Sitting of 11 February 1943

Preamble
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  CLYDEBANK AND DISTRICT WATER ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
  Considered; to be read the Third time upon the next Sitting day.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  NATIONAL WAR EFFORT

    Central Register (ex-officers)
    Captain Sir Ian Fraserasked the Minister of Labour how many officers have been retired from the Armed Forces on account of disabilities or under age limits and have applied to the Central Register for employment; and how many have been placed?
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The only statistics available are those relating to ex-Army officers retired under Army Council Instruction 422 of 1942. Of these, 1,757 have enrolled for employment on the registers of the Appointments Department since March, 1942. Of these 251 remained on these Registers or on other Registers on 31st January, 1943. Some 900 are known to have found employment, of whom 445 were placed by the Appointments Branch and about 100 by the Central (Technical and Scientific) Register and the Employment Exchanges, 104 have been re-employed in the Army, 501 have not maintained their enrolment. Statistics regarding other ex-officers are not available.
    Sir I. Fraser: Is it not a fact that there are two or three Government organisations which purport to find jobs for ex-officers and also for ex-other ranks, for instance, the Central Register and the special department set up by my right hon. Friend, and since there is some confusion, could he make a clear statement which officers could understand as to how they should proceed?
    Mr. Bevin: I would advise all ex-officers to go to the Appointments Department, and then I will co-ordinate the efforts of the other Departments concerned.

    Directed Woman Worker, Woolwich
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that Miss Gearing, employed in the food preserving department of the Woolwich Co-operative Society, was directed by his local officers to other employment; that she has since married a man serving in the Royal Navy; that, owing to pressure from his local officers, she is now employed in the Royal Arsenal; that she has an aged father and mother at home for whom she is responsible and that the hardship committee is still dealing with her claim for deferment on the basis of her original registration as a single person; and will he take steps to remedy this?
    Mr. E. Bevin: As Miss Gearing is now married, she is no longer subject to liability under the National Service Acts and does not require the renewal of her postponement certificate by the hardship committee. I assume, however, that she is in employment which is scheduled under the Essential Work Order. If she wishes to leave this employment, she must obtain the permission of the National Service officer; as my hon. Friend knows, there is an appeal to the Appeal Board if this permission is refused.
    Mr. Davies: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that reply, may I ask whether he and his Department will give serious consideration to the removal of persons in food preservation to other work? Does it not occur to the right hon. Gentleman that food preservation is most important at the present time?
    Mr. Bevin: I have to hold the balance. I have said in this House before, in reply to other hon. Members, that I can give no undertakings to anybody. I have to adjust things from day to day according to the priorities of war production.

    Aircraft Production Workers, Oxford (Hostels)
    Mr. Quintin Hoggasked the Minister of Labour whether his attention has been drawn to the housing shortage in Oxford and to the proposals made to ease the

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    same by the provision of hostels for single war workers; and whether he is in a position to announce a decision?
    Mr. E. Bevin: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to him yesterday by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Aircraft Production, with whom I am in consultation.

    Aircraft Production Hostel (Management)
    Mr. Perkinsasked the Minister of Labour what changes are proposed in the management of a Ministry of Aircraft Production housing estate, of which he has been informed; and whether he has considered the representations of the inhabitants regarding these proposals?
    Mr. E. Bevin: The reference is to a hostel which provides accommodation for workers at a number of local factories. The management of this hostel was originally let by the National Hostels Corporation, Limited, to a private firm for 12 months, with the right, on either side, to terminate the contract thereafter at three months' notice. Notice to terminate the contract was duly given by the Corporation, which will take the hostel under direct management as from 7th March. It is the normal practice of the Corporation to manage their hostels direct, and I have no reason to suppose that the new arrangements at this hostel will be anything but satisfactory. Representations against this change have been made to me by the Residents' Committee of the hostel, and I have considered them, but I see no reason for altering the proposed arrangements.
    Mr. Perkins: Is the Minister aware that the vast majority of those responsible are opposed to this change, and may I bring a deputation of those responsible to see him?
    Mr. Bevin: If my hon. Friend will bring the deputation to see one of the Parliamentary Secretaries, I will arrange for it.
    Mr. Lipson: Is there any truth in the reports that there is a threat of a strike of the workers in these factories unless they can get their way, and, if that is so, will he take steps in the matter?
    Mr. Bevin: I am afraid that in deciding public policy I cannot be influenced by threats by anybody.
    Mr. George Griffiths: Not even the Tory Party.

    Compulsory Employment (Tomlinson Committee's Report)
    Sir I. Fraserasked the Minister of Labour whether, by reference to great war and/or present war figures, he will supply figures showing the relationship between the number of members of the Fighting Forces, members of Civil Defence units, civilian air-raid victims, persons suffering from industrial accidents and persons born with or who acquire diseases or affections which reduce their employability below normal, respectively, so as to enable an estimate to be made of the numbers in these categories who are proposed to be dealt with under the Tomlinson Report Scheme of Compulsory Employment?
    Mr. E. Bevin: As indicated in paragraph 71 (c) and (d) of the Tomlinson Committee Report, it is not possible at present to form even a rough estimate of the number of persons whose employability has been affected by some kind of disablement nor as to their distribution between the groups referred to.
    Sir I. Fraser: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate the sincere difficulty in which Members and others find themselves in assessing the practicability of the proposal that all unfit persons should be compulsorily employed, when there is no idea of their number? Could he not find out the number by the process of sampling or in some other way?
    Mr. Bevin: I assure my hon. Friend that it is a little difficult to come to a conclusion on figures now. Many men who are partially disabled find employment in war-time, but I am certain that, when the matter has to be analysed and dealt with in the post-war period, with the then conditions of unemployment, it will be entirely different.

  EDUCATION

    School Children (Weight and Height)
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the President of the Board of Education whether periodical records have been taken of the

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    average height, weight and other physical measurements of any school children since the outbreak of war; and how these compare with those of pre-war days?
    The President of the Board of Education (Mr. Butler): A few local education authorities have continued periodical weighing and measuring of children during the war, and a scientific investigation into growth rates in certain neutral and evacuation areas is being undertaken on behalf of my Department. This investigation, as far as it goes, shows that growth rates measured by height and weight since the beginning of the war are being well maintained.

    Boarding Schools
    Mr. Woodburnasked the President of the Board of Education whether, in his post-war plans for boarding schools, he will consider making even a short period at a boarding school part of the education of all children; and whether, in this connection, he will consider using the great industrial hostels in country areas likely to be redundant when peace comes?
    Mr. Butler: In reply to the first part of the Question, I should not regard it as practicable to require a period of boarding school education for all children, but the hon. Member will have realised from the answer given to him yesterday that the possibility of using some of the hostels to which he refers for boarding purposes is very much in mind.
    Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: Could the Minister say whether, under existing powers, he has any authority to subsidise boarding, except for boys in approved schools or boys who live distant from a secondary school?
    Mr. Butler: There are one or two isolated cases, which I have investigated. I should like the hon. Member to put a Question down, when I will give him an exact answer.
    Mr. Woodburn: Would the Minister consider, if this matter is to be limited to certain children, using those children for experimenting with the most modern system of education—using them, as it were, for laboratory purposes?
    Mr. Butler: I should like to feel that all children could get this chance, but it is rather difficult to find facilities for all of them.
    Dr. Edith Summerskill: Is the Minister not aware that we do not all subscribe to all the views expressed in this Question?
    Mr. Butler: That is one of the reasons why I said that I did not think it would be practicable to enforce it for all children.
    Captain Poole: Is it not a fact that the finest influence that can be exerted on the life of a child is the influence of the home?

    Ethical Instruction
    Mr. Sorensenasked the President of the Board of Education, whether, in framing future education proposals, he will give particular attention to the need for ethical instruction in forms appropriate to the different ages of schoolchildren; and whether, in any conclusion he may reach respecting the translation of religious beliefs to schoolchildren, the ethical criterion will be paramount, with particular emphasis on democratic principles?
    Mr. Butler: The general lines of approach adopted by the Board to the matters raised by the hon. Member were set out in an answer given to him on 9th July last, and I do not think I can enlarge upon that reply.
    Mr. Sorensen: Has the Minister had consultations and representations regarding this aspect of education? If not, will he do so, seeing that it is a matter of very great importance?
    Mr. Butler: I think I have probably received more advice than any other of my colleagues on these matters during the last two years. These questions have not been left out.

  HOUSING

    Agricultural Workers
    Sir Stanley Reedasked the Minister of Health whether he will consider permitting rural housing authorities to borrow money to acquire, without delay, such sites as will be necessary to ensure an early start on post-war plans for the erection of dwellings for agricultural workers?
    The Minister of Health (Mr. Ernest Brown): I am already considering this matter, and I hope shortly to be able to send a circular to local authorities giving

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    them advice on the action which they should take now in preparation for post-war house-building.
    Sir S. Reed: Would the Minister not agree that this is most urgent for post-war reconstruction plans and that it is impossible for a local authority to provide satisfactory planning unless they know well in advance the actual sites which will be used for the purpose?
    Mr. Brown: I assure my hon. Friend that I will keep my mind on that matter.
    Mr. G. Griffiths: Will the Minister of Health see that when he issues these borrowing powers the interest will not be more than 2½ per cent. on the loans, and not 6 per cent. as in the past?
    Viscountess Astor: Will the Minister also see that there is running water in these rural houses, as otherwise it is not worth building them?

    Standard Rent
    Mr. Denmanasked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been called to the recent comments of the Court of Appeal on the effect of Section 12 of the Rent Restrictions Act, 1939, on the ascertainment of standard rent; and whether he will take steps to have that Section amended?
    Mr. E. Brown: The answer to the first part of the Question is "Yes." I have noted the point for consideration when amending legislation is undertaken.
    Mr. Silverman: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the working of these Acts has shown a number of anomalies, and does he not consider that the time has come when a Select Committee of this House might inquire into the operation of the Acts and consider what Amendments are necessary?
    Mr. Brown: I should have to consider that point.
    Mr. Stephen: Can the right hon. Gentleman give any indication when he will bring forward the amending legislation?
    Mr. Brown: Not at the moment.

  CEMETERIES AND BURIAL GROUNDS
  Sir J. Lambasked the Minister of Health the acreage of land now reserved
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  for use as public cemeteries and burial grounds in England, Wales and Scotland respectively?
  Mr. E. Brown: I regret that this information is not available as regards England and Wales, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State informs me that it is also unavailable as regards Scotland.
  Sir J. Lamb: Is it not a matter for regret that these figures are not available? Is it not common knowledge that a vast area of land is occupied for this purpose, and will my right hon. Friend use every endeavour to provide facilities for cremation for those who express a wish for it and make it cheaper and more available than it is at present?

  PUBLIC HEALTH

    Nurses and Midwives (National Advisory Council)
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour whether he is yet in a position to announce the results of his consultations with the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, and the nursing and midwifery organisations concerned, on the subject of securing a better supply and distribution of nurses and midwives?
    Mr. E. Bevin: Yes, Sir. The present shortage and uneven distribution of nurses and midwives for civilian work demand special measures. After consultation with the organisations representing the interested parties and in agreement with my right hon. Friends the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, I have decided to appoint a National Advisory Council for the Recruitment and Distribution of Nurses and Midwives to advise me on all questions relating to the recruitment and distribution of male and female nurses and of midwives on civilian work. The Council, which will be presided over by a Parliamentary Secretary to my Ministry and with which officers of the Departments concerned will be associated, will consist of representatives nominated by the various organisations concerned. With the permission of my hon. Friend I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement showing the constitution of the Council.
    I am asking the Council to meet at an early date and to give immediate consideration to measures for increasing recruitment, to arrangements for a special

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    registration of nurses and midwives and to the priority to be accorded to the different demands for the different types of nurses and midwives, as well as to make suggestions for easing the situation in respect of certain types of hospitals with large immediate demands, such as tuberculosis and mental institutions. There is, of course, no intention of changing existing arrangements where those are working satisfactorily.
    The administration of such measures as are decided upon will be entrusted to the Appointments Department of my Ministry acting where necessary through the local Appointments Offices, each of which will be assisted in its work by a Local Advisory Committee.
    In undertaking this new and important duty, I have been greatly encouraged by the whole-hearted and helpful co-operation which I have received from the organisations I have consulted in drawing up the scheme. On that basis I feel confident that we shall be able to solve the difficult problems with which we shall have to deal and to maintain the very high position which the nursing and midwifery professions deservedly occupy in the public regard.
    Miss Ward: Can my right hon. Friend say whether that statement implies that the nursing services of, the Ministry of Health will be transferred to the Ministry of Labour?
    Mr. Bevin: No, Sir.
    Mr. Messer: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the problem is not limited to nurses and midwives, but that if the denudation of administrative staffs goes on, the nurses will not be able to carry on because of the inability of the hospitals to do their job?
    Mr. Bevin: That is another question.
    Sir Francis Fremantle: Will the Commission also have power to deal with the nursing services in the three Fighting Services, especially sick-bay rating nurses, who, after their discharge, will be extremely useful?
    Mr. Bevin: Anyone discharged from any Service who has such experience will be passed on to the Appointments Department, and will then come under the purview of this Department.
    Following is the statement:
    NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR THE RECRUITMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF NURSES AND MIDWIVES.
    Chairman: Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service (Mr. McCorquodale).
    Representatives of the following organisations:—

    Royal Colege of Nursing

    4*

    Association of Matrons

    2

    Trades Union Congress General Council

    2

    National Association of Local Government Officers

    1

    King Edward's Hospital Fund (Nursing Recruitment Centre)

    1

    College of Midwives

    2

    Joint War Organisation of the Red Cross and St. John of Jerusalem

    1

    Queen's Institute of District Nursing

    1

    London County Council

    1

    Association of Municipal Corporations

    1

    County Councils Association

    1

    Association of Councils of Counties of Cities in Scotland

    1

    Association of County Councils in Scotland

    1

    Mental Hospitals Association

    1

    British Hospitals Association

    3*

    *Including 1 from Scotland.

    Nurses' and Midwives' Salaries
    Sir Joseph Lambasked the Minister of Health whether he has any statement to make about the Report of the Committee on Nurses' Salaries and the action he proposes to take thereon?
    Mr. E. Brown: Yes, Sir. I have received from my Noble Friend Lord Rushcliffe the first Report of the Committee which I appointed under his chairmanship on the salaries, emoluments and other conditions of service of nurses. This Report deals with female nurses in hospitals and will thus cover the majority of the nursing profession. The Report is being presented as a Command Paper and copies will be available to-day in the Vote Office.
    As Members will be able to see from the Report and its schedules, the scope of the Committee's work has been intricate and far-reaching, and the House will, I am sure, agree with me in congratulating both Lord Rushcliffe and the representatives of employers and of nurses who have constituted the two panels of the Committee on their successful efforts to reach an agreement and to put on an improved and uniform basis salaries and other conditions of service of nurses. It is estimated that the total additional cost of bringing these recommendations into operation will be between £1,500,000 and

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    £2,000,000 per annum. I am to-day communicating with local authorities and voluntary hospitals commending to them the recommendations made in the Report and with the agreement of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer am informing them that the Government are prepared to pay both to local authorities and to voluntary hospitals 50 per cent. of any increased expenditure in which they are involved in giving effect to the recommendations.
    The Committee are already considering the salaries and conditions of service of other groups of nurses, and have stated their intention of recommending that the proposals they formulate for them shall operate from the same date as the recommendations made in the present Report. I am informed also that the Midwives' Salaries Committee will recommend that their proposals about midwives shall operate from the same date. I should like to take this opportunity of paying a special tribute to nurses and midwives, whose work during the long years of war has been such a vital contribution to the national effort, and will be no less vital when peace is restored.
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Minister of Health whether he can now make a statement regarding the effective working of the Central Midwives Board; and when the Report and statement by the Rushcliffe Committee can be expected regarding the whole question of the supply of midwives throughout the country?
    Mr. Brown: I believe the Central Midwives Board to be working effectively, as in the past. I am informed by my Noble Friend Lord Rushcliffe that the Committee on the salaries and emoluments of midwives, of which he is Chairman, is actively considering the matters within its reference and will report as soon as possible, but he is not yet able to give an indication of the date. I would also refer my hon. Friend to the statement just made by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service about the recruitment and distribution of mid-wives and nurses.
    Mr. Be la Bère: Is the Minister aware that while admitting that the Central Mid-wives Board are doing their best, they are a law to themselves, that it is absolutely imperative that something should be done
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    immediately to ensure an adequate supply of midwives, and that the matter is not one to be lightly played with?
    Mr. Messer: Is it not true that there are a large number, a really big number, of registered midwives who are not doing midwifery work?

    Hospital Accommodation, Coventry
    Mr. Bowlesasked the Minister of Health whether he has considered the resolution, a copy of which has been forwarded to him, passed by the hospital committee of Alfred Herbert, Limited, of Coventry, complaining of the many problems arising from the lack of beds at the local hospital; and what action he proposes to take?
    Mr. E. Brown: Yes, Sir. I am afraid that the supply of labour and materials does not at present permit a further extension to the hospital referred to in the resolution. I am advised that the total accommodation available in this and other hospitals in the area is adequate.
    Captain Strickland: Is not the Minister aware that the nurses in this voluntary hospital are compelled to sleep away from the hospital because of this shortage, and that a very serious position arises?
    Mr. Brown: Yes, of course, but there is a very serious position about labour and materials.

    Milk Pasteurisation
    Mr. Purbrickasked the Minister of Health the temperatures and periods of application that should be applied to milk to destroy all tubercle germs present therein; and whether he is satisfied that tuberculosis in cows is infectious through their milk to human beings?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am advised that the temperatures and periods of application necessary to destroy tubercle bacilli range from about 135° F. for 40 minutes to boiling point for a fraction of a second. The answer to the second part of the Question is "Yes."
    Vice-Admiral Taylor: Is not the Minister aware that while that process is destructive of the tubercle germ, it is also destructive of the nutritive value of milk?
    Mr. Purbrickasked the Minister of Health whether, as regards pasteurisation of milk, he will define the exact process

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    which it is the policy of his Department to support?
    Mr. Brown: Two processes of pasteurisation are prescribed in the Milk (Special Designations) Regulations, 1936–1942, namely, a "holder" process whereby the milk must be retained at a temperature of not less than 145° F. and not more than 150° F. for at least 30 minutes, and be immediately cooled to a temperature of not more than 55° F.; and a high-temperature short-time process whereby the milk must be retained at a temperature of not less than 162° F. for at least 15 seconds and be immediately cooled to a temperature of not more than 55° F. New proposals in connection with the control of heat treatment are under consideration.
    Mr. Purbrick: Is the right hon. Gentleman assured that those two temperatures and processes destroy all tubercle bacilli in milk?
    Mr. Brown: I have answered the Question in the terms on the Paper.
    Mr. Higgs: What steps are taken to have these Regulations enforced?
    Mr. Brown: That question would require a much longer answer than Mr. Speaker would allow me to give.
    Dr. Summerskill: Are all the right hon. Gentleman's medical advisers unanimous in regard to these processes?
    Viscountess Astor: Are they ever unanimous about anything?

    Public Assistance Institutions, Buckinghamshire (Nurses)
    Major-General Sir Alfred Knoxasked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been drawn to the serious shortage of nurses in the Public Assistance Institutions in the county of Buckingham and especially in Slough, and what steps he proposes to take?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am aware that there is a considerable shortage of nurses in some institutions in Buckinghamshire and especially in Slough. My nursing officers are, however, in close consultation with the sector matron and others concerned, and the main deficiencies have been met by the employment of temporary nurses.
    Sir S. Reed: Is the Minister aware that while the shortage in public assistance
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    institutions in Buckinghamshire is particularly difficult, the shortage applies to almost every institution in the country?
    Mr. Brown: That is the reason for the important statement by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour to-day.
    Sir A. Knox: Does the Minister realise that the employment of temporary nurses has not alleviated the position at all?
    Mr. Brown: It has alleviated it, but not solved it.

    National Health Insurance (Uncertificated Teachers)
    Mr. Lipsonasked the Minister of Health why uncertificated teachers, whose salary plus bonus is £180 a year, are not allowed to join National Health Insurance; and will he take steps to enable them to do so?
    Mr. E. Brown: The uncertificated teachers to whom my hon. Friend refers are excluded from compulsory health and pensions insurance under paragraph (e) of Part II of the First Schedule to the National Health Insurance Act, 1936, as being employed in contributory service within the meaning of the Teachers' (Superannuation) Acts. As regards the second part of the Question, the position of persons in excepted employments is receiving consideration in connection with the general review of the social insurance and allied services.
    Mr. Lipson: Will the Minister take into account the very small amount of superannuation these teachers receive?
    Mr. Brown: The hon. Member will understand that under the scheme they must secure sickness and old age provision which are on the whole not less favourable than under the State insurance scheme.

    Child's Death, Edmonton
    Mr. Viantasked the Minister of Health to what was death attributed in the case of Dennis Hillier, of 220, Canterbury Road, Leyton, E., aged 11 years, who died on 13th October at Chase Farm Hospital, Edmonton, after being ill for two months following inoculation against diphtheria?
    Mr. E. Brown: The coroner who conducted the inquest in the case to which my hon. Friend refers recorded a verdict

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    that death was due to natural causes, and certified the cause of death as "sub-acute encephalitis due to virus"—to which he added the word "natural."
    Mr. Sorensen: How does it come about that this child should be treated in a hospital some miles away?
    Viscountess Astor: Was this inoculation compulsory?

    Compulsory Medical Examination
    Mr. Vernon Bartlettasked the Minister of Health whether, in order to improve the nation's health by the prevention rather than the cure of disease, he will consider the introduction of an order making it compulsory for every individual to undergo a medical examination twice a year?
    Mr. E. Brown: I sympathise with the object which my hon. Friend has in view but, apart from all other considerations, including the addition to the already very heavy burden on the medical profession, I should certainly not be prepared to take the action suggested except with the express approval of Parliament.
    Sir Frank Sanderson: Is the Minister aware that it would take no fewer than 8,500 doctors working eight hours a day, six days a week, assuming that only one-half of the population were medically examined, to carry out this suggestion?

    Venereal Disease
    Dr. Summerskillasked the Minister of Health what is the loss in working time and the estimated cost to the country of venereal disease?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am not aware of any information on which the particulars for which my hon. Friend asks could be readily ascertained.
    Dr. Summerskill: What is the cost of treatment at the clinics? Surely we can have that?
    Mr. Brown: This is a question of loss of working time. I will look into the matter, if the hon. Lady will consult with me, so that I shall know exactly what she wants.
    Dr. Summerskill: I asked for the estimated cost.
    Mr. Brown: But the hon. Lady asked for the loss of working time.

    Doctors
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Minister of Health whether, in view of the need for more adequate supply of doctors on the home front, he will convene a meeting of the Minister of Health and the heads of the three Service Departments, with a view to making some provision whereby any doctors who have been called up but temporarily have no regular duties to perform are enabled to resume their civil practice until such time as regular duties are available for them.
    Mr. E. Brown: Arrangements are already in operation under which doctors urgently needed in their civil practices are, on the application of the Central Medical War Committee, temporarily released from their Service duties, where this is practicable.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is the Minister aware of the disturbing fact that there are many districts throughout the country where there is a great shortage of doctors, and can he do something still further to remedy this matter, which is a very serious matter?

  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (DEPENDENT RELATIVES)
  Mr. Oliverasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that, in cases where the wives of men serving in the Forces have obtained employment to help to make up the loss of income, some public assistance committees have ceased to pay relief in respect of dependent relatives, with the result that little or no benefit accrues to the household, thereby destroying the incentive to undertake employment; and will he consider making, for the period of the war, a Regulation to prevent such earnings from being assessed for the purposes of maintenance?
  Mr. E. Brown: My attention has not been drawn to any cases of the kind to which my hon. Friend refers. The function of a public assistance committee is to relieve need and it is their duty to discontinue the payment of relief when the need ceases by reason of employment or otherwise. I have no power to make such a Regulation as is suggested in the last part of the Question.
  Mr. Oliver: Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to consider this matter, and, if so, may I give him evidence on which to work?
  Mr. Brown: Surely, I shall be very glad to have it.
  Mr. Oliver: Thank you, Sir.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARIES
  Sir Charles Edwardsasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that articles and letters have appeared in the Press calling attention to the need for alteration of local government boundaries and for larger units of administration; to what extent local authorities are already giving attention to this; whether this was prompted by him; and what steps does he propose to take to carry it into effect?
  Mr. E. Brown: Yes, Sir, and I have also seen the published views of the Association of Local Authorities, which indicate the amount of attention given to the matter in local government circles. The answer to the third part of the Question is "No," and, in reply to the last part, I would refer my right hon. Friend to the reply which my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister gave to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Penryn and Falmouth (Major Petherick) on 19th January.

  ARMED FORCES (PENSIONS AND GRANTS)
  Sir I. Fraserasked the Minister of Pensions what percentage of pensions claims arising during this war in respect of ex-Service men, women and widows, where there has been death or discharge from the Armed Forces owing to unfitness or disability, have been granted; what percentage have been refused; and, in the latter class, what proportion of cases have expressed dissatisfaction at the decision of the Ministry?
  The Minister of Pensions (Sir Walter Womersley): An award of pension has been made in rather under one-half of the cases of men and women who at the time of discharge from the Forces claimed or implied that Service had played some part in the onset or progress of their disability. Nearly 90 per cent. of the claims from widows of men who have been killed or have died during Service have been accepted. It is not possible precisely to state the percentage of those refused pension who have expressed dissatisfaction, but of the cases where pension has initially
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  been refused rather over one-third have made further representations. In some cases these representations have contained additional evidence which has enabled the claim to be accepted.
  Sir I. Fraser: Is my right hon. Friend aware that during the period after the last war something like one-third of all the cases that had been rejected by the Ministry were subsequently admitted by independent appeal tribunals? Does it not follow that in the half that have now been refused there must be a substantial percentage of cases which should be reconsidered?
  Sir W. Womersley: No, I do not admit that at all. I am going to claim that I give far more personal attention to these cases than was given in the period mentioned by the hon. and gallant Member. As regards tribunals, I have said over and over again in this House that I want them as quickly as possible and that they will be set up as soon as it is possible to get the required personnel.
  Mr. Shinwell: Is the Minister not aware that there is now considerable disquiet all over the country because of the position of these men who were accepted as fit for service after passing a very gruelling medical examination and are now being left in the lurch without any pension at all, and are having to apply to public assistance for relief? Will he not reconsider the matter?
  Sir W. Womersley: The concession made by the Government in July, 1941, in the case of men who are passed into the Service A I that if there is a slight aggravation of their condition the Minister can regard that as material and give a pension, resulted in over 70 per cent. Of the men who had been rejected receiving pensions. Of the remainder, I have given most careful consideration to those cases, and I do not think many of them would succeed before a tribunal.
  Mr. Woodburnasked the Minister of Pensions how many soldiers discharged with psycho-neurosis, who entered the Army as A I, have been refused pensions on the ground that this was not due to war service; and whether he is prepared to reconsider this position?
  Sir W. Womersley: I regret that the information asked for is not available. With regard to the second part of the

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  Question, I am always prepared to review an individual case in the light of any fresh presentation.
  Mr. Woodburn: Is it not the case that there is a general feeling growing up in the country that the right hon. Gentleman's medical advisers give the benefit of the doubt against the person who has applied for the pension, and that in every case unless the individual claiming the pension can prove that the disability resulted from war service he cannot get a pension, whereas obviously many things might result from war service which cannot be proved? If the men are accepted as A 1, should they not get a pension?
  Sir W. Womersley: I do not agree with the latter part of the hon. Member's Supplementary Question. It is not a question of our doctors asking men for proof; it is a question of our doctors going through the evidence carefully and making an examination of the man and ascertaining what is his disability and how it might have been brought about. I am satisfied that these cases do receive the most careful consideration.
  Mr. Shinwell: Is not this much more than merely a medical and technical question?
  Mr. Woodburn: Is not this term "psycho-neurosis" another name for what was called "shell-shock" in the last war, and how can it arise from any other cause than the war?
  Sir W. Womersley: There was such a term as the hon. Member mentions in the last war. They call it anxiety neurosis nowadays, and I know another name the sergeant-major has for that. [Interruption.] Hon. Members have not to deal with these cases; I have. I will send the hon. Member or any other hon. Member the findings of the committee of specialists presided over by Lord Horder on this question, and I am acting strictly on the advice given me by those specialists.
  Mr. Lipsonasked the Minister of Pensions whether he has drawn the attention of the Committee which he has appointed to consider the possibility of setting up pensions appeal tribunals, to the fact that 207 applications were received recently from doctors for nine posts under the Mines Department of the Ministry of Fuel and Power?
  Sir W. Womersley: I will inform the Committee, although a careful review of many factors, including the present duties of the doctors in question, would be necessary before any reliable deduction could be drawn.
  Mr. Lipson: In view of the strong demand that these pensions appeal tribunals should be set up, will the qualification and credentials of these doctors be carefully examined, to see how many can be made available for the purpose?
  Sir W. Womersley: Yes, I have received similar representations from other bodies, and I have given them very careful consideration. We are doing our best to get the right medical personnel for these tribunals.

  INDIA

    Prisoners and Detainees
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for India the number, charges and categories of prisoners arising from offences of a political nature during the past 12 months; how many are still detained or imprisoned; and how many times force has been employed in connection with disturbances?
    The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery): I am unable to answer the hon. Member's present Question in full; but I have made a special inquiry as the result of his earlier Question, and am informed that up to 1st December the number of persons arrested in connection with the disturbances of last autumn was 60,229, of whom 39,498 were still under arrest on that date. During the same period the police were compelled to open fire on 470 occasions, and the military on 68 occasions.
    Mr. Sorensen: How many have been killed, Indian and British respectively; and how many floggings have taken place in that period?
    Mr. Speaker—

    Food Supplies
    Mr. Bartlettasked the Secretary of State for India whether, instead of shipping wheat to India to relieve the famine conditions there, he will initiate discussions with the Government of the Union of South Africa for the purchase and transport of maize?
    Mr. Amery: I would remind the hon. Member that I have already explained that conditions in India are not famine conditions. The immediate request of the Government of India is for wheat, and I have no reason to think that maize would be an acceptable substitute.
    Sir S. Reed: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that maize is not an ordinary article of diet in Western India, where the kharif crop is poor; and that much of the maize shipped from the United States by generous Americans during the famine of 1899–1900 could not be used for human consumption?

    Mr. Nehru and Mr. Gandhi (State of Health)
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any recent report concerning the health of Mr. Jawarharlal Nehru and his daughter and of Mr. Gandhi?
    Mr. Amery: I have had no very recent reports about Mr. Nehru or his daughter, but I am sure that I should have been informed if there had been any deterioration in their health. So far as I am aware, Mr. Gandhi was in his normal state of health when he decided yesterday to undertake a fast.
    Mr. Sorensen: Has the right hon. Gentleman any statement to make regarding the fast contemplated by Mr. Gandhi and the correspondence between him and the Viceroy?
    Mr. Amery: A very full statement on the subject and the whole of the correspondence have been published by the Government of India. They have been reproduced pretty fully in the Press, and I have taken care to have a copy available in the Library.
    Commander Locker-Lampson: Will my right hon. Friend do anything to prevent Mr. Gandhi advertising himself unduly in this way?

  NORFOLK BROADS AND RIVERS (BOATS)
  Mr. G. Griffithsasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that the continued prohibition of the use of boats on the great majority of the Norfolk Broads and rivers is depriving numbers of individuals
  1434
  in need of recreation of the most convenient district where such recreation can be obtained; that the prohibition has caused considerable hardship to persons whose sole means of livelihood is obtained through the use of these broads and rivers; and whether, in view of the changed military situation, he will now consider the restoration of free access to this district and the free use of its waterways?
  The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Herbert Morrison): The restrictions to which my hon. Friend refers prohibit the mooring of pleasure vessels in certain reaches of rivers and the Broads. I regret that I do not see my way to authorise any relaxation of them at the present time.

  DOG RACE TRACKS
  Sir Waldron Smithersasked the Home Secretary how many dog tracks are in operation; how many days a week are they open; what is the totalisator turnover; and what is the approximate daily attendance at each?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Information received last summer showed that there were then 144 dog tracks in use in England and Wales. Racing on dog tracks is limited to one day a week on each track. Information as to the remaining parts of the Question is not available, and I regret that in present conditions the labour involved in obtaining it would not be justified.
  Sir W. SmithersIs the right hon. Gentleman aware that at; one dog track, of which I will give him the name, it is estimated that the turnover is £14,000 every week? Does he not think that the men and money employed should be put to better use during the war?
  Mr. Morrison: We have restricted dog-track racing. I have no deep feeling about it, but I really think it is wrong to exploit the war situation for the furtherance of peace-time policy.
  Mr. G. Griffiths: Could the Home Secretary tell us—
  Mr. Speaker—
  Captain Pooleasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that a large number of taxicabs are used each Saturday afternoon to convey-patrons to greyhound racing at the White City Stadium; that the taxicabs remain there throughout

  1435
  the whole afternoon, thus depriving people who require them for more urgent purposes; and, as there is an underground station within a few hundred yards of the stadium and omnibuses pass the gates, will he take steps to stop this waste of petrol?
  Mr. Morrison: There will be general agreement with my hon. and gallant Friend in condemning the thoughtlessness and lack of public spirit shown by people who use taxis for journeys which could be performed without difficulty by other means; but I know of no method by which the police or the courts could decide in individual cases whether an individual was or was not justified in using a taxi. Nor can I see any practicable method of deciding whether or not a taxi driver is justified in waiting or not waiting for fares at any particular place.
  Captain Poole: Surely, my right hon. Friend in conjunction with the Minister of Fuel and Power ought to be able to do something; and is it not rather disgraceful that men should risk their lives to bring petrol to this country to be frittered away and that some hundreds of taxicabs should stand outside the White City Stadium every Saturday afternoon?
  Mr. Morrison: I have made a general statement at the beginning of this answer not out of sympathy with my hon. and gallant Friend's point of view, but if the responsibility is to be placed on the police of deciding whether any particular taxicab journey is socially necessary or not, I think it would be putting an impossible burden on the police force.
  Captain Poole: Is it not possible for my right hon. Friend to issue an Order prohibiting the use of taxicabs to such places when other means of conveyance are available?
  Mr. Morrison: I do not think that that would be a matter for me.
  Mr. G. Griffiths: Will the Home Secretary prevent taxicabs from being used to convey people to the Stock Exchange?

  BORSTAL INSTITUTIONS (PRE-MILITARY TRAINING)
  Mr. Astorasked the Home Secretary what steps have been taken to institute pre-military training in Borstal institutions?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Pre-military training has not hitherto been adopted in Borstal institutions for the training of young offenders, and the introduction of such training for a substantial proportion of the inmates would present many difficulties. It is, however, recognised that the question deserves consideration, and recently arrangements have been made at one institution for some of the inmates to receive instruction in the Army Cadet Force syllabus. The progress of this experiment will be carefully watched.
  Mr. Astor: In view of the fact that these institutions have always been regarded as educational and not penal establishment, and as it has always been the aim to arouse a sense of citizenship among the inmates, will my right hon. Friend consider pressing on with this idea, because it will help to raise the morale of the whole institution?
  Mr. Morrison: There are certain practical difficulties about it, but, as I have informed my hon. Friend, we are not unsympathetic to his purpose. An experiment is being conducted, and it will be carefully watched.
  Mr. McNeil: Is one of the practical difficulties the fact that at least two of the Women's Auxiliary Services refuse to accept girls from Borstal institutions for service?

  CIVIL DEFENCE

    Detainees
    Mr. W. H. Greenasked the Home Secretary the number of persons detained under Regulation 18B, and the number of enemy aliens detained as at 1st January, 1941, and 1st January, 1943?
    Mr. H. Morrison: The number of persons detained under Defence Regulation 18B on the dates mentioned was 1,089 and 486 respectively. As regards aliens of enemy nationality (including not only Germans and Austrians, but the nationals of all States which are at war with His Majesty) the number of persons interned under the Royal Prerogative whose release had not been authorised was respectively 17,940 and 6,123.

    Black-Out Regulations
    Mr. McEnteeasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the increasing carelessness in

    1437
    private dwelling-houses and in business premises in regard to black-out regulations; and will he draw the attention of the persons responsible to the need for closer attention to this matter?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Reports I have received indicate that in some areas freedom from air raids has led to slackness in observing the black-out regulations. I am satisfied, however, that the police are fully alive to their duties in the matter.

    Fire Service (Requisitioned Garage)
    Flight-Lieutenant Sir Gifford Foxasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that in a small town, of which the facts have been sent to him, the National Fire Service has commandeered the only large garage, to the great inconvenience of residents in the district; that alternative buildings were available for a repair shop such as is needed; that the contemplated alterations will cost about £2,000; and whether he will further investigate the need for this outlay?
    Mr. H. Morrison: I regret the necessity for taking this garage for National Fire Service purposes. This course was taken only after extensive search had been made, in vain, for suitable accommodation elsewhere, and after full consultation with the Factory and Storage Control Department of the Board of Trade and the Ministry of War Transport as to the availability of alternative accommodation which would serve the purpose. I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that there is very real and urgent need for a National Fire Service workshop in the district, and I understand that other garages are available not far away for the garaging and parking of private cars. I am having inquiry made as to the extent and the probable cost of any alterations to the premises that may be necessary, but I understand they are not expected to reach the figure mentioned.
    Sir G. Fox: Will my right hon. Friend consider whether it is necessary to put a central heating system into this garage?
    Mr. Morrison: I could not answer that point of detail without notice.

    Cycle-Lamp Batteries (Workers, Prosecution)
    Mr. Dribergasked the Home Secretary whether, pending the promised increase in the supply of bicycle-lamp batteries,
    1438
    he will advise magistrates to deal leniently with workers engaged in vital war industry who are obliged to cycle to and from their work and can show that they have been unable to obtain batteries?
    Mr. H. Morrison: No, Sir. It is for the magistrates to decide the appropriate penalty to be imposed in any particular case having regard to the nature of the offence and to any mitigating circumstances. It would not be proper for me to seek to interfere with the exercise of this discretion.
    Mr. Driberg: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that there is a very wide divergence of practice between magistrates in exactly similar cases causing very real hardship to people who are in effect innocent, and could he not issue a circular to magistrates on the subject?
    Mr. Morrison: I am afraid that there is always some divergence of practice between benches, and I do not see how that can be avoided under our local system of administering justice. But the real remedy is the supply of batteries, on which my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade has recently made a helpful statement.
    Mr. R. J. Taylor: Will my right hon. Friend give advice to motorists who have to travel during the night that they should travel with the greatest possible care, for the safety of cyclists, which is more important than the fine?
    Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward: Is it not almost entirely for the cyclists' own protection that they are made to carry lamps; and is it not in their own interests that they should be fined if they do not carry them?
    Mr. Morrison: There is a considerable element of risk to the cyclist in not carrying a lamp, I agree.

  BARONESS ANNE MARIE VON DER GOLTZ
  Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Home Secretary whether Baroness Von der Goltz, of Pomerania, is still in this country; whether she is interned and, if so, upon what grounds; and with what organisations or political bodies she was formerly associated?
  Mr. H. Morrison: According to the records of my Department, the Baroness

  1439
  Anne Marie Von der Goltz left this country in February, 1939, after a visit of about a fortnight, and has not been here since.

  CIRCUS ANIMALS (CONDITION)
  Mr. Messerasked the Home Secretary whether he has inquired into the conditions in which the animals belonging to the Harry Benet International Circus are kept, a report on which has been sent to him?
  Mr. H. Morrison: When this circus was recently at Hammersmith, an inspection made on behalf of the London County Council showed that such of the animals as had been brought to London were in good condition and properly cared for As, however, the letter which my hon. Friend sent referred to other animals than those brought to London, I am having further inquiry made.

  PAMPHLET, "WHY IS THE RUMANIAN ARMY FIGHTING?"
  Mr. Evelyn Walkdenasked the Home Secretary whether he has examined the pamphlet, "Why is the Rumanian Army Fighting?" published by G. Emiliescu, formerly assistant Rumanian military attaché in London, which applauds the present Rumanian army now fighting for the Axis against Soviet Russia; and, as many passages in this pamphlet are anti-Soviet in character and in effect pro-Axis, if he will take measures to prevent its further circulation as injurious to the war effort?
  Mr. H. Morrison: While His Majesty's Government deprecate strongly the attitude this pamphlet adopts towards our Soviet Ally, I do not think that it would be correct to describe it as pro-Axis. In any event, the pamphlet is not of sufficient importance as to require any action on my part.
  Mr. Walkden: Could my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he is keeping an eye on gentlemen of this type, who seem to have their own brand of Hitler doctrine, and to circulate it in pamphlets week by week?
  Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir, and I think it would be wise for enemy aliens in particular not to enter into matters which are controversial in this country.
  Sir Percy Harris: Can my right hon. Friend say how they are able to get paper for matters of this kind?
  Mr. Morrison: That would not be a matter for me.

  ENEMY RAIDERS (COUNTER-MEASURES)
  Captain C. S. Taylorasked the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied that everything possible is being done from a military and civil point of view to combat the tip-and-run raiders on the South-East coast?
  The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): Yes, Sir.
  Captain Taylor: As the right hon. Gentleman will realise, this is a matter which it is unwise to discuss in public for security reasons. I therefore beg to give notice that I shall raise it on the Adjournment at an early date and take the opportunity of spying Strangers.

  FORESTRY COMMISSION (WELSH REPRESENTATION)
  Sir Henry Morris-Jonesasked the Prime Minister whether he will appoint a Welsh representative on the Forestry Commission?
  Mr. Attlee: There is at present no vacancy on the Forestry Commission, but I understand that my hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean (Mr. Price) was asked some time ago by the Commission to take a special interest on their behalf in Welsh aspects of their work.
  Sir H. Morris-Jones: Is it the case that out of eight commissioners there is not a Welsh representative on this Commission; and in view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman promised this House last year, on behalf of the War Cabinet, that full consideration in future would be given to the question of Welsh interests, will he reconsider this matter?
  Mr. Attlee: That is a point that might be borne in mind when there is a first vacancy.

  CADET ORGANISATIONS
  Mr. Bartlettasked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the amalgamation of the Sea Cadet Corps, the Army

  1441
  Cadet Force and the Air Training Corps into a United Services Training Corps under a single administration with a common age of entry which shall be not later than the statutory school-leaving age?
  Mr. Attlee: There are practical objections to the proposal. Pre-Service Cadet organisations exist in great measure to meet the needs of Service Departments and must therefore be managed by them. Furthermore, cadets enrol voluntarily, and I am doubtful whether a common service or a common uniform would appeal to them as the service uniforms do now. But I agree that it is important that a high degree of common practice should be aimed at in the training of pre-service cadets, particularly from 14–15½, and that wherever possible, organisation and finance should follow the same lines, and that transfer between corps should be facilitated wherever it is of advantage to do so. An Inter-Services Cadet Committee exists to secure the greatest possible measure of co-ordination on these lines.
  Mr. Bartlett: Will the right hon. Gentleman see to it that the Inter-Services Committee has rather more power, because is it not-a fact that a great many regional organisers of these services want amalgamation and believe that it would be in the interests of the training?
  Mr. Attlee: I am not aware of that.

  WOMEN'S SERVICES (POST-WAR DUTIES)
  Mrs. Cazalet Keirasked the Prime Minister whether any action is proposed by the Government to carry out the suggestions in Section 19 of the Report on the Women's Services, that members of the Auxiliary Services should form part of the Armed Forces for work in Europe and elsewhere after the war?
  Mr. Attlee: This suggestion is now being examined.

  BEVERIDGE COMMITTEE (SIGNING OF REPORT)
  Sir John Mellorasked the Minister without Portfolio what issues, which were not foreseen when the Beveridge Committee was appointed, caused his predecessor, on 27th January, 1942, to direct
  1442
  that those members who were civil servants should not sign the Report?
  The Minister without Portfolio (Sir William Jowitt): I do not think that I can usefully add anything on this subject to the statement in paragraph 40 of the Beveridge Report.
  Sir J. Mellor: As these items are not described in that paragraph, will my right hon. and learned Friend now describe them?
  Sir W. Jowitt: All the relevant considerations are set out in that paragraph.
  Sir J. Mellor: Will my right hon. and learned Friend say why Parliament was not informed of these matters at the time they arose?
  Sir W. Jowitt: I can only suppose that it was because it was not considered necessary so to do.

  AGRICULTURE

    Hampshire Rivers Area
    Squadron-Leader Donnerasked the Minister of Agriculture (1) whether, in view of the compromise reached with the fishing interests, he is satisfied that the condition of the land in the valleys of the Hampshire rivers is such as to meet the needs of war in the matter of food production; and will he give an assurance that such measures as may be necessary to bring the land into full cultivation will be taken forthwith;
    (2), why a compromise was effected which precluded the Hampshire Rivers Catchment Board from operating outside the main river area as requested by the Hampshire War Agricultural Executive Committee, and as provided for under Section 14 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous War Provisions) Acts;
    (3), whether he will establish an impartial committee of inquiry, with one of His Majesty's Judges as chairman, to consider the extension of the activities of the Hampshire Rivers Catchment Board so as to include within their purview the Upper Test and Upper Itchin and submit the full evidence now at the disposal of the Hampshire War Agricultural Executive Committee for the consideration of the committee of inquiry?
    Captain Gammansasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he gave instructions that the Hampshire War Agricultural Executive Committee should be consulted before reaching a compromise with the fishing interests in the Test Valley?
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture (Mr. Tom Williams): As the answer is inevitably very long, I will, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the answer: The history of this matter is briefly as follows:—
    When, as a result of several personal visits, my right hon. Friend decided that it was necessary to try and do something to deal with the drainage position on the River Test and other rivers in Hampshire he made an Order creating the Hampshire Rivers Catchment Area. In view of the volume of objections, a public inquiry was held. At the inquiry the objectors included not only the owners of some hundred thousand acres, but several local authorities, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, Winchester College, the watercress growers and certain fishery interests. At the conclusion of the inquiry two courses were open to my right hon. Friend: (1) to obtain the sanction of Parliament to the Order or (2) to endeavour to reach a compromise. The House will note that an Order if opposed has to go through the ordinary Private, Bill Procedure of this House. In view of the volume of opposition, it was clear that this process would inevitably take considerable time, and there was no certainty that the Order would not be rejected. Even if Parliament had confirmed the Order, further delay would have been incurred in setting up the Board, and there would have been a legacy of bitterness which would have promised ill for the future operations of a Board set up under such circumstances.
    My right hon. Friend's main concern was to try and increase the area of arable in the valley. He satisfied himself that there was no practical hope of securing any appreciable increase of arable in the Upper Test and that the most promising area was that below Kimbridge. He therefore decided that the most effective procedure and the one that was likely to obtain the quickest results in war-time would be to proceed with the constitution
    1444
    of a Catchment Board but to limit the extent of its "main river" on which it is statutorily empowered to do drainage work, in the case of the River Test to the lower part of the river, and to rely on the willing co-operation of the various interests to do by voluntary support what was possible to improve the meadows for grazing in the Upper Test. He accordingly made the Order on the understanding that the "main river" would be so limited and this arrangement has come to be known as "the compromise." He accepts full responsibility for this decision. The Catchment Board have been constituted, they have set to Work; they have appointed an engineer, carried out surveys and work has actually been started. All this has been done very much more quickly than would have been possible under the alternative procedure referred to above. In addition to that, voluntary schemes have been discussed and I understand accepted, which will result in a material improvement in the condition of the meadows in the Upper Test.
    My right hon. Friend is aware that there is still a good deal of propaganda going on against the decision which he made. His sole aim is to bring about the quickest possible results in war-time, having regard to the necessary limitations of labour and machinery. He would venture to appeal to all concerned to cease recriminations and to get on with the job (a) of improving the grazing in the Upper Test, and (b) of increasing the arable for the Lower Test as far as possible.
    I should add that the Hampshire War Agricultural Executive Committee are my right hon. Friend's agents for the purpose of increasing food production in accordance with such powers and duties as he delegates to them. Certain members of that Committee including the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman have been made members of the Catchment Board, and this step should ensure the necessary co-operation between all parties.

    Milch Cows (Tubercle Tests)
    Mr. Purbrickasked the Minister of Agriculture when he proposes to introduce the testing of milch cows for tubercle germs and the destruction, with compensation, of all found so suffering?
    Mr. T. Williams: My hon. Friend's suggestion is, I am afraid, impracticable.

    Land Drainage, Monmouthshire
    Sir C. Edwardsasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware of the hundreds of acres of valuable land between Newport, Monmouthshire, and the Severn Junction which is more or less permanently under water; who claims to own this land; and whether he will take power to compel them to adopt a system of drainage which will bring this land into cultivation again, or take over this land on behalf of the nation and undertake whatever work may be necessary to ensure permanent reclamation?
    Mr. T. Williams: My right hon. Friend is aware of the large area of waterlogged land in this district. Responsibility and full powers for arterial drainage rest with the Caldicot and Wentlooge Level Drainage Board, who have recently succeeded the Monmouthshire Commission of Sewers and are completing three grant-aided schemes of work which were begun by the Commission under the Agriculture Act, 1937. As regards supplementary work, my right hon. Friend will consider whether any action is required under the Defence Regulations. I have no information as to the ownership of the land concerned.

  HERRING SCHOOLS (LOCATION)
  Sir Robert Rankinasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that the Canadian Government Fisheries Research Department are experimenting with a system of locating herring schools by echo-sounding; and whether, in view of the demand for herring, he too will experiment with this new device?
  Mr. T. Williams: The answer to the first part of the Question is "Yes, Sir." Moderately successful experiments were unofficially undertaken before the war in this country.

  LENIN MONUMENT, FINSBURY (DAMAGE)
  Mr. Woodsasked the Home Secretary whether he will institute a special investigation into the mutilation of the monument to Lenin, in the borough of Finsbury, with a view, not only to the apprehension of those guilty of such vandalism, but to ascertain if such acts are inspired and organised by agencies or bodies opposed to the successful prosecution of the war?
  Mr. H. Morrison: As soon as this outrage was discovered immediate steps were taken to trace those responsible, and investigations are still proceeding. At the moment, therefore, I am not in a position to make any further statement, but I need hardly say that everything possible will be done to bring to justice the author, or authors, of this deplorable and senseless piece of vandalism.
  Mr. Woods: Is the Home Secretary aware that it is the belief in the locality that such elaborate preparations could not have been made by individuals and must have been the work of an organised body, and will he try and ascertain by whom they were inspired and organised?
  Mr. Morrison: I can assure my hon. Friend that all these factors are kept in mind.

  JEWS AND OTHER REFUGEES (ADMISSION TO UNITED KINGDOM)
  Miss Rathboneasked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the widespread anxiety to offer every possible means of escape to Jewish and other victims of Nazi persecution, he has reconsidered the restrictions which have hitherto impeded the admission of such persons to this country; and whether he will state the conditions under which admission will now be permitted?
  Mr. H. Morrison: I am not in a position to add anything to the statements already made on this subject on behalf of His Majesty's Government.
  Miss Rathbone: Will the right hon. Gentleman be in a position to make a further statement if I put down a Question, say, next week; and is he aware that in the meantime there is great anxiety on the subject and that we are all besieged by letters from agonised refugees and their friends and sympathisers, who wish to know whether it is not possible to do something?
  Mr. Morrison: I am not in a position to say what I might be able to say next week. As my hon. Friend will recall, the position of the Government was clearly stated. This is a United Nations problem, and I am not in a position to say anything, because I cannot control the actions of other Governments.
  Commander Looker-Lampson: If we put down a Question next week, will the right hon. Gentleman answer it?
  Mr. Morrison: I certainly cannot stop my hon. Friends from putting a Question down next week.
  Miss Rathbone: My Question applies to this country, and should we not set the example ourselves before we can expect other countries to do so?

  EVACUEES, UNITED STATES (REMITTANCES FROM UNITED KINGDOM)
  Mr. Viantasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, as a matter of principle, remittances payable to adult evacuees in the United States of America on the footing that they are in charge of children remain payable in cases where they are in gainful employment and in receipt of a dollar income and in cases where they have taken out first naturalisation papers; and whether he is aware that remittances are being made in such cases?
  The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Kingsley Wood): Yes, Sir. I should not desire to refuse applications to purchase exchange up to the equivalent of £10 per month to be transferred to such persons if they take gainful employment and so relieve the burden on their hosts. I am aware that remittances are allowed in such cases. As I have already explained, remittances are not confined to British nationals.

  DEPARTMENTAL DOCUMENTS (IDENTIFICATION)
  Sir J. Mellorasked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he will direct Departments to identify upon all notices, circulars and memoranda, issued for public information, the Minister or officer authorising such issue, together with reference to any statutory or other provision relied upon?
  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Assheton): So far as I know, notices or circulars issued by Government Departments for the information or guidance of the public state explicitly or indicate clearly in the text the Department from which they originate, and, therefore, the Minister responsible. Where action is
  1448
  taken under specific statutory or similar enactments, it is I believe usual to refer to them. If the hon. Member has in mind any particular class of document where either point is obscure, perhaps he will communicate with me.

  HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS (HOUSE CHARGES)
  Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Mooreasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food when it is proposed to annul the system of house-charges as this has resulted in increased profits to the restaurant at the expense of the consumer?
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (Mr. Mabane): My Noble Friend does not propose to amend the Meals in Establishment Order, 1942, in the sense suggested by my hon. Friend. I cannot accept the suggestion in the latter part of my hon. and gallant Friend's Question.
  Sir T. Moore: Does the Parliamentary Secretary realise that these charges serve no useful purpose except to enrich the profits of luxury hotels and force the public to eat and pay for what they do not want?
  Mr. Mabane: I cannot accept that as the main reason for the present prosperity of restaurants.

  CABBAGES (PIG FOOD)
  Mr. Thorneasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether he can give any information about several tons of cabbages that were sent from Worcestershire to Glasgow on 27th January for a few shillings per ton for the purpose of feeding pigs; and what he intends doing about the matter?
  The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport (Mr. Noel-Baker): I am making inquiries and will communicate with my hon. Friend.

  AEROPLANE (BOY'S FLIGHT)
  Mr. Thorneasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he can give any information about the boy, 14 years of age, who took an aeroplane from an aerodrome

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  on Salisbury Plain, flew it and, on coming down, landed in a tree; and why the aeroplane was not immobilised?
  The Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair): I am informed that the aircraft in question belongs to the United States Army and that an inquiry by the United States authorities into the incident is taking place.

  U-BOAT CAMPAIGN (PUBLICATION OF LOSSES)
  Sir C. Edwardsasked the Minister of Information whether he is aware that in the news broadcast from Germany every evening extracts are quoted from the British Press with reference to the success of the German U-boats and its serious effect on this country; and whether, as this is a direct encouragement to the Germans to concentrate on this work, he will take steps to forbid reports of this kind in future?
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Information (Mr. Thurtle): The Press in this country is free to express its opinions and warnings on a subject of great public importance, such as the U-boat campaign, and my right hon. Friend could not forbid this, even if he wanted to. You cannot have free discussion on such matters without running the risk of affording some consolation to the German propagandist.

  BRITISH ARMY

    Special Campaign Pensions (Means Test)
    Sir Smedley Crookeasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the application of the means test in connection with special campaign pensions is less sympathetic than that applied by other Government Departments with resultant hardship to a number of deserving old soldiers; and whether he is now in a position to accept the proposals on this matter, submitted to the Commisisoners of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, by the British Legion in April of last year?
    The Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. Arthur Henderson): The operation of the means condition for special campaign pensions has been under
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    review, and certain changes in practice have been made. I regret, however, that I cannot accept my hon. Friend's suggestion for a radical change in the rules governing these pensions.
    Mr. Bellenger: Is the Financial Secretary aware that conditions have drastically changed since special campaign pensions were inaugurated many years ago? Will he make them what they were intended to be—extra rewards to old soldiers who have served their country well?
    Mr. Henderson: My hon. Friend is wrong in his assumption. The awards were provided for soldiers who received a war medal, irrespective of the length of their service.

    Home Guard (Post-War Use)
    Sir Smedley Crookeasked the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been drawn to a statement recently made by the General Officer in Command, London District as to the future use of the Home Guard; and whether it is the intention of the Government to use the Home Guard as a police force at the conclusion of hostilities?
    Mr. A. Henderson: I have seen reports of the statement referred to. The Home Guard has been raised and organised to meet the threat of invasion. It has no duties other than those connected with the local defence of Great Britain, including air defence. The use of the Home Guard when the need for performing its present duties is removed is a matter which cannot be decided until that time comes, but I can assure my hon. Friend that there is no intention—nor was there any suggestion in the G.O.C's statement—to use the Home Guard as a police force.
    Captain C. S. Taylor: In view of the man-power shortage, could some of the Home Guard be used to help man antiaircraft guns on the South and South-East coast?
    Mr. McEntee: Will Home Guards, when they have served for 21 years, become entitled to a Service pension?

  WAR CRIMINALS
  Colonel Burtonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the process of compiling a list of enemy war criminals is in course of preparation?
  The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Richard Law): I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the reply given to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight (Captain P. Macdonald) on 16th December last.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Arthur Greenwood: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the Business for our next series of Sittings?
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): The first, second and third Sittings Days will be set apart for a Debate on Sir William Beveridge's Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services. The Debate will take place upon a Motion standing in the names of Members of all parties supporting the Government.
[That this House welcomes the Report of Sir William Beveridge on Social Insurance and Allied Services as a comprehensive review of the present provisions in this sphere and as a valuable aid in determining the lines on which developments and legislation should be pursued as part of the Government's policy of post-war reconstruction.]
During the week we shall ask the House to agree to the Committee and remaining stages of the House of Commons Disqualification (Temporary Provisions) Bill.
Mr. Greenwood: May I follow a question I put to my right hon. Friend two days ago, arising out of the difficulty that I am sure many Members are in, in giving proper consideration to so weighty a statement as that which the Prime Minister will be making immediately following that statement? Would it be possible for my right hon. Friend to make arrangements at an early date for a further Debate on the War Situation?
Mr. Eden: The arrangements have been made for this occasion, and time has been allowed to enable a discussion to take place after the Prime Minister has spoken, so that I think that for this particular occasion that arrangement might stand. As to whether it is possible or desirable to change the present system, I am quite ready to consider that and examine it through the usual channels.
Mr. Henderson Stewart: May I ask two questions about which I have been in communication with the right hon. Gentleman? Is a member of the Government likely to speak early in the Debate on the Beveridge Report, and, secondly, as there is a Motion standing in my name and that of hon. Members of every other party, dealing with Forestry, may we expect that at an early date there will be a Debate on this very important subject?
[That in order to secure the best co-ordinated use of Scottish land in the national interests for the production of food and timber it is desirable that the functions of the Forestry Commission as they affect Scotland should be vested in a special Forestry Division of the Scottish Department of Agriculture, thereafter to be known as the Scottish Department of Agriculture and Forestry.]
Mr. Eden: With regard to the first question, the answer is "Yes." A statement will be made by a member of the Government during the early stages of the Debate on the Beveridge Report. As regards the second question, I cannot give an undertaking, though if an opportunity could be found, I should not be opposed to it. I cannot, however, give any undertaking.
Mr. Rhys Davies: Has the right hon. Gentleman noted the fact that there is a Motion on the Order Paper standing in the name of 94 Members of this House asking for a declaration of peace aims? Can we have a Debate on that?
[That this House would welcome a Declaration by His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the United Nations, clarifying, amending and enlarging the Atlantic Charter, so that the peoples of the world, friendly, neutral and enemy alike, may be better informed of the aims for which the United Nations are fighting.]
Mr. Eden: I am afraid I cannot give any undertaking on that.
Mr. Stokes: Arising out of the reply which the Leader of the House has just given, is he aware that there is very wide interest in the country on this matter and that I have addressed no fewer than 100 meetings about it?
Mr. Eden: I have no doubt that there is very wide interest, and I am sure the hon. Gentleman is hoping to stimulate it.

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But for the moment I am dealing only with Business.
Mr. Gallacher: In view of the fact that during the discussion on the Beveridge Report many questions may be asked in conection with old age pensions, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government intend to provide the opportunity for a separate discussion on this question? If that were done, it would obviate points on this question being made during the Debate on the Beveridge Report.
Mr. Eden: I could not give a date at present, but, of course, the subject will be open for discussion during the Debate which will take place during our next series of Sittings.
Sir Herbert Williams: May I ask a question which is not so important? Will my right hon. Friend arrange for a Debate before 1st March—when it comes into effect—on the Order published by the Board of Trade to-day relating to hire purchase?
Mr. Eden: Perhaps my hon. Friend will be good enough to let me consider that, as I have not had notice of it.
Sir F. Fremantle: May we have a statement in regard to the Business for to-day?
Mr. Eden: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is about to make his statement on the Adjournment, and it will be open for debate.

ARMY (SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1942)
Estimate presented, of the further sum required to be voted for the Army for the year ending 31st March, 1943 [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed. [No. 46.]
ARMY ESTIMATES, 1943
Estimates presented, for the Army for the financial year 1943 [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply and to be printed. [No. 47.]

WAR SITUATION
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. James Stuart.]
The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): The dominating aim which we set before ourselves at the Conference at Casablanca was to engage the enemy's forces on land, sea, and in the air on the largest possible scale and at the earliest possible moment. The importance of coming to ever closer grips with the enemy and intensifying the struggle outweighs a number of other considerations which ordinarily would be decisive in themselves. We have to make the enemy burn and bleed in every way that is physically and reasonably possible, in the same way as he is being made to burn and bleed along the vast Russian front from the White Sea to the Black Sea. But this is not so simple as it sounds. Great Britain and the United States were formerly peaceful countries, ill-armed and unprepared. They are now warrior nations, walking in the fear of the Lord, very heavily armed, and with an increasingly clear view of their salvation. We are actually possessed of very powerful and growing forces, with great masses of munitions coming along. The problem is to bring these forces into action. The United States has vast oceans to cross in order to close with her enemies. We also have seas or oceans to cross in the first instance, and then for both of us there is the daring and complicated enterprise of landing on defended coasts and also the building-up of all the supplies and communications necessary for vigorous campaigning when once a landing has been made.
It is because of this that the U-boat warfare takes the first place in our thoughts. There is no need to exaggerate the danger of the U-boats or to worry our merchant seamen by harping upon it unduly, because the British and American Governments have known for some time past that there were these U-boats about and have given the task of overcoming them the first priority in all their plans. This was reaffirmed most explicitly by the Combined Staffs at Casablanca. The losses we suffer at sea are very heavy, and they hamper us and delay our operations. They prevent us from coming info action with our full strength, and thus they prolong the war, with its certain

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waste and loss and all its unknowable hazards.
Progress is being made in the war against the U-boats. We are holding our own, and more than holding our own. Before the United States came into the war, we made our calculations on the basis of British building and guaranteed Lend-Lease, which assured us of a steady and moderate improvement in our position by the end of 1943 on a very high scale of losses. There never was a moment in which we did not see our way through, provided that what the United States promised us was made good.
Since then various things have happened. The United States have entered the war, and their shipbuilding has been stepped up to the present prodigious levels, amounting for the year 1943 to over 13,000,000 gross tons, or, as they would express it in American nomenclature, 18,000,000 or 19,000,000 dead weight tons. When the United States entered the war she brought with her a Mercantile Marine, American and American-controlled, of perhaps 10,000,000 gross tons, as compared with our then existing tonnage, British and British-controlled, of about—I am purposely not being precise—twice as much. On the other hand, the two Powers had more routes to guard, more jobs to do, and they therefore of course presented more numerous targets to the U-boats. Very serious depredations were committed by the U-boats off the East coast of America until the convoy system was put into proper order by the exertions of Admiral King. Heavy losses in the Far East were also incurred at the outset of the war against Japan when the Japanese pounced upon large quantities of British and United States shipping there. The great operation of landing in North Africa and maintaining the armies ashore naturally exposed the Anglo-American fleets to further losses, though there is a compensation for that which I will refer to later; and the Arctic convoys to Russia have also imposed a heavy toll, the main part of both these operational losses having fallen upon the British.
In all these circumstances it was inevitable that the joint American and British, losses in the past 15 months should exceed the limits for which we British ourselves, in the days when we were
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alone, had budgeted. However, when the vast expansion in the United States shipbuilding is added to the credit side, the position is very definitely improved. It is in my opinion desirable to leave the enemy guessing at our real figures, to let him be the victim of his own lies, and to deprive him of every means of checking the exaggerations of his U-boat captains or of associating particular losses with particular forms and occasions of attack. I therefore do not propose to give any exact figures. This, however, I may say, that in the last six months, which included some of those heavy operations which I have mentioned, the Anglo-American and the important Canadian new building, all taken together, exceeded all the losses of the United Nations by over 1,250,000 gross tons. That is to say, our joint fleet is 1,250,000 tons bigger to-day than it was six months ago. That is not much, but it is something, and something very important.
But that statement by no means does justice to the achievement of the two countries, because the great American flow of shipbuilding is leaping up month by month, and the losses in the last two months are the lowest sustained for over a year. The number of U-boats is increasing, but so are their losses, and so also are the means of attacking them and protecting the convoys. It is, however, a horrible thing to plan ahead in cold blood on the basis of losing hundreds of thousands of tons a month, even if you can show a favourable balance at the end of a year. The waste of precious cargoes, the destruction of so many noble ships, the loss of heroic crews, all combine to constitute a repulsive and sombre panorama. We cannot possibly rest content with losses on this scale, even though they are outweighed by new building, even if they are not for that reason mortal in their character. Nothing is more clearly proved than that well-escorted convoys, especially when protected by long-distance aircraft, beat the U-boats. I do not say that they are a complete protection, but they are an enormous mitigation of losses. We have had hardly any losses at sea in our heavily escorted troop convoys. Out of about 3,000,000 soldiers who have been moved under the protection of the British Navy about the world, to and fro across the seas and

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oceans, about 1,348 have been killed or drowned, including missing. It is about 2,200 to one against your being drowned if you travel in British troop convoys in this present war.
Even if the U-boats increase in number, there is no doubt that a superior proportionate increase in the naval and air escort will be a remedy. A ship not sunk is better than a new ship built. Therefore, in order to reduce the waste in the merchant shipping convoys, we have decided, by successive steps during the last six months, to throw the emphasis rather more on the production of escort vessels, even though it means some impingement on new building. Very great numbers of escort vessels are being constructed in Great Britain and the United States, equipped with every new device of anti-U-boat warfare in all its latest refinements. We pool our resources with the United States, and we have been promised, and the promise is being executed in due course, our fair allocation of American-built escort vessels.
There is another point. Everyone sees how much better it is to have fast ships than slow. This is also true of racehorses, as the Noble Lady was well aware in her unregenerate days. However, speed is a costly luxury. The most careful calculations are made and are repeatedly revised as between having fewer fast ships or more slow ones. The choice, however, is not entirely a free one. The moment you come into the sphere of fast ships, engine competition enters a new phase. It starts with the escort vessels but in other directions and also in the materials for the higher speed engines there come other complicated factors. I should strongly advise the House to have confidence in the extremely capable people who, with full knowledge of all the facts, are working day in day out on all these aspects and who would be delighted to fit an additional line of fast ships, even at some loss in aggregate tonnage, provided they could be sure that the engines would not clash with other even more urgent needs. In all these matters I should like the House to realise that we do have to aim at an optimum rather than at a maximum, which is not quite the same thing.
On the offensive side the rate of killing U-boats has steadily improved. From
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January to October, 1942, inclusive, a period of 10 months, the rate of sinkings, certain and probable, was the best we have seen so far in this war, but from November to the present day, a period of three months, that rate has improved more than half as much again.
At the same time, the destructive power of the U-boat has undergone a steady diminution since the beginning of the war. In the first year, each operational U-boat that was at work accounted for an average of 19 ships; in the second year, for an average of 12, and in the third year for an average of 7½. These figures, I think, are, in themselves, a tribute to the Admiralty and to all others concerned.
It is quite true that at the present time, as I said in answer to an inquiry by my hon. Friend the Member for Seaham (Mr. Shinwell) the other day, we are making inroads upon the reserves of food and raw materials which we prudently built up in the earlier years of the war. We are doing this for the sake of the military operations in Africa and Asia and in the Far Pacific. We are doing it for the sake of the Russian convoys, and for the sake of giving aid and supplies to India and to Persia and other Middle Eastern countries. We are doing this on the faith of President Roosevelt's promise to me of large allocations of shipping coming to us, as the floods of American new building come upon the seas. Risks have to be run, but I can assure the House that these needs are not left to chance and to sudden and belated panic spurts. Provided that the present intense efforts are kept up here and in the United States, and that anti-U-boat warfare continues to hold first place in our thoughts and energies, I take the responsibility of assuring the House—and I have not misled them so far—that we shall be definitely better off, so far as shipping is concerned, at the end of 1943 than we are now, and while it is imprudent to try to peer so far ahead, all the tendencies show that unless something entirely new and unexpected happens in this well-explored field, we shall be still better off at the end of 1944, assuming that the war continues until then. It may be disappointing to Hitler to learn that we are upon a rising tide of tonnage and not upon an ebb or shrinkage, but it is the governing fact of the situation. Therefore, let everyone engaged in this sphere of operations bend to

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his or her task and try to get the losses down and try to get the launchings up; and let them do this, not under the spur of fear or gloom, or patriotic jitters, but in the sure and exhilarating consciousness of a gigantic task which is forging steadily forward to successful accomplishment. The more the sinkings are reduced, the more vehement our Anglo-American war effort can be. The margin, improving and widening, means the power to strike heavier blows against the enemy. The greater the weight we can take off Russia, the quicker the war will come to an end. All depends upon the margin of new building forging ahead over the losses, which, although improving, are still, as I have said, a lamentable and grievous fact to meditate upon. Meanwhile, let the enemy if he will, nurse his Vain hopes of averting his doom by U-boat warfare. He cannot avert it, but he may delay it, and it is for us to shorten that delay by every conceivable effort we can make.
It was only after full, cold, sober and mature consideration of all these facts, on which our lives and liberties certainly depend, that the President, with my full concurrence as agent of the War Cabinet, decided that the note of the Casablanca Conference should be the unconditional surrender of all our foes. But our inflexible insistence upon unconditional surrender does not mean that we shall stain our victorious arms by wrong and cruel treatment of whole populations. But justice must be done upon the wicked and the guilty, and, within her proper bounds, justice must be stern and implacable. No vestige of the Nazi or Fascist power, no vestige of the Japanese war-plotting machine, will be left by us when the work is done, as done it certainly will be.
That disposes, I think, of two important features of the Casablanca Conference, the recognition that the defeat of the U-boat and the improvement of the margin of shipbuilding resources is the prelude to all effective aggressive operations, and, secondly, after considering all those facts, the statement which the President wished to be made on the subject of unconditional surrender. But the Casablanca Conference was, in my not inconsiderable experience of these functions, in various ways unparalleled. There never has been, in all the inter-Allied Conferences I have known, anything like the prolonged professional
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examination of the whole scene of the world war in its military, its armament production and its economic aspects. This examination was conducted through the whole day, and far into the night, by the military, naval and air experts, sitting by themselves, without political influence thrust upon them, although general guidance was given by the President and by myself. But they were sitting by themselves talking all these matters out as experts and professionals. Some of these conferences in the last war, I remember, lasted a day or two days, but this was 11 days. If I speak of decisions taken, I can assure the House that they are based upon professional opinion and advice in their integrity. There never has been anything like that.
When you have half a dozen theatres of war open in various parts of the globe there are bound to be divergences of view when the problem is studied from different angles. There were many divergences of view before we came together, and it was for that reason, that I had been pressing for so many months for the meeting of as many of the great Allies as possible. These divergences are of emphasis and priority rather than of principle. They can only be removed by the prolonged association of consenting and instructed minds. Human judgment is fallible. We may have taken decisions which will prove to be less good than we hoped, but at any rate anything is better than not having a plan. You must be able to answer every question in these matters of war and have a good, clear, plain answer to the question: what is your plan, what is your policy? But it does not follow that we always give the answer. It would be foolish.
We have now a complete plan of action, which comprises the apportionment of forces as well as their direction, and the weight of the particular movements which have been decided upon; and this plan we are going to carry out according to our ability during the next nine months, before the end of which we shall certainly make efforts to meet again. I feel justified in asking the House to believe that their business is being conducted according to a definite design and, although there will surely be disappointments and failures—many disappointments and serious failures and frustrations—there is no question of drifting or indecision,

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or being unable to form a scheme or waiting for something to turn up. For good or for ill, we know exactly what it is that we wish to do. We have the united and agreed advice of our experts behind it, and there is nothing now to be done but to work these plans out in their detail and put them into execution one after the other.
I believe it was Bismarck—I have not been able to verify it, but I expect I shall be able to find out now—who said in the closing years of his life that the dominating fact in the modern world was that the people of Britain and of the United States both spoke the same language. If so, it was certainly a much more sensible remark than some of those that we have heard from those who now fill high positions in Germany. Certainly the British and American experts and their political chiefs gain an enormous advantage by the fact that they can interchange their thoughts so easily and freely and so frankly by a common medium of speech.
This, however, did not in any way diminish our great regret that Premier Stalin and some of his distinguished generals could not be with us. The President, in spite of the physical disability which he has so heroically surmounted, was willing to go as far East as Khartoum in the hope that we could have a tripartite meeting. Premier Stalin is, however, the supreme director of the whole vast Russian offensive, which was already then in full swing and which is still rolling remorselessly and triumphantly forward. He could not leave his post, as he told us, even for a single day. But I can assure the House that, although he was absent, our duty to aid to the utmost in our power the magnificent, tremendous effort of Russia and to try to draw the enemy and the enemy's air force from the Russian front was accepted as the first of our objectives once the needs of the anti-U-boat warfare were met in such a way as to enable us to act aggressively.
We have made no secret of the fact that British and American strategists and leaders are unanimous in adhering to their decision of a year ago, namely, that the defeat of Hitler and the breaking of the German power must have priority over the decisive phase of the war against Japan. I have already some two months ago indicated that the defeat of the enemy
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in Europe may be achieved before victory is won over Japan, and I made it clear that in that event all the forces of the British Empire, land, sea and air, will be moved to the Far Eastern theatre with the greatest possible speed, and that Great Britain will continue the war by the side of the United States with the utmost vigour until unconditional surrender has been enforced upon Japan. With the authority of the War Cabinet, I renewed this declaration in our Conference at Casablanca. I offered to make it in any form which might be desired, even embodying it in a special Treaty if that were thought advantageous. The President, however, stated that the word of Great Britain was quite enough for him. We have already, of course, bound ourselves, along with all the rest of the United Nations, to go on together to the end, however long it may take or however grievous the cost may be. I therefore think it only necessary to mention the matter to the House in order to give them the opportunity of registering their assent to that obvious and very necessary declaration. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]
We may now congratulate our American Allies upon their decisive victory at Guadalcanal, upon the taking of which the Japanese had expanded a serious part of their limited strength and largely irreplaceable equipment. We must also express our admiration for the hard-won successes of the Australian and American Forces, who, under their brilliant commander General MacArthur, have taken Buna in New Guinea and slaughtered the last of its defenders. The ingenious use of aircraft to solve the intricate tactical problems, by the transport of reinforcements, supplies and munitions, including field guns, is a prominent feature of MacArthur's generalship and should be carefully studied in detail by all concerned in the technical conduct of the war. In the meantime, while Hitler is being destroyed in Europe, every endeavour will be made to keep Japan thoroughly occupied and force her to exhaust and expend her material strength against the far superior Allied and, above all, American resources. This war in the Pacific Ocean, although fought by both sides with comparatively small forces at the end of enormous distances, has already engaged a great part of the American resources employed overseas as well as those of Australia and New Zealand.

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The effort to hold the dumbbell at arms length is so exhausting and costly to both sides that it would be a great mistake to try to judge the effort by the actual numbers that come into contact at particular points. It is a tremendous effort to fight at four, five and six thousand miles across the ocean under these conditions. It is the kind of effort which is most injurious to Japan, whose resources are incomparably weaker in material than those of which we dispose.
For the time being, in the war against Japan the British effort is confined to the Indian theatre. Our Asiatic war effort is confined to operations to clear Burma, to open the Burma road and to give what aid can be given to the Chinese. That is the task which we have before us. We have been in close correspondence with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whom of course we should have been delighted to see at our Conference had it been possible for him to come. General Arnold, head of the United States Air Force, and Field-Marshal Dill are at present in Chungking concerting what we have in mind with the Chinese Generalissimo. We have already received from him an expression of his satisfaction about the strong additional help that will be provided for China at this stage in her long-drawn, undaunted struggle. The Generalissimo also concurs in the plans for future action in the Far East which we have submitted to him as the result of our deliberations. A communiqué about this Conference, received only a few minutes ago, declares the complete accord between the three Powers in their plans for the co-ordination of their Forces and in their determination in all their operations against Japan to ensure continued efforts and mutual assistance. Discussions between General MacArthur and Field-Marshal Wavell will follow in due course.
So much for the Casablanca decisions and their repercussions as far as they can be made public. I must, however, add this. When I look at all that Russia is doing and the vast achievements of the Soviet Armies, I should feel myself below the level of events if I were not sure in my heart and conscience that everything in human power is being done and will be done to bring British and American Forces into action against the enemy with the utmost speed and energy and on the largest scale. This the
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President and I have urgently and specifically enjoined upon our military advisers and experts. In approving their schemes and allocations of forces, we have asked for more weight to be put into the attacks and more speed into their dates. Intense efforts are now being made on both sides of the Atlantic for this purpose.
From the Conference at Casablanca, with the full assent of the President, I flew to Cairo and thence to Turkey. I descended upon a Turkish airfield at Adana, already well stocked with British Hurricane fighters manned by Turkish airmen, and out of the snow-capped Taurus Mountains there crawled like an enamel caterpillar the Presidential train, bearing on board the head of the Turkish Republic, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, Marshal Chakmak, and the Party Leader—in fact, the High Executive of Turkey. I have already uttered a caution against reading anything into the communiqué which has already been published on this Conference, more than the communiqué conveys. It is no part of of our policy to get Turkey into trouble. On the contrary, a disaster to Turkey would be a disaster to Britain and to all the United Nations. Hitherto, Turkey has maintained a solid barrier against aggression from any quarter and by so doing, even in the darkest days, has rendered us invaluable service in preventing the spreading of the war through Turkey into Persia and Iraq, and in preventing the menace to the oilfields of Abadan which are of vital consequence to the whole Eastern war.
It is an important interest of the United Nations and especially of Great Britain that Turkey should become well armed in all the apparatus of modem war and that her brave infantry shall not lack the essential, weapons which play a decisive part on the battlefields of to-day. These weapons we and the United States are now for the first time in a position to supply to the full capacity of the Turkish railways and other communications. We can give them as much as they are able to take, and we can give these weapons as fast as and faster than the Turkish troops can be trained to use them. At our Conference I made no request of Turkey except to get this rearmament business thoroughly well organised, and a British and Turkish Joint Military Mission is now sitting in Ankara

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in order to press forward to the utmost the development of the general defensive strength of Turkey, the improvement of the communications and, by the reception of the new weapons, to bring its army up to the highest pitch of efficiency. I am sure it would not be possible to pry more closely into this part of our affairs. Turkey is our Ally. Turkey is our friend. We wish her well, and we wish to see her territory, rights and interests effectively preserved. We wish to see, in particular, warm and friendly relations established between Turkey and her great Russian Ally to the North-West, to whom we are bound by the 20-years Anglo-Russian Treaty. Whereas a little while ago it looked to superficial observers as if Turkey might be isolated by a German advance through the Caucasus on one side and by a German-Italian attack on Egypt on the other, a transformation scene has occurred. Turkey now finds on each side of her victorious Powers who are her friends. It will be interesting to see how the story unfolds chapter by chapter, and it would be very foolish to try to skip on too fast.
After discharging our business in Turkey I had to come home, and I naturally stopped at the interesting places on the way where I had people to see and things to do. I think that the story I have to tell follows very naturally stage by stage along my homeward journey. I have already mentioned to the House, at Question time the other day, my very pleasant stay during my return journey at Cyprus, which has played its part so well and is enjoying a period of war-time prosperity. But how different was the situation in Cairo from what I found it in the early days of last year. Then the Desert Army was bewildered and dispirited, feeling themselves better men than the enemy and wondering why they had had to retreat with heavy losses for so many hundreds of miles while Rommel pursued them on their own captured transport and with their own food, petrol and ammunition. Then the enemy was 60 miles from Alexandria, and I had to give orders for every preparation to be made to defend the line of the Nile, exactly as if we were fighting in Kent. I had also to make a number of drastic changes in the High Command. Those changes have been vindicated
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by the results. In a week an electrifying effect was produced upon the Desert Army by General Montgomery and by orders which he issued, and upon the whole situation by the appointment of General Alexander as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. At the same time great reinforcements, despatched many weeks and even months before round the Cape of Good Hope, were steaming up the Red Sea and pouring into the Nile Valley. The American Sherman tank, which the President gave me in Washington on that dark morning when we learned of the fall of Tobruk and the surrender of its 25,000 defenders, came into the hands of troops thirsting to have good weapons to use against the enemy. As a consequence of those events and many others which could be cited, the enemy has been decisively defeated, first in the second Battle of El Alamein, where Rommells final thrust was repulsed, and, secondly, in the great battle for El Alamein, which will do down in history as the Battle of Egypt, for by it Egypt was delivered. On arriving in Cairo I found that now the enemy, who had boasted that he would enter Cairo and Alexandria and cross and cut the Suez Canal, and had even struck a medal to commemorate the event, of which I was handed a specimen, had been rolled back 1,500 miles, and it is probably 1,600 miles by now. What an amazing feat this has been. The battle is one story, the pursuit is another. So rapid an advance by such powerful, competent, heavily equipped forces over distances so enormous is, as far as I am aware, without parallel in modern war; and the Ancients had not the advantages of locomotion which we possess, so they are out of it anyway.
Everywhere in Egypt there is a feeling that Britain has kept her word, that we have been a faithful and unfailing Ally, that we have preserved the Nile Valley and all its cities, villages and fertile lands from the horrors of invasion. It was always said that Egypt could never be invaded across the Western Desert, and certainly that historical fact has now been established upon modern and far stronger foundations.
From Cairo I proceeded on my magic carpet to Tripoli, which 10 days before was in the possession of the enemy. Here I found General Montgomery. I must confess quite frankly that I had not

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realised how magnificent a city and harbour Tripoli has been made. It is the first Italian city to be delivered by British arms from the grip of the Huns. Naturally there was lively enthusiasm among the Italian population, and I can hardly do justice to the effusiveness of the demonstrations of which I was the fortunate object. I had the honour as your servant to review two of our forward divisions. The 51st Highland Division is the successor of that brave division that was overwhelmed on the coast of France in the tragedies of 1940. It has already more than equalised the account which Scotland had open in this matter. In the afternoon I saw a mass of 10,000 New Zealanders, who, with a comparatively small portion of their vast equipment of cannon, tanks and technical vehicles, took one-and-a-half hours to march past. On that day I saw at least 40,000 troops, and as representing His Majesty's Government I had the honour to receive their salutes and greetings. Meanwhile, of course, the front had rolled nearly another 100 miles farther to the West, and the beaten enemy were being pursued back to the new positions in Tunisia on which it is said they intend to make a stand. I do not wish to encourage the House or the country to look for any very speedy new results. They may come, or they may not come. The enemy have carried out very heavy demolitions and blockings in Tripoli harbour. Therefore, supply from the sea is greatly hampered, and I cannot tell what time will be required to clear the port and begin the building-up of a new base for supplies. It is not the slightest use being impatient with these processes. Meanwhile General Montgomery's Army is feeding itself from its base at Cairo, 1,500 miles away, through Tobruk, 1,000 miles away, and Benghazi, 750 miles away, by a prodigious mass of mechanical transport, all organised in a manner truly wonderful.
Presently we may be able to move forward again, but meanwhile the enemy may have time to consolidate his position and to bring in further reinforcements and further equipment. Let us just see how things go. But I should like to say this; I have never in my life, which from my youth up has been connected with military matters, seen troops who march with the style and air of those of the Desert Army. Talk about spit and polish. The
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Highland and New Zealand Divisions paraded after their immense ordeal in the desert as if they had come out of Wellington Barracks. There was an air on the face of every private of that just and sober pride which comes from dear-bought victory and triumph after toil. I saw the same sort of marching smartness, and the same punctilio of saluting and discipline, in the Russian guard of honour which received me in Moscow six months ago. The fighting men of democracy feel that they are coming into their own.
Let me also pay my tribute to this vehement and formidable General Montgomery, a Cromwellian figure, austere, severe, accomplished, tireless, his life given to the study of war, who has attracted to himself in an extraordinary measure the confidence and the devotion of his Army. Let me also pay, in the name of the House, my tribute to General Alexander, on whom the over-riding responsibility lay. I read to the House on 11th November the directive which in those critical days I gave to General Alexander. I may perhaps refresh the memory of hon. Members by reading it again:
"1. Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German-Italian army commanded by Field-Marshal Rommel, together with all its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya."
"2. You will discharge, or cause to be discharged, such other duties as pertain to your Command without prejudice to the task described in paragraph 1, which must be considered paramount in His Majesty's interests."
I have now received, when, as it chanced, I visited the Army again, the following official communication from General Alexander, in which General Montgomery took great pleasure, and to which it will be necessary for us to send a reply:
"Sir, The Orders you gave me on August 15, 1942, have been fulfilled. His Majesty's enemies, together with their impedimenta, have been completely eliminated from Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya and Tripolitania. I now await your further instructions."
Well, obviously, we shall have to think of something else, and, indeed, this was one of the more detailed matters which we discussed in the Conference at Casablanca. I did not publish the original instructions to General Alexander until some months afterwards, when the Battle of Egypt had been won, and the House will naturally grant me a similar delay before I make public the reply to him which is now required.

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I should, however, inform the House and the country of the various changes in the High Command which the marked improvement in our affairs and the movements of the Armies have rendered suitable and necessary. This brings me to the general situation in French North-West Africa, on which I have a very few general remarks to make.
The descent upon North Africa by the British and American Forces will, I believe, be judged in the words which Premier Stalin used to me when I told him about it in August last. He said that it was "militarily correct." It certainly has altered the strategic axis of the war. By this very large-scale manœuvre, thought by many experts to be most hazardous before it was undertaken, we recovered the initiative in the West, and we recovered it at comparatively small cost of life and with less loss in shipping than we gained by what fell into our hands. Nearly half a million men have been landed successfully and safely in North-West Africa, and those fair and beautiful regions are now under the control of the United States. We agreed with the President many months ago that this should be an American enterprise, and I have gladly accepted, with the approval of the War Cabinet, the position of lieutenant in this sphere. The Americans attach the greatest importance to unity of command between Allies and to control over all these Services being in the hands of one supreme commander. We willingly and freely accepted this position, and we shall act loyally and faithfully up to it on all occasions and in every respect. Some people are busily concerned about the past records of various French functionaries whom the Americans have deemed it expedient to employ. For my part, I must confess that I am more interested in the safety of the Armies and in the success of the operations which will soon be again advancing to an important climax. I shall therefore not take up the time of the House with the tales which can be told of how these various Frenchmen acted in the forlorn and hideous situation in which they found themselves when their country collapsed. What matters to General Eisenhower and to our troops, who, in great numbers, are serving under him, and what matters throughout this vast
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area of population of well over 16,000,000, 90 per cent. of whom are Moslems, is, first and foremost, a tranquil countryside, and, secondly, secure and unimpeded communications to the battle-front, which is now steadily developing on what I have called the Tunisian tip.
I have not seen this battle front, I am sorry to say, because it is 400 miles distant by road from Algiers, where I spent last Friday and Saturday with General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham, and also with our Minister-Resident, the right hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Harold Macmillan), who is doing admirable work and becoming a real solver of problems—friends with everyone—and taking, with Mr. Murphy's co-operation, an increasingly heavy load off the shoulders of the Commander-in-Chief in regard to matters with which a military commander should not to be burdened. Although I did not have a chance to see this front—because one does get a number of communications from home from time to time—I can tell the House that conditions are absolutely different from those which the Desert Army has triumphantly surmounted. The Desert Army is the product of three years of trial and error and of continued perfecting of transport, communications, supplies and signals, and the rapid moving forward of airfields and the like. The Armies now fighting in Tunisia are still in a very early stage of building up their communications. The enemy opposite to them, although largely an improvised army, have something like the advantage which we had over Rommel in front of Cairo, I mean the advantage of lying 30 or 40 miles in front of your bases; while we have to go over very long, slender, tightly stretched and heavily strained approaches, in order to get at them. Very nearly did General Anderson, under General Eisenhower's orders, clear the whole province at a run. Very little more, and we might have achieved everything. It was absolutely right to try, but it failed. The Germans effected their entry, and made good their bridge-heads. We had to fall back to gather strength and to gather our resources for heavy battle. I cannot pretend not to be disappointed that the full result was not achieved at the first bound, Still, our main object is to fight the Germans, and one cannot be blind to the fact that we have made them fight us

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in a situation extremely costly to them and by no means disadvantageous to us. Although the enemy's lines of supply on land are short, they are under constant attack by sea. Before they reach the battlefield they lose one-quarter, or one-third even, of everything they bring across the sea. Our power of reinforcement is far greater and more secure than theirs. The portentous apparition of the Desert Army, driving Rommel before them, is a new, most potent and possibly even decisive factor. Air fighting is developing on an ever-increasing scale, and this is, of course, greatly to our advantage, because it would pay us to lose two machines to one in order to wear down the German air force and draw it away from the Russian front. However, instead of losing two planes to one, the actual results are very nearly the other way round. Therefore, it seems to me that the House need not be unduly depressed because the fighting in North Africa is going to assume a very much larger scale and last a longer time than was originally anticipated and hoped. It is, indeed, quite remarkable that the Germans should have shown themselves ready to run the risk and pay the price required of them by their struggle to hold the Tunisian tip. While I always hesitate to say anything which might afterwards look like over-confidence, I cannot resist the remark that one seems to discern in this policy the touch of the master hand, the same master hand that planned the attack on Stalingrad and that has brought upon the German armies the greatest disaster they have ever suffered in all their military history. However, I am making no predictions and no promises. Very serious battles will have to be fought. Including Rommel's army, there must be nearly a quarter of a million of the enemy in the Tunisian tip, and we must not in any way under-rate the hazards we have to dare or the burdens we have to carry. It is always folly to forecast the results of great trials of strength in war before they take place. I will say no more than this: All the disadvantages are not on one side, and certainly they are not all on our side. I think that conforms to the standards of the anti-complacency opinion in this country.
French North-West Africa is, as I have said, a United States operation, under American command. We have agreed
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that the boundary between our respective spheres shall be the existing frontier between Tripolitania and Tunisia, but the Desert Army is now crossing that frontier and driving forward on its quest, which is Rommel. Its movements must, therefore, be combined with those of the First Army and with the various powerful forces coming from the West. For some weeks past, the commanders have been in close touch with one another; these contacts must now be formalised. As the Desert Army passes into the American sphere it will naturally come under the orders of General Eisenhower. I have great confidence in General Eisenhower. I regard him as one of the finest men I have ever met. It was arranged at Casablanca that when this transfer of the Desert Army took place, General Alexander should become Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower. At the same time, Air Chief Marshal Tedder becomes Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, responsible to General Eisenhower for all the air operations in his theatre. He will control also all the Air Forces throughout the whole of the Middle East. This is absolutely necessary, because our Air Forces of Egypt, Cyrenaica and Libya, and also our powerful Air Forces operating from Malta, are actually attacking the same targets, both by bomber and fighter aircraft, as the United States and British Air Forces now working from Algeria and Tunisia are attacking. You must have one control over all this, and that control must be exercised under the supreme command of one man—and who better, I ask, than the trusty and experienced Air Chief Marshal Tedder, for whom General Eisenhower so earnestly asked? Under him, Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, hitherto working with the Eighth Army, whose services have been so much admired, will concert the air operations in support of the British First and Eighth Armies and other troops on the Tunisian battlefield. At the same time, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, who already commands all the British and American naval forces in this theatre, will extend his command Eastward so as to comprise effectively all the cognate operations inside the Mediterranean and the present Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean will become, with his headquarters in Egypt, Commander-in-Chief of the Levant, dealing also with the Red

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Sea and all approaches from that quarter. There is no need for me to announce exactly where the line of demarcation between those commands is drawn, but everything is arranged with precision. The vacancy in the Command of the Middle East created by General Alexander's appointment as Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, will be filled by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, now commanding in Persia and Iraq, where the Tenth Army, now become a very powerful force, is stationed. It is proposed to keep Persia and Iraq as a separate command for the present, and the new commander will shortly be appointed.
Meanwhile, General Eisenhower has already obtained the consent of General Giraud, who commands the French Army fighting on the Tunisian front, an army which is being raised by American equipment to a very powerful force and which will play its part later on in liberating the French Motherland, to this Army being placed all under the command of General Anderson, together with the strong United States Forces, which have been moved forward into Tunisia. Thus we have a hierarchy established by international arrangement completely in accord with modern ideas of unity of command between various Allies and of the closest concert of the three Services.
I make an appeal to the House, the Press and the country, that they will, I trust, be very careful not to criticise this arrangement. If they do so, I trust they will not do it on personal lines, or run one general against another, to the detriment of the smooth and harmonious relations which now prevail among this band of brothers who have got their teeth into the job. In General Eisenhower, as in General Alexander, you have two men remarkable for selflessness of character and disdain of purely personal advancement. Let them alone; give them a chance; and it is quite possible that one of these fine days the bells will have to be rung again. If not, we will address ourselves to the problem, in all loyalty and comradeship, and in the light of circumstances. [Interruption.] I have really tried to tell the House everything that I am sure the enemy knows and to tell them nothing that the enemy ought to know: [HON. MEMBERS: "Ought not to know."]
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There was a joke in that Still, I have been able to say something. At any rate, I appeal to all patriotic men on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to stamp their feet on mischief-makers and sowers of tares wherever they may be found, and let the great machines roll into battle under the best possible conditions for our success. That is all I have to say at the present time.
I am most grateful for the extreme kindness with which I am treated by the House. I accept, in the fullest degree, the responsibility of Minister of Defence and as the agent of the War Cabinet, for the plans we have devised. His Majesty's Government ask no favours for themselves. We desire only to be judged by results. We await the unfolding of events with sober confidence, and we are sure that Parliament and the British nation will display in these hopeful days, which may nevertheless be clouded o'er, the same qualities of steadfastness as they did in that awful period when the life of Britain and of our Empire hung by a thread.
Mr. Arthur Greenwood: I wish before the Prime Minister leaves the Chamber just to say two things. First, that I feel that certain aspects of the speech of the Prime Minister may need further consideration at a later stage, a matter which I raised about Business. The second is to say that I think the House will wish to offer to the Prime Minister a welcome on his safe return after an arduous and a hazardous journey, the fruits of which we hope will be mightily to aid the war effort.
Mr. Cocks: I have been called at an early moment. I would like to say while the Prime Minister is here that we all welcome his return from his marvellous and historic Odyssey, in which many important events have taken place, as he has told us. At Casablanca, in the shadow of Mount Atlas and almost in sight of the Pillars of Hercules, he and President Roosevelt emulated the feat of that ancient hero in holding up the canopy of civilisation. Then, like a modern St. Paul, he took the Atlantic Charter to Tarsus, and then finally from the clouds he descended upon sea-girt Cyprus like Venus returning to her native home. And now, after touching at Egypt and Tripoli and regions adjoining Carthage, our wise old Ulysses has returned home to his faithful

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Penelope, the Deputy Prime Minister, and her handmaidens in the Cabinet, who, in his abs Pence, I hope with the permission of the Minister of Fuel, have been keeping the home fires burning, and have not, like their originals, been just marking time and unwinding at night the red tape which they have been tangling up in the day.
We can say one thing about our leader which the Nazis cannot say about theirs; he is not afraid to speak to his people. Moreover, we are quite certain that he is very much alive and in charge of events. At Casablanca very important decisions were taken. We do not know what those decisions were, but the Germans, I am quite sure, will in due course find out. It has been suggested, however, in certain quarters that an opportunity was missed on that occasion in not bringing about, or setting up, a united command for the military direction of the whole war. I do not agree with that, because apart from the fact that Soviet Russia is not at war with Japan, the facts of geography seem to me to be against such a system. At present the Russian generals are conducting their own campaign in Russia on the Eastern front, and I think we all agree that they are doing fairly well by themselves. The destruction of an army of 330,000 men outside Stalingrad was quite a considerable military achievement, and for some supreme military command sitting, say, in Iceland or Khartoum, to tell these victorious generals that now is the time they ought to strike in the North, in the Baltic or in the centre, or along the shores of the Black Sea, would seem to be an unreasonable procedure. In the same way for such a command to tell the Anglo-American Forces that now is the time to attack in Sicily, or in the Balkans, or in Norway, or oh the coast of France, or that now is the time perhaps to tell their ancient Ally, Portugal, that she should throw open the port of Lisbon as a base for the Allied Armies, would seem to me to be equally unreasonable. It is better for the present, I think, for Russia to look after the Eastern front and for us and America and our French Allies to look after the West and decide when and where to strike. When the time comes to attack in a united way the central fortress of Germany, it may be that a closer unity of command, a closer co-ordination of effort, will be possible and perhaps even
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necessary, but I do not think it is time for that yet.
A point I wish to mention particularly is one which the Prime Minister has but lightly touched upon. I think it is an important one, and it is the only one I shall raise to-day. Although it is not possible, in my view, to set a supreme military command for the whole of the war, I think something should be done to bring about a more unified political direction of the war effort and to set up machinery by which the views of the United States of America, of the Soviet Union, and of Fighting France and ourselves could be expressed and co-ordinated before vital decisions are taken on matters of high importance. That was not done in the case of North Africa, and the results have been unfortunate. I intend to speak with the utmost restraint and moderation on this particular point. I think that anybody who said anything which might cause dissension at the present time between any of the Allies would be doing a disservice to the general cause.
But the way to avoid dissension in the future is to get agreement beforehand, and to decide on a policy which all can follow. If that is not done, dissension is bound to recur and great evils to result. Some of the things that have happened in North Africa in the last few months have been shameful. I will not go into them in detail, especially as since Casablanca it seems to me there are indications that the situation is improving, but it is still not good and is affecting the military situation as well as our moral position. But the great question we have got to settle now and in the future—I would ask the Deputy Prime Minister to note this, and I hope he agrees—when the time approaches to drive the Nazis out of the nations and countries they have occupied, is this: "Are we going to make terms with all the Quislings of Europe, or are we going to accept the help only of those who have refused to collaborate with the enemy and have resisted him to the end?" That is he great question, the great problem upon which some decision has to be made.
In France, and in other countries, too, hundreds of thousands of people have never accepted, for example, the Vichy policy of collaboration with the Nazis; they have faced starvation, imprisonment, torture and death for the sake of freedom.

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They have seen their friends and relatives cast into prison. They have seen them executed, not by the Nazis in all cases, sometimes by the Quislings doing the vile work for the Nazis. Peyrouton, for example, was the man who threw into prison Messieurs Daladier, Blum and Mandel, and they are there still.
Mr. Molson: Peyrouton arrested Laval.
Mr. Cocks: He was never in prison, as far as I know. If he was, he came out very quickly. The three I have mentioned are still in prison. These brave Frenchmen of the kind to which I have referred look on General de Gaulle as their leader. He was a member of the last Republican Government in France and therefore in a sense represents the Third Republic. But far more he represents the spirit of French resistance and has done so from the first. Because of that, he is supported by people of all political creeds in France, from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, Royalists and Communists, who look on him as their champion and the Cross of Lorraine as their symbol of hope and salvation. Recent events have dealt a sad blow to many of these Frenchmen still in France to whom the Prime Minister spoke on 24th April when he said:
"Lift up your heads, gallant Frenchmen; not all the infamies of Laval and Darlan shall stand between you and the restoration of your birthright."
It is not only in France where this situation exists. In Norway, Poland and Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia and in Greece there are thousands, and hundreds of thousands, of people resisting the Nazis, sometimes in actual combat, sometimes in other ways. They have never collaborated with the enemy. They have their own Quislings, but they are holding out to the last. They are keeping alive the spirit of resistance in Europe, they are praying for an Allied victory, and it is their faith and hope for that Allied victory that are keeping them alive. When the time comes for an invasion of Europe they will give us every assistance they can. But if we make terms with the Quislings for the sake of some temporary military advantage in the future, we shall break their hearts and we shall betray the cause for which we and they are fighting.
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As I have said, this problem is an important one because it is bound to return, and it ought to be settled now. We may be told in the case of some future event, for example, as were were told last November that we must make terms with some traitor in order to save bloodshed. That plea may fall with a reasonable sound on certain ears, although the answer might be made that if you really want to save bloodshed, you can make peace with Hitler or with the German General Staff now. But that plea was rejected in advance at Casablanca when the decision was reached of "Unconditional surrender." The Nazi is a monster and an enemy, but a Quisling is a monster and an enemy and a traitor as well. If anything, if possible, he deserves a double punishment. Are we to ally ourselves with Judas in order to defeat Pontius Pilate, who, after all, was perhaps the better man of the two? I feel that the declaration of unconditional surrender reached at Casablanca should be applied not only to the Nazis but to the Quislings also and to everyone who has helped to rivet the chains of slavery on Europe. I would appeal to the Government to come to some definite decision on this matter, to draw up with their Allies, especially with America and with Soviet Russia, a settled, clear, and united policy upon this particular question, because upon it, I believe, depends one of the chief spiritual issues of the war.
Mr. Granville: We welcome back the Prime Minister, and, indeed, his very arrival in this country is something of a national event. In my view what has taken place in the past few months, and also, in a sense, what was indicated by the Prime Minister in his speech to-day, suggests that there has been something of a fundamental change in British foreign policy during this war. I think that the House of Commons on this occasion, although it may be unpopular, should try to get something of a true perspective of the war situation. The capture of the Sixth German Army in Stalingrad altered the whole course of the war. I see that it is estimated that 7,000 Russians are sacrificing their lives every day on the Eastern front, and that in the process they are liquidating 10,000 Germans every day. The Russian Army is engaging, holding up, and in the south hurling back, the main might of the Wehrmacht and

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other Axis forces. It is clear that Premier Stalin has thrown the Nazi leaders on the defensive, and that to-day the Russian Premier is dictating the main strategy of this war by the march of military events. Undoubtedly, there has been some kind of Nazi crisis in Berlin in recent weeks. I have no doubt that that has been related to the tremendous events caused by the Russian offensive on the southern front. All this has made a tremendous impression on the minds of people in this country.
Whatever we may be thinking or saying in this House of Commons, which was elected in 1935, what I have said is being thought, and is growing in the mind and the imagination and the hearts of the British people to-day. This is the fourth year of the war, and we are not yet at grips with the main forces of the enemy. Nevertheless, I think that the two soldiers whom I heard talking in the train the other day were exaggerating the position when they said, "We can leave it to our comrades in Russia, while we stand on the touch lines and cheer." I am aware that what I am saying may be unpopular here; but the future of this country depends on our ability to co-operate with the Russian war effort, and it may be that that same future depends upon our ability, in spite of all the difficulties of which the Prime Minister spoke, to increase the supply of tanks and aircraft to the Russian Army to a considerable extent to enable them to keep up the offensive and to destroy the German forces. I believe that our future vitally depends also on the co-ordination of our strategy with the strategy of the Russian High Command. I also believe that our future depends very much upon whether we, together with the Russians and Americans, obtain an agreed policy on the occupation of Europe after the military victory has been achieved. That is absolute reality. I repeat that, in my view, this will be dictated by military events.
The Prime Minister has described his journey around the perimeter of the Middle East as on a magic carpet. An American critic has described the Casablanca Conference as being theatrical but not yet in the main theatre of war. I believe that every one of the people of this country desires to pay tribute to the great courage and initiative
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and endurance of the Prime Minister in having undertaken at his age that tremendous journey by air. The Prime Minister entered Tripoli in a blaze of glory and publicity. What has happened in Casablanca has been heady wine for the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Information. As someone has said, there were camera men on the landing grounds, on the beaches, in the streets, and in the fields; and nothing like it has been seen in the world of publicity since Mafeking. It was called a conference of unconditional surrender; and while it was called that, soon afterwards 330,000 Nazis in Stalingrad unconditionally surrendered. The Prime Minister's speech and the communiqué which was issued at the end of the conference stressed the agreement oh enterprises to be undertaken in 1943. I do not believe that this communiqué was issued for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. I credit the Prime Minister and the President with the intention of attacking occupied Europe from Iceland to the Baltic possibly, in this year; because, as we have been told from Washington and in this House by the Minister of Production, Allied production exceeds Axis production to a very great extent, because we have been told that we have complete superiority in the air over the Luftwaffe, and because if we do not there is a growing number of people in this country who believe that Russia may well win the war for us. I was glad that the Prime Minister gave first place in his speech to the problem of shipping and the destruction of the U-boat, about which there has been great anxiety in this country for some time.
But surely, there has been a change in the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government. I was hopeful that the Prime Minister, as a result of his conference at Casablanca with the President and of all that we have been told in the newspapers, not only in America but in this country for some time, was going to make a declaration in his speech to-day of a new policy, on behalf of His Majesty's Government. It seems to me that the foreign policy of the Government has become something of a question mark. If we have to read between the lines, if we have to try to size up this situation, it seems that our foreign policy is heading towards something which commits us to a new balance of power policy in Europe

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and the installation of puppet governments on the Continent after military victory. I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister to give the House and the people of this country an assurance that no secret agreement was made at Casablanca. Secret agreements were made during the last war, and they did not turn out very well afterwards. I would also ask, in view of what has happened politically in North Africa, whether it is still the policy of the Government that the Forces and people of this country are fighting for the ideals for which we entered the war—for freedom, for liberty, for democracy. There has been a tendency to suggest that with whatever has been happening in respect of the political situation and the political set-up in North Africa we have had very little to do. The Prime Minister has said that he was the faithful lieutenant of the President. That is the general impression which has been given, not only in this country but in America. But on 12th November, in the Debate on the Address in this House, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs made a speech—I do not know whether it would be called a discreet speech—in which he said:
"In this North African operation the Political Warfare Executive has really had the first chance it has ever had of developing and seeing through to the end a campaign in political warfare. It has meant an immense amount of work. Broadcasts from this country, from the United States, and from the field of operations itself, have had to be synchronised. Leaflets have had to be drawn up, translated and despatched. In the whole field there has been the fullest co-operation between ourselves and the United States. The burden of that work has fallen upon the Political Warfare Executive, for which my right hon. Friend"—
That is, the Foreign Secretary—
"shares the responsibility. It will interest the House to know that my right hon. Friend has received a letter from General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff to the Allied Forces, in which he says that the work of the Political Warfare Executive in this campaign 'constituted an outstanding achievement.'"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1942; col. 150, Vol. 385.]
We may seek to justify the political policy in North Africa: we may think it a good policy or a bad policy; but that statement is definite proof that the Government, for many months before the operation began, had assumed their full share of responsibility, through the Political Warfare
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Executive, of which the Foreign Secretary is chairman. I hope that in future we shall not be told that the Government do not bear the full responsibility for what takes place in political warfare, and in the unfortunate political set-up in that theatre of war. I am not going to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) on the question of whether we are to recognise Quislings and the like. There are many first-class quotations which could be used on the subject, but I am not going to take up the time of the House on that point to-day. I will content myself with saying that it is no good holding these Debates, having a speech from the Prime Minister, and then all going home as though the whole question had been settled. Whether we like it or not, the people of this country are asking whether there has been a change in war aims and in the foreign policy of the Government. I believe that there are a number of people who are deeply disturbed and suspicious about the deep motives behind this apparent change in our foreign policy. They are wondering whether there has been any change with regard to the fullest co-operation with Russia. This question will have to be answered by His Majesty's Government. This war is a different war. I believe that the people of this country will fight for the ideals for which we entered this war.
I believe that not all the oratory and the propaganda power of this Government will change that. There is another suspicion among the ordinary people. There is a growing feeling among the public that they are getting a purely propaganda version of the war from the most powerful propaganda machine controlled by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Information. A propaganda machine of enormous power has been selling Government sunshine for a long period, with the very serious result that many sound judges are of the opinion that this country has in past months lost its sense of urgency with regard to the conduct of the war. There is a feeling that democracy and the House of Commons have lost control and the check on policy, and that dangerous seeds of Fascism are growing. Therefore, in conclusion, I would quote the words of General Smuts:
"A new sort of hero-worship is arising very different from that which Carlyle preached,

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and which, saps the very foundations of individuality and makes the individual prostrate himself before his national leader as before a god.
That way extreme danger lies. The road to Caesarism lies clear. The disappearance of the sturdy, independent-minded, freedom-loving individual, and his replacement by a servile standardised mass-mentality is the greatest human menace of our time."
I say to the Deputy Prime Minister here now with his background of responsibility, Make sure that we do not win this war and lose that one.
Mr. Martin: I only want to take up the time of the House for a few minutes to say a word in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) in what he said at the conclusion of his speech about the unification of the political situation of the war. I hope I shall not be classed among those people to whom the Prime Minister referred as mischief-makers. I shall do my best to avoid making mischief under any conditions at all, but more mischief may be made by silence on some of these matters at the present time than will ever be made by frank and sincere speaking. What I am going to say will be said with perfect sincerity and in the belief that, by saying it, I may do some little thing to pave the way for happier relations between the Allies during the difficult times ahead. It is plain that, whatever may be said in any quarter whatsoever, Anglo-American relations are not on so sound or so happy a footing as we could all of us wish at the present time. That is a natural thing, for two great nations With interests so diverse as those of the United States and this country, engaged in a war with regard to which they must necessarily have somewhat different outlooks. Our outlook is conditioned to a large extent by relations with Europe, and the American viewpoint is equally conditioned by their rather remote relations with Europe and with their rather closer relations with the Pacific. I think that we all understand that there are also slight distinctions in ideological and political outlook between the two countries which necessarily cause a certain amount of division between us at the present time. The question is how to get those relations on to the most satisfactory basis. It certainly will hot be done by a storm of abuse and recrimination, and it clearly will not be done by shutting up and saying nothing at all.
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I want to refer to one or two questions only which lie at the root of this matter. The first is the situation that arises with relation to the French people. It has been very widely said in this country that we should not have consented to the arrangement which was made in North Africa. I am not going to criticise that arrangement. The difficulties were enormous, and any country responsible for the safety and well-being of immense armies might well have considered the necessity of avoiding unnecessary bloodshed at all costs in the part that Americans and ourselves were going to play in North Africa, and in our relation to the French people there. It was important to have support among the French people in North Africa if we could possibly get it for the Allied movement. However much we lament—and I think we all do lament—the tragic method by which it took place, we are all slightly relieved that Admiral Darlan is no longer part of the administration, and we are glad that General Giraud is now in his place, as far as that aspect of the matter is concerned. General Giraud seems a thoroughly patriotic and, as far as his word goes, a thoroughly reliable Frenchman of his own type. But what is that type? [An HON. MEMBER: "He is not a democrat."] My hon. Friend has put his finger directly on the spot. He represents the officer class of the French Army. He is entirely different from the type to which Marshal Pétain belongs, because Marshal Pétain believes that the interests of France, or his own interests, necessitated compromise with the Nazi forces. He was prepared to go the whole length with Nazism in the creation of their new order. There is no doubt about it that General Giraud is utterly opposed to that point of view, but none the less he belongs to that authoritarian class of French officer who believes in one of the greatest illusions which has been cherished in twentieth century Europe. He believes in an authoritarian France. He stands for the creation, as I understand it, of an authoritarian France when liberty is restored to the French people.
Necessary or desirable as it may have been to come to some sort of compromise on that point of view from the American standpoint when North Africa was invaded, and desirable as it may have been for the British Government to subscribe to the American position, it is clearly a tremendous menace to the kind

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of peace that we on these Benches desire to see established after the war, and to Anglo-American relations as hostilities draw to a conclusion if, when France is freed, some kind of repetition is going to take place of what has occurred in North Africa. I mean that there will be an effort on the part of certain groups in France when the French nation is again able to take some part in the control of its own destiny, to establish vested interests of a particularly objectionable kind but which were common in France before the Third Republic failed. There is scarcely anybody—there is certainly no sincere democrat in this country—who does not feel convinced that the whole odious story with which the names of Flandin and Bonnet were associated during the last 10 or 15 years in France, the whole attack upon the interests of the French people and the French workers, the whole effort to build up a consolidated agreement between the forces of reaction and Nazism in Germany and Italy and a certain group of French politicians—there is no doubt, among students of that situation, that an effort will be made to repeat that if the opportunity is open for such a situation again to arise in a somewhat different form when the Allies are victorious, as they will be, in this war.
Part of the trouble, I think, is that the American people have a long-standing affection for the French people. They feel differently towards the French people than towards almost any other people outside their own borders. You can call it sentiment or what you like, but it dates back to the time of Lafayette, and since that time they have always felt a particular admiration and tenderness for France. That makes them think—and no one can blame them for that—that they have a special understanding of the French people and a special relation towards them. I am not prepared to deny that it may be so and that the American people have a relationship with France which gives them an advantage over us at the present time, and it might be well to allow the American Government to develop that relationship and for us to stand back a little in the shadows while that is being done. They certainly do not feel towards France in the sense of what Jefferson called "the entangling relationships" against which he warned his country. It may be that that warm accord between the American
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and the French people might be turned to some advantage to the Allied cause. But the American people are 3,000 miles away and we are only 21 miles away and it is going to be of a different order of importance and of urgency to us when hostilities come to an end that the kind of government which is of interest to the British people should be established in France from what it will be to the Americans. We on this side of the House cannot look with indifference—and it is extraordinarily important that we should say it how before the situation becomes too involved or too urgent or too dangerous—upon efforts not to establish any particular government in France but to prejudice the interests and opportunities and chances of certain other forms of government. We do not desire, and I do not think that we shall make any effort to see, that a Socialist or Labour administration is established in France when hostilities come to an end, but it is of vital importance to us—and I believe we are united on these Benches and have the support of every sincere democrat on every side of the House when we say that it is of vital importance to see that no effort should be made to prejudice the chances of such a government taking office when the war comes to an end.
That must be clearly and unmistakably represented between us and the Americans. I do not see any reason why it should cause unfortunate friction in the relations between us. But whatever the results, I think that situation is one which should be made plain before efforts are made by any interested parties in North Africa, France or America to try and jump a claim for any particular movement to establish such an interim Government in France which might, during its period of office, prejudice the prospects of democracy and of labour when the French nation comes again to stand on its feet.
The danger is that when this war comes to an end the American nation may feel tempted to relax into some form of isolationism. I am quite certain that that danger is in the mind of all thoughtful people in this country and America. It is quite possible for there to be the most cordial and sympathetic relations between the two Administrations, between the present British Government and the American Administration, but very cool, or even hostile, feelings between the two peoples. The thing with which we are

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concerned is that the relations between the American and British peoples should be put on a sound and lasting footing, however cordial and sympathetic the relations between the two Administrations may be. So, for that reason, this question of unification of the Allied political effort is becoming one of great significance. I think it is important that the peoples should be reassured that we can establish a common effort and a common understanding between our two nations and the Russian people. There is no question whatever that there is a feeling in Russia and this country that there are groups and parties over here and in America who may be glad to see relations with Russia—I will not say become cooler—but be left so elastic that after the war it might be possible to push the Russians back into their own sphere of interest and create an Anglo-American sphere elsewhere. At all costs we have to avoid that situation coming to pass, and I do not think it will be satisfactorily avoided until there is some kind of established political council existing between our three countries. Both in Russia and the United States there are elements which are critical of ourselves; they are critical too of our own policy with regard to India and the Colonies. I think we must face the fact that part of the price of a satisfactory peace is the admission, not that Great Britain must break up her Colonial Empire, but that Great Britain has to concede the principle of third-party judgment in dealing with these great problems. There is nothing that would do so much to combat the Isolationist movement in the United States and the feeling of hostility and mistrust of Great Britain as the conviction that we shall establish and subscribe to the principle of a third-party judgment in drawing up the final peace settlement in regard to our own interests as well as those of other nations.
If that principle could be established at an early date in regard to the problems facing us in connection with Anglo-American and Anglo-Russian relations, it would do a great deal to clarify and enhance the solidity and cordiality of those relations. However, I cannot pursue this matter further to-day as I have taken a longer time than I had allotted myself. I will merely conclude by saying, as I began, that these matters should be dealt with urgently and comprehensively so
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that in the near future there will be a clearing-up of the relations between the three main Allies to such an extent that those of us who believe this war to be not only a national war but a war for the establishment of true democratic principles will feel confident in the further measures to be taken by the United Nations.
Mr. Boothby: I do not intend to detain the House long. We have had, as we all expected, a masterly review of the war situation from the Prime Minister in which there was one passage which must have given satisfaction even to his most formidable critics. That was in relation to the arrangements he was able to announce with regard to the High Command of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean area during the immediately forthcoming phase of operations. We had three problems facing us in this sphere. There was the geographical problem; the problem of co-operation between the different Services, namely, the Navy, the Army and Air Force; and there was an international problem superimposed upon these two. It does seem to me, at first glance, that all these problems have been brilliantly surmounted by the arrangements which the Prime Minister was able to announce with regard to the various appointments to high commands, divided so well as between the Americans and ourselves. I am sure that no Member of this House would say that his announcement was not received with great satisfaction. So far from wanting to make mischief, the mood of the House with regard to these appointments is solely one of congratulation to the Government, and to the Prime Minister himself.
The part of the Prime Minister's speech I liked best of all was his reference to the necessity for bringing the maximum possible aid to Russia in the shortest possible time. His references to the superb effort which the Soviet Armies are making at the present moment, and also to the urgent necessity for bringing the maximum assistance to our Ally had both deep sincerity and a great sense of urgency; and when he said that he himself would feel he was falling below the level of events if we did not make every effort to bring that maximum assistance to Russia in the shortest time, I am sure he expressed the views of the vast majority

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of Members of this House and of the people in the country.
The only part of the Prime Minister's speech which I did not like was his very brief, cursory reference to recent political events in North Africa. It would be a great mistake if the Prime Minister, or anybody else, dismissed the political situation in North Africa as being of no consequence whatever. It matters a very great deal. The appointments of Darlan and Peyrouton—whose record is extremely bad, and who was, in the opinion of many of us, quite unnecessarily transported all the way back from South America to take up this important appointment, which could not be justified on the grounds of military expediency—affronted many millions of people in this country, in the United States of America, in France, and, I may add, in Russia. I would ask the Deputy Prime Minister seriously to consider the possible effect upon Anglo-Russian relations of any suspicion that we may allow to arise that we are playing with any kind of Fascist elements in any quarter. It is a thing that has to be watched most carefully. We are fighting this war to eliminate Fascism, not to stabilise it in any part of the world; to restore justice and freedom, not to permit freedom to be withheld from those who have been in prison—some of them for many months—because they supported the Allied cause and the cause of democracy in the past.
I do not think we ought to have any truck with Fascist elements, not even for the sake of preserving what the Prime Minister referred to as a "tranquil countryside." I feel it was right that great anxiety should be shown in this House and in America about the régime in North Africa, which was described to me the other day by a distinguished officer who has just come back from Algiers as "a political sewer." While that persisted, I feel it was only right and in the interests of the Allies as a whole, and the cause for which we are fighting, that the gravest possible anxiety should be expressed here. So long as democratic political prisoners remained under lock and key, and so long as anti-Jewish legislation remained in force in North Africa, we could not feel happy about what was going on there. No doubt, in recent days there has been a substantial improvement
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in the situation in North Africa, and I am sure the House was gratified to hear from the Prime Minister that we owe this largely to the efforts of our Minister-Resident in Algiers, my right hon. Friend the Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Harold Macmillan). But we want to be quite sure that this improvement will continue.
I am one of those who believe that France will rise again one day, and I further believe most firmly that however difficult and obstinate he may have been, nevertheless General de Gaulle symbolises for the vast majority of Frenchmen in Metropolitan France at the present time the spirit of revolt and of resistance to Fascism or Nazi-ism in any shape or form. The mere fact that he is sometimes so difficult increases, rather than diminishes, the confidence and trust that people in France have in him; because they know well that, whatever else you may call General de Gaulle, you could never call him the tool of the British Government. I am not one of those who say that everything should be done for de Gaulle and nothing for anyone else, but I think we have to bear in mind the very important position he holds to-day inside Metropolitan France.
I would like to tell my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, who has just come in, that I was saying a moment or two ago that it would be a great pity to dismiss the North African political situation as of no consequence whatever. It is of great consequence. We have had a right to feel anxiety about it, and equally we are happy to feel that recently an improvement has taken place. The impression formed on my mind by one passage in the Prime Minister's speech—had it not been for this. I would not have risen to speak—was that the Prime Minister himself rather thought the whole matter of no great consequence, and that the only thing to do was to get on with the war and not mind about the North African political situation, or bother about a lot of rather tiresome French politicians. But we have to mind these things, because they have vast repercussions; and we must not do anything to prevent the unity of the best elements of the French people both inside and outside France.
Let it not be forgotten that General de Gaulle commands the support of the Communist party in France, and a large

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part of the underground movement in France. If they get the impression that we are playing with Fascist elements, we shall have the responsibility of having prevented French unity. I want to encourage such unity. I want to see unity between General de Gaulle and General Giraud. I think that the despatch to North Africa of General Catroux is a most helpful development, and a most hopeful sign. I rose simply in order to put in a plea on behalf of those of us who have been expressing grave anxiety about the developments that have taken place, and which at one moment almost amounted to the establishment of a Fascist régime in North Africa with British and American support. I think that in expressing anxiety in the House about these things, hon. Members have done a service and not a disservice to the Allied cause.
Mr. Tinker: The nation and the House, and indeed the whole world, have been waiting for the statement which the Prime Minister has made, and I believe that he has given universal satisfaction by his speech, which covered such a vast area. I think that we should not allow an occasion such as this to go by without making one or two comments. The Prime Minister referred to Turkey. We want Turkey to have all the help possible. The Prime Minister remarked that Turkey could not take all we wanted to give, and he also said that Russia was getting as much help as could possibly be given. It crossed my mind that if Turkey could not assimilate all the help we want to give, could we not attempt to send all that we have to Russia? Although I am not criticising the position, one is bound to recognise that at the moment Russia has to carry the brunt of the war, although I am confident that we shall come in later. If an assurance could go out to the people of this country that everything possible is being given to Russia, it would be in keeping with the sentiments of every individual in the country. If the Prime Minister could have said that what Turkey could not take we would do all we could to send to Russia, his statement would have received a very hearty response.
I welcome very much what the Prime Minister had to say about the U-boat menace. We had all been wanting to hear a statement on that matter, because our fears had been growing. I can assure the Prime Minister that his statement has
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cheered me up appreciably, because I had wanted to have an assurance from a responsible person that we were more than combating that menace. The U-boat is the only thing on which Germany can rely finally. I believe that the Germans have been beaten on land and have no chance on land and that all the hope they have is to try to starve us out by submarine attacks. Once that menace has been removed, victory will be within our grasp. I was glad to have an assurance from the Prime Minister that our shipbuilding is going ahead of what we are losing as a result of destruction by U-boats. That is a message of hope to the land.
I was very much struck by the Prime Minister's statements about unity of command in North Africa. As has been pointed out by hon. Members who have spoken already, none of us has been fully in agreement with what has taken place in North Africa, but I realise that it is very difficult to criticise on that matter because of the extreme difficulty of the conditions obtaining there. For instance, in regard to the landing of the 1st Army, one had to do something to land the 1st Army with as little danger as possible, and probably those concerned did over-step the mark by making an agreement with some people there, Darlan in particular; but when one balances the two things, whether or not the 1st Army should be held up in its landing or whether one should come to some terms with a man whom one did not like—because none of us liked Darlan—when one considers whether it was better to get the landing of the 1st Army by making a compromise with a man we did not like or whether, by not having anything to do with him, we should give the 1st Army the terrible job of getting its foot on shore—
Mr. Horabin: As I understand the situation, Darlan was actually imprisoned by the French forces helping us in North Africa and was released after we had landed.
Mr. Tinker: One cannot get a proper picture of what the position was. This is wartime, and to win the war I would make peace with the devil himself [An HON. MEMBER: "With Hitler?"] Hitler is beyond that. We cannot hold on to the strict letter of what we believe to be right and wrong in time of war. Therefore, I look upon the arrangement that

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was made with regard to the landing of the 1st Army with a great deal of sympathy, because I believe that if the 1st Army had not landed as it did, there would have been much more trouble than there has been. The main thing about which I want to speak is the Prime Minister's remark that we must put our foot on those who are trying to raise trouble.
I want to draw the attention of the House to what I believe to be a grave position. Many people anticipate an early termination of the war. They are consequently getting ready for what will take place afterwards and considering how we can get a hold on trade. I was much concerned by a two days' Debate that took place in the other House recently. I shall not refer to it in detail, but it struck me that the Debate in the other House on air transport tried to instil into the minds of the people of this country that the time had come when we must make an effort to get hold of air transport, and that if we did not do so America might step in before us. If at this time we begin talking about who is to get trade after the war, and so create dissension among the Allies, it seems to me that that will be the most fatal thing we could do. The war is not won yet. I believe it will be won. If, however, we begin to cause dissension by talking about collaring trade after the war, regardless of the interests of any other country, it will be fatal to the immediate war effort. I would like the Leader of the House, if he replies to this Debate, to give out that our feelings do not go that way, that we are acting together in the war and that when the war is over there will not be a repetition of that keen competition that led to previous wars and created dissension among the nations. At the end of the war everything will be upset, private enterprise will be trying to create a position for itself, regardless of the general good of the community. I want to prevent that. My sole object is to get the war won and then for the combination of peoples that has won the war to try to control the trade of the world to the mutual advantage of every country, and not for one country to get an advantage over other countries. I believe that if we go whole-heartedly into the struggle without giving thoughts to our trading position after the war, the war will be brought to a speedy conclusion.
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The German race is already beaten. The Germans are hoping that some dissension will take place among the Allies. If we can prevent that dissension, victory will come quickly.
I was glad to hear the Prime Minister make it clear what was meant by unconditional surrender. It has gone out that unconditional surrender meant that the German people would probably have to suffer many things after the war. I do not want that idea to get abroad. I shall be as bitter as anybody against those men who have led the nations into war, but I want it to go out to the common people of the world that when we talk of unconditional surrender we do not mean that the German people or any other people who are beaten in the war will be driven down to the lowest depths. After the war we shall have to live together and to build up a new world. When the war is won we must say to the other peoples of the world, "Now that the war is out of the way, the whole human race must go forward and make a better world." On these grounds alone the Prime Minister's speech has been very welcome to me, because I believe that the impression had gone out that we intended to take some revenge on the people of Germany. By removing that impression the Prime Minister has done a good thing, and if the German people can get to know about this, I believe it will have some weight in influencing them to give up the war. They are afraid of what will happen to them. The more we can let them know what are our real intentions, the more I think they will turn against Hitler and Goering and the people behind them, clear them out, and bring the war to an end as quickly as possible.
I trust that on this occasion those hon. Members who have anything to say will not leave it over until some future time. If we appreciate the Prime Minister's speech, we ought to say so. I do not believe in simply waiting always for an opportunity to criticise and to find something wrong with the Government. On this occasion, the Prime Minister having made such a speech, we ought to be ready to respond to him and to tell him how we feel about the glorious message he has given to us.
Wing-Commander James: We have just listened to a

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speech such as we always expect from the hon. Member for Leigh (Mr. Tinker)—a thoroughly helpful, common-sense, contructive speech. I was prompted to intervene briefly by the first part of the hon. Member's speech, in which he alluded with great force to the, as I think, foolish and harmful—although it had every appearance of being sincere—speech of the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby). I am referring to the North African position. It would be a great pity if the fag end of this Debate left an impression in the country that an undue number of hon. Members wished to see His Majesty's Government interfering in French North African affairs. There is always a tendency for those people who are hagridden by ideologies to express their opinions on these occasions and for the great majority of hon. Members who take a common-sense view not to express themselves. I have probably had as much to do as most people in this House with French officials and affairs since the war began, and one thing of which I am absolutely convinced is that the only way to secure French unity is for British politics not to intrude in French affairs, and to leave it to them to settle their own differences. After all, a large part of French North Africa is French Metropolitan Territory and we should do far better for the cause of French unity now and also post-war French politics not to let our ideals or ideas obtrude.
Mr. Boothby: By what right does my hon. and gallant Friend say that the present political regime in North Africa is in any way representative of Metropolitan France?
Wing-Commander James: I never said it was.
Mr. Boothby: My hon. and gallant Friend said we must not intervene in French affairs and that this was a French Metropolitan Government. The implication was that it must represent some part of France. I do not admit that it is in any way representative of France.
Wing-Commander James: My hon. Friend entirely misunderstand my thesis. I did not say that the Government of North Africa was representative but that the territory was part of Metropolitan France. Inevitably any emigré Government—after all, the French North African Government is to some extent
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emigré—cannot be representative of the people of the whole land. My belief is that we should not seek to obtrude our ideas, which are not the same as theirs, upon French politics. If we leave the situation alone that will give far the best chance of securing unity for the purpose of the war and facilitating French unity on the whole when the war is over.
Mr. Stokes: I could not disagree more with the hon. and gallant Gentleman. I appreciate the good points of his observations. I appreciate the point that France must be for the French, and I also appreciate the point that we should not interfere in the affairs of another country, but when I am asked to swallow Darlan I find my collar a great deal too small. I am not prepared to stand by and not protest against the acquiescence of our Government in the appointment of Quislings. It seems to me that it altogether alters the purpose for which we are fighting if we are going to accept that lack of principle. I am not going to accept any Fascist intrigue whether from across the Atlantic or from Europe. The sooner that is understood by our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic the better for all of us. I was glad to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Mr. Tinker), with most of which I profoundly agreed. I found myself in disagreement when he said that in war-time we must not define too closely between right and wrong. War seems to me the very time when you ought to do it. Unless you stick to principles in war-time you go up the garden path. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend is evidently mentally indulging in the gymnastic that you can do wrong, in order that good may come from it.
Mr. Tinker: When we collared the French Fleet, does my hon. Friend say we did not do a proper thing?
Mr. Stokes: I do not understand the parallel. I thought it was extremely open to question whether the episode at Oran was wise or unwise. History alone, I suppose, will prove that to us. With other parts of my hon. Friend's speech I agreed, particularly with regard to trade after the war. What is going on in regard to civil aviation? We read in the Press that the Government say it is impossible for us to put any experts on to designing civil transport planes because

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they are too busily engaged elsewhere. As one who has worked in the engineering industry for some years may I say that that is sheer and unadulterated nonsense, and anyone who knows the aviation trade would support me. Very great concern is felt at the whole of our international air transport being handed over to the Americans. Further, has there been any secret understanding with regard to trading in North Africa? Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will tell us. At present traders in this country are debarred from communicating with their representatives in North and West French Africa.
I will not deal in detail with all that the Prime Minister has said. I am not capable enough to grasp all the implications of his very cleverly put together speech. I agree that it was a masterly speech in many ways and—I say it without wishing in any way to be offensive—it was extremely masterly for some of the things that it left out. One thing left out which has been very near my heart, and has exercised the mind of other Members, is the chaining of prisoners. We were told nothing whatever about that. The House has been extremely patient. Everyone knows, and the Foreign Secretary will not deny, that the Government made a grave error in the first instance, and it seems quite wrong that we should not now be told what the true position is and what really did lead up to that unfortunate situation. The Prime Minister referred to the U-boat position and explained that first priority had been given in all the Government's plans to the U-boat war, and that shipping was getting first priority.
While I naturally accept the assurance that that is so now, it is really sliding off too easily because, to our knowledge in the trade, shipping has not had first priority for nearly as long as it ought to have had nor was it given that priority when we and the critics of the Government pressed for it to be given. With the figures that the right hon. Gentleman gave, I was not entirely impressed. When he referred to 13,000,000 tons as the output, I am not sure whether he meant 1942 or 1943. If he meant 1943, the position is no better than I expected it to be and no worse, and it would seem to prove that Hitler still has the initiative
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in the West because it all depends on the progress of U-boat warfare, and we are not quite on top of that yet whatever the assurance may be as to the future. He talked about the agreement arrived at at Casablanca, as I took it, for the next two years. Those agreements necessarily in the circumstances were primarily between ourselves and the United States. I did not gather that there had been complete agreement with our friends in Moscow. Perhaps it would clear the matter up if the Foreign Secretary would deal with that also.
My last point concerns the directive. I agree that the Prime Minister was able to stage a bogus communication but, if you examine the directive, it has never been carried out. I am the first to acknowledge the gigantic and monumental success that our Armies have had in North Africa, but there is no reason on that account why one should ignore a glaring inaccuracy merely for the sake of being afraid to criticise at this moment. The directive was
"Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German Army commanded by Field Marshal Rommel together with all its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya."
I agree that they have destroyed all the enemy establishments in Egypt and Libya but, when the Prime Minister told us that there were now 250,000 troops at the "Tunisian Tip," he confounded himself. I decline to let the Prime Minister walk off with the idea that the directive was carried out in the form he first intended, because it was not. We know that 50,000 or 60,000 Germans escaped and were neither captured or destroyed.
The most important point I want to refer to is the question of unconditional surrender. I was very much relieved at what the Prime Minister said. Till I see it in print I am not sure that I have it completely right but, as first put over in the Press a few days ago, it seemed to me to be the most ill-judged name that could be given to any conference—Unconditional surrender, with no qualification would be a negation of the Atlantic Charter and contrary to Labour Party policy. A statement of that kind at this moment, when we ought to be bringing true propaganda pressure to bear on the German people, will only be calculated to stiffen their backs and is serving up something very delectable to Goebbels on a platter. The object of our propaganda

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should be to shorten the war and not lengthen it. Now is the psychological moment when we can bring home to the German people the fact that we do not seek their complete destruction. What we seek is the destruction of the Nazi regime, and we look to them to help us to do it. Many people realise that the way that will ultimately do it is a rising from the inside. I so well remember the last war, when we went on with perfectly useless slaughter because the ordinary people on both sides did not understand what they were striving to obtain. Anything that will save the life of a single soldier is worth saying, however unpopular it may be at the moment. Some members of the Government I give up as hopeless, but I should like to ask what the underbelly of the Government—the Labour Members—think about it. I should like to remind the House of what the Deputy Prime Minister said on 8th November, 1939, after the war started, when he was in Opposition:
"There shall be no dictated peace. We have no desire to humiliate, crush or defeat the German Nation All idea of revenge or punishment must be excluded. Peace, to be lasting, must result from the agreement of all and not from the dictation of a few nations."
Later he said, on 9th January, 1940:
"We are opposed to any attempt from outside to break up Germany. We do not seek the humiliation or dismemberment of your country. We wholeheartedly desire to welcome you without delay into the peaceful collaboration of civilised nations. We must warn you, however, that Hitler and his system prepared and started this war. He would not continue if you ceased supporting him. Until this accursed Nazi regime is overthrown there is no hope of peace between us. If you establish a Government willing that Germany should be a good neighbour and a good European, there shall be no humiliation or revenge."
As far as I know, that stands as the policy of the Party to which I belong to-day. There has been no alteration, and I am sure that is the feeling still among ordinary people now. It would be tragic if we did not use this opportunity, when Hitler has to explain his colossal defeat in Russia, and his propaganda machine is telling the Germans that the only way out is victory, if we did not make it abundantly clear that by "unconditional surrender" we mean the overthrow of the Nazi regime, that we want the German people themselves to overthrow their tyrants and that we would help them to do so, making them realise that the one
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aim on the part of all good human beings, in Germany and elsewhere, should be to overthrow this tyrant so that we may arrive at a state when we can all live at peace with one another.
Captain Alan Graham: I should like warmly to endorse the appeal of the Prime Minister that we in this House should do nothing to assist the troublemakers on either side of the Atlantic, with special reference to North Africa. I feel more strongly than I can say that in spite of the natural tendency there is, particularly in this country, to back one personality against another—a form of sport in which we have indulged—it is an unhealthy practice when we are dealing with international affairs. From the point of view of the interests of our own country the important thing, whether it be France or Rumania or any other country, is that that country as a whole should be on our side rather than that just one section of it should be numbered among our supporters. In regard to France geography has made it plain, reinforced as it is by modern communications in the speed at which aeroplanes can travel, that we simply cannot afford to have any Power ill-affected to ourselves in control of the northern or western French coasts. Therefore, accepting the fact that we are pledged to support the Atlantic Charter which leaves it to nations to decide their own destinies, we would be acting in the most impolitic and unpatriotic fashion if we were to convey to the French people as a whole that we were more in favour of one political party among the French than of another. The sympathy of France herself is much more vital and much more important than the sympathy of any one party.
Mr. Boothby: May I ask my hon. and gallant Friend whether he thinks that we should endeavour to eliminate or prevent any Fascist régime in any country? That is the principle involved.
Captain Graham: There is so much confusion about the word "Fascist." It is used by people who have never taken the trouble to understand the real meaning of the Fascist philosophy as applied to Italy. It is becoming among members of political parties of the "Left" a word to be applied to anybody with whom they are not in complete sympathy. It is doubly unfortunate to apply that word to

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foreigners who would be the last people to accept any Fascist régime. If the hon. Member were to suggest to any Frenchman, however Conservative, that he was adopting a policy sponsored by Italians, he would find himself very quickly rebutted. He would merely by such a suggestion create hostility in a quarter where he might naturally have expected to find friends.
The point of my remarks is that France herself is far more important to us than either General Giraud, distinguished general that he is, or even General de Gaulle. My sympathies are quite clear. I was one of those who were principally responsible for bringing General de Gaulle to address a joint party meeting in this House. I am in close contact with his supporters in this country and I know very well what they feel about things. They themselves, as patriotic Frenchmen, would be the first people to admit—indeed many of them have commented on it to me—the unfortunate capacity of English politicians to-day to range themselves on one side or another of French politics and on issues which no longer exist politically amongst Frenchmen. Both these patriotic Frenchmen recognise that France is very much greater than General de Gaulle or General Giraud. It is only wise, if we wish to arrive at the truth of the situation, to face the political facts of that situation as honestly and clearly as we can. Having told the House that I personally have done what I can in a minor capacity to assist General de Gaulle and that I wish to continue to do so, I will go on to say this. Unfortunate as it may seem to us, General de Gaulle is not acceptable to the French of North Africa as a man who is most representative of their ideas. He is an admirable soldier and would be accepted by them as such.
I do not know whether the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby), in spite of being a Scotsman, has a profound knowledge of the state of feeling in French North Africa. If he has he will realise that the French population there is very different from the population in Metropolitan France, although, of course, Algeria is legally and politically considered, in spite of geography, a part of continental France. The population consists mostly of people who are called colonists, and apart from the relatively big towns of people who own landed property. In
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addition, the labour is not white labour; it is much more coloured labour, with all the problems that coloured labour brings. In addition to the colonials, there is the army. Here I will say something which will come, I know, unpleasantly to the ears of many Members. I wish it were not so; but it is a fact that to the French army in North Africa the word "democracy" brings with it no instant appeal to sympathy whatever. What is the reason for that? Rightly or wrongly, among the French army in North Africa they consider that the main reason for the weakness of France at the beginning of the war was the activities of the Front Populaire. That may be unpleasant to hear and it may be incorrect, but that is what they believe, and what people believe constitutes a political fact. In foreign policy it is impossible to deal with any other than political facts.
That is the reason why even Darlan, contemptible though he was, traitorously though he acted to the Anglo-French Entente, was accepted by these people, not because he acted traitorously to us or to the Entente, but because quite clearly he was not tarred with what they considered to be the ultra-democratic brush. He was accepted gladly by them for these reasons. Actually the same applies to General Giraud. Democracy makes no appeal to them. That may be foolish and regrettable, but it is the fact. We have to reckon with Conservative opinion abroad and not drive it by our abuse into the opposite camp. We have to win it to us because it is just as hostile to Germany, and still more hostile to Italy. For that reason I would beg hon. Members not to make matters harder for the French, for General de Gaulle and General Giraud, to come to a reasonable understanding between themselves by our "butting in." It has been very much regretted by General de Gaulle already in regard to other activities of ours in another part of the world which he considers to be solely a French affair, and where our representative considers that we have interests. That has caused considerable disquiet and annoyance to General de Gaulle. Do not let us make the same error in a far thornier position, where far more is at stake in North Africa.
The same applies not merely to North Africa but throughout Europe. The Press of this country and the wireless

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continually make appeals to foreign nations under the enemy's heel and to neutrals which, convince Conservatives of those countries that they have little or nothing to win from a victory of the United Nations. In other words, we have helped to convince these people that what Hitler has told them is only likely to be too true, namely, that a victory of the United Nations would mean in all these countries of Europe a violent, bloody, social revolution. By continually stressing that note we bind them all the closer to the German war chariot. The same thing applies to the far more Conservative feeling of Frenchmen in North Africa. Therefore, I can strongly support what the Prime Minister said as being absolutely vital for our own cause on the lowest motive of all, namely, military expediency, because military expediency properly utilised will achieve the victory of our highest ideals.
Mr. Silverman: The House has listened to what, I suppose, is the most mischievous contribution to its Debates for a long time. The hon. and gallant Member began by saying that nothing ought to be said to encourage the trouble-makers on either side of the Atlantic. If the hon. and gallant Member was sincere in that view he ought to have kept his seat.
Captain Graham: That is the hon. Member's view.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. and gallant Member has expressed his view without restraint and I propose to express mine. The view I am expressing at the moment is that no speech at this period in the history of the war, at a critical moment when victory is opening up before us, could have done more to make trouble and mischief than the speech of the hon. and gallant Member. Let us examine the implications of it. He said that it was not our business to take sides between personalities. That is quite right. Then he said that France as a whole was far more important than personalities, principles, ideals or the outlook of any individual in France. So it always was if it is true at all. So it was in May, 1940. There were a lot of people in France in May, 1940, who said that France was more important than anything else. The result of that was the collapse of France and the prolongation of the war by nobody knows how many years.
Captain Graham: I said that France itself was more important to us than which party or personality was in charge, and so it is, If France had been united in 1940 she would not have collapsed.
Mr. Silverman: I am trying to see where the hon. and gallant Member's argument leads. It leads straight to the justification of Darlan, Laval, Peyrouton and all the other people who took France out of the war.
Captain Graham: I must correct the hon. Member on this one matter. To put Laval and Peyrouton in the same boat, considering that Peyrouton arrested Laval when he was Minister of the Interior, shows how little the hon. Member knows of the situation.
Mr. Silverman: I do not understand where the hon. and gallant Member gets his facts or reads his history. Peyrouton said that he was proud to be numbered amongst the leading people in France who accepted Hitler's view. That also is Laval's view. What, then, is the difference between Peyrouton and Laval?
Captain Graham: One has seen wisdom and the other has not. Has the hon. Member never heard of Talleyrand or Fouché?
Mr. Silverman: Does not the hon. and gallant Member see that what Peyrouton has seen is not wisdom, but the growing might of the Allied Armies?
Captain Graham Captain Graham rose—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Milner): The hon. and gallant Member is not entitled to interrupt unless the hon. Member gives way.
Mr. Silverman: I do not think that so far I have been ungenerous in giving way, and perhaps I may be allowed to proceed with my argument, and then I will give way again, if necessary. What Peyrouton has seen is not political wisdom, any more than the hon. and gallant Member has begun to see political wisdom. What Peyrouton sees is that it looks now as if the Allies were going to win. The hon. and gallant Member says, "Why not let him do it, why not accept that?" But it does not mean that he has seen wisdom, but that for some other mean or petty reason he is now prepared to sell his collaborators in France precisely as he

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sold the Allies at an earlier stage. "Let us welcome that," says the hon. and gallant Member. "Let us make him our Ally, let us put him in charge in North Africa." But suppose something goes wrong with military events in North Africa. The Prime Minister told us that there were 250,000 men in the Tunisian tip, well armed men and of great experience. Heaven forbid that they should have any military success and I do not believe they will, but suppose they do? Is Peyrouton going to see political wisdom again? That is the danger we run. Are we to put in charge of communications, in charge of territory, in positions of authority, in positions of command, people who share the political and social and economic ideas of the enemy? They may indeed be useful when you do not need their assistance, but heaven help you if you come to rely upon them when you do need it.
That is the first thing that follows from the hon. and gallant Member's view. If his view is right it does not apply only' to France. It will apply to Norway, to Holland, to every country in Europe where there are hosts of people who saw political wisdom as Peyrouton saw it in 1940, and who will begin to see political wisdom again as the might of Allied arms and Allied victories grow. What are we going to do in all those cases? Are we going to turn our backs upon those who were our friends during the dark days and make our Allies the fair-weather friends who have come in since we began to succeed? Is that what the hon. and gallant Member is recommending?
Captain Graham: If the hon. Member had listened to my speech he would have realised that it was the very opposite of that. I was, and am, a very firm supporter of General de Gaulle. If the hon. Member cannot see the political advantage of using people on the spot who represent popular feeling—not just isolated turncoats, but those who represent popular feeling—then I am sorry for his political wisdom. That is the logical view to take.
Mr. Silverman: I am not going to debate logical points with the hon. and gallant Member. I want to follow his argument, as far as I am able to do so, on his logical level. What you are to do, he says, is to pick out the people who represent popular feeling. How?
Captain Graham: I explained—
Mr. Silverman: I was asking a rhetorical question. How do you pick out people who represent popular feeling? The hon. and gallant Member knows how we do it here. We have a free political system and the ballot-box and a free Press. There is no difficulty about finding out who represents popular feeling in this country. Does the hon. and gallant Member suggest that M. Peyrouton represents popular feeling anywhere? He represents the anti-popular view everywhere, and not merely in North Africa. I daresay that if the speech of the hon. and gallant Member represented the correct view my speech does not. I can follow that logically enough. On the other hand, if my view is the correct one he will make a similarly logical deduction about his own.
What is the third point which seems to follow from his argument? He says, "Let us not intervene in matters that are purely French." Not everybody, he says, accepts our political views. Let each country have its own political views and let us respect them. Does he mean that? Does he really mean that at this time of day it is not the concern of one country what kind of political and social faith has dominance in other countries in our contracting world? Does he really think it is possible to have side by side in Europe Democracy and Fascism? Does he or does he not agree with Abraham Lincoln, who said in a famous passage a long time ago that it was not possible for the United States to go on living half slave and half free.
Flight-Lieutenant Raikes: Is Stalin a democrat?
Mr. Silverman: Neither is it possible for the world as a whole to live half slave and half free. Surely the war in itself is the ultimate proof that it is not true that in our day the internal affairs of one nation have no concern for other countries. We are all vitally concerned. If Hitler had never come to power in Germany there would have been no war. We and everybody in the world were vitally concerned when Hitler got power in Germany in 1933 but there were too many people in those days and there have been since who said that that event was the concern only of Germany and was purely a matter of domestic politics with which no one else was concerned. The hon. and gallant Member was one of them.
Captain Graham: No, Sir, I was not.
Mr. Silverman: I thought he was, but I accept his denial. I would very much like to know why he holds that view now.
Captain Graham: The hon. Member insists in putting fatuous and quite inaccurate ideas into my mouth. I said that it was far more important to have a country on one's side than to have a party in that country on one's side.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is so anxious to disagree with me that he has not appreciated that I left that part of my speech five minutes ago and am now dealing with the other point he made about the internal politics of one country not being anybody else's concern. He gave that as his reason why we should not interfere in North Africa, France and, presumably anywhere else in Europe. I thought it was a fair deduction from that argument that he thought that about Hitler in 1933. He says he did not, and if he says he did not I accept it from him; but it makes the position all the more unintelligible when a man who was wise enough in 1933 to know that Hitler's coming to power was not purely a domestic concern of Germany, 10 years later appears to hold the reverse opinion. In regard to Spain, that was again a matter which was regarded as the internal concern of Spain alone. On which side was the hon. and gallant Member about that matter?
Captain Graham: I was and still am a friend of Franco because he stood for civilisation.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. and gallant Member is a friend of Franco and a friend of Peyrouton. It is a curious thing that Hitler and Mussolini were on that side too. All the people in the world who are fighting the Axis Powers to-day were on the other side. That is not an accident: it arises out of the fact the nowadays none of these matters is the domestic concern of one nation. Let the hon. and gallant Gentleman beware. If he goes on like this and follows his argument to the logical conclusion, as he assures us he is prepared to do, we shall find him yet advocating a negotiated peace with Hitler.
Captain Graham: Never.
Mr. Silverman: He says "Never," but on the principles of his speech this afternoon it is very difficult to see why not. Some day, perhaps, in another speech—I know that he cannot speak again to-day—he will tell us why.
I have been rather provoked into making a speech which I had not intended to make. Two days ago I was in Liverpool, and an American sailor came to see me. He had been with an American ship to North Africa, and he was disturbed about what he had seen there. He talked of the camps, about the friends of the Allies there in prison, the Fascist-minded authorities, people walking about with Fascist slogans on their arms, pro-Fascist signs and anti-Ally signs written up on the walls at night. He was afraid that we were backing the wrong side again and he wondered what we could do about it. I know, now that the fortunes of war have turned and it looks as though we shall win after all, that a great many people would like to draw the veil over the past and would like to see this country make in the future exactly the mistakes that have brought the world to this pass already. They would repeat the Franco mistakes, the democratic-concern mistakes, the country-against-country mistake. If this war were an old-fashioned war of that type, not 10 per cent. of the people of this country would shed a drop of blood for it.
People are not interested in contending Imperialisms. They do not believe that the fortunes of the common man in one country are not exactly the same and do not depend upon exactly the same things as the fortunes of the common man everywhere else. They do not believe that patriotism consists in helping your own country to dominate as large a part of the globe as you can. They will defend to the death the things in which they do believe and the way of life that seems good to them, and their patriotism takes the form of believing in the contributions to civilisation made by their countries and not in the offences against civilisation which all countries have committed. That is not what people are fighting and dying for, but for a world in which it is possible for men, women and children to live and breathe freely, to work together, to produce and to enjoy the results of their labour, and to live as comrades in a brotherly world and against all the ideas

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that the Hitlers, Mussolinis and Francos in this and other countries would like to see preserved.
Mr. Astor: The speeches of the two hon. Members who last spoke have shown the House how the problem of North Africa can appear in different lights to two hon. Members, both of unquestioned patriotism, integrity and intelligence, and both having in their minds the supreme desire to beat the Germans. I am not going to follow them in their arguments. On a previous occasion I have shown where my sentiments lie. I would like to see how far we can draw the lessons of this episode and prevent it occurring in the future. We have been shown the danger of our national unity being split before the war is over, and we have been very near the point in which a wedge has been driven between Great Britain and the United States. Those of us who believe passionately that we must maintain our national unity and must keep the unity of the United Nations till we have got the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan must look very carefully for the lessons which can be drawn.
I regret that the Prime Minister did not speak longer on the North African situation. I think the Governments of the United States and this country have a good case. Those of us who have had an opportunity of hearing the strictly military side of the situation and the position with which General Eisenhower was confronted can understand the very powerful arguments which existed. It is very important that those overwhelming military considerations should be shown which may put us in a politically difficult position. These situations may occur again, and if we indulge in pacts, whether it is with France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia or Norway, exactly the same situation may occur. It is absolutely necessary that we should have a united country and really united nations on a policy of how to deal with the situation if it arises again.
There is this conflict of military necessity, which can be argued on a strictly rational basis. There is the conflict of political emotion. Some people say that in war we cannot afford political emotions, but that is not true, because people do not fight wars on strictly rational lines. The people of this country have only
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undergone the sufferings they have because their emotions were deeply stirred, not only against Hitler but against the Quislings, and the Government and the B.B.C. deliberately worked up feelings against the Quislings and the Vichyists, and so on. You cannot turn the whole current of emotion overnight, and so you have the great emotional disturbance in this country which the North African situation produced. So I put it to the House that we must work out our plans for the future; we must have proper political planning. It may be that the ideas should be put across to the country, how, for instance, we might take the view that our first consideration is to judge foreigners solely by whether they are prepared at this given moment to fight the Germans on our side, at the same time giving a formal guarantee that at the end of the war we will supervise the elections in those countries and make sure that the governments represent the popular will. That is one possible idea. But we must prepare the country for what is happening, otherwise we shall split it. You have the B.B.C. taking one line.
The remarks of the Prime Minister today about the Italians in Tripoli being delivered from Germany will be read, and a great deal will be read into them in Italy and elsewhere. It will be regarded as an attempt to split Germany and Italy, and as though we are trying to get a substantial portion of Italians over to our side at some particular moment. If we are to do that, let us think out ahead on what principles we are going to do so and get some principle accepted. We need not only military planning but political-military planning. We need to be quite sure that the plans of the General Staff are co-ordinated with the stuff put over by the B.B.C. In the past I have not seen this unity among our Government Departments. Too often they appear to have been different ones pursuing, to some extent, a policy of their own. I have not seen every bit of information which comes from the Government all going into one Department, and one person issuing everything in a real co-ordination of the political information which we get. We need to get every bit of information, and if we are planning an operation we have to foresee not only the military but the political consequences, weigh them up, make our plan and then prepare the public at home for the acceptance

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of this plan, and make quite sure that the United Nations have the same idea as to what they are trying to achieve, and the steps ahead, because if we go with an unprepared and an ill-defined scheme, we are merely playing into the hands of Germany. I am sure that if Germans could have heard the interchange between the two hon. Members who have sat down, they would say "Hurrah, English unity is breaking up."
Mr. Stokes: Does not the hon. Member really think that they have enough intelligence to invent it if it is useful to them, and that it does not really matter what one says here?
Mr. Astor: I quite agree, but obviously they much prefer the thing to be handed ready made than have it invented.
Mr. Stokes: "Unconditional surrender" has done that already.
Mr. Astor: I do not intend to take sides in this controversy but to plead that we should avoid one in future and that we should get down with the United Nations and think out the principles of our political-military operations on the Continent of Europe and get the public to understand the background. I quite agree it is very difficult for us to judge foreigners, for us to look into people's minds. Some people might find the Parable of the Vineyard, the labourers in the vineyard, as applicable to the present situation, but the Parable of the Vineyard is not one which any Christian has found it very easy to accept wholeheartedly. Many people are sympathetic with the elder brother of the Prodigal Son. We have to get a co-ordinated idea among ourselves and among the United Nations before we go into another of these operations, or there will be a split, and that will delay our victory for a considerable time.
I would like to say how pleased I was to hear the Prime Minister's reference to the war against Japan. We must always remember that Japan's situation is very like our own. She has her Achilles heel—shipping—and she has not nearly our building capacity for replacing ships which are sunk. If we are going to soften Japan, it is by steady pressure and attrition on her shipping, merchant shipping and warships, by submarines and other forms of attack to soften her for
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when the time arrives. I am sure that what the Prime Minister has said will bring great comfort to the people of China who have so gallantly held the fort in that part of the world for so long.
Mr. Bowles: I am sure everyone in the House was delighted to see the Prime Minister looking so well when he entered the House on Tuesday. He has obviously benefited greatly from his trip, and no doubt from the sunshine, of which we have been suffering a lack here, and no doubt from the very justifiable feeling he must have at the way the war is going from the military point of view. If I may put it in this way, he was, in a colloquial sense, in cracking form, which is exactly the opposite of what those words usually mean. I do feel, however, that it is the job and the duty of Members of Parliament to say what they think, and that they should say it completely sincerely and not be beaten down by any accusation of being mischievous. Because I realise my responsibility, the last thing I want to be is to be mischievous in any way at all. Therefore, I hope the House will appreciate, and will believe, that what I am saying is completely sincere. The Prime Minister requested that we should not go into the history of various French generals. I will obey that request. But I did feel, when he was saying that, that he was referring to the difficult situation in which these people found themselves when France was in such dire straits, that we can look back on certain people who are still Members of this House and members of this Government who, when this country was not in dire straits, were, to my mind, guilty of various actions. These actions are still a serious indication of a viewpoint which, if it is still held—and I do not see why it should not be—does seem rather a menace so far as the future is concerned. We must not forget that this Government still has in it Members who were responsible for, and agreed to, the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty in 1935, which in a sense allowed the German Nazis to build a fleet on condition that from time to time they wrote and told us what progress they had made in that rebuilding.
That conference at Casablanca has been referred to as an "unconditional surrender" conference, but we must remember that in September, 1938, a great

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number of Members of this House were quite prepared to agree to the almost unconditional surrender of Czechoslovakia to the Axis. I am very concerned at the fact that there is still a large core of reaction in this House, as witnessed by the heavy vote against the Catering Bill. I find in various parts of the country, where I speak and discuss this matter, that there is great anxiety lest that will result in setting up Fascist Governments in North Africa, and possibly in Spain, Portugal, Finland, Hungary, and so on.
I hope that whoever is replying for the Government will give an assurance that they will not enter into any secret treaties. The hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Granville) asked for an assurance that there was no secret political agreement entered into at Casablanca, I would supplement that by asking for an assurance that there was none at Adana. There is anxiety among people with whom I have discussed this matter lest some undertaking was given to the Turkish Government in case of Russia becoming too strong. It is so easy to dangle the fear of Bolshevisation before people in this country, and no doubt in other parts of Europe, too; and there is no doubt that people could by that means be urged to turn over and change their coats, without any difficulty at all. People are anxious to see a future which will be safe for democracy and the peace of the world. If, after the war, treaties came to light, as after the last war, which will rebuild Fascist key points in Europe and in Africa, that would be fatal. Otherwise, the landing in North Africa and the dealings with Darlan and so on would seem to be a turning point in the war from a political point of view. I earnestly ask the Government to give an assurance that no secret political treaties have been entered into which, will come into force if and when what might be described as the Russian menace becomes too serious.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I think that after this discussion the House would like a brief reply to some of the points which have been raised. I do not think it need be more than a brief reply, because most of the speeches seem to have cancelled one another out. When I listened to the French controversy—which at one time seemed almost to reach the level of the French Chamber of Deputies—I felt
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thankful that I was not called upon to intervene between the two hon. Gentlemen. If I have asked my hon. Friends—and I have asked them—to restrain themselves as far as they can from expressing preferences for this or that individual Frenchman, it is simply because I think that there are encouraging indications that Frenchmen are getting together of their own volition. That being so, I am certain that any contribution from us backing one or another individual is not likely to promote the process. From the point of view of winning the war, the most important thing is that Frenchmen who want to fight the Germans should be united. I thank the House for the restraint which it has shown in this matter; and it has helped. That is all I want to say on the French position. I think that in recent weeks the position has improved, and I am not without hope that the movement towards unity will grow in strength.
The hon. Member for Leigh (Mr. Tinker) asked a question about a Debate in another place on the future of civil aviation. He was apprehensive lest some of the things said there should cause ill feeling in the United States, or make our work together more difficult. I must make quite plain our position on future work with the United States. On all these post-war subjects we want to work in the closest association with the United States and with our Russian Ally. We are absolutely certain that unless we succeed in doing so there will be no real permanence in the better conditions which we hope to create after the war.
Mr. Stokes: Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that no concessions have been granted to America?
Mr. Eden: Yes, Sir: no concessions have been granted to anybody. My hon. Friend may rest assured of that. Equally, I can answer the hon. Member for Nun-eaton (Mr. Bowles). We have no secret engagements or secret commitments of any kind towards any other Power at all. If there is one thing that I have tried to do at the Foreign Office in this war period, when diplomacy is only a secondary instrument trying to help the military power as much as we can, it is to ensure that we should not arrive at the Peace Conference with a lot of commitments on our hands which would embarrass us and

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our Allies in trying to make the best settlement we could. My hon. Friend the Member for West Fulham (Mr. Astor) made some observations on the importance of making political plans in connection with military operations. I entirely share his view. In this case we did make political plans, very closely co-ordinated ones, and the staffs worked well together. But you may make political plans, and then events occur which you have not foreseen. I confess that I did not think of Darlan turning up in that way. That was no doubt very backward of me and of the Foreign Office, but I did not think that he would be there at that moment, in that shape, and in that form. Although you make careful preparation, it sometimes happens that the eventuality is not what you expected when you made your plans, not what you hoped would come about.
I was asked by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) whether I could give any information about the shackling of prisoners. He said, quite truly, that the House has shown great patience on this matter. The hon. Member and the House will remember that some time ago the Swiss Government made an appeal to us and to the German Government to unshackle prisoners within a given period. We responded at once to that appeal—in fact, we responded even before the date which the Swiss Government had suggested. The German Government have not seen fit to take similar action. We have been consulting with the Canadian Government, and we have also been in consultation with the Protecting Power, on the situation created by this fact. Only this morning we despatched a further communication to the Protecting Power on the subject; which I do not think the House will ask me to give, because I think we have a better chance of a solution if I do not at this stage give the communication to the House. From the Foreign Office angle, I thank the House for the patience it has shown on a matter on which we all feel deeply.
I have only one general comment to make. I felt, as I listened to this discussion, that hon. Members felt keen pleasure to see the Prime Minister back and to hear his account and to see the spirit he was in and to know that that spirit was based on his own confident anticipation of the present and the future. I feel sure that there could really be no tribute he would like more than the
1530
many generous things which have been said by hon. Members during this Debate, which I will convey to him, and for which I know he will be grateful.
Mr. Cocks: I did not hear the first part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. Did he deal with the question I put as to future arrangements and whether we are to have some settled agreement between Russia and ourselves as we enter Europe? Are we going to have agreements with Quislings or with the people who have been keeping up resistance all the time?
Mr. Eden: I think I covered that point fairly well. Broadly, the position is that whenever we take action of this kind there is political discussion with the other Powers concerned. Even in regard to the North African business hon. Members are wrong if they think we have not kept the Russian Government closely in touch and informed of the position. When we come to Europe, all the more so shall we need consultation between the parties concerned on the policy to be followed.
Sir Edward Grigg: I rise only to add a very brief footnote to what has been said about North Africa. Everybody will agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said about the extreme importance of getting unity among those Frenchmen whose one object is to fight and defeat Germany. That is our object. That undoubtedly is the first object we have to consider, but I would also like to say one word on behalf of the military commanders and their difficulties. The military commanders, who have the lives of the men and the success of operations in their hands, have really to deal with people who can deliver the goods. That must be, with them, one of the ruling considerations. I am reminded of a famous occasion in the past when the Duke of Wellington dealt with Talleyrand. No one could suppose the Duke of Wellington had the slightest sympathy with Talleyrand, but he used him. Afterwards Talleyrand went out of the picture. It is a historical parallel that is worth considering at the present moment.
Everybody is agreed that the return of the Prime Minister in such excellent health and spirits, and the review of his travels which he has given to the House, have put everybody in very good heart.

1531
I would like only to express particular pleasure at the attention which he gave to the U-boat danger. That he should have put that in the forefront of his speech and that he should have given us the very clear assurance he gave us on that subject is extremely satisfactory, and for one particular reason, that he showed quite clearly the appreciation of the Government of the important fact that new building and launchings will never quite compensate for sinkings. The most essential thing is to prevent and reduce sinkings if you can, because the losses you make over sinkings are not only in material, but, above all, in men, and it is something you cannot recover by any launchings. On that point the speech of the Prime Minister seemed to be particularly satisfactory, and I am anxious to say so.
Sir Francis Fremantle (St. Albans): I want to say a few words on a subject which, I think, requires to be mentioned. I realise the admiration and the immense loyalty and respect that we owe to the Prime Minister for all he has said and done, but it is constantly forgotten that we are always talking of the progress of the war with regard to the supply of munitions to the troops, and yet the thing upon which they depend infinitely more than the supply of munitions is the condition and health of the men. Some attention has been paid to it, but I am reminded of the times in the past in which the medical service has not been considered worthy of consideration because there has been so little for it to do and there has been no ill-health. The whole triumph of this war is dependent on the health of the troops. Splendid service is being given in this connection, and some mention ought to be made of it in due course and an opportunity given in order to hear what has been done.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  SUPPLY
  Considered in Committee.
  [Major MILNER in the Chair]

  SUPPLY
    CIVIL ESTIMATES, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1942
      CLASS II

        COLONIAL AND MIDDLE EASTERN SERVICES
        Motion made, and Question proposed.
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10,273,650, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for sundry Colonial and Middle Eastern Services under His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, including certain non-effective services and grants in aid."
        The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Colonel Oliver, Stanley): It will, I think, be for the convenience of the Committee if, in presenting this Estimate, I deal only with the few main items and then leave Members of the Committee to ask any questions on the rather varied items which are contained in that Estimate and which I shall be only too glad to answer. Hon. Members who have looked at the Estimate and have seen that the total is one of £10,200,000 will have realised that almost the whole of that sum is accounted for by one item. That item is the sum of £10,000,000 for Malta. Hon. Members will recall an announcement made on behalf of my predecessor in November of last year with regard to this sum. The House was then told that His Majesty's Government would seek the approval of Parliament for the sum of £10,000,000 which would go to Malta as a free gift from Great Britain for the restoration of war damage in the island and for the rebuilding of Malta after the war. Surely it takes little imagination on the part of hon. Members to realise how much that sum is needed and what an essential purpose it will fulfil. On this small island, 120 square miles, about one-sixth the size of my constituency, since the beginning of the war, there have, I believe, been over 3,000 air-raid alerts and 1,200 actual air raids, and it is computed that last year over 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the island, so small in area and with its population and the buildings concentrated in only one small section of the

        1533
        island. It is not surprising, in view of figures of that kind, to know how serious has been the damage done to property in the island. It is estimated that 25 per cent. of the total value of all buildings in the island has been eliminated by air-raid action.
        The Malta Government propose to deal with the question of compensation for war damage to property on the same lines as it has been dealt with in this country. There is at the present time before the Council of Government a War Damage Bill drawn up on the same principles as our Compensation Act in this country, and when that Bill has become law, it will be for an authority in Malta to deal with all the claims arising out of this war damage. The Act will provide, as our Act does here, for certain contributions to be paid by property owners in the island, but it is clear, when you consider the proportion of damaged property in the island, that even when contributions have been taken into account, there will remain a deficit facing this authority of a very large amount, which it would be quite impossible for Malta to bear. But the main purpose of this fund of £10,000,000 is that it should be used to pay these claims and rebuild the public property which has been destroyed. The Committee may be interested to know that all provisional estimates which have been made hitherto—and, of course, they must be very provisional—and on the assumption, the very large assumption, that there will be no further heavy air-raid damage in Malta, it is reckoned that the sum of £10,000,000 will be sufficient to cover this primary purpose and that there will be some balance remaining. It is the intention, as was announced to the House, that the balance, after meeting these first claims on the fund, should be available for any purpose which is available to Malta, that is, any purpose of such character which is approved by the Government of Malta and the Secretary of State.
        I cannot imagine that the Committee have ever voted such a large sum with so much readiness and so much satisfaction. For almost the first time in two years we really can talk about the siege of Malta. For the last two or three months such a startling change for the better has come over the affairs of the island that we can talk in a way now that a few months ago we hesitated to do without immediately
        1534
        touching any wood which was in the neighbourhood. The siege of Malta for those two years, when the history of this war comes to be written, will rank as one of the great sieges of history. It will be of most peculiar interest, because it has been the first of these sieges which we have known under strange new conditions. Sieges of the past have been equally heroic, such as the siege of Leningrad in the present war, but they have been on old, traditional lines—a city surrounded by enemy troops and the inhabitants within reach of the foes outside. Yet Malta has never had an enemy foot set on the island, and with the exception of one small raid, no enemy warship has been in the coastal waters around Malta. But for two years Malta has been in dire peril from this great new air power. No city has suffered such a siege in the past. As the Committee knows only too well, that great peril has been averted only by the skill, courage and sacrifice of all concerned, and the dominant note I would like to strike in referring to the performances of Malta during this period is that it is an ideal example of a combined operation.
        The Services, merchant seamen and the civilian population alike have been all for each and each for all. It is not because of the particular exploits of one Service but because of the combination and co-operation of all that Malta has come successfully through her ordeal. Even in the darkest, period of the, siege of Malta, even when some of us were wondering whether she could hold out against the terrific air bombardment to which she was being subjected, even at the blackest moment of the fight, the Navy turned up and showed that Malta had a sting. The defensive was rapidly turned into the offensive. Air force has upset all the calculations of those of us who tried in the early days of the war to study warfare under new conditions. We all believed that where you had a constricted area, with no aerodromes deployed in depth and facing, as Malta does, the great island of Sicily, which is covered with aerodromes and within range of Metropolitan Italy, you could never hope to cope with a depth of aerodromes of that kind. Yet Malta, with her restricted aerodrome space and with an Air Force always inferior to the Metropolitan and Italian air forces and their

        1535
        German ally—with all these disadvantages Malta gained the victory.
        But the Service about which I would like to speak at a little greater length than either the Navy or the Air Force is the Army. I want to do that, because the part that the Army has played in those two years has been less dramatic than that of the other two Services and for that reason has been inclined, perhaps, to be a little overlooked in the many well-deserved tributes paid to the Services. The part played by the Army in Malta has been just as valuable and just as gallant as that played by the other Services. First of all, there have been the "Ack-Ack" gunners on the island. I do not think it is too much to say that they have turned themselves into the finest anti-aircraft barrage in the world. In 1942 anti-aircraft gunners alone brought down 182 planes; but do not let us forget the services that have been rendered by the infantry and other arms. They have had no opportunity of being able to perform what are considered to be their usual roles; they have, in fact, become the handymen of the island. They have rendered immense contributions to the successful role of the Royal Air Force under conditions often of great danger, because the aerodromes on the island have been a natural focal point for many of the German attacks. They have seen to the maintenance of aerodromes, and largely owing to their exertions fighters have been able to leave the ground within a few minutes after what would appear to be a devastating raid.
        Above all, these men have done magnificent work in the docks. When convoys have come in, when it has been essential that the convoys which have escaped so many perils should not be destroyed at the last moment in harbour and their valuable supplies lost, when it has been essential that they should be unloaded quickly, these men have unloaded ships with a rapidity which compares very favourably with the rapidity with which large ships can be unloaded in this country by skilled labour and the requisite appliances. They have performed throughout the island a number of unusual tasks with great skill and courage. Besides the Services, I think all of us would like to pay tribute to those members of the Merchant Navy who have
        1536
        taken their share in supplying Malta during these difficult years. I spent 18 months of this war with the Joint Planning Staff, and I remember many times how, when the time came round to try and get a convoy through to Malta, one used to watch in the war room, with heart in mouth, the progress of the convoy. You would hear first of its being sighted, you would hear next of its being attacked, you would hear of its losses, and in the end nearly always you would hear of its success; but there is one thing that you never heard, one thing that I never heard during the whole 18 months I was there—you never heard of them turning back. It is because they did not turn back, because they faced great losses and many casualties, these Merchant seamen, that Malta got the food which enabled the people to survive and the ammunition which enabled them to fight back.
        Finally, I want to speak of the people of Malta, who in some ways had the hardest role to play of all. Many hon. Members who, either in the last war or in this war, have taken part in fighting, feel, I expect, as I do, that when you fight in a Service you put on a uniform, you go to a different land very often, you live under quite strange conditions—it is a new world—and somehow or other all the horrors of war do not seem so dreadful in that new and different world. But when you get ordinary bombing, when you live your ordinary civilian life, when you are living in the same house as you lived in during peace, going to the same office, wearing the same clothes, and when life in some ways is going on just the same as you have known it through all the happy peaceful years, and yet when, in other ways, there are those strange and awful horrors, there is something much worse in it and more difficult to bear. That is what the people of Malta have had to bear. They have had to see everything they liked, everything they treasured, everything that belonged to them, being destroyed about them, and yet in the middle of all this they have had to try to carry on with their ordinary life. In these years they have faced death and injury from 1,200 air attacks, they have seen destruction all around them, they have seen the destruction of 25 per cent. of all the buildings on the Island, they have endured discomforts and in the last few months privations. I think the message which the Committee would like

        1537
        to send them is that those are things which we will never forget.
        May I express finally the feelings of the Committee about one other figure in the Island, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Lord Gort, and his predecessor, to whom many tributes have already been paid? This is the first time anyone has had an opportunity of paying a tribute to Lord Gort who in a few months became an almost legendary figure, bicycling all over the Island, with his A.D.C. faint but still pursuing behind him, putting out with his own hands, at the cost of very severe injury, a fire that was started by a bomb, seeing all and being seen by all, and because he shared the dangers and discomforts and privations of the common people inspiring the common people with a sense of oneness of purpose and unity in sacrifice.
        I take it that this £10,000,000 will be regarded by the Committee and by the country as a small token of our admiration for all who have played their part in the defence of this Island and as an earnest of our real desire for the well-being of Malta when peace at last returns.
        There are only two other items to which I think I need call the attention of the Committee. One is the item of £300,000 for Transjordan. That is caused almost entirely by a decision of the War Office, since the Estimates were presented to the House, to form a third mechanised regiment of the Arab Legion. The only other large item is not on the expenditure but on the savings side, and it is a saving of £800,000 in Palestine. The reason for that is this: In the Estimates we took the sum of £2,500,000 as a grant-in-aid for Palestine. Owing to the improvement in the economic position and the large amount of money which is being spent by the troops and the various Services in the country, the yields from taxation have risen, and it is possible, therefore, to reduce the grant-in-aid from this country by £800,000. I think I have dealt with all the major items in this rather formidable list, although, of course, I should be only too glad to answer any questions put by hon. Members on points of detail.
        Mr. Amman: I think this is the first occasion on which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Colonial Secretary has presented Supplementary
        1538
        Estimates since coming into his new office, and he is to be congratulated on having a good wicket on which to open his innings. He will not find the slightest criticism or disapproval of the things he said with regard to our own Services or, more, especially, the things he said about the population of Malta itself. Anyone who has had any experience or knowledge of that little island, as I have had the good fortune to have, must have marvelled at the way in which the people there have stood up to the tremendous bombardment and assault which they have endured. Everyone throughout the Empire must feel proud to be associated with that small island and its people, who are also proud to be members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. We can only express our gratitude to them. There is only one question I want to ask. I presume that the voting of this sum of £10,000,000 does not indicate that it may be a final settlement, but that it is an interim recognition of what we owe to them, and that we shall not be oblivious to any further claims that may come up later on.
        Commander Bower: There is no Maltese Member of the House, and I am sorry; I hope that before long we may see members of that gallant little race sitting beside us on these Benches. I think I have perhaps a closer connection with Malta than any other hon. Member, and perhaps I may be permitted for a moment to speak on behalf of the Maltese people. I have always taught my own family to be very proud of the fact that on their mother's side they are of Maltese ancestry. During the war I have had from Malta letters not only from English people there, but from pure Maltese of all classes. Some of those letters have come through the ordinary channels and others have come uncensored by air or submarine, and some of them have found their way to 10, Downing Street to bring home the hardships, sufferings and great bravery of the Maltese people. We do not yet know what they have gone through, but things are beginning to come out. I think that when the full story is told their name will shine imperishable on the pages of history.
        I hope I shall not be straying too far from the subject if I say that I think special tribute ought to be paid to the special friends of England in Malta; those Maltese who, in the period between the two wars, fought so hard for the British

        1539
        connection; I refer to the Maltese Labour Party and the Maltese Constitutional Party, under Lord Strickland, who stood 100 per cent. for the British connection in face of Italian quislings who too often were inclined to have the support of the Colonial Office. I do not want to stress that following point now, except to say to my right hon. and gallant Friend the Colonial Secretary that I think it is a matter which might be raised on another occasion. Surely it is a little unfortunate that any of these Maltese quislings should to-day be receiving money from the Maltese Exchequer by way of pensions.
        The Maltese people will be more than grateful for this generous gift. Yesterday, I was talking to a Maltese friend of mine, a fine Maltese and a fine Briton, and he said, jokingly: "Of course, you realise that when Malta gets this £10,000,000 that is when the real battle of Malta will start?", Having served my own political apprenticeship as private secretary to the late Lord Strickland during a stormy portion of his career—because, as the Committee know, he was a man whose temperament did not always endear him to his political opponents in Malta—I could not but feel that what my Maltese friend said was probably right. But it is very refreshing to know that the Maltese people will now be able to devote a little attention to their own internal affairs. I feel that I have a right to say on their behalf how grateful they will be for this generous gift, and at the same time to assure them that this is not the end of what our great country proposes to do for them, who have fought so long and so gallantly for us all.
        Captain Alan Graham: I feel that this token of our gratitude to Malta for the heroic behaviour of its people in the war should not go unaccompanied by an expression of gratitude to a former Member of the House, the late Lord Strickland, for his part over so many years in consolidating the loyalty of the Maltese to the British nation. From the day when under Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office he was picked out as an office bearer of the Cambridge Union to be Colonial Secretary of Malta through many stormy years—he was actually wounded by a would-be assassin's bullet for his efforts on behalf of the Imperial connection—down to his death no one
        1540
        strove with greater persistence and success and more wholeheartedly for that connection. I feel that the Maltese people themselves would recognise in this grant that is made to them a tribute to his memory. In face of the most persistent Italian propaganda with all the resources of the Italian State to back it up, the Dante Alighieri Society and many other forms of Italian propaganda, against which our own Colonial Office made no counter-propaganda at all, we were entirely dependent on the money and the efforts of the Strickland family in maintaining the Imperial connection which to-day has served us so splendidly. I feel that the whole Committee will join with me in expressing our gratitude to those who in the past have done so much to secure the benefit of Maltese loyalty to the British connection.
        Mr. Cocks: With regard to Trans-Jordan I see there is a note stating that any unexpended balance of this sum shall not be liable to surrender. Is not this rather an unusual provision; and will the House have any chance of discussing it? If it is the ordinary form, I will not press the point, but it seems to me that there should be an opportunity of discussing it. With regard to the additional grant to St. Helena, I do not know whether that means that any permanent visitors are expected there after the war.
        Colonel Stanley: With regard to the first point, it is not an unusual provision. St. Helena will not be incurring expenditure for the purpose that the hon. Member suggested.
        Question put, and agreed to.

      CLASS VI

        MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,010,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, including grants, grants in aid and expenses in respect of agricultural education and research, eradication of diseases of animals, and improvement of breeding, etc., of livestock, land settlement, improvement of cultivation, drainage, etc., regulation of agricultural wages, agricultural credits, and

        1541
        marketing; fishery organisation, research and development, control of diseases of fish, etc.; and sundry other services including certain remanet subsidy payments."

        STATE MANAGEMENT DISTRICTS
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the State Management Districts, including the salaries of the central office, and the cost of provision and management of licensed premises."

      CLASS X.

        MINISTRY OF PRODUCTION
        Resolved,
        "That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge that will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Production."

      CLASS I.

        TREASURY AND SUBORDINATE DEPARTMENTS.
        Motion made, and Question proposed,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £5,291, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and other expenses in the Department of His Majesty's Treasury and Subordinate Departments, and the salaries and expenses of a Minister without Portfolio, a Minister of State, a Deputy Minister of State and the Ministers Resident in West Africa and at Allied Headquarters in North-West Africa."
        Mr. Ammon: There are two questions I want to ask on the salary of the Deputy Minister of State and that of the Resident Minister. In the first place, we want to know what are the duties of these gentlemen. I presume that the Deputy Minister of State is acting in an advisory capacity to someone and I wonder whether one might convey a hint, which could be picked up elsewhere, with regard to conditions which have been brought to my notice as obtaining in certain parts of the Middle East. For obvious reasons I do not want to be too specific. It has been brought home to me that there is a good deal of ill-feeling, of which some of our men are getting the backwash; that there is nothing to prevent certain sections of people getting rich at the expense of poorer people, and that the peasantry are in such a condition that they cannot buy even the crops that they
        1542
        sow. I am told by people who have been there that it is having such an effect on the common people that they are resenting it and are rather blaming our soldiers for it, and it is creating ill-will. I wonder whether the Deputy Minister could convey to the right quarters that it might be worth while setting up some such machinery as we have here, with a view to a more equitable distribution. With regard to North-West Africa, one is curious to know to whom this gentleman is responsible and from whom he directly takes his commission, because there is in this country, whether we like it or not, a good deal of cynicism with regard to the political situation there. Many people hold that, while we say we are going to punish certain people who are responsible for the terrible state of affairs, we already seem to be acting with regard to quislings in Africa in a way that is bound to have a bad effect on other nations.
        The Chairman (Colonel Clifton Brown): This is not the occasion on which to discuss political conditions in North Africa.
        Mr. Ammon: I only want to ask whether the Minister has any power to convey that sort of impression to the persons who are concerned out there, so that it will show that we are interested in that sort of thing and that it has not the consent of His Majesty's Government.
        Mr. John Dugdale: I want to ask a few questions about the duties of the Resident Minister in West Africa. It is now about eight months since he was appointed, and the Deputy Prime Minister assured- us that his duties would be, to ensure the effective co-operation in the prosecution of the war of all services, civil and military. Since then we have heard nothing about how he has fulfilled that duty—
        The Chairman: The hon. Gentleman has drawn attention to the Resident Minister in West Africa, but I am afraid that West Africa is not among the items included in this Estimate.
        Mr. Dugdale: Perhaps I can raise the question later.
        The Chairman: I am afraid that there is no Supplementary Estimate for West Africa to-day.
        Mr. Dugdale: I thought that the Minister Resident in West Africa and the

        1543
        Minister Resident in North-West Africa both came within the Estimate.
        The Chairman: The Estimate states clearly that it is North-West Africa, and that does not include West Africa.
        The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Assheton): This Estimate is presented in accordance with customary practice to obtain the approval of the Committee for the salaries of Ministers who have been appointed for certain special purposes which are not covered by specific statutory powers. In normal times there are only occasional appointments of this sort, such as the appointment of a Minister without Portfolio to handle some particular matter of public importance. During the war, however, there have been several appointments of this kind and this Estimate refers to three of them.
        The hon. Gentleman the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon) asked about the duties of the Deputy Minister of State and the Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North-West Africa. The Deputy Minister of State serves under the Minister of State in Cairo, who is a member of the War Cabinet. The Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North-West Africa reports direct to His Majesty's Government here and he is in a position to convey to those in North-West Africa the views of the Government on various matters which may arise there from time to time, and also to convey to the Government any matters which he thinks it necessary for them to know.
        Question put, and agreed to.

        MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for certain miscellaneous expenses, including certain grants in aid."

      CLASS X

        MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (WAR SERVICES)
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the cost of the war services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries."

        MINISTRY OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Aircraft Production."

        MINISTRY OF HEALTH (WAR SERVICES)
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the cost of the war services of the Ministry of Health."

        MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Home Security."

        MINISTRY OF FUEL AND POWER
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Fuel and Power."

        MINISTRY OF SUPPLY
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Supply, including the expenses of the Royal Ordnance Factories."

        MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of War Transport."

        MINISTRY OF WORKS AND PLANNING (WAR SERVICES)
        Resolved,
        "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943, for the cost of the war services of the Ministry of Works and Planning."
        Resolutions to be reported upon the next Sitting Day; Committee to sit again upon the next Sitting Day.

  WAR SERVICE GRANTS (WIDOWS)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Major Sir James Edmondson.]
  Miss Ward: On 28th January I asked the Minister of Pensions the following Question:
  "Whether, in view of the difficulties experienced by some widows of Service men in reducing their standard of living to fit their new financial position, he will consider inquiring into the possibility of extending the powers of the War Service Grants Committee or establishing some comparable committee to make special grants during the period of transition?"
  My right hon. Friend replied:
  "The Government have already made provision to meet the period of transition to which the hon. Member refers, since a widow continues to receive the allotment and family allowances paid by the Service Department, and any War Service Grant that may be in issue, for a period of 13 weeks after her husband's death. This period has been fixed as representing generally a reasonable time within which the widow can readjust her financial arrangements and I should not feel justified in proposing any additional provision."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th January, 1943; col. 596, Vol. 386.]
  I am raising this one issue to-day with my right hon. Friend, and I am doing so because I detect in the answer to my Question a repetition of the policy which is always followed by him when a request is put forward for the examination of some particular problem. I have observed during my association with his Department, while listening to his answers to various Questions from time to time in the House, and during my association with other Service Departments, that every time any concession is asked for it is always met with a blank refusal. Public opinion is created, and some considerable time afterwards we are very often in the fortunate position of having some concession granted. I, myself, from time to time, have had the great privilege and pleasure of winning one or two concessions. It seems to me a most extraordinary thing that it is almost only in connection with matters related to Service men and their dependants and widows, that we have to put up this public fight.
  I think my right hon. Friend would be well advised to admit occasionally, at any rate, that there is a case for examination. I appreciate that the expenditure of public money must be justified to the whole community, but I am surprised that when an issue such as I have raised
  1546
  is put forward it is met with a blank negation, and that my right hon. Friend is not even prepared to consider the possibility of an inquiry into the merits of the case. My right hon. Friend says that he fears no challenge; he is always perfectly satisfied that everything in his Department is going well and that everything possible is being done for those whose husbands and sons have sacrificed their lives for the country. He always argues from that premise; but when he tells me that 13 weeks is a reasonable time within which people can adjust their standards of living to meet alterations in their conditions, and that he does not even think it worth while to examine the position, I can only say that he must be very much out of touch with a great number of the cases in which war service grants were payable during the life of the husband.
  Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman does not know that the war service grants machinery was established to try to balance, so far as was humanly possible, the difference between life under Service conditions and the standard of living of members of His Majesty's Forces when in civilian life. If a woman whose husband may have been purchasing his house, for which a war service grant was given in order to meet the interest while the man was alive, finds herself in the unfortunate position of having lost her husband, it may not be possible for her to readjust her whole standard of life in three months to the very meagre pension which is often meted out to her. It might be a saving to the widow and a saving to the community as a whole if she could be assisted finally to purchase the house, subsequently, if necessary, to sell it in order to obtain a smaller house commensurate with her new standard of life. Again, my right hon. Friend must be aware that there are many people whose husbands are serving all over the world who have educational commitments in respect of their children or who have hire-purchase commitments which run much longer than for that period of three months of which he seemed so proud. When he says that the three months is provided in order to allow people to readjust their lives to the new position in which they find themselves, I feel that he must be completely unaware of how a great many people in this country live.

  1547
  I am not at this juncture asking for a general increase in widows' pensions. I only say that there is a case for examination in order to see whether it would not be satisfactory to establish machinery comparable to the war service grants machinery in order that a widow who finds herself faced with a difficult financial position owing to the loss of her husband may be assisted to tide over that period until she has readjusted her standard of living. I cannot think of anything more human or necessary.
  I want to take this argument one step further. My right hon. Friend has a Central Advisory Committee at the Ministry of Pensions. On that committee are representatives of the British Legion who advise him on many matters affecting the lives and interests of Servicemen, their wives and dependants. The British Legion have just circulated to every Member of the House of Commons a document in which they set out what they think to be reasonable in connection with these matters. I observe in this document that they suggest, pending the introduction of a comprehensive scheme, that
  "immediate provision should be made for supplementing the pensions of those widows whose standard of living has been considerably reduced because their husbands, who have been taken away from their homes, have lost their lives in the service of the country."
  If the British Legion urge this in a public document—they have a very fine reputation—to every Member of the House of Commons, I think I should be right in assuming that the matter will probably come to my right hon. Friend through his Central Advisory Committee. I am not going further than that, but surely, when he gives me a blank refusal and is not even prepared to consider the establishment of machinery, he is prejudging the advice that might be given him by his Central Advisory Committee. It may be that his Advisory Committee is purely advisory, since the Government are very fond of setting up advisory committees which have no power, power being in the hands of the Minister who has the right to accept or reject the advice of a committee. The committee is then powerless to do anything further in the matter.
  I want to know whether, before my right hon. Friend answered my Question in the House of Commons, he had consulted the Central Advisory Committee or
  1548
  had discussed the problem with the British Legion on the subject. If he had, were the British Legion prepared to withdraw the suggestion in their document, which has only just been circulated to us? Again, when he answered my Question was he not aware of the views of the Welfare Departments of the Services in these matters? Even in the very small position that I occupy in the House of Commons, I meet people of responsibility in matters of this kind from the Services. Has my right hon. Friend ascertained their views or the views of the welfare officers of the Army, Navy or Air Force? Can he give me a categorical assurance that those people would not support me in the request which I am making?
  What I really want to get at is whether my right hon. Friend just answered the Question in the usual way, giving me the usual denial, or whether he had in fact gone into this matter very carefully. I have had many representations lately from very reliable sources about this matter; did my right hon. Friend satisfy himself that the suggestion which I put forward would meet with the approval of welfare people in the Services? Does he think it would be worth while for me to continue my battle in the House of Commons? The terms of reference of the War Service Grants Committee at present are such that we have no power. As soon as a man is killed in the Services the Committee have no power even to advise the Minister on the subject of widows. So far as his dependants are concerned once a man is killed we no longer have any statutory right of any kind or description.
  To my mind the reason for the establishment of the War Service Grants machinery was this: The argument put forward, very rightly, by the Service Departments was that if we were asking a man to go fight for his King and country one thing we wanted to do was to reassure him that the country would look after those near and dear to him, that they would undertake a responsibility for his dependants. The Service allowances were admitted by His Majesty's Government—by the very fact that they established the War Service Grants machinery—to be inadequate to meet the very widely varying civilian commitments for which men in the Services were liable when called up. In order that the standard of living of the family might not be seriously reduced to an extent to create

  1549
  discontent and unhappiness in the mind of the man in the Services the Government established the system of War Service Grants. If we are to reassure the man when he is alive and fighting for his country surely we want to reassure him all the more when he is no longer there to protect his wife and family. If he was alive he might be encouraged to raise his voice through his Member of Parliament but when that man is no longer a member of the family surely we do not want to leave the widow unprotected in regard to all the commitments for which the Government accepted responsibility during the man's lifetime?
  I do not know, I cannot argue, how many cases there are which would qualify or which should qualify, for a grant after the husband has been killed but I do know the vast number of grants we pay under the War Service Grants machinery, and simply to come along to the House of Commons and say, "You have no case; we have provided three months and in those three months it is possible for any widow to readjust her position" is not to my mind in keeping with the pledge to those men in the Services that so far as is within our power as a nation we will look after those who are left. I Would not have raised the matter to-day in the House of Commons if my right hon. Friend had said, "I am prepared to consider the position and I shall ask for evidence from those people qualified to give it." Then I should have felt that my job was done, having raised the question. I have sent the answer to the Question to several of my friends dealing with Army welfare and I only wish I could read to the House of Commons some of the replies I have received. All the qualified people who are really dealing with this problem think that either the Minister does not know or those advising him do not know, or that the House of Commons does not care, and it creates a spirit of bitterness which I think is very regrettable. I am not asking to-day for a categorical assurance that this new machine will be established. What I am asking for is an assurance that you will take advice from the British Legion, and from the welfare officers of the Service Departments. I was horrified to find the other day that until quite recently the Service Departments were not represented on the Advisory Committee of your Department.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonel Clifton Brown): I do not know why the hon. Lady refers to the Department as "my" Department. If she says "you," she means me, and I am not Minister of Pensions.
  Miss Ward: I am sorry, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. At any rate, I shall be very much obliged if my right hon. Friend will give an assurance that he will seek advice from those qualified to give it. If he will give that assurance, I shall be satisfied. If he will not, I make this prophecy, that before the war is over my right hon. Friend will have to establish some type of machinery, because its establishment will be demanded. It would be preferable to those of us who are trying to help in the war effort if the Government, instead of always denying any concessions which we ask for, would examine them on their merits, and then come to a decision. I dislike the method of "No, no, no," and then, "Now we will consider it"; and finally being driven to give the concession which was asked for at an earlier stage in the war.
  Mr. R. J. Taylor: I can understand the hon. Lady not being pleased about the negative answers she has had from the Minister, but I do not know why she should be disappointed. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Mathers) and I have been raising this question for a long time, and we have failed completely to get any satisfaction. Perhaps she thinks that she might have more influence with the Minister, but I do not think she will have any more than we have. As time goes on, my regard for the Minister is gradually dwindling. When he has a concession to make he comes down as though he were Father Christmas, and lectures us about his generosity and how he has been able to hand out largesse in one form or another, but I do not know of any case in which he has given anything to the Services without being compelled by pressure from the House of Commons to go into the matter and make the concession. The Minister of Pensions should be cognisant of the distress which is being caused by this aspect of relief for our women. Because it is his Department, he should be able to press the need for some concession upon the Government, who with their various and manifold preoccupations cannot be expected to give the attention

  1551
  to this subject that the Minister of Pensions is able to give.
  What is the position? Time and again, in the last 18 months at least, we have pointed out that 13 weeks is not adequate for these widows, and the Minister has refused any concession. The War Service Grant, as I understand, was brought into being because it was recognised that the flat rate of Army Service pay would not meet the varying circumstances of the people we were bringing into the Services. The War Service Grant is paid over and above the Service allowance, to meet rent, insurance, purchase of house, debts that have accumulated, and various things of this description. We must remember that this is total war and that we call men to the Colours from every walk of life, but we have to remember also that there are a large number of men who went into the Army who were in that position when the war broke out. They were purchasing their furniture on the hire-purchase system and perhaps, by great endeavour, they had taken out insurances either for their wives or themselves jointly, and probably in a number of cases they were purchasing their houses. I put it to the Minister of Pensions, Is there any reasonable ground for thinking that a woman who has lost her husband—fighting for us—can adjust her circumstances in 13 weeks? It may be that the man and his wife, wanting to live in decent surroundings, probably paid a rent for their house which cut rather heavily into his wages, and that is not an uncommon thing in the country to-day. By adjusting her circumstances, does he mean that she must get out of the house and obtain another house at a cheaper rent? Evidently that is what the Minister of Pensions means. You had better ask the Minister of Health whether he can build houses of a nature that would allow such a widow to go into a house at a cheaper rent. The houses are simply not there. Therefore, she has to continue in that house, even if she wants to get out.
  But do we want her to get out? There are probably children, and we want them brought up in decent surroundings, and therefore we do not want her to have to get out. She has given the greatest possession of her life—her husband—for us, and we do not want her to have to get out. We are very anxious for
  1552
  people to marry, because we are concerned about the birth-rate. Therefore, I am not sure that we should counsel the young people of this country to wait until they have sufficient money with which to purchase furniture before they marry. In many cases the furniture is being bought on the hire-purchase system. That furniture becomes very dear to these people because of the inroads it made week by week into the wages the men were getting when they were at home. When a man has given his life for his country, does the Minister of Pensions really mean that at the end of 13 weeks, if the furniture is only half or proportionately paid for, the widow should surrender the furniture? The request to-day to the Minister of Pensions does not need a negative answer. All that is asked is that there should be an inquiry by people who know the circumstances and who would supply the Minister of Pensions with the knowledge that would allow him to go to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
  In my opinion the Chancellor of the Exchequer has too often been held up as a bogy man. We recognise that the Minister of Pensions some time ago raised the standard from 16s. to 18s. as the minimum, exclusive of the needs to which I have referred. We recognise that that wa done, but how does that square with the cutting-out of all the things that go to make a War Service Grant payable during the time the husband is living? To-day I am supporting the hon. Member for Walls-end (Miss Ward) because of what has come to my knowledge during the last 18 months to two years. The Minister knows that I have put more than one Question to him about it. These cases will probably increase, and I urge him to keep in line with the attitude he adopts when he comes to the House to make concessions and at least give an affirmative answer to the request made to-day that there should be an examination of this case.
  The Minister of Pensions (Sir Walter Womersley): May I first of all congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Wallsend (Miss Ward) on her eloquence in presenting her case, and tell her that in spite of her veiled threats I do not regard her opposition to myself as being very serious? It is true that the hon.

  1553
  Member for Morpeth, (Mr. R. J. Taylor) and the hon. Member who sits beside him have raised this matter in Questions in the House from time to time, and I hope this will be welcome news to the hon. Lady, because this is not a matter which has been just thought of during the last few weeks; it is a matter about which there has been agitation for a long time. I have asked that cases of alleged hardship should be brought to my notice so that I could deal with them. So far I have had only one case brought to my attention, and that has been dealt with quite successfully. I am quite prepared at any time to hear about any case of hardship in connection with War Service Grants, widows' pensions or the pensions of ex-servicemen themselves. I have told the House time and time again that I have not a closed mind on pensions questions. Any Minister who said that the final word has been said on pensions would be a foolish man indeed, and I am not so foolish as to say that myself.
  The hon. Lady is entirely mistaken when she alleges that I grant concessions only when great pressure is brought to bear in the House of Commons. She has not been watching this or, at any rate, watching me as carefully as one would be led to believe from the speech she made here to-day. Ever since I took office I have come to the House, without pressure from anybody, to ask for concessions and amendments which have proved to be of great value to ex-Service men and their dependants. I have, as hon. Members are well aware, an Advisory Committee, and I have had meeting after meeting with that Committee in order to consult them on various points. In fact, we have gone through the Royal Warrant with a fine tooth-comb; we have spent a lot of time going through its provisions. I want the hon. Lady to realise that it is not a question of waiting until pressure is brought to bear. In the light of our experience in administering both pensions and War Service Grants, I have come to the House, without any pressure from anybody, and asked for amendments to be made which I thought would be of real benefit to the people concerned. The hon. Lady has, as a Member of the War Service Grants Committee, shown the utmost sympathy with those who have had to apply to the Committee for grants, in addition, of course, to the ordinary
  1554
  Service allowances that they have received. I want the hon. Lady to believe me when I say that my sympathy is equal to hers in dealing with these cases. She is in a position in the Committee to see the circumstances of these cases and view them from that point of view, but I, on the other hand, have to do something even more than that. I have to look at these cases from the point of view of the circumstances as sent forward by the appellants and I have also to look upon them—
  It being the hour appointed for the interruption of Business, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Major Sir James Edmondson.]
  Sir W. Womerstey: —I have also to look upon them and examine them most carefully from the point of view of real equity and at the same time to bear in mind that I have a duty to the House and to the taxpayers of the country.
  Miss Ward: May I remind my right hon. Friend that the War Service Grants Committee are not entitled to look at the cases of widows?
  Sir W. Womersley: I was talking about the hon. Lady's work on the War Service Grants Committee, not about what she would like the Committee to do, but about what they are asked to do according to the terms of reference. Why should the War Service Grants Committee have to deal with widows? As soon as a widow gets a pension, it is a pension, and not a War Service Grant, and it is dealt with by my other Advisory Committee. I assure the hon. Lady that they would feel it is their duty to look after those cases and not the duty of the War Service Grants Committee. Let me go into the short history of War Service Grants. As the hon. Member for Morpeth said, the War Service Grants Committee was brought into being by the Service Departments, at the time of the passing of the Militia Act, to make it reasonably possible for the household to be carried on until the man returned from his Army service. That was the first idea. When the war broke out, the Government developed it to make it apply not merely to those who were called up for Militia service, but also to cover all who joined His Majesty's Forces. It has developed

  1555
  until it has become of real benefit, as I think the hon. Lady will agree, to the wives and dependants of the men in the Services—I do not think anyone will deny that—in the main, on very generous lines, as it has been amended from time to time.
  When we came to the question of what was to happen to the widows, the Service Departments decided that they would continue their full allowances for 13 weeks, and I had to consider what in those circumstances the position of the War Service Grants was. The general idea among Members was that the War Service Grants would finish with the death of the man, because they are granted for a temporary purpose. One must bear that in mind. The War Service Grant is to keep the household going until the man returns, and then the Government's liability ceases." But a pension is on an entirely different basis. It is an annuity for life or for as long as the woman remains a widow, and an annuity is a far different thing from a temporary allowance. Therefore, hon. Members must look at the matter from a practical point of view.
  Mr. Mathers: Under the War Service Grants arrangement the temporary allowance which the right hon. Gentleman mentions is granted for a specific purpose to meet a definite commitment in the family. That commitment may not be fully discharged when the man unfortunately loses his life and the income in the home is reduced to a pension income instead of being one of allowances and War Service Grants.
  Sir W. Womersley: I quite agree with the hon. Member. What he says is correct. It is for a temporary period and when that emergency ceases the allowance ceases, whether the man is in the Services or not. But it will not go on for all time. A temporary allowance, which is made so that there is a home for the man to return to, is very different from a pension, which is an annuity. Its capital value is worth many times more than this temporary grant. I am as anxious as anyone to see that justice is done, and I have made inquiries. The hon. Lady has mentioned that educational charges must go on after the man is dead. That is true, and there is provision for dealing with it. There is no difficulty about, it. The question of hire-purchase
  1556
  payments is difficult, but in every case that has been brought to my notice we have been able to get it settled in one way or another. The only real point of difficulty at all is when you come to house purchase. There, I agree, there is difficulty, because a man has entered into an agreement with a building society to purchase a house and, during the time he is serving, the building societies allow the capital repayment to be held over for the period of the war, but they expect the interest and the ground rent. They are not very large items. The largest payment is the repayment of capital The hon. Lady suggested that we should allow a sum to be paid to the widow until she has paid for her house, so that she can sell it and get a smaller place if she desires. I do not think that is really a matter that you could go into with any serious intention of carrying it out, because we should have an outcry from the rest of the community about houses and house purchases. I do not think it is a sound suggestion.
  Mr. Woodburn: Most people do not want to sell.
  Sir W. Womersley: Houses are increasing in capital value month by month. Am I to say to a person, "Because of a certain set of circumstances, the Government will allow you money, so that you can realise all your capital assets," and deny it to other citizens, to a man disabled in industry or a man claiming under workmen's compensation? These things have to be considered. It is not as easy as some Members think. I know this problem through and through. I do not want to discuss the whole of it on this occasion, but I am prepared to consider this once again—it has been considered before—with my Advisory Committee. We are surely representative of all sections. There are representatives of the British Legion, of all political parties in the House and of the War Pensions Committee, and they are the people who understand and know these problems. I am prepared to consider the matter again with them, because it is linked up with a much bigger question.
  Mr. Woodburn: May I make a suggestion? I take it that the purpose in all our minds is that the family shall not necessarily be over-penalised by the loss of the father, and the matter is a difficult

  1557
  one if you are going to give someone property which can be realised in the market without any guarantee that the home is to be maintained. Would it be possible for the Government to say to a person who has half purchased a house, "We will take over the house and give you your savings back, or come to some arrangement by which you can be maintained in your home on a basis which is fair and equitable as between the widow and the State"?
  Sir W. Wamersley: I thank my hon. Friend for his suggestion and for emphasising the point I was trying to make, that it is not just a question of adjusting what appears to be a difficulty for one party. It is a question of equity as between all sections that one has to deal with in these matters. It is not the easy question that it may appear from the speech of the hon. Lady to be The suggestion of the hon. Gentleman wants a good deal of consideration. Otherwise we may get into a tangle with the whole of the housing legislation as regards house purchase and so on. It is well worth considering, however, and I will give it the fullest consideration. I have made the promise that it will be further considered by my committee.
  Miss Ward: May I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman will put on the Central Advisory Committee representatives of the welfare departments of the Services? I understand that he has asked Lord Nathan. Will he appoint representatives of the other Services, because they can provide cases, as the right hon. Gentleman knows?
  Sir W. Womersley: I know that they cannot provide me with cases, and that is putting it flat. I have asked them to send me cases, and I have often at their conferences listened to all they have to say. The hon. Lady does not seem to know what my Advisory Committee is. It is set up by this House.
  Miss Ward: I am asking about welfare service representatives.
  Sir W. Womersley: The hon. Lady does not understand. I cannot put people on to that Committee. Lord Nathan was appointed as Parliamentary representative by his own party. I do not nominate people. It is true that as a technical matter of law I say that I have to appoint
  1558
  so and so, but the nomination comes from the very people who are concerned in the matter. I do not think it is unwise to let the whole world know that Lord Nathan was appointed by his party, and that I accepted the nomination without question. I cannot pick and choose who should be on the Committee, but I should be glad to consider representations from these societies, which have been very helpful to me in cases which have given a little difficulty. I can assure the hon. Lady that she has not brought the evidence she ought to have done to support her case.
  Miss Ward: The welfare departments of the Service Departments are not societies. They are part of the general set-up of the Services. I am asking my right hon. Friend whether he can extend the constitution of his Central Advisory Committee so as to embody on it representatives of the welfare departments of the Services.
  Sir W. Womersley: The answer is that I cannot. It would mean altering the whole constitution of the Committee. Lord Nathan is the chief welfare officer for the London area, so that the welfare services have one powerful representative on the Committee. If any of the parties wish to withdraw their members from the Committee and nominate a member who is a welfare officer, I have not the slightest objection, but I cannot tear up the whole fabric of the Committee to please the hon. Lady, and I am not going to do it.
  I have listened with great interest to the arguments that have been put forward. I am prepared to consider any cases of hardship that are brought to my notice and do my level best to help them. Cases that have been brought to me, particularly in connection with hire purchase, have been satisfactorily settled, and I am prepared to deal with others and to consult my Advisory Committee on the matter. I can assure the House that I have given this matter great consideration over a long period. It is not just a question of saying, "No, no, no," as the hon. Lady suggests. I have to consider things from all angles, and what may appear to remove an anomaly will perhaps create a dozen other anomalies, and that is why I have to be careful. I am the custodian for this House of this pensions system and pensions payments.
  Mr. Mathers: I think the Minister has been a little more amenable

  1559
  to reason to-day than we have seen him on previous occasions, because the hon. Lady who raised this matter is quite right in saying that we found him very hard to deal with—
  Sir W. Womersley: Excuse me, that does not bear out some of your letters to me.
  Mr. Mathers: In putting arguments of this kind to him on previous occasions., I am grateful for the progress that is being made. It is a progress that I prophesied many months ago would have to be made in this matter, but I am not yet satisfied with the attitude of the Minister. I am sorry to say that, because I am afraid that in the discussions with the Committee his point of view and his attitude will weigh very considerably with them. In replying to my hon. Friends the Member for Wallsend (Miss Ward) and the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. R. J. Taylor), the right hon. Gentleman said that he had had one case of this kind put to him. I understood him to mean the case that I had put up with full details.
  Sir W. Womersley: Yes.
  Mr. Mathers: I put that case in debate in October. I had had correspondence with him before, and it has been in correspondence since. He used the expression that that particuar case had been dealt with successfully. I want the House to know what the Minister regards as success in dealing with the case of a widow who is left with heavy commitments after her husband has been killed—in this case he was killed at Tobruk. In a letter which I had from the Minister commenting on this case he said:
  "I have been pleased to help this widow in her difficulties with grants from the King's Fund totalling £11 7s. 6d."
  Those particular grants were made because of illness in the family. She was a widow left with five children, and there was illness in the home, and that £11 7s. 6d. was in the main, if not entirely, swallowed up by extra expenses in that regard. He went on to say:
  "and I am glad to learn that as the result of representations which were made on the widow's behalf the Earl Haig Fund have granted her £13 for the final settlement of her outstanding account for furniture."
  1560
  After meeting the charges of the doctor for her children this widow was left with an outstanding hire-purchase commitment of £20. The hint was given to me that I should try to get that sum down to a lower figure in order that it might be brought within the reach of what the Minister might be able to do. I was able to get the hire-purchase firm to reduce the amount to £13, and the Earl Haig Fund was prevailed upon by the officers of the Ministry, and I thank them very much indeed for the assistance they gave me, to pay the £13. My point is that that is not the way for a great nation to treat those widows to whom it owes a debt because of the loss of their husbands in this war.
  It is a shameful thing that Members of Parliament have to go about canvassing and entrusting themselves to the good nature of people in their constituencies who are entitled to their money in respect of hire-purchase agreements, begging them to make concessions. Indeed, the one argument which I used in getting this considerable reduction was that the widow would not be able to pay. I said, "I am asking you to bring this debt within the reach of the possibility of its being met from charitable funds." My request was not couched in threatening language. I was too wise to take any line of that kind. But it was an indication to that hire-purchase firm that if they did not show considerable generosity by bringing down the amount of the debt they would not get their money at all and that I was not going to be able to find means of meeting the debt.
  The gap between the position in which the wife of a serving man is placed because of the allowances and the War Service Grants, and, on the other hand, the pension position, which comes into operation after 13 weeks, has been widened in recent times in respect of the standard per unit in the family being raised from 16s. to 18s. per week, children counting as half a unit. The 18s. is to prevail in respect of every unit in the family, apart altogether from the War Service Grants for such things as my hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth mentioned—insurance premiums, hire-purchase payments and things like that—which are normally made from War Service Grants. At the end of 13 weeks, therefore, a widow finds that her position

  1561
  is seriously worsened. There is a wider gap than previously prevailed.
  It is absolutely necessary that something should be done to meet that position. Towards the end of November the Lord President of the Council was dealing with the question of these new allowances, and I raised this point with him in a question at the end of the discussion. He told me that he was not armed with the information and asked whether I would allow him to look at the matter. I not only allowed him to look at it but I gave him very many details as to the particular case to which the Minister has referred. I showed him what I considered to be the inequity of the position which exists at the present time. Up to the present I have not had any more than an acknowledgment from the Lord President of the Council. In that acknowledgment he informed me that he would certainly look into the matter which was troubling me—that is how he put it—and would write to me again as soon as possible. That consideration has gone on from 1st December. The principal point which I rose to make with the right hon. Gentleman now was that in the inquiry which he has promised he should see that the considerations which I put before the Lord President of the Council, and to which naturally he must be a party, are brought before the Committee when the particular matter is considered. I ask him this most earnestly.
  I end here. On one occasion I made the suggestion that where there are commitments such as I have described and for which a War Service Grant is given, instead of cutting short that War Service Grant at the end of 13 weeks it should be allowed to go on until the particular commitment was fully discharged. I think that would be a reasonable way in which to meet matters of this kind. In making that suggestion, I must say I did not take into account the question of house purchase. I had more particularly in mind the question of hire purchase of furniture. In making a suggestion of that kind, I think I gave a lead to the Committee of the kind of consideration they should give, and I very earnestly hope that what the Minister has now promised in the way of further inquiry into this matter will result in definite progress being made and the end of this continual pressure that we feel obliged to make upon the Minister because of the attitude that heretofore he has taken
  1562
  up in connection with this very vexed problem.
  Sir W. Womersley: By leave of the House, I would like to reply to the hon. Member. He mentioned one case we had to deal with, and he suggested it was a wrongful thing to ask for assistance from such funds as the Earl Haig Fund. I want it to be quite clear that I subscribe to the point of view of the hon. Member that as far as possible we ought not to have to depend on funds that have been subscribed by the public. But, on the other hand, I should deprecate any attempt to wipe those funds out altogether. To start with, there must be, and there will arise from time to time, exceptional cases which no Royal Warrant, no Regulation or law passed by Parliament will touch; that cannot be helped. There are difficulties about what the hon. Member said as regards the question of continuing certain payments. Those are matters which the Advisory Committee will have to consider. There is hire purchase. Take a case where that expires in 26 weeks, we will say, and according to the hon. Member's suggestion, the allowances are continued for another 13 weeks. But some of the commitments of some woman living next door may finish earlier, and she wants to know why the other woman is getting more money. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] Oh yes. Administration would be very difficult, but these are matters the Committee will have to consider. I wish to express my deep gratitude to those who have subscribed to the Earl Haig Fund, and those who administer it, and also to those who have subscribed to my King's Fund. I do not regard them as charity in the ordinary sense but as something which has been given by a generous public to be used for ex-Service men and their dependants. I do not think it is charity to go to them with an exceptional case and say, "The Regulations do not cover this. Let us deal with it with your assistance." They are only too glad to give that assistance, and I do not think we are doing anything wrong in appealing to them. The hon. Member did help me to get this particular case settled, but does he think we ought to alter the whole general system because of one case? How many cases has he brought to my notice? One. How many cases has the hon. Lady brought to me? Not one. I say we must not generalise on special cases. That does not

  1563
  make any difference to the fact that we are to have a thorough inquiry. I am not afraid of inquiry because I know that the members of my Committee are so independent that they will do what they think is right. It was suggested by an hon. Member that the Committee will be influenced by me. You have not much faith in your own representatives on that Committee.
  Miss Ward: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept the advice of that Committee or will he reject it?
  Sir W. Womersley: Will the hon. Lady give up nagging? I have had enough of that.
  Miss Ward: Can the right hon. Gentleman reject the advice of that Committee?
  Sir W. Womersley: Of course I can. How is a Minister to be responsible to this House if you are to take all responsibility from him?
  Miss Ward: What power has the Committee got?
  Sir W. Womersley: It has the power to make recommendations. If they are not satisfied, they can come forward and make representations.
  Miss Ward: They cannot.
  Sir W. Womersley: Is this a cross-talk act, or is the hon. Lady conforming to the Rules and Regulations of the House?
  Miss Ward: The right hon. Gentleman is making a wrong statement.
  Sir W. Womersley: I do not think it is a right and proper way to deal with this question. I did not interrupt the hon. Lady, and I appeal to hon. Members—
  It being the hour appointed for the Adjournment of the House, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

  GOVERNMENT TRAINING CENTRES
  GOVERNMENT TRAINING CENTRES
FOOD SUPPLIES
  Eggs (Complaint of Wastage)
  Eggs (Complaint of Wastage)
  Sugar Ration
  Sugar Ration
  British Restaurants
  British Restaurants
  ALIENS (NATURALISATION)
  ALIENS (NATURALISATION)
  STANHOPE CASTLE APPROVED SCHOOL
  STANHOPE CASTLE APPROVED SCHOOL
  JUVENILE OFFENDERS
  JUVENILE OFFENDERS
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
  Temporary Staff
  Temporary Staff
  Retiring Age
  Retiring Age
  Canteens, City of London
  Canteens, City of London
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Industrial Alcohol (Allowance)
  Industrial Alcohol (Allowance)
  Local Authorities (Income Tax)
  Local Authorities (Income Tax)
  Civilian Cripples (State Pension)
  Civilian Cripples (State Pension)
  Post-War Expenditure (Taxation)
  Post-War Expenditure (Taxation)
PUBLIC HEALTH
  Venereal Disease (Preventive Education)
  Venereal Disease (Preventive Education)
  Hospital Equipment (Supplies)
  Hospital Equipment (Supplies)
  RURAL HOUSING, WALES
  RURAL HOUSING, WALES
BRITISH ARMY
  Sports Goods (Supplies)
  Sports Goods (Supplies)
  Senior Officers (Retirement)
  Senior Officers (Retirement)
  Access to Official Documents
  Access to Official Documents
  North Africa (Airgraphs)
  North Africa (Airgraphs)
  Auxiliary Territorial Service
  Auxiliary Territorial Service
  Maritime Royal Artillery
  Maritime Royal Artillery
  Rifle Range, Warrington
  Rifle Range, Warrington
FUEL AND POWER
  Water-Power Resources, North Wales
  Water-Power Resources, North Wales
  Ministry and Local Authorities' Staffs
  Ministry and Local Authorities' Staffs
  Timber
  Timber
  WOMEN, CALLING-UP (DOMESTIC HARDSHIP)
  WOMEN, CALLING-UP (DOMESTIC HARDSHIP)
AGRICULTURE
  Hedging and Ditching
  Hedging and Ditching
  Hampshire Rivers Catchment Board
  Hampshire Rivers Catchment Board
  Land Workers (Housing, Essex)
  Land Workers (Housing, Essex)
  SEAMEN (DEATH CERTIFICATES)
  SEAMEN (DEATH CERTIFICATES)
SCOTLAND
  Nursing Service (Committee's Report)
  Nursing Service (Committee's Report)
  Potato Crop
  Potato Crop
Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

WAR SITUATION.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on the war situation.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, many of your Lordships will know that less than an hour ago the Prime Minister in the House of Commons finished his speech—an incomparable exposition delivered with all his unique authority—on the present war situation, and gave an account of the meeting at Casablanca and of other recent visits and decisions of which it may be said quorum pars magna fuit. It is entirely right that your Lordships' House should receive on the same day some account of these matters from a member of the Government who has the honour to have a seat in your Lordships' House, and in the absence of our Leader I am called upon to undertake the task. I hope I shall have from those who hear me the indulgence and sympathy which a rather difficult occasion requires.
The method which we have adopted of periodic statements about the war situation made in each of the two Houses at appropriate intervals is, I think, a very useful way of forming a judgment and getting a balanced view as to the progress of this world-war in its many theatres. As in so many cases, it is often more important to know the way in which things are moving than to know the exact position at the moment of speaking. In your Lordships' House, and indeed in both Houses, we have, as I have just said, followed that practice. For example, it was on November 11 last year, Armistice Day, that the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, made to us a very full statement. At that moment the Eighth Army had just won a crushing victory at El Alamein. At that moment the Anglo-American Forces had been safely borne across the seas and had landed in French Colonial Africa. They were at
1048
that very moment establishing themselves in Algiers, Oran and Casablanca. Then again we had the last of these summarized statements from Viscount Cranborne as recently as January 19, little more than three weeks ago, in this House.
As your Lordships know now, though it was not known then, the Casablanca Conference had by that time already begun. It began on January 14. Dr. Goebbels and the purveyors of information from German quarters were suggesting that the absence from this country of the Prime Minister must be because he had crossed the Atlantic to throw himself in petition at the feet of President Roosevelt in Washington. It is not without humour to note that since that ridiculous miscalculation has been exposed, there are some at any rate of the propagandists in Germany who explain that that anticipation was not so far out, because, after all, President Roosevelt lives at the White House and the Spanish for White House is Casa Blanca. That, therefore, is the taking off point, the datum line as far as I am concerned to-day. I will endeavour in the plainest and most summary-way I can, to put before your Lordships on a number of heads the recent information and the latest situation, premising that a great deal of this is really governed by the decisions at Casablanca.
I heard the Prime Minister just now say in another place that the dominating purpose of the Casablanca meeting was to work out this principle—that our main aim, all of us in the United Nations, was to engage the enemy forces on land, sea and air on the largest possible scale at the earliest possible moment. There were many other much more definite decisions reached at this great Conference which I will put together and communicate to your Lordships a little later. Following the method which has been followed before, we have to take a rapid survey of the different main theatres of war. First take then—as indeed in duty bound we ought to take—Soviet Russia. When Viscount Cranborne made his statement on January 19 he summarized the position as it was then in Russia. Three months before, of course, when he spoke in November, the Germans were still on the offensive. Three weeks ago it was already possible to say that the Germans were in retreat over practically the whole of their Southern Front in Russia. Hitler's

1049
troops, as it appeared three weeks ago, the troops before Stalingrad, were already entirely cut off from the main German Armies, and though it would have been rash for any commentator to say so then, the view held in professional quarters and by our advisers in this country was that, while they were being precariously maintained by air, even three weeks ago their fate was absolutely sealed. In mid-December the Russians had struck at the Don salient, and three weeks ago a fresh Russian offensive had just begun in the Upper Don sector.
Now allow me briefly to review what are the immense and crucial developments which have occurred in the Russian theatre of war in this brief space of three weeks. The German Army of the Caucasus, or what remains of it, appears to be completely cut off except for a precarious line of retreat across the Kerch Straits into the Crimea. The main exit, the exit that they have always marked down for use in case of necessity, is the exit at Rostov. That exit is; closed to these retreating troops absolutely. The Russian Armies, at this moment, hold, and are the masters of, the whole of the left bank of the Don right down to the Sea of Azov, and Rostov is on the right bank of the Don. Then again, we can now say with assurance that the Maikop oil-fields have been recovered, and that the whole of Hitler's plans for getting oil fuel from the Caucasus are in ruins. Equally important is the recently developed threat to recover the Donetz Basin. At some points, indeed, the Russian troops have already crossed the Donetz. Both north and south of Kharkov the threat is developing, and with Kursk already recovered the fate of Kharkov is in the balance. These are stupendous events. They indicate a power of drive and recovery which puts these Russians soldiers among the most heroic that history has ever seen.
And while we should be wise to abstain from all speculation as to what may be the future outcome and the ultimate success of these immense achievements of the Russian Armies, inspired by their unquenchable determination to drive the hated invader from Russian villages and towns, which have been so brutally laid waste and despoiled, and directed by the military genius of Stalin, this much at least is quite clearly established: the initiative has passed entirely to the Soviet
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Armies. The Germans are nowhere advancing. Both in the north and in the south they are in actual retreat. Hitler's intuition has led the Axis Armies into defeats so serious and into threats so dangerous that his propagandists are searching everywhere for some palliation or excuse. Notice what it is. Goebbels and his collaborators have to whip up German sentiment, if they can, and extract the last ounce out of German resource by picturing in the most sombre terms the consequences that would follow if they cannot make the tide of Soviet victory turn. One wonders—I think many of us must have wondered—whether this German attempt to evoke fresh efforts on their side by warning Europe of the Bolshevist flood does not sound strange, even to German ears, as it is to be remembered that just before the war broke out Hitler was proclaiming that he had, by agreement with this very Soviet, settled Soviet-German relations by a Pact which would "last for a thousand years."
While these splendid Soviet successes are so heartening, we must still keep the main proportions of the map of war in our minds. There are immense stretches of Soviet territory still in German hands. Broadly speaking, the line—if indeed you can call the division between the opposing forces a line—which existed last summer and from which the German offensive last summer proceeded, is the line which the Russian Armies have now re-established. They are still thrusting forward in their advance; working out this vast strategic plan which is gaining them constant new successes. The fact remains that the Armies of our Allies have a long way to go; the German retreat must go back much further before the enemy is expelled from Russia, and before German territory itself comes within the danger zone. Nevertheless the achievements of these heroic men are stupendous, and full of consequence for more reasons than one. Their main success lies not so much in the recovery of vast stretches of territory as in the destruction of German Armies, in the annihilation of whole divisions, in the capture of incredible quantities of material, and in the refutation of the myth that even with the help of Hitler's intuition the German soldier is invincible.
Let me in the same way, but more briefly, turn to Africa. All of us know this story, because recent news and an

1051
undying pride in what our own men have done, write it indelibly on the tablets of the memory. But let me recount one or two dates. The victory at El Alamein was won early in November and Rommel was in full retreat. When my noble friend Lord Cranborne spoke on January 19, General Montgomery was half way across Tripolitania and the Germans were endeavouring to hold him at Buerat. In the three weeks since the last statement was made in this House there is not a school boy or a school girl in the land who does not know that the Eighth Army has swept on until the whole of the coast of Tripolitania is ours, and Italian Africa is no more. I heard the Prime Minister just now, in one of the most entertaining passages I ever remember in a Parliamentary pronouncement, describe his impression of the great modern town of Tripoli. He said that he was naturally received with great enthusiasm by the Italian population because this was the first large Italian town which had been redeemed from the Huns. To all of this—to the loss of Italian Africa, now absolutely complete—Mussolini has no answer except the vicarious sacrifice of his son-in-law, Count Ciano, and of Signor Grandi.
The Eighth Army has now come into French North-West Africa, and so it passes under the general orders and supreme command of General Eisenhower, while General Alexander becomes Deputy Commander-in-Chief, with the special duty of co-ordinating the action of the First and Eighth Armies. I have had put together in a separate short statement the decisions about new Commands decided on at Casablanca, and will refer to that in a moment. Your Lordships will observe that there have been and are in Tunisia on the side of the Allies three elements: British, American and French. From the concrete decisions under this head taken at Casablanca, of which I have been told and of which the House of Commons has now heard, it would certainly appear that effective co-operation between these different elements has been most ingeniously and most successfully secured.
I cannot detain your Lordships for more than a moment or two on the Far East, but even the most summary account of the war situation at the moment could
1052
not possibly leave out some events in the Far East and the Pacific during recent weeks. First, as to China, that much-tried and essentially peaceful nation, which has been fighting for six long years in a ceaseless struggle to protect herself against the assaults of Japan. Your Lordships will hear with particular pleasure that General Arnold, who is the head of the United States Army Air Force, and Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, who of course is the head of the British Military Mission at Washington, have quite recently been to Chungking to concert with the Generalissimo there plans for positive co-operative action. I believe only to-day the message has reached this country that this all-important charge committed to their care has been carried out successfully, and that there is the fullest agreement between the Generalissimo and the representatives of the other Allies as to the action to be taken.
The other reference to the Far East which I really must make is as to two striking events which have occurred in the Pacific since we last considered the war situation. One is the driving of the Japanese out of Papua by General MacArthur's Australian and American Forces, a perfectly definite achievement which leaves no ragged edges behind it. The other is the resounding and significant success of Admiral Halsey in the Solomon Islands, where American Forces have cleared Guadalcanal of the Japanese. These operations, as everyone who has had occasion to study the elements of military and naval affairs will well understand, are all the more remarkable because action has to be taken at such immense distances from the home country from which these Forces come. As the Prime Minister, in an illustrative phrase, said in my hearing—it is like the difficulty which you have in holding a heavy dumb-bell indefinitely with your arm outstretched.
I will now, if I may, fulfil my promise and tell your Lordships quite specifically some of the decisions which were reached at Casablanca. First—and this is fundamental—it must of course be understood that in the area of French North-West Africa the enterprise is under American supreme command. That was arranged with President Roosevelt long ago. It is an arrangement which our own authorities and our own Government have freely

1053
accepted, and all that need be said about it here is that of course it will be loyally and faithfully carried out. Therefore, General Anderson and the First Army are acting, as they have been ever since the landing, under General Eisenhower's orders. As we know well, the First Army very nearly succeeded in clearing the German Forces out of Tunisia at a blow; and, although that effort failed, I believe that it is the universal opinion of all who are competent to judge that that was an effort that ought to have been made, and that it was absolutely right to try it. But it failed, and, as a result, the Germans have made good their bridgeheads; and indeed, if you include Rommel's Forces—what is left of them—I believe that the estimate is made that there may be not far short of a quarter of a million of the enemy still in some part or other of the Tunisian theatre. We therefore must expect operations for the expulsion of the enemy from Tunisia to be severe. They may be prolonged, and the only safe thing to say here and now is that it is idle to prophesy and foolish to speculate
But there are one or two other matters on which a definite statement can be made. Our desert Army which is now crossing the frontier into Tunisia, as I have pointed out, comes thereby into the American sphere and comes under General Eisenhower as supreme commander. Under the allotment of parts which was most carefully worked out at Casablanca, General Alexander becomes the Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower.
Let me say a word or two about the other arms, the Air and the Navy. Air Chief Marshal Tedder becomes Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and within what I may call the Eisenhower theatre is responsible to General Eisenhower, but the Air Chief Marshal necessarily also controls all the Air Forces throughout the whole of the Middle East for, from whatever aerodromes these machines of ours may come—Malta, Egypt, wherever it may be—they are to a very large extent engaged in attacking the same targets and of course they are co-operating very closely with one another according to type and occasion. Under Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, who has hitherto been working with the Eighth Army, will concert air operations in support of the
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First and Eighth British Armies and other troops on the Tunisian Front. So much for the air. Now take the Navy. The arrangements made at Casablanca resulted in this, that Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, who already commands all the British and American naval forces in the French African theatre, extends his command eastwards so as to comprise corresponding operations inside the Mediterranean, and the present Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, with headquarters in Egypt, will become Commander-in-Chief of the Levant and will deal also with the Red Sea and its approaches.
One more important piece of information which arises out of the decisions at Casablanca under the head of Staff appointments, I can give to your Lordships. As you will have noticed, the appointment of General Alexander to be Vice-Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower leaves a vacancy in the Command of the Middle East, the post he formerly held, and that post is being filled by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson I have done my best, in extracting these matters from far more voluminous records, to give to the House as well as I can a picture of the Staff situation as it exists to-day.
I would venture to close with this single reflection, which perhaps, in an image, represents justly the situation in the war, taken as a whole, at which we have arrived. Those of your Lordships who in your youth took any part in the pastime of serious mountain climbing will know very well how, as you struggle up some severe slope the crest of which seems to be clear against the sky, and as you push nearer to the top of this slope, you discover that so far from being at the top of the mountain there stretches before you, it may be vast rough territory, rocks or snow, which perhaps includes some very dangerous and anxious descents before you can really say that you are engaged in the final struggle and will very shortly stand on the peak. Now I conceive that the developments of the war up to the point that it has now reached is very much like that situation in mountain climbing. Instead of comforting ourselves with the thought that, after such successes as we can see, looking back, we were close to the summit, we must realize that there is an immense amount of dangerous and grievous terri-

1055
tory still to be covered. But none the less we are entitled to say that some difficulties which might have seemed overwhelming have been overcome, that the spirit and purpose of the United Nations were never more closely knit, and if the great company of those who share the inheritance of freedom persist in the course they have chosen, then the day will come when Hitlerism will be dead, and when sanity and peace will be restored to the world.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I am sure we all appreciate the statement which the noble and learned Viscount has made to us, and would like to associate ourselves with him in his expression of regret that the Leader of the House is unfortunately not able to be present. Your Lordships will also, I know, wish to join with one accord with me in expressing our appreciation of this type of statement and of the practice of making a series of statements presenting to us in a compact form the sequence of events and the place or places which we have reached in the course of this war. There is not one of us but will welcome the appointments which the learned Lord Chancellor has announced and express the sincere hope that these distinguished soldiers, airmen and admirals will have the conspicuous success which their past histories warrant and lead us to expect. I was glad to note some omissions from the statement of the Lord Chancellor. I noted, for example, that he did not refer to the French political differences in North Africa; that was an act of good sense and diplomacy with which we all wish to associate ourselves. Let us leave that matter to those who have the management of this tangled business.
We welcome particularly the high and splendid appreciation which the Lord Chancellor has expressed of the exploits of the Russian Army. I do not know how, hereafter, these will be judged in perspective, but we are simply staggered in trying to imagine the difficulties and complexities of supply and organization of these massed Armies at this time of the year over this difficult country. However we may view them, these events are certain to have a resounding effect in history. We rejoice with the noble
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Viscount at what has happened so far in North Africa. I was a little surprised at the size of the German forces which he mentioned in Tunisia. It makes it all the more disappointing that the inclement weather has not given the First Army, through no fault of ours, the opportunity of making the fullest use of its good start. Still, the weather is not an element which we can successfully contend against. We have no doubt as to what the end will be, with patience and our usual perseverance.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I should like to be quite sure about the statement I made on this point. My noble friend seems to be under the impression that I actually spoke of nearly 250,000 Germans. I am greatly obliged to him for the opportunity of correcting that, and no doubt it will be corrected by the gentlemen who deal with the reports. What I meant to say was that there might be a little under a quarter of a million of the enemy there. How they are composed as between the different nations I am not in a position to state. It was probably the bringing in of the remnants I of Rommel's Army that induced me to depart from the more accurate phrase used by the War Office.
LORD ADDISON: I am much obliged to the noble Viscount. I was about to say a word about Chungking. We all deplore the difficulties of geography and wish, I am sure every one of us, that geography could enable us somehow or other to get into closer contact, for consultation, with the high authorities both of our Russian and our Chinese Allies. I am quite sure that every effort will be made to progress towards that end, because we have felt a kind of helplessness, almost, as we contemplated the immense difficulties which present themselves in giving greater and more active help to the heroic Chinese. It only remains for me to express our thanks to the Lord Chancellor for his statement, and to express the hope that this splendid example of consultation between the high authorities of the Allied Nations will be extended as much as it can practicably be extended to the leaders of the other great Allied Nations, because we know that the closer o we are brought together in the war, the more easily shall we be able to work together in peace.

GERMAN ATROCITIES.
LORD VANSITTART LORD VANSITTART moved to resolve, That, in view of the systematic atrocities committed both by the Gestapo and the German Army, remedies should be proposed before systematic extermination has gone beyond repair. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall not weary you with any narration of German atrocities. It is not my purpose to dilate upon them but to cast around with the very greatest diffidence and, as a sheer case of conscience, to make sure we have done everything in our power to check these horrors and, what is more, to ward off the even worse ones there may be yet to come. Therefore, in anything I may say to-day I shall be taking the standpoint of the victims, and that standpoint alone. Since I am trying rather to look ahead than to look back, I shall ask your Lordships to cast your minds no further back than Germany's fourth war. Even then I shall say nothing of the massacre, the arson, the wholesale looting that disgraced the German Army. I shall concentrate attention on one phase only which is germane to the point I am going to try to make to-day.
When the conquest of Belgium and Northern France was achieved there appeared on the scene some bodies known as the Niederlegungkommissionen. It is a fixed German principle that the German eagle is always closely followed by the German vultures. These bodies settled down on the occupied territories and ransacked them. The factories were gutted; all industrial machinery that could not be carried off to Germany was destroyed. This was done with the transparent and avowed object of so paralysing the victims economically that Germany, win or lose, would have no difficulty in capturing their markets. Therefore this policy was relentlessly pursued during the retreat. The mines were flooded, houses and villages blown up, even the humbler forms of private property—beds, furniture, utensils—were ruined or spitefully defiled. Not only the woods, but the very fruit trees were cut down. That policy was pursued—this is the point to which I wish to direct particular attention in view of my conclusion—even after the Germans had appealed to President Wilson for what they were pleased to call a "just peace." That policy is being pursued to-day, and in the crescendo that has characterized all
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German barbarism. We are on the way to witness the devastation and depopulation of all Europe, except Germany; and that policy, too, has a purpose and we had better face it. The Herrenvolk are minded to win this war, even if they lose it, and they intend to do so on a basis of population. They count on achieving that deadly purpose by the wholesale stripping of all territory once occupied by processes of enfeeblement and starvation which prevent the victims from breeding, and by the massacre of the inhabitants, particularly those capable of intellectual leadership.
When the Germans are losing—and they are losing, and that is what makes the problem all the more burningly urgent—they are likely, only too likely, to intensify these measures unless they are checked now. Against all this horror not a voice is raised in Germany. In his sermon preached on January 14, the most reverend Primate, the Archbishop of Canterbury, very truly pointed out that not even the German Churches had protested against Germany's crimes against her neighbours and fellow-beings. That is very true indeed, because the German Churches have never protested against the atrocities of the German Army. And I think I can give you the reason in a single sentence. It was written by the greatest of all living German writers, Thomas Mann, now in the United States, in the middle of the last war, and it was written not in condemnation but in eulogy. He said:
"German militarism is the manifestation of German morality."
That is the whole trouble. That is why the Germans do not protest against anything, however bloody, and that is why our whole problem resides in making the Germans protest against their own instincts. When you have done that the problem is half solved. "Well," you may say, "that requires a miracle." The age of miracles is not yet over. The thing can be done, and must be done and done quickly, because there is worse to come and our Allies know it. If we had had any doubts on the subject they would have been settled by Radio Paris on January 24.
Moreover, as long as a year ago an order intercepted in Belgium, and widely publicized in this country, showed us

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very clearly what to expect, and that is that in the event of defeat the Germans will increase the devastations of the last war and accompany them with calculated slaughter. That is an old German policy which has its roots deep back in the last century, and it is that policy which we must strain every nerve to defeat, because if we fail to do so the German policy of extermination may win the peace even though we shall have won the war. So far, no effective deterrent has been found. There have been most praiseworthy meetings and resolutions in St. James's Palace. There was a learned and eloquent debate in this House in October which left in some quarters an impression, I am sure erroneous, that only a few of the "big shots" would be hanged after an infinity of legal procedure. There have also been timely threats by His Majesty's Government, though these again have left in some quarters an impression, again, I am sure, erroneous, of the menace of King Lear: "I will do such things—what they are yet I know not." And so the policy of atrocity, for it is a policy, goes on unchecked, and will probably grow worse. It is carried out by all sorts and conditions of Germans, sometimes to order, sometimes without orders, spontaneously, even eagerly. Therefore the victims were grateful some weeks ago to the most reverend Prelate, the Archbishop of York, when he said it would be our business to punish not only the instigators but the thousands of thugs who never fail to carry out bestiality with gusto.
Now, all our Ministers have spoken to all our Allies about the dawn of liberation. It is a well-worn phrase but it is still potent with evocation. It can only ring true on conditions, and if those conditions are not faced, the world will face instead the blank vision of Omar Khayyam:
"The stars are setting, and the Caravan
Starts for the dawn of Nothing—
Oh, make haste."
Precisely because the German star is setting we must make haste lest we become the prophets of a false dawn. Therefore I had thought out and tried to set in order a number of points by which I thought His Majesty's Government might act now, and then I reflected that the shortest way to assent is simplicity. Consequently, today, I have scrapped the lot and reduced them all to a single and, I hope, entirely
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simple measure. It can be decided to-day and taken to-morrow, not only without cost but with great economy and profit, and not only without offending any principle but in consonance with the highest principle—humanity. In my very humble judgment it is the rock bottom minimum of what we owe to the oppressed. But before I come to it I have two preliminary observations to make.
In the first place, I have assumed that we are all in deadly earnest when we say that we mean to punish not only the instigators but the perpetrators, and in that case we shall happily not fall short of Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code which provides as follows:
"The subordinate executing the order will make himself liable as an accessory (1) should be exceed his orders, or (2) if he was aware that the order of his superior was an action involving a common military crime or offence."
If we accept our own doctrine together with the German doctrine, it follows that, as foreseen by the Archbishop of York, we shall have to face retribution on a very considerable scale, particularly if we include, as I think one must include, entire categories like the Gestapo, the Security Police and the Death's Head Guards at the concentration camps. That being so, it follows again, or should have followed, that we should long since have been driving at the German people the truth that this is the price of atrocity, that the price is rising, and that it is very vital in their interests to prevent it from rising any further. I think that, on the contrary, our propaganda has rather tended to reassure the Germans by telling them that only identified individuals will be brought to book. That is encouraging the Germans to believe they will escape retribution by such easy devices as blackening the faces of executioners. One cannot run after the guilty without losing sight of the innocent, because one cannot run two ways at once; and to-day that, I think, in the phrase so often and so wrongly attributed to Talleyrand, is worse than a crime, it is a mistake.
That brings me to my second preliminary point. I venture to recall to your Lordships the first speech I made in this House nearly a year ago, in which I said:
"It seems to me that we have tried our present line of propaganda for two and a half years of failure—I think of foredoomed failure"—

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I went on with the words that if we really wished to achieve results in Germany we must take a very much stiffer and more outstanding line, and I ended by saying:
"The right way to get into Germany is not to crawl."
Other counsels prevailed and conciliation, even ingratiation, continued. I beg your Lordships to reflect on what has happened during this last year. Millions more people have been slaughtered, Jews, Poles, Russians, Greeks, Yugoslavs—all our Allies—are slain all the day long. The situation is far worse than it was a year ago because we have had, not two and a half but three and a half years of "foredoomed failure." In what I have to say I shall be inspired by no captious or carping spirit. I would not dream of criticizing for the sake of criticism. I am only trying to be constructive within the piteously small means vouchsafed by Providence. Therefore it is in that spirit, and that spirit alone, that I say that in looking back over these three and a half years as a whole there has been a pervading and recurrent weakness in our attitude towards Germany.
Time and again, in our broadcasting in German, we have exonerated the German people—even the German Army, God forgive us!—and we have put down all crime to one clique, or even to one man, and that was done again even a short time ago. It is not true and the untruth has been a ghastly expensive one to the victims. I think that they have, therefore, some cause for complaint because that untruth has tended to make us pull our punches, has held out tentatively the promise of good things to come if only Germans will be good boys, instead of dwelling more on the bad things that are certainly coming to many bad boys, and may come to more, if they do not mend their ways, if they do not halt horror as they can, and halt it now as they can. Indeed, throughout the whole of this latest and greatest of German homicidal mania we have tended to address the German nation as a reasonable being and that, my Lords, is a deep-seated misjudgment of German character. I venture to suggest that the last excuse for that posture, or imposture, has vanished since Germany began to lose the war, and by that very loss to imperil the very existence of multitudes yet in her power.
A year ago I asked that we should stand up and hot suck up to Germany; but although it is impossible to have it both ways in dealing with the German, we have gone on trying, and I have here a very recent and cogent example. On the day on which the Germans killed forty English schoolchildren the following notice appeared widely in our Press:
"Three German airmen who were killed when their machine was shot down by a. British fighter during the raid over London on Monday were buried in a cemetery in S.E. England yesterday. Military honours were accorded by R.A.F. officers and men, each coffin, bearing a wreath from the R.A.F., was carried by six airmen. A contingent of the R.A.F. followed in procession. The pilot's coffin was draped with the Swastika flag. A large crowd, including Civil Defence workers, gathered at the graveside, and while an R.A.F. Chaplain conducted a commital service, fighter planes passed overhead in salute."
There are, no doubt, good reasons for such proceedings at such a time, and I make no comment on them, not even on the hallowing of the Swastika on free soil. But what I think highly unwise, and indeed unpardonable, is to put a description of that ceremony into German and broadcast it to Germany, for that, of course, produces exactly the opposite result to what was no doubt intended, and I will say in this connexion that it makes a very bad impression also on the feelings of hundreds and thousands of our martyred Allies who understand German. I have received some protests on their behalf. On that I say no more except to remind your Lordships that only ten days ago the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs told us that we cannot expect the occupied countries to go on hoping for ever, and broadcasts like that make them despair.
That kind of thing does not stand alone. Let us see how the process of ingratiation beguiles us in other directions. On January 27 our European Service was discussing in German the number of Austrians lately executed by Germans, and one of the speakers intimated that the resistance of the oppressed was less due to hatred of the Germans than to ideological solidarity. He equated the victims with the German workers. In the first place, that is not true. The resistance of the German workers with whom the speaker connected the Austrian victims has been very small indeed, almost negligible. In

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the second place, I have examined very closely the names of the victims and they seem to come from all walks of life. Some appear to be Czechs. There can in no circumstances be any question of solidarity with Germany. The Prime Minister has repeatedly promised us the liberation of Austria, and if that liberation did not mean the liberation of Austria from Germany it would mean nothing and be worth nothing. Your Lordships will be hardly surprised to hear that this broadcast has evoked a considerable outburst of protests of which I had a good many samples sent to me. I do not propose to inflict them all on your Lordships, although I have them here, because I do not think some of them are quite fair. I choose just a couple of excerpts to show what they are like. One said: "This broadcast is the rankest Pan-Germanism." Another said: "The martyrs were not even allowed to die as Austrians," which they undoubtedly did, and it was suggested that they died merely to express their class solidarity with the German workers. Most of these comments are not fair, and I wish above all things to be fair, because as a matter of fact the speaker did allow for some hatred of Germany but had unwisely and wrongly laid emphasis on class solidarity with Germany which naturally evoked such a storm of susceptibilities that the sound part of the discussion was. entirely overlooked.
I am the last person to magnify a mere episode of that kind, but at the same time it does point two very useful lessons. The first is that the susceptibilities are so strong, so natural, so sensitive, that we should be extremely careful in no wise to wound or to discourage them. In the second place, there is perhaps an even more valuable lesson. I think it is a mistake on our part to discuss these agonies from afar, dispassionately, even cold-bloodedly and in German, and so convey the idea that we are rather strange and aloof beings living in another world,, which is indeed the case of a good many people still in this island. In a nutshell, I think if only we were not so frightened in our broadcasts of appearing to be anti-German there would be a little more warmth and a little more humanity in our utterances. I have a number of similar protests about other episodes which all point in the same
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direction, but i do not propose to lengthen my speech unduly by inflicting them on your Lordships.
I will merely pass on to another instance of how I think things had better not be done on the Home Front. On February 1, I heard to my stupefaction our Home Service broadcasting an account of the funeral of the late Mr. Ben Tillett in which it was stated that a wreath had been presented inscribed "From the German transport workers doomed to silence." There is no one in Europe who docs not know that no wreath was sent by the German transport workers. A wreath was doubtless sent i by a German transport worker or a few German transport workers living in exile, but the German transport workers are hard at work on behalf of our common enemy, and the war victims, without exception, know it to their cost. Moreover, the German transport workers are not doomed to silence. They are no more doomed to silence than the German churches have been, but they are all Germans and, therefore, they do not protest. This disengenuity was, naturally, heard all over Europe, and I think sometimes we are apt to forget that a great many of the victims understand English just as we sometimes forget that they understand German. Naturally, the broadcasting of this kind of thing is apt to discourage them very seriously because it leads them, in their innocence, to suppose that we must be either dupes or hypocrites.
The plain fact is that a good deal of our broadcasting, particularly our broad-casting in German, whatever its merits in other directions, is out of touch and sympathy with the occupied countries. I think that the reason for that is that the voices are so often those of men with no feeling against Germany. With such voices I would like to know how you are on the one hand to sustain the sufferers and on the other hand to deter and impress the Germans. By trying to conciliate the Germans you are trying to have it both ways, and therefore you get neither. I have always protested against the ingratiating approach to Germany because I have always been sure that it would not deliver the goods. Where are they? I think it is even more disastrously mistaken now, because I have never been able to see, and no victim has ever been able to

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see, how on earth you can expect the Germans to take seriously your threats of retribution if you continually undo with one hand what you do with the other.
Let me give you an even more cogent example. Some months ago Mr. Wolsten-croft, speaking as President at the Trade Union Congress at Blackpool, made a speech which, from the point of view of the victims at least, was invaluable because it was stern and therefore salutary. What did we do? We got on the air and explained him away in German. That is crawling, and I do not see how you can expect to impress the Germans with such a lack of dignity. I need hardly tell your Lordships that the same people have also explained me away on a number of occasions. I take that in such good part, however, that I hope nobody here to-day will weary himself with any unnecessary genuflexions. At the same time you cannot be surprised that a great many of us have felt for a long time—and this feeling is particularly prevalent among representatives of the victims—that there has been a lack of concentrated policy and purpose in our broadcasting to Germany.
In consequence, the Germans have not taken seriously our threats of retribution and have gone on their way, murdering and committing atrocities, banking on ultimate impunity and fortified by the remembrance of our weakness towards the war criminals at the end of the last war. And here it is not only fair but important to add that in that respect the attitude of the United States Government was even weaker. It is important to add that for this reason. In this vile crisis that involves so many millions of our fellow-beings, it is absolutely vital to see ourselves as others see us. We must never forget that in German eyes all democratic policy during the inter-war period was one of unadulterated weakness of which they took advantage. It is vital to dispel that background. We have not succeeded in doing it. Where, after all, has this hang-over of the old policy got us in three and a half years? In the eyes of the victims, nowhere. In their eyes, and in mine, it has been bankrupt from the start. In their eyes it has not paid 1s. in the pound. After ten years of Hitler and three and a half years of war there has been, in their eyes, no change of German heart except for the worse.
Well then, what is to be done? I think the answer is a fairly simple one. Cannot we change our tone as the Russians are really changing theirs; and for the same reason? It is wrong, and because it is wrong, it has failed. I would venture to urge that we should, anyhow for the time being, dispense with the soft sawder and strike out boldly with a new policy and new voices. And, if it is asked, What is the new policy? I would venture, again with great deference, to define it as something very simple. I ask for two things. I ask that henceforth the consideration of the interests of the victims should be the. main, though of course not the only, criterion of our broadcasting in German; and secondly, I ask that we should drop conciliation until the Germans drop atrocities.
I now venture to suggest to your Lordships, again very tentatively, how I think this might be accomplished. At present I think our broadcasting in German occupies something like five hours a day—or just short of it—and again, from the standpoint of the victims, which I am trying to present to you to-day, that has been largely a waste of time. I venture to suggest that we should cut it down by half and concentrate it; that we should improve its quality and diminish its quantity. I further venture to suggest that we should distribute the balance of the time to countries who need it more and who will give us a better return. I suggest that we should transfer part of our investment to the occupied countries, remembering always that we cannot expect them to hope for ever. Therefore let us give them all we have got, or anyhow all we can spare. To make this possible I suggest that, for the lime being at any rate, we should cut down, perhaps even cut out, the many confused and confusing categories of broadcasts to Germany to which I have often listened. At various times we broadcast to German soldiers, to women, to workmen, to Catholics, to farmers and peasants, to seamen and airmen; one ends by losing count and direction. Cannot we, I ask, dispense, at any rate for the time being, with this complicated and cumbrous excess machinery? Cannot we simplify it? Cannot we have an abbreviated and unified transmission, and plug it at the whole German nation daily?
They are in a more receptive mood just now. Do not let us miss the chance, and

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do not let us be frightened of being misrepresented; that will happen in any case. No one in this country has ever suggested the extermination or annihilation of the German people. I see with a certain grim amusement that the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt have been having their share of that old libel. Let us by all means and every means tell the German people that it is a libel, a libel designed to get them deeper into crime and punishment. Tell them that the remedy is in their own hands, and that it is not a very difficult one; but tell them, too, that retribution—the lady with the limp—is not class-conscious, and will not recoil before numbers, however great, if really guilty. Tell them every night that if they lie awake they can hear her footfall in the darkened streets, and tell them the addresses at which she will call. Tell them what their fellows and friends and relatives have been doing in every country, great and small, from Russia to Luxemburg. Believe me, you can get a result in that way, and I know a little of what I am talking about. For some time during the last war I was head of the Prisoners of War Department, and a great many of my acquaintances have told me subsequently that, when they were being particularly maltreated, they found the means to say, perhaps to a guard or sometimes even to the Commandant, "I suppose you know that you are on our list?" They have told me that that very rarely failed to produce an effect.
I suggest, however, that we should go further than that, and that we should not only name fresh culprits but include fresh categories. For instance, I should like to see included among those proclaimed as liable to the penalty of death all those engaged in the German policy of starving whole peoples to death, as in the case of Belgium and Greece. I think you might save hundreds of thousands of lives in that way, when things begin to go worse for the Germans. "Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight it concentrates his mind wonderfully," said Dr. Johnson, and what is true of two weeks is true of two months or two years, provided a man knows that it is a dead certainty that he is going to be hanged. I say that you can concentrate the German mind, but only by a
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policy of concentration. We seem to me so far to have followed rather a policy of diffusion, and that means confusion. I have often been accused of being a pessimist as regards Germany, but I think it is clear that I am a greater optimist than some of our broadcasters, because I maintain that you can make the Germans protest against their own instincts; and, as I said before, when that is done the battle is half won. But I think that that can be done only by new methods, and not by perseverance in the old methods. I believe that perseverance in those old methods will lead only to the brief picture painted by an early saint of an earlier invasion of the German barbarians: "Nothing was left," he wrote, "but the sky and the earth."
Of course, what I am proposing does not exclude many other things as well, such as the extension of asylum, which I should very greatly welcome; but we all know perfectly well that that is only a palliative, and touches only a corner of the problem. You cannot transport and lodge whole peoples. Moreover, the Germans will not let the people go. Does anybody really suppose that they will be; anxious to release upon the world a cloud of witnesses of atrocities? No; they will be more inclined to murder them. I regret to say that we make that more likely still when we tell them on the air that only those identified by eye-witnesses will be punished. I confess that I shuddered when I heard that, and I am sure that many of the witnesses did so too. What do you expect to happen to your witnesses? Is not that a clear proof that sometimes our broadcasters do not quite realize the sort of people to whom they are talking, or else that they are still so busy propitiating the wolf that they sometimes lose sight of the lambs?
We have all been greatly heartened by the Casablanca declaration that no peace will be made with the Axis short of unconditional surrender. That is the only way to the only peace worth having. At the same time, however, that declaration immensely strengthens the argument that I have been putting to your Lordships; for, if you reject it, the Germans will go on murdering and laying waste, according to plan, until they reach the confines of their own country, and then, according to plan, they will surrender, and thus, according to plan, they will win the peace,

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with German territory intact and all around in ruin. I hope most earnestly, therefore, that the Government will take into consideration my minimum request. I know that it amounts to pitifully little, and I am hoping most sincerely that some members of this House will say so this afternoon; because I shall then immediately reply that that is the very reason why refusal is impossible. I know perfectly well that in official life the easiest and most convincing reasons are always the negative ones, but I hope that that will not he your Lordships' mood to-day, else nothing will be left but the sky and the earth, and the dawn to which we are all pledged will be the dawn of nothing for millions whom we might have saved. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That, in view of the systematic atrocities committed both by the Gestapo and the German Army, remedies should o be proposed before systematic extermination has gone beyond repair.—(Lord Vansittart.)
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord has, in eloquent language, explained the case for the punishment of all those who have been guilty of what he has properly called "systematic atrocities''; and for my part, so far from detracting in any way from or attempting to add to what he has said on the subject of these terrible crimes, I should be inclined, if I were to embark on the subject, to use even stronger language than he has done. I do wish to point out, however, certain facts with regard to the punishment of these people and the proper way of dealing with them which may not be apparent at first sight to anybody but one who has had a long legal training. Nothing is simpler, and nothing is more apt to obtain approval from an audience, than to state that your intention is that anyone guilty of cruelties, of murders and other bestialities such as those of which the Germans have been guilty, shall be punished. That is a maxim or an idea with which I thoroughly agree, but I also have another idea which I will put before the House, whether it be unpopular or popular, and for which I am prepared to contend anywhere; and that is that this country has to take steps to see that, in the punishment of people who are believed to be guilty of these crimes, we do not punish
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the innocent in the belief that they are guilty.
The noble Lord poured scorn on somebody who appears to have said that evidence of eye-witnesses must be produced before you can punish anyone. Well, I dare say that particular sentence went too far, but what does the noble Lord mean? Does he mean that you can punish people without evidence at all, and that if you come across Germans in Belgium who are wearing or have worn the German uniform, you are to jump to the conclusion that those persons have been guilty of terrible atrocities and must be punished by death? Well, I do not know what he means in that respect, but all I can say is that that would not be my view.
LORD VANSITTART: Perhaps, just to put that straight and make quite clear what I mean, may I say that I only meant that that is not the sort of thing which it is advisable to broadcast to Germany if you wish to produce a deterrent effect? It is not the principle I object to, it is only the method of transmission to Germany and the occupied countries.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I am glad to hear my noble friend's qualification of what I thought was the implication to be gathered from what he said. However, without now associating the noble Lord with the proposition that I am objecting to, I wish to make it quite clear that in my view this country cannot, in accordance with its ancient traditions, accept the view that we punish people unless we are satisfied that they are guilty of these terrible atrocities. But let me point this out. The noble Lord, I think, would have no ground for objecting to my stating my own conclusion from what he has said in such moving terms. My conclusion is that his view involves the punishment of millions of Germans for having, under the orders of their superior officers, committed these detestable crimes—not less than millions. The whole of the Gestapo, all the soldiers who have been involved in the systematic starvation, horrible though it is, of people in Greece, in Yugoslavia, in Belgium, and in Holland, as well as in parts of France—all over Europe where their feet are to be heard resounding on the cobble stones—all those soldiers would be guilty, I think, if we are to apply Article 47 of the German Military Code in its strictness. I am well acquainted

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with this section and have considered its effect on what we can do. It would be just as difficult to apply that and to bring these people to justice as if we applied the English law on the subject in so far as there is jurisdiction to try people for crimes committed abroad. But I am for the moment only pointing out that nothing short of millions is the number that the noble Lord suggests have been guilty, and whom we are to bring to justice.
He observed that in the debate which I had the honour of opening before your Lordships in November of last year there were statements made which were regarded as suggestions that only what I think he called the "big shots" were to be subjected to the death penalty or any other penalty in respect of these crimes. Well, as the noble Lord seemed to be aware, that is a complete mistake. I certainly did not say so, and I did not hear anybody else say so. The argument which I put tentatively before the House in the hope that the Government might be persuaded to accept it was this, and if your Lordships will pardon me I will repeat it in a few words. Most of these crimes have been committed in the East of Europe. The people who are being or have been murdered are Poles and Russians and Greeks and other people in the East, and it is the countries whose nationals have been so destroyed, and destroyed on their own respective territories, who are primarily concerned with punishing these crimes. In other words, I was suggesting that you should let the National Courts of Russia, Poland, Greece and the other countries concerned be responsible.
Let it be left to them to apply their own laws against these people who have been guilty in their lands of murders. Let them apply their own penalties, whatever they may be. In many countries, it is not the death penalty at all, even for murder; it is something short of that. Those countries have got their own ideas of evidence, which differ very largely from our own, and perhaps are very much better suited to the particular cases which they will have to deal with. Let all those cases be tried by the National Courts; and we have quite a small number of cases with which we as a nation are concerned—namely, cases where our own nationals have either been murdered or have suffered serious injuries which our
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Courts can deal with if they are given jurisdiction—which, I pointed out, they must be given—to try cases where these things have occurred elsewhere than on the soil of Britain. Because, as I pointed out in the House an English Judge has no right at present—I am hoping that the Government will alter it very soon—to try a German who happens to have brutally killed any number of British people on the soil of Germany.
That was the main thing which was in my mind, and which I know is in the mind of many other jurists who have carefully considered it. If that is done it is quite true there will be far more than a million people who might be tried before these National Courts, but it will be for the National Courts to deal with them, to get such evidence as they can—and probably the evidence is to be found on their own soil—and as I say, to apply such rules of evidence as they think are just. But for my part I stand for this, that if we are going to try people here, either in a British Court or an International Court which we are responsible for, we must try people according to English law, except to this extent, that jurisdiction must be given to empower them to try these various people, although the actual criminal acts have not been committed on British soil. That is my view. I do not know how far it coincides with that of the noble Lord who has moved this Motion, but I know that a number of people who have had a training in English law do agree that that is the proper course for this country to adopt.
But now, I want to add two very short observations on that point. It was suggested by various people, including my noble friend Lord Crewe, whom I see sitting opposite, that it would be better, having regard to what most people consider as the rather troublesome form of English law, that these criminals should be tried by Military Courts. There I want to make a distinction and make it quite clearly. Two things may be intended. One is that we should leave all criminals to be tried by Courts Martial, by Martial Law, and the other is that they should be tried by what are more generally described as the rules of Military Law. Punishment by Martial Law is not punishment by law at all. Law has got nothing to do with it. Those who are engaged in administering Martial Law are engaged in doing something which is so illegal

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that our British law has to give them an act of indemnity afterwards in respect of it. You find no laws applicable to such a case. They can take any evidence they like, and convict and punish by any sentence they please.
There is, however, something quite different. There is the Military Law of this country which is to be found chiefly in the Army Act, but that does not help you in this matter because there is nothing about such crimes as we are dealing with here. There is nothing in the Army Act which will allow you to punish a German whom you have caught and who has been guilty of a crime against a British soldier or civilian. It is not so abroad. In such countries as Poland and Russia they have got a Military Law to deal with cases of that kind, and they can very readily say: "We do not need to go to our Courts. Our Military Courts under our own Military Law have got power to deal with these cases." We have not. So really the alternative before you is to say that punishment here must be inflicted either by a Court of Law, according to our rules and our system, or it can be left to be punished by what, to a lawyer, is not law at all—namely, by the Martial Law of the soldiers who are charged with the matter.
I only want to point this out. If you are going to say, "Let it be done by Martial Law," I do not know what the result will be in practice. There may be a great many cases, and you may find the greatest reluctance among British officers to be engaged for years, perhaps, after the "Cease fire" has been sounded, in trying numbers of Germans for these various offences. In our law we can get evidence, as a rule, by various methods. We have definite rules with regard to it. I do not know how a Court, constituted to administer Martial Law, sitting, say, in Paris or Geneva, or wherever you choose to fancy it, is going to get any evidence at all with regard to a crime committed, it may be, in Breslau or Leipzig or somewhere a long way off. How are they to get the people, how are they to be supported, and in what gaol are you going to put all the people before you try them? There are countless difficulties, because the thing has never been worked out, from the point of view of Martial Law in starting to investigate cases against hundreds, thousands, and it may
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be even a greater number of criminals whom you desire to punish.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): May I ask the noble Viscount a question? I gather the suggestion is that when atrocities have been committed in occupied territories—Poland, Belgium, or Russia—the offenders should be tried by the law of the country where the atrocities were committed.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: Precisely.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: Suppose an atrocity is committed on a Belgian. Russian, or Pole on German territory, how would the noble Viscount suggest the matter should be dealt with?
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I am obliged to my noble friend for asking the question. The answer depends, of course, on a question of foreign law. In a great many of these countries on the Continent the Courts have already got jurisdiction for trying all crimes committed against nationals of their own country. In other words, if a Pole is killed on Russian soil or German soil, the Polish Courts have jurisdiction to try the criminal, if and when they capture him, for that offence. It is not so in England. The present jurisdiction of our Courts is limited to what we call the venue, which goes back to ancient English history. We do not have anything to do, generally speaking—with one or two exceptions, which are not material—with any crimes committed on foreign soil. Our Courts have no jurisdiction, but tire crime is the same, and I see no objection at all to au Act of Parliament saying that these crimes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of British Courts if, and so far as, the victims are nationals of this country. That would not mean we could try a man here for murdering a Frenchman outside this country. It is our own nationals that the State ought, and is entitled if it pleases, to protect by providing that a National Court shall try cases in which they are the victims.
I am afraid I have been led to say a little too much on that point, and I do not want to take up any unnecessary time. I would like to say this before coming to my final observation. I agree with so much that my noble friend Lord Vansittart has said that I should be most unwilling to be supposed to he arguing

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against his general views. I also agree with a great deal that he has said about German mentality and the way to deal with them. I particularly want to say that I am not in the least arguing contrary to his views as to our propaganda, contrary to the view that firmness is the great thing we have got to exemplify in communicating with the Germans. Leaving on one side a great number of the topics with which my noble friend has dealt, I would say this. It may be that the Germans will go on committing atrocities. It may be that in some countries they will be liable to do even worse things at the moment when it becomes evident to them that they are going to lose the war. When that time comes, and they are beginning to act as they are now in Russia—namely, to evacuate important towns—it is my view that it would not be impossible, and it would be very wise, to adopt then an altogether new system of warning the Germans in charge of the proceedings in those countries that violent steps will have to be taken if they follow the course which my noble friend Lord Vansittart thinks they will take, of intensifying the process of devastation and murder. That would be a moment when Martial Law might properly be invoked both to prevent and to punish acts of the nature my noble friend suggests. At the present time they are, as he says, looting and devastating many of the occupied countries.
With regard to those offences against humanity, and of course against every rule of International Law, I think they ought to bring with them their own punishment in this way. I think there must be a restitution to the countries from which things are stolen deliberately at any time during the war, and there must be restitution to those countries at the expense of the Germans themselves. They are even now taking property away from some of the occupied countries. In Poland they have already stripped every library, every factory, except the factories used for German purposes, museums, and railway stations. They have taken where they could locomotives, rolling stock, railway lines, and the sources of materials. All these things have been taken away from Poland and are being taken away from other countries.
As I have stated before, there is no law, human or divine, whatever the
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result on Germany may be, which prevents us saying: "You shall restore these things to the countries from which you have taken them." If that is done as part of the deliberate policy of the Allied Powers on entering Germany, and if full restitution is made to the countries which have been despoiled, the result on Germany is bound to be a terrible retribution. The means of transport, the stock which they have relied on for competing with other countries immediately after the war, for the civilization on which they pride themselves so much, and which they have attempted to help on (as if it were possible) by stealing these things from other countries, from museums, schools and scientific institutions—all these things should be restored, and if they are restored there will be very little left for Germany for many, many years. In that way that country, which is supposed to be in charge of these mighty Herrenvolk, will indeed have suffered a punishment which, if not equal to, will approximate to the crimes which it has committed.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, no one who listened to the speech based, as that of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, was based, on the principle of consideration for the victims, could help being moved. The catalogue of atrocities which he referred to is a hideous catalogue, and we shall all agree in saying: "Woe be to the perpetrators of such brutalities." I am in whole-hearted agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, as to the grossness of the brutalities which have been committed by the Gestapo and the German Army, and I am in wholehearted agreement with him in his desire that "remedies should be proposed before the systematic extermination goes beyond repair." But while I agree as to the shocking character of the crimes committed in Germany's name, I am not wholly in agreement with the noble Lord's diagnosis of the sources of the crime. This leads me also, I fear, to a difference of judgment as to the remedies which he has recommended. As it is the remedies which are of supreme importance, and as the nature of a remedy is intimately associated with the question of on whom lies the principal responsibility, I venture to make a few observations on this all-important point.
In his Motion the noble Lord speaks of the atrocities committed by the Gestapo and the German Army. I will come to

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the German Army in a moment, but it is with the Gestapo and with the assassins and the gangsters that run the Gestapo that the supreme guilt lies. I was very glad that in his Motion the noble Lord, by placing the Gestapo first, laid the chief emphasis on that instrument, for it immediately reminds us that the Gestapo was the instrument of atrocities for six and a half years before the war began. It is impossible to form a just estimate of the atrocities committed by the Nazis on the nationals of other countries from 1939 to 1943 unless we also take account of the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Germany upon their fellow Germans in the years which preceded the war. Long before September, 1939, these atrocities were perpetrated against political opponents and against Jews. I took a very humble part in calling the attention of Churchmen in England and abroad, and even of statesmen in Germany, to them. As far back as May, 1934, a memorandam, prepared by legal and historical experts and one or two Churchmen and in fluentially signed, was addressed to Hitler and taken by a messenger to Berlin. It called attention to the alleged atrocities committed by the Nazis against their political opponents and Jews, and it asked for facilities for objective examination, which Goebbels then professed himself ready to welcome. It made no impression whatever, and why? Because of the silence, because of the soft-pedalling, because of the unwillingness to cause embarrassment, which for long years prevailed in most circles in England and outside Germany.
I have also in my possession reports of the inside of concentration camps in and since 1934. The tale they tell of tar speakable atrocities against Germans is fully consistent with what the Nazis have perpetrated, and are perpetrating on the largest scale, against the Poles, Yugoslavs, Czechs, and other nationals in occupied territories. It is Hitler and Himmler, the head of the Gestapo, it is Goebbels and Goering, Boorman and Ribbentrop and their partners in Nazi leaderships who have carried on and extended during the war atrocities systematically perpetrated long before it. Their reign then was, their reign now is, the reign of the assassin.
The noble Lord linked the German Army with the Gestapo in responsibility. I have no doubt that for the perpetration
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of many of these terrible atrocities large parts of the German Army are, and must be held responsible. There are many brutish Germans; I do not deny it. The young men in that Army have been Nazi-lied and brutalized by ten years of Hitlerite training. It is from Hitler that the inspiration comes. I would add this not unimportant point. At last Himmler has got his way and has succeeded, in spite of the opposition of the German Army, in placing his own agents, the Storm Troopers and the Brown Shirts under his authority, obeying his command, in the very heart of the German Army and the German Air Force. They are ruthless in their atrocities, and they are ready to deal ruthlessly with any rising against the authority of Hitler of which the Nazi régime is beginning to be more and more afraid.
But there is something more about the German Army which is not a little significant. The most interesting evidence has come from German soldiers who have been taken prisoners of war in Russia. This evidence shows not only considerable disillusionment on the part of the soldiers, but also an increasing revolt in the rank and file of the German Army against Hitler. I could give your Lordships quotations from letters and speeches from prisoners of war, from resolutions passed in the camps of prisoners of war in camps in Russia, all tending this way. Let me give you an example. Here is part of an appeal to the German Army from German officers who are prisoners of war, dated last March:
"We have now reached the point when the hooligans of the S.S. and the Gestapo set the tone for the Army and our forces, the nation's defenders, have been degraded to the position of a tool of a man and his party."
Then it goes on:
"It is necessary to take up the struggle before it is too late, before Hitler has driven you to the wall. Form a front against the creators of the Nazi Party and the Gestapo in the Armed Forces. Remember that you have weapons."
Here is another appeal from 805 German private soldiers, prisoners of war in Camp 74, also in March, 1942. It is signed by every one of the prisoners with their regimental number and position. It says:
"Why is it that the war continues? Who is driving million after million to the front line where, in spite of our wishes, hundreds of thousands will find their death? Hitler, with

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his greedy gang of profiteers, is the only obstacle on the path to peace.… Down with Hitler and his criminal gang! Rise to struggle for a free Germany."
Most telling of all is a resolution unanimously adopted in prisoners of war camp 95, at a meeting of 190 German noncommissioned officers representing 1,242 non-commissioned officers in other camps. This is the text of the resolution:
"It is now clear to us, German workers, peasants, and clerks dressed in soldiers' uniforms, that the plunder, outrage, humiliation and massacre of peaceful Soviet citizens are disgracing the German Army in the eyes of civilized mankind. We ourselves have witnessed many of these atrocities. These monstrous crimes could take place because the Nazi system of Government and the German High Command deliberately let loose the basest instincts of certain officers and soldiers … We declare that the time has come for all honest Germans to realize that Hitler and his clique stand for an endless barbaric and ruthless war.… Down with Hitler and his gang! For a new and free Germany based on the great principles of democracy, liberty and international co-operation!"
I hope your Lordships noticed the reference there to atrocities.
I am not attempting to palliate atrocities. I have seen too many victims of German atrocities for that. Nor do I suggest that another nation like the British nation with a long tradition of free speech would have been as incapable of action as the non-Nazi Germans. But I do say that there is plenty of evidence that the worst of the atrocities outside Germany have been perpetrated by Brown Shirts, Storm Troops and those infested by the Nazi poison or at their mercy. It is fair to remind the noble Lord when he criticizes the silence of so many German people that Englishmen who read the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Voelkische Beobachter are bound to observe that the way in which the crimes of the Nazis, the elimination of the Jews and other atrocities, are recorded in those pages give no idea of the scale and character of the atrocities themselves. The more that Germans inside Germany know of these atrocities—I know this at first hand—the more ashamed and humiliated they are. Many have protested in spite of the machine guns. Many are in concentration camps, many have been killed, many have committed suicide, as the only form of protest possible to them.
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I am not attempting to deny a dark streak in the character of many Germans, but I do claim that the most powerful, the most significant portion of Germany and the German character, is not all black. I am not attempting to deny the over-docility of the Germans, but I recall that when they had no friends outside to help them in their struggle against Fascism and tyranny for six and a half years before the war, and when during the war they find themselves involved in as heavy a condemnation as the tyrant whom they loathe, their lot is not easy. Whatever our feelings about silence, we must remember that the control exercised by the Party and by the Gestapo is extremely severe and extremely clever, and that it is very difficult for the opposition to get out into the daylight, so that when one ray does appear it becomes almost a miracle.
What is the remedy, for it is on the remedies that, as the noble Lord himself agrees, everything depends and all our energies must be focused? Of one thing I am sure. The noble Lord has not threatened all Germany with destruction. To do anything of that kind is to hound on the bestial Germans to more bestialities, and to play the very game that Goebbels wants the Allies to play, by uniting the anti-Nazis and the non-Nazis with the Nazis, under the lash of despair. The war has never been popular in Germany. It is hated now. But to line up the Nazi assassins in the same row with the people of Germany whom they have outraged, is to make for more barbarism, possibly to postpone peace, and to make quite certain an incredible worsening of the conditions of all Europe when at last peace comes.
The true remedy for the atrocities is to fix the guilt of the atrocities on the real criminals, Adolf Hitler and his co-assassins, the heads of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo and their satellites, and, having boldly and plainly fixed the guilt on them, to declare as plainly that we take a very different view of other Germans who loathe the Nazi régime and repudiate the lust for world dominion, and that we appeal to them to join us from within Germany in overthrowing Hitler and all his gang. The remedy is to tell those inside Germany who are anti-Fascist that we want their help, that we will help them in getting rid of the common enemy, and that we intend that

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a Germany, delivered from Hitlerism, shall have fair play and a proper place in the family of Europe. If we take that line, we shall find that a more potent means for curbing and ending the atrocities committed by the Gestapo and the German Army than these which the noble Lord has recommended. I find a good augury for this policy of enlisting the enemies of Nazism inside Germany for overthrowing the Nazi tyranny, in the Prime Minister's words when he broadcast on July 14, 1941
"The best solution will be if the Nazi régime is torn to pieces by the German people themselves."
The noble Lord spoke—but he did not actually give evidence of it I think—of the Russian propaganda rather changing its tone. I should, therefore, like in conclusion to call attention to a very important and illuminating letter published in the Manchester Guardian of February 6. It was written by a prominent Russian journalist, Mr. A. Yanovsky, and cabled from Moscow. Mr. Yanovsky is a contributor to Izvestia and Red Star. The date of the letter is February 1. It could hardly have been sent without some high authority in Moscow. The writer deals with the subject of what is in the mind of the German people, and he mentions a considerable change which he asserts that that mind has lately undergone. As his evidence he gives partly letters and diaries found on the bodies of dead German soldiers, and partly what has come out in the cross-examination of German prisoners of war in Russia. It is plain that the confidence of the Germans is shaken. It is also plain that there is a great longing for an end to the suffering.
But, the writer says, there are two factors in the German mind which have to be met, and he quotes a German prisoner of war speaking thus:
"Every German understands perfectly that everything is at stake. If Germany wins the Germans will live splendidly at the expense of other nations. If they are defeated they will everywhere be destroyed … if the Russians defeat us it will mean the end of Germany."
Mr. Yanovsky observes that the German stubbornness is explained by the two motives of greed and fear, and he says that the proper way of destroying those motives is to deprive them of any basis in fact. On the one hand, it must be made absolutely clear that the German is pursuing a phantom in his greed; that
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world supremacy is impossible. This means bringing the overwhelming superiority of the United Nations home to the Germans, and showing that the decision in the military field is achieved beyond all doubt. On the other hand, it must also be made absolutely clear that it is the eradication of Hitler's régime and not the eradication of Germany itself that forms the United Nations' goal. There is no reason for Germany to fear the future once Hitler and his men are down on the ground. And this is how the writer puts it in a nutshell:
"It is the business of the Generals to destroy German greed. It is the business of the Statesmen to disperse German fear."
I do not think that the remedy for the atrocities, which we all loathe and abominate, could be better put than in these words.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I am sure we have all listened to the right reverend Prelate with very great interest. I wish that I had more time in which to reply to his speech, but I should like to remind him that, whilst he states that our object is to get rid of Hitlerism and Nazism, he seems to forget that we shall be unable to accomplish that Object unless we defeat Germany. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, has been at pains to suggest how we can defeat Germany. The right reverend Prelate suggests that we should go on as before, utilizing the same form of propaganda and doing everything that we have been doing in the last year or two in that regard. The noble Lord has pointed out, however, that, in spite of the mellifluous form of the propaganda which has been sent over the air during the past year and a half, these atrocities have been growing in number and brutality all the time.
I was very curious, when I saw the wording of the Motion which the noble Lord was to move, as to what his remedy would prove to be, and I am very interested to find that he has come to a conclusion to which I myself came a year ago, and which I ventured to express in this House—namely, that the only way at thy present time in which we can induce Germany to surrender is to let the Germans know that we intend to defeat them, and that we shall go on until we do. There is, I trust, no one of our nationality in this House or outside it, who has any idea of the extermination of the German

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race, or anything of that kind; but this war has proved to us, as it has been proved in the past, that the only way to beat Germany is by going all out by every means in our power—by arms, by propaganda and by every other means. I therefore support most heartily the remedy which the noble Lord has suggested.
I was also very interested in the remarks of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, who misunderstood what Lord Vansittart said with regard to the trial of the criminals. I myself did not understand that Lord Vansittart intended to say that all these criminals were to be tried here, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, corrected that impression in his intervention. I would go even further than the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, who explained the procedure so clearly to us; I would say that the Governments and people of the countries in which atrocities have been committed will insist upon trying the criminals in their own countries, and according to their own procedure in their own Courts. No doubt Courts will be set up in Germany to deal with those who have treated Germans in the way in which we know some of them have been treated. One thing, however, is absolutely necessary. Before any of these things can happen, we shall have to find ourselves, together with the other members of the United Nations, in Berlin and in other centres of Europe, in full control. It is only in that way that we shall be able to secure that these criminals are tried. I foresee an Inter-Allied Council which will be set up in Germany, with headquarters in Berlin and with many functions. That one of those functions should he to ensure that these criminals are tried, and tried fairly, is, I believe, an absolute necessity. That is all that I wish to say to-day on this subject, but I am glad to have had the opportunity of saying it.
LORD SEMPILL: My Lords, I should like to add a few words to those already spoken by those who have participated in this debate in support of my noble friend Lord Vansittart. In his vigorous phraseology, he pointed out the opportunities which were being missed in regard to the broadcast material put over to the German people and others in Europe, and he recommended that the time should be shortened and that the material itself
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should be more vigorous and concentrated. There is a very good illustration of the need for that in relation to the debate on the subject of Austria which took place in your Lordships' House on February 2. At midnight on February 2, the Austrian section of the B.B.C., which is a section established within the last few months, broadcast to Austria and touched on what had been said in that debate. But, prior to speaking to the Austrian people about matters which were of vital interest to them, by virtue of the fact that the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, and other noble Lords had made many highly sympathetic references to the people of Austria and their sufferings, the broadcast technique employed involved a long dissertation on what was happening in Russia and in the other theatres of war, when the only thing that mattered to the Austrian people was an account of the sympathetic words which had fallen from the Leader of your Lordships' House, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, in relation to their future. They were not particularly interested in the other matter, and should have heard more vigorous words more directly spoken on a subject which was vital to them. I suggest that that shows how very necessary it is that the suggestion made with regard to broadcasting by my noble friend Lord Vansittart should be given careful consideration.
THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): My Lords, I think we are indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, for raising this question again, although it has been debated in your Lordships' House more than once. I think we are indebted to him not only because of the great wealth of knowledge that he brings to your Lordships' debates on all subjects connected with Germany, and, I venture to say, particularly with regard to German psychology, but also because it seems to me to be very important that everybody, not only in this country but especially in Germany, should realize that this is a matter which is insistently in the mind of the British people and of the British Parliament, and, having debated the matter last autumn, we have not forgotten about it and do not intend to forget about it until justice has been done. Therefore I make no complaint of a certain amount of repetition which has inevitably occurred in this debate. Indeed, I think on the

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contrary it is very important that some of these things should be repeated, and that the Government and your Lordships should bear in mind and face squarely some of the difficulties that have to be faced.
If I have any complaint at all about my noble friend Lord Vansittart, it would only be this—and it is a purely personal one, for which I hope he will forgive me. I confess that I did not gather from the terms of his Motion, which are very simple and direct—namely:
"That, in view of the systematic atrocities committed both by the Gestapo and the German Army, remedies should be proposed before systematic extermination has gone beyond repair—"
I confess I did not guess from a perusal of those words that something like ninety per cent. of his speech, his very eloquent speech, would be directed towards denouncing our methods of broadcasting to Germany. Therefore, I regret to say I did not acquaint myself perhaps sufficiently with the exact nature of our latest broadcasts on this subject, as I had no intimation from my noble friend or from anybody else that this was so much in his mind. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot attempt a detailed reply to ray noble friend on that, the greater part of his speech.
But I would like to say this to him. He produced a number of quotations which he gave to your Lordships and which he denounced. I have no doubt that he selected those quotations in a manner Which he considered to be absolutely fair, but I think it is very difficult for those who have not followed the matter as closely as my noble friend has, to judge or condemn a whole broadcasting service on half a dozen extracts, necessarily short, without consideration of what went into the remaining five hours of every day, as he told us, that is allocated by the B.B.C. to broadcasts to Germany. It is like the old question, with which all Parliamentary candidates are very familiar, "What did Mr. Gladstone say in 1866?" One solitary quotation, or even half a dozen quotations, prove very little. But I assure my noble friend that I will draw the attention of the Minister of Information particularly to what he and other noble Lords have said on this subject this afternoon, and I am sore that the matter will receive very careful consideration in
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the highest quarters. I agree with my noble friend that it would be a real tragedy if we left the German people under any misapprehension as to what the intentions of the Allies are in this respect.
War is necessarily always harsh and brutal, and that is why the British people—though when they have to fight they fight as gallantly and as bitterly as any people in the world—hate war. But there is all the difference between acts carried out in the heat of battle and the cold-blooded, inhuman cruelties which the German Government have systematically and deliberately inflicted on the helpless civilian populations at their mercy. There is every difference between the two. And it is that practice, which has been reintroduced by the German Government from the Black Ages into so-called civilized times, that the Allied Nations, for the sake of posterity, are determined to do everything they can to extirpate. My noble friend said he anticipated that these atrocities would become worse as the Germans increasingly realized that their defeat was near, and I am afraid that what he says is very likely true. I think his great knowledge of the German people and his study of their psychology would alone entitle his view on a matter of that sort to our most respectful attention. But, as he pointed out, our experience of the last war was to that effect.
I listened to my noble friend very carefully and I listened to other noble Lords, and I think I am right in saying that they and the right reverend Prelate are really in agreement, that the only thing we can now do is to convince people in Germany that if they take part in these atrocities they will be brought to a court of justice. I think that is the view of my noble friend, it is the view of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, and of the right reverend Prelate. My noble friend Lord Vansittart expressly said that he had no desire to exterminate the German people. Nobody who knows him would think him guilty of such a desire. Lord Maugham and the right reverend Prelate were really at one with him in their object. What steps are we taking, then, to give effect to that? As your Lordships are aware, those steps were detailed so far as is now possible, by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor in the debate in your Lordships' House on October 7 last.

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He then explained to your Lordships that two steps had already been agreed upon by the Allied Nations. The first is the proposal to set up with the least possible delay a United Nations Commission for the investigation of war crimes. The Commission will be composed of nationals of the United Nations selected by their own Governments. It will investigate war crimes committed against nationals of the United Nations, recording the testimony available, and the Commission will report from time to time to the Governments of these nations cases in which such crimes appear to have been committed, naming and identifying wherever possible the persons responsible. The Commission would direct its attention in particular to organized atrocities.
That is to say, the first essential step is already in hand, the constitution of a fact-finding Commission. Your Lordships are aware that already a great deal of work in that direction has been done by individual nations. The Poles, for instance, have a most extensive dossier containing a vast number of names and particulars of a terrible catalogue of atrocities. Other nations have similar dossiers. A great deal of the preparatory work which will be brought to the attention of this Commission has already been done by individual nations. The mere fact that this step has been taken collectively by the Allied Nations is an assurance to all of us that the United Nations are in earnest in this matter. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, in his very interesting speech to-day, reverted to the question as to what was the appropriate Court to try these cases. He gave his reasons for thinking that these crimes ought to be tried by National Courts. The Lord Chancellor made it quite clear on the previous occasion that there is nothing which has been said on behalf of His Majesty's Government that is contrary to the view expressed by the noble and learned Viscount. The actual composition of these Courts has not yet been decided. It is not a matter only for this country or this Government—it is a matter for the United Nations—and on difficult, technical, complicated matters of this sort conference between them necessarily takes some little time. I can assure my noble o and learned friend that
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his is one of the propositions before the United Nations at the present moment.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I did not intend to say that all crimes should be tried by National Courts, only that a large number which were suitable to that form of tribunal should go before them. I quite recognize the fact, to which the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack also adverted, that there are some crimes which would more properly be tried by an International Court with jurisdiction ad hoc.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I take it also that my noble friend will not object to what the Lord Chancellor said in regard to Military Courts when he pointed out that it was a perfectly well-established International Law that the laws of war permits a belligerent commander to punish by means of his Military Courts any hostile offender against the laws and customs of war who may fall into his hands wherever be the place where the crime was committed. All these questions concerning the appropriate court are before the United Nations at the present time, and there is no further statement which I can make on the matter beyond what has been already said. The other most important announcement by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack on October 7, of which I must remind your Lordships because it has not been mentioned this afternoon, was that the apprehension of these criminals would not be postponed until the Treaty of Peace but would form a part of any Armistice. That is a decision of the utmost importance. If a similar decision had been taken during the last war I do not think we should have had the fiasco which we did have and which has been mentioned by noble Lords to-day.
Therefore we can say that this House is unanimous on the point that these individuals who can be proved to have been guilty of these atrocities must be brought to justice. So far as I am aware, nobody speaking for His Majesty's Government or for any other of the United Nations has suggested that the persons to be apprehended should be confined to a few important individuals. On the contrary, the declaration, as I understand it, applies to all, high and low, so long as they can be proved to have been guilty of these atrocities. That is a point I should like to

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make clear. As to what the noble Lord said about eye-witnesses, surely he will agree with me when I say it is not always necessary to have an eye-witness to prove that a man is guilty of an atrocity. If, for instance, it is proved that a man was in charge of a particular camp for a certain period of time, and it can be proved that during that period atrocities were committed in that camp, then surely that man can be held responsible for these atrocities. I can assure my noble friend that the evidence which has been already collected in regard to a great many of these atrocities is very impressive. The point on which we are all agreed is that the guilty, whether high or low, must be apprehended and punished.
I do not propose to enter at length into the question raised by the right reverend Prelate of the responsibility of non-Nazi Germans. I should agree with him that every one of these cases must be tried on its individual merits. But I do think he would be misleading us if he suggested that the German nation as a whole had no responsibility for what has happened. After all, we have to remember that ten years ago Germany had a democratic Republic, and it has been transferred into a Nazi régime, and that in the land of a people who used to boast themselves to be the most educated and civilized in Europe. I find it impossible to exonerate the German nation as a whole from responsibility for that. But, having said that, I agree with the right reverend Prelate that so far s it is a question of trial by Courts and punishment by them, individual responsibility for the crimes committed must he found. Let the German nation realize that this is matter on which the Allies are in deadly earnest.
Surely the present condition of the war should cause them to reflect deeply on the matter. They are, as the noble Lord said, losing the war. They have been defeated in unparalleled disasters by the Russian Armies. They are being driven out of Africa. Great British and American Armies are massing for the assault on the Continent of Europe. Every day more ships, more aircraft, more tanks, more men are at the disposal of the Allies. The day of retribution is being brought near. The question which every German soldier must now ask himself is simply this: When Germany is conquered do they want to be treated according to the rules of civilized warfare as soldiers who have
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surrendered, or do they want to be treated as criminals? Those men, high or low, who have been active participants in the nameless horrors of which the Nazi régime is guilty will be treated with the utmost severity. We have learnt our lesson. There will be no repetition of the fiasco after the last war when all the German war criminals were allowed to escape. These criminals, whether they be big men, or whether they be small men, will be sought out. The future of posterity demands that they shall not be allowed to escape. Wherever they go there shall be no refuge for them here on this earth. Their only refuge will be in hell.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I think there has been perhaps a little misunderstanding about this debate. I thought that my Motion had made it clear, and I again made it quite clear at the beginning of my speech, that I was not proposing to discuss the past nor indeed to discuss the methods or machinery of punishment. What I said I was trying to do was to look ahead because I thought that worse was coming. Now I said that last year, and I said that the remedy for it was to intensify our propaganda. I am only saying the same thing again a year later, and asking for the same thing again, because I can see no other means of preventing the worst that is yet to come. I think the noble Earl used rather too strong an expression in saying that I was denouncing our propaganda. I was merely asking for an intensification of it. I think that is a very different thing. He also said—and I think it was quite just criticism—that I had selected a number of quotations. That is perfectly true. I have a great many more, but I did not want to inflict them on your Lordships, but I did say, and I think quite clearly, that it was not only a case of those excerpts. I alluded to the broad impression left on my mind after three and a half years of close observation. I generalized as well as specified. The noble Earl assures me that that point will be looked into, and I am very amply satisfied that that should be so. I hope perhaps this year I shall be a little more lucky than I was last year.
Before I sit down I would reply to one or two points made by the right reverend Prelate. If I understood him rightly, he sought to establish some kind of difference between the Germany Army and the

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Gestapo on the ground that the Gestapo had had a six years' run from 1933 to 1939 and that the Army had not. To that I would answer very briefly that the Army had its day, and it was a very long one, from 1914 to 1918, and I think on that score we may very nearly call it a day. He then proceeded to read us some extracts from letters he had received or resolutions moved by German soldiers in 1942. My only answer to that is: Where were those letters and resolutions in 1939, 1940 and 1941? For my part when the devil is sick I am never very greatly in favour of sending him hothouse grapes, though I will willingly allow him some sour ones. I think in making his case the right reverend Prelate overlooked the fact that, apart from the four years 1914 to 1918, more men of the Left were killed under Weimar than during the six years from 1933 to 1939, and that all those murders took place not only with the connivance but at the instigation of the German Army. Finally, I think that the German Army is the German people and that even the Weimar showing alone rather disposes of his case; but I do not wish to argue any further. I express my gratitude to the noble Earl who replied to my Motion and I hope that intensification of the propaganda will be seriously considered. This I put forward simply because I did not think anybody could suggest anything better to be done. Anyhow, I have not heard of anything better this afternoon. I beg to withdraw the Motion
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

AN AMERICAN MAGAZINE ARTICLE
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing in my name.
[The Notice was as follows:
To call attention to the article published in the current issue of the American. Mercury under the title "Our Government's case for Expediency," apparently purporting to reflect the views of the State Department, and intimating that "there are most likely to be deals with other Darlans not only in France but in other Axis-dominated countries, and even with the Prussian Junkers"; and to ask whether His Majesty's Government will give an assurance that there is no foundation for these disturbing allegations.]
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, the attention of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has been drawn to the article in the American Mercury to which the noble Lord's question refers. As the House will be aware, the American Mercury is an unofficial publication, and the article in question no doubt represents the personal views of its author. It is clearly not for His Majesty's Government to comment on the statements of American journalists regarding the policy of their own Government, nor to answer for the United States Administration. But the noble Lord will doubtless warmly welcome the President's recent description of the Casablanca meeting as the "unconditional surrender" meeting.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I hope that answer will serve to allay the considerable suspicions and uneasiness that were certainly aroused by that article, and will put them at rest. I also venture to hope that the American Mercury will make no more such suggestions.
House adjourned.