Sitting of 30 March 1943

Preamble
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

NEW WRIT (DAVENTRY DIVISION)
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a new Writ for the electing of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the County of Northampton, with the Soke of Peterborough (Daventry Division), in the room of Captain the Right Honourable Edward Algernon Fitz-Roy, deceased."—[Mr. James Stuart.]
Sir Richard Acland: I rise formally to oppose this Motion, simply for the purpose of asking four questions, to which I believe I may have a not unsatisfactory answer. The first is Will the Government make a statement on the subject of these by-election registers and/or the more general subject, within a reasonable time, say, before Easter? The second question is, Will that statement contain proposals for putting by-election registers into a somewhat better condition right away? The third is, Shall we have an opportunity of discussing that statement on an occasion which will give us a chance of voting against it if we are so minded? Fourthly, while I can hardly ask for the publication of a White Paper on such a subject, may I ask, Will the Home Secretary give to those Members who are interested in the subject perhaps some informal opportunity of learning the nature of the proposals some two or three days before we
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have to discuss them? Those are the formal questions, but in addition I should like to put also an informal question. Would the right hon. Gentleman like to have a few words with me on this subject, because I probably have more experience of the actual problem of contested by-elections than any other hon. Member in this House—in war-time—and I might be able to give him useful advice as to what proposals are practicable and what are impracticable from the point of view of the different candidates, their agents, shall we say, and those who support this point of view?
The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): The Report of the Departmental Committee on Electoral Machinery did not deal with by-elections. That Report is under consideration by the Government; it involves complicated and important issues, and no statement can yet be made. When the Government has come to its conclusions on the Report it will consider whether any inferences can be drawn as to modifications in by-election arrangements in war-time. While it is the wish of His Majesty's Government that all possible eligible persons should have the right to record their votes, I think it proper to warn the House that the technical and practical difficulties may be formidable. It is in any case not possible for the Government to reach any conclusion as to by-elections meantime, so that I am not able to give an answer of a favourable character to the hon. Member's request. In the meantime constituencies without the services of a Member will naturally expect us to take the usual steps to enable the

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vacancies to be filled, and I therefore trust the House will assent to the Writ being issued. I gather that the hon. Baronet has volunteered to offer some assistance in these matters to the Home Secretary. That, of course, is a matter which should be settled between the hon. Baronet and my right hon. Friend.
Sir R. Acland: As the right hon. Gentleman sees no prospect of improving by-election arrangements, my opposition ceases to be formal and is effective, and if other hon. Members will support me, I shall take the matter to a Division today.
Mr. Bellenger: I have no wish to be obstructive in this matter, but my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will know the seriousness of the situation. At the present moment large numbers of the Armed Forces both here and overseas have no part in the election of their Members, and therefore although the Prime Minister has given us some indication that the Government are considering this matter, I hope that he will be able to come to the House very shortly and give us a much more satisfactory solution of the problem than he has done to-day.
The Prime Minister: I do not think there is much prospect of the kind of solution at this time which the hon. Member would wish.
Mr. Thorne: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he does not think that in all the constituencies where there is no Member and there is going to be a by-election the constituencies will demand a by-election?
Mr. Stokes: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he is aware—as I have no doubt he is—that this Report from the Select Committee was in the hands of the Government some months ago? We have been promised that some statement will be made, and can the right hon. Gentleman tell us——
Mr. Speaker: We are dealing now with a particular constituency and not with the general subject of by-elections.
Mr. Stokes: On a point of Order. The Prime Minister said that the Government are waiting to investigate this Report, and surely I am in Order in putting to him that the Report has been in the hands
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of the Government for some three or four months and that we have been promised some statement on several occasions—I myself have. The information we now have is that the Prime Minister holds out no hope, and in that event I propose to support the hon. Baronet.
Mr. Graham White: May I ask the Prime Minister whether expressions of opinion have been received from constituencies in which by-elections are in prospect or any protest has been received in regard to these matters?
The Prime Minister: I am not aware of any.
Mr. William Brown: Many of us are not anxious to vote against the Government on this Motion, but I am bound to say I think the Prime Minister might have gone a good deal further than he has to-day in trying to meet what is a very serious matter in the constituencies. I want to ask whether the Prime Minister cannot hold out to us the hope of a fairly early statement on this matter. I agree with the observation of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) that this Report has been in the hands of the Government for some time, and while one does not look for precipitous haste in matters of this kind when there is a war on, it does seem that the Prime Minister might be able to give us some indication of when he thinks he may be able to say something to the House. If what the Prime Minister has said to us to-day means that there stretches out in front of us a long vista of by-elections to be fought on a completely out-of-date register—[An HON. MEMBER: "On which you got in"]—and on which my majority was only about one-tenth of what it would have been had there been an up-to-date register—many of us will with regret have to vote against the Government. On the other hand, if the Prime Minister can assure us that within a reasonable time we are likely to have a statement which will give satisfaction then the position will be different.
Mr. Cocks: I was very disappointed with the answer from the Prime Minister. I wish he had given us a more satisfactory one. In view of the fact that it is entirely unsatisfactory, I have no alternative but to oppose the issue of the Writ, for the following reasons. First, I consider that by-elections at the present time on the existing registers are an absolute farce——
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must confine himself to this particular by-election.
Mr. Cocks: I desire to follow and conform to your Ruling, but the general reasons for not holding any by-election until the register is brought up to date, apply exactly the same to one constituency as to the whole lot. Therefore, ills very difficult to draw a dividing line between the reasons why we should not have a by-election in Daventry until the register is brought up to date and the reasons for the suspension of all by-elections until the Government bring the registers up to date in order that the opinions of our people can be properly recorded. Let us see what happened on the subject at a recent by-election.
The Prime Minister: On a point of Order. Ought I not to give notice that, immediately on the resumption of Government Business, I shall again make the Motion for the Writ?
Mr. Speaker: No point of Order arises on that. This Motion is a matter of Privilege which can be made at any time.
Mr. Thorne: May I ask your Ruling, Mr. Speaker? It seems that every now and again we shall have a repetition of what is going to happen to-day and what happened the other day. Is there any possible way of coming to a final decision on this matter so that we shall not waste the time of the House?
Mr. Speaker: I am sure that if the House desires a way of overcoming this difficulty it can be found.
It being a quarter of an hour after the hour appointed for the Meeting of the House, the Motion for the new Writ lapsed, without Question put.
[See Columns 61 to 70.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  BRITISH ARMY

    Officers' Uniform
    Mr. Evelyn Walkdenasked the Secretary of State for War how many regiments of the Army, excluding the Brigade of Guards, and how many battalions of the same are being dressed
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    in Guards barathea or barathea of the Guards shade; what prices do young officers pay for such uniforms compared with the prices laid down in the Board of Trade, Goods and Services (Price Control) Order, No. 2556; and from what source do manufacturers obtain the yarn for the making of such cloth?
    The Secretary of State for War (Sir James Grigg): An officer is allowed to wear material of whatever type he prefers provided it is one of those normally used, that is, khaki barathea, whipcord or serge. Officers of the Brigade of Guards usually wear a special barathea. There is no Regulation against other officers wearing this barathea if they wish to, but I know of no unit in which all the officers wear this cloth. I understand the Wool Control release the necessary yarn for its manufacture. A Service jacket and trousers in this barathea cost between £12 3s. 5d. and £14 3s. 6d. The prices in the Order referred to by my hon. Friend vary between £12 3s. 10d. and £13 7s. 9d.
    Mr. Walkden: While thanking my right hon. Friend for his reply, may I say that I was hoping that he would give us a general statement upon what appears to be a general ramp on the part of military tailors who seem somehow to have information from commanding officers on what is dress uniform for a particular regiment, instead of the Service type of uniform or standard uniform laid down by the Army Council? Cannot the right hon. Gentleman make a general statement?
    Sir J. Grigg: I made a general statement. If the hon. Member is referring to the Question which I answered the other day in regard to the supply of articles from ordnance, I hope to make a further statement shortly. I see no evidence, in the figures which I have given in my answer, of what the hon. Member refers to as a general ramp.
    Mr. Walkden: Will the right hon. Gentleman make inquiries about what has happened in O.C.T.U. camps where tailors' shops are being set up which seem to encourage young officers to spend more than they ought to do upon their uniforms out of their uniform allowance?

    Parachute Pay
    Mr. Collindridgeasked the Secretary of State for War why paratroops who are wounded on active service have deducted

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    the 2s. a day granted especially to them as para-pay or jumping allowance; and whether he will take steps speedily to remedy this injustice to the paratroops which has caused disquiet amongst serving men and the civilian population?
    Sir J. Grigg: Parachute pay of 2s. a day is granted to the personnel concerned because of their special duties. In common with other forms of additional pay it ceases to be issuable if the individual concerned ceases to perform the duties, whether through wounds or injuries or for other reasons for a period exceeding 21 days. As the reason for its issue is no longer present in such circumstances, its continuance would not be justified.
    Mr. Collindridge: Does the right hon. Gentleman feel that this would be likely to stimulate recruiting in those needed sections of our Forces? Further, do we, the right hon. Gentleman in his capacity as Cabinet Minister and servant of the State and myself as Member of Parliament, suffer reduction of pay when we are off duty by reason of sickness? Will not the right hon. Gentleman reconsider this question?
    Sir J. Grigg: We do not get special additions to our pay for performing special duties but a consolidated rate of pay for performing all our duties.
    Mr. Bellenger: Is not this case on a par with that of officers who are permitted to hold their temporary rank up to three months if they are wounded, and therefore does not the right hon. Gentleman consider that there is some justification in asking for this matter to be reconsidered?
    Sir J. Grigg: The only difference between the two things is that in one case they have three months and in the other they have 21 days. If the question is whether I will consider the assimilation of the periods, my reply is that I certainly will do so.
    Mr. Gallacher: Is not the Minister aware that a Cabinet Minister obtains extra allowance for the job he is doing? If he is ill, is the Cabinet Minister reduced to the ordinary £600?
    Mr. Collindridge: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I reluctantly beg to give notice that I will raise this matter at a suitable opportunity.

    Home Guard
    Mr. Douglasasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will consider the letter from the Battersea Borough Labour Party and Trades Council, dated 11th February, complaining about the use of members of the Home Guard for purposes outside their duties; whether he has replied to that letter and on what date; and what was the nature of the reply?
    Sir J. Grigg: I regret that a careful search has failed to trace the receipt of the letter referred to. I understand that a copy is being sent to the War Office where it will be fully considered. I will then communicate with my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Douglas: Would the right hon. Gentleman explain how one of his clerks knew the contents of this letter, more than is contained in my Question?
    Sir J. Grigg: Because the clerk of one of my private secretaries rang up the hon. Member's house and asked him whether he could furnish a copy of the letter and in fact sent a sent a special messenger to get a copy of the letter; and the letter has not yet arrived.
    Mr. Douglas: Is the Minister aware that this information was communicated before any information was supplied by me?
    Sir J. Grigg: That, to the best of my knowledge, is contrary to my recollection of the events.
    Mr. Thorneasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can give any information in connection with £500,000 Home Guard accounts shortage which is reported in the Comptroller and Auditor-General's statement for the year ended 31st March, 1942; and what he intends doing about the matter?
    Sir J. Grigg: I do not think I can usefully add anything at present to the explanation given by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in his report. The Committee of Public Accounts will have an opportunity of going further into the matter in the near future if they so desire, when the Army Appropriation Account for 1941 is under consideration.
    Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward: Does not the shortage referred to in the Auditor-General's Report cover the entire period from the inception of the Home Guard until 31st March, 1942; and

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    furthermore is not the shortage almost entirely due to stores and equipment destroyed by enemy action?
    Sir J. Grigg: So far as the first part of the question is concerned, that is certainly the case. As regards the second part, I would not like to commit myself to saying that it is almost entirely due, but it is certainly materially due, to that reason.
    Mr. Walter Edwardsasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Home Guard personnel have been informed that, when called upon to muster, they are expected to bring a 24-hours' supply of food with them; and, in view of the difficulty in complying with this order, will he cancel it and arrange for the men to be issued with an iron ration as they report at their respective depots for duty?
    Sir J. Grigg: Arrangements for feeding the Home Guard when mustered have been made, and there is no reason which can be foreseen why these arrangements should not work. It will, however, be a time of emergency and unavoidable delays may occur. It is, therefore, considered prudent and in the interests of the men themselves for them to bring some food with them. The regulation says no more than this. I am unaware of any order to bring a 24-hours' supply of food.

    Royal Armoured Corps (Badges)
    Mr. Gledhillasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will consider issuing to the personnel of the Royal Armoured Corps badges signifying technical qualifications similar to those issued to observers, wireless operators, air gunners, &c., in the Royal Air Force?
    Sir J. Grigg: The question of issuing distinguishing badges is now being examined.

    Claims Commission (Staff)
    Mr. Gledhillasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will give the number of officers of both A and B category, respectively, employed by the Claims Commission in both London and the country who are under 35 years of age; what steps are being taken for their replacement; and the number so graded who are between 35 and 40 years of age?
    Sir J. Grigg: There are 48 officers in the Claims Commission in category A and 15 in category B under 35 years of age. There are 37 in category A and 4 in category B between 35 and 40 years old. Steps have been taken to transfer those under 30 in category A to field units and their place in the Claims Commission will be taken, as far as possible, by other officers with the necessary technical qualifications who are not suitable for service in field units.
    Mr. Gledhill: Can the Minister say when the releases will actually take place? Is he not aware that there are many men in the ranks who have knowledge of this work and who might be commissioned and used to replace younger men?
    Sir J. Grigg: My experience is that it is extremely difficult to replace these people. In regard to the first part of the question, transfers are taking place now.

    Bands
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Mooreasked the Secretary of State for War what arrangements he has made, or has in mind, for the more general use of military bands during the coming summer months?
    Sir J. Grigg: Instructions have been issued that bands should, as far as possible, take every opportunity offered by civil authorities to play in public. It must not, however, be forgotten that the primary duty of military bands is to play for the troops.
    Sir T. Moore: While thanking my right hon. Friend for his reply, as far as it went, may I ask whether he will not consider the greater use of bands marching with troops through the streets of our cities and towns? Would it not stimulate the morale of the troops themselves as well as that of the onlookers? That is what we want.
    Sir J. Grigg: As most of the movements between towns take place in motor vehicles, I do not think a band would look very well playing in two or three separate motor lorries.
    Mr. Rhys Davies: Will bands be entitled to play the "Internationale"?

    Soldiers Under Arrest (Pay Allotments)
    Mr. A. Edwardsasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is now in a position to state what steps have been

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    taken to remove the hardships inflicted on the wives and dependants of soldiers under close arrest?
    Sir J. Grigg: The present rules are about to be modified in order to allow the qualifying allotment from the man's pay to be paid to the family for the full period of his detention. I will communicate with the hon. Member as soon as the details have been settled.
    Mr. John Dugdale: Will this apply to officers?
    Sir J. Grigg: I would rather not be pressed further at the moment. The details have not been settled. I will make a statement when they are settled.

    Y.M.C.A. Centre, Manchester (Entrance)
    Mr. Thorneycroftasked the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been directed to the fact that the military authorities suggested there should be a special entrance for officers at the new Young Men's Christian Association centre near London Road Station, Manchester; and, as this is not in accord with the policy of the War Office, will he make it clear that the special entrance can be used by all serving in the Armed Forces?
    Sir J. Grigg: I understand that the entrance referred to gives access to a Y.M.C.A. club for officers which happens to be under the same roof as the new Y.M.C.A. Centre. I am not aware that there has been any breach of War Office policy. I have just been informed that the Y.M.C.A. have decided to use all the accommodation at the building referred to for other ranks and provide the officers' club elsewhere.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that officers and men have been found dining together throughout the land, and is it not a waste of labour and material to build special entrances, particularly in these democratic days?
    Sir J. Grigg: It is not a question of a special entrance; it is a question of two separate clubs in the same building.

    Accounts (Auditing)
    Mr. Wakefieldasked the Secretary of State for War when certain accounts, of which he has been informed, were last audited?
    Sir J. Grigg: These accounts were last audited on 28th January, and the next audit will take place next week.
    Mr. Wakefield: While I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his reply, can he state whether the accounts were found in a satisfactory condition?
    Sir J. Grigg: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Wakefield: Thank you.
    Mr. G. Strauss: Is a Question in Order when the reference is so vague that no Member of the House apart from the questioner has any idea what it is all about?
    Mr. Speaker: It is in Order. Whether it is clear or not, does not rest with me.
    Mr. McEntee: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what is the reason for withholding the name of the organisation concerned?
    Mr. Wakefield: May I say that I gave full details in the Question I handed to the Clerk at the Table, and that they were ruled out by the Clerk at the Table?
    Mr. Speaker: The Question could not be put on the Paper more clearly on account of security reasons.

    Lieut.-Colonel Gates.
    Major Gatesasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will give instructions that correspondence intended for Lieut.-Colonel Gates, at one time commanding a training battalion at Matlock, and addressed "c/o the Under-Secretary of State for War," shall not be forwarded to the hon. and gallant Member for Prestwich?
    Sir J. Grigg: I am sorry if this mistake has been made. It has been impossible to trace the occurrence, but special instructions have been issued to those likely to be concerned to avoid such a mistake in future.
    Commander Locker-Lampson: Will the hon. and gallant Member for Prestwich (Major Gates) be offered a job on the staff?
    Mr. McGheeasked the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the complaints still being made against the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel W. B. V. H. P. Gates, it is now proposed, failing his resignation, to terminate his staff appointment?
    Sir J. Grigg: I have received from the hon. Member a letter in which he describes two new subjects of complaint against the officer in question. One of these complaints is that the officer used in public a phrase derogatory of Members of this House. I am satisfied that this is not so. In point of fact most of the members of the officer's family, his secretary and he himself were subjected to a stream of telephone inquiries by daily newspapers. Under this stress I understand that the officer ultimately remarked that he was not interested in yapping dogs. As to the second complaint, I am having detailed inquiries made. If action is necessary as a result of those inquiries it will be taken.
    Mr. McGhee: Would the right hon. Gentleman consider at the same time the fact that the illegal punishments inflicted on the men are on the records of these men, and would it be possible to have these records erased?
    Sir J. Grigg: I will certainly consider that.
    Major Lyons: Arising out of the original reply, may I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that many Members of this House are having communications making allegations about other people? Those allegations might be right or wrong, but would he consider in the case of any which is brought giving an undertaking that there will be no victimisation of the persons whose names are mentioned in the letters?
    Sir J. Grigg: I am perfectly prepared and willing to investigate any case which is brought to my notice, but I think it is incumbent upon the hon. Member bringing it to my notice to satisfy himself that there is at any rate a prima facie case for the accusation made.
    Commander Locker-Lampson: Should a man who has been proved a bully be allowed a staff appointment?
    Sir J. Grigg: That was the subject of the Debate which took place, I think last week, in this House.

    El Alamein (German Personnel)
    Mr. Stokesasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is now able to state the approximate number of Germans engaged at El Alamein; and what quantity
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    of them escaped to Mersa Matruh and the West?
    Sir J. Grigg: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Granville) on 16th March.
    Mr. Stokes: I put this Question down to the Prime Minister. In view of the fact that it has been generally stated in the Press that some 60,000 Germans escaped to the West, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the declaration by the Minister of Defence that the directive given to take or destroy the enemy had been carried out was, to say the least, a bit misleading?
    Major Petherick: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the House and the country are getting a little tired of the continual attempts to disparage the victory of the Allied troops in Africa?
    Mr. Stokes: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the country likes to be told the truth and that it does not like misleading statements, and this one could not deceive the enemy?

    Canteens (National Fire Service Personnel)
    Mr. Bellengerasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will permit uniformed Members of the National Fire Service who are posted away from their homes to have access to the voluntary Service canteens?
    Sir J. Grigg: The admission of personnel of the National Fire Service was fully and sympathetically considered. I regret, however, that the present strain on the canteen services is such that it is impossible to extend its facilities to others than those now catered for.
    Mr. Bellenger: Will my right hon. Friend recollect that after considerable pressure in this House he permitted members of the Women's Land Army to have access to voluntary canteens, and will he therefore not extend this to other uniformed Services serving under the Crown?
    Sir J. Grigg: Since the case of the Women's Land Army—and I think their case is special—I have had a series of representations from the Ministry of Food exhorting me to reduce the consumption of food in canteens. That seems to me to create a material change in the circumstances.
    Mr. Bellenger: I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment.

    Training Centre, Wrotham (Rejected Candidates)
    Mr. Hutchinsonasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a large number of cadets, including many senior warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, who had successfully completed their training at the pre-Officers' Cadet Training Unit training centre, Wrotham, have recently been rejected by No. 21 Selection Board, after a brief test and interview; and whether, in view of the discouraging effect of rejection in these circumstances, he will review the cases recently rejected by this Selection Board?
    Sir J. Grigg: I regret that, owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding, the War Office Selection Boards who interviewed these men before they went to the pre-O.C.T.U. 'training centre passed candidates who were not up to the standard normally required. The men concerned were therefore re-examined by the Selection Board attached to the training centre. The Board had before it the results of the written tests carried out by the earlier Board, and it was unnecessary to repeat these tests, which in any case form a comparatively small part of the whole procedure. I am satisfied that this was the right course to adopt and that it would not be in the interests of the Service to send on candidates to O.C.T.Us. until they are considered fit to become efficient officers.
    Mr. Hutchinson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of the candidates had passed successfully through their training at the pre-O.C.T.U. unit before being interviewed by the Selection Board?
    Sir J. Grigg: I am not aware of that. In fact, I think that that is not in accordance with the information at my disposal; but I will look at my information again and verify that.
    Mr. Evelyn Walkden: Was there any departure at this O.C.T.U. from the procedure which certain Members were privileged to inspect at certain camps some weeks ago? We were then fairly satisfied with the methods of examination.
    Sir J. Grigg: The officer in command of the pre-O.C.T.U. was not satisfied with
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    the quality of some of the candidates, and he had them re-tested. I think unfortunately, in the light of after events, he did not have a complete re-test. He took for granted the previous written test.

    Sentenced Soldier
    Mr. Ivor Thomasasked the Secretary of State for War whether he has considered the case of a soldier, whose name has been forwarded to him, who has been sentenced to 42 days' detention for stealing a mug to take the place of one stolen from him; and whether, as the soldier had previously borne the highest character, he will order the remission of the unserved portion of the sentence?
    Sir J. Grigg: In the daily routine of barrack life soldiers must constantly leave exposed their arms, accoutrements and kits, as well as their private property. They trust to the honour of their comrades, and stealing in these circumstances is regarded as particularly disgraceful. The value of the article stolen does not affect the gravity of the offence. The court no doubt took all the facts into consideration in awarding the sentence, which is not unduly heavy. Detention is corrective, and does not carry with it the stigma of imprisonment. Moreover, if the man earns full remission he will serve only 28 days.
    Mr. Thomas: Is my right hon. friend aware that this offence is not stealing, in the normal sense of the word, but part of the process of scrounging, which every hon. Member who served in the last war knows about?
    Sir J. Grigg: I would not accept that for a moment.
    Mr. Thomas: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment.

  RUSSO-GERMAN OPERATIONS (GERMAN CASUALTIES)
  Mr. Stokesasked the Secretary of State for War whether he has any information as to the estimated casualties inflicted on the Germans by the Russians since the commencement of Russo-German operations on 22nd June, 1941; and as to how these compare with the total German losses during the 1914–1918 war?
  Sir J. Grigg: I can only refer to the statements made from time to time by official Russian and German sources. These estimates of course differ widely.
  Mr. Stokes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a statement has been made in this House that the Russians have already destroyed and put out of permanent action more millions of Germans than were casualties in the whole of the last war, and whether in view of the fact that 2,000,000 Germans were killed in the last war and 4,000,000 wounded, ought not the war to be over if that statement is correct?

  NAVY, ARMY AND AIR FORCE INSTITUTES
  Mr. Bellengerasked the Secretary of State for War whether any decision has been reached concerning the implementation of the recommendation of the Select Committee on National Expenditure regarding the attachment of representatives from the ranks to the headquarters of the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes?
  Sir J. Grigg: The recommendation referred to by my hon. Friend was carefully considered at the time. It was agreed that other ranks should be given fuller opportunities to make their wishes known on N.A.A.F.I. questions. The system in force in the Navy for securing this is, however, unworkable in the Army owing to the large number of units in all parts of the country. In July of last year instructions were therefore issued reconstituting the regimental and command institute committees and forming new committees at the headquarters of corps districts and districts or areas. The members of the regimental committees are composed of other ranks chosen by the men themselves; the members of the other committees are other ranks elected by the regimental committees. Thus the committees are now entirely representative of the other ranks including the A.T.S. The regimental meetings are presided over by the president of the regimental institutes, the others by the officer in charge of administration. The appropriate local N.A.A.F.I. representative is in attendance at these meetings.
  Mr. Bellenger: While I thank my right hon. Friend for that information, does he
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  realise that this does not really solve the problem which is put in my Question? The regimental institutes have very little control, if any, over N.A.A.F.I. and therefore will he not reconsider this Question and try to implement the suggestion made by a Select Committee of this House?
  Sir J. Grigg: I hoped that I had already explained that it is not really practicable in wartime, in view of the very large number of units, to carry out in its literal form the recommendation of the Select Committee. I believe I am right in saying that the revised proposals here have been explained to the Select Committee.

  ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR (AGRICULTURAL WORK)
  Commander Locker-Lampsonasked the Secretary of State for War how many Italian prisoners of war have been taken up to date; and whether a note has been made of those available for agricultural work?
  Sir J. Grigg: The total number of Italian prisoners of war held by members of the British Empire is now about 274,000. This was the number a few days ago. The answer to the last part of the Question is, "Yes, Sir."
  Commander Locker-Lampson: Will you please go on taking these prisoners?

  SCOTLAND

    Office and Staff (Proposed Transfer to Glasgow)
    Mr. William Brownasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received from the local authorities in Glasgow against the proposed transfer to that town of an office and its large staff; and whether he will discuss with the Department concerned the desirability of finding accommodation for this office in the southern counties so as to obviate complaints about transfer of English workers to Scotland, with the consequential billeting difficulties?
    Sir J. Grigg: I have been asked to reply. The difficulties in connection with the reception of this office in Glasgow have been such that it has proved impossible to carry out the projected move, which on general grounds is desirable and in many ways might be considered very

    19
    necessary. I am satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation cannot be found for the office in England.

    Milk (Price)
    Mr. Sloanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he has any statement to make regarding the question of milk price parity?
    The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. T. Johnston): The Government have had before them the proposals put forward by the Scottish Milk Marketing Board for assimilating the price paid to producers of milk in Scotland with the average of the prices prevailing in England and Wales, but, after careful consideration, have not been able to accept these proposals. I have explained the position fully to the Scottish Milk Marketing Board and to the National Farmers' Union of Scotland. I will send my hon. Friend a copy of the explanatory statement issued by the Board to its registered producers on the subject.
    Mr. Sloan: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his explanation will not satisfy the Milk Marketing Board; and does he intend to do nothing at all to remove this disparity, which is giving the English producers a decided advantage over Scottish producers?
    Mr. Johnston: Except for the last part, I can answer the hon. Gentleman's supplementary by saying this. There is no doubt that there is dissatisfaction with the present position, and I have offered to discuss with the Scottish Milk Marketing Board any alternative proposals that they can put forward.
    Mr. Sloan: Is there any alternative proposal to regulate the price? It is the question of price that is involved.

    South Ayrshire War Agricultural Executive Committee
    Mr. Sloanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland the names of the War Agricultural Executive Committee for South Ayrshire; by what process were they selected, and whether the Farmers' Union and the Farm Servants' Union were consulted?
    Mr. Johnston: I am circulating the names of the Committee members in the OFFICIAL REPORT. The members were originally selected by the Secretary of
    20
    State, on information available in the Agricultural College and the Department of Agriculture, for their knowledge of agriculture, for their standing in the community, and with due regard to the functions of the Committees as agents of Government. The National Farmers' Union of Scotland were asked for any observations on the provisional list of names before appointments were made. The Scottish Farm Servants' Union were given an opportunity of saying whether they wished farm servants to be specifically included in the personnel of Committees.
    Mr. Sloan: Is my right hon. Friend not aware that the bulk of the farmers in South Ayrshire know nothing about how this Committee was appointed, and that there is tremendous resentment over its personnel?
    Mr. Johnston: I can only repeat that the National Farmers' Union of Scotland was consulted on the matter.
    Following are the names:
    CONSTITUTION OF THE AGRICULTURAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR SOUTH AYRSHIRE.
    Chairman:—Colonel Norman Kennedy, D.S.O., C.B.E., Doonholm, Ayr.
    Vice-Chairman:—Mr. J. D. H. Forbes, Jamestown, Maidens, Girvan.
    Members:—
    Mr. A. Barr, Hobsland, Monkton.
    Mr. Q. Dunlop, Sen., Greenan, Ayr.
    Captain John Farquhar, Changue, Barr, Girvan.
    Miss B. T. C. Frood, Threave, Kirk-michael.
    Mr. J. Grant, Doonholm Farm, Ayr.
    Mr. J. J. M. Hannah, Girvan Mains, Girvan.
    Mr. A. Y. Hendrie, Dumfries Estate Office, Cumnock.
    Mr. H. J. Hewetson, Glenapp Estate Office, Auchencrosh, Ballantrae.
    Mrs. A. M. McFadzean, Thomaston, Maybole.
    Mr. H. A. Maclehose, Grange, Maybole.
    Mr. T. McMillan, Auchonwynd, Maybole.
    Mr. R. McVey, Shields Farm, Monkton.
    Mr. Alex Moodie, Dunree, Dalrymple.
    Mr. J. Murdoch, Dalcairney, Dalmellington.
    Mr. J. S. Murray, Dalgig, New Cumnock.
    Lieut.-Commander C. H. Hughes Onslow, D.S.O., Alton Albany, Barr, Girvan.
    Principal W. G. R. Paterson, O.B.E., B.Sc., F.R.S.E., West of Scotland Agricultural College, 6, Blythswood Square, Glasgow, C.2.
    Mr. Allan Stevenson, Parkhill, Mauch-line.
    Mr. J. S. Stevenson, Balig, Ballantrae.

    School Holidays (Harvest Help)
    Mr. Sloanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is aware of the indignation aroused among parents in all parts of Scotland against the Memorandum he issued to education committees, recommending that children should be kept in schools during the month of August and receive their holidays in October, which is very often the worst month in the year for weather in Scotland; and whether he will immediately countermand the Circular?
    Mr. Johnston: No, Sir. I have received no expressions of hostility to the proposals in the Memorandum referred to. On the contrary, I am assured that the proposals are receiving support from education authorities generally, from the teachers' organisations, and from the public Press. I propose, with the hon. Member's permission, to circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a full account of the recommendations sent to education authorities on this matter.
    Mr. Sloan: Is my right hon. Friend aware that nothing has caused more trouble in education authorities than the Memorandum which was issued, and is he aware that the Educational Institute of Scotland is not favourable to the scheme?
    Mr. Johnston: That is directly contrary to my information.
    Mr. Gallacher: Are we to understand that the children are to get their summer holidays in October?
    Mr. Johnston: No, Sir; that is not so.
    Mr. Stephen: Are the children to be compelled to undertake this work?
    Mr. Johnston: No, Sir.
    Commander Galbraith: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the parents and the children are looking forward with great pleasure to doing this work?
    Mr. Sloan: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that the implication of the Memorandum which he has issued is that, as potatoes are lifted in October, the children will get their holidays in October?
    Mr. Johnston: No, Sir; that is not the statement in the Memorandum. There is to be a month's holiday, as usual, in midsummer, and a fortnight or some other time, as may be appropriate to the circumstances in different districts, to be staggered, later on.
    Sir Alfred Beit: Is there really so much difference between the climate in Scotland in one month and in another?
    Mr. Johnston: Yes, Sir.
    Following are the recommendations referred to:
    The Memorandum referred to was issued in connection with plans for the ingathering of the harvest next autumn, which are intended to enable schoolchildren of suitable age to give the greatest possible measure of help without loss of education. The arrangements are not intended to apply to children at the primary stage.
    Children who are legally old enough to help the farmers should, it is recommended, have a proper holiday for, say, a month in the height of the good weather, and then should have another break later in the year when they can help with the grain harvest or the potato harvest, both of which fall outwith the normal period of school holidays. Only boys of 16 and over are wanted for the grain harvest. The later break is to be regarded not as an ordinary holiday, but as a period during which the children will be able to share in a vital form of national service.
    The detailed arrangements in each area are to be made by the education authorities in consultation with the agricultural executive committees. These authorities, and the teachers' organisations, were fully consulted about the proposed arrangements. The representatives of the teachers, whose assistance is so necessary in safeguarding the welfare of the children, have pledged the co-operation of their profession.
    I am sure that Scottish parents will recognise the immense national importance of the 1943 harvest and will encourage their children to help in securing the country's food supply in this critical

    23
    year. Everything possible is being done to tap all alternative sources of harvest labour, but it is clear that without a wholehearted response on the part of the schools, the immense acreage which will be under crop this year cannot be harvested.

    Furnished Apartments (Rents)
    Mrs. Hardieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is aware of the extortionate rents being charged for furnished apartments in Scotland; and whether he will take some action to regulate these rents, in view of the serious shortage of houses?
    Mr. Johnston: I have received several representations on the subject, including one recently from Glasgow Corporation. I am considering whether, and if so, what action can usefully be taken.

    Housing Accommodation
    Mrs. Hardieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether, as a war measure, he will consider having a survey taken of available accommodation in the Clyde area, including larger houses occupied by one or two people, with a view to providing apartments for people who have to work in that district?
    Mr. Johnston: Surveys of available accommodation have been made by all the local authorities on Clydeside, and I have encouraged local authorities to make every possible use of existing accommodation by billeting and by requisitioning unoccupied houses. The requisitioning of parts only of large houses at present not fully occupied raises difficult questions, but it has been adopted as an exceptional measure in one Clydeside area, and I should be prepared to consider similar proposals from local authorities where the conditions warrant it.
    Mrs. Hardie: While I thank my right hon. Friend for his reply, does he not think that, if an appeal was made to certain people who have these houses, they would be prepared to take in these tenants, as a good many people want housing accommodation; and could not something on these lines be done, as there is in Glasgow and the suburbs a large number of the bigger houses unoccupied?
    Mr. Johnston: I think we had better take the advice of the local authority on these matters. As I have already said, if any local authority will make application on these lines I will gladly consider it.
    Mrs. Hardie: Is the Secretary of State also aware that some of the people who have to work and live in the Glasgow area are living in shops which are rat-infested and some in houses of two or three apartments, that the death-rate among children and the tuberculosis rate are increasing in many districts, and that really something must be done?
    Mr. Kirkwoodasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is aware that the housing situation in Clydebank is being worsened by tenants who left to avoid air-raids and sub-let their houses now returning to Clydebank and evicting the sub-tenants, who are engaged on vital war work and cannot get other accommodation; and will he treat this matter as of extreme urgency to protect these war-workers?
    Mr. Johnston: In so far as war workers who have taken sub-lets are not protected by the Rent Restrictions Acts, I am prepared in appropriate cases to authorise the requisitioning of the houses to enable the war workers to continue in occupancy.

  FUEL AND POWER

    Coal Research
    Mr. MacLarenasked the Minister of Fuel and Power, what action he is taking to deal with surplus coal stocks so as to avoid short time and unemployment in the mining areas?
    The Minister of Fuel and Power (Major Lloyd George): I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave on 16th March to the hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) a copy of which I am sending to him. Generally speaking, there are no surplus coal stocks, and the question of the avoidance of short time and unemployment does not therefore arise except in special circumstances. If my hon. Friend has any particular case in mind, I should be glad if he would let me know of it.

    Public Buildings (Central Heating)
    Mr. Denvilleasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether it is his intention

    25
    this spring to issue a regulation to suspend the use of central heating in public buildings, on similar lines to last autumn, with the object of saving fuel?
    Major Lloyd George: Yes, Sir.

    Bands (Petrol Allowance)
    Mr. Hannahasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that the schemes of local authorities to provide holidays at home are being seriously interfered with by the refusal of petrol for bands; and will he allow fuel for the transport of musicians and instruments required for this purpose?
    Major Lloyd George: I have no indication that any local authority is in difficulties on this account. I shall be happy to consider any case of which my hon. Friend will give me particulars.
    Mr. Hannahasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that the refusal of petrol for the movement of bands, which constitute only a part-time occupation for their owners, is in some cases requiring more fuel to be used from the hiring of taxi-cabs, which may have to make several journeys instead of only one; and will he look into the whole matter?
    Major Lloyd George: I do not regard the transport of members of a part-time band as justifying an allowance for a private car, and I have no reason to believe that a net economy would be achieved by granting petrol for this purpose.
    Mr. Hannah: Will the Government consider the whole question of making holidays at home a real success this year?
    Major Lloyd George: We have made arrangements with the local authorities for that purpose, and we have had already from the hon. Gentleman's own constituency a reply saying that they were very pleased with the arrangements that we had made.
    Mr. Hannah: Thank you.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Boiler Suits and Overalls
    Mr. Evelyn Walkdenasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the urgent need for further
    26
    economies in the use of cloth for suitings, he will consider the wholesale manufacture of a boiler-suit type of garment that will protect good suits or promote extended wear of part-worn suits and encourage universal adoption of this style of dress by civilians?
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Dalton): Boiler suits and other types of overalls are already available at specially low coupon-rates and anyone can use them for the purpose suggested by my hon. Friend. It would not be wise, and might indeed seriously disorganise the clothing programme, to arrange for the production of boiler suits on a much larger scale, unless I was satisfied that this increased supply would be matched by the demand.
    Mr. Walkden: Has not the right hon. Gentleman had representations from many organisations and local authorities suggesting some kind of boiler suit or protective garment for fire guards; would it not be better for persons who have good suits to have a battledress such as he himself spoke about; and would not they become popular in different parts of the country and worn with dignity by the average professional man and even by the wage earner?
    Mr. Dalton: I will do what I can to increase production of the type of garment that my hon. Friend has in mind if I find there is an increased demand for it, but at this stage of the war we have to be very careful that any increase in clothing material for any one kind of garment is not at the expense of other kinds, and I must keep a balance.
    Mr. John Dugdaleasked the President of the Board of Trade whether arrangements can be made for employees in industries included under Occupational Supplement Schedule, G.O.S. 10, to obtain extra coupons in order to purchase boiler suits and overalls?
    Mr. Dalton: Workers included in the Schedule to which my hon. Friend refers are entitled to 10 extra coupons for the rationing period of 15 months ending 31st August. These coupons may be used for the purchase of industrial overalls and boiler suits which are available at specially low coupon rates.

    Civil Servants, Nottingham (Petrol Allowance)
    Sir Reginald Clarryasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will give the designation of the civil servants in connection with factory premises control in Nottingham who have authority to use private motor cars, identifying the size or horse-power and average monthly allowance of petrol in each case?
    Mr. Dalton: As the answer contains a number of figures, I will with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the statement:—

    Designation of Officer.

    H.P. of Car.

    Average recent monthly consumption of petrol.

    (Galls).

    Regional Controller of Factory and Storage Premises.

    30*

    36

    Inspection Officer

    8

    35

    Inspection Officer

    14

    45

    Senior Temporary Assistant (Technical).

    14

    20

    * During the period covered by the figures of petrol consumption. This officer has now been able to secure a car of 16 h.p.

    Cotton Export Trade
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the President of the Board of Trade, whether he is aware of the uneasiness prevailing in the Lancashire cotton industry relative to the decision of the Washington Government to offer to transfer idle manufacturing machinery from the United States of America to some of the South American Republics; that this may adversely affect the British cotton export trade after the war; and will he represent these views to the authorities in Washington?
    Mr. Dalton: As I have already informed my hon. Friend, the United States authorities no doubt consider that there are advantages, in view of the shortage of shipping space, in sending to Brazil and other South American countries plant which is lying idle in the United States owing to war conditions, rather than finished materials. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government maintain close touch on all questions affecting the use of the productive resources of the United Nations for the common
    28
    war effort; and I do not feel that special representations on this particular matter are called for.
    Mr. Davies: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that, while idle machinery in the United States is to be transferred to some of the South American Republics, idle machinery in Lancashire remains in this country; and does not he understand that the people of Lancashire affected by this are feeling that there is some element of unfairness in the situation?
    Mr. Dalton: As my hon. Friend knows, I am keeping in close touch with Lancashire cotton representatives, and I am sure that these matters are being well kept in mind by the combined board.

    Clog Soles
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is taking steps to relieve the serious shortage of wood for clog soles in the Westhoughton district, which is likely to adversely affect the attendance of miners at their employment; and whether, in future allocations of wood for this purpose, he will bear in mind that men following certain mining occupations wear out one clog quicker than the other?
    Mr. Dalton: There is a general shortage of clog soles, owing to greatly increased demand, but output has already risen by over 70 per cent. compared with 1941, and I hope to raise it still further. The final point to which my hon. Friend refers will be borne in mind.
    Mr. Davies: Are we to understand that the right hon. Gentleman will see that clog soles are provided soon for this district, because some men may be unable to go to work?
    Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir, I am doing my utmost, and, as I have said, we have made a big increase compared with 1941.

  ORDERS IN COUNCIL
  Mr. De la Bèreasked the Prime Minister whether he will find time for a Debate on the Motion standing in the name of the hon. Member for Evesham, relating to Orders in Council?
  [That this House notes the many thousands of Orders in Council which have

  29
  been issued since the commencement of hostilities; that many of them are so framed as to be difficult of comprehension, both to those who are administering them and those who must observe them; is of opinion that, in view of the importance of the proper direction of manpower, there is a loss of efficiency directly attributable to these Orders, which add to the burden already placed on the overstrained businesses throughout the country, and urges on the Government the necessity for curtailing the number of these Orders in Council and inquiring into those which are already issued with a view to the more wasteful and harmful Orders being rescinded.]
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I regret that in the present state of Business I cannot hold out any hope of being able to afford time for a discussion of my hon. Friend's Motion.
  Mr. De la Bère: Does not my right hon. Friend realise that a number of these Orders are redundant, and would it be possible to have a periodical review of the Orders with a view to seeing that redundant ones were rescinded and the unnecessary ones amended and put in order?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, I hope that that process is continuous, but at any rate my hon. Friend's remarks will call further attention to it.
  Mr. Gallacher: Would the Prime Minister consider handing over the Hydro-Electric Power Bill to the Scottish Grand Committee and thereby relieve this House of a lot of work?

  POST-WAR PLANNING
  Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Prime Minister whether he can now say whether he will be able to make the Report issued by the United States Government on Organisation for Post-war Planning available for honourable Members; and has he considered the need to take action in regard to national post-war planning for this country?
  The Prime Minister: Copies of the Report of the National Resources Development Board for 1942 have now been placed in the Library, and copies of the 1943 Report will be made available as soon as they have been received. As regards the last part of the Question, I
  30
  would refer my hon. Friend to the answer given to him on 2nd February, by my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister.
  Mr. Moelwyn Hughesasked the Prime Minister, whether His Majesty's Government have formulated their policy upon the recommendations of the Uthwatt Committee; and when the House may expect to be apprised of it?
  The Prime Minister: The Government have already announced their decisions on some of the recommendations but have not yet completed their examination of others.
  Mr. Hughes: Would the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the matters touched upon in this Report will receive high priority among those matters which necessarily require preliminary legislative preparation?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, the Government have already announced their decisions on a central planning authority, control over interim development and the compulsory acquisition of land. No time will be lost.

  BEVERIDGE REPORT (IMPLEMENTATION)
  Mr. Gallacherasked the Prime Minister (1) how many resolutions he has received from co-operative, trade union and shop stewards organisations, demanding the full acceptance of the Beveridge Report; and what course does he propose to take to meet these demands;
  (2) whether he has considered the resolutions from the Renfrewshire Cooperative Party and the Cowdenbeath Co-operative Party, sent to him by the hon. Member for West Fife, demanding acceptance of the Beveridge Plan in full; and what statement he has to make?
  The Prime Minister: I have received various resolutions from co-operative societies, trade unions and shop stewards' organisations, including the two resolutions referred to in the hon. Member's Question No. 48. As regards the last part of the Question, I would refer him to the statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the course of the recent Debate on this subject.
  Mr. Gallacher: Is the Prime Minister aware that the people of the country are not exactly satisfied with that answer made on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and would he not give an undertaking to make a new reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government?
  Major Petherick: Is the Prime Minister aware that the interest in this Report has been greatly exaggerated—that many Members of this House have received under 10 letters from individuals in their constituencies, and will the Government adhere to their decision to give the whole Report careful examination, in view of the wide implications involved?

  WORKERS (DEPUTATIONS TO MINISTERS)
  Mr. Kirkwoodasked the Prime Minister whether he has completed his inquiry into the refusal of the Minister of Labour to receive Members of this House in deputation unless accompanied by a trade union official; and whether he has now any statement to make?
  The Prime Minister: I have now looked into this matter as I promised, and have discussed it fully with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour. The position is as follows. On 25th May, 1940, in the deadly crisis of the war, the Minister of Labour met the executives of all the trade unions at a conference at the Central Hall, and appealed to them to join with the Government in increasing production, preventing strikes or lockouts, and facilitating and speeding up procedure so as to avoid difficulties arising. The Minister then, with the authority of the Government, gave a pledge, not in any way subsequently challenged in the House of Commons, that so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned they would deal with these problems through the executives of the respective organisations. This was followed by a conference of both the parties, the Trades Union Congress and the British Employers' Confederation. As a result of these negotiations, which must be taken as a whole, the parties agreed to accept compulsory arbitration, and this was embodied in an Order, No. 1305, made under Defence Regulations.
  It would, in my opinion, be a breach of this understanding, from which we
  32
  have derived and are deriving enormous benefit, if the Minister of Labour were to allow the official representatives of the trade unions to be by-passed, and were to discuss or negotiate with unofficial bodies, behind the backs of the responsible representatives of the unions, in respect of any of the matters covered directly or indirectly by Defence Regulation No. 1305.
  I must make it clear that His Majesty's Government is working hand in hand with the Trades Union Congress in this task of beating down Hitler and Nazi-ism, and that both sides intend to stand strictly to their engagements until this great quarrel is brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
  On the other hand, my right hon. Friend assures me that he is always ready to see any Member of Parliament on any subject, as is the usual practice, and he has, in fact, seen Members repeatedly on these very subjects.
  There is no constitutional obligation upon Ministers to receive any particular deputations, whether headed by Members of Parliament or not; I believe, however, that the practice of Ministers in making themselves as accessible as possible to Members of this House works smoothly and that there are no serious reasons for departing from our usual methods. If any hon. Members have grounds for dissatisfaction at any time, there are Parliamentary opportunities for raising such matters. I must make it clear, however, that so far as His Majesty's present advisers are concerned, we consider ourselves pledged by the negotiations of May, 1940, and we shall ask the House to support us in this view, which We regard as essential to the war effort.
  Mr. Gallacher: Is not the Prime Minister aware that a Member can receive a deputation from a factory in his constituency which raises matters that are not the subject of discussion between trade unions and the Employers' Federation? Is it not essential that in such a case any Minister should be prepared to receive that Member with that deputation?
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to my reply.
  Mr. Kirkwood: Arising out of the original reply, is not the Prime Minister aware that it is quite impossible

  33
  for me to get into touch with an official of our union so easily as heretofore because our offices in London have been bombed and we have had to take temporary offices in Northampton? Why should not the arrangement that existed before the present Minister of Labour came into office be continued?
  Mr. W. H. Green: Is the Prime Minister aware——
  Mr. Kirkwood: Wait until the Prime Minister has answered my supplementary.
  Mr. Green: Is the Prime Minister aware that there exist in London and the London area officers of the union who are always available?

  WAR OPERATIONS
  Sir Herbert Williamsasked the Prime Minister on how many fronts His Majesty's land, sea and air Forces are now engaged or in position?
  The Prime Minister: His Majesty's land Forces are at the moment actively engaged on three fronts—in North Africa, in Burma and in the South-West Pacific. It would not be in the public interest to state on what other fronts they are in position. So far as His Majesty's sea and air Forces are concerned, the term "front" is hardly appropriate. His Majesty's ships have to operate continuously on all the oceans of the globe. The areas in which our Air Forces are engaged may be defined as follow:—

  Western Europe.

  The Atlantic.

  The Mediterranean.

  India and Burma.

  The Pacific.

  Sir H. Williams: Are not our Forces engaged on more fronts than those of any other nation?
  Mr. Astor: Will my right hon. Friend discourage in future the use of that very misleading phrase, "Second Front"?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir, I do not want to discourage the use of it, because our good friends, fighting so hard, know very well what they mean by it.

  TUNISIAN OPERATIONS
  Mr. Arthur Greenwood: May I ask the. Prime Minister whether he has any further statement to make about the military situation in Tunisia?
  The Prime Minister: Since I informed the House last week of the check sustained on the Mareth front, the situation has turned very much in our favour. General Montgomery's decision to throw his weight on to the turning movement instead of persisting in the frontal attack has been crowned with success. Another severe defeat has been inflicted by the Desert Army upon the Axis forces they have so long pursued. According to my latest information, we occupied El Hamma last night, and our vanguards passed through Gabes this morning. The decisive break-through of General Frey-berg's turning force was aided to an extraordinary degree by the novel forms of intense air attack, in which many hundreds of British aircraft were simultaneously employed.
  The enemy losses in men and material have of course been very serious to him, and the panzer divisions in particular are remarkably mauled and enfeebled. It is, however, too soon to say what proportion of the Italian 20th and 21st Army Corps have been left behind. The operations are being prosecuted with the utmost energy.
  It must be remembered that this new exploit of the Desert Army must be viewed in its relation to the general scheme of action on the whole Tunisian front. The very fine unceasing advance of the United States Forces and the increasing activities in the French sector and on the front of the British First Army, all play their part in the combinations of General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, and his Deputy, General Alexander.
  I should not close, however, without uttering a warning against any underrating of the task which lies before the whole group of Allied Armies and Air Forces in Tunisia. The country is very difficult and abounds in defensive positions, but we have every reason to be satisfied with the progress already made by our superior forces and superior equipment under their skilful and resolute commanders.
  Sir Percy Harris: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether General Montgomery's Army included both French and New Zealand troops?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. New Zealand troops have actually passed

  35
  through Gabes this morning. That I am entitled to say, as they are actually in contact with the enemy.
  Mr. Ivor Thomas: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if General Montgomery was in the German army, he would still be a sergeant?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SECRET SESSION)
The Prime Minister: By leave of the House, I wish to give notice that it will be necessary for me to ask the House to go into Secret Session on the next Sitting Day in order that I may make a statement in regard to our Business arrangements, which, for security reasons, it is considered inadvisable to make in public.
Mr. Gallacher: Has not the proposal already been published in the Press?
The Prime Minister: Sometimes such announcements might be inaccurate, in which case they would form a valuable camouflage.

COASTAL AREAS (NEW RESTRICTIONS)
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Herbert Morrison): With your permission, Sir, I wish to make the following statement:
The Government have had under consideration the restrictions on access to coastal areas necessary in the present phase of the war. Apart from the special restrictions applicable to aliens in aliens protected areas and the restrictions on access to beaches and camping near the coast, there has been from time to time, as part of the measures against the possibility of invasion, a ban on the entry of pleasure visitors to a coastal strip from the Wash to Littlehampton and to the Isle of Wight. Except in Kent and a small part of Sussex this ban has been suspended during this winter until 1st April.
The time has now come when the question of access to coastal areas must be considered, not solely in relation to the risk of invasion, but also from the point of view of the use of this country as a base for offensive operations against the enemy. This new situation calls for measures of a
36
different character, and the following arrangements will apply after 1st April. The ban on the entry of pleasure visitors will not be in force except from the Thames to Hastings and in the Isle of Wight. On the other hand a different system of restriction will come into force over a more extensive area of the coast. The area affected will be the whole of the East and South coasts from the Humber to Penzance to an approximate depth of 10 miles inland, and in Kent and Sussex will also include the area at present subject to the visitors' ban.
Mr. MacLaren: Is not this giving information to the enemy?
Mr. Morrison: If I make the statement, the security aspects will have been considered.
This coastal belt will be declared a regulated area under Defence Regulation 13A, and within it access to particular places may from time to time be either restricted or completely barred without prior notice by the military authorities for military purposes. The coastal strip from Milford Haven along South Wales and round the Severn Estuary to Portishead, and in Scotland areas round the estuaries of the Forth, Tay and Clyde will also be declared regulated areas under the Regulation, and places within these areas will be subject, as occasion may arise, to similar restrictions.
As from 1st April, therefore, no guarantee can be given that anyone entering these regulated areas may not at any time and at any place encounter restrictions imposed by the military, after consultation with the Regional Commissioner, for military purposes. It will not be possible to make any general public announcement as to the nature, place or time of these restrictions. Any persons intending to visit a place in a regulated area should ascertain beforehand from the person whom he intends to visit, or the hotel, etc., where he intends to stay, whether any special restrictions are in force at the time in that locality. Advice on the position can only be given locally and will not be available from railway companies, travel agencies, etc.
The Government appreciate that this system of restrictions may bear hardly upon persons who have legitimate reasons for visiting places in these regulated areas, because of the uncertainty whether they will be allowed to reach their destination,

37
but they are confident that the public will willingly accept any inconvenience involved, having regard to the purpose for which these restrictions are necessary. No greater restrictions than are required for military reasons will be imposed. No additional transport facilities will be available this summer to any place within the regulated areas and the injunction against unnecessary travel applies with particular force as regards travel to places in these areas. The directions of the Regional Commissioners concerned restricting the taking-up of residence in the coastal belt of the Eastern and South Eastern Regions, and in the Isle of Wight, remain in force.
Mr. Bossom: Is there any reason for the retention of the bar on South East Kent and the Isle of Wight?
Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir. In the case of South East Kent the restriction on visitors has been on throughout the summer and winter, and it is thought best to retain it. In the case of the Isle of Wight, the reason is local transport considerations.
Earl Winterton: Do we understand that, so far as it is in the public interest to do so, local authorities will be informed in advance of the actual restricted places so that they may communicate to members of the public who come to ask for information?
Mr. Morrison: It is not proposed that local authorities should communicate with members of the public. Members of the public should ascertain in the way I have suggested, and anyone answering inquiries of the public must be very careful not to convey to them any detailed information of military use to the enemy. I will consider the point the Noble Lord raises, but I should not like to give a clear answer at the moment.
Mr. R. C. Morrison: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a number of conferences have been arranged in some of the places covered by his statement, and, in view of the uncertainty, would he be willing to get into touch with the people who are organising these conferences to see whether some satisfactory arrangement can be made?
Mr. H. Morrison: I am not sure whether I can safely do that on security grounds, but I recognise that there is a problem there, and I will consult with the Secretary of State for War to see how far he can be helpful in the matter.
Brigadier-General Clifton Brown: Could people to whom military identity cards have been issued visit these areas?
Mr. Morrison: Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman will put that Question down. I do not know the answer.

EVIDENCE AND POWERS OF ATTORNEY BILL [Lords]
Read the First time; to be read a Second time upon the next Sitting Day.
MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to consolidate the Courts (Emergency Powers) Acts, 1939 to 1942, and certain enactments relating to the possession of mortgaged land." [Courts (Emergency Powers) Bill [Lords.]
BILLS REPORTED

  SUNDERLAND CORPORATION BILL
  Reported, with Amendments, from the Committee on Unopposed Bills (with Report on the Bill).
  Bill, as amended, and Report to lie upon the Table; Report to be printed.

  LIVERPOOL HYDRAULIC POWER BILL [Lords]
  Reported, with an Amendment, from the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
  Bill, as amended, to lie upon the Table.

KITCHEN AND REFRESHMENT ROOMS (HOUSE OF COMMONS)
Special Report from the Select Committee, brought up, and read; to lie upon the Table; and to be printed. [No. 71.]

NEW WRIT (DAVENTRY DIVISION)*
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. James Stuart): I beg to move,
"That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a new Writ for the electing of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the County of Northampton, with the Soke of Peterborough (Daventry Division), in the room of Captain the Right Hon. Edward Algernon FitzRoy, deceased."
Mr. Cocks: I rise to oppose this Motion, or to ask for it to be postponed until the register at Daventry has been brought up to date. I will endeavour to follow your Ruling, Sir, in confining my remarks to Daventry itself. It is a notable and important constituency but, for reasons which we all know, there have been no elections there for many years. [Interruption.] Anyhow, there has not been an election for some time, and it is important that, when an election takes place, the views of the people of Daventry shall be properly represented and declared. Daventry has suffered from the general shifting and movement of the population which have taken place since the war. It is estimated that 5,000,000 people have left their old constituencies, and Daventry will suffer from its proportion of that number. In the last three months, owing to the operations of the Minister of Labour, who has been busy in transferring labour, there is no doubt that there will be a considerable increase. Secondly, in Daventry there is a large number of young men and women who have reached the age of 21 since 1939—that is to say, they are entitled to vote—and there is a large number of people between 21 and 25 who are now disenfranchised. That is very unsatisfactory. In Daventry as elsewhere large numbers of young men and young women between 21 and 25 have no right to vote at the present time. The effect upon these young people may be two-fold. Naturally they will have their minds to some extent divorced from Parliamentary institutions, and I think we would all agree that that is a very bad thing. What is even more serious is that a great many of them will be-discontented. They will feel that they suffer from an injustice and I think they do suffer from an injustice, because if anybody at all in this country should have a prior right to vote, that right should surely belong to the young men and women in
* See Columns 1–5.
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the Forces and in the factories who are working and fighting to save the country.
There may be in Daventry young pilots who fought in the Battle of Britain and who helped to save this country and this Parliament—this very building—and to preserve our whole existence as a nation. Is it not a shameful thing that those who preserved Parliament should not be allowed to vote for Parliament? This is a very serious matter. I do not think the Government dare allow such a state of things to continue, and I was surprised that the Prime Minister did not force his Government, or those people in his Government who are responsible, to wake up and to see that the men who fought in the Battle of Britain and the men and women who are working in our munition factories and serving in the Forces are given the vote. What will happen in Daventry? I can only explain what will happen there by pointing out what has happened in three or four by-elections recently. I think it is important to show this. In one case recently, at the General Election 34,972 voted, but at the by-election only 19,723 voted.
Mr. Speaker: The general question of by-elections is not in Order now. We must confine ourselves to the particular matters affecting Daventry.
Mr. Cocks: I understand that, and I shall endeavour, Mr. Speaker, to follow your Ruling. I was trying to show, by analogy, what will happen when an election takes place in Daventry by referring to what has happened at the last three or four by-elections.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is carrying the illustration rather far.
Mr. Cocks: I bow to your Ruling, Sir, and I will not carry it any further—not even as far as the Portsmouth by-election, which, although I am very glad it sent us the genial admiral who now represents North Portsmouth (Sir W. James), rather pricked the bubble of having by-elections on the present register. The people of Daventry realise that this House is eight years old and is getting rather stale. Therefore it is very important that from Daventry should come somebody to this House who will represent the views of the younger generation. Opinion in Daventry as elsewhere has changed since 1935 and in my view the change has been towards the Left.
Mr. Speaker: It is not good enough to bring in the name of Daventry occasionally while using general arguments.
Mr. Cocks: I brought in the name "Daventry," of course, since I wished to keep as far as I could within your Ruling, and I am very grateful to you, Sir, for having allowed me to go on so far. At the same time, I must admit that I am not yet convinced that arguments which can be applied to the general idea of by-elections should not be applied to one by-election in particular. It is very difficult to draw the distinction. I was about to say certain other things, but in view of your Ruling I will not do so, and I conclude with this sentence. There is a rumour, which I think the Government ought to dispel at once by their action in this matter, that their reluctance to alter the present state of things, is due to the fact that people in Daventry have economic views which do not coincide with those of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That is an appalling suggestion, and I think the Government would do well to show that it is untrue by suspending the issue of the Writ until they have given the young people the vote.
Sir Richard Acland: On a point of Order. Is this a new issue, or is it the same issue as that which we were discussing an hour ago? If it is the same issue, I understood that I had moved an Amendment and that my hon. Friend was seconding it. If it is a new issue, and if my hon. Friend has now moved an Amendment, I would beg leave to second it.
Mr. Speaker: This Debate starts de novo.
Sir R. Acland: It does not seem to me that there is any prospect that further arguments will alter the views of the Government, and therefore a straight fight in opposition is the only way in which hon. Members, who feel that the answers so far given to them are unsatisfactory, can show their purpose. All I want to do now is to repeat what I said when this issue came up before and what I am certain is true—that if you can register people for chocolate rations and for fire-watching, you can register them for democracy.
Mr. Bellenger: I wish to put a new point to the Prime Minister and the Home
64
Secretary on the present position in relation to Daventry and with the permission of the House I would refer to King's Regulations. The present position concerning those soldiers who have the vote and who want to be registered is this. It is in Appendix 10 of King's Regulations:
"Officers and soldiers who are duly qualified are entitled to be registered as military voters for the address in Great Britain or Northern Ireland at which they would have been residing if not serving in the Army."
It goes on to say in paragraph 2 (b):
"Officers commanding units will accordingly see that a copy of the instruction is given to every officer and soldier who is 21 years of age or over and not already registered."
I have reason to believe that considerable numbers in Daventry who have been called up by Act of Parliament are not registered because they have not been given that opportunity under King's Regulations. My first point is that many of those who are entitled to vote or who were entitled to vote when the last register was made, are disfranchised at present because commanding officers have not done their duty.
Mr. Speaker: I think this is very far away from the actual situation in Daventry.
Mr. Bellenger: With respect, Sir, I wish to make this submission. I wish to ask the Home Secretary, or the Secretary of State for War, how many of those who should be entitled to vote in Daventry either by recording their crosses on the ballot paper or by proxies are registered. My case is that in Daventry there are many such. Of course the House will see that this relates to other constituencies as well, but I do not want to press that point except to say to the Prime Minister that this issue, which arises in Daventry and which will be repeated in other constituencies, will have to be faced by the Government. It is no use saying to those in Daventry who are in the Forces—probably thousands of them—that they are not to have the vote, that they are not to have any say in connection with this House, for the duration of the war and probably some time after the war.
I seriously call the attention of the Prime Minister to this issue. There are difficulties in the way. We are all aware of that, but I think the Government ought to be frank with us. The Prime Minister

65
ought to take the House more into his confidence on this matter. The House is not unreasonable in this respect. I think I speak for Members in all quarters when I say that all the House desires is to get some representative result from the electors, whether those electors happen to be in the Forces or in industry.
Those electors of Daventry who happen to have been directed to munition factories or happen to be serving in industry and not in the Forces have an advantage over their colleagues who have been called to the Colours. I suggest to the Prime Minister that this issue cannot be shelved for too long. Otherwise there will be deep discontent among those electors at Daventry who are serving in the Forces. Every lecturer who goes round the Army or to Ministry of Information meetings knows the point. It is raised in question by soldiers in uniform although they are supposed to take no part in meetings. Therefore the Government cannot put their heads in the sand and affect to ignore this issue.
I earnestly beg the Prime Minister to give us more information than he has given to-day. It would not be difficult, at any rate it would not be impossible, for the Armed Forces to overcome the difficulty, although the Prime Minister affects to see many insuperable difficulties. The Canadian Forces have an opportunity, whether they be serving at home or overseas, of recording their votes. Why, therefore, should not the electors of Daventry, much smaller in numbers than the Canadian Forces, have their opportunity of having a say as to who should represent them in the House of Commons? If the Government ignore this matter any further, we shall make a farce of our democratic institutions. We are having Members—and possibly in the case of Daventry we shall have it again—returned to this House on a very small suffrage. The Prime Minister, who is such a great democrat and upholder of our constitutional liberties, should be the first to try and put this matter right.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I hope the House will be ready to come to a conclusion on this Question. There is important Business to be taken, on which a great many Members desire to speak,
66
affecting the whole situation in India. It is not correct, as the hon. Gentleman says, that the Government are ignoring this question. I gave an answer in exactly the opposite sense and said that we were considering it actively with a view to seeing whether the difficulties can be solved. Our desire is that eligible people should be able to vote at by-elections. At the same time, with that candour and frankness which the hon. Gentleman urged me to display, but which I thought I had anticipated, I also stated that I thought from what I had heard that the difficulties appeared very considerable, and it might well be that on a survey of the advantages on the one hand and the difficulties and complications on the other, especially when it comes to the Army under the prevailing conditions of war, it might be thought better by the Government, and the House might endorse their view, that we should not make the changes that are required. I agree with the view that some further statement is needed from the Government when our survey of this matter has been completed, and I hope that something may be said by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary even before we rise for the Easter Recess. I say that to show that the Government's position is not at all one of ignoring the matter or of dull resistance, but that it will be a position of giving the House the best advice and putting the pros and cons fairly before it. On the whole, I think that honesty must make me say that the prognosis looks somewhat adverse at the present time. It is a very odd remedy for those who wish to see more people vote that they should disfranchise all the others. That is certainly illogical and inconsistent, and to seek to disfranchise the people of Daventry, of whom we have heard so much to-day, is a tendency which should certainly be resisted by the House.
Question put,
"That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a new Writ for the electing of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the County of Northampton, with the Soke of Peterborough (Daventry Division), in the room of Captain the Right Honourable Edward Algernon FitzRoy, deceased."
The House divided: Ayes, 239; Noes, 12.

Division No. 12.

AYES.

Adamson, W. M. (Cannock)

Goldie, N. B.

Oldfield, W. H.

Albery, Sir Irving

Green, W. H. (Deptford)

O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir H.

Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.

Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A.

Paling, W.

Ammon, C. G.

Grenfell, D. R.

Palmer, G. E. H.

Anderson, Rt. Hon. Sir J. (Sc'h Univ.)

Grey, Captain G. C.

Peat, C. U.

Assheton, R.

Griffiths, J. (Llanelly)

Peters, Dr. S. J.

Astor, Hon. W. W. (Fulham, E.)

Grigg, Sir E. W. M. (Altrincham)

Petherick, Major M.

Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.

Grigg, Rt. Hon. Sir P. J. (Cardiff, E.)

Pethick-Lawrence, Rt. Hon. F. W.

Barr, J.

Grimston, R. V.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Barstow, P. G.

Gunston, Major Sir D. W.

Pilkington, Captain R. A.

Beamish, Rear-Admiral T. P.

Guy, W. H.

Price, M. P.

Beattie, F. (Cathcart)

Hambro, Capt. A. V.

Procter, Major H. A.

Beauchamp, Sir B. C.

Hannah, I. C.

Purbrick, R.

Beaumont, Major Hn. R. E. B. (P'ts'h)

Hannon, Sir P. J. H.

Pym, L. R.

Beechman, N. A.

Harris, Rt. Hon. Sir P. A.

Raikes, Flight-Lieut. H. V. A. M.

Beit, Sir A. L.

Heilgers, Major F. F. A.

Rathbone, Eleanor

Bennett, Sir P. F. B. (Edgbaston)

Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)

Reed, Sir H. S. (Aylesbury)

Bevin, Rt. Hon. E.

Henderson, J. (Ardwick)

Reid, Rt. Hon. J. S. C. (Hillhead)

Blrd, Sir R. B.

Henderson, T. (Tradeston)

Reid, W. Allan (Derby)

Blair, Sir R.

Hicks, E. G.

Ridley, G.

Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C.

Hill, Prof. A. V.

Russell, Sir A. (Tynemouth)

Boothby, R. J. G.

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Salt, E. W.

Bossom, A. C.

Hogg, Hon. Q. McG.

Sanderson, Sir F. B.

Boulton, W. W.

Hopkinson, A.

Schuster, Sir G. E.

Bower, Norman (Harrow)

Horsbrugh, Florence

Scott, Donald (Wansbeck)

Bower, Comdr. R. T. (Cleveland)

Howitt, Dr. A. B.

Scott, Lord William (Ro'b'h & Selk'k)

Brass, Capt. Sir W.

Hughes, R. M.

Selley, H. R.

Broad, F. A.

Hulbert, Wing Commander N. J.

Shute, Col. Sir J. J.

Brown, Rt. Hon. E. (Leith)

Hume, Sir G. H.

Simmonds, O. E.

Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Newbury)

Hunter, T.

Smith, E (Stoke)

Burden, T. W.

Hutchinson, G. C. (Ilford)

Smith, E. P. (Ashford)

Burgin, Rt Hon. E. L.

Jeffreys, Gen. Sir G. D.

Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)

Campbell, Sir E. T. (Bromley)

Jennings, R.

Smith, T. (Normanton)

Campbell, J. D. (Antrim)

Johnston, Rt. Hon. T. (Stl'g & C'km'n)

Southby, Comd. Sir A. R. J.

Cary, R. A.

Jowitt, Rt. Hon. Sir W. A.

Stanley, Col. Rt. Hon. Oliver

Challen, Flight-Lieut. C.

Kennedy, Rt. Hon. T.

Strickland, Capt. W. F.

Channon, H.

Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)

Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (Northwich)

Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)

Kerr, Sir John Graham (Scottish U's)

Stuart, Rt. Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Chapman, Sir S. (Edinburgh, S.)

Kirby, B. V.

Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir M. F.

Charleton, H. C.

Knox, Major-General Sir A. W. F.

Sutcliffe, H.

Chorlton, A. E. L.

Lamb, Sir J. Q.

Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (P'd'ton, S.)

Churchill, Rt. Hn. Winston S. (Epp'g)

Lawson, J. J.

Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)

Clarry, Sir Reginald

Leach, W.

Thomas, I. (Keighley)

Cobb, Captain E. C.

Lennox-Boyd, A. T. L.

Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)

Collindridge, F.

Levy, T.

Thomas, Dr. W. S. Russell (S'th'm'tn)

Cooke, J. D. (Hammersmith, S.)

Linstead, H. N.

Thorne, W.

Cooper, Rt. Hon. A. Duff

Little, Dr. J. (Down)

Thorneycroft, H. (Clayton)

Courthope, Col. Rt. Hon. Sir G. L.

Lloyd, Major E. G. R. (Renfrew, E.)

Thurtle, E.

Craven-Ellis, W.

Lloyd, G. W. (Ladywood)

Touche, G. C.

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.

Locker-Lampson, Commander O. S.

Tree, A. R. L. F.

Daggar, G.

Loftus, P. C.

Tufnell, Lieut.-Comdr. R. L.

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Lyons, Major Sir J. M.

Wakefield, W. W.

Davidson, Viscountess (H'm'l H'mst'd)

Lyons. Major A. M.

Walkden, E. (Doncaster)

Davies, Major Sir G. F. (Yeovil)

McCorquodale, Malcolm S.

Ward, Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)

Davison, Sir W. H.

Macdonald, Captain Peter (I. of W.)

Ward, Irene M. B. (Wallsend)

De Chair, Capt. S. S.

McEntee, V. La T.

Waterhouse, Capt. C.

De la Bère, R.

McEwen, Capt. J. H. F.

Watkins, F. C.

Denville, Alfred

McNeil, H.

Watson, W. McL.

Dobbie, W.

Maitland, Sir A.

Watt, Lt.-Col. G. S. H. (Richmond)

Doland, G. F.

Makins, Brig.-Gen. Sir E.

Webbe, Sir W. Harold

Donner, Squadron-Leader P. W.

Mander, G. le M.

Wedderburn, H. J. S.

Douglas, F. C. R.

Markham, Major S. F.

Wells, Sir S. Richard

Dower, Lt.-Col. A. V. G.

Marlowe, Lt.-Col. A.

Welsh, J. C.

Drewe, C.

Mathers, G.

Westwood, J.

Duckworth, W. R. (Moss Side)

Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.

White, H. (Derby, N.E.)

Dugdale, John (W. Bromwich)

Mellor, Sir J. S. P.

Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W. (Blaydon)

Dugdale, Major T. L. (Richmond)

Messer, F.

Wickham, Lt.-Col. E. T. R.

Ede, J. C.

Mills, Sir F. (Leyton, E.)

Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)

Edmondson, Major Sir J.

Molson, A. H. E.

Williams, Sir H. G. (Croydon, S.)

Edwards, Walter J. (Whitechapel)

Montague, F.

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Emmott, C. E. G. C.

Moore, Lieut.-Col. Sir T. C. R.

Wilmot, John

Emrys-Evans, P. V.

Morgan, R. H. (Stourbridge)

Windsor, W.

Erskine-Hill, A. G.

Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Universities)

Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl

Etherton, Ralph

Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Hackney, S.)

Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir K. (Woolwich, W.)

Fox, Flight-Lieut. Sir G. W. G.

Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)

Woodburn, A.

Fraser, T. (Hamilton)

Mott-Radclyffe, Capt. C. E.

Woods, G. S. (Finsbury)

Fremantle, Sir F. E.

Murray, Sir D. K. (Midlothian, N.)

York, Major C.

Furness, Major S. N.

Murray, J. D. (Spennymoor)

Young, Sir R. (Newton)

Galbraith, Comdr. T. D.

Nicholson, Captain G. (Farnham)

Gardner, B. W.

Nicolson, Hon. H. G. (Leicester, W.)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G. Lloyd (P'b'ke)

Noel-Baker. P. J.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas and Mr. A.

Young.

68

69

NOES.

Acland, Sir R. T. D.

Gruffydd, W. J.

Reakes, G. L. (Wallasey)

Bevan, A.

Hardie, Agnes

Stephen, C.

Bowles, F. G.

Horabin, T. L.

Cooks, F. S.

Kendall, W. D.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES

Driberg, T. E. N.

McGovern, J.

Mr. Stokes and Mr. W. Brown

INDIA (SITUATION)
The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery): I beg to move,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Madras on 30th October, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 15th February, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th March, 1943, respectively."
This and the other Motions on the Order Paper are concerned with only six out of the 11 Provinces of British India. In the remaining five Provinces, comprising a population of over 112,000,000, Indian Ministers responsible to Indian Legislatures have continued in control of the vast majority of subjects which affect the daily life of their fellow citizens. It is only in the Provinces controlled by the Congress Party's organisation that self-government was suspended by the Order of the so-called "High Command" of the Congress Party in October, 1939, and the Governors have been compelled to shoulder the direct responsibilities of government. They do so under the provisions of Section 93 of the Government of India Act. These are emergency provisions and as such properly come before this House for periodic review. I need not add that they are also under constant review by the Viceroy and the Governors concerned. In two Provinces where Ministries were originally ordered out by the Congress dictatorship self-government has been restored. The resumption of self-government in other Provinces can take place whenever Ministers can be found in a position to conduct affairs and co-operate in the common war effort. The door remains open, and the whole situation remains under constant review.
The origin of that situation and the reasons for its present continuance can only be understood in the light of the nature and policy of the Congress Party. Originally democratic in its organisation and constitutional in its methods, the Congress Party has progressively become a dictatorship, aiming at the expulsion by revolutionary, though professedly non-violent methods, of the existing British Raj
70
and its supersession by a Congress Raj. For the detailed story of that evolution I can only commend to the House the masterly and objective survey of the last seven years of Indian politics embodied in the second volume of Professor Coup-land's Report to the Nuffield Trust. For myself, I would only go back over the past sufficiently to make the events of recent months intelligible. The particular character and methods of the Congress Party have largely been shaped by a single man, Mr. Gandhi. I will not attempt here to assess the qualities of that remarkable and enigmatic personality. Many Members have no doubt read a recent book, "Grey Eminence," in which Mr. Aldous Huxley describes the combination in one person Father Joseph—Francçois du Tremblay—of the devout mystic with the unscrupulous political adviser who helped Cardinal Richelieu to keep Europe distracted by a generation of disastrous war. Enough for me to say that Mr. Gandhi's peculiar appeal to the Hindu veneration for the ascetic has helped to make him the unquestioned dictator, the "permanent super-president," to use Mr. Nehru's description, of by far the largest, best financed and most rigidly-drilled party organisation in India.
In the Provincial elections of 1937 the Congress Party secured 711 out of 1,585 seats, that is to say, less than a majority even in British India. But it was enough to give the Party an absolute majority in five Provinces and the control of three others. This unexpected result would seem to have intoxicated the Congress Party leaders with a sense of new-found power. Overriding and ignoring the growing intensity of the opposition which they were piling up in India itself, they persuaded themselves that they and they alone were India. Only a relatively small effort, so it seemed to them, was still required in order to displace British rule at the centre and for the Congress Party, to use Mr. Gandhi's phrase, to "take delivery." The imminence of war came as a shock not only to Mr. Gandhi's sincere pacifism, but also to those dreams of early power. At the first sign of preparations to meet the coming danger

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the Congress members were ordered to boycott the Central Legislature. In their absence that Legislature unquestioningly accepted the brief statement in which Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan, as leader of the House, declared that all present were determined to do their duty to King and country. The far-reaching provisions of the Defence of India Act were passed without a division. The Ministries and Legislatures of the Punjab, Bengal, and Sind endorsed the attitude of the Central Legislature, as did the Liberal and Mahasabha Parties. The Ruling Princes of India, both individually and afterwards by unanimous vote of the Chamber of Princes, vindicated their traditional loyalty to the King-Emperor by their pledges and their actions. The part India has since played in the war is known to all the world. It is as well that I should remind the House of these facts. They are the conclusive answer to the wholly untruthful legend promulgated by the Congress Party and since, I regret to say, too readily swallowed outside, of a reluctant India dragged into a war in which she had no voice and in whose issues she felt no concern. During the next few weeks Lord Linlithgow strove with unwearying patience to persuade the Congress leaders to co-operate with the Government and with the leaders of other parties in support of the war effort. The only answer was the summary edict, to which I have already referred, of the "High Command" suspending self-government in the Congress Party's Provinces. In the following August the Viceroy issued a far-reaching Declaration which, in fact, pledged us to the acceptance, at the earliest possible moment after the war, of India's completely free and equal partnership in the British family of nations, under a Constitution of her own devising. At the same time, it invited the party leaders, on the strength of that pledge, to co-operate in the war effort by joining the Viceroy's Executive. Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues contemptuously refused even to discuss that offer, and Mr. Gandhi followed up that refusal by launching a campaign of individual protest against India's participation in the war. That campaign proved a complete fiasco and petered out in the course of 1941.
In March of last year my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Air-
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craft Production went out to India. The proposals which he was charged to explain were so far-reaching, so generous and so explicit that it at one time seemed almost inconceivable that they could be rejected. Even within the ranks of the Congress Working Committee influential elements were known to be strongly in favour of its acceptance.
Mr. Stephen: Who were they?
Mr. Amery: They are well known. The Minister and others have publicly mentioned them. Why were those proposals rejected? The first reason was the same as that which had caused the contemptuous rejection of the Declaration of August, 1940. It was the assumption underlying both Declarations that India can only be free under a Constitution system arrived at by agreement between the main elements in her national life. Both in fact denied the claim of the Congress Party to "take delivery" of India at our hands. The last-moment Congress demand for the immediate setting-up of a National Government with full Cabinet powers was, in fact, an attempt to snatch that delivery. My right hon. and learned Friend was bound to reject it, for acceptance would have wrecked all prospects of agreement with the minorities.
There was, however, another, and at that moment probably even stronger, reason for rejection. What was that moment? It was the moment of our worst defeats in the East. My right hon. and learned Friend's mission was announced by the Prime Minister on 11th March, three days after the fall of Rangoon. While the negotiations were in progress the Japanese were advancing rapidly. Not only Ceylon, but Indian coastal ports, suffered bombing raids which looked like the harbingers of far worse to come for the great cities of Eastern India. It never occurred to us here that there was any connection between these events and the sending-out of my right hon. and learned Friend, but for Mr. Gandhi the connection would seem to have been only too obvious. In his eyes, the mission of my right hon. and learned Friend was the hoisting of a distress signal, a belated appeal to Congress to commit itself to a war policy which could only help to bring upon India

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the horrors of invasion. Our offer was, for him, nothing more than—I quote his own words—" a post-dated cheque on a falling bank." During the weeks that followed the rejection of our proposals, weeks of continuous reverses in Burma, Mr. Gandhi concentrated all his efforts on a campaign by which the British Government of India was to be forced to "quit India," and hand over the control of a continent to such Government as might or might not emerge, or to abandon it to anarchy. How far he really believed that the Government of India could be driven to surrender, in view of the precariousness of the military situation——
General Sir George Jeffreys: I am sorry to interrupt my right hon. Friend, but would he be kind enough to speak a little more loudly?
Mr. Amery: Certainly, Sir. I am very sorry if I have not spoken loud enough. I was asking how far Mr. Gandhi really believed that the Government of India could be driven to surrender in view of the precariousness of the military situation or how far he was mainly concerned with reinsuring Congress with the victorious Japanese invader. It is impossible to say. Hon. Members will have read the White Paper in which Mr. Gandhi's original draft resolution of last April is included, beginning with the conclusion that:
"Britain is incapable of defending India"
and going on to state:
"Japan's quarrel is not with India",
and that a free India's
"first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan."
The House will also have followed the successive stages by which the original resolution was modified in deference to those elements, like Mr. Nehru, who were not only committed by their sincerely expressed past utterances to sympathy with China and Russia, but who are also far more alive to the desirability of conciliating opinion here and in the United States. With the one exception of Mr. Rajagopalachari, whose earnest and prophetic letter of appeal to Mr. Gandhi will, I hope, have been read by every Member—it is in Appendix II of the White Paper—the doubting Members of the Working Committee seem to have been content with an improvement in the façade of the
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resolution. What is more significant is that they seem to have acquiesced in its conversion from a general demand that the British should quit India to the specific threat contained in the resolution of 14th July last that this demand was to be enforced by a campaign of mass civil disobedience or, to use Mr. Gandhi's own words, by "open rebellion."
Mr. Sorensen: Is it not also quite clear that the Working Committee did not in fact endorse Mr. Gandhi's intention or desire in regard to peace with Japan?
Mr. Amery: I daresay not. I have explained the reasons why that resolution was amended; but they did endorse that there should be open rebellion unless their claim was admitted. On 8th August, the All-Indian Congress Committee gave its definite endorsement and sanction to that rebellion. It may help the House to understand all that lay behind that decision when I remind them that the month which preceded it had seen us driven in retreat to within 50 miles of Alexandria and had recorded the fall of Rostov and the imminent threat to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, while only the monsoon due shortly to break seemed to stand between India and Japanese invasion.
Happily there was better and sterner stuff in India than the Congress leaders reckoned upon. Not only India, but the whole Allied cause, owes a deep debt of gratitude to the Indian Members of the Viceroy's Executive, whose swift and resolute decision to arrest the organisers of mischief caused the rebellion to go off at half cock. It owes no less to the loyal Indian Civil servants, policemen and soldiers who stood faithfully to their trust during the anxious and trying weeks that followed, and also to the vast majority of the Indian public, Hindu as well as Moslem, who stood aloof or even gave their active support to the authorities.
With the actual character and course of the Congress rebellion I dealt at some length in the Debate in October last. The whole subject is, of course, dealt with comprehensively in the White Paper, and I shall not weary the House by going over the same ground. If there are Members who, having studied the White Paper, can still believe that a really non-violent movement of national protest

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was all that was ever intended or that Mr. Gandhi can have had any illusions as to the nature of the conflagration which he was determined to spread over India—well, I have really nothing to say to them. Nor is there anything I could say to those who are still prepared to argue that the concentrated and technically skilled attacks upon vital centres of communications and upon all Government buildings, associated as they were throughout both in person and in public estimation with the Congress Party, were a mere spontaneous manifestation of public indignation at the arrest of popular political leaders. There is a limit to credulity. No one who has taken the pains to go through the White Paper can remain in doubt as to what was intended and as to what was in fact attempted. The case against Mr. Gandhi and his associates is overwhelming. I have seen it asserted in certain quarters that the White Paper is a mere case for the prosecution, unsupported by the evidence required for a conviction.
Mr. Sloan: Where is the corroboration?
Mr. Amery: It is a statement of facts, many of them elicited in the course of actual investigations before the courts. These facts have not been used to obtain a conviction, for there has been no trial, still less a conviction, of Congress leaders. They are facts which, at any rate, have afforded abundant additional justification for the Government of India's decision to detain the leading mischief makers in innocuous isolation. I say, "additional justification," for I must remind the House that the declared decision of the All-India Congress Committee to paralyse the Administration at a moment of grave national peril by a campaign of mass civil disobedience was in itself ample justification, and would have been so if not a single drop of blood had been shed or a single rail torn up. Flickering remnants of the conflagration still occur sporadically. The need for watchfulness remains, but, broadly speaking, it can be said that the Congress Party's rebellion has been successsfully dealt with by the Government of India, by the Provincial Governments concerned and by India at large.
Since then, there has been the curious epilogue of Mr. Gandhi's fast to capacity,
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happily successful in that respect, happily unsuccessful in the attempt to coerce the Government of India into granting his unconditional release by the creation of an emotional crisis. It is to be regretted that three members of the Viceroy's Executive, men who had done eminent public service and not least in dealing with the troubles of last autumn, should have allowed themselves to be swayed by that emotional crisis. Their places, I understand, will be filled in the near future by no less capable Indian public men. There is no question of any going back on that expansion of the Council which Mr. Aney, one of the resigning members, has since his resignation described as "an outstanding reform," offering—I use his words:
"enough scope for solid service to the Indian people by the Indian members even under the existing system, and still more by the conventions which steadily and slowly grow up."
To return to Mr. Gandhi, I understand the Viceroy has agreed to receive a deputation arising out of a recent meeting of non-party leaders in Bombay. These leaders apparently wish to suggest that Mr. Gandhi may now be disposed to be more reasonable if allowed contact with his detained Congress followers and with political leaders outside. I think the full account I have given to the House of Mr. Gandhi's attitude and of that of his party throughout the war, culminating in the reckless and defeatist action of last year, must have convinced the House how difficult, and indeed dangerous, it would be to consider any concession of that nature in the absence of the most explicit assurances and effective guarantees of a complete change of attitude and of conduct on the part of those who have already brought so much unhappiness upon India and who might still be capable of so much danger to the whole Allied cause in those future operations for which India must be the base. I can only say that no sign of any such change of heart in Mr. Gandhi can be traced in his recent correspondence with the Viceroy.
Where, then, do we stand? Is there no conciliatory gesture, no sympathetic initiative that might serve to break the deadlock, if not with the Congress leaders, at any rate between other Indian parties? I do not believe it is fair either to Lord Linlithgow, who has been unwearied in endeavouring to bring the parties together, or to those parties themselves, even to the Congress Party, to suggest that the dead-

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lock is something which can be resolved by mere sympathetic handling or by some happy expedient that may have been overlooked in the framing of last year's Declaration. The differences are far too deep and too sincerely held. Mr. Jinnah, on the one side, and the Mahasabha leaders, on the other, to take the two extreme points of view, are each contending for what they and millions behind them believe to be vital principles between which, in their present mood and in the situation as they see it, they can see no compromise. It is no use blaming them. Let us rather see where the difference lies and what has so intensely aggravated it in recent years.
The Hindu majority of all parties—Congress, Liberals, Mahasabha—are substantially agreed in one thing, in insisting upon the maintenance of the unity of India, at least for the most essential common purposes. The Moslem attitude was clearly and unequivocally defined by the Moslem League's secretary and spokesman in a recent debate in the Assembly when he declared that
"the Moslems of India will never accept any form of central government which will place them at the mercy of the majority community."
Are these two points of view really incompatible? They have not proved incompatible so long as the ultimate control has rested with the impartial authority of this House. Are they really and necessarily incompatible under that democratic freedom which not only all Indian parties but all parties in this House wish India to enjoy? The conclusion to which I personally have been driven ever more definitely by my contact with this problem over the last three years is that the problem is not insoluble. But it cannot be solved unless we, and still more Indians, can get away from the idea that there is only one sealed pattern of democracy, namely, the particular form of Parliamentary Executive which we have developed in this country. I believe with all my heart that ours is the best type of democracy in the world, the most flexible and yet also the strongest and most stable. But it can only exist in a relatively homogeneous country where free discussion can convert the minority of to-day into the majority of to-morrow, and where a strong tradition of national unity and of Parliamentary give and take transcend the exigencies of party passion
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and the dictatorship of party organisations. Imposed as the central government of a Continent so deeply divided as India, that system would only spell the tyranny of an immovable permanent majority or else, in the alternative, disruption.
Would anyone dream of making our system the basis of a Federal Government for Europe? Let me take Switzerland. With its three separate races, Switzerland lives in happy unity under one of the most democratic federal Constitutions in the world, but a Constitution under which no one race and no one party can secure control of the Executive. I wonder whether even Switzerland could have hoped under our system to have escaped the contagion of nationalist conflict outside her borders.
Twenty-five years ago this House pledged itself to the progressive attainment of responsible government for India. We intended then, and we intend it even more directly and immediately today, that India should live under a Government responsible not to Parliament here, but to her own people under her own Constitution. What however we too lightly assumed and what we led India to assume was that this Government would necessarily be of our own particular type. The nearer we have come to the fulfilment of our pledge the more acute has become the internal deadlock in India. Experience of responsible government in the Provinces as controlled by a totalitarian Hindu oligarchy enormously accentuated it. Our recent declarations have only widened the breach. Yet I firmly believe there may be more than one way round. Like wasps buzzing angrily up and down against a window pane when an adjoining window may be wide open, we are all held up, frustrated and irritated, by the unrealised and insuperable barrier of our constitutional prepossessions. If only our mind, and above all the mind of India, could emerge from the rut of our accustomed lines of thought and look for fresh constructive solutions, wherever they may be found, adapted to Indian conditions, I am optimist enough to believe that the way round the present deadlock may be found, and perhaps found more rapidly than now seems possible. It is for Indians themselves to find the way. They alone can find a solution, for it is only when they have found it for themselves that they will be minded to make it succeed.

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There is one thing more I want to add. The House has been very good to me during these last three years. It has, I think, given me credit for attempting to make such progress as the difficult circumstances have allowed. It has I hope given me credit for endeavouring to maintain a positive and constructive outlook in face of a baffling and bewildering problem. So I trust it will bear with me in what I am now going to say. We have no reason to be ashamed of our past record in India. Never, if I may venture to echo certain great words used by the Prime Minister in a different context, never have so few done so much for the well-being of so many, so much to dispel fear and alleviate want, as was done for the toiling millions of India by a handful of British administrators in the last century. (Interruption). The work was done, it is true, within the limitations of the outlook of the age and of the local conditions of the India of that time, but it was good and enduring work for all that. It succeeded because those who did it believed in their task and believed in themselves, and because we who sent them out believed in ourselves and had faith in our mission in the world. Because we believed in our mission, India believed in it, too, and responded.
To-day we live in a very different age; we are dealing with a very different India; our own outlook upon all these problems of government and of racial relationships has undergone, and rightly undergone, a profound change. Have we brought into that new age the same faith or the same confident vision that inspired an earlier generation? There was inspiration in the old vision, and no one can deny it, of a beneficent paternal Empire. How much more splendid, more inspiring, is the vision of a Commonwealth of free nations, freely associated in equal partnership, regardless of all differences of race or of creed, a partnership not merely for mutual defence or mutual trade, but a partnership and, what is more, a lead to the world, in all good living, in all right thinking, in all generous striving. If we have failed to inspire India with that vision, if our response to Indian nationalism has looked to Indians too much like a reluctant yielding to pressure, if our desire to keep India within the Commonwealth has seemed to them a mere instinctive
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hanging-on to some last indefinable shred of past authority, may it not be due to the fact that we have not ourselves realised sufficiently vividly the vision of a united Commonwealth? How can we expect the Indians to share that vision of a united Commonwealth in all its range of opportunity, in all its breadth of freedom, if—I hope I may be allowed to quote two lines of Francis Thompson:
"'Tis we, 'tis our estrangèd faces,
That miss the many-splendoured thing"
As for faith, surely what we in this little Island, what we of this loosely bound yet amazingly coherent Commonwealth, this youngest yet infinitely hopeful experiment in super-national co-operation, what we have already shown to the world in the darkest hours of the present struggle—surely that should give us faith in ourselves and in the ideals and the possibilities of that Commonwealth in facing the tasks before us.
Of those tasks none can compare in importance to every member of our Commonwealth as well as to the future peace of Asia and of the world, with the solution, on a stable and enduring basis, of this great and difficult problem of India. We cannot solve it by shirking our responsibilities to the peoples of India, and of the Allied cause, while the enemy is at India's gates. We can help to solve it only by our continuing good will to India, by our active interest in India, by our encouragement of every effort that Indians may make to find their own way out of their present deadlock; above all, it may be, by imparting to them some measure of our own faith in our common future.
Mr. Amman: Whatever differences of opinion might emerge on some points between the right hon. Gentleman and myself, I bear testimony, without any qualification, to the undoubted interest and sympathy which the right hon. Gentleman has shown towards India for many years. Many of us remember the struggles that took place in 1935 and the very gallant part that the right hon. Gentleman played in connection with India's interest. I think it is only fair that I should pay testimony to that at the outset. There are one or two very small points which I would like to clear out of the way. I hesitate sometimes to raise very elementary questions for fear that they

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might seem so obvious as to be not worth while, but I find on talking to people that things which seem to need no explanation often are not understood. I think some trouble would be saved if in documents published by the India Office, and even in speeches like that to which we have just listened, it was made clear that the word "Congress" does not mean a Parliamentary Assembly, but a party. I have been very much impressed by the fact that one or two American friends to whom I have talked recently have thought that when we spoke about the Congress of India we were talking of something like their own Congress, whereas we were really talking about something like our own Labour Party, Conservative Party, or Communist Party. I know that there were even Members of this House who at one time were confused on that issue. That is a little thing, but it is one of those things which count, especially overseas, among people who are not well versed in these matters.
Another thing to which I wish to call attention, and which I think is worth while referring to, having regard to some interruptions which occurred during the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, is the point made in the statement of the Party with which I am connected. In our statement of August last we made it quite clear that we wanted to see that
"the establishment of a free India in the postwar world is secure."
The statement went on to condemn
"the present attempt to organise a civil disobedience movement in India as certain to injure seriously the hope of Indian freedom and give encouragement and comfort to the common enemy."
However circumstances may vary, that is still the policy of the Labour Party. That should be made quite clear. I welcomed very much the published White Paper. I am bound to say that, after reading it, I regretted its format, as likely somewhat to acerbate the ill feeling existing, because it conveys the impression of being purely an ex parte statement. It seems to me that it would have been better had the letters been published without comment. I do not suggest that that was done intentionally, but there it is. People, like myself, who have none but the best intentions in regard to India and who acknowledge the great part this country has played, see just a trace of some special pleading, which gives a handle to people in other parts of
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the world. I hope that that suggestion will be taken in the spirit in which I present it. We are living in such difficult and dangerous times that we do not want to do anything which is likely to widen the breach and to acerbate feeling or to make the Indians think that they are not getting a fair deal. Having said that, I realise that no good purpose could be served by harking back to past disagreements, if India is to be saved from a spiritual blackout without precedent in history.
When we are told by people like Mr. Gandhi that the British presence in India is an incentive to the Japs, we have only to answer with the single word "Siam"—where we were not. With the best will in the world, and with a desire to have a sympathetic understanding of India's case, I cannot see how the Government in the midst of a life-and-death struggle could have done otherwise than they have. One of my hon. Friends who interrupted has now gone, which is a pity, as I wanted him to listen to this. Not only would any other action by the Government have endangered the British Empire, but it would have thrown open the door to attacks on China and Russia. There is also our duty to other sections in India—the Moslems, the depressed classes, the Sikhs, and the Indian Christians, all of whom have indicated in no uncertain tone that they are not prepared to come under the rule of the Congress Party in India. We always compare the numbers of the Congress Party and the Moslems; but when you add those other groups, you will see that the Congress Party do not represent more than about half of the population of India. Probably it is the largest and the strongest political party that has ever been organised, but its methods are dictatorial.
It was underfortunate that the Cripps mission came at a time when the British Army had had a severe setback and when there was also a spectacular Japanese advance in Malaya and other parts. That had an undoubted influence on Congress party opinion. Mr. Nehru decidedly changed his opinion. There is no desire on my part to minimise the black pages in the British Government's record, but it is difficult to understand why the offer of August, 1942, should have been turned down, except, as one sees it now, in retrospect, because of the fear that Britain

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was beaten and the Allied cause lost and that we should not be able to implement our policy. Mr. Gandhi probably had that fear, and thought that it was best to agree quickly with his enemy, or, perhaps more likely, he saw the sands of time running out and was in haste to come to some agreement before he was called to pass on. Let me quote Mr. Gandhi's own words:
"The voice within me tells me I shall have to fight against the whole world or stand alone…Even if the United Nations oppose me, even if the whole of India tries to persuade me that I am wrong, even then I will go ahead, not for India's sake alone but for the sake of the whole world…. I cannot wait any longer for India's freedom. I cannot wait until Mr. Jinnah is converted…. If I wait any longer God will punish me. This is the last struggle of my life."
We want no further evidence that this is a man who feels that time is against him. Up to a certain point, Mr. Nehru had been more or less successful in winning the approval of the party for the point of view he took. Let there be no mistake in the mind of any hon. Member. Sir Stafford Cripps—if I might use the name—put to India an offer which was clear and explicit. There was no dubiety about it. He offered perfect freedom and liberty, full recognition and Dominion status, and explicit assurances were given that they would be free to secede from the Commonwealth of Nations if and when they thought it necessary. Surely there could have been no call for anything more explicit. Only idle fear or a desire to take advantage of the difficult position of this country and the Allied Nations could have led to the offer being turned down. A question was put directly to the right hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) as to whether there was any difficulty about India participating in the Atlantic Charter. The answer was clear and specific—"None at all." During all this time the war position was steadily deteriorating, and that undoubtedly lent a good deal of colour to, and had a good deal of influence in, persuading the Congress Party to take the line it did. The parties made no effort to settle their own disputes, nor did they even confer as to any agreed response to these proposals. It is impossible to carry on negotiations in that way.
The tragedy of it all is that in this country there was never a greater and a more genuine desire that India should be
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free to work out her own salvation. But you cannot do this if the other side will not play up. That is the position in which we find ourselves at the present time. They pressed for immediate self-government, but how could that be given when the Japanese were already at the gates? That was not the only concern of this country. We had our debt to China and Russia and the rest of India, who had looked to us for protection in past times. Against all that we had the very explicit statements by people like Dr. Ambedkar, the President of the National Democratic Union, and the President of the Indian Communists, all in most unequivocable language, saying that in no circumstances would they agree to come under a Government wholly consisting of the Congress Party. We cannot get away from that. The statements are set out in Professor Coupland's Report without any doubt whatever. Dr. Ambedkar says:
"I yield to none in my desire for the freedom of this country…but it would be madness to weaken law and order when the barbarians are at our gates."
The President of the National Democratic Union said:
"We will not allow this country to be betrayed by a misguided visionary like Gandhi."
There is the voice of India itself, to which some heed must be given and of which account must be taken. In looking through an old book the other day, I came across this quotation from Dr. Max Müller, who said:
"If I were to look over the whole world to find out the country most richly endowed with all the wealth, power and beauty that Nature can bestow—in some parts a very paradise on earth—I should point to India. If I were asked under what sky the human mind has most fully developed some of the choicest gifts, has most deeply pondered on the greatest problems of life, and found solutions of some of them which well deserve the attention even of those who have studied Plato and Kant—I should point to India."
Surely then, everything should be done that is possible, and we hope that India will come into full partnership and discussion of the new order that we are trying to set up in the world. We should say that, whatever mistakes and blunders we may have made, we now open the door, and it is surely for India to enter as and when she will. What can we do to link up the potentialities of the people for world freedom? One does not deny

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that the Congress Party were at one time a constitutional party. Mr. Gandhi seemed to be well disposed towards Britain, but he appeared to dissemble later. In the last war we had no cause whatever to complain about his attitude. Perhaps it is our fault. If it is, it is certainly our responsibility to give the lead as far as we can. I am sure that to a certain extent the right hon. Gentleman made suggestions himself in his speech. We have to appeal with imagination, generosity and faith to the men of good will in India, who want strengthening in order that their position may be upheld in the fight that they are putting up. The position has undoubtedly altered since the rejection of the Cripps mission, when there was a feeling that this country was going to be defeated and that we would be unable to defend India, and there was probably the understandable position that they wanted to make the best possible terms with the invader. Now, with a somewhat brightening position, there is an opportunity for us yet again to enter into further discussions. We might, even at the risk of a certain loss of face, take the initiative in this connection. It is no good always criticising and declaiming unless we are prepared to make some suggestions even though they may not commend themselves.
There is one person who could do a great deal in this connection—the Prime Minister himself. One curious thing has developed in the prosecution of the war. It is the tremendous reliance which has been placed by people of different nations on the spoken word, and on none more than that of our own Prime Minister, whose word has carried great power and authority, and who knows the meaning and value of words. All that he has said about India was during the discussions of 1933, when he was most strongly against the proposals, and by a curious turn of the wheel of fortune the right hon. Gentleman was his opponent. Here is an opportunity for them to link up forces and for the Prime Minister to help in that respect by making such an appeal that there will be no question as to where he stands. He gave us a certain lead recently. I wonder how many hon. Members noticed it. In his broadcast appeal he made a suggestion about a Council of Asia. There is a beginning; the door is slightly ajar. A United States broadcast commentator the other day rather deplored that he did not say
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a little more with regard to China, and I say the same with regard to India. Let the right hon. Gentleman develop that theme a little more. India and China in the Council of Asia can do a tremendous lot and can take the whole leadership of the Far East in Which we hope to rebuild the world. I suggest one connection in which that can be done. We have tried and been successful in this sphere. Canada and South Africa are outstanding examples. There we have had the racial problem, and, looking back, we can thank God for the foresight of men like Campbell-Bannerman, who took the step he did with regard to South Africa, The Prime Minister himself then took a prominent part, and he should now play his rightful role.
But having said that, the problem is not quite the same. There was a large admixture of Europeans, and there was to a large extent a common language, although we recognised the Dutch and the French. There is a great psychological difference here. We have to remember that, in regard to the Eastern question, it is not an easy thing to overcome. It can only be overcome by patience and a determination to be friendly and to work together. Here is an opportunity again, with the brightening of the prospects of the United Nations, of which we have had good news to-day. There is an opportunity for high statesmanship and good will to make a step in this direction. The right hon. Gentleman anticipated something that I was going to say with regard to the Swiss Government. Pakistan will not and cannot be accepted in India. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity to put something into the arena which may form something around which people may discuss and from which something may evolve. The Swiss Government have something in this respect. In their cantons they can fight on party lines, but party has no effect in the higher Federal Legislature. Surely, we can try and find a way out of our difficulties along similar lines, so that we may come together. If we could get together and talk I have no fear of what the result would be, with patience and helpful influence on both sides. It was Mr. Nehru who first pointed out that Mahatma Gandhi's line would make India a passive partner of the Axis, though he altered that view afterwards when Mr. Gandhi's star was in the ascendant. All

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the conditions which brought about that state are no longer there. It is necessary that India should stand up and realise those great attributes and qualities in the quotation from Dr. Max Müller. That can be done. We want to do nothing in this Debate to stir up ill-feeling or ill-will in India or elsewhere. Rather, we should send out a message to-day that, whatever mistakes may have been made in the past and whatever suspicions they may have with regard to the White Paper, as far as this House, Parliament, and the majority of the people are concerned, there is no desire other than that India shall be free at the earliest possible moment to play her great and undoubted part in establishing a new and better order of society, and that she can hasten that time if she will bend her will and her energy in order to overthrow the power and forces that threaten everything that is worth while in India and in the rest of the world.
Captain Godfrey Nicholson: The House has had the privilege of listening to two speeches remarkable for the spirit of statesmanship which inspired them. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon) paid such a tribute to the Secretary of State for India. I was grieved to see in a London daily paper this morning an attack upon him, implying that he was backward in imagination and an obstructionist. Anyone who has listened to his public utterances, and even more anyone who has had private conversations with him, must know that Indian nationhood has no warmer friend than the Secretary of State for India. I would like that to be said and put on record. As far as I am concerned, in the few remarks I am going to address to the House it seems to me the matter of statesmanship lies in dealing as little as I can with the White Paper and with recent events. The White Paper may serve to point a moral or adorn a tale, but it does not present anything fundamentally new upon which we can base our future policy. It deals, in all conscience, with tragic and serious events, tragic because they entail much human suffering and because they testify to much misplaced human idealism, and serious because they deal with open rebellion in time of war because they imply that a large part of India was in a state of open unrest. For
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that very reason I would not dwell upon it too much, because it would distort the truth.
I doubt very much whether a quarter of one per cent. of the population of India has been involved in the recent disturbances; indeed, I have heard people who have said that the right figure should be a quarter of that. It seems to me that the White Paper deals rather with personalities and symptoms rather than with fundamental causes. There is much we can learn from it, but there is little we did not know before. There is much we can learn about Congress in its trend towards totalitarianism, and in its divisions, as shown in the varying views expressed by Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Rajagopalachari. It makes one wonder what would happen if Mr. Gandhi retired or was removed from the political scene. We can learn plenty from the White Paper about the development of Mr. Gandhi's activities and a possible explanation of those activities. It is a not uncommon type of case, the mystic who goes in for politics. The mystic knows that suffering for him is a means of grace, an essential means. By a distortion of reasoning he is willing that humanity should suffer, in order that others may ultimately benefit. This is contrary to Western ideas. This quotation from Mr. Gandhi shows what I mean:
"I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement."
Clearly he believed that out of the suffering will come great benefit for the rest of India. But the main impression I received from the White Paper is that Indian politicians live in a miasma of unreality. If there was ever a case in the world that demanded a spirit of realism it is the Indian problem. We must at all costs not be deflected by symptoms and by day-to-day events from the root causes that underlie the nature of the situation. For that reason I deplore what I regard as a major heresy held by many people in this country, who seem to think that our main duty is to keep the ball rolling, to keep conversations open. It is a frame of mind that implies that a solution is round the corner if only we have the wits to find it. I am convinced that there is no easy solution

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of the Indian problem, no quick solution. I pray that there will be a solution within a measurable time, although I very much doubt whether the Indian problem is different from any other political problem. By which I mean that the only thing to do is to make the best of a very difficult job. The Indian situation, like every other, is governed by hard intractable facts, and one stands out above all others. It was dwelt upon by the Secretary of State and by the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Camberwell. It is this: that Indians cannot agree with Indians. Critics of the Government may say that this is a mere debating point, an excuse, for not leaving India. But it is not; it is the crux of the whole problem. Everything depends upon it, and will do so, in my opinion, for as long as we can foresee.
The more I think about India—and I think a lot about India because I am convinced that India is the most important single political subject with which a Member of this House has to deal—the more I am convinced that history may well judge this country by the way in which we solve the Indian problem. The more I think of Indian matters the more I am convinced that the problem in a nutshell is the word "Unity." We are concerned not with the relations between this country and India, but with relations between Indians and Indians. That cannot be said too often. Our objective has been made perfectly clear. It is the free and equal partnership of India in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and by "free and equal" we mean the right to contract out if they wish. That implies some form of democracy. Both my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Camberwell went over some of the various alternative forms of democracy. All I would commit myself to saying is that we are committed to some form of Indian Government which has the consent of most Indians and of most Indian sections of opinion. I still do not think that the Act of 1935 was a bad Act. But if India thinks that it was, then let us repeal it. Democracy does not demand uniformity if it is to function, but it does demand the spirit of unity. With the great diversity of races, religions, cultures and levels of civilisation, you will never get uniformity in India.
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But one must have that spirit of unity that believes that the whole is greater than the part. Let us remember that. We are trying to do for India what We should like to see done for Europe. We, in Europe, know all about minorities, the different races, the different religions and the different opinions all intermixed closely in this continent. But there is no intermixture in Europe which can compare with that in India. The whole future of India depends upon the development of Indian unity. Our duty is to face the ugly, unpalatable fact that the spirit of unity, far from increasing, seems to be growing less. A few years ago there were constitutional Governments in every Province. Now you have constitutional Governments in five Provinces, and not in the remaining six. It is a serious situation. It does not mean that Indian statesmanship is bankrupt, but it emphasises that India is being increasingly led to sectional differences. For example, for what proportion of India can Congress speak? I think Congress is the focus of discontent far wider in appeal than it is representative of Indian opinion. For I doubt very much whether Congress represents the opinion of more than 20 to 25 per cent. of the Indian population to-day.
Again, take Pakistan, perhaps the most significant phenomenon in political India. As hon. Members know, it means, ostensibly, independent Moslem States with Dominion status. It is envisaged that there should be an independent State in the North-West covering Sind and the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. For the time being Hyderabad would be an independent State, and there would be an independent State covering three-quarters of Bengal. I welcome the Pakistan idea as a symbol of Moslem resurgence for I believe our Moslem fellow-subjects in India have not contributed all that might be expected of them towards Indian culture and progress during the last 200 years, but politically the idea is fantastic. You have in Bengal a bare majority of Moslems, but 80 per cent. of the wealth and education of Bengal is in Hindu hands. Can anybody who has any knowledge of Indian history say he is prepared to face acceptance of the Pakistan idea? It has been made more fantastic recently by the latest suggestion of Mr. Jinnah that North-West and North-

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Eastern India should be joined by a sort of corridor. This is indeed the miasma of unreality. The hon. Member for North Camberwell said that Pakistan could not be accepted. Whom cannot it be accepted by? If Mr. Jinnah and the Moslems say that they insist on Pakistan, who is to tell them that it cannot be accepted? What overriding power is there in India that can say that it cannot be accepted? What overriding power is there to say that the Sikhs cannot have a Sikhistan in the Punjab? What overriding power can say to any other minority that they cannot have their own independent State? There is only one, and that is that power which gave unity to India. Unity came to India with us. It may be possible that just as unity was given by Britain, so it may not be able to survive the British connection. Are we prepared to contemplate the possibility of those for whom we are trustees and for whom our primary responsibility rests being subjected to the conditions that existed before we came to India. Our primary responsibility is for the great masses of the peoples of India. They are our creation; we may almost be said to have begotten them. For we created the circumstances in which they could be born and live. The primary responsibility of any government is to see that their citizens survive, and continue to survive. Are we prepared to go back to the old disunited condition of India, having due regard to our responsibility for the great masses of the Indian people? I beg the House to believe that this is not a debating point. It is the crux of the whole situation, upon which everything depends.
I may seem to be speaking in a pessimistic frame of mind. I am, if one means by pessimistic that I do not see any quick easy solution of the Indian problem, but I am optimistic, if one means by optimistic that I still have great faith in Indian statesmanship, if the situation is properly handled. If this country follows a wise policy there may still be an epoch of happiness, progress and contentment in front of India. What should our policy be in the light of what I have said? It must be this: We must resolve to do what we believe to be right without regard to criticism. I have an uneasy feeling that our Indian policy has been and is being dictated by the spirit of placating our critics at the expense of those for whom
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we are responsible. We are not responsible to the American people. It is no good trying to get a fleeting popularity there, and to appease anti-British feeling, which has always existed and always will exist in America, at the expense of our Indian fellow subjects, by doing what we do not quite think absolutely right in regard to India.
There are critics in India. Are we quite sure that we have not been guilty of appeasement in India? I am not calling for a policy of blood and iron, but are we sure we have done justice in India? Is my right hon. Friend quite sure, in the light of all that comes out in this White Paper, that Gandhi ought not to have been charged with treason? Is he quite sure that justice is being done? Are we quite sure that we have not tried to placate ill-informed criticism in this country? Are we quite sure in our own hearts that we do not try to placate cowardly consciences? Having convinced ourselves that we have made up our minds from the highest possible motives, we should go forward bravely. Having made up our minds as to our course of policy, we should carry it through, not trying to placate weakly and sickly consciences by doing what we believe is not 100 per cent. right. We must do what we believe to be right without regard to criticism from any quarter whatever. We must stick by our friends in India, by which I mean the friends of ordered liberty. Let it be known in every Indian village that we will have no truck with tyranny, but that we believe that our responsibility to those for whom we are trustees demands that ordered liberty shall be maintained. We must give of our best. No second best can possibly do. If we bear in mind this approach on the basis of trusteeship, we cannot go wrong. It is the safest touchstone if we ask ourselves, "How will this affect the masses of India?" not "How will it affect America?" "How will it affect elections in this country?" or "How will it affect ourselves?" Let us always bear in mind that we are trustees for hundreds of millions of the masses of India.
There is one other subject with which I want to deal. I do not believe that political India is the only India. There is the military India, the India which is fighting a war, and here it would be churlish indeed if I forbore to pay a sincere tribute to the magnificent and outstanding

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achievement of the Indian Forces. Then there is commerce, there is education and there is what I might sum up under the head of culture. I regret to say that all these are fields where there may still be a certain amount of bitterness and suspicion. Is India convinced that we mean to Indianise as large a portion of the Army as possible? Some years ago I visited the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, and I was immensely impressed. Let us make it clear to India that we mean to press forward the Indianisation of the Indian Army as far as possible. Then what steps do we take to see that our young men who go into commerce in India are equipped for the task, that they know something of the languages, and that they are sent there to understand India as ambassadors of this country? There is education. I wonder how many Members realise the vast field of education in India. I was there a few years ago, only for a short time, I am sorry to say, and was amazed to learn—I speak from memory—that there are something like 1,200 high schools in Bengal. How many of them have contact with British educational establishments? They need it terribly. Then there is what I call culture. What do we know in this country about Indian civilisation, whether alive to-day, in language and folk-lore and village industries, or as the civilisation of the past? Has it struck anyone to compare our attitude towards those countries for which we are responsible in the Orient with the attitude of the Netherlands and France? Has anyone taken the trouble to see how carefully the Netherlands before the war trained men to play their part in the East Indies? I have studied it very superficially, and it fills me with shame.
What does the ordinary Englishman know of Indian history? Does he know that Indian history is as ancient and romantic as that of any civilisation that has ever existed? It is a most fascinating subject. Has it occurred to anyone to inquire how much the Government in this country spend on Indian art in this country? There are lectureships in Indian history at Oxford and Cambridge, and about an eighth of the money spent on the Victoria and Albert Museum goes to Indian subjects, but hardly anything else is done for India. Not a single Rhodes scholarship goes to India. There is no Indian centre in this Metropolis at all, the capital of the greatest Oriental
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Empire in the world. We have to take some trouble about India. We have to put ourselves out to learn, understand and sympathise. I wonder how many Members agreed with me when I said I thought India was the most important single subject with which we have to deal. If we are to serve India—and indeed we must—we must put ourselves out a little. It seems to me that India is rather like the Sleeping Beauty. We woke her from her age-long sleep and introduced her into the modern world, a world difficult and complex. It will not do just to leave India to drift into the modern world by herself. The Sleeping Beauty in the story married the Prince, who gave her love and understanding, and they lived happily ever afterwards. Have we given India love and understanding? What India needs is understanding and sympathy and comprehension, and that will take trouble. I am convinced that this is by far the greatest of our responsibilities. I am convinced that, together, Britain and India could go a long way to bridge the gulf that exists between East and West. I am convinced that the chance is before us, now, and I beg the House as a whole to grasp it with both hands.
Mr. Graham White: I agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman that India is one of the most important matters with which we have to deal at present. I am no less in agreement with him when he hopes that we shall not be unduly influenced by opinion in America or other countries. I hope that in all our relations with India in the future we shall be true to what is the special mission of our people. Let us remember that the conception of colonial government, proceeding to independence, is a British invention in which we have every reason to take pride. If, so far, our transactions with our Indian fellow citizens have failed to achieve that purpose, it is a matter for profound regret, not an excuse for not going further, but to strengthen us in our intention to build the bridge between East and West to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred. It is perhaps no bad thing that this discussion is taking place on the Motions for the confirmation of these Orders, because they serve to remind us of the great part in Indian life which Indians are playing at present. The House has no choice in the circumstances in which we are met to-day but to confirm these Orders. They are, like the Bill that

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we passed in October, a regrettable necessity in present circumstances. The House will not wish to spend much time on the Orders but will wish to discuss the situation dispassionately. I hope I shall say no word which will darken counsel, but will try to discuss it in the hope that the House as a whole, by dealing with the situation realistically, may perhaps bring us closer to the day when some solution may be found.
The White Paper is indeed a lamentable document, because it contains no proposal which carries us nearer to a solution of the Indian problem. It is a lamentable document on account of the deplorable story of violence, murder and crime which it unfolds. In that respect it is a tragic document. I think it would have been a better document if there has been no element of advocacy in it, for the element of advocacy adds nothing to its strength. On the contrary, it raises elements of controversy of a minor character in regard to the problem as a whole. My knowledge of events in India, even apart from what is contained in the White Paper, leaves no doubt in my mind that the leaders of Congress, or some of them, in spite of the efforts which Pandit Nehru and his friends, brought to bear on the discussion, were in some measure committed to acts of violence and revolution on a wide scale. To any dispassionate and impartial mind I think there can be no doubt of that. It is a deplorable conclusion to have to come to, and I can imagine that it must be a cause of the greatest possible sorrow to Gandhi himself. The Secretary of State said he would not attempt to assess that enigmatic figure, and what the Secretary of State would not attempt I am less likely to attempt to do. Mr. Gandhi is a great figure in India, and his great achievements which will be judged by history to his credit. He has been responsible more than any other man for the stirring of the Indian conscience politically and the development of national feeling and patriotism in India. Those who have made any study of Indian politics and Indian conditions cannot fail to be moved, even if they are not astonished, by the fact that he at any rate has met with considerable success in altering the conditions and outlook for the depressed or scheduled classes in India—a very remarkable achievement. Now we come to what must distress every friend
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of Mr. Gandhi, the breaking of his plans and the failure of his life's work. He has professed throughout his life allegiance to non-violence, whatever non-violence may mean. I regret that there has moved from Europe to Asia an attack of that cloudy thinking which finds its outward verbal manifestation in the fixing of some innocent prefix such as "non" or "pre" before an adjective.
What exactly does "non-violence" mean? It does not help me to think straight when I see expressions of that kind. The opposite to violence, if I know my own language, is peace and gentleness and not a state which permits you to be violent on one day and peaceful on the next. It is the same line of expression which the Italians adopted when they said they were non-belligerent, a state which allows you to do the maximum amount of damage to your opponent while hoping to escape the consequences. God forbid that I should attribute motives of that kind to Mr. Gandhi, but this is on the lines of the same habit of sloppy unconsidered thinking which is working so much mischief in the world, and I profoundly regret that Mr. Gandhi should see realised under the policy of non-violence the things which he has deplored most.
I am a little puzzled to know why in these discussions and in the White Paper no reference is made to the activities of Mr. Subhas Bose. From Berlin he is engaged, through the powerful ruthless propaganda machine of Germany, on an attempt to persuade the Indian people to come within the sphere of Axis influence. He is inviting them to come within the new order, which will give them precisely what it has given to the people under Hitler's heel, the right to do what they are told and to die if they refuse. I should like to know what place the activities of Mr. Subhas Bose take in the development of these lamentable events. It is one of the saddest aspects of the development of affairs in India that, whatever may or may not have been in the minds of Congress since the mission of the Minister of Aircraft Production failed, the events which took place—the attacks upon railways, upon police stations, upon Government houses, and a general attempt to paralyse the war effort—are precisely the same steps that would have been taken by Mr. Subhas Bose or any other agent acting under German instructions. That is the sad and lamentable fact which I hope

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the Congress leaders and others will take into account when they go over these transactions in their minds and when as patriots they must be thinking how they can help India in her distress.
I do not know what we can do in this country to help India, but it is clear that with the increasing desire in this country for freedom for India, keeping pace at last with the desire of India itself, the difficulties seem to grow greater. It is, indeed, a difficult situation, but we cannot stand still. We cannot rest upon a period of repression. That is quite impossible. We must, therefore, be alert to do everything we can to promote a situation from which fluidity may come. It may be, as the Secretary of State pointed out, that on the old set lines in which politics and parties have been working in India for so long no solution can be found, but we should do everything we can to prevent the growth and the maintenance of bitterness which may lead to the permanent estrangement of ourselves and Indians as well as the estrangement and bitterness of parties within India itself. A deputation which the Secretary of State referred to is to interview the Viceroy in the near future. It is to be led by Mr. Rajagopalachari, Sir Teg Sapru and others. Let me in passing pay a tribute to all those men who, with scant encouragement, have persisted in trying to find an accommodation in India. If these men in their judgment think it will serve a useful purpose to have a discussion with Mr. Gandhi, as he has suggested, on the course of events and to endeavour to show him the error of his ways, the Viceroy would take a heavy responsibility if he stood in the way.
I take the same view as the Secretary of State with regard to the future of India's affairs. He says that a solution can be found. I think so too. It may well be that it will need new men to find it, new ideas and a new approach, but there is now a new element in the situation which was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon). He spoke of the part which India must play unless she is false to herself in the new Asia which will be part of the world when war comes to an end. The Prime Minister in his broadcast speech referred to the possibility of a Council of Asia. That may very well be part of the mechanism or the machinery of world control. A free India would be
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an essential part of that machinery. Freedom is the greatest gift in life because without it life is worth nothing. The greatest attribute of freedom is the opportunity it gives of co-operating with other free peoples for the advancement and maintenance of peace and the gradual building up of those higher standards of human conduct which are necessary if the world is again to be a fit place for human habitation. If there is to be a Council of Asia at the end of the war India, with her population, her culture and her natural and industrial resources, must play a leading, indeed, a decisive part in co-operation with China and Russia. If India is to play that part to which she is called it can only be on the condition that she is free and united.
Here is a great mission standing out before all Indian statesmen. Is it not time that they began to review the paths they have trodden and to see whether they cannot fit their country to play the great part for which she is destined? I rather take the view that we can outside India do far less for India than can be done within it. There is no question that this country wishes to see India free and enjoying, as the Secretary of State said in a happy phrase, the same amount of freedom we enjoy ourselves, neither more nor less. That is, I think, what possesses the mind of every Englishman at the present time. We must remember, and I ask our Indian friends to remember, that our honour is pledged to freedom for India. The offer that was taken to India by the special mission last April holds good until it is replaced by something which is more practical and better. Therefore, we must continue to be careful that in this country we do nothing and say nothing which will increase the difficulties, and we must not leave any doubt in the minds of Indians as to where we stand. Straight thinking and a facing of realities are, indeed, essential in the Indian situation, and I regret to observe that from time to time observations are made which seem to be calculated to create a false impression as regards the attitude of this country.
I have received by the courtesy of friends several copies of an address which was recently delivered by an eminent prelate, who speaks with authority whenever he addresses his friends and fellow countrymen. In an address which, if I may be allowed to say so, was admirable

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in spirit and in sentiment above criticism, and made a powerful plea for friendship between ourselves and our fellow citizens in India, the right rev. Gentleman allowed himself to say:
"I personally am convinced that as regards India such a slogan as 'What we have we hold is out of date. The mental attitude Which it suggests is that of an early nineteenth Century nabob."
An assertion of that kind which suggests to the people of this country and the people overseas that there are a considerable number of people—if there were only one or two surely the observation would hot have been made—who do believe in the slogan "What we have we hold" and that there are a large number of people whose mental attitude is that of the nineteenth century nabob is not wise. If there is in this House anybody who believes that our policy in India should be based on the slogan "What we have we hold" I hope he will say so before the end of this Debate, and if there are people with the mental attitude of nineteenth century nabobs I hope an expression of those views will also be made.
I speak as one who would be the sincere friend of all India. My ambition would be satisfied if I could make some contribution towards the solution of what is a most perplexing and difficult problem, the most baffling problem. It is by no means easy to do so, but I would appeal to the Government to watch the situation most carefully, so that on the slightest indication of any step they can take which would do anything to relieve the tension and soften bitterness they will act. There may be opportunities at the present time. There is the opportunity which comes from the disaster of the threatened famine in India. The relief of that situation is a difficult task for us, but one which I believe we are tackling with vigour and energy. Surely to that task we can gather in all classes who are willing to help. With special reference to what the Secretary of State said with regard to new ideas and new studies, is it impossible even at this stage, to set on foot some method by which the development of the Constitution may be studied, studied through either the Indianisation of the Viceroy's Council or some other body. A little ingenuity and a little determination ought to suggest means whereby daily contacts can be
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kept up and mutual confidence in some measure restored.
I cannot conclude these observations without making sympathetic reference to the position of the Viceroy, who has for so much longer than he had any reason to expect been called upon to maintain a heavy burden of anxiety such as has fallen, I think, to the lot of no Viceroy before. Five years was considered to be the longest time for which it was reasonable to expect a Viceroy to carry his burden in normal times, but the times are not now normal, and the Viceroy has been advised to stay at his post in conditions of anxiety and difficulty which allow little relaxation from his burdens. One can only hope that before very much longer relief may be found for him. I trust that in this and other ways we shall take a somewhat more optimistic view than the Secretary of State for India, and go forward with good will, determined that a solution shall be found.
Captain Gammans: I wish to make only one point, and that briefly. It is to urge on the Government to do more than they are doing at present to explain our Indian policy to the United States of America. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is aware, I have recently come back from the United States, and I would say without the slightest hesitation that the greatest point of difference between us and the American people is the future of the British Empire in general and the question of India in particular.
I think it is true to say that our American friends tend to over-simplify the whole issue. Their attitude can be summarised somewhat as follows: They say, "We, the Americans, do not like Imperialism in any shape or form. We do not think that any nation should rule another, and quite frankly we are not prepared to shed American blood to restore Imperialism of any kind in any part of the world. If you, the British, want our sympathy and our co-operation in post-war reconstruction, you too must show that you share these views." I think most of us here would agree that that is an over-simplification of the whole problem, but it is sincerely held, because it represents the fundamental idealism of the American people. It is true to say that they tend to think of the whole issue of Colonial Empire in the terms of their

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own limited experience in the Philippines. Ignorance on the subject of India in particular is frightening. In my experience very few Americans have ever heard of the Statute of Westminster or realise that it is as fundamental to our present-day conception of relationships as was Magna Charta of 700 years ago.
As to India in particular, almost all events are personified round the antics of Mr. Gandhi. Very few Americans have ever heard of the Indian Army or know what it has done in this war. Very few realise the Mohammedans have a point of view or that there are more Mohammedans in India than there are Germans in the world. Quite a number of them think of the Congress party as a sort of legislative assembly and view our recent action with regard to it in the same light as if the House of Commons had been locked up. They certainly do not understand that there is not one India, but many. There is the India of the Congress Party. There is the India of the Princes, the India of the Indian Army, and above all, there is the India of the 700,000 villages. I feel that this misunderstanding by our American friends is very serious, and we should ask ourselves what we can do about it. It is not much good our taking the easy way out and blaming our Information Services in America. I do not know what they were like in the past, but in my experience they are at this moment extraordinarily keen and extraordinarily efficient, and I am pleased to be able to pay tribute to them in this House. But it is no good our expecting them to do in five minutes what we have neglected to do for 20 years, and that is to make known either our ideals or achievements.
There are, I think, three specific things which should be, done. The first is that we have in this country large numbers of American troops and a sustantial contingent of the Indian Army. Before the war is over our American Allies will in all probability have to fight alongside the Indian Army. I suggest we should take this opportunity of introducing those two Forces to each other, so that the American troops may realise what the Indian Army consists of. For example, they might meet that Indian Risaldar whom some hon. Members have met in the Lobby, whose great grandfather fought for the British in 1843 and in whose
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family there has never since been a male member Who was not in the Indian Army.
Secondly, can we not do more to make use of the films to portray India and its problems? The greatest agency of propaganda in the United State to-day is not the Press or the radio, but the film. The two British films, "Mrs. Miniver" and "In Which we Serve" have done more to spread in America a knowledge of the British way of life than whole boatloads of lecturers. What a wonderful story there is in our association with India, if we only have the imagination to portray it. The early history of the East India Company, the life history of Clive, Nicholson and Lawrence, and in this war the exploits of the Indian Army at the siege of My Keren and in the sands of Libya.
The third suggestion concerns the personal position of the Prime Minister. A reply given by him to a Question in this House concerning the application of the Atlantic Charter to India has been very widely misunderstood in the United States, and, I am sorry to say in Canada as well. He appeared to qualify in some way its application to India and to the Colonial Empire. In point of fact, our declarations to India far antedate the existence of the Atlantic Charter in point of time and are very much more specific in their provisions, but that fact is not entirely understood in America, Most Americans do not understand our system of joint Cabinet responsibility. Under the American Constitution there is not the same sense of Cabinet responsibility, and statements are made by members of the American Government which are not binding to the same degree as statements made by our Cabinet Ministers. If anything can be done to-day to make it clear that the Atlantic Charter does apply to India and our Colonies, it will do very much more good on the other side of the Atlantic than can be appreciated here.
In conclusion, I cannot too strongly emphasise my own point of view that hope for civilisation must depend in the end upon Anglo-American co-operation. We and the Americans have the same way of life, and our Constitutions are grounded in the same conception of individual liberty. We speak the same language, more or less. If we cannot understand each other, what hope is there of either of us getting on with Russia or with China and the conception of international rela-

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tionship based on the United Nations? And with it the hope of the human race falls to the ground. Good relationship between ourselves and the United States cannot rest solely upon sentiment. Sentiment, emotion and good feeling there must be, as a first step. But there must also, however, be knowledge, understanding, and complete frankness, and that is why I urge the Government to make these points clear, for by so doing we shall be doing more good than some of us may realise.
Mr. Sloan: In discussing this question, and especially the White Paper, we must consider the facts calmly and with restraint. I do not think any complaint can be made about the restraint that has been exercised up till now. I listened with considerable interest to the speech of the Secretary of State. If he has really worked himself into believing the glowing picture he painted of conditions in India, it is the most amazing incident in my experience. If he can believe what he told us of how we had brought happiness, comfort, cheer and an economic existence to the Indian people, I do not understand it, when we know, and he must also know, that the contrary is the fact. We are in a situation in which any untoward action might have serious consequences.
Secondly, restraint ought to be exercised because the White Paper is so grossly unfair that it is difficult to restrain one's emotions about it. It might be using language too strong to classify this Paper as a clumsy forgery, although many of the quotations have no foundation in fact, but it is not extravagant to describe it as a vicious, mischievous and fraudulent work, to be compared only with the Red Letter of 1924. In spite of the nature of the document, it is still necessary to discuss it without heat, because what we say in this House may have serious repercussions, as is always the case when we are dealing with people labouring under a sense of deep wrong and injustice. We realise that very clearly when we are considering the peoples in Occupied Europe. We know with what inflammable material the Germans have to deal and with what underground movements. We glory in the knowledge that some day, when opportunity presents itself, there will be an uprising in which the inhabitants
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will join with us in overthrowing the brutal forces that invaded their country. To that end we have built up elaborate machinery and we have guaranteed to those people that we shall never sheath the sword until we have driven those enemies from their lands. We offer them all kinds of advice—all the advice that we are prepared to condemn when considering the people of India. We ask them to sabotage industry, quite openly; we encourage them to hold up production; we would like them to blow up munition factories; we suggest that they should impede transport and that they should assassinate their enemy occupiers or Quislings. Then we will consider them worthy of the highest praise.
Flight-Lieutenant Raikes: If I may interrupt the hon. Member on one point, can he give any example of any orders given to any occupied nation to indulge in assassination? If so, I should like to have it.
Mr. Sloan: Can the hon. and gallant Member state any time when we have condemned assassinations when they have taken place? [Interruption.] I think I have answered the hon. and gallant Member's question. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] In any case we view with horror, and rightly so, the German jack-booting across Europe and the inseparable bitterness which the oppressed populations must feel. As India is also an occupied country, as India is also under foreign domination, as Indians have also suffered tortures and whippings, imprisonments and concentration camps, as Indians have also suffered from bombing and machine-gunning, men, women and children having been slaughtered, the situation demands that we should approach the matter in a chastened mood and take care that we do not add to the difficulties under which the Indian people suffer. What is the whole of this document which has been placed in our hands? It attempts to prove that Gandhi has suddenly and mysteriously, when nearing the end of a long life of steadfast advocacy of non-violence, swung round to the opposite viewpoint and become an advocate of violent revolution. What is the evidence adduced in support of that contention? The document makes no attempt to deal with the political and economic issues of the Indian situation at a time when we ought to be dealing with them. Neither is there in it one sentence containing any statement of policy or any

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suggestion for handling the deadlock and reaching a settlement with the Indians.
My right hon. Friend made a complaint about statements that the White Paper was the speech for the prosecution. Well, the "Manchester Guardian," in a leading article on Thursday, said that this White Paper is the speech for the prosecution. So the Congress leaders are in the dock, and this House has constituted itself a jury to decide on ex parte statements of counsel for the prosecution. The case for the prosecution—no speech for the defence, no opportunity of examining the evidence; a collection of statements torn from their context, gathered together over a period and all served up together, many of them without date or place, many of them having been submitted to Indians who are well acquainted with the situation and who are unable to trace them, yet they are put into this document, presented to the House of Commons, and the Members of this House are expected to swallow them. It would be interesting indeed to have the opinion of my right hon. and learned Friend, who is a distinguished lawyer, in regard to the contents of this document. I wonder to what sort of ridicule he would be able to reduce the people who presented it. I wonder whether he has examined it, and if he has examined it, I think it would be very interesting for this House to hear his views upon the method of presenting this type of evidence to this House of Commons. It would have been money for old boots for him if he had to defend the Indians on the basis of the contents of this document.
It is, however, unfortunate that there is not a lawyer prepared to riddle it and expose the shallow fraud. There is one distinguished lawyer who sometimes sits on the Government front bench who would have been very capable of doing so. All his background gave him that opportunity to do so, his sympathy with the Indian people would have given him the right to do so, his knowledge of the Indian question would have given him the right to do so, but unfortunately, like many others, he has become so tied to the chariot wheels of the Government that on this question he is as inarticulate as the dumb man of Manchester. I ask Members on this side of the House whether they are prepared to accept the negative policy of this White Paper instead of the more enlightened policy in to-day's "Daily Herald," their own official paper. It is
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rather a pity, I think, that my hon. Friend who led on this side of the House did not quote a great deal more from the "Daily Herald's" leading article of to-day. The White Paper contains documents in its Appendices which, in so far as they are genuine Congress documents, contain nothing new. Those that are genuine have been published in India. Many of them have been published in this country. The Government never took any exception to them until now. What they prove is that the essential and consistent policy of Congress is as revealed in Gandhi's letters to the Viceroy. I think we ought to ask the Secretary of State for India why, when he was publishing this White Paper, did he not include the correspondence between Gandhi and the Viceroy. This correspondence is now published in this country. Why was it not included in the White Paper?
Mr. Amery: I laid it on the Table in the Library as soon as it arrived.
Mr. Sloan: Why was it not included in this White Paper? Surely that is a vital question. The letters distinctly proved that Gandhi was reiterating India's demand for independence. They have never denied that they want independence. Secondly, the letters ask for the immediate establishment of a Provisional Government. They have not denied that. Is Gandhi in gaol for demanding that? Thirdly, they prove that he was in favour of unity with the Allies against Fascism. The author of the White Paper is forced to this same conclusion which he gives, but apparently dismisses these aims as being merely the ostensible policy of the Congress.
"To remove foreign domination over India. To check the growing ill will against Britain, with its danger of passive acceptance by the masses of aggression against India…. To achieve communal unity, by the removal of the foreign power, with its policy of divide and rule….
"To bring all subject and oppressed humanity to the side of the United Nations, thus giving these nations the moral and spiritual leadership of the world."
All these things are mentioned and reviewed in the correspondence, and Gandhi to-day stands upon those grounds. It is absolutely untrue that at any time the Congress have ever attempted to raise the question of revolution in India.
Sir Stanley Reed: Would my hon. Friend look at Mr. Gandhi's own

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statement, that his action was rebellion? It is not our language, but his own word.
Mr. Sloan: Why have we not the correspondence with the Viceroy, which would have certainly removed many of the doubts and difficulties among which this House flounders to-day? The Congress is charged with a desire to dominate India. It is argued that the Bombay resolution, about a future national Government aiding the war effort in alliance with the United Nations, implied that the Congress thought in terms of a Congress Government. It is the stock in trade of Imperialist politicians to talk about the Congress as authoritarian. The demand was for a coalition Government. That is emphatically stated in both documents which my right hon. Friend says are now lying in the Library, but which were not published in the White Paper. I gave a promise to a certain individual that I would not occupy too much to-day, because there are a number of Members who want to speak and it is not my intention to stand in their way. But I want to say to my right hon. Friend that all his special pleading to-day, all the Sunday-school lectures he has given us, do not in any way improve the Indian situation. India stands where she did. She still demands a national Government, and if there is any sincerity in us why have we not given it to her?
Mr. Bartle Bull: I have only been here a short time myself, but will my hon. Friend tell us——
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Charles Williams): The hon. Member has been interrupted several times, and he has just said that he wants to finish his speech soon.
Mr. Sloan: What does my right hon. Friend say about the people who are languishing in prison to-day. Is it not inconsistent to condemn the concentration camps in Occupied Europe when we have the same thing in a country which we ourselves dominate? What about the 50,000 prisoners behind bars in India today? Is it his intention to release those prisoners from the prisons and the concentration camps? Is it his intention to abolish the whipping order that was introduced, to the eternal disgrace to this country? We have it in our power now to make a new approach to this problem. It
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now rests with us, not With the Indians. The leaders of the Indians are in gaol, they are not free to discuss this matter. It rests with us to re-open those negotiations, which were so perfunctorily closed when my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Aircraft Production so hurriedly left India. The Indians themselves claim that they were on the point of reaching a settlement when the negotiations were so suddenly brought to an end. Is it the intention of the Government to re-open those negotiations and to make a new approach to this matter. We have heard references to-day to the settlement of the South African problem after the Boer War, and the part played in it by my right hon. Friend the present Prime Minister. Why, then, close one's mind to the possibility of a settlement of this question?
We can do one of two things. We can state categorically our desire to settle and the basis on which we want to settle. We can offer negotiations for the basis of a Provisional Government; and I do not think it is worth while making proposals for anything less, because anything less has been categorically rejected by the Indians themselves. They do not want an extension of the Viceroy's Council by the addition of a few picked persons. We can release the prisoners and show a real desire to settle, or we can continue on the rule of force. We can continue to suppress and coerce. We can go on with our shootings and bombings, with our whippings and torture. But that leads to disastrous consequences. It is one of the immutable laws that nations, as well as individuals, reap what they have sown. If we sow the wind, we shall reap the whirlwind. In our pride and arrogance, we can continue to defy the laws of God and man, but let us not forget that it is written that
"Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord."
Sir John Wardlaw-Milne: As I see it, the position in India in the last seven or eight months has clarified Very much. At first sight that may seem a strange statement, but I believe it to be true. As some Members know, I have been for something like 18 years connected with discussions upon Indian questions by the Conservative Members of this House. I took an active part in supporting the legislation which led to the 1935 Act, after the long deliberations for

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something like 18 months, not always in the happiest of conditions in another place. While I realise that these controversies at that time were legitimate and natural, they were not controversies between one side of the House and the other so much as between different sections of the Conservative Party. In spite of the fact that they were honest, whole-hearted differences of opinion, I personally feel, and, I think, many Members who did not support that Act feel, to-day that it is a matter of regret that the 1935 Act could not have been put into operation fully, in which case India might have been working by this time under a Federation and much closer to that Dominion self-government which she has been so ardently seeking for so many years. I mention these matters of past history merely to emphasise what I want to say next.
I was almost staggered with the generosity of the offer which the British Government sent to India last year through the right hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps), now the Minister for Aircraft Production, and as a result of the deliberations and decisions of the War Cabinet. That was a most remarkable offer, which ought to have received not only assent but have fired the imagination of every Indian. It was more than any Indian to whom I have ever spoken in the days previous to the war would have believed would have been spontaneously made to India. [Interruption.] I have every respect for the Princes. Their attitude is often much misunderstood, but I assure the hon. Member I have had no consultations with them or anyone else. The offer, I repeat, was of an epoch-making character. It is a matter of the deepest regret that an offer of that kind could not be accepted because of the difficulties in the different sections of Indian opinion working together. In saying that, I want also to say that I and, I think, almost everybody who has lived in India fully appreciate the difficulties which faced the leaders of different sections of Indian opinion. It is extraordinarily difficult to realise the depth of the disagreements and the difficulties of reconciliation if you have not actually lived among these people. There are differences and difficulties which do not exist in any other part of the world.
But there has been one good result. I appreciated the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hornsey
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(Captain Gammans) regarding the question of our propaganda upon India in the United States of America. I hope he will not disagree with me when I say, that difficult as the situation is in the United States, and continuous as has been the insidious misrepresentation of our intentions and our acts through many years in America, I think that this offer made to the people of India a year ago has blown some of the mists away. At least I very much hope so.
We have arrived at a situation in which we have to face the fact—and let the House of Commons face it—that it is not possible for the Indian people to set up a Constitution-making body by agreement at the end of the war. We may deeply regret this. We may say that in any other country it would be possible, but the fact is that it is not possible in India. Under any system of the counting of heads the large majority must always be Hindu, and the other religions and even sections of the Hindu population will not agree to work under that system. Therefore any idea that Indians themselves will be able to set up a body which by agreement will draw up a Constitution for the future Government of India is to my mind ail impracticable supposition.
Do not let us blame anybody, but let us face the situation. I will go further and say that there is the danger that not only is it not possible for them to set up a constitutional system by agreement, but there is the danger of our being told "You are suggesting this because you know we cannot do it." That feeling exists to-day, although there is no truth whatever in the suggestion that it is with that idea we set up the proposal—far from it. Our proposal is an entirely genuine one, and there is no thinking person in this country who is not worried because it cannot be carried out. But we still have to face the fact that it is impracticable, and we are in danger, if we leave the situation where it is, of being blamed. I am sorry to have to repeat it in this way, but we shall be told, "You suggested our setting up a Constitution knowing we cannot do it and that there is no possibility of doing it."
What, then, is the solution? That is the practical problem that we have not faced. Is there a solution? The solution of the Government was and is to leave it

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to India. Theirs was a most generous offer, and I do not in the least blame them if they say, "What more can we do? The Indians themselves must decide." I do not think, however, that we can leave it there. They cannot decide. Therefore what happens? In the end, whether we like it or not, the problem returns to the House of Commons and to Parliament to decide. We do not want it. There is no kudos in our having to do it again. There will be continuous misrepresentation. We shall be continually blamed and misrepresented. But what is the alternative? If India cannot do it, it has to be done by someone. Some act of this British Parliament must bring about a system in which the Government of India in future can carry on.
Our work in India is one of the most remarkable probably that any nation has written in history. We are far too fond of under-rating what we have done. We have brought India to peace and order from complete chaos. We have saved India from the worst effects of disease and famine. We have brought her great prosperity as a nation, and that in spite of handicaps caused by ancient customs in which we have had no desire to force changes and which only Indian opinion can alter. The greatest evils in India for zoo years, as I see it, have been three—the fragmentation of land caused partly as a result of the otherwise excellent Hindu family system, the grip of the Bunnia or moneylender, and the inability, even to-day, enlightened as many of them are, of the Indian people to advance quickly enough in getting rid of too early marriage, which results in low physical standards. India, we say, is a poor country individually. Individually it must be so, and why? You are dealing with a population which has grown by 50,000,000 in the last few years, although they have not the same physical standard that many of us would like to see. The system under which education is carried on cannot in many cases be imparted by female teachers at all. India is the most difficult place in the world in which to get the progress we would like to see. But in spite of all these difficulties the advance in India under our jurisdiction has been remarkable. We have nothing whatever to be ashamed of and we can publish everything to the world. Financially, India has always been treated
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generously. Indeed, in the last three years she has been treated more than generously. Although she has been in deadly peril from Japan, she has become a considerable gainer from the war. India has become one of the great arsenals of the Allies, largely at the expense of other people, and her war-time developments will be of great post-war value to her. However, nobody grudges any of that, and it is outweighed by that splended loyalty, devotion to duty and courage which her soldiers have shown and which is traditional of Indian regiments.
A great deal has been made to-day of the position of Mr. Gandhi, and a great deal has been said about this White Paper. I first met Mr. Gandhi many years ago, and I have always looked upon him as a very genuine, but very misguided, man. I see that in one of his statements he said that his patience was exhausted. I wonder whether he has ever thought that the patience of the British Empire might also be nearly exhausted, or the extent to which and how long this country and people have tried to do right by India? There comes a time when even the patience of India's best well-wishers becomes exhausted. I cannot be accused of being one of those who have not been willing to move fast along the path towards Indian self-government. I have strongly supported this and previous Governments in their moves in that direction, but there is a time when we are entitled to say, "We are tired of misrepresentation. If it is the case that you cannot do anything—as I believe it is—do not try to throw the blame on the British people and Empire but face the fact that we have to start again and try to find a solution." We cannot afford, whatever our feelings may be, to accept the idea that we should leave India to her fate. We cannot do that kind of thing; our duty is much more serious. Our business is to try to establish India in an independent position, able to take her place among the nations of the world and with a settled form of government, in peace and good order. We have been trying to lead India to that for 150 years, and the task must be fulfilled.
It is not a nice idea for many of us, after all these Round Table Conferences, all the work of the past, that the whole matter should come back to the British

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Parliament to try to decide again what is right for India as a whole. Is there an alternative? I believe there is, and I ask the House to consider it. After this war is over the whole economic system of the world will require reconstruction. Post-war financial and economic questions will have to be decided, not only between the Allies, but probably between the Allies and most of the other countries in both hemispheres. Could we not invite—we have nothing to conceal but everything to be proud of—our Allies at the end of this war to sit down with us and help us to try to find a solution to this Indian problem? I do not believe that to do so would be in any way derogatory to our dignity or would be misrepresented or misunderstood. The responsibility is ours, but we might ask our Allies to assist us in coming to a decision on what is one of the most grave and difficult problems that has ever faced any governing race or, indeed, the human race. There are many forms of government possible.
It may be suggested that to do that is beneath the dignity of the British people. The future of India is a very serious problem, but I am not sure that it is the greatest problem we may have to settle after this war. There may be still graver problems, and I suggest that a move of this kind might secure confidence where confidence is lacking, might bring prosperity, happiness and the opportunity for service to a large number of people who are at present in doubt and might, above all, set the seal of world approval on the wonderful work which the British people have done in India.
Mr. Edmund Harvey: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) speaks with a long and intimate knowledge of India, and I think we must have felt that he has brought home to the House the fact that there remains an immense question to be solved and that we cannot settle it simply by saying that it must be solved by India. We British must do our utmost, even in these immensely difficult circumstances, to make a contribution towards a solution. I wish I could feel that the publication of the White Paper had been such a contribution. I am sure that all of us who have read it have been saddened by the picture it has given of the terrible acts that followed after the decisions of Congress.
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Yet it has been presented in such a way as to suggest that these happenings were foreseen by the leaders who made the decisions. That is the old fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc.It is not always the fact that because a certain decision or resolution has been followed by terrible and regrettable acts that therefore the authors of that resolution intended such results.
One of my regrets about this White Paper is that it has been presented not just as a series of factual occurrences but has been presented as a very complete, cumulative argument tending to place the whole burden of responsibility for what has happened upon Mr. Gandhi. I have had pointed out to me that this argument is really fallacious to some extent, in that in the quotations from Mr. Gandhi's newspaper "Harijan" we have had put into a single paragraph statements made by Mr. Gandhi on different occasions and to different people. On page 52 of the White Paper there is this passage:
"Strikes can be and have been non-violent. If railways are worked only to strengthen the British hold on India they need not be assisted…."
Then come three dots. Anyone would imagine that we went on to another part of the same statement. Then follows:
"What I am hoping and striving for is an irresistible mass urge on the part of the people and an intelligent response on the part of the privileged classes to the popular demand. But because I know that this picture is for the time being imaginary I am quite prepared for the worst. Hence my statement that I would end the present state of things even at the risk of anarchy reigning supreme in the land."
The first statement was made to an American journalist referring to strikes on the railways. The second is from a written answer to a question by another person dealing with the position of the Princes. Is it right or fair to put those two things together and present them as though they were the considered view of Mr. Gandhi on one point? If we can find that kind of treatment in one part of the White Paper, have we any assurance that there has not been similar misrepresentation in other parts? I am sure the Secretary of State would never have approved of such telescoping, and the effect of it, and I would ask that, as the White Paper has been issued in this form, an opportunity should be given to have something on the other side put fairly, so

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that we may see not merely one but both points of view. We cannot judge simply by hearing this very strong case that is put forward by the Government of India, unless we have also an opportunity of hearing the other side.
But we ought to go further than a question of the examination of the White Paper. Reference has been made more than once to the extraordinary personality of Mr. Gandhi. The Secretary of State has spoken with respect of him, and the conduct of the Government of India shows that they too respect Mr. Gandhi, because he has not been put in prison; he has been interned in as comfortable circumstances as possible, in order to show to everyone that the Government are doing this with respect and recognise that he is a great man, although his action is mistaken, and that if he were not so set apart for a time, it would be disastrous to India. That is a great recognition on the part of the Government, and it shows that their action is in no way comparable with that of the Axis Powers, and we ought not to confuse the issue for a moment by comparing action which we may even disapprove of on the part of the Government of India with the action of the Axis Powers.
Mr. Stephen: It is just the same as the Axis Powers have done with the King of the Belgians.
Mr. Harvey: No one could compare the treatment of King Leopold with the treatment the Government of India have felt they had to take with regard to the Congress leaders. The position is utterly different. What I want to make clear is that this shows that the Government of India respect these Indians, and I feel convinced that they look forward to the time when an understanding, which seems impossible to-day, will be come to. They want still to get the co-operation to which the Government have looked forward when they sent that memorable mission to India. We too must look forward to co-operation in the days that are coming. Cannot we make an appeal from this House, on the one hand to the Government of India, to open some way of communication which is closed to-day, and on the other hand to Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues to meet and act in a spirit of understanding? Mr. Gandhi has said
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that if the Viceroy wished for renewed negotiations, he should put him with the leaders of the Working Committee of Congress, who are interned elsewhere. Surely the Aga Khan's palace is big enough to contain all these interned leaders. They could be put together, and it would be possible to set up communications. If it is desired that there should be on the part of the Congress leaders an expression of regret and sorrow for the terrible events that have taken place, how can we hope to get it if they are not allowed to communicate with one another, and if people of good will from outside are not allowed to communicate with them and act as intermediaries to do their utmost to bring about a change of spirit?
I would therefore beg the Government to give this opportunity to Mr. Gandhi and to the leaders of Congress, if necessary, without for the time being lifting the arrangements for internment, and allow leaders of moderate opinion to get into touch with Mr. Gandhi and to use their influence in the work of reconciliation. We surely can make our appeal to this great man, one of greatest not merely of this century, but of many centuries, a man who is loved and revered as no one else has been in India for many a long year. In this White Paper we read how he felt that the time was short and he must act urgently. Life was drawing to a close, and he needed to act now for the freedom of India. We can understand something of this, and yet we can ask him to do something even greater than he has done yet. There was a time when he had the magnanimity to admit that he had made a Himalayan blunder in believing that the Indian people would act non-violently, following his advice, and finding out, as he did, that terrible things happened.
He is perfectly capable of making a similar admission to-day. May there not come to him as the crown of his life an act like that which came long ago to St. Francis of Assisi? When he lay dying in his little hut at Portiuncula the news came to him that the mayor and the bishop of his native town, which he loved, were quarrelling and that faction and bloodshed had broken out. He sent his disciples from his death bed to sing to them the song of the sun, and, in it, a verse that he had written for the occasion

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which praised God for those who show forgiveness for love of Him, and the mayor and the bishop, both in the wrong, were so touched by the message that they made peace with one another, and the last hours of St. Francis were crowned with the blessing of peace making. I earnestly hope that Mr. Gandhi may have, as the crown of his life, a great act of reconciliation for the good of all in India, for the good of this country and for the good and the peace of the whole world.
Sir George Schuster: I agree with the hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. Harvey) in one thing, and that is that the form of the White Paper is not entirely fortunate, but I am afraid that, although I have often discussed these matters in sympathy with him, I differ strongly from what he said in other respects to-day. I am in fact profoundly convinced that he is mistaken. It is unfortunate that we should have to dwell on the past in India. We ought really to be directing our attention to the future. But if we are to consider the next steps we have to know where we stand and for that purpose at times a stocktaking of the position is valuable. A stocktaking is timely and is particularly necessary to-day, for I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) when he said that in the past 12 months a great many realities had been made clear. I therefore want to brush aside all the argumentative parts of the White Paper and to direct attention to definite facts, and the realities that emerge from them.
The first of the important realities that has been made clear in the past 12 months concerns the attitude of the Congress Party. The Congress Party from the beginning of the war have taken the attitude, "We will not co-operate with you in any provisional government. We say to you, 'Give us power now and leave us to settle the Constitution.'" That was an intelligible attitude and although we could not accept it, it did not at the beginning lead to trouble since they did not seek to interfere actively with the conduct of the Government or the pursuit of the war. But after the visit of my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Aircraft Production to India last March they changed that attitude. They said, "Quit India, and hand over to us without settling the Constitution." And then in August they went one step further and
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said, "If you will not quit India at once we will stage a revolt and we will try by unconstitutional means to force you to put the whole Government of India into our hands, leaving us to settle the future." There is no possible getting away from the truth of that analysis of what has happened.
For that last step, Mr. Gandhi carries the sole responsibility. It seems evident that Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and other experienced and realistic members of the Congress Party would not have taken that step. In saying that I am under no illusion as to Mr. Nehru's attitude, his hostility to us and his determination to do everything he can to get rid of British rule as quickly as possible. But he has a sense of reality. He saw the danger of chaos in India at that time and that it might mean the betrayal of causes which he himself holds very dear—the cause of Russia, the cause of China and, indeed, the protection of India itself from any domination by Axis Powers. But unfortunately Mr. Gandhi carried the day, and as the "Spectator" well put it this week.
"With the enemy at the gate he presented an ultimatum first and then proceeded to organise revolt."
That is the bare truth. It does not matter whether he intended that that revolt should be violent or not. All the argument as to whether Mr. Gandhi knew that it must lead to violence is irrelevant. It is enough that it was intended to paralyse the Government, to compel a surrender to the Congress Party, and to force constitutional change by unconstitutional means. The fact that that was done in the gravest hour of peril not only for India but for democracy in the whole of the world is something that we cannot—certainly I cannot—forget. So I think it right to say certain things.
I have always been an ardent sympathiser with Indian aspirations and I have always had a high regard as well as a personal affection for Mr. Gandhi. I still respect him as a great spiritual leader whose unshaken belief in the ideal of non-violence and world pacifism, will, I believe, remain a beacon to India and all humanity long after these sorry events are forgotten and his own span of life is ended. But as a political leader concerned with the daily handling of practical policy I can now only regard him as a disaster—a disaster to his own party, a disaster to India, a disaster to the world.

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Let him continue to proclaim his distant vision and preach his ideals for man's ultimate goal. But for the safety of present-day humanity let him keep out of daily political affairs. Bismarck, to one of whose "more sensible remarks" the Prime Minister recently called attention, once said that the only thing more dangerous than an extremely short-sighted statesman was an extremely long-sighted one. I do not think he can have contemplated a statesman whose view was fixed quite so far ahead as Mr. Gandhi's. It seems to me that the conclusion is inevitable that there can be no negotiation with such a man. It is not merely that his long-sighted views are impracticable. His immediate advice is disastrous and reckless of human suffering. It is utterly impossible to deal with a man who said in the midst of this war, with an enemy like the Japanese at the Indian frontier,
"Let them entrust India to God, or, in modern parlance, to anarchy. Then the parties will fight one another like dogs or, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement."
My hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities suggested that we should address an appeal to Mr. Gandhi. I ventured in a book which I wrote on India two years ago to address just such an appeal to him. I sent it to him personally and I understand he read it. I appealed to him
"to make it the crowning event of his life to be the peacemaker at this supreme crisis, and instead of fencing with the British Government or asking for the fulfilment of extreme conditions, which he knew in fact could not be fulfilled, to use his great influence to make his followers realise two things—first, that this is a war of right against wrong and India's war just as much as ours; and secondly, that here in this war emergency is a challenge and an opportunity to make a fresh start in the approach to all our joint problems."
But instead of that he has talked as in this passage of which I quoted and he takes his party into the wilderness. And we must make no mistake. The man who talked thus is the man who controls the most powerful single political organisation in India, and, whatever the unworldliness of Mr. Gandhi's own views, that organisation knows quite well what it wants in terms of immediate wordly policy. So I feel bound to make clear my own view, first, that there is at present no possibility of negotiating with Congress, that is to say, no possibility by any political con-
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cessions of arriving at a settlement with them in the interim war period; and, secondly, I can see very little hope of ever reaching a practicable solution with Congress as long as Mr. Gandhi remains at its head to decide its policy. Therefore, for what it is worth, I say to the Government they will have my support in standing firmly on the position that they have taken up. I believe, in fact, that it would be better for Mr. Gandhi and better for India it that were made clear.
As I see it, the Congress Party, containing as it does among its members some of the most forceful personalities in India, must take part at the end in any satisfactory final settlement. But they must take their part with other elements; they must be reasonable—otherwise the only arbiter will be force. Anyone just now who by well-meant sympathy encourages them to take any other line, and seeks peace and appeasement with them in that way, is, in my view, unwittingly no doubt, but surely, helping to courses which in the end will bring about violence and bloodshed. I venture to put that to the House as the first reality that emerges. The second reality is that this Congress attempt at revolt has failed. That points to the existence of elements in the situation far removed from anything that is represented by Congress. The first important element is that the force of tradition has prevailed. The Prime Minister the other day reminded us of that very wise saying of Disraeli that
"nations are governed by force or tradition."
All who know India must view with horror the possibility of that country passing into a stage where the tradition of law and order no longer runs. Any one who risks that is gambling with the fate of millions. I should like to have heard more in the White Paper of all those faithful servants of established authority on whose sense of duty and bravery the maintenance of that tradition depended. I am glad therefore that the Secretary of State referred to them. I confess that I am greatly moved when I think of those men—junior officials of the Government, police officers or police rank and file—in remote places in India, faced by furious mobs, and standing to their duty at the risk of being burnt alive. And remember these men are just as fervent patriots and just as anxious for the advance to freedom of their country as those who incited the mobs to attack them. But they were

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ready to uphold established authority, and we should remember, as should Indian Ministers who may succeed us, that without loyalty to the established authority of the law there can be no security for democracy.
Then, again, as the Secretary of State reminded us, there were many other elements who stood by the Government and were ready to go on with the war effort—the Moslems, a vast majority of the Hindus, other communities, and last and very important, the Indian States. I think we should pay a special tribute of respect to the Princes. The Indian States in this war, as in the last, have been a very powerful help to us, and I venture to say that we do not hear enough of the Indian States in our general discussions on the Indian situation. It is not of course popular in these democratic days to speak well of the States which are often represented as survivals of reaction and medieval darkness. To anyone who takes that view, I say "visit the leading Indian States." And I would add that the time has not yet come, nor can I see it coming, when humanity will not be wise to cherish the survival of ideas of courage and chivalrous devotion to duty which are the tradition of the Indian Princes. I hope that in considering this situation in the future we shall give weight to the position of the Indian States.
The third important reality that emerges concerns the position of the Moslems. It seems clear to me that the feeling among the Moslems about Pakistan has gone too far for it ever to be ignored. I regret it, but no realist can now ignore that it is necessary to turn to the search for means to provide some form of separate administration for the Moslems by which they will be enabled to order their own affairs according to their own way of life. The plain fact is that Mr. Jinnah has been able to acquire great power for his Moslem League, and if one faces reality one has to recognise that it has been mainly the policy of the Congress Party which has given him his opportunity to do so. The practical difficulties of dealing with this problem are immense. But they must be faced realistically and to ignore the need to search for the best solution will, I believe, lead to inevitable disaster.
The last reality to which I wish to draw attention has regard to the British position. I hope it will be recognised un-
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alterably, and clearly understood in India, that after a long series of concessions and attempts at compromise we have come now to bedrock principles. There are two principles. There is the principle of self-government to which we subscribed in the Atlantic Charter and which has been confirmed beyond all possibility of doubt in the declaration of March last year. On the other hand, there is the principle, equally valid and right, that when we surrender our responsibility for government, it must be left to rest on the foundations of a Constitution which commands the agreement of the main elements in India. We do not want to retain power, but we are not going to walk out and leave India to chaos or civil war, or to abandon our pledges to various of the Indian community sections. It seems to be absolutely essential that we should make it clear that this is a principle which has the united support of the British nation, and that no British Government will betray it under threat of trouble from any Indian political party.
There is another reality which I should like to touch upon, and which has nothing to do with the political situation. That is the reality of the surrounding world. It seems to me that politicians in India tend to talk without any true appreciation of the realities of the world as it will be after the war. They have been sheltered from realities. They start to think and talk in terms of old controversies. But how far from reality are they if they think that India, after her long dream under British tutelage, is going to awake as an independent national unit into a world of Victorian security, guarded from all possibility of external interference by the British Navy. Not only India but all of us members of the United Nations will have to re-arrange our ideas about independence. Interdependence is a much more important idea. That idea has a direct bearing on the Indian problem. And moreover it is not a matter only between the British Government and India but is one with which all the United Nations will be concerned. The strategical security of India will be one of the key points in the peace structure of the world, and as to that aspect of the matter, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne), that it will be one in which the whole of the United Nations will be interested and which we may well discuss with them.

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Those, it seems to me, are the main realities of the situation.
What then ought we to do now? I recognise that there may be times in the affairs of nations when the wisest course is to do nothing—to wait on events and not attempt to force them. But I cannot feel satisfied that such a course is adequate to the present needs of the Indian situation. However fully I appreciate that just at the present time it is important that India, after these disturbances, should settle down to orderly administration and getting on with the job of the war, nevertheless I feel profoundly that we cannot be content with doing nothing. I agree with the hon. Member for Kidder-minister that for us to take the line that it is for the Indian parties to reach agreement and that until then we need do nothing is a position upon which we cannot stand. I want to urge, on the contrary, that just now, after the failure of the Congress revolt; after the termination without excitement of Mr. Gandhi's fast; after the Prime Minister has broadcast to the world and has shown to India that British statesmen are now seriously thinking of post-war problems and lastly after the recent developments from which India and all the world can see the rising tide of our war strength and the encouragement of our recent successes in Africa—after all these things, now is the time to take a new initiative in India. To take advantage of this opportunity and to give an inspiring lead needs statesmanship. There is occasion now for a great statesman in India. I may be asked to say just how exactly and what exactly such a man should do. It is not possible to Specify in precise and material detail just what a great man who rises to an occasion will do. But let me say this. We know what happened in this country when our present Prime Minister took the lead. You cannot describe in detail or analyse what happens. It is a psychological influence. Now is the time when we need great statesmanship in India. And there are many other things besides to be done in a practical way.
Has not the time come when we could get together representatives of various important sections to work out plans prior to a Constituent Assembly? Take the Muslim problem as the chief one. If, as I have urged, we accept this obligation not to hand over our responsibility until there
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is a Constitution which commands agreement among all parties in India, are we not entitled to say to the Muslim League that we cannot protect their position unless they come forward and say what they want? They too must be reasonable. Has not the time come when—behind closed doors—realistic discussions can be started to work out practical details of possible solutions? If such discussions can take place I should like to bring into them also the Indian States and all the other elements who take a responsible view of the situation, men who recognise that there must be an agreed solution and who are prepared to make efforts to reach agreement in a statesmanlike and cooperative way. There are available in India to-day men of great intelligence and practical experience in statesmanship, men who have sat as members of the Government of India, as Provincial Ministers, as Diwans of Provinces, who should be encouraged and helped in every way to get down to the preliminary study of these constitutional problems.
On our side, too, there are things to be done. It was an essential feature of the plan propounded in our Declaration of last March that there should be a treaty between this country and the new Indian Union. Have the British Government started to consider this complex matter? That would be a very realistic step and would have an encouraging effect in India as practical evidence of our determination to implement our pledges without delay after the war.
In conclusion—passing over many other possible lines of action—I want to say this: I have in the past ventured to appeal to the Prime Minister to broadcast a special message to India. I want to renew that appeal. I have not in mind—I never had in mind—any Weak conciliatory statement promising concessions and compromises. We stand on principles, and I want to have those principles clearly stated. They are just principles, but they are also generous principles, and I want Indians to hear them from the Prime Minister himself. I want them to know that he personally is taking an interest in the Indian problem. Words from him could have a powerful effect in making Indian public opinion face realities.
In many ways of this kind I want to see evoked the best

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qualities of British statesmanship to take the lead in a new initiative. But above all we must be clear and firm about our bedrock principles, which I have tried to state. Only in this way can we encourage men of responsibility to feel assured in coming forward to give their best efforts to find a solution. So long as they think there is a chance that we, in a moment of weakness, might make concessions to the extreme demands of Congress, we can never create this assurance. That is why I feel that the next step is to make clear that we will never do that. Although that may sound like fighting language, in the end it will, I am convinced, prove the most sure way to peace.
Mr. Ridley: The hon. Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster) speaks not only with knowledge, but with authority in these matters such as few hon. Members can rival, and even fewer hon. Members would think of challenging. In the light of that fact the first part of his speech in which he-drew attention to what he regards as the realities of the Indian situation, was all the more impressing. I cannot help thinking that his remarks will act like a breath of fresh air, when what he said is read by responsible leaders of Indian opinion. It is a great thing that in the middle of the existing situation we should be able to have a Debate like this entirely without acerbity or acidity. I would make a mild demurrer to the remark made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sloan) who said there were statements in the White Paper which were not founded on fact and which were fraudulent and only equalled by the "Red Letter." I am not saying that those charges were not justified, but they are of such a serious character that if they were found to be true, they could lead only to the impeachment of the Secretary of State and other people responsible for them. My hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon) addressed the House as to the policy of those for whom he spoke without equivocation and with complete clarity. It is the case that the policy of the people for whom he spoke is embodied in the declaration made in the summer of last year. I say, with no sense of rivalry in these matters, that there is probably no group in this House of Commons that feels more
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profound disappointment than the group with which my hon. Friend is associated. It seems too bad that just as we had managed to construct a political platform in the terms of the Cripps offer, its supports should have been kicked away by the very people for whom it was purposely erected.
There are two very unfortunate approaches to this matter. There are those who regard the difficulties as so trivial and insignificant that they could be immediately resolved if the British Government only had the will to do so. I beg my hon. Friends, the friends of Indian freedom, not to be led away by that view. There are others who take the view that the problem is so complex and so intractable as to offer no solution of any kind, and that a policy of impassivity is the only one in face of such a situation. I do not believe that either of those two policies should be pursued. On the contrary, I think that although unilateral action by this country cannot solve this deadlock, it can help to do so. But I am in no mood to goad or badger the Government in this matter. Certainly to badger a Government who have been responsible for such substantial policy advances as those described by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) would almost equal the impertinence of an urchin. There must be a reciprocal attempt in this matter, on this side and on the Indian side as well.
I am bound to confess to a pessimistic view—here I join with the hon. Member for Walsall—as to the possibility of inducing Congress to join in that atmosphere of reciprocity. What strikes me most after carefully reading the White Paper is not so much the organisation of the civil disobedience movement, bad as that was, and its effect on the purely British cause, but the almost complete inability of the leaders of Congress to take a world view of the political and war situation, their inability to see the Indian situation as a part of larger events. They are further unable to see that the future of Indian freedom depends conclusively and entirely on the seats which we occupy at the Armistice table. If we should be in the seats of the vanquished and not those of the victors, the prospect of Indian freedom would have gone for how long nobody knows.

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I do not rely too hopefully on reciprocity from the Congress side, but I do suggest to the Secretary of State that if that is not a hopeful prospect we must search for such prospects as are open. There are, as the hon. Member for Walsall said, certain responsible leaders of Indian opinion who are not closely associated either with the League or with Congress who have offered themselves in the last year or two, in the hope that they would be able to assist in the provision or development of a solution to the Indian problem. It is understood that conversations are now taking place between the Viceroy and members of the group to whom I have referred. It is sometimes suggested that it is a group composed of people with little or no representative capacity. That may well be so in the existing situation, but nobody can say what representative capacity might be acquired in the event of helpfully developing and in the end successfully concluding conversations between themselves and either the Viceroy or the Secretary of State. Mr. Rajagopalachari's integrity and courage are evidenced by his resignation from Congress and the reason for which he resigned. I have heard constant tributes to the persistent patience of the Viceroy, and we heard that again from the Secretary of State to-day.
As to the Viceroy, I have to say with great respect, that patience may not be enough. It may have to be accompanied also by warm cordiality. I would like the Secretary of State to tell us once more with clarity and precision—and as to this I think there is still some misunderstanding—that what is called the Cripps offer still stands as an offer, and that discussions on the basis of it can freely take place between those people who want to consider those proposals. I also desire—and this is an important point—that conversations, if they appear to offer a hopeful prospect, should be in London and not in Delhi. I believe that the transfer of these conversations to the Secretary of State himself and the Prime Minister would have a profound effect on opinion in India as well as on opinion throughout the world. I was impressed by the appeal which the hon. and gallant Member for Hornsey (Captain Gammans) made as to the steps which should be taken in order to create a more accurate American view of our present attitude to India. It has been
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a happy experience of mine lately to have had a good deal of contact with American troops and to have invited questions from them. I have been surprised at the amount of interest taken by them in the Indian question, and have noted their surprise at an accurate description of our attitude to the problem. Speaking from that narrow but not inadequate experience, I believe it to be important that we should take every step open to us to cultivate the right attitude towards this matter in the United States. I am quite certain the people of the United States want to understand the situation in as happy and favourable light as possible, and I beg my right hon. Friend, with great sincerity, to see that any prospect of hopeful conversations with any body of opinion in India will be not merely cultivated but warmly welcomed and vigorously pursued.
Mr. Wedderburn: It seems fairly plain from the evidence now before us that the majority of the Congress Committee had reached the conclusion last summer that the United Nations had little hope of bringing this war to a victorious end. After issuing a series of conflicting statements and resolutions, which betrayed a good deal of perplexity about the attitude they should adopt towards a Japanese invasion, the political leaders of Congress, with few exceptions appear to hive decided that they must act on the assumption that the war would probably end in an Allied defeat. At the time when the civil disturbances began in August, the Allied position did not present a very favourable prospect in any part of the world. The large and wealthy Empires held by the Dutch, the Americans and ourselves in the South-West Pacific had been conquered with incredible ease and swiftness by the armies of Japan. The Russians did not then seem likely to hold Stalingrad or the oilfields of the Caucasus. The Eighth Army had just concluded a headlong retreat almost to Alexandria, in which they had lost 80,000 men and the best part of their equipment. When the Minister of Aircraft Production went to India Mr. Gandhi is reported to have told—I think it was repeated to-day by the Secretary of State—that he was offering him a post-dated cheque on a bank which was doomed to crash. If he held that view in April, his convictions were not likely to be modified by the events of the next few months,

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which brought a fresh series of disasters to the Allied cause. No doubt it must have seemed to many Congress politicians that India might get off more lightly if the British could be prevented from offering an armed resistance which had no reasonable chance of success.
But it is equally clear that the work of destruction which was planned by the adherents of Congress to inflict the greatest possible amount of damage on the defences of India and on all the instruments of public administration did not enjoy any great measure of support among the general public. The Indian police, some of whom were cruelly put to death by organised rioters, who had been incited to acts of murder, carried out their duties with courage and faithfulness to the law. I hope their conduct has been suitably recognised by the Government of India. There was nowhere any kind of general insurrection. When my hon. Friend the Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Lawson) and I passed through India on our way to China in November, and again on our way home before Christmas, we spent some time in the cities of Calcutta, Delhi and Karachi. Neither in the streets nor in the neighbourhood of any Government buildings or anywhere else did we ever see any soldiers on duty, and the only police we saw were those engaged in traffic control at the crossroads. There was nowhere any sign of tension or alarm. The designs of Congress might have had the most serious consequences if Japan had been ready to invade India in August or September, and they may still be dangerous if they are not vigilantly controlled, but they have failed in their main purpose, and the defences of India are now much stronger than they were six months ago. As for the Indian Army, the campaign of civil disobedience coincided with record figures for the voluntary recruitment of the Armed Forces.
It has usually been our custom to act with leniency towards our political enemies in those countries for whose government we have from time to time been responsible, and our experience has proved that clemency is generally a wise policy. The only serious crime of Mr. Gandhi has been that he has made the same miscalculation about our chances of winning the war as was made by Signor Mussolini, and his endeavours to profit from the situation have been almost equally ineffectual. The
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fact that it may be necessary in a time of grave danger to intern the members of a treasonable faction, and to proscribe its activities, does not mean that the party should be permanently suppressed, or denied its proper weight in the discussions which must be held when the danger is over. But to release the Congress leaders while the war is still far from its climax, or to negotiate with them before they have been released, would deeply offend and dishearten the great mass of loyal Indians in the Army and the Civil Service, who are fighting and labouring for the success of our arms, and the majority of the ordinary population who do not desire to attain their political ends by methods of violence and revolution.
All the different parties in India, whether their policy is constructive or obstructive, whether they are willing to fight against the Japanese and the Germans or whether they prefer that their physical valour shall be restricted to assaults on the representatives of the law in their own country, are equally desirous that India shall be governed by Indians, with the same sovereign freedom as we ourselves possess. That is also our own intention, to which the Government and people of this country are fully committed. It would probably not be very difficult for all parties in this House to agree on the main principles of a settlement which would do justice to the different communities of India, since we are often better able to sympathise with the aspirations of all of them than they are to sympathise with each other's.
Let me refer in particular to the Depressed Classes, since they are the least vocal section of opinion, although they have now one very able representative on the Viceroy's Council. They have formulated a number of demands, which are neither extravagant nor unreasonable. First, they ask that a guaranteed proportion of all public funds spent on education shall be used for the education of their own class. They do not think it likely that under native rule anything would be spent on their own education, unless there were some statutory warrant to that effect. Next, they wish for a scheme of land settlement, with security of tenure. Many of them at present are living in small communities outside the villages—which they are not allowed to enter—where they are employed, on the most menial tasks, at a miserable wage,

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and if they occupy any land their tenure of it is precarious. Thirdly, they wish for some assured representation, by members of their own caste, in both the provincial and the central legislatures, and some fixed ratio of posts in various branches of the public service. These are fairly modest ambitions, in comparison with some of those which are presented by some of the other parties. We should all agree that any satisfactory plan for an Indian Constitution ought to contain some legal provision for the education and the social security of these unfortunate victims of an undemocratic religion. We can also understand, and indeed are most willing to meet by almost any imaginable expedient which can command acceptance, the anxiety of the Moslems to secure the continuance of their own particular way of life in India, and the similar desire of Hindus and Sikhs for equal protection in those districts where there is a Moslem majority.
It seems to me that in Great Britain political opinion on the subject of India has grown much more united in the last 10 or 12 years. Those who were opponents of the India Act are now persuaded that it is necessary to go much farther, and more quickly. I think that criticisms now made against the Government's policy are more concerned with methods of approach than with our ultimate destination. But it would be extremely foolish that if we did not recognise that in India itself exactly the opposite process has been going on. Political parties there, instead of becoming more united, have become more divergent and less disposed to concede anything to those from whom they differ. There was a time, many years ago, when Congress did have some claim to speak for the majority of politically-minded Indians outside the native States. Mr. Jinnah was at one time a member of the Congress Party, and his colleague, Mr. Chowdri used to play a prominent part as a Congress leader in the United Provinces. But Congress has long ceased to be a national organisation. It is difficult to say how much popular support it would now enjoy if it were deprived of the personal sway which Mr. Gandhi is still capable of exercising over large numbers of religious people. The Moslems of India, until very lately, were hardly organised at all for political action Their
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experience in those provinces where Congress obtained a majority in the elections of 1937 enormously stimulated the membership and popular support of the party now led by Mr. Jinnah. Although the Moslem League is still relatively weak and badly organised compared with the wealthy and efficient political machine of the Congress Party, it has immeasurably grown in strength in the last four or five years. The claims of both sides have become more intransigent and less easy to reconcile with each other.
Let us try to picture for a moment what the situation in India may be like at the end of the war, when the power of Japan has been finally destroyed. Perhaps we may accept the hypothesis of the Prime Minister in his broadcast the other night, that Hitler may be defeated in 1945, and that we shall then have a period of several years in which all our Forces for whom transport will be available shall be sent to the East, while other people remain here to carry out a Four Years Plan under some political combination whose complexion is still a matter of some uncertainty. The Indian troops who have fought so gallantly and so successfully in the Western Desert and Abyssinia are a very small fraction of the total number of Indians now serving with the Colours. Probably the great majority of them are still in a not very advanced stage of training and it may be a fairly long time before they can all be fully equipped. It may be expected that, when Germany is beaten and the Mediterranean is open and all our war supplies can be sent to the East, the training and equipment of the Indian Army will proceed very rapidly and that Indians will play a major part in the military operations which will then finally develop against Japan. We may, perhaps, have at the end of the war 1,500,000 or 2,000,000 Indian soldiers capable of sustaining perhaps 25 or 30 Divisions in the field. Over 50 per cent. of the Indian troops are Moslems. Of the remainder, a good many come from the native States, and those who are recruited from the non-Moslem fighting races in British India like the Mahrattas in the Bombay Presidency, are not at all interested in the political contortions of the. Brahmin oligarchy which now controls the Congress party machine.
That may be the situation at the end of the war. You may have in India perhaps

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2,000,000 well-trained, well-equipped soldiers, none of whom are willing to obey, and most of whom are hostile to, the Congress leaders. In these circumstances, we shall have to decide how we are going to implement our pledge to give to India Dominion status with complete freedom, to become entirely divorced, if she so desires it, from our connection. There are several methods by which we can do it. We can do it by abdication. We can do it by an imposed settlement like the Act of 1935, or we can go on continually repeating the offer made by the Minister of Aircraft Production on his mission last year, a mission whose total failure in no way detracts from the credit due to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for the zeal and patience with which he carried out his thankless task. I have no time to discuss the relative merits of these courses now. Abdication would be the easiest. I could never support it myself, yet I would not rule it out as altogether absurd.
I do not hold the view that the standard of life of the bulk of our people here is dependent upon our connection with India. We could say, "We have built up peace and law in India for 200 years; we have brought it successfully through the greatest war in history and now to show the world that we are free from Imperialism, we are going to quit." The reason why I should always be against doing that is that we would have the moral responsibility for the civil war which would undoubtedly follow our departure and would probably continue indefinitely until some other Power decided to intervene. I would give the Congress leaders a life of something like six weeks; perhaps that is rather a generous estimate. The objection to an imposed settlement, an expedient to which one may always have to resort, is that, if you impose a settlement which is not accepted by the different parties, you must have the responsibility of remaining in order to impose it and see that it is carried out. You cannot give real independence to India until those who have refused to work the settlement have changed their minds. It is far better, if it is possible, to achieve agreement first. It would be thoroughly dishonest to pretend that there is the slightest prospect of immediate agreement now, but the Secretary of State did not seem altogether unhopeful in his speech. Perhaps at the end of the war the atmosphere may be more congenial than it is now. Certainly there
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are plenty of men in India with the highest qualities of statesmanship and patriotism.
It may be that if we act with consistent sincerity, showing that we are not going to allow any one party to be subjugated by another, but are willing to agree to any reasonable proposal, then the credit of those Indians who have the wisdom to respond with equal sincerity may be very much raised. Whatever kind of arrangement may be made for collective security, in which India must have her part and her commitments, the defence of India can never be unrelated to ours, and Indian statesmen who sincerely desire the well-being and social improvement of their country, can never be indifferent to the benefits which they will derive from their membership of the British Commonwealth. It is not for any love of the forms of Imperialism that I believe the British connection with India must continue, but because I believe that wise statesmanship in India will always see that it will not be a good thing either for democracy or for the peace of the world that the British Commonwealth should be dissolved.
The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): I have taken part in a great many Debates in this House on the Indian problem, and some of these Debates have been marked by a good deal more heat than light. But as the years have passed, one can note, first of all, a greater knowledge on the part of all Members of the problem and its difficulties, secondly, a greater appreciation of the need for satisfying the aspirations of all the people of India for self-government, thirdly, a more practical approach, and fourthly, as the hon. and gallant Member said just now, a far greater unity of outlook on the part of Members in all parts of the House. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sloan) struck a slightly discordant note. I would to-day have liked to have had present to, hear this Debate leaders of Indian opinion of all communities. I am sure that they would have been struck by the spirit of the speeches, and I have seldom heard a Debate on India in which the Debate has not been conducted at a lower level than this. The present Debate has reached one of the highest levels of Debate I have ever heard. There were the admirable speech of the hon. Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon), that of the

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hon. and gallant Member for Farnham (Captain G. Nicholson), and that of the hon. Member for West Renfrew (Mr. Wedderburn). That is only taking out three where there have been so many good speeches.
The Debate has really tended to be forward looking rather than backward looking. It arose primarily on the publication of the White Paper, but the greater part of the speeches has dealt with the main features of the Indian problem. I think everybody realises that the Government of India, faced with this conspiracy, had to act, and I think the evidence in the White Paper has reinforced the views that hon. Members formed. My hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire greatly exaggerated the number of arrests, even at the peak, and even those arrests must be taken in their due proportion in relation to the enormous population of India. He seemed to ask why it was necessary that there should be arrests. The fact that some people are put in prison is not proof that a totalitarian State is being carried on or anything of the kind. I am sure that my hon. Friend, if he were carrying on a Government, would have to put people in prison. But my hon. Friend did make one wise comment. He said, "Those who sow the storm are apt to reap the whirlwind." That is a matter Mr. Gandhi might think about, because the terrible thing in this account to me was not merely the acts of violence but the incredible levity with which a man of Mr. Gandhi's experience contemplated the falling into anarchy of that great subcontinent of India.
Think for a moment of the population of India, nearly 400,000,000, increasing at the rate of some 50,000,000 in a decade, in highly artificial circumstances. Until British rule came to India she was always apt to be subject to famines in particular districts. Only elaborate organisation in the matter of transport, government and irrigation allows millions to live. Anarchy would condemn many of them to death. To hear a pacifist inviting anarchy is a terrible thing. Remember, we have had examples over and over again that those who seek to win power through the bomb and the revolver are apt to find it difficult to get rid of the bomb and the revolver afterwards.
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My hon. Friend the Member for the Combined English Universities (Mr. Harvey), in his interesting speech, rather animadverted on the form of the White Paper. I do not think he was quite correct in his assertions. The part he objected to was really a summary, a conclusion, of Mr. Gandhi's statements which were set against Congress's 12-point programme, and if he looks at the body of the document, he will find the proper quotation set out in its proper context. So I think he can acquit the Government of India of any attempt to deceive. I think there is no disagreement in the House as to the general desire of all of us to see that India should as soon as practicable obtain self-government. We want government of India by Indians, but that does not mean that we want government of India to be in the hands of some one person, or a few people of a particular race. What we are pledged to is to give India democratic government. Mere majority rule alone does not give you democracy. In a country which is not homogeneous democracy can work only if there is due regard to the right of minorities, and it is no good blinking the fact that India is an enormous country, full of great varieties of people who hold their views with as much tenacity and vigour as my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire holds his views. Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, Parsees, high castes, low castes, outcasts—all those people have their feelings; they have their ways of life, to which they cling passionately. Political systems cannot easily be transferred from one country to another. Terms that are used in one country may cross the sea and be used to cover something quite different. We are accustomed in this country to think of our political parties. But we are becoming very well aware that the word "party" can have quite a different connotation in other countries. The Nazi Party and the Fascist Party have little in common with the democratic parties we have over here, and it is one of the troubles in India that there is a tendency for political parties to be much more like the totalitarian parties of the Continent than the parties which we have here.
Mr. Sorensen: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that on page 44, Appendix III, the Indian Congress Committee make it quite clear that the Government they visualise is not to be exclusively a Congress

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Government, as has been suggested, but an all-party Government?
Mr. Attlee: I am quite aware of that: I have read all the documents carefully, but if my hon. Friend has read Professor Coupland's very fair survey, I think he will agree that there is a degree of totalitarianism in the Congress Party which would be foreign to this country. Besides that, superimposed on that system, is the curious position of Mr. Gandhi. You can take what view you please of Mr. Gandhi, but in fact he does on occasion act as a dictator of the Congress Party. Personally, as a democrat, I object to the dictatorship of a reputed saint quite as much as to the dictatorship of a notorious sinner. To take the kind of action he has taken goes quite against the democratic conceptions which I believe are deeply and most sincerely held by the leaders of Indian political parties. That is where you get this curious, different atmosphere from this country, in which the religious position of Mr. Gandhi is intermingled with the political conceptions of democracy.
Generally speaking, as in so many past Debates and discussions on India, everybody has realised the difficulties, but no one was very clear on the solution. I know I found that when I had to go round India. I heard at great length every possible difficulty, but nobody could tell me the way out. All would come and say, "One thing is certain, we cannot go back; another certain thing is that we cannot go on as we are; but still another certain thing is that we do not know where to go."
The Secretary of State was, I am glad to say, hopeful. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne), I thought, was rather despairing. I do not believe, and I think it is quite wrong to encourage Indians to believe, that this country can decide the Indian constitutional difficulty. I do not think we can even call in our Allies to decide, because the essential thing about democracy is not just its form but its spirit. You must have a willingness to work a democratic system. I think the hon. Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster) was right in saying we ought to stand firm where we are. It is no good constantly changing. I think he was right in saying that we made a magnificent gesture—more than a gesture: a magnificent offer—when we sent the Minister of Aircraft Production to India.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: I had no intention that, whether ourselves or with our Allies, we should consider a new Constitution without the help of India. In every consideration of this matter for years past it was obvious that we must have Indian opinion with us.
Mr. Attlee: I quite agree. I hope I have not misrepresented the hon. Gentleman. But I do not think we ought even to encourage Indians to think that this is a decision that can be made by someone else. The responsibility is theirs. Our first offer to them was made in dark days. It may have been suggested that it was made because the days were dark, but we have reaffirmed that offer when our position is vastly improved, and I suggest that it still holds the field as the only practicable proposal that has been put up whereby all sections of Indian opinion will be able to act together and frame their own Constitution.
I should like to say a word to correct something which is often misrepresented. It has been suggested that the Prime Minister has deliberately excluded India from the Atlantic Charter. On the contrary what he has pointed out is that the Atlantic Charter did not qualify the various statements that have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India. In fact our declarations of policy towards India anticipated the Atlantic Charter and are really far more precise than the necessarily rather general phrases there. I was interested in the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell which was also made by the Secretary of State. Is it not possible to work out some Constitution for India other than one framed exactly on the model of our Constitution in Britain? It is well worth exploring, and when I had to look into this matter I came to exactly the same conclusion, but the attempt to fit a suit of clothes made in this little Island to that enormous sub-Continent was an impossibility. One could devise many forms of constitution. By borrowing perhaps from the Continent or from the United States, you would get something much more suitable and much nearer to the Indian tradition of government. I discussed it with them over and over again. The Western model is not really suitable, though the Indians believe that it is the right form of democracy. They look on this House as the supreme example of democracy in

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action, but, if one tried to devise something of that kind, the only answer would be, "We do not like it." It is no good giving something which would not be worked. The fact is that words and gestures do not really answer the ineluctable facts of the situation. My hon. Friend suggested that the Prime Minister should say a word. I should be the last man to undervalue the power of the Prime Minister, but he cannot alter the facts of the Indian situation.
I said just now that forms of democracy may vary but no forms are of any use without the spirit, and, if people of varied race, varied language and varied religion are to live together as one community, there must above all things be tolerance. There must not be a spirit of domination, whether by one section which says it is intellectually superior or by another which claims to be physically superior. The misfortune of the last 20 years has been that Indian political parties have taken the wrong road. They have taken the road towards an exclusively totalitarian outlook. I should like to see them return to the older and, in a broad sense, the more liberal tradition of the earlier Congress leaders, who are the real democrats. If we could bring about such a return, while it is impossible to deal as long as people are in rebellion, we are still prepared and ready, should any favourable opportunity offer, to work to the best of our ability to help our Indian friends to find a solution of their problem.
Question put, and agreed to.
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Madras on 30th October, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 15th February, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th March, 1943, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Bombay on 4th November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 15th February, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th March, 1943, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the United Provinces on
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3rd November, 1939, and of his Proclamations varying the same issued on 1st December, 1939, and 12th February, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, 16th January, 1940, and 10th March, 1943, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar on 10th November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 2nd December, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th January, 1940, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Bihar on 3rd November, 1939, and of his Proclamations varying the same issued on 3rd December, 1939, and 13th February, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, 16th January, 1940, and 10th March, 1943, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Sec-ion 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the North West Frontier Province on 10th November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 2nd December, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th January, 1940, respectively."—[Mr. Amery.]

INDIA (GOVERNORS' ALLOWANCES AND PRIVILEGES) (AMENDMENT) ORDER.
Resolved,
"That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty in pursuance of the provisions of Section 309 of the Government of India Act, 1935, praying that the Government of India (Governors' Allowances and Privileges) (Amendment) Order, 1943, be made in the form of the draft laid before Parliament."—[Mr. Amery.]
To be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of His Majesty's Household.

NORTH MIDLAND REGIONAL APPOINTMENT
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Major Sir James Edmondson.]
Mr. William Brown: I am afraid the matter I want to raise cannot compete in interest with the subject of India, but I think it is not without its

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importance. I wish to discuss an appointment to the Civil Service, made by the Board of Trade, which, in my submission, contains all the elements of jobbery of the worst type, and ought, in the public interest, to be undone.
On 31st August last the Factory Premises Controller of the Board of Trade, North Midland District, with offices at Nottingham, urged on the Board of Trade the necessity for creating a new post of assistant controller in that office. One month later on 29th September, the Board of Trade approved the creation of that post. A fortnight later, a Mr. Wigley was appointed to the post at a salary of £450 a year. I wish to comment on the following points: (1) the circumstances in which Mr. Wigley was appointed, (2) his qualifications for the job, (3) one or two other circumstances that may throw light on the appointment, and (4) the significance from a Civil Service and public point of view of this appointment.
Before I deal with those points I want to remind the House that, in times of peace, appointments to the public service are made on the basis of merit as determined by success in open competitive examination. In time of war, for good reasons or bad, open competition is suspended, and a new method has to be found for making appointments in the public service. In this war we have devised two new methods. In relation to ordinary humble, repetitive, routine jobs, such as clerical jobs, shorthand typing and so on, we have, by agreement between the Treasury and the unions, utilised the machinery of the employment exchanges. For more important posts of higher quality, involving executive capacity, and specialist and technical knowledge, we have instituted the Central Register compiled by the Minister of Labour. It will be remembered that the folk of this country who felt that they had qualifications for serving the State in this way were invited to send in their names to the Central Register. There are, I believe, at the moment something like 70,000 to 90,000 names on that Register, which are supposed to be classified under different heads, so that, whenever a Government Department wanted a person of particular qualifications, it could go to the Register and select, from the appropriate subhead, a
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number of names of men and women who would be suitable.
I now turn to the question of how Mr. Wigley was appointed. On 2nd October last year the existence of this vacancy was notified to the Ministry of Labour Appointments Department in London. At that time Mr. Wigley was unknown to the Appointments Department, and his name did not figure on the Central Register. So far as the Ministry of Labour was concerned, Mr. Wigley was non-existent. On 7th October, five days after the appointment had been notified, Mr. Wigley suddenly registered at the Appointments Department of the Ministry of Labour in Nottingham. Still more remarkable, within 24 hours of his being registered his name was submitted by the Ministry of Labour Appointments Department in Nottingham, to the Board of Trade, for appointment to this vacancy. Five days later, on 12th October, Mr. Wigley was appointed. It must be plain to every Member, first, that there could have been no serious consideration given to the question whether there was on the Register, at the time when this vacancy was created, somebody who possessed the necessary qualifications; second, that no consideration could have been given to the question of whether the Board of Trade, with its staff of many thousands, possessed an officer who had some claim to promotion to a higher post; third, that no consideration could have been given to the question whether this job of £450 a year could not have been given to one of the many ex-officers from the Army, who were advertising their need of jobs in the Press of Nottingham at that time.
Sir Joseph Nall: Or whether the job was necessary?
Mr. Brown: I will come later to that and will give reasons to question whether it was necessary. Assuming that it was, I am submitting that what I have said proves that the Board of Trade could have given no consideration to the three properly constituted sources of recruitment, and that Mr. Wigley was jobbed into this job. I come now to the Board of Trade's excuse for this highly favourable treatment of Mr. Wigley. My. hon. Friend the Member for South Croydon (Sir H. Williams) asked on 2nd February:
"Is it not rather strange that this gentleman did not register until five days after the Board was asked to find somebody?"

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The President of the Board of Trade replied:
"Not in my judgment…In my judgment it was a sensible, quick decision, taken in time of war which any practical business man would take in time of war or peace."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd February, 1943; col. 732, Vol. 586.]
It will be noticed that there is nothing half-hearted about "our Hugh." Speed was the justification for this appointment. But the very same Minister who put forward this need as his justification told us that although this post was recommended to be created on 31st August, it was not approved until 29th September. In other words, so little was the urgency then apparent, that the Board of Trade could take a whole month in leisurely Yogi contemplation as to whether the creation of this job was really necessary. After a month of contemplation, it becomes a matter of downright urgency that we should disregard every source of recognised government recruitment and job Mr. Wigley into the job in 14 days.
Now I want to look at Mr. Wigley's qualifications for this job. The House was told on 23rd February, when I put a Question to the President of the Board of Trade:
"According to the particulars supplied to my Department by the Ministry of Labour, Mr. Wigley was employed for four years in a firm of chartered accountants, then acted for seven years as a traveller in yams "—
That I am prepared to believe—
"for a Nottingham firm, and subsequently for four years was a partner in a Leicester firm dealing in yarns."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd February, 1943; cols. 1 and 2, Vol. 387.]
It is a constant source of complaint of mine that there is a certain difference of emphasis between one Front Bencher and another. On 11th March, when I addressed a Question on this subject to the Minister of Labour, he gave me a slightly different reply. He said:
"He was registered under the National Service Acts as a yam-merchant on his own account for the previous 12 years."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th March, 1943; col. 835, Vol. 387.]
Now, the functions of the job to which Mr. Wigley has been appointed are to go round finding suitable factory and storage accommodation. Plainly, if Mr. Wigley had been employed by a firm of chartered accountants, that would have no bearing upon his capacity to assess factory or
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storage accommodation. But what about his being a traveller in yarns, or, as the Minister of Labour put it, a yarn merchant? Well, I have sources of information which are not open to every Member of Parliament. There are members of my association, the Civil Service Clerical Association, inside every Government Department in Britain. [An HON. MEMBER: "A Gestapo."] I would not describe this as a Gestapo but as an instrument of home security. At any rate, I have sources of information, and I checked up upon the alleged qualifications of Mr. Wigley, and I got from a civil servant in Nottingham, of great repute and of known responsibility, this report, which I think the House should hear:
"This gentleman is about 35 and his circum-stances are well known to people in Leicester and Nottingham. Only a few years ago he was ostensibly employed in the firm of Messrs. Wigley & Sons Ltd. in which his father had family interests. It is well known that he did no real work and occupied himself by occasional visits from Nottingham to a small branch in Leicester. At no time has he ever been a yarn merchant. Prior to the outbreak of war his father ceased to be concerned with the firm and retired. It was made a condition of the purchase of the father's interest that the son above-named should at once get out. From then he has done no work whatever, nor is he regarded as capable of doing any. A former employee of the firm took an office in Leicester and carried on business for a time in London and received on occasions visits from the above-named Wigley under the name of Collard & Wigley, yam agents"—
not merchants, notice this.
"At the outbreak of war this ceased so far as he was concerned. He spent a short time in the police force, but when he knew that he had been graded in a low medical grade he resigned, and did not offer himself for, nor was he directed to, any form of National Service. It is quite inaccurate to say that he has been a yarn merchant on his own account for 12 years, or at all, and no attempt was made to put him into any other work anywhere. He just loafed around, and is known to be of little use other than as a motor-car driver."
Those are the qualifications of the person the Board of Trade was in such a hurry to appoint to this post. I now want to cast a little light upon another circumstance which may explain why this man was appointed. [Interruption.]
Dr. Russell Thomas: As a junior Member of this House, may I ask for your guidance, Mr. Deputy-Speaker? I have listened to this Debate with an increasing feeling that the dignity of our proceedings seems to be somewhat

145
lowered by the fact that the hon. Member addressing us has twice referred to Members by their Christian names—once to a Minister and then to the hon. Member for Moseley (Sir P. Hannon)—and now he carries on a cross-conversation with other hon. Members. It seems that the tone of this Debate is on a level derogatory to the dignity for which this House has always been famed.
Mr. Brown: I am certain that those hon. Members, and the Minister, to whom I have inadvertently referred by their Christian names, will regard that as a signal honour. I was coming to a curious circumstance which may explain quite a lot. It is that the address of Mr. Wigley is 19, Private Road, Nottingham. That address emerges also as the address of the Factory Premises Controller, that is to say, of the man who recommended Mr. Wigley for his appointment, and has since reported on his work. The same address! It emerges further that the flat let to the man who recommended Mr. Wigley is let by Mrs. Wigley, the mother of Mr. Wigley. It may be conceivable that this "private road" address may explain the extraordinarily private road by which Mr. Wigley has been afforded entry into His Majesty's Civil Service.
It is disastrous that the general public should begin to learn that jobs in His Majesty's service may be arranged in this way. It is unfair also that serving civil servants in Britain should come to believe that outside or inside influence is more important to advancement than the way a man does his job. Thirdly, this case is an injustice to every one of the 90,000 men and women who have put their names down in good faith on the Central Register, believing that they would be called if they had anything to offer. The fourth point is that the freedom of the public service in Britain from nepotism and patronage is a thing that this House, if it is wise, will insist upon at any price, now and at all times. I know—and I am going to be a little pointed—that since I raised this case in the House of Commons the Board of Trade have issued a new Order, which is perhaps the best justification for my raising the question, taking away the freedom of local people to make this kind of appointment. I have a copy of this Order in my files, gathered by my "Gestapo." I shall not quote it, but I have it here available to any Mem-
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ber of the House. It is, however, not good enough that after the horse has been stolen, the Board of Trade should shut the stable gates. It is necessary that this wrong appointment should be cancelled, that this post should be declared vacant, and that we should have an honest, straightforward and true assessment of the claims of different people for appointment to this post on merit, and not on patronage and nepotism.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Captain Waterhouse): I am afraid that I have not very long to reply to the extremely full case that my hon. Friend has put. He never is an advocate of understatement. On this particular issue his opening words were that it was a piece of jobbery of the worst order. I believe I can show to the House that that is completely and absolutely unfounded. I have no exception to take at all to the factual statement of my hon. Friend. From this I definitely exclude the long extract from some anonymous correspondent about Mr. Wigley. The circumstances are these: I think the House will realise that they are not in any way extraordinary. We have set up this organisation for finding factory and storage equipment. We have set it up on a regional basis. It would be obviously impossible for the Board of Trade to try and run such an organisation from Whitehall, and I do not think the House would desire that for one moment. In order to get that administration running, we have appointed a number of Regional Controllers, and in those Regional Controllers we have complete confidence. When they lose our confidence we will ask them to find another post. Until we lose confidence in them we are prepared to support them.
In this particular area of Nottingham there have been certain troubles about the Regional Factory and Storage Control. Mr. Walters had done extremely well for us in Wales. We asked him to go to Nottingham to reorganise there. He went there early last year—in March, I think—and in the following six months he did extremely good work and was able to pull the whole organisation together. Then came the time when he wanted an assistant, and late in August he asked us whether we would give permission for him to appoint an assistant. My hon. Friend complains that we took some time to consider whether that appointment should be made. I think we were abso-

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lutely right in considering for three or four weeks whether or not £450 a year of the taxpayers' money should be spent. When we decided that point Mr. Walters was quite right in getting on with the job and finding a man as soon as he could. It is absolutely misleading the House to suggest that on the Central Register there are 80,000 or 90,000 people capable and waiting for jobs. It is not so, and the hon. Member knows it. Most of these people are in jobs, and it is not now easy to find men for jobs. Mr. Wigley was known to Mr. Walters. There is no jobbery about the thing at all. Walters had taken a flat in Mrs. Wigley's house, but that does not mean that he was going to find Mr. Wigley a job. If he had not liked the flat, he would have got another instead. That insinuation, to my mind, is absolutely unworthy of the hon. Member. Mr. Walters met Mr. Wigley, whom he did not know very well, but he knew he had some knowledge of the trade in Nottingham and some knowledge of the district, and that he would do the job reasonably well for him.
Mr. Wigley was appointed on probation. After a month the usual report came through. After two months a further report came—[Interruption.] Yes, sent by the man who appointed him. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but who would be likely to send a report except the man responsible to the Board of Trade. If hon. Members want someone else to send it, will they suggest who should do so? We have appointed Mr. Walters to carry out this job. He has appointed his assistant. The job is going very well, and I do not see why hon. Members should cavil at the fact that this appointment has been made. If Mr. Wigley fails to carry out the duties, he will be relieved of his post. Until then
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we are prepared to stand by him, because we are satisfied that Mr. Walters, in the execution of his proper discretion, knowing the urgency of filling the post, knowing the difficulty to-day of finding a suitable man for this post—because my hon. Friend is rather apt to gloss that over——
Mr. Brown: I could find the hon. and gallant Gentleman 20,000 people in the Service to fill that job.
Captain Waterhouse: If the hon. Member will do that, it will be most valuable. If he will make out his list of 20,000 people, I shall be glad to pass it on and see if we cannot use it another time. Mr. Wigley was appointed with what seemed to Mr. Walters adequate qualifications. He has been in the job for five months, and nothing he has done has led Mr. Walters, whom I have seen myself and discussed the matter with, to modify his view that the appointment was a reasonable one. That Mr. Wigley is the beginning and end of all efficiency no one pretends, but one does not expect that for £450 a year. But he is doing his job, and has done it, and when he ceases to do his job well the House may be assured that the Board of Trade will terminate his appointment.
Sir Herbert Williams: Has there been any independent report on Mr. Wigley except that of the man who has appointed him?
Captain Waterhouse: I have said not. How can one have a report except from the man who is in charge? One must trust the man whom one puts in charge.
It being the hour appointed for the Adjournment of the House, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

  LEND-LEASE (WHITE PAPER)
  LEND-LEASE (WHITE PAPER)
  RETAIL PURCHASES (CASH PAYMENTS)
  RETAIL PURCHASES (CASH PAYMENTS)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Treasury Deposit Receipts
  Treasury Deposit Receipts
  War Savings Campaign
  War Savings Campaign
  Post-War Credits
  Post-War Credits
  Customs Duties (Lend-Lease Goods)
  Customs Duties (Lend-Lease Goods)
  Treasure Trove, Wales
  Treasure Trove, Wales
  Income Tax
  Income Tax
  Civil Service Pensions
  Civil Service Pensions
  Loss of Office, Compensation (Taxation)
  Loss of Office, Compensation (Taxation)
  Armorial Bearings Tax
  Armorial Bearings Tax
  GOVERNMENT CINEMATOGRAPH ADVISER
  GOVERNMENT CINEMATOGRAPH ADVISER
  BANKING AND INSURANCE (MAN-POWER ADVISORY COMMITTEES)
  BANKING AND INSURANCE (MAN-POWER ADVISORY COMMITTEES)
BRITISH ARMY
  Army Cadet Force and Junior Training Corps
  Army Cadet Force and Junior Training Corps
  Hotel and Tea Rooms, Westerham (Restricted Use)
  Hotel and Tea Rooms, Westerham (Restricted Use)
  MERCANTILE MARINE PENSIONS
  MERCANTILE MARINE PENSIONS
  REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER, GLASGOW
  REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER, GLASGOW
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Shops (Part-time Closing)
  Shops (Part-time Closing)
  Small Businesses (Calling-up)
  Small Businesses (Calling-up)
  Licences to Trade
  Licences to Trade
  Towels (Chimney Sweeps)
  Towels (Chimney Sweeps)
  CHINA (TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND LAND ROUTES)
  CHINA (TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND LAND ROUTES)
  ENGINEERING CADETSHIPS
  ENGINEERING CADETSHIPS
  ANTI-SYPHILITIC DRUG (SUPPLIES)
  ANTI-SYPHILITIC DRUG (SUPPLIES)
FUEL AND POWER
  Petrol Rationing (Doctors)
  Petrol Rationing (Doctors)
  Coalmining (Apprenticeships)
  Coalmining (Apprenticeships)
  Closed Pits (Transferred Workers)
  Closed Pits (Transferred Workers)
  Coal Mines (Employment)
  Coal Mines (Employment)
  Coal Output
  Coal Output
  TOBACCO THEFT, LONDON
  TOBACCO THEFT, LONDON
CYPRUS
  Public Meetings (Restrictions)
  Public Meetings (Restrictions)
  Prices and Wages
  Prices and Wages
  SOCIAL INSURANCE INQUIRY (SALARIES)
  SOCIAL INSURANCE INQUIRY (SALARIES)
PUBLIC HEALTH
  Refuse Disposal
  Refuse Disposal
  Vaccine Lymph
  Vaccine Lymph
  Diphtheria (Statistics)
  Diphtheria (Statistics)
HOUSING
  Flats, London (Rents)
  Flats, London (Rents)
  Local Authorities' Schemes, Durham County
  Local Authorities' Schemes, Durham County
  IDENTITY CARDS
  IDENTITY CARDS
AGRICULTURE
  Harvest Workers (Members of Parliament)
  Harvest Workers (Members of Parliament)
  Neglect of Livestock
  Neglect of Livestock
  Part-time Workers (Insurance)
  Part-time Workers (Insurance)
  IRON RAILINGS (SALE)
  IRON RAILINGS (SALE)
  FACTORY INSPECTORS (ATTEND-ANCE AT MEETINGS)
  FACTORY INSPECTORS (ATTEND-ANCE AT MEETINGS)
  WAR SAVINGS CAMPAIGN (WOMEN WORKERS)
  WAR SAVINGS CAMPAIGN (WOMEN WORKERS)
  POSTAL CENSORSHIP STAFF
  POSTAL CENSORSHIP STAFF
  JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, SCOTLAND
  JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, SCOTLAND
INDIA
  Federal Court
  Federal Court
  Finance (Defence Cost)
  Finance (Defence Cost)
  WELSH CHURCH COMMISSION
  WELSH CHURCH COMMISSION
Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

THE LATE LORD DARCY (DE KNAYTH).
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, many of your Lordships will have heard with a sense of deep grief the sad news of the death on active service of Squadron-Leader Viscount Clive who, as your Lordships know, sat in this House in virtue of his tenure of the ancient Barony of Darcy (de Knayth). I think it is right that I should say a few words on this occasion. The noble Lord was well known to your Lordships, for he was one of those younger members of this House who took a keen interest in its doings in the years before the war. He spoke often here and seemed destined to play a considerable part in your Lordships' House. Then the war came. Viscount Clive was not very young—he was in the later thirties—and he might easily have pleaded his duties to your Lordships' House. But that warm and single-minded patriotism which had always coloured his political thought would not allow him to rest. He had to fight himself against the enemies of his country.
He entered the Royal Air Force and, from the very bottom rung of the ladder, rose step by step by sheer merit and force of character to be Squadron-Leader, in which rank he died. Like another of our younger members, the Duke of Northumberland, he had the honour of seconding the humble Address in reply to the gracious Message from the Throne at the opening of a war-time Session. This is just another sign of how grievous a toll the war is taking from the rising generation in your Lordships' House, as elsewhere. Viscount Clive has fought and died for his country. He himself would have wished no other end. Your Lordships will, I am sure, desire me to express your sincere sympathy with his young widow a and daughter.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, those of us who sit on these Benches
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would like to associate ourselves with what the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has said about Viscount Clive. We remember the active and useful part he played in the proceedings of the House before the war. His expert legal knowledge enabled him to make a very special contribution to our debates. We also recollect the eloquence of the speech which he delivered so short a while ago on the humble Address. We should like our very sincere sympathy conveyed to his relatives and we should also like the sense of loss we feel at the premature demise of so valuable a person to be known to those who will appreciate it.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, among the heavy losses suffered by your Lordships' House during this war the death of Viscount Clive must be counted one of the chief, for he was one who was regular in his attendance and active in its debates. Although, as the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has said, he was considerably above the normal age for service in the Royal Air Force, he did not hesitate to enlist, and in the service of that Force he met his death. We would express our condolences not only to his immediate family but also to the noble Earl, Lord Powis, who has now lost two sons in the service of the country. To him and to Viscount Clive's widow and children we offer our sincerest sympathy.

RAILWAY FREIGHT REBATES BILL. [H.L.]
LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Leathers, the Minister of Transport, I beg leave to introduce the Railway Freight Rebates Bill, and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Templemore.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

AGRICULTURE (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) BILL.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
SETTLED LAND AND TRUSTEE ACTS (COURT'S GENERAL POWERS) BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).
COURTS (EMERGENCY POWERS) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

WAR DAMAGE BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, in a couple of sentences I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill. It is a pure Consolidation Bill, the object being to put into this single Statute what is now to be found in three separate Acts of Parliament. If your Lordships give the Bill a Second Reading it will be sent to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read about ita, and referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
Order of the Day for the consideration of the Second Report from the Select Committee read.
The Committee reported as follows:
1.—Principal Clerk of Private Bills and Committees.
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee of the death of Lt.-Colonel Colin Keppel Davidson, C.I.E., O.B.E., Principal Clerk of Private Bills and Committees, who was killed on active service in March, 1943.
The Committee expressed their deep appreciation of the services he had rendered to the House.
The Committee sanctioned payment of a gratuity under the Superannuation Act, 1909, to his legal personal representative.
2.—Doorkeeper—Due for Retirement.
The Committee were informed that Mr. George Charles Hogbin who was due to retire on 2nd March, 1943, has been appointed a temporary doorkeeper from that date. The Committee sanctioned a pension and additional allowance under the Superannuation Act, 1909, and also salary as temporary doorkeeper to Mr. Hogbin. The additional allowance is payable forthwith and the pension on his final retirement.
3.—Corps of Custodians.
The Committee authorized increased rates of pay to the Custodian staff as from 8th February, 1943, as recommended by the Fire Committee.
4.—Temporary Messenger.
The Committee sanctioned an increase in the weekly pay of the temporary Messenger on the staff of the Clerk of the Parliaments as from 1st February, 1943.
5.—Gratuity to Widow of Custodian.
The Committee sanctioned the payment of a gratuity under Superannuation Acts, 1887 and 1914, to Mrs. Mulholland, widow of Hugh Mulholland, Custodian, who died on 5th March, 1943, after 19 completed years' service.
6.—Annunciators.
The Committee considered the question of installation of annunciators in the Library and Refreshment rooms: it was decided that no action should be taken in the matter.
7.—Salary of Resident Housekeeper.
The Committee considered an application from the Resident Housekeeper for an increase of salary and remitted the matter, together with the general consideration of certain salaries and retired allowances, to a sub-committee consisting of the Lord Chairman, Lord Templemore, Lord Stanmore, Lord Jessel and Lord Southwood with the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Yeoman Usher of the Black Rod, to consider and report.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I beg to move that the Second Report of the Select Committee be considered and agreed to. I do not think there is anything to which I need call your Lordships' special attention except paragraph 6 dealing with the question of annunciators. The Committee carefully considered the matter and it was felt that perhaps the installation of these instruments would not be necessary. Therefore we do not recommend that they be installed.
Moved, That the Report be now considered and agreed to.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

REFORM OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved by the Earl of Perth last Thursday—namely, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the reform of the Foreign Service.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, my excuse for plunging into this debate is that for about thirty-five years I was very closely associated with the Foreign Office, and in addition, sometimes for weeks or even months at a time, I was working very closely with our foreign Embassies and Legations. Moreover, I suppose there is no person outside the Foreign Office who has had so many memoranda, Dispatches and other documents of the Foreign Services through his hands. Like my noble friend the Earl of Perth, who introduced this Motion, I feel that, whether from modesty or the desire to avoid controversy, the defence offered in the White Paper against the critics of the Foreign Services is extremely lukewarm and half-hearted and does scant justice to their outstanding merits. As the White Paper states, the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service do not determine policy. But the Government who do determine policy depend upon them for reports, intelligence, information and advice. Their position is like that of the General Staff and just as important. They deal with questions of peace and war. I think I place their responsibility higher than did my noble friend the Earl of Perth. It is my confident belief that whenever the Dispatches and the memoranda of the Foreign Office on the origins of the war come to be published, it will be found that the intelligence given was ample and accurate, that the opinions were sound, and that warnings were given which were by no means always followed.
The White Paper contains no answer whatsoever to the really nonsensical suggestion that our diplomats have insufficient contacts. In any Embassy or Legation an astonishing range of outstanding figures—all the outstanding figures—of the country can be met. They all pass through its portals and many of them are entertained there. To a distinguished visitor the Ambassador can produce any politician of any hue or colour and any expert on any subject. And if the Ambassador's own contacts do not suffice there are all the
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staff—the naval, military, air, finance and economic staff, the Press Attachés—all of whom have their own contacts penetrating further and further into the finance and the expert life of the country. By all of those means an extraordinary amount of information is accumulated on every aspect of the national life of the country. This is passed into the Foreign Office, which sends it on to the other Departments concerned, and it is really almost more than they can digest.
So much for contacts. Then there are the younger men. The younger men are perfectly splendid. Incidentally they are not out of date. A very large proportion of them have studied such subjects as economics and so forth for what they are worth, and it may be that Lord Ponsonby is right in the way in which he weighs them. These young men are there and they have that education which is supposed to give a new outlook to their work. They work like beavers in their Embassies and if they can scrounge a week-end free they dash off in a motor car as fast as they can to the other ends of the country. Perhaps on their way it may be that they give lifts to the local Tom, Dick and Harry and their wives and children, and they arrive, possibly, in the evening at some mountain but and there they sit up half the night with Princes, professors, poets, paupers, anyone you like, talking on any subject under the sun, from aerodynamics to zoology. Then after a hectic day in the mountains, they return, travelling, it may be, all through the night, and at the Chancery they find themselves faced with a mass of papers of incredible dullness and complexity. That is the way in which we are building up modern counterparts of such men as that great and cultured diplomat Lord Rennell of Rodd, whom I first met a great many years ago on the beach at Nauplia in Greece after an eighty mile tramp over the mountains. I knew him well in Rome afterwards, and in Rome, as in Greece, he could talk to the peasants in the Campagna in their own patois. He had an uncanny knowledge of all their social difficulties and of their general life. I could pursue that theme. I could give you from my own limited experience, innumerable examples of people who are growing up like Lord Rennell of Rodd. It is absolute nonsense to say that the men in our Diplomatic Service have not got the right contacts on social or other questions.

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I pass now to another, but connected, aspect of the White Paper. I venture to question the historical accuracy of the statement in paragraph 4 that
"the conditions which the Diplomatic Service originally grew up to meet no longer exist unchanged in modern international affairs."
Of course it depends to some extent on that word "unchanged." Nothing remains entirely without change. The whole world changes and the Diplomatic Service has changed, as I have been trying to show your Lordships, to meet developments in the situation. But so far as the fundamentals of foreign policy are concerned, I submit that conditions have hardly changed at all. "From Tudor times," says Trevelyan, "England treated European politics simply as a means of ensuring her own security from invasion and furthering her own designs beyond the ocean." Those "designs beyond the ocean" were trade and the Colonies, and the sanction behind our foreign policy was sea power. When sea power was neglected diplomacy failed. For example, in the times of James I, who let down the Navy, [I quote again] "the diplomatic protests of James about the treatment of his subjects by Dutch and Spaniards were laughed to scorn." Cromwell, by way of contrast, restored the Navy. He sent Blake to the Mediterranean and we have been there ever since. Cromwell sent Blake not only to defend our merchants there, but also to add weight to the elaborate diplomacy of the Protectorate.
And so it was down the centuries, until, in 1911, Sir Edward Grey, in his famous address to the Dominion Prime Ministers, said in my hearing:
"What really determines the foreign policy of the Empire is the question of sea power."
It is the same to-day, except that there are changes of detail. The Air Arm is taking a larger and larger part in the exercise of sea power, while the Army, as ever, has an essential part to play in its maintenance. These fundamentals have always been well understood by our diplomats, from those merchants who were our first Ambassadors at the Court of Moscow down to Sir Robert Craigie at Tokyo. They have had to face the music. As the late Lord Salisbury said—I stand now between his son and his grandson—
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they had often to make bricks without straw. That was to say they had to conduct diplomacy—and this comes right down to modern times—without force in the background. Our Ambassadors well knew that, and I am quite sure that they took very good care to make representations about it. On that matter I do not believe that the Foreign Office or the Diplomatic Service ever failed to issue warnings. I commend that point to any critics who have not been zealous in supporting the provision of armaments and who, when talking of diplomacy, are inclined to pass on responsibility for our troubles in this respect.
But nowadays, says the White Paper, "economics and finance have become inextricably interwoven with politics." Inextricably interwoven with politics! My Lords, they always were. They were in the time of Edward III, when the Flemish cloth weavers, many of them refugees, came over here, and, after I am sorry to say being some of them massacred in London, remained to establish the great wool industry. And it was true in the search for foreign markets for this trade in the Baltic and in the Levant by the merchant adventurers. "All this widespread energy" says Trevelyan, "was taken into account by statesmen of the Privy Council who framed the nation's policy, foreign and economic." These were the Foreign Office of that day. There was no Foreign Office as we know it, but there was a Committee of the Privy Council.
Then again economics and finance were inextricably interwoven with politics in the exclusion of foreign shipping and commerce from South America in 1491 which, later on in Queen Elizabeth's time, led to a packet of trouble. That was the cause of at least three wars, including the Armada and the War of Jenkins's ear, and it only came to an end in 1823, I think it was, when Canning's support to the revolt of the South American Colonies finally settled it. Again in the days of the French Revolution when Barrere dubbed us "a nation of shop-keepers" (a phrase that Adam Smith had used in discussing the foundation of our overseas Empire in 1776). I am afraid I have missed out what I wished to mention, that it was the Navigation Laws and trade rivalries that led to the Dutch wars. These matters were interwoven with politics, too,

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throughout the Industrial Revolution and the commercial developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and especially during the period of depressed exchanges and Reparations which followed the last war.
There is really nothing new in this; it has been developing all the time, and our policy has always been mixed up with trade. The Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service know a great deal more about these matters than they are given credit for knowing. The best paper that I ever read on the complicated problem of Reparations was by the late Mr. Ralph Wigram, who was most brilliant on the subject; and I could mention some men in the Office to-day who are very good on these subjects. In just the same way, there is nothing new in the need for an understanding of, social problems and labour movements, on which the White Paper dwells. What about the French Commune? What about the revolutions all over Europe in 1830 and 1848? What about the Industrial Revolution, and the modern conflict of ideologies? Did not they call for an understanding of social problems and labour movements? I should like to ask my noble friend who is going to reply whether he can say that our Foreign Office and diplomatic representatives ever failed in recent times to report on and to appraise the relations of these financial and economic matters to our foreign policy.
I am strongly in favour of the changes envisaged in the White Paper, because we can always make improvements; but, for all its merits, I think that the White Paper is a little marred by these false premises. It was not necessary to dim the lustre of the existing Services in order to justify the White Paper. The White Paper has very good purposes of its own, and they peep out here and there. In paragraph 6, for example, it is stated: "What is aimed at is wider training and equality of opportunity for all." That is surely very sound, provided that the efficiency of the Service is not lowered in the process. Moreover, the process has already begun. The personnel of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service are drawn from a wider range than was formerly the case. Gone are the days when a young man was expected to have £400 a year, and ten years later £4,000; a year, and the Service is all the better for it. But everyone would agree that a diplomat cannot do
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his job unless he is acceptable to the foreigners with whom he has to live and work, and that involves not birth or means—although for my part I think that there is more in heredity than it is, popular to acknowledge nowadays—but certain qualities of address, and especially of character, on which my noble friend Lord Ponsonby made some very wise observations. I agree with my noble friend Lord Addison that those qualities have been found in a wide range of people—Mr. Henderson, for example, and, I might add, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. I think he mentioned someone else as well. On the whole, I think that the White Paper is well conceived to continue this process with the inevitability of gradualness.
That brings me to the constructive part of the White Paper. I very much welcome the proposed amalgamation of the three constituent Services; I have always been an advocate of it. I always used to read carefully the Dispatches of Consuls-General about their consular districts. They threw a flood of light on the conditions in different parts of the various countries, which vary a good deal, and they were an invaluable supplement to the Ambassador's Dispatches. I think that those Consular Dispatches will be more illuminating still when lit up by greater knowledge of foreign affairs. Already the Consular Service is recruited by the same methods as the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, but only a very few of its members are appointed to diplomatic posts. I know that it is possible so to appoint them, and there have been instances of their being given very high appointments. I believe that the present Minister at Teheran was a Consular man, and he is a very good Minister too. Usually, however, they get only the less attractive posts, and only at the end of their career. From that point of view, the, amalgamation will do away with a legitimate grievance and remove a sense of frustration.
One point which is more controversial is the new system of entry, which seems to me to accentuate the defects of the present system, which are the number of examinations and the rather high age at which a young man gets going on his life's profession, as well as the awkward position of an unsuccessful candidate who finds himself landed high and dry at the age of 23,

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24, or even 25, which will bear very hardly indeed on those whose means are not good. These repeated examinations are apt to produce a deterioration of body and mind which are sometimes more than temporary. Under the new system, in many cases there will be a university honours degree first. That is a much more exhausting experience than is generally realized. Before the would-be diplomat has had time to get over the effect of that, he finds looming ahead of him this new examination, on exactly the same subjects, instead of that respite which his constitution demands. If he has the money, he will go to a crammer, and so steal a march on those who cannot afford to do so, and he will probably do himself no good, because he needs a rest. If successful, he then goes abroad for eighteen months at the expense of the State to learn languages, and, at the end of that time, he has another examination. It is not competitive this time; but his life's work depends on it, as it did on the preceding examinations, but it is not competitive. Nevertheless it is quite a formidable ordeal, especially if he should have the bad luck to be indisposed at the time that it is held, which is something that I have known to happen.
I think that the system is really rather inhuman, and I believe that you will get better results from the 25 per cent. of selected candidates, not because they are better material but because they have escaped the ordeal of repeated examinations. I believe also—and here I agree with my noble friend Lord Onslow, and I also speak from personal experience—that you will not get such good linguists out of this new system as out of the old. Under the old system many of the lads went abroad in their school holidays and the majority of Foreign Office candidates went abroad in their long vacations and "topped up" at the end of the time with a year or two in a foreign country. My own experience suggests that sounder foundations are laid in that way than in trying to cram a language in eighteen months. I think I have learnt five languages, and I put a very great deal of work into them, but I cannot talk one of them as I should like, because I began late in life—when I was twenty-two or twenty-three. I feel sure also that those who can afford it will do as at present and go abroad in the university vacation and
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steal a march in the battle of life over those less well endowed with worldly goods.
Constructive criticism is not easy, and although I have a plan in my head it is not ripe. But I think the objects are pretty clear. First, to reduce the age of the final examination if possible. That suggests an earlier age for selection. Second, to get rid of the need for candidates from universities to undergo two consecutive examinations on the same subject. I believe it ought to be so managed that all get a university education. I am sure they would all be better for a university education, with scholarships, bursaries, and so on. My third point is to enable all prospective members of the Foreign Service to start the study of languages abroad at an earlier age. I should like myself to add a fourth desideratum, and that is to facilitate and encourage study at foreign universities, perhaps by exchange for a year. During the Paris Peace Conference I was asked to make suggestions for the organization of the League of Nations, and one of those I made was for the establishment of a League of Nations university to which the nations should be persuaded to send all their diplomatic cadets. That is a long way off, and my present proposal is an alternative. There are no doubt difficulties, but I cannot believe that it would pass the wit of man to devise a scheme to meet those points. There is no very great hurry about it, but I venture to suggest that the system of entry should be carefully explored and tuned up, if that can be done.
There are a great many points in which the White Paper has very high merits, and there are a great many I should like to dwell upon, but I have been rather long. There is only one other point which I shall mention, because I do not think anybody else has mentioned it, and that is a provision for attaching more representatives of the Foreign Service to the Imperial Defence College. That is very important to the College, and it is even more important, I think, to the Foreign Office. I do hope that that will be carried out. That brings up the suggestion that my noble friend Lord Perth made, that there should be closer association between the Foreign Office and the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Defence Services, and especially the Treasury, the Board of Trade and, I suppose, the Ministry of Agriculture and economic Departments

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generally. I am sure that my noble friend is right in principle, although I do not propose to dwell upon it at any length, and I sincerely hope that his proposals will be very carefully studied. But I abstain from all comment on the terrible role for which Lord Perth, to say nothing of Lord Ponsonby, cast me.
LORD TYRRELL: My Lords, I will begin by submitting a proposal to you on which I may expect unanimity, and that is that we are under a great obligation to my noble friend Lord Perth for bringing forward this Motion because, whether it be accepted or not, I think it will stimulate the interest which the public should take in creating and providing the machinery by which the Foreign Office at the end of this war will be enabled to meet what I think will be very insistent demands, and very immediate demands, for the solution of problems of immense importance, but equally of very great complication. In his speech my noble friend Lord Perth gave your Lordships an admirable idea of the direction in which these reforms should go. I need not take up your Lordships' time by comments on that speech, except to say that I entirely agree with it, and my only grievance is that he has stolen a great deal of my thunder. I should also like to thank the Foreign Secretary for making this very serious attempt at ameliorating and modernizing our Foreign Service. There again the very able and exhaustive speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, saves me the trouble of any further comments. He did one thing which neither Lord Perth nor I could have done, for he gave a wonderful character to the Diplomatic Service. I need hardly say that I entirely agree with him. He also has stolen my thunder, but your Lordships will benefit, because I shall not have to make many comments on the White Paper, except to say that I welcome the very serious effort it indicates and the realization in the Foreign Department that it requires refurbishing and modernizing.
I want to repeat my thanks and appreciation of what the Foreign Secretary has done, but I do not think that is enough, and, as the French say, l'appétit; vient en mangeant— "the appetite comes in the eating" I think these reforms outlined in the White Paper are a very handsome and useful frame, but what their results
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will be will depend very much on the picture that is going to be put into the frame. There, I believe, they did not envisage the creation of an effective machinery which should be at the disposal of the Foreign Secretary when he comes to deal with post-war problems. My noble friend Lord Hankey was quite right when he said that none of these problems is new. Where they vary is in their intensity. There are times when politics predominate, there are other times when trade does; but we have reached a period in the world's history which I can best sum up by saying that the generation which is growing up now is far more interested in questions of bread and butter than in questions of frontiers. I think that will be the prevailing outlook at the end of this war. Moreover, your Lordships will agree with me that the generation which is growing up at present is far better educated, and therefore more critical, than its predecessor. It will insist on having a policy placed before it, framed and carried out, that meets its wishes to a far greater degree than has been the case in the past
As regards the machinery with which the Foreign Secretary should be provided in order to satisfy these demands, the role that Parliament can play is to lay down the policy and leave the working out of the machinery to the professionals. Perhaps your Lordships will remember that in the course of the last war there was created a Department of Overseas Trade. I should like to state here that not a word I am going to say reflects on the activities of this Department which, within its limitations, has done very good work. In order to create that Department, they cut out of the Foreign Office what was then called the Commercial Department, and created a Department which had one great drawback, which was that it had to serve two masters—the Foreign Secretary and the President of the Board of Trade. Considering that drawback it has done very good work.
As regards the Foreign Office, however, it was deprived in the light of after events, of one of its chief functions, and that was to attend to the trade, commerce, and finance of this country. That in itself was a great weakening of that Office; but it also had a psychological effect—and I do not despise psychology as much as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby did the other day. It had,

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perhaps subconsciously, the effect of leaving the members of the Foreign Office more and more disinterested in any of these questions. I repeat, in the light of after events, that this separation, if not divorce, between the Foreign Office and the Departments of State that look after trade, commerce, and finance, grew. I remember being struck after the war by the fact—and it is a fact—that Reparations, which undoubtedly were financial in their nature, but which had a political aspect far transcending the financial merits of the question, were outside the domain of the Foreign Office, which occasionally was called in in a consultative capacity. I merely mention this as a fact. Nobody was to blame for it, but the absence of the machinery accounted for it.
Therefore what I should like to see is the re-creation of a Department in the Foreign Office that will not only co-ordinate the trade, commercial, and financial policies of this country, together with its political foreign policy, but will also control them. In other words, it should be a Department that is in a position to equip the Foreign Secretary of the day with a considered opinion when he goes into Cabinet as to whether, in deciding the direction of the foreign policy of the day, political or economic conditions should prevail. There are many occasions on which, from the angle of trade, commerce or finance, a policy is recommended on its merits, but which may have political repercussions abroad that will impair its good quality. I, on the other hand, would like to see a Department which would ensure that a foreign policy, purely political, which may have a bad repercussion on the trade and finance of this country, will be given up in deference to commercial considerations. I want the Foreign Secretary to be equipped with an organization which will enable him to place before the Government, when they settle the big lines of foreign policy, a recommendation in which all these varying, and sometimes conflicting, interests will be carefully balanced.
It has always struck me as very odd that, within the last thirty, forty, or fifty years, for instance, no big loans in large powerful countries were ever floated without the approval of the Government
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of the day. This country, as far as I know, was an exception. Our relations with the finance of this country were nebulous and spasmodic, but they never were submitted to the Foreign Secretary of the day by a responsible set of officials who could point out to him, for instance, that the lending of moneys to countries whose policies were entirely different from ours might, apart from the financial benefits accruing to this country, be a very dangerous attack on the general policy of this country. The creation of such a Department is still more necessary in view of what we hope to see after this war—a greater internationalization of countries in the sense that, in accordance with the wording and above all the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, politics—that is to say, putting it concretely, frontiers—will play a loss part in the shaping of foreign policies than, again to put it concretely, the bread and butter of the man in the street. What we hope to see is a gradual elimination of the importance of frontiers and the gradually improved outlook which will realize that, in view of the fact that modern inventions are more and more reducing the whole world to the size of a village, the prosperity of one country can only benefit its neighbours whereas the injury done to a neighbour is of no advantage to itself. In other words, after this war I hope we shall see that economic considerations—there again I apologize to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for introducing economics—will prevail, and largely prevail, in the shaping of our policies.
How that Department is to be manned is a matter for the Government to decide. The only suggestion I should make is that it need not be confined to members alone of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Secretary should have liberty to appoint to it leading members of other Departments and of trade and, above all, of finance. When I look back and see—I have no other word for it—the pernicious part played by what is called international finance in the world, the more convinced I am that we should create a machinery which will enable the Foreign Secretary of the day and the Government to control the use to which national savings are put when it comes to sharing them or loaning them to foreign countries. I mention this matter in order to point out what I consider is the crying need now for the immediate study of this

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problem of creating a Department that will be best qualified to advise the Secretary of State of the day.
A further contact I should like to see established is a far more frequent and regular contact between the Foreign Office and the Fighting Services. By that I mean that the Foreign Office should be enabled, when it submits its proposals for a policy to the Foreign Secretary or to ask for information, to point out whether or not we can afford a certain policy. My impression is that in the past we have embarked on foreign policies which we could not afford—that is to say, to which we could not give effect. And I think the experience of any Foreign Secretary is the same, that a foreign policy that is not backed by force is a bluff, and a bluff which our competitors or opponents are very likely to call. Take Germany. In the days of Bismarck history will show you that whenever he had conceived a foreign policy, before he gave effect to it he would consult his General Staff and Moltke and would say: "Can you do it or not?" And it was in deference to the advice he received that he would either go to war or remain at peace. That was his main consideration. Perhaps that advice of professionals was overrated in Germany, but I think in this country in the past we have been tempted to underrate it. I think the Fighting Services should have a very strong voice in telling the Government whether or not the policy they have decided upon is within their power to carry out. We may thus avoid some disastrous mistakes of the past. I have detained your Lordships at too great a length, but I may remind your Lordships that some two years ago, when I had the honour of addressing you, I said that the Foreign Office would be the Department upon which the greatest demands would be made at the end of this war, and that therefore it should be an office which should be so well organized as to meet these demands and help the country to have the benefit of a settled, successful foreign policy.
LORD MONKSWELL: My Lords, having in the remote past served for a few years both in the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, I should like to make some remarks from the point of view of one who achieved no distinction and never had responsibility for anything of the slightest importance. That I think puts me in a position to criticize
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freely which is not entirely shared by those noble Lords who have borne responsibility. As is so often the case in this House, by far the most important aspect of this debate is something which is not technically under discussion at all. We are supposed to be debating the proposals in the White Paper. As my noble friend Lord Perth very justly pointed out, the really important matter, the direction of foreign policy, is not mentioned in the White Paper. I think he was entirely right in immediately putting in its proper proportions this matter, but to my mind even he failed to go far enough. He pointed out what was wrong with our foreign policy, but did not tackle the truly formidable question of why it is wrong and made only very tentative suggestions for putting it right The root of the trouble is obviously home politics.
We may just as well ignore the sun at noon as ignore this. The great mass of the electors prefer "doles" and subsidies to security and have been paying for it in death, mutilation and disaster ever since they fastened the curse of "doles" and subsidies upon this country. If instead of granting "doles" and subsidies Parliament had put all that money into armaments, we should probably have avoided two world wars and almost certainly have reduced their cost by hundreds of thousands of lives and by thousands of millions of pounds, all of which latter might, if reasonable intelligence had been exercised, have been used for producing fresh wealth and raising the standard of living of the whole country in a world of plenty. My noble friend was concerned with the means for devising a suitable policy, but he did not say much about how such a policy was to be carried out. It is no good devising a policy if it cannot be executed. There is the rub. Foreign policy, as he remarked, depends upon the ability to exercise force, and force requires money. Means simply do not exist for paying "doles" and at the same time maintaining powerful armaments. We can have security or "doles," but not both together. There is not the slightest prospect of the abandonment of "doles" so long as this country is ruled by its present electorate. We are thus faced with the dilemma either of changing our whole political system, and in particular our policy of so-called social security—actually the most insecure thing that could be imagined—or in due course of facing a

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third world war. Here is to be found the real difficulty of putting before your Lordships a cut-and-dried plan of how a reasonable foreign policy could be put into execution. I should like to pursue this subject, but I fear that what I should say would be out of order.
The function of the Diplomatic Service as I understand it is to keep the Home Government informed of all the conditions in foreign countries which may directly or indirectly affect this country with a view to suitable action being taken in good time. The whole point is contained in these last words—"suitable action in good time." If this is not done the whole function of the Diplomatic Service lapses. Obviously it was not done in the disastrous years which have elapsed since the beginning of the present century. I need not go back further than that. Equally obvious is it that this failure on the part of the Home Government has hamstrung the Diplomatic Service. Long experience has convinced the Diplomatic Service of the uselessness of reporting facts to the Home Government. No doubt they continue to do so but they know the facts will be ignored and they are discouraged. The fundamental trouble is in no way relieved by the proposals in the White Paper.
Coming to more domestic and infinitely less important matters with which alone the White Paper deals, one of the troubles of the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office is that by the time a man gets to a position of responsibility he is much too old. All the routine work required can easily be learnt in a couple of years, but at least fifteen years have normally to be passed before he is given responsibility, and he does not get much then. Most of the work too is extremely dull; of much of it one may say that if it were never done at all nobody would know the difference. One of my duties in the Foreign Office was to read elaborate reports which our Consulates in China were instructed to send in. Many of them were extremely well done and must have cost the writers a large amount of time and trouble. I read them through, minuted them and sent them on to the head of the Department, who perhaps glanced at them, initialled them and sent them on to the Assistant Under-Secretary, who did the same. They were then put into pigeon
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holes pending removal to the Record Office in a third of a century's time.
I note that a good deal of stress is, I think rightly, laid in the White Paper on the importance of members of the Diplomatic Service making contact with as many different callings and professions as possible. I hope this means that the Diplomatic Service will be actively encouraged to do this. In the past the trouble was that no encouragement was given and no notice was taken of it if it was done. A man, if he liked, could make contact with almost any profession or branch of knowledge or study. He was to some extent helped to do so by introductions which his official position enabled him to secure. If he liked he might even write a report about it, which the Foreign Office was normally willing to print and publish. But there the matter ended. Very few people knew, and nobody cared, whether he did it or not, he received no credit for it and the enterprise which prompted him to write the report, together with the report itself, were both alike entirely without influence on his prospects. In these circumstances it is not surprising that very few people made wide contacts.
Then there is the proposal to pension off persons whom the controlling powers at the Foreign Office do not consider suitable heads of Missions. I must say I view this proposal with the greatest scepticism. No doubt it would be highly convenient for the Foreign Office and save them embarrassment if they had this power in addition to the absolute power over the careers of their servants which they already have. They can make or break any man among them at any time, without giving a reason, and I believe there is a general impression that these dictatorial powers have by no means always been wisely used in making the more important appointments. The ordinary passions and defects of human nature are just as rife in the Foreign Office as they are in every other walk of life—no worse, no better. I imagine that there is no Government Department and no big firm in the country that would not be glad to pension off at public expense certain of its senior officials. That the Foreign Office alone should receive this favour appears to me preposterous, particularly at a time when, owing to improved communications, the Government are taking over more and more of

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the functions of the Diplomatic Service and the importance of that Service is fading. It really hardly matters who is head of a Mission when his principal function is to transmit a stream of messages reaching him throughout the day by telegraph or even by telephone. And his importance is yet further diminished now that members of His Majesty's Government have acquired the habit of themselves proceeding abroad when anything important is afoot and conducting negotiations over the head of the Ambassador—a habit that can hardly lead to harmony, and one which I have reason to believe is deeply resented.
We are given no estimate of what the proposed reforms will cost. I imagine the price will be pretty high. It looks to me as if the whole business were no more than another manifestation of that vague squandermania which has been steadily undermining the finance of this country ever since the politicians realized that in order to secure election they must play up to the ignorance and sentimentality of the voters. I should have thought that the Diplomatic Service was an admirable means of using for the benefit of the State the private fortunes of certain more or less well-off and carefully selected persons. The Diplomatic Service is a service where financial ease will always be useful. The trouble at the present time is that the members are not rich enough. No salaries that the State could think of paying would ever approach the incomes which it is desirable that the Diplomatic Service should have if they are to make the fullest use of their opportunities. This is particularly the case in the matter of making contacts. I need hardly emphasize the far greater potential usefulness of a man who can entertain on a large scale and undertake long and expensive tours by motor. How many men of this kind will be attracted by a Service in which the whim of some official at the Foreign Office may condemn him to pass his life in some remote and unimportant consulate?
With regard to the admission of women, difficulties raised by the question of marriage seem to me so great as to be decisive. The position of the husband of a married woman member of the Diplomatic Service would be intolerable. In all but the most exceptional cases he would quickly become a figure of fun with deplorable effects upon the position
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of his wife. It has been my good fortune to meet two very charming ladies who were members of the Diplomatic Services of other countries. I believe that both these ladies resigned their appointments on their marriages.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I rise to welcome whole-heartedly the proposals in the White Paper. I confess that I view with some trepidation any occasion on which I find myself differing somewhat from my noble friend Lord Hankey. None the less I do feel that my noble friend the Earl of Perth was perhaps rather hypersensitive in regard to the remarks that were made about the Diplomatic Service. I agree with my noble friend Lord Hankey that some of those remarks might have been expressed differently, as Mr. Punch used to say. But I do not read the White Paper in the way in which my noble friend the Earl of Perth reads it. I do not think that anybody suggests, for one moment, that the Diplomatic Service itself forms policy. Of course, that is done by the Government of the day very much at the bidding of the electorate of the country. What the Service does do is that it reports on affairs in the various countries to which diplomats are accredited. My noble friend I am sure will be the first to say that opinion in the capital of a country is by no means the same as it is throughout the whole area. Now although my noble friend Lord Hankey talks about young diplomats chasing across country at high speeds in order to make contacts with distant areas, I would point out that in the case of countries such as Russia, or even Germany, you cannot get far enough in a limited time. Therefore, when my noble friend the Earl of Perth says it is necessary to have the qualities of an archangel in order to be able to fulfil what is required of the Diplomatic Service adequately, I reply that I think the qualities of an archangel are not sufficient; the qualities of a Mercury are also required.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, may I say that a friend of mine who was actually attached to one at one of these conferences, did the whole business in an aeroplane? He went to Siberia and, having exhausted the possibilities of Siberia for his holiday, he turned back to the Caucasus, climbed the highest mountain in Europe and then came back to Berlin from which he had started.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, may I be allowed to point out that what I said was that I think that if archangels had been heads of Missions during the years preceding the war, there would still have been no substantial change in foreign policy? That I think is a rather different point from that which my noble friend Lord Stanhope is on.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I entirely agree. What I really wanted to point out was that according to my reading of the White Paper it is not criticism of the quality of the Diplomatic Service that it contains, but criticism of its quantity. I think it is clear from the speech of the Under-Secretary of State in another place that what is proposed is to make a necessary increase in the numbers in the Diplomatic Service. As was pointed out, in 50 countries you have only 130 diplomats, an average of less than three to each Mission. How can they get about and form contacts all over the countries in which they are stationed. My noble friend Lord Hankey has spoken of a friend of his who flew across Siberia. Well, Siberia is a country somewhere about the size of Canada, and I am sure that my noble friend Lord Bennett, if he were here, would agree with me when I say that merely to fly across Canada would not give you a complete knowledge of what happens in that great Dominion. Therefore I welcome this idea of increasing the size of the Diplomatic Service. Lord Addison talked about a house painter having got charge of affairs in Germany. Whether he thought that if we put a painter or two in the Diplomatic Service we should have a different sort of information to that which we now receive, I do not know, but my own view is that if we had anyone in the Diplomatic Service with the mentality of Hitler, he ought to be sent to Broadmoor.
The only thing I object to in regard to these proposals is that it is proposed that the increase in the Diplomatic Service is to be carried out at the expense of the Consular Service. If your Lordships will turn to the bottom of page 5 of the White Paper, you will see that it is there stated:
"It will, therefore, be necessary to increase the number of diplomatic officers and to reduce the number of consular officers. It will in any case be necessary to increase the size of the diplomatic staffs if Missions abroad are to be strong enough to make our influence more widely felt, and if officers no longer tied to their desks are to be enabled to—"
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and then the paragraph goes on on the next page—
"extend the range of their contacts. New arrangements will be made for staffing consular posts of lesser importance, and, by regrouping and reorganizing posts and making use of improved communications by air, adequate and effective consular representation will be ensured."
If the Foreign Secretary, in putting forward this White Paper, is not satisfied with the information he gets from the Diplomatic Service because of its small size, it seems to me it is no good reducing your Consular Service and expecting to create a better Service as a result. Indeed it seems to me that what you are doing is saying that if the Diplomatic Service cannot fulfil its duties unless it has the qualities of a Mercury—which it has not got—the Consular Service should have the qualities of a Hermes.
There are three different types of consular posts. First there is the consular post at a port where the Consul has to do with clearances of shipping. Then there is the consular post at a place where a large number of British residents or tourists need attention; and there the Consul has to look after the interests of all British citizens. What to my mind is the most important of all consular posts is that in which the Consul has to look after our trade interests. That was referred to in the weighty speech of my noble friend Lord Tyrrell, with which I entirely agree. I have said before that I think it is absolutely essential that if we are not going to have a great amount of unemployment after the war every step possible should be taken to secure increases in our export trade, and I look upon the service of our Consuls as being of immense value in that respect. I should like to see the Consuls regrouped in regard to the positions they occupy and their numbers enormously increased.
My own view, which perhaps is not shared by many of your Lordships, is that our ordinary commercial travellers are perhaps not so good at their work as those who come over here from other countries. We sometimes hear of commercial travellers from Germany, with perhaps More energy or greater powers, who are prepared to translate the prices of the products made in Germany into terms of the cost in the coinage of the country to which they have been sent, and as a result they get trade for Germany which our people

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fail to get for this country. I suppose I shall be accused of Laving Socialist ideas when I say that I look forward to the work of the Consuls after this war being of immense importance to the private trader. From the mere fact of his residence in the country it is obvious that he knows, and ought to know, a great deal more than a commercial traveller who simply goes round with goods trying to sell them. I look forward to the time when the Consul will be able to advise on the giving of trade openings in the country to which he is accredited. Therefore I welcome the proposals for wider experience in trade, commerce and industry than is perhaps usual in the Diplomatic and Consular Services of the present day.
The examination required to pass men into the Diplomatic and Consular Services is extremely difficult, and young men have to spend the whole of their time in acquiring a very high standard of knowledge in foreign languages, history and so on. Therefore they have very little time to acquire that general outlook which I consider so essential. I well remember sitting on a preliminary selection board for the Foreign Office with the late Lord Cadman. He said to one of the candidates: "Have you ever been into a factory?", and the immediate reply was "No, Sir," very much as if the man had been accused of going into a house of ill fame. The individual who was asked that question was not wearing an old school tie, and in fact was not entitled, I believe, to wear one of the better known brands of old school tie; but it did seem to Lord Cadman and to me to be unfortunate that that young man had not had better opportunities of seeing something of industry, trade and commerce before he entered the Diplomatic Service, if in fact (which I doubt) he passed the examination.
I am now going to raise an extremely thorny subject. When I was in Moscow more than thirty years ago, we were represented by a Vice-Consul, and, when his servant was out shopping in the market, he had to open his own front door. Germany was represented by a Consul-General, two Vice-Consuls and a staff of 63. Was Russia in those days going to say that we looked on openings for trade in Russia as being as important as Germany thought that they were? Obviously not. Not only do we
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require better buildings for our Consular Service, therefore, but we also require a big increase in staff. With that increase in staff, I want to see increased responsibilities, and I am quite prepared to suggest that that consular staff should be entitled to recommend firms for contracts. I admit that that opens a very dangerous door. We shall no doubt have the honourable Member for Little Puddleton complaining that Mr. John Smith, in his constituency, has not had an opportunity of tendering, and so on.
I know of a case where one of our Consuls was asked whether he could recommend a firm for supplying baths and sanitary fittings for a big hotel which was being put up in a foreign country. His reply was: "All that I am allowed to do is to copy out a list of porcelain manufacturers from a trade list of some three pages, and that will include those who make baths, those who make insulators for telephone poles, and those who make many other things." He was told that if he did that it would be necessary to go to the Consulate of another country, who would be prepared to give names and prices, but that it was desired to go to an English firm for these things because it was thought that they were made better in England than anywhere else. My friend said: "I think that I can trust you, but I shall get into serious trouble if you give me away. The best firms for this work are undoubtedly"—and then he mentioned four or five leading firms, whose names are household words. One of them got the contract, but, if he had not done that but had stuck to the book, England would not have got the contract.
The suggestion opens, as I say, a dangerous door, but I have too high an opinion of the Consular Service to think that there can be any possible foundation for fears on that ground, and I think that we must be prepared to find that certain firms will be recommended and others will not be recommended. I submit, as a further extension of my Socialistic view, that it might be possible to draw up a list of those who have undertaken fairly big contracts, either for the Government or for public bodies, and who have carried out those contracts successfully, and that they should be the firms whom our Consuls in foreign countries should be allowed to recommend. That would have the advantage that, in order to get on such a list,

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firms would quote low prices for Government and other public work, so as to get the contract, and would be careful to see that their work was properly carried out, so that they should not be blacklisted. That is going far a field, but I submit that the importance of the Consular Service for the export trade of this country is such that not only do we want better buildings and more Consuls, but those Consuls should be given greater powers.
I disagree, I am afraid, with the criticism made by noble friend Lord Monks-well of the proposals for early retirement. The Diplomatic Service is a small Service, and therefore it stands to reason that it is very difficult to put those who are perhaps not of the highest quality into positions which are of no importance. How is it possible to say that a country is of comparatively small importance? A country which, a few years ago, was regarded as being of comparatively small account may suddenly come into the limelight, and we may want the very best man in the Service to represent the interests of this country there. My noble friend Lord Monkswell seemed to think that there was great danger in giving the Secretary of State power to bring about early retirement; but this has prevailed for years past in the three Fighting Services, and, so far as I am aware, it has had no ill effects. It is far more important in the Diplomatic Service.
I have disagreed for a long time past with the retirement of diplomats at the age of sixty, perhaps because I am over that age myself. We all know of Ambassadors and Ministers in foreign countries, ripe in experience and full of knowledge, who have had to retire under the age limit, and I think that that is wrong. It was done in order to facilitate promotion, but I pointed out when I was at the Foreign Office that, if Ambassadors are to retire at the age of sixty or sixty-two, it will be necessary to appoint men as Counsellors who are in the early forties. They have to do their time as Counsellors, then go to a small Ministry, then become Ministers in a more important country, and then become Ambassadors; and twenty years is not very long for that process. In a small post, where there are only three people, there may be a First Secretary who is not a young man, a Counsellor who is perhaps not very good
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and a Minister or Ambassador. It may be desired to appoint a first-class Counsellor. That cannot be done in some cases because the First Secretary is an older man than the Counsellor who would be put over his head. In the past there has been no way of getting rid of such people. This is a reform which to my knowledge has been asked for in the Diplomatic Service for many years past, and I should like to see it extended to the whole Civil Service. There are cases, as all of us who have been in the Public Service must know, where men have found, sometimes owing to somebody being brought in from another Department, that their prospects of promotion have gone. They feel depressed about it, and eventually, being but human, a few of them sit back and do not do very much more work until they retire on pension at sixty years of age. It is better to get rid of those gentlemen at a younger age. I do not think that it would cost the State a great deal, because such cases are comparatively rare, and the number of people who would have to be pensioned off in that way would be very small.
I welcome the proposals contained in the White Paper for promotion in the Foreign Service. As one who has served in the Service Departments, I confess that the system of promotion which prevailed in the Foreign Office seemed to me extraordinarily casual. We sat round the table and discussed the merits of various individuals, and there was no report on which those promotions could be based. It was done entirely on the knowledge of the various individuals who sat round the table. I well remember one occasion—of course, I am not going to quote the actual countries that came into the question—when we had fitted in all the various recommendations that we were making to the Secretary of State, and we thought we had got all nicely fitted in and the square peg fitted into the square hole. Then we remembered that the gentleman who was going to be appointed to Rumania had married a Hungarian wife, and therefore he was not likely to be quite persona grata when he went to Rumania. As I say, those were not the countries in question; I am giving that merely as an illustration. The result was that all the names had to go back into the hat, arid we had to start our allocation all over again. I think it is essential that there should be

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proper confidential reports for the Diplomatic Service, in exactly the same way as there are for the Fighting Services. Only then shall we be quite certain that we always get the right man in the right place.
There are two omissions, I think, in the White Paper. Nothing is said of reform of the Foreign Office itself. A former Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office once said, "Who is this who is writing a minute on this paper? He draws a salary of less than a thousand a year." That was not my noble friend Lord Tyrrell, it was Lord Sanderson—a good many years ago. We have got a good deal past that. But I do suggest that Assistant Under-Secretaries should be given a good deal more power than they have at present. It was said by Lord Monkswell that the number of reports—telegrams and so forth—that pour into the Foreign Office is tremendous. I do not know whether my noble friend Lord Tyrrell got his private secretary to total up the number of reports and Dispatches that are brought in every day. It very often amounted to a pile of foolscap pages from one-eighth to one-quarter of an inch thick, printed on both sides. Those very seldom get to the Secretary of State; it is the business of the private secretaries to see that they do not. But they do get sent to Missions abroad, and I have asked the heads of Missions what they do with them. The best of them said they put them into pigeonholes. Some of them tried to read them, with the result, of course, that they became buried in paper, and they had less time for thought and consideration than was essential for the proper carrying out of their official duties. A very large number—a collection of them—go to the Dominions, and a certain number go to the Cabinet. I should like to see the Assistant Under-Secretaries being each responsible for a block of work in the Foreign Office, and each of them a filter which would allow only the more important Dispatches to go through, a précis being made of the others, which then would be sent to other people.
When I was on the military staff of the Supreme War Council at Versailles we find that we spent so much time in reading Foreign Office telegrams and Dispatches, which all came to us there, that we sent one of our number down to make
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a précis every day. I always regretted when I was in the Cabinet that the same thing did not prevail there, and that the flood of telegrams which comes to every Cabinet Minister did not go through a filter. There should then be a précis and a reference to where that particular information is given, so that if a Minister or anybody high up in the Foreign Office wishes to look up the actual record it would be quite simple to find it and confirm what is said in the minute. I think that will show the noble Earl, Lord Perth, what a high opinion I have of the Diplomatic Service, because I propose to put a great deal more power into their hands, in order that they should make themselves even more responsible for the information that comes to the Government and, as I say, to filter it and make it easier for assimilation by the very stupid people who run the Government of this country.
That means an increase of staff at the Foreign Office. The White Paper suggests an increase of staff in the Diplomatic Service, and I have suggested an increase of staff in the Consular Service. There arises the question, Who is going to pay? I am afraid that my noble friend the Leader of the House will not welcome the remark that I am going to make. Is it going to be those who are resident in these islands, or is it going to be the Empire as a whole? Not a word is said about that. I am aware that some of the Dominions have their own representatives in foreign countries—one or two Ministers in three or four countries. Is each of them going to have a great Diplomatic Service, similar to our own, in every country of the world, or are they going to unite with us in one joint service? After all, our interests are very much the same. There is no reason why they should not have a representative, or more if they like, appointed to a Mission to look after the special interests of Canada, Australia or New Zealand, but why should not we have a pooled Empire service, with India and those Colonies which are able to afford it paying their share? It is no longer possible to look on this country as a rich country, able to run the Diplomatic Service and the Fighting Services in the way that we have been doing in the past. I submit that that is a matter in which we have got to ask the Empire to take its share. I am well aware that that raises a most thorny question in regard

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to the responsibility for foreign policy, but, after all, the Dominions are always consulted before any action is taken in regard to foreign policy now, and it merely puts it on a more regular basis.
My noble friend may say "You can recruit for the Foreign Service now, and in fact we do, from the Dominions." We have an extremely able individual, I know, in the Foreign Service now who comes from one of the Dominions. But, after all, they are comparatively few. He may say that this does not affect the White Paper and therefore why should these points be raised now? Well, the question has to be faced some time, and I submit that the time to face it is when you are proposing a big reorganization of the Foreign, Diplomatic and Consular Services. Therefore, while I welcome the proposals in this White Paper, the only criticism being as to the reduction of the Consular Service, I trust that we may look forward to a further White Paper in which those two points, which I suggest have not been adequately dealt with on this occasion, will receive further consideration from His Majesty's Government.
LORD GEDDES: My Lords, for fifteen years before the war I as a man of business had a great deal to do in five or six foreign countries, and I should like to place on record the fact that in every one of those countries I found the diplomatic Mission most helpful, always ready to listen, and always ready to make any representations that were necessary to the Foreign Office, and I also found the Foreign Office extraordinarily helpful. I do not know how many times it was necessary for me to go to see the Permanent Under-Secretary on one question or another vitally affecting the commercial interests, or the industrial interests of the country, and sometimes the interests of the country in a more direct sense. Therefore I am not altogether sure that I think all the proposals in this White Paper are wise. When I read it the first time, and saw what was proposed, I thought, "Well, at last, the Treasury has undergone a great conversion, and has recognized the fact that if you want work well done—a fact well known in every big office—you must have a good subordinate staff." I certainly welcome in this White Paper the proposals that a proper subordinate staff
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should be established. In the past it has really been quite extraordinary to visit Missions abroad and find men of the Diplomatic Service being compelled to do work that was clearly that of a stenographer, typist, or whatever might be the proper designation of the clerical assistant. Therefore I think we have a great step forward here which will lighten the work of the Diplomatic staff.
With regard to the entry, I do not know whether it would be possible, as Lord Hankey suggested, to lower the age somewhat. There is a great deal for these young men who come into the Service to learn, and one does not want them to get to their posts too late. Quite apart from languages and from all the literary subjects in which they have to be examined, there is this great organization, the Empire. You know, my Lords, it is quite extraordinary in going, as I have done, from one Mission to another, and talking to them, to find out how frequently members of our Diplomatic Service were entirely ignorant of what they were representing. They were representing in their view the United Kingdom, but in the view of the country in which they were serving they were representing the whole Commonwealth of Nations and Empire. I have met men in that position who had never seen the Dominions, who had never seen India, never seen the African Colonies—they had no idea what they Were representing, except a derived knowledge which is never the same as that of a man who has seen a place and has contacts with it. Very often I have noticed a great weakness in our representation because of that ignorance of the great Empire and Commonwealth that our Missions really represented. To-day you may at times find reactions from that ignorance in quite erroneous impressions existing in the minds of the people of the countries with which we have to deal. So I would suggest to the Government the consideration of whether it would not be possible, in some way, to increase the educational facilities available for the men going into the Foreign Service.
In connexion with the amalgamation of the Foreign Services into one Service—the Consular, the Commercial Diplomatic, the Diplomatic, and the Foreign Office—I can see great advantages from the Service point of view, but I am not sure that I see any great advantage from the point of view of the man in business who,

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after all, has a great interest in what the Foreign Service is doing and can do. When one has to deal with a Consul, it is essential that the Consul should know exactly who is who in the town in which he is stationed, that he should be able to speak the language well, and that he should be able to give the British man of business sound advice and information. That takes a long time to collect. It means that a man who is a Consul-General cannot be there in his post for only a short time. It means that if he is going to be of real use to the British community, and to represent it adequately, he must be there for quite a long period. The best Consul-General I ever had to work with was Sir Harry Gloster Armstrong in New York, who was a most extraordinarily well-informed man about everything in that great city, who knew every British person of importance—and many of no importance at all—and who was able to give you any information which was right and proper for a Consul-General to give. In the same way I could mention many others, but that sort of qualification only comes after a long time.
Then you have the Commercial Counsellors. A good Commercial Counsellor is a great help to the man of business—extraordinarily helpful he can be—but a bad Commercial Counsellor is quite awful. We had a very interesting experience in that line—"we" being my business organization—in one country where we were vitally interested on a very large scale. We heard that the Commercial Counsellor was being moved, and I went to see the head of the Mission and said to him, "We really shall hardly be able to get along without the help of Captain Charles." The country was Spain, and I might as well mention his name. In the end, in order that not only we but the other British firms working in Spain should have the continued advantages of Captain Charles's help and assistance and profound knowledge of the country, he came into the employ of one of the companies of which I have the honour to be Chairman. He has served that company well. It has been well worth having him there; but he has not only served his own company but every British company working in Spain. Not only that, but he has served the Foreign Office and the Empire as well. Yet he is no longer in the employ of the Government, and
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has not been for many years, but he is of great value in the organization of British representation in Spain.
We had another case—a man of the highest quality on the Commercial Diplomatic side who was serving in Germany. For some reason which was quite obscure—though doubtless for some Service reason that was quite clear to the Service—he was going to be taken away, and exactly the same thing happened. He was taken into commercial employ in order to retain the great advantages that his knowledge conferred upon all of us who were working in that country. That man—and the Foreign Office knows well how valuable he was—is now Colonel Robins; he was then Mr. Robins. At the outbreak of this war he was taken by the War Office to organize the Intelligence side of the Staff College which he commanded, and when America came into the war he went to America to help the Americans to organize the Intelligence side of their Staff College. Now, as Colonel Robins, he is Commandant of the School which has been established for the training of people for the occupied territories. He is a man who had specialized in the knowledge of Central Europe, commercially, industrially, with, of course, a certain flavour of the political side. This man could never have reached his position of power and helpfulness unless he had been stationed for a longish period in the countries in which he was at work.
It alarms me somewhat to think that there is going to be a very free interchange of all these highly specialized officers of the Foreign Service. If there be a common entry, well and good, if for Service reasons that is sound; but I do hope there will be no confusion in the higher ranks of the Service between the various jobs that the different men are to do. Head of Mission after head of Mission who had received me with great courtesy and kindness and who had honoured me by talking to me and telling me of his difficulties and successes, laid great stress and emphasis upon the value and help of the highly expert technical knowledge of these officers of his staff, and so I do hope that the scheme outlined in this White Paper does not mean that men of that type are going to be moved about too freely. Of course they must be moved to meet the needs of the Service and as promotion comes along.

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In the same general branch of the White Paper we have this question of the Consular Service. I am alarmed at the idea that the Consular Service is going to be reduced. I agree most heartily with the noble Lord who spoke a moment ago that the Consular Service at the present moment needs strengthening, that it needs more men of a high standard of consular ability in it. I trust that we are not going back to the unpaid Consuls, the native or citizen of the foreign country who lives on fees. That is a very dangerous type of organization; it is a type of organization which has done much harm in many parts of the world to British trade and commerce, and everybody who has worked in that Department I think will agree with what I have said.
Now if we have these difficulties in the scheme put forward in the White Paper, we have another great difficulty: Where are you going to get the real permanent staff for the Foreign Office? It is not just a chance occupation to be one of the high officers of the Foreign Office; it takes a long experience and it takes great knowledge to fulfil the various functions that are required of these servants of the State. I do not see under this scheme, unless I have misread it, how you are going to get that permanent nucleus if you are to have everybody switched through the Consular, Commercial and Diplomatic Services and the Foreign Office. It would be a maelstrom and there would not be any continuity at the centre. The only alternative is to make a selection out of the people who have passed in under the common entry and detail them to the various branches. Then you are back where you were, with the same heart-burning (perhaps worse) with the same sense of frustration (perhaps worse) and probably not quite the same efficiency. It may well be that purely for Service reasons it is worth while running the risk of having a common entry, but I cannot see how you are going to have really anything approaching a common service over these various fields. The man who is doing consular work has got almost nothing in common with the man who is doing Foreign Office work. It is true that the man who is doing Foreign Office work ought to know what the Consul does. That is important. It probably would be quite a good thing if the Consul had some idea what the Foreign Office did, but that
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is less important. But they are not interchangeable.
The next point I want to refer to in dealing with the White Paper is this. It is wrong if it were thought to be possible for men really to learn two languages in eighteen months at the same time as they are learning a lot of other things and right on top of an exhaustive competitive examination. If anyone thinks that is possible educationally, well they just do not know the conditions of learning and of getting a permanent hold upon a language. It is not conceivable that that can be done. You have got to begin learning languages much younger, very much younger. It may be possible to finish off two languages, if you have a fair grip of them, in eighteen months, but you cannot really learn two languages in eighteen months so that you can use them freely and do all the other things you have got to do.
This whole scheme might be recommended to us strongly by the Government saying that it will be exactly right for the conditions fourteen, fifteen, twenty years hence, but this scheme is not going to have any effect whatever upon the organization of the staffing personnel or its acquirements in the immediate post-war period unless the war goes on very much longer than any of us imagine it is going to do. What we want, it seems to me, at the present time is something much more than that rather vague line or two which comes near the top of page 4, paragraph 7, as to the Foreign Service staff to be created in the immediate post-war period. That creation of the staff for the immediate post-war period is going to determine the conditions of the Service fourteen or fifteen years later. You cannot get away from the fact that once that body of men is brought in which is necessary for the staff of the Foreign Service during the immediate post-war period, that will set a permanent trend upon the line of development and also on the type of the Service that we are going to have.
It has been remarked that in this White Paper we have very little indication of what the central control of foreign policy is going to be. It is perhaps unfair to ask that it should have been in this White Paper, but I think we are entitled to ask, what is the control going to be? We know that in the years before the war there was practically no real control. We know that, I think in 1937—the noble Viscount

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the leader of the House will remember it very vividly—because there was no real control in the Foreign Office he and the Foreign Secretary thought it would be better to be outside.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: No, I would not accept that. There was control, but we did not agree with the control.
LORD GEDDES: There was control which took no account of the facts. We will put it in that way, because we know there were large quantities of information coming into this country from the Services all over the world. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. It is a good pudding if it tastes well and does not give you indigestion, and it is a bad one if it tastes badly and gives you a war. We know, therefore, that there was a bad control of foreign policy before the war and a control that was neither realist nor informed. The other day I was speaking here in connexion with the Air Force and certain proposals came up at that time. I suggested that what was needed was a Great General Staff to get a co-ordination of the Fighting Services. That is necessary for that purpose, but I believe it to be far more necessary from the point of view of giving sufficient weight in the mind of Government to the real defence implications of any foreign policy, and I believe that it is essential for proper recognition of the facts and proper control of foreign policy that we should have a Great General Staff representing the three Services. In the old days the Admiralty was able to give most of the advice that the Government needed. Then came the Admiralty and the War Office, and now it is the three, and three people may not give the same advice, but one Great General Staff would. Therefore I hope that the noble Viscount who is going to reply will be able either now or at some time in the future to give us a picture of how it is proposed to balance the various considerations which go to the making and control of foreign policy.
I have been fairly critical on some points of the White Paper. Many of the suggestions in it are, I think, not really fully thought out and there are great gaps in it. With such a White Paper it is very difficult to say exactly what the future pattern will be, but I hope that before long we shall be told what it is intended to do in the way of organizing
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an adequate Foreign Service for the immediate post-war period.
LORD HARMSWORTH: My Lords, I cannot speak on this question with the wealth of knowledge of many members of your Lordships' House, and I cannot speak of experiences in connexion with our Missions abroad or in the Consular Service, but I have had some experience of the Foreign Office and I venture to join with those noble Lords who have on the whole welcomed the proposals in the White Paper. Some points deserve the very careful consideration of your Lordships' House. One point is the proposal that there should be power to select a very small proportion of candidates without severe competitive examination. I know that is a power that might be abused, but it is perfectly certain that there may come to the public service men of the first quality who are unable to pass through the ordeal of an extremely severe examination. We have embodied in the Constitution so far as it applies to our Foreign Service the very principle in question, because many a time when it has been desired to appoint a man with quite exceptional ability to a very difficult post he has been chosen, as your Lordships are well aware, from right outside any of these Services. We have a notable example of that, if I may be allowed to say so in his presence, in my noble friend Lord Geddes. I was very glad to hear him bear testimony to the efficiency of our Foreign Service.
For myself I want to refer particularly to the Foreign Office. In the course of my political career I have been familiar with five great Government Departments and I have always said that the Foreign Office was on the whole, having regard to the very delicate nature of its work in many countries, the most efficient of them all. Although the production of these proposals is not an admission of inefficiency in the Foreign Service, it is a fact of course that all Government Departments require, and should receive, reconditioning from time to time. This can only be done by Government and by Parliament. We hear suggestions made in this quarter and another of Departmental and Inter-Departmental Committees consisting of members of the Permanent Civil Service. I do not think that is what we want. We want a much closer association of members of both Houses of Par-

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liament with foreign policy. These proposals in the White Paper do not begin to affect in any way what is our vital need in relation to foreign affairs—that is the framing of an intelligent and intelligible and far-sighted foreign policy. I say this is not a function of permanent officials but an essential function of Parliament and the Cabinet.
It is commonly assumed—we use the language ourselves—that the Cabinet at any given moment is in a position as a body to give a considered and constructive opinion on foreign policy. I believe that to be an entirely mistaken notion. Cabinet Ministers in these days are too fully absorbed with the work of their own Departments to be able to pay the requisite amount of attention to foreign affairs. Indeed in my experience of the Foreign Office I have more than once been invited by Cabinet Ministers before going into Cabinet to explain to them what on earth all the fuss was about in this or that foreign country. They cannot know, they cannot be constantly seized of the vitally important question of foreign policy. The result is that the whole burden of foreign policy—it really comes to this in practice—is from time to time and perhaps generally thrown on the shoulders of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister.
Some years ago I had the temerity to write to The Times proposing a readjustment of the Foreign Secretaryship. I even went so far as to propose that it should be put into commission and that with the Foreign Secretary there should be associated two Cabinet Ministers of high rank and, as we have come to say nowadays, without portfolio, devoting their whole time to consideration of the major issues of foreign policy. Then there is the suggestion of my noble friend the Earl of Perth about a Committee. I take that to mean a Committee on foreign affairs comparable in prestige and power of representation with the Committee of Imperial Defence. At all events some means must be found to obviate the haphazard, last moment, dangerous decisions of recent years. I should hardly have ventured to refer to such matters in your Lordships' House had they not been so pointedly and courageously referred to by the Under-Secretary of State in another place. Some means must be found of
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associating Parliament more closely with foreign affairs. In this House particularly, as we have seen in the course of this debate, we have an extraordinary wealth of knowledge and experience with regard to foreign policy, foreign organization and foreign affairs. I look forward to the time when your Lordships' House will exercise even more than it does now or has done in the recent past, a decisive influence on foreign affairs.
VISCOUNT DAVIDSON: My Lords, I would not have ventured to address your Lordships for the first time on an occasion of this kind were it not that I, in the somewhat distant past, had occasion to observe the work of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, while in the very near past I have had the opportunity of visiting no fewer than nine of the diplomatic posts in the Continent of South America. The White Paper contains proposals which, in my view, have been very long overdue. But now they are before us, and in the future we are to have one Foreign Service. My recent experiences showed me quite conclusively that diplomacy had really become only one of the many activities which the heads of Missions and the diplomatic members of Missions had to carry out, and that somehow or other it would be necessary to broaden the basis of experience prior to the enlistment, or rather prior to the appointment, of candidates for the Diplomatic Service, which in the future is to be called the Foreign Service.
I will not go into the details with regard to the proposals of the White Paper, except to support the view which was expressed by my noble friend Lord Geddes when he pointed to the great problem which is to face the country and the Government in the matter of filling in the gap before the new Service is in operation. That is a problem which the Government will have to consider with great care. No doubt, bearing in mind the principle in consequence of which Governorships in the Colonial Service are not appointments to which men entering the Colonial Service can normally aspire—they do not rise beyond Colonial Secretaryships—the Government will recognize that in the emergency period after the war it will be necessary to consider very carefully whether those temporary civil servants now serving in War Departments may not have to be called upon to

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strengthen the ranks of the Foreign Service for a short period to fill the gap until the new Service is completely organized.
What I would suggest to the Government is this. It is quite obvious that the proposals contained in the White Paper are for a long-term policy. Now most of the countries in Europe, including those of our Allies and other smaller nations, are overrun. It is not practical politics to settle now our representation to those countries after the war. But there is a vast continent where we have normal Missions in countries geographically, at any rate, within reach. I humbly suggest that the Government should start with those countries at once to establish working models, as it were, to try out the kind of representation and the methods to be employed, and to put into practice the recommendations of the White Paper with regard to buildings, increased staffs and increased allowances to enable members of the diplomatic and other Mission staffs to travel in order to make their contacts. I submit that the Government should start at once on that policy, because then by means of the model services which they erect there—only on a temporary basis, it is agreed, because a long-term Foreign Service cannot be organized at once—they will be able to get the work planned and gain experience that is required on all kinds of matters. There I suggest is an opportunity which might well be taken advantage of at once.
And now I wish to say one word about the Foreign Office itself. There have been two plans put forward. There has been The Times plan, which really means that after the war this Government will be headed by a small Cabinet and the Departments will be grouped under the control of one or other of the Cabinet Ministers of the first rank—rather on the lines of the War Cabinet—having superintending and co-ordinating powers over a group of Departments, while the Foreign Office will be demoted to the same level as other Departments dealing with external affairs and will be under a Cabinet Minister who will be, in effect, the Minister of External Affairs. The ether scheme is Sir Victor Wellesley's scheme of reorganization within the Foreign Office. I have a third alternative, if I may very humbly presume to put it forward. It was the noble Lord,
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Lord Geddes, who in fact gave me the courage to get up and make this proposal. I can see tremendous force in the suggestion about the need for defence playing a very great part in the settling of our foreign policy. Now what is going to happen to the Foreign Office after the war? It either has to be one political Department, responsible only for the advice on foreign policy, which is not in keeping with the recommendations of the White Paper, or it can become a Department which will embrace a great many of the activities now performed by ad hoc War Departments such as the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Ministry of Information. Further, as Lord Tyrrell has said, it ought also to have a very strong finance and economic department.
These considerations, therefore, have led me to suggest that the future structure of the Foreign Office should be modelled more on the Admiralty than on any other Department. Taking the long view you are going to have a Foreign Service like a Naval Service. You can then have a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with, so to speak, superintending Lords who are responsible for ad hoc departments organized within the Foreign Office itself—publicity and information, economics, finance, and trade—in close contact with the business community outside and who are officials of the Foreign Service in close contact with the business community abroad. There would also be, as now, the Political Department. Without going into too great detail, one can envisage the Secretary of State being advised by a Council of men of great seniority, brought back only for a time for the purpose, and later going back, as the Sea Lords go back, into the front line, so to speak, of the world.
That would have the advantage of elevating once again the Foreign Office to the position from which it should never have fallen, and from which it never would have fallen had it not been for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter. The League of Nations made the power of the diplomats less and the power of the politicians greater. But we have to think of the future, and I believe that, if we think along those lines, and if we have the Foreign Office and the Defence Departments grouped together as one division of a small Cabinet—because the tendency these days is to create many new Minis-

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tries; we have two Ministries dealing with planning, a Beveridge Minister is asked for, and to what size the Cabinet would grow without reorganization we do not know—and forming the great external wing of the Cabinet, then the Foreign Office will once again come into its own, and so much the better. I am grateful to your lordships for the patience with which you have listened to me.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, the claims which I make on the time of your Lordships' House are so infrequent that I feel that on this occasion a few words from me, based on an experience of some thirty years in the service of the Crown, of which eleven were in the Diplomatic Service, may receive a little attention. Before saying anything on that subject, however, I feel that it would be your Lordships' wish that I should congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Davidson, who has just addressed the House for the first time, and express the hope that we may often have the opportunity of hearing a contribution from him to our debates. My object in rising is to associate myself with all those noble Lords who have welcomed the Motion put down by my noble friend Lord Perth, and on which he has so ably and so forcefully developed his arguments in this debate. At this stage, I do not propose to weary your Lordships by going into any of the details which have already been amply discussed, but I should like to say that when it is stated in paragraph 3 of the White Paper that the Diplomatic Service is not alone responsible for foreign policy, that does imply to some extent that blame could be attached to the Diplomatic Service for certain failures in foreign policy. I do not think, however, that any failures which we have encountered in foreign policy over a term of years can be attributed to the Diplomatic Service; they should rather be ascribed to the lack of heed paid to the information received from our representatives abroad over a number of years.
In passing, I should like to associate myself with the reference made by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby to the regret that we all feel that we have not the advantage to-day of Lord Hardinge being able to address us. He is not able to do so for reasons of health, but he
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could have spoken with almost unrivalled authority. In mentioning a member of your Lordships' House who is unable to be here by reason of ill-health, I think I should also mention that I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, had had the intention of addressing us, and I am sure that we all much regret that we are not to have the opportunity of hearing him.
I do not wish to take up more of your Lordships' time, except to emphasize the point made by my noble friend Lord Perth as to the absence from the White Paper of any proposal for the formation of some sort of body, either in the form of an additional Department of the Foreign Office, such as Lord Tyrrell mentioned, or as a kind of counterpart to the Committee of Imperial Defence, as a sort of Committee of Foreign Relations. I think that it is some sort of body of that kind which a number of your Lordships, including the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, and the noble Viscount, Lord Davidson, have in mind. It would strengthen the hands of the Foreign Secretary in dealing with the Cabinet and with the country at large. I venture to submit for the consideration of His Majesty's Government that some sort of machinery of that kind not only would be useful at a later stage but could be set up during the war to meet the very point which my noble friend Lord Addison made on the first day of the debate—namely, that it is necessary to have something of that kind ready to face the multifarious problems which will affect people all over the world as soon as the war is over. The experience which the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, has had in foreign affairs will enable him to correct me if my views are at fault, but I submit them in a spirit of the utmost helpfulness for the consideration of His Majesty's Government.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I detain them rather longer than I should wish, or perhaps than they would wish either; but so many points of really major importance have been raised in this debate that I feel it would be proper that I should deal with them as fully as I am able. I agree very warmly, first of all, with the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, in saying that the House owes a very real debt of gratitude to the noble Earl, Lord Perth, for initiating the debate

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which has taken place this afternoon. I am quite certain that it will be of the utmost value to my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in his further consideration of the reforms which form subject of the White Paper.
It is perfectly true, of course, that there has already been a debate on this subject in another place, but I think that it is no reflection upon the members of that great assembly to say that the House of Lords can make a contribution on this subject which it is impossible for the House of Commons to make. After all, members of the House of Commons look at this question primarily from the point of view of the man in the street. That is a very important point of view, but it is not the only point of view. So far as the House of Commons includes members who have personal experience of diplomacy—and there are some very brilliant members of that type—they are usually men who left the Foreign Office at a comparatively early stage in their career. Your Lordships' House, on the other hand, contains some of the foremost diplomats of our age. The noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, speaking very modestly, referred to Parliament as if it was a gathering of amateurs who ought to leave the actual working out of proposals to the professionals; but actually, as your Lordships know, the noble Earl, Lord Perth, and the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, both of whom we have heard in this debate, and Lord Hardinge and Lord Vansittart—whom I am sorry not to have seen here to take part in the discussion—all of them speak with unrivalled authority and experience of the Foreign Service both at home and abroad. It is particularly satisfactory to the Government, therefore, that this House has given a general blessing to the proposals and has expressed the view that so far as they go—and I would emphasize that to the noble Earl, Lord Perth—they will make for the greater efficiency of the Service; though I must say I noticed that the appetite of noble Lords seemed to have been somewhat stimulated to ask for further reforms with regard to the general organization of our foreign policy here in London. As the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, said. l'appéit vient en mangeant. At any rate, that is a matter which, if I may, I will leave to the later part of my remarks.
The reason why these proposals have been brought forward is. I think, now clearly recognized everywhere. They do
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not represent a sop to popular clamour they do not represent an admission that the Foreign Service has failed in its duties between the two wars. I am glad that my right honourable friend the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs made that abundantly clear in his speech in another place. There has been, as your Lordships know, a good deal of very foolish talk in recent years, often by people who ought to know better. There has been a sort of suggestion that the Foreign Service is composed of languid, la-di-da young men lolling about in drawing rooms and collecting rare editions. In fact, as your Lordships know, nothing could be further from the truth. Anyone who has worked, as I have and as many of your Lordships have, in the Foreign Office for a number of years will know that, as my noble friend Lord Hankey said this afternoon, there is no more devoted or hardworking body of officials in the world than are to be found in the Foreign Office. If I may give your Lordships one single example, in the first year of the Spanish Civil War the head of the department in the Foreign Office most directly concerned was not absent from his office one single day in the whole of that year. I very much doubt whether any of the critics of the Foreign Office could equal that record. Nor is it, I think, in the least true, as is sometimes suggested, that the Foreign Office is entirely chosen from a small social clique. The most cursory glance at the Foreign Office List would soon dispose of that charge.
But of course the main criticism of the Foreign Service arises, as has been said in this debate, from a fundamental misconception. It is that the officials of the Foreign Office and of the Diplomatic Service are responsible for foreign policy. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, indicated, people say, "We are having a catastrophic war and therefore the Foreign Office must be to blame." This most fallacious argument has been already most effectively dealt with not only by my right honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State in another place, but by the noble Earl, Lord Perth, by Lord Tyrrell, and also by Lord Hankey, who gave independent evidence from his unrivalled experience of public affairs, and there is really very little more that I need say about it. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, dealt with this matter at some length at the beginning of his speech

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last week. He felt, I think, that the White Paper had not been quite fair to the Foreign Service, that it gave some support to these unfounded allegations. As one noble Lord said this afternoon—I think it was the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope—I think the noble Earl is a little unduly sensitive on this point. If I may give one example, he drew attention in his speech to the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the White Paper, which reads as follows:
"The success or failure of our foreign policy should not therefore be attributed to the Diplomatic Service alone."
He, as I understood it, took that to mean that a large share of blame, but not all the blame, attached to the Foreign Service. He may be right; but I did not read it in that way. I understood it to mean that there was a statement commonly made that the success or failure of our foreign policy must be attributed to the Diplomatic Service alone, and that statement was firmly denied. That was the way I read it. But whether that interpretation was right or wrong, in any case I should have thought that any misunderstanding on this point should have been removed by the speech of my right honourable friend the Under-Secretary in another place, who made the position absolutely clear. Of course, any such suggestion rests upon a complete misunderstanding of the functions of civil servants. As the noble Earl himself said, they are never responsible for decisions of policy. That is the duty of the Cabinet and, to a lesser degree, of Parliament. The function of the Civil Service is to carry out policy. It is, as my right honourable friend said in another place, "interpretive rather than positive." If our foreign policy before 1939 was unsuccessful in averting war, it is the Governments of the day, Parliament, and to a lesser degree the people of this country who elect Parliament, who must shoulder the responsibility; and to try to shuffle it off upon the officials of the Foreign Office is not only unworthy but really contemptible. I hope we shall hear nothing more of that kind.
At the same time, though I think no complaint can properly be made about the efficiency of the Foreign Service in the years before the war—and I would echo the tribute which was paid to it by my noble friend Lord Hankey this afternoon—as Lord Addison said in his
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speech, this does not mean that reforms may not be necessary to meet the changing needs of the time. There is no doubt that the character of international relationships has been greatly altered during the last quarter of a century. I see that Lord Hankey will not have that. If I may put it another way, I will say they have been greatly developed in the last quarter of a century; and this change, as I understand it, arises largely from an alteration or development in the social and economic structure which has taken place in varying degrees in nearly all the great countries of the world. In almost every country to-day the State intervenes more and more in the economic life of the community, and production, distribution and consumption are coming ever more under public control. And this tendency, surely, is equally extending to the international field. As a result, the work of those concerned with public affairs, which used to be mainly political, is beoming increasingly concerned with economic matters.
I hardly dare say this in view of the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. But the noble Lord, who I am sorry to say is not in his place at present, is a Whig, with all the remote and aristocratic charm of a Whig. Listening to him I was reminded of a story of an earlier Whig, Lord Melbourne, of whom it was related that at one time when his Cabinet was discussing a financial matter, which included the discussion of a sliding scale, one of the members of the Cabinet said, "Does it slide up or down?" to which the Prime Minister replied, "It does not much matter as long as we are all in the same story" That slightly detached attitude to matters of finance seemed to be rather like that of Lord Ponsonby to economics last week. Indeed the noble Lord went even further than Lord Melbourne, because he obviously does not like economics and therefore averted his eye completely from the subject. I could not help feeling that his physical proximity perhaps had infected with his pessimism and scepticism the noble Lord, Lord Monkswell, who was sitting by his side in the House. Lord Monkswell indeed in his way went further than Lord Ponsonby. He was not against reforms, but he wanted them in exactly the opposite direction from that desired by the rest of the House. At any rate whatever may be true or un-

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true in views expressed by Lord Ponsonby, I as a mere Conservative cannot afford the luxury of adopting the detached attitude which he showed in his speech.
I have been driven, as I think the majority of your Lordships have been driven, to the conclusion that politics, economics, and commerce are becoming inextricably mixed. That is the reason for one of the main proposals in the White Paper—the amalgamation of the Foreign, Commercial and Consular Services. This amalgamation has been generally approved by your Lordships during this debate. Indeed, as I understood it, the nob1e Earl, Lord Perth, thought so well of it that he would like to see it extended immediately to the amalgamation of the Colonial Service and the Colonial Office. Perhaps I might say this in passing—the analogy is not complete. The Foreign Service is not an administrative Department; the Colonial Service is. The Colonial Empire comprises vast territories, and the administrative officers of the Colonial Service therefore have to be very many in number. Indeed they far outnumber the members of the Colonial Office—to a degree of something like twenty to one. There are twenty times as many members of the Colonial Service as there are members of the Colonial Office. Complete interchangeability therefore between the two is not really practicable. I do not say that the difficulties of amalgamation in their case are insuperable, but they are obviously very much greater, and the impression I got when I was in the Colonial Office was that the most helpful approach for the moment was the introduction of members of the Colonial Service into the Colonial Office—a va et vient between the two. That is being done.
If I may return to the amalgamation of the Foreign Service and the Consular Service, which has occupied a considerable part of this debate, the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, asked two important questions with which it may be convenient if I deal now. First of all he asked—and this is a question also asked by my noble friend Lord Stanhope—will the projected reduction of consular officers hamper the efficiency of consular work? Lord Geddes also raised that question. This is a point of very real substance, and the situation, I admit, will need careful watching. I
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understand my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary believes it to be absolutely essential to remove the present disparity between the two branches of the Service, otherwise, in his view, inevitably there will be numbers of members of the Foreign Service who will spend their whole career in consular work. Were that to happen, the present division between the diplomatic and consular posts would, in fact, remain, and all the advantages of the amalgamation would be lost. I should point out to the House, however, that this reduction in the numbers of consular officers is perhaps more apparent than real because, as the result of the amalgamation, members of Embassies and Legations occupying diplomatic posts will in fact do commercial work to a greater degree than they do at present—rather on the analogy of what takes place in the American Foreign Service. Some of the work which used to be done by consuls will now be done by diplomats. In addition, it is proposed, as the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, suggested, that there should be a rationalization and regrouping of consular districts to enable easier supervision to be maintained by the various diplomatic Missions in different parts of the world.
My noble friend Lord Onslow raised a second point also of considerable importance. He drew attention to the possible dangers which might flow from the present system by which we appoint to the smaller consular posts, instead of Consuls de carrière, local inhabitants, who are not of British nationality and not members of the Consular Service. My right honourable friend fully recognizes these dangers. On the whole these gentlemen have done their work very well, and I should not like it to go out from this House that they have been unworthy of their trust, because I do not think that is true. But clearly it is not a satisfactory system, and it would be far better if all our Consuls were Consuls de carrière. Already, partly as the result of the war, there has been an improvement in this situation. As compared with ninety foreigners who occupied posts of this kind before the war, there are now only twenty-eight in minor consular posts. But in any case, after the war, it is proposed that we should promote career men from the subordinate grades of the Service into some of these posts. There is at present,

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as your Lordships know, very little chance of promotion for men in the subordinate grades of the Service, and it really will give an opportunity for efficient and capable officers to be brought up and put into consular appointments.
There is one other point of substance regarding the Consular Service which was raised by Lord Perth. He drew attention to the importance of changes in Consuls from one post to another not being too frequent, and this point was also made by Lord Geddes. It is clearly necessary to strike a balance, between, on the one side, changing them so rapidly that they have no opportunity of acquainting themselves with local conditions and local personalities, and, on the other, keeping them so long in one post that their energy and their initiative become atrophied.
LORD GEDDES: On the contrary, in my experience, Consul-Generals who have been a long time in their posts showed no sign of atrophy of initiative.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: That is not likely to happen in a place like New York, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, but it is likely to happen in some of the smaller and duller places. We have all seen cases of it, those of us who have been round and interviewed men who have been stationed in some one place at the end of the world for twenty years. Their energies inevitably become impaired. This is not one of those cases, in my view, where you can lay down any rigid rule. It must be left to the competent authority to decide who should be moved and who should not be moved. I have no doubt that the authorities at the Foreign Office will note what has been said this afternoon by noble Lords, who speak with very great experience of this subject.
Now I should like, if I may, to return to my main theme. Every diplomat to-day evidently needs some economic and commercial training, and one of the main purposes of these reforms is to meet that requirement. It is clear that diplomats cannot, any more than anyone else, be expected to be experts on every subject. If we expect from these reforms to get a Service of Admirable Crichtons we shall be paving the way to disappointment. No one in this country, so far as I know, is expected to be an expert on all aspects of public life, with the possible exception
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of the Leader of the House of Lords, who is expected to speak on many and multifarious subjects with complete authority several times a week. But lie is no doubt the exception which proves the rule. What does seem to me important is that every member of the Foreign Service should have a general training, political, economic and commercial, and that result I feel is only possible if we give them a proper grounding in the earlier stages of their career. Later, as Lord Perth said, they will no doubt gravitate to one section or other of the Service, according to their personal attributes. Some will be found more suitable for the political side, others will be found more suitable for the commercial side; but at any rate all of them should have some preliminary training in both branches.
It is in this connexion that I would draw your Lordships' attention to the proposals of the White Paper with regard to entry into the new Foreign Service. Not only is it intended to open the doors wide to able young men from every section of the population—so far as that is not already true—but it is intended to ensure that before they become members of the Service they shall have had some experience of all the subjects with which they are likely to have to deal. First, as has been said this afternoon, they must pass a preliminary test. For this, as your Lordships know, two alternatives, or I would rather call them supplementary methods, have been devised. Method one, which is to apply to 75 per cent. of successful candidates, is an open and competitive examination similar to that for candidates for the Home and Indian Civil Services. In addition it is proposed to try a second method, which is to apply to 25 per cent. of the successful candidates and is based upon selection. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, last Thursday, and several noble Lords to-day, warmly welcomed this innovation, and so, I must honestly say, do I. I believe it is going to be most extraordinarily valuable.
It is sometimes said that it takes all sorts to make a world, and it certainly takes all sorts to make an efficient Foreign Service. You need not only men of great intellectual ability and brilliance, you need men with solid horse sense. There should be a place in such a Service not only for diplomats who are skilful at their

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office work and in their diplomatic contacts, but also for what may be called "good mixers," men able to get about in the countries to which they are accredited and make contacts and friends among all sections of the population. Those two types, I suggest, are complementary to each other and they are both of them absolutely essential. I know there is a theory in some minds that the adoption of a system of selection will mean a return to the old privileged class. That has not been the experience in the Colonial Service, where a system of selection has been in operation now for over ten years. On the contrary, it is a remarkable fact that the proportion of successful candidates corning from the older universities and from the great public schools is smaller than it was before.
This of course has a bearing upon the question of the Selection Board about which Lord Addison asked a question which perhaps I might answer now. He asked if it was to be composed entirely of diplomats. It is not. It will be composed of the Ordinary Civil Service Commissioners, who examine other candidates for the Civil Service, with the addition of a few people of special experience, eminent members of the Foreign Office and so on; but the main body of that Selection Board will be the same as that which selects other candidates for the other branches of the Civil Service. I hope personally, and I think probably other noble Lords feel the same, that the method of selection will become a permanency in the Foreign Service. At any rate it is an experiment that is well worth trying.
Now, my Lords, I will return to the further stages of the procedure of recruit-merit laid clown in the White Paper. After the preliminary examination, as your Lordships know, successful candidates will be given travelling studentships at public expense for eighteen months to enable them to study at least two languages abroad and also some history and economics and, further, to familiarize themselves with conditions in foreign countries. The noble Earl, Lord Onslow, and also I think Lord Hankey, suggested that eighteen months was far too short a time in which to learn two languages. Of course it is a very short time to become a master of two languages; but I do not think it is too short a time to get a working knowledge of two languages, especially if, as will probably be the case, many of the
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candidates will already have had an interest in these questions and will have taken up some of their time in familiarizing themselves with some foreign tongue. If we make it longer than eighteen months, as I think was suggested by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, there is a real danger that a new member of the Foreign Service will be twenty-five or twenty-six years of age before he really gets down to work; and that will certainly tend to discourage the more energetic candidates. At any rate, if I may say so, this seems to me a point of importance which must be reviewed again in the light of practical experience of this scheme.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: May I ask one question? Is it suggested there should be two languages, or at least two, and possibly there might be three?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I suppose you might get a situation where a candidate already had a knowledge of what might be called a minor language and would want to familiarize himself with two of the essential diplomatic languages. Anyhow two is a minimum. Lord Onslow also asked whether the Foreign Office would have a right of direction to candidates as to what languages they should use. I can re-assure him on that; they will retain that right. Clearly this is important, otherwise you might have all candidates learning two only and no experts on the others. At the end of this eighteen months the candidates will return to England and enter for the qualifying examination in the subjects they have studied. If they pass they will become members of the Foreign Service; but still they will have to undergo one further year's probationary period. Half of this period will be spent in the Foreign Service, and the other half will be spent in the study of economic, industrial and social questions in this country in the Government Departments concerned. If that is not a comprehensive training I really do not know what is. We have moved along a long lane since the days in the last century when, I have always been told, the eminent Foreign Office official in charge of the selection of candidates used first to ask the name of their fathers and then look at their boots, and if they were both all right he passed the Candidate into the Service.
LORD ADDISON: On the question of this most valuable professional course of training, will the noble Viscount tell us

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what he thinks will be the average age of a man at the end of it? I am thinking of the five or six years which most other professions require for their training.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I would have thought, though I am speaking perhaps rather without the book, that they ought to finish it by the age of 24 or 25, counting the eighteen months plus the years of the final probationary period.
All of us I think appreciate the force of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, about the possible hardships to candidates who manage to pass the first test and then fail in the second and are thrown into the street, as it were, at the age of, say, 24. We must all agree that it is very important to eliminate that risk so far as is possible. To a certain extent it will be countered by the abolition of the preliminary Selection Board which saves a certain amount of time and also by the simplification of a preliminary examination. That, I think, has a certain bearing on the point made in the debate this afternoon about duplicating examinations. One noble Lord asked how can you expect a man to go in for his Final Schools at university and then have to do another examination immediately after? This new examination will not require any special study and therefore the information that they have gained for their Final Schools at the university should enable them to pass other examinations. I must say I think it would be rather difficult to have two different systems, one for men who have been at the university and the other for men who have not been at the university. That would indeed be differentiating between two sections of the population.
In any case, I think noble Lords who have expressed anxiety about this a little over-estimate the number of cases where the candidate will be likely to fail at the second test. It will only happen in practice when a young man is evidently entirely unfitted by temperament for the Service and that case must surely be comparatively rare, I should have thought very rare indeed. I suggest it is likely to happen more in the case of young men who have chosen method one—that is the examination in which they will have to get in through intellectual ability—rather than those who have chosen method two, which is based on personality. If in fact they have chosen method one they will
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have passed the Civil Service examination and they might well be considered, if still within the age limit, for other branches of the public service where their attributes would be more suitable.
EARL STANHOPE: Might I ask which Department is going to be the dump?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: It is not a case of dumping. You might have a young man who would be quite admirable at the Treasury although not particularly suited for diplomatic life. I have no doubt the noble Earl (Lord Stanhope) when he was at the Foreign Office came across cases of candidates who were promising young men but who had not the attributes suitable for a career which they had chosen. Even if such young men failed to get into the home Civil Service, the special training they had received should increase their chances of employment in banking or business or the B.B.C., and so forth. Surely, however, hardship to a few individuals should not override the interests of the country as a whole. It is essential that we should not admit men to the Service who from the first have not been fitted for the duties they would be called upon to perform. That has happened in the past and we do not want it to happen again in the future.
Now I come to another section of the White Paper which deals with conditions of service. This has taken up very little time in our debate and from that I conclude that the proposals have given general satisfaction. There was, however, one question asked by my noble friend Lord Addison last week which I think I ought to answer. He referred, and very rightly referred, to the extent to which conditions in the Foreign Service differed from those in the home Civil Service and the Indian Civil Service. He asked who was to determine what were to be the conditions in the Foreign Service and I understood him to say that he hoped this was not going to be the Treasury. Of course the Treasury is responsible for the way in which public money is spent and cannot delegate that responsibility to other Departments, but my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has in fact approved the reforms. He will no doubt note also the interest expressed in your Lordships' House and in another place as to the need for adequate allowances and suitable buildings.
LORD ADDISON: May I be allowed to interrupt for a moment? This is a very vital matter. The suggestion I made was, and I read it over carefully myself, that someone, we will say the principal Assistant Secretary at the Treasury, or someone from the Treasury department concerned, should be advised through the Foreign Office by a body of persons capable of advising on the financial matters which really arise, so that the Treasury will have before them in considered form the advice of men who knew the actual circumstances.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I take it That that is what will happen, although whether actually in that form or not I cannot say. The appropriate persons in the Foreign Office will go to the Treasury and explain the special circumstances of the case and then it will be a matter for agreement between them. In view of the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has accepted these reforms I do not think there is any real need for apprehension that he will not be willing to authorize the expenditure for which the Foreign Secretary asks. One other question of a financial character was raised by my noble friend Earl Stanhope. He suggested that part of the cost of the Foreign Service should be defrayed, as I understood, by the Dominions.
EARL STANHOPE: And other parts of the Empire.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I would like to speak mainly of the Dominions. It is not for me obviously to answer in your Lordships' House for the Dominions; but I would say that at present all the Dominion Governments have got Ministries of External Affairs and they have their own diplomatic representatives in the more important capitals. I cannot imagine that they would look with great favour on a proposal that they should also contribute to the payment of our diplomats as well. I gather that the node Earl recognizes that. His proposal went a good deal further and he proposed in fact the amalgamation of the United Kingdom and Dominions Foreign Services. Of course, that raises very wide issues indeed and it certainly is not a question for a unilateral declaration by His Majesty's Government in this House. I should doubt myself, for varied reasons, whether a complete merging would be practicable,
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but what I do agree is that the closest possible co-operation between all sections of the British Empire is essential both in the war and after the war. That no doubt will be one of the most urgent questions which will have to be considered at an Imperial Conference directly after the war.
I hope your Lordships will forgive me for keeping you so long; but these questions are all important. There is yet another matter of first importance to a really efficient Service, and that is the retirement of men who are no longer doing useful work. I was glad to feel that, with the exception, perhaps, of the noble Lord, Lord Monkswell—who was answered, I think, pretty conclusively by my noble friend Earl Stanhope—these proposals have met with general approval. It is no reflection upon these men to admit that they exist. In every walk of life people exist who do most valuable work in the lower grades of their profession, but who are not suited by temperament for the higher posts. They reach a certain point, they stick there, and they clog the avenues of promotion to younger and more energetic men. Many of them are themselves willing and anxious to leave the Service, but they cannot do so without a pension. The reform that is now proposed is only designed to remedy that confessedly unsatisfactory state of affairs and I am certain that it will be generally welcomed by all concerned.
I will say only one word about the question of the appointment of women to the Foreign Service. That was touched on only once I think in this debate. It is a question upon which everybody feels strongly. Either one is very strongly in favour or violently against. It is a question on which there are no neutrals so far as I know. I can only say this, that the Committee which considered this matter in 1936 produced a report which, while more or less evenly divided on the appointment of women in the Foreign Service, came down very strongly against the appointment of women to the Consular Service. Your Lordships know that under the present proposals the Foreign and the Consular Services are to be amalgamated. In the new circumstances, the appointment of women clearly must be a matter which needs further consultation and consideration. In any case for the period of the war no candidates are to be admitted to the Foreign Service. My right

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honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has promised to set up after the war a committee of inquiry into this question of the admission of women. No doubt, as my noble friend the Earl of Onslow said, the basis of that inquiry will not be merely the interests of men or the interests of women but the interests of the Foreign Service. No other basis would be satisfactory.
So much, my Lords, for the proposals in the White Paper.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, may I ask one question? Will the Foreign Service be free from any potential interference from the Head of the Civil Service?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I should rather like notice of that question.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I raised it in my speech.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I know that the noble Earl did raise it, but I should like to have notice of it. I would point out that, as the noble Earl knows, stress is laid on the fact that this is to be a separate Service.
The noble Earl, in his speech, raised one more question obviously of the very first importance; that of the co-ordination of the Foreign Office with other Government Departments. That, as I think he explained in his speech, is the consideration to which he attaches most importance, and it has really been the main point raised in the debate that has taken place on these two days. It is a question, of course, which, as the noble Earl I am sure would readily admit, raises far wider issues than the other. The White Paper is concerned merely with the internal organization of the Foreign Service. The noble Earl's proposals deal with the co-ordination of the Foreign Office and other Departments. Indeed, they deal really with the whole machinery of government in this country. No one, with the possible exception of Lord Ponsonby, would dispute the noble Earl's contention that, if there is to be continuity of policy and if our relations with other countries are to remain on a harmonious basis, it is essential that there should be the closest possible co-operation between all Departments concerned with international affairs, not only in time of war but in time of peace
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as well. As he pointed out, the sphere of international collaboration is steadily widening, and it is likely that, in the postwar international organization which we all hope to see built up, there will be not only political machinery but machinery for defence and machinery of an economic character.
I understand that the noble Viscount, Lord Davidson—whom I was sorry not to hear and whose participation in these debates I can assure him we all warmly welcome—stressed the very great importance of the defence side, and I think nobody would quarrel with him about that. The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, in the very interesting speech which he made to-day—and which I think may get him into terribly hot water with Lord Ponsonby—has shown that there is nothing essentially new about this. He said that diplomacy, armaments and commerce have always been inextricably interwoven, and he gave very powerful examples of this, going back a considerable distance in our history. No doubt we shall all agree that this, broadly speaking, is true. History can show many examples of agreements for military assistance between us and other countries. Equally there are many examples of commerce proceeding between men of different countries—this and other countries—dating right away back to the Dark Ages. I heard only the other day, down in Dorset, of how a little boy grubbing about in one of the barrows which you find there, dug up a little blue' bead which, on examination subsequently, was found to be of Mycenaean design. It had come into that part of the world long before Roman times, almost in Neolithic times. That is a very early example of international trade. At that time, of course, such trade was conducted entirely between adventurous individuals—it was private enterprise in the strictest sense of the term. But I am sure that the noble Earl will be the first to agree that with improvements in the matter of transportation the international machinery for the direction and control of commerce is becoming rapidly more complicated and more centralized. It is assuming more and more the character of trade not between individuals nor even between firms, but between nations.
Indeed I suggest that the world is in fact, whether we like it or not, rapidly becoming an interdependent unit. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, said

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to-day that it is being reduced to the size of a village. Efforts by nations to isolate themselves from their neighbours, may, I think, be truly described as a temporary phase, a phase which, though it may very well see us out, is only temporary in the world's history. I think myself that all of us would agree that it will not be able permanently to stand up against the pressure of the economic facts. This country is likely, if it speaks with a strong and united voice, to have a big part to play in helping to mould this vast new inter-national economic machine which will be required in order to manage this interdependent world. If we are to be in a position to do this, clearly our policy must be closely coordinated between the various Departments, not only at the stage of decision when it comes to the Cabinet but also in the formative stage, further down in the Government machine.
I think, if he will forgive me for saying so, that the noble Earl unduly belittled, in his speech, the amount of co-ordination which already exists. There are, as he well knows, not only discussions between Ministers of the Cabinet, but also countless exchanges of views both between officials and Ministers directly concerned a: earlier stages. But, of course, it may very well be argued, and I think it has been argued, that ad hoc discussions are not enough, and that there should be some permanent machinery for the automatic discussion of questions in the international sphere which affect more than one Department at what I have called the formative phase—that is to say before the matter comes to the Cabinet for decision. As the noble Earl has said, suggestions for some: machinery of this character have lately been ventilated in the Press. He mentioned two of these suggestions on the weak points of which he very shrewdly and immediately put his finger.
Take The Times proposal. With him, I do not believe: that it is practically possible to take the control of day-to-day foreign affairs out of the hands of the Foreign Secretary; who is in constant touch with his Department, and hand it over to a Super-Minister who is living and working, as it were, in a vacuum. I do not believe that in practice that would work. The conduct of foreign affairs, contrary to views often expressed in the Press and elsewhere, is not easily handled by amateurs. Such affairs need experts
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like other questions. They really need the constant day-to-day attention of a man with long experience of their particular problems. Equally, I think, there may be objections to the suggestions put forward by Sir Victor Wellesley, though, of course, he speaks with immense practical experience. As I understand it, what he proposes—I am putting it very briefly indeed—is that we should entrust the direction of policy to a committee almost entirely composed of officials. That is contrary to the whole constitutional tradition of this country and I do not think it would work. The responsible Ministers must finally bear responsibility, and having to bear responsibility must have a hand in the moulding of policy.
Thirdly, there was the proposal put forward by the noble Earl himself. In effect he suggests—I hope I am not misrepresenting him—the constitution of something approaching a Sub-Committee of the Cabinet—I think he used the analogy of the Committee of Imperial Defence. In any case, it would be something like a Sub-Committee of the Cabinet, which would sit under the Foreign Secretary and comprise representatives of all the Departments concerned. If possible these Departments should be represented by the. Ministers themselves. His intention, as I understood it, was to attain the same object as that defined by Lord Tyrrell; that is to say, to strike a balance between the various considerations—political, economic, financial and military—which are sometimes, as my noble friend Lord Perth said, complementary and sometimes conflicting, and on which some harmonization is necessary if a wise and stable policy is to be produced. Both the noble Earl, Lord Perth, and the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, emphasized the need for having on this Committee representatives of the Services. I have great sympathy with that view, because, as I have said before in this House, you cannot have a foreign policy at all unless you have physical power behind it. That is the lesson which we should have learnt by the experience of the last twenty years, and I very much hope that we have learnt it. The noble Earl's proposal has clearly certain advantages over the other two. It is simpler, and it merely involves an extension of the existing machinery of government. It retains Ministerial control of policy. Those are very important points.

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The noble Earl also proposed the establishment of an expert economic staff at the Foreign Office. In fact there already exists in the Foreign Office, as he probably knows, something very similar to the expert economic staff which he has in mind. This is a matter to which I think the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, referred. Before the war there was an Economic Relations Department in the Foreign Office the functions of which were to maintain relations with the Economic Departments of His Majesty's Government, to direct the supply of economic intelligence from posts abroad, and to advise the Foreign Office on the economic side of their work. This Department lapsed at the beginning of the war, and its staff were lent to the Ministry of Economic Warfare. It has now been revived in the shape of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. It is, of course, already the duty of the Political Departments of the Foreign Office to be informed on the economic, social and other questions of foreign countries which form part of foreign affairs, and to give the Secretary of State advice in which these aspects as well as the political aspects are taken into account. This advice results partly from a consultation by the Political Department interested, or by the Economic and Reconstruction Department, with the other Government Offices concerned. I do not think that the noble Earl had the impression that no such organization existed, but, if he had, he would not have been correct. He may consider—and I think that Lord Tyrrell argued this with great force—that even more elaborate machinery is required.
The noble Earl suggested that the Government should immediately set up a Committee to consider his and other proposals. He will not, I am sure, expect me to give him a definite reply to-day. As your Lordships know, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary is at present in America, and I have not had the opportunity of obtaining his views, much less the views of the Cabinet, of which he must be himself the chief adviser. I can, however, at any rate promise the noble Earl that I will refer the proposal to the Foreign Secretary immediately on his return, and I am quite certain that, whether it turns out to be practicable or not, it will receive the very
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real and serious consideration which it deserves.
It only remains for me to thank those noble Lords who have made contributions to the debate for what they have said, and to assure them that these contributions will be of the greatest value to my right honourable friend in his further examination of these important questions. If anything is certain in this very uncertain world, it is that this debate has been very well worth while.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, we have listened to a very eloquent and sympathetic speech from the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House. I should like to express my great appreciation of it. He has not only personal but hereditary experience of foreign affairs. He has promised us that all the different suggestions which have been made shall receive full and sympathetic consideration. There is only one point which I should like to make. In the closing part of his speech, he referred to the centralization in London of our foreign policy. I quite understand that I can have no answer on that point to-day, particularly in the absence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who, if I may say so, is doing admirable work in another place—America—and also because questions affecting the machinery of government are extremely difficult and can be dealt with only after considerable thought. I feel sure, however, that the noble Viscount will forgive me if I do not abandon the idea altogether at this stage. I hope very much that after the Foreign Secretary returns the Government may be able to announce the formation of a Committee. If so, I shall be very happy; but, if this does not happen, I attach so much importance to this problem that I should like to give the noble Viscount notice that, if some satisfactory answer is not given, I intend to open the question again, either by way of a fresh Motion or by a question in your Lordships' House. Meanwhile, I ask leave to withdraw my present Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

LEICESTER GAS ORDER, 1943
Report from the Special Orders Committee, That no petitions have been presented praying to be heard against the Special Order, and that there is nothing

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in this Order to which they think it necessary to call the attention of the House: Read and ordered to lie on the Table.

GRAND UNION CANAL BILL [H.L.]
The King's consent signified and the Bill reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.

ADJOURNMENT: BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I move; that the House do now adjourn.
Moved, That the House do now adjourn —(Viscount Cranborne.)
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, I should like to ask whether any announcement can be made about business on the next sitting day?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, the Motion in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has been postponed; It is proposed, therefore, to take the Motion standing in the name of the most reverend Prelate, the Archbishop of York, which should have been taken to-day, and the other business on the Paper.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned.