Sitting of 25 February 1947

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'Clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  POLISH FORCES

    Camps, Nettlebed Common
    Squadron-Leader Sir Gifford Foxasked the Secretary of State for War when he anticipates removing the Army huts which disfigure Nettlebed Common, Oxfordshire, and which interfere with the amenities; and for what purpose the camp is being used at present.
    The Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. John Freeman): The two camps at Nettlebed Common, Oxfordshire, are both occupied by units of the Polish Resettlement Corps. I regret, therefore, that I cannot yet state when the huts will be available for dismantling and removal.
    Sir G. Fox: Will the Minister give an undertaking that when the Poles go, these huts will be removed and the common restored?
    Mr. Freeman: No, Sir, but I will give consideration to the suggestion, and I should think it likely.

    Palestine Evacuees (Dogs)
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Mooreasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that personnel of the Polish military forces now in Palestine who are being evacuated to this country are not permitted to take their dogs with them; and whether, in view of the hardship involved, he will make arrangements to have the present Order, under which all animals belonging to Polish troops must
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    be destroyed before leaving Palestine, withdrawn.
    Mr. J. Freeman: Polish troops are eligible to take part in the Service quarantine scheme, fully set out in Army Council Instruction 1148 of 1945, under which a limited number of dogs can be brought home under Service arrangements. The number of applications, however, under this scheme greatly exceeds the quarantine accommodation available in this country and there is a very long waiting list.
    Sir T. Moore: As the Polish Forces, apparently, have so few friends in this country, especially on the benches opposite, would it not be a humane act to allow them to keep those who are really faithful to them?
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: May I ask whether the hardship mentioned in the Question refers to the dogs or to the Poles?

    Northern Ireland
    Mr. H. Hyndasked the Secretary of State for War how many Polish troops are stationed in Northern Ireland; and whether members of the Polish Resettlement Corps will be found employment in that part of the United Kingdom.
    The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Bellenger): No Polish troops are stationed in Northern Ireland. The employment of Poles is not a matter for my Department.
    Mr. Hynd: Will my right hon. Friend consider enlisting the aid of the hon. Member for Queen's University (Professor Savory) to ensure that Ulster gets a fair share?
    Professor Savory: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that we in Ulster gave hospitality to thousands of Gibraltarians during the war, and welcomed hundreds of thousands of American and Belgian troops?

    Welfare Funds
    Major Bramallasked the Secretary of State for War in what way it is proposed to dispose of the Polish Military Welfare Funds collected from the Polish forces in this country, in view of the gradual dissolution of these forces.
    Mr. Bellenger: Consideration is being given to the disposal and future administration of these funds.
    Major Bramall: Would the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that these funds were deducted from the pay of Polish soldiers, and that the men who have returned to Poland have had no benefit so far from these funds?
    Mr. Bellenger: Certainly, Sir.

  BRITISH ARMY

    Court Martial System Inquiry
    Mr. Dribergasked the Secretary of State for War how many times Mr. Justice Lewis's Committee, set up last October to inquire into the court martial system, has met; and how soon a report may be expected from it.
    Mr. J. Freeman: The committee held its tenth meeting on 20th February. There is a great weight of evidence to consider and I cannot say how soon a report is to be expected.
    Mr. Driberg: Does my hon. Friend recognise that this is a very serious matter, and that this committee's report is awaited most anxiously?
    Mr. Freeman: I regard it as quite as serious as my hon. Friend does, and I have no doubt the committee will take note of what he has said.
    Mr. Stephen: Will the Minister ask the committee to try to have the report ready before the Army Annual Bill is introduced?
    Mr. Freeman: No, Sir, I should think that would be quite out of the question. The Oliver Committee, which did a somewhat similar job, took four and a half months to report, and the terms of reference in this case are such that I do not think it would be possible to have the report ready when the hon. Member suggests.

    L.I.A.P., India
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Secretary of State for War why the men on the staff of Darua camp, H.B.T.D., Deolali, India Command, have to complete two years' overseas service before qualifying for L.I.A.P. leave, whereas the men of other units enjoy this privilege after 15 months' overseas service; and if he will remove this differentiation.
    Mr. J. Freeman: No fixed period of overseas service is required in India for
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    eligibility for L.I.A.P., but vacancies are allotted on a points basis, as my right hon. Friend explained in a reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) on 28th January. I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of that reply.

    Territorial Army (Training Areas)
    Mr. J. H. Hareasked the Secretary of State for War what plans have so far been completed to secure adequate training areas in this country for the new Territorial Army.
    Mr. J. Freeman: It is proposed that, wherever possible, the training of the new Territorial Army should take place on training areas planned for the Regular Army and these, together with specific areas required for the sole use of the Territorial Army are, as previously stated, being considered by the Inter-Departmental Committee.
    Mr. Hare: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the Prime Minister will touch on this subject in the statement which he has promised for this afternoon?
    Mr. Freeman: I am afraid the hon. Gentleman will have to wait and see.
    Major Legge-Bourke: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it is most important from the point of view of the Territorial Army to have available training areas sufficiently close to each headquarters area so that a lot of time will not be wasted in travelling during training periods?
    Mr. Freeman: Yes, that is one of our biggest problems.

    Cyprus (Complaints)
    Major Legge-Bourkeasked the Secretary of State for War why British troops on the day prior to the visit of Press representatives to the camp at Xylotymbu, Cyprus, were ordered to clean up the filth of the camp with their hands as no shovels were available, and why this task was not performed by the Jewish inmates who had made the task necessary.
    Mr. J. Freeman: I have no information on this matter, but have called for a report and will write to the hon. and gallant Member.
    Mr. Orbachasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that

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    the lack of a canteen for our troops and the absence of a club for non-commissioned officers in Nicosia, Cyprus, is causing some dissatisfaction; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy the situation.
    Mr. Bellenger: There is a N.A.A.F.I. club for other ranks in Nicosia. I am making inquiries about the details of the accommodation there and will write to my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Orbach: is my right hon. Friend aware that there is an officers' club in the centre of the city, while there are no canteen or club facilities for troops or noncommissioned officers; and that the Church of England offered to bring an institute over from Cairo to Nicosia but have been refused facilities?
    Mr. Bellenger: I have already said there is a N.A.A.F.I. club there, and from my experience N.A.A.F.I. clubs now are very good.
    Mr. Orbachasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that there is still delay in the delivery of troops' mail to Cyprus; and if he will take steps to see that our troops in Cyprus are informed of the extent to which this is due to the severe winter weather.
    Mr. Bellenger: Mails to Cyprus have not been delayed recently until the onset of the bad weather, which has caused interruptions of as much as three days. Information of delays of more than 24 hours is broadcast or signalled to the troops, together with full reasons.
    Mr. Orbach: Is my right hon. Friend aware that troops who have written to me from Cyprus complain that mails were delayed for to days, and no reason was given?
    Mr. Bellenger: I am not aware of that. On the whole, the mail facilities to Cyprus have been very good.
    Mr. Orbachasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that there is no garrison cinema for our troops in Nicosia, Cyprus, and that this is causing some dissatisfaction; and what steps he is taking to arrange for films to be shown.
    Mr. Bellenger: The Army Kinema Corporation has agreed with the industry not
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    to operate cinemas within three miles of public ones that are able to cater for the needs of troops in the vicinity. It is for this reason that there is no garrison cinema at Nicosia.
    Mr. Orbach: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the only cinemas available in Nicosia are two commercial vermin-ridden cinemas, and that the troops refuse to go to them?
    Mr. Bellenger: I will look into the point raised by my hon. Friend.

    Malaya (Officers' Families)
    Commander Nobleasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware of the shortage of accommodation for officers' families in Malaya; and what steps are being taken to remedy this.
    Mr. J. Freeman: Yes, Sir. Further semi-permanent married quarters in Malaya are being provided as part of the overall accommodation plan for that country. The hon. and gallant Member will appreciate that married quarters for officers are only one item in a heavy programme for improvements of housing generally in Malaya, which is being energetically carried out with available resources, but which is necessarily limited by labour and material shortages.

    Troopship Conditions
    Mr. Granville Sharpasked the Secretary of State for War how many troopships are now used to transport soldiers between this country and India and the Far East; to what extent the type of accommodation, meals and amenities have been improved during the last three months; and what further improvements are contemplated.
    Mr. J. Freeman: An average of 15 troopships are at present employed to transport Servicemen between this country and India and the Far East. During the past three months, the capacity of troopships in service has been reduced, and the majority of the sleeping accommodation thus released converted to extra amenity space. In view of the accelerated rate of release in the next three months, this process of improving amenities at the expense of berths will be considerably slowed down. With a few exceptions, which have been corrected during the voyage, there has been no

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    cause of complaint either as to quantity, quality or preparation of meals. These have been in accordance with the scales laid down in regulations.
    Mr. Sharpasked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that H.M.T. "Eastern Prince" is an unsatisfactory troopship; and when it is proposed to improve the ventilating system and the galley facilities and to ensure effective supervision of the catering service.
    Mr. Bellenger: I am not aware that the "Eastern Prince" is an unsatisfactory troopship, though her most recent voyage to the Far East did give rise to an unusual number of complaints, which are being investigated. I have so far received no complaints about the homeward bound voyage just completed.
    Mr. Hare: Will the right hon. Gentleman consult with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport who ordered an inquiry into the conditions of the outward voyage; and will he see that the shocking conditions endured by the passengers who had to undergo that voyage are taken into consideration when he is examining it?
    Mr. Bellenger: I have already said the complaints are being investigated. I do not agree with the hon. Member that the conditions are shocking. Indeed, there were no complaints on the homeward voyage.

    Personal Cases
    Colonel Gomme-Duncanasked the Secretary of State for War (1) why the parents of 2888492 Private John Auchterlourie, Cameron Highlanders, have been refused payment of gratuity in respect of their son who was killed in action;
    (2) why War Office letter, No. D/133937/W.G.7/Effects, dated 2nd August 1946, was addressed to the parents of the late Private John Auchterlourie, Cameron Highlanders, and not to the Coupar Angus branch of the British Legion who initiated the inquiries.
    Mr. J. Freeman: I am sorry that the War Office reply of 2nd August, 1946, which gave the reasons for refusing payment of war gratuity, was addressed in error to the parents and not to the British Legion who had asked the Department to look into the matter. On 5th October,
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    however, a letter was sent to the Legion explaining why war gratuity was inadmissible, and a further letter dated 29th November, 1946, reiterated the decision and explained fully the grounds on which it was based.
    The conditions laid down in the Royal Warrant require a minimum of six months' reckonable service, and any service given before a conviction for desertion is not reckoned unless that service is subsequently restored. Private Auchterlourie did not qualify for restoration of the service which he forfeited as a result of conviction for desertion.
    Colonel Gomme-Duncan: May I ask the hon. Gentleman, first, whether he realises the great distress that was caused to the family of this soldier by this letter being sent to them and not to the British Legion, that being the first they had heard of his being a deserter; and, second, does the second part of his answer mean that in the opinion of the War Office it is more important that a man should serve six months' good conduct to get back his privileges than that he should give his life for his country?
    Mr. Freeman: With regard to the first part of the supplementary question, I have expressed the apology of my Department. With regard to the second part, I am administering the Royal Warrant, and if the hon. and gallant Member would like that amended to allow desertion to count for gratuity, we will consider any representations he has to make.
    Colonel Gomme-Duncan: This is a matter of great principle. This was a man who gave his life for his country, and had he lived another six months he would have had all his privileges restored to him. This is so unsatisfactory that I give notice I shall endeavour to raise it on the Adjournment.
    Mr. Langasked the Secretary of State for War the cause of death at Ballykinler Camp, County Down, on 31st December last, of 19094813 Private Turner, of Stalybridge; and why his relatives were not informed of his illness.
    Mr. Bellenger: Private Turner was admitted to hospital at 2.45 p.m. on 31st December and died less than an hour later from heart failure. Two telegrams, one reporting that he was dangerously ill and the other that he had died, were sent

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    to his next-of-kin on 31st December. I should like to express my sympathy with his relatives, in the sad and sudden loss.
    Mr. Lang: Can my right hon. Friend tell me why, after the family had written and received a reply on 2nd December, the commanding officer wrote, and no other communication was sent, and the last they heard was a letter from their own boy on 8th December that he was all right and these two telegrams which were delivered together?
    Mr. Bellenger: We had no reason to believe that Private Turner was seriously ill, and after his admission to hospital he died from heart failure, as I have said. We did all we could in those distressing circumstances to inform his relatives.
    Mr. W. R. Williamsasked the Secretary of State for War whether he has given further consideration to the claim made by Mr. A. S. Hill for payment at the rate of 20s. a day in respect of the period of leave granted to him on release from his duties at the special communications unit; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Bellenger: As I explained to my hon. Friend in my letter of 3rd December, 1946, I had given very careful consideration to Mr. Hill's claim but could not accept his contention. Men in his circumstances were quite properly treated in receiving, during release leave, the normal rate of pay of soldiers of their rank and service, and they have no just grounds for claiming pay at special rates during such leave.
    Mr. Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. Hill, and many others who have been similarly treated in regard to their claims, firmly believe in the validity of their claims? Is he prepared to make a test case of this, by submitting the claim to the Law Officers of the Crown for their observations?
    Mr. Bellenger: No, Sir. I have given both Mr. Hill and the hon. Member very full facilities for stating their case; and, on the legal advice I have received, I am informed they have no case at all.
    Mr. Williams: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg leave to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Funerals (Escorts)
    Mr. Langasked the Secretary of State for War if he will arrange, in the event of the death of a soldier away from home, for an escort of at least one soldier when the body is taken home for burial.
    Mr. Bellenger: At present, if the next-of-kin so desire and arrangements can be made, commanding officers may allow one or two friends of the soldier to attend the funeral, at private expense.
    Mr. Lang: If that is so, why is nothing of that said on the telegram which is sent about funeral arrangements, the price of the coffin and things of that sort?
    Mr. Bellenger: I do not think the telegram could say that, but I will certainly look into the matter to see whether it is possible to inform the next-of-kin that these arrangements can be made.
    Dr. Morgan: How old was this soldier; and was there any connection between the first illness and the second illness, which obviously caused his death?
    Mr. Bellenger: I think my hon. Friend is referring to a previous Question; this deals with a general principle.

    B.A.O.R. Families (Household Goods)
    Mr. Yatesasked the Secretary of State for War if household goods are being supplied to British families in Germany according to the scales mentioned in the pamphlet for the guidance of B.A.O.R. families, including 45 towels for a married officer; and if he will consider revising the booklet.
    Mr. Bellenger: The pamphlet containing these scales was a provisional one, as indeed was stated in the introduction. A new pamphlet containing the authorised scales will be issued shortly.
    Mr. Yates: While I appreciate that answer, will my right hon. Friend, when revising the pamphlet, consider the distinction which has been made between the married officer and the married other ranker in this instance, which happens to be 45 towels for a married officer and 45 towels for a married other ranker; and is not that quite unfair?
    Mr. Bellenger: I must say, I quite agree, speaking as a hard pressed civilian, that 45 towels seems a lot for anybody.

    Communication with M.P.s
    Mr. William Wellsasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will cause an instruction to be issued to all units of the Army making it clear that all ranks are entitled to write to Members of Parliament without permission from their military superiors.
    Mr. Bellenger: It is well known throughout the Army that an officer or soldier is permitted to write to his own Member of Parliament. It is, however, most desirable, both in the interests of those who may have complaints and of the Army as a whole, that complaints should, at least in the first instance, be made in the proper and normal way. If this is done they can usually be dealt with far more quickly and efficiently.
    Mr. Wells: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some units are still issuing orders prohibiting the writing of letters to Members of Parliament, and that hon. Members of this House continually receive complaints about this? Will he take action that will prevent indiscipline on the part of colonels, as he would in the case of corporals?
    Mr. Bellenger: Yes, I am aware of that, and I have taken steps to stop that. The hon. Member may or may not know that in the last Parliament I was one of the back bench Members who established this right.

    Education
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Secretary or State for War what progress he has to report in the preparation of the education scheme for the post war Army.
    Mr. Kenneth Lindsayasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is now in a position to announce the Army education plans for the coming years, in view of the disquieting reports on illiteracy, the paramount needs of trained manpower and the future intake at technical colleges and universities.
    Mr. Bellenger: I hope to make a comprehensive announcement within the next three weeks.

    Strength
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Secretary of State for War the total strength of the British Army on 31st December, 1946, and its estimated strength on 31st December, 1947, on the basis of the estimates contained in Cmd. 7042.
    Mr. Bellenger: The strength of the Army on 31st December, 1946, was 896,757, including A.T.S. Exact figures cannot be given at this stage. A provisional estimate is that the strength on 31st December, 1947, will be in the neighbourhood of 660,000, but it clearly depends on a number of factors which cannot yet be resolved.
    Brigadier Low: Will the right hon. Gentleman, having given those provisional figures, also give the provisional release programme, taking the release groups of the Army up to 31st December, 1947?
    Mr. Bellenger: I do not think that arises on this Question.

    Court Martial, Port Said
    Dr. Comynsasked the Secretary of State for War when the hon. Member for Silvertown will have an opportunity of reading the evidence submitted at the court martial of the three non-commissioned officers at Port Said, held in December, and for which application was made on 23rd January last.
    Mr. Bellenger: As my hon. Friend has recently been informed by letter, the proceedings have been sent back to the Middle East where they would be required in the event of any of the men submitting petitions. I have asked for their return in due course, but I am not prepared to press for their immediate despatch until I am satisfied that they are not required in connection with a petition. When they arrive I will consider letting my hon. Friend see them.
    Dr. Comyns: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable feeling in my constituency about this case, that many resolutions of protest have been made, and numbers of signatures obtained for petitions? Is he also aware that the prevalent impression in my area is, that justice does not appear to have been done in this trial, and that one of the men has been made a scapegoat? Will he see that something is done?
    Mr. Bellenger: Certainly, Sir, but the matter is not entirely in my hands. I am bound to observe the ordinary machinery of justice, and therefore I am bound to wait to see whether any of these men submit petitions.
    Mr. Martin Lindsay: Would the right hon. Gentleman say what precedent there is for Members of Parliament expecting to have the right to see court martial proceedings? Surely, in his own Department he has a department concerned with reviewing court martial proceedings? Surely, it is undesirable that Members should have any right to see them?
    Mr. Bellenger: Courts martial proceedings are open to the public and, therefore, the public have access to them.
    Mr. Gallacher: In view of the feeling of dissatisfaction there is with this case, and with other courts martial recently, is the right hon. Gentleman considering a complete overhaul of the court martial system?
    Mr. Bellenger: I should have thought that the hon. Member would have known that there is now a committee, presided over by one of His Majesty's judges, considering that question.
    Mr. Awbery: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that the hon. Member for Central Bristol, who has also written to him on this subject, has an opportunity of reading the evidence?
    Mr. Bellenger: If the hon. Member is interested, no doubt he will.
    Mr. M. Lindsay: Are we to understand from the right hon. Gentleman's reply to my supplementary question, that any member of the public has the right to ask for any particular court martial proceedings to read?
    Mr. Bellenger: No, Sir. I did not say that. All that I have said is that I am waiting for those proceedings to arrive here, and that I will consider letting the hon. Member see them.
    Captain Crookshank: But why only that hon. Member? If all this sort of information is not to be available to the general public, why limit this to only one hon. Member?
    Mr. Bellenger: For obvious reasons, I should have thought; because the hon. Member is interested in the particular case of one of his constituents.
    Captain Crookshank: It might turn out that lots of people were interested if they knew all about it.

    Ammunition Depot, Perthshire
    Mr. Snaddenasked the Secretary of State for War the tonnage, by categories and types, of ammunition and explosives removed from the depot in Perthshire since 1st September, 1946; the amount of each category received into the depot in the same period; and the present rate of removal in tons weekly.
    Mr. Bellenger: I am having the figures prepared and will send them to the hon. Member as soon as they are ready.
    Mr. Snadden: Is the Minister aware that there is grave dissatisfaction at the slow rate of progress, and would he expedite this?
    Mr. Bellenger: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would wait until he sees the figures.
    Mr. Snaddenasked the Secretary of State for War what measures are in force in each area of the ammunition depot in Perthshire for guarding the ammunition dumps therein by day and by night on week-days and at week-ends; what further measures are proposed to provide the additional protection required by the presence later in the year of hikers, cyclists, picnic parties and holidaymakers in general; and what special precautions are taken to prevent the illicit removal of gelignite or other explosive.
    Mr. Bellenger: Twenty military personnel are on the average employed on guard duty each day, assisted by 12 civilian watchmen. There are no additional precautions at week-ends during the winter months, but as the hours of daylight lengthen, and improvements in the weather allows hikers and holiday makers to visit the area, the number of guards will be increased on the lines I explained td the hon. Member on 25th June. Such items as gelignite are concentrated into the areas which can be more readily guarded.
    Mr. Snadden: Is there not a great danger in not having a guard or patrol on Sundays during the winter?
    Mr. Bellenger: We are doing our best, not only in this area, but in other areas, but there is a limitation to the manpower at our disposal.
    Mr. Henry Strauss: Does "20 military personnel" mean "20 soldiers"?

    Occupation Currency
    Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyreasked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the total of allied occupation currency issued in lire, marks and francs, respectively, by English authorities.
    Mr. Bellenger: The issue of allied military lire in Italy was initially a combined Anglo-American responsibility until under an agreement of February, 1946, it was assumed by the Italian Government. Lire currency, mostly Allied military lire, was made available to the various armies operating in Italy. The amount drawn by the British forces is about 75,000 million lire. The British authorities were not, however, as such, separately responsible for the issue. Responsibility for the supplemental francs issued in France was accepted by the French authorities who agreed to make available the currency required by the various Armies. The currency drawn by the British Forces under these arrangements was about 1,200 million francs. I understand from my hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster that about 1,790 million Allied military marks have been issued by the British authorities in Germany.
    Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Will the Minister make a supplementary statement about Austrian schillings, so that we may have the whole picture?
    Mr. Bellenger: I should want notice of that. This Question deals specifically with lire, marks and francs.

  PRISONERS OF WAR

    Deferred Repatriation
    Mr. Symondsasked the Secretary of State for War if he will extend beyond six months the period for which suitable German prisoners of war are allowed to volunteer to remain for work in this country after their normal repatriation dates.
    Mr. J. Freeman: Prisoners of war who have deferred their repatriation for six months may in the fifth month defer for a further period, and so on each time.
    Mr. Sidney Shephard: How many prisoners have taken advantage of this offer?
    Mr. Freeman: I could not say without notice.

    Canteen Purchases
    Mr. Symondsasked the Secretary of State for War if he will make arrangements to enable German prisoners to obtain shaving materials, cigarettes, etc., at times when they draw no pay owing to illness or inability to work through no fault of their own.
    Mr. J. Freeman: German prisoners of war who are unable to work are not necessarily without means to make canteen purchases as they may well have credits existing in their pay accounts from previous employment. Those who have no credits available for canteen purchases may be issued with items which are essential to the maintenance of health and hygiene such as shaving materials or tooth paste. The cost of such issues is recoverable from the prisoners if and when their accounts are again in credit. Cigarettes are not issued in such circumstances.

    Ditchingham Camp
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodgeasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is satisfied that the conditions at the prisoner-of-war camp at Ditchingham, Suffolk, are up to standard.
    Mr. J. Freeman: Yes, Sir, except that at a recent inspection the camp was found to be slightly overcrowded. This matter is being dealt with.

    British Prisoners (German Assistance)
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodgeasked the Secretary of State for War whether, in those cases where there is proof that German civilians helped our own prisoners of war, the same rewards and privileges can be extended to them as in the case of Italians; and whether, in the interests of justice, he will arrange to adopt in Germany the same means of discovering those who assisted the allied cause as is operated in Italy.
    Mr. Bellenger: I am not prepared to extend to Germany, where there were very few active helpers, the procedure adopted in Italy, where there were many. In those cases that have come to light in Germany, preferential treatment has been given where justified.
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: I am afraid I did not hear the Secretary of State's reply. May I ask him whether he Swill do all he can to iron out the discrimination between Italian civilians and German civilians, where they have adopted the same attitude towards British prisoners of war?
    Mr. Bellenger: Yes, Sir; but I am bound to say that there were thousands of Italians who helped our men actively in Italy, but very few Germans who helped our men in Germany.

    Fuel Emergency (Assistance)
    Mr. Skeffington-Lodgeasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will make a statement about the service rendered by Poles and prisoners of war in helping to resolve the fuel crisis.
    Mr. Bellenger: As arrangements are not made centrally I have no figures readily available of the number of Polish troops or prisoners of war who have been helping on the roads and railways during the fuel crisis, but I am sure that my right hon. Friends the Ministers of Fuel and Power and Transport join in welcoming the valuable assistance that has been and is being given from these services.

    High Ranking Officers
    Air-Commodore Harveyasked the Secretary of State for War, how many German admirals and generals are detained in this country as prisoners of war.
    Mr. Bellenger: Three field-marshals, 164 generals, and 17 admirals, Sir.
    Air-Commodore Harvey: How many of these men have been returned to Germany since the end of the war? What does the right hon. Gentleman intend to do with those now in this country?
    Hon. Members: Put them down the mines.
    Mr. Bellenger: I am only the guardian of these officers. I think that the latter part of the supplementary question should be addressed to somebody else.
    Air-Commodore Harvey: Who is responsible for these admirals and generals?
    Mr. Bellenger: All these prisoners of war are now in the process of being screened by my hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
    Air-Commodore Harvey: In view of the most unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible time.

    Detention Powers
    Mr. Stokesasked the Secretary of State for War under what provision of the Geneva Convention German prisoners of war are still detained in this country.
    Mr. Bellenger: The Geneva Convention is not the authority for the detention of prisoners of war, but deals with their conditions and treatment while detained. Article 75 of the Convention, however, does include mention of the liberation and return of prisoners of war, and on this point I have nothing to add to the reply given on 8th May, 1946, to my hon. Friend by my right hon. Friend the then Minister of State.
    Mr. Stokes: Yes, but is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the whole of the Nuremberg trial was based on the theory that the Control Commission was the legal Government of Germany; that under Article 75 of the Geneva Convention, we must enter into communication with the existing Government of a State for the immediate return of its subjects we hold prisoners of war; and that we ought, therefore, to return the German prisoners of war to the C.C.G.?
    Mr. Bellenger: That seems to me to be a very involved legal point. I have given the answer to the Question my hon. Friend put on the Paper.

    Work Volunteers (Officers)
    Major Bramallasked the Secretary of State for War how many officer prisoners of war at No. 20 Prisoner-of-War Camp, Llanover Park, have volunteered for work outside the camp; how many are actually working; and how many of those who have volunteered, but are not working, are graded C.
    Mr. Bellenger: Between 60 and 70 officer prisoners of war at this camp have volunteered for work outside the camp, and they are all working.

  SERVICE LAND REQUIREMENTS
  Brigadier Prior-Palmerasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the present policy of the Government with regard to training areas
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member will await the statement which I propose to make at the end of Questions.
  Lieut.-Colonel Sir Cuthbert Headlamasked the Minister of Town and Country Planning what steps he is taking to reconcile the proposals of the War Office to extend the Rodesdale artillery range with those of the Tynemouth Corporation to establish a reservoir in the same area; and whether he will ensure that, in doing so, he will do nothing to prejudice the creation of the proposed Coquetdale national park.
  The Minister of Town and Country Planning (Mr. Silkin): The proposal referred to will be considered by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Services Land Requirements, and the considerations to which the right hon. and gallant Member draws attention will be taken into account.
  Sir C. Headlam: How long will it take the Minister and his committee to come to a decision on this matter, which is causing a great deal of unrest in the area in question?
  Mr. Silkin: Not very long.
  Mr. Quintin Hogg: Will the Minister undertake to hold a local public inquiry into this matter?
  Mr. Silkin: I will not give an undertaking, but probably it will be held.

  INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

    Restrictive Practices
    Mr. William Shepherdasked the Prime Minister if he will hold a public inquiry into restrictive practices, both in respect of labour and of trade.
    The Prime Minister: No, Sir. As regards labour, I think these matters are best dealt with by negotiation between the employers and the trade unions. As regards trade, my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council informed the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) on 30th July last that the 'Government intend to introduce legislation on restrictive practices when time permits, generally on the lines foreshadowed in the White Paper on Employment Policy. Power will be sought to inquire into the extent and effect of par-
    1878
    ticular arrangements and to take appropriate action to check those shown to he contrary to the interests of the nation.
    Mr. Shepherd: Am I to understand that the Prime Minister regards the obtaining of this vital information as of less immediate importance than the head-hunting Press Commission to which he has given sanction?
    The Prime Minister: No, Sir. It is a different method, that is all.

    Ministerial Co-ordination
    Mr. Edelmanasked the Prime Minister whether, analogously with his appointment of a Minister of Defence, he will appoint a Minister of Production charged with the responsibility for coordinating those Departments concerned with production.
    The Prime Minister: No, Sir. My hon. Friend may have in mind co-ordination by a Minister of the work of all the Departments concerned with economic development, including production, and not the establishment of a Ministry with executive authority in the field of production. This is already provided for in the system of Cabinet committees.

  WEEKLY PERIODICALS (SUSPENSION)
  Sir W. Smithersasked the Prime Minister if, since the use of industrial electricity is to be resumed in some areas only, he will ensure that all weeklies and similar periodicals shall be suppressed or allowed to go to publication without discrimination.
  The Prime Minister: To avoid discrimination, the restrictions on the publication of weekly and other publications imposed from Saturday, 15th February, applied equally in all areas of Great Britain. Similarly, the removal of the restrictions, announced on 21st February to permit the resumption of publication on and after 3rd March, applies to all areas, irrespective of the resumption in the use of industrial electricity in any particular area.
  Sir W. Smithers: Is the Prime Minister aware there is a strong and widespread feeling that the suppression of these periodicals is for political ends, and to avoid criticism of Socialist mismanagement?
  The Prime Minister: If the hon. Member shares that impression he had better get rid of it, because the whole point is that it applies equally to all political opinions.
  Mr. Frank Byers: By what statutory or other authority was this suppression made, and will the Prime Minister give a categorical assurance that there was a statutory authority?
  The Prime Minister: It was actually done by agreement—
  Hon. Members: Oh!
  Mr. Byers: In that case, is it not a fact that those people who are not members of the P.P.A. are not bound by the agreement which was reached?
  The Prime Minister: This was done by agreement.
  Sir W. Smithers: Is it not a Communist trick to suppress the Press and avoid—
  Mr. Speaker: That is expressing an opinion, and is not asking for information.

  INDIA (DEFENCE)
  Brigadier Lowasked the Prime Minister whether he will confirm that His Majesty's Government intend to maintain responsibility for the security of India from external attack after June, 1948.
  The Prime Minister: The Government have declared their intention to transfer full power to Indian hands not later than June, 1948, and the responsibility for the security of India from external aggression will fall upon India from the date when full power is transferred. If India decides to remain within the British Commonwealth, the position as between His Majesty's Government and India will be similar to that now existing between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth If India decides to leave the British Commonwealth the continued security of India will, of course, be a matter of great interest to the British Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government will naturally be very willing to enter into discussions with India as to mutual assistance in matter of external defence subject, of course, to the obligations of both parties under the United Nations Charter.
  Colonel Gomme-Duncan: In view of the Prime Minister's statement, will he give some assurance to British officers in the Indian Army in regard to their position during this critical time, as they want to know where they will stand in 1948 and to make plans?
  The Prime Minister: That is a different question.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Coalmining Machinery Purchases
    Dr. Santo Jegerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what amount of money has been expended in the U.S.A. since 1st January, 1946, on the purchase of coal-cutting and mine-loading machinery, and other mining equipment for use in this country.
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton): £646,000.

    Tax Rebates (P.A.Y.E.)
    Lord Willoughby de Eresbyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is satisfied that the machinery for dealing with all claims for a rebate of tax already paid under Pay As You Earn is working satisfactorily, in view of the recent increase in the numbers of the unemployed.
    Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir. I am glad to say that most employers are making these refunds themselves, and I take this opportunity of thanking them for their cooperation.

    E.P.T. (Small Firms)
    Lord Willoughby de Eresbyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider giving some form of financial assistance to small firms and businesses who had no E.P.T. standard in the past, and who were therefore unable to build up any substantial capital reserves, in view of the fact that they are today unable to meet the cost of keeping their businesses open during the present stoppage of work resulting from the fuel shortage.
    Mr. Dalton: No, Sir. I am afraid that this would be quite impracticable.
    Lord Willoughby de Eresby: In view of the fact that the losses these firms have suffered are in no way their responsibility, and the Government have a certain

    1881
    responsibility to provide for them, does not the Chancellor of the Exchequer consider they should have some assistance?
    Mr. Dalton: I am afraid it is quite impracticable, from the administrative point of view, to single out the group of people the noble Lord has in mind. It is not possible to do it.

    Sterling Balances
    Mr. W. Shepherdasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what interest is being paid on the sterling balances which are held by overseas creditors.
    Mr. Dalton: Most of these balances are in Treasury Bills at ½ per cent.
    Mr. Boothbyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much of the accumulated sterling balances held in London by our creditors have been used during the past 12 months for purchase of British goods and for the purchase of British assets abroad, respectively.
    Mr. Dalton: In the year 1946 as regards the sterling area increases in accumulated sterling balances amounted to ½98 million, and decreases to £149 million. In the case of the non-sterling area, increases amounted to £201 million, and decreases to £81 million. These increases and decreases of balances represent the net result of the purchase and sale of goods and services to or from the United Kingdom and other countries, expenditure on British troops overseas, receipts from surplus disposals overseas, and movements of capital. Figures are not available of the amount used for the two purposes referred to in the Question.
    Mr. Boothby: Is it not clear that we had a deficit during the last 12 months, and that sterling countries have been permitted by the right hon. Gentleman to use some part of their credits in this country for the purchase of goods? Does the right hon. Gentleman think that we are in a position to afford this, and will he say whether there is any principle governing his action?
    Mr. Dalton: If my hon. Friend will read the figures he will notice that whereas, in the sterling area, the decreases were greater than the increases, to the extent of £50 million, in the year, in the non-sterling area the reverse was the case, to the extent of £120 million. I do not think,
    1882
    therefore, that the position is so bleak as the hon. Gentleman may have imagined when he put his Question on the Paper.
    Mr. Walter Fletcher: In spite of the cloud of mystifying figures which the right hon. Gentleman has produced, is it not plain that we are, against no profitable return, financing and equipping places such as India with cotton machinery that had better be kept in this country?

    Territorial Army Pay (Taxation)
    General Sir George Jeffreysasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer by what methods it is proposed to collect Income Tax on the pay, training expenses allowance and annual bounty recently announced for the reconstituted T.A.; and when the Pay-as-you-earn system is made use of, who is to make the calculations as to tax due, collect the money and keep the necessary accounts.
    Mr. Dalton: In most cases, by set off against the Income Tax allowances to which the man is entitled. The answer to the second part of the Question is—the Army.
    Sir G. Jeffreys: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when the Territorial Army is reconstituted, it will be amateur officers who will have to go to these drills; and when he says "the Army," does he mean that these amateur officers have to add to their other tasks the great labour of keeping P.A.Y.E. accounts and making deductions? Is he aware that this is likely to wreck the whole scheme of reconstitution?
    Mr. Dalton: I would hope that there were no grounds for the pessimistic view the hon. and gallant Member has expressed in the last part of his question. We are now working out the exact detailed arrangements for all these matters regarding the Territorial Army, and we are approaching it with the utmost goodwill and desire to make the scheme work. If there is any proposal the hon. and gallant Gentleman can make on the matter, I shall be very glad to look into it.

    Dollar Credits (Capital Goods)
    Mr. M. Lindsayasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what percentage of dollar credits was spent on the purchase of capital goods during January, 1947, or

    1883
    during the last month for which figures are available.
    Mr. Dalton: Five per cent. of our imports from U.S.A. in December were machinery.
    Mr. Lindsay: May I ask how the right hon. Gentleman reconciles the figure he has given with the statement made to the House on 12th December, 1945, that it is indispensable some considerable part of the dollar credit should be spent on the purchase of capital goods? Does he consider 5 per cent, is a considerable part?
    Mr. Dalton: I stand ready to deliver dollars for any orders for machinery from the United States sponsored by any Government Department.
    Colonel Crosthwaite Eyre: Can the Chancellor of the Exchequer give the corresponding figure for Canadian dollars?
    Mr. Dalton: Not without notice.
    Mr. Jennings: Can the Chancellor say why the Government Departments have not made these claims? Surely they must be asleep.

    Car Taxation (Disabled Persons)
    Mr. Skinnardasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether a war-disabled person who, by reason of his civil occupation, has been assisted to obtain a motor car instead of an invalid chair, can claim exemption from, or partial reduction of, the Road Fund tax normally payable on his vehicle.
    Mr. Dalton: No, Sir.
    Mr. Skinnard: In view of the fact that some relief is granted to disabled persons who have invalid chairs, and in view of the fact that cars are in lieu of chairs because of the nature of the work these people have to do, cannot some relief be given comparable with the other disabled persons?
    Mr. Dalton: The position is that invalid carriages are totally exempt, providing they do not weigh more than 5 cwt. In the case of private cars, I have tried to explain on previous occasions that we must, for administrative reasons, base the tax on the nature of the article taxed, and cannot base the tax on the use to which it is put, which is administratively im-
    1884
    possible. We have tried to meet the urgency of these cases by exempting invalid carriages in all cases up to 5 cwt.

    Loans to Foreign Countries
    Mr. C. S. Taylorasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to which countries loans have been made by the British Government since the end of hostilities; and if he will give details.
    Mr. Dalton: I will, with permission, circulate details in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following are the details:
    The Amount of loans made to foreign Governments since the end of hostilities, and not yet repaid, is about £37 million, viz.:

    £

    France, under Agreement of March, 1945

    21,350,000

    Greece, for stabilization of currency

    10,000,000

    U.S.S.R., execution of Wartime Agreement

    4,050,000

    Czechoslovakia, post-war reconstruction credit

    2,120,000

    Currency Export Restrictions
    Viscount Hinchingbrookeasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent restrictions on the amount of money taken out by travellers will be relaxed for those countries where visas have been, or may be, abolished.
    Mr. Dalton: Not at all.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: What is the point of relaxing the technical restrictions on travel, if the financial restrictions are not also relaxed? Will not the right hon. Gentleman back up the Foreign Secretary, who I understand is interested in this matter?
    Mr. Dalton: The Foreign Secretary is just as well aware as I and the noble Lord of the need to conserve foreign exchange, which is as great as if not greater than ever before.

    Coal Output (P.A.Y.E.)
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that production graphs kept by most collieries throughout the country show good outputs of coal on Monday and Tuesday each week and general tendencies of a heavy decline on Thursday and Friday; and if he will inquire as to the extent such

    1885
    declines are attributable to the dislike of the miners to Pay As You Earn and make the result of such an inquiry public.
    Mr. Dalton: No, Sir.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is it not the truth that P.A.Y.E. is doing an immense amount of harm to increased production throughout the country? Is it not the case that the Chancellor knows the truth of that, does not like it, and cannot think of a suitable answer?
    Mr. Dalton: No, Sir, the fact is that the hon. Gentleman has been misinformed. I have consulted the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which are the authority on these matters, and they entirely disagree with the hon. Member's statement that coal output generally falls on Thursday and Friday. That is not the case, and so the hon. Gentleman's Question falls to the ground.
    Mr. Gallacher: Is it not the case that output in this House begins to decline by Friday?
    Mr. De la Bère: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the graphs I have demonstrate beyond all doubts that what I have said is so, and will he allow me to send him some copies so that he will not dispute what I have said? I would rather have the opinions which have been given to me than the opinion of the Ministry of Fuel and Power.
    Mr. Dalton: I should be glad to receive relevant information from any pitman, including the hon. Member.

    Re-exports (Customs Checks)
    Mr. Mallalieuasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he is taking to ensure that invoices and other documents covering goods re-exported from this country correctly describe the goods so re-exported.
    Mr. Dalton: There are Customs checks on the accuracy of export documents. It would be contrary to the public interest to give details.
    Mr. Mallalieu: But is the Chancellor aware that goods described on the invoice as "Fine quality cotton, British made" turned out on examination in Denmark to be poor quality woollen, Italian made, and that this was only one example of
    1886
    such complaints now being made in Denmark?
    Mr. Dalton: If my hon. Friend will send me particulars I shall be glad to look into them, but the Customs are not so simple as they seem.

    Canadian Loan (Purchases)
    Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the classes of goods that have been purchased from proceeds of the Canadian Loan; and the amount expended on each class.
    Mr. Dalton: No, Sir. As I explained to the hon. Members for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) and Hallam (Mr. Jennings) on 28th January, in connection with the American credit, it is impossible to separate dollars from the Canadian credit and dollars from current trade.

    Anglo-Danish Trade
    Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer in terms of sterling, the anticipated additional expenditure in kroner during 1947 as a result of the ratification of the Anglo-Danish trade negotiations.
    Mr. Dalton: No, Sir. We do not yet know what quantities the Danes will, in fact, be able to deliver.
    Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that authoritative statements made at Copenhagen, that we were going to pay more for agricultural imports from Denmark, and undertake to ship animal feedingstuffs to Denmark, under this agreement, will not be realised?
    Mr. Dalton: We have been negotiating with the Danes with a view to getting some food out of them, and the amount of food they can deliver will depend upon the volume of Danish imports of feeding-stuffs. The two are connected, and are within the terms of the discussion which is now going on.
    Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Would it not be better to keep our feedingstuffs here, and let home agriculture have a chance, for once?
    Mr. Dalton: I daresay that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture would have an opinion about that, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would put a Question on the Paper.

    National Savings
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury if he will state, with reference to the latest convenient period, the proportion of National Saving Certificates bought through the savings group system of the National Savings Committee.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Glenvil Hall): Twenty per cent. in the six months ended 30th September last.

  POST OFFICE (DISABLED PERSONS)
  Mr. W. R. Williamsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why the report of the Joint Committee of the Post Office Departmental Whitley Council on the employment of disabled persons in the Departmental grades of the Post Office, which was signed by all affected interests in May, 1946, has been held up by the Treasury since July, 1946, and when the report is to be promulgated.
  Mr. Dalton: Most of the recommendations dealing with the types of work appropriate to disabled persons in the Post Office are already being put into effect. Those relating to conditions of service raise issues outside the Post Office field. These are now being considered.

  HANSARD (PUBLIC LIBRARIES)
  Mr. Peter Freemanasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how many public libraries take the daily and weekly HANSARD; and how many do not.
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: Three hundred and eighty-six take the daily, and 318 the weekly, edition. I am unable to give the number who do not take HANSARD.
  Mr. Freeman: Can my right hon. Friend say how those figures compare with the numbers previously issued to public libraries?
  Mr. Hall: I have not the exact figures, but I believe that an answer was given in the House a few years ago to the effect that about 454 libraries took HANSARD in one shape or another although, of course, the weekly edition was not then published.
  Sir T. Moore: Has the right hon. Gentleman any analysis of the political hostility to the Government as the result of this widespread circulation?
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: On the contrary, it would appear that libraries are taking a greater interest than formerly in the proceedings of this House.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: Can my right hon. Friend say how much it would cost to make HANSARD available daily to every library in the country? Would not that be a matter worth considering?
  Mr. Glenvil Hall: I cannot give the exact figure, but, obviously, it would mean a loss, depending on the number of libraries which actually took HANSARD. We are not sure how many library authorities there are, but I believe they number 600 to 700. There is, of course, a loss on the daily issue.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Departmental Staff
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the President of the Board of Trade the number of civil servants employed by his Department in London and the provinces on 1st January, 1946, and 1947.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. Belcher): The number of non-industrial civil servants employed by the Board of Trade in London and the provinces was 8,121 on 1st January, 1946, and 15,197 on 1st January, 1947. The increase was mainly due to the transfer of staff during 1946 from the former Ministry of Production, Department of Overseas Trade, and the Raw Materials Department of the Ministry of Supply. In addition, the Board of Trade employed, on 1st January, 1947, 2,572 industrial civil servants who had been transferred during 1946 from the Ministry of Supply.
    Mr. De la Bère: In view of the great shortage of manpower, surely it is possible for the Board of Trade to pull themselves together in this matter?
    Mr. Belcher: The answer I have given indicates that the increase in the number of staff employed by the Board of Trade is due, in the main, to transfers from other Government Departments, including one which is no longer in being. If it will

    1889
    give the hon. Member any satisfaction, I can tell him that we are at present conducting an investigation into the establishment of the Board of Trade, with a view to reducing numbers.
    Mr. Eden: Would the hon. Gentleman bear in mind, when making that investigation, that the transfers of which he speaks with so much pride are from wartime Government Departments, which should now be closed? Surely it is reasonable to hope that when wartime Departments are closed their staffs should be dispensed with, and not merely transferred.
    Mr. Belcher: It is true that they are wartime Government Departments, but it is also true that many of their functions remain.

    New Factories, Scotland
    Mr. Willisasked the President of the Board of Trade the number of new projects completed in Scotland at the latest available date; and the number of jobs thus provided for men and women, respectively.
    Mr. Belcher: At 31st January, 56 new factories and extensions had been completed and were employing 1,834 men and 1,342 women.

    Railway Rolling Stock (Export)
    Mr. S. O. Daviesasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will now cease exporting locomotives and wagons, having regard to the fact that the shortage of such rolling stock has contributed to the failure in the distribution of our coal supplies.
    Mr. Belcher: No, Sir. I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which was given to the right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Assheton) on 28th January, which applies to wagons as well as to locomotives.

    Football Pools (Supplies)
    Mr. Nallyasked the President of the Board of Trade what reply he intends to give to the application for a paper licence from an organisation known as National Football Pools; and if he will state the procedure adopted by his Department in dealing with this and other applications for paper licences made by the proprietors of newly-established football pool firms.
    Mr. Belcher: No application for a licence for paper has been received from National Football Pools. It is, however, our practice to licence paper for pools only to firms which were operating before the war, and on the basis of their prewar consumption.
    Mr. Nally: In view of the fact that, to meet the requirements of the proposed new venture mentioned in the first part of the Question, a staff of at least 1,000 would be needed, will my hon. Friend give a specific assurance that under no circumstances will any help be given to new firms in the industry to further waste man and woman power, and will he do his best to restrict the operations and expansion of the older pool firms?
    Mr. Belcher: That is going rather beyond the terms of the original Question. My answer indicates that if an application for paper is received from a new organisation, according to our present practice they will not be eligible to receive it.
    Mr. Nallyasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give an undertaking that his Department will not issue any further licences to manufacturers of desks and other office equipment for production to meet the needs of football pools organisations.
    Mr. Belcher: No, Sir.

    Triplicate Forms
    Sir W. Smithersasked the President of the Board of Trade why, in Form T.C.3/8/CPL to be completed in triplicate, the green and pink copies omit sections vii and viii which appear on the buff form.
    Mr. Belcher: These particular sections of the form are for use by the consumer and the supplier after the licence has been granted. Since the green and pink copies are retained for official use there is no object in printing these sections on them.
    Sir W. Smithers: Can the hon. Gentleman say how anyone can comply with the requirements to fill up a form in triplicate, if the forms are not identical?
    Mr. Belcher: They will fill up the form in triplicate in so far as it is possible for them to do so. If, on two sections of the form, there is no question asked, it is impossible for an answer to be given.
    Sir W. Smithers: Is it not a trap being laid; and who but a Socialist bureaucrat would be responsible for such a farcical procedure?

  OLD AGE PENSIONS
  Mr. William Teelingasked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is aware that the hon. Member for Brighton has received over 50 complaints during the last 14 days from constituents who have been kept for anything up to five months without pensions and without replies to their queries from his Department; that they are running into debt and in some cases are in dire need; whether this constituency is exceptional; and what he proposes to do to stop these delays.
  The Minister of National Insurance (Mr. James Griffiths): I assume the hon. Member refers to cases in which title to the higher rate of pension has been claimed after the beginning of October. I have had inquiries made, and I find that there have been special local difficulties in clearing these cases in the Brighton area. These have now been removed and the work of clearance should proceed speedily.
  Mr. Teeling: The right hon. Gentleman says that they have now been cleared. Is he aware that only yesterday 15 people came to see me on this subject, and they simply have not the money and, cannot carry on?
  Mr. Griffiths: I said that they were being cleared immediately. I am sorry if there were local difficulties at Brighton, but as soon as I heard about them, I took immediate steps to clear them.
  Major Bruce: In these circumstances, will my right hon. Friend resist all pressure from the Opposition to decrease the number of civil servants?
  Major Legge-Bourke: Will the Minister bear in mind that, from all accounts, Blackpool seems to be working very slowly indeed, and that only today I had to send him four cases?
  Mr. Griffiths: I am very conscious indeed of the difficulties in organisation, which I am trying to improve. We are working a very great scheme, and while there have been disappointments, I would remind hon. Members that there are
  1892
  millions of pensioners drawing a higher pension than ever before.
  Mr. Keeling: Is the Minister aware that Brighton is by no means unique in this respect?
  Mr. Driberg: Will my right hon. Friend take care to ensure that Assistance Board officials do, in every case, give help as promptly as possible, on an interim basis, as he intended, because, in some cases, they do not seem to know his intention?
  Mr. Griffiths: Yes, Sir, and if my hon. Friend knows of any case perhaps he will let me know.

  EMPLOYMENT

    Poles, Scotland
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Labour how many Poles are there now in Scotland; how many are in the city and county of Aberdeen, respectively; how many are still in uniform and how are they employed; and, of the remainder, how many are employed and unemployed, respectively.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Ness Edwards): As the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Hughes: Will my hon. Friend see that, as many of these men are retained in this country, they are properly trained for useful industries and absorbed into useful industries?
    Mr. Ness Edwards: That is the task upon which we are engaged.
    Mr. H. Hynd: Can some of them be transferred to Northern Ireland?
    Following is the Statement:
    There were, at 13th February, 29,772 uniformed Poles in Scotland of whom 541 were in the city of Aberdeen and 4,595 in the county of Aberdeen. About 13,200 of these were employed on camp maintenance and other service duties and tasks, and about 1,430 were on loan for civilian work. Others are receiving instruction or training. With regard to numbers out of uniform, about 1,010 had been relegated to the Reserve for civilian employment, of whom some 340 have remained in Scotland. I have no indication that any

    1893
    appreciable number of these are unemployed. Of the total number in uniform 9,350 had not yet joined the Resettlement Corps.

    Dockers (Extra Payment)
    Commander Nobleasked the Minister of Labour whether he will enumerate the claims made by dockers in the past six months for special extra payments for unloading cargoes.
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. Isaacs): I have no information on which a reply to this question can be based. The claims referred to by the hon. Member are normally settled through the joint negotiating machinery in the industry.

    Disabled Persons' Factory
    Mr. Frank Andersonasked the Minister of Labour when it is anticipated that building operations will commence for the disabled persons' factory at Cleator Moor and how many men this factory will employ.
    Mr. Isaacs: I anticipate the building of a factory to employ 50 severely disabled persons will begin within the next two months. If so, it will be ready early in 1948. Meanwhile, I hope to open temporary premises to employ some of these disabled men.

    Training Centre, Egremont
    Mr. F. Andersonasked the Minister of Labour, with regard to the proposal to use the Egremont Army huts for a training centre, when this training centre will be opened; how many are to be trained as a first unit; from what source the trainees will be secured and for what particular trades they are going to be trained.
    Mr. Isaacs: Progress on adaptations to the premises at Egremont has been retarded by weather but it is hoped they will be available for training during April. The centre will provide training for the building trades and will accommodate approximately 200 trainees who will be recruited from ex-Servicemen and others who are eligible for training under the Vocational Training Scheme.

    R.A.F. Unit (Redundant Staff)
    Mr. Peter Freemanasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that eight ex-Servicemen with more than five years temporary Government service, will be declared redundant at the Maintenance
    1894
    Unit, R.A.F. Branch in Newport, at the end of February; how many additional clerks in South Wales are required by Inland Revenue; and whether the above men will be offered some of these jobs, in place of the positions in temporary posts, at a reduction in pay and with no allowance for board and lodging that have hitherto been offered to them.
    Mr. Isaacs: I understand that 20 men and women clerks, including eight ex-Servicemen, will become redundant as a result of closing the R.A.F. Maintenance Unit at Newport. All of these have been offered alternative employment at a Royal Air Force establishment at Bicester and five have accepted. I am informed that the Inland Revenue do not expect any vacancies for temporary clerks to occur in South Wales apart from those which result from normal staff wastage.
    Mr. Freeman: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these men do not want to leave the camp in which they are now working because it would impose great hardship on them, particularly in finding housing and other accommodation; and may I ask him whether efforts could be made to find them other jobs in South Wales?
    Mr. Isaacs: Yes, Sir. Efforts have been made and will continue to be made to find local employment of a suitable kind.

SERVICES LAND REQUIREMENTS
The Prime Minister: The Government have under close consideration the demands of the Service Departments for land for training and defence purposes. Particular matters under examination are the amount of land required, the extent to which training can be carried out abroad, the feasibility of utilising the more remote and less populated parts of the country, particularly Scotland, and the effect of the proposals on agriculture, amenity and other interests. When this examination is completed, a White Paper will be issued.
Meanwhile, through inter-departmental machinery, consideration has now been given to certain areas of particular importance, namely, Harlech, Dartmoor, Braunton Burrows, Ashdown Forest, Purbeck, Castlemartin, and Martindale. Decisions have been reached as follows, references to acreages being approximate:

1895

(i) In the case of Harlech, the Government have reached the conclusion that the harm to the public interest, if it were retained, would be so grave that its use for peacetime training purposes must be abandoned.

(ii) The original proposals of the War Office and the Admiralty in respect of Dartmoor, involving about 75,000 acres in all, have been modified with the result that the amount of land required has been reduced to 58,000 acres. It may be possible to reduce this even more by up to 11,000 acres by arrangements for joint use. Of the 58,000 acres, the public would be excluded from 28,000, as compared with 49,000 under the original proposals. Over 14,000 acres there would be not only prohibition of access to the public, but some restriction on grazing. A public local inquiry will be held into the proposals in their modified form before a decision on the retention of the area is reached.

(iii) As regards Braunton Burrows (including Northern Burrows) the area has been reduced from 1,200 to 700 acres, the land to be surrendered including a rifle range. No agricultural land would be involved and service use would not prevent public access to any part of the area apart from eight acres at Instow except for a total of 12 days in the year when firing takes place. Use of the area save for a very small portion would involve training rights only. The proposal, as modified, will be the subject of a' public local inquiry before a decision on the !etention of the area is taken.

(iv) The area of land required in the Ashdown Forest has been reduced from 7,500 to 7,000 acres, and public access and the use of the land for grazing purposes would be the same as before the war. In this case also a public local inquiry will be held before a decision on the retention of the area is taken.

(v) As regards the Purbeck area, comprising 6,940 acres, no reconciliation of military and civil interests has been found possible. The retention of the land for tank training purposes would involve the loss of 1,500 acres of cultivatable land, 3,000 acres of rough grazing land, and exclusion of
1896
the public from 6,540 acres, including the coastline from Worbarrow Tout to the west of Kimmeridge Bay. A public local inquiry will be held before a decision on the retention of this area is taken.

(vi) The use of the Castlemartin area as a tank training area was approved by the Government of the day in 1938, after full consideration of all the factors, and the land involved has, save for a very small portion, already been acquired by the War Office. The area is most suitable as a tank training range and considerable sums of money have been spent on the necessary installations. Moreover, as the result of discussions with the interests concerned, modifications of the original proposals have been made which would greatly reduce the detriment to civilian interests. Out of a total of 5,960 acres, about 5,000 are suitable for cultivation and grazing. Of this amount, 1,500 acres would be likely to remain permanently available for agricultural use, while some 2,500 would still be usable for these purposes until such time as the tank range came into full use. Limited access to the coastline by the public would also be possible. About A miles of the coastline would be open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays and on any other day when firing is not in progress, and special arrangements would be made for visits by scientific bodies to the remaining three miles of coastline which would otherwise have to remain closed on account of the danger of unexploded shells; but though much has been done to safeguard civilian interests, the Government have decided that a public local inquiry should be held before decision is taken.

(vii) A decision regarding the Martindale field firing range awaits the result of a search for an alternative area in which local interests are co-operating. This search has been delayed by the weather, but is likely to be successful.

Sir C. Headlam: Can the Prime Minister tell me whether anything has been decided with regard to the Redesdale artillery range?
The Prime Minister: No, Sir, I cannot make an announcement on that particular area at the present moment.
Mr. Clement Davies: May I ask the Prime Minister whether, apart from the specific cases to which he has referred, a local public inquiry will be held in every case before any land is taken, and whether such inquiries will be heard as near to the locality as possible; and may I add that there will be great satisfaction in Wales with regard to the decision concerning Harlech?
The Prime Minister: If it is a major matter there will be a public inquiry, but I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will realise that if the case were that of a small site such a procedure might not be worth while.
Mr. Medland: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind the necessity for fixing a very early date for the public inquiry on Dartmoor, having regard to the importance of arranging for the summer holiday tourist traffic?
The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, it will be arranged as soon as possible.
Mr. Eden: Although the right hon. Gentleman's announcement in regard to a number of cases in which public inquiries are to be held will no doubt be welcomed, may I ask him to give the House an assurance that no action will be taken by Government Departments in respect of any of this land until after the conclusion of the public inquiry?
The Prime Minister: Where land is already in occupation it will continue to be occupied as at present until the inquiry is held, but if there is a case which involves taking something new it would obviously be improper to do so before the inquiry was concluded.
Mr. Eden: I am much obliged to the Prime Minister, but does he realise that this has in fact happened?
Sir G. Jeffreys: Will the Prime Minister tell the House what will be the approximate increase in the acreage on Dartmoor as compared with what was occupied by the War Office before the war in the Okehampton range and the background to it, and in the Purbeck area, because both were occupied by the War Office to a certain extent before the war?
The Prime Minister: I am sorry, but I have not that prewar figure with me. If the hon. and gallant Member puts down a Question I will give him the information.
Mr. Driberg: Although it has not so far been found practicable, would my right hon. Friend re-examine the possibility of training in Canada, bearing in mind not only the question of expense of transport, etc., but the positively good effect on inter-Commonwealth relations of the Empire Air Training Scheme during the war?
The Prime Minister: All these matters have already been given close examination, but there are obvious difficulties such as expense and trouble of movements, etc., and I do not think it is possible at the moment.
Mr. Emrys Roberts: While expressing deep appreciation of the decision to release Harlech, which will be widely welcomed in my constituency and throughout Wales, may I ask the Prime Minister if consideration will be given to the position of Wales as a whole and not merely to particular camps, bearing in mind that the percentage of land occupied by military camps in Wales is about 10 per cent. of the whole as against 3 per cent. in England and 3 per cent. in Scotland; can we have an overall plan for Wales?
The Prime Minister: We shall consider the country as a whole and shall try to take areas which will do the least harm to agricultural amenities and other economic activities, and of course there are parts of Wales that are not very cultivable.
Mr. Vane: Could not the Prime Minister say a little more about the Lake District, because he has only mentioned Martindale, which is a small area, and there are many larger areas also involved?
The Prime Minister: I have given the information about areas where decisions have already been reached. I am awaiting a full report before other decisions are taken. Further decisions will be announced as soon as possible.
Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Can my right lion. Friend say to what extent the proposed national parks areas are affected by what he has announced today?
The Prime Minister: Not without notice.
Mr. Keeling: At the beginning of his statement the Prime Minister referred to Service requirements of land for training

1899
and defence. May I ask him whether that includes land for experiments on new weapons, or is that on a different footing?
The Prime Minister: This includes training and defence. I cannot give specific details as to whether the weapons are new or old, but the training must go on.
Miss Jennie Lee: While we cannot expect a reply from the Prime Minister now, may I ask him to keep in mind when reducing the amount of land used in England, Wales and elsewhere that it would be a good idea to exclude areas like Cannock Chase, which is in the heart of an industrial area? I mention that because I heard a rumour that the Chase was going to be closed, which would be contrary to the policy of making the mining areas more attractive.
The Prime Minister: I will bear that in mind. I had not heard that rumour.
Mr. H. Strauss: Can the Prime Minister say anything about the public inquiry, which Department will hold it and will those who advocate that these territories should be taken over submit themselves to cross-examination?
The Prime Minister: The Ministry of Town and Country Planning will hold the inquiry. I could not give an answer specifically without notice in regard to the exact way in which it will be conducted.
Mr. David Grenfell: Having regard to the sites that are being taken in Scotland, Wales and other districts, will the Prime Minister undertake that the views of the people in the immediate district shall be fully heard?
The Prime Minister: I can assure my hon. Friend that we are having a public inquiry for precisely the purpose of obtaining the local views.
Mr. Grenfell: I could not hear what the Prime Minister said. Could he give us that assurance?
Mr. Charles Williams: How long does the right hon. Gentleman expect the Dartmoor inquiry to take, and can he assure us that real consideration will be given to local feeling on the matter?
The Prime Minister: Certainly. I think the House will realise that there are conflicting interests and that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have got to he trained. Therefore, we have to consider these areas with regard to amenities, defence and agriculture. An endeavour will be made to hold a fair balance between these considerations, but if I were to say that one should be absolutely overwhelming, obviously it would not get us anywhere.
Brigadier Prior-Palmer: In view of the fact that it was under the wartime regulations that these large training areas were taken over and are held by the War Department, will the right hon. Gentleman state how soon we might expect the White Paper and a decision on these matters?
The Prime Minister: I cannot give a date, but as soon as possible.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: We have got a very important Debate coming on and I think we should get on.

PALESTINE (GOVERNMENT POLICY)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. William Whiteley.]
3.44 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The course of events has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the Mandate contained contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home, and, in the second place it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be accomplished without a conflict, and events in the last 25 years have proved that it could not.
The Jews set about colonising and there is no doubt that, in the sphere they have developed, they have carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing, which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country, who has been associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed that it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talking. I want to remind the House, however, that that is not the issue now. All that is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is, first, shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; second, shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab State, with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home be admitted; or, third, shall it be a Palestinian State, in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in that form, because in all negotiations I have had to conduct, and whatever proposals we have adopted today, I come back every time to these
1902
three provisions. I cannot escape them and I do not think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary, or who has handled this problem hitherto, however much the question has been argued, has, in fact, escaped them.
That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We, as Mandatory Power, have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations, or in the discussions between the great Powers at Versailles and after, indicates that we have that power. The Mandate certainly does not give it, and the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State, and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to that every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government have to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonial Secretary and I, over and over again, came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision as to the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.
Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem, and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact—I do not desire to escape it that when I was a Member of the Coalition Government with right hon. Gentlemen opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine. I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement because this is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may, if not settled, lead to much wider trouble—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, h ear. "] Various schemes have been evolved in the past, including partition, but all which have come before me, whether in the Coalition Government or

1903
in this Government, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.
His Majesty's Government, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last 25 years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution, that it might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might, indeed, start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We, therefore, proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. It has been suggested that all that was needed was to tear up the White Paper. This raises a very serious question in international affairs, one that cannot be approached lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside, when Labour was in Opposition, that they would not be bound by that decision of the Government of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international affairs at least, that the party coming into office after making such a declaration, does not just tear up existing undertakings, but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. I have to emphasise this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Man dates Commission did not endorse it—
Mr. Clement Davies: Not this House—a predecessor.
Mr. Bevin: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right—[Hon. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I did not mean the actual Members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 did, in fact, vote—and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament—[Interruption.]
1904
I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes, if I thought that I might go to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and give undertakings, and that those undertakings were to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end—
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Would my right hon. Friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other Power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the Mandatory Power?
Mr. Bevin: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and one which would be carried out. May I suggest—[Interruption.] Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon. Friend that if the vote had been the reverse way, and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon. Member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House, and that we could not tear it up. Really, I must stand for this as a point of principle, because all my negotiations of any kind with foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons—
Mr. Turner-Samuels: If that is right, how can the Foreign Secretary reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:
"The Government have never stood by the White Paper policy.— It is quite wrong to say that we ate carrying on the White Paper policy. "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st July, 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907.]
Mr. Bevin: That is quite right, and it the hon. and learned Member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this—and really I must ask the House, whether it is my party or any party, to support me in this because it is fundamental—I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say that they are subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place—whatever the vote is—and an undertaking is given, I assume that

1905
whatever party succeeds us, whatever its political colour may be, will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change. I must ask my hon. Friends to accept that; otherwise they ought never to send me to an international conference at all for any purpose. Really I have to state this, because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the country. This is not a question of continuity of policy, but a question of keeping one's word, and, indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a trade union leader, it is that I have kept my word, whatever the opposition may have been.
Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my party had declared that they could not be bound by this, and that a change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take. Thereupon, the present question arose; what should the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secretary, that the first step which should be taken—and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman who corrected me the other night about the date—was to decide about immigration. The question was, should immigration come to an end at 31st December, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it should not. My right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, in his Department, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine—I dealt with the Arab States—and we agreed that it should continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was agreement by the Arabs to that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way, we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month.
Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provided, and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words,
1906
18,000 a year is above the average for the whole Mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we could have informed them. But, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it sit the whole thing back.
However, we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. Accordingly, having regard to what they had said, we invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the Committee's Report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the Report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the Report as a whole, which included 1o points. I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it would not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We could not undertake this, except as a part of the general settlement, and we had to continue our efforts to work out policy.
Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provincial autonomy. I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Committee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the Report as a basis, we put forward this Provincial Autonomy

1907
Plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay it down but, if I may say so, if other countries with different races and different religions can work on the cantonal principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsewhere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into the conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them, to the best of my ability, to come in and face the issue with us.
I profoundly regret they did not. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.
The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan. There is the Arab plan"—it by then had been drawn up —" You have your plan. Let us take these three plans, and see if, out of them, we can produce a solution." I knew from experience that I could not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this, quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I would accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance. I could not do that, so they did not come into the conference. Neither could I get them into one room.
I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrange-
1908
ment, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated that I did not mind whether this interim arrangement was for five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 20 years, it might well be that you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling—I do not think I overestimated it—when they left me in the Foreign Office that day, that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day—I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.
I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.
One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone, and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine was to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish State. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it

1909
was dearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign State. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations were meeting in New York. I thought that by going to New York, I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end he made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain was proposing to hold the conference, in his view, merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results.
Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into the conference. I have been too long a negotiator to stand on form. I thought it was better, if they could not see their way clear to come into the conference, that I should meet them informally, and see whether, with my colleagues, I could get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent State in Palestine. They have reiterated at every meeting that they have never accepted the Palestine Mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine are concerned. These include about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs.
I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement could be found. I believe a settlement can now be found if it is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, that is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the European situation if—and I emphasise this—immigration, after that, was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.
The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. We here in Great Britain as a House of Commons determine
1910
whether people shall be admitted into this country or not. No one else is doing that. Why should an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people should come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have been there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, if it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned the country. But the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out, by an external agency, from a country which they regard as their own—I am using their words—and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country. That is what the House has to face, and it is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what would happen if a lot of Welshmen tried to drive the Englishmen out. There would have to be a buffer State. The difficulty would be, no doubt, intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home—and they now accept the National Home—although they did not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, they will accept the National Home—
Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: Does that also mean partition?
Mr. Bevin: No. I will deal with partition in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary State. That gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a State or are they a religion? I have got to face the question of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe that if there is a unitary State in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate—he may in the first instance—or that every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. About the only constituency in this country which returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this House either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a: man, as a representative. Therefore, one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of the people whether there will be Conservatives. It may be that there will be some Liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt that people will form views

1911
which will crystallise. Therefore, the Arabs argue, "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."
Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home "?
Mr. Bevin: I am sorry that I cannot give an accurate definition, and Balfour is dead. I do not say that unkindly, but whether anyone can explain what people meant at the time, I do not know. When I used it, there was an understanding on the part of the Arabs that in Palestine, in view of certain historical associations, those Jews who had migrated there should have their liberty and freedom—no pogroms, no persecution—and be equal citizens of the State. That makes it a national home—[Interruption.] My national home is in England, with the same conditions.
Mr. Turner-Samuels: My right hon. Friend says that the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what that is, and cannot give a definition of it, what is the good of telling the House that the Arabs are prepared to accept it?
Mr. Bevin: Because they agreed in their plan—hon. Members have it before them —that "You can have your own language, your own university, your own religion — everything" —[Interruption.]My hon. Friend says, "Very kind of them," but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that, there would never have been a problem.
Mr. Lipson: It is the people who matter.
Mr. Bevin: It is human rights which are the basis of the United Nations, and in the proposals, which I thought were perhaps too limited—I did not accept them—they were fundamental principles which I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people—I have read all the papers—in the original discussions.
I want to put the other side. The Jews say that if that is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State—that is
1912
impossible—any more than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah today in India. The numbers are there, and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Members will have seen it in the White Paper. The plan had certain features common to the Anglo-American Report and the Provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view, those proposals had the advantage that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We proposed to set up a Governor's Council, and in two years—and this was not based on anything but humanitarian principles—96,000 people would have been allowed in from Europe, without any question of economic absorptive capacity. That was the proposal. Afterwards, he High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consulting them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, incorporating the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), which he included in the 1922 White Paper.
Mr. Janner: Will my right hon. Friend permit me to ask one question, a rather important one? What is the proposal with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions in the Mandate about the Jewish Agency, which is recognised as an international body?
Mr. Bevin: I will come to that, but my hon. Friend is delaying my statement, and I hope that I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed that if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal, and we, as the Mandatory Power, would abide by the result. Was that not reasonable? What was the answer? It was that that proposal was rejected because we proposed that the Arabs should be consulted at all. Really, His Majesty's Government could not accept a position in which one was going to admit people into a country, and representatives of the people living in it must not be consulted. That was really too tall an order, and I could not, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, accept that. I am saying this because I

1913
am leading up to the point where I shall say, at the end, that there is a chance of a settlement yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positions. I am still open to try.
Then the other difficulty was that the present Government has no roots in the people at all. It is an alien Government imposed on the top by a mandatory Government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their minds, but I am perfectly sure in the discussion of this problem during the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended that we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and that the regulation of our relationship with Palestine should, in the end, be on a treaty basis and not a mandatory basis. That is as I understood it, and I believe that there is agreement on that. Therefore, I thought it would be a good thing. Suggestions have been put to me over and over again by hon. Members of this House and by Members of another place, "Why not try to establish a British Dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for that. The Trusteeship Council has been established and there is no other road but the establishment of a trusteeship leading to independence from a mandatory position, unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was no chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years—for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitration after that on the question of the economic absorptive capacity—and that we should begin at once by creating municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which would have Jewish majorities, and others which would have Arab majorities. In order to achieve that, we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised that 78 per cent, of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed that they are all on the land. That is not true. They are an urban population.
Mr. Oliver Stanley: The right hon. Gentleman said that 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant that. I think he meant that they live in urban districts.
Mr. Bevin: I beg pardon. They live in urban areas. Taking the Tel Aviv population with that of other urban areas, we have this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear that the police for the maintenance of order have no roots in the place. We suggested devising a police system like our own which would be partly central and partly municipal in the respective areas. It would be recruited in a way similar to that of Birmingham, or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so as to begin building up a Government with roots in the people, ready to hand over. After four years, we suggested a constituent assembly which should endeavour to work out a Constitution. If they could not succeed—this is not British territory; we hold it under trust—we would return to the United Nations and ask for their help and advice. We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasise in Palestine—are given a chance to work together, they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates, it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially.
Mr. Janner: With the greatest respect—
Hon. Members: Order.
Mr. Bevin: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We, therefore, tried a new method. It was rejected.
In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a Mandate, it has led to self-government—in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and all the rest. I want to suggest that the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of as high a standard

1915
as the cultural development and aptitude for government to be found in any other Arab State. That being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in that way. If this policy was expressed in connection with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say that our policy was right in that we were aiming for independence, getting rid of the Mandate and developing self-government and self-determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. That has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine, it would have been successful.
I was asked a question about defining the National Home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent Mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the National Home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression that I can find is this vague expression of a "Jewish National Home." I know the reason for this Declaration. I know why it was made, but I do not believe it would help the discussion now. It was thought by most people prior to 1939, that the steps that had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour Declaration. Between the Labour Party and the party then in office a great dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents, the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish National Home has been completed or established. It was for that reason that we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in that area, we should have established in fact the National Home. We should have established the National Home within a unitary State, with a free chance to the Jews for their own development, which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews, to have had their say in the affairs of the world.
That leads me to another point, which is also a very difficult one. It is said that, if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very
1916
big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people geographically situated, or how are we in it? If the United Nations is to arrive at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned, at any rate—
Mr. Turner-Samuels rose—
Mr. Bevin: I have given way very often already, and the hon. and learned Gentleman will have his turn. I must raise this issue, because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, "as nationals, but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations." I never knew, and I never thought, that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations today as States, and, within every State of the United Nations, there are any number of religions. It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious question, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.
Therefore, I have asked, over and over again, if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there—the business ability, and it is exceptional and has done remarkably well, the statesmanship and the aptitude for government—cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this Debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one-

1917
seventh of the globe, but it is colossal, and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.
May I now turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that, if we have agreed to partition, we would have had a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the Provincial Autonomy Plan; I have seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine, however we may try. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest to one of the Arab States, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now, with Palestine as we know it today, to make it into two viable States, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take await the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for productive purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: "If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33⅓ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?" I have no answer to that.
Therefore, you transfer one large issue in solving your problem by partition, and there are only two possible consequences. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority, or else they must be driven out—the one thing or the other—and, on that basis, I am afraid
1918
that I should be led, and the Government would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked "Why go to the United Nations?" Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State, will lead to one result—the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can discuss all these things, I know, quite easily, but, really, we cannot do that.
Therefore, the Government tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclusion that this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler regime. If we take the ratio of migration and development un-accentuated by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do is to meet, with this Mandate, the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that throughout British Governments have done their best all the way through.
The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any Administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they managed to carry through. They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to persecution of the Jews it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem, as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time.

1919
Take the position now. There are a million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Governments, week after week, what are a million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer—and I make it from this Box today—that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that million, and add them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands—I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that, with all the organisation built up for this business, one million people could not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but, everywhere I go, and everywhere I turn, nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America, and in some other parts of the world, but it is relatively very little.
I will not mention the name of one great statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished, I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem, and if I could get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000—that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years—into Palestine, and if this political fight for a Jewish State could be put on one side, and we could develop self-government by the people resident in Palestine, without any other political issue, I would be willing to try again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe, in order that more millions can be poured in, so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to create, I am afraid—and I say this with great sincerity—that that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that if, as I have said today, we can bring the matter back to this contribution to the relief of European suffer-
1920
ing, which was where His Majesty's Government originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.
Finally, there is the question of time. I have been asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than that it should go to the United Nations, I would prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, should be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people as we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further immigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.
4.58 p.m.
Mr. Oliver Stanley: It had been the intention of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to open this Debate from our side of the House. I am sure that the whole House will sympathise with the family bereavement which is the cause of his absence today, and I am also sure that the House will regret that one who has played such a prominent part in connection with the problem which we are now discussing, should be absent on such a vital occasion. I am not always in agreement with the views of the right hon. Gentleman on Palestine, and perhaps many in this House have differed from it, but all of us have been impressed with the sincerity of his feelings and the generosity of the emotions which have led to it.
In the last 18 months, His Majesty's Government have had every reason to be grateful to hon. Members on this side of the House for their behaviour in regard to the Palestine question. During the whole of that time, we have refrained from Debate which might excite controversy

1921
on the policy to be adopted. We have, it is true, on several occasions discussed law and order, but the only Debate which has taken place upon policy was at the request of His Majesty's Government. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that, during that Debate, we tried to be constructive rather than destructive. We on this side have been actuated by a sincere desire that this Government, or any other Government, should be enabled to find a solution. That a successful solution would redound to the credit of the present Government is a little thing compared to the benefits that a successful solution would confer upon the nation. Looking back, I am not sure that we have been altogether wise. It may be that if we had pressed on more frequent occasions for a Debate we should not be in the situation in which we find ourselves now, which, shorn of all verbiage, is that after 18 months nothing has happened in Palestine, and now for the best part of another year nothing can happen.
I cannot disguise the fact that I and many of my hon. Friends did under those circumstances feel considerable disquiet at the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman last week. It was only a few days since we had had a Debate in this House upon the maintenance of law and order in Palestine. During that Debate all speakers on both sides of the House, whatever views they might have taken upon the immediate problem of the maintenance of law and order, expressed their opinion that it was inextricably bound up with the announcement of some policy by His Majesty's Government, and that the Administration could not indefinitely maintain law and order unless such a policy was produced. I remember that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in winding up that Debate, repudiated in a tone almost of ferocity—which is not usually one of the attributes of his Parliamentary speeches—the idea which seemed to be held by some that the Government have no policy on Palestine. In those circumstances the statement of last week, which no one after all can claim to be a policy, which is only a postponement of the issue and a plan to get others as well as ourselves to join in finding a policy, came as a great disappointment.
Today we have had from the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary a re-
1922
markable speech. With some of it I agree, with some I disagree. I am grateful for some of the things he said, and I am sorry for some of the things he omitted to say. Certainly in that speech he set out clearly and sombrely the difficulties which lie today, but which also have lain for several years, in the way of finding a solution for the Palestine problem. In that speech he certainly displayed a willingness to appreciate the Arab point of view and a fairness in stating the Arab case which has not always been shown in speeches made on this problem by members of his party or by his colleagues. I cannot help thinking that it was a pity the right hon. Gentleman did not make that speech at the Blackpool Conference in June, 1945. How different it was in tone from the speech which was actually made then by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. He saw no difficulties, he saw no two points of view. He did not think it was necessary to wait for the decision of the United Nations. He was quite clear—unlimited immigration and a Jewish State. That was to be the policy of the Labour Party.
Mr. S. Silverman: Unlimited except by economic conditions.
Mr. Stanley: Yes, unlimited except by economic conditions—that was to be the policy of the Labour Party, and he pledged his party light-heartedly to a solution the difficulties of which have today been put before us and before his party so potently by the right hon. Gentleman. I did not sympathise with the solution then proposed, but I confess that today I have some sympathy with the Jews. If that had been said two years ago, if that had been the policy of the Labour Party over the last few years, if they had been told then as they are being told now that their aspirations for a Jewish State were unobtainable, who knows but that there might not have been some change in their policy, that they might not today be putting forward that policy with a vigour some of which they would draw from the belief that hon. Gentlemen opposite were supporting them in their demands?
Mr. S. Silverman: And that the White Paper of 1939 was binding on the Labour Government.
Mr. Stanley: I will leave the hon. Gentleman to pursue that point. Although I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman's definition of the difficulties that face anyone looking for a solution in Palestine, we must remember that a mere statement of difficulty in the end gets us nowhere, and that, however difficult it is, sometime, somehow, somebody must make a decision, somebody must choose between those difficulties, somebody must choose between the dangers, and among alternative courses all of which may be dangerous somebody must find the courage to choose the least bad.
I do not propose today to follow the right hon. Gentleman in his analysis of all the various solutions that have been put forward. If I did I should have something to say about the solution which I have always confessed would be the one I should prefer, but which he dismissed rather summarily and not entirely objectively. We have to face quite a different situation today from that to which the right hon. Gentleman's speech was devoted. We have to face the fact that the Government are not themselves announcing a policy, which we either criticise or approve, or against which we can put up some alternative solution. The Government are defending or explaining a decision that they will, under certain circumstances and at a certain time, go to the United Nations and obtain from them the advice, and if possible the support, which they need, and it is to that decision rather than to a perhaps airy discussion of the various alternatives which have been put forward for Palestine that I want to devote my attention this afternoon.
I want to make it plain from the beginning that as far as we on this side are concerned we have no complaint to make at all about a reference of this problem at this stage to the United Nations. We agree that in any case it would have been necessary, ex post facto, to submit any solution we proposed to the Trusteeship Council, and we agree that in the special circumstances of the day it may well be that it is better to get prior approval and support from the Assembly. While we do not criticise the decision to go to the United Nations, we criticise both the timing of that appeal and the method of the appeal. We find it very difficult
1924
to understand the delay that has already taken place. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary advanced the principle, for which there is much to be said, that in default of agreement between the two parties, it is necessary to go to the United Nations for a decision, but the right hon. Gentleman must haveknown—and so must his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies—many months ago that there was really no prospect of agreement between Jews and Arabs, if by "agreement" one means a prospect of those two parties coming together and setting their names to a policy which is then to be carried out.
Certainly, in the years during which I was connected with the problem I never heard any expert connected either with the Foreign Office or with the Colonial Office suggest that there was any possibility of that occurring, and I should be very surprised if, in the intervening months, they had Changed their minds. I was always told—and I believe this still to be the case —that in no circumstances would either side dare to make in advance the concessions that would be necessary to secure agreement, and therefore, what one had to aim at was not to attempt the securing of an agreement beforehand, but to try oneself to find a solution which it might be possible that both sides would acquiesce in afterwards. If it was the decision of the Government that, in default of agreement, the whole matter should be referred to the United Nations. I suggest that it was the duty of the Government so to arrange their programme of announcements and discussions that, when the moment came to make that reference to the United Nations, it could come speedily and without the intolerable delay which now confronts us.
In view of the decision of which we are now told, I cannot understand the events of last summer. The Morrison plan, as it is called—I think not because the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council invented it, but because he read it—was produced at the very beginning of August. It was made abundantly clear by both parties, Jews and Arabs, that it was not acceptable to them, and the rejection was based not upon this or that detail which might have been susceptible to modification, but on a fundamental divergence of view which

1925
has come up on every proposal that has been made—who is to control immigration, not for this year, not for next year, but in perpetuity, because the man who controls immigration decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority, and whoever decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab State. In those circumstances, it would have been easy to have—as one had to have for the sake of courtesy—the discussions with Jews and Arabs, although they were bound to result in failure, at the beginning of August, some time before October, when the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations took place. It would have been easy to establish at that time this fundamental disagreement between the two parties, and it would have been easy to bring it before the United Nations in October last for the decision which has now to be postponed until next September. Indeed, it is very difficult, if this has always been the plan of the Government, to understand one particular passage in the speech which the President of the Board of Trade made in that Debate, because the suggestion, which is now the policy of the Government, that the matter might be refeffed to the United Nations was made during the Debate by several hon. Members, and this was the answer of the President of the Board of Trade:
"One or two hon. Members yesterday made the suggestion that the whole matter ought now to be referred to U.N.O. for fresh decisions and suggestions. It will of course be necessary for the terms of the trusteeship agreement which is to supersede the Mandate to be settled by U.N.O.… indeed, many hon. Members have already stressed the need for a speedy decision, and have noted quite rightly"—
this was last August—
"the deterioration in atmosphere that has gone on while we have been awaiting the present agreement. In the existing circumstances we believe a quick decision to be absolutely essential.''—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August, 1946; Vol. 426, C. 1241.]
It was because of the need for a quick decision last August that the idea that it might have been referred to U.N.O. last October was rejected by the President of the Board of Trade. How can we reconcile that with the present proposal that it should go to the United Nations next September? I shall await from the right hon. Gentleman an explanation, and failing that, the Government will have to
1926
bear a responsibility for a delay which, on their own claim, could have been avoided, and a delay which has already caused much difficulty. To turn now, not to the delay which has taken place, but to the delay that lies in front of us, is there no way of avoiding that seven months' delay between now and the meeting of the ordinary Assembly of the United Nations in September next? I regard that delay as being fraught with all possible dangers, as something that ought to be avoided at all costs, and I beg the Government, if it is in any way possible, to curtail that delay. The suggestion was made to the right hon. Gentleman that one might get over this difficulty by referring the matter to the Security Council under Article 34. He replied that it was not within the terms of Article 34, and he did not think it threatened the peace of the world, but perhaps I might quote to him something which he said on 30th November, 1945:
"Considerations not only of equity and of humanity, but also of international amity and world peace, are thus involved in any search for solution."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th November, 1945; Vol. 415, c. 1928.]
In his speech today, the right hon. Gentleman referred to Palestine as a sore spot which, if not settled, would lead to wider disturbances; and it is difficult to see how, in view of those statements of the right hon. Gentleman, it would not be possible to bring this question within the ambit of the Security Council. It may well be that the right hon. Gentleman does not think the Security Council the right body to settle the matter, but one of the merits of bringing it before the Security Council in the first place is that the Security Council, under Article 20, could call a special meeting of the Assembly to consider the question, and it might be possible then still to submit this question to the Assembly of the United Nations, but to submit it much earlier than September, which is the date of the ordinary meeting. I feel that, whatever the difficulties, every attempt should be made to bridge a gap which may well prove to be disastrous to the possibility of any final settlement, and will certainly impose an, immense strain on our own people during that period.
The second thing that we regret about the form in which this appeal is being made to the United Nations, is the fact that His Majesty's Government propose. to lay the question before the Assembly

1927
with no indication of the policy which they themselves prefer. All kinds of suggestions, with some of which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt today, are to be put before the United Nations, for them to make their choice, but we, apparently, are to express no choice ourselves. It is clear, of course, that, after all these months, His Majesty's Government must have some view of their own upon this question. They must, despite difficulties and dangers, have made up their own minds which plan they think will have the hest chance of proving to be a final and lasting settlement in Palestine. If they have such a view, how can they avoid, in the long run, putting it forward? They cannot go to the Assembly of U.N.O., hear all those various plans, and sit there in complete silence, without joining in the discussion at all. Of course not. It would be a ridiculous attitude to adopt. If they are going to join in the discussion and add their view, they surely must know, before they begin, where they want to lead the discussion and what object their arguments are intended to reach. They must, therefore, whatever be the position now, disclose to the Assembly, as soon as the discussions start, and then to us, what policy His Majesty's Government prefer upon this question. If that is so, if, next September, they have to make a choice and a recommendation, would it not be very much better to make it now?
It seems to me that there are two good reasons for doing it. The first is that if His Majesty's Government have a view—they cannot go to the meeting of the Assembly without it—this House and the country are entitled to know what it is and whether it is a policy which they will support. When the policy is disclosed at the Assembly it may well be too late for this House or the country to express approval or disapproval of the course then taken. The second reason why it might be wise to make the declaration now rather than in September is this: we are to go through a very dangerous period in the next six months. Let us not close our eyes to that fact. Jew and Arab will start from now, and will spend the intervening months in lobbying members of the Assembly in support of their two viewpoints. All the arts and wiles of propaganda and persuasion will be brought, in these six months, from both
1928
sides upon the nations who will form the Assembly. During that time, those nations will be left without any guidance as to what is the middle course which we, as Mandatory, would recommend. It does seem that, in the absence of that guidance, and of any recommendation, there is a very great danger that quite a number of nations will arrive at the Assembly next September with their minds already made up, influenced by the propaganda and publicity which they have received.
Mr. Scollan: Is there not a chance that if Arabs and Jews do not know what the policy of the Government is, they might reconsider the whole position in the intervening period before the meeting of the Assembly?
Mr. Stanley: Why should anybody, Jew or Arab, reconsider their position during the intervening period? Their obvious line, before they go to the Assembly, is first to get as many friends as they can for their point of view, and then to present to the United Nations their own point of view complete, and 100 per cent. That is why I should prefer that, during those six months, the whole field should not be held by those two rival policies, both of them extreme, and that there should be in the field a third policy, that of His Majesty's Government. It is for that reason that we think there will be far more chance of success if His Majesty's Government, when they go to U.N.O. in September, were not to go there merely to empty upon the table of U.N.O. a wastepaper basket full of all the discarded plans of past years, but should go there to state clearly what their own views are and to ask the Assembly to support and approve them.
Our final criticism of the way in which the appeal has been made is that it contains no indication of what is to be our line after the Assembly has discussed this plan. I know that it means that any decision we make and any views we adopt today, must be on certain assumptions. This is the sort of matter in which any Government must look forward. It is quite true that, by their decision to refer this matter to U.N.O., a certain amount of time has been bought, although I think it has been bought pretty dearly. For some months, right

1929
hon. Gentlemen opposite will be able to return the answer to any question on their policy, that they cannot be expected to anticipate the discussions in the United Nations. It is true that for their supporters this is a postponement of the inevitable conflict between the pledges which many of them gave at the Election, and action which is likely to be taken by the Government which they support. For those reasons, a postponement of this kind is generally popular. It is also usually disastrous, for the only result of the postponement is merely to let things drift on so' that, a few months later, we can take up again the question that we have been afraid to tackle today.
The least the Government can do is to prepare now for the possibilities of the Assembly when it meets. It may happen that, when the Assembly meets in September, some new plan will be proposed and that the whole of the fifty-odd nations will gather together and will agree to it, and that it will then be approved by Jew and by Arab. It would be a miracle if that happened. For years, people on all sides, with ability and talent, have been searching for a possible variation of any scheme that might be used as a solution of this problem. It is unlikely that, in a few months some wholly new proposal will be found. Every proposal that has yet been made has caused divisions in Palestine, and divisions in parties here, and even, it is sometimes rumoured, divisions in Cabinets. Probably what will 'happen when the United Nations meets next September is that there will be no such unanimity; that, in fact there will be the same divisions among the nations there as can be found among peoples and parties; and that, whatever final decision is taken, if any decision is taken, it will be arrived at by a majority, with a minority supporting the other viewpoint.
If such a situation arises, as it is almost sure to arise, it is important that we should be quite clear what is the position of this country and to what we have committed ourselves. Therefore, I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman when he replies to answer two questions. The first is this. Are we pledged by our reference to U.N.O. to accept the majority decision, whatever it may be, and, what is important, of whomsoever the minority may consist? I appreciate that if there were an overwhelming majority, including all the great States, and that unanimity were
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only broken by a few small nations whose interest in the problem might, perhaps, be very remote, we would be quite entitled to treat that as a unanimous decision and to act upon it. But there might be a very different situation. We might have a situation in which there was a majority for a certain proposal, but in the minority there might be included at least one of the major Powers. We have to face this fact, that if there were a divergence at the Assembly, with some taking one side and some taking the other, even if we had a majority in favour of a particular course, if the minority included powerful States it would be very difficult to get the communities concerned to accept the decision, as we want them to accept it, as a final settlement. I want to know, therefore, whether, if there is merely a majority decision, we are committed to accept it and enforce it on the people of Palestine. Secondly, I want to ask if we are to carry out the recommendations of the majority even if they indicate a course with which we ourselves disagree. I quite appreciate that if we are to be loyal to the United Nations we must accept and acquiesce in the decision which they make, but there is a great difference between that and asking our troops and using our resources to enforce a decision of which we ourselves may not be in favour and which we cannot defend.
Those are the two questions. I would like to know whether our reference to U.N.O. in any way commits us to carry out a decision of the United Nations, however it is arrived at, with which we ourselves are not in agreement. Surely, it would be better to say now what we shall have to say in the end, namely, that failing agreement between the United Nations upon some policy which we ourselves can support, we will surrender the Mandate of Palestine and leave it to the United Nations themselves to appoint a successor and frame a policy. The principle of fixing a date and saying that if by that date something does not happen, we should clear out, is not a principle to which His Majesty's Government have any objection. They are doing it in India in much more difficult circumstances, in much more complicated conditions of greater danger and in circumstances where there is no United Nations organisation as a residuary legatee to whom we can hand back the responsibility which we feel no longer able to carry.

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I believe it might have a considerable effect upon the deliberations of the United Nations if we were to make this announcement now. If they were to know that their deliberations might be followed by certain consequences and that every nation who spoke and voted might have to take some part of the consequences of their speeches and their votes, it might have a very considerable effect upon their willingness to reach some sensible, practical and tolerable conclusion. Therefore, see quite an advantage in making such a declaration now. I do not see any disadvantages. If, after the meeting of the United Nations, there has been no agreement, if the countries are found to be divided into parties supporting the Arab case and parties supporting the Jewish case, and if there is to be no concrete conclusion from that meeting, I do not think this country could ever hope to impose upon the people of Palestine any solution, whatever it may be. If we cannot hope to impose a solution and, as the right hon. Gentleman himself has said, if we cannot find a basis upon which the Mandate, which was never meant to be eternal, can be brought to an end, it is much better that we should say so at once and restore our Mandate to the United Nations, instead of continuing to jeopardise the lives of our men and pour out the all too exiguous treasures of the State in a task which, by then, will have been demonstrated to be incapable of successful conclusion.
We cannot change what has happened in the past. No one, of course, accuses the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the last 18 months of wasting time in the sense that we believe they have been idle or trying to put things off. Of course, that time has been lost—no one looking back over the past i8 months can deny it—but it is not the past which now matters so much as the future, and the future can be planned. All of us, in all quarters of the House, agree in the present circumstances to the appeal to the United Nations. It is only after that, that divergencies appear. We believe that that appeal should be made as soon as practicable and that, if necessary, it should go to the Security Council and, through the Security Council, to a special meeting of the Assembly in order to save time. We believe that we should go there recommending a policy ourselves, giving to the
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United Nations what they are surely entitled to—the views of the people who, for 30 odd years, have been actually administering the country which the United Nations had to consider. We believe that we should say, here and now, that if that policy is not approved and if we are not promised not only approval but actual support for that policy, we shall surrender our Mandate to the United Nations and leave to them future decisions—no doubt, with our assistance as an ordinary member of the United Nations organisation.
That, at least, is a policy which would be definite and strong. At best, it might be the last chance of getting the sort of agreement at the Assembly which might enable some settlement to be imposed and accepted in Palestine. At worst, it would, at any rate, set a definite term to the burdens which we are now bearing and which are now becoming intolerable. The alternative proposal of His Majesty's Government is to go to the Assembly of the United Nations next September without recommending any course of action, and with no definition of what our position is to be after the Assembly have taken their decision. I regard that not as a policy, but merely a postponement. It means that next winter we shall all be sitting here discussing, once again, just the problems we are discussing now, and which were discussed last August; having to face, once again, just the decisions which we are refusing to face today. It is for that reason that I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, before it is too late, to make, not a change in the whole thing, not an abandonment of an appeal to which we have agreed, but changes in the manner, which, I believe, might offer success where now little promise prevails.
I want to say a few words upon the actual situation in Palestine, and what is likely to happen during the next few months. All of us must echo the hopes of the right hon. Gentleman that Arabs and Jews alike, in view of the discussions at the United Nations in the autumn, will, meanwhile, exercise restraint and moderation; that they will not proceed to violent extremes, if not for the sake of morality at any rate in order not to prejudice their own case when it comes up for decision. But alas, however wise and moderate the leaders may be—and all of us hope that they will be—there are the extremists still to reckon with; and while we are still

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saddled with the responsibility we shall have to carry it out, and law and order must be maintained in the interim as rigorously as we have tried to maintain it in the past.
I have two points which I should like to put to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The first is with regard to immigration, and the rate of immigration of Jews during the period between now and next September. As the fine weather draws on, there comes, of course, the time most favourable for illegal immigration. There have been quite a number of instances, even during the storms and difficulties of the winter months. We have to expect an increase as conditions become more favourable. As I see it, in that illegal immigration during this period lies the greatest danger to peace in Palestine between now and the meeting of the Assembly. I wonder if it would not be possible, during this period, to make some special approach to the Arabs? Any increase during these few months, on which they may be asked to agree, could amount to only a few thousand; it could not possibly influence either the decision of the United Nations in September or, still less, the final result, which depends so much on numerical proportions in Palestine.
Twice already the Arabs have been approached with regard to an alteration in Jewish immigration. Although the right hon. Gentleman is quite correct when he says that they have not formally agreed, they have on both occasions acquiesced, and I think it is to their credit that they have done so, and have recognised the greater need and given attention to it. I wonder if it is not possible that they might be approached again, and that again they might acquiesce? And is it not possible that their acquiescence would be much more likely if it were possible to base any proposal for an increase during these few months on women and children alone? I do not know what the proportions have been during the past year; but I am told that an exceptionally large proportion of the legal immigrants have, in fact, been able-bodied young men. It is quite clear that a large proportion of able-bodied young men is the form of immigration which raises most fears in the hearts of the Arabs. Would it not be possible to approach them with a proposal that, over and above the 1,500 a month, between now and September a
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certain limited increase, drawn from those classes of people which will not cause anxiety, could be made with their consent? It might do much to smooth down possible difficulties in the intervening period.
The second question I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman is with regard to our own people. Since we last debated this question in the House only a few weeks ago, a great change has been made in the conditions under which British people live and work in Palestine. They are today living under what are nothing but siege conditions. The women and children have all been evacuated; and I think it is true to say that all officials have left their homes, and are congregating in reserved and safe areas. It is a terrible life for people to be expected to lead for any long period, entailing great sacrifices and great hardships. As the House will remember, many protests were made in Palestine when that decision was taken a few weeks ago. I, myself, gave no support to those protests, because, as I understood the situation then, I thought the action the Government were taking was right. The Arab Conference was obviously breaking down, and we had been promised a statement of policy by His Majesty's Government. Everyone has always realised that immediately after a statement of policy, whatever the final result, there must be inevitably an increasing tension, and the possibility of grave disturbance.
When I read that order, in view of the forthcoming decisions, I thought the Government were taking a wise precaution in clearing the decks, and in removing the women and children. But, of course, we find now that that is not the case at all. There is no decision; the decision is postponed for at least a year; and the crisis, because of which I thought these people had been removed, now cannot occur till the end of next winter, or the beginning of next spring. In those circumstances, is it necessary or wise to maintain, during the whole of this period, the very stringent conditions which have now been imposed, and which the Government will justify by some impending crisis? Would it not be possible, for the months that are bound to elapse before an official decision is taken, to have some relaxation? Because the danger is, that if people are kept under this tension, suffering these hardships in these unnatural conditions for too long,

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when the moment of crisis comes they may already be stale, and they may not be at their best to meet it. Those are the two points I desire to put, and I should be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman if he could deal with them.
No one in this House is under any illusion today. We realise that we are discussing a matter of very grave moment for the people of this country, and indeed for the world. It is only one of the great problems that this House has to discuss in the next few weeks. There is the discussion of our own economic situation, on which depends our standard of life, and indeed our survival; the discussion on India, with all that that means in peace or chaos for four hundred million people; the discussion on Germany, with all that it will mean for the future of European civilisation, and the peace of this country. But with all those problems, grave as they are, this problem is worthy to take its place. On its solution depends the whole future of the Middle East.
There was a time, until the great retreat began, when the Middle East was regarded as one of the key points of the British Empire. On its solution depends the attitude of Jews and Arabs to this country all over the world, with grave consequences, because they may easily affect the whole tenor of international relations. On its solution depends the safety of 100,000 British troops and British officials. On its solution depends whether the weight of the burden which has been carried, and which has to be carried, by the staggering people of this country will be lightened.
We welcome the fact that this problem has been submitted to U.N.O., but we regret the time and the manner of the appeal. If the appeal is to be presented as is now proposed, we believe it can only lead to delay, and that that delay can only be disastrous. If it is made, as we suggest, with speed and decision, we believe that it still may succeed. Now, the Foreign Secretary is not a man who is deficient in either of those two qualities, and it is, therefore, to him that we appeal—the last appeal, probably, we shall have a chance of making—to make those changes which may give a chance of success. I repeat that this, I think, may well be our last opportunity Post hoc occasio calva.
5.53 p.m
Mrs. Ayrton Gould: We have listened with great interest to both the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). With much of what the latter has said many, I think, on this side agree; but, at the same time, I must point out that he rather over simplified the position when he said that it is perfectly easy to discover fundamental divergencies between Jew and Arab in a short time. I should like to remind the Opposition that there never would have been the difficulties which have arisen if it had not been for the White Paper policy which was instituted in 1939. That policy started a perfectly impossible situation.
The Foreign Secretary pointed out that, in his view, the Mandate would have worked quite well up to the time of the Hitler regime. Well, it could never have worked well if the completely iniquitious White Paper policy had been imposed. The difficulty that the Government have had since they came into power in connection with Palestine was quite simply stated—though I do not think he intended it to be—by the Foreign Secretary, when he said, at one point, that we could not carry out the White Paper policy, and, at another point, that we could not tear it up. Well, if we could not do either of those things we were obviously left in a fearful muddle, and that is the position we are in now: we have a muddle over a desperately serious affair. What, in their difficulties, the Government decided to do was to carry on a modified White Paper policy, and, of course, that was not acceptable to the Jews.
I believe that, if it could be left to the Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, a unitary State could be carried on, and that they could very well solve their difficulties in the future, as they have done in the past. But the moment we get these political difficulties arising from the Arab League and the Zionist Agency outside, we have an impossible position because both try to lay down bases for Palestine, which Palestine must accept. The Arab basis, quite simply, is that they are prepared to put up with the small minority of Jews that are there, but will not have any more immigration. In the last analysis, the Jewish basis is that they want immigration until they get a majority.

1937
I want to suggest that the British proposals that have been made have been altogether too simple. On immigration, it was suggested that 4,000 a month should be allowed for two years, and that, at the end of the two years, when 96,000 immigrants had legally been allowed in, an Advisory Council, which would sit under the High Commissioner, composed of both Arabs and Jews, would decide on further immigration. It sounds very well; it sounds a good bit of democratic work; but one has to remember that the Arab population compared with the Jewish population is two to one, and that, therefore, the democratic advisory council set up would inevitably give a majority to the Arabs, which would enable them alone to decide—that is what it would amount to—whether there should be any Jewish immigration into Palestine at all, and, if so, how much. The recommendation says that this council should decide even what immigration is to be allowed into the Jewish State. Knowing the Arab attitude, of course, the result would that no immigration, after the 96,000. would be allowed at all.
There has been no mention of the Discriminatory Land Law, which would, in fact, play a very large part in the outlook of the Jews. In Western Palestine, only 5 per cent. of the Jewish population are allowed to purchase, or to settle on, the land. It is then suggested that, under the trusteeship, the local authorities should decide whether there should be an increase or a reduction, even whether the actual laws themselves should continue to be operative. As I said before, the majority of the authorities in the majority of States would be Arab. It would mean, again, that the majority ruling would inevitably prevent any expansion on the land for the Jews. Therefore, what really looks like a democratic suggestion, in fact, is not a democratic suggestion at all. It could only be democratic if there were approximately the same number of Arabs and Jews who were going to vote on these duly elected bodies to make these decisions. I can only say that it is no wonder that it was not accepted.
I agree that it has seemed to take a very long time to find out that it was not acceptable. Some of us have said from the beginning, right back in October, 1945, that it was not possible. along these lines, to come to any arrangement which
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would be acceptable to both sides. That leaves us in the position that, either we have to impose something, or we have to agree to allow a situation to go on like the present one.
There is, I suppose, no one in the House who is prepared to accept the present intolerable situation in Palestine. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol has said that we are not prepared to allow British troops to go on having their lives endangered, and we all agree about that; neither do we wish to see British people undergoing this artificial and extremely hard life, nor are we prepared to hold a mandated territory where there is continuous terrorism, or indeed, where there is any terrorism on the present scale in Palestine. I want to ask the Government what is to happen between now and the time when the whole question comes before the United Nations. It is all very well to say we hope that both the Jewish and Arab leaders will be able to persuade their followers to be moderate and behave, but it is impossible for them to do that. In view of the situation in Palestine, it is impossible for them to keep the terrorists under control, unless something is handed to them meantime, and they are offered unconditionally some definite hopes for the future. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol suggested that we should increase immigration, but, unlike him, I do not suggest it should be confined to women and children. It is absolutely necessary to have building operatives and other workers to provide accommodation for those who are to enter the country. It is necessary to have buildings for the women and children immigrants, many of whom are in a very bad physical and mental state because of what they have been through. I suggest that we allow immigration to continue at least to the extent of 4,000 per month, not only up to the time when the problem is handed over to the United Nations but during the time when it is being considered by the United Nations, because judging from what happened at the Assembly last year, and at all the conferences it will not be a week or a fortnight, but months before a decision will have been reached.
Does anyone suggest that the Jewish Agency or the moderate Jews can hold back the terrorists, when there is a miser-

1939
able allocation of 1,500 immigrants per month? We know that illegal immigrants will be pouring in, and that they will consist of men, women and children who are the miserable remnants left in Europe. We must remember all the time what is behind all of this. It is no good talking about the humanitarian angle, as we did during the war, when we expressed horror over what the Nazis were doing, unless we face what is happening, and envisage what these remnants have gone through, remembering that Palestine is the only place in the world which wants them and welcomes them. I believe that the present state of affairs could be settled if we got -out of Palestine. I do not believe the Government would dream of accepting this solution, but if the Haganah were allowed arms and Palestine was left to settle its own differences, I believe that before very long we should have a united country. What is the alternative? We shall have bloodshed in any case, and the alternative is that our boys will be involved in it. When history comes to be written, it will be decided that Palestine would have got a solution to her problems much more quickly if Great Britain had cleared out and let the people settle them herself. We are rightly asking that the Haganah, the moderate Zionists and others should root out the terrorists, bring them to justice, and hand them over, but it is too much to ask these people unarmed to root out the fanatical armed terrorists. I think it would be much better if we went to them and told them that during the interval we would allow them to be armed, if they would act as a localised police force—after all, we armed them during the war when we needed them. We should ask them to get down to rooting out the terrorists, and if that were done and Jewish immigration was raised to 4,000 a month, we could have peace in Palestine until the whole matter had been taken to the United Nations and a decision had been reached.
The British Government, who have carried the burden of the Mandate for all these years, ought very definitely to make recommendations which will be acceptable to us, and if they are not agreed upon, we should simply hand over the Mandate to the United Nations. It is well known that residuary legatees do not do very well—and I do not think in these circumstances the United Nations will do
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very well—but what I am anxious about is that Britain should not be left as a residuary legatee, being expected to carry out a policy to which we may object very strongly, and have to risk the lives of our troops to carry it out. We ought to make it perfectly clear what we want and what we intend to do, and we should do everything possible to secure peace on both sides until the recommendations of the United Nations are made known.
6.10 p.m.
Mr. Clement Davies: Every reasonable man, in every country, must be longing to see a final settlement of this age-long problem. Every reasonable man must desire that that settlement should come by negotiation and agreement, and not by force or by war. I would like to pay my tribute to the Foreign Secretary, not only for the quite remarkable speech he made this afternoon, but for the manner in which he has undertaken and carried out his duties in his great office. At no period in history was any Foreign Secretary ever called upon to face such problems as the present Foreign Secretary. No one has devoted himself more conscientiously to his duties. He has brought to them wide experience, great tact, and, above all great human sympathy.
I would like to deal, here and now, with a point the right hon. Gentleman made, which, I believe, arose out of an interruption of mine. Let it be clearly understood that when he goes to Moscow, and discusses these great matters with other great States, this country, whatever Government may be in power, will always honour its word, and regard treaties as binding. This country will endeavour, so far as is possible, to carry out pledges which have already been given. But let it also be clearly understood that the decisions of this House are not even binding on itself, still less on its successors, and still less on successors who have gone to the country on a different programme from the one which the House followed at the time it made those decisions.
Having paid my tribute to the right hon. Gentleman, and said that, may I say that I can understand still less the criticism of the Foreign Secretary which came from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley)?

1941
It was niggardly and carping, which is not unusual, coming from him. The right hon. Gentleman's criticism was that the Government's proposal was being presented at this time, that the offer might have been made last August. I may be doing the right hon. Gentleman an injustice, but I have tried to read, in the meantime, his own speech of last August, and I could not find in it any reference to handing this problem over to U.N.O.
Mr. Stanley: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right. That was not my policy. I thought the Government would come to their own decision, and that when they were ready would impose it. We are now told that that has never been the policy, and that in default of agreement the Government will go to U.N.0.
Mr. Davies: I understood that the right hon. Gentleman accused the Government, and especially the Foreign Secretary, of wasting time. The only suggestion on those lines, last August, came from a supporter of the Government, for the President of the Board of Trade spoke in that Debate. After the right hon. and learned Gentleman had spoken there was a speech by the Leader of the Opposition, with which I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol did not agree. He and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) have never agreed on a real policy for Palestine. Speaking personally, I have never had any doubt whatever about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I have always felt, and said, that a home was not destroyed when lodgers came in. There is a whole world of difference between the right of a lodger in a house, and a right to people to recognise that place as their home.
Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: That is a piece of argument which is quite unworthy of the 'right hon. and learned Gentleman. The question is: What is the constitutional definition of a lot of people living together?
Mr. Davies: What was the pledge that was drawn up and signed by Mr. Balfour as Foreign Secretary, and agreed to by the Cabinet? It was brought before the League of Nations when His Majesty's Government undertook the Mandate. There has never been much doubt in the
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minds of those who were largely responsible for that Declaration, or those who remained in that Government. Neither the then Prime Minister, the late Earl Lloyd-George, or the present Leader of the Opposition, have ever doubted that what they had in mind that was in the course of time a home should be created for Jews, a true home where they could control their own affairs.
Mr. Gallacher: It was not just a home but a National Home.
Mr. Davies: Undoubtedly it was understood that in course of time such a state of affairs would come about that the Jews would be in control of their own affairs in Palestine. I cannot help feeling that a great part of this controversy would not have arisen today but for the fact that in the main those in charge of affairs in Palestine from 1922–39 never took that view Although they were advised by those who had more to do with it than anyone, namely, the present Leader of. the Opposition and Mr. Amery, they took. the other line entirely. I should say that their desire was to whittle down the Balfour Declaration as much as it could be whittled down. It ill becomes anybody to say now that there have not been changes of view, both in the Government and in this House.
Look at the vacillation, right from 1922 down to today. I remember, in 1937, the Government coming forward with a wonderful scheme for partition. But in 1938 they said that partition would never do. In 1939, a White Paper was produced That White Paper was described by the Lord President of the Council—I think rightly—as an evil thing. It was described by the Leader of the Opposition in a most eloquent speech, as a breach of the Mandate. I would like to point out to the Foreign Secretary that in almost the last part of the speech delivered by the Lord President of the Council he made it clear that whatever the decision of the House then and it was obvious what it would be—it would not be binding on the party opposite, in spite of the advice of Mr. Amery and the Leader of the Opposition. May I also remind him of the pledges that were given, not after the Election, but before the Election, with regard to this matter. Be that as it may, I am perfectly sure of this—that the Foreign Secretary and those who have assisted him, the ex-Secretary of State for the

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Colonies, and the present Secretary 01 State for the Colonies, have done their very best to deal with this situation as wisely as it was possible to do under the circumstances. I feel also that it was right that they should try to see, even now, whether there was not a way out of it, without having to resort even to the United Nations Organisation. We had undertaken the Mandate, and it was our duty, as trustees, to see how best that could be arranged to the advantage of all the beneficiaries under it.
I agree with the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) that there was little trouble before the White Paper of 1939—little trouble from the Jews prior to 1939; and, what was more, trouble from the Arabs had more or less died down in 1937 and 1938. One has only to read the pledges then made by Members of the Tory Government. Nothing, I think, has been so terribly sad and agonising as the attitude of the Jews since then, and recently, with regard to this country, its Government and its people. No nation in the world has been as generous to the Jewish people as this nation; it has not only opened its gates and protected them, but made every office in the land open to them. That, I agree, has not only been to their advantage but to the advantage of this country. It ill 'becomes anyone, anywhere, to malign this country; still more so to destroy the young British men who are actually in Palestine to try to ensure justice and fairness.
I have never regarded this as a purely Jewish question. The Arabs are not the cause of it; it is the treatment of the Jews by other nations throughout 2,000 years that is the cause of it. It is not merely an Arab question, and it is certainly not merely a British question. This has become a world question, and I would, therefore, ask that all the nations of the world should make their contribution towards its solution, once and for all, and among the peoples of the world are the Jewish people and the Arab people. They should see if there is not some way by which the Jewish people can reach their ambition, which is linked up with their faith, because a good deal of the ritual connected with that faith is meaningless outside Palestine. They have always built their synagogues facing towards Jerusalem and it has been linked up with their
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faith that once a covenant was made between the Almighty and themselves, that that land should be theirs. In every country to which they have gone they have formed their own little communities. If they could be brought back, many of the Arabs would assist, and then I should regard it as the duty of the United Nations of the world to do anything which the Arabs would require in return in order to help them. It is along those lines that I hope this matter will be approached, and approached successfully, so that, at any rate, we can say that in this generation, although we have fought two most terrible wars, we have tried to solve problems which have worried people for generations.
Finally, may I ask one question? The right hon. Member for West Bristol rather assumed that the question which will be put to U.N.O. is one of advice. I am not sure. I gather from the Foreign Secretary's speech, and the statement which he made to the House the other day, that the Government had come to the conclusion that the Mandate has failed, but until some other solution has been brought forward, they would, of course, carry out their duties as trustees. I want to know what is the matter that is to be put before U.N.O. Is it; "We have not been able to arrive at a solution with regard to this. Will you advise us; and then we will follow that advice and carry out, more or less, your directions, and do our duty there once more as a Mandatory Power, acting now for the United Nations organisation as we did for the defunct League of Nations"? Or do the Government intend to go to the United Nations organisation and say, "We can no longer carry out this Mandate. It is finished. We will do our best to protect the Mandate in the meantime, but take it back and decide what is best for the future for these people, so that there may be a new Mandatory power given to the United Nations organisation." Which of the two is it to be?
In the meantime, I am reminded that Members of this Government, having fought against and denounced that White Paper, and having gone to the country not only denouncing it, but saying that they would reverse it, are still carrying out, more or less, the policy which they told the country they would not carry out. Will they from now until this new decision has been arrived at by the United

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Nations Organisation, go back to what they conceive, what I conceive, and what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) conceived was the true meaning of the Mandate, and the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration? I most sincerely hope and pray that, finally, a peaceful solution may be found for this problem, so that never again will it worry any man in any country.
6.29 p.m.
Mr. Pickthorn: I can find almost nothing—[HON. MEMBERS: "peak up."] I will try to speak up but I am suffering from a sore throat and must ask the House to be kind to me. I can find almost nothing to agree with in the speech to which we have just listened. I cannot believe that it is very useful now for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) to tell us what Mr. Balfour thought when Mr. Balfour composed his letter, more particularly as Mr. Balfour did not compose the letter. The history of it is pretty well known, particularly how it got composed and issued and why and when it was published. I think that the best comment which can be made upon it briefly—and I desire to be brief for the convenience of the House and for the convenience of myself—is to read a quotation, from a speech by Dr. Weizmann. I think I have got the date right, April, 1918, though I may be a year wrong. He said:
"The fears of the Arabs that they are to be ousted from their present position are due either to a fundamental misconception of Zionist aims or to the malicious activities of our enemies."'
I do not really see how in the light of that statement taken from Dr. Weizmann, who was certainly at that time even if he be not thought so now, the greatest possible authority upon these things, it can be said that the Balfour promise gave the Zionists the right to expect that British arms should be used to impose on a long settled society unwanted immigrants until they should become the majority under it, because that is the gloss put upon the national home by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery, and by the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) who spoke before him and whose arguments he adopted. I do not believe that the House should really allow itself to be stopped by that gloss,-which I think is
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demonstrably unfair. Further, supposing it to be fair, I think this House would make a mistake to pay any attention to it, because if there is one thing plain it is that no man can ever have had, politically or morally the right to promise what Mr. Balfour is by that interpretation alleged to have promised. If there is one thing clearer even than this it is that if such a promise could have been made legitimately in 1918 it could not be legitimately kept now. There is nothing in such a promise or the keeping now of such a promise that can be defended by any principles of politics or morality, democracy, Christian principles, or I make bold to say, to my Jewish friends and Jewish colleagues, of the Jewish faith.
I want to say a very few things and to say them as shortly as I can. If I am longer than I mean it will be because it has been very difficult to listen to the Foreign Secretary's speech today and to be sure that one has exactly got hold of the right bits of it. I should like to begin by asking the Colonial Secretary whether he can quite easily—because I realise that it is not fair to face him with it—tell us now, or anyway at the end of the Debate, again exactly what are the interim immigration proposals. I do not blame the Foreign Secretary but I am hound to say that he did not leave me quite clear in mind as to what the position was, and I feel sure that the House ought to have its mind made quite clear about that.
Then I should like if I may without impertinence to compliment him in one respect. That is always a little difficult. I myself do not think much of compliments in this House, and especially compliments from one side to another, which are often not very useful. Above all I dislike the compliment on sincerity. I feel that when we address each other as hon. Gentlemen what we assume by that is that each of those of us who speak tries to the best of his intellectual power to say what he means. This is an occasion, however, when I hope that without fulsomeness or impertinence I may s ay that as political opponents we were moved by the sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I mean that not in the ordinary drawing room sense of being sincere, in the sense that he was not really telling us what he himself knew to be

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lies but in the far more important sense that he had performed the difficult and painful operation of thinking as hard about the subject as he could before he dared to inflict upon his countrymen what his opinions were. That is what I take sincerity to mean in our relations to each other here, and I hope he will not think it fulsome or impertinent of me if I say that he showed a shining example of it this afternoon.
Having paid him that compliment, I should like if I may to utter a small reproach. It is a very small one and I do not do it from any personal point of view. Today he clearly distinguished between two main parts of the difficulty with which we are concerned, which has not been done so clearly before by anyone speaking from that Box of whatever party. He continued as almost all have done—and I shall probably slip into the expression myself although I regard it as a bad habit—to speak of the Palestine Problem. It is the cutting up of life into Problems which tends to the assumption that if only we could get to the back of the teacher's book we would find a solution on the back page. This Palestine affair is a thing not of that sort. Although the Foreign Secretary used that, as I think, dangerous language, he did distinguish between the problem of what ought to be done with Palestine and the problem of what ought to be done with displaced Jews. I think that to make that distinction clear and clean is the beginning of wisdom in all this question. The small reproach I do address to him is that he did nothing to make clear that there have been here a few, a comparatively few, members who have made that distinction over and over again. I do not say that because I believe that I have been an important one of them, but Members who have been here during the war and in the last two Parliaments know the names of Members who made this distinction and could write their names on the back of a postcard.
I think that if this Debate has been carried on, continued as reasonably as it has been, and has been something quite different from the sort of way the subject was debated 12 years ago, that 'change in the climate of opinion has been made by people who may sometimes have seemed to the Foreign Secretary to
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be pertinacious questioners and tiresome debaters, and I do not think that it would have done any harm to acknowledge the service that has been performed by them, because if we wish to have Parliamentary Government continuing in the world, it is by noting advantages of that sort which accrue from Parliamentary Government that we shall do it. There is one other preliminary thing I should like to say before I pass on so the main matter and that is that it seemed to me that the Foreign Secretary dropped what I think were his two main heresies of a year ago. Of course hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who have grown grey or great, or both grey and great in some cases, in working machinery whose honourable business was to try to raise the material conditions of the less fortunate parts of the population are rather specially tempted to think that economics is what matters in politics, that politics are scarcely more than the shadow of economics and that if they get economics right then politics will come right of themselves. I believe that to be the worst and the most actively harmful of the heresies of the last 50 years.
The right hon. Gentleman seemed to me a year ago to have that heresy, but today, whether consciously or unconsciously, he seemed to throw it away. He also seemed to throw another heresy away into what I hope will be an unregretted limbo—that is, the notion that international organisation should be built up by going over the heads of national states, straight to the people themselves. He threw away that notion very completely today and I congratulate him upon it.
The questions I wish to put to His Majesty's Government are I am afraid it will be thought, of a rather verbal nature, but all our discussions and the discussions which may take place at the United Nations must be conducted with words as counters. I think we were almost, although I agree not entirely, promised some time ago by the Prime Minister that we should have a Palestine Debate before any decision had been taken, but now a decision of sorts has been taken, a decision not to decide, a decision to refer elsewhere, and I think the least we have a right to ask is that in that reference elsewhere we should know what the technical terms are going to mean and

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how the brief is going to be produced, and I am inviting the Colonial Secretary to make these matters clear to us this evening.
I speak in the presence of professional gentlemen who will correct me if I am wrong, but I imagine that any really competent Solicitor can so put a question to counsel, especially if the counsel be chosen as not very competent or practised, as to be pretty certain beforehand what counsel's opinion will be, and it is of the utmost importance that we should know in what shape and form this question is to be put to the United Nations. We have been told that there is not going to be any recommendation. There is going to be a mere statement of history. Can we be reassured that all the history is going to be drawn to the attention of the United Nations? I have no fear here that we might suggest something which would be tiresome to the British Government that might otherwise have passed unforseen. We may be quite sure that there will be people and indeed, it will be the duty of the United Nations to see that there should be people, who will drag up everything which seems to show that the British Government at any stage has been disingenuous or inadequate.
I wish to be quite sure that the British Government itself will do that work for them, that we can be perfectly sure that it is going to be perfectly clearly put to the United Nations if the matter is to be put at all, what is a mandate—a new word; how it got drawn up; what was an A Mandate, how an A Mandate was something which from the first admitted the existence of a society dwelling within the territory concerned with a right to nationhood provisionally admitted. It was admitted from the first that these were people provisionally to be recognised as deserving of political independence. What was the method by which and the date at which the Mandate become (a) politically and (b) legally a governing factor in the situation? It is far more complicated than people generally think, and than I myself think unless I have looked up the books and the papers the day before, and than the right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway thought. My recollection is that the Mandate did not acquire any legal or quasi legal force until I think it was the end of 1923. So there was a long period before that when
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whatever we were doing we were not doing it under the Mandate, nor did the Mandate come from the League of Nations as many people seem to think. We ought to be quite sure that all these things and all the relevant facts and documents are quite clearly set forth in the dossier which we put before the United Nations.
Secondly I should like to ask when we put this matter before them, are we going to define quite clearly what is Palestine for our purposes? Does it mean the borders and boundaries as they exist now or are there other possibilities which will be taken into consideration? Then, since it is The Palestine Problem which is being referred, it is extremely important that we should know what is from this point of view The Palestine Problem. Is it going to be sharply defined from the problem of dealing with the Jews in Europe? Those hon. Gentlemen with whom I have been more particularly associated on this question have always insisted all along that it is no use putting the difficulties and the blame upon Hitler.
Upon him primarily much of the blame is, but also upon all the rest of us who did not somehow find ways of taking in the persons whom Hitler persecuted or threw out. There is some blame. We have always said that, and I think it very important that now it should be made quite clear which of these things it is that we are putting before the United Nations, whether it is all one or whether it is two separable questions. I thought the most moving passage in the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State's speech this afternoon was when he, if I may say so with an absurd sort of arrogance, agreed with me on this point in advance, that whatever else we do we ought to be prepared to play our full share on the humanitarian side of the thing, We should make that quite clear, first that the burden ought to be taken off the Arabs. It should not be the Arabs upon whom the burden is left that they have to look after this terrible, cruel by-product of the vices of European civilisation, for which we all of us to some extent or another are responsible.
Then I want to ask one more small and one more large question about these definitions that are going I hope to be put to the United Nations. About the Jewish Agency for instance. The Jewish Agency originally was set up for a highly limited

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purpose, but it was from the first by the British Government allowed to develop into something far wider than its terms of reference properly warranted. There is no doubt of that.
Mr. Janner: Will the hon. Member permit me one question? Would he be good enough to say what the Mandate says about the Jewish Agency because if he reads it out he will find that the Jewish Agency had and have an extremely important position under the Mandate?
Mr. Pickthorn: I have not the reference in my pocket but on the last occasion on which I made a speech of this sort the hon. Gentleman interrupted me with exactly the same question and on that occasion I did read out the Mandate and it did carry out my argument to a sufficient extent. Perhaps I may leave hon. Members to look it up themselves. The argument then and now is whether the Jewish Agency is to be continued in its functions and decisions during this interim period and if so is it tolerable that that should be done without at least some similar council for consulting and cooperating with the Arabs. Now I come to my last question on this matter and indeed the last thing I have to say. What for this purpose is the United Nations organisation? I know we ought to know. The Foreign Secretary told us this afternoon that Sir Alexander Cadogan does know and I am quite sure that he does and for all I know by some means, direct or indirect, Sir Alexander Cadogan has told the Colonial Secretary, and I think the Colonial Secretary ought to tell us when he comes to reply. We none of us do know these documents and constitutions half as well as we ought and I take as much blame as anyone for that, hut we are trying to learn too many things and to read too many papers.
What does it mean in practice for these purposes? Does it mean, to use a few letters, us, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R., or is there more in it than that? Is it in fact going to be a horse swapping deal, a Kahhandel, as the Germans say between the two or three both great Powers who have the proper power of the veto or what more than that does it mean? because on that, I think, does depend the next question which we ought to go into: that is, are we assuming that whatever decision is handed down we shall operate?
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If so, are we ourselves to be judges in the matter? Are we in on this matter, or do we, as fellows of a college do, if I may use an illustration from my own humble experience, when their own affairs are being discussed, go out politely into the outer combination room and read "Punch", or are we there all the time? That is always assuming that the Minister of Fuel allows "Punch" to be printed next September. I think it highly important and we want to know what the machinery is going to be, in simple terms which those of us who have read the covenant once and do not remember much about it now, will understand. We ought to know to whom it is we are appealing, whether we ourselves are to be there as advocates or judges, or both, or neither or as witnesses, or with some two of these functions, or what. It seems to me that this question ought to be properly explained to us by the Colonial Secretary this evening when he comes to wind up.
6.50 p.m.
Mr. Benn Levy: The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) reminded the House that this is a topic which has been wont in the past to rouse high feelings. I shall attempt myself to tackle it in a temperate and reasonable way because if my own emotions are engaged, I honestly believe they are not so through any Jewish prejudice but are engaged, as those of most hon. Members of this House would be, on behalf of any people or group of people who are in distress. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary himself underlined that point. In a rhetorical passage which I shall not attempt to emulate, he showed considerable sympathy, but I am bound to say that those Jewish people in distress can derive little comfort from his speech because there was little else he had to offer. His speech was, I admit, the best exposition of the Arab case that I have heard, but it had to me an air, if I may say so, not merely of unreality but of special pleading.
Let me take for example his treatment of the problem of partition. He argued against it on the grounds that any proposed scheme of partition would involve the leaving of an Arab minority in the Jewish sector in such a position that that minority would be permanent or would have to get out. But surely precisely the same argument would be valid against his own plan for a unitary Palestine in which

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the Jews were a permanent minority or had to get out? Apparently in that case it was not thought a valid argument, because in another part of his speech, after expatiating on the various abilities of the Jews as statesmen, businessmen and the rest of it, he practically exhorted them to exercise their gifts for nationhood as a permanent minority inside an Arab State. That does not seem to me to be a very practicable or serious proposition—
Mr. Lipson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that is exactly what the Jews in this country and every other country are doing?
Mr. Levy: If the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Lipson) supposes for a moment that the position of Jews—he ought to know better—is the same in this country as it is or would be under Arab government in Palestine, he really is not qualified to make an intervention. It is a libel on the British people.
Mr. M. Philips Price: Is the hon. Member aware that 120,000 Jews have lived in Bagdad since the days of Nebuchadnezzar?
Mr. Levy: There are 120,000 Jews who have lived in Bagdad and have been happy, and I do not know how many have lived in America. There have been 600,000 in Germany. I am talking about Palestine and not Great Britain or Bagdad.
To revert to my argument, there is another point which the Foreign Secretary made. I am trying to illustrate what seems to me to be the essential unreality of his argument. When last year he made Transjordan into an independent State, that action was criticised in some quarters as premature on the grounds that it would make possible future partition difficult. Today he comes down to the House and says, "Partition is difficult, if not impossible, because last year I made Transjordan an independent State, and there is, therefore, no longer room for a second viable Arab State if there is to be a viable Jewish State." The essential argument in favour of partition was never even mentioned. That essential argument is this, that it is surely at this day and age abundantly clear to everybody that it is impossible to submit Arabs to Jewish domination in a unitary Palestine and it is impossible to submit Jews to Arab domination in a unitary Palestine. The
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second course is even more impossible. I think both are impossible, but the second is more impossible because, whatever the hon. Gentleman for Cheltenham may think, there is a wide discrepancy between the grades of social development of the Jews and the Arabs. To put the socially more advanced under the government of the socially less advanced is an absolutely untenable proposition.
I have never been a Zionist, though I am bound to confess that the Foreign Secretary has gone some way towards converting me; but his success is only partial. My conversion is still only halfhearted because my reasons are largely negative. I have felt in the past no mystic conviction of a national Jewish destiny. I have been averse also from the multiplication and intensification it nationalisms in a world which is striving. however ineffectually, towards inter nationalism; and moreover, there was to my mind objection to the avowed intention of Zionists to swamp Palestine by immigration in order to create a Jewish State in Palestine when the time for independence should arrive. But that objection has now been removed. There is no possibility any longer of the Jews being able to swamp Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"]—because six million of them have been slaughtered in Europe. There are not sufficient numbers waiting to go to Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Oh."] Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to quote from Sir Frederick Leggett, one of the members of the Anglo-American Committee, who is himself an anti-Zionist. He says:
"As the average annual rate of natural increase of the Arabs is nearly twice that of the Jews and as mortality among the Arabs is declining, partly by reason of the better conditions which have followed the activities of Jews, it is fairly clear that no measurable amount of Jewish immigration will produce a Jewish majority."
I do not believe there is any serious possibility of that, so that objection has been removed so far as I am concerned.
But a more important reason and a new factor is this. I believe indeed that although every side of the House is committed to the establishment of a National Home in Palestine, it is quite impossible now to establish a National Home which is not also a national State, and for this reason. The Foreign Secretary admitted that he had some difficulty in understanding precisely what was meant by

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"a Jewish National Home." I sympathise. It is a nebulous phrase. But whatever it may mean, one thing is certain and that is that one cannot call a man's home his home if he is prevented from entering it at the point of a gun. Therefore, it seems to me that unless we have free immigration we cannot have a National Home.
It is merely specious to maintain that there are 600,000 Jews there now and that, therefore, the promise of a National Home has been fulfilled because there they are—at home. For, after all, that argument could have been equally well applied in 1922 when there were only 85,000 Jews there. So if the Home means anything, it must mean free immigration; yet it is clearly incontestable that the Arabs will not consent to further immigration into Palestine.
I feel, therefore, that the crux of the problem is immigration and I am convinced that if, when this Government took office, it had torn up the White Paper and the 100,000 had been admitted, the extreme Zionist argument would have lost very much of its force; and, moreover, paradoxically enough, Arab resistance would not have increased but would have diminished, for the simple reason that you fight so long as there is a chance of getting what you want, but you do not always fight against a fait accompli.
Very briefly, that is at least one aspect of the Jewish case. What I want to suggest to the House is that at no point does it conflict with British interests but, on the contrary, British interests are identical. There are three British interests of which I want to remind the House. One is of prime importance, namely, the reputation of British good faith. I know there has been a mass of contradictory promises in the past—that is deplorable, but it is an undeniable fact; and it is impossible, therefore, for any Government to come in now and fulfil all the pledges of its predecessors; but it can at least fulfil its own pledges—
Mr. Stakes: The Government as a Government have not made any.
Mr. Levy: Is the hon. Member advancing the theory that a party is only bound by pledges made when it is on
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the Government bench, and not when it is in Opposition? I should have thought he would have been the last person to suggest such a thing.
Mr. Stokes: My hon. Friend surely does not suggest, especially in the field of foreign affairs, that that is said in Opposition must be carried out at all costs by the party when it comes into government?
Mr. Levy: I should have said so; and what is absolutely indisputable is that this party is pledged, not up to the hilt but up to the elbow, to repeal the White Paper when it came into office. The Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that there was a great difficulty about that, and he advanced what to me was a novel and extremely subtle doctrine in defence, that you cannot really do it without consulting the other party. That might have some substance if the original arrangement had been a matter of negotiation between parties, but when it is a unilateral one, why in the world cannot it be unilaterally repealed? After all, if unilateral commitments cannot subsequently be repealed by different Governments, then an extremely bizarre theory is imported into government, and one which would have to apply also to internal affairs. I did not notice that the Foreign Secetary was reluctant to repeal the Trades Disputes Act until he had consulted the employers; yet it is a completely parallel case.
Dr. Morgan: Specious.
Mr. Levy: I do not think I am being specious.
Dr. Morgan: You called it bizarre.
Mr. Levy: There are two other things I want to speak about. One is the question of safeguarding and preserving British lives; the other is the safeguarding of British economic and strategic interests. One word about the first. One thing which is quite clear is that this delay of 18 months, which has weakened the hands of the moderates, which has played into the hands of the terrorists, has cost us British lives. We cannot wash our hands of that responsibility. It is a deplorable thing but it is true and, unfortunately, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) has pointed out, the delay is not over. We are at

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the outset of another large delay. I hope sincerely that means will be found by the Foreign Secretary to abbreviate the period of waiting before the matter can be submitted to U.N.O., but even when it has been submitted, there will still be a long period when we shall be left holding the baby.
As to the other point regarding our vital interests or key points, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol called them, it has for a long time been the orthodox Foreign Office view that we have vital economic and strategic interests in the Middle East which can only be protected by appeasing the Arabs. The Labour Party, rightly or wrongly, has disagreed with that view, but if the Foreign Secretary, since he has been accessible to the blandishments of the Foreign Office, has abandoned the Labour Party view and accepted the Foreign Office view, what is to happen if, when U.N.O. comes to a decision, it should decide that Great Britain must evacuate what the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office believe to be an essential strategic and economic position? Are we to invoke the veto? Are we to hedge? Are we to use all the machinery of delay open to us? If so, to submit the thing at all to the United Nations is a farce, and is merely a device for delay. I cannot believe that, but there is no alternative to that if the Foreign Secretary is persuaded that the status quo in Palestine is essential. If he is not so persuaded, then he must obviously have some alternative plan. But if we have some alternative plan, why cannot it be put into operation now before we continue to incur the odium of the present situation and the dishonour of broken pledges?
For these reasons, I believe the course that we are embarked upon is injurious to the interests of Great Britain, and I urge the Foreign Secretary to call a halt before it is too late.
7.9 p.m.
General Sir George Jeffreys: I do not propose to attempt to deal with the general situation as regards the government of Palestine. It is common ground that Jews and Arabs have been unable or are unwilling to agree, and will not accept any compromise proposals. It may be that the Government are well advised in referring this matter to the United Nations organisation but, as we have heard from
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the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) and from the Foreign Secretary himself, that must take time. It cannot come before the United Nations before next September but, whatever the eventual judgment of the United Nations may be, we must continue for some time at least to carry out our Mandate. I want to urge that, so long as we hold the Mandate, we should carry it out properly and, in particular, that we should enforce law and order in Palestine and shall suppress and rigorously punish terrorism. It is with this question of the suppression of terrorism, and with the part that must be played in that suppression by British troops, that I wish especially to deal tonight.
The Foreign Secretary referred last week to the great strain which he said was put on the civil Government of Palestine. No one will doubt that that strain is very great, but I suggest that it is nothing like the strain which is thrown on the British troops who have been living under the constant menace of kidnapping, murder, and outrage in its worst forms, and who have to treat the population as being supposedly friendly until some outrage is committed, or at least threatens. Those troops have never been called upon, or permitted, to take any sustained offensive against terrorism. In that connection, I think the observations last summer by the Lord President of the Council regarding the order of the General Officer Commanding in Palestine were very unfair to the General Officer Commanding.
The troops in Palestine are in a very similar position to that of police in a criminal area. If those police are on friendly social terms of intercourse with the friends and families, possibly, of the criminals, their movements, and their intentions, will almost certainly be known by the criminals in due course, and those criminals will be able to take precautions accordingly. I think the position of our troops in Palestine is very analogous to that of police under those circumstances. If they go about, and are allowed to have social intercourse with the Jewish population, to go to public places of amusement and refreshment amongst them, they are not only risking kidnapping and outrage, but every unguarded word and indication of movement or intentions is sure to be overheard by someone. Even if it is not

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overheard by terrorists, it is certain to be passed on to them by their friends. I am sure that the instructions of the General Officer. Commanding as to the avoidance by troops of social intercourse with Jews were fully justified for these reasons, apart from the strain on the troops involved in the present methods, a strain which is so great that I believe it would be too great for any troops except British troops, because of their morale and discipline, I say that these methods have been ineffective. When an outrage has been committed, according to reports which reach England, measures are at once taken locally and temporarily. They are strong measures, certainly, of searches, restrictions, curfews, arrests, and all the rest. But, after a short time, these measures are relaxed and finally taken off altogether, until the next outrage occurs. I would urge that what is necessary is a continuous and sustained offensive against terrorism, with no let-up whatever, no relaxation of pressure, and regardless of the inconvenience and restrictions which may in consequence fall on the Jewish population.
Mr. H. Hynd: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me? Is he quoting from Hitler's instructions to his troops for the occupation of Palestine?
Earl Winterton: The hon. Member for Central Hackney (Mr. H. Hynd) ought to be ashamed of himself. That was a most insolent interruption.
Mr. H. Hynd: I did stand up to make my interruption. That is more than the noble Lord did.
Sir G. Jeffreys: They should be treated in the way the civil population might be treated in a hostile country, until the hostile forces have been defeated. For instance there might be restrictions for intelligence purposes. After all, the Jewish Agency have refused co-operation against the terrorists, and can scarcely claim any consideration on that account. I believe everyone in this House will agree that the terrorists must be completely knocked out and exterminated. To my mind, the defended areas behind barbed wire should not be regarded as refuges, but as bases from which offensive operations can be conducted against the terrorists. Those operations should be continuous and sustained. There should be no relaxation, but they should be carried out with the use of every appro-
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priate weapon which is available. There should be no question of waiting for the terrorists to shoot first. With the object of knocking out terrorism, I urge that complete discretion be allowed to the military authorities to deal with the situation. I do not know whether that is given now, but the general impression is that the military authorities are hampered at times by instructions from the Colonial Office, and are not allowed the completely free hand which they ought to have to deal with such a situation. There should be one order, and one only, to the G.O.C., to completely knock out terrorism with any and every means available. The terrorists should be brought to justice if possible, and, if brought to justice, they should be dealt with by the utmost rigour of the law.
The British troops who have this most unpleasant and invidious duty of attempting to restore law and order in Palestine and to suppress odious outrages there, should be given every form of encouragement and support. Their hands should not be tied in any way. They have displayed admirable restraint, and can be depended upon to display equal restraint in any offensive measures they take. Those measures should be taken, they should be continuous, there should be no relaxation until the moment terrorism is completely knocked out. So, and only so, shall we be carrying out the terms of our Mandate to govern Palestine properly, and to enforce law and order so long as we are there.
7.18 p.m.
Mr. Turner-Samuels: We are considering today a question of a very grave character, the treatment of which by this House, and in the future, might have very grievous results. I profoundly agree with the view that was expressed by the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) when he laid emphasis on the future in its relation to the present Debate. It is very easy in a matter of this kind to evoke emotion and to cover it with a lot of complications. Heaven knows there are plenty of complications on this subject which bear upon the past, and the sooner the past buries itself the better. We must concentrate on the future even if it is somewhat uncomfortable as we all know it very often is, to face facts.
It seems to me that the two material matters which concern this country, Pales-

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tine, and indeed, the world are first the question of the Mandate, and secondly the question of the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary, in his speech, which I do not for a moment doubt was made with the greatest sincerity, and was intended to be helpful, was, in my humble submission, on the two critical points which I have mentioned, entirely unsatisfactory. He gave no guidance to the House on the crucial question of the White Paper as regards the period between now and September, when the matter is to go to U.N.O. Indeed, when I challenged him during his speech, to try to reconcile what he' was saying—that this House was committed to the White Paper—with the entirely opposite version we had from the Prime Minister as recently as 1st July of last year, he observed that he was coming to that matter, but he never did.
I noticed one remarkable thing that he said about the Mandate. He said that it had become unworkable. All I can say is that it must have been through a long and painful course that he arrived at that conclusion after 23 years. Even if it were true that the Mandate was unworkable, it does not lie in the power of this or any other Government to abrogate the Mandate. If that is to be done, if the Mandate is to be changed, if there is to be a new document or a new policy, then the only power, the only source from which that can be done is the United Nations, and because of that it is to that body that it is now intended to refer this particular Mandate. The Foreign Secretary said at the same time, that the Mandate,"was intended to lead to something." I find it difficult to see how it is to lead to something, if, according to the Foreign Secretary, it is in fact to lead to nothing, because that was the effect of what he told us this afternoon. The effect was not to implement the Mandate, not to try to carry out any of its terms, either in the language in which it is now framed, or in a modified form. His view was that it was unworkable.
There is one other point I would like to mention before I come to the point of the legal status of the Mandate, and a few words about the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary said what I thought was rather an extraordinary thing. I do not honestly believe that he intended to convey what his words, in my submission, did convey, namely, that the Jews were contending that they should be entitled
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to become members of the United Nations organisation on the single ground that they were Jews. Speaking as a member of that faith, if any Jew or any body of Jews were to suggest to me that they should have an entitlement for inclusion in the United Nations organisation, merely because they were Jews, I should just laugh at them. There is no possible foundation for any such claim. As the Foreign Secretary truly said, that would at once open the doors of the United Nations to all sorts of absurd and unsustainable applications for membership. But the Jews have never made any such far-fetched proposal. What they have said, as regards representation on the United Nations, has been that if they built up their National Home in Palestine, as the Mandate, in the most explicit terms. prescribes that they are to do, then they would he eligible in respect of that home on political grounds for a seat upon the United Nations organisation, in exactly the same way, it should be noted, as the Arabs are entitled to representation on the United Nations organisation, not because they are Arabs but because they have been given national independence in the particular States they now occupy. That is precisely the basis upon which the Jews put forward their claim, not on the basis of an absurd suggestion that because of some religious reason they ought to be members of the United Nations organisa tion.
Earl Winterton: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not wish to indulge in an historical inaccuracy, which quite inadvertently he indulged in, and which might give offence to certain countries. The Arab States have not been given their independence. They have enjoyed independence for hundreds of years.
Mr. Turner-Samuels: May I remind the noble Lord that this country and America, with their treasure and their blood, fought to liberate large areas in the Near East? Therefore, is it not right to say that we, in this country, as well as the Americans, have some claim to say what ought to be done in the Near East in regard to those States? Indeed, that is precisely what has happened, because we were given Mandates of these places and these Mandated territories have now been converted into independent States. That is the position.
Earl Winterton: I thank the hon. and learned Member most sincerely for having reminded me that I fought in the Desert in the 1914–18 war, with Lawrence. I was aware of the fact he mentioned, but I was dealing with the statement which he quite inadvertently made, that the Arab States have been given independence. Some of them were independent long before the 1914–18 war.
Mr. Turner-Samuels: Perhaps I did not quite catch the noble Lord's point because it was quite irrelevant. I was trying to underline the fact that as far as the position of the Jews in Palestine is concerned it is exactly the same as the position of the Arabs in the Arab States which had been under Mandate and had since been converted into independent States.
The senior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) had an extraordinary idea about the origin of the Mandate. So far as I can gather from what he said, it appears to him to have come out of the blue and no one can trace its descent. Actually, the position is that the Mandate came into being as a result of an agreement of all the Allied Powers after the first World War. As a result of that, the Council of the League of Nations handed this particular Mandate to this country. The Mandate contained in its first recital, a clear statement as to why it was being handed to this country at all, and what its express object was. It said that the Government of His Britannic Majesty had made a declaration on 2nd November, 1917, and that that declaration was adopted by the other Powers,
"in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."
Subject to preserving certain rights to which I will refer to in a moment. That was the premise upon which this Mandate was established. That was the object of this Mandate. Every Article which follows is intended to carry out that object, subject to the modifications that other civil and religious rights are not to be prejudiced. I challenge anyone to contradict that statement. The reason why the phrase, "Jewish National Home" was used is not hard to understand. Advantage has been taken of the word "home" in order to raise some legal refinement about the fact that the word "State" is not used, but the word "Home." In my submission there is no
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distinction of substance between the phrase, "Jewish National Home" and "Jewish National State."
I will tell hon. Members why the word "Home" was, in my view, used instead of the word "State." It was perfectly clear that there was a large body of Jews outside Palestine who were anxious about what was taking place in Palestine as regards a Jewish State. They were people who were closely attached to their own particular countries. They had been born there, they were resident there, their families and businesses and hopes and their traditions were there. They were as much a part of the country as those who had been native to it for hundreds of years. They were troubled about the setting up in Palestine of what was to be described as a "Jewish State." As they were Jews themselves, they did not want the idea to be accepted that a Jew must necessarily be identified with Palestine because it was a Jewish State. That was I am sure due of the main reasons which operated to cause the phrase "Jewish National Home" to be used rather than the phrase "Jewish National State."
The other cause was obviously diplomatic. There was a good deal of sense in that. There were people who were already seated in Palestine. There were people there who had civil and religious rights. Naturally, everyone concerned was anxious that these people ought not to feel that they were to be dispossessed or prejudiced in the arrangement that was being made. If the word "State" had been used that might easily have aroused these doubts, whereas by using the word "Home", a modified term, it was no doubt desired to avoid that. We must remember in this case that as a substitute for "State" we have the word "National." It is impossible for anyone reading the Articles of the Mandate and wishing to put an honest interpretation upon them, to come to any conclusion but that it was intended that a National Home should be set up in Palestine for the Jews, and, as it says in Article 2 that should lead gradually to "the development of self-governing institutions" there. There appears to be no doubt about that whatsoever. The whole context of the Mandate justifies that conclusion.
I would like to say a word about the Jewish Agency. A suggestion has been made that we can merely wave our hands

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and get rid of the Jewish Agency. The Agency is an integral part of the Mandate. Before we can get rid of the Jewish Agency, we must get rid of the Mandate. In Article 4 are stated precisely the functions of the Jewish Agency. Certainly it is not one of the prescribed functions that they should deal with matters of terrorism or anything of that kind. In fact, the Jewish Agency has neither the power nor the means to do that. The function 'of the Agency was:
"for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as ma) affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine."
That was their principal purpose. As immigration, under Article 6, was one of the main purposes of the Mandate, it was not likely, and it is not likely, that the Jewish Agency would do anything which would stop that immigration, for that would be a contravention of the Mandate itself. The Agency has never contravened a single one of its duties under the Mandate. I defy anyone to prove a single contravention by the Agency of any duty, obligation or function which it was given or has exercised under this Mandate.
Major Legge-Bourke: What about the White Paper?
Mr. Turner-Samuels: The White Paper is another matter; the White Paper is illegal. So far as the question of immigration is concerned, I would like to mention Article 6 of the Mandate which is very important. It is the Article which controls the question of immigration and it says:
"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections "
Brigadier Mackeson: On a point of Order. Many of us are well acquainted with this question. Could we not get on with the modern problem?
Mr. Turner-Samuels: Hon. Members may be well acquainted with it, but the speeches already made have not indicated that. Those speeches and the errors they evince are on record and I think that I am, at least, entitled to correct them. Article 6 says:
"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights -and position of other section. of the population are not prejudiced shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suit-
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able conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."
Mr. Manningham-Buller: Would the hon. and learned Gentleman read the earlier words:
"while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population…
Mr. Turner-Samuels: I have just read those words. I do not know why I should be required to read them twice. I wish to say a few words about the White Paper of 1939. I will be brief, because I know others want to take part in the Debate. We are bound as regards the White Paper of 1939 to take into account what has been the policy of this party and the right hon. Gentlemen who now sit on the Front Bench. It is an absolute heresy, in my humble submission, for anyone to say that because they have become Members of the Government they can throw off, or discard, all the statements and pledges that they have ever made. If that were to pass as being the political principle of this country, we should have come to a sorry state of affairs. While the right hon. Gentleman the Foreigr Secretary was speaking, I interrupted him. He said that this House was bound by the White Paper. That proposition cannot be sustained. It is a piece of pure advocacy. As I said when I interrupted the right hon. Gentleman earlier, the Prime Minister himself has repudiated any such position. I quoted his view as expressed in this House on 1st July, 1946, reported in HANSARD of that date in col. 1907. I am sorry that time does not, allow me to go more fully into the White Paper, and I conclude by saying that the document is from beginning to end, illegal and ought now to be repudiated by the Government which opposed it originally in this House and had prior to this Parliament, consistently denounced it.
7.40 p.m.
Mr. Stokes: I will deal with some of the points mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) in the course of my speech, but in regard to his suggestion about the Foreign Secretary changing party policy, I would say that I was not at the recent party meeting, but, from Press reports, I gather that, on the whole, the party supported him.
Mr. Turner-Samuels: I was referring to the Labour Party.
Mr. Stokes: The hon. Member ought to have been long enough in the House to realise that the Parliamentary Labour Party's job is to interpret party policy in the House of Commons in the light of existing circumstances, and I would add that, when the Parliamentary Labour Party supports the Foreign Secretary, that is good enough for me. I was particularly delighted with the Foreign Secretary's speech, because I think that, for the first time, I heard him state a moderately fair case for the Arabs, though he did not go far enough for me. I thought he stated the Jewish case absolutely fairly, but I am assured by my Zionist friends, that he did not go far enough for them. Therefore, it must have been a good speech. We know that a good many promises have been made, but what must never be forgotten is that the Arabs were first promised the return of Palestine. Both my hon. and learned Friend who spoke before me and the Foreign Secretary expressed views as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I think that a great deal of misapprehension exists there because people do not realise that the Balfour Declaration was only a sentence embodied in a long letter from Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild.
Mr. Janner rose—
Mr. Stokes: I am not going to give way. I want to make it quite clear that the Arabs never accepted the Balfour Declaration, and were never consulted about it. They never accepted the Mandate, because they considered it to be completely contrary to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he did not find it easy to decide what a National Home for the Jews meant. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester explained that it really meant a national State, and said that the wrong word had been used. I am going to quote from the important White Paper which was issued on 3rd June, 1922—a British White Paper—which said:
"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose which is in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become Jewish as England is English. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time
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contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."
That was issued by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), who said the other day that he stood completely by that declaration. I do not think there is any doubt whatever about what was intended.
My contention, and I speak with some limited experience of Arab affairs, is that, numerically, at any rate, the intentions of the Balfour Declaration have been carried out. When the last war ended, there were some 60,000 Jews in Palestine, forming about 7 per cent. of the population. There are now 600,000 Jews in Palestine, forming 30 per cent. of the population, and we cannot expect the Arabs to consent to more and more European Jews going into Palestine, when they were not responsible for the persecution of the Jews in Europe, and so long as Britain and America—and the Jews in England number i per cent. and the Jews in America 4 per cent. of the population—are not prepared to open their doors to let them in. I am quite sure from what I have been told by our Arab friends that, if we were prepared to raise our Jewish population up to 33 per cent., there would be no difficulty with the Arabs in Palestine.
I was very glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he was not going to give up his efforts to solve this problem. I was sorry when he said the other day that the matter had to go to U.N.O. would much prefer, and I understand that my Arab friends would much prefer. that this matter should be settled between the British Government and the parties concerned, and I hope that the appeal which has been thrown out today will not fall on deaf ears.
To turn to another subject, that of the stamping out of violence, these acts of violence were condemned on both sides of the House with great unanimity. The point to which I would call attention is that our methods of stamping out violence in the case of Arabs are very different from the methods until recently used against the Jews. I think it was in 1937 that the Arab Higher Committee was

1969
declared an illegal organisation, and four members of the Arab Higher Committee and other Arab politicians were arrested and deported. Following on that, we had the attempted assassination by the Jews of the High Commissioner, followed by the assassination of Lord Moyne, and what happened next? The Jews were merely told that they must be good boys, or they would get no further. Recent revelations have made it plain that there was some responsibility on the part of the Jewish Agency for being concerned in matters leading up to the blowing-up of the King David Hotel, and it is astonishing to me, in spite of what has 'been said about the Mandate, that the Jewish Agency has not been declared illegal and the leading people in it removed from that country.
There is one other thing I would like to say If the Foreign Secretary fails, and does not bring about a reconciliation of some kind, there can be no question of partition, because the Arabs will not have it at all. There can only be a unitary State, and I hope that if, in the end, the matter is going to U.N.O., the Foreign Secretary will make it clear that some time limit should be set. It seems to me that we should follow the excellent policy which has been announced in regard to India. I think that, in the case of India, the time is wrong, but that is by the way. We ought to have a time limit; otherwise, U.N.O. will mess about and not come to a decision, and our men will have to bear the heat and burden of the day.
There is one other small point. I hope the attention of U.N.O., as well as of this House, may be called to the extraordinary concessions granted in Palestine in 1921 and in 1927 both in regard to water and hydro-electric power and mineral resources. In the Colonial Office White Paper of 1925, it was stated that the salts in the waters of the Dead Sea, at the valuation at that time, were worth £240,000 million. The figure is at least double that value today. It is an astonishing thing that, when these concessions were granted, an hon. Member of this House—Sir W. Joynson-Hicks—said:
"I have had some experience of contracts in this city, but the Rutenberg contract contains the most astonishing concessions I have ever seen or read in my life."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th July, 1922; Vol. 156, C. 304.]
I think that will bear investigation. I am sure that behind the scenes, these
1970
matters have a great bearing on this situation.
I think it was a great mistake to mix up the question of the persecution of the Jews in Europe with the Palestine problem. But people always seem to do that. We all know that Mr. Balfour had no thought of Hitler in mind when the Declaration was made. There was no thought of thousands of Jews wanting to leave Europe. [An HON. MEMBER: "What are the figures?"] I cannot give the figures, but no doubt, when my hon. Friend speaks, he will say what was in Mr. Balfour's mina. I am quite certain that he did not contemplate the huge influx of Jews from the West to the East; he certainly did not contemplate that the Arabs were to be asked to take into their midst a huge European colony. It really is a matter of Arabs and Europeans—not Jews—against whom their military effort was sought in the 1914–18 war. I think that ought to be clear in people's minds when they discuss this subject.
I agree with the Foreign Secretary, and I believe that anybody who has travelled in that part will also agree that Arabs and Jews, if left alone, will get together. I believe that, even with this European in flux, it is still possible, with a hit of good will on both sides, for them to do that But, with no decision and the matter being allowed to drift on the thing becomes more and more difficult. As to our own party policy. I never agree with party policy as declared in the Labour Party paper called "The International Post-War Settlement," for under the heading "Colonies," we declare that the important thing is to develop the country and to give the indigenous population fair play and to support the Government. In the next column we say that we must doublecross the population in Palestine. That is fantastic. I do not believe that the party which passed that White Paper, had the slightest conception of what they were doing.
Finally, I will say that there is a common point between the Jews and the Arabs. They both dislike us; they dislike all our schemes, and they dislike one another. But they all realise that they must get- together. That is a very good common ground from which to start. At least, one knows where one is. I believe that the Foreign Secretary's suggestion is right. If they would only follow the policy which

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he has outlined and try to get on together for three, five or ten years, as he said, under a properly constituted Government, in which everybody is represented, I think we should achieve the solution of our difficulties, and that this unhappy chapter will be closed for all time.
7.54 P.m.
Sir Ralph Glyn: I do not propose to detain the House for long, but I would like to say something in support of what the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) said just now. I am one of the few Members who were in this House when the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper were discussed. I think it is only right that, in such circumstances, one might say what one's recollections are of the intentions of that time, because, since then, many things have happened, and many things have overlaid the views then held.
We must first of all remember that the United States was to have had the Mandate, and that important point should not be forgotten. It was accepted by the United States, and, when President Wilson turned down the League of Nations, it passed to us to hold this troublesome baby. We accepted the Mandate, not because we wished to have it, but in order to do something for the benefit of the Middle East. The White Paper of 1922 was issued in an endeavour to correct what Mr. Balfour had said in that unhappy declaration about the National Home. There was an idea that the Jewish National Home should be not far from Jerusalem, and that there should be a university to which the Jews should go. It was at one time proposed that there should be a passport or a nationality office so that Jews could go there and obtain Jewish nationality. Having done that, they could then go wherever they wished, and could travel with a Jewish passport. But the British Jews, whose views I have always respected, and who made a great contribution to our efforts, were strenuously opposed to such a plan
Mr. Janner: The hon. Gentleman is making a statement which is absolutely incorrect. There were a few British Jews who signed a letter, but they were in a very minute minority, and certainly did not represent the opinions of British Jewry at all.
Sir R. Glyn: No doubt the hon. Member will have a chance of stating his views later. All I can say is that at that time Zionism, as we know it today, was unknown, and our preoccupation at that time was to try and help settle those difficult problems in Palestine in such a way as was in accordance with British practice and tradition.
I believe that an immense amount of harm has been done both in the United States and elsewhere by mixing up strategical considerations with the Mandate. There have been a great many people in America who thought that we were manipulating the Mandate for, strategical purposes. If a Mandate is used at all, it must be used largely in the interests of the people concerned in the territory for which a country is responsible. There ought to be no other consideration. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) said, I think, that one of the reasons why we should continue with the Mandate was strategical. That, surely, should be the last reason. It shows that we are not carrying out the purpose of the Mandate quite disinterestedly, which was the original intention.
It was never felt that this country should be saddled with this Mandate for a long period. It was always considered that it should be for a fairly short time, but, unfortunately, we have got more and more into the morass. We must keep absolutely distinct the problem of Palestine from that of the Jewish displaced persons. There are certain figures which have been issued quite recently, and some hon. Members had an opportunity of seeing the distress in Europe and the number of Jews who are now in camps in Germany, Austria and Italy and are being looked after by U.N.R.R.A. Indeed, a great many of them are not in the camps, but are mixed with the people of these countries. There is no greater distress or misery in any part of the world than that suffered by these unfortunate people, and this country should give a lead in this matter. It is our duty to do it.
As reported by U.N.R.R.A. the actual number of Jews up to October last was 152,600. That is apart from the other displaced persons who, I think, number nearly a million. It is quite obvious that we are rot going to help those people by thrusting them, willy-nilly, into Palestine. For one thing, many of them do not want

1973
to go there, but they do want to get out of all the associations and the miseries of the Hitler persecution. It is a great blemish on the postwar conduct of foreign affairs that we have not been able to find a proper solution to that problem. But we should be in a far worse mess if this House—and, after all, this House is responsible for the Mandate—did not make it perfectly clear at this moment how far we are to be tied to this affair, even if we do go to the United Nations organisation. What I am afraid of—and I ask the House to consider this—is that too much time will be taken in arriving at a settlement. I believe it is right that we should go to the United Nations organisation, but that it is essential that we should fix a time limit for arriving at a decision.
We have done it for India, and I believe that policy will succeed, and we ought to do it for Palestine. If the meeting of the United Nations is in September, surely it would be reasonable to say that on 1st January, 1948, we quite definitely go out, because it would be intolerable that British troops, the Palestine police and our administration in Palestine should be forced to carry out a policy which we not only do not approve, but are not really capable of carrying out. It should be remembered that, though we may have numbers of men in uniform, unless the financial position of the country is such that they can be maintained at a necessary war potential, we have no business to accept the responsibility. We stand now upon the edge of a completely new situation. We have published to the world what our financial and economic position is. We have given the details and the numbers. I cannot conceive that anybody in his right senses could possibly doubt that Palestine and the Middle East are today a danger spot. Unless handled with the utmost care it will be the beginning of such trouble between East and West, and we shall find ourselves involved in such a situation, that it will be quite intolerable to the people of this country to have to bear the responsibility for law and order while not in fact being able to ensure it.
Having heard the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, therefore, I believe today we stand as we did in 1922. Then we accepted the situation which somebody else had produced. Now today we acknowledge a situation with which we are no longer
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able to cope within the terms of the Mandate. We should go to the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, and say that for all these years we have struggled and done our best; circumstances are such that we honestly believe we cannot carry on any further, and we therefore fix a date when we come out, refusing to be tied to a position which is no longer tolerable.
Mr. Scollan: Will the hon. Member please explain how we can submit the matter to the United Nations for a decision while, at the same time; making a declaration that in no circumstances would we continue in Palestine?
Sir R. Glyn: The hon. Member may feel that we should give up all our sovereign rights in this country, but our first duty as a member of the United Nations is, surely, to point out that we are not any longer in a position to undertake the risks entailed by a continuation of the Mandate. The greatest mistake we could make today would be to do something in connection with Palestine which would be misunderstood, as the Balfour Declaration was. The whole history of the Middle East and of Britain's administration there is one series of misunderstandings and misconceptions, and, surely, we have had sufficient warnings of the difficulties which follow from not facing the facts and telling the truth. After all, what is it that is at stake? It is not a question of party politics, it is a question of right and wrong. Either we are able to do this job or we are not, and I am convinced that the time has come when we can say quite honourably that we have done our level best, but we are anxious that the world should take up this burden. We have failed to produce a policy—that is a fact—which brings peace to both sides. Nobody can say we have not tried; let somebody else try, and bring fresh minds to bear upon it.
My last word is in regard to the Arab League. The Arabs, and indeed all peoples, at our request, made a contribution to fighting the terrorism of Hitler. The Arab League represents a great assembly of religious people, believing in Mohammedanism, and forming an enormous block of power stretching right across that part of the world. We have had contacts with Moslems in every part of the world, we respect their faith and

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understand it. The Arab League are looking to those nations which understand them to give them a lead. It is not a question of domination, it is a question of help. There are many Arab states which are struggling forward. Let us not put ourselves in a position which perhaps does not, permit us to give free and unfettered advice and help to those people, who have always looked to us in the past for honourable and fair dealing. I believe that we have a great opportunity; if we take it now we may save the world from another conflict, but if we do not take it, I think a conflict is more than possible.
8.6 p.m.
Brigadier Peto: We have in the last three-quarters of an hour heard three totally different and extremely good speeches. The first, perhaps a little long, was by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels), who took the Jewish point of view; the second was by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), who took a totally different view, that of the Arab, and the third was by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), and with it I, personally, wholeheartedly agree. In the past I think both parties have made mistakes. The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester prefaced his remarks by saying that he was not going into the past, and from then on never mentioned the future in the rest of his speech. I. however, am going to mention the past. and at the beginning I feel it right to say that I do know a little about Palestine. I have been there and served there, and I was there right at the beginning, from 1921 until 1924. I have seen, and can bear witness to what the Foreign Secretary said, that it is perfectly possible for Jew and Arab to work together. They have not identical interests, and that is perhaps why it is quite easy for them to work together. They are jealous of each other only when it comes to a question of which shall be the dominating people in the country. It is then that the quarrel begins.
As the Foreign Secretary said, the Jew is a town-dweller; 78 per cent of them live in the urban districts, in Tel Aviv and so forth. The Arab, on the other hand, does not live in the towns, he cultivates the soil. It is quite possible for those two communities to live in harmony
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together. For my part I have always been in favour of partition, not as a permanency but as an initial stage with a view to getting them to live together without quarrelling for a certain period, meeting each other and possibly working for each other in a way which will lead ultimately to unity. There is no doubt in my mind that it is possible to start by partition and finish with unity in that country.
I have heard with some interest the views expressed by various hon. Members on the meaning of the term "National Home." I thought it was quite enlightening to hear the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester give his view that it meant a pre-eminently Jewish State. I have no doubt that is the view of many other hon. Members on the Labour side. It is not my view. While it is quite impossible to say what was in Lord Balfour's mind, my view is that the National Home was not intended to be an exclusive State for Jews only. I thought the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester gave the impression that it was to be an exclusive home for Jews.
Mr. S. Silverman: Is not the hon. and gallant Gentleman getting a little confused? A National Home is, surely, a home in which a nation lives, in which it is there as of right, and in which it is not dominated by anybody else. There are cases where one can have that, as in Wales and Scotland, without a State.
Brigadier Peto: The hon. Member answered that point himself, I think, when he interjected, a little while ago, that it was to be a Jewish home with free immigration into it, limited only by the economic capacity for absorption. That is obviously what it must be, and what it was intended to be—a limited number of Jews would be allowed to immigrate into the country, but the number would be limited by the economic capacity of the country, and it would not be to the exclusion of the Arabs who are there already. I find it very hard to understand how the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with their knowledge, could possibly have stated, in December, 1944, and May, 1945, at Labour conferences, things which are totally and absolutely different from the interpretation of the term "National Home" to which I have referred. According to those statements, it was to

1977
be to the exclusion of the Arabs. If I remember rightly, the Prime Minister's remark was to the effect that the Arabs must be encouraged to leave the country as soon as possible and that the Jews must be allowed to immigrate into Palestine absolutely freely, without any let or hindrance, and that no obstacle was to be placed in their way. I have the quotation here.
Mr. Hoy: Perhaps it would be better if the hon. and gallant Member would read the quotation, because I do not think it was exactly as he has said.
Brigadier Peto: The Prime Minister said:
"There is, surely, neither object nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter into this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority, the Arabs being encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let them settle elsewhere …
and so on.
Mr. S. Silverman: What is the date of the quotation?
Brigadier Peto: December, 1944, at the annual conference of the Labour Party. I could also quote what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said the following year, which was even stronger. I cannot understand how two men of great integrity and wisdom could possibly make such statements and lead the Labour Party, at a conference of that sort, completely up the garden path. Now those statements have come back on them. They are in a position of great responsibility. Their words can be quoted. Their party is entirely at sixes and sevens; some people in it think one thing, and some another; some people hold that the Jewish problem should be solved by allowing Jews to go into Palestine freely, and others hold totally opposite views, as, for example, the hon. Member for Ipswich. We know that the great Labour Party has often been confused before as to their policy, and without wishing to rub it in, I mention their lack of policy with regard to Russia, India and Palestine, and I would add with regard to domestic affairs. They were full of promises before they had responsibility, and now that they have responsibility, they are not putting their promises into effect.
Mr. Scollan: Is that the reason the hon. and gallant Gentleman's party has no policy?
Brigadier Peto: The Foreign Secretary said that Palestine was, and is likely to be, a sore spot. The position in Palestine is extremely like that in Ireland after the 1914–18 war. I also happen to have served in that country at the time of the Sinn Fein troubles. The problem in Palestine now, with the terrorists, is almost identical with the problem that had to be solved from 1918–20 in Ireland. I think there is only one way of solving that problem, and that is to handle it very strictly and very firmly, or to get out. There used to be a saying at the time of the Irish troubles which is equally applicable today, although I hope that in mentioning it I shall not deter recruiting. It was:
"Join the Army and see the world "—
and in those days, they used to say:
"Join the R.I.C. and see the next."
If one said now:
"join the Palestine Police and see the next,"
there would be a certain amount of similarity in it. Our men in Palestine have a very unpleasant task to do. Whatever is done, whether the Foreign Secretary goes to U.N.O. with a policy or without a policy, whether U.N.O. in the end comes to no decision or comes to a decision which we feel we have to implement, I ask one thing only, and it is this, that, policy or no policy, we shall be guided by the rule that whatever Is decided as a result, it shall not make the position of our troops in that country more difficult than it now is.
8.17 p.m.
Mr. Crossman: Every time I have listened to a discussion in the House on Palestine, and particularly in listening to certain passages of the Foreign Secretary's speech, I have become increasingly aware that the chief problem is the distance, psychological and physical, between this country and Palestine. When I listen to our quiet discussion, and when I remember that, while we are talking cheerfully about keeping the door open and asking what, in two thousand years, is a year in solving the problem, and that, on the other hand, in Jerusalem today British officials are cooped into ghettos and no British official

1979
can go about among the people he is trying to serve; when I remember that, in the last two days, I have received from two men, one an Englishman and one a New Zealander, who have spent their lives in serving Jews and Arabs desperate appeals to be released from the prison into which they have been put by the British authorities; when I remember the feelings of Jews and Arabs, exasperated by 18 months' constant delay—and it is really ten years of delay from 1937—then I feel we ought to get some actuality and some real relationship between the urgency of the problem and what we are doing about it.
I welcome this Debate if for no other reason than that it will have impressed upon the Foreign Secretary the sense of hon. Members on all sides of the House, whether they are pro-Jew or pro-Arab or, as I prefer, mainly pro-British, our deep concern and our lack of policy today—lack of short-term policy, lack of long-term policy—and the dangers to this country which such a lack of policy will bring. There was one particular thing in the Foreign Secretary's speech which concerned and worried me. It is very easy to generalise from one's own experience. One has spent one's life in negotiations between reasonable British people, where one just gets them into two rooms, and then, after all, it is a question of the employers offering 8d. and the men demanding rod., and then splitting at 9d., and it is very easy to believe that the Jews and the Arabs, in their passionate national opposition, can be somehow jostled together by personal influence, and made to sign on the dotted line some compromise. Not one person who has visited Palestine in the last few years has come back disagreeing with the view that no agreed solution is possible, and that if we try to get people to conferences there will be endless postponement and delay. That was the view of the Peel Commission in 1937 and the view of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in 1939; it is the point upon which the White Paper agrees and it was also the view of the Anglo-American Committee, of which I was a member, last year. Every person agrees that it is an absolute waste of time to go on bringing these people together into conference. I agree with the spokesman for the Opposition today that a whole year has been completely wasted, and that this matter
1980
should have gone to U.N.O. last year if it was going at all. I hope that after this Debate there will be no more talk about leaving the door open.
Arab and Jew have both of them an impregnable moral, case. They have something that they really believe in, and they cannot be wangled out of it by some trick solution which everybody sees through. They know the problem from A to Z, and they look at every proposal with their eyes on the two questions of land and immigration. They judge every proposal according to the way in which-those two questions are dealt with. There is no way of bringing them together before we impose something on both Jews and Arabs.
Mr. Alpass: Would the hon. Member impose a settlement by force?
Mr. Crossman: Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to develop the argument. There are only two ways of ending the situation, unless we continue the Mandate and continue spending £40million a year on keeping a large Army and being unpopular with both sides. One way is the 1937 way of partition. The other is the way of the White Paper of 1939. Now, 52 nations in U.N.O. are to find more devices for wanting to keep up the Mandate. One is the Arab way, and the other is the Jewish way. One way is that which enables the Jews to survive and have a reasonable chance of surviving, with a stake in parts of Palestine where they can either come to terms with the Arabs or fight it out. The other way is to be at the mercy of an Arab majority.
Those two policies, partition and the White Paper, do not differ very much at the moment. The Jewish population in Palestine would, if the White Paper were imposed and our troops were withdrawn, create a de facto republic. British troops would go out and Jewish troops would take over what they could hold, and then there would be negotiations between the two sides. Whether we impose our wishes, or impose the White Paper, the future of Palestine will, in fact, be decided between the Jews on the one side and the Arabs on the other. What we have to decide is between an illegal or irregular way of dividing the country, walking out and leaving the parties to fight it out, or an internationally agreed

1981
partition of the country which will reduce the bloodshed to some extent. There is not a very great variety of solutions.
Now I would say a word or two about the reference to U.N.O.. I am alarmed at the very easy way in which some people believe that reference to U.N.O. will settle the matter. I remember the days when a reference to the Anglo-American Committee was going to solve the problem. The problem is not to be solved in that way. As time goes on we find Arabs and Jew terrorists grow stronger, so that when we have to impose a solution the cost will be greater in British, Jewish and Arab blood the longer we wait. In regard to the reference to U.N.O. let us see realistically what is going to happen. There is a Russian bloc and an American bloc. The aim of the Russian bloc will be to have the British troops removed out of Palestine. The Russians want us out. What about the Americans? The Americans want us in. We have to understand that position. There has been a certain amount said about the Americans and upon the subject of elections in New York. Self-righteousness is rather dangerous. Apparently if there had been a million Jews in London we might have seen a slightly different attitude on the Front Benches on both sides of this House. There were Election pledges about the Jewish question. That British pressure group is big enough to get an election pledge at the conference, but not big enough to formulate the policy of a Government.
It is unwise to bicker at Americans about the size of the Jewish community in that country. We ought to look soberly at American interests. There are two factors which determine America's attitude, the Jewish democratic vote and Standard Oil. Jewish lobbying is vocal; oil lobbying is silent but highly influential. The oil lobby is quite powerful enough, in view of the close connection with the American Chiefs of Staff, to prevent' the Americans assuming any responsibility in the Middle East, to jeopardise the relationship with the Arab world by which the oil supply would suffer. I do not blame the Americans for that. The Jewish group at home and Standard Oil abroad, make it their obvious interest to sit on the fence and to avoid ever making themselves get into the Middle East where they would have to fight pro-Jew or pro-Arab.
1982
Every American politician will do all he can to sit on the fence in the Middle East, so as to ensure that the British are there and that the Russians are not.
If this problem goes to U.N.O. the Americans will prevent the Russians having their way and will try to press the thing back on us. There will be some fantastic new Constitution proposed, with a quite unworkable Mandate. We shall be politely pushed back into running the country to defend British and American interests in the Middle East. We shall, therefore, be no whit further on than if we had done it all ourselves. All U.N.O. brings is another Mandate which we shall not have written ourselves, but which others will have written for us. We may be much worse off than we are at present. Therefore, those Members of this House who have pressed for a time limit for the withdrawal of British personnel and troops are completely justified.
Secondly, we have not only to press for the time limit, but we have to make it clear to U.N.O. that, in our view, the Mandate is unworkable. On that point we agree with the Peel Commission and with the White Paper, and this House even agrees with the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) and myself, who were on the Commission which came to that simple conclusion—a conclusion which has only dawned on the Front Bench. The Mandate is unworkable. We are not prepared to work it. A new compromise cannot work, and we are not prepared to fail again. I believe it is essential that we should go to U.N.O. saying not only that we have this record but that this record has led us to this conclusion: It is impossible for an alien to go on ruling Jew and Arab. The problem has to be settled either by the White Paper or by partition which may both mean the same thing. But it has to be settled in one way or the other, enabling foreign rule to get out of Palestine. That would be to the interest, not only of the British but of the Arabs and the Jews.
I wish to say one harsh thing in conclusion. There are times, even in industrial disputes, when a strike or a lock-out is necessary, when a trial of strength has to come, when the task of the conciliator is to say, "The boys have got to have their heads and try it out." I believe that situation has arrived in Palestine, when it is preferable for Jew and Arab, who have

1983
passionate convictions, to "have it out" as equals and free men, even though it involves some bloodshed, than to continue fighting us. That is the case for partition. It is the case for the White Paper, and it is a case for ending the Mandate.
Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: It is a case for abdication.
Mr. Crossman: When two mature peoples are being ruled by a third people through a police State, I do not call it abdication. I call it liberation of the peoples concerned. It is not abdication to say that the Jews are now strong enough to defend themselves and the Arabs think they can defend themselves, that they should, therefore, have their freedom, and that we should not be tied up to some arrangement which the Americans want to impose on us for keeping us in Palestine with another "phoney" constitution and another compromise which will keep us balancing between the two. We all know that we are now ruling Palestine—we did not know it until last week—under the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary says we are bound to do it because it is a pledge to the Arab world. I would point out that if it is a pledge to the Arab world, it was also declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations—[An HON. MEMBER: "No."]—by a majority of one. It was declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations by four to three. It was declared illegal by Labour Ministers in the House of Commons, and I think I would be supported by the hon. and learned Member for Daventry opposite if I said that there was not a member of the Anglo-American Committee who could find a way of making the White Paper compatible with the Mandate.
We ought to be quite clear on what we are about. We are now saying that we do not want to impose a solution in Palestine. I would point out that we are imposing a solution in Palestine. With enormous force, we are imposing the White Paper. If, through that, we came to war, as at any moment we may, and this country were to find itself fighting to impose the White Paper which was declared illegal by the international authority under which we hold the Mandate, I must frankly say that I would be doubtful whether it would be a just or an unjust war.
Mr. Pickthorn: Did the hon. Member say that we hold the Mandate under the Mandates Commission? If so, I think he should correct himself.
Mr. Grossmann: I said we hold it under the League of Nations.
Mr. Pickthorn: We do not.
Mr. Crossman: I will correct myself and say, "confirmed by the League of Nations." The point I was coming to was this: We have to face the reason why we are imposing the White Paper today. It is the same as in 1939. In 1939 we had to impose the White Paper because the Arab world might have joined the Axis in the years of the war. We all know that was the reason, and it may be it was a perfectly good strategic necessity, though an unpleasant one. We all know that today we are still imposing the White Paper, because we are afraid that otherwise the Arab world might go over to Soviet Russia.
I think it is time we were honest about this, and knew that what we are doing from strategic reasons is taking precedence over morality and legality. If it does, at least we should know it in this House of Commons, and should know the motives behind our policy. It is intolerable to continue in this way, in which expediency is constantly having to take precedence over morality and legality. We know, of course, that there is a large terrorist movement; and if we increase Jewish immigration, who in the Arab world will not say, "You are giving way to Jewish nuisance value"? The Arabs are bound to say that. Just as if the Arab view prevails the Jews will say, "You are giving way to Arab nuisance value." We have now reached the situation in Palestine in which both sides believe, and passionately believe, that the British give way to nuisance value. It is not a question of this Government, but a question of the last 10 years. The attitude is: The British give way to nuisance value, therefore the revolver is the "Esperanto." I say it is that which now utterly corrupts life in Palestine for Briton, Jew and Arab. If we have reached that point, and if the hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. K. Lindsay) calls it abdication, I say that is nonsense.
Let us close down this lamentable story. Let us, for once, make up our minds, and go to the United Nations with the following three plain statements. First: The

1985
Mandate is unworkable, and we cannot possibly agree to any United Nations' recommendation for reconstituting the Mandate with any compromise solution at all. Secondly: We are in favour of an orderly partition of Palestine instead of a disorderly partition, which is what would occur it Palestine were made an Arab State and the Jews merely took what they wanted by means of the Haganah fighting for it; let us say we would rather do it under international guarantee. Thirdly: Whatever happens we will have our troops and adminstrators out by a certain date, because that will speed up the solution.
8.38 p.m.
Mr. Lipson: It seemed to me that the whole burden of the argument of the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) has been to lead up to his suggestion of partition. If I may say so, he has been extremely dogmatic.
Mr. Crossman: Brief.
Mr. Lipson: He is quite sure that no agreed solution is possible. But that was not the view put forward by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary told us that even at this late hour he has not given up hope that an agreed solution may be found. In the course of his speech he showed us how on two occasions he had almost brought the two parties together with the possibility of an agreed solution, when the untimely intervention of America made the position entirely impossible.
Mr. Crossman: Might I correct the hon. Member on one point? I was not, I think, quite dogmatic. All I said was that no one who has been to Palestine in the last three years has come back with the view that agreement is possible. That view is limited to people who sit in London.
Mr. Lipson: At any rate, personally I prefer the more optimistic view taken by the Foreign Secretary. The alternative offered by the hon. Member for East Coventry is that we should come out, and leave it to the Jews and Arabs to fight it out between themselves. That is an alternative which, to my mind, is quite unworthy of the responsibilities which we have had in that country for so many years; and the result of which, I think, would be too terrible to contemplate.
1986
In all the Debates on Palestine in which I have been privileged to take part, I have tried to take as objective a view as possible of this problem.
Mr. Crossman: We all have.
Mr. Lipson: I have tried to be fair to the Government; I have tried to be fair to the Jews; I have tried to be fair to the Arabs; and have endeavoured to apply to this problem the principle which, in my view, ought to be applied to all political problems—the principle of justice. I have refused to forget that principle, or to turn a blind eye towards it, because, as a Jew, the problem of Palestine has a special significance to me. Starting from that premise, I want to say that I think that many of the charges which are brought against the Government in the handling of this problem are not fair. It has been said that there has been unreasonable delay. But to bring about a solution of the Palestine problem does not lie with this country alone. The other parties concerned, the Jews and the Arabs, have also their contribution to make, and I think it is clear that they have not been at all helpful. Both of them have maintained an extreme point of view.
Mr. Gallacher: Who are "they"?
Mr. Lipson: The Jews and the Arabs.
Mr. Gallacher: Then why does not the hon. Member say "We and the Arabs"?
Mr. Lipson: Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to make my speech in my own way. Both of them have adopted an extreme point of view, and have not made the task of His Majesty's Government easier. Then, too, I think it is only fair to the Government to appreciate the fact that this is by no means the only problem with which they have had to deal since they came into office. After all, the war has created problems much greater and far more numerous than many people imagined it would, even when the war ended. Peace has not yet been made with Germany and Austria; the United Nations organisation had to be set up; economic problems of tremendous magnitude have had to be dealt with; the world has been, and still is, in danger of famine; in our own country we have had our domestic problems. In these circumstances it is most unreasonable of the extreme Jewish nationalists to complain that the Govern-

1987
ment have not given priority to their own particular problem.
Personally, I want to thank the Foreign Secretary for the speech which he made today. In my opinion, that speech is the best speech that has been made on the Palestine problem by anybody, and I think it has served a most useful purpose, because it has, at least, given all the facts, and it has made all the difficulties with which the Foreign Secretary has had to deal crystal clear; and to that extent, I think, it has considerably cleared the air. I was very much impressed by the obvious sympathy with which the Foreign Secretary has approached this problem, and the courage he has shown, in spite of all the difficulties, in trying to find a solution.
Therefore, I think that the supporters of the Zionist cause ought to show a little more understanding of his difficulties—perhaps they will after that speech—and realise it is not possible for him to meet all their demands, unless he is to sacrifice many of the political principles for which he and his party, and, indeed, all parties in this country have stood for so many years. It is, I think, obvious, that as a result of the terrorist activities in Palestine, the Zionist cause and the cause for a Jewish State have much less support than before. These people, by their actions, have done infinite harm to the cause of Jewry generally, and also to the cause of Jewish nationalism in Palestine. People are naturally asking now what kind of Jewish State is likely, when the terrorists show the particular attitude of mind indicated by their actions. As a result of the breakdown in the negotiations, it was inevitable that the Government should decide to refer this problem to U.N.O. The Foreign Secretary has said that the Mandate as it exists at present is unworkable, and it is only proper, therefore, that it should be handed over to U.N.O., which has been created to deal with problems of this kind. Personally, I hope the view expressed by the Foreign Secretary that there is still a chance that solution by agreement may be found between the Arabs and the Jews and the British Government before the matter goes to U.N.O. may be justified, because if agreement can be arrived at. it is far better than anything which is forced upon the country from outside. We can all hope and pray that that confidence is justified.
1988
I should like to strengthen the appeal which has been made to the Foreign Secretary, that in the interval between now and, if need be, when the matter goes before U.N.O. in September, there should be an increase in the number of immigrants allowed into the country. I suggest that the Government might agree, until the matter has been considered by U.N.O., to the figure being raised to 4,000 per month, which was the figure envisaged in the latest Government proposals for the settlement of the Palestine problem. I appeal to the Arabs to give sympathetic consideration to this request. I think I have shown that I have some understanding and appreciation of 'heir point of view on this matter, and I trust that an appeal, coming from me, might have some influence with them. It is clear that an increase of this kind could not possibly do the Arab cause any harm whatsoever. On the other hand, it would relieve a tremendous amount of suffering, and help to create a better atmosphere in Palestine itself until a happier solution of the problem could be found. If the Colonial Secretary could assure the House that the Government are prepared to consider increasing the number of immigrants to 4,000 a month, I believe that such an assurance would meet with general acceptance, particularly when coupled with the plea which the Foreign Secretary made today, that all nations in the world should be prepared to open their gates and take their share of the displaced persons who are so sadly in need of a home.
I am glad that the Government have turned down the proposal for partition, because although partition might buy an easy peace for a time, like Munich, it would tend to keep Arab and Jew apart, with all the possibilities of conflict that might arise in consequence. As, in my view, the only ultimate solution of the Palestine problem is to be found in a Unitary State, in which Jews and Arabs would live and co-operate together for the common good of all, I believe that it would be a fatal mistake to start dividing the country. Palestine is smaller than Wales, and partition is a solution which the Government have rejected for India, where the case is so much stronger. If we were to accept partition for Palestine it would be difficult, from a logical, fair, and just point of view, to refuse Pakistan to India There are differences of opinion

1989
as to how the Palestine problem is to be solved, but we are all agreed in desiring the earliest possible solution. I hope the Foreign Secretary will continue, as he told us he intends to do, in his efforts, so that, at long last, peace may be brought to Palestine, and that in peace and prosperity Palestine can once again make her proper contribution to human good and human happiness.
8.54 P.m.
Mr. Lever: I hope I shall not offend my hon. Friends, and give comfort to the Philistines, by extending to the Foreign Secretary's plan a conditional welcome, a welcome which I might describe as being with open arms, but crossed fingers. I believe in a united Palestine, and that partition, logically, would involve what my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) says it would involve, namely, Jews and Arabs deciding to fight out their differences. I believe in a united Palestine because I believe that Jews and Arabs have to get together in Palestine, work together, and settle their differences, and I feel that partition as between Jews and Arabs would be the preliminary bout to a major fight. It would give no pleasure to me as a Jew to see the Jews of Palestine use their brilliant organising skill and great mental superiority and knowledge in Palestine to give them a victory in arms against their more primitive opponents. I think that nothing more dreadful could be contemplated, in the interests of the Jewish people anywhere, than that a blood bath of that kind should be preceded by a partition policy. I believe in an independent Palestine, because I believe, as the Foreign Secretary has said—I hope sincerely—that the relationship between Jew and Arab in Palestine has been bedevilled from outside.
The Foreign Secretary seems to have in mind exclusively the hysteria of Madison Square Garden meetings and the efforts of some extreme Zionists. But there are other intermeddlers whom we ought to have in mind outside Palestine, the moguls who rule the Arab States, who represent every backward and reactionary tendency in the Middle East—and the oil moguls too, whose influence makes itself felt at every conference and on every decision about Palestine. I am bound to tell the House that I can think
1990
of another interfering party, who have no right to be there, and that is the British Government and the British Army. I am bound to say that it is not in the interests of British people that they should remain there any longer as one of the inter-meddling parties of whom the Foreign Secretary has spoken. I give him hearty support in his desire for a united, free and genuinely independent Palestine, and a democratic Palestine which will govern its own destinies in every way. I do not think that that means that we can walk out tomorrow, but I think we ought to have a time limit. No one is going to believe the story that if we go out Jews and Arabs will massacre each other. If Britain goes out under a ruling of the United Nations organisation and proper arrangements are made for a short interim period, the Jews and Arabs of Palestine will learn to live together, as everyone acknowledges they are able to do, if not subject to outside interference. They already work together in their trade unions, in big business, and in many other ways.
Mr. S. Silverman: How are we to get it?
Mr. Lever: The way to get it is to go to the United Nations organisation for the temporary cover under which we release our troops and set up the framework of a democratic self-governing Palestine. [Interruption.] With the Jews in a minority, at the moment, certainly. That is a matter for the people of Palestine to decide in a democratic way. I am bound to tell the House that I do not believe that any such solution will work without the temporary umbrella provided by the United Nations; it will not work if we do not at once admit a substantial number of Jews into Palestine. That is very different from demanding a Jewish State in Palestine, or a Jewish majority in Palestine. I am told by the Foreign Secretary, and I believe it, because I ventured to suggest the same thing myself some time ago, that, if we do not insist on the idea of a Jewish State and join with the Arabs in demanding self-government in Palestine, we can get agreement with the Arabs to let at least 100,000 Jews into Palestine. I want to see at least 100,000 Jews admitted into Palestine in the immediate future. I think the effect in soothing the whole situation would be immense and

1991
would give the denial to the pessimistic expectations of permanently bad relations between Jew and Arab. We are told by all sorts of people that these two races can never live together. Of course, they will not, if people with political and financial motives are continually bedevilling their relations. Let us see what are the genuine minimum needs of both sides and we might get rather a different and less gloomy picture of the possibilities from that which has been painted by my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry.
One of the pressing problems of the moment is the question of the displaced persons, and this problem of displaced persons, if we try to for some academic reason, cannot be separated from Palestine. That problem is inseparably linked up with Palestine. We have to see these helpless people do not rot any longer in the displaced persons camps of Europe, and that we no longer pay mere lip service to humanitarian efforts which ought to have been made on their behalf. I am not afraid to say that there is a difference between displaced Jews and other displaced persons, because the Jews require rather different treatment and consideration. I must tell the House quite candidly that my view is that it is dishonesty and hypocrsy to pretend that the world should take them as an alternative to Palestine when at the present time the whole world shows no sign of wanting to take them. The only people in the world who have offered to take the displaced Jews are tile Jews of Palestine who are prepared to die for the right to take them. I do not think that that can be ignored although the Jews are a minority in that country.
I want to put one or two questions and make a short statement. I should like the Colonial Secretary when he comes to reply to tell me in plain terms what steps the Government propose t2 take in regard to Palestine if the United Nations disagree on that subject. Secondly, I should like him to tell me v hat the Government proposes to do if the United Nations agree on Palestine. What steps are they to take in the interview? I should like an assurance from him now, particularly after all the statements that have been made on this matter in the House, that there are going to be no deals of an unsavoury kind, but that the British Government will take steps to get out of
1992
Palestine and leave Jew and Arab the job or running and ruling their own country. Those who are genuinely concerned about the British troops in Palestine want to see those troops brought home to England, where they are badly needed for the tasks confronting us today.
One final word. Some people in this country seem to have difficulty in understanding the position of the Jews in England and their special interest in the Jews in Europe and the Jews in Palestine. Some Members on both sides of the House in the course of Palestine Debates have made remarks of which on reflection they cannot be proud. I remember when my, hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) was valiantly fighting the battle of these unfortunate people the hon. and gallant Member for North Blackpool (Brigadier Low) made some remark suggesting a dubious loyalty existed on the part of the British Jews when he made his plea for these people. There is no mystery or secret about it. The British Jews are concerned about the suffering Jews in Europe and in Pales- tine, and in being so they do not abate one whit their loyalty to this country, but they desire to waken the conscience of the people of the world to the terrible plight of these unfortunate people. I ask the House to see that the Foreign Secretary sincerely fulfils the pledge he has given to get out of that country as soon as possible. I ask the House to insist that there is no double dealing now, because the history of the last 20 years is riddled with double dealing and false promises, which have helped to bring about this intolerable and ruinous state of affairs in Palestine, resulting in injustices to the Jews, fears on the part of the Arabs, and in no confident hope for the peace and prosperity of Palestine in the coming years.
9.6 p.m.
Mr. Manningham-Buller: The hon. Gentleman the Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester (Mr. Lever) in the course of his extremely fluid speech took to task the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) sitting in front of him. I was sorry that that should occur, because that showed on the part of the hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester a singular ignorance of the conditions in Palestine which

1993
would be likely to ensue if British troops forthwith left that country. The other point he made was the interest that the British Jews had in Jewish displaced persons. I was sorry that he confined his interest to British Jews. I think that on both sides of the House we are concerned with the interests of the displaced persons, whether they be Jews or non-Jews who are now in camps in Europe.
Mr. Lever rose—
Mr. Manningham-Buller: I will not give way because I have not the time. I think that everyone will agree that we have listened to a good Debate today on this problem which has been so often debated in the House of Commons. The Foreign Secretary started his momentous and courageous speech by saying that there was no denying the fact that the Mandate was contradictory. That is no new discovery. It has already been pointed out by the hon. Member for East Coventry and it was mentioned in the Peel Report and confirmed in other documents. That in itself is a reasoned and cogent argument for the decision to refer this problem to the United Nations organisation. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to reduce the Palestine problem to three simple questions—simple in the sense that they can be simply asked but by no means easily answered.
The first was, should the claims of the Jews be admitted; secondly, should that of the Arabs; or, thirdly, should it be a United Palestinian State? As he said, we cannot solve these problems, but he invited this House" to face up to Y them as he said His Majesty's Government have to "face up to them now." I do not know whether really there is very much point in this House facing those problems now if the Government are going to put them before the United Nations without any recommendation of any kind whatsoever. I agree that in the absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs those are questions which fall to be answered if there is to be a final solution of a difficult and persistent problem. My view of these answers is contained in the Report which I signed and which the hon. Member for East Coventry, among others, also signed. We said there that there should be no Jewish State. I think we were right in that, and having heard arguments since we signed it I personally adhere to that position. After all, the official
1994
Zionist demand for a Jewish State has a fairly recent origin, starting, I think, in 1942 with the Biltmore Declaration. I believe that is the first declaration—
Mr. Janner rose
Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am limited in time.
Mr. Janner: That is not correct.
Mr. Manningham-Buller: I think I am entirely correct in saying that the Biltmore Declaration was the first official declaration of the Zionist demand for a Jewish State—
Mr. Paget: Surely, there was one before?
Mr. Manningharn-Buller: Not official Zionist policy. The hon. Member can correct me later if he desires, but I cannot give way because time is short and the Colonial Secretary wants sufficient time in which to reply. I do not believe that the claim for a Jewish State in Palestine is in the true long-term interest of the Jews in Palestine, and that is why I hope that even at this late date the Jewish organisations may reconsider their official policy. If they study the trend of population, there is no prospect of maintaining a permanent Jewish majority, or of obtaining one without some expulsion of the Arab inhabitants already there. I also agree that there should be no Arab State. I should not assent to the Arabs, with their present intensity of feelings, having any domination over the Jews now in the country. The hon. and gallant Member for Barnstaple (Brigadier Peto), who spoke with knowledge of the country, gave testimony to the fact that politics are removed when Jews and Arabs work together. We on the Commission did not exclude the possibility of both Arabs and Jews working in unison. If we had excluded that, we should have published a very different Report. There has been testimony from both sides of the House to the effect that the door is not yet completely closed to the possibility of Jewish and Arab co-operation in a united Palestine. In my belief, that—a united Palestine, if it can be achieved—is the policy which is likely to lead to greater prosperity in that country than any other.
There has been some discussion this evening on the thorny question of what

1995
is meant by the "National Home." The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) gave us a lengthy disquisition on that subject. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) said that the meaning was quite clear to him—that it meant a borne and not lodgings, but he did not go further than that, and while he would say, no doubt, that Wales was his national home, he did not go on to indicate whether in his view that meant that Wales should be a national State.
It is agreed on both sides of the House that the Mandate is not only ambiguous but that it contains obligations which it is impossible to reconcile. From that it follows that there must be revision, and in recommendation No. 4 of our Report we anticipated that this matter would go to the United Nations—and that it would go without the delay that has occurred. If there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs as to what should be the contents of a trusteeship agreement, the revision would be so much easier, but even if there is no agreement, still, the revision is equally necessary.
But what is the cause of the delay which has occurred? We were asked to perform our duties in the short period of 100 days, and since then we have been told that there have been these efforts to secure agreement between Jews and Arabs. I listened with great interest to what the right hon. Gentleman had to say as to the history of those efforts and the reasons for the breakdown and change of attitude. I admire him for his optimism but I should have thought that anyone with any knowledge of this problem would have realised that at this present time agreement between Jews and Arabs was really completely impossible.
Indeed, it was completely impossible, as the Peel Report showed, before 1939, and long before the White Paper of that date—and in that respect the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) was entirely inaccurate. It would be a miracle in my view if that agreement was achieved; it could not be achieved unless the mutual fears of the Arabs and the Jews were resolved. I think we could all agree upon that. Now what are the Arab's fears? The Arab's fears, in the first place, are of Jewish domination; secondly, of dispossession and de-
1996
privation of his means of livelihood: thirdly, he fears a flood of immigration which will lead to that domination and to his dispossession. Those are the chief fears, in my belief, in the Arab mind. On the Jewish side, what are their fears? I am talking now not of the political Jews not residing in Palestine who have such an influence on the policy of the Jewish Agency but, so far as I can judge, of the Jews in Palestine. I believe their fear is this, and it can be stated quite simply: the fear that they will be dominated by the Arabs unless, with the aid of immigration, they can keep up their numbers.
We cannot resolve those fears, we cannot dispel them. It can only be done by a change of attitude on the part of the Jews, and also a change of attitude on the part of the Arabs. I regret that since 1942 Jewish domination has been in the forefront of Jewish policy. That was confirmed today by the Foreign Secretary when he said that the Jews thought it wrong that he should consult at all with the Arabs on the question of immigration. As I say, I regard this policy of the Jews, from the point of view of Jewish interests, to be really disastrous on long-term because, whether there is a Jewish state or not in Palestine, the livelihood and well being of those Jews who reside in Palestine must depend on their getting on well with the Arab inhabitants of that country and the surrounding people in the nations alongside. I cannot think that there can be any final settlement by agreement of this problem unless the Zionist attitude changes completely. Like the right hon. Gentleman, I would much prefer an agreed solution because that would have a much greater chance of finality, but I regret the right hon. Gentleman's statement the other day that the only proposals which would be put before the United Nations would be those contained in the White Paper, those which have been rejected either by Jews or by Arabs or by both. What does that mean? It means that if the United Nations accept any of the suggestions put forward in that White Paper, they either have to be imposed by force on the entire population of Palestine or on a majority or minority of the inhabitants who are opposed to that solution, and I cannot regard that as desirable.
Furthermore, these proposals are put forward by the right hon. Gentleman with a view to trying to secure agreement be-

1997
tween the Arabs and Jews The proposals put forward to try to negotiate a settlement may not be quite the same as the proposals you put forward if you are trying to determine what is the right course to pursue in the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. I hope that after this Debate there will be further consideration by His Majesty's Government as to whether or not they should put suggestions before the United Nations when the matter is referred to them.
I do not propose to spend much time on the proposals contained in the White Paper, but I take the view—opposed as I am to partition, having signed that Report—that any policy is better than no policy and at the present time we have none, but in the final suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government we give notice that we will quit Palestine in five years. That White Paper concludes with these remarkable words:
"The proposals contained in the present Memorandum are designed to give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State."
That is a great and pious aspiration. But these people in the past have had many opportunities of working together. They have not taken them, and I feel confident, but reluctant, in expressing the opinion that if that sort of proposal is put forward in the present state of mind in Palestine, it will mean that both sides will prepare for the day when we withdraw and they will then settle their differences by the sword.
Mr. K. Lindsay: I gather that the hon. and learned Member's views were not in complete accord with those of the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). I know it is not usual for the Opposition to put forward policy, but when a matter is so serious as this, I think we should know the policy of the Opposition, as well as that of the Government.
Mr. Manningham-Buller: I signed this Report expressing my view. I am speaking for myself and not committing anyone, nor the party behind me, to adhere to the view stated in the Report.
Mr. S. Silverman: The hon. and learned Gentleman agrees that the Report he signed was expressly not intended to be a long-term agreement, but was a set of
1998
transitional proposals. Will he say now what he thinks is a permanent solution?
Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am asked by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) whether our Report was merely a set of transitional proposals. I do not agree with that, and I think that if the hon. Member studies it carefully he will see that it contains both short-term and long-term proposals. I am also asked to suggest the course to be followed now. The question we have to discuss tonight is not so much the policy which one of us might think right, but the course which His Majesty's Government should now pursue—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is the same thing."]—It is not the same thing. The course we are told His Majesty's Government should pursue now, is to throw this matter on to the table of the United Nations, with no recommendation at all. I have said before, and say again, that whether the policy put forward by His Majesty's Government is one with which I personally agree or not, I am prepared to go so far as to say that any policy put forward by them is better than no policy.
Mr. Lever: What policy would the hon. and learned Gentleman like to put forward?
Mr. Manningham-Buller: I wish to carry on with what I was saying before I was interrupted on these matters think the House will agree that to throw this matter at the United Nations without any advice, without any recommendations, in the hope that some nation, free from any responsibility, will put forward a solution which is universally acceptable, is a most impracticable hope. We, having governed Palestine, and not too badly at that since the Mandate, are really in the best position to say in what respects the Mandate should be revised, and what the trusteeship agreement, which will replace the Mandate, should contain. If there is no hope, as I think there is no hope, of getting a solution from the United Nations which is really universally acceptable, one can only regard this as another factor leading to delay. During that delay, apparently, the present situation must continue, and, for an indeterminate period, we shall continue to bear alone an intolerable burden, a burden we have borne for the last 18 months largely owing to the fact that His Majesty's Government have had no policy. We shall have to

1999
bear that burden, apparently, until next September, and we shall have to go on bearing it, apparently, until the United Nations has come to a conclusion, which may be for a much longer time.
I wish to say one word about immigration, because immigration is one of the first things, as the hon. Member for East Coventry said, to which the Arabs and Jews look in considering whether or not a policy is right, the second being land. I cannot help wondering whether, to assist in the solution of the problem in Europe, to which we drew attention in the forefront of our Report, it really would not assist immigration into Palestine if, in future, the selection was made by Great Britain of those to whom immigration certificates were to be given, and if priority was not given in future, and it has not been, I understand, in the last few years, to the aged and infirm who are now in these displaced persons centres, to the very young and to some skilled workmen, whose services are required in Palestine to provide accommodation for them.
As I understand it, the Jewish Agency now has the power of selection. That selection has, in the past, been criticised, I think rightly criticised by the orthodox Jews, Agudath Israel, for not including sufficient orthodox Jews. I criticise it on the ground that in determining to whom certificates for legal immigration should be granted, they have not selected those categories from inside the camps in Europe. I also ask the right hon. Gentleman to say whether the policy with regard to illegal immigrants has now changed. In 1945 an illegal immigrant who was detained, put in a camp, gained priority in securing immigration, under the quota, into Palestine. After he was caught, he went to the head of the queue to gain admission. I hope that that practice has ceased, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say it has, because of the danger of a wave of illegal immigration which will accentuate the tense situation this summer. I can think of few things so likely to encourage people to attempt this operation than the knowledge that if they are caught they will at least get priority in admission to Palestine.
I wish we had heard today, from the Foreign Secretary, a statement of the
2000
terms upon which we were prepared to carry on in Palestine. I wish we had heard from him that he was prepared to go to the United Nations and say, "This, in our view, is what the Mandate should contain. If the Mandate contains this, if it contains these obligations, then if the United Nations, the United States of America and every other country are prepared to support us, we will do our best to carry it through." I hope that we shall get some assurance that by going to the United Nations we are not getting ourselves into the position of undertaking an obligation to fulfil anything which the United Nations, in their wisdom, may determine to be right for the future of Palestine.
9.29 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): I want to assure the House that all the suggestions which have been made during this Debate will be most carefully studied by the Government. The Debate has shown, once again, how difficult is this problem of the two communities in Palestine, and how divided are the parties in this House in regard to a solution of the difficulties. It is not a problem out of which any party dare attempt to make political capital. I think the approach of the present Government has been that it is a great human problem, calling for the most careful handling, because of the deep human feelings which have been expressed and evidenced over a long period.
Therefore, we would accept the view that any contributions which can be made from any quarter of the House towards finding a method by which Arab and Jew communities can live together in Palestine, will have our most sympathetic examination. It is hardly reasonable to pronounce that His Majesty's Government have not had a policy in connection with this matter. I shall seek to show, if I can, what that policy has been over the past 18 months. It is not necessarily a failure on the part of the Government if, so far, they have been unable to bring the two communities together, for the finding of a constructive solution to a problem which has baffled us over so many years.
Mr. Pickthorn: The Minister spoke about not making political capital. Now he talks about a problem "which has

2001
baffled us"—by which I take him to mean his party—"over so many years." Surely, they were not baffled until after the General Election?
Mr. Creech Jones: I just do not understand the interruption. The problem is one which has battled the British Government, as the Mandatory Power, almost ever since Great Britain has held the Mandate. There have been difficulties, and disturbances of all kinds. Numerous policies have been announced in the hope of resolving the difficulties between the two communities in Palestine. It is an easy gibe to say that the Government have wasted 12 months on this business, that we should have realised 12 months ago that this problem of trying to administer Palestine under the Mandate was insoluable, and that then we should have gone to the United Nations with the problem. Again, I want to show, it was the responsibility and the duty of the Government to attempt to find the means whereby the two communities could live in harmony together. It was an obligation upon the Government to exhaust all possibilities to achieve this end. When the Labour Government came into office, both Britain and the United States were entangled in promises which had been made to the Arabs. It was clear that, if this problem were to be solved, then a new approach would have to be found to what had already been an intractable problem for previous Governments. It was clear that any possible scheme, if it was to work, would have to be enforced and therefore, it was obviously desirable that an effort should be made to try to procure some agreement by negotiation. There had been the White Paper policy, which presumably was still being applied, and which, brought criticism from the United States. It was the responsibility of the new Government to decide whether, if the approaches which had previously been tried had proved ineffective, a new way should be discovered. Accordingly, representations were made to the United States for the purpose of seeing what degree of co-operation could be obtained from them in finding a way through these difficulties.
It has been said that a great deal of time was lost in obtaining the co-operation of the United States, but I submit that the difficulties were not with the Government, but on the other side of the
2002
Atlantic. There was no time lost in obtaining the Report of the Anglo-American Mission, and, immediately, the Mission reported, steps were made for the Report to be studied by the experts. A unanimous series of recommendations—unanimously agreed by the Anglo-American experts—was in our hands on 26th July. Within four or five days, an announcement was made in this House of what the British Government would seek to do in respect of the recommendations of the experts.
Mr. Stanley: When the right hon. Gentleman talks about Anglo-American experts, he is differentiating, is he not, between them and the Anglo-American Mission?
Mr. Creech Jones: I thought it was within the knowledge of the House that, immediately following the report of the Anglo-American Mission, the recommendations were submitted to two bodies of experts drawn from both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Mr. Crossman: Is it not a fact that, on the American side, not one of the experts had visited Palestine, whereas, at least, the Anglo-American Mission had been there?
Mr. Creech Jones: Certainly, but let us get the facts. These were, in the main, persons who were very familiar with these problems, many of them had had very long experience in regard to Palestinian affairs, and they certainly made a series of recommendations as to how the Report which had been received from the Mission—
Mr. Manningham-Buller: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the question. He has repeatedly called these unknown gentlemen experts. Can he say how many of them have ever been to Palestine?
Mr. Creech Jones: In any case, the point is quite irrelevant. Some of these men were experts in regard to the Palestinian Administration and the problems of the Middle East. The problem which had to be tackled was the implementation of the report of the Mission, and I submit that, when it became obvious that the United States Government were not prepared to implement the Report of the Anglo-American Committee, the British Government themselves took the initiative and

2003
made their announcement on 3rst July. This offered a basis for discussion to both the Arabs and the Jews. At that time, there was a reasonable hope of discussion on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Morrison Report. But let me add this important fact—
Mr. Pickthorn: On a point of Order. May we know, Mr. Speaker, what is meant by the "Morrison Report"?
Mr. Creech Jones: The Morrison Plan, obviously.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Pickthorn: Hon. Members cannot "Hear, hear" for 20 minutes; the hon. Gentleman will have to say something.
Mr. Creech Jones: I also want to make another point clear. In January, 1946, the British Government made an announcement at the Assembly of the United Nations. They declared that the Palestine Mandate was receiving the close attention of the American and British Governments, and that, as early as possible, an announcement would be made to the Assembly in regard to these discussions. On the winding up of the League of Nations a few months later, Britain again declared, with the other Powers holding Mandates under the League of Nations, that she would observe the obligations of the Mandate until a new arrangement was mane with the United Nations. That meant that if we were to present the problem of Palestine to the United Nations, we could only do it in one of two ways. Palestine could either achieve its independence, which was not a practical proposition, because of the opposition of both Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, or alternatively, the trust arrangements could be continued. But if an agreement were to be registered with the United Nations, and Palestine brought under the Trusteeship Council, then it became necessary that an understanding should be reached as between Jews and Arabs, and with the neighbouring Arab States who would also expect to give their agreement. Therefore, whether we liked it or not, if independence was not a possible immediate course for Palestine, sooner or later a trusteeship agreement would have to be negotiated. It was con-
2004
sequently an obligation on the British Government to attempt to find out what the terms of that agreement could be.
It has been suggested that we might have attempted to impose a solution, either of partition or of some plan along the lines which had previously been announced in the House of Commons in July of last year. It was not possible to impose a partition plan in Palestine, even if there had been the unanimous backing of the whole of Jewry, or even assuming that some practical scheme could have been found which would have satisfied the Jews. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Arabs."] No, the Jews. Any attempt to impose a partition solution in Palestine would have been out of harmony with the Mandate itself; it would not have been consistent with the terms of the Mandate. Moreover, it would have exposed us to a great deal of suspicion and distrust, and certainly the other nations in the United Nations would have declared that we were seeking to serve some ulterior purpose.
Mr. Stanley: Is it not a fact that the old League of Nations held that partition was within the terms of the Mandate, and at that time recommended the British Government to find a solution on those lines?
Mr. Creech Jones: That is not the interpretation which has been placed upon it by our own legal advisers. [Interruption.] I wish we could at least have an exhibition of good manners on the other side. This argument is of some importance because the Government have been criticised for not having imposed a solution in Palestine; I am trying to show that, as far as partition was concerned, it was not within the power of the Government to impose such a solution. It could only have been enforced by military operations which would have been repugnant to the British people. It would have been a threat to peace and would have brought us before the Security Council, with very doubtful results. In addition, I think, it would have brought us an enormous amount of resentment from the Arabs, and a continuing hostility. That was the position in regard to partition.
It was equally difficult for us to consider the imposition of any alternative scheme which implied the preservation of a united Palestine. The success of such an arrangement depended again on the collaboration of the Arab and Jewish com-

2005
munities, but both Arabs and Jews were in opposition to a scheme of that kind and neither would accept it. Therefore, our responsibility as a Government, if we could not impose a scheme, and if it was essential to get some kind of basis for a trusteeship agreement, was to discover whether in some way we could obtain the co-operation of both Arabs and Jews. The Morrison Plan had been rejected. When, latterly, His Majesty's Government got the Arabs in conference and the Jews in informal discussions, we attempted very hard to find some plan which might be a basis for securing their co-operation. I want to make clear that what was offered, and what has been known as the Bevin plan, was merely a basis for discussion with the two sides. I do not accept the description of the proposals that was given by my hon. Friend the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould). What we attempted to do was to build up in Palestine, for the two communities, self-government, and we tried to give in various areas, to Jews and to Arabs, very real powers, and then to build up, if we could, some central political institutions whereby reasonable parity might be obtained in order to meet Jewish and Arab objections that one might conceivably dominate the other in the national political life of Palestine. Further, in the proposals that were made, we suggested areas which would give reasonable opportunities for economic expansion and land development; indeed, the land which could be freely acquired by the Jews was, I think, three times larger than they are permitted to expand in at the present time. Not only that, we attempted to find a satisfactory formula to cover immigration, because the Jews themselves were dissatisfied lest they found that economic absorptive capacity as a formula would not give them the volume of immigration which they regarded as necessary.
Sir Patrick Hannon rose—
Mr. Speaker: I cannot allow any interruptions. There are only seven minutes to go; the Government have been attacked, and they must be allowed to meet those attacks.
Mr. Creech Jones: Those proposals were in the spirit of the Charter. They were within the framework of the United Nations, and responsibilities were given
2006
to the respective authorities under the United Nations in the event of difficulties arising.
I come to the next criticism which has been made in regard to Government policy. Why are we making no recommendation to the United Nations? I do not accept the view that our line is to deny British leadership in the United Nations. I do not accept the view that to offer this problem for the consideration of the United Nations is derogatory to the prestige of Britain. We shall offer to the United Nations our experience in the working of the Mandate; we shall submit all the schemes which have emerged in the discussions when a settlement has been sought. We shall not be a silent member when these deliberations are going on. The whole history of the Mandate will be objectively presented. There will be no special pleading for a particular solution. But I would like to put this, that on the practical side, when this problem is submitted, we as a nation, in regard to our administration of the Mandate have had to tolerate a great deal of vilification, and we have been bitterly attacked, and our administration has come under the most severe scrutiny of various nations.
We have been very unfairly attacked in regard to our administration. Therefore, we feel that it is right and proper that we should let the world now judge what is the best to be clone for Palestine. There is a great deal of suspicion and distrust in regard to Britain. If that is so, and if we are told that we are continuously seeking our own self-interest in connection with the affairs of Palestine, let there be a solution which we do not attempt to prejudice, a solution which is likely to give satisfaction to the rest of the world.
Further, all our plans which we have submitted for a solution have so far been rejected. If we put all our plans within the possession of the United Nations it is far better that the United Nations, knowing of our experience and knowing why those plans were submitted and the defects associated with the working of the Mandate, should be able to form their own judgment. If it should happen that another nation has a bright idea for solving this problem, let that idea be put into the pool. Do not let it be thought that Britain is trying to

2007
prejudice consideration of other schemes. If other nations have ideas and proposals for schemes, let those schemes be fairly considered and let us not seek to deflect from their fair consideration by advocacy of particular schemes of our own.
Mr. C. Davies: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer this question? In what way is this question to be put before the United Nations? Are we the mandatory Power asking for advice, or do we surrender the Mandate and ask the United Nations what they will do about it?
Mr. Creech Jones: That is the point 10 which I was just coming. We are not going to the United Nations to surrender the Mandate. We are going to the United Nations setting out the problem and asking for their advice as to how the Mandate can be administered. If the Mandate cannot be administered in its present form we are asking how it can be amended. It would be folly for us at this point to prejudice that discussion by ourselves imposing any duress on the United Nations, or trying to set a time limit within which the decision must be taken. If we go to the United Nations we shall do all in our power to get as early a discussion as is possible. We are already exploring the question of how a speedier discussion of this problem can be achieved. it has been represented to us that we should go to the Security Council. I suggest that for the purpose of dealing with a problem such as this the Security Council is an imperfect instrument. Indeed, the machinery of the Security Council is such that it may not make a recommendation to the Assembly. [An HON. MEMBER: "It can call a special meeting."] True, it can call a special meeting. The Security Council may, under the Charter, keep this problem entirely within its own purview. There are other difficulties, and, likewise, there are difficulties about reference to the Trusteeship Council.
It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  CHEESE (CONTROL AND PRICES)
  10.0 p.m.
  Mr. Keeling: I beg to move,
  "That the Cheese (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1946 (S.R. & O., 1946, No. 2109), dated 12th December, 1946, a copy of which was presented on 17th December, be annulled."
  This is largely a consolidating Order. There is little new in it except the startling announcement that Roquefort cheese from France is being sold in this country at five and a half times the price of British Wensleydale and Stilton. I would like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if she will give some explanation of that rather remarkable news, and whether she would inform us what is the subsidy on British-made cheese. I do not mean the subsidy on the milk which is supplied to the British cheese manufacturers, but I want to know how it works out in the price of cheese. What is the British taxpayer contributing per pound?
  This consolidating Order gives me an opportunity of asking the Minister several questions. The Order holds out very little hope of there being much variety in the cheese which is put on the British luncheon table or in the British worker's luncheon packet. Successive Ministers of Food have told us of the great importance of variety in food. We have a good variety of fish and vegetables, some variety of meat and an increasing variety of fruit, and, in spite of what the hon. Member for Mile End (Mr. Piratin) said the other day, the British wage earner is quite prepared to buy pineapples at any price at which they are put on the market. But we have hardly any variety in cheese.
  The vast bulk of the cheese which we consume today and which is controlled by this Order is Dominion or American Cheddar, commonly called "mousetrap" and, I think, rightly so called, because, as Lord Harmsworth pointed out in a letter to "The Times" the other day, it is more suitable for the undiscriminating palate of the rodent than for the human palate. Will the Minister tell us what proportion of the cheese consumed today is this imported Cheddar? Is it 90 per cent., or 95 per cent., or what proportion,

  2009
  and, of the remaining small balance, how much is English? I will agree that some imported Cheddar is better than others. It is largely a question of whether it is properly matured. As King Lear said,
  "Ripeness is all."
  Cheddar properly stored does not really get ripe for at least six months. I want to ask the Minister whether it would not be possible to import Cheddar sufficiently far in advance for it to attain maturity before it is put into the shops.
  Now I come to the possibility of getting other cheeses. Paragraph 2 of this Order prohibits the manufacture of any cheese in this country except on licence. Under this stern control most of the cheeses of yesteryear have disappeared. Until last week the only cheeses which were permitted to be manufactured in this country were of what is called the Cheddar type which, according to the Minister, consist of Cheshire, Wensleydale, which is mentioned in Part I of the First Schedule, Lancashire, and one or two other cheeses. The reasons given by the Parliamentary Secretary for this limitation are rather mystifying. She said in this House on 23rd January of last year:
  "… we can only manufacture in this country cheeses which conform to a certain type —the Cheddar type.—[HON. MEMBERS 'Why?'] … It is because we can only put a certain type on the ration. It would be unfair to limit a certain number of housewives to one type and a certain number to another; we should have trouble in every shop."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd January, 1946: Vol. 418, C. 157.]
  Now I cannot understand this. I do not believe that people are so narrow-minded and such dogs in the manger. I do not believe the British housewife says that because she cannot get Double Gloucester nobody else should. It seems to me that that is a complete fallacy. The theory that because everybody cannot get something, nobody should have it, seems to have hypnotised the Ministry of Food; it seems to be an obsession, which for a very long time prevented us from getting any oranges. I know that to be a fact. I believe that the more encouragement we can give to English cheese making, even for the small quantity that is produced, the better will everybody be pleased. When Ben Gunn, stranded on Treasure Island, said "Many's the long night I've dreamed of cheese," I do not believe for a moment he ever dreamed of Canadian Cheddar.
  2010
  There are many other cheeses that we should like to see on our table. There is Stilton, for example. I was delighted to read that the Minister said last Tuesday that a small amount of Stilton would be put on the market. I want to ask her, as Stilton is not of the Cheddar type, whether that means that her previous argument has gone by the board. But what about Gloucester? What about Blue Vinny from Dorset? What about Caerphilly from Wales? What about Dunlop of Ayrshire, and a number of other cheeses which I need not mention? Before the war go million gallons of milk was made into cheese in this country, and the Milk Marketing Board gave licences freely. Thirty per cent. of the cheese consumed in this country before the war was made in England. How much English cheese is consumed today? I am afraid that farmhouse production is negligible. The age-long skill of the British cheese maker is lost, or being lost, and if we are not careful the art of the cheese-maker may die in many districts of this country.
  I wish to quote one sentence from a letter which the chairman of the Milk Marketing Board wrote not long ago to "The Times." He said:
  "The public are most anxious to enjoy all the special types of home-produced cheese free from wartime technical control; it will require neither more labour nor cost to provide their needs—only more craftsmanship, more freedom from control, and more milk."
  Of course, milk is the kernel of the problem. I do not dispute for a moment that only surplus milk should be made into cheese, and that demands for liquid milk must come first. But may we have an assurance that English cheese making will be encouraged in so far as supplies of milk allow?
  Quite obviously, we must go on importing cheese. We have always for many years done so and we must go on importing it. I want to say a few words about imported cheese, the prices of which are controlled in this Order. Why cannot we have more variety? Why cannot we have some Gorgonzola or some Bel Paese—those rich and fragrant Italian cheeses? Nine months ago we were given a hope that we should have some, because Sir Ben Smith said of Italian cheese on 22nd May last:
  "When cheese of a suitable type is available at reasonable prices I shall endeavour to procure it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd May (946; Vol. 423, C. 330.]

  2011
  Well, when is it coming? Could not we also have some Brie, Pommel and Pont d'Evèque from France, Port Salut from France and Belgium, Gruyere and Tilsit from Switzerland? Can we be assured that, when it is possible to get these cheeses, they will be forthcoming.
  I think—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—all imported cheese, except Cheddar, is on points. We should like to see more cheese on points. At present we are getting from abroad some Danish cheese, some Camembert—item 3 in the first schedule to the Order—and some Roquefort which is item 2 in the schedule. But I think it is a mistake to import Camembert in the winter, when there is very little cream in the milk, and I would suggest that in the winter we should import something else instead. From the Dominions and from the United States, I understand, at this moment we are getting only "mousetrap." Could not Canada, with its enormous supplies of milk, be persuaded to make some other kind of cheese? New Zealand used to make a very good imitation of Stilton. New Zealand milk and cream were inoculated with penicillin glaucum from Rutland. Is it possible to get some Stilton from New Zealand today?
  As I know other hon. Members want to speak, I come to my final suggestion. All English cheeses should be labelled with the place or county of origin. A bottle of French wine, unless imported by the Government under the present regime, bears, at least, an indication of what part of France it comes from, and, very often, what chateau. Why not do the same thing for British cheeses? It would foster pride in British dairy farming. It would encourage the public to be more cheese-minded, and to find out the best cheeses, and then ask for them. I ask the Minister if she will consider that suggestion.
  Mr. Speaker: Before calling on the seconder of the Motion I think I ought.o say that I have been wondering while this matter has been under discussion whether anybody would rise to a point of Order. This is a Consolidation Order, and it is unusual to discuss the whole Order on consolidation. But I have considered this very carefully, and I should like to read out a careful Ruling which, I hope, will be borne in mind on future occasions.
  2012
  This Order consolidates the Cheese (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1943, and subsequent amending Orders. It also incorporates two amendments of detail. If the principal Order of 1943 had been subject to annulment by Address, I should have had to rule, that, apart from the two new points, the scope of Debate on the Consolidation Order was limited to the question of consolidation. Since, however, the principal Order was not subject to annulment, and this is the first opportunity the House has had of debating the policy of the Orders consolidated in this Order, I must decide that it is fully open to Debate.
  I should like to take this opportunity of placing on record my view that in the case of any Orders which consolidate previous Orders that have been subject to annulment, the policy of the main and amending Orders would not be under discussion, since if the consolidating Order, which revokes the previous Orders, were annulled, the only result would be that the previous Orders would continue in operation unconsolidated. In the case of consolidation Bills, the scope of Debate has long been restricted to the single purpose of consolidation. Of course, I must apply that principle to Orders, but not on this particular occasion.
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: If we allow Orders to pass unchallenged in this House, is there not the possibility later on, of an Order consolidating various other Orders being unchallengeable, because the original Orders were allowed to pass unchallenged? Would not this lead to a series of Debates which might otherwise have been avoided?
  Mr. Speaker: I had that in mind, but we have to stick to the rules, and I have an idea that the House as a whole would like to see Orders consolidated, and Members would not unnecessarily impose Debates on this account.
  10.17 p.m.
  Mr. C. S. Taylor: I beg to second the Motion.
  I am very grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for your Ruling on this matter. Hon. Members opposite may have made some ribald remarks under their breath when my hon. friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Keeling) was speaking, but I am grateful to him for having raised this matter tonight. There are, at least two

  2013
  points of substance in this Order, which should be cleared up by the Parliamentary Secretary when she replies. Let me say first, that in a very humble way, I am a cheese-maker. Perhaps hon. Members opposite will know that my interest in Statutory Rules and Orders is as great as my interest in cheese-making. The Order we are discussing is No. 2109 of 1946, and I would draw attention of Members who have taken the trouble to get a copy of this Order, to the explanatory note, which is very simple. It is confined to two lines, and talks about a special price provided for Roquefort cheese, and for all other imported blue vein cheese. The Order has in it far more than that, and the explanatory note does not in any way indicate the sinister meanings which lie behind the Order, especially under paragraph 10. I suggest the Ministry of Food have put maggots into the cheese, which undermine not only the cheese but the Order as well.
  If hon. Members turn to paragraph 10, they will see that it appears to be the usual provision dealing with Northern Ireland. That was what I thought when I read it through rather hurriedly, but on further consideration I came to the conclusion that it not only dealt with Northern Ireland, but gave the Minister the most extraordinary powers. For example, I submit that tonight, after this Order has been laid in the House and after hon. Members have been asked to agree to it, the Minister could take the Order home and rewrite it without any further reference to the House. Leaving out the parts referring to Northern Ireland, paragraph 10 reads:
  "The provisions of this Order are subject to (a) any direction which may at any time be given by or on behalf of the Minister … in relation to the articles to which this Order applies."
  If that does not mean that the Minister could take this Order home tonight and vary it at his will or discretion, I frankly admit I do not know what the wording of paragraph 10 really means. I always believe in bringing out my most important point first, and I ask the hon. Lady the Parliamentary Secretary to deal with that point when she replies. The second point about the wording of the Order is that, bearing in mind, this is an Order which fixes the maximum retail and wholesale prices of cheese. Paragraph 12 (2) states:
  2014
  "The maximum prices prescribed by this Order,;hall not apply to the products commonly known as lactic cheese and lactic food or to cheese, processed cheese, soft cheese or curd cheese sold—

  (a) for use as ships' stores;

  (b) to any Government Department; or

  (c) to the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes."

  Why is this paragraph necessary? Are the people responsible for ships to pay more than the maximum wholesale price? Are they to sell cheese at more than the maximum retail price aboard their ships? Are Government Departments likely to pay more than the maximum wholesale price or sell at more than the maximum retail price? I ask hon. Members opposite to realise that this is a maximum price Order and not a minimum price Order. Had it been a minimum price Order, I could have understood that, perhaps for ships' stores, cheese might have been sold at less than the minimum price prescribed by the Order, but I cannot understand why paragraph 12 (2) is necessary. Are we to assume that N.A.A.F.I. will buy at more than the wholesale maximum price of cheese? Are we to assume that N.A.A.F.I. will "rook" the soldiers, sailors and airmen, or their wives, and sell at more than the maximum retail price? I cannot understand why this paragraph is necessary.
  I would like now to say a few words about cheese. Except for increasing importations of certain special cheeses from abroad, we in this country, during the past six years, have got used to what my hon. Friend referred to as "mousetrap," and my goodness, much of it has been "mousetrap." I cannot understand why, under this Order, certain other cheeses are not encouraged, such as Wensleydale cheese, which is the only special English cheese mentioned. I think all hon. Members who have sampled it will agree that Wensleydale cheese—I am not trying to boost any particular product—is infinitely preferable to "mousetrap." the price of Wensleydale cheese to the consumer is 1s. 1d. a lb.; the price of "mousetrap" to the same consumer is 1s. 1d. a lb. I know that the hon. Lady will tell me that Cheddar cheese—and, after all, all sorts of cheese go under the name of Cheddar nowadays—takes 117 gallons per cwt. to make, whereas Wensleydale takes only 109 gallons per cwt. to make.

  2015
  I cannot see why there should not be a little bit of extra encouragement given to the Wensleydale maker of cheese and the Stilton maker, and the makers of other special cheeses rather than to the makers of ordinary mousetrap cheese. How much do the Government pay for Canadian Cheddar and Australian Cheddar? I understand from the experts whom I have consulted that Canadian Cheddar is very good Cheddar, rather like the best English Cheddar, and Australian Cheddar is not quite so good. But they all sell at 1s. 1d. per lb. to the consumer, including Wensleydale which is a special cheese. I think that we all agree that the cost of living in this country has gone up since the war and that the price of Cheddar cheese—the hon. Lady will correct me if I am wrong, because I cannot remember the exact figure—was about 1s. 1d. before the war. I think that cheese is probably the only thing that has not gone up in price and Cheddar cheese and "mousetrap" still stand at 1s. 1d. per lb. to the consumer.
  There are, I think, too many cheeses called Cheddar. I agree with my hon. Friend that it might be possible to organise the industry in such a way that when we have Cheddar coming from "X", which people may like, and Cheddar coming from "Y" which some may like and others may not, they will be able to ask for a special Cheddar cheese coming from such and such a place, because they like it. If the hon. Lady eats her cheese ration, she will notice the difference beween the Cheddar of one week and the Cheddar of another week. I understand that this difference is due to the fact that Cheddar is made in different parts of the country or 'may be imported.
  I am not trying to make a case for the big cheese manufacturers and factories, and my final word is a plea for farmhouse cheese. I know that the hon. Lady will tell me that paragraph Io, which gives the Minister terrific powers, was in the wartime Order, and it may have been necessary during the war when we did not want to talk about cheeses but about how to win the war. Now we have peace, and we are more concerned about things of this sort which may have slipped through the House because of lack of vigilance of Members—who were occupied with more important things during the war—but are not going to be allowed to
  2016
  slip through in time of peace. If we are to debar the ordinary farmhouse makers from making the special cheese which they used to make before the war, I think that would be a very sad thing indeed. How can any farmhouse keeper—if that is the right word—hope to make cheeses if they are governed by such an Order as this, the explanatory note which consists of two lines, and gives no indication of what it is about, while the Order itself consists of five pages. I cannot see how any farm housewife or any farmer can ever hope to keep up the manufacture of one of the great delicacies of this country, the farmhouse cheese, if they are to be subject to such Orders as this.
  10.30 p.m.
  Mr. Baker White: I want very briefly to deal with the first schedule to this Order, which refers to the prices which are to be charged for cheeses. In doing so I hope I may be allowed to give the background of those figures. I calculate from the figures given by the Ministry of Food that the amount of cheese available for consumption in 1946 was in the neighbourhood of 218,000 tons. From that I calculate that the total imports were in the neighbourhood of 200,000 tons, and, therefore, the home production was presumably about 18,000 tons. Our imports of cheese amounted to £26 million, of which £8 million worth came from New Zealand, over £6 million from Canada and over £8 million from the United States. These three great groups of imports were all of the Ministry of Food standard cheese, what is known as Cheddar.
  I venture to suggest that it is always wise to produce as much food at home as possible, and my belief is that this Order will have the effect of decreasing and discouraging the production of bulk cheese here. I cannot understand the prices fixed for imported cheese and how those prices are related to home produced cheese. Blue vein cheese is not regarded by the Danes as a particularly high quality cheese. Danish Camembert is regarded by the Danes as a much' higher quality cheese, yet it is priced at 3s. per pound. I cannot understand why the French blue vein which is undoubtedly the same is priced at 6s. per pound. It is not that much better. Camembert cheese imported from France is priced at

  2017
  2s. 6d. per whole cheese per box. I weighed a box this evening. It weighs nine ounces, and that gives a price of 5s. This French Camembert is a low grade cheese, because the French, in order to conserve their milk supplies for butter making, have made an order lowering the standard of Camembert. It is also a skimmed milk cheese and yet it is priced at 5s. per pound while our own cheese is priced at 1s. 1d. per pound. I do net understand that figure at all.
  I agree that this Order offers no future at all to the home cheese industry. That industry was important in the past, and it can be important in the future. The skill is there on our farms; the machinery is still there; and the milk will be there one day. Do the Government also realise that our high quality cheeses can be quite an important export? There is a market for high quality British cheese, and particularly in America they are prepared to pay high prices for it. If the Government by this Order destroy this industry they will destroy an important future export. I believe the effect of this Order is to condemn us for all time to this dreadful standard of cheese, which my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Taylor) called "mousetrap" cheese. I would venture to point out that discouragement of home food production in any category may lead to the position described in the lines:
  "In vision, the worm in the wheat,
  In the shops, nothing for people to eat,
  Nothing to eat in Stupidity Street."
  10.36 p.m.
  Mr. Kendall: I want to ask one question, on paragraph 12 (2) in relation to the N.A.A.F.I. organisation. The question is whether or not the N.A.A.F.I. organisation will be able to purchase cheese, and whether they will be able to sell cheese, as they do today, to civilians as well as Service people, to the detriment of the little shopkeeper. Because N.A.A.F.I. do not come under the maximum price Order they will obviously get the cheese. I know that in my own Division there is a great deal of disquiet about the N.A.A.F.I. being able to get more privileges than private traders. It seems to me that under paragraph 12 (2) of this Order, once again N.A.A.F.I. is going to get things which other people cannot get. I would like a specific answer from the hon. Lady on this point.
  10.38 p.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (Dr. Edith Summerskill): I think it has been made clear that the purpose of this Order is to provide maximum prices for the sales of Roquefort cheese which the Ministry have just purchased, and to increase the maximum prices of other blue vein cheese. We have, at the same time, taken the opportunity of consolidating this Order. I must thank you, Mr. Speaker, for giving us an opportunity of having such a wide Debate. I think it must be clear to the House why it is necessary to control the import of cheese, to ensure that cheese producers are licensed, and to control the prices of cheese. This system has been instituted during the period of milk shortage, and unless we make Orders of this sort, the milk supply, which, as every Member in this House knows, is often very critical, would be diverted to other purposes. Secondly, it is important that we should know exactly the source of our cheeses—whether they are imported or home produced—to ensure that the cheese is offered to the Ministry in the first place, and also that it is suitable for the ration. Members who have spoken have abused to some extent our imported cheese. I deplore the fact that it has been characterised as "mousetrap" cheese, because I can assure hon. Members that these cheeses all have the same nutritional value.
  Lieutenant-Colonel Bromley - Davenport: They have not the same taste
  Dr. Summerskill: I think that the nutritional value is of primary importance. The function of the Ministry of Food is not to pander to an acquired taste, but to ensure that the people who have never had time to acquire these tastes, are suitably fed. Therefore, the cheeses which we import for the ration, which come from Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, are all hard-pressed cheeses. An hon. Member asked why Wensleydale cheese was bracketed with these other cheeses. The answer to that is because Wensleydale is a hard-pressed cheese. It is a little difficult, I know, to ask hon. Members opposite to imagine the difficulties of the small grocer. But I see that we have one or two practical grocers here, and perhaps they will understand the difficulties—and they are the difficulties

  2019
  which we, at the Ministry of Food, have to understand. It would be quite impossible and impracticable to ask the little grocer who has to serve, single-handed, hundreds of customers, to cut two ounces of Camembert, or Stilton, or any of the fancy cheeses mentioned this evening. The hard-pressed cheeses can be cut easily and wrapped rapidly, but Camembert would be very difficult to pack, and Stilton would crumble.
  Mrs. Leah Manning: It would be all crumbs.
  Dr. Summerskill: Yes, and the grocers would send most offensive letters to us if we asked them to do it. That is the reason why these special cheeses, to which I have no doubt the hon. Gentlemen opposite are very partial, cannot be include on the cheese ration.
  Mr. Keeling: Is the hon. Lady aware that, before the war—before she, or the Ministry of Food, were born or thought of—
  Dr. Summerskill: Thank you.
  Mr. Keeling: Both the small and the large grocer found not the slightest difficulty in grappling with any of these alleged difficulties?
  Dr. Summerskill: Has the hon. Gentleman forgotten that the cheese ration is two ounces a week?—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] It was not uncommon in those days for people to buy pounds—a pound or perhaps two pounds at a time—of cheese, but now the grocer is called upon to cut these little packets every day. On the subject of imported cheeses, we are now importing many. The hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) asked if we had changed our policy and reminded me of a speech last January.
  Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: On a point of Order. The hon. Lady has suggested that I had reminded her of something. I have, so far, reminded her of nothing.
  Dr. Summerskill: I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. It was the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Keeling) I meant. I suppose it was an association of ideas. The hon. Member for Twickenham asked why we are not importing more cheeses and why I made that speech in January
  2020
  last year. I can tell him we have decided to import these different cheeses which he will see in the Schedule, Column include Camembert and the blue vein cheeses.
  Mr. Keeling: I would remind the hon. Lady that her speech of January last year did not refer to imported cheeses. It referred to English cheese.
  Dr. Summerskill: I think the hon. Gentleman said that last January I stated that it was difficult to include imported cheeses in the ration and I gave the reason. It is because of the difficulties of the grocers, and these difficulties are still with us. The question has been asked why we do not import more cheeses, and why we do not take off all control. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If we import more cheeses we are relaxing control. For the moment we are controlling the import of cheeses. Surely that is elementary? The hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. C. S. Taylor) must not expect me to speak in words of one syllable, surely?
  Mr. C. S. Taylor: Not necessarily one syllable, but the hon. Lady might talk sense.
  Dr. Summerskill: If today we were to allow the import of these cheeses without control of any kind, it would mean that the milk which is now used for the butter which we also import, would be used for cheese. Therefore, although lion. Gentlemen opposite might enjoy their fancy cheeses, the children of the country would suffer, because they would be denied their butter. The hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Baker White) also talked about mousetrap "cheese. He is under a misconception. This is cheese of the Cheddar type. It is not really all of one type although it is all called Cheddar-type cheese. It comes not only from Cheddar, but from Cheshire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Derby, Wensleydale, and Dunlop. One hon. Member mentioned Dunlop. We have been having Dunlop cheese during the whole of the war. Now we propose to give a million gallons of milk for Stilton cheese, but that cheese will not go on the ration because there is not enough of it. Furthermore, we must have cheese of one type, in order that the grocer can serve it more easily. Stilton will, of course, be included in another Order.
  Mr. C. S. Taylor: The hon. Lady challenged me just now when she said I expected her to speak in words of one syllable. I expect to understand what she is saying. She says we have had these cheeses during the war. Now she says we must consider the small grocer and have one type of cheese. The point I and my hon. Friends were making was, might we not have—
  Dr. Summerskill: The hon. Member wants more and I think I was perfectly justified in chiding him just now. I said quite clearly that this was one type of cheese. It may come from Cheddar or Cheshire, or the other places I have mentioned, but it is all a hard pressed cheese which is generally called in the country a Cheddar-type cheese. Is that quite clear?
  Now let me deal with speciality cheeses. A number of hon. Members have suggested that speciality cheeses were made here before the war and that we are now denied them. A very small amount of Blue Cheshire was made before the war. Some hon. Member mentioned Double Gloucester and Blue Vinney from Dorset. The production of these two cheeses, which I understand went chiefly to large hotels and clubs in the West End—[Interruption]. It is quite possible for us to find out where these cheeses went previously. The production of these cheeses, I say, was under one ton a year, and since the Milk Marketing Board has been functioning, it has been found that farmers are not too eager to manufacture these cheeses. There is one other cheese I want to mention, and that is the cheese known as Caerphilly. It is a cheese about which I observe hon. Members opposite seem to know nothing, because it is a workers' cheese. Caerphilly was the favourite cheese of the miners, and hon. Members on the other side of the House will, I think, agree with me, that we did try to meet their special taste at the beginning of the war. But the grocers told us that it was not taken up to a great extent, and that they would take Cheddar cheese in lieu of Caerphilly. I have, in those four cheeses covered in the main what were regarded as speciality cheeses before the war. I think I have made it clear to hon. Members that we are trying to meet the tastes of the majority of the people in this country.
  The hon. Member for Twickenham asked me what proportion of cheese was
  2022
  imported. The answer is that 90 per cent. is imported, and that 10 per cent. is home-produced; 98 per cent. of the imported cheese is on the ration. The hon. Member also asked me why we did not get Stilton cheese from New Zealand. We have made inquiries about this, and find that New Zealand produces only a very small amount of this cheese. We are told, today, that it would be very difficult to transport, and that probably by the time it arrived here it would not be in perfect condition. The hon. Member for Eastbourne asked about the paragraph dealing with directions. I think, if he will study other Orders, he will find that this provision is always included. It certainly does give the Minister powers, but hon. Members will agree that these powers have never been abused. The hon. Member is in the cheese world, and therefore is in a position to contradict me if I am wrong.
  Let me give a small illustration. Suppose one kind of cheese was being produced by one manufacturer—I might even say, lactic acid cheese, a special cheese manufactured before the war which was supposed to have certain medicinal properties. It is not manufactured now. Suppose a manufacturer decided to produce a little of this lactic acid cheese, and we gave him permission. We might then give him directions as to the price and conditions of sale. In a case of that kind, it would not be necessary to issue an Order. Paragraph 12 of the Order also was mentioned by the hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Kendall) and the hon. Member for Eastbourne. They referred to that part which deals with cheese which is to be used as ships' stores, and sold' to any Government Department. I was asked why this was included. On this point, again, if hon. Members will consult other food Orders, they will find that this provision is generally included for the reason that we are dealing with these Departments direct through the Ministry. There is no wholesaler or retailer involved. Therefore, we leave ourselves open to decide the prices.
  Mr. Kendall: Will the hon. Lady before she leaves that point tell the House what kind of control she has over N.A.A.F.I. in relation to this cheese Order? What possibility is there of N.A.A.F.I. buying cheeses, which the small grocer cannot buy, and reselling them to civilians, as, indeed, they do in a little village in my constituency?
  Dr. Summerskill: May I remind the hon. Member that N.A.A.F.I. has registered customers—the wives and relatives of serving men? Of course, these people will be buying cheese at the controlled prices. I do not think there will be any abuse there.
  Mr. C. S. Taylor: On that point, I would like to ask the hon. Lady if, under paragraph 12, (2), it would be possible for N.A.A.F.I., if they so desired, to charge more than the maximum retail price. I have a second question, which is, if the Ministry are selling cheese to N.A.A.F.I., are the Ministry proposing to charge more than the maximum wholesale prices?
  Dr. Summerskill: No. The registered customer would pay the controlled prices. But in every food Order—and I think there have been a number of Prayers in this House against food Orders—a provision has been included giving the Minister a fairly free hand. I think the House will agree that we have aimed in this Order at maintaining a balance. We have tried to introduce certain cheeses which will perhaps provide a little variety in the diet, but in the main, we have so controlled the manufacture of cheese in this country, and the imports of cheese, that the diet of the people is protected and that the milk of the country will not be diverted to the making of cheese or any other food which we consider is unnecessary today.
  10.56 p.m.
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I should not have intervened in this Debate were it not for the fact that the hon. Lady has made a series of statements which cannot possibly be allowed to go altogether unchallenged from this side. She has, I think, done an almost unique thing—she has contrived to introduce class consciousness into a Debate on a cheese Order. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Food is out of the country at the moment, but I think the hon. Lady might well consult him, for unless his tastes have altered very considerably in the last few years, he still appreciates those cheeses which she contemptuously dismisses as being almost invariably, if not entirely, eaten in West End clubs. I should like to ask the hon. Lady, what is wrong with West End clubs?
  Dr. Summerskill rose—
  Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I will sit down when I have completed my question. The hon.
  2024
  Lady makes a series of cheap jibes and attempts to suggest that the purpose of this Prayer is to try to preserve a few things, eaten only by a limited few, at the expense of things required by the general body of the public. [HON. MEMBERS: "It is true."] This, as the hon. Lady in her better moments knows, and as the Minister knows all the time, is wholly unfair and untrue, and it goes very badly with the appeal to the "Dunkirk spirit" and the union of all the best elements in the nation in the great production drive about which we hear so frequently from the Government benches.
  The main purpose of my intervention is to challenge straight away the extraordinary doctrine of the hon. Lady that the main purpose of the Ministry of Food is to settle what people ought to eat instead of providing what they want to eat. It was, for a period, my privilege in the earlier days of the war, before it got too hectic, to serve in the position that the hon. Lady now occupies, and I know that we regarded our function—and I think she will give me this credit, for she remembers my association with the Department—as that of providing the people of England with what they wanted from time to time, and not always what some official or dietitian thought they ought to want. There are a large number of people in this country who want these types of cheese. They are by no means limited to a small social class. If there is anything in the Government's argument that every day, the opportunities of life are widening for the masses of the people, more and more people are wanting these cheeses and new foods which hitherto perhaps only a smaller and more limited class has wanted. It is wholly undesirable, when we are trying to bring forward a perfectly responsible suggestion for the annulment of an Order of this kind, that it should be suggested that all we want to do is to preserve limited privileges for a few.
  Life now is, after all, drab enough and standardised enough, bound and ruled by licences, under which the average citizen is denied the right to do the ordinary, desirable and proper things he wants to do, without extra gibes being thrown across the House by the hon. Lady, who finds it impossible to deal with the merits of the Order, and so has to indulge in some class-conscious tripe. It may seem something like bathos that we should pass from a Debate on Palestine to a Debate on a

  2025
  cheese Order, but the two subjects have this in common: the difficulties in which the Government find themselves are, in both cases, based on promises which they made before the General Election. The difficulties in Palestine, with which we have already dealt, and the difficulties in regard to food rationing, date, very largely, from that exhortation of the Minister of Transport at the last Election, "Vote Labour and prevent any cut in your rations." Well, the general public of this country can now appreciate that at its true value.
  Nothing has emerged from the hon. Lady's answer to deal with any of the detailed and proper criticisms that have been made. She has said nothing to show that this Order will not still further prejudice the building up of an export trade in the cheese industry, in which we have the facilities the skill, and the opportunities, but are hampered by Orders of this kind. There was in her answer nothing to justify these maximum price Orders, either in relation to such organisations as N.A.A.F.I.—as the hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Kendall) said—or in relation to the great disparity that exists, and will continue, between imported cheeses at, say, 3s. a pound and British Wensleydale at about one third of the price. She has not attempted to deal with those questions. We do not want to divide the House on every possible occasion. If we divided the House on every occasion when the Government are guilty of hasty and ill-digested legislation, we should spend the entire time of Parliament in having Divisions. But we must register our protest at one further indication of the incompetence of His Majesty's Ministers and their failure to appreciate the immediate needs of the moment.
  Mr. Tiffany rose—
  11.3 p.m.
  Mr. Keeling: I had intended to claim the right to reply, but if the hon. Member for Peterborough would like to speak before me. I will delay doing so. If not, I am going to reply very briefly, because I do not think that hon. Members really want much reply to the deplorable speech by the Minister. The remark of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd), that the Minister had imported a great deal of class prejudice, was received with laughter on the other side. I should like to ask them whether
  2026
  it is wrong to like Double Gloucester, but right for miners to like Caerphilly? If that is not class prejudice, what is? The hon. Lady suggested, also, that the cheeses that I mentioned were an acquired taste. This inability on her part to distinguish between cheeses is completely beside the point. Does she not realise that the British working man is out today to buy the best he can get, either in cheese or in other foods? What else has he to spend his money on? The fact that pineapples are sold off barrows in South London and East London at any price at which they are put on the market, is proof of what I say. This is not a class matter at all.
  The Parliamentary Secretary misrepresented entirely what was said about the "mousetrap" cheese. We did not apply that to English cheese of the Cheddar type, but to imported Cheddar cheese. The taunt of "mousetrap" could be removed from imported Cheddar by keeping it until it is ripe. The Minister did not deal with that proposal. She suggested that the people existed for the Ministry of Food, and not the Ministry of Food for the people. Her contention that the grocer is quite incapable of grappling with a variety of cheese under the ration system would be rejected by any association of grocers. I have never heard any such suggestion made by grocers, and they are perfectly willing, I am sure, to serve the people in any way they can. She failed to answer a great many of the questions put from this side of the House, and in spite of the speeches which have been made by her chief from time to time about the importance of introducing variety into the diet of the people, she held out no hope whatever of, any increase in variety of cheese. I think that her speech would have been received with dismay by any audience of British people I had not intended to divide the House if she had given a reasonable and sympathetic answer to the reasonable suggestions and requests from this side of the House, but as she has failed to do that, I certainly intend to divide the House
  Question put, "That the Cheese (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1946 (S.R. & 0., 1946, No. 2109), dated 12th December, 1946, a copy of which was presented on 17th December be annulled."
  The House divided: Ayes, 35; Noes, 180

  Division No. 91.]

  AYES

  [11.7 p.m.

  Agnew, Cmdr. P. G

  Hannon, Sir P. (Moseley)

  Robinson, Wing-Comdr. Roland

  Baldwin, A. E.

  Herbert, Sir A. P.

  Scott, Lord W.

  Birch, Nigel

  Kendall, W. D.

  Spence, H. R.

  Bower, N.

  Lambert, Hon. G.

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

  Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.

  Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H

  Stuart, Rt. Hon. J. (Moray)

  Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W

  Lennox-Boyd, A. T.

  Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)

  Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T

  Lindsay, M (Solihull)

  Thorp, Lt.-Col. R. A. F.

  Carson, E.

  Low, Brig. A. R. W.

  Wheatley, Colonel M. J.

  Challen, C.

  Mellor, Sir J.

  White. J B. (Canterbury)

  Conant, Maj. R. J. E.

  Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)

  Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

  Pitman, I. J.

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Dower, Lt.-Col. A, V. G. (Penrith)

  Prior-Palmer, Brig. O

  Mr. Keeling and

  Gage, C

  Ramsay, Major S.

  Mr. Charles Taylor.

  NOES.

  Adams, W. T. (Hammersmith, South)

  Gooch, E G.

  Noel-Buxton, Lady

  Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V.

  Grey, C. F.

  O'Brien, T.

  Allen, A. C. (Bosworth)

  Grierson, E.

  Orbach, M.

  Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

  Griffiths, D. (Rother Valley)

  Parkin, B. T.

  Attewell, H. C.

  Griffiths, W. D. (Moss Side)

  Pearson, A.

  Awbery, S. S

  Gunter, R. J.

  Pearl, Capt. T. F.

  Bacon, Miss A

  Guy, W. H.

  Plans-Mills, J. F. F

  Baird, J.

  Hale, Leslie

  Poole, Major Cecil (Lichfield)

  Balfour, A.

  Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. R

  Popplewell, E.

  Bechervaise, A E

  Hannan, W. (Maryhill)

  Porter, G. (Leeds)

  Benson, G.

  Hardy, E. A.

  Price, M. Philips

  Berry, H.

  Hastings, Dr. Somerville

  Randall, H. E.

  Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

  Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)

  Ranger. J

  Bing, G. H. C.

  Herbison, Miss. M

  Rankin, J.

  Blyton, W. R.

  Hewitson, Capt. M.

  Rhodes, H.

  Boardman, H.

  Holman, P.

  Robens, A.

  Bowden, Flg.-Offr, H. W.

  Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)

  Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)

  Hoy, J.

  Roberts, W. (Cumberland, N.)

  Braddock, Mrs. E. M. (L'pl, Exch'ge)

  Hubbard, T.

  Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)

  Brook, D. (Halifax)

  Hutchinson, H. L. (Rusholme)

  Ross, William (Kilmarnock)

  Brooks, T. J. (Rothwell)

  Hynd, H. (Hackney, C.)

  Scollan, T

  Brown, T. J. (Ince)

  Janner, B.

  Segal, Dr. S.

  Buchanan, G.

  Jay, D. P. T.

  Sharp, Granville

  Burke, W. A

  Jager, G. (Winchester)

  Shawcross, C. N. (Widnes)

  Castle, Mrs. B. A

  Jeger, Dr. S W. (St. Pancras. S.E.)

  Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir H (St. Helens)

  Champion. A. J.

  Jones. D T (Hartlepools)

  Shurmer, P.

  Cobb, F. A

  Jones, Elwyn (Plaistow)

  Silverman, S. S. (Nelson)

  Cocks, F. S.

  Jones, J H, (Bolton)

  Smith, C (Colchester)

  Coldrick, W.

  Keenan, W.

  Smith, S. H. (Hull, S.W.)

  Collindridge, F

  Kenyon, C.

  Soskice, Maj. Sir F.

  Collins, V J

  Kinghorn, Son.-Ldr. E.

  Stubbs, A. E.

  Colman, Miss G. M.

  Kinlay, J.

  Summerskill, Dr. Edith

  Cook, T. F.

  Lang, G.

  Swingler, S.

  Cooper, Wing-Comdr. G.

  Lavers, S.

  Sylvester, G. O

  Corlett, Dr. J

  Lee, F. (Hulme)

  Symonds, A. L.

  Crawley, A.

  Leonard, W.

  Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)

  Crossman, R. H. S

  Lever, N. H

  Thomas, D. E (Aberdare)

  Daggar, G.

  Lewis, A W. J. (Upton)

  Thomas, Ivor (Keighley)

  Davies, Edward (Burslem)

  Lewis, J. (Bolton)

  Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)

  Davies, Ernest (Enfield)

  Lewis, T. (Southampton)

  Tiffany, S.

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Lipton, Lt.-Col. M

  Timmons, J.

  Deer, G.

  Logan, D. G

  Usborne, Henry

  Delargy, Captain H. J

  Lyne, A. W.

  Wadsworth, G.

  Dabble, W.

  McKay, J. (Wallsend)

  Watkins, T. E.

  Driberg, T E. N

  Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N.W.)

  Watson, W. M.

  Dye, S.

  McLeavy, F.

  West, D. G.

  Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

  MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

  While, H. (Derbyshire, N.E.)

  Edwards. W. (Whitechapel)

  Mallalieu, J. P. W

  Whiteley, Rt Hon. W.

  Evans, John (Ogmore)

  Mann, Mrs. J

  Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

  Evans, S N (Wednesbury)

  Manning, Mrs L. (Epping)

  Wilkins, W. A.

  Ewart, R.

  Mathers, G

  Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)

  Fairhurst, F.

  Medland, H. M.

  Williams, J. L. (Kelvingrove)

  Farthing, W. J.

  Mitchison, Maj. G. R

  Williams, W R. (Heston)

  Fletcher, E. G M. (Islington, E.)

  Moody, A. S.

  Willis, E.

  Follick, M.

  Morley, R.

  Wilmot, Rt. Hon. J

  Foot, M. M.

  Morris, P. (Swansea. W.)

  Wilson, J. H.

  Forman, J. C.

  Moyle, A.

  Woodburn, A

  Ganley, Mrs. C. S

  Murray, J. D.

  Woods, G. S

  Gibbins, J

  Nally, W.

  Gibson, C W

  Neal, H. (Claycross)

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Gilzean, A.

  Nicholls, H. R. (Stratford)

  Mr. Michael Stewart and

  Mr. Simmons.

  PENICILLIN (CONTROL)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do new adjourn."—[Mr. Arthur Pearson.]
  11.15 p.m.
  Sir John Mellor: I am glad to have the opportunity of referring to the control of penicillin, because I know it is a matter which interests a large number of Members in this House and I know that some of them will desire to speak after me this evening, so I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible. Penicillin is controlled under Order No. 731 of 1946. Under that Order if anyone walks into a chemist's shop and says "Please sell me some penicillin," unless he tenders a medical prescription, he is guilty of a criminal offence for which he may be severely punished. Even at the time of a shortage of penicillin, to some of us that seemed to be rather a drastic provision, but there is now no longer any shortage of penicillin. Therefore, in 'my submission, the Order is now quite unjustified.
  On 18th February I asked the Minister of Supply to state the production and the consumption of penicillin in the United Kingdom in January; the amount imported and exported during that month; and why the Control of Penicillin (No. r) Order, 1946, had not been revoked. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply gave this written answer:
  "225,387 mega units were produced and 85,000 exported. Figures of the quantities distributed to meet demand in January are not yet available, but we are satisfied that there is ample to meet all prescriptions. About 5 mega units were imported for experimental purposes. As regards the second part of the Question, I am advised by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health that penicillin should be used only under expert supervision, and at his request my right hon. Friend is retaining the Control Orders until such time as other arrangements can he made."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th February, 1947; Vol. 433, C. 166.]
  So it is clear that the ball has been passed by the Minister of Supply to the Minister of Health. In view of that answer, I wrote to both Ministries drawing attention to this forthcoming discussion. I received a letter from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health explaining to me that unfortunately owing to his being unwell he was unable to be present this evening. I am grateful for the courtesy of that reply, and I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman cannot be here. I am sure that the Parlia-
  2030
  mentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply will be well able to answer for him. As I understand the position with regard to medical opinion generally in relation to penicillin, it is that penicillin is in no way harmful, but—and I do not want to under-estimate the importance of the "but"—the doctors also consider that if penicillin is continually used the body becomes so acclimatised to it that it becomes less susceptible to its beneficial qualities. The reaction of the body to penicillin tends to diminish with frequent use, though I do not think it is contended by the medical profession that any direct harm can come from the use of penicillin.
  I think it can be said of many drugs that their continuous use would be undesirable, but that does not mean that their sale is in any way limited by legislation. We have, of course, the poisons dealt with in the Poisons Act, and opium and other narcotics of that character dealt with under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Under both these Acts the Home Secretary has power to make regulations restricting their distribution, but I am not aware that any legislation has yet been passed to restrict the sale of therapeutic substances which are not harmful. In my view, if my premises are correct, the continuance in force of this Order is therefore quite unjustified. Even assuming, for the purposes of argument, that it was desirable that some control over the distribution of penicillin should be retained, then, in my submission, the continuance in force of this Order is entirely the wrong way of doing it. This Order is made under Regulation 55, which is effected by virtue of the Supplies and Services Transitional Powers Act of 1945. That Act enables such regulations to have effect for the purpose of regulating supplies so as to ensure a sufficiency of supplies essential to the well-being of the community, their equitable distribution or their availability at fair prices. There is nothing at all to justify the use of an Order, made under these provisions, to enforce the medical opinion of the Ministry of Health.
  This Order, which was no doubt quite properly made in the first instance to deal with a shortage of supply, is now being extended for an entirely different purpose in the interests of an entirely different Ministry from the one which made the Order. Far be it from me in any way to speak disrespectfully of medical opinion,

  2031
  indeed, I think we are wise when we hearken to medical opinion. But surely it is one thing to say that medical opinion should be respected, and quite a different thing to enforce it by law. I submit that the people of this country should be entirely free to follow medical opinion or to disregard it.
  11.23 p.m.
  Mr. John Lewis: I am sure the House is very grateful to the hon. Baronet for raising this matter tonight. I am in rather the same difficulty as that in which he found himself. Neither of us is a medical man, and in this discussion we are basing quite a lot of what we have to say upon the advice of experts who know more than we do about it. If I understand the hon. Member's argument, it is that because penicillin is plentiful and readily available —a situation which is a distinct change from the previous years when it had to be carefully used because of the shortage—any person who desires it should have the facility of going into a chemist's shop and buying penicillin and using it, without a doctor's prescription. I think that in this case we must examine the way in which penicillin may be efficaciously used. No one would say that this drug which has proved to be one of the greatest boons to mankind should be used indiscriminately, because there are parts of the world where it could at present be employed with great advantage to the people living there, and I think that if there is any surplus of a pharmaceutical or a therapeutic product of this kind, that surplus should be made available to those who most need it. But we must bear in mind that this drug can only be used with effect by injection. That means that any person who proposes to use it without a medical certificate has to get a hypodermic syringe and give himself injections and I think no medical man in this House would be happy if he knew that a patient, without instructions and advice was injecting himself with whatever amount of penicillin he thought fit there is quite a lot of danger in sticking a needle into one's flesh and in any case, the medical men would like to be assured that the interests they have in giving injections are not interfered with. I think it has been argued by the hon. Member opposite that penicillin can be given in other forms and that one can buy penicillin tablets of 500 units each without a doctor's certificate, in any
  2032
  chemist's shop. I hope the hon. Gentle man who is to reply tonight is aware that this is an utter waste of penicillin these tablets of 500 units each, have not the slightest effect.
  Sir J. Mellor: Is the hon. Gentleman not going to mention other methods of application—penicillin cream. for example?
  Mr. J. Lewis: I am glad the hon. Baronet has mentioned that. I was coming to the question of creams being used in cases in dermatology, but that is not a panacea for all ills. In some cases such as stefflacocus, streptococus, and pneumococus, it may have produced some very wonderful results. We do not know definitely yet, whether if one continues to use penicillin indiscriminately, one does not build up a penicillin resistance strain so that after a time it will have no effect at all. The medical authorities are not all of that opinion. In any case this valuable drug should not be wasted and I hope the hon. Gentleman who is to reply ill make investigations, in co-operation with his colleague the Minister of Health, who I am pleased to see sitting on the Front Bench tonight, to find whether these tablets of 500 units are in pharmaceutical practice proving profitable and whether it is proposed to go on selling them when the manufacturers themselves know they are not of the slightest use. I have contacted a director of a firm which is one of the largest manufacturers of penicillin, and he has assured me that these tablets are of no use.
  We must bear in mind that penicillin is an unstable compound. It is not possible to keep these tablets for very long. They must he kept under special conditions in refrigerators. If we are to let everyone go into a shop, without a prescription of any kind, and buy whatever penicillin they think is necessary for maintaining their health, I feel the effectiveness of this drug will be lost completely. If we allow it to be used in that way it would create a precedent. There people who are now entitled to buy insulin on a doctor's prescription would feel that they also should not need a doctor's prescription. The hon. Member's point is that this is not a dangerous drug and that therefore it should be available without control. Insulin is not a dangerous drug but it is in short supply and it is still thought necessary to exercise some control. I

  2033
  hope my hon. Friend will deal with this question of the waste of penicillin and will promise to make an investigation into its indiscriminate use.
  11.31 p.m.
  Wing-Commander Roland Robinson: There is no doubt that the discovery of penicillin by one of our own countrymen and its subsequent commercial development by the Americans, represent a great advance in medical science. I thought the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply was right when, in June last, he said it was one of the most potent cures known for certain diseases. Our desire on this side of the House is to be quite sure that adequate supplies are available to the general public, so that they can get the benefit it offers. I hope the hon. Gentleman will not take everything said by the hon. Member for Bolton (Mr. J. Lewis) too seriously. There are other ways of taking penicillin than injection. I remember when I was in America, I had a bad throat and I cured it by chewing two tablets of penicillin chewing gum. It has been said that penicillin can cure a very wide range of diseases, from sore throat to venereal disease, and that it can thus help unfortunate children who suffer through no fault of their own. Here we have a great opportunity to launch a public health campaign to help our people. We can do much for them.
  Mr. J. Lewis: Is the hon. and gallant Member suggesting that people should treat themselves for venereal disease?
  Wing-Commander Robinson: I did not say that at any time. I said we wanted to ensure that penicillin was as freely available as possible to meet public needs. I have not the slightest thought that we should cut out the medical profession, where injections are needed. I would urge on the Minister the opportunity he has here to launch a campaign for public health. I am afraid this has not so far been done. It is all wrong that whenever penicillin is discussed, the matter has to be dealt with by the Ministry of Supply rather than by the Ministry of Health. I am afraid we are using penicillin as a pawn in the export drive. The Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade are trying to use it to get hard currency, when they might well use it at home to improve the health of the people. The
  2034
  Joint Parliamentary Secretary, when he spoke last June, said we were exporting more than we were using at home. I am anxious to, know if we are maintaining these restrictions on penicillin, and seeking to narrow its use here so that we can export it in competition with our American friends who have done so much in its devolpment. Let us encourage the Minister of Health to launch a great health campaign. Let us use it at home, and I am sure it will pay far greater dividends than we can obtain from the small quantity of hard currency which we get by export. We have an opportunity of doing good; let us take it.
  11.35 p.m.
  Dr. Santo Jeger (St. Pancras, Southeast): Whenever a new drug is discovered and achieves a fair proportion of cures, the public at once gets the idea that it is a cure-all, and one is faced immediately with a demand from the public for an indiscriminate supply of it for all sorts of purposes for which it is no use whatever. That is one of the reasons why the supply of penicillin should be controlled. It is true that the main method of therapeutic application is by injection. But there are other ways of giving penicillin—first, inhalation, and secondly, by lozenges. But there has been considerable correspondence in the medical Press recently on certain deleterious effects following the use of lozenges. The hon. Member who spoke last mentioned venereal disease, as a disease which can easily be made to yield to the application of penicillin. I would not like to treat myself with penicillin for venereal disease without being subjected to the proper tests, both before and after the treatment. I think it would be a most dangerous proceeding, and one which would be likely to lead to great distress.
  Wing-Commander Robinson: I did not say, at any time, that it should be done without the advice and care of a doctor. I made this plain in answer to an interjection by the hon. Member for Bolton (Mr. J. Lewis).
  Dr. Jeger: I was under the impression that the sole purpose of those who initiated this discussion was to argue that penicillin should be used without medical supervision. When a doctor issues a prescription, he does not just order a supply of the drug. The prescription consists of two parts, the first being a recipe for the drug,

  2035
  and the second, the method of application of the drug. There are instructions on the prescription which will be repeated on the package handed to the patient, or to the person who collects the drug, so that the patient may know the proper way to use it. In my view, the supply of penicillin must be controlled, first, because we have not got unlimited quantities of it, and secondly, because its use must still be medically controlled.
  11.38 p.m.
  The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. Leonard): The hon. Member who introduced the matter prefaced his remarks by saying that he was glad to have the opportunity of doing so. I welcome the opportunity of giving him a reply, which I propose to restrain within the few minutes now available to me. I shall not weary the House with details with regard to the advantages of deep culture as against the early method of surface culture but I would say that there is now no serious risk of supplies being insufficient to meet requirements in this country for medical and dental and veterinary requirements. With regard to the latter category, I was questioned about it on the last occasion when this matter was raised in the House and I gave an assurance then than it would not be ruled out, when supplies of penicillin were sufficient. Supplies being sufficient, we have no hesitation about including the veterinary category.
  It may interest the House to know that, in January, 85,000 mega units were exported. I make reference to this not to support the view of the hon. and gallant Member opposite, who thought that there was 'some inclination on the part of this country to restrain the use of penicillin here, so that it could be exported, but in order to support the contention that there is ample penicillin available in this country, and that in the circumstances we think it should be made available for export. The reason for the Control Order was the need, while penicillin was in short supply, to ensure that those limited supplies were not frittered away on trivial uses, but having said that, it was always recognised that there might be reasons for controlling its sale and distribution on purely medical grounds, a point which I think I mentioned when this matter was dis-
  2036
  cussed last June. I will not go into details because of the support I have received from my hon. Friends who have spoken from this side of the House, but I stated then that when penicillin became available in greater measure the policy of control would be reviewed. This we have kept in view and we have only adopted the attitude we have because of the considerable risks on supply grounds, namely, that if we removed control too early no one could forecast the expansion of the demand and we might find ourselves short of penicillin for important medicinal uses.
  May I also give what I am advised has been the experience in America? They started with control and that control was lifted, but because of what transpired after the lifting of control it was deemed to be in the national interest to reimpose it. I put that in in order to support the attitude we adopt. Now, however, I am glad to be able to say that the supply position in this country is so much improved that on supply grounds alone it would no longer be necessary to retain control over distribution. I notice that my hon. Friend said "Far be it from me to be disrespectful of medical opinion," and may I say, "Far be it from me to disregard medical opinion. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Health has been advised by eminent medical experts—including Sir Alexander Fleming, who is pre-eminent in this matter—that there would be considerable danger in the uncontrolled use of penicillin, and it should not be permitted. This is a very specialised problem and I do not propose to enter into it, but I am advised that there is a real danger to patients and to others by the creation of a strain of organisms resistant to penicillin treatment, if I may choose a formula different from that used by the hon. Member who introduced this matter. This aspect of the matter is well recognised and therefore, as has already been stated by the hon. Member who opened the Debate, we still stand by the reply given to him on 18th February that he has referred to, when he was informed that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health requested my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply to retain the Control Orders in force until such time as other arrangements could be made. That still stands.
  However, I think the House will be pleased to learn that a draft Bill has been

  2037
  prepared to control the sale and supply of penicillin other than by Order. I cannot anticipate what that might mean, but I think it should give surely to the hon. Gentleman who introduced this discussion tonight that the matter is well within the
  2038
  notice of the Government, and with that I think he ought to be satisfied.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at Sixteen Minutes to Twelve o'clock.

BRITISH ARMY
  Demobilisation
  Demobilisation
  B.A.O.R. (Amenities)
  B.A.O.R. (Amenities)
  African Troops (Rioting)
  African Troops (Rioting)
  Milton Rifle Range (Houses)
  Milton Rifle Range (Houses)
  Technical and Non-Technical Arms
  Technical and Non-Technical Arms
  Personal Case
  Personal Case
  Rate of Exchange
  Rate of Exchange
  Defence Works, Coast Areas
  Defence Works, Coast Areas
  SERVICES LAND REQUIREMENTS
  SERVICES LAND REQUIREMENTS
PRISONERS OF WAR
  Repatriation
  Repatriation
  Visitors
  Visitors
  Newspapers
  Newspapers
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Taxation (Suggested Concessions)
  Taxation (Suggested Concessions)
  Land Tax (Revenue)
  Land Tax (Revenue)
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Dresses (Imports from U.S.A.)
  Dresses (Imports from U.S.A.)
  Surplus Government Tyres
  Surplus Government Tyres
  Agricultural Machinery (Exports)
  Agricultural Machinery (Exports)
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING
  Housing Sites, Rural Areas
  Housing Sites, Rural Areas
  New Town (Micklefield-Sherburn)
  New Town (Micklefield-Sherburn)
EMPLOYMENT
  Foreign Workers
  Foreign Workers
  Lodging Allowances
  Lodging Allowances
  Factory Sites, Scotland (Disabled Persons)
  Factory Sites, Scotland (Disabled Persons)
  Wallasey
  Wallasey
  Herring Nets (Disabled Men)
  Herring Nets (Disabled Men)
  Housing Contracts, Ennerdale (Craftsmen)
  Housing Contracts, Ennerdale (Craftsmen)
  Vocational Training Scheme
  Vocational Training Scheme
  Distribution of Workers
  Distribution of Workers
  NATIONAL INSURANCE (WOMEN LAND WORKERS)
  NATIONAL INSURANCE (WOMEN LAND WORKERS)
  NATIONAL SERVICE (STUDENTS)
  NATIONAL SERVICE (STUDENTS)
SCOTLAND
  Council on Education
  Council on Education
  Water Supply Schemes (Grants)
  Water Supply Schemes (Grants)
  Island of Soay (Communications)
  Island of Soay (Communications)
  Forth Bridge Provisional Order
  Forth Bridge Provisional Order
MINISTRY OF PENSIONS
  Total Disability
  Total Disability
  Appeals (R.A.F. Cases)
  Appeals (R.A.F. Cases)
AGRICULTURE
  U.S. Tractor Engines
  U.S. Tractor Engines
  Sheep Feedingstuffs
  Sheep Feedingstuffs
PALESTINE
  British Proposals (Replies)
  British Proposals (Replies)
  United Nations Meeting
  United Nations Meeting
  INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (BRITISH MEMBERSHIP)
  INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (BRITISH MEMBERSHIP)
  RURAL HOUSES, ESSEX
  RURAL HOUSES, ESSEX
MINISTRY OF SUPPLY
  Foundries, Southern England
  Foundries, Southern England
  Alarm Clocks
  Alarm Clocks
  Rail Locomotives, 1946
  Rail Locomotives, 1946
  ELECTRICAL PLANT PRODUCTION
  ELECTRICAL PLANT PRODUCTION
  RAILWAY CHARGES (GOVERNMENT DECISION)
  RAILWAY CHARGES (GOVERNMENT DECISION)
  INDIAN ARMY CADETS (TRAINING ADMISSION)
  INDIAN ARMY CADETS (TRAINING ADMISSION)
FOOD SUPPLIES
  Costings Division
  Costings Division
  Oranges (Grading)
  Oranges (Grading)
Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers.

  FRESH MEAT STOCKS.
  LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I rise to ask the first question standing against my name on the Order Paper.
  [The question was as follows:
  To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are aware that the substantial amount by which our consumption of meat is exceeding our supply is causing grave anxiety, and whether they are prepared to make a statement on stocks of fresh meat, and on their ability to meet the present ration of one shilling's worth of fresh meat per week.]
  LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, the ratio of consumption to supplies shows some variation from time to time, but taking the calendar year 1946 as a whole, the total supplies were somewhat in excess of total consumption. For reasons given more than once to the House, I cannot agree to disclose the stock position. So far as the last part of the question is concerned, the first six months of the year are usually the most difficult from the point of view of supplies, and it would be premature to give any firm opinion about the prospects for this period.
  LORD LLOYD: Will the noble Lord please state, in view of the progressive decrease in the last few months of 1946 of both foreign-produced meat and home-produced meat, whether His Majesty's Government will take every possible step to raise the production of home-produced meat in the future?
  LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that His Majesty's Government have every intention of doing exactly what he has asked.

MEAT PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS.
2.31 p.m.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I rise to ask the second question standing against my name on the Order Paper.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, what was the home production of fresh meat in December, 1946, and January, 1947, and what were the imports of fresh, frozen, canned and corned meat in January, 1947.]
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, the home production of fresh meat in December, 1946, was 63,000 tons, and the provisional figure for January, 1947, is 53,000 tons. Provisional figures for January imports are 78,000 tons of fresh frozen meat, 14,800 tons of canned corned meat, and 8,700 tons of other canned meat.
LORD LLOYD: I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his reply.

BUILDING OPERATION CONTROL ORDER.
2.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing in my name.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, what is the effect on the householder of the "Control of Buildings Operations (No. 8) Order" of 15th January last (S.R. & O. 1947 No. 74).]
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I apologize for the fact that this answer is a little longer than is normally the case. This Order lays down for the period from February to July, 1947, inclusive the financial limits below which building work may be carried out on any one property without a licence from the Ministry of Works under Defence Regulation 56A. The limit prescribed is the same as in the previous three periods of six months—namely, an overall limit of £10 for the period together with separate limits of £2 in any one month of the period. In the previous three periods, work on a dwelling house required no licence if the work was to be carried out by the householder himself or by unpaid labour, even though materials in excess of the licensable limits were to be

925
used. The only change made by the present Order is that work above the financial limits mentioned on dwelling houses now requires a licence, even if it is to be carried out by the householder himself or by unpaid labour.
The work on private dwelling houses is licensed by local authorities acting as agents for the Minister of Works. The local authorities have been instructed that, in granting licences for work to be carried out by a householder himself or by members of his family or friends, they should have regard only to the cost of the materials to be used. The arrangement by which work carried out by the householder or by unpaid labour was not licensable was originally made at the time of the flying bomb attacks on this country, when the building labour force was at its lowest and it was desired to give every possible encouragement to householders to carry out minor repair work with their own resources. Experience has shown, however, that it has been possible for quite considerable quantities of scarce materials, such as timber and paint, to be diverted to work carried out in this way, and it is for this reason that the change is essential. It will be appreciated that it is still vitally necessary to conserve supplies of these materials which are so badly needed for the housing programme, and the sole purpose of the change in the order is to curb abuses which are known to have developed.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I should like to thank the Minister for the efforts he has made to meet representations which have been made to him on this particular point, but I do not suppose that any noble Lord on this side of the House will be entirely satisfied with the answer. I would like to ask the Minister whether further instructions could not be issued to the regional officers, or whoever they are, to exclude altogether the householder himself or his family from the scope of this Regulation. In our view, a householder ought not to be subject to a £10 limit. That seems to us to be an infringement of the elementary right of the ordinary citizen that he should be able to make his own house fit for habitation without a licence from the State. I do not think a very large number will wish to take advantage of it, or that the amount of paint they will use will, in the nature of things, be very large. We feel that this is a matter of principle and that this is an unnecessary and deplorable
926
Regulation as applied to the householder and his family. I would, therefore, ask the noble Lord who has replied whether he will make further representations to the Minister of Works to see whether the interpretation of the Regulation may not be modified in the sense I have suggested.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I will certainly see that the suggestion of the noble Viscount is conveyed to my right honourable friend. I would merely add that this Regulation is not directed to restricting the freedom of the individual but to safeguarding the public interest in the use of materials which are essential to house building and which, from experience, we know to have been diverted to a wrong purpose.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: It is entirely a question of how great that diversion is. If the diversion is really not very large, then the limitation of die liberty of the individual would not be justified. I would make this further point. I understand the House has not much time to consider whether it wishes to take any further action in this matter, and I would be most grateful if the noble Lord would let me know the result of his inquiries of the responsible Minister by to-morrow.
LORD HENDERSON: I will certainly see that that is done.

INDIA.
2.38 p.m.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD rose to move to resolve, That the decision of His Majesty's Government to hand over India to an Indian Government or Governments in June, 1948, under conditions which appear to be in conflict with previous declarations of the Government on this subject, and without any provisions for the protection of minorities or the discharge of their other obligations, is likely to imperil the peace and prosperity of India. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, it is with genuine regret that I feel bound to move the Resolution that stands in my name. For some time past there has been an almost unique unity of front upon Indian questions. All Parties in the State have realized the changes that were taking place in the Far East, and they had accepted the fact, obvious to everyone, of the great growth of nationalism in Asia. Many who in the past would have wished

927
to see the transfer of power in India carried out at a deliberate pace, have come to realize that, in the overcharged atmosphere of the post-war world, it is necessary to expedite that transfer. The result has been that no Government within living memory have received such consistent support from the Opposition in the conduct of Indian affairs as this Government. The Opposition have followed with sympathy the difficulties of the Government. Upon every occasion they have made it clear that they are prepared to transfer power and that they are prepared that that transfer should be expedited.
This unity of front was based upon three conditions. Let me remind the House of them. In the first place, the transfer was to be orderly; in the second place, it was to be based upon a substantial measure of Indian agreement; and in the third place, it was to take full account of our obligations which had grown up during the generations in which we had conducted the affairs of India. I will not weary your Lordships with quotations upon these conditions, but I will merely take three short sentences to illustrate what I have just said: first of all, the condition that the transfer was to be orderly. Let me remind your Lordships of what the Secretary of State for India and Burma, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, said on this subject on December 4, 1945:
"The realization of full self-government can only come by the orderly and peaceful transfer of control of the machinery of State to purely Indian authority."
I come next to the pledge about general agreement, and I take my quotation from the Government statement of December 6, 1946:
"There has never been any prospect of success for the Constituent Assembly except upon the basis of agreed procedure. Should a Constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented, His Majesty's Government could not of course contemplate—as the Congress has stated they would not contemplate—forcing such a Constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country."
I come last to the third condition, the fulfillment of our obligations. I take my quotation from the statement that was made upon the Cripps' Mission and that, so far from not having been repudiated by the Government, has been re-stated by them on several subsequent occasions.
928
In that statement it was laid down that the transfer must be:
"Subject to the fulfilment of our obligations for the protection of minorities, including the Depressed Classes,"—
I draw the attention of noble Lords to the fact that the Depressed Classes are included actually by name—
"and of our Treaty obligations to the Indian States."
Although the details may have been slightly varied from time to time, these conditions have remaind the foundations of the common front of Indian affairs. By one stroke of the pen, without any previous consultation with the Opposition, the transfer is now to be made "not later than June, 1948," and without any of these three conditions being retained. This is a case not of gradual appeasement but of unconditional surrender, and of unconditional surrender at the expense of many to whom we have given specific pledges for generations past.
In view of these facts, it is inevitable that those for whom I speak should, in this Resolution, dissociate themselves from the Government's declaration and should make it quite clear to the House and to the country that it is the Government, and not we, who have broken up this unity of the Indian front. I realize that the Government were in great difficulty. The plan of May 16 was breaking up; its two props, the Constituent Assembly and the Interim Government, were failing to work. The Constituent Assembly were becoming the exclusive platform of Congress, and the Interim Government were showing in its worse form the faults of diarchy. Some people well qualified to speak upon Indian affairs took the view that this confusion was not a little due to the Government having departed from the solid basis of Indian agreement before making new proposals. If that be the case, it would surely have been a very strong argument against a new intervention. And yet, as I have said, the Government are now not only making a new intervention but are proposing something which seems to us to be in direct opposition to everything they have said in the past. They are making, so it seems to us, a gambler's throw. The throw may come off, but equally it may do irreparable damage to the good government of India.
I ask your Lordships to-day to examine the proposal not on the basis of good

929
intentions—we give the Government the fullest credit for their good intentions—but on the basis of probabilities as to what is likely to happen. Let me put it to the House in the form of two questions. First of all, is the declaration of a definite date in the near future for the transfer of Government to Indian hands likely to lead to Indian agreement? Secondly, is this date likely to produce a workable Constitution, and is it likely to lead to the peace and prosperity of India?
Let me make an observation or two on both of those questions. I begin with the first question: Is the declaration of the date of evacuation likely to lead to Indian agreement? I should have thought the result would be exactly opposite to what the Government hope. I should have thought myself that the separatist elements in India, those sections of India who wish to see Governments of their own, would have observed the fact that at the end of fifteen months the Government, according to their White Paper, are prepared to negotiate with a number of different Indians and Indian bodies. I should have thought that that would lead them to be more isolationist than ever. It is early days to deduce from the Indian news whether that view is correct or not, but even in the papers of to-day there are signs that that is already being the effect in certain important Indian sections.
Can the Government have had it in mind that the statement of a definite date would lead to the separation of the various parts of India? On the face of it, it looks almost as if they had. If that be so, I maintain that if India is to be divided into parts, this is the worst possible way in which to divide it. It is my own view—a view which I have expressed before in your Lordships' House—that India 930 the unity of India depends upon the existence of British influence in India, and that, whether we like it or not, when the British influence is withdrawn that unity will come to an end. I make the statement not as an argument for maintaining British influence in India, but simply as a statement of fact. If that be so, lot this separation come about upon a considered plan; let it not be the result of a disorganized fragmentation. That seems to me likely to be the result of the White Paper proposals. I take the view that the White Paper proposals lead directly, not to the unity, but to the
930
division of India, and to the division of India in the worst possible conditions.
I pass from that question to my second question: Are the Government proposals likely to produce a workable Indian Constitution, and are they likely to lead to the peace and prosperity of the Indian sub-continent? Here again I would have feared that the fixing of a date at such a short distance would have exactly the opposite effect to that which the Government no doubt desire. I look back—if I may make this personal allusion—on the years that I spent upon the details of an Indian Constitution. For seven years of my life I did practically nothing else. At the end of that period, as a result of the co-operation of scores of British and Indian leaders, we produced an Indian Constitution. I am not arguing now whether that was a good or a had Constitution, but I am stating a fact which no one can deny: that the Constitution that was produced was the shortest possible Constitution which could be produced to meet Indian conditions, although it contained 350 clauses and covered 320 of the pages of the Statute Book. And the complexity of this matter, however you approach the problem of the Constitutional proposals for India, is greater than that of any other Constitutional problem in the world.
Let anyone who doubts the strength of what I say look at the Government of India Act. Look at it simply, not to read it through, but to look at the headings of the chapters. I will give the House an idea of these headings, to show the complexity of the Indian Constitutional problem: Federal Constitution, Constitution of the eleven great Provinces, Safeguards, Trade, Professions, Broadcasting, Finance, Water—I particularly emphasize the heading of "Water," as water is one of the basic problems of India; it covers the use of the great rivers which pass from one Province to another, and the irrigation on which the prosperity of India relies—Indian States' Contributions, Railways, Backward Areas, and a host of other minor details. Here is a Constitution unlike the British Constitution; every word of it is written. Unlike the British Constitution, it has to deal not only with the centre but with the great autonomous Provinces. Unlike the British Constitution, it has to enter into every detail of the social, political and economic life of

931
the Indian populations. Is it conceivable that you can destroy this great machine and in fifteen months build it up again, or, if you do not build it up again, create a new Constitution? It seems to me inconceivable that between now and June 1, 1948, any workable Constitution can be created either for the centre or for the Provinces.
At this point let me put this specific question to the Government: How do they propose to deal with this task, and what results do they contemplate? Parliament is deeply interested in this question; time is short, and we ought to know at once what is the plan in the Government's mind. In particular, to what kind of authorities do they intend to transfer power if they fail to obtain an agreed Constitution in a single Constituent Assembly? These are questions which ought to be answered at once; the time is short. Here again, this is another criticism of the time factor. Time being as short as it is, it is essential that we should know in the course of this debate what is the Government's plan and what are the kind of responsible authorities—to use their own expression—to which they are prepared to transfer the machinery of Indian government.
It might be said that the Government's problem is so gigantic that it is bound to fail, that by no stretch of the imagination can a workable plan be created in the space of fifteen months. That may be so. But, unfortunately, that does not end the trouble. For what is to happen in the interim period while this transfer is going on? The Government stated in their White Paper that they intend to begin the transfer of power at once. I hope that the Secretary of State will make clearer to the House what is the intention of the Government in this respect. The White Paper is very obscure on the subject. It seems to imply that whilst legislation will be needed for the final transfer, it may not be necessary for the interim period. Here again, in the course of this debate, we ought to have a specific answer from the Government on this very important point.
Suppose the Government surmount these Parliamentary difficulties, let noble Lords think what effect this transfer, carried out at a frantic pace, is going to have upon the Services in India, and upon the minorities in India, and upon the Princes.
Take first of all the case of the Services. I am thinking not only of the Secretary of State's Services—a very small percentage of the whole body of the Indian Administration—I am thinking of all the various Services, particularly of the police and of Services which are now almost entirely manned by Indians. What is going to be the effect upon Services of those kinds when they see, day by day, the total dismantlement of the whole machine of government, and they know that, in fifteen months' time, the machine is to be scrapped altogether? Their loyalty, which has been very remarkable in these times of trial during the last two years, has already been strained to the uttermost. They have heard threats made against them by the Congress leaders. I am told that some of those threats have already been carried out—carried out against individual members of the various Services. Think now of their position, their power of negotiation—and let me emphasize this point—almost gone as soon as a date is fixed, after which, as they know, they will have no support from the Secretary of State.
Here I would ask the Secretary of State a specific question. There was a debate in this House a fortnight ago upon the question of compensation to the Secretary of State's Services. We hope that during the course of this debate the Secretary of State will give us an answer to questions which were then raised. There is no time for delay—again let me emphasize this point—now that a date has been mentioned, fifteen months from now. It is essential that we should know, here and now, whether these public servants are to be justly compensated.
I pass from the effect of the date upon the Services to the effect of the date upon the minorities. I take as my example, not the major community of the Moslems, but the Scheduled Castes or, as we generally know them, the Depressed Classes. With them the problem is a very different one. Unlike the major communities, they are scattered over great districts of Hindu India, and in most cases they have not the compact solidarity of the greater communities. On that account, the pledges of successive Governments, and the pledges of Parliament, are of particular value to them. Let me remind your Lordships of the quotation that I made at the beginning of my speech regarding the specific pledge that a prior

933
condition of the transfer of power should be the safeguarding of our obligations to the Depressed Classes—the Depressed Classes being mentioned by name.
I, myself, raised their case in a debate in your Lordships' House shortly before Christmas. The noble Lord the Secretary of State then gave the answer that I expected, an answer in full accord with the previous pledges he had given in statements made on behalf of the Government—namely, that this Government recognized the Depressed Classes as one of the minorities that we are bound to protect. I ask the Secretary of State to-day, is he repudiating that pledge? I ask him, further, how is it possible for the Depressed Classes to negotiate with any hope of success, when they know that on June 1, 1948, the support of the Government here will be withdrawn from them, and the pledges made to them will, apparently, be torn up?
I come now to the last of my examples; I come to the question of Indian India, the India of the States. Noble Lords know the position so well that I need not describe to them the position in the Indian States. It is sufficient for me to say that we are bound to many of them by express treaties; we are bound to others by agreements and sanads; and to all of them we are under an obligation that goes beyond treaties and statements and words by reason of the fact that they have always come to the aid of the Empire in the hour of her need. There is another fact that is sometimes forgotten. What is called paramountcy means not only Imperial protection of the States' rulers, but also a responsibility for the good government of the States' peoples. Paramountcy, according to the White Paper, is not to be transferred to a British India Government. Nor is it to be brought to an end until the final transfer of power. In the meanwhile—here again the paragraph in the White Paper is extremely obscure—negotiations are contemplated between the Government and the Indian States.
Let us look for a moment into the details of this proposal. Hitherto the Viceroy has held two positions. He has been the Crown's representative—the Viceroy in fact—dealing with the Indian Princes in matters of paramountcy, and he has been the Governor-General dealing with the administration of British India. It is obvious, as the transfer proceeds in the interim
934
period, that the position of Viceroy will become submerged into the position of a Governor-General acting on the advice of British Indian Ministers. That is to say, the Indian Princes will have lost their independent prop, and the Viceroy—if he still calls himself Viceroy—will become more and more a responsible Governor-General, acting not for India as a whole but for British India. That means that during the period of the transfer the Indian Princes will be placed in a position for their negotiations of daily becoming weaker. As things are now, their liberty of action is restricted in many important directions. For instance, it is restricted in the matter of Customs, and it is restricted in the matter of the number of Armed Forces that they may maintain.
I claim that in This transfer period the only just course, to leave the Princes in a fair position for constitutional negotiation, is that there should be a transfer of power to the Indian Princes simultaneously with the transfer of power to British India. That is to say, these restrictions upon the maintenance of Armed Forces should be withdrawn; otherwise, as noble Lords will see, the Princes will be left in an impossibly weak position. That is the just course. But let your Lordships consider what it means. It means that here again, as in the case of the date, the Government's proposals are leading not to the unity but to the division of India. The Government are faced with this dilemma: that justice for the Indian States means a further step in Indian fragmentation. What a commentary upon the Government's Statement of May 16, of which the greater part was devoted to a disquisition on the theme that two Indias were impossible! Here are proposals that lead not to two Indias, but to ten British Indias, and possibily twenty or thirty Indian States. Here again, under the threat of the date in fifteen months' time, the Government proposals lead directly to the fragmentation of India.
I hope that I have said enough to show why it is that we on this side of the House must dissociate ourselves with the Government's proposals. We believe that they are morally wrong. We believe that a great country cannot, without loss of credit, give notice that on a certain day it will throw its pledges to the wind. We believe that the proposals are practically unworkable, and that ft is impossible to

935
make this gigantic transfer in an orderly fashion in fifteen months. We believe that the proposals are politically unwise; that they will encourage, rather than moderate, sectional opinion, and that instead of creating unity they will make well-nigh inevitable the fragmentation of India. For these reasons I hope that they will never come into full operation. I believe I am expressing the views of many noble Lords when I say that it is the duty and the destiny of Great Britain to complete our task in India by achieving peacefully, and with unconstrained agreement, the transfer of British power, and that, however great may be the difficulties, we should refuse to accept a final separation before our obligations and responsibilities are adequately discharged. These conditions we believe to be essential to the peace and prosperity of India. The sooner they are fulfilled the happier we shall be. We shall then feel that we have finished our great task in a manner worthy of our splendid record, and worthy of the long line of great public servants who have given peace, justice and unity to a continent that, for generations, had been devastated by anarchy and civil war.
Moved, to resolve, That the decision of His Majesty's Government to hand over India to an Indian Government or Governments in June, 1948, under conditions which appear to be in conflict with previous declarations of the Government on this subject, and without any provisions for the protection of minorities or the discharge of their other obligations is likely to imperil the peace and prosperity of India.—(Viscount Templewood.)
3.20 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, we often hear it said on one occasion or another that we have reached an historic moment, sometimes even when that occasion is merely of temporary importance. But to-day there is no doubt at all that we stand at a turning point in the history of the nation. Let us see this debate in its time setting. For three hundred years the States of Europe were extending their sovereignty over other continents. This Island, with its ships and its seamen, outstripped its rivals and assumed control over nearly one-fourth of the land surface of the globe. Then we have had a century of devolution. In the transfer of power to the Dominions similar
936
to the British in stock, language, religion and history, that has been easy. But it has proved difficult when the transfer of power is to peoples of other races without that similarity of characteristics.
That being so, we see the half of mankind which is dwelling in Asia and in tropical Africa claiming their own liberties and the right to take their place in the onward march of civilization. It is not a coincidence that at this moment our old rivals in colonization, the French and the Dutch, are faced with exactly similar problems in their dominions. Nor is it an accident that we have to deal not only with India but also with Burma, Ceylon and the West Indies. This great movement of the Asiatic and African peoples has been approved and encouraged by the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, which was endorsed and confirmed by the Charter of the United Nations. In that document President Roosevelt, on behalf of the United States, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf of this country, declared that these two countries "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."
The Government Statement that was made here a few days ago, and which we are to-day debating, is the climax of a long evolution. It declares bluntly that in India it is time to come to a decision. The Motion condemns that declaration. But what alternative policy is proposed by the Opposition? There is none apparent in the terms of the Resolution itself. I kept a blank sheet on my notes in order to write down the heads of the alternatives which the noble Viscount was going to propose. That page remains blank. There has not been a single word in the speech of the noble Viscount to indicate what other course, failing this one, he would desire the Government to pursue. The Resolution in its final words says that the action of the Government is likely to imperil the peace and prosperity of India. Is there no peril to-day to the peace and prosperity of India? Are we to drift on interminably, as we have done, with the civil Government of India, as we know, running down, losing their efficiency and authority, with no possibility of recruiting their numbers owing to the uncertainty of the conditions? Is the British Army to assume the task of maintaining order between the two communities, and, if the communal strife

937
grows more bitter and spreads throughout the country, are we to send more and more troops in order to preserve law and order?
I was very much struck during our debate two months ago by the speech of the former Viceroy, the Marquess of Linlithgow. He is at present abroad, I understand, and therefore not able to take part in the debate to-day. He said that in his view it was useless to attempt policies for India which the British people cannot support with a clear conscience. He said, further, that he thought our authority might be reestablished if undertaken with confidence and conviction, and possibly with less difficulty than is often assumed. But he expressed the view that this nation might not be willing to supply the necessary impulse, and he went on to say—and I quote his actual words:
"In that case—and I say this with profound reluctance—my advice would be that we should frankly re-shape our policy, renounce our pledges as being beyond our capacity to discharge and, having given a due date and due warning, march out. To attempt to remain in India and to bear responsibility without adequate power to discharge it would be fair neither to India nor to ourselves."
I confess I heard that declaration from the late Viceroy with surprise and with regret. But on consideration, and knowing that the Government have taken the course they have after much fuller knowledge of the circumstances than any of us here possess, and since the Government bear the responsibility, I, for my India 938 part, should not be disposed to challenge their decision.
I am sure of this: that the worst course possible would be to proclaim a policy that we cannot execute. If the minorities, with respect to whom the noble Viscount has been speaking—the Moslems, the Sikhs, the Depressed Classes, and the Princes also—were induced to shape their course in reliance on our action in their support, and then found that their trust had been deceived because we were unable to make good our undertakings, that would not avoid disaster to them, but it would bring disgrace for ourselves. If this Motion could win support through the personality or the persuasiveness of its advocate, certainly the record and the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, would have achieved that end. We all remember his labours during the years when the great Bill of 1935 became the Constitution of India Act. He told us that he gave seven years of his
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life to that service, only to meet in the end, as it proved, with disappointment—like the Biblical patriarch who served seven years for Rachel and then got only Leah.
From what quarter did his difficulties mainly come? They came mainly from the fact that he was faced by the strenuous opposition of a large part of the Conservative Party, led with indefatigable energy and irreconcilable hostility from beginning to end by Mr. Churchill. And we have to bear in mind that, very soon after the Atlantic Charter was issued under his signature, Mr. Winston Churchill declared in another place that it was not meant to apply to India and elsewhere in the British Dominions. He said that that was quite a separate problem—an announcement that was received with dismay in India and with surprise throughout the world. Now he is Leader of the Conservative Party, which is reverting to those tendencies which, though from time to time they have been in abeyance, have really existed throughout all its history. They were responsible for the two great failures of the British Empire, for the loss of the American Colonies and the long quarrel with Ireland. They would have added a third if they had their way after the Boer War when, as to-day, they dissociated themselves from all responsibility for what Mr. Balfour declared was the rash experiment of granting self-government to South Africa. To-day, apparently, they might be willing to add a fourth in creating an ungovernable India.
We are, of course, all deeply disappointed that the leaders of the Indian Parties should have been so intransigent. It has long been obvious to the friends of India, in this and in other countries, that the right destiny of India is for her to become a Federation—neither a unitary State, for it is too large and too varied for that, nor vet a division into two or more independent States which would be only too likely to give rise to new conflicts-and that this should be accomplished by consent. Those were the principles of that great measure of 1935, which we all supported. The Moslem League, up to a point, have had a strong case. Clearly, they have lately gone beyond that point, and (this is suggested as my own opinion) have been putting themselves in the wrong. The Congress Party have been most reluctant to concede anything, and

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when they did make concessions they did so grudgingly, and accompanied them with reproaches and recriminations. All the Indian leaders have had very short experience of the working of democratic institutions. They do not realize how difficult democracy is; they do not remember how often it has failed. Some of them seem determined to be so uncompromisingly democratic as to make themselves incapable of working a democracy.
A few days ago, the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, said that he received the announcement of a definite date with a sense of shock. Its purpose was, not here but in India, to administer a sense of shock. Apparently it is beginning to have that effect. The last speech of Mr. Nehru was in a different tone and inspired by a different spirit from many of his former speeches. My fear is that this Motion by the Opposition in your Lordships' House to-day may tend to spoil the effect of the shock in India, and that there are some who may entertain the hope that divisions here at Westminster may result ultimately in the whole question being suspended indefinitely. On the other hand—one can never foresee—it might possibly have the opposite effect, and they may feel that they must hurry up and come to an agreement quickly, for fear that a Churchill Government may come into power at Westminster some day and throw them back to the point from which they started.
We on these Benches feel that it would be unwise for this House to pass a Resolution in these terms at this juncture. We see the Indian peoples now, after ages of subservience, first to their own Princes and afterwards to alien Empires, at last believing that they have the prospect close at hand of a new era, of being able to lift up their heads in freedom. Let us not give the appearance here in this Parliament that we are clinging to our old Imperial power, that we are grasping at all the communal difficulties in order to gain a brief respite before we are obliged, as we should be obliged in the end, to surrender with bad grace to turbulence and rebellion. The effect of what we are doing here to-day will be felt in the relations between the two peoples for generations to come. Let it not leave behind memories of anger, perhaps of bloodshed, and accusations of bad faith. Those could only produce lasting antagonisms. Let us
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rather give them the impression that we here are animated by a feeling of friendly helpfulness, because that may make possible subsequent co-operation, and perhaps even some form of union or alliance, to the advantage of both peoples and bringing cordial comradeship and mutual goodwill.
3.35 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE): My Lords, I rise with a profound sense of responsibility which I know will be shared by all those who take part in this debate. In the course of my speech I shall endeavour to place before your Lordships the reasons which have prompted His Majesty's Government to take this momentous step, and to give an answer to some of the questions which have been raised by the noble Viscount who opened the debate, whose speech I, in common with all your Lordships, have listened to with profound interest and attention. If the noble Viscount will allow me to say so, I think he put a well-constructed case with sincerity and advocacy of a very high order. Before I come to the political aspect of the question, I desire to pay my personal tribute to the great Viceroy who is shortly laying down his high office. The sincerity and devotion of the noble Viscount, Lord Wavell, to his most difficult and baffling task have rightly won the respect of all those with whom he has been brought into contact. In particular, I recall with appreciation his unsparing efforts, in conjunction with myself and other members of the Cabinet Mission, in our endeavour to reach an agreement among Indians on the basis of a Constituent Assembly, and to provide for the Government of India in the interim period. I am sure your Lordships will unite with me in that appreciation, and in extending to his successor good wishes for the very hard task upon which he has entered.
Coming now to the political Statement, which has been the subject of both the noble Viscounts who have addressed your Lordships, I would like to say, in the first place, a few brief words on the events which led up to the announcement which was made by the Prime Minister in another place and by myself in your Lordships' House on Thursday of last week. Having said that, I should like to add this. The statement of the noble Viscount, Lord

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Templewood, was, as I have already said, a clear presentation of a very sincere case, and I have no doubt he felt with conviction that he was facing reality and that His Majesty's Government put forward their views on paper without very much appreciation of where they were going. However, I felt that the noble Viscount himself was living in an unreal world, and that this dream world in which he was living was shattered by the powerful wind of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel's speech, which tended to freshen up the situation so that we could have a real and effective understanding of the position.
What are the real facts? The facts are that for the last twenty years a progress towards self-government has been going on. That is a progress to which all Parties of the State have contributed. We have now reached a new stage, when, as it were, the balance is beginning to tilt and when a large share of power and responsibility has already been transferred to Indian hands. That being the case, it is not possible to deal with the situation as though it was exactly as it was before. That is not due mainly to the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government today; it is the natural and inevitable result of the policies that have been adopted by previous administrations. Perhaps the most significant happening was the abandonment of all recruitment to the Indian Civil Service during the war. The result of that was that the cadre of the Indian Civil Service and Police was not refreshed and brought up to date, and in consequence the position at the end of the war was entirely different from what it had India 942 been at the beginning. When the time came for us to consider whether that recruitment should be renewed (and it would have been done in the teeth, let me say, of a very strong body of opinion in India which took a contrary view) we found that any new officers who would have started at the bottom of the ladder would have been quite ineffective in restoring the position until after five years' training in India. Those are the facts.
When His Majesty's Government took office we were confronted, broadly, with two alternatives. We could either go back or we could go forward. If we went forward, we had to rely more and more upon the good sense and co-operation of the different Parties in India; or we had to be prepared, in the event of opposition
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or disagreement, to start all over again the unhappy procedure of the arrest and imprisonment without trial, and to come into direct conflict with a rapidly growing and determined body of people in India. With, I believe, the concurrence of the vast majority of the people of this country, and, I think, as the noble Viscount will no doubt agree, with the concurrence of people of all Parties in both Houses, with perhaps a few exceptions, we went forward.
What I want to convey to your Lordships is that you cannot do that and at the same time retain complete power over the ordering of events. If you imagine that you can do that, then you are labouring under a delusion which will lead you to all sorts of false conclusions. It would not merely be a question of attempting for a short while to restore the old system of complete control by the British Raj in India; in order effectively to produce that result it would be necessary to guarantee that we would stay in India for some ten, fifteen or even more years. Without such a guarantee, the forces at our disposal to bring the situation under our direct and absolute control could not have been effective. His Majesty's Government, therefore, as soon as they came into office, decided upon a course of action which was an attempt to restore representative institutions in India and to endeavour to build out of them a structure of complete self-government. Accordingly, elections were held in the Provinces, lasting over several months, and finally the Cabinet Mission, of which I was a member, went out to India to endeavour to produce a settlement, first of all of the long-term plan for building a Constitution, and secondly, for the setting up of an Interim Government to function in the period which would intervene before the Constitution could be framed and come into being.
I should like your Lordships to appreciate that in the period before the Cabinet Mission went out to India, and in fact when the Cabinet Mission arrived in India, we were confronted with a really dangerous situation. There were in the ranks of Congress, Congress supporters with violent revolutionary sentiments who were determined to press vigorously and by all means towards the objective for which Congress had stood firm from its incep-

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tion. They were suspicious of British intentions, frustrated by their long imprisonment, and supported by a mass of national feeling. The Moslem League, while also demanding full independence for India were vigorously propagating the policy of Pakistan, which was contrary to the fundamental beliefs of Congress. Both within and without Congress there was a swing to extremes and a demand for revolutionary methods to achieve full independence. That is what we knew existed before we went and it is what we found when we got there.
Again, we had to choose whether we would go forward or whether we would go back. If we were not to go back (back to what would have had to be, in my opinion, a long period of resumption of British rule, which was contrary to feeling in this country, although it may conceivably have been possible of execution) we had to go forward to an increasing transference of power as time went on. The Cabinet Mission, as I said when I came back, however much it may not have succeeded in bringing about a combined Constituent Assembly and a coalition Government at the centre, did succeed in one objective, at any rate, and that was of dispersing the element of suspicion that was in Indian minds as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government. I think that was of very great importance, and it has enabled the relationship between this country and India to proceed on the peaceful lines on which it has gone up to the present time. But, of course, the hostility between the Congress and the Moslem League not only remained, but, with the expected transference of power, in some ways became greater than it had been before.
I would remind your Lordships of the terrible and tragic events of the summer and early autumn of last year, when, in communal riots, thousands of people were cruelly put to death, but in the last few weeks this divergence between the Congress and the Moslems has come into still more active antipathy. We had hoped, when the leaders of both Parties came over to this country at the beginning of December last year, by our pronouncement at the end to have enabled the Moslem League to come into the Constituent Assembly, because we did decide on the main issue along the lines which the League had asked us to do, and there was a response from Congress. But unfortunately, to-
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wards the end of last month, there still remained the refusal of the Moslem League to come into the Constituent Assembly that there was before our Statement of December 6 was made. In addition, we have been confronted with a demand by the leaders of the Congress Party for the exclusion of the Moslem League from the Interim Government on the ground that as the Moslem League could not enter the Constituent Assembly they had no place in the Interim Government. In addition to that we have had disturbances breaking out in the Punjab of an exceedingly serious character.
We had to take some action in view of those facts and as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, has said, no suggestion has been put forward from those who oppose our action on what was the appropriate course for us to pursue. Of course, I quite agree that it is not for the Opposition to initiate policy; it is for His Majesty's Government; but we were faced with a very serious situation and we had either to take some action or to take none. Now if we took no action we were simply going to sit quiet while India drifted into a graver and graver position. We felt that it was essential to act, and if anybody could suggest some brilliant course of action, devoid of any risk, I shall certainly be willing to admit that they have found something which we, in all our efforts, failed completely to find. But we did take a course of action which we had very considerable grounds to think was supported in India. In spite of what the noble Viscount said, I think it has shown that it has support, and that it may have a result of great benefit to the future. I repeat that the growing deterioration of the situation demanded courageous and drastic steps, and it was because we realized that fact that we made the Statement of February 20.
The noble Viscount asked me some questions. He asked me, for instance, what are our intentions as to what Parliament will do when the time comes for legislation to carry out the changes that we contemplate in India. He said he must have an answer to that in this very debate. Well, with all respect to him, I cannot given an answer to-day. In the first place I want to see what is going to be the result in India of the Statement. I want to see how far it achieves the purpose for which it has been put out, and if it does achieve that purpose we shall

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take one course of action; if, on the other hand, it does not achieve its purpose then we shall have to take another course of action. I cannot here and now say that this and that will be done until I see the course of events and judge what will be the most appropriate action.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: Could the noble Lord give the House some idea as to how long he will take to form an opinion on this? I should not dream of pressing this matter were it not for the dates in the Government Statement.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: I cannot begin to think about what steps I have to take until I know what I have to meet. It is only when I see what takes place in India that I shall be in a position to judge what we ought to do.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: It is very urgent.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: I think it is a matter of great importance, but I do not think it is so urgent that it must be settled to-day. The noble Viscount might as easily ask if I get an illness next week what medicine am I going to take to deal with it and want to know at once. The answer of the doctor will be: "Well, wait first of all until you get an illness, and then wait until I have diagnosed it, because I certainly cannot recommend a remedy until I know what it is you are suffering from."
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Surely the noble Lord does not think that the patient is in a very healthy state at the present time? The facts of the illness are already known.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: That may India 946 or may not be, but we are getting rather far ahead. It is to cure whatever illness the patient is suffering from at the present time that His Majesty's Government have put forward this Statement, and I really cannot go another stage further than that at the present time. The noble Viscount also asked a question about the States, and I cannot help thinking that he has rather misunderstood the Statement in that respect. The position is this. The Cabinet Mission and the Government made it perfectly clear that they were not handing over our powers and obligations under paramountcy to any Government of British India. That is perfectly clear with reference to the posi-
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tion which will be reached when power is in Indian hands. That was accepted at the time when the Mission were there by such representatives of the States as we got in touch with, and they recognized that the Indian States would be handed back their full independence, and paramountcy would come to an end and would not be handed over to British India.
What is said in paragraph 12, to which I think the noble Viscount referred, is this:
"It is not intended to bring paramountcy, as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted by agreement."
That means, among other things, that if a State or body of States, seeing that transference of power is going to take place, want to discuss with His Majesty's Government some variation of the present position, there would be nothing to prevent an agreement of that kind being reached. I thought that a most sensible provision and I would have thought that no exception could be taken to it. It is an indication to your Lordships and others that there may be some slight variation in the relations between the Paramount Power and the States in the intervening period.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: Your answer has taken the question no further at all. I put the question to the noble Lord in order to know what will be the general line of the Government in dealing with the Princes. Do they accept the suggestion, for instance, that there would be a simultaneous transference of power to the Indian States as to the Government of India in the interim period?
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: I do not think I can answer that particularly or categorically. There is no general transference of power. What I have said with regard to British India is that in the process of time, for the interim period, there is necessarily and naturally a certain shifting of the balance of power. No doubt when it comes to the States there is some change already beginning, but I really would beg the noble Viscount not to cross-question me too closely on this very delicate point, because it would be very unwise of me, on the spur of the moment, to give answers which may not be quite correct. I really think I have met the point quite fairly.

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The noble Viscount felt very deeply about the difference between this Statement and the Statement of May 25 with regard to minorities. It would be disingenuous of me if I were to suggest for a moment that there was no difference in the letter* of what is said with regard to minorities at the present time and what was said then. But I would like to draw attention to certain facts. The major Parties have always expressed their willingness to provide full safeguards for the minorities in the Constitution in the form of fundamental rights and other necessary provisions. The proposals of both Parties at the Simla Conference in 1946 included such provisions. Since we issued our Statement on May 25 important developments have taken place. The Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly defining the objects of that body lays it down that in a Constitution to be framed there shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of India justice, social, economic and political, equality of status and opportunity before the law, freedom of thought, expression and belief, faith, worship, conviction, association and action subject to law and public morality: adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas and depressed and backward classes. The Constituent Assembly have appointed an Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities and excluded areas, and there is no reason to assume that this Committee, which is widely representative of all sections except the Moslem League for whom places are kept vacant, will not make the proper recommendations.
I would remind your Lordships that, whatever the paper safeguards in the terms of the Constitution, after we have left India the protection of minorities in the last resort must in an independent India depend on the wisdom and statesmanship of Indians, subject to the light of world opinion. This provision of an Advisory Committee is part of the machinery which the Cabinet Mission suggested should be carried out, and I think we can say we have achieved a great deal in protecting the rights of minorities.
Now I come to the question of the date fixed in the Statement for the transference of power into Indian hands. It
* Originally reported as "matter."
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will be evident from what I have already said that the transference of power has been a process that has been steadily going on for the last twenty years, and that this process cannot be indefinitely continued, leaving nominal responsibility for events in our hands while we lack the means of fully exercising these responsibilities. The advice that we have received from responsible authorities in India has been that, taking all the circumstances into account, British rule cannot be maintained upon its existing basis with adequate efficiency after 1948. The policy pursued in recent years by successive British Governments has assumed that full power must be handed over sooner or later; and that, when the time came, Indians would be found capable of assuming authority. We cannot now import the conception that Indian leaders are incapable of bearing that responsibility. The fixing of an early date is designed to impress on the Indian Parties, first of all, the complete sincerity of His Majesty's Government in their promise to transfer power and authority, and secondly, a sense of the urgency of finding solutions to their outstanding difficulties, themselves, without the assistance and control of this country. The substitution of a slightly later date would not make it appreciably easier to secure a fully detailed constitutional structure, and a substantial postponement such as the noble Viscount envisages—something that might run as long as, I think, seven years—
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: No. I never mentioned a time.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: With all respect, I think that inferentially the noble Viscount did. He said that he had spent seven years in framing and piloting through Parliament the Act of 1935, and he thought it very unlikely, I understood, that in a very much shorter period the Indians could pilot through a new Constitution of their own. He contemplated, at any rate, a period of several years. It is the view of His Majesty's Government that had we substituted for the date actually fixed a period running into years, we should have failed to produce the psychological effect on the Indian Parties that our Statement was designed to produce. With the date announced there will be ample time for the main

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decisions of agreement to be reached between the Indian Parties, if they are willing to arrive at them, and for a great deal of the detail to be filled in. If the task is not fully accomplished by that date, it is ill be possible for Britain to hand over power to a provisional Government which can accomplish the remaining pacts of the task.
The noble Viscount claimed that he saw no signs that the Statement of February 20 was producing the desired effect in India. In fact, I think he went so far as to say that he saw signs of the exact reverse. I, certainly, do not see signs of the reverse, and I think there are signs that it has had some of the effects that we hoped it would have. I will not quote the various utterances of Pandit Nehru, but they have certainly been encouraging, and I think that Pandit Nehru and the Congress Party, as a whole, realize that it is of supreme importance that they should bring the Moslem League in with them in constructing a future Constitution of India. With regard to the Moslem League, so far as I know they have not expressed any opinion at the present time, but I shall be surprised if, when they have read the terms of the Statement carefully, and after due consideration, they will think it is necessarily so likely to produce the Pakistan to which the noble Viscount referred. I would like, however, to read a statement by the Nawab of Bhopal. He said:
"The statement of policy in regard to India by His Majesty's Government will serve a useful purpose. No longer can it be said that the British desire to maintain their hold on India through adherence to the principle of divide and rule.
"I hope that it may also help to bring home to the people in India the stark realities of the situation which faces them, and the fact that no time can now be lost in coming together and working out an acceptable solution, if the serious trouble which threatens to paralyze the urgently needed development and reconstruction of the country is to be avoided.
"The States now have their chance of playing a vital part in helping to construct the new India."
I think that probably most of your Lordships will have seen in The Times this morning an article written by a very distinguished man, not of our Party, who was Governor of Bengal for a time, and I believe, a very successful Governor—Mr. R. G. Casey. I do not know whether he is accepted by noble Lords opposite as a member of their Party, but, at any rate,
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he has always denied that he is one of ours. He writes:
"The British Government has not taken an irresponsible and unnecessary step, and my belief is that the sooner we hand over political power to Indians the better. We have responsibility there without power. No doubt the situation contains the seeds of civil war but now that everyone knows that British bayonets are not available to either side I believe that the risk is diminished."
I commend that statement to noble Lords.
Finally, on the political aspect I want to say this. I think that sometimes noble Lords assume that if India opts to go out of the Commonwealth—and she has not expressed that option yet and it may well be that when she really has the opportunity of looking at all the facts she may take a different view—if she does opt to go outside the Commonwealth, then nothing that this country says, that this country does, that this country wishes, will have any influence on India. I do not take that view at all. I believe that whether India stays within or goes without the Commonwealth, there is an immense field in which it is for the mutual advantage of the two countries to co-operate and work together, and that our views will have great weight with an India which feels itself entirely free. After all, your Lordships must not forgot that it was really from the great Liberal thought of this country in days gone by that Indians were started off on the roas2 of seeking liberty and a democratic way of life. I think it may well be true that when, after all these troubled hours that are going on now, India attains that kind of freedom for which she asks and which she is striving to get, we may find that we have a closer bond of affection, friendship and mutual advantage between ourselves and India than we had in the days gone by.
I have finished, but the debate goes on. I have not been very long in this House, but I know that your Lordships always weigh your words with great care and attention, and I hope you will not think it presumptuous of me if I say that in this case I hope you will weigh them not once but two or three times. You have to remember that every word that is said in Parliament is cabled out to India or, at any rate, gets there, and words that are used with quite good intention may be entirely misrepresented when they appear in cold print in an Indian newspaper. If this policy of His Majesty's Government is to have effect, I do feel

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that the value of its impact should not be seriously injured by anything that is said in this House. When the time comes, and the debate is over, your Lordships will have to consider whether you wish to divide on this Motion. It is not for me to say whether, in your judgment, you should take that course or not; but I do feel that should your Lordships decide to carry this Motion to a Division, and should the Division go against the Government, it will considerably weaken our means of effecting our desires in India and most likely weaken the very purposes for which the noble Viscount spoke so eloquently in his opening speech.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I suppose it would be true to say that never in the history of our long association with India has a Statement of a graver nature been made than that which was delivered by the Secretary of State for India last week. He will forgive me if I say that nothing in his remarks to-day has removed the doubts and fears that were expressed by the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition last Thursday. His speech seemed to me to contain a variety of pious platitudes and hopes of what might occur, but he gave us no ideas whatever as to how the future Government of India may be set up and function. As one who occupied during the days of the Coalition Government a humble position as Under-Secretary of State for India, let me say at once that I should like to be dissociated in every way from the policy which is outlined in the White Paper. I do so for three reasons.
The first reason is that to hand over our responsibilities by a given date to an undefined unit or units of government is, to my idea, a policy fraught with the gravest dangers; secondly, that during this transitional period there can be no hope that the Parties will try to seek a settlement of their outstanding difficulties, with the likely result that the unity of the country will be broken asunder; thirdly, because I believe that His Majesty's Government are breaking the oath and pledge that was given by past Governments, and by themselves, to protect and succour the right of minorities.
On my visit to India a year ago, I saw that the nationalism in that country had risen to such a pitch that it had to be met, and I propounded views to certain
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individuals, privately and in public, on my return. For that reason I was not opposed, and never have been opposed, to the proposals which were contained in the Cabinet Mission's White Paper of last May. What has been the issue for many years between us? The Government of this country and the Indian leaders have never disputed about the attainment of independence, but upon the method by which it can be won. Through no fault of ours, the Parties have failed to agree and to devise a Constitution of their own manufacture. Successive Governments have given every opportunity to the Parties to come to some settlement, and the nearer we have approached a settlement the Sharper have become the divisions within the ranks of the Indian leaders themselves. But that agreement between the Parties has always been a necessary prelude to our orderly departure; otherwise, there could be no responsible Government commanding the allegiance of India as a whole to whom we could rightly transfer our powers and our obligations.
As the noble Lord the Secretary of State himself has said, for twenty years that has been the agreement amongst all Parties, and I can only presume that this sudden change had the support of the Viceroy as well as of His Majesty's Government. Last May the Cabinet Mission were clearly of the same opinion, and the whole purpose of their plan was to enable a Constituent Assembly to meet and to thrash out some Constitution for the whole of India—a Constitution which, above all else, could function finally at the centre and assume the obligations and the responsibility which would then be transferred to them as soon as possible. That the Cabinet Mission's policy has failed is no fault of ours, but it has become merely one of the many suggestions which have been put to the Indian leaders and which have failed of their own accord. It is quite apparent from what I have said that there was agreement among all Parties in this country that we should not acquiesce in freedom for India without a settlement first having been obtained between the principal Parties in India. My noble friend Viscount Samuel will forgive me if I say that I thought his speech to-day—a speech with some sentiment which, I venture to think, outweighed all reason—was quite contrary to the opinion he voiced three years ago

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in supporting me wholeheartedly when I was Under-Secretary of State for India and propounding the views I have put forward to-day.
To forego that agreement between the main Parties, and to insert a date for our departure is, to my mind, quite unlikely to cause the main Indian Parties to make any concessions to each other. Indeed, it is a direct reversal of all former policy which has been accepted amongst all Parties in this country. The White Paper contemplates a handing over to an undefined unit or units of government, and it is quite clear from Paragraph To of that document that His Majesty's Government have no idea to whom responsibility can ultimately be transferred. In the short space of fifteen months a Government or Governments are to be set up in India, who, it is said, will be responsible and capable of accepting every obligation committed to them and of ruling in an orderly fashion and manner. There is no certainty whatever that a Central Government, representing the whole of India, will be in existence, and I was surprised that the Secretary of State for India should fail to give the House any clear indication, which must exist in his mind and in the mind of His Majesty's Government, as to how this future Government outlined in the White Paper will function in India.
What is the centre in India? The centre is the axis upon which the whole body politic of India revolves. It is the sole authority for any number of vital and important subjects. Communications, including railways, foreign affairs and defence, financial matters (including Customs and Income Tax)—all these are the responsibilities of the centre, and in the Cabinet Mission's plan of last May a scheme was devised whereby the centre would be responsible for much the same authority as it has to-day, and with power to raise the necessary finances. If, as seems to me likely, the existing central powers will not be transferred to a new and Central Government, owing to the inability of the Indians and perhaps His Majesty's Government to form one, who then, it is pertinent to ask, becomes responsible for those existing central services, including the very important unified system of defence? That alone may have repercussions on the Dominions, on Australia and New Zealand, and upon the whole of the
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British Commonwealth and Empire. And the noble Lord to-day thought it was better to leave these matters unmentioned! Unless, as I say, these central subjects can be conducted and organized by one Central Government representing the whole of India, then I believe we are laying down for ourselves, quite apart from the many unknown factors, endless complications and difficulties, which will cause a slowing down, if not a complete cessation, of the many urgent social, industrial and economic projects in which the Government of India are concerned.
I pass now to my second point. In the space of fifteen months we are to end our age-long duties and to withdraw finally from India. If the communal problem had been settled, or was likely to be settled, within that period of time, no one, so far as I can see, could object to our departure. But what really are the chances that in this interim period appeals which have been made will be harkened to, that fear and suspicion will be banished from the Indian minds and that all the old political quarrels and diversions will suddenly and miraculously disappear? I am bound to say that I do not believe a settlement will be reached. I can hardly conceive that concessions will have been made on either side, and it will run completely counter to all expectation and precedent if in that short period of fifteen months agreement materializes. The provisions in the Government's own White Paper to hand over power to small units of government, quite irrespective of agreement at the centre, will, I believe, lead India to disasters of great magnitude.
The unity of India which the Government now seek to disturb is, perhaps, the greatest blessing which British rule has brought. Internal peace, a just administration, political and social progress have all been achieved by the unity of the whole. To the world India is one country, and all her races, whatever their various religious beliefs, are Indians. When British rule ceases, without any agreement amongst the main Indian Parties, is all this unity to disintegrate, and are those diverse multitudes of innumerable races to become the plaything of Party politicians? These are some of the questions on which I wish the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for India, had given us some assistance and advice to-day.

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I turn now to my third point. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, and before that date, the minorities in India were assured of special protection. That same protection was to be afforded by the Cripps Plan and by the Cabinet Mission. Where does that appear in this document to-day? Indeed, for generations the safeguarding of the rights of minorities from all kinds of tyranny and oppression has been a cardinal principle of British rule and British justice. Why is it neglected in the document we have before the House to-day? The minorities who have received pledges time and again from successive British Governments will realize that after June of next year all these pledges will be valueless. They will have to fight their own battles and struggle for their own livelihood. I am bound to say that the proposals which the Government have put forward to-day are proposals that I deeply deplore. I supported them at the time of their own Mission, and I would have continued to support them on that basis. But to hand over India now, without agreement between the main political Parties in India, is a proposal which I could never support and, indeed, one which is against all the principles and all the guarantees that have been given by successive Governments of this country for many, many years.
4.35 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, as I stand before your Lordships in this room I am vividly reminded of scenes which were enacted in this very Chamber twelve years ago. Several of my noble friends who sit around me will confirm it. There was a very long inquiry and we sat in many different rooms, but for many months we sat here. We wasted bur time, I am afraid. When I think of the Act of 1935 which issued from that inquiry, and of its history since then, I am brought aft once to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. He must be very disappointed now. He believed in the Act of 1935. I rely only on my memory—which is atrocious—but I think he thought that the Act of 1935 would produce peaceful results of a constitutional kind in India, and in about five years. The noble Viscount has never been able to depart from his old Liberalism. He really believes that the salvation of all political difficulties lies in some constitutional change.
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Of course it is not constitutional changes which are valuable; it is the changes of heart. There is the essential thing. So we have gone on, under successive Governments, with successive Secretaries of State trying, by all manner of devices to achieve by constitutional means a solution of the problems of India—Committees, Commissions, Conferences, Cabinet Missions sent to India, and Indian leaders brought to England. They are all failures. I warn the House against the facile optimism of speakers like the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. It is speeches of the kind that he made that lead to disaster. People think that by quoting some old-world Liberal maxim they can solve the problem that way. They cannot. The facts have to be faced; and in India the facts are very awkward, because you have there a profoundly divided community—divided in race, divided in language, and divided in temperament. You cannot mould them into a Constitution in fifteen months, which is what the Government think they can do. It cannot be done that way.
Therefore, very properly, in more recent times there have been certain conditions laid down: there must be agreement amongst the Parties, and there must be protection for the minorities. I listened with great respect to the speech of the noble Lord, the Secretary of State, but I did not gather inferentially why he thought it quite natural that he should have eliminated the condition of a prior agreement amongst the Parties. Why is it that it should have been necessary—was it six months ago, or more recently?
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: In May.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Why was it necessary then, but not necessary now? Have the Congress Party changed since then; or the Moslem League? Are there now no Untouchables? Has all that vanished? These are the things you have to deal with. The Government, and others in this country, have said that you can do nothing until you have an agreement between the Parties. Notwithstanding that, they fix fifteen months and say that it has all to be done by then. How do they suppose it will be done? They are sending out a new Viceroy, a very distinguished officer for whom I have a profound respect. I do not know that he has had any particular training in constitutional development, but undoubtedly

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he will do his duty nobly. What is he going to do if he finds that he cannot get them to agree? That is the thing you are up against all the time. Does he think that Pandit Nehru is the kind of man who will be easy to manage; or Mr. Jinnah? Why should they agree? They have carried on for a long time, each in his own particular sphere, and they have not agreed. I do not think that they will agree. I think it be found that Mr. Jinnah does not agree with Mr. Nehru and he will say so.
What is to happen then? What is Lord Mountbatten going to do then? I understand from the White Paper that the Government theory is that Lord Mountbatten will invent a Constitution of his own and, of course, he will have infinite advice. As I have already reminded your Lordships, those of us who met in this Chamber previously considered this question for many months, and, as my noble friend Viscount Templewood has already pointed out, we constructed a large volume comprising all the details which would have to be solved in order to establish an Indian Constitution. Apparently this distinguished officer will do it much more quickly than that. He will have to try and do it in fifteen months. What is to happen if he does not succeed? Due to my misfortune, I am not sure that I heard quite plainly what the noble Lord, the Secretary of State, said, but I understood that if there was a lap-over there might be some kind of provisional body which would carry on. I am perfectly willing to give way to the noble Lord if I am misquoting him, but that is what I understood. Are we to understand that there is already emerging a new device to get over the difficulty? What will this provisional body be? Will it be India 958 the British Government, again protected by British forces? Has the period of fifteen months already been so blown open by criticism that it has been abandoned? I hope it is so, for you cannot do anything in fifteen months.
I turn now to the minorities. My noble friend Viscount Templewood, in his admirable speech which opened this debate to-day, dwelt upon this point. We have got to face the question of the minorities. They are very numerous. I am not speaking, of the Moslems, as I think the Moslems will take care of themselves. I am speaking for the moment of the Untouchables—the Depressed Class. They are not a small
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body. They are very scattered, but there are more than 50,000,000 of them. Are they happy at the events which are taking place? If they had listened to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, would they have been reassured? I read not long ago the account of the interview which Dr. Ambedkar gave in England. He was over here for a short time at the end of last October, and he gave an interview to a newspaper. I have had the advantage of reading an account of it. He was contemplating—at least I think he was—the ascendency of Mr. Nehru and his friends. What did he say? He said: We are doomed. We shall be trampled in the mud by the Caste Hindu ascendency, which has trampled upon us for 2,000 years. "That is how he received the message of peace which gratifies the heart of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. What is going to be done for Dr. Ambedkar and those he represents?
Perhaps I may remind your Lordships—because I sometimes forget how old I am—that Dr. Ambedkar is a very distinguished representative of the Depressed Classes. He is highly trained; I think he is a barrister by profession. He was selected to represent the Depressed Classes on the Joint Select Committee of which I myself was a member, as were some of my noble friends around me. He was their representative. You could not have anybody more official than Dr. Ambedkar, and yet he says: "We are doomed". Is it to be written, at the end of this chapter of British history, that we left 50,000,000 of our fellow subjects to be trampled upon by Mr. Nehru's friends? That cannot be; we cannot abandon people.
I heard with deep regret the passage in the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, in which he quoted my noble friend the Marquess of Linlithgow. The noble Marquess was reported to have said—and did say, I think—"We must abandon our pledges." Is this great country to abandon its pledges? What are you going to rely upon if you do not rely upon British pledges? Are you going to rely upon the assurances of Pandit Nehru? I do not say a word against him. As far as I know he is everything he ought to be, but I certainly would not like to risk the welfare of 50,000,000 of my fellow subjects upon his assurances. At a future date he might well say: "The British Government abandoned its pledges; why should not I?" Where are we going, if we work

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upon a basis like that? I earnestly hope your Lordships will not sanction a policy of this kind.
I gravely doubt—I may be quite wrong, and many of your Lordships may say that is very likely—whether this distinguished Admiral will be able to solve the problem. In June of next year matters are to be brought to an end, unless some device is evolved such as was hinted at by the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for India. When the fixed date comes the British will move out; all their civilian officers will go, and their troops will disappear. Suppose it is found then that there is no peace, and that there is no mercy shown to the Untouchables: What are we going to do? Your Lordships will watch gradually the discarding by the British of their responsibility, and there will be nothing to be done—nothing. The telegrams will come in telling of bloodshed, oppression, disorder and failure, and yet nothing will be able to be done—nothing except to regret. I cannot believe that your Lordships will sanction a policy so ill-conceived and so ill-adapted to the situation as that to which the White Paper relates.
I earnestly hope that your Lordships will vote against it, not merely the noble Lords on these Benches—of course I know how they will vote—but even some of the friends of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. I certainly did not notice any enthusiasm on their part while he was speaking. Indeed, I hope that some of the Labour Peers will vote against it. Have they considered what the ascendency of the Caste Hindus means? They hate privilege here in England; they are all for the under-dog. They believe that we on this side of the House are all anxious to oppress the under-dog—there is not, of course, a word of truth in it—and they India 960 honestly think it is their duty to defend him. There are 50,000,000 under-dogs in India. Is the Labour Party to hand them over? I cannot believe that anything except ignorance will make them do that. I believe, once it is brought home to them that that will be the result of a reckless policy such as that revealed in the White Paper, that they will vote with us on this side of the House.
4.59 p.m.
LORD DARWEN: My Lords, I am glad to have been given this opportunity of voicing very warm and whole-hearted sup-
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port for the Government's action from these back Benches. We have listened with great sadness to the wonderful oratory of the noble Marquess. I hope the noble Marquess will forgive me for saying so, but I think it is a tragedy that some of the things he said should have been uttered in this debate. We do not regard June of next year as the end of all things. We regard February 20 of this year as the beginning of a new chapter of hope in Indian history. We regard it as a great act of courageous statesmanship and, for the first time in history, a great act of real faith in the Indian peoples. Speaking for myself, I will say that I welcomed it as I welcomed Campbell-Bannerman's great action in granting independence to the Boer Republics—and I have no doubt that many of those who are opposing the British Government to-day opposed the British Government then in its action in South Africa. That action has been fully justified by results, as I believe this action will also be fully justified by results.
This problem of the transfer of responsibility from this country to the Indian people has baffled succeeding Governments in this country. It has dragged on, year after year, until not only India but the whole world has doubted our sincerity and has believed that we never did intend to grant this independence to India. In India itself that had become an absolute axiom, and that axiom of our faithlessness has been the root of a great deal of our difficulties. Even the Prime Minister's declaration in March last year did not dispel this doubt. Our Cabinet Mission achieved a great deal in India, and we heard from the Secretary of State that it changed the atmosphere there. I believe that possibly it averted terrible disaster in India. I know that the noble Lord the Secretary of State himself achieved a great personal success; that he made a tremendous impression upon the India people; that he won their lasting regard. But even he, in those three months, could not dissipate the deeply-rooted mass of suspicion.
It was because of this lack of faith in our bona fides that the India leaders felt no responsibility for settling the differences between them. That was the cause of the Cabinet Mission's failure. We know that this charge of faithlessness against our country has never been justified, but it was absolutely essential, somehow or

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other, to get it into the minds of the Indian people and the Indian leaders that we really meant business; that we really were determined to hand over the responsibility for the Government of India to the Indian people. This courageous and dramatic act, this fixing of a near date, was, I think, a splendid way of proving our sincerity and so throwing upon the Indian leaders the responsibility for the government: of India. The Statement of February 20 has actually convinced India that we were sincere.
May I suggest that the cause of a great deal of our failure in the past has been that we have been too unwilling to trust the Indians; too unwilling to believe that they could solve their own problems? After all, the problems are their problems, and our refusal to trust them is what has destroyed their trust in us. Trust is a mutual attribute. We have not trusted them, and because we have not trusted them they have not trusted us. This fine gesture of our: has brought back an immediate and fine reply from Pandit Nehru. Let: us remember, in considering that reply from him, that we have been responsible for his sufferings in the past; we have been responsible for his imprisonment in the past. If your Lordships read that reply of his with that in mind, I think you will agree that: it is not only a statement of great statesmanship but a statement of extraordinary generosity. If we accept it in the same spirit in which it has been given—and I am quite sere that the mass of people in, this country will do that—it will lead to a deeper friendship and understanding between our two peoples.
These problems which the leaders in India have to solve are vast problems, even compared with what we think are our great problems in this country. It is said that this is a rash decision. It has been said that it is a gambler's throw. It must not be assumed that the choice was between this action and a slower but more peaceful transition. There has been serious strife already, and it was almost certain that if this action was not taken we should have lost the ground gained by the Cabinet Mission, that the position would have rapidly deteriorated and that we should have been too late, as we were in Ireland. No noble Lords who opposed the granting of independence to Ireland
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can feel happy about the results of the delay over years in that land.
The noble Earl Lord Munster, suggested that the unity of India depended upon Britain, which sounds as if he were talking about what used to be called the Pax Britannica. Would he then go back to the Pax Romana in Europe which is its equivalent? These things must be looked at all round and not just taken up out of their setting. There are very good grounds for believing that the faith which the British Government has shown in India's capacity to settle these problems will be well founded. I think we have underestimated the profound concern of the Indian leaders themselves in the solution of this problem, and we have underestimated their ability to solve this problem. There are great forces working for unity in India, which are little known in this country and which do not appear in the press. I often cheer myself up, when reading the papers, by remembering the newspaper axiom that it is the unusual that is news. When you read of all the horrors in the world it is a great encouragement to remember that. There is a great deal of quiet work going on among millions and millions of Moslems and Hindus which is not news because it is quite usual; only the clashes get into the news. Very good work is going on in the Constituent Assembly, and I believe a genuine effort is being made to be fair to all communities and sections, in spite of the absence of the Moslems.
The minorities are not only represented in the National Assembly but are working in full harmony with the Hindus in that body. May I be allowed to quote a sentence from Pandit Nehru's speech in the Assembly on January 22nd:
"There is no group in India, no Party, no religious community, which can prosper if India does not prosper. If India goes down, we all go down, all of us, whether we have a few seats more or less, whether we get a slight advantage or not. But if it is well with India, if India lives as a vital, free country, then it is well with all of us, to whatever community or religion we may belong."
Then we have the appointment of Dr. Mokkerjee, a leading Bengal Christian, as Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly. Everyone knows what tremendous work Mr. Gandhi has entered upon for reconciliation in East Bengal. Everybody, however, does not know that the Hindus and Moslems are working together on the great Damodar Valley

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Scheme, which is a joint effort of Hindu Bihar and Moslem Bengal for the irrigation of 800,000 acres of land and to generate a peak load of 300,000 kilo-watts to benefit altogether 7,000,000 people. Let us not forget these things. Let us realize that there is a great deal of co-operation going on in India.
Finally—I am a very young member of your Lordships' House to say this, but I am going to say it all the same—I hope we shall not forget that the purpose of the momentous decision that the Government have taken is to convince the people of India that this country is sincere and is determined to transfer government to India. I trust that nothing will be said in this House which will at all weaken that conviction in India. In conclusion, may I remind your Lordships of one sentence in that generous response of Pandit Nehru to the Government's declaration. Remember again that he has been in prison for many years for political activity against the British Raj. He said:
"We have had a long past of conflict and ill-will, but we earnestly hope that this past is over. We look forward to a peaceful and co-operative transition and to the establishment of close and friendly relations with the British people for the mutual advantage of both countries and for the advancement of peace and freedom all over the world."
I think that is a most generous answer, and I hope that we, in this country, will give it a warm-hearted reception, so that friendship and affection may be built up between this country and India and form a bridge for ever between East and West.
5.19 p.m.
LORD NEWALL: My Lords, I do not intend to take more than a few minutes of your time, nor is it my intention to go over all the various arguments we have already heard. I served for some years in India, and witnessed, with profound admiration, the wonderfully unselfish devotion to duty of that magnificent body of men, the Indian Civil Service, to whom we and India owe so much. I have also some experience of the difficulty of the situation brought about by racial and religious conflicts amongst the people of India. I would like, therefore, with all deference, first, to give my views, very briefly, on the general question, and to ask the noble Lord who is going to reply for enlightenment on a few matters, and then, if I may, to add my support to the Resolu-
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tion which has been put forward so ably by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood. I, too, am a very new member of your Lordships' House. In my view this policy of the Government is a gamble. I am not averse to a gamble if it is a reasonable one, but I consider that this is a rash gamble, entered upon without due consideration being given to what is involved. In my humble opinion, if some new factor does not intervene, then the recently announced policy of His Majesty's Government, instead of bringing the peoples of India more closely together, will have exactly the opposite effect and will result, when the time comes to hand over, in the handing over of our remaining responsibility to chaos, if not to worse.
The date of our final departure from India has been virtually fixed at about fifteen months from now. Now, I have no mandate to speak for the military of this country, nor for the Services generally, but this is the sort of evacuation the burden of which, with its accompanying operations, usually falls upon the shoulders of the military, as does the burden of almost all those unpleasant episodes which are apt to occur immediately prior to evacuation. After fifteen months, as I understand the statement of His Majesty's Government, we evacuate India. What is the plan? There must be some planned process of evacuation. Are we going to stay there till the last—be there one day, as it were, and get out the next? Or is the process going to be gradual, and, if so, how do we propose to carry it out? Are British troops going to be interposed to keep order, if necessity arises, as they have done in the past? What happens if, at the end of our time in India, trouble occurs, and we have some few troops left there—that is, if we leave them to the last? Or, if we have almost all of them there up to the last, are we still going to intervene? Perhaps the noble Lord who is going to reply to this debate will give us some broad enlightenment upon these matters.
Now what I am going to put forward may be termed a hypothetical case, and indeed it is; nevertheless it is the sort of thing which will have to be taken into consideration in making a plan. Supposing the Moslems, when they realize fully that Britain is no longer willing or able to look after and to protect the minorities, say to their friends in the

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North West Frontier Province, or elsewhere: "Come along, give us a hand; Britain cannot help us." Are we going to intervene in that sort of situation should it arise? As I say, that is, indeed, a hypothetical case, but it is the sort of case that must be visualized and planned for if we are to carry out this evacuation successfully and without undue hardship on the Military Forces, whose responsibility it will be.
Lastly, there is one further point with which I would like to deal, taking advantage of this debate to do so. It is a matter in which I am particularly interested personally, and I know that there are many other people in this country who, like myself, are anxious about it. I wish to refer to one particular section in the Indian Army—the Gurkhas from Nepal. As your Lordships are, no doubt, well aware, Nepal is an independent State under treaty relations with this country. The Nepalese are not Indians. Men from Nepal have served the British Crown faithfully and loyally since about 1815 or 1816—that is, since the days of the John Company. They have fought in practically every war in which we have been engaged since then. They stood by us in the Mutiny, and they fought valiantly in it. They fought gallantly in the First World War and in this last war. They have, in fact, been in every scrap since the time I have mentioned, on our side, and magnificently have they acquitted themselves on all occasions. I believe I am correct in saying that in this last war they won more Victoria Crosses, having regard to their numbers, than any other section of people fighting for the British Empire.
During the 1914–1918 war, I believe, some 114,000 Gurkhas enlisted for service in our Army. In this war there were 100,000 of them or more. The Nepalese Government themselves provided nine battalions. There are now twenty regular battalions of Gurkhas serving in India. They are most wonderful people to serve with. I am sure that any of your Lordships who have had the privilege of coming into contact with them will substantiate what I say. They are bosom friends of our British soldiers whenever they meet. What is to happen to this magnificent force? How are we going to carry out our undertakings to the Nepalese Government? Nepal is a land-
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locked country and, no doubt, is very largely dependent on the Indian Government for its economy.
I think that I am right in saying that possibly the major export from Nepal has hitherto been Nepalese or Gurkha manpower to serve under the British Raj. We are short of manpower all over the world. We hear it said that we have too many troops abroad clearing up all the messes that we have to clear up. Surely we are going to employ these people of whom I have spoken. I cannot convince myself that we are going to throw them overboard in this process of liquidation. Can the noble Lord who is going to reply give us some assurances on this? It would be a matter of great comfort to many people in this country, and I am sure to those Gurkhas now serving, if there could be some assurance that they will still be employed and still serve the Crown as they have served so faithfully and loyally for the last 130 years.
5.27 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I do not think it is a misrepresentation of the speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State to say that he argued that we had now got into such a position that we had either to go back or to go forward, and that as we could not, in his view, go back, it was necessary to go forward. I could not help asking myself what really is the object of statesmanship; what is the object of politics; what do those who are called to work in affairs of State aim at; what is the object for which we are all striving? Surely that object must be, and always has been, what is known in the formula as: "The greatest good of the greatest number," and it has been the glory of the people of these Islands that we have given to the great sub-continent of India security, justice, peace, material progress and prosperity such as it had never experienced before. We have done wonderful work for the betterment of the condition of the people of India and the improvement of their lot; and for the removal of tyranny and injustice.
It appals me that noble Lords opposite, and indeed the noble Viscount who leads the Liberal Party here, can, with such light heartedness, if not levity, gamble—for it is a gamble, as the noble Lord who has just spoken has said—the fate of these countless millions of illiterate peasants on

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a venture of this sort. It is one thing for the Government to gamble on having a warm winter and therefore to neglect to lay up sufficient stocks of coal. That is a gamble which, if it does not come off, may produce very serious effects; but it does not produce effects which cannot be remedied. But if this gamble does not come off, then the most appalling human suffering that we have witnessed in our time will occur, and will occur as a direct result of the action of His Majesty's Government because they were unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of Government.
I confess that I was amazed when I listened to the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, giving his analogies in justification of the action of His Majesty's Government—the old controversies with regard to the United States of America and Ireland and South Africa. If I may say so with great respect, I do not in the least agree with what he said about those issues. In all humility, I should very much enjoy discussing them with him on an appropriate occasion. But for such an acute mind as his to argue that there is any analogy between those cases and the Indian problem leaves me almost dumbfounded. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, is well aware that the essence of the Indian problem is that India is not a nation but a continent containing many nations, many creeds and many languages. I submit that the conditions in India are such that democracy never will work and never can work, any more than it could work in this country if one-half or one-third of the nation knew that never by any swing of the pendulum could they win a General Election, but that they must always be in a minority and be for ever out-voted by men whom their ancestors conquered.
Let us never forget that when Britain conquered India she conquered it from the Moslems, and not from the Hindus. I would like to ask the noble Lords whether they would regard it as a feasible proposition to expect the French and the Germans to live together in one independent republic where all issues were settled by the ballot; or the Germans and the Poles. We all know that the wars which have ravaged Europe for so many years have been caused just by the fact that no accommodation has been found possible between the nations of Europe. Yet I should judge that the chance of getting all the problems settled in Europe by the ballot box would
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be far more favourable than getting those in India settled by the ballot box there. If we are to have historical analogies this afternoon, it seems to me that the analogy which is much more appropriate to the course which His Majesty's Government have announced is the evacuation of the Roman armies from Britain. You may say that the evacuation of Britain by Rome worked out all right in the end—and no doubt some of us are very glad we are Englishmen and not Welshmen—but for the inhabitants of Britain at that time it was the greatest disaster that could possibly be conceived, and for four or five hundred years they were massacred and destroyed by the Angles and the Saxons.
Therefore, I was interested when the noble Lord, Lord Darwen, in his eloquent speech asked us if we proposed to restore to Europe the pax Romana. Surely that is what the statesmen of Europe have been trying to do ever since the Roman Empire collapsed. First they invented the Holy Roman Empire, and that was a pacifying influence for a long period. Then they tried such devices as the Concert of Europe, then the League of Nations, and now the United Nations. The present dominant idea behind statesmanship in the rest of the world is to erect some super-authority that can keep the peace between warring nations—an authority that can prevent an aggressor attacking a weaker State, and stop the Continent of Europe, and so the whole world, being plunged into war.
What His Majesty's Government are proposing to do in India, and to do in the name of "Progress," is to go exactly contrary to what the United Nations are trying to do for the rest of the world. The United Nations are trying to impose a super-State to keep the peace between the warring factions and States of Europe. His Majesty's Government propose to remove the pax Britannica which has kept the peace of India for 200 years, and they propose to do that in the name of Progress! Instead of progress, I believe that we shall see nothing but the most appalling human misery. We shall see civil war and slaughter, and, after that, famine and disease for millions and millions of innocent persons. The weak and the poor will die horrible deaths. That will all be due to the fact that the people of England, led by a Labour Government, have not the resolution to keep the peace in that great continent. It is not often

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that we have cause to be ashamed of being Englishmen, but I do not know how I shall look one of these Indian peasants in the face.
Having said that, I feel I ought, very shortly and in all humility, to answer the question—a perfectly legitimate but generally a futile debating question—that was asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. The question was: What is your alternative? I say at once that I have always approached this problem from the angle of one who does not believe that democracy was ever possible in India, or ever will be possible, because the conditions which alone make democracy possible in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the word do not exist in India. It is like trying to make an oak tree grow on the banks of the Ganges.
As the noble Viscount knows, I have not in the past been in agreement with my noble friend Viscount Templewood and other noble Lords on this matter. But if their object was to try to introduce democracy into India, then I have always felt that it was a tenable position, and a most reasonable one, that the first condition of self-government must be a measure of fundamental agreement among the Indians themselves. When the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and the noble Lord, Lord Darwen, quote America and Ireland and such instances, can they conceive of our trying to force a Constitution on the Americans because they could not agree among themselves? Or trying to force a Constitution on the Southern Irish because they could not agree amongst themselves? It is not unreasonable, it is not evidence of insincerity, that my noble friends who promoted the Act of 1935 have insisted, as all British Governments up to now have insisted, that agreement among the major nations and creeds of India must be an essential preliminary to self-government. I have always felt that that was a perfectly honest, a perfectly logical, and a perfectly right position, and if you go forward ignoring it, you will end in disaster.
Therefore, my first reply to the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, is that I think we have every right, both moral and practical, to say that we cannot go forward unless there is a measure of agreement among the Indians. The noble Lord may ask me: "Well, what would you do now?" and I say quite frankly to him
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that it all depends on whether the British people believe in their moral right to govern India. If they have lost the belief in their moral right to govern India, then I agree that there is nothing we can do but walk out. But if they are willing to shoulder the burden of their forefathers, as a great responsibility and a great work for the benefit of humanity, then I believe it is possible for us to administer India as we have administered it in the past. I oh not pretend that we should have an easy time during the next five years or so. It is much easier to run a motor car into the ditch than to get it out. His Majesty's Government have got the Indian problem, like so many other problems, into such a mess that whoever has the clearing up of it is going to have a most difficult time. But I do not believe—and nothing that has been said by the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, and others who have great knowledge of this matter leads one to believe—that if the British people, and the British Empire as a whole, feel that they still have a moral right to govern India and to maintain the Pax Brilannica there, it is beyond the resources of our people to do so.
5.45 p.m.
LORD RANKEILLOUR: My Lords, may I in the first instance say one word on behalf of the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, who happens to be my kinsman. I was sitting next to him on the previous occasion and I remember exactly what he said. I think that he has been misquoted to-day, though unwittingly. He did not admit that we have not the moral force to refuse the plan then adumbrated by the Government. What he did say was that it would be a very bad thing, if we knew we had not the force, to pretend that we had. As a matter of fact, he also said that undoubtedly we had the force, if we chose to exercise it. The celebrated Sir William Harcourt, who, whatever one might think of his views, was, at any rate, a very great politician and a very great Parliamentary figure, once said that unless the same person said the same thing at least seven times in practically the same words no one paid the slightest attention. Therefore, I ask the indulgence of your Lordships if—I think only for the fourth time—I again go into the question of minorities. Of course, I need say nothing with regard to the Moslem's; their case has been strongly and properly put. But

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besides the Moslems, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has pointed out, there are the Scheduled or Depressed Classes, the Sikhs, the Christians, the Primitive Tribes (who are specially in want of protection) and the Parsees and the Jains.
The noble Lord the Secretary of State for India has referred to what passed in the Constituent Assembly. I understand that the Constituent Assembly have agreed to recommend that there shall be no discrimination between classes or religions. But how will that work out? After all, it is not the Constituent Assembly which in the end is going to govern India. According to the Government plan, it is the Constituted Assembly. I do not know whether they in turn will have an Advisory Committee. If the Committee are only advisory their value will be very much diminished; in fact the Committee will be of very little use at all against the domination of the majority. But if you put a provision in the final Act, which may or may not be passed, to regulate the relations between India and ourselves, has the Constitution, or any schedule or clause of that Constitution, any guarantee of permanence? You may make a treaty, but What are the sanctions in it? We know the two great provisions of the Irish Treaty, but further demands were surrendered. At the same time, is the Constitution as fixed by the treaty really a fixed Constitution that cannot be altered?
The real solution is not only to establish an organic law for the protection of classes of persons, but to make that law as difficult as possible of repeal; in short, to follow the American precedent, where the equality of all American citizens is set forth quite clearly and properly. It is quite true that it is not strictly enforced, but tine position of the coloured peoples of the South would be very much worse if it did not exist. I saw only the other day that a judgment of the Supreme Court of America insisted on there being no discrimination between races in the matter of railway travel.
That brings me to another point. If you have an organic law you must have it interpreted, and you can have it interpreted only by an independent Supreme Court; therefore, in that case, the Supreme Court can hardly be nominated by a Government dependent on a
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Party majority. Finally, when you have the organic law and the judgment of the Supreme Court, and an Executive to enforce it, I submit that that Executive must be based on the Canadian model. There you have the fullest independence. You can go forward and, though with risk, you can give your central powers to the Legislature; but you must have something in reserve. If you have that in reserve you may go forward a great way. I do not for one moment accept the dilemma of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India, that you must either go forward or go backward. You can go forward; and I would suggest that if he went forward and gave self-government to India, always on the Canadian analogy, he would give India a full chance of doing what she chooses, subject always to the protection of minorities and the independence of the States.
May I say one word on what I think is a profound fallacy? It appears in two of the paragraphs of the Government Statement, and I think it has been echoed by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, in his speech to-day. There is a reference to the Indian people. There is no Indian people, any more than a European people. As my noble friend the Earl of Selborne has just pointed out, there are a multitude of peoples and races in India. I agree with every word that he said about the analogies and the possibility of dealing with the peoples of India as one in an attempt to enforce unity.
I now come to paragraph 10, which suggests that certain Provinces of India may be given powers for themselves, entirely apart from the Central Government. Various questions arise on that. For example, will the Indian debt be apportioned among such Provinces? It will not be a very easy thing to do. What degree of Customs freedom are they to have? Again, are they to have armies? If they are to be independent sovereign States, presumably they must have Customs, presumably they must have armies; and so it may be with many powers that the Central Government now have. If they are not to be independent sovereign States, then the suggestion in the White Paper is really illusory. Let me come to another point. Paragraph 11 speaks of "preparatory measures". How are they to be effected? Will they be effected by administrative action by the new Viceroy and the Indian Governments, or will they

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come from here? Again, many difficult points arise. What will be the effect on the status of the Indian loans? I am not a financier, and some of your Lordships will know better than I, but I do not think it is an easy or a happy prospect.
I do not think that any adequate answer has been given to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, as to the position of civil servants. Lastly, as to the Army, do you expect that in fifteen months the proposed Government can be given, under their own control, an army which will be adequate both for internal and possibly external trouble? Or is there any suggestion that the present British Army should be handed over? That, I suggest, would be an impossible proposition. I do not know exactly—though this is a comparatively minor matter—what is the status of the officers, and the rights of the officers to compensation for loss of occupation and prospective rises.
A good deal has been said about the meaning of paramountcy, which is dealt with in paragraph 12. Are all these Indian States to have paramountcy? If so, they, too, will have the right to have armies. So if some of the contingencies contemplated in the White Paper take effect, there will be a number of armies in India, and I do not see how there can be any control if the British Empire cannot exercise any.
It is a very uneasy prospect, and I agree with everything the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, has said about it. Indeed, I note that in the Statement the intention of effecting an evacuation is referred to. But neither there, nor in the speech of the India 974 noble Lord the Secretary of Stone for India, is there a suggestion of how the problems that immediately arise can be dealt with. To argue from a small matter to a large one, it is rather like the Minister who was insistent on a new town being built but left out of consideration the essential requisites for the town until after his decision had been given. I cannot but feel that there is a sinister similarity in the proceedings of the Government over Imperial affairs, whether in India, Burma, Palestine or Egypt.
There is the same infirmity of counsel, the same vagueness of statement, the same disregard of the consequences, and the same priority given to political dogma over ascertained and ascertainable facts. In
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one thing they do seem consistent—namely, the abandonment of responsibility. We are not in India for our own advantage, material or moral; we are there to do justice to the multi-form races and creeds of a vast sub-continent. To this end great and wise men have laboured, and you are throwing their achievements on to a scrap heap. Some of your Lordships may remember the lines so familiar in your youth, Fuit Ilium et ingens glories tenerorum. Is it the wish of the Government to write Fuit Britannia on the page of history?
LORD MIDDLETON: My Lords, I cannot hope adequately to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ranked lour, who is described in the legal fraternity, I believe, as "our learned lay friend" owing to his profound knowledge of all matters dealing with Constitutions. For one who has served a good many years in the Indian Service, and who has developed a very keen affection for India and her peoples, in the last thirteen or fourteen years it has been heart-breaking to see the gradual approach to the brink of a precipice, at the bottom of which lie bloodshed, chaos and disaster. A short time ago a noble Lord made a maiden speech and stated to the House that he was breaking a family silence which had lasted for over a century. I cannot say with absolute certainty, but I rather believe that when in 1931, after seven years' silence in your Lordships' House, I first addressed your Lordships on the subject of India, I was breaking a family silence of more like 160 years. I know that then I nearly fainted with the effort, and even now it is a painful ordeal which probably others share. One is severely handicapped when one's forbears were inarticulate. I was acutely conscious of this disability in serving on the Joint Select Committee on India, which sat for twenty long months.
Only two out of the thirty-two members of that Committee had served in Indian Services, but there was of course a galaxy of former Viceroys, Governors, Secretaries of State and Under-Secretaries of State. Between them they had a first-class experience of the affairs of India from certain angles, but the late Sir Reginald Craddock, and I, to a lesser degree, had seen far more than any of them of the great 90 per cent. of the people of India who cultivate the soil. I hope that I may be acquitted of any dis-

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respect to the memory of a great Indian civil servant if I say that I believe that he was not very much more at ease than I was in matters of argument and exposition of a case. After all, we were faced with such giants in debate as the late Lord Reading, the late Sir Austen Chamberlain, the late Lord Lothian and, of course, the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, whose eloquence excited one's admiration and some envy. They carried the day, even if their arguments failed to convince a handful of us. We certainly desired that India should at the right time have self-rule, but we considered that the pace was too fast and we wanted India to gain more experience in developing her capacity for working a democratic system. Personally, I feel quite impenitent, and I believe that we were right.
I fully realize the difficulties that might have occurred if this process had been made more gradual, when politically-minded Indians (who, after all, comprise only a tiny percentage of the total population) were clamouring for immediate self-government. But in our haste—though some would describe in otherwise—we have sacrificed the vast bulk of the Indian population, who even now are scarcely interested in politics and who ask only for a peaceful existence and protection from oppression. From that community is recruited the Indian Army. They have been mentioned this afternoon. Their services in two great wars and in countless campaigns in Egypt, East and West Africa, Persia, China and Afghanistan have been invaluable. I regret to say that a great many Indian soldiers to-day feel that we have let them down and ill-rewarded them for all they have done and endured. When I say that, I am not India 976 retailing secondhand information. That is what was said to me time and again by Indian soldiers during this last war, in Egypt, Italy and France. I did my level best to tell them what was our policy in this country—namely, to govern only until peoples were ready to govern themselves—and I pointed out the success of that policy in other parts of the Empire. They listened with courtesy, but that was all. It hurt abominably to realize how deeply they felt about the situation.
Last week the Prime Minister denied that we were handing over to chaos. But, if I may say so, that is exactly what the Government are doing. I am afraid that
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we have seen only the beginning of bloodshed of a sort that will make the operations of Shivaj and his Maharatta hordes look like something of a picnic. One knows from the Press of the slaughter in Calcutta, Bombay, Bihar and elsewhere, but a good many other horrors have been perpetrated which, so far as I am aware, have not appeared in the Press. I will quote from a letter I received last month from one of my contemporaries who is still serving. He writes:
"A little time back a gang or commando from Gurgaon and Rhotak, said to have consisted of Jats, went to Gurmuktesar and blotted out one or two Moslem villages, murdered everyone they could lay hands on, ripped open pregnant women, combed the Kadir for escapees and then set it on fire."
And so it will go on. The whole thing is a tragedy. What are we going to see emerge from it all? I wonder if we may not live to see the creation of some international corporation, very much on the lines of the Honourable East India Company, brought into being to protect trade. If so, we shall have turned the full circle. I do not know whether that is an extravagant idea.
The only Indian organization of any importance of which I know in which Hindus and Moslems can work together in perfect harmony is the Indian Army. In the Indian Army they have been comrades in arms for a very long time, working in cordial relationship. There has been ample time for all races and creeds in the Army, led by impartial officers, to achieve a unity of purpose and friendly co-operation in peace and war, but there has not yet been time for Indian politicians to get together like soldiers have. People talk glibly—and we have heard it this afternoon—about drift and delay in handing over the reins of government to Indians. How long has it taken our country, or any other democratic country, to develop democracy? If it took centuries for us, how can democracy become a real thing in India in a few years, when all the circumstances are infinitely more difficult?
As things stand at present, I have no doubt at all that if no impartial race exists in India to hold the balance and keep the peace, either Hindus or Mohammedans will rule all India, and the struggle for supremacy will be appalling. On the shaky foundations of democracy that we have laid there can be no enduring partnership between Hindus and Mohammedans in any time that can be

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foreseen. Only those profoundly ignorant of India can suppose that there can be peaceful settlement of spheres of influence or anything else. Are we so war-weary that we have to follow the line of least resistance? Are we to be entirely callous to the sufferings of millions, so long as a theory is tried out? "Trial and error" is, I believe, what that is called. God help the weak, the women and children, and the minorities who have been mentioned this afternoon. I will mention one more minority, of whom nobody has yet spoken, and that is the Anglo-Indian community, whose fate is terrible to contemplate. These people will perish, thanks to soft heads and feeble hands in high places.
When India is in travail she will be easy prey to any invader. Is it not possible that the Government could declare, and undertake to enforce, something in the nature of a Monroe doctrine for India, to prevent an invasion that can only add to India's agony? The Government have a very heavy responsibility to shoulder, and I only hope that something may occur between now and June of next year either to show that their action is justified or to show that they will adopt wiser counsels. In spite of the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel (which was referred to by the noble Lord, the Secretary of State—a little unkindly I thought—as wind"). I have much pleasure in supporting this Motion.
6.9 p.m.
THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH: My Lords, it would be folly to under-estimate the difficulties which confront His Majesty's Government in India. I am certain, too, that it would be unwise to form too hopeful an estimate of what the Viceroy, the Governors and the official machine can now do in India. Therefore, any step which His Majesty's Government decide to take needs very serious consideration. In the few minutes in which I shall address your Lordships I shall endeavour to bring to this new proposal what I hope will be some fair, as well as searching, examination. I must admit that I come to this examination with some initial bias, because the Government announcement appears to shatter the hopes which I, and many others, have held about the ultimate fulfillment of the British task in India. The objective which I have held, and which I understood the Government also held,
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was the attainment by India of full self-Government as early as possible provided a reasonably stable administration could be set up. That objective of the Government is now changed. Their objective becomes the termination of the British connexion with India, whether or not a reasonably sound and stable alternative can be put in its place. We are to go, and it does not matter any longer what we leave behind us. It is that which shocked me when I heard the Government announcement, and which brings me to start upon the examination of the Government proposal with a dislike. I recognize perhaps that it would hardly be enough to condemn this proposal simply because it does not conform to the hopes which one has hitherto held; it has to be considered alongside the circumstances which exist in India to-day.
As I understand it, the Government proposal could be justified on two possible grounds. The first is that it is likely to lead to agreement in India, and the second is that, whether there is agreement or not, there is really no other alternative before the Government. I would like to deal very briefly with both of those propositions. In regard to the first, I would like to say in passing that reference has been made in this debate to what I would call the "sincerity argument". Several times noble Lords opposite have claimed that at least one thing which will come out of these proposals is that all doubts will vanish about the sincerity of British intentions. I would beg noble Lords opposite not to derive too much satisfaction from that argument. It is deduced almost every time that a major move is made. Indeed, the noble Lord, the Secretary of State, himself recalled that one result of his Cabinet Mission was that all doubts about British sincerity were removed; and yet here we are once again. Once again the doubts crop up, and something more has to be done to remove those doubts about our sincerity. That argument used in regard to India is a manufactured argument. It is a very useful one, and part of the stock in trade of nationalism. It is a very useful argument to distract attention from failure to get leaders to agree among themselves.
It is the Government's hope that this announcement will so shock and startle political opinion in India that they will be brought at long last to reason and agreement. Well, that will be proved one

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way or another before very long. At this time one can only form the best judgment one can as to what the probabilities are. It is important that we should form some judgment now as to what the probabilities are, because time is short and everything in the end will depend upon whether the transfer will have to be made to one or to more than one Government, and the sooner that important decision is made at any rate the better it will be for those who, in a very few months, will have to do the winding-up process.
My view, for what it is worth, is that it is very unlikely that the fixing of the date is going to lead to agreement. Those who hold the view that it will, probably believe that during the last few years when this internal deadlock has continued there has been a large amount of bluff about both the main Indian Parties. I would agree that in much of the manoeuvring which has been going on there has doubtless been a good deal of bluffing, but there is a hard core for each of the conceptions held by the two political Parties, and these cores have never yet been brought together. If you will consider for a moment the efforts which have been made in the past eight years to resolve this deadlock—in each of which there has been also an element of shock or some special element in the situation which might have brought them together—you will see how very hopeful you must be if you expect this further attempt to succeed.
In 1939 and 1940 the then Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, made a prolonged attempt to assist the Indian leaders to reach agreement. There was an element of shock there to help them—the outbreak of the war. It did not succeed. In 1942, there was the Mission of Sir Stafford Cripps, and there was certainly an element of shock there, because the Japanese were very close to India at that time. It did not succeed. In 1945, the present Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in conjunction with the Government of that day, made a further attempt. There was a special element there, because the end of the war was in sight and there was opening up a vista of reconstruction after the war, which might have assisted to bring them together. It did not succeed. In 1946, the Cabinet Mission, with all the skill and ingenuity which they devoted to it, have not, as yet, brought a
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successful result, and I feel this device of fixing a date, and a very early date, brings in nothing new which is going to make it easier for the Indian leaders to come to terms with each other. In fact, I would expect that it is more likely to have the reverse effect. I hope I am wrong, because if there is a failure, if this move does fail to bring them together, the consequences are going to be very grave.
May I very briefly mention some of them? Not all of them have been raised in this debate. First of all, if no agreement is reached, what happens to the immediate situation in India which brought about this very action by the Government—the disagreement within the Executive Government? What are you going to do about that? Then ultimately, if there is no agreement on the whole of the new plans, I foresee, as other noble Lords have done, confusion and chaos in India, with the minorities and the Princes, with all our obligations to them, abandoned. What will hit many people in this country very hard is the consciousness that, after all, Great Britain has failed in India. I doubt whether the shock which that will give to our confidence in this country will be calculable. Then, if it turns out that agreement does not arrive and that confusion results from our departure from India, there will be a danger spot in the world; and danger spots, especially when they exist in areas of strategic importance, can be sources of friction to Great Powers.
We all want to look to the best relationship in future between Indians and ourselves, whether within or outside the British Empire. What do you think is going to be the attitude of Indians if they find themselves abandoned by us? Are they going to look with gratitude to us for having left them in chaos and confusion? I believe that if this policy fails it will have a very serious effect upon the future relationship between Indians and ourselves. For that reason I hope, with all sincerity, that I may be wrong, that a miracle will happen and that this announcement of a date will lead to agreement in India.
The other argument which could justify the step which the Government has taken is one that has already been mentioned—namely, that there is no real alternative. There is one point in regard to that which I do not quite understand, and I would

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be grateful if the noble Earl when he comes to reply could remove my doubts. I would be much relieved. We have been told that the state of the administrative Services in India is such that they will be unable to carry on longer than June, 1948—that is what I understood the noble Lord the Secretary of State to say—and that therefore, at that time, the Viceroy and the many officials, the police officers and all the British troops are to go away. What after that? If the state of the Services at this moment is so bad, when we take these considerable numbers away we are going to leave the Indians with an administration which is far too weak to carry on. Surely that is an alternative hardly to be contemplated.
If it be asked, "What would you do instead," I would reply that, in the first place, I do not accept the view that necessarily the situation was such that some action had to be taken at once. You can take action too often and too soon in India, as elsewhere, and I am not at all convinced that the situation was so precarious that something had to be done or else worse would happen. I ventured on the last occasion I addressed your Lordships on the subject of India to plead, not for action, but for a pause, but nobody seems to have taken any notice. It is too late now to repeat that, but I think that if there had been a pause instead of drastic action there might well have been better hopes of some eventual accommodation. If that is not considered a big enough alternative, I will suggest another. I think what the Government ought to have done, if they really felt that the situation was such that some action was necessary, was to call together the leaders of all Parties in this country and to take out a delegation from among them to India with these terms of reference: To make one final attempt to assist Indian leaders to reach agreement. If that failed, the leaders of all the Parties in this country would have appealed to the country for the carrying on of our administration in India for another ten or twenty years. I believe that alternative is better than the one of abandoning India in its present confusion.
My humble conviction in this momentous matter is this. I recognize to the full the difficulties which confront His Majesty's Government. I fear—and I hope I am wrong—that their shock tactics will lead to further trouble, and that if we do carry
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out the intention to leave India in June, 1948, we shall very likely leave her to the chaos and confusion from which we rescued her 150 years ago; and by so doing we shall have brought very low the honour of the British name.
6.30 p.m.
THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I have listened to this debate, the prelude to further discussion to-morrow, in which many noble Lords with great experience of India and Indian affairs have expressed their convictions, with a great deal of interest and, I hope, profit. But I must confess that I have also listened to it with a growing sense of gloom. I think that that sense of gloom was partly due to the fact that the predominant view expressed was that the Government had done the wrong thing, and partly because, with the sole exception of the noble Earl, Lord Scarborough, not a single speaker had any alternative policy to recommend as being preferable to the present policy of His Majesty's Government. I must say that I rather wondered whether, if the noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite were sitting on this Front Bench, they might not have been addressed, by noble Lords on the back Benches, in rather similar terms to those in which we have been addressed this afternoon. That is an extremely depressing consideration in view of the weight which the words of many noble Lords carry when they speak about India.
Now I should like, if I may, to answer one or two—and I fear it will be one or two only, because I would not venture to do more on the spur of the moment—of the points made in the course of the debate. I am sure that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, did not wish for a moment to suggest that the Cabinet Mission had been indifferent to the fate of the Untouchables, or even that their rights would be completely disregarded by their fellow countrymen in the framing of their new Constitution. They are, of course, represented in the Constituent Assembly, and to that extent will be in a position to look after their interests. Further, they will be protected in the same way as other minorities by whatever safeguards are introduced into the Constitution. The noble Lord, Lord Newall, asked me a series of questions and I will endeavour to answer two of them. In the first place,

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I can assure him that there is not going to be an evacuation of India—"evacuation" was the word he used—but a transfer of political power from the British to responsible Indian hands. That is not, as the noble Lord, I think, suggested, a military but a political operation. The noble Lord also asked a question about the Gurkhas.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Will the noble Earl forgive my interrupting? I think that the House is intensely interested in what he has just said, and I wonder if he could expand it just a little further. I understand that he says that there is not going to be an evacuation of India but a transfer of political power. What does that actually mean? Evacuation is only a physical thing. You evacuate your people, you evacuate your Army, your civil servants and such of the British inhabitants as wish to leave. Is that not going to take place? Is the Army going to stay on? Are the civil servants going to stay in India? Is there going to be merely a transfer of power? I think that the House is a little bit at sea as to the exact meaning of the noble Earl's remarks in this connexion.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I am sure that the noble Viscount will appreciate that it would be presumptious of me to go into such detail as he has asked for about a matter of such importance, remembering, of course, that every word we speak is likely to be recorded for Indians as well as for noble Lords in this House.
LORD RANKEILLOUR: My Lords, may I venture to ask the noble Earl one further question? Will the Army stay in India under the orders of the new Government?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: May I be allowed to intervene once more? I quite appreciate that it is very difficult for the noble Earl to reply to a specific question of that kind, a question not directed to a matter which concerns his own Department. I wonder if the Secretary of State could answer that question?
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: The noble Viscount, of course, is aware that this debate is being continued to-morrow, and there will be two further Government speakers. I can assure him that they will
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address their minds to the matter which he has raised and, in so far as an answer can be given, I have no doubt that it will be provided when the moment arrives. I should like, however, to emphasize that this is not an evacuation from a hostile country but a political transfer, a transfer of political power to people who, I believe, from all accounts, are better disposed to us now than they have been in the past.
I was dealing a moment ago with the second of the questions addressed to me by Lord Newall, that relating to the Gurkhas. He asked me whether any Gurkha troops will be available for employment by His Majesty's Government. We must await the result of negotiations between this Government, the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. I cannot, of course, forecast what the outcome of those negotiations will be. I can assure the noble Lord—and I hope that my assurance will be conveyed to him in the Official Report to-morrow that we shall see that fair treatment is accorded to these gallant men to the best of our ability. I was, I must confess, a little puzzled by some of the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Selborne. He seemed to suggest that, whatever happened, the Pax Britannica should never be withdrawn from India. But, of course, he and other noble Lords opposite were parties to the Cripps offer which did promise that the Indians would be able to exercise self-government and form their own Constitution, not at a remote date but after the war.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: If they could agree among themselves.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: Certainly—if they could agree among themselves. But I do not think the noble Earl was suggesting that we should exercise power in India indefinitely—at least that would not have been quite consistent with the offer that was made in 1942. Now may I give a little further explanation with regard to the object of fixing a date in advance of agreement between the Parties in India, as that is a point which has been referred to by several noble Lords who have spoken on both sides of the House. We do share the fervent hope that the Moslem League, as well as the Congress Party, will eventually take an active part in the work of the Constituent Assembly, because we are all

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aware that that affords the best prospect of a lasting and friendly settlement of the differences between the two communities.
But to say, as I think some noble Lords opposite have suggested, if not explicitly at any rate implicitly, that we should wait until the League has entered the Constituent Assembly, and until that body has concluded its task, before we publish a date for the final transfer of power, is really, in our view, putting the cart before the horse. For, so long as any Party believes that it can rely on British protection, it can surely, with comparative safety, refuse to compromise with its adversary, and may secretly hope that in the long run it will obtain British support for its extreme claims. But by our saying now that after Tune, 1948, our authority can no longer be invoked by either side, the Parties will be obliged to settle their differences between themselves. The whole responsibility is placed on their shoulders. An opportunity is given for the exercise of that statesmanship which is a quality that we have all assumed in the leaders of Indian opinion. That is one important reason why a date for the transfer of power should be fixed in advance of agreement between the authorities and not subsequently, and that, I think, is the reply to the long argument in the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Munster.
Another point on which I believe we are all agreed is that the test of our policy—whether it is a success or a failure—must be its effect in the long run upon India, and the response and co-operation it receives from the representative leaders of Indian opinion. That is implied in the Resolution of the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, for he refers in it to our policy as a threat to the peace and prosperity of India. Reports we have received so far—some of them have been quoted by my noble friend the Secretary of State for India—indicate that the Prime Minister's Statement last Thursday has had a favourable reception in India. My recollection of India does not go back very far, though I remember the publication of several White Papers on India, but in that recollection no statement of British policy has been accorded more general approval. It has been praised in the columns of the Hindu and Moslem papers. The Moslem paper Dawn, in a leading article, says that:
"Moslems welcome the declaration that the British Government propose to transfer power
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to Indian hands on a specific date, as well as the broad outline indicated."
That is an encouraging indication of Moslem opinion. There is an even more interesting comment in the Hindustan Times, which says:
"This clear decision should put an end to all doubts about the bone fides of the present British Government, or fear that it may yield to reactionary councils in the United Kingdom or India. The process of transfer can now begin in an atmosphere of good will and cordiality which should create a permanent bond of friendship between the two countries."
Finally, I should like to quote one small passage from the Delhi correspondent of our London Times, because obviously this correspondent is a person with an objective mind who would not look at things from the angle of any political Party. It was in last Saturday's issue of The Times, and the article opens as follows:
"A change little short of miraculous has been wrought in the Indian political scene by Mr. Attlee's statement in the House of Commons yesterday. It is as if the miasma of doubts and suspicions of British good faith had been dissipated and Indians could now see clearly the horizon of their endeavour."
That has described, as only a correspondent of The Times can describe, the effect which we hoped might be achieved in India.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: Has the noble Earl the rest of the article?
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I will certainly produce the whole of the article after the debate.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I have read it, and I wondered if the noble Earl had read it.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I can satisfy the noble Earl on that point. The comments so far reported from representative Indian leaders are favourable to this new step in policy. Pandit Nehru, to whom reference has already been made, has described the decision of the Government as a "wise and courageous one." He continues, in the same statement, to emphasize two new features which the Government decision has imported into the political scene; the final expulsion of all ideas and suspicions that Indians may still feel about British intentions, and the challenge to Indian statesmanship which the transfer of power presents—a challenge that he has accepted without a moment's hesitation. This is extremely

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encouraging for our belief that this decision of policy is a right decision, and it is encouraging to have such a response from Pandit Nehru, whose views are doubtless, shared by other influential members of the Congress Party.
It is particularly pleasing that these friendly reactions to the Prime Minister's statement are not limited to the spokesmen of British India. The Nawab of Bhopal, to whom my noble friend, the Secretary of State for India, referred, has issued a statement which my noble friend quoted at length. I will not repeat it, but his view was that this statement of policy would serve a useful purpose. The conclusion that may be drawn from the views expressed by some important organs of the Press and certain political leaders in India is surely that the new step in policy is making a good start. It is, of course, far too early yet to say whether it will achieve what we desire, but may I suggest that it might be unreasonable for this House to decide now—as the noble Viscount's resolution suggests—that our policy is "a threat to the peace and prosperity of India" when Indians themselves have not endorsed this view? I hope the House will give us time to see how our policy works, to test it in the light of experience, and then wait for events to show whether it is a failure or a success. That would surely be a wiser course than deciding now, without further evidence, that we have already failed in our purpose.
The noble Viscount mentions in his Resolution the danger that he visualizes in our present policy to the economic prosperity of India. I am quite convinced there is less danger of economic difficulties from the policy of the transfer of power in the near future, and at a definite date, than there would be from a policy of indefinite delay. This would inevitably involve disturbance, which would react upon the distribution of supplies. But, apart from, the effect of internal conditions upon the food supply, I am sure that a substantial improvement in the production of food supplies by the peasants in India must depend upon an inspiring lead from their own political leaders. I think everyone recognizes that what is needed is not only irrigation and hydro-electric schemes for bringing land into cultivation, and the application of modern technique to agriculture by the
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peasants in their own holdings, but also a change of outlook and attitude, and a willingness to overcome the handicaps of ignorance and background. This psychological change can only be brought into effect by the example and teaching and devotion of the Indian national leaders.
I submit that there is no satisfactory alternative to the policy of the Government, and that is the reason why we have had only one speech suggesting any alternative this afternoon. Surely it would not be altogether fair to condemn a policy unless at the back of one's mind one had something better. After all, it is the business of the Government to govern. We have to administer the Statutes that are presented to us by Parliament. We must have a policy, and we can hardly be blamed for having a wrong policy if no one can suggest a right one. I am quite certain that any alternative (including both the alternatives suggested by the noble Earl, Lord Scarbrough, in his extremely interesting and constructive speech) that postponed the transfer of power in India until after the Parties had reached agreement and the Constitution had been framed, would be both impracticable and disastrous. Time is the essence of our contract in India, and the consequences of further substantial delay in the transfer of power would be fatal, both to us and to India.
The advice we have received from India (I should like to repeat this, although it is a statement that has already been made by my noble friend the Secretary of State) is that a British Administration could not expect to continue to exercise effective control over the country after 1948. If there is any difference of opinion on matters of fact about India, I do hope that noble Lords will give us the benefit of the doubt, because we have access to a larger number of sources of information.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I hope that the noble Earl will forgive me for interrupting. First he asks why do we not propose an alternative, and then he says that only the Government have the facts upon which an alternative can be founded.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I was not, of course, suggesting a detailed plan. I was only suggesting the broad outline of an alternative, which was, in fact, provided by the noble Earl, Lord Scarbrough. If this is the case, and this is the appreciation of the position in

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India, made by those who have had the best opportunity of studying the circumstances, and if we were unable to get our instructions fully carried out by the administrative services after 1948, we should then be in the really hopeless position of having full responsibility without any real power. We should also in the process have embittered the Indian nation to a degree that would certainly prejudice the relations between our two countries for many years to come.
I thought the reference of the noble Lord, Lord Darwen, to Ireland in this connexion was extremely apposite. None of us, I am sure, forgets what happened in Ireland, and that the worst results came from a policy that gave too little and too late. What we are now doing is the culminating step in the discharge of our legal and moral responsibility for the welfare of India. It is a step that I believe most people will look back on from distant retrospect, with pride. It is a step that is one of a very long series, in which many different Governments have shared. I believe that our decision to transfer power by June, 1948, is one of those decisions that vindicate the unique role in the world of the British Commonwealth and Empire.
We maintain that the mainspring of our Empire, a feature which distinguishes it from any of its forerunners, is the continuous evolutionary development of all its peoples from an initial state of dependency to a final state of freedom and independence. Whether the last stage of this long historical process is reached inside or outside the British Commonwealth, a free self-determined nation State is the crown of our endeavour. I am sure that one consequence of the awakening of India to full nationhood will be, in due course, an unprecedented development of her latent material resources. This will be of great mutual advantage, for we shall always remain linked to India by a variety of interests, ties, and associations, and, not least, by a firm resolve to raise the standard of living of the common man, and to preserve peace, wherever and by whomsoever it may be threatened.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I beg to move that the debate be adjourned until to-morrow.
Moved, That the debate be adjourned until to-morrow.—(Viscount Simon.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

TRAINING AREAS.
6.53 p.m.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Before the House adjourns, I should like to ask the Government if they have any statement to make on training areas in this country.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD PAKENHAM): My Lords, the Government have under close consideration the demands of the Service Departments for land for training and defence purposes. Particular matters under examination are the amount of land required, the extent to which training can be carried out abroad, the feasibility of utilizing the more remote and less populated parts of the country, particularly Scotland, and the effect of the proposals on agriculture, amenity and other interests. When this examination is completed a White Paper will be issued. Meanwhile, through inter-Departmental machinery, consideration has now been given to certain areas of particular importance—Harlech, Dartmoor, Braunton Burrows, Ashdown Forest, Purbeck, Castlemartin, and Martindale. Decisions have been reached as follows (references to acreages being approximate):

(1) In the case of Harlech, the Government have reached the conclusion that the harm to the public interest, if it were retained, would be so grave that its use for peacetime training purposes must be abandoned.

(2) The original proposals of the War Office and the Admiralty in respect of Dartmoor, involving about 75,000 acres in all, have been modified, with the result that the amount of land required has been reduced to 58,000 acres. It may be possible to reduce this even more by up to 11,000 acres by arrangements for joint use. Of the 58,000 acres,, the public would be excluded from 28,000, compared with 49,000 under the original proposals. Over 14,000 acres there would be not only prohibition of access to the public, but some restriction on grazing. A public local inquiry will be held into the proposals in their modified form before a decision on the retention of the area is reached.

(3) As regards Braunton Burrows (including Northern Burrows) the area

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has been reduced from 1,200 to 700 acres, the land to be surrendered including a rifle range. No agricultural land would be involved and Service use would not prevent public access to any part of the area, apart from eight acres at Instow, except for a total of twelve days in the year when firing takes place. Use of the area, save for a very small portion, would involve training rights only. The proposal, as modified, will be the subject of a public local inquiry before a decision on the retention of the area is taken.

(4) The area of land required in the Ashdown Forest has been reduced from 7,500 to 7,000 acres, and public access and the use of the land for grazing purposes would be the same as before the war. In this case, also, a public local inquiry will be held before a decision on the retention of the area is taken.

(5) As regards the Purbeck area, comprising 6,940 acres, no reconciliation of military and civil interests has been found possible. The retention of the land for tank-training purposes would involve the loss of 1,500 acres of cultivatable land, 3,000 acres of rough grazing land, and exclusion of the public from 6,540 acres, including the coastline from Worbarrow Tout to the West of Kimmeridge Bay. A public local inquiry will be held before a decision on the retention of this area is taken.

(6) The use of the Castlemartin area as a tank-training area was approved by the Government of the day in 1938, after full consideration of all the factors, and the land involved has, save for a very small portion, already been acquired by the War Office. The area is most suitable as a tank-training range, and considerable sums of money have been spent on the necessary installations. Moreover, as the result of discussions with the interests concerned, modifications of the original proposals have been made which would greatly reduce the detriment to civilian interests. Out of a total of 5,960 acres, about 5,000 are suitable for cultivation and grazing. Of this amount 1,500 would be likely to remain permanently available for agricultural use, while some 2,500 would still be usable for these
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purposes until such time as the tank range came into full use. Limited access to the coastline by the public would also be possible. About three and a half miles of the coastline would be open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays, and on any other day when firing was not in progress, and special arrangements would be made for visits by scientific bodies to the remaining three miles of coastline which would otherwise have to remain closed on account of the danger of unexploded shells. But though much has been done to safeguard civilian interests, the Government have decided that a public local inquiry should be held before a decision is taken.

(7) A decision regarding the Martindale field firing range awaits the result of a search for an alternative area in which local interests are co-operating. This search has been delayed by the weather, but is likely to be successful.

VISCOUNT SIMON: May I ask the noble Lord about the Castlemartin area? It is, of course, in Pembrokeshire. I am not clear as to whether the area which the authorities want to retain or make use of is limited to what is called the Castlemartin area. I was under the impression that there were areas of coastline—some of the most beautiful coastline in this island—which were also involved. Or are they included in what is technically called the Castlemartin area? For instance, Stackpole, of which the noble Lord might have heard.
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble and learned Viscount is evidently much better acquainted with the area at first hand than I am, but I will certainly take the trouble to make sure that he has a full answer to his question.

JOURNAL COMMITTEE.
Report from: That the one hundred and seventy-eighth Volume of the Journals (9 & 10 Geo. VI, 1945–46), with an Index, together with an Appendix containing the Proceedings in Secret Sessions of the House, 1940–44, was ready for delivery: Read and ordered to lie on the Table; and the said Volume ordered to be delivered in the same manner as the preceding Volumes of the Journals have been delivered.
House adjourned at five minutes past seven o'clock.