Sitting of 13 March 1945

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter past Two
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Retail Licences (Co-operative and Multiple Concerns)
    Captain Gammansasked the President of the Board of Trade how many existing retail businesses have been taken over by the co-operative societies and multiple concerns since February, 1944.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Dalton): During 1944, 6,491 licences were granted to traders who had acquired the good will of existing businesses. Of these, 1r5 were granted to multiple concerns and 94 to co-operative societies.
    Mr. Leslie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in the case of co-operative societies taking over these businesses, it means a higher rate of wages for assistants,
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    and also that many of the owners have got jobs as managers, and are now better off financially?
    Major Lloyd: Do the figures which the right hon. Gentleman has given include Scotland?
    Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir.

    Export Merchants
    Mr. Higgsasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has considered the Report on Post-War Trade Policy issued by the National General Export Merchants' Group, a copy of which has been sent to him; and, in view of the fact that approximately two-thirds of the pre-war export trade of Great Britain was handled by merchants, what assistance they will receive from his Department to re-establish their businesses.
    Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir. I have read this report with interest and with a considerable measure of agreement. My Department will be glad to keep in touch with this group with a view to rendering them all possible assistance from time to time.

    Clothing Supplies
    Mr. Sheppardasked the President of the Board of Trade if his attention has been drawn to the impending clothing shortage; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy the position.
    Mr. Dalton: The main problem in this field is the output of cotton yarn, and, as I informed my hon. Friend the Member

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    for East Willesden (Mr. Hammersley) on Tuesday last, steps are being taken, subject to the urgent needs of war production, to increase the labour force in the spinning section of the cotton industry.
    Mr. Shephard: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that there is no danger of a collapse in the clothing coupon system?
    Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir. A collapse is certainly not contemplated.
    Mr. Hammersley: Could my right hon. Friend say whether the main cause of the shortage of cotton yarn is an inadequate supply of labour?
    Mr. Dalton: My hon. Friend has asked this question several times, and I have had to tell him that one of the difficulties is that cotton employment is very unattractive, because conditions in the engineering industry, into which many cotton operatives have moved, are much more agreeable both in wages and amenities. In spite of this fact, the Ministers who are primarily concerned in this matter are trying to get cotton labour back into the spinning section.

    Surplus War Factories (Disposal)
    Mr. Higgsasked the President of the Board of Trade if, when disposing of shadow factories in the Birmingham area, he will give preference to local firms whose premises have suffered through enemy action before he considers applications from firms outside Birmingham.
    Mr. Dalton: Government factories which are declared surplus to war requirements are allocated in accordance with the principles which I stated to the House on 25th July and 20th October last. I would add that due regard will be paid to the claims, on grounds of equity, of firms whose premises have been destroyed or damaged by enemy action.
    Mr. Burkeasked the President of the Board of Trade to what uses he proposes to put the factories in Burnley now engaged on war work when war contracts are no longer available; and in particular, what he proposes to do with the Magnesium Electron factory at which production has now ceased.
    Mr. Silvermanasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps the Government propose to take to direct or
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    encourage new industries in North-east Lancashire so as to render North-east Lancashire less exclusively dependent upon the cotton industry.
    Mr. Dalton: I have the needs of this area in mind. As I have already stated, I hope to arrange for war factories in Burnley and elsewhere in North-east Lancashire, when declared surplus to war requirements, to be used for peace-time purposes. The Magnesium Electron factory has not yet been declared surplus.
    Mr. Burke: Is it not a fact that there is no production going on at the M.E.F., that the factory is admirably situated, and in many ways could be of great use in that particular area? Can nothing be done about it?
    Mr. Dalton: My hon. Friend asked a Question on this subject as lately as 24th January of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aircraft Production. This factory has not yet been declared surplus to war requirements, and until it is so declared by the Supply Department responsible, the Board of Trade is not able officially to deal with it.
    Mr. E. J. Williamsasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has considered the proposals of the Maesteg Urban District Council for the erection of factories to absorb the trained labour which will be released from the Royal Ordnance factory; and with what result.
    Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir. I have received these proposals, and my Regional Controller has already had several discussions with the council regarding possible future developments.

    Special and Development Areas
    Mr. Burkeasked the President of the Board of Trade when and how were the special areas determined; and what are the differences between the special areas and the proposed development areas.
    Mr. Dalton: The special areas were determined in 1934 on the basis of inquiries conducted by His Majesty's Government at that time. The proposed development areas differ from the special areas by covering, in three cases out of four, a somewhat larger area and population.
    Mr. Burke: Do the same factors apply, in the case of the areas that are added, as those which applied in the case of the special areas?
    Mr. Dalton: Lancashire was not a special area.
    Mr. Burke: But do the same factors apply to those areas that have been added to the special areas?
    Mr. Dalton: I asked my hon. Friend last week, in reply to a similar question, whether he would be kind enough to await my speech on the Second Reading of the Distribution of Industry Bill, when I hope to go into the matter in detail.
    Mr. Burke: It would help us very much to know in advance.
    Mr. Foster: Was the percentage of unemployment existing in the area at the time the only factor, or were other factors taken into consideration?
    Mr. Dalton: I would be glad if my hon. Friend would let me develop this systematically, when the Second Reading of the Bill is moved.

  BRITISH ARMY

    Discharge Leave (Hospital Cases)
    Mr. Dribergasked the Secretary of State for War what progress has been made in the consideration, by the various Departments concerned, of the position of sick or wounded Servicemen who have to spend their 56 days' discharge leave in hospital; and if, in view of the considerable number of men currently affected, he can now make a statement.
    Captain Prescottasked the Secretary of State for War what principles govern the point of time at which a man is discharged as medically unfit for service, in view of the fact that 56 days' leave pay operates from that date, even though the man be in hospital.
    The Secretary of State for War (Sir James Grigg): I would refer to the answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Abertillery (Mr. Daggar) on 27th February last.
    Mr. Driberģ: Has any progress been made in the conversations since that date?
    Sir J. Griģģ: If the hon. Member will look at the answer, he will see that I announced the decision in the answer to which I refer.

    Transferred Personnel
    Mr. Turtonasked the Secretary of State for War whether, on the transfer of a soldier from other arms of the Service to infantry, every effort is made to secure that he is posted to a regiment that has some connection with the area in which he lives or has previously worked.
    Sir J. Griģģ: This factor is certainly taken into account when men are transferred, but it has been found in the majority of cases that the consideration which carries most weight with them is that groups of friends should as far as possible be kept together.

    Cadets (Home Guard Equipment)
    Mr. Turtonasked the Secretary of State for War whether rifles, ammunition and denims that are or were held in charge of the Home Guard can now be made available to the Army Cadet battalions.
    Sir J. Griģģ: Ball ammunition is not issued to Army Cadets but the scale of rifles allotted to them is now under review. The demand for denims is so great that none can, I regret, be made available for the time being for Cadets.

    War Office (Correspondence)
    Mr. Quintin Hoģģasked the Secretary of State for War what is the average number of letters to his Department at present being received per month from Members of Parliament and from the public respectively.
    Sir J. Griģģ: The averages over the last six months are roughly 2,700 and 55,000 respectively.
    Mr. Hogg: Does my right hon. Friend realise that although some of us are not always satisfied with the contents of the replies, we do appreciate the care and the devoted labour expended on those replies?
    Sir Henry Morris-Jones: Are not the overwhelming majority of letters about compassionate cases, which give a great deal of concern to all Members of this House, and can the right hon. Gentleman give some ruling on these compassionate cases which would give satisfaction?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I have given rulings and announced them to this House at great length. As regards the quantitative part

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    of the question, I think the answer is probably that something like one-third to a half of the cases are of compassionate posting, release or discharge.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Would it not be of assistance to my right hon. Friend in dealing with the vast mass of correspondence, if those sponsoring the case ensured that the normal machinery of the Army Welfare Service was utilised?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I quite agree. I have come across case after case in which the matter could have been more expeditiously handled through the ordinary machinery of the commanding officer.
    Mr. Shinwell: When is the right hon. Gentleman joining the Young Tory group?
    Mr. Hoģģ: He has to become a Young Tory first.

    War Gratuities
    Mrs. Tateasked the Secretary of State for War whether, in a case where a man has deserted his wife and family, it will be permissible for the wife to draw the additional money which he has obtained on her account under the war gratuities scheme.
    Sir J. Griģģ: The rates of war gratuity are the same for married and single men. But perhaps the hon. Lady is referring to the man's allowances while he is on notice leave. The payment of family allowances during this period will follow the same rules as during the man's service in the Army.
    Sir John Graham Kerrasked the Secretary of State for War the gratuities payable, respectively, on discharge after five years' service to the holder of a short service Regular commission in the R.A.M.C. granted shortly before the outbreak of war, and to an officer of the Volunteer Reserve called up at the same time and serving for the same period; and the reasons for the disparity.
    Sir J. Griģģ: An officer serving on a short service Regular commission in the R.A.M.C. is entitled to a gratuity in respect of his war service in the same way as any other officer. One of the conditions of these commissions was that the officer should get a gratuity of £1,000 after five years if he was not given a permanent
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    commission. This has nothing to do with war service, and it is, of course, paid in addition to any war gratuity.

    Territorial Drill Halls
    Captain McEwenasked the Secretary of State for War how soon it will be possible to clear Territorial Army drill halls of the arms and equipment which, at present, preclude the public from making even occasional use of them.
    Sir J. Griģģ: These halls may only be used by the public if they can be spared by the Army. Progress is being made with clearing them but so long as the staff to handle and the transport to carry this equipment is short the progress will, I fear, be slow.
    Captain McEwen: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that there are cases where these halls are the only halls available for public entertainment; and does he not agree that in such cases an early clearing of them would be highly desirable?
    Sir J. Griģģ: Yes, Sir, but I am also aware that an early clearing of the Continent would be even more desirable.

    Case for Inquiry
    Mr. J. J. Davidsonasked the Secretary of State for War if he has now fully investigated the case of Private Thomas Laird, an exemplary soldier with four years' service who, after taking part in D-day invasion, being severely wounded at Caen, has had, without any justification, his home raided on two occasions, on the grounds that he was a deserter; and what steps has he taken to punish those responsible for the pain caused to this soldier and his wife.
    Sir J. Griģģ: I had not heard of this case until my hon. Friend put down his Question. If he will send me particulars which enable the man to be identified, inquiries will certainly be made.
    Mr. Davidson: There must be some mistake. I have a receipt from the War Office thanking me for sending the full correspondence a week ago.
    Sir J. Griģģ: Perhaps the hon. Member will let me have the acknowledgment. If there has been some slip up I will trace it but I cannot trace it on the information I have at present. There are five Thomas Lairds known to the 2nd Echelon.
    Mr. Davidson: The information I submitted gives the man's number, regiment and all particulars in regard to this case. If I put down a question a week hence will the right hon. Gentleman be able to answer it?
    Sir J. Griģģ: Perhaps the hon. Member give me the postcard first, Evidently there has been some slip up and I would like to trace the matter.

    Building Technicians (Release)
    Mr. Bossomasked the Secretary of State for War the number of officers and building trade technicians in the R.E. works services establishment, now stationed in England, who have little or nothing to occupy their time; and why they are not released permanently or temporarily to aid in the preparation of plans or arrangements for post-war reconstruction.
    Sir J. Griģģ: There are usually about 60 such Royal Engineers officers who are waiting to be posted. Most of them have recently returned to this country after long service overseas, and are on disembarkation leave. They are then usually sent to Home Commands to take over from officers who are to be sent abroad. While they are taking over they may not have a full day's work to do, but my hon. Friend will understand that they cannot be released from the Army.
    Mr. Bossom: Are there any of these officers who have had no appointment since D-Day? If my right hon. Friend can release any of them, it will be much appreciated by the industry, because they need these people.
    Sir J. Griģģ: Perhaps my hon. Friend will put that question down. It sounds to me extremely unlikely.

    Psychosis Cases (Discharge Procedure)
    Lieut. - Commander Hutchisonasked the Secretary of State for War whether he has now issued a new Order dealing with the discharge procedure in cases of soldiers suffering from psychosis in place of A.O. W9.
    Sir J. Griģģ: The new Army Order will he issued shortly.

    Higher Age Groups (Physical Training)
    Mr. Burkeasked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that men
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    over 40 years of age are frequently compelled to do physical training and undertake long marches with men of 18 and 19 years of age, often with disastrous effects to their health; and, will he take steps to prevent this.
    Sir J. Griģģ: At primary training establishments, where all entries into the Army are posted for the first six weeks of their training, special tables of physical training have been drawn up for men over 35 years of age. The basic tests carried out in the final week are graded according to the age of the recruit, and each individual test is graded according to the man's progress. For men over 44, the tests are voluntary. I should be grateful to my hon. Friend if lie would forward me particulars of specific cases which have come to his notice. I should be very surprised if the facts would support any such wide gencralisation as is contained in the Question.
    Mr. Burke: If these facts are established will it mean that the person whose name is produced will be free from all victimisation?
    Sir J. Griģģ: Yes, I can give an absolute guarantee of that.
    Major Lloyd: Are these tests equally applicable to officers and men from sedentary occupations, doing clerical work, and is there any evidence that, because of their sedentary occupations, they find sudden physical effort a great strain at a certain age?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I referred to the tests at the primary training centre, when the men first come in. They all have medical examination, and nobody ought to be pressed beyond his physical capacity.

    B.L.A. Units (Mention)
    Captain Gammansasked the Secretary of State for War why there is such delay in giving the divisional numbers and names of regiments of the British Army in operations in Europe, when similar information in respect of the American Army is issued in the course of actual operations.
    Sir J. Griģģ: This is, in the first place, a matter for the commander in the field, who is responsible for the safety of his men and the success of his operations. The need to give full details of the regiments which take part is, however, fully

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    appreciated, and my hon. and gallant Friend will no doubt have seen the lists which have been released in the last few days of units which have taken part in the advance to the Rhine. I have taken up the question again recently with commanders-in-chief in the various theatres of war.
    Captain Gammans: Does my right hon. Friend realise that it is difficult to understand sometimes if the British Army is fighting at all on the Western Front? Does he not think that representations might be made to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, to see that adequate publicity is given to both Armies under his command?
    Sir J. Griģģ: This is a difficult and very delicate question. I should like to consider it, without committing myself.
    Mr. Shinwell: Is it not most mischievous and dangerous to imply that the British Forces are not fighting? Do not we all know that they are fighting, and fighting well, and ought we not to say so?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I think so, and I sincerely hope so.
    Sir Joseph Nall: In view of the time that has elapsed since D-day, could not more adequate publicity be given to the exploits of the British 30th Corps?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I should have thought that a good deal of information about the exploits of the 30th Corps had been given.

    Requisitioned Property and Land (Release)
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will give an assurance that the branch of his Department which deals with the requisitioning of houses, public halls and buildings throughout the country is now adequately staffed; and if he will, in so far as is compatible with military requirements, make an endeavour to expedite the release of these properties, in view of the overwhelming demand for accommodation by the public.
    Sir J. Griģģ: The answer to the first part of my hon. Friend's Question is, "Yes, Sir." The second is a very fair statement of the War Office policy.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in spite of his answer, there
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    really is a very widespread public feeling that many buildings have remained unoccupied for a long time and might now be released?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I am perfectly well aware of the feeling, but unfortunately there are future liabilities which have to be cared for. However, I assure my hon. Friend that this matter of the large number of requisitioned properties constantly engages my personal attention, and I will certainly go into it very thoroughly. But there is bound to be a great deal of conflict between the needs of our returning soldiers, either on the release plan or as returning prisoners of war, and the desire of property owners to have their property released. I will try to reduce that conflict to the narrowest possible limit.
    Mr. De la, Bère: Will my right hon. Friend help me about a case at Evesham?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I have heard about that case, and, quite frankly, I think that there are a lot more deserving ones.
    Mr. E. P. Smith: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the needs of educational establishments, especially in Kent?
    Sir J. Griģģ: Yes, Sir; I will put the needs of educational establishments second only to those for small dwelling houses.
    Major Studholmeasked the Secretary of State for War, in view of the fact that large areas of agricultural and common land requisitioned far training are no longer required for that purpose, what steps he is taking to have as much of such land as possible derequisitioned at the earliest moment.
    Sir J. Griģģ: As soon as it is clear that land will not be needed for training it is given up, and over 4,000,000 acres have recently been returned to their original use. This figure includes land requisitioned under Defence Regulation 51, and land over which training rights were acquired under Defence Regulation 52. Some areas still retained are perhaps not being used at the moment, but it is expected that they will be needed later.
    Major Studholme: Will my right hon. Friend give instructions that every effort shall be made to avoid damage by tanks to any trees, as has happened at Thursley Common?
    Lieut.-Colonel Dower: Is it not the fact that the War Office are not making up

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    their mind because heavy payments are due for damage to requisitioned land, and they are not prepared to face up to the decision?
    Sir J. Griģģ: Perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will put that question down. It is a new one on me.
    Miss Wardasked the Secretary of State for War how many dwelling-houses are 'held by his Department unoccupied in the local authority areas of Longbenton, Gosforth and Wallsend-on-Tyue.
    Sir J. Griģģ: As far as I have been able to find out since my hon. Friend put down her Question, there are three.
    Miss Ward: Under the three local authorities?
    Sir J. Griģģ: That is the idea, yes.

    Leave Scheme, Far East
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for War whether those categories who could not benefit from the leave scheme for Forces in the Far East can now be placed in the same position as other soldiers in respect of leave; and if he can now give any indication of an abbreviation of the period overseas before leave may be granted.
    Sir J. Griģģ: I assume the hon. Member is referring to men of the Royal Corps of Signals, whose repatriation under the Python scheme has been delayed for operational reasons. Most of those eligible for repatriation at the end of last year should have embarked by the end of this month.
    Mr. Sorensen: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the - last part of my Question?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I have dealt with that matter in the House over and over again, and I will deal with it in my remarks later this afternoon.

    Soap Supplies
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for War why no washing soap is issued to soldiers in the B.L.A.; and whether such an issue will be made along with the issue of toilet soap.
    Sir J. Griģģ: A soldier's underclothing is normally washed for him. If he has to wash it himself instructions issued by 21 Army Group provide that he should be given two ounces of soap a week.
    Mr. Sorensen: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that complaints have reached me, and, I am sure, other hon. Members, that washing soap is not distributed at the rate of anything like one tablet a week, but rather at the rate of about one tablet in eight weeks? Can he not give instructions that soap shall be issued more frequently?
    Sir J. Griģģ: Field-Marshal Montgomery has given instructions, and there is no need for me to double the instructions.

    Malaria Cases (Repatriation)
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for War after how many attacks of malaria soldiers fighting in Burma and Eastern theatres of war are considered for repatriation on medical grounds; and how many have been repatriated because of the effect of malaria.
    Sir J. Griģģ: The general state of a soldier's health, and not any fixed number of attacks of malaria, determines whether he is repatriated to this country. I regret that the figures asked for in the second part of the Question are not readily available. If modern methods of treatment are properly applied men need not normally now be invalided to this country on account of malaria.
    Mr. Sorensen: Am I to understand that in fact there is no particular number of attacks that a man must have before he is considered for repatriation to this country?
    Sir J. Griģģ: That is the implication of my answer.

    Tropical Kit Allowances
    Miss Wardasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can make any statement with regard to increased tropical kit allowances.
    Sir J. Griģģ: The R.A.F. is at the moment more concerned with this question than the Army, and I understand the position is as stated by my hon. and gallant Friend the joint Parliamentary Secretary of State for Air on 26th January.
    Miss Ward: Will my right hon. Friend consider making a decision in this matter and stimulate some steps being taken by the Secretary of State for Air to get on with this job as well?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I really have enough to do without doing that.

    Doctor, Sussex (Release)
    Rear-Admiral Beamishasked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that a district in Sussex, of which he has been informed, with a scattered population of some 3,000, will be left without adequate medical attention if the sole local practitioner is again called to military service, that the recommendation in September, 1944, by the Central Medical War Committee for release has not been withdrawn by them; and will he now permit this doctor to continue his civil duties.
    Sir J. Griģģ: This doctor was granted three months' release during the winter, and I am advised that the Central Medical War Committee have twice considered representations for an extension of this period of release, but have not seen fit to make any further recommendation to the War Office. I understand the district referred to is part of the borough of Brighton, where there are, at present, relatively more doctors than in many parts of the country. In view of the very great need for doctors in the Army, I regret that this one cannot be allowed to return to his civil duties.
    Rear-Admiral Beamish: May I ask my right hon. Friend—I did not quite hear his answer—whether he is or is not going to release this medical officer?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I am afraid that my hon. and gallant Friend's question is a great testimonial to my normal and shorter method of answering. The answer is "No."
    Colonel Clarke: Will my right hon. Friend consider whether some of the trained R.A.M.C. officers who do administrative work in field ambulances and hospitals could be exchanged for others who could do it for them, so that more doctors could be released?
    Sir J. Griģģ: It the hon. and gallant Member means that we should try to substitute on the administrative side of the R.A.M.C. non-medical officers for medical officers, I can assure him that we do that as much as possible, but it cannot be done altogether.
    Mr. Rhys Davies: Will the Minister bear in mind that he may be violating the legal provisions of the National Health Insurance Act by not leaving a sufficient number of doctors in certain localities?
    Sir J. Griģģ: I confess that that is one of the things which I could not answer off-hand.

    REPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR (LEAVE)
    Miss Wardasked the Secretary of State for War if he will give an assurance that the period of leave due to sick repatriated prisoners of war only commences after discharge from hospital.
    Sir J. Griģģ: A repatriated prisoner of war is given 42 days' leave as soon as he can take it after arrival in this country. If, on leaving hospital, he is discharged from the Army on medical grounds he is given not 42 but 56 days' leave, unless of course the new arrangements I outlined in a reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Abertillery (Mr. Daggar) on 27th February apply to him.

  SCOTLAND

    Dysentery
    Mrs. Hardieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether his attention has been drawn to the alarming increase in dysentery in Scotland; and if he can make any statement on the subject.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Westwood): I am aware that there has been a sharp increase during the war in the number of persons notified as suffering from dysentery in Scotland, although the number of certified deaths is stationary since 1941. Most cases are of a mild form and involve only a few days' incapacity. The increase began long before the war, and may be partly due to improved methods of diagnosis. During 1944, there is no recorded instance of spread of the disease among the civilian population by food, milk or water, although the possibility cannot be ruled out.
    Mrs. Hardie: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this disease is caused mainly by food poisoning; and is he quite sure that there is sufficient inspection of food supplies in Scotland?
    Mr. Westwood: I can assure the hon. Lady that the medical officers of the Department of Health for Scotland are in close touch with the public health authorities, and that we are watching the position very closely.

    Children's Homes (Inspection)
    Mrs. Hardieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is satisfied that there is sufficient inspection in Scotland of boarded-out children and children in orphanages and other institutions to ensure that they are properly cared for.
    Mr. Westwood: I would refer the hon. Member to my right hon. Friend's reply to the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) on 7th March, when he stated that he hopes to announce shortly the personnel of a committee to consider the position of children who are deprived of normal home life.
    Mrs. Hardie: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that reply, which is quite satisfactory, may I ask him if he will consider asking the local authorities to invite the teachers to call attention to any cases that arise amongst school children?
    Mr. Westwood: I shall draw the attention of my right hon. Friend to the suggestion made by the hon. Lady.
    Mr. McKinlay: Is the implication of appointing still another committee, that adequate machinery does not already exist in Scotland for dealing with this problem?
    Mr. Westwood: The implication is that England has set up a committee, and that it was promised to this House that we would set up a similar committee in Scotland, to inquire into this matter.
    Mr. McKinlay: Why set up a committee in Scotland, to inquire into something that does not exist, because England has set up one?

    Fishing Industry (Coastal Installations)
    Major Neven-Spenceasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will cause a list to be prepared of all the minor works which have been constructed on the Scottish coast by the service departments concerned with a view to ascertain-fishermen after the war, such as piers, slipways, boatbuilding and repairing yards, ice making plant, cold stores and installations for piping oil to boats; and whether he will approach the departments concerned with a view to ascertaining the terms and conditions on which such works will be made available to fishermen.
    Mr. Westwood: The disposal of works of the nature referred to in the Question, which are surplus to defence requirements, affects a number of Departments and other interests, but the hon. Member's suggestion is being explored with the Departments concerned. My right hon. Friend will communicate with the hon. Member in due course.

    PETROL ALLOWANCE
    Captain Ganunansasked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he is prepared to increase the petrol allowance to London taxi-cabs in order to reduce the delay and congestion at the London railway termini.
    Mr. Hiģģsasked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he will consider granting a small allowance of petrol for the purpose of lawn-mowing during the coming season.
    The Minister of Fuel and Power (Major Lloyd George): While I am anxious to permit relaxations, such as those suggested by my lion Friend, in the petrol rationing scheme as soon as possible, I regret that at present the supply position does not justify such action. My hon. Friend will appreciate that other concessions may in any event require to be given precedence over such proposals for relaxation, even though the amount of petrol involved is small.
    Captain Gammons: Does not the Minister realise that baldly anybody travels to-day for pleasure; and does he not think that some alleviation could be made in the case of taxi-cabs which serve the main line stations at night?
    Major Lloyd George: As I have informed the House before, I am most anxious, at the earliest possible moment; to permit some relaxation, but the supply position at the moment definitely does not allow that.
    Mr. Higgs: Is the Minister's reply to this minor request governed to some extent by the fact that the United States will not give the British Government permission to use petrol for this purpose?
    Mr. Bowles: Is the Minister aware that there are certain devices in this country that consume 60,000 gallons of petrol an hour?
    Mr. Edģar Granville: Will the Minister give an assurance that any increase of petrol to taxi-cabs will make more taxicabs available at the London stations and not at race meetings and football matches?
    Mr. Turton: Will any relaxation in favour of taxi-cabs be confined to the London district, as there are various other areas affected?
    Major Lloyd George: Any relaxation would not be confined to one area, and, when the time comes when relaxation can be made, it will, obviously, be made in such a way as to benefit the country as a whole.
    Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the confusion caused by bracketing taxi-cabs and motor cars together?
    Commander Locker-Lampson: Is not the taxi-cab the poor man's car?
    Hon. Members: No.

  COAL INDUSTRY

    Low Temperature Carbonisation (Lancashire)
    Mr. Tom Brownasked the Minister of Fuel and Power if his Department will give consideration to the installation of a low-temperature carbonisation plant in the coalfields of South-West Lancashire as part of the post-war development plan; and with what result.
    Major Lloyd George: If my hon. Friend would supply me with particulars of any scheme he has in mind, I should be very happy to consider them.
    Mr. Brown: Do I understand that the Minister's Department has not submitted to my right hon. Friend the proposal for the establishment of this low temperature carbonisation plant?
    Major Lloyd Georģe: I am not aware of it, but, if my hon. Friend will let me have particulars, I will look into it.
    Mr. J. Griffiths: May I ask whether my right hon. Friend's Department has considered this matter of the development of the oil and coal industries in a general way. Is there a committee?
    Major Lloyd Georģe: A very considerable amount of research is being done at the moment.
    Mr. Foster: Is it not the job of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's Department to consider these schemes in fulfilment of the Government's promise of full employment?
    Major Lloyd Georģe: It certainly is, and I have said that I would consider them if they were brought to my notice.

    Opencast Coal
    Mr. Tom Brownasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what proportion of the £2 per ton which it is now costing for production of coal from opencast mining is used for the restoration of the land; and is he satisfied with the manner the restoration of the land is being done.
    Major Lloyd George: Restoration involves two processes, namely the levelling of the sub-soil and the return of the top soil which has been lifted and stocked separately prior to excavation. The schedule rate for digging overburden provides also for levelling and it is not possible to separate these items, but the cost of lifting, transporting and spreading top soil after levelling is 2s. 6d. per cubic yard. This applied to a site from which four feet of coal had been extracted with an average depth of soil of one foot, would work out at approximately 7½d. per ton of coal won. On the whole I am quite satisfied with the manner in which restoration is being done.
    Mr. Brown: Am I to understand from that reply, that the Department is satisfied with the way the restoration of the land is being carried out by the contractors receiving these sums; and is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that reports are coming through almost every week that the contractors are leaving the land in a slovenly state?
    Major Lloyd George: I cannot accept that, because I have personally visited many reclaimed sites and, as I said the other day, I have spoken to farmers who work these fields, and, speaking generally, they were satisfied with the land after restoration.
    Mr. Tinker: If, later on, the land sinks again, will anything be done to recover it a second time; is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that the land gets worse and that something ought to be done?
    Major Lloyd George: My hon. Friend will appreciate that it is difficult, when

    21
    the cause of the sinking is 40 feet down, to restore the land completely to its original levels. It takes from 20 to 25 years for complete settlement to take place, and it is impossible to say at the moment whether the land looked exactly the same before the excavation took place.

    Caravans (Supplies)
    Mr. Edmund Harveyasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether his attention has been called to the hardship of caravan dwellers whose caravans have been immobilised under war restrictions, in their inability to register for coal with a coal merchant under the terms of the Coal Distribution Order, 1943; and whether as permission to purchase coal from such merchants as are willing to supply them is rendered inoperative by the fact that merchants generally only receive enough coal to supply their registered customers and the caravans cannot now move about as formerly, he will modify the Order to meet this need.
    Major Lloyd Georģe: I am not aware that caravan dwellers have suffered unduly in the matter of fuel supplies, but I am willing to examine any specific cases brought to my notice.
    Mr. Harvey: Is the Minister aware that one such case was brought to his notice where the applicant was merely told to go to a coal merchant?
    Major Lloyd Georģe: That might be so. But I have made inquiries in the Southern region where there were from 300 to 400 caravans, and there was no special complaint from any one of them.
    Miss Rathbone: Does not the right hon. and gallant Gentleman think, as these caravan dwellers are already living under considerable discomfort and are likely to continue doing so owing to the demand for houses, they ought to receive every encouragement?
    Major Lloyd Georģe: They do. They are treated very well and I know of no case of special hardship. One of the difficulties with caravan dwellers is to discover where last the caravan rested.

    State Management (Australia)
    Mr. Lewisasked the Minister of Fuel and Power if he will get from the Australian Government particulars of the results obtained at those coalmines in Australia, the management of which has
    22
    been taken over by that Government, showing the financial results obtained and a comparison as to the number of men employed, and the production obtained compared with that during their private ownership, and if he will make available by means of a White Paper, or otherwise, this information for Members of this House, in order that they may have an opportunity of seeing how nationalisation has worked in practice in this case.
    Major Lloyd George: I have consulted my Noble Friend the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, who is making inquiries of the Commonwealth authorities. I will communicate with my hon. Friend as soon as possible.

    ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE WIRES (POLES)
    Mr. Bossomasked the Minister of Fuel and Power why it is necessary in this country in rural areas to have one series of poles to convey the wires for electric light and power and another series of poles to carry the wires for telephones and so forth when, in other countries, both these series of lines are carried on one series of poles; and if he will confer with the Postmaster-General with a view to ending this practice.
    Major Lloyd George: There are technical considerations which seriously limit the use of the same pole by electricity wires and telephone wires but nevertheless the practice is not unknown in this country. I have consulted my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General who agrees that our two Departments should confer and examine the possibility of extending the joint user of poles.
    Mr. Bossom: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend make use of the postal facilities and write to the United States, where he will find that there are many thousands of miles over which this is done and all the technical disabilities are overcome; and is he aware that the failure to do this, is preventing electricity from going into rural areas?
    Major Lloyd George: I am certainly prepared and, indeed, I shall be glad, to examine that but, as my hon. Friend is aware, many of the rural areas up to now have been equipped with telephone only, and in many cases the pole is not of sufficient size to carry the other wire.

    WAR MEDALS AND DECORATIONS
    Lieut.-Colonel Dowerasked the Prime Minister if he is now in a position to make a statement regarding the award of war medals and stars as indicated in his reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Chichester (Lieut.-Commander Joynson-Hicks) on 15th November, 1944.
    The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): The necessary consultations, including those with the Dominion Governments, are not yet completed but progress is constant and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will make an announcement at the earliest moment.
    Lieut.-Colonel Dower: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a whole day's Debate took place in this House a year ago and that there has been a series of Questions ever since then; and cannot he give some indication as to what this "earliest moment" is going to be, and, in particular, if a decision has been arrived at on the question of whether the men who were in action during the Battle of Britain will get a medal or star?
    Mr. Attlee: The hon. and gallant Gentleman will realise, from the number of Questions, the difficult point which arises. It is a matter which has to be concerted with the Dominion Governments and we have not received their full answer yet. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is hopeful of being able before long to give an answer, but I cannot give an exact day.
    Commander Sir Archibald Southby: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that many months have now gone by since we were promised a reply on this matter, and that it is one which gives rise to considerable feeling in all the Forces, in view of the anomalies which the present system is bound to cause?
    Mr. Attlee: I am sure that those considerations are very present to the mind of my right hon. Friend.

    SERVICE CASUALTIES (NOTIFICATION)
    Mr. Bellenģerasked the Prime Minister whether casualties affecting members of the Armed Forces are notified in the "Gazette" as occurred during the last war.
    Mr. Attlee: No, Sir. Casualties are not notified in the "London Gazette."
    Mr. Bellenger: Can my right hon. Friend say why not, seeing that the total number of casualties are given to the public from time to time?
    Mr. Attlee: Perhaps my hon. Friend would put that question down.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Agriculture (Financing)
    Mr. Edģar Granvilleasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if it was intended to include the requirements for re-equipping the industry of agriculture within the scope of the activities of the Finance Corporations recently announced by him for the purpose of making loans to businesses of medium size.
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Anderson): The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation is not prevented from providing finance in suitable agricultural cases, but my hon. Friend will recollect that this company is intended to supplement but not supersede the activities of other financial institutions and that in addition to the facilities provided by the Banks, special provision for agricultural finance is made available by such institutions as the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation and the Scottish Agricultural Securities Corporation.
    Mr. W. J. Brown: May I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that it is estimated that something like£800,000,000 of additional capital will be required to put agriculture on a sound footing; is he satisfied that all the agencies put together will be able to secure that amount of capital for the industry, and, if not, what does he propose to do?
    Sir J. Anderson: I am not prepared at the moment to say that. With the resources available to the industry itself, and the other facilities available, including the assistance which agriculture will receive, under a Bill which is being submitted for Second Reading to-morrow, it should be possible to do over a period of years all that is necessary.
    Mr. Granville: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for his reply, may I ask him if he will bear in mind that farmers

    25
    were forced to mortgage their farms at inflated values prior to the repeal of the Corn Production Act after the last war, and that they have a great fear of this sort of thing in future; and will he see that they are in a position to secure finance purely on the basis of their credit worth?
    Sir J. Anderson: I think that I have given a good deal of evidence that I am alive to the importance of helping industry in the post-war world.

    Capital Issues Committee
    Sir Geoffrey Manderasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give particulars of the issues that have been approved by the Capital Issues Committee during the past 12 months; of those that were not approved; and the present composition of the Committee.
    Sir J. Anderson: Apart from any other considerations, I do not think, in view of the widely differing circumstances of individual cases, that publication of the particulars asked for in the first two parts of the Question would serve any useful purpose. In reply to the last part of the Question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) on 14th February.
    Sir G. Mander: Would my right hon. Friend consider the possibility of giving the totals and the number of applications?
    Sir J. Anderson: I will certainly consider that.

    War Damage Payments
    Lieut.-Colonel Dowerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the War Damage Commission will include in cost of works payments the additional cost of making good damage caused by deterioration or looting of building materials when such additional damage is caused either by delay on the part of the War Damage Commission in deciding that the building attracts a cost of works payment or when a value payment notification is later rescinded in favour of a cost of works payment.
    Sir J. Anderson: As regards deterioration, I would remind my hon. and gallant Friend that the owner of a war-damaged property may claim from the War Damage Commission the proper cost of any tem-
    26
    porary works reasonably executed to protect his building against deterioration before the Commission have decided that a value payment and not a cost of works payment is to be made. Damage caused by looting is not war damage, and the Commission has no power to make any payment in respect of such damage.
    Lieut.-Colonel Dower: Does not my right hon. Friend appreciate that in many cases the War Damage Commission issue a notice that a value payment will be made and, later on, change it to a cost of works payment, and during that period there has been no chance of carrying out repairs of any kind? Will my right hon. Friend, therefore, undertake the responsibility for any deterioration that takes place in that time?
    Sir J. Anderson:.I think that point is dealt with in another Question put down by my hon. and gallant Friend. However, the position is that, provided the owner of the property does everything he might be reasonably expected to do to protect the property from further deterioration, such deterioration as may occur can be taken into account.
    Lieut.-Colonel Dowerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the War Damage Commission will include in cost of works payments the additional cost of making good repairs caused by deterioration or looting of building materials when such additional damage has been caused by delay in the carrying out of repairs or in the issuing of licences to carry out repairs by the Ministry of Works or local authorities to whom the Ministry has delegated its responsibility; and will he state in cases where such delay causes a cost of works to be changed to a value payment what additional compensation can be claimed by the aggrieved person.
    Sir J. Anderson: Where a cost of works payment is appropriate and war damage is increased by deterioration, the War Damage Commission would not refuse a claim for the cost of making good the additional damage, if satisfied that the owner had taken such steps as were reasonable to prevent deterioration, and due regard would be paid, where the case arose, to any difficulty or delay in obtaining a building licence or other necessary consent. Where deterioration has occurred as a result of causes beyond the owner's

    27
    control and a value payment is appropriate, the Commission would take the additional damage into account in computing the value payment. As regards looting, I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to my answer to his previous Question.
    Mr. Bellenger: Might I ask my right hon. Friend, in view of what seems to be a satisfactory answer, whether the War Damage Commission have taken into account the fact that for quite a considerable time past, either because of the absence of licences or because of the lack of building labour, it has been physically impossible for owners to do repairs to their war-damaged properties, and would his answer cover that point?
    Sir J. Anderson: My hon. Friend will find, if he looks carefully at the answer, that that point is specifically covered.

    Direct Taxation and Rates (Yield)
    Sir John Graham Kerrasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he can furnish an estimate in relation to those parts of the public revenue raised by direct taxation and by rating, respectively; what percentage is contributed by the weekly wage earners of the country, including, under the second heading, rates paid through the landlord as part of the rent.
    Sir J. Anderson: The amount of Budget revenue raised by direct taxation in 1943–44 was £1,910,000,000. The income of local authorities from rates during the same year is estimated at about £199,000,000 in England and Wales and £24,000,000 in Scotland. As regards the percentage of direct taxation contributed by weekly wage earners, I must ask my hon. Friend to await my Budget Speech, in the course of which I will give particulars of the yield of the Inland Revenue duties. No information is available as to the amounts of rates paid by particular classes of ratepayers.

    Legislation (Post-War Cost)
    Sir Herbert Williamsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he can furnish an approximate estimate of the cost, in a normal post-war year, of the new permanent legislation passed since 3rd September, 1939, of a character not connected with the war; if he can also furnish a similar estimate in respect of
    28
    Bills now before Parliament, on the assumption that they become law in their present form.
    Sir J. Anderson: This information is being collected and I will circulate it later in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

    Treasury Deposit Receipts
    Mr. Stokesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the value of the Treasury deposit receipts included in the £4,347,000,000 from non-official sources borrowed by the Government from the outbreak of war to 3rst December, 1944; and how many of these Treasury deposit receipts have been converted into long dated loans.
    Sir J. Anderson: The amount of Treasury deposit receipts outstanding on 31st December, 1944, and included in the figure of floating debt referred to by my hon. Friend, was £1,794,500,000. The amount of subscriptions to Savings Bonds covered by repayments of Treasury deposit receipts before maturity since the scheme began on 30th June, 1940, to 31st December, 1944, was £357,750,000.
    Mr. Stokes: Can the Chancellor tell the House at what rate of interest those were transferred into long-dated loans?
    Sir J. Anderson: I have taken the specific case of Savings Bonds.

    Forfeited Imports (Distribution)
    Mr. Glenvil Hallasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give the names of the approved organisations authorised to distribute for charitable purposes imported gifts which have been forfeited; and what checks are applied to ensure that the materials thus seized are in all cases used for benevolent objects.
    Sir J. Anderson: There are no organisations specifically approved for the purpose of distributing forfeited gift importations but such gifts are usually handed over, for free distribution to suitable recipients, to one or other of the charitable organisations which have already been approved for the purpose of handling gifts sent from abroad for free distribution in this country. The full list of approved distributors is very long, but in the absence of a special request from the addressees of the forfeited parcel for disposal through a particular channel, only a few organisations of unimpeachable standing are

    29
    normally concerned and no special checks for these have been considered necessary. I can, if my hon. Friend wishes to see a copy of the full list, make arrangements for him to do so.
    Mr. Hall: Does the reply of my right hon. Friend mean that people can choose their own charity to which these goods may be sent?
    Sir J. Anderson: If a specific request is made in a particular case, then effect would be given to it if it were thought proper.
    Mr. Silverman: What exactly is the meaning of the phrase "imported gifts which have been forfeited"? On what grounds have they been forfeited, and in what sense is a gift an import?
    Sir J. Anderson: There have been a great many questions in the House recently about articles sought to be imported free of duty as gifts. Where the Customs law is violated, the goods in question are liable to be forfeited. It is to these that the Question refers.
    Mr. Silverman: But would my right hon. Friend explain what Customs law is violated in respect of a gift, which one would have thought could not be imported at all? Surely the notion of importation of goods involves a commercial transaction of some sort?
    Sir J. Anderson: Of course not; a person who brings goods in from abroad which are his own property is importing them. There is no question of a commercial transaction there.
    Mr. Bowles: May I ask this question, about which we have had some correspondence: Supposing an alien living in a foreign country, off his own bat, sent what obviously was an unsolicited gift to a person in this country, in what sense is that an import?
    Mr. Magnay: Has not the ball been lost owing to this hypothetical question?
    Sir J. Anderson: I do not think that arises out of the Question on the Paper. If my hon. Friend would like to put it down, I will give him an answer all to himself.

    HOUSE OF COMMONS STATIONERY
    Mr. Purbrickasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury why Members of Parliament are charged for House of Commons stationery which they use outside the House while if used inside the House it is supplied free; and if he will arrange for the stationery used outside the House to be also supplied free.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Peake): From time immemorial stationery has been available for the use of Members within the Palace of Westminster. I have no responsibility for stationery which Members use outside the House, except that since 1910 Members who desire to use outside the House stationery with the House of Commons die have been able to purchase it through the Serjeant-at-Arms, and as it is supplied by the Stationery Office the rates at which it is charged to Members are favourable ones in comparison with retail purchase. I see no reason to alter this long-standing arrangement.
    Mr. Purbrick: Is it not time that the immortality of this process came to an end and a more sensible arrangement was reached?
    Mr. Peake: No, Sir, in my view the present arrangement is a good one. It is designed to save my hon. Friend the anxious thoughts in which he would otherwise be involved in having to decide, when embarking on correspondence at home, whether each of his letters was for a public or for a private purpose.
    Commander Agnew: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that the quality of the stationery provided is less wearing to the pens and to the tempers of the hon. Members who use it?
    Mr. John Dugdale: Will the right hon. Gentleman make it quite clear to the public, many of whom are ignorant of the fact that, owing to the parsimony of his Department, hon. Members have to buy both their stationery and their stamps for all their correspondence with all their constituents?
    Mr. Peake: No, Sir, all letters written within the Palace of Westminster are assumed to be written for a public purpose.
    Mr. Shinwell: They are not stamped.
    Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Will my right hon. Friend arrange a more expeditious and convenient way of paying for the stationery we buy? The present situation is that very small bills are flying about and they get neglected and cause trouble to everyone. Could not some arrangement be made by which we pay someone in the House of Commons?
    Mr. Peake: I will certainly consider that.
    Mr. Shinwell: As my right hon. Friend may have given a wrong impression in reply to one of the supplementary questions, will he now state, quite categorically, that letters written in this House and sent from this House are not franked, and that hon. Members have to pay their own postage?
    Mr. Peake: That really has not anything to do with the Question on the Paper. I was indicating that, so far as stationery is concerned, it is supplied from within the Palace of Westminister.
    Hon. Members: But not stamps.
    Sir A. Southby: In view of the enormous amount of correspondence with which hon. Members now have to deal, and the resulting increase in office work, would my right hon. Friend consult with Stationery Office to see whether Members could not be allowed to purchase office equipment in addition to stationery in order to help them in the work they now have to do?

    AFFORESTATION, COUNTY DURHAM
    Mr. W. Joseph Stewartasked the right hon. and gallant Member for Rye (Sir G. Courthope) as representing the Forestry Commissioners the number of acres that have been set apart for afforestation in the County of Durham; whether it is their intention to acquire more land in this county for that purpose; and when and in what part of the county.
    Colonel Sir George Courthope (Forestry Commissioner): The Forestry Commission own 5,675 plantable acres in the County of Durham. It is intended to acquire more land for afforestation if and when areas suitable in extent and otherwise become available in any part of the county.

    SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE (TRANSPORT FACILITIES)
    Mr. Dribergasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport if in view of the proposed suspension of the Standing Order, Sittings of the House, on Tuesday, 13th March, he intends, as an experiment to provide transport for hon. Members and members of the staff who may be detained late at the House on that night.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport (Mr. Noel-Baker): In reply to a question by my bon. Friend on 28th February, I expressed the hope that on all ordinary Parliamentary days, hon. Members and members of the staff would have no difficulty in reaching their homes by the normal services. I added that, if hon. Members would inform the Serjeant at Arms of any special difficulties which they might foresee, I would consult with the authorities of the House about what could be done to overcome them. So far, I have received no communications in response to this suggestion. I am to-day circulating to hon. Members a note on the subject.
    Mr. Driberg: Arising out of the circular, which was distributed only half an hour ago—a rather odd and premature way of answering a Question on the Order Paper —could my hon. Friend say whether there will be time for these arrangements to be made to-night, if they are desired?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: If I get the information in time I will try to make the arrangements, but unless I have the information I cannot.
    Mr. Driberg: Do the arrangements also apply to the staff?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: I understand that arrangements have been made for the staff to sleep on the premises.
    Commander Locker-Lampson: Why not make arrangements before the need arises?
    Mr. J. J. Davidson: Will my hon. Friend see that if representations are made on behalf of the staff they will be given first consideration; and, secondly, will my hon. Friend recognise that any special privileges given to Members of this House will have a serious effect on the minds of war workers?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: The needs of the staff have already been carefully considered, and I understand that arrangements have been made for them. As regards the second part of my hon. Friend's supplementary, I am quite sure that the country will recognise that the work of the House must go on.

    QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
    Mr. Speaker: I should like to draw the attention of the House to the practice of some Members often postponing their Questions when they find that these appear towards the tail end of the Order Paper and, in consequence, even if these Questions are reached, Members do not ask their Questions although the Minister is present, and has come to the House to answer them. Naturally, Ministers feel aggrieved at a practice which would seem to indicate a lack of courtesy. It is surely better to ask the Clerk at the Table, in advance, to postpone the Question only if it is not reached and then, if by chance it is reached, to ask it in the usual way.
MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS
That they have passed a Bill, intituled "An Act to authorise the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board to construct further works and for other purposes"—[Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Bill [Lords.]
MERSEY ERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL [Lords]
Read the First time, and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
SUPPLY
  ARMY ESTIMATES, 1945
  Order for Committee read.

SIR JAMES Griģģ'S STATEMENT
3.15 p.m.
The Secretary of State for War (Sir James Griģģ): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The British Army has travelled a long way during the last three years, and that in more senses than one. It has travelled from the Nile Valley by way of Tripoli, Tunis, Sicily, Rome and Florence to the Valley of the Po. It has travelled from Rangoon back to the hills of Assam, and forward again into the heart of Burma and to Mandalay. Above all, it has travelled from the training grounds of our own country, via the Normandy beaches, through France and Belgium into Holland and finally into Germany. But even more striking than the voyaging in space has been its spiritual voyage as an Army. At the beginning of 1942, it is true that the fear of invasion was no longer serious, but the process of retaining and re-equipping the Army for its resumption of an offensive role and a re-entry into Europe had not got very far. Indeed, recovery from the humiliations of 1940 had been gravely impeded by discouragements in Africa and defeats—some of which had all the magnitude of disasters—in Asia. On the other hand, after standing for a year alone against the Nazi storm, we had been joined in the middle and the end of 1941 respectively by the enormous potential might of Russia and the U.S.A. The Nazis had, of course, been reinforced by the Japanese but in the long run the resources of the three Allies were certain to outweigh those of the Axis even so reinforced. Russia and the U.S.A., however, were nothing like as well prepared as the axis Powers and we had to expect that there would be a period of grave peril before this potential might could actually be brought to bear. And so in

47
fact, it was. The summer of 1942 saw Russia driven back to the Caucasus and Japan supreme between the northern shores of Australia and the newly discovered North-Eastern frontier of India.
At the beginning of 1945 we and our Allies can look back to a considerable period of practically unbroken success on land. Our own Army has perfected itself by a long process of rigorous training; it has been equipped as no British Army has ever been equipped before, it is fully conscious of and confident in its own strength, and it is assured of final victory both in the West and in the East. This remarkable transformation is due to many factors—the skill of those who planned the major strategy, the ability and, in some cases, I would say the genius, of the higher commanders who executed it, the energy and resource of those who invented and prepared at home—including the vast numbers of working men and women in the factories—but, more than any of these, the change is due to the qualities and resolution of the soldiers themselves. On the testimony of the commanders in Italy, in North-West Europe and in Burma, we have a magnificent Army, and I am sure that they would agree that this is primarily due to the inherent character of the ordinary British soldier, and to the added courage and unselfishness he acquires whenever faced by a supreme task. These qualities will help us to a full realisation of the victory which now promises, and they will also go far to preserve and strengthen the influence of this country in the days of reconstruction after the victory—days which, to begin with at any rate, will be far less plentifully endued with milk and honey than some easy optimists have supposed. But, in spite of this miraculous betterment in our fortunes I think it would be unwise to act as if all was over bar the shouting.
Mr. Stokes: Hear, hear.
Sir J. Griģģ: That is the first sign of approval from the hon. Member. In recent months we have had more than one false dawn, and I am sufficient of a pagan not to want to provoke Nemesis. I do not propose, therefore, to beguile the House with accounts in detail of what we intend to do after the war with Germany is over. It is clear that there will be a substantial measure of release from the Forces, and
48
it is clear that there will have to be a very complicated and difficult process of redeployment against Japan. It is clear that these two processes will have to be accompanied by a further call up from civil life, including a substantial number of those who have hitherto been in reserved occupations. And it is clear that some conflict will arise between the accommodation needs of our returning soldiers, including prisoners of war, and the inevitable and natural pressure for the release of requisitioned houses, schools and other buildings. Announcements of policy affecting these have been made from time to time, and some of them have been debated in this House. But beyond saying that, I do not think we are leaving anything to chance in these matters—and apart from what my hon. and learned Friend the Financial Secretary may have to say when we come to discuss the Amendment—I would prefer to postpone the actual unfolding of the tale until the date of the end of the war with Germany can be seen with some certitude. Still less would I wish to adumbrate plans and projects for the time when Japan, too, has been defeated. A great deal of study is being given to the post-war Army but obviously some of the main elements of the problem are still wrapped in impenetrable mystery. If, then, I am denied what is half of the peace-time purpose of an Estimates speech, namely, to put forward plans for the future, I am thrown back entirely on the past. But here, events have been too vast to be compressed into one short hour, and the only thing I can do, therefore, is to pick out one or two subjects for reasonably full treatment and to hope to pick up any other subjects in which hon. Members may be interested in the ensuing Debate.
There can be no doubt that the event of the year, so far as the British Army is concerned, is the re-entry into Europe from the West. Let me make it clear beyond all misunderstanding that I am dealing primarily with the British Army and that the epoch-making events in Eastern and Central Europe, or in the Central Pacific, are, therefore, excluded from my present view. Let me also say with the greatest emphasis that I do not seek to under-estimate the importance of the campaigns in Italy and in Burma. Here, too, great deeds have been done, great results have been achieved and great contributions have been made, in the last

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year, to the defeat of Germany in the West, and Japan in the East. In particular, it should be understood that the Burma campaign has brought about the biggest single deployment of the Japanese land forces so far. But the re-entry into North-West Europe has had, and will have, a more direct and proximate effect on the defeat of Germany and, moreover, it has not hitherto been mentioned in our annual reviews. I will, therefore, begin by giving a considerable account of the preparations for this vital campaign and of its fortunes up to date.
The preparations for the operation known as "Overlord" go back a long way. They began to gather real momentum from the time that the first arrange-meats were made for the reception and accommodation of American Forces in this country. So far as the British Forces were concerned, the preparations fell into three categories. First, there was the actual planning of the operation, secondly we had to find and train the men for it, and thirdly we had to supply them with all the equipment and material necessary to carry it out. Of the operational planning naturally I can even now say little, but success can speak for itself.
Few campaigns can ever have gone more according to plan that that of June, July and August, 1944. I remember being present, a month or six weeks before D-Day, at a conference where the land, sea and air commanders expounded their plans and gave out their provisional orders. Admiral Ramsay and Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory were the sea and air commanders. Anything more impressive than the story they had to tell that day it would be hard to imagine, and all of us I am sure would wish to associate ourselves with the tribute paid to these two great men by the third of the triumvirate, Field-Marshal—then General—Montgomery. I knew what to expect from Admiral Ramsay, for I had seen him in Cairo a few days before the Sicilian expedition was to sail. On that occasion he depressed me extremely by pointing out all the things that could go wrong. He did the same at this private view for "Overlord" but, in fact, on neither occasion did anything substantial go wrong and the Admiral was incomparably better than his word. Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory spoke of what he hoped the Air Forces would do in preventing reinforcement of
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the crucial areas, and he, too, was better than his word. And now for General Montgomery. At the end of his exposition he put on the wall a large map showing where he expected the Anglo-Canadian-American forces to be at D+90. Somewhere about D+80 I was visiting the General at his field headquarters. The work of destroying the Germans trapped in the Falaise pocket was nearly finished. The Americans were up to the Seine at Mantes. The dispositions of the Allied Forces were, in fact, almost exactly as they had appeared on the map I saw at the pre-view, but the position of the Germans was quite different. They had stood and fought on the wrong side of the Seine. A great part of them had been destroyed in consequence, and the way was open for a rapid advance beyond the Seine to the very German border. I do not think that any further compliment is necessary to those who planned this classic enterprise.
A year ago, I described to the House the main elements in our problem of making the best of our limited allotment of manpower. In particular, I explained how we bad always laboured under the difficulty of having no substantial reserves and how, in consequence, we were unable to meet the constantly changing needs of the strategic situation without having either to disband units or to convert them for new roles. The absence of reserves acquired a special importance during the last stages of the "Overlord" preparations. Normally, it is not good policy to put a formation into the field unless there is a clear prospect of being able to provide enough reinforcements to keep it up to strength for as long as the operations are likely to last. But the campaign which was to start in the summer of 1944 held the chance of complete and final victory and there was, accordingly, everything to be said for making our initial effort as great as possible. We therefore decided to throw everything we could into the battle, and we did this knowing full well that, if for any reason victory were delayed, we should either have to reduce the scale of our effort or to call for very special measures to maintain it. Thus, in the months preceding 6th June, we occupied ourselves in building up the 21st Army Group to the required shape and the maximum size. This was the final stage in the transformation of the Army from defence to attack—a task which, first and

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last, involved the creation or conversion of no less than 2,000 units. We had for long been engaged in the process of combing out fit men from administrative posts and reducing the number and establishment of non-operational units. This process had to be intensified. Moreover, a drastic overhaul of our commitments for home defence was undertaken, in the course of which the allotments to Anti-Aircraft Command were heavily reduced and a great number of its units either disbanded or converted to new purposes. And all had to be done in the knowledge that new forms of attack from the air were in preparation and would almost certainly be launched upon us before our invasion began.
It will be clear that the recruitment and training of reinforcements sufficient to replace the expected casualties in 21 Army Group was a constant anxiety. Even with all our combing and conversion, even with all that the Minister of Labour was able to do in the way of new intakes, despite even the fact that a number of men were transferred to the Army from the Navy and Air Force—men who had already done a good deal of their basic training and who were of very high quality—despite all this, we did not see how we could simultaneously keep the Group going as well as provide for our needs in the Mediterranean and in the Far East. Certainly there was no possibility of finding replacements enough to enable us to reduce appreciably the Army tour of overseas service which as the House knows well is so much longer than that of the other Services.
Perhaps I could digress for a moment here to say a few sentences about what has come to be known as "Python." Some newspapers and, I am afraid, some hon. Members have—no doubt unwittingly—given the impression that nothing but the obstinacy of the Secretary of State for War stands in the way of a reduction of the tour of overseas service to three years. If this were true the "Python" problem could easily be solved. But it is not in the least true. I have shown how we decided to go all out for accelerating the defeat of Germany. I have described some of the shifts and turns we have adopted to this end. Some months ago I explained in this House that to reduce the overseas tour to three years would have the cones-
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quence of reducing by 125,000 the number of British soldiers deployed at any one time against the enemy. Clearly then until Germany is defeated any such reduction is out of the question. When Germany has been defeated that will be quite another matter. A great many of those with the longest service will be released, but there will still be the war against Japan. And I am bound to say that I think that our re-deployment plans for this second stage of the war should be based on reducing the maximum tour of unrelieved overseas service to three years. In the meantime and until Germany is beaten, I see no hope of this, though, as I have made it clear over and over again, we shall spare no effort to make gradual reductions in the present excessive figures. But to return to my story. In the Mediterranean our Armies managed fairly well by copying the processes of combing and converting which we had been carrying out at home. In India and Burma I am afraid that for a time the British units had to be kept short of their full establishments. One factor told in our favour however. The "Overlord" casualties in the actual assault period were less than we had feared and we were able later in the year to send more replacements to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and so reduce the overseas tour substantially in the latter and slightly in the former.
I know that there exists an idea that we still have too many men behind the fighting line. The people who express this are quite often those who insist—and in my view rightly insist—on a very high standard of maintenance and welfare services for the fighting soldier. But all these services add to the length of the administrative tail. A much more important factor, however, is the wide distribution in space of our operational theatres. External lines have certain operational advantages but they also impose very heavy burdens. We have had invariably to transport our troops across the sea, to build up bases on open beaches, to repair and re-equip damaged or destroyed ports, to construct roads and bridges. Here I may say that 75 railway and 723 road bridges, apart from an unknown number of improvised bridges, had been built by 21 Army Group up to the end of last year. Above all, we have had to supply our armies along ever-lengthening lines of communication through

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countries devastated by war, and of which the transport systems have either never existed or been hopelessly shattered. Incidentally, for good and sufficient reasons, the Army in the field does the bulk of the supply work for the R.A.F. It carries its bombs, stores and petrol, feeds its men, constructs its airfields and accommodation and provides most of its hospitals and communications.
Before I come to the equipment side of the "Overlord" preparations, I would like to say a word about the accommodation of the U.S. troops in this country. They began to arrive in March, 1942, and before D-Day came we were housing more than a million of them. They were quartered for the most part in South-Western England and upwards of 100,000 of them were billeted on the British public. This great influx of American troops was something entirely new to our people, and it says much for the character and good sense of both our nations that the adjustments necessary on both sides were so successfully made that this particular invasion, far from impairing good relations, has led to a closer sympathy and understanding. I should especially like to thank those of our people who accepted with such public spirit displacement from their homes in order that battle training areas might be available for the U.S. Forces. Altogether we provided our American friends with hutted camps for 800,000 and hospitals containing nearly 100,000 beds. We also furnished 18,000,000 square feet of covered storage, more than one-third of it being new construction. The House will not need to be reminded that during this period of preparation we mounted and sustained offensives in North Africa and that, after the destruction of the enemy there, we invaded Sicily in July of 1943 and Italy two months later.
These operations provided many lessons for the new venture, and many new devices were specially produced for it. And, of course, a great many old devices were developed and perfected. The Ministry of Supply and the War Office worked day and night to produce not only the large quantities of equipment that were required, but also in order that this equipment should be of the very highest quality. It is quite impossible to catalogue it, but I must mention the Bailey bridge; the flail tanks; the engineer assault tanks; the flame throwing tanks, which Field-
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Marshal Montgomery picks out as a particular success; self-propelled anti-tank guns and the special forms of anti-tank ammunition. Of the entirely new devices, the most notable, perhaps, was the prefabricated harbour—the "Mulberry"—models and photographs of which have been on exhibition in London and are now about to be shown in the provinces. Who could have imagined that we should be able to transport to the shores of France in the space of 14 days harbours each containing 70,000 tons of steel and 250,000 tons of reinforced concrete? Although I am prepared to claim for the War Office the main responsibility for seeing this job through, it was altogether an admirable example of co-operation between the Fighting Services, civilian Government Departments, contractors and workmen. I could quote many other examples of ingenuity and foresight. For instance, a set of spare lock gates for the Caen canal were constructed and made ready to be floated over complete in case the Germans destroyed the existing gates. And again, spare parts and assemblies for the repair of vehicles damaged in the early days were packed in special cases such that the required part could be found in the dark and without delay. In addition there was always the sheer physical problem of providing the normal needs of a large force thrown suddenly across the sea on to a hostile shore.
Two million 24-hour rations, specially packed in waterproof covers, were issued in the period immediately after landing, together with 3,000,000 self-heating tins of soup and cocoa. Three and a half million cases of compo rations, 60,000,000 gallons of tinnel petrol and 16,000 tons of coal packed in 500,000 special rot-proof bags were got ready for early shipment. Twenty thousand feet of railway bridging and 25,000 tons of steel trestling were prepared to reconstruct our supply lines as we advanced. The movement of all these stores and the reception of more and more U.S. troops with their equipment and supplies naturally caused a great expansion of our Movements Organisation. Moreover, both British and American divisions returned from the Mediterranean to take their place in the Liberating Army. The strain upon the railways was immense. During 1944 they ran for us 30,000 special trains and handled more than 3,000,000 wagons. At

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the same time their burdens were increased by the withdrawal for the purposes of the invasion of 600,000 tons of coastal shipping whose normal freight had now to be handled by road or rail. Under this almost unendurable pressure the railways did magnificently and every member of the public who, during this period, decided that his journey was not really necessary, helped to send a soldier on one that was.
As D-Day approached the troops moved to their concentration areas. Every unit was brought up to strength in men and equipment. In the 60 days before the 6th June, 12,000 Armoured Fighting Vehicles, 60,000 lorries and 2,000,000 spare parts were issued by Ordnance Depots. In the last 14 days alone they issued 150,000 miles of telephone cable and 11,000,000 yards of minefield tracing tape. Incidentally, I may say, that a considerable part of this vital work of the Ordnance Depots was done by the A.T.S. Then began the movement to marshalling areas. The marshalling camps, which had been constructed near to all the ports of embarkation, were designed for two main purposes. First, they enabled the Movements staffs to sort out each unit into appropriate craft loads, and, second, they served as hotels where troops arriving and departing at all hours of the day and night could be fed, bathed, accommodated and supplied with all their last minute needs. It was in these camps, too, that the final stages of the waterproofing of vehicles were carried out. In all 150,000 vehicles were waterproofed, and despite the fact that many of them went ashore through five feet of water in heavy seas, less than two in every thousand were drowned off the beaches. Here also the assault troops were given their final briefing and received their first issue of French money. Some days before D-Day the camps were sealed and cut off from all the normal contacts with the world outside.
By D-8 the loading of stores into coasters had been completed and the berths were clear for the loading of the assault vessels. All during this week the road convoys moved down the last few miles from marshalling areas to ports and the craft were loaded in the order planned long beforehand to ensure that what was first needed on the other side would be first off. Thousands of the public saw this great movement to the ports and no doubt
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guessed its purpose. After a delay of 24 hours due to weather, the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, directed that the assault should begin on 6th June. The great machine was set in motion. All that careful planning could provide had now been done, and the issue lay in the skill, the strength and, above all, in the courage of the individual fighting man—more particularly of the infantryman.
The House is well aware of the course of the campaign that followed, and yet I think it would be advantageous if we reminded ourselves of its main outlines. Let me again make clear that my purpose is to show the part played by the British Army. I shall do no more, therefore, than acknowledge once for all the essential contributions of the Navy and the R.A.F. in promoting and supporting the campaign. I shall also point out once for all that, although, to start with, the British Empire and U.S. land forces involved were roughly equal, it was not very long before the latter exceeded our own forces and at the present time are probably more than twice those of the Empire operating in this theatre. General Eisenhower vested the command of all the ground forces engaged, of whatever nationality, in General Montgomery. This was to continue until the number of U.S. troops engaged warranted their separate control by a U.S. Army Group Commander. The assault began, therefore, under General Montgomery's direction in the early hours of 6th June. The landings were made between the base of the Cotentin, or Cherbourg peninsula and Caen. On the right were two divisions of the First U.S. Army and on the left three divisions of General Dempsey's Second British Army—the 3rd and 50th British and the 3rd Canadian. Still earlier that day, two U.S. Airborne divisions had landed in the Cotentin peninsula and the 6th British Airborne Division had seized the bridges over the River Orne and the high ground to the east of it. Enemy opposition was more severe in the U.S. sector but was on the whole less than expected and by 10th June—which was D + 4—the Allied Armies had won a continuous front along a narrow strip of the Normandy coast. Incidentally I may say that by this time Generals Dempsey and Montgomery had already set up their advanced headquarters ashore.
During this critical phase, when we had no ports our chief concern was to win

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what the Americans call the logistic battle or as they also say "to get there fustest with the mostest." The enemy's buildup was reduced because he could not make up his mind what was corning next and also because of the success of the R.A.F. policy of interdiction. Our own build-up was successful because of our months and years of careful preparation. The specially devised Build Up Control Organisation functioned admirably and there was always in reserve a great system of air supply. In the first fourteen days 390,000 men, 70,000 vehicles and 230,000 tons of stores were landed for the British and Canadian forces alone and the figures for the U.S. forces were of the same order. The gales which raged round about the 18th June delayed the build-up and damaged the two Mulberries, one of them so badly that it was abandoned; but though it delayed it never interrupted and in the end the logistic battle was won.
During the month of June the Americans overran the Cotentin Peninsula and captured Cherbourg on the 27th. Meanwhile the British and Canadians, though making some local gains, were primarily concerned with holding the hinge position North-West of Caen and containing the greater part of the enemy's available armour. To them had been assigned the unspectacular task of forming the anvil upon which the German forces were to be held and pounded. Towards the end of July the newly formed 3rd American Army broke through from St. Lo Southward and reached the neck of the Brest Peninsula. Here it divided. One corps moved West and cleared the Peninsula except for its three main ports, and the remainder of the Army moved quickly eastwards towards Le Mans and Alençon. A determined German counter-attack tried to divide the First and Third U.S. Armies. After some initial success it was held and as soon as its failure was established General Montgomery directed part of the American Third Army to turn North from Alençon towards Argentan while the First American Army, the Second British Army and the newly formed First Canadian Army—which incidentally has never so far contained less than one British Corps—moved steadily South-East. Argentan was captured on 13th August, the Canadians took Falaise on the 17th, and to all intents and purposes the German 7th Army was hopelessly trapped.
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The time had now come for the U.S. troops to pass from General Montgomery's command, and he issued his last directive as Commander of all the Allied land forces on 20th August. This directive over and over again emphasised the importance of speed. The U.S. 12th Army Group was to assemble its right wing West and South-West of Paris. The Group was, moreover, so to dispose itself that it retained the ability to operate North-East towards Brussels and Aachen while a portion operated simultaneously towards the Saar. Alternatively, the whole Army Group might be required to move to the North-East on the right flank of 21 Army Group. When the remaining enemy in Normandy had been destroyed the 2nd British Army was to move with all speed to the Seine and cross it. It was then to advance to the Somme and cross it between Amiens and the sea. I expect that the House will have heard of the concluding words of the directive:—
"All Scotland will be grateful if the Commander, Canadian Army, can arrange that the Highland Division should capture St. Valery. I have no doubt that the Second Canadian Division will deal very suitably with Dieppe."
Now let us see how this order was carried out. By 27th August the Falaise pocket had been completely eliminated. Meanwhile the 3rd U.S. Army had secured a bridgehead across the Seine and the British and Canadian Armies moved up to join it. Both were across the river by 30th August, by which time the resistance forces in Paris had worked to such good effect that, with the aid of the Americans and, most happily, of the Second French Armoured Division, Paris was freed. It was now our turn to move fast, and British and Canadian Forces, headed by the Guards and the 11th Armoured Divisions, advanced swiftly through the Pas de Calais and through Belgium to Brussels, Antwerp and the borders of Holland. In the South of France the American and French forces which had been withdrawn from the Italian front for this operation landed on the French Riviera on 15th August, and advancing north along the Rhône Valley, completed the disruption of the remaining enemy forces South of the Loire.
When accordingly, on 1st September, General Eisenhower resumed direct command of the entire Allied land forces in the theatre, the Germans were in full

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flight. The Anglo-American victory had been so complete that it was permissible to hope that the enemy could be prevented from steadying up until at least the Allies were well into the Reich. On the other hand he was hanging on to the Channel ports and our communications stretched back to Arromanches and Cherbourg so that every mile of our advance added to the already immense strain upon them. The question was in short, if somewhat colloquially, whether we could bounce the Germans out of the Siegfried line—at any rate in some of the vital sectors—without waiting to secure and build up more forward supply bases.
General Montgomery was given a certain preference in the allotment of maintenance resources and two U.S. airborne divisions were placed under his command. In the middle of September he attempted to capture the crossings of the Maas and the Rhine at Nijmegen and Arnhem respectively. Success in this enterprise would have enabled him to outflank the Siegfried line from the North and to begin to envelop the vastly important industrial area of the Ruhr. Unfortunately, however, the operation did not succeed. It failed only narrowly and after a great display of gallantry by the airborne troops, both American and British. It secured a bridgehead across the Maas which became of considerable importance later on. The really spectacular objects, however, were not achieved, and General Montgomery had to turn to building up his lines of communication in an orthodox way.
Meanwhile U.S. Forces had made progress in two important directions—south of the Ardennes towards the Saar and in the direction of Aachen they had actually breached the Siegfried line. This process of building up communications involved first of all the liberation of Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais by the Canadian Army, but much more than that, the clearance of the Scheldt estuary in order to make use of the incomparable facilities of the port of Antwerp, which had been captured undamaged as a result of the lightning move of the armour of the 2nd British Army from the Seine. The clearance of the Scheldt was a very dangerous and arduous operation and in it British and Canadian soldiers, Royal Marines, the Navy, and the Air Force worked wholeheartedly together. As a
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result all Holland up to the Maas was free by 7th November and on the 28th the first full convoy berthed in Antwerp.
Early in November the 3rd U.S. Army had opened an offensive South of Metz and a few days later the French Army attacked south of Belfort. A few days later again the 1st and 9th U.S. Armies attacked from Aachen towards Cologne and Bonn while the 7th U.S. Army attacked towards Strasbourg. During the next month considerable progress was made in the Southern attacks, but in the north, opposite the Ruhr, German resistance was extremely stubborn and no significant advance could be recorded.
Then, on 16th December, came von Runstedt's electrifying assault in the Ardennes, where the line was very thinly held. This must still be vividly in the recollection of all of us, and it is sufficient to say that for a few days the German armour made alarming but not vital penetrations, that until the end of the eighth day they continued to make progress, but that from then Onwards the movement was reversed, and the rebound of our American Allies was such that the Germans were not able to arrest it even on their start lines.
The House will remember that I spoke just now of our Nijmegen bridgehead over the Maas and of the American breach of the Siegfried Line towards Aachen. The whole Northern sector of our line, including the American 9th Army as well as the British, Canadian and Polish Forces, was now placed under Field Marshal Montgomery's command. The plan to be put into force involved the Canadian Army—strengthened with additional divisions until about two-thirds of it consisted of troops from the United Kingdom—clearing the country between the Maas and the Rhine Southwards while the U.S. 9th Army was to attack from the direction of Aachen, with its thrust line towards the Rhine at Dusseldorf. The date fixed for the former was 8th February and it duly went off on that date. The House might like to hear Field Marshal Montgomery's opinion of the troops of the British Empire engaged in this operation:
"When the present offensive began on 8th February in the Reichswald Forest area the British armies were in a very highly efficient state. The ranks were full; equipment was at full scale; the sick rate was only 1 per 1,000 per day evacuated to hospital; the troops were in tremendous form and in great spirits. All ranks were imbued with that infectious

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optimism and offensive eagerness which comes from physical well being, and from a firm belief in a just and righteous cause; the completion of the task being well in hand. It was a great inspiration to see such fine soldiers ready and anxious for battle; our nation having been at war for over five years."
I wonder how many people realise how much of the credit for this was due to the hard and unremitting work of General Paget in earlier days. I know that the Field Marshal does.
The American attack was originally designed for 10th February but owing to the blowing of the Roer dams it could not in fact start till the 23rd. In the meantime the Germans had moved many of their crack troops Northwards and General Crerar's progress through woods and floods, though steady, could not be dramatic. When the American attack went in against the lightened opposition there was very soon a spectacular transformation. Except for a bridgehead covering Wesel the West bank of the Rhine was quickly cleared from Dusseldorf Northwards. Great numbers of prisoners were taken and many Germans were killed, though no doubt considerable numbers succeeded in escaping over the river. Further South the American First Army conformed its movements to those of the 9th Army. They are now in Cologne and Bonn, while further South they captured intact the bridge over the Rhine at Remagen and have succeeded in establishing a sizeable bridgehead on the other side. The American 3rd Army also thrust rapidly Eastward towards the Rhine and Southward towards the Moselle. The position now is that the Allied Armies have closed up to the Rhine from Coblenz to North of Emmerich, that they have crossed it at one point and that the North bank of the Moselle is rapidly being cleared of the enemy. And with our forces preparing for the task of crossing the Rhine in force I leave this which is the main part of my story.
I hope hon. Members will not think I have spent too long on it, but nobody can doubt that a campaign which takes us in eight months from the wrong side of the Channel to the Rhine and beyond, which rescues practically all of France and Belgium and some of Holland is well worth re-describing, especially when one reflects on the number of Germans it has put finally out of action. I cannot say, of course, how many of the enemy have been killed or so seriously wounded that they
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will never fight again; certainly many hundreds of thousands. I do know, however, that the prisoners alone number more than 1,000,000, of which roughly two-thirds fell to the American Armies.
Let me, as an appendage to this story, say a little about tanks—
Mr. Thorne: I would warn the right hon. Gentleman that the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) is watching him.
Sir J. Griģģ: Our tanks have been criticised in some quarters because they are not the biggest and heaviest on earth in every single particular. Personally, I believe it quite a wrong policy to try to recreate the mastodon, but let me go a little more into detail. First as regards guns. The Royal Tiger, alone of the enemy's tanks, mounts a gun, a "hotted-up" 88 mm. firing a 22½ 1b. shot with a muzzle velocity of 3,340 feet per second, which has a penetrative performance superior to that of our 17-pounder firing conventional shot. The standard 88 mm. gun, mounted in the ordinary Tiger, and the 75 mm. mounted in the Panther, are both, inferior weapons; but the 17-pounder, firing the latest type of ammunition, surpasses the performance of any German gun yet encountered or, so far as I know, in contemplation. Moreover, we have in action at least five tanks mounting a 17-pounder for every Royal Tiger the Germans have on the Western Front.
Mr. Stokes: Single purpose or dual purpose?
Sir J. Griģģ: Dual purpose. Then, as to armour, it is true that the frontal thickness of the Tigers, and indeed of the Panther, makes them all three formidable defensive weapons, but we are not any longer fighting a defensive war. For quite a long time now we have been on the offensive, and surely, for the offensive, speed, mobility, reliability and manoeuvrability are of much greater importance. All of these the Tigers and Panther have sacrificed, and anyhow their defensive battle is not being very successful.
Mr. Stokes: Ask the soldiers.
Sir J. Griģģ: I am coming to that point. Perhaps the opinion of the soldiers, whom I am always being adjured to consult, is entitled to more weight than any arguments from me. I will therefore give the House the latest and most authoritative

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military opinion, namely that of Field-Marshal Montgomery himself, naturally after consultation with his subordinate commanders. He thinks that British armour has come through the campaign in Western Europe with flying colours, and has proved itself superior in battle to German armour. He holds that if Rundstedt had been equipped with British armour, when he attacked in the Ardennes on 16th December, he would have reached the Meuse in 36 hours, which would have placed the Allies in a very awkward situation. And further, that if 21 Army Group had been equipped with German armour it could not have crossed the Seine on 28th August, and reached Brussels on 3rd September and Antwerp on 4th September, thus cutting off the whole Pas de Calais area in eight days—
Mr. Bellenģer: Was that in the despatch?
Sir J. Griģģ: —which the Field-Marshal holds to be a very remarkable achievement with far reaching results. The credit for all this he attributes to the War Office—[Laughter]—wait a minute—and concludes that the British Armies were, in June, 1944, splendidly equipped for the job that had to be done. I do not entirely agree with this last sentence. The men using the equipment had most to do with it, and the Ministry of Supply and the workmen in the factories were in it too. But, anyhow, I assure the House, and the hon. Member who kindly interjected just now, that the testimonial was entirely unsolicited. I should just like to add that our two main types, the Churchill and the Cromwell, are already grandfathers, and that we are developing even newer and better types of tank and anti-tank ammunition. These great military feats are the prelude to final victory in the European theatre, a victory which, as I said at the beginning of my speech, will be followed by a considerable redistribution of the available man-power, carrying with it the release of large numbers of serving soldiers.
My hon. and learned Friend, in replying to the Amendment, will deal with the processes of release and the intentions of the Government towards those men fortunate enough to be in the releasable groups. I want to say a little—a very little—about the role of those who are
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to be retained. I have heard it said that we, in the United Kingdom, will be entitled to sit back, after finishing with Germany, and take a less active part in the war against Japan. The argument is that we have been in this affair longer than anybody else, for five and a half years continuously, and that for a part of that time we were without any kind of external support whatever. A moment's reflection, however, will persuade the most doubtful that there are the most compelling reasons of honour and interest why we should continue our efforts. Indeed, it is of the whole essence of our war objects that we should. Loyalty to our American Allies and to our kith and kin in the great Dominions, of itself, requires us to go on to the end. The recovery of our possessions and material interests in the Far East is also a factor which no sensible man can disregard; but when all that has been said, we are fighting this war for the establishment and maintenance of a principle. The elimination of the greater plague-spot in Europe cannot assure even the establishment of that principle, let alone its maintenance for all time. So long as there remains a semi-barbarous nation imbued with the desire of world domination by force, a nation blinded to the higher developments of human society by adherence to an outdated feudal system; so long, in short, as the present Japan exists, we have no hope of securing the main object for which our fellow countrymen have fallen on the field of battle. Is it not patent, therefore, that the decision of His Majesty's Government to pledge themselves and their resources to the Far Eastern campaign, when Germany is finished, is not only right but inescapable?
It is perhaps appropriate that in a speech which is so largely an account of operations in North-West Europe I should tell the House something of the military part in feeding the civil population in the liberated countries. This is a subject about which the House has shown very great anxiety, and indeed arrangements have been made to debate it shortly. I do not want to anticipate this Debate, but I should like to make clear to the House, as a preliminary to it, exactly what are the military responsibilities in this matter. The military authorities come into this business for two reasons. First, because the Commander-in-Chief must assure himself that his operations will not be

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hampered by disease and unrest among the civil population caused by lack of food and medical supplies. Secondly, because, if the imports necessary to prevent disease and unrest are to come into the country in the early phases of operations, they must come as part of the military flow of supplies or they will not get in at all. Shipping and port clearance must obviously in these early phases be entirely under military control. It is easy to see, therefore, why it was decided to allot to the military the responsibility in the earlier stages for importing foodstuffs for the civil population.
Certain consequences flow from that decision. In the first place, it cannot be a question of what we should like to give our Allies but of the utmost that can be procured and shipped in competition with military requirements not only in the theatre but all over the world, and let us remember that procurement has to be started months before the supplies can get to the people concerned, on estimates which must be highly speculative. Next, the indigenous government must co-operate from the start by arranging for detailed distribution, by preventing profiteering and black markets, and by fostering local production in order that the imports may go as far as possible. Of course, in the forward zones the military authorities must do more in the way of helping the local authorities than they do in the rear zones, such as the zone of the interior in France, or the areas in Italy already handed back to the Italian Government. Thirdly, the military do not and cannot undertake a long-term policy. To set the wheels of industry going, to import machinery and raw materials to restart the national economy—these are matters for the liberated government, with, of course, consultation and help from the various Allied or inter-Allied authorities concerned.
Needless to say, even within the limits of undoubted military responsibility, planning and action are not solely British. Our troops in North-West Europe are serving under an American Supreme Commander, and the plans to supply his needs in this respect have been worked out on a joint basis between Washington and London. Canada, too, has been closely associated in the actual provision of the supplies. Under the combined plans, over 300,000 tons of food for the relief of France, Bel-
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gium and Holland have been provided since the beginning of operations in Western Europe, and deliveries are now averaging, at various ports in France and Belgium, some 7,000 tons a day. Nor is this the whole story. In Greece, up to the middle of February, the military authorities had provided between 150,000 and 200,000 tons of food, and in Italy, up to the 3rst December, about 1,000,000 tons. These supplies, as I have stated above, have been a joint United States, United Kingdom and Canadian responsibility. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, substantial contributions have been made from the stocks of the Ministry of Food.
The provision of supplies is not in itself enough to enable the people to be fed. Other factors may prevent full use being made of what is available both from local sources and from military imports. In France, for example, the shortage and dislocation of internal transport have prevented uniform distribution. That shortage is, I hope, being overcome. In Belgium it was bound to take time for the Government to get going the administrative machinery of distribution and control. The new Government is tackling this problem with great vigour. In Holland, I am afraid that when the parts now occupied by the Germans are freed, there will be grave problems, not only of internal communications, flooding and mines, but also of shortage of local products to help out the imported supplies. Of the early difficulties in Greece and those in Italy I need not remind the House. Aid to the civil population went forward while the troops were engaged in actual fighting and wheat ships had to compete with munition ships for space in ports and at the quays. But despite all the difficulties, the Armies have delivered in France, in Belgium, in Holland, Greece and Italy supplies on a not unworthy scale, and have helped the Governments to tide over the period till they are able to take over the responsibility for their own supplies.
But though we have got so far without disaster, I do not conceal from the House my fear that in the coming months the demands for foodstuffs for the liberated countries may become almost overpowering. The news from Holland still in the German hands, shows that the population are in desperate straits, and as I have just said, when liberation comes, there is likely

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to be little help from local resources. Then, when we get into Germany, there will be displaced persons, not by their thousands by their millions, who will look to the Armies for food. The combined resources of the Allies may be strained to the utmost to prevent hunger and indeed starvation, especially if our victory comes before the new harvest is gathered. So far as the Armies are concerned, they will do their best, but I should fail in my duty if I did not stress the magnitude of the task which we have undertaken.
Of course it is only right that we—the military—should shed our responsibilities in this matter as soon as the military situation permits, and we are anxious to see the Governments concerned not only take over the obligation for the procurement of the basic supplies, which we are now providing, but also push on with their civil import programmes, which will enable them to re-start their industries and to re-establish their economic life. Those are matters which fall outside my province. But they are matters which I know are being pressed forward to the limits of the practicable.
The House may perhaps wonder why I have not so far mentioned U.N.R.R.A. That is not due to any lack of appreciation of an organisation which, I hope, will bring to post-war Europe material and moral help and support. It is because, broadly speaking, U.N.R.R.A.'s help—the help of an independent international body—comes after the main military work is done, and then only at the invitation of the indigenous Governments. That statement, however, requires some qualification. During the military period U.N.R.R.A. may act—by mutual agreement—under the direction of the military authorities to carry out tasks which would, otherwise, fall on the military. Thus in Greece U.N.R.R.A. teams assisted in the distribution of the food which the military brought in, and arrangements are being made gradually to hand over to U.N.R.R.A. not only the responsibility for distribution, but that for the whole relief scheme in Greece. In one other most important sphere we are arranging with U.N.R.R.A. to work under the military authorities with a view to their taking over full responsibility in due course. In the plans for dealing with displaced persons in Ger-
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many the military authorities have invited and are receiving U.N.R.R.A.'s co-operation. It is hoped that U.N.R.R.A. teams—recruited from representatives of various United Nations—will go in under the military authorities to organise the reception, care and eventual repatriation of these displaced persons, and ultimately to take over from the military authorities the entire responsibility in this connection.
Now I have come to the end of the time which, in these days, it is reasonable for a Minister to occupy. I am very conscious of what I have left unsaid. Far too little has been said of the work of our American and Russian Allies in theatres where the British Army is unrepresented. Far too little has been said of troops from other parts of the Empire. I have also said too little of the work of the other Services. I explained, however, at the beginning, that my purpose was to speak of the British Army, particularly since it has displaced the Navy as the Silent Service. But even within the British Army I have passed over, perhaps too perfunctorily, the deeds of our men in the Mediterranean and in Burma. Last year our troops in Burma were a little disposed to think that they were as far away from us in thought as they were in space. It was never true, and even if it had been, their brilliant victories of the past year would have brought them forcibly back to our minds and hearts. The crushing defeat of the last all-out assault on India, the rapid subsequent reconquest of large parts of Burma and the Arakan, and above all the ascendancy which has been established over the biggest Japanese Army which has so far been in action, these are stirring and glorious achievements worthy to rank with any in our history. General Giffard can, indeed, be proud of the Army—Indian, British and African—which he handed over to General Leese. And General Leese is making noble use of it.
Then the Army in Italy. There has been a certain disappointment on their part that they have not been allowed to finish off more completely the liberation of Italy. It is an undeniable fact that shortly after the conquest of Sicily, almost before the campaign of Italy had got under way, a number of divisions, both British and American, were withdrawn in order to strengthen the forces for "Overlord." Despite this, the Allied Army of Italy under Field-Marshal Alexander was

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able to liberate Rome and Tuscany after one of the most brilliant campaigns of all time. But almost immediately more divisions, this time American and French, were taken away to carry out the assault on the Southern coast of France. Small wonder then that the final conquest of Italy has been delayed. The wonder is that so much has been done. I cannot, to-day, set out in length what this in fact is, but I should like to tell the House one thing—that our forces in Italy are even now containing enemy formations whose strength numerically we reckon to be upwards of one-third of the German forces in Europe other than those engaged against the Russians. Even in their less spectacular period, therefore, they have been making no mean contribution to the common cause.
I cannot close without calling attention to the loss which the British Army and the Allies have suffered in the last year by the death of Field-Marshal Sir John Dill. I am afraid that he concealed for a very long time the gravity of his illness in order not to interrupt his work in Washington. I am sure that the House would like me to express our sympathy with those he has left behind. And I think it would be fitting that we should do the like to the relatives of all those who have been killed in battle. The achievements of the Army have been very great. They have not been attained without heavy cost, and it is right that we should remember this, and remember those who have borne so large a part of the cost.
Let me quote from a prayer we said in Westminster Abbey in memory of Field-Marshal Dill:
"O Thou, Who art heroic love, keep alive in our hearts that adventurous spirit which makes men scorn the way of safety so that Thy will may be done. For only so shall we be worthy of those courageous souls who, in every age, have ventured all in obedience to Thy call, and for whom the trumpets have sounded on the other side."
4.23 p.m.
Mr. J. J. Lawson: The right hon. Gentleman had a great story to tell, and it is only the simple truth to say that he has done justice to the story. The strength of his speech lay in the fact that he let the facts speak for themselves, and as he told those facts, I confess that I felt most strangely moved. As I have heard the Estimates speeches made by the Secretary of State for Air,
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by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and to-day by the right hon. Gentleman, and as I have seen the house so deeply impressed by simple statements of facts, I have asked myself: Is it not possible as this House has been impressed and moved by those statements, to present the same facts to the nation by wireless, so that the nation will be moved, even as we have been?
The right hon. Gentleman paid a just tribute to the Army. It is probable that many of those men in Holland and Germany at the present time have had an experience, which has scarcely any parallel among soldiers in the whole range of military history. It was my lot to see some of those soldiers on the sands of Africa. Since that they have had to face the mountains of Italy, and now they have had to face what is perhaps the worst fighting terrain in the world, that of Holland. I remember many years ago reading Alva's "Campaigns in Holland," and I thought that that kind of thing could hardly be repeated. But I gather that Holland has improved very little from the fighting man's point of view in the last three hundred years, and I think that if I read that same hook now, I would have a better understanding of the mind of the Spanish soldier in the sixteenth century, since hearing the illuminating remarks of some of the men who have come back on leave from Holland.
If we cannot tell this story to the coon-try by wireless—and I wish we could and get the same punch into it that we do—at any rate we ought to do justice to those of our men who are fighting on the Continent. The right hon. Gentleman said at Question time that statements had been made in the last few days mentioning some of the units that were taking part in the fighting. He has stated to-day, in rather humorous vein, that the Army is rivalling the Navy—
Sir J. Griģģ: Beating them, replacing them.
Mr. Lawson: —as the Silent Service. This kind of thing can go too far. It is strange that the news had to come from Canada, of all places in the world, that the greater part of the forces of the 1st Canadian Aimy were British troops. We have had this repeated. I am making no new criticism, and it is time that this game was ended. Let us tell the right

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hon. Gentleman that there is no reason behind it. Every commonsense person, as well as every soldier, knows that at certain stages there is need, for security reasons, for secrecy, but that is not the reason why the world is not getting to know the facts about the operations of the British Army on this battlefield, as it was in the case of Africa. And Africa was such a secret thing that one Secretary of State staggered the world when he announced that actually 70 per cent. of the men killed came from these islands. Secrecy had then got to such a stage that the world was telling us that Britain would fight to the last American, or the last Australian. Now we have the same kind of thing again. The enemy knows at an early stage what units are opposite him, just as well as we know what units are opposite us. It is true that changes may take place, and at certain stages there is need for secrecy, but this silence about the units and the numbers of British troops that are fighting on this battlefield is becoming almost criminal. There was an article in the "Daily Herald" this week which surprised me. The writer referred to the various units that were part of the Canadian First Army, and said that always allowing for security, the fact remained that the statement which was made about the units that were fighting was long overdue. That was from a man in touch with the units.
In Italy my hon. Friends and I had some experience of this matter. What knowledge have our people of the units of the British Army in Italy? There is no need for secrecy: the enemy knows the units so well that on one or two occasions he has sought out the weak places, because he knew what units were opposite him, just as we know what units are opposite us. If something is not done about this question the right hon. Gentleman is due to be the centre of a first-class row in this House. There are plenty of publicity agents out there, but they are limited in their objectives. They do publicity very often in the wrong places. The people in this country are proud of the units that come from their localities. They like to hear those units mentioned, and the men in them like to have them mentioned, too. I do not know whether it is the right hon. Gentleman, the War Office, the Army Command, or somebody else who is responsible for this sort of
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thing, but something drastic must be done to prevent a repetition.
As the House knows, some of my hon. Friends and I had the opportunity of seeing the troops in Italy a short time ago. Perhaps the House will forgive me for referring to the tragedy that marred our journey, when four of ourparty, two Members of this House and two others, with the pilot and the observer of the plane, lost their lives. When we parted from them that morning we did not dream that we should never see them again. We had been a good company. Members, drivers and batmen, with our very wise and efficient guide, Brigadier Partridge, had pulled together, and when one considers the great distances we travelled, over difficult country, the absence of strain was very striking. Two Members of this House lost their lives. They contributed in no small measure to the good fellowship and work of that party, and I need scarcely say that we felt deeply the loss of the good men in that plane, and that we sympathise, as I am sure the whole House does, with their families. It was a fine day when we turned round and landed in Bari, and we little thought that such tragedy was coming on the party.
Our troops in Italy, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, are not in the headlines. They are in remote areas hundreds of miles away, in the mountains or down in the marshy lands of the Adriatic coast. I think it is a wonderful fact that their morale is so high although their part in the general strategy does not appear on the surface. When one considers the extreme isolation of these men and the conditions in which they operate, particularly in the winter, I must repeat that the morale of those men is surprisingly high. We had plenty of opportunity to test it, because, while it was necessary that we should be guided over mountain passes, once we got to the front we were our own masters and went where we liked and did as we liked. We covered most of the fronts of the Fifth and Eighth Armies, and, as far as we could see, the relations between our men and the American troops were very good indeed. We received legitimate complaints of course, and we have put those complaints to the right hon. Gentleman. But practically all those complaints arose from the extreme isolation of their position and the fact that the man had been so long

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away from home. This is the sixth year of the war. We are within sight, as, I gather, the right hon. Gentleman thinks, of the end of the European war, but both the fighting men and some who will be recruited have to visualise perhaps another year or two of war, so it is necessary for us to take note of the psychology and the position of men such as those in Italy.
People in this country know that we live in peace because of such men. They do not know the heart-hunger of these men for children whom they have not seen for three or four years. War is bad enough anyway, but the hunger of men for their families, from whom they have been separated, is a terrible thing. So far as possible, it is the duty of those in authority to break down this sense of isolation from home and family. We have told the right hon. Gentleman that these men need more news. They need bigger newspapers, more broadcasts, and more facilities for hearing them. I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman has done about many of these points that we have raised, but there is, for instance, the simple matter of the need of men for photographs of their children, their wives, and their parents. Every soldier knows the value that is placed upon a photograph by men who are on the battlefield. That is something that cannot be explained to those who have not experienced it. There is difficulty in getting photographic material; there is difficulty in getting cameras. In Italy American soldiers are going about with cameras, and they take photographs themselves. They do not seem to have any difficulty in getting materials. I think it is very little to ask that proper arrangements should be made by the right hon. Gentleman with the Board of Trade for plenty of materials to be available, so that these men may get the photographs which they would prize so much.
Colonel Greenwell: Would my hon. Friend not agree that the Regulations preventing photographs being sent in an air mail letter card are very hard on the troops? It seems a very little thing to ask that it may be possible for men fighting overseas to receive photographs from their relatives in that way.
Mr. Lawson: I am very glad that my hon. and gallant Friend has drawn attention to that matter, which gives point to what I am saying; but this question of photographs is only a pointer. The men
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are isolated. They are ignorant of home facts. They get a certain amount of A.B.C.A., and they know a certain amount about post-war plans, but, nevertheless, their isolation from the world outside is almost incredible. Some of my hon. Friends will probably go more into detail on these matters, but this question will recur; as a matter of fact, it is arising now, I daresay, in Burma. It will get worse when the European war finishes, and we have to face the Japanese in Asia. I was very much struck—and here I underline what the right hon. Gentleman said—with the way the Army gets supplies over great distances, over roads that in many cases are incredibly bad, over great passes and over mountains. I never quite understood it. I stand in awe of these men who drive the lorries over those passes. It is quite true, as the right hon. Gentleman said, that, if it had not been for the Bailey bridge, driving the Germans out of Italy would have been quite impossible. I gathered that, in many areas, the password in the unit is often: "Have you seen our Bailey bridge?" They seem as proud of them as if they were a mascot of the troops.
It may be that before the next Estimates the war will be confined to the Japanese, and Burma will become a very important fighting area; it is at the present moment, but it will then become even more important. Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that he can get his supplies through all the time? Is he getting the proper food, the right kind, through to these men in Burma? Since I have head the Munster Report I have wondered what things were like on the Burma fighting front. What arrangements are being made for rest camps? There are a good many questions to be seriously considered in that part of the world, and probably we have, even yet, some lessons to learn.
I was not here when the Debate took place on the posting of the A.T.S. overseas and I wish the Financial Secretary could tell us something about that position. He may not be able to tell us how many have gone overseas, but could he say whether they are going over in large numbers? My right hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) put several suggestions to the Minister. Can my right hon. Friend tell us how far these suggestions are receiving attention? One of the things which I should like to have said if I had

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been here at the time was that a good many of these young women are members of families, and for quite a long time and for a good part of their service have been getting compassionate consideration. They have spent their time between the Forces and the home, and they have been very necessary to the home at certain periods. In many cases I do not really know how the home does without them, even for a short period. Is that kind of case receiving full and sympathetic consideration? I shall be very pleased if satisfaction can be given on that point.
There is another point. After the right hon. Gentleman made his statement, I went home and said to a certain member of my family, who happens to be serving: "The Secretary of State says that he has asked for volunteers and that you are not volunteering." The member of my family said: "No; we were asked to volunteer, but we did not." I said: "But you volunteered three years ago." She said: "Yes, it is quite true; we volunteered to go out as a team, and we will go out as a team to-morrow." There is a kind of esprit-de-corps in certain units of the A.T.S. They have worked together in teams and in groups, and they have got used to acting together. I ask if it is not possible to maintain that fine spirit and pride in their unit by, as far as possible, sending these units, and particularly batteries, overseas in teams, if they are willing to volunteer to go out in that form. I think that, generally speaking, the House and the country wants parents to feel that their daughters are receiving the fullest consideration in this matter, and the house must be kept fully informed about this in the future, so that it and the country can feel that everything possible is being done for the young women who are going out to new scenes and are being submitted to new tests unknown in our national history.
So I finish, as I began, with the statement that we have to-day heard a great story. A great demand has been made on the young manhood of this nation, and grimmer demands are still to be made. Their fighting qualities, their courage, patience and endurance, have been sustained at a very high standard. The right hon. Gentleman has paid an eloquent tribute to them to-day, and I hope that, in the days to come, this nation will ex-
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press its pride by making a nation worthy of the young men who have helped to sustain us through these years.
4.54 p.m.
Winģ-Commander James: I will try to be exceedingly brief. The hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Lawson) has spoken with so much appreciation in regard to our journeyings to Italy, and has said all that needed to be said on that topic, so I will deal very briefly with three specific points. In the Debate in the week before last on the Crimean Agreement, I was very sorry that so much interest was taken in Poland that nobody referred to the strategic commitments which were undertaken on behalf of this country at that Conference. We are very much in the dark as to what is going to be the future of the Army after the war with Germany is over. I hope to keep in Order, but I very much hope that the Secretary of State is paying very close attention to the preparations for demobilisation and release of those sections of the Army that can most be spared. Anxiety is mounting after all these years of war, and I am a little apprehensive about what commitments the Prime Minister may have made on behalf of this country concerning the war with Japan. After all, we have been in this war longer than America, and we are so much more fully mobilized. Anxiety is mounting. Old people who have been taking the strain for so long are very nearly reaching the breaking point.
I had a very sympathetic reply last week from the Secretary of State to a Question in which I asked about the machinery for release on compassionate grounds. I know from long experience that the Minister is, in fact, extremely sympathetic to the legitimate needs of the Services, but, in the immediate post-European war period, I am sure that that machinery is going to be very much overworked. It does not work too well now, and it is clogged, as the Minister said. It does need an overhaul and the proper preparation to take the very great strain that is coming on. This cannot be sustained at the present pitch indefinitely. Not only is there a very serious shortage of goods, and not only are repairs in all branches of life difficult, but replacement is now very often quite impossible. I do not think the world in general realises the extent to which Britain is being squeezed

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to maintain the war at the present pitch. I very much hope that the Army is not to be called upon to play more than its fair share, in proportion to the Americans.
We, in this House, have extraordinarily little opportunity of knowing what is the relative burden imposed upon ourselves and the Americans, or to what extent they are mobilised, in man-power and resources, compared to ourselves. I see that in the United States there is an organisation called the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, which has published figures recently which are certainly far franker than anything I have seen in this country. I tried last week to get some indication from the Minister of Labour, and it seemed to me to be a most legitimate and proper question to ask, for, otherwise, how are we to judge? I got a reply which was both impertinent and arrogant. I asked the Minister to what extent British man-power had been mobilized and used as compared with the U.S.A. I consider it a very reasonable question to ask, but the answer was that the Minister saw no advantage in endeavouring to compare the war effort of the different Allied nations. I think that was a most improper and unsatisfactory answer, and I think we ought to have some kind of protection from the Chair against Ministers making that kind of reply.
Mr. Huģh Lawson: Did the hon. and gallant Member give the Minister of Labour notice that he was going to raise this matter in the Debate to-day?
Winģ-Commander James: No, of course not; the Minister gave me no notice that he was going to give me that kind of answer.
Mr. Lawson: But the Minister is not here to reply.
Winģ-Commander James: No, but the right hon. Gentleman can defend himself by some other course. I want to come now to a point about the release of unemployed and surplus officers. It is a fact that there are a very large number of officers unemployed and unlikely to be employed. I have been given a figure of 1,154 officers in the Royal Armoured Corps at present surplus. There are a great many other officers unemployed. Have we not reached a stage when at least officers who rejoined at the outbreak of war or officers who are in "C"
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category, and are now unemployed, cannot be released to go back to their own farms and businesses? It seems to me to be wasteful to hold them up now.
The third point to which I want to refer is the question of the removal of obstructions on property and of some of the restrictions on property. I recently put a Question to the Minister on this point. As I understand the present system, cash payments are being offered to members of the public to make up for things like antitank blocks on their property. I have received the complete papers of one case as far as it has gone. While the cash compensation offered sounds fairly adequate the fact is that, if cash compensation is paid, the work really cannot be undertaken; the contractors cannot do it. Surely it is up to the War Department to remove the concrete, the poles and so on that they have put upon people's property. No individual who has had these things put on his ground should be obliged to accept cash compensation with the possibility of not being able to get them removed for, perhaps, years. In my locality I have seen searchlight posts given up, the hutments taken away and a lot of concrete and wire and rubbish left lying about. The farmers have not the labour to do the clearing and surely the War Department could employ some low category men or, better still German prisoners to do the job.
The same applies to the land. A lot of land is no longer in use for training purposes and yet people are not allowed upon it. Only a few days ago I was shown an area of by no means agriculturally useless land reserved for training. No one is allowed to make use of it at all and I am assured that there has been no training there for a year and a half. There may be good reasons for keeping it, but I would press the Secretary of State for War to review the release of land and to de-requisitioned houses also, in many cases. The housing shortage could, to some extent, be alleviated if buildings could be given up and I am sure that some could be given up at this stage. We know that the Secretary of State for War's natural and proper pre-occupation is the direct conduct of the war but I urge him to pay close attention to this problem of unwinding the machine, easing the strain on our people and realising, as I know he does, the frightful and accumulative burden of hardship that the length of this war has imposed upon the people.
5.4 p.m.
Major Markham: I join with the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Wellingborough (Wing-Commander James) in congratulating the Secretary of State for War upon a very fine and moving review of the military events of last year. At the same time I agree with the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. J. J. Lawson) that the War Officer generally has not been very good with its publicity. Judged by American standards, it has been very backwards in many respects, but at least we must admit that War Office publicity has been splendid when the British have been retreating. We can say, without any fear of contradiction, that the story of Dunkirk, or Alamein, or Tobruk or Arnhem has gone round the world. But when it comes to British advances and successes there seems to be a weakening of that dash and determination in getting the story over. It has been apparently a common practice for the War Office or the British Press to use the headlines "British Retreat" but "Allies Advance". The Americans do things in precisely the opposite way. It is always the "Americans Advance" but the "Allies Retreat"—a subtle point, but one that sways thousands of people in their opinions. I suggest that the War Office has something to learn from the Americans in relation to headlines which have been appearing in the Press. It makes one wonder what a great story the War Office might have made if we had lost the war and the British Army had gone down in a blaze of glory! But as we are going to win the war the reverse may happen, and the probability is that the British Army will be questioned throughout the world as it was during the last war. I suggest that the War Office should copy the American information services and bang the biggest drum when our troops are advancing.
May I give a concrete illustration? We have heard during the last two days of the magnificent exploits of an American officer who was first to cross the Rhine. I think that every British newspaper has had his photograph. Here was brilliant propaganda that has gone all over the world. But when we compare this with D-day and remember that it was a British officer and a British unit who first made the landing there and were the first to enter the shores of France there one is
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struck by the complete silence of individual mention, the silence of the morgue over the gallantry of some British units. The Americans have got over to the world the great story of the crossing of the Rhine by a small batch of Americans by, it must be admitted, a great stroke of military luck. We should have the same genius for story telling in describing the advances of the British troops.
Let me refer to another point which is not quite of such general interest but is, nevertheless, very important. I refer to the question of civil affairs. The Secretary of State for War in his review passed very swiftly from the military activities to U.N.R.R.A. activities and did not mention that in between those two there might come a period of civil affairs control in enemy countries. I have been one of those associated, on and off, with our civil affairs administration for some years. It is a remarkable tribute to the War Office that it first began planning for the occupaton of Germany within a very few weeks after Dunkirk. It was a heroic, optimistic and well-justified decision. The first class for the training of officers in civil affairs was set up in the early part of 1941. It is not beyond the recollection of the Financial Secretary to the War Office that he himself was at one of those courses and perhaps he will pay tribute to the curriculum that was given to the officers who were selected for this course. A large number of officers were subsequently trained, but early in 1943 there came a change. It was not just a question of training but a question of pooling. The officers when trained were no longer sent back to their units, but held in pools, and since 1943 thousands of officers have from time to time been held in pools, eating their heads off and doing very little work.
At the moment we have some thousands of civil affairs officers, and of these, as far as I can judge, not more than 50 per cent. are doing a really good day's work. All the rest are held in pools or waiting around for a job. It may be that we have rather too many civil affairs officers. It has already been said, I do not know with what accuracy, that when the occupation of Germany comes along the British share of it will be rather a small portion. If that small portion is only the North-West corner, then we may have far too many civil affairs officers unless we have officers in almost every large village

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throughout the whole of that part of Germany. In addition to the fact that there may be too many, a proportion of whom are doing no real work at present in the various pools, there is also the fact that much of this civil affairs work duplicates other work done by other sections of the Army. There is the legal function in civil affairs, which, I am confident, can be carried out by the Judge-Advocate General's Department. There is the public safey section, which could be carried out quite well by the Corps of Military Police, with the addition of trained officers.
There is a very good case for urging the War Office to save 700 officers who at the moment are doing practically nothing and get them back into jobs they can do and want to do, or, as a previous speaker suggested, give them their honourable discharge after five years of service. The one thing that the country ought not to tolerate is to have these pools of officers where they engage in about two hours' German study in the morning and an hour or so of functional study in the afternoon. It has become something in the nature of a scandal that this should have gone on for so long and I hope that the War Office will turn its earnest attention to this matter.
The whole of this civil affairs organisation has been very much weakened by the introduction, at a rather high level, of officers into the organisation who have had little or no civil affairs experience. The situation, as I understand it, was that when the Home Guard was stood down in this country there became redundant a number of sub-area and district staffs. The heads of those staffs were full colonels or brigadiers and something had to be done for them, and in many cases the expedient was for them to be transferred to the civil affairs administration. They were not trained in civil affairs but were put in charge of men with specialist training over many months or years. This has done a great deal of harm to the administration. I suggest, therefore, that those officers who are not competent in their jobs should be weeded out not only in order to give younger men a chance of a job, but to make a more efficient civil affairs administration of Germany or Austria when the time comes.
There is also in the civil affairs administration as a whole a most noticeable lack of co-ordination. May I tell the House
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a short story of what happened during the past few weeks? Only a few weeks ago someone, I do not know who, decided that a bunch of officers from the 21st Army Group should be sent over to London for a final brushing up in German, and a score of officers came over. They were highly delighted with the prospect not only of getting back for a spell, but of getting their teeth into German at one of the best language institutes in the world. They had attended that course for four days when they were whisked back to Belgium. Before coming over they were sitting around in the pool. Since they have gone back they have continued to sit around in the pool. This sort of thing does not reflect credit on the higher organisation. It discourages officers and requires detailed investigation by the Army authorities.
I would be wrong if I allowed these few remarks of mine to cause hon. Members to think that I have nothing but criticism to offer the civil affairs administration. They have done a very great job in Italy and North Africa. They are doing a good job in Germany and Holland and I am convinced that with attention to such details as I have mentioned they will do a job which will make the occupation of Germany and Austria a model for all nations.
5.15 p.m.
Dr. Haden Guest: I must join in the tributes which have been expressed already to the Secretary of State for his remarkable and very comprehensive review of the military situation over a long period of time, and I do so with all the more understanding than I had until recently when I paid a visit to 21st Army Group. I was very interested to hear, in the course of the Secretary of State's remarks, the communication which he read out to us addressed by Field Marshal Montgomery to the troops in the early days of February, because I was myself with 21st Army Group at that time, and I actually had the privilege of seeing—although, of course, what was happening was not explained to me in detail—the preparations going on. I was even able to guess that something was in the wind—one cannot see divisional transport crowding the roads in many directions, so that journeys supposed to take two hours took four and a half, without knowing that certain military operations were in immediate prospect.

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The chief reason of my rising to-day is to pay my tribute to the magnificent spirit and high morale of the whole of 21st Army Group. I have never been more inspired in my life than I was with my all too short contact with that great collection of armies. I may perhaps instance one example of Elizabethan courtesy which came under my immediate notice when I happened to be in a large German village surrounded by a wall—I suppose it was surrounded by a wall but I did not explore it very much because the whole place round about was mined. I went, however, with two officers—the A.D.M.S. of the division and a junior medical officer—to explore round about a house in the immediate precincts of the regimental aid post of the unit which had been conducting a pretty gallant action only the day before. As we went round this house, the A.D.M.S. turned to the junior medical officer and asked, "Has this place been tested for mines?" and the junior officer replied, "I do not know, sir; let me go first." I thought that was rather a good example of Elizabethan courtesy. The A.D.M.S., however, would not allow him to go first; he grunted and went on himself. That was the kind of spirit I found everywhere, the spirit of adventure, the spirit of high courage, and everyone knows what I mean who has had any experience of service, the experience of that vivid appreciation of the fact of existence that comes at its highest to men when they are joined with others on the field of action.
I also want to pay tribute to the medical services, the inspection of which was the particular object of my visit. I hoped to find these in good shape. I knew a great deal about the medical services in the last war. I knew a great deal also of the medical services in this war, because not only did I visit the Armies in France in 1940 before the historic trek to Dunkirk—and I saw the organisation then established—but I also served afterwards for a time in Eastern Command in this country as Administrative Medical Officer, and I saw the set-up of the medical services here. Indeed, Eastern Command, as those connected with the Services know, was concerned very largely in making some of the arrangements which eventuated in the present set-up of the Army Medical Ser-
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vice. So I had some background for my observations when I went to 21st Army Group in February. I want to pay my tribute to the tremendous progress that has been made in the medical service. The astonishing smallness of casualties, which anyone who has looked at the figures knows; the astonishingly high rate of recovery—by which men not only survive but actually recover to pre-wounding condition—of men in the Services is a tribute to the efficiency of that service. It is not only that operations take place very shortly after men have been wounded—as soon after men have been wounded as is, in fact, possible from the point of view of operative technique—but that the whole method of co-operation of the medical service with the other Services and of the other Services with the medical service is so much closer and more intimate, so much more on a footing of complete equality, that it has in fact completely changed the medical service and the picture of the health conditions and the vitality and vigour of the Army.
The work that is being put in by the hygiene services to give, not only to men doing commando work, but to the ordinary infantry soldier—and all the infinite gradations of the special arms which men use—and to the ordinary soldier of every kind a knowledge of how to keep himself completely fit, has made an astonishing change in the situation as regards the health and fitness of the Armies. In the last war, as those who served know very well, the louse and scabies were an everyday affair; in this war I found it almost impossible to believe when I was with 21st Army Group, but it was the fact, that the louse and scabies are practically unknown. Men get the opportunity of bathing, even under front line conditions. They have changes of clothing even under front line conditions, and although the conditions are very adverse indeed, that terrible malady of trench-foot, which was the bane of operations in Belgium and in the Low Countries during the last war, for practical purposes simply does not occur in the British Armies. It does not occur, not because of some intervention of Providence, but because of the extremely good organisation of the combatant Forces, and this largely depends on the combatant Forces applying medical knowledge, and on the medical services too.

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In fact, I found when I came back and had to consider all the notes I had taken of the front line conditions, of field ambulances, of casualty clearing stations, of hospitals very near the front, of the work of advanced surgical teams, that I had a story out of which I could make a large volume, and the space at my disposal in the journal for which I was writing did not by any means run to a full volume. It is at any rate a story which is perhaps worth expanding—not at this moment but on some future occasion. However, I would like to give one or two instances. I came across an advanced surgical centre where operations were being performed, with skilled surgeons, with all the apparatus of a modern operating theatre, with the help of nursing surgical sisters, within half a mile of the fighting line. I admit it had not been intended originally that that should take place, but the enemy had, unfortunately, advanced somewhat and the operations continued and then the enemy were pushed back.
I am sorry my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) is not here because I would like him to hear this story about tanks. It has nothing to do with the medical services at all. It occurred in the little German town called Waldefucht, which is not very far from Roesmond. The unit I was visiting had been engaged in clearing a loop of the River Maas. Two Tiger tanks about 50 yards away from the regimental aid post I was visiting had been knocked out by the efforts of one officer and one sergeant of the King's Own Scottish Borderers who had operated one six-pounder gun at twenty yards' range. I am sure my hon. Friend would be interested to hear that. It was a pretty good feat, and it just shows that the Tiger tank is not so invulnerable as some people have imagined.
Mr. Logan: Better bring in the hon. Member for Ipswich.
Dr. Guest: I regret I did not give my hon. Friend notice that I intended to make this tangential criticism of his remarks about tanks.
Mr. Hubert Beaumont: He will read HANSARD.
Dr. Guest: I hope he will, but I am afraid I cannot guarantee that. I rose particularly for the purpose of paying this tribute, and of saying how much one feels
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that for the men who are fighting overthere—young men for the most part, very gallant men all of them—there is very little we can do for them that we ought not to do. It is very difficult for us to think of anything quite good enough for the work they are doing. I was glad to have the honour of setting my foot alongside of their's on the German ground which they had conquered, and they are going on in this tremendous, sweeping battle into Germany. In that time there will be many wounded, there will be many killed, and there will be in this country many sorrowing hearts. I feel that if we in this House do our duty by those men who return and the dependants left behind by those who do not, we shall set out to do, not the least possible, but the most that this country can do, we should try in every way to set them up again in civil life when they come back, and to make smooth the way of their dependants and their families so as in some small measure to recompense them for the loss of those men whom they will have lost as individuals, whom we shall have lost as a nation but who, in their sacrifice, are making the world safe for the generations to come.
5.28 p.m.
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: It is difficult to follow any technical expert who has been speaking on his own subject. The hon. Member for North Islington (Dr. Guest), however, was, in fact, only strengthening the opinions hitherto advanced, that the services of our Army in the field are in this war incomparably better than they have been even in past wars, and that is a thing of considerable merit. We have at long last provided what is undoubtedly the best Army in the world. Man for man, I do not think any of our Allies would query that fact; certainly division for division not one of our Allies can beat that. That Army has been built up with great toil and labour. Listening to the Secretary of State to-day expounding his magnificent story, nobody could refrain from feeling that the pity was that it took us nearly five years to build up that Army, and that we had to start from so little in the building. The full tribute, of course, must be given to those great soldiers, those heroic souls, who, through the years of the depression, when the War Office—a much insulted body on many occasions—was scrounging around for halfpennies, and wondering

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whether a cavalry regiment could afford half its complement of horses or a couple of armoured cars and had to make its decision before the Estimates. The result is that certainly no Army in our history has been better commanded than the Armies we have lately put into the field. It is an old theory of ours—I never knew whether it was wholly sound historically, but there is some evidence for it—that great soldiers never arise in really good Armies. If we look at our own great soldiers, they were thrown up from Armies which had practically reached the nadir of neglect. Napoleon arose to command a rabble which he turned into the great fighting instrument which it became. However, I do not want to press that too far, because it controverts the main theme of my speech, which is that I hope we shall maintain the efficiency in training and the number of our Armies when the war is over. One might be tempted to believe that we should abandon all training in the hope of getting good generals. This vast Army—because it is a vast Army, although not in comparison with those of some of our friends—has been raised, trained and equipped, as I have said, from scratch.
Perhaps the House will forgive me if I go a little further into the future than anybody has hitherto gone, and consider what is to happen to this magnificent fighting force when this war is over. I do not want to be accused of being a warmonger, as I do not believe that, following this war, there will be any danger of another major war for a very long period, but people said that during the last war, when a patent safety formula was invented. It was the ten-year formula: "No major war for 10 years." It was laid down in 1919, which meant that the danger of war was postponed until 1929. Then, of course, the inevitable tendency of Governments arose and they thought they would take a chance and extend it by another five years, to 1934. Then they thought they would "chance their arm" on another period, and that took them into 1939, before which, of course, there had been a little rearmament. That is a very dangerous formula, and whether there is a danger of war or not, it is the duty of a Government to see that the nation is prepared to defend itself, and that the equipment and training of its soldiers are adequate to meet any emergency.
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I want to base my observations to-day on the assumption that after this war conscription will continue. I do not think any of us know whether it will or not, because I do not think there has been any long-term Government pronouncement yet. I only hope that before very long—I do not expect my right hon. Friend to commit the Government of which he is a Member at the moment, but I believe he will rub it into them again—a pronouncement will be made on the matter. I also hope that in order to avoid the issue of conscription ever becoming a party issue, that pronouncement will be made before this Coalition Government breaks up. It is an essential political dictum which should be laid down by all parties in common. After that, when we return to party Government then, with luck, all parties would be committed—and not only one party or small congeries of parties—to the maintenance of an adequate Army. It was in 1937, only two years before this war started, that a report appeared in the "Sunday Times," which I read again to-day, stating that the Association of University Conservative Associations had had a debate on whether conscription was desirable or not. The proposal, it stated, was opposed with great vigour by the present Secretary of State for the Dominions, and was defeated by 20 votes to r. That was one party in the State denying the necessity for conscription. The paper went on to comment that this would be very useful in putting an end to efforts to make party capital out of the possible introduction of conscription—
Mr. Bellenger: Did the hon. and gallant Gentleman say "The Secretary of State for the Dominions?"
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: The present Secretary of State for the Dominions; I am not quite sure what office he held then. Or is it the Secretary of State for the Colonies—I forget? [HON. MEMBERS: "The Secretary of State for the Colonies."] I beg the House's pardon; I mean the Secretary of State for the Colonies. That comment in that newspaper indicated that the other great party in the State was also against conscription, that nobody was ready to take the final step necessary to ensure the adequate defence of this country even two years before the war was due to break out. If we are to fulfil any of our immediate post-war commit-

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ments conscription is, of course, necessary. We cannot possibly maintain our various garrisons abroad, a large Army of Occupation in Germany, and the necessa,ry drafts to re-inforce those various comitments, on a voluntary system alone. We could not do it before the war, and we certainly shall not be able to do it after the war.
I hope that the occupation of Germany will be so prolonged that it will remove the issue of conscription or not almost to the next generation. But even that must be to a certain extent foreseen, and agreement reached between the parties that the maintenance of this system of defence is essential, even though the question may not arise in its full urgency for a very long time. The nature of this post-war Army will, I think, need an enormous; re-adjustment in our past thinking on the subject of armaments. If we have a conscript Army, that will provide for the defence of this Realm of Britain and any possible commitments we may be forced to undertake as a result of our membership of a world security organisation. That, I say, can be done by a conscript Army, but to imagine that our overseas garrisons can be maintained by a conscript Army is to imagine something which, in military parlance, "is not on." The length of service is far too short for us to imagine that we can send drafts of conscripts to India, or to some of our African possessions, or to the Far East, and bring them back in time for the completion of their military service. In other words, parallel with our conscript Army there will have to be a long-service Army.
I am being forced to the conclusion that we must have a really long-service Army. Our old pre-war enlistment of seven years with the Colours, and five with the Reserve, is not long enough, and does not provide a sufficient career to attract men into the Army. It is beyond reason to imagine that a young man of really good qualities and reasonably high intelligence, at the age of 19, should be prepared to put himself out of the industrial running until he is 26, to serve his country overseas, while his brother in a factory is becoming a skilled worker in that time, and that he will come back to work at a lower rate than is being obtained by his brother, or by his friend, who has remained at home.
The only way to offset that is to make the Army a whole-time career. If our
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main defence is a conscript Army, there is no reason why a garrison Army for our overseas possessions should not be run on a 21 years' service basis, with an adequate pension at the end of that time, or, even better, the guarantee of employment out of the resources of the country. For a long time before this war I considered this problem, and once wrote a memorandum on it, with a view to making enlistment for the then professional Army more attractive. In the course of my researches I discovered that, even then, there were 1,250,000 jobs which were either directly in the gift of the Government or could be influenced by the Government. When I say "influenced by the Government" I mean jobs with the Automobile Association, for instance, and with various benevolent and other societies. If the Government were to make full use of the jobs at their disposal they could ensure that any soldier of long service, with a good character, was fully employed. Not only that, there is no reason why a soldier with 21 years' service should not be able to count that towards a full-time pension in the job to which he goes after his military service. Instead of having a break between military and civil careers, both would be a part of one career.
On those terms I believe that a very adequate long-service Army could be raised. It would not need to be as large as the pre-war regular Army. It would, however, have to find the necessary cadres for the training of a conscript Army, which brings me to the point of where this long-service Army and conscript Army are to get their officers. This was a growing problem before the war. The career offered to young men by the Armed Forces was not sufficiently attractive then to provide nearly enough entrants to the ranks of the officers. Since that time a great deal has been done, and the pay of Army officers to-day does not compare at all unfavourably with what they could possibly earn in civil life. If that were maintained, I think there would be a steady flow of men prepared to make the Army their whole life. But we could not officer the whole of the conscript Army from those regular officers, otherwise we would be carrying an overloaded officer corps. At the least, subalterns of the conscript Army will have to be found out of the ranks of that conscript Army, out of the young men who come into it, and regular

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officers will not be able to provide more than the personnel from Company Commanders upwards.
That brings me to the point of how to find the junior officer. If he is going to come from the young men who are to be called up annually, it is obvious that he cannot waste the first six months of his military service in learning to be a tolerably competent corporal in order to be made an officer afterwards. Service in the ranks as a necessary preliminary to holding a commission has to go. Ours, in fact, is the only Army in the world which has it. In no other Army is it necessary to serve in the ranks before one can get a commission. I think the practical solution is quite simple. We have the Junior Training Corps and I can see no reason whatever why boys should not be drafted straight from the Junior Training Corps.
Mr. J. J. Davidson: Drafted from all schools?
Lieut.-Cotlonel Wise: Yes, the whole Junior Training Corps, which means the whole of the Cadet Corps. It will presumably be voluntary after the war, which will mean to a great extent that the boys who go to it are those to whom a military career appeals, and who are therefore likely to make better officers.
Mr. Hubert Beaumont: Is the hon. and gallant Member proposing to make the Junior Training Corps obligatory on all schools, or will he exclude boys who are at schools where there is no Junior Training Corps?
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: If a school is sufficiently fantastic not to have a J.T.C., I do not see how we can help it.
Mr. Davidson: Is the hon. Member aware that in ordinary elementary schools, with a great number of pupils and classes of 60 or 70, it is impossible to have a training corps of that kind?
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: I think the hon. Member misunderstands where the J.T.C. starts getting its boys from. The elementary schools do not come into this.
Mr. Beaumont: Then the hon. Member is going to maintain the officer class?
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: I have tried to get down to words of one syllable. I will again. The J.T.C. will, after the
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war, presumably be on a voluntary basis. I would rather see it compulsory but I do not think that is possible. It is open to any boy of the requisite age, whether he is at school or not, to join the Junior Training Corps and to study the art of becoming a soldier. When he reaches the end of his period it will be easy to find out, by examination and trial, whether or not he is fit to go to the officer producing unit now known as the 0.C.T.U. He can be sent there and in six months, if his work has been sufficiently competent, he can be trusted to command a platoon in our post-war Army, because he will have the supervision of experienced professional officers and, of course, a cadre of experienced professional N.C.Os. and, like nearly all young officers, he will learn his job as he goes along. After that, how does he get promotion? Unless he cares to go to the Regular Army, he gets promotion in the same way as he would have before the war in the Special Reserve. If he does various periods of annual training attached to Regular units, and otherwise conducts himself properly, he will get promoted as Special Reserve officers did before the war. That is the only way in which I think it is possible that promotion shall take place. Presumably the Territorial Army will continue, and that opens up another possibility of promotion. If he gets a commission in the Territorial Army he will be able to get promoted as a Territorial officer was before the war.
I am afraid this is a speech, for me, of inordinate length, but the subject is one on which I feel deeply and, if I am boring others, I am interesting myself frightfully. We come now to one very minor point in the post-war Army, that is, where this conscript army is going to be trained. This island has many military merits, but it is not overwhelmingly equipped with training grounds in peace conditions. In war-time we have Defence Regulation 52A and we can say, "Here we are, remove your flocks and your herds, your men servants and your maid servants, and get out and let us train." But in peacetime I have an idea that sooner or later our long-suffering public may revolt against this. We have to find training grounds somewhere. Again, this is considering a very distant problem, because I sincerely hope that for at least 25 years we will be training in Germany, where there is plenty of room. There will be a

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wholly adequate manoeuvring area and something like Defence Regulation 52A will be perfectly enforceable. But ultimately we have to face the problem of where we are going to train them when the Armies of Occupation are finally withdrawn from Germany, and that is a problem to which I can produce no immediate solution. We have time to think it out, and I think that mental process should begin fairly soon.
I have only one point left. There is one special branch of the Armed Forces which, I very much fear, may be relegated to comparitive unimportance once the war is over. That is the Directorate of Military Intelligence. In 1885 General Wolseley, who then came to the War Office, decided that a Department of Military Intelligence was necessary, and he formed it. He put in charge of it an officer of the rank of major-general, and not only that, he selected an officer whom he described himself as not one of the cleverest but the cleverest officer in the Army. In other words, he understood the value of the Department that he was setting up. I should like the House to forget the idea of false beards and false noses, because that has very little to do with military intelligence. The Department of Military Intelligence provides the material for training armies. It provides the information an which all military exercises are, or should be, reasonably based.
Before the war the Department of Military Intelligence had ceased to exist. It existed only as part of the Department of Military Operations, and there was only one director for the two services. The British Army then trained only for civil war. Every year one British general went out with a British force and conducted a campaign against another British general with another British force. In those circumstances the idea of considering the possibility of what the army of some other nation would do never really arose at all. It is possible to study the methods of warfare of another nation, and indeed to conduct military exercises against the forces of that nation, without conveying the impression that we are immediately preparing to go to war with her. Indeed, in many ways it is a great compliment to the armed forces of any other nation to base our military exercises with them as a potential opponent, because it works
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out that in our opinion they have the best army in the world and we wish to learn from them.
The Department of Military Intelligence, if it is maintained after this war, will have to have some much more vigorous encouragement. I know the difficulties of preserving intelligence staff officers on a peace establishment. A third grade staff officer will actually have nothing whatever to do in peace-time until the annual training starts, and it is, of course, a problem how to employ him in the meantime. One thing that we had before the war was a very serious shortage of military attaches abroad. There was, for instance, only one for the whole of Scandinavia and the Baltic States. The result was that our knowledge of what turned out after all to be a very vital area in the war was by no means as perfect as it ought to have been had the various Legations been properly staffed.
I suggest that there is a possible employment for junior intelligence staff officers as military or extra-military attaches overseas. There is nothing clandestine about their methods. They are there to learn how other countries train their soldiers and, if necessary, pass the information on so that our methods of training may be improved to run parallel with those of other countries. If that is done, I believe we shall vastly advance the training of our Forces. We have made in this war the most astonishing difference in the realism and effectiveness of our military exercises, and, in face of the almost pathetic waste of time in peace, our military exercises to-day are a real test of commanders and staffs. If we only maintain them we shall be doing well by our armed Forces.
We have all deeply enjoyed my right hon. Friend's exposition of the magnificent story of the Army's exploits. I will pay him one tribute—he does not get many in this House—that, whatever irritation he may arouse sometimes among his questioners, among those soldiers who have anything to do with the War Office there is a firm conviction that he is on the Army's side. That cannot be said of large numbers of Secretaries of State I have known in the past. That is as fine a tribute as any soldier could pay to the right hon. Gentleman. It is a really meant one, and I hope that he will long hold this partisanship for the Army in the

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ranks of the Cabinet. That Army, as the Secretary of State said, has performed probably the most astonishing military exploits in history in France, Africa, Sicily, Italy, and many other places. Sooner or later this House will have to make up its mind whether it will permanently maintain these Armed Forces, to continue the training and to let the traditions go on, or to go back to our pre-war defences which, as far as I can make out, might really be summed up in the words, "Boy Scouts and bluff."

DEMOBILISATION AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
6.2 p.m.
Mr. Gallacher: I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof,
"this House is of opinion that, in view of the strong feeling that exists in the Army on the question of demobilisation and re-employment, that an advisory council be set up, composed of five officers and ten other ranks, and that all measures necessary be taken to ensure that all men due for demobilisation are so trained that they can be fitted into useful employment with the minimum of delay."
May I be allowed to refer to the high tributes paid by the Secretary of State for War to the commanders in the field and by Members of the House to the spirit, the courage and the achievements of our soldiers in the field? Tributes are good, but something much more than tributes are required. That is why I move the Amendment. I am reinforced in moving it by the following couple of sentences from Command Paper 6568:
"The interim period is likely to be one of severe readjustment. Many difficult problems will arise and many conflicting interests will need to be reconciled."
The Minister may say that that White Paper was issued by the Minister of Labour and that the interim period is the business of that Minister. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman, however, that the demobilisation which will take place in the first instance will be an interim demobilisation. As the Minister has said, there will still be in existence a very large Army carrying on warfare. In the Army of to-day there are considerable grievances. I am not going to deal with them, but will just mention them in passing. There are grievances about leave, repatriation, being transferred from
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one front to another, gratuities—all kinds of grievances—and it is necessary that everything affecting the Army should be handled with the greatest care and the greatest measure of human understanding. I am not satisfied that the Secretary of State is a partisan for the Army or that the War Office shows a human understanding of the many problems that come up. The Minister mentioned how many letters are received by the War Office. It is not the bulk of letters but the character of the answers that matters. I got a letter three or four weeks ago from the War Office, a terrible letter. I showed it to the Minister, and he could not understand the utter lack of human feeling and the terrible character of the letter. He told me it was meant to be a nice letter. I sent it back to the War Office, and I believe that, as a result, some discussion is taking place as to another method of dealing with the matter contained in the letter. It was a horrible letter.
Sir J. Griģģ: No, it was not.
Mr. Gallacher: Does the Minister mean to tell me, that when a lad dies on the fighting front and the War Office sends a letter to his parents saying, "Your son owes the country £10, £15 or £20" it is not a horrible letter?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Milner): I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Member, but the Amendment is quite a narrow one and deals with the setting up of an advisory council and the training of men before demobilisation.
Mr. Gallacher: I want an advisory council so that letters of this kind will not be sent. The Minister still does not understand the ghastly character of such a letter and I hope that no other like it will ever be sent out again. I will come in time to the advisory council. This great Army has its grievances, and there is a lack of care and of the human touch. When the interim demobilisation comes nobody will watch with greater interest what is happening than those who remain in the Army for whom the Minister is responsible. They are very watchful at the present time, and in many cases they are very suspicious. There is a general acceptance of the interim scheme, but that does not mean that everybody accepts it. It does not mean there is not great feeling in many parts of the Army about it. I have seen letters which urge that service

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abroad should be the dominating factor. Others urge that age should be the dominating factor. Others urge that domestic responsibility should be the dominating factor, while others draw attention to the fact that physical fitness, apart from sickness that calls for dismissal from the Army, should be one of the deciding factors. The important thing is the watchfulness that will be displayed regarding the interim demobilisation and re-absorption into civil life because those who are retained in the Army and those who are brought in by the process that is going on will see how demobilisation and re-absorption is going to affect them. What is likely to happen is of the greatest interest to them, and it is in the interest of the Minister and the War Office to see that nothing happens that can have any adverse effect on the millions of men remaining in the Army. It is not possible to stress too much the importance of that.
It will not do for the Minister to try to "pass the buck" to the Minister of Labour, or to some other Service Department, and to say that he is finished with the men as soon as they are demobilised. He is not finished with them, because he is responsible, not only to them, but to the men who remain, to see that the demobilisation takes place in such a way as will give general satisfaction. The men have been taken from the Ministry of Labour and trained in the arts of war. They have given a good account of themselves, they have used the tools with which they have been supplied with a tenacity and courage which every one is ready to recognise. Under the control and direction of the War Office and under their commanders they have defended what is generally called "our island home." That is recognised by all. Our cities stand, not one of them has been laid under siege. If we look across to the Continent we see city after city gnat has been under siege and razed to the ground. Many of our cities are scarred by the blitz, but every one stands because, as the Minister has said, the Army crossed that strip of water and pressed the enemy back from the menacing positions he held on the Western coast. Not only have our Army defended this island home, but it has liberated many countries in Europe from the Nazi scourge.
Recognising all this and paying tribute to all those who took part, the Minister and
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the War Office cannot wash their hands of their responsibility to these men. When victory comes in Europe, the Minister cannot say: "I am finished with them; I have no more interest in them; I hand them back to the Minister of Labour, as they are his concern." The Minister of Labour brought them from the factories and the schools and handed them over to the War Office. He knew when he was handing them over that there was a job waiting for them. When the Secretary of State hands back to the Minister of Labour, will he see that there is a job waiting for them? That is the responsibility which the Department has. I know that the Department will want to dodge it. It is much easier to pay high verbal tributes than for the Department to interest itself in a matter of this kind. Already many questions are arising about the interim scheme. There is a general impression that the interim period will be a very long one, but it may not be long. When it is over, great masses of the soldiers will want to be demobilised at the earliest possible opportunity.
What provision is being made for the general demobilisation. What discussions are taking place? Millions of men are affected. Are they to be consulted? Is any consideration at all shown for the opinions of the men? The Minister of Labour comes to this House occasionally, makes propositions regarding various types of workers and tells us that he has had consultations with the Employers' Federation, with the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, or with officials of the particular organisations to which the men belong. In some cases he has told us that the questions at issue had been settled in the discussions between him and people outside, whereupon protests have been made in this House about negotiations having gone so far. It is all very good that those discussions and negotiations should go on between the Minister and representatives of those masses of workers, but why should not consideration be shown to the opinions of the soldiers on matters which are so vitally important to them? Why should there not be a consultative body representing the men in the Army? Why should there not be such consultations with the men in the Army?
Letters come, I am certain, to every hon. Member regarding demobilisation and questions which arise out of it. I have

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had a few letters which have said that the writers would rather not be demobilised, than left to wander about the streets unemployed. I heard the Minister quote Field-Marshal Montgomery as saying: "It is an inspiration to see such fine soldiers." The Minister should not forget that similar things were said about our soldiers during the last war, but it was a heartbreak to see the same soldiers after they were demobilised. The Minister of Labour does not take the men out of the factories and leave them to wander the streets till the Army picks them up. Are the Secretary of State for War and the War Office proposing to take the men out of the Army and leave them to wander about the streets until the Minister of Labour can pick them up? Will that be an inspiring sight or a desirable example? Does the Minister realise the effect it would have on the men who still have the fighting to do?
Many problems arise, and many different questions and complaints come in to Members. I had some suggestions from a soldier not long ago which seemed to me to be very good, and so I sent them to the War Office. We are always getting complaints and suggestions. Would it not be good if we had an advisory body to which we could send such questions, suggestions and complaints so that they could be considered by those with an understanding of the conditions? Such an advisory body I suggest in my Amendment. I know that this suggestion is new.
Mr. Turton (Thirsk and Mahon): Oh, no. They had one in Cairo.
Mr. Gallacher: It is one thing to have such a body in an isolated area, and another to have one nationally, which would accept responsibility and would be consulted in all questions affecting demobilisation and reabsorption of the soldiers, as a part of Government policy. This is something new. We know that anything new is generally abhorrent to the Tory mind. That is one of the difficulties that we are always up against. I am always struck with the massive lack of intelligence of the Tory mind.
I remember that a present Member of this House was, towards the end of the last war, in Petrograd, and sent a report to the then Prime Minister which is typical of the Tory attitude of mind which it is
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impossible to break through with a new idea. I wish it was possible to save the young Tories from becoming old Tories. They might look around, and when they see the sour and solemn defenders of privilege for the few, and privation for the many, perhaps they will realise what they are likely themselves to become, unless they leave that charnel-house of dead hopes, and come out into the fresh, clean air with the true progressive forces. The hon. Member of this House to whom I have referred had come up against the political commissars or delegates, and that was something new. He reported to the then Prime Minister—and this is the authentic Tory voice [Interruption]—We are faced with the fact that if Harry Pollitt makes a statement anywhere I am held responsible, and I accept responsibility for it. If Johnny Gollan in Glasgow makes a statement, I am held responsible, and accept responsibility for it, yet if a Tory makes a statement, every other Tory wants to dodge it. The authentic Tory voice was heard when that hon. Member, talking about the position in the Russian Army, reported: "The political delegate is now looked upon as a universal panacea, but he is not half so effective as were the subaltern's boot and fist in former times." [An HON. MEMBER: "What?"] Boot and fist, kicking the men; that is the Tory voice and the Tory mentality: that is how it was in the past, and so it must always be. It may be that that mentality still finds a place in the War Office. If it does, it should be cleaned out. It is still in this House at any rate.
Associated with the questions of demobilisation is the training of men for being reabsorbed into civil life. That will be a very big and very important task for the War Office. As the men are trained, they will be able to take their places in the country which they have so nobly defended. The Minister and Field-Marshal Montgomery speak highly of them, and so does everyone else. When the men come back, will the Minister say: "These are your cities; you have saved them. The best that is in them is for you." Will he see that they will be able to fit in, and will not simply have to take just anything that may be provided for them? Will they be fitted in and be enabled to give fruitful and valuable service for the community?

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Everybody wants to see these men trained for absorption into civil life. Surely the War Office has a responsibility for seeing that civil life is ready to receive them. It would be a waste to train the men and then to put them on to the streets. I hope the Minister understands that point and that all the time the men are in the Army, he will be watching it. It will be quite possible to make mistakes through bad handling of the interim demobilisation. I want the Minister and the War Office to say to the Government: "When the war with Germany is ended we shall be able to release so many men. Have you jobs for them?" It will be necessary for the Government, if they are to meet the needs of the occasion, to control the industries to ensure that these will be capable of providing work. Are the War Office prepared to submit those suggestions to the Government?
The Minister pointed out that the building of "Mulberry" represented an amazing example of co-ordination between the War Office and civil Departments. It is more important now that there should be co-ordination among all the Departments, in order to bring about proper reabsorption of these men into civil life. I want to see the men consulted on all questions which affect them, and an advisory council representing the Army being considered and consulted in all such questions. The men and the officers have as much right to be consulted as the men and the employers' federations in industry and for that reason I propose that an advisory council should be appointed to ensure that those consultations take place. The Minister has a great responsibility for the men, and so has this House of Commons. The men have proved themselves grand soldiers. Therefore, the Minister and this House must 3.ee to it that these "grand soldiers" are given every opportunity to become grand and useful citizens when the war is over.
6.30 p.m.
Mr. Malcolm MacMillan: I beg to second the Amendment.
The compliment might perhaps have been even greater if it had not been dictated to some extent by the numerical representation of the hon. Member's party, but I do appreciate being asked by him to second this Amendment on such an important subject. I would like to congratulate the hon. Member on his passionate sincerity in matters of this kind in the
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interest of the soldiers and the workers, whether in the field or factory. I congratulate him on his luck in the Ballot, and on his good sense in framing an Amendment in the interests of our soldiers. I cannot add too sincerely and whole-heartedly my tribute to his and to the others paid to-day to our soldiers in the field, both men and women, who have taken part in the defence of this land and the liberties of the whole world.
The purpose of the Amendment is to make possible for those men and women who have made peace possible, and we hope enduring, a better future and a better world, with wider opportunities for them than they had in the past; and what is even more important to them, better opportunities for their children after them. In the meantime, while these men and women are in the Services, let us do better justice to them in matters pertaining to demobilisation and their training for re-entering industry after the war. We cannot pay these debts easily, or dismiss lightly their demand for more adequate attention to their needs. Had we had more representation of the actual serving men, officers and other ranks, in the past during this war, I feel certain that a lot of those causes of friction and discontent, which are brought to our notice so frequently in letters and personal interviews, could have been obviated altogether. Many of these questions which are important to the men could have been solved for them without their having recourse reluctantly to Members of Parliament, had they been able freely to express themselves, and to have their views put effectively in the councils of the War Office and Ministry of Labour, through a tribunal or council of this sort, proposed by the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher).
I have heard it summed up very bitterly by a soldier from my constituency in a fairly free paraphrase from a speech by the Prime Minister: "It is toil and sweat and tears all right, for us. We toil and sweat for profiteers!" That may have been an exaggeration or not, according to how one looks at the question. Those in the Services have been called upon to face the enemy and to make, possibly, the greatest sacrifice. They have seen men and women at home enjoying a higher standard of living than they themselves enjoyed in the past. They have said "If we had been at home, we would have

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enjoyed the same standard of wages, and would have been free agents and in dividuals and happier beings. Instead of that we have been drafted at inadequate wages, with a prospect of a miserable gratuity compared with those of the Dominion and American Forces." They have had no adequate means of expressing themselves on this question except through Members of Parliament. That is not enough. Many Members have done a great deal in these matters, but I think the men would have felt that they were better represented had they had an opportunity for the expression of their own views through a special agency, and free from all the restrictions on the Service soldier in expressing himself on military matters.
I wish to put a few points about the question of releases. These are individual and practical points. One of these concerns the question of considering compassionate leave in relation to a man's service for demobilisation. I do not know for certain what is the War Office attitude on this question; but I plead with them to disregard compassionate leave for length-of-service demobilisation purposes. It is given to a man only because of exceptional hardship; and this special leave should be completely disregarded. Since it is not disregarded under the present arrangements, I hope they will be amended to make it possible.
Captain Duncan: Does the hon. Member mean leave or temporary release?
Mr. MacMillan: I mean temporary release. The term "unpaid leave" was used loosely. In connection with the specific question of training for the teaching profession I would ask the War Office to encourage and advise men and women to take advantage of the improved scheme for getting them into the teaching profession, which both needs them, and will welcome men and women from the Services with their wider experience. But do help to prepare their minds now to choose the full university and training-college courses, rather than the telescoped and inadequate courses, which will leave us with some badly-equipped and partially trained teachers, to the detriment of the teaching profession and its standards, and the standards of education, and which
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will be damaging to the training to the children, the citizens of to-morrow. I would urge the War Office to approach the Treasury and other Departments concerned in this matter to ensure that adequate funds will be made available to give our Service men and women a full university course instead of being rushed through half-trained as partially competent teachers. In respect of certain other trades and professions also, I would rather that men should be given time, and their minds prepared now, to think in terms of the full training and full courses, with the assurance that the necessary money will be forthcoming, not only in their own interests and the interests of the trade, but in the interests of the future of industry as a whole.
There is a feeling in some of the rural areas in connection with post-war use of amenities which have been set up for troops in the country areas. There is a feeling among men serving abroad, for instance, in our Highland divisions, that the new electricity facilities and water supplies, etc., should be left permanently in those areas; so that they shall have in their own homes in peace and permanently, the things which are deemed to be so necessary for strangers, those on war service, even temporarily, in these areas. There is a great deal of suspicion and doubt among the soldiers, whether justifiable or not, regarding the question of employment after the war. That is the more widespread probably because of the fact that millions of very young men and women have been taken into the Services without any previous training whatever in industrial work. They were part way through their apprenticeship, part way through their training, or they had had no training at all. They expect, after the war, to be given the same conditions, the same wages and the same standard of living generally that their fellows have had who have not been called up, or disciplined and put into the firing line in this war. It is a serious problem.
Remarkably good work is being done by the Ministry of Labour and National Service. I cannot complain about them in relation to my approaches to them, but the War Office itself can do a tremendous amount to prepare the minds of these men and women for the future, for their approach to the kind of work into which they are to be fitted, and how they are to

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tackle the problem of their training. They will have to get out of the minds of hundreds of thousands of these young men and women the idea that they will step at once into a job at war-time wages. There is no reason why they should not enjoy those conditions— they have more right to expect it—of those who have enjoyed personal comfort as citizens at home, and have had, to a large extent, their personal freedom. We have to give those in the Services reassurance that, not only the disabled cases, not only the difficult psychological cases, are to be specially provided for. We have to give them some assurance that, as my hon. Friend has said, even as we find plenty of work for them to do in the Services, so we will find, at good wages and in good conditions, useful, constructive work for them to do as citizens in the post-war world, in the world which they themselves have preserved for civilisation. We must get rid of this suspicion which exists about the post-war world by putting something definite and wholesome in its place; that is by putting there a full reassurance and practical guarantees of suitable opportunities for training and employment after the war.
Many of our soldiers, men and women, are anxious regarding the question of the employment after the war of aliens. I mention that only in passing, to say that many aliens apparently wish to remain in this country after the war, and take the place of many of our own men and women in, for example, the catering industry. Our men have fought for trade union conditions, which were built up through years of effort, to be enjoyed by free men. I do not think we should give priority to those who were on tie other side, the wrong side of the battle for freedom and tried to force their slavery on us as well. There are compassionate cases, and difficult ones, but in the main let us be blunt and give a guarantee to our own men and women. Let the Government say that we shall give preference to our own men, and people who have fought for our freedom. That would, I know, be welcome, and would dispel many doubts. Some of our serving men and women have been worried about another odd story; in connection with reparations and "making Germany pay" some stories have been circulated about the bringing into this country of hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of Germans as a punish-
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ment to do the work that our men themselves would otherwise be doing. That may be far-fetched but it has been brought to hon. Members' attention by men who are worried about it; and I ask that an assurance be given on this also.
With regard to the question of priority on release for the higher administrative posts, there is worry in the Services with regard to the selection from the Army, on demobilisation, of men who have been in the higher commissioned ranks—that these men will automatically be fitted into the higher administrative posts in peace-time services. According to the official story, which has always been maintained, against our experience to some extent, men are chosen for a particular job in the commissioned grades because of a suitability for that particular job, as a job. For example, you do not make a man an infantry officer because he is a good medical officer in peace time. It would be silly. You obviously make him a doctor in the R.A.M.C. Similarly, because a man has been a civil engineer in peace time, you do not make him an officer in the R.A.M.C. In the same way you do not make a man a senior officer in an entirely different civilian service in peace time, because he was a good Army officer. You do not make him, because of his fate Army rank only, senior to a technical expert who was only an N.C.O. or a private, or a corporal during the war. There is a good deal of misgiving about the question of putting men into civil life in grades corresponding to the positions and rank which they have held in the Army. There is a good deal of fear of all the "plums" being offered to the "brass-hats" when they come out of the Services. That feeling arises, perhaps, out of the misconception of the White Paper's intentions and our discussions here about it.
The Minister of Labour should dispel these ideas if they are not true. A statement from him would go a long way, because his good will is appreciated in the Services and in this House. Such a statement would get rid of a sense of impending unfairness in allocating post-war jobs. Let the men be told that they are going to start equal in civil life, and find their own level on merit, irrespective of the ranks they held in the Army. Let them, of course, have scope to use the qualities which gave them promotion in the Army, but do not let them be given preference in civil life because of their ranks alone.

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If you could dispel that fear of unfair priority in civil life on the basis of service, commissioned standing, you would go a long way towards reassuring the serving men now. It is important that the untrained millions—untrained for anything except military service—should be given every possible kind of vocational guidance and technical training on coming out of the Service. We cannot afford to say that we cannot afford the greatest amount of financial and other assistance, within reason, to enable men, whether they come from rich homes or from poor homes, to be trained on the basis of the country's need. And our desire in this House should be that they shall be afforded every opportunity and help to make their own way in society, and along the line they have chosen to pursue as a lifetime vocation.
One way of doing that is to put more directly for free consultation at the disposal of men requiring training and vocational advice a body of people representing the active Service officers and other ranks, to whom the troops can have free access, without fear of being penalised for going to them. Almost every letter that we get from men on service says, "Will you please keep this confidential?" or "Will you regard this as being entirely personal to yourself and not pass it on to the War Office?" because they fear repercussions, not from the War Office directly, but from somebody lower down, who may be annoyed at the soldier going to the War Office or M.P. over his head. If we could have a body, in consultation with, and co-operating with, the rehabilitation services of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Pensions and so forth, to which the men could go freely, without any fear of victimisation, in the assurance that this was a body officially set up for their purpose, it would give a great fillip to morale in the Service. We have not far to go: the war is approaching its end; and there is little enough time in which to perfect our demobilisation plans. If the right hon. Gentleman will accept this Amendment, in the spirit of its helpful intention, I think the troops will be grateful to him, as will be many hon. Members of this House.
6.50 p.m.
Mr. Loģan: I have been very much impressed by several of the observations of the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher),
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and by one particular phrase in the Amendment:
"all men due for demobilisation are so trained that they can be fitted into useful employment with the minimum of delay."
I am sure that all Members, after listening to the Minister, are convinced that we have a great deal to congratulate ourselves upon, so far as the military service of these men overseas is concerned. People who can take their minds back to the years between 1914 and 1918, and others who even to-day think of absent ones from their homes, will realise that this matter affects every home in the nation. Unless we have a contented military service this nation can achieve nothing of value. In view of the discontent all over the world, we must recognise that the more we can do to bring about good conditions in the Army and contentment among the relatives of the troops, the better it will be for this nation and for the world. I realise now more than ever, not only the responsibilities of parenthood but the responsibility of representing in this House a great commercial city and those who "go down to the sea in ships," and who go overseas to fight for us. We cannot escape our obligation to those young men, who have so readily stepped into the gap, and in some cases have made the great sacrifice, to enable us to have a better future. I am fully aware of the debt that we owe to those men for the sacrifice that has been, and is being made, by them. The future is of pressing importance to those men, and we ought to know what that future is to be.
Anyone who thinks that we shall have a new world when this war is over is under a delusion. To talk about an Eldorado coming in a few moments is absurd. There is a responsibility on every Member of this House in regard to the men of the nation, not only from the little homes but from the homes of the rich, who are taking their place on the battlefields of the world. But there is another fight which will begin only when the war is over and men resume normal life, which will be very difficult for many of them. What is the future to give them? It is not too much to ask a Minister who is responsible for the greatest Army that Britain has ever assembled in a fight for her life: "What are you about to do in regard to those young men, and those middle-aged men, who have

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done so much for us?" When we recollect the sacrifices that have been made, we must realise that we have had an easy time compared to the young men who in the course of a few years have become philosophers and sages before their time, because in their youth they have seen much greater things than we have seen. When senility has had its time in this House and is passing out, and younger men are taking their places here, they have a right to ask the Minister, in regard to youth, "Quo vadis? Whither goest thou?" One or two little cameos come into my mind—not cameos from the jeweller's shop, but cameos of life, studies of the individual who comes to his representative in this House, and not with any fear of the authorities in the Army, for I have not found men afraid to say: "I would like to put my complaint before you." There has been no anonymity about it. They have come straight to me, and said: "This is my complaint," and when the statements have been vouched for I have been able to find redress.
Last week I had a case bearing on this question of rehabilitation. On 28th February a young man who had been in the Army came from Scotland to Liverpool to look for a home. He had no home. He left the Army after 11 years as a gunner on special duty. I have here the location, destination, and everything else, with his name and address and number, but I do not intend to give them. This man, now 29 years of age, became a physical wreck in December, through enemy action. He is getting treatment. He goes to Scotland, because his wife and two children have been blitzed out of their home in the South and are unable to get a house in Liverpool. In Scotland he gets a shack, which has been untenanted for many years, because it is insanitary. Now he is living there, with his wife and two children, because he is not able to get a home. He came from Scotland to Liverpool last Friday to see if he could get a home there. I want to know if priority rights are to be given in cases such as this. If priority rights are to be given, in regard to household effects and a home, men who have sacrified their health deserve them. A Minister cannot say, "I have my own Department, and I have nothing to do with this particular part of the work." Ministers, like the Trinity, are all one. It is a question of collabora-
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tion. The Minister of Health, the Minister of War, and the Minister of Labour must work together; otherwise, there can be no true organisation in the affairs of this country. We shall be told that the matter we are raising is a matter for the Ministry of Labour, but—
Mr. Speaker: I must interrupt the hon. Member now, and point out that he can only discuss matters within the scope of the Ministry of War. The hon. Member may not bring in the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Labour, which are outside the scope of this discussion.
Mr. Logan: With all respect, Sir, I am trying to keep in Order, but I daresay I passed the border. I am trying to point out, in regard to the co-ordination of the three different Services, how essential it is that, in regard to the particular Service about which I am speaking, collaboration must take place if fair treatment is to be received by the individual.
Mr. Speaker: I am afraid that that matter is outside the scope of the Debate. In the past, the matter of the co-ordination of staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Force was raised and that has been ruled out. Therefore, co-ordination of the Ministry of War with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour must also be ruled out.
Mr. Loģan: I am sorry that I am unable to escape the meshes of the jurisdiction of the Chair, and so I shall have to confine myself to the War Office, although I have heard that the 86 Irish Members in the olden days used to be able to break the Rules by asking what they were. I am anxious to bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and so I address a specific question to the Secretary of State for War, asking what he is doing in regard to his duty and responsibility towards the serving men, and inquiring if he is having any collaboration with anyone else—without specifying any particular Department—in regard to the interests of these serving soldiers who will have to be rehabilitated. I should be very pleased to know if any steps have been taken to see that these people who will come back will be rehabilitated. I am anxious to know whether young men in the Far East, and those in the European war zone, who are coming back to this country and may be demobilised in the course of six months or a year, will be given every opportunity

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to fill posts in this country which they were filling prior to the war. In regard to the position of employers of labour, who are under a responsibility to give employment to the people who were previously in their employ, are the military going to insist that these young men, officers as well as other ranks, shall have the opportunity, when returning to civil life, to get back into the kind of employment in which they were previously engaged? I want to know if any collaboration has taken place in regard to the returning officers or soldiers to ensure that no injustice will be done on the two points I have raised, those of housing and the question of re-employment, and I shall be very thankful indeed for any information that can be given.
7.4 p.m.
The Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. Arthur Henderson): The Amendment which my hon. Friend the Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) has moved to-night covers matters in which all serving in the Armed Forces are vitally and deeply interested, and I think, if I may say so, that the House owes a debt to my hon. Friend for raising these matters through the medium of his Amendment. I am not saying that I will find myself in agreement with him later on, but I think we are certainly grateful to him for raising these matters. I think it would be of interest to the House if I were to deal briefly with the principle of release. As the House knows, the general principles of the scheme of release of men from the Forces, which is, of course, applicable to all three Services, are fully set out in the White Paper on the re-allocation of man-power between the Armed Forces and civilian employment during any interim period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan.
The House will recall that this scheme was very fully debated on 15th November last, and, it may be fairly said, was generally approved, and there is every reason to believe that, by and large, it commands the general approval of those who are serving in the Forces. I do not propose to go through the features of the scheme, which are well known to everybody, but it may be worth while to emphasise certain fundamental points. As was pointed out in the White Paper, the
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present scheme is not a scheme for general demobilisation; it is, as the title indicates, a scheme for the re-allocation of the nation's man-power between the needs of the Armed Forces and those of civil employment. As long as the war with Germany lasts, the demands for man-power by the Army require the services of every man that can possibly be spared, and the requirements of the civil economy have to go short. When the war with Germany comes to an end the balance will shift to some extent, since it will be neither necessary nor possible to deploy the whole of our existing man-power resources against Japan, and, consequently, more men will be available from the Army for reconstruction and the general civil economy of the country.
The release scheme is, therefore, in essence, simply an instrument for deciding the order in which man-power now in the Army surplus to military requirements should be released. An essential need is that this order of release should take into account, not merely the priority or demand of civil industry—this aspect is, of course, catered for by what is called the Class B scheme—but the legitimate claims of those who have undergone the hardships, dangers and separation involved in service in the Forces to return to their homes and normal vocations.
Any scheme which, in its impact, affects the lives of millions of men, each individual different, must inevitably be open to criticism from certain angles. No scheme of this nature could possibly be devised which could satisfy every individual interest; the best that can be hoped for is a scheme which will be fair and equitable as between man and man and will provide the greatest common measure of satisfaction. As was stated in the White Paper, the arrangements for the release of men from the Forces must be readily understood and accepted as fair by the Forces and they must also not be too complicated for practical application.
To put it briefly, the scheme must be fair and must be recognised as fair, and must work. These desiderata can only be achieved by having an objective ponderable standard to govern the order of release; and I would suggest that age and length of service is such a standard. An objective standard does not depend upon the assessment of merit, whatever that

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may cover—or a physical condition, as was suggested by one correspondent of my hon. Friend—by another human being or body of human beings who, however well-intentioned, are fallible. Nor does it admit of wangling. Every man knows his year of birth and the date on which he joined the Army, and both can be verified in his documents. Explanatory tables showing the age and service groups have been supplied to every unit and sub-unit in the Army. Every man can thus see his group and discuss his position in relation to other men, and nothing can alter that relative position unless he forfeits service under conditions fully made known to him.
Major Woolley: Could my hon. and learned Friend say if steps are taken to ensure that these tables are brought to the notice of the men?
Mr. Henderson: I think the method of the notice board is adopted, and I must confess that I have not yet met a soldier in my journeys who does not know his service group. I think my hon. and gallant Friend can be assured that every practical step is taken, but if he has information to the contrary, perhaps he will let me have it? When the time comes for his group to be released and he wishes to go, the only thing which can prevent his going is the possibility of his having to be retained on grounds of military necessity. As was pointed out in the White Paper, military requirements must override all other considerations, but every effort will be made to reduce the application of military necessity to a minimum. Retention under this heading will be rigorously restricted to real military necessity. Few individuals are indispensable, and the possibility of replacement must be thoroughly explored before retention is authorised, as was announced in the House a little while ago. The competent authority to authorise retention on this ground in the United Kingdom is the general officer, commanding-in-chief, of the command, and overseas commanders-in-chief, who may, at their discretion, however delegate their authority to any officer not below the rank of brigadier. In addition, the War Office, may, at any time, authorise the retention of any individual.
Dr. Haden Guest: Is it not a fact that this question of military necessity may very adversely affect the chances of
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demobilisation of medical officers, owing to the fact that medical officers are very scarce; and will my hon. and learned Friend pay particular attention to the possibility of making some adjustment of the scheme, so as to make possible the demobilisation of men of senior rank and low medical category as early as possible?
Mr. Henderson: I will certainly have that suggestion examined, but I would not like to go any further than that at the moment. The adoption of an objective standard also facilitates enormously the administrative working of any scheme. Plans can be made in advance, since however long the war lasts the relative position of one man to another will remain unchanged in respect to age and length of service. This is one of the main reasons why it is undesirable to attempt to take into account too many factors, many of which naturally command sympathy. An attempt to assess and weigh a large number of factors would complicate any scheme and make it administratively difficult, with the result that, apart from possible controversy as to the relative merits of different factors, the scheme might well break down.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Fife has suggested that the release scheme should be operated through the machinery of a committee composed of officers and other ranks, his object, no doubt, being to ensure that the release scheme is carried out fairly, and without fear or favour. I need hardly say that the Government have no objection in principle to the setting up of a committee if such a committee would in fact assist. For some time past a joint committee of officers and other ranks have operated in the Middle East, and possibly in some other Commands, for the purpose of deciding cases for compassionate reposting, but I would point out that favouritism or wangling cannot operate in the proposed release scheme, which is, of course, one of its main merits. It cannot operate because of the standard we have established.
As I have already pointed out, each man knows into which group he falls. Nothing can alter that, and when the time for the release of his group comes he is bound to be released unless he is retained on the ground of military necessity, as to which it is obvious the military authorities alone must decide, or unless, of course, he voluntarily decides to remain in the Army. Any interference with the auto-

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matic operation of this objective standard would only cause a great deal of administrative trouble and delay, and accordingly the suggestion of my hon. Friend cannot therefore be accepted. If my hon. Friend has in mind a possibility of influence and interference in regard to the Class B men he need have no cause for apprehension. Nor could any committee of the type he may have in mind render any useful practical service.
The demand for Class B releases will come from this end. Nor, so far as block releases are concerned, will they be dealt with on the basis of individual persons. If the number of building operatives due for release in Class A on account of their age and service do not meet the requirements of the building industry and an allotment of a further X-thousand Class B releases is made by the Ministry of Labour in consultation with the other Government Department concerned, then the names of men to make up this number of X-thousand will be obtained automatically from the War Office central card index by running through the next age and service groups and extracting the names of the building operatives. It will, I think, be impossible to influence the electrically-controlled War Office central card index. As regards the release of individual specialists in the Class B scheme, these will be relatively very few in comparison with releases as a whole, and will have, as at present, first to be sponsored by the Government Department interested in the industries or professions concerned, secondly to be scrutinised and accepted or rejected by the Minister of Labour, and, thirdly, to be finally agreed or rejected by the War Office, so that the chances of unfair discrimination are very remote.
Mr. Gallacher: Would it not be simpler if the hon. and learned Gentleman, instead of going through all this, were to say that there would be no problem of any kind affecting the soldier in connection with interim demobilisation and therefore the War Office does not need any advice?
Mr. Henderson: The War Office is always glad to receive advice, but what I am trying to say is of great interest to soldiers. I am trying to tell them and the nation as simply as I can what exactly we propose to do when the time comes. Cases of hardship will, however, continue
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to be dealt with as at present on compassionate release grounds. No hard-and-fast definition of what constitutes hardship is practicable, but conditions will conform generally with the provisions of the compassionate manual under which the Army operates at the present time. My hon. Friend the Member for the Western Isles (Mr. MacMillan) asked whether it was not possible to include periods of compassionate release in reckoning length of service, but I am afraid that this is not possible, as only days for which a soldier receives pay can be counted, and a man who has been released does not receive pay.
Mr. MacMillan: This seems to me to be an additional hardship to the one which caused the man to be originally temporarily released on compassionate grounds, and now we are going to impose a third hardship.
Mr. Henderson: In my experience soldier A goes home and secures employment and the remuneration that goes with it, whereas soldier B has to stay and render service either at home or abroad, and I think it is only right that the other man should not be given advantages which are not possible for the one who remains on active service.
Mr. MacMillan: I am sorry to interrupt again, but does the hon. and learned Gentleman really think that it is possible for a man to secure employment for two or three weeks when the employer knows that in a very short time he will be leaving him?
Mr. Henderson: I would not like to commit myself but I think the House will agree that it is fairly easy for any man to get a job at the present time. I should like to give an assurance that we have not lost sight of one of the bad mistakes of 1919, when inadequate time was given in which to make the necessary arrangements to bring home those serving in distant theatres of war. The release scheme applies equally to all personnel wherever they may be serving and when a group or a block of groups is scheduled for release, it is intended that all personnel wherever serving shall, as far as possible, be released concurrently in the United Kingdom. It cannot of course be guaranteed that every man in a particular group will get home from abroad, and be released at exactly the same time as other men in the group stationed at home, but the intention

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is to assign a period during which a group will be released, and to give sufficient notice of the opening date to enable the necessary arrangements to be completed in respect of the movement home of the men serving overseas. The House may like to have some information as to the mechanics of release which have now been worked out with plans ready to be put into execution when required.
Mr. Belienģer: Would it be possible at the same time to give some indication of the number of groups that will be released?
Mr. Henderson: That point I can answer straight away. It will not be possible.
Mr. Bellenģer: When will it be possible?
Mr. Henderson: I do not know, and I am certainly not in a position to say anything about it to-night.
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have been divided into dispersal areas, each of which is served by a dispersal unit, established in some existing camps or barracks. Near every dispersal unit will be a collecting unit, also established in existing camps or barracks. The procedure on release will be as follows: Every Class A man who is stationed in the United Kingdom will go first from his unit to the collecting unit serving the dispersal area in which he is stationed at the moment. If he is, so to speak, a native of that area, and is going to live there, he will be passed on at once by the collecting unit to the neighbouring dispersal unit where his final documentation will be completed, we hope, in a very short time—15 to 20 minutes. If, on the other hand, he does not reside in that area, but in some other part of the country, he will be sent by the collecting unit to the dispersal unit serving the area in which his home is.
Each individual officer or other rank, man or woman, will have a release book, the greater part of which will be completed in his unit before he or she starts on his or her journey home. At the dispersal unit, there will be representatives of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health to issue unemployment books and medical contribution cards. Four pages will be left in the book for the individual to take away from the dispersal unit. One is a railway ticket home; one
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is a form in exchange for which he can obtain from the local authority a civilian identity card, ration book and clothing book; one is a form on which those eligible for national health insurance benefit can obtain medical treatment by a civilian doctor if they need it during the 56 days' release leave, and one is a form on which he can apply for a disability pension if he desires to claim one. The back cover of the book forms a leave certificate, a record of service, and a testimonial which the individual can keep.
Other ranks will be paid a round sum according to their rank at the dispersal unit, the balance due for his release leave being sent later by the paymaster in a book, on which he can draw fortnightly payment at any post office. As already announced men will receive an outfit of clothes at a clothing depot which will be near the dispersal unit. Women will not be given clothes but will receive clothing coupons at the dispersal unit, a grant of £12s. being sent to them direct from the paymaster. There will be separate wings of each dispersal unit for the A.T.S. Men coming home from overseas for release, will be sent direct from the port to a disembarkation camp. There they will hand in arms and equipment and will be sent direct thence to the dispersal units serving the areas covering the neighbourhood to which they are to go on release. There they will go through the procedure already described. A.T.S. coming home from abroad, will not go to a disembarkation camp, but will be sent from the ports to a suitable unit in this country, and thence to the appropriate dispersal unit.
As releases in Class B are analogous to the releases which have been made during the war from the Army to work of national importance, and the procedure for the Class B releases will be much the same as for the former type of release, there will be no necessity for men released in Class B to go through dispersal units or for them to use release books. Men released in Class B will be released direct from their units, but, before leaving their units, will be sent to clothing depots to draw their civilian clothing outfit. They will, however, only receive 21 days' leave with pay and allowances of their rank, seven days' pay and ration allowance before leaving their unit the balance to be forwarded shortly afterwards by the appropriate paymaster.

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I should like to refer to the main schemes for education and training and for placing men and women in civil employment. Those have already been announced by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour on 16th November, 1944. These schemes provide facilities for the further education and training of those men and women suitable for professional careers, and a vocational scheme to provide training for the skilled manual occupations and for certain occupations for the black-coated worker. As regards the Army, while education and training will assume far greater importance during the interim period following the defeat of Germany, there cannot, of course, be any question of the Army becoming primarily an organisation for the preparation of men and women for civil occupation. There are, however, obligations which the Army, in full agreement with the other two Services, is anxious to discharge as regards all men and women who have given a long period of service in uniform. Preparations for a wide scheme of education and training in the Army are well in advance. They provide the most generous facilities which it is possible for an Army in being to provide with the object of refurbishing old skills, developing skills and capacities which have been acquired or utilised during service, and preparing men and women for the fuller education and training schemes which are to be available as I have indicated after they have been released. The scheme will apply to all ranks, men and women, at home and overseas and, generally speaking, will be on a unit basis.
Mr. Gallacher: The War Office must give consideration to the fact that they cannot send these young lads away in the period when they would have been getting training, and then, when they come back, say: "We are not going to take any responsibility for their general training." You cannot turn them out in this way.
Mr. Henderson: I entirely disagree with my hon. Friend. I do not think that it matters who does the training as long as the men receive the training. It must be remembered that any education and training schemes within the Forces must conform to the general scheme of release, as it is considered that the vast majority of soldiers who would not wish the date of their release to be delayed to accord with
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the requirements of the education and training schemes. The schemes, therefore, seek to make the best use in the interests of the men of such time as may be available for education and training until their time for release, in accordance with age and length of service, arrives. It has, therefore, been decided that the Army scheme shall be mainly general and prevocational, the vocational training being provided for by the schemes for which the Ministry of Labour has accepted responsibility. The House will remember that the details that have been published of some of the educational training schemes for which the Ministry of Labour is responsible require a six months' course; I take one for example—bricklayers, carpenters and other trades connected with the building industry. These men do not require to be under Army conditions for six months while they receive their six months' training.
Mr. J. J. Davidson: May we take it that there is complete co-ordination between the War Office and the Ministry of Labour in order to see that those men who go in for Ministry of Labour vocational training will not be left for a considerable period unemployed?
Mr. Henderson: I think I can certainly give my hon. Friend the assurance. This may be the convenient point to deal with three points which were raised by the hon. Member for the Western Isles. He referred to the need for teachers to receive the full course of university training. He will, no doubt, recollect that a scheme has recently been announced by the Ministry of Labour which seeks to provide the very facilities which he suggested were desirable.
Mr. M. MacMillan: I said that I hoped it would be made clear to the men that these facilities would be available, and that they would be encouraged to take advantage of this training rather than go in for the easier way. That is what I was emphasising.
Mr. Henderson: My hon. Friend can be assured that every attempt will be made to bring to the notice of the men all the facilities that are to be provided, and there is no reason why we should not encourage those who wish to do so to take the full course. He would like an assurance that our returned soldiers are

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not to be displaced by German labour. It is a rather fantastic suggestion which has been made, but as it has apparently reached a number of the troops—although I do not think it necessary for this to be done—I will give an assurance that we certainly do not intend to allow our returned soldiers to be displaced by German labour. Another point that he made was whether the appointments branch of the Ministry of Labour was restricted to officers. It applies to all ranks provided they have suitable educational or technical qualifications.
Now I come to what the scheme provides. The scheme provides the individual soldier in the unit with a reasonable choice of study under the following headings:
(a) Technical Subjects. (b) General Science. (c) Home and Health. (d) Man and Society. (e) Commerce. (f) Crafts, Music and Drama.
Under the heading of "Technical Subjects," there will be courses likely to suit men who have an interest in mechanical or electrical engineering, or who are thinking of becoming, let us say, welders, fitters or mechanics. This heading will also include courses in building construction, designed to attract men who fancy some such trade as decorating, bricklaying or plumbing. None of the many courses under this heading will train or qualify a man for a job—but they will at least teach him the elements of the subject and thus save him time if and when, after leaving the Army, he decides to go all out for preparing himself for a trade. Full information and instructions concerning the facilities when the time comes to provide them, and the preparations which must be made, have been published to the Army in the field by the Army Council. For some time past planning and preparation has been going forward and provision has already been made to meet the main requirements of the educational scheme. Supplies of books and equipment are now being accumulated and substantial provision has already been made for the initial training of a proportion of the instructors who will ultimately be required. This provision is about to be very substantially increased. These larger schemes of education and training intended for the period following the defeat of Germany will not be without good foundations. Already, particularly in the theatres less actively
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engaged in military operations, not only has the wartime scheme of education taken root but considerable developments towards the Release Period scheme are already taking place.
While the education and training schemes in the Services must mainly be general and pre-vocational, the scope of such general and pre-vocational education and training will not be narrowly interpreted. Facilities must be provided generally on the basis of part-time education amounting, where military requirements permit, to some six or eight hours per week. All this provision must be on a dispersed basis in view of the fact that military requirements dictate that the units of the Army shall be able to take their education and training provision with them wherever military need requires that they shall serve. The House may be interested to know that plans have been made for the establishment of what are to be called "Formation Colleges", which seek to provide opportunities for further education for men and women who wish to pursue general and technical studies at a more advanced stage than is possible in lower formations and units. Each college will be a residential educational institute for men and women of all ranks, and will provide a full time course of one month's duration, catering for from 600 to 1,000 students at each college in home commands. Similar colleges will be set up overseas. The main lines of the scheme which is to operate in the Army have been laid down after the most careful consideration of all the circumstances which are likely to exist. It is essentially flexible and general. It dovetails into the facilities provided by civil education generally, and by the two main schemes of education and training already published by the Ministry of Labour, and if it should happen that during the course of the operation of the release scheme, more direct training for particular occupations can be made available, the scheme provides for such a transition. It is, however, essential to the scheme that no unfounded hopes should be raised by offering training for jobs which when the time for release arrives are not in fact available. Full provision has, however, been included in the scheme to make available to the men and women in the Army, wherever they may be, the fullest possible information about employment which the

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Ministry of Labour can from time to time provide.
May I say in conclusion that reference has been made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State earlier in the Debate to the British soldier, and may I add my personal tribute? I believe that the British soldier has played a great part in this war. He has shown himself to be a superb soldier, unbeaten in defeat, modest in victory, and he deserves well of our nation. But he is, first and foremost, a citizen soldier, ever looking forward to his return home, so that he may take up the threads of his civilian life again. It is both our duty and our privilege to assist him to do this, and I feel sure that the House will agree that the plans that I have outlined to-day will indeed provide practical and valuable assistance for our returned soldiers.
Sir Granville Gibson: In view of the fact that the hon. and learned Gentleman has made such an important pronouncement of policy, is it the intention of the Government to issue a White Paper on the policy that he has outlined?
Mr. Henderson: A good deal of the policy part of the statement I have made is already in the White Paper which has been published. What I have endeavoured to do, in addition, is to convey to the House some conception of the mechanics of the release scheme, and what we are doing administratively in the direction of giving some measure of training and education to our soldiers in the period with which we are dealing.
Mr. Gallacher: As I do not want to divide the House, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," again proposed.
7.40 p.m.
Major Studholme: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, in a fine speech, has covered the whole wide field of military operations. In my few remarks I only intend to touch one theatre of war. I have been fortunate enough to be a member of the Parliamentary party which recently visited Italy and Greece and I should like to take this opportunity publicly of expressing my
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thanks to our hosts and paying a tribute to the troops of the Central Mediterranean Force. We were the guests of the Army and we could not have had kinder or more thoughtful hosts. Everything was done to make things easy for us and to enable us to see as much as possible in the time available. We had only to express a wish to see some particular unit or formation for that wish to be gratified as far as time and distance would allow. Wherever we went we were able to meet and talk informally with all ranks, and nothing could have been more friendly than the reception which they gave us. What I have said applies equally to our visits to naval and air establishments.
I do not propose here to raise the various points which were put to us in the course of conversation by officers and other ranks. The hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. J. J. Lawson) has mentioned some of them and I agree with what he said, but we have already passed them on to the proper quarter and I know that my right hon. Friend is giving them his sympathetic consideration. I would merely make a few remarks of a more general nature. Hon. Members will forgive me if they appear obvious, but there are some obvious things which tend to be forgotten, and it is most important that our troops out there shall know that we at home do realise all that they have done and what a vital part they are playing towards the coming victory. In the days when the battle was raging across North Africa all eyes were fixed upon the Eighth Army. History will record that astonishing story and the debt which the world owes to that small British Army and to the Dominion troops in those tremendous days when the British Empire stood alone. I often think that insufficient tribute has been paid to those leaders who bore the burden and heat of those early days, often under grave difficulties, and on whom fortune did not always smile. But history will assess their achievements. After Field-Marshal Montgomery's historic victories and the Germans had been cleared out of North Africa with the aid of the Americans and the French, there came the short Sicilian campaign and finally the landing in Italy.
The Italian campaign was a testing time for the Eighth Army. They were used to rapid movement and swift advances and had to adapt themselves to the slow tempo of mountain warfare. Anyone who has

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motored, as we did, right up the length of the Italian Peninsula will realise what a tremendous achievement this campaign has been for armies fighting nearly all the time in a jumble of mountains with every hillside favouring the defence, where every road was mined and every bridge was blown. It was a wicked country in which to fight. When you think that in under four months from the opening of Field Marshal Alexander's offensive in May of last year down to 26th August the Eighth Army had broken through the Gustav and Hitler lines, cleared the Germans out of countless delaying positions and had advanced from Cassino to Florence, more than 200 miles as the crow flies but a far greater distance over the winding Italian roads, it was a tremendous achievement ending as it did in the triumphant attack on the Gothic line.
I have traced this short history because, for many months now, the troops in Italy have not been in the limelight—it has been switched off and focused on other fronts. The role of the Armies in Italy has become an unspectacular one. In the front line high up amid the rigours of the Apennine snows or down in the plains in the waterlogged districts along the Adriatic—most difficult tank country—they have been condemned by the weather and the terrain to relative inactivity. The march of events and the coming of spring will no doubt alter the picture. In the meantime, however, we want our fighting men in Italy to know that we realise that the job that they are engaged on is no picnic, and that we understand the value of the job they are doing. The Armies in Italy have been containing nearly 30 German Divisions which, if thrown in elsewhere, might very well have altered the course of the war.
I think it should be generally known that the bulk of 15th Army Group—60 per cent, of them—consists of British troops from the Mother Country and from the Empire, 25 per cent. from the U.S.A., and the remaining 15 per cent. of Poles, Brazilians and Italians. The British are still the backbone of the Armies in Italy. The American Forces in Italy know this, and nothing could have been more genuine or more generous than the tribute paid by General Mark Clark to British, Dominion and Indian troops—but are these figures known in this country, much less known in America? I wander.
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In passing, I would like to say how tremendously impressed I was by the fine spirit of comradeship and the excellent integration between the American and British staffs. I think we should rememher that Field Marshal Alexander's task in Italy was not made easier, as the Secretary of State pointed out, by having a considerable number of Divisions drawn off last year to make the landing in the South of France, and by the necessity for sending troops to Greece—but how right that decision was. All this, however, has meant that very much greater demands have had to be made on those troops who remain in the front line. Some of these men have been fighting for over four or five years. I know a British battalion—and it is not unique—still in the line when we were there which has suffered in casualties in one year 75 officers and over 1,300 other ranks, nearly 30 per cent. of the battalion has been wounded twice, and some of them three times. That is the sort of thing I would like to tell the world, to shout across the Atlantic Ocean, just as an example of British guts and endurance.
In conclusion, may I say a few words about our visit to Greece? We had the honour of being received by the Regent, a most impressive figure. It was a great privilege to be able to see things for ourselves and to meet General Scobie and our Ambassador, and to talk to the troops. There was no doubt at all what the troops felt. I heard not one complaint about the job they had been called upon to do, although it was a beastly job, and they had done it with all the courage, discipline and restraint which one expects from British troops. They had friendly feelings for the Greek people—but they were angry—angry with those "something" bandits which they called the people they were fighting against; angry with certain sections of the Press in England who had so misrepresented the Greek situation; angry with those hon. Members of this House who had criticised our Greek policy, and who had said that we had "backed the wrong horse." Our troops in Greece knew that we had not backed the wrong horse. What they said about some hon. Members opposite was not polite. It was certainly not Parliamentary, and, if I were to repeat it now in the vernacular, you, Sir, would rule me out of Order.

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We were frequently asked to pass on an invitation to some of these hon. Members, in particular—I am sorry that none of them are here—to the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan), the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks), the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Bowles) and the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher), to visit the troops in Greece in order that the troops might tell them "where they got off". I can assure my hon. Friends that if they went to Greece, they would receive a very warm reception. All ranks expressed great satisfaction with a speech made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in the Debate in this House on Greece in January. "He understands" they said. I can well realise the overwhelming enthusiasm with which he was acclaimed during his recent visit to Athens, not only by our troops but by the Greek people, of whose gratitude to Great Britain there is no doubt at all.
There is much else about our tour that I would like to say, but time is short. Before I sit down, however, may I just mention two incidents which moved and impressed me very much? I would like to record them. At the Piraeus, we went on board the ship—an old C.P.R. boat which used to sail between Victoria and Vancouver—on which the British and Indian prisoners and the Greek hostages had just returned from Volos. Our men had suffered grave hardships and privations, but their own sufferings had not incensed them half so much as the brutal treatment which their Indian comrades had received at the hands of the enemy. I was told that towards the end of their captivity, when the R.A.F. started dropping supplies, the British insisted that the Indians should receive first pick of everything, as a token of their affectionate regard, and the indignation and the sympathy which they felt. The other incident is this: The House will remember that the South Africans, who have for so long been fighting alongside a Guards Brigade, recently made a most gracious gesture which will never be forgotten in this country. They sent a princely contribution towards the rebuilding of the Guards Chapel. I was deeply touched at being asked by South Africans in Italy, "How is our chapel getting on?" It is such acts of comradeship which gives one faith in the future of our country and of the Empire.
7.53 p.m.
Mr. Bellenģer: The House has now had the unique opportunity of listening to the reminiscences of three of the hon. Members who formed the deputation to Italy and, indeed, Greece. I propose to say nothing in that respect, because I believe that, if I did, I should have considerable difficulty in keeping in Order. I will only say, as the Secretary of State for War is here, that the arrangements made by the Army authorities for the Members' visit to Italy were excellent, and our hosts, the Army, were perfect hosts. We have listened to two very important speeches to-day—one by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, telling us, in almost epic language, of the deeds and exploits of the Army; the other, by the Financial Secretary, giving us most valuable information, which I can only hope will get to the troops, because I can assure my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State that they know little about what the Financial Secretary has told the House to-night.
I do not want to detract one iota from the remarkable speech of the Secretary of State for War about the exploits of our Army, but I am wondering why it is that the public has been for so long denied this record in the unpublished despatches of the Commanders-in-Chief. It has been the custom of this House and the nation to receive them. It was the custom during the last war for the Commanders' despatches to be published almost as soon as they were received or at any rate within a few months. Now we have to wait until nearly the sixth year of the war has expired to hear the Secretary of State for War telling us in the main what has been told to him by his Commanders overseas in their despatches. I have asked the Prime Minister before to publish some of these despatches. It may be that at certain periods of the war it was not possible, for security reasons, but I maintain that there is no possible reason, now that we have had one despatch on what was a defeat of the British Army published by the Commander-in-Chief, why we should not have some of the despatches on the victories of the British Army published.
We have had very little information about our Armies in this House during the past five years. It is true that either the Secretary of State for War or his predecessors in that office, and the Prime

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Minister, have told us something about their doings, but we have had very little information. For obvious reasons we have been told very little about the size of our Forces, the cost of our Forces, and, indeed, the purposes of these Forces. Of course, hon. Members may ask "Why should we want to know that? We all know the purpose for which these Forces have been mobilised." We do indeed, but we are coming to the end of the German war—very shortly, I hope—and then will the Government say anything about the purpose, the size, and the cost of the Armies we shall need for the war in the Far East? If they do not, I suggest that it will be impossible to answer questions which have been proposed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise). It will be impossible to satisfy the large numbers of men in the Forces that they are really needed in the jobs which they will then be called upon to undertake. Make no mistake about it. They will not all be asked to go to the Far East and to fight.
I imagine that quite a small proportion of the British troops will be required to go to the Far East for that purpose, or even the Services which supply those combatant Forces. Are we to be told nothing at the appropriate moment? I realise that we cannot demand these facts now, but in view of the fact that the war with Germany is coming, as we hope, to a speedy conclusion, the House will be lacking in its duty—and I do not know what the occasion will be when we can demand this information—if it does not demand from the Secretary of State for War more information than he has hitherto given about the size of our Forces and the purpose for which they are to be used. This House, over a long period, has fought consistently against the Crown over the size and the purpose of the Armed Forces which, even to this day, owe allegiance to the Crown.
Sir J. Griģģ: That is perfectly true. Very different times, too.
Mr. Bellenģer: The Army Act is passed each year giving to this House control over the Armed Forces which now are in almost the sole control of the Executive. Five years—perhaps six years it may be, I forget now—we have been debating Service Estimates, and particularly Army Estimates, on a more or less academic
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basis. We have listened to speeches like that we had from my right hon. Friend to-clay, speeches which, I admit, should be made on the appropriate occasion, speeches which proclaim to the whole world the glorious deeds of our Armies. But I suggest that the purpose of these Debates should be to get something more than information, which, as I suggested a little earlier, should be given to us in the despatches from the Commanders-in-Chief. When the war with Germany ends, Parliament will be asked to provide the necessary funds and facilities for certain forces to continue the war against Japan. We already know from the Minister of Labour something about the interim demobilisation plan, and the Financial Secretary has told us to-day something about the mechanics of that plan. But if I may refer for one moment to my visit to Italy in conjunction with the other Members of Parliament who made that trip, what the troops there want to know a little more about is more than the mechanics of the demobilisation plan. They want to know when they will get leave, or when they are to be repatriated under the Python scheme. The only answer we could give them was the answer which was giver; to us by the Secretary of State for War, namely, that there was little hope for leave, and perhaps a little more hope, although not too great a hope, of the repatriation of long-service men under the Python scheme. The Minister said he hoped that when the war with Germany was over it would be possible to bring that period down from four years and six months or a little less, which it is now, to three years. I suggest to my right hon. Friend and the House that if he is only going to bring that period down to three years there will be a great deal of disappointment, and that the Ministry of Labour and the other Departments concerned may be inundated with requests for earlier release than that.
Make no mistake about it—and I challenge any of my hon. Friends who went with me to Italy to deny it—the men are war weary, just like the nation. Of course, that does not mean that they will not carry out their duty until the end, but it does mean that they are concerned about seeing that the end comes quickly, and that that end brings with it, their return home to peaceful pursuits. I suggest that we cannot rely indefinitely on the National Service Acts in order to pro-

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vide large numbers of soldiers for service in the Far East. During the war with Germany one motive has actuated the large forces which Parliament conscripted, namely, the overthrow of the Nazi evil which has been near to their own hearths and homes. An added incentive to that has been the bombing which their families have had to undergo from the enemy. But this and other factors will not apply in the same degree, when the war with Japan is started in real earnest. The war with Japan has to go on—we all know that—but I think the Secretary of State had better tell us something more than he has hitherto done. It may be that the House will then want to know what contribution the Dutch are going to make towards the recovery of the Dutch Empire in the Far East; what contribution the Americans are going to make to the recovery of certain lands in the Pacific in which they are interested, and what contribution the French are going to make to the recovery of that part of their Empire which they surrendered so wantonly at a time when we were almost facing defeat.
The House will be entitled to these facts, and if it is not for the Secretary of State for War to reply at the appropriate time, we must have this information, unless Parliament intends to surrender altogether its prerogative and undoubted right, through the Executive, to control the Armed Forces of the Crown. A little while ago I put a Question to the Prime Minister asking what was being done to recruit our post-war Army. Even my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise), with much of whose interesting and vital speech I agreed, suggested that we should want a post-war Army. He went further. He said that we should want such a vast postwar Army that we should need conscription to provide it. I do not go so far as he did in that respect, but I travelled along the same road as he did when he asked the Secretary of State what is being done to try and recruit that postwar Regular Army which we shall need whether we have conscription or whether we do not? The Prime Minister, in answering the Question I put to him on this matter on 28th November, said;
"Plans for the reconstruction of the Army after the war are under active consideration in the War Office, and these include such matters as the terms of service and the means
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or attracting men, to enlist under regular engagements. The question of national service as the foundation of our military system is also being examined."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th November, 1944; Vol. 404, C. 2389.]
It does not look, from that, as if the Government have made up their minds in the direction that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Smethwick would desire. If the question is under examination, presumably it is under examination only for the purpose of mitigating the present harshness of the National Service Acts. Although this is not germane to my argument to-night, I would say it also includes the direction of industrial labour—of which I would especially like to remind my hon. Friends on these benches. I am concerned to know something about what the War Office are doing in these matters for this reason: The Secretary of State for War, on 16th November last, in answering a Debate initiated, I think, by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Kensington (Captain Duncan), who raised a specific matter affecting one of his constituents, said:
"… I will certainly have it noted as a point for consideration in the general review which will have to take place in time for the conditions of service in the post-war Army to be clearly understood in advance, because it is a matter of common knowledge now that the regular Army, at any rate in ranks below warrant officer, Class I, has, to all intents and purposes, disappeared, or will have disappeared in a year or so. Most regular soldiers will, by then, have completed their engagement. …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th November, 1944; Vol. 404, c. 2234.]
Thus, our Regular Army is in the process of disappearing, except for the limited recruitment which is now taking place, for long-service men and officers, by the War Office. What does that amount to? The Army Council have asked for volunteers in the commissioned ranks and, I think, they have received more offers to serve for a long period after this war than they require. At any rate, they are rejecting large numbers of officers who want to offer their services after the war. Perhaps many of these officers will not be suitable for such service then but, at any rate, I am convinced, from the evidence which has come to my attention, that the Army Council are not recruiting from the commissioned ranks for the Armies they want after the war; they are merely dabbling with the problem. When it comes to the other ranks, I say that the Army Council are taking no adequate steps to try and induce men now serving to enter into

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long-term engagements. Why not? Because they can hold out very little reward for such soldiers.
Many know what happened after the last war, when rates of pay were cut down. Many heard from old soldiers that if they served for eight years and had a clean conduct sheet, they got only an extra threepence per day as long-service and good conduct pay, and that if they were fortunate enough to go an for 13 years—and most engagements before the war were for a lesser period—they got the magnificent sum of 6d. per day for long service and good conduct. Some have heard what happened after retirement from the Army. If they retired before serving 21 years, the pensionable period, what did they get? The magnificent sum of £1 for every one year's Colour service. Small wonder that the Army Council are not recruiting a Regular Army. You cannot recruit a Regular Army under those conditions except, perhaps, the "scum of the earth" which, so the Duke of Wellington told us, formed the basis of his Armies in the Peninsular War. Have I not said enough to convince the House that these matters are urgent and that, so far, the Secretary of State has told us very little about what he is doing about our post-war Armies? Have I not convinced the House that it is our duty to insist on an answer to these questions?
Colonel Clarke: Why does the hon. Member suppose that all long-service soldiers will retire as private soldiers? He was talking about rates of pay for private soldiers only. If a B.Q.M.S. retired in 1930 on a pension he would have something like £2 10s. a week. Most old soldiers do get some promotion; they do not all stay in the Army as privates.
Mr. Bellenģer: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has not told us how many years the B.Q.M.S. had to serve to get his £2 10s. He did not get it until he had served 21 years continuously.
Colonel Clarke: Well, that is only three more than the 18 which the hon. Member was talking about.
Mr. Bellenģer: Long service and good conduct pay comes after eight years and 13 years' Colour service, and the bonus of £1 for every year's service conies after retirement from Colour service. I think the hon. and gallant Gentleman is labour-
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ing under a misapprehension. At any rate, perhaps the Secretary of State will inform the House how many soldiers are discharged with the rank of B.Q.M.S. on retirement after 18 or 21 years' service, as compared with the large number of private soldiers who are discharged with a few shillings a week pension?
I want to ask my right hon. Friend whether he is going to say something now—and I think he could—or in the immediate future about what he is doing to provide the basis of our regular cadres that will, whatever the system, be the basis of our long-term Armies—the Armies which garrison the British Empire, which the conscript Armies are now going to win back in the Far East? The hon. and gallant Member for Smethwick developed a very interesting point when he was elaborating the idea for a conscript Army after the war. It is quite alien to the British instinct of freedom and volunteering to have conscript service. The best of our battles were won, not by conscripts but by volunteers.
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: That is not the case. The Army at Waterloo was a conscript Army. Service, in the militia in any case, was compulsory. We have had a conscript Navy almost since the beginning of time, and up to quite modern times, the sheriff had the right to call out the forces of the county.
Mr. Bellenģer: I am surprised at the hon. and gallant Member introducing the Navy into this discussion. If he is referring to the press-gang, I am not advocating that. If I had time to enter into a discussion of military history, I think I could convince the House—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Charles Williams): The hon. Member is getting out of Order now.
Mr. Bellenģer: I only want to give an illustration of my point that the country will not tolerate conscription as lightheartedly as the hon. and gallant Member imagines. He was talking about the method of obtaining our junior officers for a conscript Army. I do not know what term of compulsory service he had in his mind but we will assume a year. I believe it takes roughly ro months to give an infantry man his primary training, or perhaps a bit more than his primary training. If you take subalterns from the ranks of a conscript Army, what

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chances of promotion have they? I asked the hon. and gallant Member that in an interruption and he said they would have a chance of promotion in the Special Reserve. He also mentioned the analogy of Territorial officers. Service Members are conversant with what happened to the Territorial Army when the war broke out. Territorial officers may have got promotion while they were Territorials, but, when the war broke out, the regular officers did their best to displace them on every possible occasion. There may have been very good reasons—I do not deny that—but if that is all that you are going to offer your subalterns, recruited from the ranks in a conscript army, you are not going to get many aspirants for officer rank from that class.
The hon. and gallant Gentleman knew what he wanted. He wanted a class system of officers, such as prevailed before this war and the last. I would not raise the class issue lightly but I have served in the last war and in this. I know the conditions under which a man rose from the ranks in the last war, and I know the conditions of this war. In this war the imposition of a term of service in the ranks was initiated by the present Adjutant-General I think. If that system served the nation well under the test of war, are you going to throw it away under the test of peace, even in a conscript Army? You will never get any conscript Army on those terms. I think my hon. Friends on this side will oppose it bitterly. I am not denying that many valiant, courageous and clever officers have not gone through the ranks before they achieved the position they did but under the impact of this war, at any rate, the lower commissioned ranks have justified the method of selection initiated by the Army Council, namely selection from the ranks except in a few specialist cases.
I urge the House vigilantly to watch this issue of the recruitment of our postwar Forces. We do not know yet, although some of us have an idea, whether it will be necessary to have large land forces in the future such as have operated in the past. Revolutionary advances are taking place in weapons which may even eliminate the necessity for large land forces such as we have known in past wars. Many of us have know the artillery of the past from practical experience and yet, day after day,
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what do we hear on the wireless—so many' raids, so many sorties, so many thousands of tons have been dropped. We hardly ever hear how many guns there are and how many rounds of ammunition have been fired. The curtain was lifted a little the other day, though it was lifted far more when we went to Italy. What about the Navy, and what about the Air Force? They will get all the volunteers they want after the war. One of the reasons why the Navy has been recruited on a voluntary basis, in spite of what the hon. Member for Smethwick says, is because it has been a fine Service—
Sir J. Griģģ: Does the hon. Member deny that the Army is a fine Service?
Mr. Bellenģer: The right hon. Gentleman has challenged me to answer.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We cannot at this stage go into an argument as to the respective merits of the Services. These are the Army Estimates and it is not relevant to go into these asides.
Mr. Bellenģer: I submit that I am entitled to say that the other two Services can do something which I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman ought to do. All I am saying is that, as the right hon. Gentleman has challenged me—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am not disputing the challenge. The hon. Member can raise the point that the other Services get recruits more easily, and it may be possible to go into the question of past history, but we really cannot expand this Debate to go into the values of the three Services.
Mr. Bellenģer: I did not intend to do so. All I say is that what the Navy and the Air Force can do the right bon. Gentleman ought to do, and I leave it at that. I asked the right hon. Gentleman what he is doing in relation to recruitment for the Armed Forces in the post-war years and he told me practically nothing. Yet my hon. Friend the Member for West Islington (Mr. Montague) asked the Secretary of State for Air the other day what the Air Force were doing, and the answer given, him was that there will certainly be short-term engagements. The Air Force will be able to get their men on those terms because they are excellent terms. All I ask is that the Secretary of State for War shall use the same methods to recruit the post-war Army. The House

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should not be put off by these platitudes, which are too often used by Ministers in dismissing a very awkward subject—and this is one of the most awkward subjects the Government have to face, the question of how they are going to get their men to serve in the Army after the war.
It is said that you can take a horse to the water but you cannot make him drink. The right hon. Gentleman will not get the men to go from the European areas to the Far East, on the terms that he is offering them at present. I do not only mean the pay terms. There are many men who are determined that they will not go, and that is not the spirit that we want in the British Army. We want, if possible, to maintain the spirit which has animated large numbers of soldiers who have fought valiantly against the German menace. We want to finish the war properly and we want to do the job properly for the men and their families. In negecting this issue, as I suggest that the War Office and the Army Council are neglecting it, we are not doing the fair and proper thing for the large number of men that we shall want, not only to finish the war with Japan but to win back vast territories of rubber and tin.
8.28 p.m.
Lieut.-Colonel Gibbons: I should like to start, as others have done, by congratulating the Secretary of State for War on the way he has told the story of what has been perhaps the most famous year in the famous history of the British Army. I was very glad that he said the British Army had been waiting for four years before it went over on D-Day. I was reading last night that there are two enemies to the morale of an army—anxiety and boredom. Both those factors were very present during those four years. The men were anxious because their homes were under air bombardment, and there was the boredom of four years' continuous training without fighting. Yet the Army went over with a higher morale than that of any British Army which ever went overseas. They could not have won their victory otherwise. I believe that the best testimonial to the general standard of training and administration in the Army during the war is that after four years the Army went over with its morale so high. The sentence that pleased me most in the right hon. Gentleman's speech was that the principal job in the fighting
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was done by the infantry. In the last war, while the infantry had an ample chance of showing its bravery—its guts—it had no chance of showing its skill, and it got about that, in the infantry, no skill was needed. Hon. Members may remember the remark of the late Lord Fisher when he was Sea Lord, that it took 12 months to train a seaman, but that any ass after a week could go out and fire a rifle in a trench. The idea that to be an infantry soldier needed very little skill more or less continued until after this war broke out. The restoration of mobility in this war has brought back the need for the infantry soldier to be a highly skilled man. He has to know small arms and mortars of various calibres, how to handle and maintain wheeled 2-track vehicles, to know short-range wireless, have a thorough knowledge of ground and the way to get over it, and to be able to get himself and his weapons over any natural or artificial obstacle.
Mr. J. J. Davidson: He always had to do that. Will not the hon. and gallant Gentleman agree that the infantryman in the last war often had to go through musketry courses and bombing courses, that he had to act as runner between company and battalion, that he had to learn the lay of the land and to find his way back, and that he had to carry equipment just as heavy as any equipment carried to-day?
Lieut.-Colonel Gibbons: The hon. Member is wrong. There are nearly three times as many weapons in an infantry battalion to-day as there were in the last war. In the last war, if an infantry soldier advanced 600 yards he did very well, but now he is asked to advance six to 12 miles, which is a very different matter. A man who has great skill at a job, who is recognised as a trained driver mechanic or wireless operator, a cook or a clerk, is a tradesman. At present an infantryman is just an infantryman, whatever he does. A man who knows how to use his weapons and the ground and by patrols in no-man's-land gains the initiative in battle, is rated exactly the same as the dear old gentleman who with canvas shoes on his feet and the badges of some famous infantry regiment in his cap carries out the coal and sanitary fatigues at some rural headquarters. The highly skilled infantryman has had to make a greater physical effort, and at

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least as great a mental effort, as any one else to learn his trade. He has learned the trade of being a first-class fighting soldier, and I hope that in the Army of the very near future he will have the status of a tradesman.
I listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise) on reforming the post-war Army. I wanted to say a good deal about this subject but the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down made a long speech and I will try to keep the average right by making a short one now. I agree Very much with what the hon. and gallant Member for Smethwick said, but I hope that the re-formed Army will be based on the tradition of our old Territorial regiments. It will be a terrible thing for the Army if these regiments disappear. Owing to the exigencies of war certain of them are in abeyance. Everybody interested in the Territorial Army—and a great many local people are interested in it who are not interested in the Army in general—are looking forward to the fulfilment of the pledge that was given that these regiments would be re-formed. I believe that the country did not have as good a Territorial Army as it might have done before the war, but, taking into account the amount of interest it was prepared to give to that Army, and the amount of money it was prepared to spend on it, we had a great deal better Territorial Army than we deserved. I hope that that Army will be fully revived when the war is over.
8.36 p.m.
Major John Morrison: I would like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on his speech and the wonderful story he told us. It has only been made possible by the valour of the soldiers and their hard work and efficiency all over the many theatres of war, and also by the Department over which the right hon. Gentleman presides. I also want to keep down the average because time is late. I want to support my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bilston (Lieut.-Colonel Gibbons) with regard to the future of the Territorial Army. Anybody who looks back to the last days of 1939 will recollect with pride the efficiency and wonderful record since those days of the all too small Regular Army. But the outlook of this war might very well have been very different if it had
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not been for the Territorial Army which was mobilised and became one with the Regular Army. Their record is a proud one and second to none. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise) and the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) have referred to the future of the Armed Forces. They both took it for granted that the Territorial Army will continue. I very much hope that we shall at no far distant date have a statement to that effect from the Government, because there is considerable thought about the future of the Territorials among those who have an interest in the future of the Armed Forces and the peace of the world when this hard-fought peace is won.
It is particularly in the nature of the British man that he gives of his best if he can give voluntary service such as that in the Territorial Army. I believe that, whatever is settled about the future of the Regular Army, its ultimate size and the period of conscription, it will have to be married with the Territorial Force, which gives voluntary service and in time of crisis can be the backbone on which a large Army can be built, although most of us hope that that time will never come again. I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has done a great deal personally to help further the interests of the regimental spirit, and, in spite of great difficulties, has done all he can to keep units together. I know, however, the difficulties that there are from the staff duty side and from the Adjutant-General's side in this matter. Unfortunately, a good many units have been broken up in this war, and I hope my right hon. Friend will continue to use his influence where possible to keep units and men together. The whole spirit of the Army is built up on pride in the regiment. That is particularly so in the case of the old Territorials. During the rest of this war and in the future, I hope that the Department which is responsible will take into consideration that great regimental tradition and couple it in the case of the Territorial Army with the association of a district or county.
I want to touch on a point that was mentioned in a Question to-day by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tavistock (Major Studholme) and by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Wing - Commander James). It concerns the areas taken over

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by the military for various purposes, mainly for training. It may be that they are to be used further by the military, but it looks to the outward eye as though this will not be necessary now. It may be that the War Office are waiting for the passage of another Bill which I would be out of Order in mentioning. It goes against the grain and the heart of one who represents a constituency in the country which has probably contained in the last two years more military than any other in the British Isles, and which contains areas which have been used to train more troops than any other area, to see those lands still retained by the Army and denied to agriculture. I hope that my right hon. Friend will consider returning them to agriculture at the earliest opportunity.
8.42 p.m.
Mr. Foster: I would like to join with other Members who have spoken in paying my tribute to the splendid work which has been done by our fighting men on the field of battle. I would also like to endorse the final statement made by the Financial Secretary to the War Office that, after the work the men have done, it is our duty to do well by them when they return to civilian life. The question I want to raise is not a big one, but it is an important one. It concerns the wounded soldiers, and I am wondering whether the House, the Government or the country are facing up to their responsibility to these men. I want to raise the question of the discharge of wounded men from the Service while they are still in hospital. I had the opportunity a short time ago of visiting a large military hospital in the North of England. I went with a voluntary organisation which was taking comforts to the wounded men. As I passed through the wards I found the complaint that was general in the hospital was that the War Office was carrying out a policy of discharging from the Service badly wounded men, who had come from Normandy and had taken part in the invasion on D-Day, while they were in hospital and that they were actually serving their 56 days' leave in the hospital. I could not have believed it had I not actually seen it.
In addition to that, I have had several letters from people in my constituency, mostly from parents whose lads have been badly wounded and have been discharged
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under similar circumstances. As a result of those complaints I put Questions to the Secretary of State for War asking whether he was aware of what was happening in those hospitals, and aware also of the great financial loss to the wounded soldier and his dependants. On 6th February I put down a Question to ask what was the relative financial position of the wounded soldier before and after discharge. Hon. Members will find in HANSARD the answer of the Secretary of State for War, and will note that there is very serious financial loss to the wounded soldier and his dependants. I asked for a statement which would apply to all ranks. I realised that it would be a very long statement if that were done, and so the Secretary of State gave me a few examples of the effect. For the benefit of the House, I propose to give figures showing the actual loss of income of the soldier, before and after discharge.
In the first case, that of a private who is married—and I would like the House to keep in mind all the time that these men are still in hospital receiving treatment and are in some cases to be operated upon later—he loses, after his discharge, 13s. 6d. per week of his income. The private who is married and has one child loses 23s. 3d. The corporal, married and with no children, loses 17s. 2d., while the corporal who is married and has one child loses 25s. 6d. per week. When we come to the sergeants, the relative figures are that the married sergeant with no child loses 24s. 4d. while the sergeant with one child loses 31s. 10d. Those reductions of income take place despite the fact that the men are lying in bed wounded, as a result of fighting for their country.
In addition to those losses of income, there is a charge against the wounded soldier. If he is married he has to pay 7s. a week out of his remaining income for his keep while in hospital. The wounded soldier who is a single man and who is 100 per cent. incapacitated and lying in hospital, has a pension of £2 per week when he is discharged. He has to pay 19s. out of his £2 for his keep while in hospital. All this time, while this is taking place, there is no change, and the wounded soldier is still in hospital receiving treatment. Not only does he suffer that financial loss but he is also unable to use the N.A.A.F.I. canteen and is deprived also of the comforts which the Red Cross and other voluntary organisations

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bring to the soldiers. The hospital to which I am referring is a semi-military civil hospital. After the men are discharged they are transferred from tile military side to the civil side of the hospital, with the results which I have just outlined.
I understand that the procedure before the discharge of these soldiers is contained in the reply which was given by the Secretary of State to the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Summers) on 30th January. In that reply, the Secretary of State stated that it was the policy chat after six months—I do not think the period was named—if a man had been determined by medical examination to be no longer physically fit to return to his unit, he was given 56 days' notice of discharge. He receives full payment during that period, but at the end of that period there takes place what I have just explained to the House.
I feel that this is not the treatment we should mete out to our men when they come back. To reduce the income in the home to the extent which I have just outlined can have effects which can easily be visualised, especially in the case of men who had to depend upon weekly earnings before they were enlisted or joined the Forces. It is absolutely wrong, and it has created a feeling in the minds of these men that when the Government want them to fight they compel them, but that when they are wounded and can be of no further use to the Army or the country they are got rid of as soon as possible. I know that this is a perplexing question and I understand from the reply which the Secretary of State gave to me on 13th February that this matter concerns other Service Departments also.
Sir J. Griģģ: I did give a reply on 27th February setting out a new practice. I do not know whether the hon. Member has seen it.
Mr. Foster: I have to confess that I have not seen that reply, and if it is an improvement upon the present method—
Sir J. Griģģ: Would the House like me to read it? [HON. MEMBERS: "Read it."] The crux of it is:
"It has been decided, therefore, that the fairest way of dealing with these cases if to fix a minimum period. In future, no member of the Forces, whose in-patient treatment in a
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Service or E.M.S. hospital is not completed, will be discharged from the Service until at least eight calendar months, including 56 days' notice leave, have elapsed from the date of his first absence from duty on account of the disability."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1945; Vol. 408, c. 1242.]
Mr. Foster: That is no improvement upon what I understood to be the case when I visited this hospital. I understood that the period before examination takes place was six months, and after the six months the men were given 56 days' notice of discharge. There is no improvement.
Sir J. Griģģ: It is a very great improvement.
Mr. Foster: My point, on the statement which I brought from those lads at the hospital, is not altogether the period or the minimum period before discharge. In the circumstances these men ought not to be discharged at all until they are fit to leave the hospital and to return to civil life. Before they joined the Army they were earning wages, and some of them good wages, in civilian employment. They go into the Army and receive a certain income. They are badly wounded, just as anyone might be in a pit or a factory. They are injured in battle and they are thrown back upon about half the income, or perhaps less, that they had when in civilian life. The right hon. Gentleman should remember that these men are crippled for life. There are men who are not likely to be able to obtain suitable employment when they return to civilian life, even if they are capable of doing some form of light employment.
This is nothing more or less than throwing these men on to the scrap-heap. After all the eulogies and glowing tributes which have been paid by both the right hon. Gentleman and the Financial Secretary to the War Office these men who have saved Britain and the world are to be thrown into civilian life, with an income which would not keep a single man, never mind a man with a wife and one child. This House should see to it that these men are treated differently from this. Just paying lip-service to the great work they have rendered gets them nowhere. It is the money which they receive and with which.they can purchase commodities, get decent clothes or bring their children up decently that counts. Lip-service, or a text on a tombstone, does not do any good whatever, or giving them medals. Medals do

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not keep a man. There are ex-Service men in the streets wearing medals and ribbons begging for a livelihood. [An HON. MEMBER: "And selling them."]
My final word is my reason for raising the matter. I want my right hon. Friend to understand why I have raised it. It is not so much that there should he a minimum period as that there should be a principle not to discharge these men from the Service while they are in hospital. The Government should take the responsibility of seeing that these men have the best possible treatment while in hospital and until they are fit to resume civilian life—and they tan never resume normal civilian life. That is the least we can do for these men who have done so much for us in these battles in Europe and other parts of the world.
8.57 p.m.
Captain Sidney: We have heard to-day from my right hon. Friend of the triumphant successes of our Armies in three major theatres of war, North-West Europe, the Mediterranean and o South-East Asia. I was particularly glad to hear the high tribute he paid to the Commanders for their skill and foresight, and to our soldiers for their courage and endurance. There is no doubt that there has been a very severe test of their endurance, and, as we have heard from hon. Members who have visited the Mediterranean theatre, that test has been particularly severe in Italy. The House knows that a great many, the bulk, of the British and indeed the Imperial Forces engaged in that theatre have been in almost constant contact with the enemy for a very long time. That imposes a tremendous strain upon them. I hope that that fact will be realised throughout the country and the Empire.
In measuring the extent of our successes, it is a poor compliment to our troops to under-estimate and under-rate the skill and determination which our enemies have shown. I have not fought the Japanese, but I know that the German is a very skilful and determined fellow, and he is overcome only by superior skill and superior determination. I hope that that too will be realised, and although I wish to say nothing to decry the quality and quantity of the magnificent equipment with which the Army has been provided, it should be realised that it is founded on the skill and courage of the individual man. Therefore, I par-
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ticularly wish to support the plea of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bilston (Lieut.-Colonel Gibbons) when he said that he hoped that the proficiency of the infantryman would be recognised, and that he would be treated as a tradesman. It takes a long and arduous training to make an infantryman. He has to handle a great number of weapons. He has to be skilful in the use of ground and camouflage. He is exposed to the elements, he has to know how to live hard and how to work hard and to fight hard, and if anybody deserves trade pay I believe he does. I would very much like to hear, if there is a speech at the end of the Debate from the Front Bench, whether something can be done to recognise that, and to make a practical gesture to the fighting man on this point.
Other hon. Members have dealt very effectively with the question of publicity for the Army, in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. J. J. Lawson) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Nottingham (Major Markham). They both pressed very hard that the great work which the Army has done should be recognised in the country and throughout the world. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will use what influence he has with the Minister of Information to see that he gets a proper share of publicity for the Army. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) have both referred to the post-war Army. I do not intend to take up the time of the House by sketching my scheme for the Army, but I would like to ask my right hon. Friend for a little more detail about the selection of officers. There have been published two Army Council Instructions, the earliest in 1942 and the other as a supplement to it in 1944. The earlier one set out in broad terms the conditions of service and the second filled in the details a little more. But there is one most important detail, which all aspirants for commissions in the Army will want to know, and that is the ordinary question of what they are going to earn. I feel that if that register is to contain the widest possible selection the War Office can have from which to choose, they should know something of the financial conditions of their service.
Dr. Morģan: They would like to know something more. They sometimes want to know why they are declared unfit to be an officer and turned down when a board of so-called psychologists consider that they are not fit to be an officer.
Captain Sidney: If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I do not propose to go into the question of psychologists and psychiatrists. I am not quite so sure of the general opinion throughout the Army as to psychiatrists. They have a different word for them. If my hon. Friend will forgive me I will leave that matter to him later in the Debate. But they do want to know what they are going to get. There are only two references to finance in those Army Council Instructions and they are both rather in a negative sense. The second recalls Punch's advice to those about to commit matrimony—"Don't." It is that no allowances were payable, prior to the war, before the age of 30. I do not think that would be a great encouragement to a young man aged perhaps 24, with five or six years' service, who thinks of marrying, and who wants to have a Regular commission. We ought to hear a little more from the Secretary of State on this matter at a very early date. That covers the three points which I wished to bring before the House to-day. These are, trade pay for the infantryman, more publicity for the Army, and a little more information as to the conditions of service on which Regular commissions are to be granted.
9.7 p.m.
Mr. Clement Davies: I can assure the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Captain Sidney) that the House is always glad to hear him, and I hope he will take more frequent opportunities of assisting in our Debates. I want to raise to-night one point very briefly, that is the question of gratuities. I have received quite a number of letters from serving men, and I have made a selection of two, one from the father of a young man, the father himself having served in the last war, and an extract from the letter the boy had written to his father. The case which they put forward is that which has been put forward in the other letters I have received, and it has been so well put by them, that I feel I cannot do better than to quote them, nor can I add to the strength with which they
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argue their point. With the permission of the House I will quote the letters:
"SIR,
I have received a letter from my son, who is serving on the Burma front. He has been in the Army since the outbreak of war and has served in Europe—until the Dunkirk evacuation, and in Africa and South-East Asia for nearly three years. An extract from his letter is enclosed herewith.
As an ex-Service man of the last war and the father of a serving soldier, I appeal to you to use your good offices to see that fair treatment is given to our Service men on demobilisation. I, and other relatives of Service men feel strongly about the gratuity scheme, which in its present form, appears to us and these Service men to be most unjust. The gratuity will be our first effort towards helping these men to civil life and may be our only opportunity of being able to confine to confer on ex-Service men, any aid to better conditions.
In most cases war service has taken place at a vital stage in life and many careers have been shattered. The longer the period of service the more difficult it will be for these men to fit into civil life. This is the more reason why gratuity should be based on length of war service only—thus the amount could be increased to the benefit of those who have served longest and of necessity lost most financially and otherwise."
That is the letter of the father. Here is the extract from the letter of the son which the father has sent:
"A private soldier with five years' war service gets £30, but a lieutenant with only three years' war service gets £34 16s., and a general with five years' service gets over £200, Well, this is the point that annoys us; that is, that rank counts a lot more towards gratuity than does war service. Well, I ask you, is this fair or even commonsense? The infantry private who has probably done five years of continuous fighting for the glorious new world which we are supposed to get when this war is over gets a mere £30, after all they are the people who do the most graft, suffer the most and get paid the least. The purpose of this gratuity is to help Servicemen back to civil life. Well, in civil life whether a man be ex-private or ex-colonel he still has to pay the same price for a Portal house or a suite of furniture or anything else he has to buy. Yet a lieutenant who has only done three years' service gets more money than a man who has done five years, but during the two years before the lieutenant came into the Army he was probably in a position to save a considerable amount of money, while the private was sweating his guts out on some battlefield for a few shillings a day and was not able to save anything. Now I ask you, who has suffered the most, who is most in need of the money? The private, without a doubt. It is utterly unfair to bring rank into the matter; there are no ranks in civilian life. Length of war service alone should count towards gratuity. I wonder what reaction the Government think this will have on the soldiers on the battle fronts. These are the views of us here and

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the majority of people who are fighting this war, so don't waste any time about it, try and get it done immediately."
That has been so cogently and forcefully put that I should be detracting from the strength of the argument if I added anything more. Gratuity is not deferred pay; it is a gratuity for services rendered, and length of service alone should count.
9.12 p.m.
Colonel Greenwell: The Secretary of State for War has had a very pleasant task to-day in detailing to the House a record of achievement which is, I think, unparalleled in the whole history of British arms. The country is deeply grateful for what has been done. There are those of us—I am one—who hardly felt that it was within the bounds of possibility that it could be done. It ought to be put on record that the whole country owes a debt of gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman for the way he has organised his Department to achieve this result. My right hon. Friend is apt at times to get a little impatient with some of us. He has yet to learn to suffer fools gladly. But none of us doubts his sincerity, his vigour, or his earnestness in prosecuting the great job that he has to do. I am sure the whole civilised world hopes that but for a recounting of the events leading to the overthrow of Japan, this will be the last time that such an opportunity as this will occur. So much has been heard recently about the exploits and the gallantry of the 14th Army in Burma that it has outlived its appellation of the "Forgotten Army," but I hope the House will hear with me if I bring to its remembrance another Army which for a very long time has served the country well, and has still more merited the description of the "Forgotten Army." I refer to the Territorial Army. When it was formed by that great Secretary of State, Lord Haldane, in 1908, I do not think anybody expected that it would so soon be put to the stern test of war. Perhaps the late Lord Kitchener may be forgiven for not altogether trusting it when war broke out in 1914.
Earl Winterton: As an original member of the Territorial Army, may I say that Lord Kitchener cannot be forgiven for the calamitous mistake of so soon sending the Territorial Army to France? No Territorial of the last war will ever forgive him.
Colonel Greenwell: That is a view which is widely held. I was not a Territorial in those days, but that interjection is not without value. The country cannot forget what it owed to the Territorial Army then, and in this war. We are continually reading in the Press of the exploits of the 50th, 51st and various other Territorial divisions, but their splendid records were not laid in this war. It was in the last war that a captured German order revealed that the Germans considered the 51st the most to be feared of all British divisions. Nowadays, although tens of thousands of men volunteered for service in the Territorial Army before war broke out, that Army seems almost to have disappeared from view and to be forgotten. If that is not the view—and I do not think it is—of the public at large, at any rate it seems to be a fair reflection of the War Office point of view. I do not think that the Territorial Army is getting a fair deal. It is obvious that, under the rapidly changing conditions of modern war, it is necessary to meet those changing conditions by reconstruction within the Army itself. Nobody would cavil at the necessity, which from time to time becomes apparent, of altering the functions of units, or sometimes, unhappily, of disbanding them, but in the case of the Territorial Army this point of view appears sometimes to have been carried to excess. I submit that after five years of war it is not unreasonable to say that man for man the Territorial Army officer and the Regular Army officer ought to be of the same standard of efficiency, but it may be said that it would be easier for a cable to go through the eye of a needle than for a Territorial Army officer to aspire to a rank higher than that of major, and certainly the command of formations such as brigade and higher seems to be almost exclusively though not entirely, reserved for Regular officers.
Major York: Does my hon. and gallant Friend not realise than a considerable number of Territorial officers are now commanding units in the North-Western region?
Colonel Greenwell: I appreciate that, but a great number have lost their jobs, very often for quite trivial causes. If my hon. and gallant Friend will let me go a little further I think I can provide him with a reply. On the other hand, bowler hats are handed out with great frequency

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to Territorial officers. I will not weary the House with a great number of cases, but I will give one or two examples. One officer was so good at his job that he was given command of his Territorial brigade before the war broke out—in the spring of 1939. He was then at what was considered a pretty youthful age for a brigadier—I do not think he had reached his 4oth birthday; and he was an amateur soldier at that. To-day he has just come out of the Army, still a brigadier, with an exceptionally fine war record. During that time, he has seen a number of Regular officers, one of whom happens to be a friend of mine, promoted to the rank of major-general and handed their bowler hats, and retired because they were not quite up to their jobs. I suggest that that is a case that does make one think. A Regular officer, who happens to be a close personal friend of mine, and who himself has admitted to me that he never ought to have chosen the Army, was made lieut.-colonel when the war broke out. He is a delightful fellow, but he is still a lieut.-colonel, and I do not think the reason is far to seek. I think a man who has made the profession of arms his career and who has studied the art of war is the proper man to run the Army in war time, but I also feel that this sort of thing can be carried too far, and I think that proficiency is the only thing that, in war time, should govern promotion to higher rank.
I have an acquaintance in the Army, a young officer who was promoted to command a regiment in the Middle East, and who eventually lost that command because a certain general came round to inspect, just after he had received orders to move from one place to another. He was getting on with the job, and did not lay on any ceremonial, and that annoyed the general, and so the officer found himself a major again. I know another general, who, under exactly similar circumstances, would have taken the other point of view, and, if that young officer had put on a ceremonial parade, he would have said to him, "Why are you not getting on with your job?" and the officer would have gone just the same. I submit that promotions and demotions should not depend, in war time, in cases like this, on one particular man, and I feel very strongly that St. Paul must have had the Territorial Army in mind when he said,
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"My brethren, these things ought not to be."
In regard to the splitting up of Territorial Army units, it often seems to me that, in many parts of the country, Territorial formations are held in closer affection than regular Army units. In my own county of Durham, neither of the two battalions of the Regular Army have served within the county, and their regimental depot is over the river in another county. It is not surprising that the Territorial units are those in which the affections of the local inhabitants are centred, but, when an emergency arises, I have never heard of a regular formation being broken up, but only of the Territorial Army having to suffer. There are, I understand, men who were appointed brigadiers some time ago in various theatres of war, and who were found, perhaps, not quite up to their jobs, or, it may be, whose units were changed to something else, so that their commands disappeared. These men, between 50 and 60, are still brigadiers, still holding the rank and getting the pay, having been "kept on ice," for civil affairs jobs. Are they the right sort of people to represent this country abroad in civil affairs when the fighting is over? Are we really trying to stage a come-back of "Colonel Blimp?"
Finally, I would like to mention two other points. I trust that the War Office, after the war, will keep the Department of Scientific Research going for the benefit of the Army. In peace time, I think, far more than in war, we should have a Secretary of State for War who is a man of imaginative qualities, who will see that the Army is not only properly trained and equipped, but that it is two jumps ahead of any other Army in the world. We do not again want to go back to face the criticism of always having been thoroughly prepared for the last war we fought. I hope that national service will continue after the war. I think that it is a fine thing that young men and young women, in return for all the benefits they receive 'throughout life from the State, should be ready, willing and prepared to serve their country to the utmost of their powers in time of war.
Viscount Hinchinģbrooke: Do I understand my hon. and gallant Friend to say that he is advocating conscription for young women?
Colonel Greenwell: I certainly see no reason why young women, with young men, should not serve their country. I feel that, so far as our reserve forces are concerned, they ought properly to be based upon some territorial system, though not perhaps the Territorial Army as it was before the war. I hope it will be better trained and very mach better equipped than the Territorial Army, but the affection in which it is held by large numbers of people, because they have had personal contact with it themselves, either through service themselves or by their own relatives, makes it, in my opinion, the proper vehicle for the Army reserve, and it ought not lightly to be thrown aside. It is, obviously, too early for plans in this respect to be formulated now, but I hope that these ideas will be borne in mind, because I know that they are held not only by hon. Members of this House but by large numbers of the public outside, when reformation of the Army falls to be undertaken. I hope my right hon. Friend will bear some of these ideas in mind.
9.27 p.m.
Mr. Hubert Beaumont: The Secretary of State for War had a glowing story to tell of the achievements of the Army and he was very proud in the telling. If I may say so, his speech was admirable in both tenor and tone, and my right hon. Friend, if he were present, would not be offended if I say that he seemed to have become mellowed and softened, I will not say chastened, by the House. We saw him more like a cooing dove than one who is so often annoyed at the interjections and questions of hon. Members. May be, this changed tone is due to the fact that the anxieties of past years are not so great upon his shoulders now, and that he seems to realise that victory may be very near.
In the last few days we have had three speeches from Service Ministers. The Secretary of State for Air, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and now the Secretary of State for War have each retailed to the House in admirable terms the deeds of daring and the valour of the men in the Services which they have the honour to represent in this House. I would not for one moment make comparisons. Each of the Services has rendered inestimable benefits to the community, and I was very glad that the right hon. Gentleman, in closing his speech on such a high note,
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brought to our notice again the great sacrifices that have been made which should inspire us to re-dedicate ourselves to the determination that those who have suffered most grievous of all and have given their lives that those who they have left behind shall be cared for, and that those who come back shall be provided with full opportunities of living a decent and full life.
I am very glad that the hon. and gallant Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise) is in the House, because I made some interjections during the course of his speech and he seemed either puzzled or pained that I had not understood his speech, which, as my hon. and gallant Friend said, consisted largely of words of one syllable. It was because I understood it that I could not believe it was true. It was so simple and so patent that the scheme he was advocating was just the perpetuation of an officer class, drawn from a certain section of the community.
Lieut.-Colonel Wise: I cannot let that pass. I suggested that officers should be recruited from the J.T.C. There is no class distinction in the J.T.C., which is recruited from all classes of the community. It is a highly efficient body.
Mr. Beaumont: I still assert that my contention is strictly correct. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] It is true that the hon. and gallant Member suggested that you should have the J.T.C., but who are likely to become members of the J.T.C.? The children who go to the elementary schools? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] I wish hon. Members would wait until I have finished. Many of the children who go to the elementary schools will not have the opportunity afforded them of going into the training corps. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] For many and varied reasons. [HON. MEMBERS: "What are they?"] If hon. Members really want to know I will give them. A great number of children of working class parents have various duties to perform or they have to utilise a definite part of their time for study at home. It may he said that that applies to other children, out there is this difference. In many schools there will be junior training corps already established as part of the school and it would definitely be to the advantage of children of parents who had their children at such schools. It would be giving these

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children a greater advantage. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] This view is fundamental. I do not think they should start their military training until approximately 18 years of age. The time that could be spared before that age should be used to enable them to become educationally fit.
The hon. and gallant Member for Smethwick advocated the formation of a conscript Army. I do not know what is going to happen. We shall have to have a much larger Army for the first few years after the war. It all depends upon our commitments in Germany and so forth but I am convinced that as far as the community are concerned they will demand that, if we have an Air Force, a Navy and an Army, there shall be afforded a free and full opportunity for everyone, to any boy, to become an officer, no matter from what branch of society he may come.
I want to deal with three or four points as briefly as I can. We do not want to keep the Secretary of State for War too long away from his bed. [An HON. MEMBER: "He has gone already."] Then, I do not want hon. Members to be away too long from their beds. The Financial Secretary to the War Office dealt with the question of education. I would like to ask whether the War Office is sufficiently conscious not only of the importance of education now but during the post-war period. Now that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has come back I hope that he will not think that I have been casting aspersions upon him in any shape or form. I would rather he knew that I had been paying him compliments. I said that the right hon. Gentleman had become mellowed but not chastened.
With regard to education, we not only have to take into account the needs of the standing Army but also the Army of Occupation. I was one who had occasion to be concerned with the formation of the Army Education Corps. I remember after all the work that was put in the ruthlessness of the Geddes axe destroyed the education system of the Army. I hope the Secretary of State for War will set his face against any reduction in the form of educational training. It is true, as the Financial Secretary said, that the Army cannot primarily become an educational establishment. It is also true that as the Army took these young men into the Service they have to see to it that
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they do not suffer from the educational point of view, and at least have facilities for education offered to them. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will stress the direct importance of education among the troops in post-war years and improve, as far as possible, the amenities of Army life in preparation for the return to civil life. There is a point I want to ask the Secretary of State for War. I am not sure how far he is concerned with it, but I along with a number of other Members received letters from people who are very distressed about the conditions of service offered in the Indian Army.
Sir J. Griģģ: That has nothing to do with me.
Mr. Beaumont: The right hon. Gentleman says that it has nothing to do with him, but the mind of the general public does not dissociate the Indian Army from the British Army, and that being so, the War Office is being criticised for an action for which they are not responsible.
Sir J. Griģģ: Not for the first time.
Mr. Beaumont: But the sweet gentleness, persuasiveness and grace of the right hon. Gentleman might soften the heart of the India Office, who may be responsible, and perhaps he can get something done so as to remove the impression that has been created. Suspicion has to be allayed and the position has to be clarified. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman is responsible for the welfare and amenities of the troops in India, but what is certain is that there is still a deal of discontent about the canteen conditions and so forth among the troops in India. We have had the Munster Report, but I would like to know what has been done to implement the provisions of that Report and whether action has been taken. A comparison was made, quite unfairly, in a speech in this House by the Secretary of State for India, who stated that the prices of articles in the Army canteens of India were much lower than they were in N.A.A.F.I. This is entirely untrue. Of 36 articles only one in N.A.A.F.I. was higher than the price charged in the Indian canteen.
I am not complaining that the right hon. Gentleman omitted certain things in his speech, which was a magnificent review of the scope and operations of the Army. There is one point I would have

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liked him to mention and which I am certain only the question of time prevented him so doing. He is the representative in this House who answers for N.A.A.F.I.—the Navy, Army and Air Force canteens. It is true that N.A.A.F.I. functions over the whole of the Services but in the main it functions in the Army itself. N.A.A.F.I. has been a much-maligned and misunderstood institution. It has rendered tremendous work for all the Forces. In the last few months I have been especially privileged to see the work of N.A.A.F.I. in its varied forms and ramifications. I saw it before D-Day. I saw a great deal of the skill and organisation which had been put into that organisation. Great credit and tribute should be paid to Sir Lancelot Royle and the Board of Management for their great services and for the great skill with which they carried out the work of N.A.A.F.I. N.A.A.F.I. has meant a tremendous lot to the troops There may be occasional criticism of N.A.A.F.I. with regard to cigarettes or no sugar in tea. These are the usual grouses of soldiers.
In the main N.A.A.F.I. has rendered inestimable benefit to soldiers in this country and especially abroad. As far as N.A.A.F.I. has been concerned it has been prominent on D-Day and every day in this war. N.A.A.F.I. has followed up the troops quickly. In paying a tribute to the girls—and they were the first girls to go overseas and the staff of N.A.A.F.I. who have done-so much, I hope that their services will be recognised by the Secretary of State for War. I would like to know if the Secretary of State for War is considering a situation that may arise with regard to a section of the soldiers in the Army. I think it is true to say that, practically speaking, those foreigners who have been permitted to join our Services have in the main joined the Army. There are in our Army at the present time a large number of foreigners—some of them coming from enemy country—who have fought valiantly and well and who have, in some cases, given their lives for the cause which they have at heart. Can the Secretary of State for War tell us whether the Prime Minister, who in speaking of the Crimea Conference said this:
"In any event, His Majesty's Government will never forget the debt they owe to the Polish troops who have served them so valiantly, and for all those who have fought under our command I earnestly hope it may be possible to offer the citizenship and freedom
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of the British Empire if they so desire."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1945; Vol. 408, c. 1284.]
Mr. Speaker: It has nothing to do with the Secretary of State for War.
Mr. Beaumont: I want to know, Mr. Speaker, whether anything is to be done, whether any special arrangements are to be made with regard to these foreigners who have joined our Forces. They will not have jobs to come back to in the same way as the British soldier, who we hope will have a job given to him. I want to ask three questions: If the Secretary of State for War can state if any consideration has been given to the status of these aliens who have fought for this country in our Army; whether that service may be regarded as one of the factors in determining naturalisation, and will facilities be granted to those; and will the Secretary of State advocate that facilities shall be, granted to those who have served with the Forces to emigrate to the Empire? I feel that is a problem that has to be dealt with, and the sooner it is considered the better.
My last word is this: We believe that the forces of the Army can overcome all difficulty, can encounter all danger, and will come out victorious. Let us, out of the thankfulness of our hearts, determine that for the sacrifice they have made, for the courage they have shown, this country will be thankful not only in words, but in deeds as well.
9.43 p.m.
Mr. Hammersley: I am sure that at this late hour the Secretary of State will excuse me if I do not join in a well-deserved eulogy which has come from all parts of the House in respect to his review of the works and achievement of the British Army. I would not, in fact, have intervened in this Debate had it not been that the Secretary of State made some comment towards the end of his speech as to the tank situation. It seemed to me that my right hon. Friend tried to prove too much. He tried to prove that his policy in respect of tanks had been quite right and that the critics' policy in respect of tanks has been quite wrong. Now what was my right hon. Friend's policy? It was persistently to refuse to put a request to the Ministry of Supply for a tank provided with heavy guns, and for a tank provided with heavy armour. Nothing that my right hon. Friend said

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in his speech, in my judgment, could justify him in that policy. It is true that he gave the House a statement from Field Marshal Montgomery but I think it would have been better if we could have had some direct statement from one of the chief officers of the Armoured Corps. In my experience there used to be a direct representative of the Armoured Corps in the War Office. Now, of course, all this information has to come through the Field Marshal, and though of course one takes a great deal of notice as to the observations of Field Marshal Montgomery, I think it would have been more convincing if we had been told by the Secretary of State that the Royal Armoured Corps itself were quite satisfied with the policy which had been followed by the Secretary of State, namely, his refusal to demand a heavy tank.
Now what was the critics' policy? The critics' policy did not say "We want all our tanks to be heavy tanks", but we did say that we must have, in our judgment, some tanks in our organisation armed with powerful guns and well-protected. We put forward the analogy of the fleet—that it was necessary to have some battleships and not rely on all cruisers. We never criticised in the least the most excellent fast British tanks—I suppose the fastest tanks in the world—which were at the disposal of the British troops, but we did say there ought to be something more. My right hon. Friend said our tanks now mount a 17-pounder. I wonder if he would tell us what proportion of our British tanks have got 17-pounders. When we criticised, we did not criticise the 17-pounder because it was not a good gun; on the contrary, we said it was a first-class anti-tank gun. Mind you, an anti-tank gun is a defensive weapon. My right hon. Friend may play with the fact that we are now on the offensive. We said the time would come when we had to take the offensive, that the time would come when the gun required would be in both defensive and offensive roles, when we would need a dual-purpose gun capable of firing an effective high-explosive charge.
What does my right hon. Friend say to-day? He says that he has such a gun. He says that the policy that we advocated is the policy which he has now adopted. He tells us more. He tells us that he is now going to produce a heavy tank, and
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therefore I would suggest that my right hon. Friend did try to prove a little too much. One cannot go too much into detail on matters of this kind, but on the whole, the situation now is that the Secretary of State told us that we are going to have a gun which can fire an effective high-explosive charge. We are going to have a heavy tank which is capable of dealing with the heaviest gun of the enemy, and that, after all, was all the critics asked for. I would say only this in conclusion—it is never too late to mend—but two years is a long time to wait.
Mr. Stokes: I want to join, in support of the hon. Member for East Willesden (Mr. Hammersley) on the tank issue, but I shall defer that until later in my speech. I may say at the outset that I welcome the sign that the House proposes to celebrate the return to more normal hours by sitting a long time, and I certainly do not propose to help it to adjourn at an early hour.
May I refer first, with great seriousness, to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. Foster), especially to his concluding sentences, in which he emphasised the treatment to be meted out to those persons in the Services who suffer from loss of limb, wounds, and disease, as a result of the war. I think every hon. Member who was present would endorse all that he said about the necessity and urgency of locking after them. But I would add- that those of us here who were in the last war recollect what happened after that war. No doubt the intentions of the House of Commons before the end of the last war were just as genuine as the intentions of the House of Commons to-day. My hope would be that we do not forget the men this time, as the House of Commons after the last war forgot the men we saw trotting up and down the streets begging on one leg, in dire- poverty and distress. If we do, we shall have betrayed the lot.
I, for one, am going to congratulate a Minister of the Crown. He will probably say that there must be something wrong, but I felt with the right hon. Gentleman particularly in his most moving peroration. I regret, however—and I say this without any criticism of my right hon. Friend, because I have never put him in the same category as some of the professional politicians who adorn the Front Bench—that Ministers will persist in read-

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ing their speeches. Looking up at the Press Gallery in the course of the Minister's oration, I noticed that the Press had stopped taking notes and were reading a copy of his speech. It would be a great convenience for me if I had my right hon. Friend's precise words alongside me to refer to while I was speaking. The Minister had an epic story to tell and I was glad to hear him—I think he is the first Service Minister to do so this year—offer sympathy and regret to the friends and relations of those who have lost their lives or suffered wounds in this war. I also agreed with him when he referred to the nonsense of saying everything was all over bar the shouting. I emphasise this point only to refer briefly to a matter I have referred to before, namely, that I sincerely and honestly believe that the war might very well have been all over bar the shouting a long time ago but for the idiocy of our "unconditional surrender" policy. When we look back on the idiocy of that cry, we may live to regret it. Certainly, those who lose friends and relations killed from now onwards will have cause to complain.
The Secretary of State also paid tribute to the terrific valour shown by our troops in all theatres of war, and so do I. But how much more effective might that valour have been, had it been supported by adequate weapons, weapons far ahead of those employed by the enemy, as they very well could have been. I was glad to hear the Minister pay tribute to the Bailey bridge. Recently, I had the opportunity of visiting our Forces in Italy and on my way back from the front, I picked up two Americans who wanted a lift. In the course of that journey I said to them, "What do you consider, quite without prejudice, and quite regardless of nationality, to be the best invention of the war?" Without hesitation, both said "The Bailey bridge." I thought that was a generous tribute from them. I also endorse all that has been said about the labour and sweat of those ingenious persons who provided those marvellous things, the "Mulberry" Harbours.
I do not want immediately to get on to the tank issue. [Laughter.] This is a serious matter—and I propose to do so. I want to speak about two other matters. The first is the question of feeding Europe. I was glad to hear the Secretary of State say so much about the terrible problems confronting us in feeding the huge civilian
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populations in Europe who have nothing to eat. I carry my mind back to what may now be forgotten, to the futile, although repeated, efforts some of us have made in this House to try to organise the distribution of limited amounts of foodstuffs in enemy-occupied countries. Such a distribution would not have hurt our war effort, or helped the enemy, but would have provided a channel of organised communications which could have been built upon and enlarged when we came to invade Europe. We said so at the time. To another point—I know the Secretary of State has little to do with what—perhaps unfortunately for some people—has become a somewhat notorious speech I made in Cairo. I do not wish to refer to that speech except as a matter of principle [Laughter]—really, this is serious. We are told that men in the Forces are only too anxious to take part in the next election, to learn the points of view of the Left, Right and Middle, and whatever else may be served up on the electoral plate. How can they do that, unless given a fair opportunity of hearing representative speeches, undoctored and untampered with, from Members of all parties?
I want to ask the Secretary of State whether he will reply to me on this matter, which I and other hon. Members regard as very serious? It appears that towards the end of December, which happens to be a short time after I was in Cairo, orders were issued that no speaker on political issues from England, whether a Member of Parliament or otherwise, would be allowed to address troops without the permission of the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, or that part of the world, and without first submitting the script of what he was going to say.
Mr. A. Bevan: Submitting the script?
Mr. Stokes: Yes.
Mr. Bevan: To whom?
Mr. Stokes: To the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. Speaker: Was it the military Commander-in-Chief or the civil Commanderin-Chief? It is a question of whether it is a matter for the War Office or for the Prime Minister.
Mr. Bevan: The Prime Minister is Minister of Defence.
Mr. Speaker: We are not discussing the Ministry of Defence, but matters connected with the War Office.
Mr. Bevan: The Secretary of State for War controls the War Office.
Mr. Stokes: There is no difficulty about this, I can assure the House. General Paget, I understand, was responsible for issuing this edict. The matter which concerns me is this: Since this order has been issued, there has been a well-known speaker on Tory politics, Mr. Arthur Bryant, who has been sent out with the approval of the War Office to talk politics to the troops, and for no other reason. I understand there is now an approved list. Will the Secretary of State let the House know who is on the approved list, and whether it is going to include or does include all parties, and whether persons who happen to hold different views from those of General Paget, or the Secretary of State himself, will be allowed to address the troops? The matter has even gone so far that where war correspondents tried to refer to my speech and give reactions to it, everything was closed down on them and they were not allowed to report home. War correspondents got themselves into trouble for threatening to do so. Further, the British Press in Egypt have now been told not even to report any reference in this House to that particular instance, even from HANSARD—
Mr. Driberģ: I hope the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State will deal with this serious charge, because we are told that there is no political censorship.
Mr. Stokes: I am glad of that interruption. That is the situation. I was somewhat surprised at the reception which my speech got here, in view of the eulogies showered on it by the local Press in Cairo, which is by no means Left Wing. They have been told from London to shut up. Despite the fact that Army education officers in the Middle East have requested that representative speakers from all parties should be sent out to address the troops, that, also, has been "sat on" at this end. I do not blame the Secretary of State. It may be a Cabinet decision. But the House is entitled to know the degree of suppression, which will affect very seriously political thought in the Armed Forces.
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Now I come to tanks. My hon. Friend the Member for North Islington (Dr. Guest), whose speech unfortunately I did not hear, said he had been told that 6-pounder guns had knocked out Tiger tanks. Of course, it is possible that an air gun would kill an elephant, but if my hon. Friend bases his opinion for his own patients on the kind of evidence which he appears to have submitted to the House with regard to tanks, I am very sorry for his patients.
Dr. Guest: I made a joking reference to my hon. Friend's well-known concentration on the tank situation, but I was only relating an incident that actually happened to show the extraordinary gallantry of the soldiers concerned. I was not really attacking my hon. Friend, who, of course, has a monopoly of the tank subject.
Mr. Stokes: That is just where my hon. Friend is wrong. He gets quoted wrongly against me. People do not understand the tone of voice with which things are said in the House and I felt bound to answer him. I approach this tank question from one angle only and that is that men's lives are concerned. Thousands of lives have been lost and tens of thousands have been wounded as the result of the incapacity of responsible people at this end to produce proper tanks and the inefficiency of the weapons that have been produced as compared with what the enemy have. Our tanks, such as they are, work, but the other chap has something that is much better. I thought the right hon. Gentleman passed over the matter much too lightly. He talked about flail tanks. I remember our difficulties in pressing for minesweeper tanks and the trouble the Army had to get them. Where were the flail tanks made? Not here. They were knocked together in workshops at Cairo and Alexandria because the troops could not get them from this end. The right hon. Gentleman did not attempt to tell the House, because he could not, that we have anything comparable either to the Tiger or the Panther. It is all very well to quote messages from Field-Marshal Montgomery. Does he expect Field-Marshal Montgomery to say publicly that all our weapons are rotten? He is in the position the critics have always said the soldiers would be in if we had a Minister of Defence who is also Prime Minister. They have to pay regard to

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what the politicians want to say. They have not any independence of thought at all. I am sorry for Field-Marshal Montgomery for being put in that position, and I am not a bit impressed. I should have been much more impressed had he quoted somebody from the Royal Armoured Corps.
I am reminded of a report I saw—I cannot remember in which paper—of a conversation between Field-Marshal Montgomery and the Prime Minister. It is reported that the Field-Marshal said, "You know, I still don't like the Churchill tank"; to which the Prime Minister replied, "Well, Field-Marshal, it had one or two blemishes on it, before they gave it my name." That is the only report I have heard from Field-Marshal Montgomery on that particular subject. The Secretary of State went on to say that the Tiger is the only tank with a "hotted-up" 88mm. gun—
Sir J. Griģģ: Royal Tiger. The Royal Tiger and Tiger are different.
Mr. Stokes: I know. I meant the Royal Tiger. I have asked a lot of questions about them, and I had not had a decent answer. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say that, as if it was the worst our troops had to meet. It is not. He said nothing about the Panther, with its "hotted-up" 75mm. gun.
Sir J. Griģģ: Yes, I did.
Mr. Stokes: The right hon. Gentleman said very little. He did not give the muzzle velocity, which I understand is 4,500 feet per second. A terrific gun.
Sir J. Griģģ: I said that the penetrative power of the 17-pounder firing conventional shot was better than the penetrative power of the 88mm. of the ordinary Tiger, and better than the 75mm, which is also a "hotted-up" 75mm., of the Panther.
Mr. Stokes: That cannot be stated in understandable figures to this House. Anything can be done with figures. I have spent all my life in engineering concerns and I know how easy it is to deceive your listener with figures. I assure the House, however, that I have never tried to do that in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman went on to talk about the 17-pounder gun, and when
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I interjected and asked whether he really called that a dual-purpose gun, he said "Yes." That is a half truth; it is the worst kind of deception. No gunner will tell you that the r7-pounder gun, as used by the troops to-day, is an effective dual-purpose gun.
Sir J. Griģģ: I will.
Mr. Stokes: But you are not a gunner.
Sir J. Griģģ: Oddly enough, I was in the last war.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member said "You are not a gunner." I was not. I was a cavalry soldier.
Mr. Stokes: I should be surprised, Sir, if an experienced cavalry soldier like yourself would call a 17-pounder gun as it is to-day an effective dual-purpose weapon. As for the Secretary of State for War, his later duties have made him out of date. It is obvious that the 17-pounder, high velocity, shell cannot carry enough explosive. It will take only nine ounces. At least the simple formula should be clear to the House that the volume of the shell varies as the square of the diameter. The 17-pounder gun is put against the 88 mm., firing a 22-lb. shell, which carries about 25 ounces of high explosive.
I do not intend to argue all the details of this case again. I have done it so often before—but I am going on. I propose to read a letter which I received, dated 11th March this year, from a very gallant soldier who is just home, with the D.S.O., and, I think, bar, and the Military Cross. He is in the Royal Armoured Corps. He says:
"Your own qualifications for receiving a letter like this are widely known; my own for writing it are not. I have fought tank actions in seven distinct types of British and American tanks, beginning with tile antediluvian A10's we took to Greece and ending with the Cromwells we took to Normandy on D day. I have myself had 17 tanks knocked out in one way and another, though my survival, I assure you, is in no way attributable to the design of the tank concerned, and been wounded four times. So you see I ought to know what I am talking about.
"For four years now I have been watching shells fired from mine and other tanks bouncing off the front armour of German panzers. I mean actually watching and actually bouncing, and that after we had wriggled and crept and rushed our tanks to within effective range for our weapons. This has meant always that for at least 5,000 yards we have been within the enemy's effective range before we

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could fire a shot that had any hope of success. And then, unless we had somehow managed to get to the side or back of our opponent, we would see our well-aimed shot ricocheting into the air."
"What about the 17-pounder, you ask?" That is what the Secretary of State has been asked to-day.
"I answer that the 17-pounder does not penetrate the front of the German Mk VI or Panther. I was sceptical when my gunners in Normandy told me they had got strikes on the front of the Panther at close range and that it got away. Then a test was held on a captured Panther at 600 yards with a 17-pounder, and boo yards is pretty close. The first shot made a scoop in the oblique plate, the second shot cracked it and did not penetrate, the third shot penetrated …
"You can imagine the thoughts that pass through the heads of every tank crew when they read the extraordinary ballyhoo that originally surrounded the 2-pounder and 6-pounder guns, and the Prime Minister's statement in the House after the invasion of Normandy: 'I am informed by General Montgomery that the 17-pounder will go clean through the Panther.' All our guns will go clean through the side of a Panther. As far as my experience goes none of our anti-tank weapons will penetrate the front of one, unless there is a lucky strike on the driver's visor."
That seems to be unanswerable, from an officer with exceptional experience. The Secretary of State also talked about the speed and manoeuvrability of our new tanks. That is an old, old story. [Interruption.] The Minister should not interrupt. I listened patiently to him without interrupting.
Sir J. Griģģ: I am very sorry the hon. Member was upset. I was agreeing with him.
Mr. Stokes: I assure my right hon. Friend that he is incapable of upsetting me.
Sir J. Griģģ: I said I was agreeing with him.
Mr. Stokes: That is very acceptable. I was just saying what this officer had to say about manoeuvrability. I have always said that the curse of our tank production was the idiocy of putting it in the hands of the motor-car trade, which thinks in terms of high speed and not in terms of guns and armour. This is what he says:
"The facts of the matter are that the German Panther and Tiger tanks are within a few miles per hour as fast as the Sherman, the tank which has made the most spectacular of our break-throughs"—
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this was up to the time of Normandy—
"the only time you would ever need the 40 m.p.h. of the Cromwell is when yours is in headlong flight. Or in a demonstration. … In the close country of Normandy and doubtless the greater part of Europe it is undeniable that the Panther and the Mark VI were far more mobile or tactically manoeuverable than the Cromwell or Sherman. The recent Russian break through from the Vistula to the Oder with tanks at least as heavy and probably heavier than the Tiger and Panther must surely thump the last nail home in the long-delayed coffin of 'fast, lightly armoured tanks.' I cannot believe that it was beyond anybody's contemplation to build a heavy tank that would also go fast; it is a pure matter of weight and horse power ratio."
I apologise to the House if I am quoting at too much length, but it seems to me a very unusual letter. He goes on to say:
"Supposing I was challenged to a duel by a German tank commander, and that I had the choice of weapons. The choice lay between a Mark IV Panther as used in the first year of the war, and a Cromwell, as used for the first time in June, 1944, I would choose the German Mk IV."
It seems to me that is completely damning, though I agree it is a matter of opinion. The Secretary of State for War went on, in his great eulogy of tanks, to talk about the fact that the Churchill and the Cromwell had become grandfathers. I do not know what that means, but it is perfectly true that the Churchill, the latest A22, has got heavy armour on the front where it is wanted. The trouble with the tank is that it was originally designed for a 2-pounder gun, and that is what the public does not know. I remember having a quarrel with the Prime Minister in 1942, when he came down to the House and made a long ex-parte statement at the end of Questions in answer to a question of mine. He told us that the reason why we rushed into production was that we had to have something to defend these shores. The A22, with only a 2-pounder gun, was then put into production at the very time when we had Valentines and Matildas with 2-pounder guns—coming off the production line at 400 a month. The Germans already had Mark IVs—and we in the engineering profession knew that something of the order of the Tiger was about to appear. Yet nothing was done to put us ahead of the Germans. It simply is not good enough for the troops, merely to let the Secretary of State get away with what he said to-day. I came to this House with some considerable doubt as to whether I would speak on the matter at all. I realise it is too late to put things

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right. Had the things been done which we recommended two or three years ago, the situation on the Rhine to-day would be entirely different. I am not going to allow the Secretary of State to give the impression to the troops that we are not sufficiently watchful in this House to contradict what he said.
I am amazed on this issue. We hear great talk of our development and invention, and the difficulties of producing big tanks. Yet the Russians have got bigger and better tanks than the Germans. The Secretary of State for War will not answer Questions when they are put down. He says it is not in the public interest to give the information. What he means is that it is not in the Government's interest to tell the truth—he dare not. Soldiers have asked me whether it is really impossible, with out engineering capacity in this country, for us to have produced in the course of the war, a tank equal to or better than the Tiger. My answer is of course it is possible; I drove a tank in the early days of 1943 with a gun better than the 88 mm. gun. Had that tank been proceeded with—and I wrote and called the attention of the Prime Minister to it, in a letter to which I received only a cursory acknowledgment—we should at least have got something better than the Tiger today, even though we might not have had it in the quantity we desired.
The Secretary of State for War is always applauding the virtues of the Cromwell. I agree that it is a good tank and has good points. But as long ago as 1942 he told us that this was a world-beater, "better than anything the Germans or the Japanese had produced, better than any tank in the world," and that it would have a stirring effect on the war. That was in September, 1942. The first time it was used in action, however, was in Normandy in June, 1944. In February, 1943, I asked if the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to say that in his considered judgment that tank, the A·27, was capable of taking on the German Tiger. He did not answer, but HANSARD records—this is interesting, because HANSARD does not often record these things—that the Secretary of State "indicated assent." It is not true, as every tank officer will tell him. It is astonishing that we never seem able to give the coup de grace in a military affair. I think it is because, both in armour and in armament, our tanks are not adequate for the job. The soldiers
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say that. My right hon. Friend constantly jeers at me that I am the only person who finds deficiencies. He knows, and every Member knows, that the soldiers in the Royal Armoured Corps are constantly complaining. I have a pocket full of letters from people who say, "For Heaven's sake go on! what you say is quite right. Perhaps we shall get something adequate in the end." Why are we never ahead of the enemy, but always lagging behind?
As I said in production Debates, even before the war, it is a fundamental error to separate the production of fighting weapons from the Department concerned. Where would the British Navy be, if the supply of battleships had been handed over to the Ministry of Supply? It is a frightful mistake to allow the weapons which the Army are going to use to be produced by a different Ministry. Trouser buttons, if you like: clothing and that sort of equipment, but not weapons. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend will agree—I was not watching for his nod. Let us be quite fair. I do not blame my right hon. Friend for all this. He has taken over the sins of others. There is a history behind this, for which he is not responsible. When in the past we have got the House of Commons to such a pitch that it is really prepared to discuss tanks, what happens? We are plunged into Secret Session so that the people shall not know the sins of the Government and for no other reason. I have quoted that in Debate before, and I do not mind doing it again, and it is not uninteresting to remember that, on the only day when tanks were debated in this House, the Minister of Defence was inspecting paratroops in the country! I believe there have been two Reports from the Select Committee that were so bad that the Prime Minister suppressed them. The Government dared not allow them to be published—even to the House of Commons.
The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War are both so afraid of the defects that they dare not allow even Members of Parliament to go and see the latest German weapon and compare it with our best. It is a lot of humbug to say that the tank cannot be seen because it is being experimented upon. It is perfectly easy, without experiments all day and every day, to bring a tank along for us to have a look at it or let us go to

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the tank. But the Government dare not do it. They are just afraid of the wrath of the people if such a demonstration were carried out. I am afraid that there has been a great deal of deliberate deception in this matter. What about the two-page illustrated article in a newspaper not so long ago, in which the War Office tried to make out that the A22 (Churchill) was a better tank than the Tiger? What practical man who knows anything about either, would admit that? They have even indulged in the old-time trick of taking a close-up picture of the A.22, and a distant one of the Tiger, so that the A.22 (Churchill) looked bigger and better and headed it:
"Tiger biggest tank in action! Churchill can lick it hollow."
even adding "Outgunned at last," as if the low-velocity 13-pounder on the Churchill were better than the high velocity 22-pounder on the Tiger! I would just remind the House that, in 1943, when the Tank Committee met, the Minister of Production, the Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Supply then told the Committee that there was
"no military demand for a tank to mount a gun capable of matching or outmatching the 88mm. gun on the German Mark VI Tiger tank."
That is simply contrary to what every fighting soldier knows. It has been in all the newspapers that the German name for "the admirable Shermans," is the "Tommy Cooker." I will read part of an American sergeant's letter:—
"The Mark VI has seven inches of armour, and all of our guns except the 90 mm. bounce off its front when it is hit. They have an 88 mm. gun that will pierce 5½ inches of armour at 2,000 yards. The front of our tanks has only 3½ inches of armour. Our tracks are only 16 inches wide, against the Germans' 32 inches."
When the Russian generals came over to the Rhine, and saw a lot of our tanks bogged down in mud because of their narrow tracks, they said that those conditions would have been regarded as favourable on the Eastern front.
I come now to my final point, which is that of the sheer necessity of a proper inquiry into all the circumstances. Thousands of people have lost their lives, and tens of thousands of young men have been wounded. It is all very well for the Secretary of State to laugh it off, but the
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Ministers responsible are, primarily, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Production, and they are the people who have deceived the country and the country should know that they have repeatedly come to the House and have lied.
Sir Patrick Hannon: May I ask my hon. Friend a question?
10.30 p.m.
Mr. Quintin Hoģģ: On a point of Order. The last words of the hon. Member's speech were that two Ministers of the Crown "have repeatedly come to the House and have lied." That is what I understood the hon. Member to say. If he did say that, is it in Order—
Mr. A. Bevan: Let us have an inquiry and see if it is true.
Mr. Speaker: I did not catch the last words of the speech. I was only too glad to hear the end of it.
Mr. A. Bevan: On a point of Order. Is it correct that a Member has said that two Ministers have "come to this House and lied"? If that is correct, there should be an inquiry or a withdrawal. May I also respectfully submit to you, Sir, a point concerning your own statement about the end of the hon. Member's speech? May I submit that the remark made by you is an improper remark for the Speaker to make at the end of any speech? I will put a Motion down on the Paper. It is a perfectly improper statement.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is quite entitled to put a Motion down.
Mr. Bevan: I do feel that it is a perfectly improper statement.
Mr. Speaker: I do feel that at this late hour speeches should be limited in their length.
Mr. Bevan: Further to that point of Order. Very many of us were extremely anxious to hear the speech made by the hon. Member, and many of us are extremely grateful the speech was made. We have decided in this House to meet at a quarter to four in the afternoon—I am talking of the Debate—and I submit that we shall be under very considerable restraint and may be, in fact, inhibited from doing our duties in this House if at the end of speeches Mr. Speaker is

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to use language which rebukes Members for doing their duty in this House.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member can put a Motion down. In the meantime, he is not entitled to make remarks derogatory of the Speaker.
10.35 p.m.
Mr. Turton: There is one remark with which many of us will agree and it is that it is wrong for the War Department not to be responsible for the manufacture of their own weapons and I think it is a matter which will bear far greater attention in the future in the House. I think the account given of the history of the tank has been unfortunate. The hon. Member has paid far too little credit to the achievements of the Cromwell—
Mr. Stokes: I made perfectly clear where my information came from. It came from the people who took part in the fighting.
Mr. Turton: Let me deal with two points I wish to make. First of all the speech of the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Foster), dealing with the 56 days in hospital. I think we all have a good deal of sympathy with that point, but he did not give the Minister credit for the change that has been made. I think I am correct in saying that before 27th February, the man had 3 months in hospital and then got 56 days. That three months has been extended to six months, but I do not think it is yet satisfactory. What is happening really is that a man who is suffering from multiple wounds is being penalised against a man who has got less complicated wounds. I have a constituent in hospital who has been in hospital with multiple wounds for well over six months. As a result, that man, who has served his country for four years, is being penalised compared with another man who has slighter wounds. I ask the Secretary of State to reconsider this matter for I feel that the country expects that, so long as a man is in hospital suffering from his wound, he shall not suffer a diminution in his rate of pay during that time.
The main reason I had for rising was to draw attention to the fact that, great as have been the achievements of the Army, it is a notable fact that the burden and heat of the fighting have been borne by a
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very few. I think that is a failure that has been admitted by my right hon. Friend. It does mean that, somehow, during this war we have skimped the Army of men. The burden has always fallen on the same men. That does require rectification, and I thought the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) did an ill service to the House, when he suggested that we should not send many men into the Far East. I gathered that the explanation of his speech was that he was trying to dissuade men from service in the Army, and especially from service in the Far East. I hope that will not be the policy of His Majesty's Government. Do not let us throw the burden of the fighting in Burma on a few units. Let us spread the burden on as many units as possible, so that all can have a proper rest.
Mr. Bellenger: If I understand my hon. Friend aright he suggests that I am trying to subvert the Army from their duty. That was not my purpose. It was to call attention to the lack of method adopted by the Secretary of State for War to get men otherwise than by conscription.
Mr. Turton: My object has been amply served. The hon. Gentleman made a speech which, in my view, was subverting men in the Army from their discipline. I am glad to have his refutation. If he reads his speech in HANSARD to-morrow, he will see that that appeared to be the case. If we are to bear the burden of more units in the future, I think the right hon. Gentleman has to get a greater comb-out, both from the other Services and also in the Army. I have noticed from my experience in the war how some commanders in the field have combed-out their services more than others. I could think of notable examples where commanders have gone through their services in the backward areas, and out of those services have made fighting formations to take part in the battle. I believe the example of these commanders should be followed universally in the Army. I am quite sure that there has been an economy of manpower in a great many of the theatres of war, but it is my experience that there has been in these theatres at times a great wastage of manpower. I have known Cairo for two years and during that time there was a terrible waste of manpower whilst the Army in the field was dependent on one or two divisions.

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I have seen a mushroom growth of new services often with long alphabetical pseudonyms, and usually belonging to some of the minor branches of intelligence. There are far too many of these so-called units.
The one remark of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War with which I disagreed was that in which he tried to make a comparison between economies of man-power and economies of welfare. One does not lead to the other; it is rather the opposite. You find a good commander who economises in man-power is usually able to give far better welfare to his troops than those who are extravagant in man-power and I do think we should do more in this direction to economise in man-power. But if we are short of man-power, this is the time to think more of morale. If we are dealing with a few units, let us see that those units are at fighting pitch for as long a period as possible and that does mean that the Adjutant General's Branch of the War Department has to try to keep units together and he has also to pay more attention than is paid to-day to the geographical arrangement of units. I do not want to use the phrase "territorial"—it may be misunderstood—but men will fight better together if they are drawn from the same area of England.
Mr. MacLaren: And Scotland.
Mr. Turton: I left out Scotland because I think the Director of Infantry makes it quite unnecessary to refer to it. There is no reason why in future years we should not have our fighting divisions related to some area or territory. I think the Regular Army has paid too little attention to that territorial spirit in the fighting formations. The time has come when that must be introduced.
In the war establishments of units you have got always provision made for first reinforcements. Throughout this war I have found first reinforcements and what used to.be called "L.O.B." in North Africa have been completely misused. The first reinforcements should be used as a relieving company, so that when a battalion had been in the line for a long time, you could draw one company out and rest it and put in first reinforcements. In my experience of the Army, we did not
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have reinforcements, or if we had, they were far behind and used for another purpose as in 194o. I think the time has come not to review these matters having in view the finish of the German war and also the operations in Burma. We want to carry on our campaign with a maximum economy of manpower, and also with the greatest incentive to the morale of the fighting troops that has been ably demonstrated during the last 12 months.
10.45 p.m.
Mr. John Dugdale: Many Members have paid tribute to the Army during to-day's Sitting but I think the greatest tribute this House has paid is the fact that such a large number of Members is present at such a late hour. I would like to say how much I agree with Members who have suggested that the Army should go in for a greater degree of publicity. I have been impressed recently by reading about Remagen detailed accounts showing the actual unit that first saw the bridge, the actual captain of the company, where he came from, and what sort of man he was and everything about it. One got a complete picture of it as one would not get by a simple recounting such as one usually gets with the case of our own regiments. I would like to say, although perhaps it might not be quite diplomatic, that if at all strategically possible, the next time we advance, it would be well to see whether the Americans can hold the hinge, while we do the more spectacular advances.
The right hon. gentleman the Secretary of State of War mentioned that we had captured, since D-Day, 1,000,000 prisoners of war. I want to ask what we are doing with these prisoners of war. Recent events have disturbed Members of all parties. I do not speak only of the escape of certain officers in South Wales or near the Forest of Dean. We all know that officers can escape from prisons from time to time, and that there can be mistakes and I am not prepared to say that the people who were running this particular camp were guilty of any great negligence. But I am, and many other Members are, concerned at the far more serious incident that took place when one, two or three German prisoners, anti-Nazis, were beaten up and severely injured by violent Nazi German prisoners. In his reply to questions on 20th February the Secretary of State for War said that some of the prisoners at this camp

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in Canning Town had been treated by the camp doctor and none died or were admitted to hospital. I would like to inform hon. Members that since that reply one has died. Secondly that there was no British doctor present at this camp; that the only doctors there were German doctors; that these doctors were Nazis and that they refused to treat the non-Nazis.
That is the situation at one camp. Is it due to lack of supervision? I am not so certain that it is. I think it is due to a "don't care" attitude, an attitude which I think was expressed when the right hon. gentleman replied that it did not very much matter whether one set of Germans killed another set, they were all equally bad and nothing could be done to make the killers into war criminals. I hope that there will be no "grilling," as it is called, of members of the Forces connected with prisoners of war camps as a result of anything I say. When the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) asked a question recently, I am informed there was "grilling" and personnel who, it was thought, might have had contact with him, were called up before commanding officers and asked, "Did you give this information? If so, why; what right had you to give it?" That is something that we as Members of Parliament cannot possibly stand for.
What is the system of administration in our prisoner of war camps? I should suppose, first of all, that they are divided into different sections composed of different kinds of prisoners—good, bad, and indifferent prisoners. But not at all. They are simply divided into groups of from 1,500 men. These groups are represented by what is called the lager fuehrer, and the lager fuehrer is chosen, not because he is the most democratic, the least unpleasant German. He is chosen because he is the most Nazi and the best disciplinarian. You will find in camp after camp groups of 1,500 men whose sole method of communication with the British authorities is through a man who is known as a Nazi leader, who has been picked out for many years as a Nazi leader, and who is there to preserve discipline. What powers has that man got? He has very great powers. He sits, in many camps, in the orderly room, or in the company office with the officer in command who may be a subaltern or a captain; and with him there is a sergeant.
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The men are brought up before this Nazi leader and they are brought up charged with certain crimes. One might assume the crime is insubordination to a British officer or British n.c.o. But the crime with which the men are frequently charged is insubordination to a German n.c.o. and the German n.c.o.'s are in the majority of cases members of the Nazi Party. These men are brought up charged with these crimes and sentence is then passed by the Nazi officer. I admit that it is possible for the British n.c.o. to alter a sentence; it is quite possible for him to remit the whole sentence. But in fact the attitude often taken is: "It is a good thing for these men to keep camp discipline. They order these chaps about, and it is a good thing for one German to keep these other Germans in order." I submit that is not the best way of running our prisoner of war camps or inducing Germans to cease upholding the Nazi régime.
What remedies are there? What remedies can we suggest? I would suggest in the first place that the Nazis be separated into different groups. There might be Nazis in one; there might be anti-Nazis in another; and in the third group there might be those people who form the great majority—thoroughly stupid, very often sullen German soldiers, who are neither Nazi or anti-Nazi, but are just stupid and go whichever way any leader takes them. Unfortunately, during the past five or ten years the leader has been a Nazi. I would suggest that they should be taken out of the hands of the Nazi leaders who are to-day moulding them in the wrong shape, and put into sections where, I believe, it would be possible to mould them into better shape.
Viscount Hinchinģbrooke: Does the hon. Member's suggestion call for more British guards or less?
Mr. Duģdale: It may call for more British guards. I am told one of the objections is the question of space. That was the objection raised by the right hon. Gentleman. As to the question of space, my information is that there is plenty of space in prisoner of war camps. It might be necessary to provide a certain amount of tents and certainly an amount of barbed wire. One thing that would

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prevent the War Office from doing it, would be a great deal more trouble. It may take a certain number more troops to do it, but I would submit that the job is well worth doing. I would suggest also that it is very unfortunate that there is such a shortage of British interpreters. It is unfortunate that a man who wants to tell the officer in charge about difficulties, or to explain anything, may have to go to a German interpreter rather than to a British interpreter, because there are not sufficient British interpreters. The German interpreter may entirely misinterpret them. I know hon. Members on the other side will say it is quite impossible and useless and that there is no point in thinking about these Germans at all. I would suggest, on the contrary, that this job of looking after prisoner of war camps is worth while. It may not be so spectacular, and may not contribute so much to the war effort—or, rather, may not appear to—as many other more spectacular works we have heard about to-day. But, at the same time, it may contribute a great deal to lay the foundations of peace. The right hon. Gentleman paid great tribute to the Army, and I think it would be discourteous if one did not say that some of the tribute should go to the Secretary of State for War himself, who has been head of the Army during its victories. I would ask him in his reply to deal with our prisoner of war camps. In so doing he may not only be doing yet more to help to win the war but may be doing something to help to lay the foundations of peace.
10.59 p.m.
Mr. R. J. Taylor: What I have to say is rather different.from what we have been discussing in recent speeches. But I do want to pay my tribute to the men in the Army. The Army's day has come behind those of the Navy and Royal Air Force, but I am sure our men, had they been in the Air Force or the Navy, would have been equal to the men in those Services in doing their duty. I want to say a word about the men in India and in Burma, not in regard to their services in the actual fighting, but as the heroes they are. I believe when the tale is told of what our men have done in Burma, there will be nothing finer in the world's history of warfare. May I say a word or two about the treatment of the men
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proceeding to the front and after they get there? With regard to the troopship, I recognise that it must be a very difficult job to give comfort, spaciousness and good treatment to men in troopships, but there are, I understand, very considerable complaints so far as the private soldiers are concerned. I have a little experience of this, because, a long time ago, I went to Australia, and while I did not work my passage I went steerage. I, therefore, have some idea of the position of the men who are travelling practically steerage. When the ship is divided off for first and second class, there is not much room left for the men. Something should be done as to feeding and the mess deck arrangements. Would it not be possible, with the limited space there is, to let the men have, at least, a dining room and cafeteria, and, above all, to let them have some deck space for exercise and entertainment?
Another thing—and I want to proceed as rapidly as I can—is the accommodation in the troop trains in India. Some of the journeys are very long, anything from 5 days to 10 days. I have information from a young man, in whom I have the most implicit confidence, who says that some of his journeys have taken five to seven days. The accommodation for these men is simply abominable. I see that the Secretary for War indicates that he agrees with me. I have been on trains in America three or four days and I know what it means to be so long on a train even with comforts; but on these trains I understand that there are no sanitary arrangements for the men. If they want to make tea they have to get hot water from the engine. The only water they have for ordinary use, shaving and that sort of thing, is the water they get during the day. In a hot climate, when they want a bath, they have to go to the second or first class when the tanks are being filled and if the attendant is kindly disposed he puts a shower on them.
I want to speak now about the canteens. I understand that there is no N.A.A.F.I. East of Suez. What is happening there?
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Major Milner): I am sorry. It is my fault, but I should not have allowed the hon. Member to proceed on that topic. This Vote is exclusive of India. There will be other opportunities of dealing with India.
Mr. Taylor: I have made my point. We look upon the Secretary of State for War as a man who is prepared to stand up to anybody or anything, and it seems a pity that our boys, when they go there, have to pass into somebody else's hands, seeing that the right hon. Gentleman apparently agrees with me that the conditions are abominable. I feel that he should follow these lads through and see that they get correct treatment.
There was a very sad tragedy not far from my constituency a couple of months ago in which ten young men were drowned. There was an inquest, but there was no criminal charge, according to the coroner—a very wise and capable man for whom I have the greatest respect—against anyone. Eighteen young men who had been in the Army just a month or two began practising crossing a river in a wooden structure covered with canvas, and very light—and needing very special skill even under more or less normal conditions. But on the day this happened there was one of the biggest floods there has been for many years. A short distance away from where the accident happened there was a weir. There is a bend in the river, and the river hi flood takes the weight of the water to the side. Underneath the weir—about a 11 ft. or 12 ft. drop—there is a pool from which stones were quarried when building the weir. The weir is about 70 yds. long, and the pool 30 ft. to 40 ft. deep by 30 ft. to 40 ft. wide, and these lads having been instructed how to paddle over lost control and went over the weir and were drowned.
There is, as I say, no criminal charge and I am not making any now. But to take young men and give them instructions how to cross there, without placing any qualified person in the boat with them to ensure that they would cross, shows there has been a great dereliction of duty. A serious lack of judgment was shown in allowing a state of affairs like that to continue. To me it seems like taking a number of young men and giving them instructions how to swim and then telling them to get into a considerable depth of water and chancing that they would be able to swim on the instructions they have received. Surely when we have not all the man-power we require to-day it is more than ever necessary that we should cherish it and be careful to ensure that the young men we do get will be able to fulfil
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the purpose for which they joined the Service.
One last question in regard to this accident. The coroner made the suggestion that, in circumstances like this, there should be a rope across the river, so that if boys were not able to manage, or lost control, at least they would be able to grasp this rope and thereby save their lives. A representative of the War Office promised to pass this on. I would like an assurance that this arrived at the War Office and a further assurance that it will be carried out, because I can assure the House and those who know this river as I do—and I know it like the back of my hand—that this tragedy—it was nothing less—created a very great feeling of despondency and not too high an appreciation of the judgment of those who have young men's lives in their hands.
11.9 p.m.
Captain Duncan: I do not propose to embarrass the Secretary of State for War by making any more complimentary references to his speech. He has always been sharp and direct and has had a great story to tell, and, what is more, he has made the Army popular in the eyes of the world. I do not want to detract in any way from that popularity which he has so successfully achieved. If I raise certain criticisms to-night they are criticisms of detail and will not in any way affect the popularity of the Army in the country, but there are things which are pinpricks. They are local and all constituency matters. The first is a very small point but one of importance to the people concerned. It is a question of shirts for Army cadet officers. Naval cadet officers and air force cadet officers can wear their Service shirts in civil life. The sea cadet officers have white shirts and the air cadet officers have blue shirts, and they can be worn with ordinary civilian clothes. The Army cadet officers are not in that position. Borough engineers or business men cannot wear a khaki shirt and collar with their civilian clothes and it has been represented to me that the issue on repayment of an army shirt, officer type, with collar and tie coupon-free to army cadet officers would be a very great assistance to these people, who, after all, are giving their time voluntarily without any form of pay and with no hope of reward. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to

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look into that, and if possible to give a satisfactory answer.
The next thing on my list is that I hope that cadets themselves will have their clothing issue reconsidered. I have in my hand an order from the County of London Cadet Committee regarding a football match between the County of London Army Cadet Corps and the City of Lanark Army Cadet Corps. In the course of that order, the County of London Committee state that khaki overcoats will be worn, and that uniforms must be correct in all details. That raises two questions. Uniform, correct in all detail, means boots and anklets, not shoes, but the Army cadets have no issue of boots and unless a boy happens to have boots he is not in a position to turn out in full uniform. I know the position regarding boots is difficult but I would like to ask my right hon. Friend whether it would be possible to have a pool of boots for these special occasions. The same applies to overcoats. Army cadets are not issued with overcoats, while "khaki overcoats will be worn," says the order. It is an impossible order to carry out. How is a boy to get a khaki overcoat? He is not allowed to have one issued to him. If he borrows his father's from the Home Guard it will have to be cut down and that is contrary to Home Guard orders. If he borrows that of his brother, home on leave from the Services his brother may have to go back, perhaps to France, without the overcoat. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider the question again of issuing overcoats, or if cadets cannot have overcoats issued to them, that there shall be a pool held by the County Cadet Committees or the Territorial Association, so that they can be drawn upon on special occasions when overcoats are wanted.
The last point is a rather different one, affecting the Regulars. I propose to go with some detail into a special case to illustrate the difficulty I have found with cases of releases. There have been great delays and I think there must be a great deal of overlapping between the Government Departments concerned. If I give details of this case it is not the only one, because I have others under notice at the moment. But I think this case a particularly bad one and therefore I bring it to the notice of the House and my right hon. Friend in the hope that we can get
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this thing cleared up and more efficiently run in future. Private Schneider, who is British and is a constituent of mine, was employed to the extent of 90 per cent. in working for the Ministry of Supply in making Sherman tank parts.
I visited this factory to-day. They are still employed to the extent of 90 per cent. For the other 10 per cent. they are making jacks for R.A.F. aeroplanes and kitchen units for the Ministry of Works. In other words, the firm which is a small one and employs about 25 people is wholly employed on working on essential work, 90 per cent. for the Services itself and Mr. Schneider is the owner of this small works. He was called up about a year ago. At that time he applied for deferment on the grounds that he had to attend to his business which was entirely on war work, but that was turned down. On 22nd September he applied for his release. I should explain that during the time he was away there was another man who was a technical assistant who was not only looking after his business but a whole lot of other businesses and all that happened was that this other man visited the factory occasionally and also looked after the books. This man has got so busy now that he can no longer look after the books and the only man in charge who is now called the works manager, but in fact, is a foreman. Although he is a very nice fellow, he cannot attend to the books, the accounting or correspondence. His application for release was turned down in December.
The first question I want to ask is why on earth he was turned down when he was working 100 per cent. on war work and 90 per cent. for the War Office working on Sherman tank parts which the War Office itself wants. Why did the War Office turn it down? The War Office and the Ministry of Supply between them surely could have overcome any objections of the Ministry of Labour. Then on 9th January the Soldiers and Sailors Help Society appealed to me. I made inquiries and wrote to the Ministry of Supply and asked them three questions—whether the original application was strongly supported by the Ministry of Supply, what the reasons were for turning the original application down, and whether the Ministry of Supply had appealed against the first decision. And this is the answer I got from the right

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hon. Gentleman, the Minister of Supply. The application was strongly supported by his Ministry, the War Office would not give the reasons why the application was turned down and that he had already appealed. It was obviously in the interests of the War Office that this man should be released from the R.A.O.C. So I then wrote to the War Office.
The Ministry of Supply letter was on the 12th of February and on 7th March the P.P.S. to the Secretary of War wrote as follows:
"So far there is no trace of any appeal in regard to this matter."
I do not understand what has happened but I am told that the appeal usually goes from the Ministry of Supply to the Ministry of Labour and the War Office.
Here is a case of a man making tank parts which the Secretary of State wants. The Minister of Supply strongly supports this application and has appealed—God knows where the appeal has got to—but he has appealed. Surely it is in their own interest to appeal in this case and see if something cannot be done. On the merits of the case I would only add that Pte. Schneider is 41 years old, and medical category C2, which means he has to be employed indoors. He is employed in an ordnance depot doing work that an A.T.S. would do better. I can see, therefore, no reason why if the War Office want tank parts they should not release this man forthwith and see that they get their tank parts and to see that this man is released to do far better national service than he could ever do with his age and medical category in the army.
I do hope my right hon. Friend will deal with this case as expeditiously as possible. These are relatively minor matters where perhaps the machine has got clogged up and is overworked but this particular case seemed to me to be a grievance which it is my privilege but it is my duty at this stage on the Army estimates to raise.
11.43 p.m.
Mr. Driberģ: I do not think it is at all a bad thing that the House should show on this first day of the return to normal hours of sitting, that it will not shirk working overtime on such an important subject as the Army. The Secretary of State has had a very
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long day. I pay him my tribute for the patience, punctuated only occasionally by perhaps natural manifestations of impatience, with which he has sat through a large number of speeches. But I am hopeful, late though the hour is, that he will be able to give us more than a perfunctory reply, a fairly detailed and thorough reply, to some of the speeches we have heard to-night.
One speech which contained rather serious allegations, which should be answered, was that of the hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) concerning recent incidents in prisoner of war camps. -The hon. Member for West Bromwich made two particular charges which I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to deal with. The first charge was that the right hon. Gentleman had misled the House when, in answer to a question by me, he said that a man had not died as a result of the disturbance in the camp at Canning Town; and the second of these charges was that following that question by me a number of the officers and men employed in that camp were had up before the commanding officer and "grilled"—put through an interrogation—as to whether they had supplied the information to Members of this House or not. These are two quite serious charges, as it seems to me, and I hope, the right hon. Gentleman will deal with them when he comes to wind up this Debate.
I presume that he will be dealing with the very long but, I must say, extremely interesting speech of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes). I have no technical knowledge whatever on the subject of tanks and I cannot speak about them as hon. Members on this side and that side of the House have done. All I know is that I have actually seen some of our tanks in action and certainly the most inspiring memory of my life is the memory of having been privileged, last 17th September, to be with the Guards Armoured Division—even though only as a spectator or recorder—on that memorable Sunday afternoon when they broke out of their bridgehead in Holland and advanced up that straight road towards Eindhoven. One of the memories that remain with me from that day is of the sombre sight, towards sundown, of a large number of our tanks blazing on each side of the road—"brewed up," in the jargon of the Royal Armoured Corps.

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It was a terrible spectacle. It was a grim as well as a splendid day, and the only reason that I mention it now is because, à propos of the speech of the hon. Member for Ipswich, I felt bound to report to the House what some of those particular tank crews did think about this matter. I talked to a number of officers and men of the Guards Armoured Division on that day and the following days in Holland. I know the right hon. Gentleman himself will not suspect me of being a blind follower of the hon. Member for Ipswich. In many respects, perhaps in most respects, I differ from the hon. Member, but on this particular issue of tanks, I am bound to report that those officers and men were 100 per cent. supporters of him. They were not Left Wing mischief-makers, or any thing of that kind. Hon. Members opposite will know that such types are not frequent among the officers of the Guards' Armoured Division; they were what might be called "pukka" Guards Club types. They asked questions about the hon. Member for Ipswich. They said: "What is this chap Stokes really like? He seems to be a pretty good so-and-so in some ways, but he is dead right about tanks." I merely pass that information on, from those men on the spot, for what it is worth.
That brings me to the main point I wanted to raise—the facilities granted to war correspondents with the fighting forces at the front. As the right hon. Gentleman may remember, I did intend at one time to raise this matter on the Adjournment; but, for various reasons that I need not go into, it was postponed, and it was postponed for so long that my first-hand information on the subject was no longer topical. Moreover, I heard that the situation had considerably improved over on the other side, and therefore I did not raise it on the Adjournment. However, it now becomes topical again and reasonable, I hope, to raise it, because I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether sufficient steps have been taken to make sure that there is enough technical equipment and everything else that is necessary to cope with a situation which might arise in Germany similar to that which arose during that great sweep forward up to Brussels and Antwerp. The trouble for the war correspondents, who have done and are doing quite an important job, arose en-
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tirely, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, from the tremendous speed of that advance. The necessary technical facilities and equipment were left far behind, and it was very difficult to catch up with the speed of the armies. Supposing a similar situation arises now, as it may, during the victorious Allied advance into Germany, has anything been done since last September to improve and make more ample the transmission facilities?
On 3rd October I asked the right hon. Gentleman two questions on this matter arising from my own direct personal experience as a war correspondent. Unfortunately, they were not reached orally, and therefore I only got written answers, which are never the most satisfactory kind of answers. One of the questions I asked him was about the censorship and the lack of uniformity of practice between the two almost rival groups of censors, the field censorship in Belgium and the censorship at S.H.A.E.F. headquarters, which were at that time in England. I pointed out in my question that details of the progress of operations had been simultaneously stopped by the field censorship in Brussels and released by S.H.A.E.F. in England, with the result that messages from correspondents were obsolete by the time they reached the newspaper offices. The right hon. Gentleman replied:
"In view of the speed of the advance of the British Second Army, particularly from the Seine to the Scheldt, and the consequent strain on communications some unevenness in censorship was unavoidable."
From experience on the spot I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that his word "unevenness" is one of his most momentous meioses. He went on to say that instances of this would be reduced as far as possible. I also asked the right hon. Gentleman if he was aware that, owing to repeated failures of communication and transmission, war correspondents serving with the Second Army had been unable to report adequately the operation in Holland; and if he would endeavour to afford fuller facilities to the public relations service concerned.
I am not going to labour the details of the inadequacies of transmission facilities at that time, because that was in September and it was improved considerably a few weeks after that; but I do want to guard, so far as we can, against the possibility of the same thing happening if there is a very rapid sweep forward into the

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centre of Germany, because it is very important that the story of such an advance should be told fully and promptly. Merely by way of illustration in passing, to show how bad things were at that time, I will mention that transmission from Brussels began on or about 4th September, and that from the eighth to the nineteenth of that month, according to the Public Relations staff themselves, transmission was satisfactory on two days only. The great operation at Arnhem and the simultaneous land operation towards Eindhoven started on the afternoon of Sunday, 17th September. That was obviously one of the great stories of the war from the point of view of glorifying the British Army, which is, after all, the point of this debate to-day and the Secretary of State's speech to-day. Yet on the next day, 18th September, no fewer than 30,000 words which had been filed by war correspondents in Belgium were still held up at 7 o'clock in the evening, not transmitted to the London offices—with the result that the British public did not get as complete or as prompt a picture of that great operation as they could have had.
It is not a matter of the convenience or the comfort of the newspapers or war correspondents that I am concerned with. That, obviously, does not matter. Nor is it particularly a question of the information of the public here, though I think that that is rather more important: I think the public are entitled to claim as full a picture as the security people can release of these great operations in which so many millions of their relatives are concerned. It is not that. It is because I think that there is a tremendous political importance in getting in its correct historical perspective now, not only in this country but throughout the world, the great part played by the British Army in the liberation of Europe. It would be disastrous if either now or a year hence or ten years hence it could be said in Europe—in Belgium, in Russia, or in America, or anywhere else—that the British Army had only played a very minor and subsidiary role in the liberation of Europe. It is because I believe that the job the war correspondents are doing, and can do, contributes quite a lot towards the total picture that I am asking that the right hon. Gentleman should give us some guarantee that as the armies sweep into Germany the fullest possible facilities will be given them for transmitting their stories
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and for getting them censored as speedily and as uniformly as possible.
11.37 p.m.
Mr. Huģh Lawson: As is both natural and proper on the Army Estimates, the Debate has ranged both wide and long. I wish to refer to one particular subject, and I do so because it is something which will concern the Army very considerably this year. The Army will have to face a task in the next twelve months it has not had to face in any of the other war years, and I hope it will acquit itself with as much success as we have had recounted to us this afternoon by the Secretary of State for War. The task the Army will have to face is the fact that there will be in the next twelve months a general election while a very large number of men will still be in the Forces. I believe it is the wish of all Members of this House that those in the Forces, for whom we have gone to some trouble to provide them with facilities for voting, should be able to exercise their rights in that election in the best possible manner. As far back as 9th March last the Financial Secretary to the War Office did say in this House:
"In the past special instructions about political activities have been issued on the eve of a general election when the vast majority of the men in the Services are affected. This will be done on the eve of the next general election. I can assure the House that, consistent with the reasonable requirements of discipline and with the interests of the Service, the fullest opportunity will be given for all Service personnel to exercise their rights as citizens for election purposes."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1944, Vol. 397, col. 2352.]
I put one question to the Secretary of State to which I would like a reply: when do the Government intend to announce to the House their plans for the fulfilment of this promise given by the Financial Secretary? I do not expect the Secretary of State to do so to-night, but I would be glad if he would give some indication when this important matter is to come forward.
I believe if the men in the Forces are to be able to exercise their rights as citizens in the election, two things will have to be done. First there will have to be some relaxation or modification of King's Regulations and various A.C.I. that have been issued and, secondly, I believe there will have to be a different spirit and a different approach to this

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question both in the War Office and also in some Commands. As an illustration of the way in which the existing regulations have been interpreted and may be interpreted, I wish to refer to an example which is very well-known to hon. Members—the Cairo Parliament of which there has been some discussion in this House. I wish to refer to it as an example and also because I do not believe that the full story of that Parliament has been yet disclosed to the House. If some of the things I have to say are already known I must apologise to hon. Members.
This, as the House will recollect, started off in a venture which was called "Music for All" in Cairo some time in 1944 and in this Parliament, which was attended both by service personnel and civilians, there were at first no parties. There was a pro-nationalisation "government" and anti-nationalisation "opposition" and by large majorities this government introduced and passed "bills," one called the "Distributive Trades (Nationalisation) Bill" and another the "Inheritance Restriction Bill." It happened that an ex-Conservative Member of Parliament was attending this forum and he complained that there must be some secret Left Wing movement organising the Parliament if they passed "bills" of this sort. After consultation with the area Army authorities, a general election was held with the following result: Labour was returned with 119; Common Wealth 55; Liberals 38; and Conservatives 17. That meant that the people returned for the Labour Party were to form a "government" and on 1st March this "government" led by a private of the R.A.P.C. presented the "King's Speech." It is interesting to note that in the period between the election and the "King's Speed'," a Lance-Corporal Hunt, who had been "Prime Minister," had been posted away from Cairo.
We will pass on. It was only after the results of the election were known that there was any opposition from the Army authorities to this venture and the area commander, Brigadier J. L. Chrystall, issued instructions to Dr. Worth Howard, the voluntary literary director, an American citizen, that no civilians or reporters were to be allowed in at any further meetings of the Parliament, and
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this was agreed to by the committee concerned for their next meeting, which was to be on 5th April last year. A few hours before that meeting Brigadier Chrystall saw Dr. Worth Howard and produced a completely new set of rules which among other things provided that the word "Parliament" was not to be used, and the proceedings were to be conducted under military control. These are the exact words of the instructions:
"This is simply an insurance that no violent political propaganda occurs."
When asked for an example of what constituted "violent political propaganda" the example given was that if the "Chancellor of the Exchequer" in introducing his "Nationalisation of Finance Bill" attacked landlords, that would be taken as violent political propaganda. It was further pointed out that the War Office had already inquired about the Parliament, which was not quite the same story as that given in this House when the Secretary of State gave us to understand that the suppression of this Parliament had come from Cairo and not from this end. Anyway, Dr. Worth Howard refused to communicate these rulings to the Committee, and so an Army officer attended at this meeting and read these instructions out, which, as is known to this House, led to a spontaneous protest on the part of all parties in this "Parliament." That finished the whole thing off, because when the next meeting took place no one turned up. From that time the people who had been mostly concerned with this venture were quietly posted away from Cairo.
I do wish to stress this affair as an example of the spirit which was found both in the War Office and in some commands which is quite contrary to the statement made by the Financial Secretary which I quoted. I wish to quote as a further example the case of Captain Gilbert Hall, who was at this time an officer in the Army Education Corps in Cairo. Captain Hall, as well as being an officer in the Army, was a member of the Party to which I belong. He had already contested one by-election unsuccessfully, and he is now an adopted Common Wealth candidate for a constituency. He had been a member of the committee of the Cairo Forces Parliament. On 26th April he received from the Education Officer-in-Chief M.E.F. a letter referring to the Parliament which stated:

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"I must ask you to refrain from taking any part in its activities."
Why this should be I cannot for the life of me see. That brings us to 26th April. [Interruption.] I am bringing this example to the notice of some Members who appear to think it is not a matter of some importance. But I think it is. It affects the privileges of this House, for among other things Captain Hall cabled to an hon. Member of this House, the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt), about this matter, and although it was accepted by the censor in Cairo and actually forwarded to the Member concerned, apparently after it was forwarded, an attempt was made by the authorities in Cairo to stop it, because they told Captain Hall that the cable had been stopped, although in fact it went through. As well as sending this cable, Captain Hall wrote to two hon. Members of this House, the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith and the hon. Member for Eddisbury (Mr. Loverseed), about the Cairo Parliament. At this time the hon. Member for Eddisbury was a member of the National Committee of Common Wealth. Since then he has followed the example of the present: Prime Minister and changed his party. He was a member of the same party as this officer who was a Parliamentary candidate. This officer was refused permission to send this letter to his colleague, who was a member of the National Committee of his own party. The substance of the letter was that he was disclosing to his colleague that he (Captain Hall) had received this letter from Colonel T. St. J. Anderson, Education Officer-in-Chief M.E.F. on 13th May, 1944, as follows:
"You will not deliver any lecture, nor will you assist in the organisation or proceedings of any Discussion group, Debate or similar activity without reference to, and permission from this G.H.Q. while you are stationed in Middle East Command "
I think that is a monstrous, unlawful command to give to any officer. It would mean, for instance, that he was not allowed to take part in any discussion group which might be discussing religion, or philosophy or anything you like. After he had been given this instruction, when he did apply for permission to give lectures these permissions were refused. The result was that while there was never any complaint about his efficiency or capabilities in the end Captain Hall was called upon to resign his commission be-
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cause of his political opinions, which he did. I am quite sure that people who use their military authority for political persecution of this kind are not really fitted to see that at the time of the general election there is a reasonable opportunity for those who are still in the Forces to exercise their rights.
Since that day have things got better or worse? I personally think they have got worse. I think there has been a tightening up of regulations on this matter. There was the one quoted by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes)—the order with regard to the Middle East to which he referred. There is another one, A.C.I. 1537, 1944, which I propose to read:
"All ranks will be warned not to permit their names or their opinions on service matters to be published for political purposes, nor to add their signatures, nor to permit their names to be added to public petitions, circulars and affairs dealing with political matters. Any officer or soldier who permits his name to be so used may be held to have contravened one of the following regulations: K.R. 1940, 530, 541, 547."
Regulation 530 refers to the redress of grievances within the unit. Obviously that cannot apply to public petitions for instance relating to the payment of family allowances to the mother; 541 is well known, dealing with the affairs of any political organisation; 547 entirely refers to communicating military information to the Press and it seems that all this is really threatening Service personnel with action which cannot be justified on the parts of the Army Act to which it refers. I and other Members of this House have on former occasions asked the War Office that there should be a relaxation of the present regulations on general grounds and on what we believe to be the rights of a citizen Army. I believe that there is widespread persecution of people holding Left Wing views in the Army. Time and time again I have come across traces of what can only be described as persecution and victimisation and I desire that before a General Election there will be a thorough examination of this matter so that the House can be told what relaxations are going to be made so that these Servicemen and women who are going to take part in the election may do it in a really free and democratic way.
11.56 p.m.
Sir J. Griģģ: I can only speak with the leave of the House, and at this very

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late hour I have got only a very small ration of voice, and in any case if I tried to answer one-tenth of the points of infinite detail which have been raised, I should be here and the House would be here until to-morrow morning at breakfast time. Accordingly, I can deal with only a limited number of points and for the rest all I can say is I will look through HANSARD, or cause it to be looked through, and if there are any points which ought to be dealt with, I shall attend to them.
Let me thank those Members who have made kind remarks about my speech. I am all the more grateful for the remarks of those who have praised the Army and, in particular, the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. J. J. Lawson). I should like to thank him very much for his tribute to the Army which he knows so well. He raised the question of greater publicity for the Army, and I entirely agree with him. I have no doubt whatever that we have made mistakes in this matter from time to time, but until the end of the German war, the full story of the censorship and all the names of the formations and units cannot be told. But when the story can be told, it will be seen that there has been a great deal more to be said for the censorship, than is yet known. Even so, I am prepared to believe that we have been, from time to time, a bit sticky. But even then we have done a great deal more than Members seem to realise over this particular operation which has now just concluded with the closing up of the Armies to the Rhine.
I have in my hand a list of some 18 or 20 units whose names have been published as taking part in the operation, and I know that three or four divisions have been mentioned so I think there has been a great deal of exaggeration about the unwillingness of the authorities to let the information out. In any case, as I have said in reply to a Question to-day, I have sent exhortations to commanders-in-chief from time to time on this subject. It has however quite often happened—it happened in this last operation, and over the whole of the Normandy operation—that there was assigned to the British a very much less spectacular role than there was to the Americans, and no doubt war correspondents have been looking for the more spectacular operations. Even when all
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is said and done, I think, at this period of the war, deception and cover are clearly of much less importance than it was in the early days after D-Day, and I hope names will be more forthcoming. But if that does happen I hope that the Press and war correspondents will do their bit in the matter and talk about British soldiers and write about British soldiers even in their unspectacular days.
Mr. Driberģ: They do try to.
Sir J. Griģģ: I know all about that. The hon. Member for Chester-le-Street raised some questions about the A.T.S. One particular point was whether friends could be sent together and units together. I had intended to read what I said on this subject in the original Debate at which the hon. Member was not present as he was in Italy.
Mr. Stokes: Where is he now?
Sir J. Griģģ: I had dealt with that in the original Debate saying we would try to send friends together and, in the rare cases where it was practicable, units together. This has now been embodied in the instructions which have been sent out.
The hon. Member for North Islington (Dr. Haden Guest) reminded me of one of the things I had left unsaid and undone, that is to pay a tribute to the doctors and the medical services. There is no doubt that they have been beyond praise in this war and the number of lives and limbs saved by the devotion of doctors is almost beyond measuring. In the newspapers the other day there was, as the House will remember, an account of the heroic action which won the V.C.—a posthumous V.C. unfortunately—for a lance-corporal of the Royal Army Medical Corps. I do not remember ever reading anything more heroic.
The hon. and gallant Member for Wellingborough (Wing Commander James) made some remarks of which I am bound to say I rather regretted the tone. They seemed to me to indicate that there was a tendency on the part of people of this country to throw up the sponge. I do not believe it for a moment and I a little regretted what was said. As regards his point about moving road blocks, I dealt with it in a reasonably full answer in the House on 12th February, to which I cannot add anything at the moment.

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The hon. and gallant Member also said that a large number of Service officers were lying about at Catterick. He got hold of a figure of 1,054 which happens to be very near to the office population of the R.A.C. at Catterick, but they are not lying about by any means. Some 500 are on sick leave, 260 have just returned under the Python scheme; 57 are under orders for overseas, 170 actually employed on substantial jobs and 33 under training. I do not know what that adds up to, but it disposes of much the largest part of 1,054. I do not think it is right to convey the impression that there are large numbers of officers lying about kept doing nothing. There must be a certain amount of overlapping in postings when you have a scheme like the Python scheme working and a certain amount of delay in posting people when you have so many conversions in units from one job to another. But as soon as it becomes clear that there is no further prospect of employment for an officer he is discharged in the ordinary way.
The speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Smethwick (Lieut.-Colonel Wise) dealt very largely with the shape of things to come. I, personally, did not think it a minute too long, and I listened to it with great care; with some of it I agreed, with some of it I disagreed, but wild horses would not drag from me which were the parts I agreed with and which were the parts I disagreed with. It must be obvious that the shape of the post-war Army raises very largely particular major decisions but I can assure him that once major decisions of policy are taken the work which is being done will enable the complete picture to be filled in very carefully indeed.
I was going to make some remarks about the speech of the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger). I got the same impression as the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), but as the hon. Member for Bassetlaw disclaimed any such intention, I think I better reserve any observations I wish to make until I have read his speech in cold print.
Let me come to the speech on tanks. I will deal with that very shortly. I am afraid there is no hope for it. The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) and myself are and will continue to be in complete and utter disagreement on this matter. It is not merely that it is over-
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sight on my part or neglect. I entirely disagree with his view of tank warfare. He claims the support of various soldiers—pockets full of letters and all that sort of thing. I have seen, as well as heard, some of the letters. But I claim that I have the agreement of the most consistently successful British soldier since Wellington and, that being so, I prefer to adhere to my own view. I have no hope of converting the hon. Member for Ipswich to my view.
Perhaps I can have one more shot by way of parable. There was once an occasion, he may be surprised to hear, when I followed his doings with excitement and approval. That was when he was an ornament—well, perhaps not an ornament—of the Cambridge scrum. I imagined from what I used to see of him at that time that he had not very much speed and was not very manoeuvrable and that it was thickness of bone and muscle which got him his place in the Cambridge XV. But however much muscle and bone may be qualifications for the scrum to set up as an expert on tank warfare—
Mr. Stokes: Could I interrupt here—
Sir J. Griģģ: Could I finish the argument and then be interrupted? Thickness of frontal armour, particularly of the turret, does not seem to me to be enough. I think I had better leave the parable there.
Mr. Stokes: I was only going to say to the right hon. Gentleman that I have one technical quality in common with the Cromwell, that I could go fast.
Sir J. Griģģ: I have seen the hon. Gentleman like "Panting Time toil'd after him in vain."
Mr. Stokes: The right hon. Gentleman was not in the right place.
Sir J. Griģģ: I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Tavistock (Major Studholme) for what he said about the reception and hospitality of the troops in Italy. I will certainly pass on to Field-Marshal Alexander with great pleasure what the hon. and gallant Member said. He asked whether we realised all that the Army in Italy had done. Certainly. There is no doubt about that. I am only sorry I could not deal fully with that Army's story and with the Burma campaign as well as

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with the campaign in North-West Europe. As regards Italy and other theatres, the more this House praises the Army, the better I shall be pleased. From this point of view I am bound to confess that the Debate to-day has left on me a certain impression of disappointment.
Certainly—there can be no question of it—the year 1944 has been for the Army its annus mirabilis. It has moved from the United Kingdom to Normandy and the Rhine, from Cassino to Rome, Pisa, Florence and Ravenna, from Kohima and Imphal to Mandalay. The Army which landed in Normandy without a hitch, on the showing of Field-Marshal Montgomery, was the best equipped Army we ever had. On the showing of anyone who ever visits the Army it is well fed and well cared for. Thousands of our gallant fellows have laid down their lives that Britain may live. They are helping to save Europe. They have rescued the Greeks from a hideous fate. I would turn from the great things abroad and come down to some of the smaller things that have happened at home. Troops have gathered in the harvest because there was not enough labour; they gathered in the sugar beet crop and the potato crop. They were brought in to take the first bump of repairing the bomb damage. When the dockers struck, the troops helped out so that Londoners could get their food. When the gas workers struck in Manchester, the Army had to keep the light and heat going. With this record for the past year to speak of, a good many of the speeches to-day gave me the impression of being merely a repetition of the points raised at my Tuesday serenade. I am rather sorry about that. I do not think the House really ought to give that sort of impression or that that sort of impression ought to go out from it to the Army, because it is the best Army we have ever had. The message that ought to go out from the House or from anyone of us is that we are proud of them.
Mr. John Duģdale: Surely it is the right hon. Gentleman who is sending out this entirely false message.
Sir J. Griģģ: I will leave that to the judgment of the House. A large part of the speeches have been those which, as I say, are more customary to the Tuesday serenade I have to put up with every
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week—I am sorry; I withdraw that—that I incur every week, and quite rightly. But it is appropriate then; it is less appropriate in a Debate like this.
Mr. Bellenģer: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that this is the one day of the year—and was long before he came into the House—on which there is occasion for points to be raised by Members? This is their main chance, and not his "serenade," as he calls it.
Sir J. Griģģ: Perhaps. But they should be mixed with praise for the best Army Britain has ever had.
Mr. C. Davies: Surely everyone agrees in praising it.
Sir J. Griģģ: I am entirely delighted to hear it. I wish hon. Members would say it a little more often. All my life I shall always be proud at having been associated with such an Army.
Mr. Stokes: Before the right hon. Gentleman sits down will he deal with the statement by General Paget?
Sir J. Griģģ: I will not deal with that, because I have not the facts at my finger ends. If the hon. Member would like to put a Question down I will deal with it.
Mr. John Duģdale: At the risk of troubling the right hon. Gentleman, who does not like to deal with inconvenient questions at all, may I ask him if he will deal with the question I raised?
Sir J. Griģģ: I cannot do that now. Although the hon. Member accuses me of misleading the House, I will examine the accusation of misleading that he has made. So far as my information goes—I have not verified it in the last day or so—the information I gave to the House is correct. I shall certainly take steps to see if it is correct.
Mr. R. J. Taylor: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the recommendations of the coroner at the inquest in the case to which I referred, will be considered?
Sir J. Griģģ: The hon. Member did not give me notice of the question, and I do not know the facts. I will certainly go into the matter and give him an answer. To the best of my belief, the facts have not been brought to my notice.
Captain Duncan: Could not the right hon. Gentleman deal with the three points I raised of which I did give him notice? Can he assure the House, or me at any rate, that he will deal with the matter by correspondence if he cannot deal with it now?
Sir J. Griģģ: I will certainly deal with the matter when I have investigated it.
Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
Supply accordingly considered in Committee.
[Major MILNER in the Chair]

DEMOBILISATION AND RE-EMPLOYMENT

  NUMBER OF LAND FORCES
  Resolved:
  "That such number of Land Forces of all ranks, as His Majesty may deem necessary, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom at Home and Abroad, exclusive of India, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 5946."

  PAY, ETC., OF THE ARMY
  Resolved:
  "That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Pay, etc., of the Army, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1926."

  ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1944
  Resolved:
  "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1945, for expenditure beyond the turn already provided in the grants for Army Services for the year."

  SCHEDULE

  Sums not exceeding

  Supply Grants

  Appropriations in Aid

  Vote.

  1. Pay, &c, of the Army

  £10

  £160,000,000

  Resolutions to be reported this day; Committee to sit again this day.

WAYS AND MEANS
Considered in Committee.
[Major MILNER in the Chair]
Resolved:
"That, towards making good the supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st of March, 1945, the sum of £8,930,743 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."—[Mr. Peake.]
Resolved:
"That, towards making good the supply granted to His Majesty for the services of the year ended on the 31st day of March, 1946, the sum of £241,926,300 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."—[Mr. Peake.]
Resolutions to be reported this day; Committee to sit again this day.

ADJOURNMENT
Resolved:
"That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Drewe.]
Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-two Minutes after Twelve o'Clock.

  OPENCAST COAL (CALORIFIC VALUE)
  OPENCAST COAL (CALORIFIC VALUE)
  NEW FOREST BUCKHOUNDS
  NEW FOREST BUCKHOUNDS
  R.A.F. OFFICERS (RETIRED PAY)
  R.A.F. OFFICERS (RETIRED PAY)
  DRUNKENNESS (LONDON)
  DRUNKENNESS (LONDON)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Unestablished Civil Servants (Superannuation)
  Unestablished Civil Servants (Superannuation)
  Entertainments Duty
  Entertainments Duty
  FERTILISERS AND FEEDING STUFFS
  FERTILISERS AND FEEDING STUFFS
  SUEZ CANAL COMPANY
  SUEZ CANAL COMPANY
  CENTRAL REGISTER (GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES)
  CENTRAL REGISTER (GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES)
  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES (LOCATION)
  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES (LOCATION)
  TELESCOPES AND BINOCULARS (RESTRICTIONS)
  TELESCOPES AND BINOCULARS (RESTRICTIONS)
BRITISH ARMY
  Personnel (Release)
  Personnel (Release)
  Retired Officers (Pay)
  Retired Officers (Pay)
  Tuberculosis Patients (Sanatoria, South Africa)
  Tuberculosis Patients (Sanatoria, South Africa)
  Overseas Postinģs
  Overseas Postinģs
  Barrack-Room Damaģe
  Barrack-Room Damaģe
  Class W Reserve
  Class W Reserve
  Buildinģ Operatives
  Buildinģ Operatives
  CIVIL AVIATION (CANADA-U.S.A. AGREEMENT)
  CIVIL AVIATION (CANADA-U.S.A. AGREEMENT)
  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (LIFTMEN)
  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (LIFTMEN)
  EASTER HOLIDAYS (TRAVEL FACILITIES)
  EASTER HOLIDAYS (TRAVEL FACILITIES)
  ROYAL NAVY (PRIZE MONEY)
  ROYAL NAVY (PRIZE MONEY)
  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE