Lord Chorley.)
  7.0 p.m.
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment also is drafting. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 46, leave out ("3") and insert ("2").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This again is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 38, line 24, leave out ("non-county borough") and insert ("borough losing its commission").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This again is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 39, line 11, leave out from beginning to end of line 15.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment also is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 39, line 16, at end insert—
  "Sheriffs
  .—(1) In the application of the Sheriffs Act, 1887, to any sheriff or under sheriff for a county which includes two counties within the meaning of section eight of this Act, references to a justice of the peace for the county in the following provisions, that is to say—

  (a) section seven and subsection (3) of section twenty-three (which relate to the making of a declaration of office before a justice); and

  (b) section seventeen (which precludes the sheriff from acting as a justice);

  shall be taken as references to a justice for either of the said two counties, and the reference in subsection (1) of section thirty (which provides for filing the declaration of office) to the clerk of the peace for the county shall be taken as a reference to the clerk of the peace having the custody of the records which include the declarations made before the coming into force of section eight of this Act.
  (2) In the application of the said Act to any sheriff or under sheriff of Berwick-upon-Tweed, Carmarthen, Haverfordwest, or Lichfield (each of which is a borough losing its commission, but is a county of a city or a town) the said references shall be taken as references to a justice of the peace or the clerk of the peace, as the case may be, of the county within the meaning of section eight of this Act in which the borough is situated, and in the case of those boroughs any jurisdiction conferred by the said Act on the recorder of the borough may be exercised by the court of quarter sessions for the said county."—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment is consequential.
  I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 39, line 19, at end insert—
  "Special provisions for Hampshire and Isle of Wight
  .—(1) The court of quarter sessions for the Isle of Wight shall not have jurisdiction to deal—

  (a) with any person committed for trial or sentence before the date of the coming into force of section eight of this Act; or

  (b) with any appeal brought (whether before that date or not) from a conviction, sentence, order or decision before that date, except an appeal against conviction brought by a person who is sentenced or committed for sentence in pursuance of the conviction after that date;

  and the court of quarter sessions for Hampshire shall have the same jurisdiction to deal with any such person as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this sub-paragraph and any such appeal as is mentioned in paragraph (b) thereof as if it were a court of quarter sessions for the county of Southampton.
  (2) The justices for the Isle of Wight shall as soon as practicable after the coming into force of the said section eight hold a special sessions at which—

  (a) they shall appoint a chairman of the court of quarter sessions for the Island, unless they determine to apply to the Lord Chancellor for the appointment of a legally qualified chairman under section one of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938;

  (b) they shall appoint a clerk of the peace for the Island;

  (c) they shall fix the times for holding quarter sessions for the Island in accordance with section twenty-two of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925;

  (d) they shall make such other appointments and transact such other business (being appointments or business which a court of quarter sessions for a county has power to make or transact) as appear to them to be required before the first meeting of the court of quarter sessions for the Island.

  (3) The justices for the Isle of Wight shall not be required to hold a court of quarter sessions before the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the said section eight, or have power by virtue of anything in paragraph (d) of the last foregoing sub-paragraph to deal at the special sessions required by that sub-paragraph with any person committed for trial or sentence or with any appeal.
  (4) Notwithstanding the general provision of this Schedule limiting to Hampshire any appointments made for the whole county of Southampton by the court of quarter sessions thereof, any committee appointed by that court to act for the purposes of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, as compensation or confirming authority for the county of Southampton shall, until the expiration of one year from the beginning of the last Epiphany sessions for the county of Southampton, continue to act as aforesaid as if the county of Southampton remained one county for purposes of justices and as if the justices for Hampshire and the justices for the Isle of Wight were justices for the county of Southampton:
  Provided that casual vacancies on any such committee shall be filled by the court of quarter sessions for Hampshire.
  (5) Notwithstanding the general provision referred to in the last foregoing sub-paragraph, the following provisions shall have effect with respect to appointments made under the Lunacy Act, 1890, by the court of quarter sessions for the county of Southampton, namely—

  (a) any appointment under section ten of that Act of a justice to make reception orders, if at the coming into force of section eight of this Act the justice is resident in the Isle of Wight, shall have effect for the Island as if made by a court of quarter sessions for the Island, and shall not have effect for Hampshire unless the justice is the n resident in Hampshire too; and

  (b) until the expiration of one year from the beginning of the last Michaelmas quarter

  303
  sessions for the county of Southampton. the visitors of licensed houses appointed under section one hundred and seventy-seven of that Act shall continue to act as such for the whole county of Southampton as if it remained one county for purposes of justices and as if the justices for Hampshire and the justices for the Isle of Wight were justices for the county of Southampton, so, however, that any power or duty of quarter sessions in relation to the visitors shall belong to the court of quarter sessions for Hampshire and any reference to the clerk of the peace in relation to the visitors shall be construed as a reference to the clerk of the peace for Hampshire.

  (6) As at the date when the committee referred to in sub-paragraph (4) of this paragraph ceases to act as compensation authority for the county of Southampton, the assets standing to the credit of the accounts of Hampshire and of the Isle of Wight in the compensation fund of the said authority shall respectively become assets of the compensation fund of the compensation authority for Hampshire and of the compensation authority for the Isle of Wight, and any rights or liabilities of the authority for the county of Southampton in respect of their fund shall vest in the authority for Hampshire or the authority for the Isle of Wight accordingly.
  (7) Any buildings which at the coming into force of section eight of this Act are vested in or held in trust for the Hampshire and Isle of Wight county councils jointly and are used in connection with assizes or with quarter sessions shall pass to, vest in and be held in trust for the Hampshire county council alone, and there shall cease to have effect any special provision made in relation to quarter sessions by the order constituting the Isle of Wight a separate county and confirmed by the Local Government Board's Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 2) Act, 1889.
  (8) In determining the costs of assizes for the purposes of the said order, the expenses of the Hampshire county council in respect of any buildings which besides being used in connection with assizes are used in connection with the Hampshire quarter sessions or for administrative purposes of that council shall be treated as costs of assizes so far only as may be determined by agreement between the Hampshire and Isle of Wight county councils or, in default of agreement, by arbitration.
  (9) There shall also be determined as aforesaid any other question arising between those councils with respect to their property and liabilities in consequence of the coming into force of section eight of this Act."—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I should like to thank the noble Lord and those who work under him for the immense care they have taken in working out the repercussions of my Amendment to give the Isle of Wight a separate quarter sessions to which this long Amendment refers.
  LORD CHORLEY: I expect the officials have heard what the noble Lord
  304
  has said. If not, I will have it conveyed to them.
  LORD CHORLEY: This again is drafting. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 39, line 21, leave out ("3") and insert ("2").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 39, line 44, leave out ("two") and insert ("three").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: There are three Amendments here which go together—namely, the Amendment to page 40, line 8, the one to page 40, line 15, and the one to page 40, line 19. They are all drafting Amendments. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 40, line 8, leave out from ("justices") to the third ("of") in line 9, and insert ("(including recorders) in consequence of the establishment or abolition by this Act of any commission of the peace or court").—(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 40, line 15, leave out from ("sessions") to end of line 16 and insert ("(including a recorder) by any Act or other instrument;").(Lord Chorley.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 40, line 19, after ("the") insert ("establishment,").—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment also is drafting. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 41, line 1, leave out paragraph 17.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD CHORLEY: This again is drafting. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 41, line 22, leave out paragraph 20.—(Lord Chorley.)
  Second Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  LORD CHORLEY: The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

  "NON-COUNTY BOROUGHS RETAINING COMMISSIONS OF PEACE

  PART I

  Boroughs with a population of 75,000 or over

  Cambridge

  Luton

  Poole

  —(Lord Chorley)
  Third Schedule [Constitution, etc., of Magistrates' Courts Committees]:
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 41, line 42, leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:
  ("Constitution, establishment, etc. of committees
  1.—(1) A magistrates' courts committee shall be composed of magistrates for the county or borough for which the committee acts or, in the case of a committee for a joint committee area, each such county or borough.
  (2) The custos rotulorum of a county shall by virtue of his office he a member of any magistrates' courts committee acting for the county or any division thereof.
  (3) The magistrates' courts committee for a county divided into petty sessional divisions, or for a joint committee area including such a county, shall consist (in addition to the custos and, in the case of a joint committee area, to the members from other parts of the area) of one magistrate chosen from amongst themselves by the magistrates for each of the petty sessional divisions of the county and one magistrate chosen from amongst themselves by the magistrates for each of the non-county boroughs (if any) in the county which have a separate commission of the peace but no separate magistrates' courts committee.
  (4) The magistrates' courts committee for a county not divided into petty sessional divisions or for a borough shall consist (in addition, in the case of a county, to the custos) of such number of magistrates chosen by the magistrates of the county or borough as they ma y determine.
  (5) The magistrates' courts committee for a joint committee area which includes a county
  Amendment moved—
  After the Second Schedule, insert the following new Schedule:
  not divided into petty sessional divisions or a county borough shall consist (in addition to the custos of any such county included in the area and to the members from other parts of the area) of such number of magistrates chosen from amongst themselves by the magistrates for the county or borough as may for the time being be determined by or in accordance with the order directing that the area shall be a joint committee area.
  (6) The Secretary of State may by statutory instrument make general regulations (subject, except as hereinafter mentioned, to the foregoing provisions of this paragraph) about the constitution and quorum of magistrates' courts committees.
  (7) The regulations may—

  (a) lay down upper and lower limits for the number of members of which the committee for a county not divided into petty sessional divisions or fer a borough may be composed; and

  (b) direct that where, in a county divided into petty sessional divisions, the total number of the divisions and of the boroughs referred to in sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph is less than that specified in the regulations, there shall from each division or borough be such number of members on any magistrates' courts committee acting for the county as may be so specified (the number being the same for all the divisions and boroughs).

  (8) The Secretary of State may give general or special directions with respect to summoning the first meetings of magistrates' courts committees.
  2.—(l) There shall be a single magistrates' courts committee for a joint committee area if, but only if, the area is for the time being directed by an order of the Secretary of State to be a joint committee area.
  (2) No order directing that an area shall be a joint committee area shall be made except

  307
  on the application of the magistrates for each county or county borough included in the area.
  3.—(1) There shall be a separate magistrates' courts committee for a non-county borough having a separate commission of the peace and a population at the time of the establishment of the committee of seventy-five thousand or over, if, but only if, it is for the time being so directed by an order of the Secretary of State.
  (2) No order directing that there shall be, or shall cease to be, a separate magistrates' courts committee for such a borough shall be made except on the application of the magistrates for the borough.")—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: On this Amendment I should like to make one point. In a way it is consequential, but it is a little more than that, because it sets out for the first time quite clearly how these magistrates' courts committees are to be composed. I have only one point to make on this. If your Lordships will look at sub-paragraph (3), you will see that the magistrates' courts committee, in the case of a county with petty sessional divisions, is to consist of
  "…one magistrate chosen from amongst themselves by the magistrates for each of the petty sessional divisions.…"
  Apart from those, that is, one from each petty sessional division, who will be there largely to talk for the petty sessional division—there will be only the custos rotulorum, whom we added last time, with no power to co-opt or anything of that sort. I suggest that a natural person to be on this magistrates' courts committee in the counties will be the chairman of quarter sessions. I think he ought to be on equally with the custos.
  When the noble Marquess, Lord Exeter, proposed the custos, I do not think he necessarily meant that the custos should be the person to be elected chairman, but merely that he should have the right to serve. Normally, in a county I think it would be better to be able to have somebody like the chairman of quarter sessions; probably all the justices would agree to his being chairman, and if anything came up about the division of the petty sessional department boundaries they would have certainly an independent and impartial person in the chair. I would like to see sub-paragraph (2) altered to read as follows:
  "The custos rotulorum and the chairmen of quarter sessions of a county shall by virtue of their offices be members of any magistrates' courts committee…"
  308
  and so on. I would like the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor to look into that point, if he would, before Report stage and, if he can meet the point, to put down an Amendment. At any rate, I would like to give him notice now that I think it would be a reasonable Amendment for the Report stage of this measure.
  THE MARQUESS OF EXETER: With regard to the chairman of quarter sessions being a member of the magistrates' courts committee, no one on earth would have the slightest objection to his being a member of the magistrates' courts committee. Many of the chairmen of quarter sessions, however, come from an entirely different part of the country, and it would probably be a strain upon them to have to attend the magistrates' courts committee. Therefore, I would like to see it provided that, "If they so wish" they shall be ex-officio members. I do not know whether that arrangement could be made.
  LORD ROCHE: I should desire to associate myself with the noble Marquess. I think that the chairman of quarter sessions should be ex officio a member if he so desires. I am aware that in a county where there is so energetic a custos as the noble Marquess, the chairman might not find it necessary to attend. But there are other counties where, if he is brought in from outside, the custos might not be able to go. The custos is not so interested in or conversant with magisterial matters, and the chairman of quarter sessions may be the only person to take a lead in all matters of the magistrates' courts committee. I think it would be a profound mistake to leave him out altogether.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, was good enough to mention to me privately to-day this suggestion, and I told him that at first blush I liked it. I will therefore look into it and consider putting in a clause on Report stage. My present mind is to include such a clause. Whether it should be, as the noble Marquess, Lord Exeter, suggested, that he should have the right to come, or words to that effect, or whether it should be that the Lord Chancellor should have the right to ask him to be a member of the committee and

  309
  that it should not be an obligation, I am not sure. For myself, I am a little inclined to think that there is something in the latter course. There are many chairmen of quarter sessions whom I shall be very glad to have, but there are other chairmen of quarter sessions who are not sufficiently identified with the county to make them very desirable. It might be that discretion should be with the Lord Chancellor, or it might be that we should leave it to the chairmen of quarter sessions. However, I will think it over in my own mind to see whether we should have some provision for dealing with this. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, for raising the point.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor. I am sure he will not take it ill if I correct him and say that the discretion is with the Secretary of State. This is one of the cases where we tried to substitute the Lord Chancellor for the Secretary of State, and the Lord Chancellor declined. In many cases, of course, the chairman of quarter sessions, although a magistrate for a bench, does not identify himself a great deal with that bench. He does not sit there regularly and they are much more likely to send their own chairman. For that very reason, the chairman of quarter sessions is not very likely to be sent as a representative to the magistrates' courts committee, from the very fact that he thinks it is his duty to keep out. There is a great deal within the petty sessional field for which he has to reserve himself, such as appeal work and other things. May I just add, as one of these chairmen of quarter sessions, that I am sure in many counties it would be a great help indeed for the chairman of quarter sessions to be a member of this committee?
  LORD CHORLEY: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 42, line 25, leave out paragraph 4.—(Lord Chorley.)
  LORD LLEWELLIN: I do not know whether I should be in order in suggesting this: I have looked through the whole
  310
  of these Amendments from here onwards; I do not know whether any other noble Lord wants to talk about any of them. I came to the conclusion that they were all consequential on something we had done before.
  LORD SCHUSTER: All to the end?
  LORD LLEWELLIN: Yes.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I was going to ask a question one page 27 of the Marshalled List, relating to page 62, line 45, which deals with the Middlesex County Council Act.
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: I had better go through the Amendments. I think we can take the Amendments to the end of this Schedule.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move the remaining Amendments to the Third Schedule.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 42, line 45, leave out ("the three last") and insert ("any of the").
  Page 42, line 49, leave out ("paragraphs 2 and 4") and insert ("paragraph 2").
  Page 43, line 5, at end insert—
  ("Any order of Secretary of State under paragraph 2, 3 or 4 of this Schedule may, if it relates to an area for which a magistrates' courts committee is already acting, contain such consequential and transitional provisions for the preservation of rights and liabilities of that committee or otherwise as appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient.")
  Page 43, line 7, leave out paragraph 6.
  Page 43, Line 36, leave out the first ("county").
  Page 43, line 42, at end insert ("including quorum").
  Page 43, line 44, leave out paragraph 12.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Third Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  Fourth Schedule [Modifications of Local Government Superannuation Act, 1937, in relation to Justices' Clerks and their Staff]:
  7.12 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move the Amendments to the Fourth Schedule.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 46, line 1, leave out ("on its establishment").
  Page 46,line 8, leave out ("establishment of the magistrates' courts' committee") and insert ("coming into force of section sixteen of this Act").
  Page 47, line 11, leave out from ("of") to ("council") and insert ("any relevant").
  Page 47, line 20, leave out from ("which") to end of line 21 and insert ("section sixteen of this Act comes into force").
  Page 47, line 28, at end insert—
  ("(5) The relevant councils for the purposes of this paragraph are the councils of any county, any county borough and any borough named in the Schedule (non-county boroughs retaining commissions of peace) to this Act.")
  Page 47, line 34, leave out ("on its establishment").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Fourth Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  Fifth Schedule [Consequential Provisions as to Local Act Stipendiaries]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move the Amendments to the Fifth Schedule.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 47, line 43, at end insert ("and for any non-county borough having for the time being a separate commission of the peace and magistrates' courts' committee which is situated within the area for which he acts.")
  Page 47, line 44, leave out the third ("the") and insert ("any such")
  Page 48, line 3, after ("Bromwich") insert ("or for any non-county borough having for the time being a separate commission of the peace and magistrates' courts' committee")
  Page 47, line 9, leave out ("county")

  ("52 & 53 Vict. c. clxvii.

  The Local Government Board's Provisional Order confirmation (No.2) Act, 1889.

  In the Schedule, in Article VI, the words 'custosrotulorum,' the words 'quarter sessions, justices' and the words 'and clerk of the peace'; paragraph (1) of Article VII; in paragraph (2) of Article VII the words 'or quarter sessions'; paragraph (2) of Article VIII; Articles IX, XI and XII; in Article XV the words from the beginning to 'Southampton and' where first occurring and the words 'and quarter sessions'; in Articles XVI and XVII the words 'and quarter sessions' wherever occurring, and in paragraph (2) of Article XVII the words from 'and all' to 'order'.")

  Page 59, line 20, column 3, after ("repeal") insert ("in section five, the words from 'at' to 'State';")
  Page 59, line 20, at end insert—

  ("58 & 59 Vict. c.cvii.

  The Staffordshire Potteries Stipendiary Justice Act, 1895.

  Section eight.")

  Page 48, line 28, at end insert—
  ("(3) The stipendiary magistrate under the said Acts shall be by virtue of his office a justice of the peace for any non-county borough having for the time being a separate commission of the peace and magistrates' courts' committee which is situated within the area for which he acts.")
  Page 48, line 32, after ("borough") insert ("and any such non-county borough as aforesaid")
  Page 48, line 34, leave out ("county") and insert ("such").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Fifth Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  Sixth Schedule [Repeals]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move the Amendments to the Sixth Schedule.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 52, line 52, column 3, at beginning insert ("In section six, the words from 'at the rate' to year';")
  Page 53, line 5, column 3, after ("thirty-four") insert ("section forty-two;")
  Page 56, leave out lines 20 and 21.
  Page 56, line 32, column 3, after ("repeal") insert ("section twenty-one from the beginning to the words pounds and';")
  Page 56, leave out lines 57 to 59.
  Page 57, line 19, column 3, at end insert ("section forty-two from the word 'not' where first occurring onwards;")
  Page 57, line 42, column 3, leave out from beginning to ("subsections") in line 44.
  Page 57, line 48, leave out from ("sixty") to ("section") in line 51, and insert ("section one hundred and sixty-one")
  Page 57, line 56, column 3, leave out ("coroner of Hastings and Dover")
  Page 58, line 24, column 3, leave out ("section thirty-seven")
  Page 58, line 45, at end insert—
  Page 59, line 28, column 3, at beginning insert ("In subsection (5) of section fifteen, the words from 'of one' to 'be paid';").
  Page 60, line 4, column 3, leave out from ("(3)") to ("to") in line 8.
  Page 60, line 12, column 3, leave out from ("two") to end of line 36, and insert ("subsection (3) except the words (3) For the purposes of this Act as respects a licensing district being a borough the licensing justices are the borough licensing committee', and subsection (5); in section three, subsection (1) from 'during' onwards and subsection (2); section

  ("7 & 8 Geo. 6. c.xxi.

  The Middlesex County Council Act,1944.

  Sections three hundred and ninety-seven, three hundred and ninety-eight and four hundred and eighteen, the Fifth Schedule except paragraph (f) and in that paragraph the words 'any officer to whom this Schedule applies or'.")

  Page 63, line 9, at end insert—

  ("12 & 13 Geo. 6. c.27.

  The Juries Act, 1949…

  In subsection (4) of section six the words 'or at a court of quarter sessions held for that county'; in section nine the Words and quarter sessions' in both places.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

  On Question, Whether the Sixth Schedule, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
  LORD SCHUSTER: If the Committee will excuse my irregularity, because we are all a little irregular at the moment, I would like to ask a question in regard to the Amendment to page 62, line 45, at the end of this Marshalled List. Can the noble Lord in charge of the Bill tell us the meaning of all this? It is almost impossible to follow what the effect of these Amendments is on the Middlesex County Council Act, or how the Middlesex arrangements will stand after they have been made.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think the provisions of the Middlesex County Council Act of 1944, are those relating to the appointment of justices' clerks and their staff, and the performance by the justices' clerk of collecting officer's duties and supervision are replaced by the comprehensive provisions in regard to these matters made in Part III of this Bill. Consequently it is necessary to repeal those provisions in the Act of 1944, the whole matter having been dealt with in Part III.
  LORD SCHUSTER: I am sorry to be stupid, but does it come to this: Middlesex would be in just the same position as any other county when the Act is passed in respect of these matters?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes.
  four; in section seven, in subsection (2) the words or joint committee';").
  Page 60, line 39, column 3, leave out from ("twenty-nine") to ("section") in line 41, and insert ("in subsection (1) of section forty-nine the words from 'held' to 'is the clerk';").
  Page 61, line 19, column 3, after ("repeal") insert ("in section seven the words from 'at' to 'State';").
  Page 61, line 55, column 3, after ("eighteen") insert ("in subsection (7) the words from the first 'and' to 'ceases to be mayor,'").
  Page 62, leave out lines 20 to 22.
  Page 62, line 45, at end insert—
  LORD MERTHYR: I would like to refer to the Amendment to page 61, line 33. On the last occasion I moved an Amendment to repeal Section 76 of the Salmon and Fresh Water Fisheries Act of 1923, and the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, said in column 1311:
  "I think the noble Lord is right about this, but 1 shall be glad if he will withdraw so that the draftsman can look at the point and put down an Amendment on the next stage."
  I then withdrew my Amendment, but I see no Amendment at this stage. May I ask the noble Lord whether he can help me a little?
  LORD CHORLEY: The noble Lord is quite right; I did give him that assurance. I am sorry to say that it has been overlooked, but I will look at it later on in time for the Report stage.
  LORD MERTHYR: Thank you very much.
  Sixth Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  House resumed.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL [H.L.]
7.18 p.m.
Order of the Day read for the consideration of the Commons Amendment.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[The references are to Bill No. 173]
Clause 55, page 49, line 43, leave out ("the prescribed officer") and insert ("such officer as may be prescribed by the Court of Session by Act of Sederunt").
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment—there is only one Amendment. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE (No. 2) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read lª; and to be printed.
NURSES BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments.
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL
King's consent signified, and Bill reported with Amendments.

WRITTEN ANSWERS AGRICULTURAL TIED HOUSES
THE EARL OF MANSFIELDasked His Majesty's Government whether they will state why they object to "tied houses" in agriculture, when they themselves fully accept the principle as far as houses owned by the National Coal Board and the Forestry Commission are concerned, and bearing in mind that forestry workers come under the same wage scales as those engaged in agriculture.
LORD SHEPHERD: In the debates on the Housing Bills which have just been enacted, His Majesty's Government explained their views on the question of payment of Exchequer grant for the improvement of privately owned agricul-
316
tural houses. Under these Acts Exchequer grant may be paid in respect of the improvement of houses occupied on a tenancy basis as opposed to houses occupied as part of a contract of service. Most of the houses owned by the National Coal Board and the Forestry Commission are occupied on a tenancy basis.

OIL FROM SUNFLOWER SEED
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOEasked His Majesty's Government whether, in view of the decision to abandon the Government-subsidised scheme of growing ground-nuts in the Kongwa region of Tanganyika Territory, and the proposed substitution therefor of sunflowers as a source of oil for the manufacture of margarine and other like purposes, they will consider the possible economic advantages to be derived from the stimulation (by subsidy or otherwise) of the raising of sunflowers in selected areas of Great Britain, where, according to experts, the crop can be made to yield as high a percentage of oil as in any tropical or sub-tropical region in the world.
JOINT PARLIAMENTARY THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON): Experiments have shown that sunflowers can be grown as a farm crop in selected areas in the South of England. However, evidence so far available suggests that the cultivation of this crop for the production of oil and animal feeding stuff is at present prices unlikely to be remunerative to the grower. It is doubtful whether the artificial stimulation of sunflower production by a subsidy would be justified.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past seven o'clock.