Sitting of 2 July 1942

Preamble
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  NATIONAL WAR EFFORT.

    Refractories Industry.
    Mr. R. Morganasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware of the difficulties which are being experienced in the refractories industry owing to a shortage of skilled labour; and whether, in view of the importance of this industry in the production of war materials, he will arrange for it to be included in the lists of munitions industries published by his Department?
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I am not aware that the refractories industry is suffering any exceptional difficulty owing to the shortage of skilled labour, but if my hon. Friend has any particular case in mind and will let me have details, I will look into the matter. It is not practicable to designate the manufacture of refractory goods as a munitions industry because it forms only a small, though important, section of other industries which are not themselves munitions industries. The most skilled occupation, however, is treated as a vital war occupation, which has the same effect as inclusion in the munitions industries and I am considering the possibility of adding other occupations. It is, of course, open to employers to apply for the deferment of calling-up of any of their workers who are liable under the National Service Acts and are not reserved.

    Discharged Service Officers.
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour how many applications for employment have been received by the Appointments Board from discharged Service officers; how many have been placed; and the comparative figures for each Service?
    Mr. Bevin: The available statistics relate to the end of May, at which, date the new arrangements had not been in opera-
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    tion for more than a short time. One thousand four hundred and eighteen ex-Army officers had then registered, and 117 were known to have secured employment. I have no corresponding figures for the Navy or Air Force, but the numbers concerned are certainly small.
    Miss Ward: Is the Minister aware that a great deal depends on how we are able to place these officers as to the confidence which the country will have in future plans of the Government for placing people who are demobilised? Is he satisfied that the arrangements are working satisfactorily?
    Mr. Bevin: I do not think they have been working long enough to become satisfactory; they are being developed. It may be that a good many of these ex-Army officers, instead of being able to find jobs at the salaries which they think they ought to have, will have to fit into industry, and re-training may be absolutely essential.

    Lower Medical Grades.
    Major Lyonsasked the Minister of Labour whether he now proposes to take the necessary steps to mobilise for appropriate national service all those persons under 41 years of age whose liability is determined but who are of a lower medical category and who are not engaged in any work of war importance?
    Mr. Bevin: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to the hon. Member for Salford West (Mr. Emery) on 19th March relating to men placed in Medical Grades III and IV. Similar arrangements are now being introduced for women placed in those grades.
    Major Lyons: In view of the present-day position, would the right hon. Gentleman consider taking some action to provide national service for a large number of people who are doing no work at all for the war effort and have never taken any part in it? Will he take steps to find something useful for them to do?
    Mr. Bevin: I am not prepared to admit these general statements that large numbers of people are doing nothing for the war effort.

    Young Persons (Hours of Work).
    Mr. Kenneth Lindsayasked the Minister of Labour what steps he has now

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    taken to correct the excessive number of hours being worked by boys and girls under the age of 18?
    Mr. Bevin: In any case where excessive hours are worked contrary to law I take corrective action directly my attention is called to it. As regards the matter generally, I am in consultation with my right honourable Friend the President of the Board of Education in order to ascertain what evidence there is to warrant my taking further steps.
    Mr. Lindsay: Would the Minister, in view of the difficulties of interpreting the pre-war legislation, consider the imposition of maximum hours for boys and girls aged 14 to 16 and 16 to 18?
    Mr. Bevin: To deal with this question of hours in a piecemeal way might lead to more anomalies. I have to get evidence upon which any action is to be based, and I am studying the problem to see how I can produce the same result by regulations allowing for some adaptation and flexibility, a very desirable thing in industry.
    Mr. Radford: Does the Minister not agree that the experience of most of us is that we were more fit for hard work and long hours at those ages than we were in later years?

    Work Direction (Boot Repairer, Boston).
    Lieutenant Butcherasked the Minister of Labour for what reason a boot repairer carrying on business in Boston, Lincolnshire, was directed by him early in April to report for work on boot repairs at a factory in Nottingham; whether he is aware as a result of this direction he was compelled to close his shop and that he has since been discharged?
    Mr. Bevin: I am having inquiries made and will communicate with my hon. and gallant Friend.
    Lieutenant Butcher: While I thank my right hon. Friend, will he take steps to see that increased demands for labour are met by the training of new entrants and the up-grading of less skilled workers, and not by the transference of skilled labour in circumstances which cause great hardship?
    Mr. Bevin: That all depends what the order of priority is. I cannot accept a rigid rule on this matter. If there is a sudden priority order which involves moving business men or anyone else, I must satisfy the requirements at a given moment.

    Married Women (Registration).
    Mr. Oldfieldasked the Minister of Labour how many of the 8,000,000 women that have now been registered are, respectively, married and without children or married with children under the age of 14; and how many of each class are in full-time employment?
    Mr. Bevin: Detailed figures for the last three registrations are not yet available. Of the 6,565,207 women registered up to 16th May, 1942, 1,539,606 were married and without children under 14 and 2,600,776 were married with children under 14. The number of each class in full-time paid employment when they, registered was 768,933 and 383,311 respectively.
    Mr. Thorne: Can my right hon. Friend state from memory the total number of men and women who have been registered since the start of the war?
    Mr. Bevin: I cannot, from memory.

    Miner's Absenteeism (Prosecution).
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that Thomas Henry Lowe, 276, Leigh Road, Hindley Green, Wigan, a coalminer, was recently fined £15 plus £3 5s. at the Wigan County police court on a charge of absenteeism; that he was unable to work on the days in question because of sickness, but could not produce medical certificates; that workmen following arduous employment underground often suffer from fatigue in respect of which it is not customary to ask for or to issue medical certificates; and whether, as the miner usually consumes as much meat to sustain his physique in two days as the present ration allows him for a week, he will direct his officials to take these factors into account before prosecutions are initiated in future?
    Mr. Bevin: This was a case of persistent absenteeism, in spite of repeated warnings. The pit production committee recommended prosecution and may, I think, be

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    relied on not to overlook such considerations as that mentioned by my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Davies: Why does the Minister's Department specialise in persecuting and prosecuting miners in particular, and is he aware that miners doing arduous work may suffer from fatigue without obtaining a medical certificate?
    Mr. Bevin: I repudiate entirely the suggestion that I either persecute or unduly prosecute miners. I have confidence in the representatives which the Miners' Federation have on these bodies, and I would rather rely on their judgment than that of my hon. Friend.

    Call-up Deferment (Age Limit).
    Major Lyonsasked the Minister of Labour whether he proposes to take steps to impose an age limit where none yet exists to qualify for tribunal deferment from any form of war service?
    Mr. Bevin: I have under consideration the question of raising in a number of occupations the age limit below which deferment may not be granted and of imposing such an age limit in a number of other occupations.
    Major Lyons: Could the Minister say when he expects to come to a decision on this matter?
    Mr. Bevin: I am coming to decisions every day.
    Major Lyons: On this matter, I asked?
    Mr. Bevin: Yes, on these trades.

    Earnings (Inquiry).
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Labour whether he will give the results of the recent inquiry into the earnings of workpeople in the principal industries in January 1942?
    Mr. Bevin: The results of this inquiry will be found on pages 118 to 121 of the "Ministry of Labour Gazette" for June, 1942, copies of which are available in the Library.

  COST OF LIVING INDEX.
  Mr. Banfieldasked the Minister of Labour the effect on the cost of living index figure of an increase of ½d. on the price of the 4 lb. loaf?
  Mr. Bevin: An increase of ½d. per 4 lb. in the price of bread would raise the cost-of-living index figure by approximately three-fourths of a point.

  CHIMNEY SWEEPING.
  Mr. Lipsonasked the Minister of Labour what steps he is taking to make good the shortage of chimney sweeps with its consequent danger to public security during the black-out from chimney fires?
  Mr. Bevin: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to the hon. Member for West Leyton (Mr. Sorensen), on 26th March, 1942, by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Home Security, to which I have nothing to add.
  Mr. Lipson: Would the Minister say at what age chimney sweeps are reserved?
  Mr. Bevin: I really cannot remember.
  Mr. Thorne: Can my right hon. Friend remember when little boys used to sweep the chimneys?

  EDUCATION.

    Children (Agricultural Work).
    Mr. Liddallasked the President of the Board of Education whether he will make it clear that the arrangements by which school children are to help in agriculture do not involve any interference with the normal school holidays?
    The President of the Board of Education (Mr. Butler): In the Circular, a copy of which I am sending to my hon. Friend, I have asked local education authorities and governing bodies, where satisfied of the need by the war agricultural executive committees, to fix up to eight weeks of the total normal school holidays for the year at such times, and where necessary at short notice, as will best suit the seasonal agricultural operations of each locality.

    Public Schools (Committee).
    Mr. Ammonasked the President of the Board of Education whether he can now announce the terms of reference and the names of the members of the committee he is appointing to advise on the best method of extending the opportunities for boarding school education?
    Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir. I am asking the committee to consider means whereby

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    the association between the public schools (by which term is meant schools which are in membership of the Governing Bodies' Association or Headmasters' Conference) and the general educational system of the country could be developed and extended; also to consider how far any measures recommended in the case of boys' public schools could be applied to comparable schools for girls.
    The committee will be composed of persons qualified to speak for the educational and wider interests concerned. The members are as follow:

    The Hon. Lord Fleming (Chairman).—Senator of the College of Justice in Scotland.

    Alderman Sir James Aitken.—Chairman, Lancashire Education Committee.

    Mr. A. L. Binns.—Education Officer, West Riding of Yorkshire.

    Mr. Robert Birley.—Headmaster of Charterhouse.

    Dr. Dorothy Brock.—Headmistress of the Mary Datchelor School for Girls.

    Mr. Harold Clay.

    Mr. G. D. H. Cole—Chairman of the Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey.

    Sir Edward Crowe, K.C.M.G.—Governor of the Harpur Trust, Bedford, and Director of various Companies.

    Professor W. J. Gruffydd.—University of Wales.

    Mr. M. L. Jacks.—Director of Oxford University Department of Education.

    The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bishop of London.

    Mr. A. C. Macdiarmid.—Chairman and Managing Director of Stewart and Lloyds.

    Mr. A. E. Nichols.—Headmaster of Hele's School, Exeter.

    Mr. H. N. Penlington.—Treasurer of National Union of Teachers.

    Dr. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge.—Member of the Committee of the Governing Bodies' Association and late Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University.

    Sir Ernest Pooley.—Secretary of the Governing Bodies' Association of Girls' Public Schools.

    Mr. C. L. Reynolds—Headmaster of Nottingham High School.

    Miss E. M. Tanner.—Headmistress of Roe-dean School.

    Mr. G. G. Williams, Mr. F. R. G. Duckworth, C.B.E., and Mr. W. J. Williams of the Board of Education, will act as assessors to the committee, and it will have as Joint Secretaries Mr. R. N. Heaton and Mr. P. Wilson, H.M.I.
    Mr. Ammon: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he has received a communication from me regretting certain remarks I made concerning Lord Fleming during the recent Debate on education, caused by confusing him with someone
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    else of the same name? It would be a pity if this gentleman started his duties prejudiced by an unfounded statement, for which I apologise.
    Mr. Butler: I am sure that the House will be glad to hear the question asked by the hon. Member, and I can assure him that I have received his communication, which confirms my impression of the value and ability of Lord Fleming to be chairman of this inquiry.
    Mr. J. J. Davidson: What proportion of this Committee represents the educative side of the question and what proportion represents the wider interests concerned?
    Mr. Butler: As this is largely a question of education there are rather more on the educative side than on the wider interests side, but I am glad to say that both sides are represented.
    Mr. Maxton: As I have some slight interest in this matter, can the right hon. Gentleman give the House some idea of the communication to which he has referred in the conversation between himself and the hon. Member?
    Mr. Butler: There is nothing particularly serious in the communication. The hon. Gentleman was kind enough to tell me he had mistaken Lord Fleming for somebody else, and he considered, therefore, that his remarks were unjustified in their application to Lord Fleming himself.
    Mr. Maxton: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that I did not mistake Lord Fleming in the remarks I made?
    Mr. Lipson: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the exclusion of Members of Parliament from this Committee was deliberate?
    Mr. Butler: Hon. Members were not excluded from this Committee for any lack of merit on their part, but because I considered that the membership of this Committee was satisfactory in the manner in which I have announced it.

    Policy (Green Book).
    Mr. Oldfieldasked the President of the Board of Education whether he has considered the copy sent to him of a resolution which was carried unanimously at a representative meeting of education authorities in Manchester; what action he proposes to take; what is the Green

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    Book; why was it circulated secretly; who was responsible for the policy which has led to the undermining of confidence; and will he give a copy of the book to hon. Members who apply?
    Mr. Butler: I have seen a copy of the resolution referred to. The Green Book, which was issued with the approval of my predecessor, is a body of suggestions on the reform of the public system of education, prepared by some officers of my Department to serve as a basis for discussion with the representives of those interests whom the Board habitually consult confidentially on major changes of educational policy. There was therefore nothing improper or even unusual in the confidential issue of this pamphlet. In view of the limited purpose for which it was prepared I do not see my way to enlarge the circulation of this document.
    Mr. Oldfield: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the result of the conference which took place and the alarm which it has created in Yorkshire, Lancashire and Cheshire?
    Mr. Butler: I think that Lancashire and Cheshire have sufficiently stout hearts not to get alarmed.

    Teachers' Pensions.
    Mr. William Brownasked the President of the Board of Education the number of teachers who have retired from teaching services and are in receipt of pensions from State funds?
    Mr. Butler: On 31st March, 1942, the number of retired teachers who were in receipt of pensions from State funds in respect of teaching service in England and Wales was 50,800.
    Sir Alfred Beit: Is there any necessity for the return of these teachers?
    Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Brookeasked the President of the Board of Education whether he is aware that some retired teachers are being deterred from returning to teaching by a fear that their subsequent rate of pension may be adversely affected; and whether he can give any reassurance on this point?
    Mr. Butler: The general effect of the provisions of the Teachers (Superannuation) Acts which regulate this matter is
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    that further service by a pensioned teacher either does not materially affect the pension permanently or increases it, although it is possible for a reduction to occur in special cases. Any teacher who desires to return to service and who feels doubt on the subject may put his case to the Board and obtain full information.

    Evacuation.
    Mr. Sorensenasked the President of the Board of Education whether, in view of the aerial bombing of reception areas or of towns hitherto assumed to be suitable for evacuated schools or children he is reconsidering the whole question of child evacuation; whether any immediate transferences are to take place; and whether he is making any further plans respecting accommodation, the supply of teachers and curricula to cover the future period of the war?
    Mr. Butler: On the first and second parts of the Question I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health to the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) on 7th May. The matters referred to in the third part of the Question are constantly under review.
    Mr. Sorensen: In view of the prolongation of the war and the new circumstances, would it not be wise to review the whole situation and draw up some interim plan between now and the end of the war?
    Mr. Butler: As I said, the matters referred to in the third part of the Question are under review, and in the case of other parts, I am constantly in touch with my right hon. Friend with a view to the developing circumstances of the war.
    Mr. Logan: Will the right hon. Gentleman make arrangements in the areas that have been blitzed for establishing a central school to replace schools that have been blitzed so that the children can attend school?
    Mr. Butler: The local authority has to make special arrangements in every case, and the hon. Member may rest assured that we are in touch with the local authorities, who are doing their best to meet the different circumstances.

    Vocational Training.
    Mr. Lindsayasked the President of the Board of Education whether he can give any further information about the

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    body, whose existence he recently announced, which is considering the question of vocational training in relation to employment?
    Mr. Butler: With the agreement of the Joint Consultative Committee appointed by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service, arrangements are being made for discussions on this matter between representatives of the Departments concerned and representatives, both employers and employees, of individual industries. The reference in my speech was to the preliminary meeting concerned to put these discussions in motion.
    Mr. Lindsay: Is this a permanent Committee?
    Mr. Butter: It will be permanent until it has achieved something useful, in which case its work will pass into posterity.
    Mr. Lindsay: Is there to be a report?
    Mr. Butler: No, Sir.

  HOUSE PROPERTY (PRICES).
  Mr. Lipsonasked the Minister of Health whether, in view of the fact that the big increase in prices of houses above pre-war prices is not confined to certain areas but is widespread, that the normal increase is 60 per cent. and frequently 200 per cent. and over, he will without further delay establish, a system of price control for house property?
  Mr. Vernon Bartlettasked the Minister of Health whether, in order to put a stop to profiteering, he will take measures to forbid the sale of house property for more than 10 per cent. above the price paid at the last sale?
  The Minister of Health (Mr. Ernest Brown): The figures which I have obtained from the Valuation Department show not only that the increase to which my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Lipson) refers is less than he suggests, but that it is confined to the limited number of houses in reception areas which are sold with vacant possession for occupation by the purchaser. Owing to the Rent Restriction Acts the selling price of houses generally has not increased and in the vulnerable areas sales are taking place at a figure considerably below the
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  previous purchase price. I have reexamined the problem recently, and in view of its limited nature and of the powers of billeting and requisitioning which enable me to meet the needs of people who are required to move in connection with the war effort, I do not consider that I should be justified at present in asking Parliament for the new powers which would be necessary.
  Mr. Lipson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this evil exists in certain reception areas, and will he give further consideration to the matter and put a stop to this profiteering in house property?
  Mr. Brown: I cannot accept that assumption. My hon. Friend wants it both ways.
  Sir Francis Fremantle: Has the Minister also considered the position in the East End of London, which is not a reception area, where, I understand, this evil is very rampant and very serious?
  Mr. Brown: If my hon. Friend has evidence of that sort, I wish he would give it to me.
  Mr. A. Edwards: Does the Minister realise that the deliberate inflationary policy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer tends to create these evils?
  Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend will not expect me to answer that question.
  Mr. Bartlett: Will the Minister bear in mind the fact that a great number of people who have gone to these reception areas have been bombed out of their own homes elsewhere and that they are very genuine cases?
  Mr. Brown: I have had a look at all the elements of the problem. They are many and varied and not so clear-cut as my hon. Friend seems to suggest.
  Mr. De la Bère: Is the Minister aware that the matter cannot be lightly dismissed?
  Mr. Lipson: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

  FLATS (RENTS).
  Mr. Bartlettasked the Minister of Health what steps he is taking to prevent

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  landlords from charging increased rentals to sitting or incoming tenants of flats which do not come under the protection of the Rent Restrictions Act?
  Mr. E. Brown: As my hon. Friend will appreciate, many owners have been forced by the war to let their dwellings at a loss and they, naturally, seek to obtain normal rents as and when opportunity offers. I see no reason why the raising of temporarily reduced rents within the limits imposed by the Rent Restriction Acts should be prevented, and I am not satisfied that there is any strong case for extending the scope of the Acts to cover the small number of expensive dwellings, the rents of which are not at present controlled.
  Mr. Thorne: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what the remedy is in cases where rent is being overcharged?
  Mr. Brown: I will send the details to my hon. Friend.

  PNEUMONIA (STATISTICS).
  Mr. Messerasked the Minister of Health the number, of cases of primary pneumonia occurring annually for the last 10 years to the most convenient date, indicating when treatment of this condition by chemotherapy came into general use in this country?
  Mr. E. Brown: During the 10 years 1932 to 1941 inclusive, the average number of cases of acute primary and acute influenzal pneumonia notified annually was 50,912, with a maximum figure of 65,009 cases in 1933 and a minimum of 42,312 in 1939. I am advised that chemotherapy in the treatment of pneumonia was introduced about six years ago and has come into general use since 1938.

  OLD AGE PENSIONS.
  Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Health whether he will make clear the position in regard to supplementary pensions when a woman and her children, if any, return home temporarily while her husband is serving in the Forces?
  Mr. E. Brown: I am informed by the Assistance Board that the normal rule in such cases would be to regard the woman
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  as contributing towards the rent and other overhead expenses of the supplementary pensioner in whose house she is for the time being living a sum of from 2s. 6d. to 7s. a week according to circumstances.
  Mr. Daggarasked the Minister of Health the nature and object of the inquiry now being conducted by the Assistance Board info the conditions of the old age pensioners; and whether the distribution of blankets, clothes, etc., is in addition to, or in substitution of, the undertaking given by the Government on the need for improving the conditions of the aged people and widows?
  Mr. Brown: As my hon. Friend is aware, the Supplementary Pensions Regulations contain express provision for making special grants for meeting needs of an exceptional character and such grants are, in fact, frequently made. The Assistance Board, however, felt that many supplementary pensioners may not be aware that they can apply for such grants and they accordingly decided that all cases where on the known facts it appeared that a supplementary pensioner might be short of clothing or similar articles, should be specially examined so that the pensioner should not be at a disadvantage because of ignorance of the extent of the Board's powers. As regards the second part of the Question, I cannot anticipate the statement which my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes shortly to make, but in the meantime my hon. Friend should not assume that this is the only measure contemplated by the Government.
  Mr. Daggar: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that what is being done now will not interfere with the inquiry which is to be undertaken at the suggestion of the Chancellor?
  Mr. Brown: This is an attempt to be really helpful, and the House knows it is not easy for old people now to get the kind of goods they require, whether they have money or not.
  Mr. Daggar: The right hon. Gentleman has not replied to my question. Can he give us an assurance that what is being done now to meet the needs of old age pensioners will not interfere with the proposed inquiry and its effects?
  Mr. Brown: I am sorry if I did not make myself clear; I said so.
  Mr. George Griffiths: Did not the right hon. Gentleman make a mistake when he used the word "frequently"? They are not frequently given; they are infrequently given.
  Mr. Ness Edwardsasked the Minister of Health by what authority public assistance committees are authorised to confiscate the pension book and pensions of elderly persons who are in public institutions and are entitled to old age pensions?
  Mr. Brown: Section 20 of the Poor Law Act, 1930, empowers the authority to take any money or the produce of any valuable security for money in the possession of a person in receipt of relief, so far as is necessary to reimburse them for the cost of his relief. The authority is, of course, not entitled to confiscate the pension book of a pensioner relieved in an institution, but it is customary to arrange for the safe custody of this book and any other documents in the pensioner's possession. If he gives the necessary authorisation pension payments are collected on his behalf and a suitable amount is taken towards the cost of his relief.
  Mr. Edwards: If a pensioner retains his position as a pensioner and draws his pension himself, has a local authority any right to extract any part of that pension from his old age pension?
  Mr. Brown: I would like to see that Question on the Paper. It cannot be answered in reply to a Supplementary Question.
  Mr. Ness Edwardsasked the Minister of Health whether he will inform the House of the general nature of the instructions issued recently by the Assistance Board whereby the cases of applicants for supplementary pensions shall be reviewed for the purpose of affording a certain standard of clothing?
  Mr. Brown: I explained the general purpose of the steps now being taken by the Assistance Board regarding clothing, etc., in my answer to an earlier Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Abertillery (Mr. Daggar). The Board inform me that with tins purpose in view, they instructed their officers to visit specially any case where, on the known facts, it appears that there might be a shortage
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  of clothing or household necessaries by reference to certain standards laid down for their guidance, and in particular cases of single pensioners and married couples living alone with no substantial resources beyond the old age and supplementary pensions, and to make a grant of appropriate amount where required.
  Mr. Edwards: Will the Minister answer the first part of my Question, which asks for information as to the general nature of these instructions, and, further, will there be no indecent examination of the clothing of pensioners in their households by investigators from the Assistance Board?
  Mr. Brown: If the hon. Gentleman means that he would like information on the standards laid down for the purposes of the inquiry, I will see what I can do to have the details published in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Mr. Thorneasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that Mrs. Pollard, an old age pensioner, of 41, Chargeable Street, Plaistow, E.13, has had her supplementary pension reduced by 1s. per week, because of her rent being reduced; and what action he intends taking about the matter?
  Mr. Brown: I am having inquiry made and will communicate with my hon. Friend as soon as possible.
  Mr. Thorne: Is the Minister aware that I have in my hand a letter from this woman, who states that because she left three rooms and went to live in one room her rent was reduced and is was stopped from her supplementary pension?
  Mr. Brown: If the hon. Gentleman will let me have the letter, I will look into the matter at once.

  NORTH VEGETABLE MARKET, LIVERPOOL (REPAIR).
  Mr. Kirbyasked the Minister of Health whether he has considered the representations from the town clerk of Liverpool regarding the need for repairs and improvements to the North Vegetable Market, Liverpool; for what reasons he refuses to sanction such repairs, &c.; and whether, as the traders and workers who use this market are unanimous in their opinion that the present state of the

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  market is likely to have a damaging effect upon the health of those working there, many of whom are females who have replaced male relatives now in the Armed Forces, he will now sanction the proposed improvements as being essential to the war effort?
  Mr. E. Brown: The re-paving work in question cannot lawfully be carried out at present unless expressly authorised under powers conferred upon me by the Defence Regulations. After consultation with my Noble Friend the Minister of Food I was unable to satisfy myself that the work was of such urgent necessity as to warrant, in present circumstances, the heavy call on labour and materials involved. I have not received any representations from the Corporation of Liverpool on health grounds, and it is not clear to me in what way the continuance of the present condition of the market can constitute a risk to health such as to outweigh the need for conserving labour and materials for other purposes directly connected with the prosecution of the war.
  Mr. Kirby: If the right hon. Gentleman has not already received representations from the town clerk, will he reconsider the position if he does receive representations?
  Mr. Brown: I will always look at any new facts.
  Mr. Kirby: But is not the Minister aware that the people concerned in this matter are unanimous that something should be done?
  Mr. Brown: I know that the Liverpool Fruiterers' Association have made a general allegation about the effect on health, but I have no evidence that that is so, and the Ministry of Food has informed me that all the selling is done outside the market.
  Mr. Logan: Is not the Minister aware that this distributing centre is the only place we have in Liverpool, and that this matter is likely to deter people coming in, with the result that vegetable produce is not likely to be distributed? This place is rotten from the point of view of sanitation and is detrimental to health.
  Mr. Brown: It is quite clear that the two hon. Gentlemen do not agree. The hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. Logan) is now arguing on
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  a peace-time basis, but he and the House must understand that there are vital needs for labour and material and that there are many things a Minister would like to do, but cannot de nowadays.
  Mr. Kirby: But are we in Liverpool not justified in making representations with a view to getting this state of affairs remedied?

  PENSIONED LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS.
  Mr. W. Brownasked the Minister of Health the number of local government officers who have retired from the local government service and who are in receipt of pensions from State funds?
  Mr. E. Brown: I regret that the desired information is not available.

  HOUSING ACCOMMODATION.
  Mr. Sorensenasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that the difficulties of domestic accommodation are increasing and are likely to become acute; whether he is considering means by which these difficulties shall be met in the ensuing months; and whether comprehensive plans expeditiously to meet the housing problem at the end of the war are receiving consideration?
  Mr. E. Brown: The answer to all parts of the Question is "Yes."
  Mr. Sorensen: Would the right hon. Gentleman issue some report or a White Paper dealing with this problem and the prospects before us as regards housing? Will he consider publishing some facts about this matter before long?
  Mr. Brown: I will consider that, but, as the House is aware, it was only a few months ago that I reconstituted the Central Housing Advisory Committee, which has urgent matters' under consideration now.
  Mr. Sorensenasked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been drawn to cases of young married couples seeking accommodation who have been refused tenancies because they have a young child or also because the husband is serving in the Forces; and whether he will take action to prevent house-agents and others exercising this discrimination?
  Mr. Brown: One or two such cases have been brought to my notice, but I do not believe that they are other than very exceptional. As my hon. Friend will be aware, my powers of billeting and requisitioning are sufficient to enable me to ensure that the needs of people who are required to move in connection with the war effort are met.
  Mr. Sorensen: If I send the right hon. Gentleman specific cases, will he look into them and advise me in regard to them?
  Mr. Brown: I will look into them at once.

  ARMED FORCES (PENSIONS AND GRANTS).
  Mr. Lipsonasked the Minister of Pensions whether ex-Service men in receipt of a disability pension, who are called up for a further medical examination, can claim the full amount of earnings lost in consequence or whether the amount of compensation is limited to a maximum of 7s. 6d.; and is it made clear on the form sent to these men that they are entitled to apply for compensation for lost earnings?
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions (Mr. Paling): The maximum compensation for loss of earnings in the circumstances referred to by the hon. Member was until recently 7s. 6d. in respect of any one day, but this sum has now been increased to 9s. 0d. Whilst the form used does not specifically mention compensation for loss of remunerative time, it is the practice at the time of medical examination to ascertain whether the absence from employment has resulted in financial loss. In order to remove any misunderstanding, my right hon. Friend proposes at the first opportunity to amend the form to include a reference to this provision.
  Mr. Lipson: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that concession, may I ask him whether he will take note that one of my constituents lost 11s. 10d. through having to undergo a medical examination and received only 9s. compensation? Is that fair?
  Mr. Paling: I will take note of that.
  Mr. Mathersasked the Minister of Pensions whether, in view of the hardship
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  which falls upon the wives and families of Service men who are killed in action, owing to the stoppage of war service grants in respect of instalment payments on furniture, &c., he will arrange to have these grants continued until the deceased man's commitments are fully met?
  Mr. Paling: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given to a similar Question put by the hon. Member for Wallsend (Miss Ward) on 27th January, a copy of which I am sending to him.
  Mr. Mathers: As obviously it has not yet dawned on the Ministry of Pensions that this is an intolerable burden which cannot be allowed to continue, will my hon. Friend personally make representations to the Minister in order to have this undoubtedly unfair hardship removed?
  Mr. Paling: I will certainly convey to my right hon. Friend what has been said by my hon. Friend, but he knows that war service grants were never meant to deal with pensions.

  INDIA (NEGOTIATIONS).
  Mr. Davidsonasked the Secretary of State for India whether he has now considered the letter sent to him by the Glasgow Trades Council, asking for the reopening of negotiations with representatives of India; and what reply he has sent?
  The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery): I have received the letter in question and am replying that the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this connection was clearly stated on 28th April by my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal and myself.
  Mr. Davidson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this organisation represents a considerable volume of industrial opinion, and, therefore, will he, in his reply, give a definite assurance that nothing will be allowed to stand in the way of further negotiations and that no approaches will be refused by His Majesty s Government?
  Mr. Amery: The statement already made shows that I shall always be willing to listen to suggestions made within the framework of our previous proposals by any representative body of public opinion.
  Mr. Gordon Macdonald: But the question is whether the Government themselves are doing anything to reopen negotiations?
  Mr. Amery: No, Sir.
  Mr. W. Brown: Does not the Minister consider that the recent statement of Mr. Gandhi affords a new opportunty of an approach from this country, with a view to getting a settlement of this matter?

  CIVIL DEFENCE.

    Invasion Committees.
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is satisfied with the number of Invasion Committees set up in a certain area; if not, who is responsible; why have more not been set up; and what action is being taken to deal with the matter?
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Herbert Morrison): In the area to which I understand my hon. Friend refers, Invasion Committees have been set up in all parishes in the county nearest the coast, while in the other counties concerned they have been or are being established where the military authorities so recommend. The work involved has been undertaken in a settled order of priority and good progress is being made.

    Detainees (Employment).
    Mr. Edmund Harveyasked the Home Secretary whether he has considered the suggestions recently sent to him as to useful work which persons interned in the Isle of Man under Regulation 18B would be glad to undertake; and whether he will follow up these suggestions wherever this course is practicable?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Some of the suggestions in the letter which my hon. Friend was good enough to send me are not, I fear, practicable, such, for example, as the suggestions that persons under detention should be allowed to practise as surgeons or chemists or to take over and work farms in the Isle of Man; but I am anxious that opportunities shall be developed for useful employment in which the detainees will co-operate, and that any practicable suggestions for improvements in this matter shall be followed up.
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    The total number of men detained under Defence Regulation 18B in the Isle of Man is approximately 380.
    Mr. Harvey: May I take it that the Minister will look into one or two of the other suggestions made in that letter?
    Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir; all possible and practical suggestions will be considered.

    Personnel (Rank Markings).
    General Sir George Jeffreysasked the Home Secretary (1) whether badges of rank have been authorised for the various grades of Civil Defence personnel; to what extent these badges have been reported on by many local authorities as being unsuitable and difficult of recognition; for what branches of Civil Defence have no badges been authorised; and whether he is aware that there is, throughout the country, general dissatisfaction with the approved badges;
    (2) whether he is aware that wholesale divergences from the approved patterns of Civil Defence badges and uniform generally are prevalent throughout the country; and whether, in view of the fact that no Civil Defence disciplinary code exists, he will reconsider having badges of rank at all in that service?
    Mr. H. Morrison: The scheme of rank markings which was introduced to meet the operational needs of the Services in September last provided for the junior supervisory grades of all the local authority Civil Defence General Services, and for controllers and the senior supervisory grades in the wardens service. Provision was not made for the senior supervisory grades in the other services because of the difficulty of devising a standard plan to meet all the variations in local organisation, including the widely varying responsibilities of the senior officers of local authorities who are ordinarily in charge of those services. Some local authorities, anticipating the official scheme or finding it insufficient for their own organisation, have introduced unauthorised innovations which do not, however, so far as I am aware, affect operational efficiency. To insist upon a change would entail the use of additional material as well as further expenditure. I appreciate my hon. and gallant Friend's argument that badges of rank should not be necessary in the Civil Defence services but the general opinion is that they are

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    desirable, if only to facilitate identification of key personnel. If it were legitimate to start afresh I would consider the introduction, in the place of bars and chevrons, of descriptive markings which have the advantage of raising no questions of precedence. The justification of making a complete change under present circumstances is, however, very doubful.
    Sir G. Jeffreys: Would it not be better to have the grade of the wearer designated by lettering on the shoulders, which could be read by everybody—such as "Controller," "Chief Warden," or whatever it might be—rather than to have any form of badge or rank liable not to be understood by the public or even by the service concerned?
    Mr. Morrison: I have indicated that if I were in a position to consider the matter afresh I think there would be a great deal to be said for that point of view, but it would involve the use of material and labour and administrative troubles to make the change at the present time. I will, however, consider the matter as and when new uniforms are issued.

    Shelters.
    Mr. Davidsonasked the Home Secretary the total number of uncompleted air-raid shelters in this country up to date?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Shelter statistics are not compiled on the basis of numbers of shelters, since individual shelters vary greatly in capacity. At the end of April, the latest date for which figures have been submitted, the amount of shelter provided by local authorities or the Government represented nearly 94 per cent. of the objective aimed at with due regard to the amount of labour and materials likely to be available. I have no information to what extent the remaining 6 per cent. comprises shelter the construction of which has been commenced but not completed.
    Mr. Davidson: Is the Minister aware that in many districts there is a considerable number of uncompleted shelters, and in view of the difficulties of labour and material which are generally recognised, is there in the Department any committee which is considering the whole question of alternative material, with strong resistance power, for those shelters?
    Mr. Morrison: No, Sir. I have not got in my Department any more committees than I cannot avoid having, but technical officers do keep the matter under review, and I will consider any suggestions that may be made. If the hon. Gentleman will let me have particulars of the districts he has in mind, I will, of course, have them investigated.
    Mr. Craik Henderson: Has the Minister considered the possibility of using the rescue and demolition squads?
    Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir; the arrangements are that Civil Defence personnel can be used for this work.

  PROBATION OFFICER, WEST RIDING.
  Mr. Harveyasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the urgent need for a liaison officer for probation work to deal with cases coming before quarter sessions and assize courts in the West Riding; and whether he will communicate his views to the West Riding County Council?
  Mr. H. Morrison: I agree with my hon. Friend as to the desirability of arranging for an experienced probation officer to act as liaison officer for courts of assize and quarter sessions, and my Department has been in communication on the subject with the Clerk of the Peace for the West Riding. I hope that as a result satisfactory arrangements may be made.

  WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
  Mr. Isaacsasked the Home Secretary whether he can now give the result of his negotiations with the employers' associations and insurance companies regarding their attitude to actions at common law by injured workmen who have accepted payment of compensation?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Yes, Sir. It appeared that the difficulty might be overcome by the employers, or their insurers, undertaking that where compensation payments have been made in respect of an accident to a workman, neither his employers nor anyone on their behalf will raise the defence that the acceptance of those payments, or the form of receipt for them, shall debar the workman or his dependants or personal representatives

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  from bringing proceedings otherwise than under the Workmen's Compensation Act. I am glad to say that an assurance in these terms has been given by the employers' organisations and insurance interests generally, subject to a condition that proceedings independently of the Act are commenced within three months of the accident. The arrangement does not apply to payments made under an award or recorded agreement under the Act. This assurance should make it unnecessary to propose legislation to deal with this matter at the present time.
  Mr. Isaacs: While I thank the Minister for his reply, which will be of great help to the persons concerned, is he satisfied that this kind of undertaking will stop anybody who is not a member of the employers' organisation, or not covered by one of the insurance companies, from taking action contrary to the assurance?
  Mr. Morrison: I have every hope that it will work out satisfactorily, but if it should not do so, I will give the matter further consideration

  POLICE PENSIONERS.
  Mr. W. Brownasked the Home Secretary the number of retired members of the police forces in Britain who are receiving pensions from State funds?
  Mr. H. Morrison: The only figures which I can give relate to persons in receipt of pensions under the Police Pensions Acts, and the latest available are for 31st March, 1940, as respects England and Wales and 15th May, 1940, as respects Scotland. Those figures were 38,134 and 2,502 respectively.

  NATIONAL FINANCE.

    Post-War Credits.
    Major Kimballasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the official certificates of post-war credits for 1941–42 will be issued to taxpayers; and will these certificates make it clear that they represent a definite undertaking by the Government to repay the sums shown on the certificate, subject only to the date of payment being determined after the war?
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Kingsley Wood): Certificates for post-war credit for 1941–42 will be issued during
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    the course of this year. The form of the certificate was made public some weeks ago, and, as I said in the course of the Finance Bill Debates, I think it will be agreed that it gives the taxpayer real and tangible evidence of his right to the postwar credit. The certificate shows the amount of the credit that will be due at the end of the war on the basis of the Income Tax liability as computed at the date of the certificate and subject to the condition that the Income Tax for the year has been paid.
    Major Kimball: Will my right hon. Friend consider publishing this answer in the form of a leaflet which could be distributed to Income Tax offices, as I understand that a great many taxpayers ask this question daily at the Income Tax offices?
    Mr. Wootton-Davies: Has my right hon. Friend any intention to issue similar certificates to industrial undertakings in respect of payments they have made on Excess Profits Tax?
    Mr. Messer: Will they be negotiable?

    War Damage (Mortgagees).
    Mr. R. Morganasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will agree to set up a small committee to consider whether any fair and practicable means can be devised to enable mortgagees to play their part in providing for the cost of insuring against war damage the properties on which their mortgagees are secured?
    Sir K. Wood: This matter was the subject of careful consideration during the preparation both of the War Damage Act and of the Amending Bill now before Parliament. It has, moreover, in the course of the discussions on that Bill, been fully debated in this House. I do not consider, therefore, that the committee my hon. Friend suggests would serve a useful purpose.

    Ploughing-Up Subsidy (Income Tax).
    Mr. Priceasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the £2 an acre ploughing subsidy is to be regarded as revenue liable to Income Tax or as capital and, therefore, an item which is not brought into trading accounts?
    Sir K. Wood: In the view of the Board of Inland Revenue the payment referred

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    to is of a revenue nature and should be taken into account in computing profits for taxation purposes.
    Mr. Price: Is it not a fact that a court case is pending on this matter, and will the Chancellor's present view be modified in view of the decision which has been taken in that case?
    Sir K. Wood: No, Sir. There has been a decision taken by the Special Commissioners of Income Tax on the matter, but the Board propose to maintain their view, and, if necessary, to seek a ruling from the courts if the decision is opposed.
    Lieutenant Butcher: Does my right hon. Friend realise that farmers have not the means to contest a decision of the Special Board, whereas the Inland Revenue have the whole resources of the State at their command?

    Price Stabilisation (Wages).
    Major Stourtonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the persistent demands for wage increases in war industries, although the cost of living has not risen during the past six months; that such demands once conceded would imperil the national war effort, produce uncontrolled inflation entailing hardship in general, and, in particular, to old age and widow pensioners or those deriving fixed moneys from invested funds; and, as such demands are contrary to the Government's policy of price stabilisation, will he institute a policy of controlled wages on comparable lines with the existing limitation of profits from industrial enterprise, thus stabilising prices on a permanent basis?
    Sir K. Wood: The Government are fully alive to the possible dangers resulting from any departure from the policy stated in the White Paper of July, 1941, on price stabilisation and industrial policy. That policy remains unchanged.
    Major Stourton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a declared wages policy by the Government is long overdue, and that, if wages continue to rise, the policy of price stabilisation will have to be abandoned with disastrous consequences?
    Major Lyons: Does the Chancellor seriously suggest that he has stabilisation to-day rather than inflation?
    Captain Studholme: As prices and profits are controlled, is there any reason why wages should not also be controlled?
    Sir Patrick Hannonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the recent increase in wages to the coalminers and the decision to pass on the increase to the consumer affects the Government's stabilisation policy; what will be the increase in the price of coal; and what steps the Government propose to take on this account in relation to the industrial and domestic users?
    Sir K. Wood: It is part of the Government's policy to rely for the settlement of wages on the machinery of industry for collective negotiation and arbitration. The White Paper issued last year contemplated that there might be sectional increases of wages in circumstances such as the Board of Investigation have found to exist in the coal-mining industry. The increase in wages costs will require an average increase of 2s. 6d. per ton in the price of coal. Certain other previous increases in costs which have to be covered will bring the total increase up to 3s. There will be an increase in the cost of manufacture of gas and electricity and in so far as an increase in these prices may be needed, the cost of living will be slightly affected. The combined effect of these factors on the cost of living index number is estimated at about one point.
    As regards industrial coal, the Government will be prepared to discuss with industries which are large users of coal, the effect of this increase in relation to their other costs and the prices of their commodities or services, with a view to taking the measures necessary to deal with it. The Government is now by far the largest consumer, and it is not anticipated that the indirect effect on the cost of living of any increases in price that may be called for will be substantial. The Government will continue their policy of controlling the cost of living as stated in my recent Budget Speech, and in particular will effect such reductions in the retail price of other commodities which enter into that cost as may be necessary to compensate for the increase in domestic coal prices.
    Sir P. Hannon: Will my right hon. Friend answer the last part of the Question, as to what steps the Government

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    propose to take in relation to industrial and domestic users?
    Sir K. Wood: Industries which consider that an increase in the price of their products is required will, no doubt, approach the Department with whom they customarily deal; and, as I said in my answer, the Government will continue the policy of controlling the cost of living.
    Mr. Shinwell: Is this increase in the price of coal likely to lead to an increase in electricity and gas charges, and will the Government consider subsidising to some extent, on the existing subsidy basis for other commodities, some part of the extra cost involved? Will he take care to make it clear that, if there is an increase in the price of coal and a subsequent increase in the cost of electricity and gas, the miners will not be held to blame?
    Sir K. Wood: I will not answer the latter part of the question. As far as the first part of the question is concerned, I have already stated in my reply that it does not appear that the addition will be a substantial one, and that the Government are prepared to discuss with industries what will be the effect, and see how best to deal with it.
    Mr. Shinwell: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate, when he talked of an increase in the cost of living index figure of one point, that that is an average increase, and that some persons in the country, such as Service men's dependants, old age pensioners and the like, will be more seriously affected?

    Estate Duty.
    Dr. Russell Thomasasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether value payment claims payable at an indefinite date by the War Damage Commission are added to estates, thereby increasing the Death Duties payable on the actual present value of an estate?
    Sir K. Wood: A value payment under Part I of the War Damage Act, 1941, is added to other property passing on the deceased's death for the purpose of determining the rate at which Estate Duty is payable on the estate and a provisional estimate of the amount of the value payment should be made for that purpose. Duty in respect of the value payment will not be collected until payment is received.
    Dr. Thomas: Does my right hon. Friend think it is fair to the executors to charge this extra rate of Death Duty, and does he not think it is an inequitable way of obtaining money?
    Sir K. Wood: No, Sir, I do not consider it inequitable.
    Sir John Mellor: How can the present value of a future payment be calculated, when the date of that payment is uncertain?
    Sir K. Wood: I would refer my hon. Friend to the War Damage Act.
    Dr. Thomas: As I am not satisfied with my right hon. Friend's reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter again on the Adjournment.

  MAN-POWER.
  Major Lyonsasked the Prime Minister whether immediate vacancies exist for man-power in the Armed Forces of the Crown and in war industry, respectively; whether, in present circumstances, he will instruct that on determination of liability call-up and posting should be immediate and that no delay should be permitted on the score of no intake demand in any particular direction and that waiting lists should be terminated?
  The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): In reply to the first part of the Question, vacancies are constantly arising and being filled. Waiting lists are necessary in a few special cases; but in general there are no waiting lists properly so-called. Men and women are called up or required to transfer to other work as and when the need arises, and meanwhile are allowed to remain in their existing occupations, in which for the most part they are giving useful service.
  Major Lyons: In view of what is felt to be the general delay throughout the country in regard to the calling up of the persons referred to in the Question, and the spirit of frustration which this sort of thing causes, will the right hon. Gentleman himself look into the specific cases brought to his notice?
  Mr. Attlee: Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman will give me some evidence for his statement.
  Mr. De la Bère: Is there not overwhelming evidence of anomalies in the call-up?
  Mr. Bernays: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that in the Army older men who have been called up find that the courses are not available for them?

  PRODUCTION (SHOP STEWARDS, WOOLWICH ARSENAL).
  Mr. Kirbyasked the Prime Minister whether he has considered the communication recently addressed to him by the Shop Steward's Committee of Woolwich Arsenal on the subject of production and other matters; and whether he can make a statement thereon?
  Mr. Attlee: The communication referred to has only just been received and is being examined.

  WAR AND PEACE AIMS.
  Mr. Davidsonasked the Prime Minister whether he intends, in the near future, issuing a statement to all the Fighting Services indicating our war aims and stating clearly the Government's pledge on planning responsibility for those who return?
  Mr. Attlee: I have nothing to add at present to the various statements that have been made on these subjects.
  Mr. Davidson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is some considerable time since the statement was made, and that discussions are going on among men in the Services with regard to this particular point? Does he not think it would be a good idea if the Government issued a plain statement to members of the Fighting Services, which would give them a greater incentive?
  Mr. Attlee: My hon. Friend will realise there are a number of difficult financial and economic problems concerned with these post-war matters. They are being very closely investigated by my right hon. and learned Friend the Paymaster-General, but I will certainly bear in mind my hon. Friend's suggestion.
  Mr. John Dugdale: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a number of men in the Fighting Services are erroneously under the impression that our intention is
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  to return as rapidly as possible to pre-war conditions, and will he make a statement to dispose of that?
  Mr. Attlee: My reply to this Question, in which I stated emphatically that that is not so, will perhaps clear that up.

  ANTI-TANK GUNS.
  Mr. Molsonasked the Prime Minister whether he has considered the design for a new six-pounder anti-tank gun fitted to a mobile unit of which a full size mock-up had been prepared under the directions of Mr. T. C. L. Westbrook; and whether he has instructed the Ministry of Production to come to a decision on the desirability of producing this equipment?
  The Minister of Supply (Sir Andrew Duncan): I have been asked to reply. The project referred to is being actively pursued. But at the same time another mobile unit project has been developed and is already in production.

  AGRICULTURE.

    Farm Institutes.
    Mr. Harveyasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is making preparation for the reopening of farm institutes for agricultural education; and whether, in this case, it is proposed that the education in the farm institutes shall be ad ministered by the county councils as being the existing statutory authorities?
    The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. R. S. Hudson): The answer to the first part of the Question is in the negative. The second part, therefore, does not arise.

    Allotments (Damage by Animals).
    Mr. Donald Scottasked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in view of the damage done to allotments by the trespass of animals, he will consider extending Defence Regulation 62AA to include horses, cattle and sheep?
    Mr. Hudson: No, Sir. The question of straying dogs on allotments, which is dealt with by Defence Regulation 62AA, is not entirely analogous to trespass of horses, cattle and sheep. The existing remedies under Common Law are available, and I propose to make an Order under Defence Regulation 55 dealing

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    specifically with straying livestock in certain specified areas where they are causing serious damage to crops on allotments and elsewhere.
    Mr. Scott: Is the Minister aware that his reply will give great satisfaction to allotment holders?

    Poultry Rationing.
    Lieutenant Butcherasked the Minister of Agriculture why the announcement of the reduction in the poultry ration was not made earlier so as to avoid hard ship and loss to many persons who have recently purchased chickens to rear for egg production?
    Mr. Hudson: I assume that the hon. and gallant Member is referring to the new basis for the rationing of domestic poultry, which will not be introduced until 1st October. Domestic poultry keepers will continue to draw rations on the present basis until that date. There was no avoidable delay in the issue of the announcement after the necessity for the change, which arises in turn from a deterioration in the feeding-stuns supply situation, had become evident.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is it not very desirable that this scheme should be abandoned altogether, in view of the unnecessary hardship which will be caused to many hundreds of thousands of backyard poultry keepers?
    Captain Godfrey Nicholson: Will the Minister take steps to secure publicity as to the value of other forms of food, such as acorns and beechmast?
    Lieutenant Butcherasked the Minister of Agriculture the total amount spent in Press advertising and in other ways to encourage backyard poultry keeping; and the date on which the last advertisement appeared?
    Mr. Hudson: The policy of the Government has been to assist through the Domestic Poultry Keepers' Council people who keep backyard poultry to get the best out of them rather than to encourage a wide extension of the movement. Advertisement of the kind indicated by the hon. and gallant Member has therefore not been undertaken.

  CIVIL SERVICE.

    Call-up Deferment.
    Mr. Purbrickasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether any cases have arisen in which proposals for deferment of calling up of civil servants have been considered excessive and have necessitated review by the Treasury, as indicated in the circular of 12th September, 1941, issued by the Treasury, in the light of the Report of the Committee under Lord Kennet; if so, the names of the Departments and the numbers of such cases in each Department?
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Captain Crookshank): No, Sir; but applications for the deferment of individual officers have been frequently modified or rejected by the Committee.

    Home Guard.
    Mr. Wootton-Daviesasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury what instructions are being issued to civil servants with regard to joining the Home Guard; and whether, in the case of civil servants whose work will continue to be essential under invasion conditions, it can be made clear that if they join the Home Guard, it will be for the Minister in charge of their Department and not the military authorities to say when and under what conditions they may temporarily abandon their Civil Service activities and participate in Home Guard defensive operations?
    Captain Crookshank: Departments have been asked to do all they can, consistent with Departmental needs, to enable and encourage civil servants to play their full part in the Home Guard, whether as members of local or of Departmental Units. In view of the liability of members of the Home Guard to be "mustered" for the purpose of resisting an actual or apprehended invasion, Departments have been instructed themselves to divide their employees who continue as, or become members of, the Home Guard into two categories. The first category consists of those who can be made available immediately for full-time military service. The second category consists of those who can be made available only at a later stage because of indispensable preoccupation with essential civil duties. These would have to report within 48 hours, and would

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    then be instructed whether to parade for military duty, or to continue their civil duties for a further period according to the operational situation at the time.

  URBAN DISTRICT COUNCILS (SIGNING OF DOCUMENTS).
  Major Procterasked the Attorney-General whether, in view of the burden of work now falling on chairmen of urban district councils in signing forms and documents of many kinds, he will make arrangements to enable past chairmen of urban district councils to sign all documents which may now be signed by the existing chairman, who is an ex-officio magistrate?
  The Solicitor-General (Major Sir David Maxwell Fyfe): I have been asked to reply to this Question. I am not aware that there are classes of forms or documents which the chairman of an urban district council is the sole person capable of attesting or witnessing. Some documents are by Statute required to be attested by a justice of the peace, a notary public or a commissioner for oaths, and my Noble Friend has no evidence before him that there is any insufficiency of justices of the peace for the purpose. As far as my Noble Friend is aware, in other cases where a justice of the peace (whether the chairman of an urban district council or otherwise) is a possible attesting party, there are long categories of people who are equally competent to perform this duty.
  Major Procter: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that in urban district councils in the Parliamentary Division of Accrington there is a great shortage of magistrates, and, as the war proceeds, all kinds of forms require signatures, and, as a great deal of time is required from busy men to do this work, surely steps should be taken to remove some of the burdens from the shoulders of the chairmen of urban councils?
  The Solicitor-General: If my hon. and gallant Friend can refer me to any district where there is a shortage of magistrates, or to any particular class of form that he has in mind, I will have the matter inquired into at once.
  Major Procter: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman look into the shortage
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  of magistrates in Church and in other urban districts in my division?

  TRADE AND COMMERCE.

    Cotton Piece Goods, Manchester.
    Mr. Hammersleyasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can make a statement with reference to the stocks of cotton piece goods originally intended for the Dutch East Indies and now lying idle in Manchester warehouses?
    Mr. Harcourt Johnstone (Secretary, Department of Overseas Trade): No, Sir, but I understand that negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily.
    Mr. Hammersley: Will the hon. Gentleman inform the House under what powers the Board of Trade is preventing the owners of cargoes from disposing of them?
    Mr. Johnstone: Under the powers under which it issues export licences.
    Mr. Hammersley: When do you expect a definite decision?
    Mr. Johnstone: I think the hon. Member has been informed privately that there is a meeting to-day between the interested parties, and we hope that negotiations will be concluded very rapidly.

    Retail Trade Committee (Report).
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, arising out of the publication of the Third Report of the Retail Trade Committee, he will now make a comprehensive statement as to what extent the Government intends to act upon their recommendations?
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Captain Waterhouse): The report makes a number of far-reaching recommendations, which require careful study. They affect a number of Departments, and my right hon. Friend is accordingly consulting the Ministers concerned.
    Mr. De la Bère: Have not the Government admitted that the small shopkeeper is the backbone of the country, and will they bear in mind the central and vital fact that you cannot destroy the backbone of anything if you want it to survive?

  WHEAT DISCUSSIONS WASHINGTON (AGREEMENT).
  Mr. Watkins (by Private Notice)asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is in a position to give any information about the recent discussions at Washington with a view to the conclusion of a Wheat Agreement?
  The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Dalton): I am glad to be able to say that the wheat discussions in Washington have been satisfactorily concluded and the text of the agreed documents is available in a White Paper which was presented yesterday.
  His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have agreed with His Majesty's Governments in Canada and Australia, the Government of the United States and the Government of Argentina, on the outline of a wheat Convention which will later be submitted to a larger conference of the countries interested.
  Meanwhile, the five Governments will regard certain arrangements as in effect amongst themselves, and a Wheat Council, on which they will have equal representation and voting rights, will be set up to administer these arrangements. In the first place, a relief pool of 100,000,000 bushels of wheat, and more as may be required, will be created forthwith to ensure that supplies of wheat and flour shall be available to any territory as soon as it is liberated from enemy control. This practical measure for relief should hearten oppressed peoples everywhere. Secondly, after the cessation of hostilities certain other provisions of the Convention will be brought into effect for a period of two years, pending the conclusion of longer-term arrangements. Basic minimum and maximum export prices for wheat and flour from the four principal countries of supply will be fixed by unanimous agreement of the five Governments. The four exporting countries will guarantee wheat for export at prices not exceeding the maxima so fixed. They will also control their production, so as to provide what the Vice-President of the United States has called an "ever-normal granary," but at the same time to discourage excessive stocks. Further, they will maintain a scheme of export quotas in terms of percentages of their combined exports. These arrangements should have the effect of steadying inter-
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  national trade in wheat in the period of transition from war to peace.
  It will be for the larger conference to which I have referred to decide how far these arrangements, should be embodied and extended in a wider agreement.
  Mr. Leach: Does this agreement, so admirably outlined, destroy the Ottawa arrangement of ill memory?
  Mr. Dalton: It has no connection with it.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. Greenwood: Will the Leader of the House announce the forthcoming Business and make a statement as to the proceedings to-day?
The Lord Privy Seal (Sir Stafford Cripps): The Business will be as follows:
First Sitting Day.—Supply (11th Allotted Day): Committee, Debate on Propaganda. The Ministry of Information and other appropriate Votes will be put down.
Second Sitting Day Supply (12th Allotted Day): Committee. The Votes for the Department of Health for Scotland and Public Education, Scotland, will be considered.
Third Sitting Day.—Committee and remaining stages of the Allied Powers (War Service) Bill; Second Reading of the Housing (Rural Workers) Bill, and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution; Second Reading of the Isle of Man (Customs) Bill and any outstanding Business, including the Motion relating to Members' Passes.
We propose to-day to continue the Debate that began yesterday. I understand the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) proposes to ask leave to move his Motion formally, so that the Debate may proceed.
Mr. Greenwood: Has the Leader of the House in contemplation a fairly early Debate on the question of shipping losses?
Sir S. Cripps: It is hoped that the questions of both production and shipping losses will be discussed during the following series of Sittings.
Sir F. Fremantle: Why is it that in the Business for to-day the Motion of Censure and the Amendments are not on the Order Paper?
Mr. W. Brown: Is it proposed to suspend the operation of the Rule to-day?
Sir S. Cripps: It is not the intention to ask the House to do so, because for the general convenience of the House, to-day being Thursday, it was felt best to take the Vote at the usual hour.
Mr. Brown: In these circumstances may I ask that you, Sir, will cast a kindly and fatherly eye on those of us who were cut out of the first day's Debate after staying until three o'clock this morning?
Mr. Speaker: I am always in the habit of casting a friendly eye.
Major Lyons: In view of the fact that a number of Members who stayed up all night and tried to intervene were prevented from doing so by certain events, will the Leader of the House consider suspending the Rule for a fixed period?
Sir S. Cripps: It was not my fault that Members stayed. I also stayed until three o'clock this morning. Unfortunately there were two Members who had then been unable to speak, but I do not think it would be for the general convenience of the House to suspend the Rule.
Mr. Bellenger: Will my right hon. and learned Friend consider the situation that arose early this morning by what I suggest was a misuse of- the Rules of the House which will only bring Parliament into contempt? Is it not possible at some later date to consider, especially in wartime, the abrogation of this Rule, which prevents a Debate from continuing and excludes hon. Members who want to speak?
Sir S. Cripps: Every hon. Member has a right to make use of the Rules of the House in what way he thinks fit, but I hope that not many hon. Members will think fit to use them as they were used last night.
Mr. Maxton: Was not the use of the Rule in the early hours of this morning and the result of it evidence that it was the proper time to use the Rule?
Sir S. Cripps: I will not put my judgment against that of the hon. Gentleman. I take a different view.
Mr. Thorne: Is it not the duty of the Leader of the House and the Government to keep sufficient Members here?
Sir S. Cripps: I think that, with the present difficulties of transport, when it comes to two o'clock in the morning it is rather difficult.
Mr. Silverman: Is it not the duty of the Government Whips to keep a House, and on an occasion of this kind would it not have been better if that duty had been performed at whatever cost?
Sir S. Cripps: If the hon. Member wishes to be technical, I think it was the duty of those who were moving the Motion to see that sufficient people were here to carry on the business.
Petty Officer Alan Herbert: Is it not the case that the hon. Member who by making this use of the Rules cut out many Members—not myself—who wished to contribute to the Debate, had himself addressed and bored the House for 46 minutes?
Mr. Maxton: Have you not, Sir, known occasions in this House where that has happened before?
Mr. Magnay: Should it not be understood that, while we do not complain of being governed in this House in a time of crisis from that end, we will not be "McGoverned" from this end?

NEW MEMBER SWORN.
Captain Charles Edward Mott-Radcliffe, for the County of Berks (Windsor Division).

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have agreed to—
London Passenger Transport Board Bill, without Amendment.

CENTRAL DIRECTION OF THE WAR.
Sir John Wardlaw-Milne: I beg to move, with the leave of the House,
"That this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endurance of the Armed Forces of the Crown in circumstances of exceptional difficulty, has no confidence in the central direction of the war."
Mr. A. Bevan: I beg to second the Motion.
The Hon. Members who put their names to this Motion and I were rebuked yesterday by hon. Members in some parts of the House for having done so. They rebuked us on two grounds—one, that a Motion of this nature moved at this time would have a bad effect upon the morale of the troops; and the other that it would have a bad effect upon the morale of the country. I want to reply to these two charges at the beginning. I believe it would have been a very bad thing indeed for the reputation of the House of Commons if this Motion had not been moved. It is the duty, as I understand it, of Members of Parliament to try and reproduce in the House of Commons the psychology which exists in the country, and there can be no doubt that the country is deeply disturbed by the movement of events at the present time. Having put the Motion on the Order Paper, it would have been a great disservice to the country if we had withdrawn it. I do not know whether hon. Members have received many letters in the last few days, but if they have they will have realised that there are far more people supporting the Motion outside the House than are represented by the names on the Order Paper.
With regard to the morale of the troops, my hon. Friends and I would be loath indeed to do anything here which might have the effect of undermining the courage and resolution of our troops in battle. It is not, however, what we say in this House, it is not the speeches we make that bring home to the soldiers the defects in the direction of the war; it is what they experience themselves in battle. It would be a serious thing if the soldiers in the field could not hear any voices raised in their behalf in the House of Commons. I believe that nothing would more nerve our Forces to greater efforts and arouse their enthusiasm than the knowledge that
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their representatives in the House of Commons were doing their best to see that they are given the right weapons with which to fight. It will never be possible for us, in this war, to move a Vote of Censure on the Government at a time when no battle is in progress. Battles are going to be continuous throughout the war, and, therefore, we must take the opportunity, when we think it is proper, to move a Vote of Censure upon the Government, although it may happen that at that very moment a series of grave battles is in progress.
The Prime Minister has decided to wind up the Debate, and I understand he proposes to talk for something like an hour and a half. I am bound to point but to the House that I think a very serious disservice is being done to the House and the country by the fact that the Prime Minister did not see fit to open the Debate. He has the right to choose when he will speak. Of course he has, but the Prime Minister is also Minister of Defence, and the House had the right to be put in possession of the facts of the case, so that the Debate might have proceeded upon an examination of those facts. I know that it is better debating tactics for the Prime Minister to wind up the Debate. In that way, he will win the Debate. But the country is now more concerned with the Prime Minister winning the war than with his winning a Debate in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister wins Debate after Debate and loses battle after battle. The country is beginning to say that he fights Debates like a war and the war like a Debate. It would have been much more dignified for the Prime Minister and of much greater service to the House, if he had opened the Debate yesterday and allowed one of his Ministers to wind up. Indeed, the Prime Minister could have opened the Debate and wound it up as well. He has done so before. But that would have been undignified for other Members of the Government, because it would give the impression once more to the world that there was only one man in the Government.
So, because of that situation, the House of Commons is in the difficulty of having to await the Prime Minister's reply before it is able to consider the merits of the Government's case. Furthermore, yesterday we were at a disadvantage in having

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had a speech from the Minister of Production. Rather it was the Government's disadvantage, not ours. I have heard some members of the Government complain about the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I do not see why they should complain, because, had the right hon. Gentleman made himself more clear, the Government's case would have suffered more damage. What, in fact, did the right hon. Gentleman say? What was the main case made by him? It was that we had had no time in which to produce new weapons and that, therefore, our troops in Libya had to fight with weapons which were designed before the war. That was his main case—that we could not change the designs in time, that there are new designs in production, but that they could not be put on the battlefield because we had to continue with the old types. What then becomes of the Prime Minister's statement last December that at last we were meeting the enemy on equal terms with modern weapons?
I would also refer to a speech which was made yesterday in another place. Ministers are all concerned to prove that they were right and that they made no mistakes when in office. I recommend hon. Members to read the speech made in another place, because that is another answer to the Government. Ministers are trying to absolve themselves by putting the blame somewhere else. I hope to show that the blame rests squarely upon the Government's own shoulders. I, therefore, believe that it is the duty of hon. Members to state their minds clearly and independently upon this matter. The House may not agree with me, but when I sit down, there should be no misunderstanding about what I think.
It seems to me that there are three things wrong. First, the main strategy of the war has been wrong; second, the wrong weapons have been produced; and third, those weapons are being managed by men who are not trained in the use of them and who have not studied the use of modern weapons. As I understand it, it is strategy that dictates the weapon and tactics that dictate the use of the weapon. The Government have conceived the war wrongly from the very beginning, and no one has more misconceived it than the Prime Minister himself. The nature of the weapons used by the
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enemy has not been understood by the Prime Minister ever since the beginning of the war. I will read to the House what the right hon. Gentleman said on 19th May, 1940:
"It would be foolish to disguise the gravity of the situation. It would be still more foolish to lose heart or courage, or to suppose that well-trained, well-equipped armies, numbering 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 of men, can be overcome in the space of a few weeks or even months, by a super-raid of mechanised vehicles, however formidable."
That is precisely what did happen in a few weeks. No one was more Maginotminded that the Prime Minister himself. I have read all his speeches very carefully, and I say that no one has thought of this war in terms of the last war more than the Prime Minister himself. That is contained in the statement to which I refer. He also said:
"We may look forward with confidence to the stabilisation of the front in France——"
Fancy, after Poland and in the opening weeks of the Battle of France, speaking about stabilisation of the front in France. No Russian general, no German general speaks about the stabilisation of the front. The front cannot be stabilised in modern war, and Rommel is proving it to-day. The Prime Minister went on to say:
"——and to the general engagement of the masses which will enable the qualities of the French and British soldiers to be matched squarely against those of their adversaries: For myself, I have invincible confidence in the French Army and its leaders."
The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): Ought I to have said the opposite?
Mr. Bevan: It is a case of what the right hon. Gentleman ought not to have said. He ought not to have used language which, on the face of it, reveals quite clearly that the Prime Minister had not penetrated to the heart of the methods that were being used by the Germans or were going to be used in this war. It is that primary misconception of the war which has been responsible for the wrong strategy of the Government, and, the strategy being wrong, the wrong weapons were produced. The chief evidence of that is the case of the dive-bomber. The second chief evidence of that is the complete failure to equip the British Army with transport planes. Take the situation in Libya. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Production yesterday said that according to modern methods of warfare "islands" of troops had been made in the desert

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behind fortifications. We had one in Bir Hacheim, fought with distinguished gallantry by the Free French. This has been one of the most heroic episodes in the whole war, and I am informed that they had not even two-pounder guns in Bir Hacheim. Having seen for more than two years that we should be fighting a desert war in Libya, we still have not provided any transport planes, and had to send a tank brigade through with supplies, whereas the Germans have supplied strong points and islands of resistance in Russia right throughout the winter by transport planes.
I say that if the war had been properly conceived, if the Prime Minister had understood it, we should have had both dive-bombers and transport planes, so that wherever we organised a strong point, whether in the desert or elsewhere, transport plans would have been available to supply our troops. Further, had we produced transport planes in any quantity, we should have been able right through the campaign there to use them for carrying a great deal of material instead of having to send all supplies 14,000 miles by sea. I ask the House seriously whether that condition of affairs reveals any deep penetration by the Government into the nature of the war we have to fight. A lot has been said about dive-bombers. Even now the Government have not made up their minds upon them. The Secretary of State for War says that discussions are proceeding. I would remind hon. Members of a letter, from Mr. Westbrook which they have probably read for themselves, which was published in "The Times." He was at the Ministry of Aircraft Production and went out to the Near East in charge of supplies, or at least as one of the higher officials, and he came home from the Near East for reasons that it is not politic to state in public. He says:
"Just lately many confusing and conflicting statements have been made about the lack of dive-bombers. The true facts are that the Air Ministry decided before the war against the use of them."
Against the use of them before the war. Where was our Intelligence Service? For the last five or six years I have heard the Prime Minister making eloquent speeches about the German military preparations. His reputation to this day rests upon those speeches. The affectionate regard
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the country still has for him arises out of gratitude because he warned the country at that time. But he warned the country about them quantitatively; the qualitative position he, left aside. He gave us the figures, but there was no insight behind the figures. He has been in charge of this war really for three years. He must have known the nature of the weapons that the Germans were making. Dive-bombers were not a secret. The Czechs knew of them and had prepared to resist them. Czech-military strategy was based upon the use of the dive-bomber. The letter from Mr. Westbrook goes on:
"Probably this was correct until we had the mastery of the air or sufficient capacity to enable their production without detriment to the more important types."
There, of course, is the official defending his decisions. The fact remains that a prototype was never developed, that the Government could not even make up their mind then, because they fell between two stools. Mr. Westbrook says further:
"Both Lord Beaverbrook and I thought they were necessary, so he obtained a request from Mr. Eden, then at the War Office, and a quantity to a new design were ordered from America in the summer of 1940. These are now in production. There were, however, delivery delays, as the British Air Commission in America were never allowed to give them any form of priority."
That is a most serious statement. We have no- right to complain against America. If America did not want to give them priority, why should America do so when we ourselves said they were no use? We did not ask for priority for them. The result is that after three years of war the British army is not equipped with dive-bombers. I say that at once reveals that the Prime Minister and his Government have not gone to the heart of this modern, war-making, and I say that it is disgraceful that the lives of British soldiers should be lost because of the absence of this elementary knowledge at the top.
We ourselves, here, must accept responsibility for it. After all, the Government are responsible to us, and if the House of Commons refuses to exercise its independence against the Government, the House of Commons must accept responsibility for the result. It is we, not party machines, not secret meetings upstairs of Members on any side of the

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House, but we in this House who are responsible for sending British soldiers on to the battlefield with improper weapons, and hon. Members, when they go back to their constituencies, should not hide behind any formality of Parliamentary debate but face squarely up to the facts. When the mothers and fathers of British soldiers ask why their boys go into battle worse equipped than the enemy, for heaven's sake say, "We are responsible, and nobody else."
Sir Granville Gibson: The hon. Member was for seven years. He always voted against any increase in armaments for seven years.
Earl Winterton: What about the Government? What about the Home Secretary?
Mr. Bevan: I will face the issue squarely. I do not run away from it. This House of Commons gave the Government unlimited power to rearm this country in 1935, and Ministers still in this Government were responsible at that time. The right hon. Gentleman has picked them for his Government. Do not throw the jeer back at me; it belongs over there. It is the Prime Minister who has cast the mantle of his benediction on the shoulders of those guilty Ministers. They are still there sitting on that front Bench, so do not throw the jeer at me. In any case, even if the rearmament of Britain before the war was quantitatively lacking, there is no excuse for its having been qualitatively inefficient. There may be an excuse for a lack of will, but not for a lack of brains, and our brains were wrong and the brains are still wrong.
I will not talk about guns, because they were exploded yesterday—almost all day. We know the situation as regards guns. We know that the guns supplied to our troops did not answer the Prime Minister's description. They were not modern weapons. The Spanish Republicans were using an 8-pounder anti-tank gun in 1936. The Germans learned the lesson in Spain and made the gun immediately afterwards in Germany. We were rearming then, we were supposed to be rearming. We had two White Papers on rearmament. But, of course, the Government of that day were too much occupied in trying to destroy the Republican Government in Spain to learn any military lessons from
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the campaign in Spain. That was the situation. I shall not deal further with that aspect of it, because I am going on to another matter.
Why is the strategy wrong? I say, first, that it is because the Prime Minister, although possessing many other qualities, sometimes conceives of the war, it seems to me, in medieval terms, because he talks of it as if it were a tourney. But the strategy is wrong because the Prime Minister has a wrong instrument of government. We have been at war for three years. Over and over again I have heard the Prime Minister speak most eloquently about the defects of the machinery of Government. Look at it for a moment. There is a War Cabinet of seven. One of them I rule out, the Lord President of the Council. I do not want to be offensive, he is a most distinguished man, but I have always looked upon him rather as a Civil servant than as a politician. So I rule him out. I do not believe that the guidance of the right hon. Gentleman on matters of high political principle differs from that he would get from any Government Department. Then there is the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, burdened by a complicated office. There is the Minister of Labour, with a most distinguished career, a most dynamic personality. He has a most complicated Department, a huge Department with a large staff. Also, he speaks every week-end. How can he master documents about the war? I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has ever claimed to understand much about war—this is a serious matter—and in any case he has not got the time.
There is the Minister of Production. He is a member of the War Cabinet. The Minister of Production was, I understand, a business man of distinction, but he has no political experience worth speaking about, as was revealed yesterday. I say with all respect that in his own sphere he is a most eminent man. [AN HON. MEMBER: "And a soldier."] This place is full of soldiers. Stalin was not a soldier, but he is a very good general. The Minister of Production is at the head of the most vital Department of all. He has no time to attend to matters of strategy, so he is no use in the War Cabinet for this purpose. Then there is the Deputy Prime Minister. We had a Debate the other day. There was no Vote of Censure then. The Government had an overwhelming Vote

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of Confidence. Every newspaper in the country, every critic in the House of Commons, including men of long standing such as the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), all advised that we should have a small War Cabinet of six Ministers without Portfolio. The Prime Minister made a few changes. He threw out the only Minister in the War Cabinet who did not have a portfolio, and gave a portfolio to the Deputy-Prime Minister. Before then the Deputy-Prime Minister did riot have a Department. Now he has one.
That foolish instrument exaggerates all the natural weaknesses which are the accompaniments of the Prime Minister's strategy. The Prime Minister has qualities of greatness—everybody knows that—but the trouble is that he has too much to do. He has not around him colleagues to whom he can delegate any of this matter concerning the central direction of the war. The result is that all these defects which he possesses are made dangerous, because the Prime Minister, among all his other qualities, has a gift of expression which is exceedingly dangerous. He very often mistakes verbal felicities for verbal inspiration. The Prime Minister will, in the course of an evening, produce a whole series of brilliant improvisations, but he has not the machinery to carry them through.
It is the absence of support as much as anything else which is responsible for the situation. I seriously suggest to the House that whatever they may do about this Motion, they should for Heaven's sake insist, at this grave hour, that the Prime Minister be kept under the clamp of strong men who have got no Departmental interests. The House knows that that is the correct thing to do, the country knows it, and every responsible man in public affairs in this country outside the Government knows that it is the right thing to do. Why does not the House of Commons exert its dignity and force the Prime Minister to do it? Even an inadequate man giving his full attention is better than a clever man who cannot give any attention. It would be a most improper thing for me to suggest that the members of the War Cabinet are men of no stature. But in this matter the country is entitled to their full services in the central direction of the war, and I suggest that we should insist upon that being done.
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Under the War Cabinet I suggest that you must have a far better co-ordination between the Services than now exists. There must be a central staff, presided over by one man who can have immediate access to the War Cabinet and who can ultimately be responsible for central strategy. I do not disagree with the Prime Minister having no Minister of De fence; I do not see how on earth, in war-time, the Prime Minister could delegate responsibility for the war to anybody else. He could not do that, but what he could do would be to have around him a number of Ministers who could assist him in that matter, and the War Cabinet as a whole could see the Chiefs of Staff instead of the Prime Minister——
The Prime Minister: They do.
Mr. Bevan:—instead of the Prime Minister seeing them before the War Cabinet sees them, because then the Prime Minister goes into the War Cabinet defending his own decisions.
The Prime Minister: That is not true.
Mr. Bevan: I am sorry, but the right hon. Gentleman will have his opportunity of correcting me later. It is the strategy that is wrong, and the production of weapons. Again, I should like to remind hon. Members that this is not a new story; we have been saying this for two years. All over the country the working classes have been deeply disturbed by the failures of production. Talk about not being able to change over to new types—even now there are aircraft factories idle in this country, changing over to new long-range bombers which may be available in two years' time. The country is bored with hearing of the production of long-range bombers. They know very well that the long-range bomber is not a decisive weapon of war, whatever else it may be. Therefore it is foolish at this moment to be changing to new types of long-range bombers which may not be available at the decisive moment.
On Tuesday the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Production told us the that he had now appointed regional controllers. The Trades Union Congress, the trade unions of Britain separately, the Production Engineers Institute arid this House of Commons asked for regional boards over two years ago. We have been trying to get the decentralisation of production controls for over two years, and the Prime

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Minister fought a successful rearguard action against us. He has been fighting rearguard actions against the House of Commons all the time, making concessions all the while to buy off the political situation, not to create a machine for war-making.
So much for production. Then there is the actual use of the weapons in the field. I speak in this matter without authority at all; I have never fought in a battle, I do not know what it is to use weapons in the field, so I have to speak with diffidence in this. Nevertheless, we are responsible, we have to make up our minds. We are as responsible as the Government. I am informed—the Prime Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that even to-day the staff colleges of the Army have no textbook on the coordination of air and land forces. Even to-day, our Chiefs of Staff and our war captains are not being educated in the co-ordination of those two weapons. I do not know what hon. Members think of that, but it frightens me. It frightens me to think that after three years of war there is no textbook in our staff colleges on this most urgent and important matter. Why, even the small nations of Europe had it years ago, and we have not got it yet.
We have in this country five or six generals, members of other nations, Czechs, Poles and French, all of them trained in the use of these German weapons and this German technique. I know it is hurtful to our pride, but would it not be possible to put some of those men temporarily in charge in the field, until we can produce trained men of our own? Is there anything wrong in sending out these men, of equal rank with General Ritchie? Why should we not put them in the field in charge of our troops? They know how to fight this war; our people do not, and I say that it is far better to win battles and save British soldiers' lives under the leadership of other members of the United Nations than to lose them under our own inefficient officers. The Prime Minister must realise that in this country there is a taunt, on everyone's lips, that if Rommel had been in the British Army, he would still have been a sergeant. Is that not so? It is a taunt right through the Army. There is a man in the British Army—and this shows how we are using our trained men—who flung 150,000 men
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across the Ebro in Spain, Michael Dunbar. He is at present a sergeant in an armoured brigade in this country. He was chief of staff in Spain; he won the battle of the Ebro, and he is a sergeant in the British Army. The fact of the matter is that the British Army is ridden by class prejudice. You have got to change it, and you will have to change it. If the House of Commons has not the guts to make the Government change it, events will. Although the House may not take any notice of me to-day, you will be doing it next week; remember my words next Monday and Tuesday. It is events which are criticising the Government. All that we are doing is giving them a voice, inadequately perhaps, but we are trying to do it.
Therefore, you have to change that business; you have to purge the Army at the top. It will have to be a drastic purge, because the spirit of the British Army has to be regained. I have spoken to men from other nations who have been around the British Army, and they say that never in the history of Great Britain has better human material been provided in the British Army. But it is badly led, not by men without courage—there is no lack of courage in the British Army at any point, at the top or at the bottom—but it is not trained, or is wrongly trained. Therefore, if you are going to give the new weapons which the Minister of Production talked about yesterday, you must give them into the hands of men who know how to use them and who believe in them. You must do that with the dive-bombers; if you have dive-bombers, you must purge from the Air Ministry those men who do not believe in dive-bombers, because the man who does not believe in his own weapon cannot use it. So you will have to purge them.
Furthermore—and I said I was going to be quite frank—if the Prime Minister wants to restore confidence in the British Army, he will have to change his Secretary of State for War. Why on earth he appointed him I do not know. I am not trying to be offensive; the right hon. Gentleman has been in the War Office for five years, and lie is picked out of a respectable obscurity and is pushed into an office. Nobody, no soldier in the British Army knows him. All they know is that he has been at the War Office for five years, and they have no confidence in

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the War Office. They do not believe in the War Office, and the Prime Minister's political sagacity is so great that he picks out an official from the War Office and makes him Secretary of State for War. I say that the Prime Minister has great qualities, but obviously picking men is not one of them, and he does not know what the reaction is to these men in the country as a whole.
Now I come to my conclusion. Here is our situation; how are we going to face it? If this Debate resulted in causing demoralisation in the country in the slightest degree, I would have preferred to cut my tongue out. We do not want to do that. I believe that there is only one way in which we can recover ourselves. Our weapons are not what they ought to be, but they are the weapons we have got, and Hitler is not going to call the war off until we produce better ones; the war is going on, and we shall have to fight with the weapons we have. This country can fight. If the Government think that there is any dismay in the country, they are wrong; there is anger in the country. This is a proud and brave race, and it is feeling humiliated. It cannot stand the holding out of Sebastopol for months and the collapse of Tobruk in 26 hours. It cannot stand the comparison between these lost battles, not lost by lack of courage, but by lack of vision at the top. It cannot stand this; it is a proud and valiant country, and it wants leadership. It is getting words, not leadership, at the moment from the Government. There is only one way: Fight the enemy in Libya, for Heaven's sake fight him, wherever you can get at him.
The country expects, and declarations have been made—I can speak freely about this, though I understand that the Prime Minister cannot—that in a very short time, at a time and place to be decided by the Government, we shall launch an attack upon the enemy in a theatre of war nearer to this country. I do beg and pray the Government, when they make that decision, to make it out of considerations of strategical propriety and not as a consequence of political propaganda. Nevertheless, we have to do it. We can not postpone it until next year. Stalin expects it; please do not misunderstand me, for Heaven's sake do not let us make
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the mistake of betraying those lion-hearted Russians. Speeches have been made, the Russians believe them and have broken the champagne bottles on them. They believe that this country will act this year on what they call the second front. Molotov said so; they expect it and the British nation expects it. I say it is right, it is the correct thing to do, and the Government have practically said so. Do not on these high matters speak with a twisted tongue; do not use words with double, meanings; do not use sentences with hidden purposes. On these high matters, speak truthfully and simply, so that the people can understand and trust. Let the Government, for Heaven's sake, make their political dispositions. In the meantime, let them change the direction of the war. Purge the Army and the Air Force of the elements which are not trusted at the moment. Get at the enemy where he really is—21 miles away, not 14,000 miles away. Get him by the throat. If this country at this moment were down-hearted, it would be a very good thing. Send some politicians out. It. has been done before: it was done in the Afghanistan campaign. Send some of us out, and let us risk our lives. When the troops land in Europe, and you go to rouse Europe, as Europe can be roused, send some of us out with the landing troops.
Petty-Officer Alan Herbert: You must be trained first.
Mr. Bevan: If, by the deaths of some of us, we can rouse the British nation, is it not worth while? Some went out to Spain untrained. Training is needed; but we have grand human material, and there is an opportunity in Europe for us. Let us get rid of this defeatist complex. This nation can win; but it must be properly led, it must be properly inspired, and it must have confidence in its military leadership. Give us that, and we can win the war, in a fashion which will surprise Hitler, and at the same time hearten our friends.
Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: We have at last heard the authentic voice of a Vote of Censure, the voice in which a Vote of Censure should be supported in such a Debate. Yesterday the Mover and the Seconder spoke in uncertain tones. Now an attack is launched with the will and intention of oversetting

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the Government—because only in order to overset the Government is such a speech justified. It was a speech which obviously sounds the ring of the enormous enthusiasm which we always knew the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) possessed. It sounds, in a way, an encouraging note for the nation, because, if it is true, as he says, that in the blocks of opinion for which he has spoken in the past—blocks of opinion which in the past were spiritually opposed to war and battle—these humiliations of which he spoke have sunk down, and if they are willing to take the forward-looking path, both in the direction and the conduct of the war, which he suggested, we may get a fusion of many elements in the war which was not available in the past, and which may be of the greatest value in the future. But untrained enthusiasm is not enough. The hon. Member's own speech shows that. It was a powerful speech, a well-informed speech, and, especially at the end, a cogently-argued speech, but parts of it ran counter to what he has urged on the Government.
Mr. Bevan: I was talking in terms of spiritual inspiration. I am not suggesting that untrained men would be of any use. All I suggested was that we should send politicians with the troops, as that might inspire the others.
Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: But he said, "Do not act on political considerations." With that the House agreed. He said that decisions should be made on strategical considerations. That ran counter to other parts of his speech. Strategic decisions must not be influenced by other considerations. As the hon. Member said, nothing would be more fatal than to launch men on to the Continent in answer to some popular urge, and to find a greater Dunkirk. Think of the shame and humiliation, and of the responsibility of this House. As the hon. Member said, when soldiers go, it is at the bidding of this House: when they die, it is at the bidding of this House. It is our serious and grave responsibility to see that everything possible is done before we send these men.
I do not complain—none of us complains—about the Motion being brought forward or about its being supported in the bitter and astringent terms which the hon. Member used. A Vote of No Confidence must mean the overthrow of
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the Government—although in part of the hon. Member's speech he was arguing for a change, not in the central direction, but in what I might call the peripheral direction, the inner circle, of the Army. Let him look at the inner history of past revolutions, and see how often they have to be guided and led by the enthusiasm of professional soldiers. Take the French Revolution. Time after time the French generals were men trained and inspired in not only the traditions but the technical skill of the old Army.
The Mover and the Seconder yesterday seemed to speak in terms which suggested that they did not wish to push the Motion of No Confidence to the Vote. The Seconder's professional record and personal qualities, and the gallant record in war both of himself and of his family, must be appreciated and respected in this House. His wish was not -to get rid of the central director of the war, the Prime Minister. He paid most glowing tributes to the Prime Minister. [An HON. MEMBER: "As Prime Minister."] Yes, as Prime Minister. The Mover, I am not sure in his speech, but certainly in an article in a Sunday paper, seemed to press strongly for the retention of the Prime Minister if the solution could be adopted of appointing another Minister of Defence.
But the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale rejected that solution altogether. He said, "How can you divorce the Prime Minister, who has the full responsibility, from the conduct of the war?" Indeed, I find it very difficult to see how that could be done. That was the solution Mr. Asquith rejected. If it was not good enough for Mr. Asquith, does anybody suppose that it would be good enough for the present Prime Minister? Correspondence passed between Mr. Asquith and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) about how a solution which would bring the Prime Minister out of the direction of the war could be adopted. Mr. Asquith said in a letter to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs that the suggested arrangement was to the following effect:
"The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of war policy. The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals, and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course,

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at his own discretion attend meetings of the Committee."
He wrote that to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, and that same afternoon he wrote:
"After, full consideration of the matter in all its aspects, I have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible that such a Committee could become workable and effective without the Prime Minister as Chairman."
My hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) maintained his contention that a divorce of this kind could be effected. Yet under much more favourable circumstances a man with admittedly far less experience in war than the present Prime Minister, and a far more judicial frame of mind, in the space of time between a morning and afternoon turned down the solution which has been urged upon the House.
The fact is that this is not a true Vote of Censure. So far we have not heard that authentic note, not even, I think, in the speech of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. That is what marks this Debate sharply off from the great Norway debate, when the Vote of Censure was put and gained the general acceptance of the House. No one could say that all the speeches showed a desire to retain the services of Mr. Chamberlain as Prime Minister—"Go, go, go," they shouted. That is far different from the attitude with which this Motion is approached at the present time. The House is still fundamentally and instinctively grateful to the Prime Minister, and desires to retain his services as Prime Minister; and I contend that while his services are retained as Prime Minister his services as Minister of Defence will have to be retained also. It is not only in this country that such a situation exists. In Russia Stalin has control of his Armies. Take the United States, where the President of the Republic is constitutionally Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The hon. Member for Kidderminster said that the President does not administer it. I am not sure how far he takes part in the day-to-day direction of the war, but the responsibility of actually being Commander-in-Chief is on his shoulders, and except by delegation he cannot move from that position.
Mr. A. Edwards: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman deal with the point which has been
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the main point? Did Stalin or Roosevelt tolerate failures without taking some action? I think that is the point.
Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: That, if I may say so, is the administration of the war. Admittedly there is disquiet in the House on that. I think we all agree that changes should be made. The House does not know and has naturally a difficulty in recommending what those changes should be, but I contend that it stands for changes on the periphery and the inner circle and not at the centre, and it is the centre at which this Motion is directed. That is the reason why I shall vote against the Motion. We are in the midst of one of the most difficult of war tasks. We are attempting to run an Empire in a great war on a democratic basis, a task which the Greeks said was impossible. It will require all the energy and the resolution as well as the brains and ingenuity of this House before it can survive that fight. I do not wish to delay the House unduly, but I say that the essence of the position of Defence Minister is the right of access of the chief staff officers to the highest political authority, nor will it ever be possible to divorce that. The Defence Minister is the heir and successor of the Prime Minister in his position as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The essence of the Committee of Imperial Defence was that the technical chiefs sat in the room with, and had direct access to, the main director. In time of war the danger of intermediate Ministers is that they merely insert cogs in the wheel but do not shorten consideration of the problems under discussion. The solution which has been put forward of a Defence Minister is a solution which cannot and will not be adopted.
Then we have to say, "Are you satisfied with the central direction of the war, taking the war in its broadest sense?" Can we leave out when we are considering, as the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale was considering, the presence of Departmental Ministers in the War Cabinet itself, the direction of the war in its political aspects? We cannot. In its home aspects you cannot. He spoke of the difficulties of production. On that we are all, of course, very greatly concerned. But can we leave out the achievement, let us say in the feeding of the nation, in the health of the nation, the great achievements in the rationing of the nation, the

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bringing of equality into fields where otherwise it would have been utterly absent? The equalitarian feeling of rationing has a great effect in steadying the nerves of the nation. I remember in the last war somebody saying how wonderful it was that the Minister of Food himself could not get a quarter of an ounce of butter more than the speaker could. That is a very great and difficult thing to put through. It is part of the direction of the war.
When the Minister of Labour is blamed for not having prevented strikes, let us remember the tremendous power he has exercised, and has had to exercise, in the direction of labour. We all remember in the last war the leaving certificates, the trouble, the friction, the worry of these "things. All that falls on the shoulders of the Minister of Labour in the direction of the war, and in the central direction of the war one is bound to take into account the feeling of solidarity which the Government have been able to inspire. That is shown by the fact that this Motion is signed by seven Labour and seven Conservative Members. It is a very unusual thing when a Motion such as that gains equal support on both sides of the House, and that would not have been the case had not the Govt. by its central direction of the war inspired a feeling of solidarity in the nation.
The idea of a small War Cabinet which will be removed from all Departmental duties has advantages, but it has great disadvantages also, and one is certainly the loss of the day-to-day touch which only someone like the Minister of Labour coming hot from the problem can put to his colleagues. We all remember the mutiny at Invergordon. We all remember the small Cabinet at that time, from which the First Lord of the Admiralty was excluded, and when an uproar was caused in the whole Fleet by mere inadvertence. If the First Lord had been in the Cabinet and had had the chance of explaining these things to his colleagues round the table, that episode and the effect it had would have been avoided. I think that the War Cabinet has certainly to its credit great positive achievements in the conduct of the war which we should remember on occasions like this when a Vote of Censure is brought forward. We lost the Anglo-French War, and started a new war, Britain against the Axis. To
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that great accessions of strength have come—Russia and America. They have been attacked by the Axis, but it was their truculent attitude towards the Axis which led the Axis to attack them, and that attitude was greatly inspired by the unflinching and stubborn stand which this country was making.
It is not enough to say that it was mere coincidence that the war against Russia should happen to break out at the same time as the war against Britain, or that the war against America should break out at the same time as the war of Britain against Germany. It was because the Axis Powers and dictators saw that the spirit of resistance to tyranny had been lit again in the world and that it would spread all over the world. It was lit while there was still time. If they had continued to pile up their resources and do nothing, it would have been too late. It was this country that nursed the flame, and it was the War Cabinet which was in charge of the flame in this country.
The hon. Member for Seaham (Mr. Shinwell) on a previous occasion gave a very interesting account to the House of similar Debates which had taken place in previous Parliaments, when, over 100 years ago, we were faced with a great revolutionary force led by soldiers of genius sweeping over the Continent and doing great damage to the interests and to the prestige of this country. He quoted the remarkable fact that time after time the Younger Pitt succeeded in carrying tremendous weight in this House although he met with disaster in the field. I looked it up last night to see what the context really was, and it is not uninteresting especially in this Debate.
"Pitt was at the head of a nation engaged in a life-and-death struggle, a nation eminently distinguished by all the physical and mental qualities which make excellent soldiers. … But the fact is that after eight years of war, after a vast expenditure of life and an expenditure of wealth far exceeding the expenditure of the American war, of the Seven Years' War, of the war of the Austrian Succession and of the war of the Spanish Succession, united, the English Army under Pitt was the laughing-stock of all Europe. It could not boast of a single brilliant exploit. It had never shown itself on the Continent but to be beaten, chased, forced to re-embark, or forced to capitulate."
That was the school in which the Peninsular Army that fought under Wellington was being hammered and forged. It is possible that the House of Commons at

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that time knew quite as much about the circumstances about which Macaulay wrote in 1859, nearly half a century later. Then followed the passage quoted by the hon. Member for Seaham complaining that
"thus, through a long and calamitous period, every disaster that happened without the walls of Parliament, was regularly followed by a triumph within them. At length he had no longer an opposition to encounter, and in the eventful year 1799 the largest minority that could be mustered to vote against the Government was 25."
It is odd how history in some ways is repeated. It would be wrong to consider this Division as a complete absolution, or, to quote the inimitable phrase of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister himself on a previous occasion, as, a spontaneous ebullition of enthusiasm which can no longer be suppressed.
There are two points which make a sharp difference between the Napoleonic Wars and this war, and the first—and it is extraordinary that no reference is made to it in this Debate—is the need of that command of the sea. Here our position is much more like that of the earlier wars. There the loss of command of the sea led to the surrender of Yorktown and the loss of the American Colonies. The battle of the Atlantic remains the decisive battle of this war, for, if we retain the Western Ocean we win, and if we lose the Western Ocean we sink. Lose the Battle of the Atlantic, and we might hear far more of the priorities necessary for ships and shipbuilding. Balance this with tanks and dive-bombers. All these things have to be brought in. That the House of Commons should debate a war for two days without mention of sea-power is wrong. Sea-power remains, as always, decisive for our people. In the Mediterranean the Libyan position began to worsen when Rommel crossed the sea, and turned against us when the Navy could not interrupt his communications. When Admiral Vian was fighting battleships with light cruisers it was clear the Mediterranenan Command was gravely impaired. The worsening of the situation in Libya is very closely linked up with the establishment of that clear, rapid line of communication bringing the whole weight of Italy and of industrial Germany at short range on to the desert of North Africa.
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On all these things, however, the country says, "We want more information. We want an inquiry. We want a report." May I make this positive suggestion to the Government? There is a means to deal with all that by the publication of despatches. The Service chiefs have always had the right to send despatches and to have those despatches published. This Government began, it is true after a long delay, to publish despatches. We must have some form of technical data upon which brilliant speakers and debaters such as the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale can base their conclusions. Without some technical information from the Army in the field I do not believe it will be possible for that informed opinion to be produced. Documents dealing with Libya and the defence of Calais which have been put out by the publication departments are of great interest, but they do not have the quality of a despatch written by the Commander-in-Chief himself. These are documents which will be of the greatest value to this country, and sooner or later, in some form-or other, they ought to be produced.
The second aspect to which attention should be given is a point which has been stressed by almost every speaker in the Debate, and that is the aspect of engineering. This is an engineers' war. This is a point which the House could properly press upon the Government. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale complained of lack of co-operation between the Army and the Air Force, but the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeen (Flight-Lieutenant Boothby) mentioned yesterday that he thought that the co-operation at the top was good but that the co-operation in the lower ranks was where the deficiency arises. That takes time. It is part of the turnover of the thought of this country from peace to war, which is far more important than the turnover of the production of this country from peace to war. It was the spiritual attitude towards war which led to the real disarmament of this country during the last 20 years, and it is not until we are reorganised in spirit as well as in the provision of weapons that we shall really be formidable to protect Europe against tyranny. They are the people who will have to be brought more and more into the foreground both in the Forces and outside. The Army is

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being milked, and has been milked in the past, for the Air Force, but surely we now see that that is all wrong. However important is the Air Force, the men who are standing up breast to breast against Rommel at this moment are as important as the men who are fighting his aeroplanes in the air. There is an old proverb in the cavalry which runs: "Make much of your horses." It enshrines the very profound truth that if you do not love a thing, you will not get the best out of it. If you say to the Army, "We will purge you, weed you out, pluck you and pick you," you will not get the best out of the Army, and none of us in this House has the conscience that we are yet getting the best out of the Army that can be obtained.
Some of the things said in the Debate yesterday were scarcely credible. It was said, for instance, that a tank turret was of such a size that a man could not get into it. I should have thought it would have been possible to make a wooden model. To take a thing from a drawing board is all very well, but surely it would have been a comparatively simple process to make a mock-up model of such a thing in order to see whether an ordinary man could operate it. It seems to me that the thought of the nation has not yet been concentrated upon this line. It will be necessary for us to obtain the thought of the nation if we are to get through our difficulties of to-day.
Mr. Sloan: It was said that all the guns were pointing one way.
Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: That is not the case, but these are things which do not mean much to the man whose mind is not imbued with the spirit of what he is trying to do. Until we get that spirit, I am sure we shall not get the satisfactory weapons we require. This is a war of iron and steel and electricity. Iron is on top. We are being pushed about by machines. That is what we feel to be the greatest humiliation we are suffering. I remember at the time of Narvik a cartoon by Low, a terribly biting cartoon, which pictured a man in an iron-ore quarry while nosing along the valley came a great tank which had been made from this iron and, overhead, were flying machines of steel. It further showed that the man had dropped his barrow and that fetters had been put on
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him from behind. It was called "the Iron comes back." The domination of humanity by engines is the feeling we have now, and of which we must rid ourselves. This anger and humiliation we feel is healthy anger and a wholesome humiliation. It was through a valley of humiliation that another great hero came to a satisfactory end of his adventures, and I hope it may be so again. We want a transformation of the spirit of which the first flickers began to be evident in a quarter from which they had not been evident before—the speech and, still more, the thought, of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. I am encouraged and hopeful and, therefore, although I shall go into the Lobby with the greatest satisfaction and do my best to vote down the Motion to which he has put his name, I rejoice in having been able to ring my lance against his shield and in being able to say, "Here is an adversary against whom anyone will be proud to tilt in the House of Commons."
Wing-Commander Grant-Ferris: I do not propose to talk in general terms of the Motion of Censure, but I wish to deal exclusively with the very vexed question of dive-bombers. There is a great deal of misunderstanding, not only in this House but throughout the country, about the use to which the dive-bomber can be put. There are several essentials which must be met before; the dive-bomber can be used with any degree of certainty and any degree of satisfaction to the Power which is using it. First of all, you must have fighter cover, good substantial fighter cover, for your dive-bombers. Secondly, there must not be substantial fighter opposition to them, because otherwise they will be put off and will not be able to do their work properly. Thirdly, their effectiveness will be greatly minimised if there is strong, light anti-aircraft opposition to them from the ground. The House will remember a well-known figure in the Air Force, Air Commodore Basil Embry, who has thrice won the D.S.O. Just after the war broke out, when he was a wing-commander, he escaped from a prison camp in occupied countries, and I met him here in company with my right hon. and gallant Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power. He said that he had had a conversation with a colonel in the Luftwaffe, who told him that the only reason why Germany did so well with dive-bombers

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in France and the Low Countries was because British fighter opposition was too small to be effective and that our light "Ack Ack" was practically negligible, with the result that their dive-bombers did tremendous execution. Those were the words of the German Luftwaffe colonel. You say that it was propaganda, but at that time this wing-commander was a prisoner, and it could not have been much use putting over propaganda to him.
Let us see how much the Junkers 87 was used in the Battle of Britain. I have taken care to ascertain correct figures, and I find that on three days 96 dive bombers were shot down by our Fighter Command over our waters and this country. They were used for only a few more days. Afterwards the Germans ceased to use them simply because the cost was too great. Let us turn to the position in Libya. I cannot speak from practical knowledge of the desert itself, although I have served four months this year in Alexandria and have had an opportunity of speaking to those who took part in the battle which took place about Christmastime and the retreat which followed. We have heard a lot about the way in which Bir Hacheim was dive bombed. Well, I took the opportunity of checking this myself, and I can assure the House that the Free French there were not dive-bombed successfully. Junkers 87 machines were used against them, and all were shot down out of the sky. A certain number of Junkers 88 had to be sent for—very good general purpose bombers and reasonally good dive bombers—to help to do the job. But as a matter of fact dive bombing was not responsible for the fall of Bir Hacheim.
Let us look for a moment at Tobruk itself. I do not think anybody, even the Government, knows very much about those hours when Tobruk was in our hands, just before its fall, but I can well visualise what the position would be there, having previously been in the neighbourhood, as it were. Our Air Force were falling back from Gambut, Gazala, El Adem and other places to their rear landing grounds. I am quite sure that at that time they were not in a position to operate against the hostile aircraft which were attacking Tobruk. Consequently, the Army was at a very great
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disadvantage, as the fighter protection which should have been there could not be forthcoming because the Air Force were not in a position to give assistance on that particular day for the reasons I have given.
Mr. Molson: Were the dive-bombers at Bir Hacheim shot down by anti-aircraft guns or by fighters?
Wing Commander Grant-Ferris: I think my hon. Friend will remember the message of the Free French at that time; it was "Merci pour le R.A.F." We have heard a good real about the Stormovik which is alleged to be a Russian dive bomber, but the Stormovik is not a dive bomber in the essential sense of the word. It is a general purposes bomber like the Ju.88, and not like the Ju.87. Therefore, it is no good saying that dive bombers qua dive bombers have had great success on the Russian front.
Mr. Woodburn: Have we any general purposes bombers?
Wing-Commander Grant-Ferris: I will refer to that in a moment. The Minister of Production told us that the Government are, or very shortly will be, in possession of a considerable number of dive bombers. Although I cannot speak officially, because I do not know, I would mention, from what talk I have heard unofficially, that the dive bombers, as they are called, which we are getting are general purposes bombers, such as the Ju.88 or the Stormovik, which is really what we need, and not the dive bomber pure and simple, as we have seen in the past. One must not confuse dive bombers and dive bombing. One can dive bomb with a number of aircraft; one can dive bomb to perfection only with a slow type such as the Ju.87, Ju.87 cannot be used against reasonable opposition.
One word more. I was in Newcastle the other day, and I went to a news film on which I saw pictures of the Libyan battle, the fighting, the bombs dropping; and mention was made by the commentator about the way in which the French at Bir Hacheim had been dive-bombed, and he finished by saying, "Would to God we had more of these dive-bombers." That is the very worst propaganda to put out. It is absolutely

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ridiculous to talk like that. There is a proper function for dive-bombing. It can be used only when a situation exists such as I have already described. And let it be remembered that the men who fly the dive-bombers are the cream of the men who are available, and it is not right to use them—it is very bad policy to use them—if their lives are to be thrown away. I ask the House and the country to keep clearly in mind the difference between dive-bombers, and dive-bombing, to remember that first of all there have to be the fighters to protect them, that there have to be bombers to do the long-distance bombing, that when one is happy about that situation, one can go in for dive-bombing, and then, let them be of a general purposes type of aircraft. But they must be second to everything else, because their use is severely limited.
Major Furness: I have wondered whether I ought to speak in this Debate. In the first place, it is a long time since I have been in the House, and when one is absent one gets out of touch with the situation and the cross-currents of political opinion. But perhaps in a Debate of this sort, when we are concerned with very fundamental issues, it is advantageous to have a fresh mind. Secondly, I was reluctant to speak because I felt that when an hon. Member in uniform speaks in the House, he is exposed to one or two great dangers. The fact that he is in uniform probably gives to his utterances a weight which his real position in the Army and his knowledge of military affairs do not warrant. An hon. Member who wears uniform because he is, a member of a claims commission is no better informed on military matters—and indeed, probably is not as well informed, for he has not the time—than a member in civilian dress. On the other hand, if a Member in uniform has been lucky enough from time to time to have a job in which he serves under important men, he has to be very careful not to give away important secrets, or betray some confidence which has been imposed in him. In the Army I have had jobs of both sorts, and I shall try to avoid both those dangers.
I speak because I feel that these are extremely serious times. I have been quiet in the House since the outbreak of the war, and I feel that now, if in those three years of soldiering one has learned
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anything, one must speak and say what one thinks. The appalling military record of the British Army in this war—it is a most melancholy thing to have to say, but after all, it is our bounden duty in the House to speak frankly—the appalling record of the British Army is that it has won successes, and striking successes, against the Italians, but has never won a single campaign against the German Army. In Norway, Belgium, France, Greece and Crete, and now in Libya, its record is one of failure. It is high time that we began to look into the matter and inquire why these failures arise. If in this House we say that failure is inevitable, the sooner we pull down the shutters and close, the better. We dare not say failure is inevitable, and we have the duty to try to find out what is wrong.
There are certain unavoidable causes for our present situation, and I will state them briefly. I speak merely as a wartime soldier, but it is definitely a fact—one sees it now, although I certainly did not realise it before—that in peace-time this country did not think much of its Army or spend much money on it. We are suffering for that now. When the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) rather sneers at professional soldiers, I would like to join issue with him. I am not a professional soldier, but I have met professional soldiers, and I must say that on the whole—of course, they are good, bad and indifferent, just as Members of Parliament are good, bad and indifferent—those I have met, and especially the staff officers, compare in ability with any Members of the House, and certainly they compare in devotion to duty. The Army to-day is an amateur army. In the battalion in which I served first, there was at the outbreak of the war only one Regular officer, and further back, at brigade headquarters, out of a staff of eight or ten, only two were Regular officers. As one goes further back and higher up, there are more and more Regular officers.
Generally speaking, even on the staffs of very big and important formations, there are to-day at least 50 per cent. who are war-time soldiers, and at staff colleges 50 per cent. of the students are war-time soldiers. That being so, it is bound to take time for amateurs like myself to learn. It is so easy to think that when

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an intelligent person is put into uniform he becomes a soldier. I used to think that, but I realise now how much there is to learn, and, indeed, there are some things which can never be learned at my age. Even very high officers have had no experience before the war in handling armoured formations, armoured corps, and armies. It is a very different thing moving an army and moving a division. In those days, such was our position, and so much had we cut down, that we had to have wooden models to represent tanks and guns. That is the first reason. The second reason is, as I have said, that we fought alone for a year against two enemies, and then a third enemy sprang upon us. The third reason is in relation to command of the sea. Command of the seas is no longer in our power in the same way as it was in the old days. We have the most vulnerable Empire. It is scattered all over the world, and it can be attacked piece by piece. In the old days it was kept going on the basis of unchallenged sea power. These are the reasons why shortcomings are inevitable, but I do not think they are a sufficient explanation for what has happened.
The right hon. and gallant Member for Kelvingrove (Lieut.-Colonel Elliot) dealt very ably with the position of the Prime Minister in this matter. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister is running the war, as far as supreme control and direction of strategy are concerned, and there is no doubt in my mind that, so long as he is Prime Minister, he will go on doing so, and that you have either to get rid of him or allow him, as Prime Minister, to be responsible for the Service Departments. I am somewhat of a neutral in this matter. Before the war I was a junior Minister when the Prime Minister was not in office, and since he has been in office I have been away from the House. I certainly have no hopes of favours to come, or gratitude for past services. Thinking the matter over, and having regard to the fact that he was the man who kept us going when we fought alone, that he is the man who put us right with Russia and jumped in when Russia came into the war and allied ourselves with her, and with the knowledge that he does well in his office now that we are linked with America, I think we should be most unwise to make a change.
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If there is a desire to make a change, an alternative to his place must be brought forward. If an alternative is brought forward, I am willing to make my choice, but it seems to me that he is the only man, and that he must remain.
The fact that I am going to support him in the Lobby does not mean that I am satisfied with the conduct of the war. There are four points of criticism I wish to make in this respect. I have felt for some time, and I think one may say it is the general opinion held among officers of my standing in the Army, that our present bombing policy is entirely and fundamentally wrong. I think we are sacrificing our chances of winning this war by using the Air Force as an independent unit. The Germans have not bombed this country for quite a long time. Their bombing force has not been used against this country, but in Russia and in the Mediterranean. It is not because the Germans love our people—they would love to kill all our people—but that they are concentrating on one thing at a time and putting first things first. If in our offensive in Libya we had used our Air Force against Italy and stopped those supplies going to Rommel, we should now be in a very different position. When I read about certain air marshals saying we are going to try this experiment of heavy bombing, I say that we had better stop it now, because it has gone on too long, and we are sacrificing Army co-operation machines for heavy bombers. The sooner it is stopped the better, if we want to win the war.
My second criticism is in regard to equipment. The experience in the Army is that we delay so long in making new-equipment that the Germans come out with it before us or that we rush something out, producing it in enormous quantities, with figures of 500,000 or more, which rums out to be no good. Obviously I cannot give figures to the House, but that is why we send out tanks with turrets which men cannot get into, or delay in bringing out new guns which the Germans produce before us. I feel very unhappy about the way in which we seem to shut our men up in places like Singapore and Tobruk, and then the general hauls down his flag. It is causing enormous harm in the Army, and it also has a psychological effect. It is quite all right to give ground, because that does not

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matter in war, but it seems the most appalling thing that 80,000 British soldiers at Singapore and 30,000 soldiers at Tobruk should go into captivity. It is something we cannot understand, and something which I implore the Government to think about, because of its psychological effect. I can assure the Government the psychological effects are bad for me, and I am certain it is worse in the case of the men serving in the ranks.
The last point I want to make is that we want some organisation in the Army where people have time to think. We have organisations for teaching, but what we want is some place in which you can shut up a certain number of intelligent people and say to them, "Study the best use of this, new war invention" or "Study the best use of this particular combination of armoured divisions or corps formations." At present we are learning by trial and error, but we should learn much more quickly if generals were unencumbered with details, as they are to-day, and could sit down and study these matters. Whatever may be wrong in this war, there are two sets of people who are not to blame. The first is the civilian population of the country. I think that ought to be said. They have delivered the goods, and, if the right goods have not been delivered, they are not the people at fault. It is not because our people have failed in blood, and toil, and sweat, but because the wrong goods have been ordered. The second class of people are the men in the ranks of the British Army. After being a Member of this House it has been a great experience to command a platoon. I know I may have failed, but these men have never failed, and I am sure, if properly led, they never will. If things go awry, it is our fault and our responsibility, and certainly it is not the responsibility of the people or the men we represent.
Sir Percy Harris: I should like to congratulate the hon. and gallant Gentleman on his most interesting and well informed speech. He has made a valuable contribution to the discussion, and I am very glad that he has made a new maiden speech in his new capacity as an officer in the Army.
Let us be frank with ourselves. This Motion is an attack on the Prime Minister. It may be camouflaged by its wording, "tine central direction of the war." but it
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is an attempt to undermine his position and, it logically and necessarily follows, to displace him by some other leader. I have very great sympathy with independence. I was for many years a free lance. In the War Parliament, of which I was a member, I was one of those wicked people who not only attacked the Government but exercised their right of voting against them in a very critical Division. Incidentally, it was the cause of the loss of my seat when an election took place. I would not suggest that that should influence anyone. On the contrary, at a time like this every Member of the House has the responsibility to exercise his own judgment and to do what he thinks right arid proper for the successful prosecution of the war. I should like to congratulate the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) on his very courageous speech. He has been a critic of every Government as long as I can remember. He has always been a free lance. He has voted against every Government and spoken against every combination, whatever its political label, whether a Conservative, National, Coalition or Labour Government. He was equally fearless in his criticism when he had a Government of his own political label. I believe it is the duty of every man who is convinced that the direction of the Government is wrong and that the Prime Minister of the day is a bad Prime Minister to vote against the Government, provided always that he sees a better man to take his place.
I do not know if these critics have visualised the kind of combination which is to displace the present Government. When there was a similar Debate on Norway we were quite clear in our minds. We saw a possible alternative, and when we took the great responsibility of forcing a Division we saw a new Government and a new Cabinet and a new Prime Minister. I have never regretted that vote, and I believe that most Members feel the same. But to blame the Prime Minister for all the shortage of material and lack of preparation comes very badly from men like the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne). I have a very vivid memory of my being responsible for putting on the Paper in September, 1938, an Amendment to the Address asking for the setting-up of a Ministry of Supply. We had a certain number of Members who exercised independent judgment. There

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were the right hon. Gentleman, now Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Minister of Information and the Prime Minister. He made a very remarkable speech. He warned the country, he almost prophesied what would take place if we did not take drastic measures, and particularly if we did not set up a Ministry of Supply. He dealt with the problem of guns and tanks and the whole productive side of the war. It ill becomes those who then failed to exercise independence to attack him. After all, you cannot turn out guns like sausages from a machine. You cannot build tanks in a moment. If you change your mind in the light of experience, you have, to have the blue prints, the jigs and tools and the factories and all the organisation. You cannot change that suddenly.
I am very glad that the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) reminded the House that we have to thank the various Secretaries of State, and especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his predecessor, who made the designs, prepared the blue prints and provided the factories and the necessary tools for the production of aeroplanes. The result was that it was possible to extend our supplies so rapidly that we won the Battle of Britain. But that did not apply to the War Ministry. It was the, failure then to set up a Ministry of Supply to make the necessary preparations for the provision of tanks and guns which was responsible for our failure—and it is a failure—to meet the Germans on equal terms. Just before the time when the Prime Minister was warning the House and the country of the necessity for rearming the nation in preparation for war, in 1937, Germany had one armoured division. In 1938 she had three armoured divisions. In 1939 it had increased to nine armoured divisions. In 1940, at the time of the failure of France, they had 10 armoured divisions. On the other hand, in October, 1939, we had only one. I understand that a former Secretary of State for War, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha), is to be the last speaker in support of the Motion. He is one of those who did nothing to support the proposal to set up a Ministry of Supply. The full responsibility was his for the rearming and the mechanisation of the Army, and
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it will want a lot of explanation to prove that the responsibility was not his. In 1938 the present Prime Minister warned the whole nation, and followed it up by a vote against his own party, of the necessity for rearming. We can all criticise. We know there have been faults. I think we ought to pay special attention to the junior Member for the Cambridge University (Professor Hill) in his insistence on the proper use of the scientific and technical knowledge of the country. This country could hold its own scientifically and technically with any country in the world, and we have been pioneers in many branches of technical and scientific experiment.
I agree with my hon. Friend in what he said about the position of the officers. We are proud of the traditions of our Army. It is a magnificent service, and the training of our officers is good. I am not one of those who criticise either Sandhurst, Woolwich or the Staff College, but they attract a somewhat limited number of people. Only a limited section of the population adopt the Army as a profession. Only a percentage of the profession take it seriously, and the number of candidates for the staff colleges is very small. The competition is infinitesimal and, therefore, our choice is limited. In the last war we made proper use of our temporary officers. Many of them proved their ability in war and were promoted rapidly, not only to the rank of colonel but to commands in responsible positions. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berwick-on-Tweed (Captain Grey) reminds me that his father, who was an old Territorial officer, did distinguished service in Mesopotamia and rose to the rank of major-general. There is not one officer in high rank, except one who has just been promoted to the Army Council, who is either a temporary or a Territorial officer. There is something radically wrong in a war, which is a mechanical war and depends on industrial and scientific skill for its organisation, when that is the case, and I suggest that the Government might well inquire into the whole system of promotion and the use of the undoubted talent that is in the Army drawn from the scientific and practical sections of the population.
I was interested in the change at the War Office. We have had three or four changes there. When the present holder

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of the office was promoted from being a civil servant to be made Secretary of State I was not one of the critics. I say, however, that a golden opportunity was lost to introduce new blood into the War Office. At one of the most critical periods in the last war there was a change in the War Office. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) was brought in like a breath of fresh air into the whole Department. He brought a new spirit. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India had something to do with it, and he will bear me out in saying that the appearance of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, with his new outlook and ideas, brought an entirety new spirit into the War Office. If we are to make the best use of the brains and ability of the country, we ought to introduce new men at the head and a new spirit right through the management of the Army. Nothing would do more to encourage those splendid men in the Army. I am talking with some knowledge when I say that they are the finest men we have ever had in the Army and compare most favourably with the men in the last war. Officers of experience confirm that. Nothing would encourage them more than to see some men who had risen from the ranks during the war in high commands and responsible positions. The generals in command of the Dominion troops are without exception amateur generals. The distinguished general in command of the Canadian Army in this country is in the ordinary way an amateur general, as also are the generals in charge of the Australian and South African Forces. In the last war one of the most successful generals was General Monash, who was in charge of the Australians and in peacetime, I believe, was a dentist.
I believe that we shall give the Prime Minister to-day a great Vote of Confidence. His leadership has never been more necessary than now. He has never failed us at any critical moment of the war. Whether it was at the time of Dunkirk, or at the time of the entry of Russia into the war, or when he was at Washington after America had become our Ally, he has never failed us. We are confident in his leadership. Let him inquire into some of the organisation of the War Office personally and see whether he can introduce there some of
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that modern spirit that prevails in the Navy and Air Force-, but is singularly lacking in the Army.
Mr. Garro Jones: I must say at the outset that, like the right hon. Baronet the Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris), I do not share the view which has been expressed by some hon. Members that it is in some way blameworthy to have put this Motion upon the Order Paper. I do not think that it renders a disservice to the country, and I am not sure that in the long run it will render any disservice to the Government. It is true that the putting down of the Motion has caused a certain amount of excitement abroad, but no one who has had the opportunity of studying the foreign Press and broadcasts can have any doubt that there is something which has caused a great deal more excitement abroad than the putting down of this Motion. That is the events of the last few weeks. This Debate has run on for 18 or 19 hours. Like a great many hon. Members, I have sat here throughout that time, and it has struck me as being one of the strangest Debates I have ever heard in this House. We have had declared backers of the Motion of No Confidence making speeches supporting the Government, and we have had declared supporters of the Government making speeches supporting the Motion, if not in express terms, at any rate by implication.
So far as the decided attitude of my hon. Friends is concerned, it is clear and single-minded and can be expressed in one short sentence—"How can the happenings of the past be sifted ruthlessly and promptly and classified into lessons for the future?"
That being our position, we shall vote against this Motion. We need be under no misapprehension that the Motion actually means calling upon the Prime Minister to resign and to form a new Government—in what direction the Motion does not make clear. Confidence in the Government or in anybody else is a peculiar thing. When I read the Motion and noted the names attached to it, I could not help asking myself if these hon. Members who have no confidence in the Government have any confidence in one another. It is obvious to anyone who has been an attentive observer of the proceedings bf this House that those who signed the Motion consist of people of the

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most diametrically opposed views on the fundamental issues of national policy. So far as the practical aspect of the matter is concerned, therefore, we can do no other than vote against the Motion. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the Prime Minister will not look upon to-day as an occasion for a Parliamentary triumph. During the course of the Debate some 150,000 words will be spoken. Much truth will be contained in them, and a great many errors and mistakes, and I am certain that it will be an easy task for the Prime Minister, by an over-refinement of the arguments, to discomfit all his critics, but if that should be the sole result, then it will be a barren consequence of our two days' proceedings.
As I am going to refer in a constructive way to the tactical handling of our Forces, which perhaps is the very spearhead of our war effort, I shall avoid as far as I can any reflection upon the skill of any individual general. We must all be grateful to our military leaders for their bravery and devotion, but it would surely be wrong to carry our loyalty to them to the point of disloyalty to our constituents and to our cause, I think that the most effective part of the speech made by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan) was that in which he dealt briefly with the tactical handling of our troops. I hope the Prime Minister will not resent the speech made by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. I have listened to him making many speeches in this House, and have always told him that I hardly ever agree with everything he says, but that there is always a great deal of truth in it, and there was a great deal of truth in his speech to-day. It was a healthy piece of Parliamentary criticism, and if the Prime Minister resents it, he will be making a mistake. It is not only the critics of the Government who have taken this view about the tactical handling of our troops. The Minister of Production put it with delicate irony in his speech yesterday when he said:
"In peace-time it was not thought that the military art was one of those activities to which the consideration of the human mind should be given."
That is all too true, and I am not at all sure that it applies exclusively to Some Members of this House. I have a feeling that it applies also to a great deal of the military organisation at the War
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Office for which we paid so expensively in pre-war years, because a mass of evidence leads to the conclusion that our greatest inferiority in relation to our enemies has been in the sphere of thought and planning. The hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Major Furness) said there was no single body throughout our war organisation, from the War Cabinet downwards, which was charged with the exclusive duty of thought upon the immediate strategical and tactical and equipment problems. I know that it is impossible to think in a vacuum, that there must be a certain link with the outside world, but there ought to be attached to the General Staff or to the Ministry of Defence some body whose sole duty should be to think and to plan in the realm of tactics and weapons for immediate and future needs.
We know what generally happens when a new committee is set up. It is what is known as the snowball system. It begins by taking a few more secretaries, a few more officers and in the end becomes buried beneath piles of papers and files. There is one aspect of our war effort which ought to be preserved and protected from that, and that is the part of our war effort in every sphere whose duty it is to think about our plans. The most important and direct necessity is in the realm of tactics and weapons. I would give such a body a name which would make it clear that its sole duty would be to think out these plans. I would call it something like the Joint Deliberative Staff for Tactics—and similarly for Equipment—and I would have one of those bodies in every theatre of the war. I should keep it free from operational and administrative duties. It seems to me wrong that the Chiefs of the General Staff, in addition to their enormous burden of thought and responsibility, should have at the same time heavy administrative duties. I know that they have been able to a certain extent to delegate them, but they all have heavy administrative duties in addition to those of thought and planning.
I do not propose to recapitulate what has been said about our guns—our 6-pounders and our 4.5 guns. I listened to a long controversy here yesterday about whether the 4.5 weapon was a gun or a howitzer when in fact there are a 4.5 gun, a 4.5 howitzer and a 4.5 anti-aircraft gun,

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three entirely different weapons. I mention that only to illustrate how easy it is to become involved in a tangle of technicalities.
But I propose to recite briefly the reasons why I think that in the sphere of thought we have been beaten all along the line throughout this war, beginning with the Battle of France. I am only going to refer to examples and not going into details. There was the attack on the Belgian forts—entirely new methods, and the element of surprise. There was the attack through the Ardennes, which were thought to be impassable for tanks and mechanised armies. The German army turned the neglect of that supposedly impassable region to their own advantage. Air-borne attack—never thought of in this country, certainly not prepared for. The transport of troops by air—25,000 of them transported to Norway in a few days, a strategy which broke upon the world almost as a novelty. A simpler point, the sending of messages en clair. It was done in France and it is done in the desert. "All aircraft to Armentières"—or to Tobruk or to Bir Hacheim. Our messages are sent in code. While we are busy decoding these messages the tide of the battle is turning.
It was said that in the desert the heat at this season would be too great for pitched battles, but the German army took forethought for that and prepared measures to reduce the temperature in their tanks. We who are supposed to have "dominion over palm and pine" never saw that in the battle of the desert in summer an enormous advantage could be given to the troops which could reduce the temperature in their tanks by 10 or 15 degrees. Then there was the provison of this 88-mm. gun. We have heard it said, and I dare say the Prime Minister will claim, that the weapons with which we are now fighting are weapons which were designed long ago, but that does not apply to the 88-mm. gun. It is true that the gun itself, while I will not say it is stale, was designed a good many years ago, but. what matters about that gun is its mounting—its all-round traverse, its self-propelled vehicle, and its general adaptation to use as an anti-tank gun. We could have done precisely the same thing with our 3.7 anti-aircraft guns. There is no technical reason, I am informed, why, if the factor of thought had operated on the British General Staff as
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well as it operated on the German General Staff, we should not have had a weapon corresponding to the 88-mm. gun even before the Germans had it.
It was the same with the Japanese advance. The jungle North of Malaya was impassable. The Japanese adapted their troops, gave them Plimsoll shoes and light weapons, and they turned the jungle from being an obstacle to being an advantage to their troops. We know also how the Russian Army, by a hundred stratagems, turned the Russian winter from an enemy into a friend. All those stratagems are in the sphere of Army operations. Oh reflection, and I have thought long about it, I have hardly been able to think of a single decisive stratagem which has sprung from the brains of our own General Staff, and I invite hon. Members who have not already done so, to submit themselves to the same test.
I can think of many stratagems which have been imitated, but imitation in many walks of life enables people to get through without failure, and even with a moderate amount of success, but in war imitation is no substitute for thought. It means invariably that you are one move behind the enemy, and sometimes more than one move, and also completely deprived of the element of surprise. Unfortunately, imitation is often the resource of men who are not able to think and who use it as a cover for their incapacity. Therefore, it is of vital importance that if that is a weakness in our war effort we should remedy it.
In the air war I want to say that our record has been very much better, and that I think the nation has good cause to be grateful to those who prepared our Royal Air Force on its technical side—I am not saying on the production side. The 8-gun fighter and our detection system in the Royal Observer Corps were the salvation of this country in the days of our greatest peril. Many people ask why we did not send 200 bombers to Libya. I have always been against the long-range-bomber policy. I think the aircraft is too specialised, takes up too many man-hours in relation to smaller and more versatile types; but it is only fair to say it was not a practical proposition to send 200 bombers to Libya during the course of the battle. It is true that at that time we were making heavy

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attacks with 1,000 and more bombers on Cologne and other German cities, but it is not always remembered that if you send bombers you must also send bombs, and the bomb-lifting cranes and ammunition. The weight of bombs alone, to enable, them to operate for three weeks is about 100 tons per machine in the case of a long-range-bomber, and they use petrol every hour they are in the air equal to that which would be used by 200 10 h.p. motor-cars running all at the same time. Therefore, we must be fair to the administration of the Royal Air Force and say that it was not possible without prolonged preparation. Where the staff of the Royal Air Force were to blame, in my view, was in the original decision to concentrate so largely upon long-range bombers and thus to reduce the strategic mobility of a great part of their striking force.
I am bound to say there is one respect in which the Air Staff has failed, and that is in regard to the dive bomber. The story of the dive bomber provides a dreadful example of the kind of obstinacy which loses wars. There is an unanswerable case for the dive bomber, for everyone who approaches the matter with an impartial mind: France, Norway, Greece, Crete, Malaya, Bir Hacheim and Tobruk. We do not over-estimate the importance of the dive bomber. We do not say that it is an absolutely decisive weapon. If you take the pilots in the Royal Air Force, they say that they would not mind sitting down under the dive bomber, because they know what they can hit and what they cannot hit. They say that if people will only dig slit trenches and sit there until the machines have gone over they will be all right, but you cannot get that into the heads of the infantry, German or British, and it requires a prolonged period of training to bring them to that stage. We have never had dive bombers even to accustom them, under suitable conditions, to that sort of thing.
We heard the statement the day before yesterday of the Secretary of State for War. It was a pathetic statement; it indicated a complete failure in the instrument of decision. After all these years he admitted that discussions were still going on with the Air Ministry in relation to the adoption of the dive bomber. The
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great mistake that the Air Ministry have made was to make misleading statements, and condemn the dive bomber on the basis of the original Stuka type, knowing all the time that immense technical improvements had been made in the performance of that weapon.
I will just give one more example of the lack of thought and decision. I am not going to say anything about the old controversy between generals, admirals and air marshals, though it is still going on. Admiral Cunningham, landing in the United States, said that it was too early yet to say that the battleship had been rendered obsolete by the aircraft. I really think it is time for the Government to come to some decision on that. The case of the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" was a tremendous victory for the thinking power of the German staff. They accepted the certainty of discovery accompanied by air protection over those two battleships as against the chance of escape undiscovered with the certainty that there would be no air protection. That was a classic example of clarity of tactical thought, and I would like to know whether there is anybody exclusively engaged at the Admiralty on problems of that kind.
I want to conform to the desire of the House that speakers should be as brief as possible, and I am now going to say something very briefly about the central direction of the war. It is impossible, in my view, to separate the two offices, at any rate while one of them is held by the present Prime Minister, and further I think that for him to give up either of those two offices at the present time would be an abdication which would throw our war effort into confusion and disarray. Almost all his life has been a training for the responsibilities which rest upon him to-day. I do not believe that any job, however vast, is too big for one man. What restricts the capacity of any individual is not the size of the job but his capacity to delegate to a sufficient degree. I believe that it is in that direction that the Prime Minister has not hitherto succeeded. I believe that it is essential for him to divest himself of some of his duties. I do not say that with any sort of arrière pensée, or as any backdoor method of criticism. I mean it in all sincerity. He is doing too much. He appoints Ministers and public servants,

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he visits the operations rooms, he presides over the War Cabinet, the Defence Committee and sometimes the General Staffs Committee, he reads to the House the Army news, the Navy news, and sometimes the Air news. I really think that it is astonishing that the Prime Minister, with the whole world horizon of the war before him, should think it necessary if one ship is sunk to come and read a statement to the House about it, to the exclusion of the departmental Minister concerned. He also discharges innumerable duties of a civic and military character which we know little about. In all these things the strain is continuous. There is no holiday for the Prime Minister in war-time. It is small wonder that, while he turns an unfaltering face of defiance to the enemy, he sometimes shows at home a little tenderness towards criticism and gratitude for praise.
But even assuming that the Prime Minister accurately divides up his precious time in answer to all the demands made upon him, who can tell how long the burden must be borne? I hope that he will not shrink from self-examination, and decide whether he is not trying to carry a burden which one day, despite all the Votes of Confidence, will unhappily bear him down, to the further damage of our war effort and our cause. I hope that the vivid writing on the wall, underlined by those of us who will support him in the Lobby, will not go unheeded or spurned. Frankly, we want and we need the Prime Minister and all that is best in his Government—that is our view—but we desire that he will accept the counsel of this House, for only by doing so can he retain its trust until the triumphant end.
Captain Profumo: I would like to thank the House for permitting me to intervene for a few minutes until such time as another right hon. Gentleman catches your eye, Mr. Speaker. I had hoped to speak at some length in this Debate, but I will confine myself to asking hon. Members to regard the matter in front of us at this moment from the angle from which I, as a soldier and a very junior Member of Parliament, am looking at it myself. In an hour or so we shall be asked to give a Vote either of confidence or of no confidence in the central direction of the war, which means, virtually: Are we satisfied with the right hon. Gentleman who is now our Prime
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Minister or are we not? In so doing we must examine the alternatives. The critics who have spoken during this Debate have put their points of view most clearly and most strongly, but in my opinion have offered no possible alternative to the present constitution of our Government as it stands.
May I, as a serving officer, tell the House—and I can do so quite honestly—that there is great concern in the Forces about our present situation, but there is far greater concern about the habitual critics, who, after every reverse or setback, like lean and hungry dogs smell around for a bone to pick. Let us look at it a little closer. What effect has this Debate had, first, upon members of the Forces, and, secondly, upon the ordinary, uninformed public? Frankly, the effect must be to confuse them. The hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate put one point of view, and expressed opinions which were not always accurate. He told us at one moment that there were no tanks in Libya which had not been designed before the war. Strictly, that may be true, but every one of the tanks in Libya at the moment has got modifications and improvements which have been made since the war started. In comparison, there are no tanks in the German Army, in any of the Panzer divisions, which were not originally designed before the war. He then talked about the Tank Production Board and told us that it met only once a month. Is it fair for the public to get that picture of the Tank Production Board? Its members may-meet only once a month, but it is no only their meetings which constitute their work. It is delving into the ideas of tank users themselves in the armoured divisions up and down the country and in the arenas of war; so that statement is not very fair. The hon. and gallant Member who seconded the Motion yesterday disagreed with the Mover. Then we had other speeches in disagreement, and at one moment yesterday a considerable argument about a 4.5 gun which added to the confusion, because not a soul who was arguing about it knew what he was talking about.
How can you expect the average soldier, sailor or airman to train himself to fight with a will, when we, the Legislative Assembly, are sitting here on our benches behind the lines, wrangling and discussing

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somewhat unimportant things like that? I do not want to give the House the impression that I am not in favour of criticism I most certainly am. This is the first speech I have made in the House, in which I have supported the Government. My first speech, and my very first vote, went against the Government of the day on the occasion of the Debate on Norway. Therefore, I am as keen a critic as any hon. or right hon. Member. But I do feel profoundly at this moment that it is vital that every hon. and right hon. Member should use his vote at the end of this Debate. I have heard hon. Members saying that they are going to abstain. That is not fair. The country and the Armed Forces demand, at this moment, supreme confidence in the direction of the war by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister We will disagree afterwards—possibly we may disagree in private, but certainly we will disagree—and I have a great many criticisms which I hope the House will allow me to put on another occasion. But this awful moment in our war should be the signal for greater co-operation and more concerted effort, for everybody to redouble their efforts and toe the line and pull together. How are we going to persuade the munition workers to make more guns when we have not decided whether they are of the right type or not; to make further aerodromes when we are debating whether the aeroplanes on them are the right ones; to go down the pits and produce the coal when we are arguing about it in Westminster? This is the moment for supreme unity.
Earl Winterton: We are doing exactly the same thing as the hon. and gallant Member did when he voted against the Government over Narvik.
Captain Profumo: Certainly, but the time was different and there was an obvious alternative. There is one other point I want to make. A great deal of the criticism made in this Debate has been made by people who are not in full possession of the facts. It very often is the case, but when the criticism reaches the public it reaches them in a different form from that in which it is made in this Chamber. There was one moment when the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Production mentioned the Churchill tanks, and an hon. and
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gallant Member opposite, who calls him self the voice of the Army, said "Where is the Churchill tank?" That is the voice of the Army. If he does not know where the Churchill tank is, then let the voice pipe down. That is the sort of thing that goes out to the public and causes confusion and lack of confidence.
Sir, my time is up; I wanted to say more, but I do feel strongly at this moment that it is time to shelve our own criticisms, large or small, and give the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister the confidence that is due to him for having taken us so far along the road to victory. This is going to be a long war like a boxing match. The boxer often has to take punishment. But if when he goes back to his corner, he is not fanned properly or given a sponge of vinegar to suck, that is not going to help him win. I ask all Members to vote in favour of the Government against this Motion, but in any case to use their votes so that they can go away confident that they have done their duty.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: I do not know whether my hon. and gallant Friend who has spoken so sincerely wishes to number me among the habitual critics of the Government. I hope not, for if he would do me the honour of reading the speeches I have made, I think he would find they are balanced, and have not, in any way, been over-critical. This, he said, is a moment when we should all cooperate, and of course I agree with him. But it is above all a moment for wise action, and it is for that reason we are holding this Debate to-day. Confronted with a catastrophe neither the character of which nor the dimensions of which were anticipated even dimly by His Majesty's Government, what is the proper course of action for Parliament to take? It seems to me that there are three alternatives. One is that we should remain silent and impotent while these great events unfold themselves. The current of war, however, is continuous, it is swift, and it is becoming turbulent. For us to stand aside, at this moment would be a confession of impotence. Another suggestion which has been made is that we should discuss the matter in some general way and at large let us say upon the Adjournment. The time for indulgence in mere dialectics has passed. No Debate can be justified now unless it leads to a

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conclusion. The Government might, of course, have put down a Vote of Confidence in their conduct of operations. From such an act of immodesty we have, at any rate, spared them. The counterpart of a Vote of Confidence is a Vote of Censure, the purpose of which is to bring a subject to a clear-cut issue, and this is a time in which issues should be clear-cut.
It is said that our deliberations will have a bad effect abroad. If the outside world is to retain its confidence in us, it will be most likely to do so if it sees us frankly facing our own difficulties, analysing them, and eradicating them. It is said that the soldiers will be disturbed. Where else are they to look but to this representative assembly? Surely it would depress their morale beyond bearing if we were to ignore the conditions in which they have been, and still are, fighting. Finally, it is said that we break the unity of the nation. The nation well understands the difference between unity and uniformity. We all have one common aim, and we shall all share in the fate of our country, whatever it may be. I seem to remember an occasion, in fact I do remember an occasion, on which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, standing below the Gangway, said:
"If only 50 Members of the Conservative party went into the Lobby to-night to vote for this Amendment, it would not affect the life of the Government, but it would make them act. It would make a forward movement of real power, of real energy." [OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th Nov., 1938; col. 1129, Vol. 341.]
Well and deeply do I appreciate the feelings of those Members who imagine that if this Motion were carried to its logical conclusion we should add a political upheaval to a military disaster. I understand their point of view, and I share it, but I repeat that if only 50 Members were to go into the Lobby to-day to vote for this Motion it would not affect the life of the Government, but it would make them act. It would make a forward movement of real energy. What my hon. Friends and myself who are associated with this Motion desire is that we should acquire a new realisation of the character of this war, and impart a new impulse to its conduct. Why do we criticise, my hon. Friends and myself, the central direction of the war? Not because we attribute to the central direction of the war all the shortcomings and all the deficiencies; not at all. The good and the bad must be put into fair balance, and
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we have no desire to do otherwise. Nor do we think that defeats should necessarily be made the cause of complaint, still less of Votes of Censure. We have had many defeats. I do not think my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, or his colleagues, could complain of the tolerance of the House or of the country.
Every measure for which they have asked has been granted. On a number of occasions we have discussed the war in a friendly manner, as I hope we still are discussing it. But the suggestions that have been made over the last two days have been made before: the warnings that have been uttered have been uttered before. There must come a time when one should ask His Majesty's Government to act upon them. If defeats occur after reasonable risks have been taken, well and good: but if they are attributable to false appreciation, it is not well and good. If situations and prospects are consistently misjudged, neither the tactics nor the equipment can ever suffice to meet them. If you persist in under-estimating your enemy and in overestimating yourself, you are courting disaster.
What is the situation in which we now find ourselves, and how have we been led into it? We are fighting for our sea power, our historic asset. The Government are very much to be congratulated upon the fact that within two months of the fall of France, which we were powerless to avoid, we had complete sea command of the Eastern Mediterranean. That fact was announced on 20th August, 1940. It was repeated at various intervals, and on nth November last my right hon. Friend stated:
"Rather more than a year ago I announced to Parliament that we were sending a Battle Fleet back into the Mediterranean for the destruction of the German and Italian convoys. The passage of our supplies in many directions through the sea, the broken morale of the Italian Navy, all these show that we are still masters there."
On 29th January my right hon. Friend said:
"This second front in the Western Desert afforded us the opportunity of fighting a campaign against Germany and Italy on terms, most costly to them. If there be any place where we can fight them with marked advantage, it is in the Western Desert and Libya because not only… have we managed to destroy two-thirds of their African Army and a great amount of its equipment and air power.

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but also to take a formidable toll of all their reinforcements of men and materials, and, above all, of their limited shipping across the Mediterranean, by which they are forced to maintain their supplies."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th January, 1942; cols. 1012–13, Vol. 377.]
I see that Admiral Cunningham thinks we overestimated our success in that direction. He says that, in fact, the enemy got across rather more than we thought he did. We had then established command of the Eastern Mediterranean; and we held it until recently. But command of the Eastern Mediterranean depends upon Alexandria, the only major naval base East of Gibraltar which has been usable by the Fleet. I am going to ask my right hon. Friend, whether the German and Italian claims that the Germans have broken through our Alexandria defences are true? He might tell us when he comes to reply. I sincerely hope that it is not so. Upon Alexandria depends our position in the Eastern Mediterranean. He who holds Alexandria, holds Suez; and he who holds Suez holds the path to our Eastern Empire: he is astride Asia and Africa. Because we hold Suez, we have held our sway in those two Continents. We have acquired thereby our prestige among the Eastern peoples. Thereby also we have increased and multiplied our commerce. Indeed, our situation as a great Power, it would be no exaggeration to say, depends upon that fact. The Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Mediterranean are one; for, should we be ousted from the Mediterranean, the Italian naval units will be free to move into other waters. The Axis Powers could send their transports freely to Syria and Palestine, Where they could maintain armies, and they could penetrate to Iraq. The oil for which the panzers and the Luftwaffe are thirsting would be theirs in abundance. They could attack Russia on a second front South of the Caucasus, and break our lines of communication with Russia through the Persian Gulf. That is the situation with which we are confronted, at its worst; but it is better to look at matters at their worst. If the worst should happen, we should be forced back upon this island.
That is the pass to which, if things go badly, we may come. Only a quick and complete reversal of our fortunes can avoid these consequences. We, as comrades and fellow-Members, must face that situation. How did it arise? General
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Wavell Was, at one time, master in North Africa., He advanced to Benghazi. His advance was there halted. The position was judged to be completely safe. A Governor of Cyrenaica was appointed. We were called upon to send two, if hot three, divisions to Greece. We had an obligation to Greece, which we were bound to honour. We were not bound to honour it in that way. The best service which we could have rendered to Greece, as I and other Members ventured to say at that time, would have been by smashing the Italian Empire completely and invading Southern Italy, rather than going into Northern Greece. Had General Wavell continued his advance from Benghazi, Rommel could never have entered North Africa. The decision was taken. We had a disaster in Greece. We had a worse disaster in Crete. It was held, despite all the experience of Norway, that Crete could withstand an invasion. We lost many ships from assault by shore-based aircraft. It was inevitable that we should. Our naval position was weakened. We lost 300,000 or 400,00o tons of shipping, and General Wavell lost all that he had gained in as many days as it had taken him weeks to acquire it.
When Rommel appeared in Africa his presence was discredited. It was stated that he was not there. Later it was said that he was there but was only in very small force. Either our Intelligence was at fault, as it had been in Norway, or the interpretation of it was inadequate. The Government, with great resolution, set themselves to retrieve this position. They gave priority in the war to Libya. They sent all the supplies possible to Suez and Alexandria. They were assisted by the Americans, who also despatched material, so much indeed, that we were told that the quay accommodation was insufficient. At length we were in a position to recover what we had lost, and on 20th November my right hon. Friend stated:
"The offensive has been long and elaborately prepared and we have waited for nearly five months in order that our Army should be well equipped with all those weapons which have made their mark in this, new war. … The object is the destruction of Rommel's Army. … The Desert Army is now favourably situated for a trial of strength.… It is far too soon to indulge in any exultation."
As indeed it was, for the offensive had hardly begun—
"…This is the first time British troops have met the Germans at least equally well-

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armed and equipped and realising the part which a British Victory in Libya will play upon the whole course of the war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th November, 1942; cols. 474 and 475, Vol. 376.]
It was on 20th November. There was an elaborately prepared offensive. We were going to meet the Germans at least on equal terms. On the same day a message was sent to all ranks of the Army. It was in these terms, and it was sent by the Prime Minister:
"I have command from the King to express to all ranks of the Army and the Royal Air Force in the Western Desert and to the Mediterranean Fleet His Majesty's confidence that they will do their duty with exemplary devotion in the supremely important battle which lies before them. For the first time British and Empire troops will meet the Germans with an ample equipment in modern weapons of all kinds. The battle itself will affect the whole course of the war. Now is the time to strike the hardest blow yet struck for final victory, home and freedom. The desert army may add a page to history which will rank with Blenheim and Waterloo. The eyes of all nations are upon you. May God defend the right!"
Although we were only beginning, the next day, throughout the 24 hours, in every European language the B.B.C. broadcast to the oppressed peoples in all the occupied countries that the Germans were now on the run in Libya and that Britain had smashed Rommel's panzer divisions. Never was an offensive initiated with so much panoply, with so much drum-beating and with so much bugle-sounding. Never were the expectations of the public roused to so high a pitch. On nth December, after a number of, as it seems, extravagant claims had been made by military spokesmen in Cairo, my right hon. Friend identified himself completely with them. He went on to say that
"the Libyan offensive did not take the course which its authors expected though it would reach the end at which they aimed."
Having said that, he said later that he made it a rule never to prophesy.
"On 18th November General Auchinleck set out to destroy the entire armed forces of the Germans and Italians in Cyrenaica, and now on nth December"—
he said to an incredulous House—
"I am bound to say that it seems very probable he will do so."
Again:
"We had a superiority in armour and in the air. … Some of the German tanks carried, as we know, a 6-pounder gun, which though
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it of course carries many fewer shots is sometimes more effective than the gun with which our tanks are mainly armed."
Our tanks were mainly armed with a 2-pounder, which the right hon. Gentleman did not say at the time.
"However, we had a good superiority in the numbers of armoured vehicles. … Like other people concerned, I had hoped for a quick decision, but it may well be that this wearing down battle will be found in the end to have inflicted a deeper injury upon the enemy than if it had all been settled by manoeuvre and in a few days."
He then explained that we could hit the enemy more decisively in this theatre than in any other because we had command of the sea, and could isolate the battlefield. He continued:
"The enemy, who has fought with the utmost stubbornness and enterprise, has paid the price of his valour, and it may well be that the second phase will gather more easily the fruits of the first. …"
That is what my right hon. Friend said. He went to America immediately afterwards, and he reiterated there the statement that we had superiority in equipment, and he also said that if he were asked to explain why our arms had proved insufficient in Malay, he could only point to the victories of General Auchinleck in Libya. Very shortly afterwards General Auchinleck, who, like General Wavell, had stopped on the Gulf of Sidra and had not pursued his offensive, was back on the Gazala line. We started then with an ample supply of equipment. It became equipment of equal quality, and it had now become in Washington of superior quality. At the same time it was said that Singapore would be held. In Ottawa immediately afterwards my right hon. Friend said:
"This fighting in Libya proves that when our men have equal weapons in their hands and proper support from the air, they are more than a match for the Nazi hordes."
Again:
"The German Army is decisively beaten, but its power of resistance has not ceased."
So that was the situation when my right hon. Friend was last in America. Did we in fact have equal equipment, or superior equipment, or anything like it? Every military correspondent concurs that we were out-gunned and that our armour was not as good as the armour of the German tanks. We chose to make this offensive, we initiated it. The hon. and learned Member for North Croydon

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(Mr. Willink) asked me yesterday whether I was not in some way responsible for the qualitative inferiority of our tanks. Well, if I had been, that was a very long time ago, but I can give him an answer on that point which does not rest upon my opinion. I do not wish to refer to these matters, because they are completely irrelevant—we are dealing with statements of the Prime Minister that our equipment is superior—but if my hon. and learned Friend will look at the speech made by Lord Margesson on the last Army Estimates, he will see that our Noble Friend then stated:
"Before the war our tank and anti-tank gun, the 2-pounder, was, without doubt, the best in the world, and its worth was shown in the battles preceding the evacuation from Dunkirk."
In a few sentences I think the sequence of that matter is this: We started the war with a 2-pounder gun which was the best in the world and which could penetrate the armour of the German tanks. This gun was captured in France, where we lost 750 tanks, and the Germans, who had a 37-mm. gun on their tanks—roughly the same calibre as ours—studied our guns, saw that they would penetrate their armour and thickened the armour of their own tanks. The armour of their later models had more resistance than their earlier tanks, and they also improved their anti-tank guns. We are still using Matildas and Valentines and Cruisers, doubtless with certain improvements, but this is roughly the position.
What great advancement in our equipment had been made to justify the Prime Minister making these repeated statements? He says we have a 6-pounder gun. Yes, but we did not have it in a tank. We sent Mr. Westbrook officially to report on equipment in Libya last summer, and he wrote:
"I reported home among other things—some done—that it was essential to have dive bombers and 6-pounder guns if we were to defeat the enemy. We started last autumn without either and then flew a number of guns out to the middle of the battle."
He further said that his suggestions
"were frustrated by the indecision and regulations framed by those who are far remote from the difficulties they cause."
Well, that has never been unusual in dealing with Governments, either under my right hon. Friend or his predecessors. The
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fact is that we had nothing to justify the statements that we had superiority of equipment. What I am concerned with is the morale of the Army. If you convince our Army that it has to undertake an offensive with superior, or even equal, armour and you prepare for five months to smash German panzer divisions, and then that Army is utterly routed, confidence is shaken. You have no right to put the Army in that position. To blame generals as you do by inference when you say that your equipment was superior is ungenerous, to blame the Army is unworthy. But to blame your predecessors is contemptible.
While we are on this subject of equipment, I would like to refer to a question which was asked of me by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Aberdeen (Flight-Lieutenant Boothby). He asked me why the Army had no dive bombers. I would point out that if this offensive, which was so much belauded by the Prime Minister, had turned out well, I do not think the House of Commons would have stopped to pass me a resolution of thanks for the equipment, but I will answer his question about dive bombers. He asked me whether I tried to get dive bombers when I was at the War Office. I would not deal with any subject concerning my term of office—and I never have—unless it had been made public elsewhere. An attack was made upon me in another place because I tried to get an Army Air Force before the war and because I repeated my efforts, of course, while I was in the Government during the war. I do not think I make any revelation when I say that. The Army has no dive bombers or any other planes—none at all. My whole case is that unless you give to a Service control over its own tactical instruments you will never get them properly developed. That is my case. I will proceed now to say a few words upon it, as I have done repeatedly during the last two years. What is the German view of this matter? The Germans continue to make Stukas. If they were guided by the Minister of Production, doubtless they would not do that——
The Minister of Production (Mr. Lyttelton): I did not say that.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: My right hon. Friend said that Stukas were not responsible for the fall of Bir Hacheim or

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Tobruk. Where then have they been used successfully? There is a reluctance to admit that the dive bomber is any good. However, I am not making any attack upon the Minister. I think he made the best of a difficult case yesterday. If he had these difficulties, as I am sure he had, and had come to the House of Commons and said he could not get this superiority of equipment, the House would have sympathised with him. Instead of that he made speeches, like other Members of the Government, saying that we were producing material at such a spate that it had almost become uncontrollable. While in America he said that that country produced every week munitions worth as much as the cost of building the Panama Canal——
Mr. Lyttelton: Every six months.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: Every six months, then. That is the kind of astronomical picture that is being given to us. But I do not blame him, because I have great respect for him, and I wish him well. As to dive bombers, this is the German view, the view of the man who is actually in charge of these operations in the Mediterranean—Air Marshal Kesselring:
"The Luftwaffe could never have achieved its task in the recent campaigns of movement had it not constantly paid attention to one factor throughout its training and development, namely, to become part of the Wehrmacht and then to fit itself unconditionally, mentally and practically into the battles of the land forces."
There is the great distinction between the German air force and our own. Unless you can get a land mentality, your Army will never have its needs supplied. The same applies to the Navy. The Japanese have developed the use of air power with their navy in the same way that the Germans have developed it with their army. If we had been as successful as the Japanese have been with this combination of air and sea power, we should not have lost the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse." We should have sunk the "Prinz Eugen," and our position in the Mediterranean would have been very different. Remember what Admiral Cunningham said: You cannot preserve your sea power without land-based aeroplanes and they should be given to the Navy forthwith. I want to ask the Prime Minister whether he intends to do anything in that direction before it is too late. The principal justification for a Ministry
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of Defence, in my judgment, is that you should integrate these arms. If you allow these old differences to be perpetuated neither your Navy, your Air Force nor your Army can exert the influence upon which you rely. We have misjudged this situation, and we are in a serious plight. Even so, I should very much hesitate to press this Motion were not the process of misjudgment continuing. This is what Mr. Samuel Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, said after the Prime Minister had addressed the leaders in the United States, in company with Mr. Roosevelt:
"Mr. Churchill indicated that Britain will hold and that there is no danger of losing Egypt."
The Prime Minister: I must say that was a statement made by other lips than mine.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: Of course, I withdraw unconditionally at once. Then I will say that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has since said it, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour has since said it.
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Bevin): Can my right hon. Friend quote?
Mr. Hore-Belisha: If my right hon. Friend denies that, I wall not press it at all. It is enough that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary should have said it. What I am saying is that we may lose Egypt or we may not lose Egypt—I pray God we may not—but when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who said that we would hold Singapore, that we would hold Crete, that we had smashed the German army in Libya, and further came down to the House to celebrate General Auchinleck's victory in the first phase, almost before it had begun—which gave me a quaver down my spine at the time, as it did many other hon. Members—when I read that he had said that we are going to hold Egypt, my anxieties became greater than they otherwise would have been. On his return to this country, a joint statement was issued by the Prime Minister and the President of the United States."
"There is no doubt," said this statement, "in our minds that the over-all picture is more favourable to victory than it was either in August or December of last year."
I want to ask the Prime Minister what he meant by that. Last December we

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had not lost Singapore, and my right hon. Friend did not anticipate we would lose it. Last December General Auchinleck was attacking and advancing, not retreating. What is meant by that statement? How can one place reliance in judgments that have so repeatedly turned out to be misguided? That is what the House of Commons has to decide. We are concerned less with the fate of the Government than with the fate of the country. It is not by over-confidence, not by boasting or arrogance or rhetoric, that we shall win this war. It is by a humble devotion to our task, with a knowledge of its magnitude and with a knowledge that if we fail, 1,000 years of British history are over. That is why my hon. Friends have put down this Motion. That is why they consider it unseemly that the peace-time practice of pressure or influence should be brought to bear on Members to tell them how to vote. Think what is at stake. In 100 days we lost our Empire in the Far East. What will happen in the next 100 days? Let every Member vote according to his conscience.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): This long Debate has now reached its final stage. What a remarkable example it has been of the unbridled freedom of our Parliamentary institutions in time of war. Everything that could be thought of or raked up has been used to weaken confidence in the Government, has been used to prove that the Ministers are incompetent and to weaken their confidence in themselves, to make the Army distrust the backing it is getting from the civil power, to make the workmen lose condence in the weapons they are striving so hard to make, to represent the Government as a set of nonentities over whom the Prime Minister towers, and then to undermine him in his own heart and, if possible, before the eyes of the nation. All this poured out by cables and radio to all parts of the world, to the distress of all our friends and to the delight of all our foes. I am in favour of this freedom, which no other country would use, or dare to use, in times of mortal peril such as those through which we are passing. But the story must not end there, and I make now my appeal to the House of Commons to make sure that it does not end there.
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Although I have done my best, my utmost, to prepare a full and considered statement for the House, I must confess that I have found it very difficult, even during the bitter animosity of the diatribe of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), with all its carefully aimed and calculated hostility, to concentrate my thoughts upon this Debate and to withdraw them from the tremendous and most critical battle now raging in Egypt. At any moment we may receive news of grave importance. But the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) has devoted a large part of his speech, not to this immediate campaign and struggle in Egypt, but to the offensive started in Libya nearly eight months ago, and he, as did the Mover of the Motion of Censure, accused me of making misstatements in saying that, for the first time, our men met the Germans on equal terms in the matter of modern weapons. This offensive was not a failure. Our Armies took 40,000 prisoners. They drove the enemy back 400 miles. They took the great fortified positions on which he had rested so long. They drove him to the very edge of Cyrenaica, and it was only when his tanks had been reduced to 70 or perhaps 80 that, by a brilliant tactical resurgence, the German general set in motion a series of events which led to a retirement I think to a point 150 miles more to the West than that from which our offensive had started. Ten thousand Germans were taken prisoner among those in that fight. I am not at all prepared to regard it as anything but a highly creditable and highly profitable transaction for the Army of the Western Desert. I do not understand why this point should be made now, when, in all conscience, there are newer and far graver matters which fill bur minds.
The military misfortunes of the last fortnight in Cyrenaica and Egypt have completely transformed the situation, not only in that theatre, but throughout the Mediterranean. We have lost upwards of 50,000 men, by far the larger proportion of whom are prisoners, a great mass of material, and, in spite of carefully organised demolitions, large quantities of stores have fallen into the enemy's hands. Rommel has advanced nearly 400 miles through the desert, and is now approaching the fertile Delta of the Nile. The evil effects of these events in Turkey, in Spain, in France and in French North

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Africa cannot yet be measured. We are at this moment in the presence of a recession of our hopes and prospects in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean unequalled since the fall of France. If there are any would-be profiteers of disaster who feel able to paint the picture in darker colours, they are certainly at liberty to do so.
A painful feature of this melancholy scene was its suddenness. The fall of Tobruk, with its garrison of about 25,000 men, in a single day was utterly unexpected. Not only was it unexpected by the House and the public at large, but by the War Cabinet, by the Chiefs of the Staff and by the General Staff of the Army. It was also unexpected by General Auchinleck and the High Command in the Middle East. On the night before its capture, we received a telegram from General Auchinleck that he had allotted what he believed to be an adequate garrison, that the defences were in good order, and that 90 days' supplies were available for the troops. It was hoped that we could hold the very strong frontier positions, which had been built up by the Germans and improved by ourselves, from Sollum to Halfaya Pass, from Capuzzo to Fort Maddalena. From this position our newly-built railroad ran backwards at right angles, and we were no longer formed to a flank—as the expression goes—with our backs to the sea, as we had been in the earlier stages of the new Libyan battle. General Auchinleck expected to maintain these positions until the powerful reinforcements which were approaching, and have in part arrived, enabled him to make a much stronger bid to seize the initiative for a counter-offensive.
The question of whether Tobruk could be held or not is difficult and disputable. It is one of those questions which are more easy to decide after the event than before it. It is one of those questions which could be decided only with full knowledge of the approaching reinforcements. The critics have a great advantage in these matters. As the racing saying goes, they "stand on velvet." If we had decided to evacuate the place, they could have gone into action on "the pusillanimous and cowardly scuttle from Tobruk," which would have made quite a promising line of advance. But those who are responsible for carrying on the war have no such easy options open. They
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have to decide beforehand. The decision to hold Tobruk and the dispositions made for that purpose were taken by General Auchinleck, but I should like to say that we, the War Cabinet and our professional advisers, thoroughly agreed with General Auchinleck beforehand, and, although in tactical matters the Commander-in-Chief in any war theatre is supreme and his decision is final, we consider that, if he was wrong, we were wrong too, and I am very ready on behalf of His Majesty's Government to take my full share of responsibility. The hon Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) asked where the order for the capitulation of Tobruk came from. Did it come from the battlefield, from Cairo, from London or from Washington? In what a strange world of thought he is living, if he imagines I sent from Washington an order for the capitulation of Tobruk. The decision was taken to the best of my knowledge by the Commander of the Forces, and certainly it was most unexpected to the Higher Command in the Middle East.
When I left this country for the United States on the night of 17th June, the feeling which I had, which was fully shared by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was that the struggle in the Western Desert had entered upon a wearing down phase, or a long battle of exhaustion, similar to that which took place in the autumn. Although I was disappointed that we had not been able to make a counter-stroke after the enemy's first onslaught had been, I will not say repulsed but rebuffed and largely broken, this was a situation with which we had no reason to be discontented. Our resources were much larger than those of the enemy, and so were our approaching reinforcements. This desert warfare proceeds among much confusion and interruption of communications, and it was only gradually that the very grievous and disproportionate losses which our armour sustained in the fighting around and south of Knightsbridge became apparent.
Here I will make a short digression on to a somewhat less serious plane. Complaint has been made that the newspapers have been full of information of a very rosy character. Several hon. Members have referred to that in the Debate, and that the Government have declared themselves less fully informed than newspapers. Surely this is very natural while a battle of this kind is going on? There

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never has been in this war a battle in which so much liberty has been given to war correspondents. They have been allowed to roam all over the battlefield, taking their chance of getting killed, and sending home their very full messages whenever they can reach a telegraph office. This is what the Press have always asked for, and it is what they got. These war correspondents, moving about amid the troops and sharing their perils, have also shared their hopes and have been inspired by their buoyant spirit. They have sympathised with the fighting men whose deeds they have been recording, and they have, no doubt, been extremely anxious not to write anything which would spread discouragement or add to their burdens.
I have a second observation to make on this minor point. The war correspondents have nothing to do except to collect information, write their despatches and get them through the censor. On the other hand, the generals who are conducting the battle have other preoccupations. They have to fight the enemy. Although we have always asked that they should keep us informed as much as possible, our policy has been not to worry them but to leave them alone to do their job. Now and then I send messages of encouragement and sometimes a query or a suggestion, but it is absolutely impossible to fight battles from Westminster or Whitehall. The less one interferes the better, and certainly I do not want generals in close battle, and these desert battles are close, prolonged and often peculiarly indeterminate, to burden themselves by writing full stories on matters upon which, in the nature of things, the home Government is not called upon to give any decision. After all, there is nothing we can do about it here while it is going on, or only at very rare intervals. Therefore, the Government are more accurately, but less speedily, less fully and less colourfully informed than the newspapers. That is the explanation. It is not proposed to make any change in this procedure.
To return to my general theme; when on the morning of Sunday, the 21st, I went into the President's room I was greatly shocked to be confronted with a report that Tobruk had fallen. I found it difficult to believe, but a few minutes later my own telegram forwarded from
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London, arrived. I hope the House will realise what a bitter pang this was to me. What made it worse was being on an important mission in the country of one of our great Allies. Some people assume too readily that, because a Government keeps cool and has steady nerves under reverses, its members do not feel the public misfortunes as keenly as do independent critics. On the contrary, I doubt whether anyone feels greater sorrow or pain than those who are responsible for the general conduct of our affairs. It was an aggravation in the days that followed to read distorted accounts of the feeling in Britain and in the House of Commons.
The House can have no idea how its proceedings are represented across the ocean. Questions are asked, comments are made by individual members or by independents who represent no organised grouping of political power, which are cabled verbatim, and often quite honestly taken to be the opinion of the House of Commons. Lobby gossip, echoes from the smoking room and talk in Fleet Street are worked up into serious articles seeming to represent that the whole basis of British political life is shaken, or is tottering. A flood of expectation and speculation is let loose. Thus I read streamer headlines like this: "Commons demand Churchill return face accusers," or "Churchill returns to supreme political crisis." Such an atmosphere is naturally injurious to a British representative engaged in negotiating great matters of State upon which the larger issues of the war depend. That these rumours coming from home did not prejudice the work I had to do was due solely to the fact that our American friends are not fair-weather friends. They never expected that this war would be short or easy, or that its course would not be chequered by lamentable misfortunes. On the contrary, I will admit that I believe in this particular case the bonds of comradeship between all the men at the top were actually strengthened. All the same, I must say I do not think any public man charged with a high mission from this country ever seemed to be barracked from his home land in his absence—unintentionally, I can well believe—to the extent that befell me while on this visit to the United States, and only my unshakable confidence in the ties which bind me to the mass of the British people upheld me through those days of trial.

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I naturally explained to my hosts that those who were voluble in Parliament in no way represented the House of Commons, just as the small handful of correspondents who make it their business to pour out damaging tales about our affairs to the United States, and I must add to Australia, in no way represent the honourable profession of journalism. I also explained that all this would be put to the proof when I returned by the House of Commons as a whole expressing a responsible, measured and deliberate opinion, and that is what I am going to ask it to do to-day.
I noticed that it was stipulated that I should not be allowed to refer in any way in the statement I am now making, or in a statement about Libya, to the results of my mission in the United States. I suppose it was not wished that I should be able to plead any extenuating and correlative circumstances. But I must make it clear that I accept no fetters on my liberty of debate except those imposed by the rules of Order or by the public interest. I have a worthier reason, however, for not speaking at length about my American mission further than the published statement agreed upon between the President and me. Here is the reason. Our conversations were concerned with nothing, or almost nothing, but the movement of troops, ships, guns and aircraft and with the measures to be taken to combat the losses at sea and to replace, and more than replace, the sunken tonnage.
Here I will turn aside to meet a complaint which I have noticed that the Minister of Defence should have been in Washington when the disaster at Tobruk occurred. But Washington was the very place where he should have been. It was there that the most urgent future business of the war was being transacted, not only in regard to the general scene but also in regard to the particular matters that were passing. Almost everything I arranged in the United States with the President and his advisers is secret, in the sense that it must be kept from the enemy, and I have therefore nothing to tell about it, except this—that the two great English-speaking nations were never closer together and that there never was a more earnest desire between Allies to engage the enemy or a more whole-hearted resolve to run all risks and make all sacrifices in order to wage this hard war with vigour
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and carry it to a successful conclusion. That assurance, at least, I can give the House.
I hope there will be no disparagement of the United States shipbuilding programme. We are making considerable shipbuilding efforts ourselves. We could only increase our output at the expense of other indispensable munitions and services. But the United States is building in the present calendar year about four times as much gross tonnage—not dead weight but gross tonnage—as we are building, and I am assured that she will launch between eight and 10 times as much as we are building in the calendar year 1943. Shipping losses have been very heavy lately, and the bulk has been upon the Eastern shores of America. The most strenuous measures are being taken to curtail this loss, and I do not doubt that they will be substantially reduced as the masses of escort vessels now under construction come into service and the convoy system and other methods of defence come into full and effective operation. These measures, combined with the great shipbuilding effort of the United States and the British Empire, should result in a substantial gain in tonnage at the end of 1943 over and above that which we now possess, even if, as I cannot believe, the rate of loss is not substantially reduced. This we shall owe largely to the prodigious exertions of the Government and people of the United States, who share with us, fully and freely, according to our respective needs and duties in this as in all other parts of our war programme.
I have not trespassed very long on the United States aspect, although that is the most vital sphere, and I return to the Desert and to the Nile. I hope the House will realise that I have a certain difficulty in defending His Majesty's Government from the various attacks which have been made upon them in respect of materials and preparation, because I do not want to say anything that can be shifted, even by the utmost ingenuity of malice, into a reflection upon our commanders in the field, still less upon the gallant men they lead. Yet I must say that one of the most painful parts of this battle is that in its opening stages we were defeated under conditions which gave a good and reasonable expectation of success. During the whole of the spring we had been desirous that the Army of the Western Desert should begin an offensive against the

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enemy. The regathering and reinforcement of our Army was considered to be a necessary reason for delay, but of course this delay helped the enemy also. At the end of March and during the whole of April, he concentrated a very powerful air force in Sicily and delivered a tremendous attack upon Malta, of which the House was made aware at the time by me. This attack exposed the heroic garrison and inhabitants of Malta to an ordeal of extreme severity. For several weeks hundreds of German and Italian aircraft—it is estimated more than 600, of which the great majority were Germans—streamed over in endless waves in the hopes of overpowering the defences of the island fortress. There has never been any case in this war of a successful defence against a superior air power being made by aircraft which have only two or three airfields to work from. Malta is the first exception. At one time they were worn down to no more than a dozen fighters, yet, aided by their powerful batteries, by the ingenuity of the defence and by the fortitude of the people, they maintained an unbroken resistance. We continued to reinforce them from the Western Mediterranean as well as from Egypt by repeated operations of difficulty and hazard, and maintained a continuous stream of Spitfire aircraft in order to keep them alive, in spite of the enormous wastage, not only in the air but also in the limited airfields on the ground. As part of this, hundreds of fighter aircraft have been flown in from aircraft carriers by the Royal Navy, and we were assisted by the United States Navy, whose carrier "Wasp" rendered notable service on more than one occasion, enabling me to send them the message of thanks, "Who says a wasp cannot sting twice?" By all these exertions, Malta lived through this prodigious and prolonged bombardment, until at last, at the beginning of May, the bulk of the German aircraft, already weakened by most serious losses, had to be withdrawn for the belated German offensive on the Russian front.
Malta had come through its fearful ordeal triumphant and is now stronger in aircraft than ever before. But during the period when this assault was at its height, it was practically impossible for the fortress to do much to impede the reinforcements which were being sent to Tripoli and Benghazi. This, no doubt,
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was part of the purpose, though not the whole purpose, of the extraordinary concentration of air power which the enemy had thought fit to devote to the attack. The enemy did not get Malta, but they got a lot of stuff across to Africa. Remember that it takes four months to send a weapon round the Cape and perhaps a week or even less to send it across the Mediterranean—provided it gets across. Remember also that the great number of these desertised Spitfires, if not involved in very severe fighting at Malta, would have been available to strengthen our Spitfire force in the battle which has been proceeding. Thus it may well be that we were relatively no better off in the middle of May than we had been in March or April.
However, the armies drew up in the Desert in the middle of May about 100,000 a side. We had 100,000 men, and the enemy 90,000, of whom 50,000 were Germans. We had a superiority in the numbers of tanks—I am coming to the question of quality later—of perhaps seven to five. We had a superiority in artillery of nearly eight to five. Included in our artillery were several regiments of the latest form of gun howitzer which throws a 55-pound shell 20,000 yards. There were other artillery weapons, of which I cannot speak, also available. It is not true, therefore, as I have seen it stated, that we had to face 50-pounder guns of the enemy with only 25-pounder guns. The 25-pounder, I may say, is one of the finest guns in Europe and a perfectly new weapon which has only begun to flow out since the war began. It is true that the enemy, by the tactical use which he made of his 88 mm. anti-aircraft guns, converting them to a different purpose, and his anti-tank weapons gained a decided advantage. But this became apparent only as the battle proceeded. Our Army enjoyed throughout the battle and enjoys to-day superiority in the air. The dive bombers of the enemy played a prominent part at Bir Hakeim and Tobruk, but it is not true that they should be regarded as a decisive or even as a massive factor in this battle. Lastly, we had better and shorter lines of communication than the enemy, our railway being already beyond Fort Capuzzo and a separate line of communications running by the sea to the well-supplied base and depot of Tobruk.

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We were, therefore, entitled to feel good confidence in the result of an offensive undertaken by us, and this would have been undertaken in the early days of June if the enemy had not struck first. When his preparations for an offensive became plainly visible, it was decided, and I think rightly, to await the attack in our fortified positions and then to deliver a counter-stroke in the greatest possible strength.
Here, then, were these armies face to face in the most forbidding and desolate region in the world, under conditions of extreme artificiality, able to reach each other only through a peculiar use of the appliances of modern war. The enemy's army had come across a. disputed sea, paying a heavy toll to our submarines, and except for the period when Malta was neutralised, to the Malta Air Force. The Imperial Forces had almost all come 12,000 miles through submarines which beset the British shores, and round the Cape to Suez or from South Africa and India. One may say that the forces assembled on both sides in this extraordinary situation represented a war effort which in other theatres would have amounted to three or four times their numbers. Such was the position when, on 26th May, Rommel made his first onslaught.
It is not possible for me to give any final account of the battle. Events move with such rapidity that there is no time to disentangle the past: one tale is good till another is told. Any hasty judgment would be more exciting than true. The main features may however be discerned. Rommel had expected to take Tobruk in the first few days, but the reception which he got deranged his plan. Very heavy losses in armour were sustained by both sides. However he held tenaciously to the inroad he had made, and we were so mauled in the struggle that no effective counter-stroke could be delivered. On 4th June an attempt was made, but was repulsed by a counter-attack with heavy loss by artillery. The battle then centred upon Bir Hakeim, where the Free French resisted with the utmost gallantry. Around this the struggle surged for eight or nine days. Finally it was decided to withdraw the garrison, and this was successfully accomplished, though with heavy losses.
Here, no doubt, was a turning point in the battle. Whether anything more could
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have been done we cannot tell. Certainly very large numbers of troops remained on fronts which were not engaged, and certainly Rommel and his. Germans punched on unflaggingly day after day. After the fall of Bir Hakeim another five days of fighting occurred round the Knightsbridge and Acroma positions. Up till 13th June the battle was equal. Our recovery process had worked well. Both sides lost, I will not say evenly, but proportionately, because our numbers were greater, and we could expect to lose more while keeping even. But on the 13th there came a change. On that morning we had about 300 tanks in action, and by nightfall no more than 70 remained, excluding the light Stuart tanks; and all this happened without any corresponding loss having been inflicted on the enemy. Sir, I do not know whit actually happened in the fighting of that day. I am only concerned to give the facts to the House, and it is for the House to decide whether these facts result from the faulty central direction of the war, for which of course I take responsibility, or whether they resulted from the terrible hazards and unforeseeable accidents of battle. With this disproportionate destruction of our armour Rommel became decisively the stronger. The battlefield passed into the hands of the enemy, and the enemy's wounded tanks could be repaired by his organisation while all our wounded tanks were lost to us.
Many evil consequences followed inevitably from this one day's fighting. There came the decision to withdrawn from the Gazala position. The South African Division was withdrawn into Tobruk, and moved through Tobruk further East, without heavy loss. The main part of the 50th English Division extricated itself by a 120-mile journey round the Southern flank of the enemy. In the desert, everything is mobile and mechanised, and when the troops move they can move enormous distances forward or back. The old conceptions and measurements of war do not apply at all. One hundred miles may be lost or won in a day or a night. There followed the decision to hold Tobruk together with the Halfaya-Sollum-Capuzzo-Maddalena line, which I have already mentioned, and then the fall of Tobruk after only one single day of fighting.
This entailed withdrawal from the Sollum-Halfaya line to the Mersa Matruh

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position, which placed 125 miles of waterless desert between the 8th Array and its foes. Most authorities expected that 10 days or a fortnight would be gained by this. However, on the 5th day, on 26th June, Rommel presented himself with his armoured and motorised forces in front of this new position. Battle was joined on the 27th along the whole front, and for the first time I am glad to say our whole Army, which had been heavily reinforced with new and fresh troops, was engaged all together at one time. Although we consider we inflicted very heavy damage upon the enemy the advance of the German Light Division together with the remainder of the Panzer Corps, 100 to 150 heavily armed tanks, which is about what it amounted to—led to our further retirement owing to the destruction of our armour. Naturally, I am not in a position to tell the House about the reinforcements which have reached the Army or which are approaching, except that they are very considerable, and after the lecture I have been read by the right hon. Gentleman apparently it is wrong even to say that we shall hold Egypt. I suppose one ought to say we are going to lose Egypt. But I will go so far as to say that we do not regard the struggle as in any way decided.
Although I am not mentioning reinforcements, there is one reinforcement which has come, which has been in close contact with the enemy and which he knows all about. I mean the New Zealand Division. The Government of New Zealand, themselves under potential menace of invasion, authorised the fullest use being made of their troops, whom they have not withdrawn or weakened in any way. They have sent them into the battle, where, under the command of the heroic Freyberg, again wounded, they have acquitted themselves in a manner equal to all their former records. They are fighting hard at the moment.
Although the Army in Libya has been so far overpowered and driven back, I must make it clear, on behalf of the challenged central direction of the war, that this was not due to any conscious or wilful grudging of reinforcements in men or material. Of course, the emergency of the Japanese war had led to the removal of a part of the Australian Forces to defend their homeland, and very rightly. In fact, it was I who sug-
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gested to them that they should not consider themselves bound in the matter, having regard to their own danger. Several important units of British troops had to go to India which, a little while ago, seemed threatened by invasion. Other Forces in India which were due to proceed to the Middle East had to be retained there. But extreme exertions have been made by the home Government for the last two years to strengthen and maintain the Armies in the Middle East. During that time, apart altogether from reinforcements to other theatres, there have gone to the Middle East from this country, from the Empire overseas and to a lesser extent from the United States, more than 950,000 men, 4,500 tanks, 6,000 aircraft, nearly 5,000 pieces of artillery, 50,000 machine guns and over 100,000 mechanical vehicles. We have done this in a period, let the House remember before they dismiss our efforts and our designs as inadequate to the occasion, when for a large part of the time we were threatened with imminent invasion here at home and during the rest of it were sending large supplies to Russia. So far as the central direction of the war is concerned, I can plead with some confidence that we have not failed in the exertions we have made or in the skill we have shown.
Now I come to the question of the qualify of some of our material, to the design and armour of our tanks and to our anti-tank artillery. This was dealt with at some length yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Production, and by Lord Beaverbrook in another place. I agree with the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale that the House should read carefully that extremely masterly, intricate and authoritative statement of facts upon these matters. I do not attempt to go into them in detail here, as I should keep the House beyond the time they have so generously accorded me, but I must ask the House to allow me to place the salient points of the tank story before them.
The idea of the tank was a British conception. The use of armoured forces as they are now being used was largely French, as General de Gaulle's book shows. It was left to the Germans to convert those ideas to their own use. For three or four years before the war they were busily at work with their usual

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thoroughness upon design and manufacture of tanks, and also upon the study and practice of armoured warfare. One would have thought that even if the Secretary of State for War of those days could not get the money for large scale manufacture he would at any rate have had full-size working models made and tested out exhaustively, and the factories chosen and the jigs and gauges supplied, so that he could go into mass production of tanks and anti-tank weapons when the war began.
When what I may call the Belisha period ended we were left with some 250 armoured vehicles, very few of which carried even a 2-pounder gun. Most of these were captured or destroyed in France. After the war began the designs were settled and orders on a large scale were placed by the right hon. Gentleman. For more than a year, until Hitler attacked Russia, the threat of invasion hung over us, imminent, potentially mortal. There was no time to make improvements at the expense of supply. We had to concentrate upon numbers, upon quantity instead of quality. There was a major decision to which I have no doubt we were rightly guided.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: May I interrupt? I should have thought that if my right hon. Friend wanted to make some reference to technical matters during my period he would have told me, so that I could have the facts. That being so I must inform the House that a very long time ago, in the Debate on Greece in May, 1941, my right hon. Friend made certain charges about my period at the War Office in relation to tanks. I then had not the facts. I had to secure them from the War Office, and that I did on 23th June, and I think in justice I must read this letter to the House:
"The Prime Minister was, I understand, intending to develop the argument that whereas in the last war tanks were slow in movement and designed to be proof against ordinary bullets only, it would have been natural to suppose that the preparations for this war would have included the energetic development of fast tanks which would also be sufficiently armoured to stand up against cannon fire. In so far as the Prime Minister's statement is capable of this interpretation, that you definitely ignored or rejected the advice of the General Staff to introduce tanks having both those qualities, it is not borne out by the fact. The Purple Primer of 1931 was only concerned with advocating a tank capable of resisting armour-piercing bullets and not artillery fire."
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That is a direct contravention of an attack made upon me in May, 1941. My right hon. Friend is now making another attack on technical grounds with reference to my period, and I think he might have notified me in advance so that I might have access to the facts for my defence.
The Prime Minister: I was only citing the facts as they are known to me; I have not been concerned to make a detailed attack upon the right hon. Gentleman's administration of the War Office. I am explaining that we had, at the time after Dunkirk, to concentrate upon numbers. We had to make thousands of armoured vehicles with which our troops could beat the enemy off the beaches when they landed and fight them in the lanes and fields of Kent or Norfolk.
When the first new tanks came out they had grievous defects, the correction of which caused delay, and this would have been avoided if the preliminary experiments on the scale of 12 inches to the foot—full scale—had been carried out at an earlier period. Is that a very serious attack? Undoubtedly delay would have been saved if we had had the model there and worked it. How do you make a tank? People design it, they argue about it, they plan it and make it, and then you take the tank and test and re-test it. When you have got it absolutely settled you go into production, and only then do you go into production. But we have never been able to indulge in the luxury of that precise and leisurely process. We have had to take it straight off the drawing board and go into full production, and take the chance of the many errors which the construction will show coming out after hundreds and thousands of them have been made.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: What about the Churchill tank?
The Prime Minister: At the present moment I have not got there. At the present moment I am only dealing with the Matildas, Cruisers and Valentines, which I may say belong to the Belisha group. Nevertheless, I was about to say that in spite of the fact that there was this undoubted delay through no preliminary work having been carried as far as it should have been, it would be wrong in my opinion to write off as useless the Matilda, the Cruiser and the Valentine

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tanks. They have rendered great services, and they are to-day of real value. In Russia the Valentine is highly rated. Has the House any idea of the number of tanks we have sent to Russia? As I said, we have sent 4,500 altogether to the Nile Valley. We have sent over 2,000 tanks to Russia, and the Russians are using them against the German armour, with vigour and effect. Therefore, I am not prepared to say that it is right to dismiss these weapons—although their appearance was retarded by the circumstances which I have mentioned—as not effective and powerful weapons of war.
Shortly after the present National Government was formed, in June, 1940, to be exact, I called a meeting of all authorities to design and make a new tank, capable of speedy mass production and adapted to the war conditions to be foreseen in 1942. In 1942—that was the test. Of course I do not attempt to settle the technical details of tank design any more than I interfere with the purely tactical decisions of generals in the field. All the highest expert authorities were brought together several times and made to hammer out a strong and heavy tank, adapted primarily for the defence of this Island against invasion, but capable of other employment in various theatres. This tank, the A.22, was ordered off the drawing board, and large numbers went into production very quickly. As might be expected, it had many defects and teething troubles, and when these became apparent the tank was appropriately re-christened the "Churchill." These defects have now been largely overcome. I am sure that this tank will prove, in the end, a powerful, massive and serviceable weapon of war. A later tank, possessing greater speed, was designed about a year after, and plans have been made to put it into production at the earliest moment.
Neither of these types has yet been employed against the enemy. He has not come here, and, although I sent the earliest two that were made out to Egypt to be tested and made desert-worthy, none has yet reached a stage where it can be employed at that distance. It must be remembered that to get a tank from this country, or a gun, into the hands of troops in the Nile Valley or in the desert takes about six months. Hon. Members will see that the date on which this battle
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began was a date before we could have got the new and improved weapon into the hands' of the troops. For this battle—for the first battle I say the equipment was adequate—we tried to make up by numbers for an admitted inferiority in quality.
I have been asked by the hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate to speak about dive bombers and transport aircraft. I can only say that the highest technical authorities still hold very strong opinions on either side of this question. Of course, you cannot judge whether we ought to have had dive bombers at any particular date without also considering what we should have had to give up if we had had them. Most of the Air-Marshals, the leading men in the Air Force, think little of dive bombers, and they persist in their opinion. They are entitled to respect for their opinion, because it was from the same source that the 8-gun fighter was designed which destroyed so many hundreds of the dive bombers in the Battle of Britain and has enabled us to preserve ourselves free and uninvaded.
Mr. Bevan: The dive bomber in the Battle of Britain was adapted by the Germans for a use never intended for the dive bomber. The dive bomber was intended by German military strategy to be used in co-operation with troops. It was shot down over Britain because it was being wrongly used.
The Prime Minister: In what way does that affect the argument I am holding, namely, that if we had made dive bombers instead of 8-gun fighter aircraft, we might not have had the 8-gun fighter aircraft to shoot down the JU.87's when they came over? I remember well, 40 years ago, rising to interrupt the late Mr. Balfour, and, after I had said what I had to say, he rebuked me by saying, "I thought my hon. Friend rose to correct me on some point of fact, but it appears that he only wishes to continue the argument." Now there is no doubt whatever that the Army desire to have dive bombers, and, nearly two years ago orders were placed for them. They have not come to hand in any number yet. That is a detailed story which I certainly do not wish to press, if it should be thought in any way that we were throwing any blame off our shoulders onto those of the United States. On the point of priority, the case is clear, when

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you have, as you had then in the United States, an immense market, an immense productive sphere and no priority questions had arisen. The rate at which the product was evolved was not influenced by the priority position. It was influenced by various incidents—changes of design and so forth—which occurred.
The dive bomber against ships at sea appears to me to be a still more dangerous weapon. I say that because this is my own opinion on the matter, but as to transport aircraft I wish, indeed, we had 1,000 transport aircraft; but if we had built 1,000 of these unarmed transport aircraft, it would have cut off our already far from adequate bomber force. I know there is a tendency to deride and disparage the bomber effort against Germany, but I think that is a very great mistake. There is no doubt that this bomber offensive against Germany is one of the most powerful means we have of carrying on an offensive war against Germany. We did not like it when the blitz was on, but we bore it. Everyone knows that it was the main preoccupation of the Government and the municipal authorities of that day, with factories being delayed in their work, ports congested and so forth. We, at any rate, had hope. We felt that we were on the rising tide. More was coming to us, and, moreover, we were buoyed up by the sympathy of the world—"London can take it" and so on. No such consolations are available in Germany. Nobody speaks with admiration and says, "Cologne can take it." They say, "Serve them right." That is the view of the civilised world. In addition to that, they know that this attack is not going to get weaker. It is going to get continually stronger until, in my view, it will play a great and perfectly definite part in abridging the course of this war, in taking the strain off our Russian Allies, and in reducing the building and construction of submarines and other weapons of war. Of course, one would like to have had both, but at this moment, much though we need transport aircraft, I am not at all sure, if I were offered a- gift of 1,000 heavy bombers or 1,000 transports, which I should choose. I should take advice.
To return to the main argument which is before the House, I will willingly accept, indeed I am bound to accept, what the Noble Lord has called the "constitutional responsibility" for everything
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that has happened and I consider that I discharged that responsibility by not interfering with the technical handling of armies in contact with the enemy. But before the battle began I urged General Auchinleck to fake the command himself, because I was sure nothing was going to happen in the vast area of the Middle East in the next month or two comparable in importance to the fighting of this battle in the Western Desert, and I thought he was the man to handle the business. He gave me various good reasons for not doing so, and General Ritchie fought the battle. As I told the House on Tuesday, General Auchinleck, on 25th June, superseded General Ritchie and assumed the command himself. We at once approved his decision, but I must frankly confess that the matter was not one on which we could form any final judgment, so far as the superseded officer is concerned. I cannot pretend to form a judgment upon what has happened in this battle. I like commanders on land and sea and in the air to feel that between them and all forms of public criticism the Government stand like a strong bulkhead. They ought to have a fair chance, and more than one chance. Men may make mistakes and learn from their mistakes. Men may have bad luck, and their luck may change. But anyhow you will not get generals to run risks unless they feel they have behind them a strong Government. They will not run risks unless they feel that they need not look over their shoulders or worry about what is happening at home, unless they feel they can concentrate their gaze upon the enemy. And you will not, I may add, get a Government to run risks unless they feel that they have got behind them a loyal, solid majority. Look at the things we are being asked to dare now, and imagine the kind of attack which would be made on us if we tried to do them and failed. In war time if you desire service you must give loyalty.
General Auchinleck is now in direct command of the battle. It is raging with great intensity. The communiqué which has been issued on the tape—I have not had any news myself—states that the attacks yesterday were repulsed. But the battle is of the most intense and serious character. We have assured General Auchinleck of our confidence, and I believe it will be found that this confidence has not been misplaced. I am not going to express any opinion about

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what is going to happen. I cannot tell the House—and the enemy—what reinforcements are at hand, or are approaching, or when they will arrive. I have never made any predictions except things like saying that Singapore would hold out. What a fool and a knave I should have been to say that it would fall. I have not made any arrogant, confident, boasting predictions at all. On the contrary, I have stuck hard to my blood, toil, tears and sweat, to which I have added muddle and mismanagement, and that, to some extent I must admit, is what you have got out of it.
I repudiate altogether the suggestion that I misled the House on and June about the present campaign. All I said was that:
"…it is clear that we have every reason to be satisfied, and more than satisfied, with the course which the battle has so far taken and that we should watch its further development with earnest attention."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd June; col. 533, Vol. 380.]
Nothing could be more guarded. I do not know what my critics would like me to say now. If I predict success and speak in buoyant terms and misfortune continues, their tongues and pens will be able to dilate on my words. On the other hand, if I predict failure and paint the picture in the darkest hues—I have painted it in pretty dark hues—I might safeguard myself against one danger, but only at the expense of a struggling Army. Also I might be wrong. So I will say nothing about the future except to invite the House and the nation to face with courage whatever it may unfold.
I now ask the House to take a wider survey. Since Japan attacked us six months ago in the Far East we have suffered heavy losses there. A peace-loving nation like the United States, confined by two great oceans, naturally takes time to bring its gigantic forces to bear. I have never shared the view that this would be a short war, or that it would end in 1942. It is far more likely to be a long war. There is no reason to suppose that the war will stop when the final result has become obvious. The Battle of Gettysburg proclaimed the ultimate victory of the North, but far more blood was shed after the Battle of Gettysburg than before. At the same time, in spite of our losses in Asia, in spite of our defeats in Libya, in spite of the increased sinkings off the American
604
coast, I affirm with confidence that the general strength and prospects of the United Nations have greatly improved since the turn of the year, when I last visited the President in the United States' The outstanding feature is of course the steady resistance of Russia to the invaders of her soil, and the fact that up to now at the beginning of July, more than halfway through the summer, no major offensive has been opened by Hitler upon Russia, unless he calls the present attacks on Kharkov and Kursk a major offensive. There is no doubt that the Russian Government and nation, wedded by the ties of blood, sacrifice and faith to the English speaking democracies of the West, will continue to wage war, steadfast, stubborn, invincible. I make no forecast of the future. All I know is that the Russians have surprised Hitler before and I believe they will surprise him again. Anyhow whatever happens they will fight on to death or victory. This is the cardinal fact at this time.
The second great fact is the growth of air power on the side of the Allies. That growth is proceeding with immense rapidity and is bound to manifest itself as the months pass by. Hitler made a contract with the demon of the air, but the contract ran out before the job was done, and the demon has taken on an engagement with the rival firm. How truly it has been said that nations and people very often fall by the very means which they have used and built their hopes upon for their rising up.
For the last six months our convoys to the East have grown. Every month about 50,000 men with the best equipment we can make have pierced through the U-boats and hostile aircraft which beset these islands, and have rounded the-Cape of Good Hope. That this should have been done so far without loss constitutes an achievement prodigious and unexampled in history. As these successive Armies, for they are little less, round the Cape we decide where they are to go. Some months ago Australia feared that an invasion was imminent. If so, our Forces would have gone to aid our kith and kin irrespective of the position in the Middle East. Personally, I have never thought that the homeland of Australia would be heavily invaded by Japan in the present year, and now that the Australian manhood is armed and in the field, and that a

605
large American Army has arrived in Australia and in the island stepping stones across the Pacific as a feature of the central direction of the war, I am confident that the mass invasion of Australia would be a most hazardous and unprofitable operation for Japan. On the contrary, throughout the whole of the South-West Pacific the watchword of the Allies is now "attack."
In March and April last we were deeply anxious about India, which, before Japan entered the war, had been stripped almost bare of trained troops and equipment for the sake of other theatres. India has now been strongly reinforced. A far larger Army, British and Indian, stands in India under the command of General Wavell than ever before in the history of the British connection. Ceylon, which at one time appeared to be in great jeopardy, is now strongly defended by naval, air and military forces. We have secured a protective naval base in Madagascar. When I remember reading an article by the right hon. Gentleman headed, "Take Madagascar Now"—I am not blaming the right hon. Gentleman, as he could not know that our troops had been some weeks on the sea—I really wonder whether he might not have found time to make some acknowledgment of the speed and efficiency with which his direction had been carried out.
All this improvement in the position of Australia, New Zealand and India has been effected in the main by. the brilliant victories gained by the United States Navy and Air Force over the Japanese in the Coral Sea and at Midway Island. No fewer than four out of eight Japanese regular aircraft carriers—vessels which take four years to make—have been sunk, as well as one of their converted auxiliary carriers. When the Japanese came into the Bay of Bengal at the beginning of April with five carriers, we were caused great anxiety, but five are now at the bottom of the sea; and the Japanese, whose resources are strictly limited, are beginning to count their capital units on their fingers and toes. These splendid achievements have not received the attention they deserve in this island. Superb acts of devotion have been performed by the American airmen. From some of their successful attacks on the Japanese aircraft carriers only one aircraft returned out of 10; in others, the loss was more than half.
606
But the work has been done, and the position in the Pacific has been definitely altered in our favour.
This relief has enabled important forces to be directed upon Egypt. The extraordinary valour and tenacity of the Russian defence of Sebastopol and General Timoshenko's massive strokes in the battles round Kharkov, together with the lateness of the season, have enabled us to concentrate our efforts on the destruction of Rommel's army. At this moment, the struggle in Egypt is gradually approaching its full intensity. The battle is now in the balance, and it is an action of the highest consequence. It has one object, and one object only, namely, the destruction of the enemy's army and armoured power. Important aid is now on the way, both from Britain and from the United States. A hard and deadly struggle lies before the Armies on the Nile. It remains for us at home to fortify and encourage their Commander by every means in our power.
I wish to speak a few words "of great truth and respect"—as they say in the diplomatic documents—and I hope I may be granted the fullest liberty of debate. This Parliament has a peculiar responsibility. It presided over the beginning of the evils which have come on the world. I owe much to the House, and it is my hope that it may see the end of them in triumph. This it can do only if, in the long period which may yet have to be travelled, the House affords a solid foundation to the responsible Executive Government, placed in power by its own choice. The House must be a steady, stabilising factor in the State, and not an instrument by which the disaffected sections of the Press can attempt to promote one crisis after another. If democracy and Parliamentary institutions are to triumph in this war, it is absolutely necessary that Governments resting upon them shall be able to act and dare, that the servants of the Crown shall not be harassed by nagging and snarling, that enemy propaganda shall not be fed needlessly out of our own hands, and our reputation disparaged and undermined throughout the world. On the contrary, the will of the whole House should be made manifest upon important occasions. It is important that not only those who speak, but those who watch and listen and judge, should also count as a factor in world affairs. After all, we are still

607
fighting for our lives, and for causes dearer than life itself. We have no right to assume that victory is certain; it will be certain only if we do not fail in our duty. Sober and constructive criticism, or criticism in Secret Session, has its high virtue; but the duty of the House of Commons is to sustain the Government or to change the Government, ff it cannot change it, it should sustain it. There is no working middle course in war-time. Much harm was done abroad by the two days' Debate in May. Only the hostile speeches are reported abroad, and much play is made with them by our enemy.
A Division, or the opportunity for a Division, should always follow a Debate on the war, and I trust, therefore, that the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the House will be made plain not only in the Division, but also in the days which follow and that, if I may so call them, the weaker brethren will not be allowed to usurp and almost monopolise the privileges and proud authority of the House of Commons. The majority of the House must do their duty. All I ask is a decision one way or another.
There is an agitation in the Press which has found its echo in a number of hostile speeches to deprive me of the function which I exercise in the general conduct and supervision of the war. I do not propose to argue this to-day at any length, because it was much discussed in a recent Debate. Under the present arrangement the three Chiefs of the Staff, sitting almost continuously together, carry on the war from day to day assisted not only by the machinery of the great Departments which serve them, but by the Combined General Staff, and making their decisions effective through the Navy, Army and Air Forces over which they exercise direct operational control. I supervise their activities, whether as Prime Minister or Minister of Defence. I work myself under the supervision and control of the War Cabinet to whom all important matters are referred and whom I have to carry with me in all major decisions. Nearly all my work has been done in writing, and a complete record exists of all the directions I have given, the inquiries I have made and the telegrams I have drafted. I shall be perfectly content to be judged by them.
608
I ask no favours either for myself or for His Majesty's Government. I under took the office as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, after defending my predecessor to the best of my ability, in times when the life of the Empire hung upon a thread. I am your servant, and you have the right to dismiss me when you please. What you have no right to do is to ask me to bear responsibilities without the power of effective action, to bear the responsibilities of Prime Minister but clamped on each side by strong men. As the hon. Member said, if to-day, or at any future time, the House were to exercise its undoubted right, I could walk out with a good conscience and the feeling that I have done my duty according to such light as has been granted to me. There is only one thing I would ask you in that event. It would be to give my successor the modest powers which would have been denied to me.
But there is a larger issue than the personal issue. The Mover of this Vote of Censure has proposed that I should be stripped of my responsibilities for Defence in order that some military figure or that some other unnamed personage should assume the general conduct of the war, that he should have complete control of the Armed Forces of the Crown, that he should be the Chief of the Chiefs of the Staff, that he should nominate or dismiss the generals or the admirals, that he should always be ready to resign, that is to say, to match himself against his political colleagues, if colleagues they may be considered, if he did not get all he wanted, that he should have under him a Royal Duke as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and finally, I presume, though this was not mentioned, that this unnamed personage should find an appendage in the Prime Minister to make the necessary explanations, excuses and apologise to Parliament when things go wrong, as they often do and often will. That is at any rate a policy. It is a system very different from the Parliamentary system under which we live. It might easily amount to or be converted into a dictatorship. I wish to make it perfectly clear that as far as I am concerned I shall take no part in such a system.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: I hope that my right hon. Friend has not forgotten the

609
original sentence, which was "subject to the War Cabinet"?
The Prime Minister: Subject to the War Cabinet against which this all-powerful potentate is not to hesitate to resign on every occasion if he could not get his way. It is a plan, but it is hot a plan in which I should personally be interested to take part, and I do not think that it is one which would commend itself to this House.
The setting down of this Vote of Censure by Members of all parties is a considerable event. Do not, I beg you, let the House underrate the gravity of what has been done. It has been trumpeted all round the world to our disparagement, and when every nation, friend and foe, is waiting to see what is the true resolve and conviction of the House of Commons it must go forward to the end. All over the world, throughout the United States, as I can testify, in Russia, far away in

Division No. 15.]

AYES.

Bellenger, F. J.

Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. L.

Spearman, A. C. M.

Bevan, A.

Kendall, W. D.

Stephen, C.

Bowles, F. G.

Kayes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir R.

Stokes, R. R.

Brown, W. J. (Rugby)

Kirby, B. V.

Wardlaw-Milne, Sir J. S.

Caine, G. R. Hall

Levy, T.

Williams, Sir H. G. (Croydon, S.)

Davies, Clement (Montgomery)

McGovern, J.

Gledhill, G.

Maxton, J.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Granville, E. L.

Morris-Jones, Sir Henry

Mr. Neil Maclean and

Guest, Dr. L. Haden (Islington, N.)

Reid, Capt. A. Cunningham (St. M.)

Commander Bower.

Horabin, T. L.

Silverman, S. S.

NOES.

Acland, Sir R. T. D

Benson, G.

Carver, Colonel W. H.

Aeland-Troyte, Lt.-Col. G. J.

Bernays, R. H.

Cary, R. A.

Adams, D. (Consett)

Berry, Capt. Hon. J. S.

Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)

Adams, Major S. V. T. (Leeds, W.)

Bevin, Rt. Hon. E.

Cazalet, Major V. A. (Chippenham)

Adamson, Jennie L. (Dartford)

Bird, Sir R. B.

Challen, Flight-Lieut. C.

Adamson, W. M. (Cannock)

Blair, Sir R.

Channon, H.

Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (H'lsbr.)

Blaker, Sir R.

Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)

Alexander, Bg.-Gn. Sir W. (G'gow C.)

Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C.

Chapman, Sir S. (Edinburgh, S.)

Allen, Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'd., W.)

Boothby, Flight-Lieut. R. J. G.

Charleton, H. C.

Allen, Lt.-Col. Sir W. J. (Armagh)

Bossom, A. C.

Chater, D.

Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.

Boulton, W. W.

Chorlton, A. E. L.

Ammon, C. G.

Bower, Norman (Harrow)

Christie, J. A.

Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)

Boyce, H. Leslie

Churchill, Rt. Hn. Winston S. (Ep'ing)

Anderson, Rt. Hon. Sir J. (So'h. Univ.)

Bracken, Rt. Hon. B.

Clarry, Sir Reginald

Anstruther-Gray, Capt. W. J.

Braithwaite, Major A. N. (Buckrose)

Cluse, W. S.

Aske, Sir R. W.

Braithwaite, Lt.-Cdr. J. G. (H'dern's)

Clynes, Rt. Hon. J. R.

Assheton, R.

Brass, Capt. Sir W.

Cobb, Captain E. C.

Astor, Lt.-Col. Hon. J. J. (Dover)

Briscoe, Capt. R. G.

Cologate, W. A.

Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.

Broad, F. A.

Collindridge, F.

Baillie, Sir A. W. M.

Broadbridge, Sir G. T.

Colman, N. C. D.

Balfour, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. H.

Brocklebank, Sir C. E. R.

Colville, Col. Rt. Hon. D. J.

Banfield, J. W.

Brooke, H.

Conant, Capt. R. J. E.

Barnes, A. J.

Brown, Rt. Hon. E. (Leith)

Cook, Lt.-Col. Sir T. R. A. M.(N'flk, N.)

Barstow, P. G.

Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Newbury)

Cooke, J. D. (Hammersmith, S.)

Bartlett, C. V. O.

Browne, Captain A. C. (Belfast, W.)

Cooper, Rt. Hon. A. Duff

Baxter, A. Beverley

Bullock, Capt. M.

Courthope, Col. Rt. Hon. Sir G. L.

Beamish, Rear-Admiral T P.

Burghley, Lord

Craven-Ellis, W.

Beattie, F.

Burgin, Rt. Hon. E. L.

Cripps, Rt. Hon. Sir Stafford

Beauchamp, Sir B. C.

Burke, W. A.

Critchley, A.

Beaumont, Hubert (Batley)

Burton, Col. H. W.

Crooke, Sir J. Smedley

Beaumont, Maj. Hn. R. E. B. (P'ts'h)

Butcher, Lieut. H. W.

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.

Beechman, N. A.

Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A.

Crowder, J. F. E.

Beit, Sir A. L.

Cadogan, Major Sir E.

Davidson, Viscountess (H'm'l H'mst'd)

Bennett, Sir P. F. B. (Edgbaston)

Campbell, Sir E. T.

Davies, Major Sir G. F. (Yeovil)

China and throughout every subjugated country all our friends are waiting to know whether there is a strong, solid Government in Britain and whether its national leadership is to be challenged or not. Every vote counts. If those who have assailed us are reduced to contemptible proportions and their Vote of Censure on the National Government is converted to a vote of censure upon its authors, make no mistake, a cheer will go up from every friend of Britain and every faithful servant of our cause, and the knell of disappointment will ring in the ears of the tyrants we are striving to overthrow.
Question put,
"That this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endurance of the Armed Forces of the Crown in circumstances of exceptional difficulty, has no confidence in the central direction of the war."
The House divided: Ayes, 25; Noes, 475.

Davison, Sir W. H.

Harris, Rt. Hon. Sir P. A.

Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Oliver

De Chair, Capt. S. S.

Harvey, T. E.

Mabane, W.

Da la Bere, R.

Haslam, Henry

MacAndrew, Colonel Sir C. G.

Denmam, Hon. R. D.

Hayday, A.

McCallum, Major D.

Denville, Alfred

Headlam, Lt.-Col. Sir C. M.

McConnell, Sir J.

Digby, Capt. K. S. D. W.

Heilgers, Major F. F. A.

McCorquedale, Malcolm S.

Dobbie, W.

Hely-Hutchinson, M. R.

Macdonald, G. (Ince)

Dodd, J. S

Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)

Macdonald, Capt. P. (Isle of Wight)

Doland, G. F.

Henderson, J. (Ardwick)

McEntee, V. La T.

Donner, Squadron-Leader P. W.

Henderson, J. J. Craik (Leeds, N. E.)

McEwen, Capt. J. H. F.

Douglas, F. C. R.

Henderson, T. (Tradeston)

Mack, J. D.

Drewe, C.

Heneage, Lt.-Col. A. P.

McKie, J. H.

Driberg, T. E. N.

Hepburn, P. G. T. Buchan

McKinlay, A. S.

Duckworth, Arthur (Shrewsbury)

Hepworth, J.

Macmillan, Rt. Hon. H. (Stockton)

Dugdale, John (W. Bromwich)

Herbert, Petty Officer A. P. (Oxford U.)

MacMilian, M. (Western Isles)

Dugdale, Major T. L. (Richmond)

Hicks, E. G.

Macnamara, Lt.-Col. J. R. J.

Duggan, H. J.

Higgs, W. F.

McNeil, H.

Duncan, Rt. Hon. Sir A. R. (C. Ldn.)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Magnay, T.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L. (Kons'gt'n, N.)

Holline, A. (Hanley)

Maitland, Sir A.

Dunn, E.

Holline, J. H. (Silvertown)

Makins, Brig.-Gen. Sir E.

Ede, J. C.

Holmes, J. S.

Mander, G. le M.

Eden, Rt. Hon. A.

Horsbrugh, Florence

Markham, Major S. F.

Edmondson, Major Sir J.

Howitt, Dr. A. B.

Marlowe, Major A.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Sir C. (Bedwellty)

Hudson, Capt. Sir A. U. M. (Hckny, N.)

Marshall, F.

Elliot, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. W. E.

Hudson, Rt. Hon. R. S. (Southport)

Martin, J. H.

Ellis, Sir G.

Hughes, R. M.

Mathers, G.

Elliston, Captain G. S.

Hulbert, Wing Commander N. J.

Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.

Emery, J. F.

Hume, Sir G. H.

Medlicott, Colonel Frank

Emmott, C. E. G. O.

Hunter, T.

Mellor, Sir J. S. P.

Emrys-Evans, P. V.

Hurd, Sir P. A.

Mills, Sir F. (Leylon, E.)

Entwistle, Sir C. F.

Hutchinson, G. C. (Ilford)

Mills, Colonel J. D. (New Forest)

Errington, Squadron-Leader E.

Hutchison, Lt.-Com. G. I. C. (E'burgh)

Milner, Major J.

Erskine-Hill, A. G.

Isaacs, G. A.

Mitchell, Colonel H. P.

Evans, Colonel A. (Cardiff, S.)

Jagger, J.

Mitcheson, Sir G. G.

Evans, D. O. (Cardigan)

James, Wing-Comdr. A. W. H.

Molson, A. H. E.

Everard, Sir W. Lindsay

Jarvis, Sir J. J.

Montague, F.

Fildes, Sir H.

Jeffreys, Gen. Sir G. D.

Moore, Lieut.-Col. Sir T. C. R.

Findlay, Sir E.

Jenkins, A. (Pontypool)

Morgan, Dr. H. B. W. (Rochdale)

Fleming, Squadron-Leader E. L.

Jenkins, Sir W. (Neath)

Morgan, R. H. (Stourbridge)

Foot, D. M.

Jennings, R.

Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Universities)

Foster, W.

Jewson, P. W.

Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Hackney, S.)

Fox, Flight-Lieut, fir G. W. G.

John, W.

Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)

Frankel, D.

Johnston, Rt. Hn. T. (Stl'g &amp; C'km'n)

Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)

Fraser, Capt. Sir Ian

Johnstone, H. (Middesbrough, W.)

Mort, D. L.

Fremantle, Sir F. E.

Jones, A. C. (Shipley)

Mott-Radcliffe, Captain C. E.

Furness, S. N.

Jones, Sir G. W. H. (S'k Newington)

Muff, G.

Fyte, Major Sir D. P. M.

Jones, Sir H. Haydn (Merioneth)

Naylor, T. E.

Gallacher, W.

Jones, L. (Swansea, W.)

Neven-Spence, Major B. H. H.

Gammans, Capt. L. D.

Jowitt, Rt. Hon. Sir W. A.

Nicholson, Captain G. (Farnham)

Gardnar, B. W.

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Nicolson, Hon. H. G. (Leicester, W.)

Garro Jones, G. M.

Keeling, E. H.

Nunn, W.

Gates, Major E. E.

Kennedy, Rt. Hon. T.

Oldfield, W. H.

George, Maj. Rt. Hn. G. Lloyd (P'broke)

Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)

Oliver, G. H.

Gibbins, J.

Kerr, Sir John Graham (Scottish U's)

O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir H.

Gibson, Sir C. G.

Kay, C. W.

Orr-Ewing, I. L.

Gluckstein, Major L. H.

Kimball, Major L.

Owen, Major G.

Glyn, Sir R. G. C.

King-Hall, Commander W. S. R.

Paling, W.

Goldie, N. B.

Lakin, C. H. A.

Palmer, G. E. H.

Gower, Sir R. V.

Lamb, Sir J. Q.

Peake, O.

Graham, Captain A. C. (Wirral)

Lambert, Rt. Hon. G.

Pearson, A.

Grant-Ferris, Wing-Commander R.

Lancaster, Lieut.-Col. C. G.

Peat, C. U.

Green, W. H. (Deptford)

Law, R. K.

Perkins, W. R. D.

Greene, W. P. C. (Worsester)

Lawson, J. J.

Peters, Dr. S. J.

Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A.

Leach, W.

Petherick, Major M.

Grenfell, D. R.

Lees-Jones, J.

Pethick-Lawrence, Rt. Hon. F. W.

Gretton, Col. Rt. Hon. J.

Leigh, Sir J.

Peto, Major B. A. J.

Grey, Captain G. C.

Leighton, Major B. E. P.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Gridley, Sir A. B.

Lennox-Boyd, A. T. L.

Pilkington, Captain R. A.

Griffiths, G. A. (Hemsworth)

Leonard, W.

Plugge, Capt. L. F.

Griffiths, J. (Llanelly)

Leslie, J. R.

Ponsonby, Col. C. E.

Grigg, Sir E. W. M. (Altrincham)

Lewis, O.

Power, Sir J. C

Grigg, Rt. Hon. Sir P. J. (Cardiff, E.)

Liddall, W. S.

Pownall, Lt.-Col. Sir Asshston

Grimston, R. V.

Lindsay, K. M.

Pritt, D. N.

Gritten, W. G. Howard

Linstead, H. N.

Procter, Major H. A.

Groves, T. E.

Lipson, D. L.

Profumo, Captain J. D.

Guest, Lt.-Col. H. (Drake)

Little, Sir E. Graham- (London Univ.)

Purbrick, R.

Guest, Major Hn. O. (C'mb'w'l, N. W.)

Little, Dr. J. (Down)

Pym, L. R.

Guinness, T. L. E. B.

Llewellin, Col. Rt. Hon. J. J.

Quibell, D. J. K.

Gunston, Capt. Sir D. W.

Lloyd, C. E. (Dudley)

Radford, E. A.

Hacking, Rt. Hon. Sir D. H.

Lloyd, Major E. G. R. (Renfrew, E.)

Raikes, Flight-Lieut. H. V. A. M.

Hall, Rt. Hon. G. H. (Aberdare)

Lloyd, G. W. (Ladywood)

Ramsden, Sir E.

Hall, W. G. (Colne Valley)

Looker-Lampson, Commander O. S.

Rankin, Sir R.

Hambro, A. V.

Logan, D. G.

Rathbone, Eleanor (English Univ's.)

Hannah, I. C.

Lucas, Major Sir J. K.

Rawson, Sir Cooper

Hannon, Sir P. J. H.

Lyle, Sir C. E. Leonard

Rayner, Lieut.-Col. R. H.

612

613

Reakes, G. L. (Wallasey)

Smithers, Sir W.

Ward, Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)

Reed, A. C. (Exeter)

Snadden, W. McN.

Ward, Irene M. B. (Wallsond)

Reed, Sir H. S. (Aylesbury)

Somerset, T.

Waterhouse, Capt. C.

Reid, Rt. Hon. J. S. C. (Hillhead)

Somervell, Rt. Hon. Sir D. B.

Watkins, F. C.

Reid, W. Allan (Derby)

Spens, W. P.

Watson, W. McL.

Richards, R.

Stanley, Col. Rt. Hon. Oliver

Watt, F. C. (Edinburgh Cen.)

Rickards, G. W.

Stewart, W. Joseph (H'gton-le-Spring.)

Watt, Lt.-Col. G. S. H. (Richmond)

Ridley, G.

Storey, S.

Wayland, Sir W. A.

Riley, B.

Strauss, H. G. (Norwich)

Webbe, Sir W. Harold

Ritson, J.

Strickland, Capt. W. F.

Wedderburn, H. J. S.

Robertson, D. (Streatham)

Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (Northwich)

Wells, Sir S. Richard

Robertson, Rt. Hn. Sir M. A. (M'ham)

Studholme, Captain H. G.

Weston, W. Garfield

Robinson, J. B. (Blackpool)

Suetor, Rear-Admiral Sir M. F.

Westwood, J.

Robinson, W. A. (St. Helens)

Summars, G. S.

While, Sir Dymoke (Fareham)

Ropner, Col. L.

Summerskill, Dr. Edith

White, H. (Derby, N. E.)

Ross, Major Sir R. D. (Londonderry)

Sutcliffe, H.

White, H. Graham (Birkenhead, E.)

Ross Taylor, W.

Sykes, Maj.-Gen. Rt. Hon. Sir F. H.

Wickham, Lt.-Col. E. T. R.

Rowlands, G.

Tasker, Sir R. I.

Wilkinson, Ellen

Russell, Sir A. (Tynemouth)

Tate, Mavis C.

Williams, C. (Torquay)

Russell, R. J. (Eddisbury)

Taylor, Capt. C. S. (Eastbourne)

Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)

Russell, S. H. M. (Darwen)

Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (P'd'ton, S.)

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Salt, E. W.

Taylor, H. B. (Mansfield)

Willink, H. U.

Sanderson, Sir F. B.

Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)

Wilmot, John

Sandys, E. D.

Thomas, I. (Keighley)

Windsor, W.

Savory, Professor D. L.

Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)

Windsor-Clive, Lt.-Col. G.

Sahuster, Sir G. E.

Thomas, Dr. W. S. Russell (S'th'm'tn)

Wise, Major A. R.

Scott, Donald (Wansbeck)

Thomson, Sir J. D. W.

Womersley, Rt. Hon. Sir W.

Selley, H. R.

Thorne, W.

Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir K. (W'lwich, W.)

Shakespeare, Sir G. H.

Thorneycroft, Major G. E. P.

Woodburn, A.

Shaw, Major P. S. (Waventree)

Thornton-Kemsley, Major C. N.

Woods, G. S. (Finsbury)

Shaw, Capt. W. T. (Forfar)

Thurtle, E.

Woolley, W. E.

Shepperson, Sir E. W.

Tinker, J. J.

Wragg, H.

Shute, Col. Sir J. J.

Titchfield, Lt.-Col. Marquess of

Wright, Mrs. Beatrice F. (Bodmin)

Silkin, L.

Tomlinson, G.

Wright, Wing Commander J. A. C.

Sinclair, Rt. Hon. Sir A.

Touche, G. C.

York, Capt. C.

Smiles, Lt.-Col. Sir W. D.

Tufnell, Lieut.-Comdr. R. L.

Young, A. S. L. (Partick)

Smith, Ben (Rotherhithe)

Wakefield, W. W.

Young, Sir R. (Newton)

Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)

Walkden, A. G. (Bristol, S.)

Smith, E. (Stoke)

Walkden, E. (Doncaster)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)

Walker, J.

Mr. James Stuart and

Smith, T. (Normanton)

Walker-Smith, Sir J.

Mr. Whiteley.

The Orders of the Day were read, and postponed.

ADJOURNMENT.
Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. James Stuart.]
POST OFFICE.
  Savings Bank (Statistics).
  Savings Bank (Statistics).
  Staff (Military Service).
  Staff (Military Service).
AGRICULTURE.
  Tomatoes (Greenhouses, Sterilisation).
  Tomatoes (Greenhouses, Sterilisation).
  Harvest (A.R.P. Workers).
  Harvest (A.R.P. Workers).
  Weed Destruction (Military Sites).
  Weed Destruction (Military Sites).
  FUEL ECONOMY.
  FUEL ECONOMY.
  ORPHAN CHILDREN (CARE).
  ORPHAN CHILDREN (CARE).
  CAMPS (CONTRACTS).
  CAMPS (CONTRACTS).
  BRICK INDUSTRY (CLOSED WORKS).
  BRICK INDUSTRY (CLOSED WORKS).
FOOD SUPPLIES.
  Strawberries (Price).
  Strawberries (Price).
  Potatoes (Stock Feed).
  Potatoes (Stock Feed).
NATIONAL WAR EFFORT.
  Regional Production Board, Wales.
  Regional Production Board, Wales.
  Women (Registration).
  Women (Registration).
  UNEMPLOYMENT (STATISTICS).
  UNEMPLOYMENT (STATISTICS).
  SOCIAL SERVICES (COST).
  SOCIAL SERVICES (COST).
  COAL VANS (WEIGHTS AND SCALES).
  COAL VANS (WEIGHTS AND SCALES).
  BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR.
  BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR.
BRITISH ARMY.
  Officers (Relegation to Unemployment).
  Officers (Relegation to Unemployment).
  Dispensing Duties.
  Dispensing Duties.
  Missing Personnel, Far East (Dependants' Allowances).
  Missing Personnel, Far East (Dependants' Allowances).
  Home Guard.
  Home Guard.
  Heavy Guns (Transport).
  Heavy Guns (Transport).
  Requisitioning Order, East Anglia.
  Requisitioning Order, East Anglia.
  ROYAL AIR FORCE (DIVE BOMBERS).
  ROYAL AIR FORCE (DIVE BOMBERS).
  MERCANTILE MARINE (GREASERS).
  MERCANTILE MARINE (GREASERS).
  ROAD SIGNS (CONTRACTORS' NOTICES).
  ROAD SIGNS (CONTRACTORS' NOTICES).
Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved by Lord Addison yesterday—namely, That there be laid before the House Papers relating to the conduct of the war, with special reference to events in North Africa and in the Mediterranean.
LORD LATHAM: My Lords, I rise to support the Motion submitted by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition and, having regard to the course which the debate took yesterday, to recall to your Lordships the purpose of this Motion. It is to draw the attention of your Lordships' House to the very serious events which have occurred and are still occurring in North Africa, and to reflect in this House the grave disquietude which undoubtedly exists outside with regard to these events. I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Addison, submitted his Motion in terms of restraint and caution, neither seeking scalps nor heresy-hunting.
The noble Viscount the Leader of the House, in his opening remarks, referred with a pride which we are all entitled to share to the fact that in this country, almost alone in Europe, the right of free discussion still exists; but I must confess I was a little perturbed by the strictures with which he concluded his speech and his vehement reference to Lord Addison, which seemed to suggest that the exercise of free discussion was acceptable only if it were not distasteful to the Government. The noble Viscount did himself less than justice, and certainly did Lord Addison less than justice, in challenging the right of criticism of the Government unless it is also accompanied by an intention to turn the Government out. We on these Benches take the view that there is another and, in the circumstances which exist, more desirable course, and that is to offer not only as a right, but as a duty lying upon us, free and frank criticism of the Government if we feel
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that that criticism will inure to the improvement and advancement of the war effort. May I say that, short as is the period in which I have had the privilege of being a member of your Lordships' House, I have already learnt to appreciate the abundant courtesy of the noble Viscount the Leader of the House; and I am sure he will acquit me of any desire myself to be discourteous if I remind him with every respect that he occupies the distinguished office with distinction which he does to-day as a result mainly of criticism which was made of the then existing War Cabinet, and he himself in his own person reflects the justice of criticism both in this House and elsewhere.
When he taunts the Leader of the Opposition on what appeared to his mind to be the only course that he should take—namely, turn out the Government—I would remind the Leader of the House that with his assent or otherwise—and I know it is otherwise—those who initiated the vote of censure in another place were members of his Party and not of the Party represented on these Benches. But it is important that the right of criticism in this House should be preserved and that it should not be resented by those whose duty and obligation it may be to reply for the Government. I think in The Times of yesterday the position is tersely but accurately expressed. The Times said:
" But the responsibility remains that of the Government as a whole. The public asks for nothing better than to be able to give Mr. Churchill and his team its confidence. But the confidence must be mutual. If relations have deteriorated under the pressure of events, it is largly because criticism and counsel have been met with resentment or accepted with reluctance."
That is an abundantly accurate summary, I submit to your Lordships, of the position at the present time, and of the intentions of my noble friends on these Benches in submitting this Motion.
I am not speaking in this debate as an expert. I can claim no expert knowledge of the arts and mysteries of war. I will seek, if I may, to reflect what I conceive to be the attitude of the man in the street. What are the facts? In the initial stages of the present campaign in Libya the people were encouraged to view its outcome with optimism. They were encouraged in that not only by official

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communiqués and unofficial statements, but by no less a person than the Prime Minister and no less a General than General Auchinleck. We were told that for the first time our gallant and doughty soldiers would be facing the enemy on equal terns. We were told that there was air superiority, and that there were vast reserves of materials, including new materials. A dispatch from General Auchinleck was read with unconcealed satisfaction, and at the end of it an appreciative reference was made to the 6-pounder gun. The echoes of the reading of that statement in another place had hardly died away before this battle took a turn against us, and the public are perplexed, they are impatient, and they are almost angry at the situation which now faces this country. No citizen of good will would seek to incite or fan that anger, but it is the duty of public representatives to reflect this feeling and to discharge their responsibility by inquiry and by criticism.
I hope that from this day onwards we shall abandon the practice of winning battles, as far as communiqués are concerned, before they are finished. Nothing more disturbs the morale of the people than to encourage them to high expectation and then to have that high expectation flung down by the facts. It is, I think, obvious that in North Africa we have been out-weaponed and out-generalled. The House yesterday listened to a long and impressive speech from Lord Beaverbrook, and to a speech from the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, but I doubt whether there is any member of your Lordships' House who can say that there were any serious answers to the criticisms which have been made of these events in North Africa. Lord Beaverbrook, it seemed to me, proved too much. He told us that we enjoyed in Libya an abundant superiority of weapons as regards quantity and that we were not inferior as regards quality. That statement of course does not coincide with what the Government spokesman in another place, Mr. Lyttelton, said yesterday. He said that the first cause was tactical mistakes, the second the unsuitability of our Crusader tanks under desert conditions—I will come back to the Crusader tank in a moment if I may—and the third, the superior armament in weight and range of the German tank.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: Would the noble Lord allow me to say that the quotation from the speech in the other place relates to the battle in 1941, not to the recent battle. This is the description of the battle of 1941.
LORD LATHAM: I must confess that that statement occasions me some surprise. We of course are only open to the normal resources of published papers and I am reading from the Evening Standard.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: If you take The Times you will see it.
LORD LATHAM: My reading of The Times up to the present has not disclosed that those statements had any reference to other than the conflict which has recently been taking place. I believe my view is shared by many other people. I do not myself otherwise see the relevancy of the statement made by Mr. Lyttelton in a debate upon what has occurred within the last six weeks. But if I may go on with the quotation from The Times. I said I thought the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, sought to prove too much. The Times said this morning that he (referring to the noble Lord)
" claimed that the British equipment available for Libya was actually superior in quality to the corresponding German weapons. His argument would have been cogent enough if it had not been tested by the actual facts of last month's battle. As it was, it came near recalling the French surgeon who, when asked whether his operation had succeeded, replied: ' Assez bien—il est mort, mais il est mort guéri '."
The noble Lord told us yesterday that if the advantages of some of the arms of this country were weighed against the advantages of those possessed by the enemy on balance it more or less came out right. For instance, the noble Lord said the Crusader tank was faster than the German tank but the Valentines and the Matildas were slower and they, so to speak, balanced themselves. My reply to that is that they do not unless the proportion in numbers of tanks balance themselves. If we had a large number of the faster tanks and only a few of the slower tanks then you might find the situation balanced, but if we had only a few of the faster tanks and most of our tanks were slower, then I confess I cannot see how the disadvantage in equipment would disappear. Mr. Lyttelton, I

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gather, said that the Crusader tanks were unsuitable to desert conditions.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: In 1941.
LORD LATHAM: I take it that even if Mr. Lyttelton was referring to the 1941 campaign that is still the case. The Crusader tank, if it was unsuitable for desert conditions then, is, I take it, still unsuitable.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: In 1941.
LORD LATHAM: Does the noble Lord say the Crusader tank was altered and that it is now suitable for desert conditions?
LORD BEAVERBROOK: Yes.
LORD LATHAM: Then I can only say that it is a pity that that small crumb of comfort was not given to the public by Mr. Lyttelton in his statement yesterday. The noble Lord asks me to read a passage from The Times report of Mr. Lyttelton's speech yesterday, which is headed "1941 Libyan Campaign." It says:
" Turning to the tactical plans for our offensive in Egypt in 1941, it was thought we then had, in spite of the existence of the 50 mm. guns, a sufficient number of tanks to obtain victory. This proved to be true, but our guns were subsequently lost owing to three causes. The first was tactical mistakes. Our operations south of Benghazi turned out to be over-enterprising in the then situation. The forces which we were able to maintain and supply were too weak for attack, and too widely extended for defence."
I must say that that statement seems to me not to bear out what I am saying, but lest there should be any misunderstanding I should like to have an opportunity of reading the whole statement to see exactly what materiality the reference to the campaign of 1941 has to the matter which was under discussion in another place yesterday and is again under discussion to-day.
Similarly, with reference to the disadvantage of our tanks in gun-power, that surely has a bearing upon the number of the heavier General Grant tanks that we have in operation. The General Grant tank, we are advised, is a very formidable weapon, but I understand from those qualified to express an opinion, that it suffers from one very serious defect—namely, that the gun is mounted beside the turret and the field of fire is very restricted by that fact. I am told that to secure an all-round field
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of fire you must manœuvre the tank completely and that an all-round field of fire cannot be obtained merely by manœuvring the gun itself. I am told also that under conditions of fluid and mobile warfare, such as arise in the desert, that is a very serious disability.
The noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, offered no explanation at all of the tragic events in North Africa except, if I may say so with every respect, to explain that really we were lucky not to have lost the battle in December last. I think that is not an unfair interpretation of his words when he was referring to the battle of last December. I am confident that the man in the street will not be satisfied with the absence of adequate explanation of these terrible events in North Africa. He will not be satisfied by reference to the 1941 Libyan campaign. He will want an explanation of what has occurred this year. In that connexion I may perhaps be permitted to read the quotation from a leading article in The Times of June 24:
" In the battles of a year ago our troops were using, by German standards, obsolescent weapons; last week by the same standards, their equipment was obsolescent still
" This is perhaps the most insistent of the questions now disturbing the public mind. How comes it that, as we approach the fourth year of war, our armament still lags behind the enemy's in quantity and design—and especially in design? This question can be answered in London without adding to the embarrassments of the Commanders now standing on the defensive in Egypt."
The Times of June 27 said:
" The tanks and the tactics employed by us in Libya this year might have sufficed to overwhelm Rommel in 1941. It will be equally poor consolation if the methods and the equipment of 1943 are good enough to defeat the enemy of 1942."
I believe it is the case that a celebrated General some years ago said that we had the peculiar faculty of always having the right weapons in the wrong year. At the moment the course of this struggle seems to have endowed him with a prophetic prescience. The noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, when dealing with the question of the inferior type of tank that we possess as compared with the enemy tank, sought to justify the situation by stating that the German tank had been designed in 1937. I am unable to dispute that, and I accept it, but the question that seems to me to emerge from that statement is when did we know of

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the design of this tank and did we put a design for a tank on the drawing board which was calculated to be less efficient than this tank? That, I submit, is the real point at issue. Are we to regard it as being a continuing virtue always to have something a little less efficient than that possessed by our enemies?
The noble Viscount referred also to dive bombers The confusion as to dive bombers has certainly been substantially added to as the result of the debates in another place and in this House this week, but I think it is quite clear that however valid were the reasons—and I am not disputing them—why we were not able to get on with the production of dive bombers, the fact that we gave an order for dive bombers indicates that we regarded then as being useful. The mere fact that other demands prevented the order from being completed, that other priorities had to take a more prominent place, does not dispose of the point that, if we ordered dive bombers, presumably they were regarded as a useful weapon. I hesitate to quote the Evening Standard again, especially in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Beaver-brook, and I cannot say whether this statement refers to this year or the last, but Mr. Lyttleton is reported to have said in another place that "some dive bombers have already reached one theatre of war—the admirable precision of that, I think, is very encouraging—" and others are on the way." Presumably that means that we do attach some importance to dive bombers, but the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, said yesterday that he doubted the suitability of the dive bomber for desert warfare.. If it were the case that dive bombers are not appropriate to desert warfare, I would find it difficult to understand why General Rommel so consistently uses them. Up to the moment he has not shown that he uses instruments of war that are useless. It would, perhaps, have been more encouraging to us if he had adopted that habit. Also it is quite correct (is it not?) that dive bombers were used at Kerch in the Crimea, at Sebastopol, at Bir Hacheim and also at Tobruk.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, I think if the noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting I must say one word here. I told
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the House that I am not an expert on dive bombers, and I said that I had made inquiries. The result of those inquiries, I stated, had shown that dive bombers were not suitable for desert war. But since I have spoken I have had confirmation of what I said from a much finer source than any that I could otherwise have drawn upon. The noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, who is the greatest authority on air warfare in this country, said yesterday in the course of the debate.
" From such information as reaches me from different sources, he "—
the noble Viscount here was referring to General Rommel—
" had but a small number of them, while I doubt if the dive bomber is tactically an effective method of attack against tanks moving deployed across the desert."
That I submit is confirmation of what I said.
LORD LATHAM: I am obliged. I have a great admiration for the very enduring work that the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, performed in connexion with the establishment and growth of the Royal Air Force, and for the glorious tradition which that arm of the Service has developed. But I confess that I am not prepared—and I do not believe that other people outside who are capable of much more expert judgment than I are prepared—to accept the statement of the noble and gallant Viscount as finally conclusive on that issue. I have listened on many occasions with much profit and with no little enjoyment to the formidable statements made by the noble and gallant Viscount in this House about the Air Force, and I have felt that the next thing to committing a cardinal sin would be to criticize anything that Lord Trenchard said about the Royal Air Force. I feel that if he had lived in earlier days he would willingly have consigned a critic of the R.A.F. to the stake and would have felt that he was performing a public duty in doing so. I repeat that the enemy has shown the utility of dive bombers. The enemy has shown it. And I believe that the Intelligence Section of our Army takes the view that the dive bomber would have been of utility in Libya and that it is suitable for effective attack under desert warfare conditions. I cannot, of course, question the sources of the noble Viscount's information, but it would be more conclusive if we were told that the

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informant was an officer who has been subjected to dive bombing in the desert itself.
May I pray in aid some support from a third party in regard to dive bombers? There was a letter in The Times of June 27 from Mr. T. C. L. Westbrook, who is not unknown I believe to the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, and who, I understand, performed very satisfactory services with Lord Beaverbrook and was sent out to Egypt because of his capacity. This is what Mr. Westbrook wrote:
" Every one who has had first-hand experience of the dive bomber in Greece and Libya has the greatest respect for them if properly used, especially if it is possible to use them in conjunction with a fighter umbrella. When in Libya last summer I reported home, among other things—some done—that it was essential to have dive bombers and 6-pounder guns if we were going to defeat the enemy."
I submit that that statement is worthy of your Lordships' consideration.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I do not wish to interrupt, but may I ask the noble Lord if he has seen a report from an Australian correspondent out there, and many other reports, pointing out that casualties among gunners have been slight and damage negligible as the result of action by dive bombers? That is what I said yesterday.
LORD LATHAM: No, I have not seen that. I shall be quite prepared to be influenced by anything that the noble Viscount may say, but he must not assume in advance that I shall accept it. On the question of tactics I propose only to pose a series of questions which I think are disturbing the mind of the man in the street. Have we really yet in the Higher Command got a tank mentality? Is the situation really that mechanized warfare with tanks is accepted as a normal and inevitable part of modern warfare, or is there still in the Higher Command the attitude of mind so disastrous in the French General Staff in its opposition to the ideas and views of General de Gaulle? Are we still using tanks as mechanized infantry instead of as mechanized cavalry? These questions are being asked outside. People are asking whether there is a disposition, perhaps, in some quarters in the Army of this country still to regard mechanical warfare as an unwarrantable intrusion into the otherwise gentle art of war. I hope that before this debate is
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concluded we may have some information on that very important point.
I now come with much trepidation, especially in view of the proximity of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, to the question of the relationship between the Air Force and the Army. I understand—and I have no reason to doubt that it is the case—that in the campaign in North Africa there has been the closest co-operation between the land forces and the Air Force. I accept that; but it is abundantly clear that, if that is the case, the closest co-operation is not enough, and what we want is combined operation—not co-operation, but combined operation; not an operation being undertaken by the Army in which it is supported by the Air Force, but a combined operation undertaken by both under one command and one direction. There is all the difference in the world, in my view, between the Army projecting an operation, and then seeking the co-operation of the Air Force, and the operation being from the very start regarded as a combined and joint operation, in which there is not only co-operation between one and the other but both are parts of a single unit. I say in all seriousness that we really cannot go on losing men, losing materials and losing battles in order to preserve the isolationism of any particular Service. All Services and all arms are part of the great war machine of this country, and their identity must be subservient and subordinate to the purpose of winning the war in the shortest possible time.
In that connexion, perhaps I may be permitted another quotation, this time from the Evening Standard of June 27 of this year. It says:
" The man responsible for airplanes operating from the Sicilian bases was Air-Marshal Kesselring, Germany's No. 1 air tactician. Let him give evidence. This is how he conceives the function of his force. He wrote this after the conclusion of the battle for Crete. ' The Luftwaffe would never have achieved its tasks in the recent campaigns of movement had it not constantly paid attention to one factor throughout its training and development: namely, to become a part of the Wehrmacht; to think and act in terms of the Wehrmacht, and thus to fit itself unconditionally mentally and practically into the battles of the Land Forces.' "
That is the quotation, and then the Evening Standard goes on to say:
" This conception of the Air Force was ruthlessly employed against the Eighth Army.

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It left our Forces reeling and retreating, and it left the R.A.F, with its air superiority. Which proved decisive? "
We know, unhappily, which proved decisive. I do urge, if I may, the immediate consideration of the adoption of a policy which will enable our Land Forces to have the fullest aid from the Air Force by their being combined in operations, and not merely being asked to co-operate in operations.
I should like to say a word about Tobruk. Probably the most disturbing factor in this unhappy campaign was the sudden loss of Tobruk. There can have been no doubt as to the importance of Tobruk, because in the first dispatch from General Auchinleck, read in another place on June 2, he said:
" From captured documents it is clear that Rommel's object was to defeat our Armed Forces and capture Tobruk."
Evidently Rommel attached great importance, and quite properly, to Tobruk. We were told that the place was adequately garrisoned, but within twenty-four hours it had gone. One is moved to inquire, I think with justification, whether preparatory steps towards the defence of Tobruk were taken in time. It is said in one newspaper that it was broadcast from Rome—of course, like most of your Lord ships, I accept broadcasts from Rome with a certain amount of hesitancy—that when Tobruk was captured British headquarters were found to be intact; files were lying on the desks and orders were still pinned up on the wall. If that is so it is a tragic circumstance, and really goes to show, if I may say so, that even when we have to evacuate a place we do not know how to do it, because to leave headquarters intact must inevitably result in vital information coming into the possession of the enemy.
Finally, let me refer to the question of the Minister of Defence. I share the view which has long been held by my noble friend Lord Addison, and which he has from time to time, like others, advanced in your Lordships' House, that it would be better if the Prime Minister was not also Minister of Defence. What we need is a Combined Central Staff presided over by a civilian of the type referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in his very informative speech earlier in the debate. That General Staff should report direct to the Cabinet. I agree with, and was very much impressed by, a statement
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made in an earlier debate by the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, to the effect that under the present system the impact of the political mind upon military decisions is too early. I think that that is the case, and I believe that it would operate to the better conduct of the war if the Prime Minister were relieved of the burden of being Minister of Defence.
The Prime Minister is seeking to carry too much. Public confidence in him is undiminished, but people arc disquieted by the load of responsibility which he insists upon taking. I think his public stature would be enhanced, if that were possible, by his being willing to delegate some of the work which ought to be delegated; and the office and duties of Minister of Defence are among the things which ought to be delegated. That does not mean that the Prime Minister would have any diminished authority; as Prime Minister, as head of the War Cabinet, his authority would be undiminished, and he would, with his colleagues in the War Cabinet, come to the consideration of the problems posed by the General Staff fresh and free to give those problems the fullest and most careful consideration.
In the course of his speech the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, referred to the need for fortitude and faith in the face of these heavy reverses. None of us will disagree with that. None of us will question the faith and fortitude of the British people, especially after what they have faced with fortitude since September, 1939. But something more than faith and fortitude are required. It is not sufficient for our people merely to have faith and fortitude; it is necessary also that they should be satisfied that affairs arc being properly conducted, that members of your Lordships' House and members of another place are exercising their right of criticism, arc keeping the Government up to scratch by proper criticism, otherwise you will have added to faith and fortitude that terrible vice, complacency. The Times in my view, on June 27, summed up this situation, and in conclusion I will ask permission to read this further quotation:
" These are new times; and more than enough has happened to show that they call for fresh minds and new methods. The causes of failure lie deeper than any individual incompetence; they lie in the inadequacy of a whole outlook, a whole method of approach. We have failed hitherto to solve the problems of mechanized warfare and air co-operation in part, at any rate, because they have been

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viewed through the distorting lenses of now obsolete tactics and training. The demand for a Combined General Staff springs from the belief that strategy can be planned only hymen not owing particular allegiance to one Service, but freed, trained and accustomed to think simultaneously and equally in terms of air, sea and land. The demand that positions of military responsibility should go to younger men rests on a conviction, not that the virtues of youth always outweigh the virtues of age, but that the younger the commander, the more likely he is to be both tank-minded and air-minded."
That expresses what is being felt in my view by the man in the street. I beg the noble Visccunt, the Leader of the House, not to resent the Motion which has been submitted to your Lordships' House, and not to resent the careful, statesmanlike terms in which it was moved by the Leader of my friends on these Benches, and to convey to the Government that the people of this country are seriously disturbed. Their faith in the Prime Minister and his team is by and large undiminished, but we cannot afford to have a repetition of North Africa.
LORD DENMAN: My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord said at the beginning of his able speech that there is grave anxiety in the country to-day on account of the recent events in North Africa. All over the country people are asking what are the causes of our defeat in Libya. We have to find the answer, because, after all, we have had a good deal of experience in desert warfare, and if we cannot succeed there, how will it be possible for us, if and when a Second Front comes into being, to defeat or to cope with the more numerous and more powerful German Armies we shall have to meet in those circumstances? I wish to trespass for a few moments this afternoon on your Lordships' time to analyse briefly some at all events of the causes of our reverses in Libya. First of all there seems a general consensus of opinion that one, if not the chief, reason was inferiority of tank armament. Not that our tanks in themselves are inferior, but that they were equipped with the 2-pounder gun; and that brings me to a consideration of the able and very interesting speech to which we listened yesterday afternoon from the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook.
I think, if I may say so, that that speech was more convincing in some parts
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than in others. I was convinced by what he said about the delay in the production of the dive bomber. I thought that there he had a good case to present to your Lordships, but I thought a less satisfactory part of his speech was that in which he dealt with the tanks, and in particular with the armament, the 2-pounder gun. So far as I could follow him he seemed to think that because in Libya there were a small number of General Grant tanks armed with 75 mm. guns and a large number of our tanks armed with the 2-pounder gun, that should have put us on equal terms with the enemy, whose tanks were mainly armed with the 47 mm. gun. I do not think that the crews of our small tanks who were outranged and outgunned by the enemy would share that view.
When last I spoke in this House on the 5th May, I mentioned the experience of our Army in Libya last autumn, with particular reference to our inferiority in the matter of gun power and tanks, and I little thought then that these tragic events would be re-enacted six or seven months later, as has been the case. I noticed that General Sir Sidney Clive, the former Adjutant-General, said in a letter to The Times the other day that last summer German prisoners who were taken by us expressed admiration for our tanks, but they marvelled that they were armed with popguns; and I would also quote from The Times correspondent in the Western Desert who wrote this:
" The bulk of our tank forces was made up of Matildas, Crusaders and Valentines, all armed with the little 2-pounder gun, which has again and again proved almost completely useless against the German tanks, all equipped with the 47 mm. gun."
The War Office must have known a long time ago about the inferiority of our 2-pounder gun. I believe it is the case that after the fall of France the Director of Artillery at the War Office recommended that tanks should be equipped with the 6-pounder gun. The noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, advanced reasons why, after the fall of France, it was impossible to do that. But I still am not convinced that after the position at home had been restored it would not have been possible to turn out some machines that would have enabled us to meet the enemy on betters terms than we could with tanks armed with 2-pounder guns.
Being interested in these matters, I happened to see the other day on a bookstall

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a pamphlet issued for the Ministry of Supply by the Ministry of Information, entitled British Tanks: What they look like, how they work, what they can do. Yon can buy this for sixpence net, or 50 copies for 20s. It contains first of all a quotation from a speech by the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, also a photograph of the noble Lord which, if I may say so, is an excellent likeness, and well worth the sum of money involved. It also gives details of the various tanks that are in use. It is rather a large document, and I am not going to quote at any length from it. But it gives the names of the tanks—the Valentine, the Covenanter, the Matilda and the Crusader—and it gives the details of the speed, the horse-power and the armament. They are all armed with the 2-pounder gun, and in addition with machine guns. In the case of the Crusader tank, I see that it says it is heavily armoured with 2-pounder guns and two machine guns.
I really think that after our experience of the 2-pounder gun it should have been possible for us to devise some weapon that would have enabled us to meet the enemy on more level terms. These tanks are turned out by the thousands. The noble Lord (Lord Beaverbrook) aimed at 30,000—I dare say it has got beyond that—and so a vast number, of these machines are being turned out which have proved to be almost useless, at all events in this desert warfare. I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, who, I believe, will reply in this debate, whether this type of small tank is being turned out, and whether it is still being armed with 2-pounder guns. There is one other question I should like to ask him. It Las been said that the German tanks have got a cooling device which keeps the temperature inside them down to somewhere about 80 degrees, whereas our tanks are terribly hot, especially under the African sun. I do not knew if the noble and learned Viscount, when he comes to sum up the debate, will be able to tell us whether the Germans have got this device in their tanks, because if that is the case it would account in a considerable measure for the success the Germans have achieved.
Next I come to the case of the antitank gun, I do not think there that the position stated by the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, was entirely satisfactory.
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Apparently the 6-pounder gun came into production, I think he said, last July.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: August.
LORD DENMAN: Last August. There were some shipped out to Egypt last January.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: By air.
LORD DENMAN: For some reason he was not able to explain, he did not think many of them had found their way to the Front.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: I did not say that.
LORD DENMAN: I understood the noble Lord to say something of the kind.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: I do not know; I cannot tell.
LORD DENMAN: It would be to the general advantage if the Government could give us a little more explanation on the point whether this 6-pounder gun got to the Front in time to take part in the action in Libya.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: It was stated by the Minister of Production yesterday.
LORD DENMAN: I am much obliged. Then there is the question of dive bombers. Whereas the noble Lord did meet that criticism, and explained the delays that had occurred, the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, told us there was no explanation of the fall of Tobruk, and so far as he was aware dive bombers had not been used by the enemy in bringing about the fall of Tobruk.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: What I said was:
" Nor have we any evidence in our possession, at present at any rate, that dive bombers were responsible for the fall of Tobruk."
I did not say they were not used; I said there was no evidence at present.
LORD DENMAN: I am much obliged to the noble Viscount. I have heard an explanation put forward that, with a strong combination of artillery fire and bombers, the Germans were able to effect a breach in our lines, and in that way brought about the fall of the fortress. Perhaps when the noble Viscount has information, he may be able on some future occasion to give it to the House.

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There is another point to which I would refer, quite different from any of these, and that is with regard to the training of our officers. I do not think that that training in the past has been entirely suitable for mechanized warfare. I know that formerly at Sandhurst no training at ail was given in such subjects as mechanics, and I think the same thing obtained at the Staff College at Camberley. In those days in the Service horses and horsemanship played a great part in the lives of officers who could afford to hunt or ride in steeplechases, not only for the love of it but for the appeal it made to the spirit of adventure and as a relief from the monotony of garrison life. With a later generation there came the motor car, the aeroplane, and the speed boat. About that time there was the outbreak of war in 1914. The young men of that day joined up in their thousands. They joined Kitchener's Army and the Yeomanry regiments, and many of them received Commissions as lieutenants and second lieutenants. The casualty lists of those ranks were terrible. Possibly, it is true to say, about two-thirds of the type of young men of whom I speak disappeared during that conflict. To-day we are suffering from the loss of these young men.
When peace came Army expenditure was drastically cut. The Army, so to speak, became the Cinderella of the Services, and a great many of the able young men who were left in it, seeing the prospect of dreary peace-time service in front of them, left and went in for other occupations. Those who were mechanically-minded went in for engineering, and a good many of them have become managing directors of engineering firms or they control factories of their own. A good many of these men are hack in the Army to-day, but by the rules of the Service they had to rejoin at a very low rank. Men with a knowledge of mechanics and with war experience are extremely valuable to-day, and I would ask my noble friend the Under-Secretary for War if he would look into this point and see whether it is possible fully to utilize the services of such men as I have described. As the noble Lord who spoke just now said, we are waging a mechanized war, and unless we fully recognize this fact, and that we want mechanically-minded men to run the war, we shall not achieve
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success. After all, you could not run a railway without railway engineers. We have been trying not only to run a mechanized Army, but to build up a mechanized Army, without giving sufficient control to officers trained in mechanics as well as being experienced in war.
This brings me to the suggestion which two other noble Lords have made. I wonder whether the best use is being made of the men who possess these qualifications. First of all the name occurs of General Wavell. That was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Addison, and by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, and I entirely agree with what both noble Lords said. I never quite understood why General Wavell, an expert in tank warfare, was shifted from Cairo to India at a time when India was not threatened; but that is by the way. General Wavell has great qualifications. I believe he was the first officer to command a tank brigade in this country about fifteen years ago at Aldcrshot, and he has a thorough experience of this type of warfare. I do suggest that in the grave situation in which we are to-day it might be a very good thing to bring General Wavell home and put him in a position of authority, possibly—I do not know whether it would be possible—as Chief of the Combined General Staff, or in some position of that kind where he would be able to bring his great experience to bear with regard to the organization, particularly the mechanized organization of our Army. There is another name that occurs to me. There is another good soldier in this country now who could render excellent service in organizing the technical side of our war machine and that is General McNaughten, the Canadian soldier. General McNaughten, besides being a good soldier, is a good engineer, and that is a rare combination. I think it would be an excellent thing if use could be made of his services in the way I have suggested.
I would venture to say one word about the Army Council. The Army Council, originally formed under the scheme of Lord Esher, I think, was composed of four soldiers and three civilians. Now, I think I am right in saying, it has grown to twelve members, and the civilians predominate in number. I am counting my noble friend Lord Croft for this purpose

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as a civilian, although I am well aware he has a very distinguished war record, but he sits on the Council as a member of this House and representative of the War Office in this House. I think the number twelve is rather large for a body of this kind. That is one point I would like to make. I suggest that the military element ought to predominate in an Array Council.
There is only one other thing I would like to say, and for this purpose I go back for a moment to the control of the war at the top. Your Lordships have heard so much about this that I dare say you arc weary of the subject already, but since our last debate—and possibly our last debate might have had something to do with the changes that have been made—there has been appointed a Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff to look after the technical side of the war machine, and he has been allotted some, but not all, of the functions of the Master-General of Ordnance. I still think that not nearly so much has been clone in this direction as might be done. I am not going to detain your Lordships by putting forward any views of my own, but I would like to refer to a letter which appeared from Professor Hill in The Times yesterday. In that letter Professor Hill tells us what the American organization is. After six or seven months of war the Americans have already evolved an organization which, I believe, is a better organization than our own. I suggest that we might learn something from them and might do worse than copy them.
In conclusion I would like to say just this. Owing partly to the reduced size of newspapers, there are very brief reports of Parliamentary proceedings in the Press. I do not complain of that because, after all, proceedings in Parliament are very unimportant compared to the great events that are taking place in Egypt and on the Russian Front. But there is also the wireless. It is a fact that accounts, possibly abbreviated accounts, are sent to distant lands of our proceedings in Parliament here, and it is quite possible that within a few hours reports of our proceedings might be heard on the radio in Egypt this afternoon or this evening. Well, if I were able I should like to send to the officers and men of our hardly pressed Eighth Army in Egypt a brief message. I should like to tell them that we here admire the
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courage and the tenacity with which they have been fighting against heavy odds, that we have some idea of the hardships they have had to endure after months of campaigning in the Libyan Desert, that we sympathize with them in the defeat which, through no fault of their own, they have sustained, and, I would add, we hope and pray that reinforcements of men and material will arrive in time to enable them to hold on, as I believe they will hold on, to the very limit of their endurance.
THE EARL OF DENBIGH: My Lords, I wish to make one or two observations on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beavcrbrook, yesterday. My qualifications for making these observations are not many, but I am the technical adjutant of an armoured battalion. However, before I refer to those matters, there arc two other points I would like to mention, although other noble Lords have spoken of them far more eloquently than I can. The first is the question of the separate communiqués being issued by the Services, which, to my mind, as I read them in the papers, are leading to a kind of Service advertisement and a sort of quick sales campaign. I think they are misleading, and that one consolidated communiqué should be issued from the headquarters of the theatres of war.
The second point is on the much vexed question of the dive bomber. The heads of the Services say that they are not convinced that they are a success in a mobile battle in the desert, where battle has once been joined. That I can well believe; but, when fighting is taking place at fixed defended localities, I am still to be convinced. If you ask people who have been dive bombed—fortunately I have not suffered that so far—they will convince you of the effect of the dive bomber, at least morally, particularly when they know that they have no dive bombers themselves to have a crack at the other fellow. I think also that the dive bomber can be of considerable advantage for attacking armoured units when on an approach march and they have to be fairly concentrated for the sake of control and rapid deployment. I also feel that dive bombers can be successfully employed against supply columns. I have no experience of that, but I think a strong case can be made out for them.

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I will now turn to the speech which the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, made yesterday. I will deal with the points in the order and under the same headings that the noble Lord did. These headings, your Lordships will remember, were guns, reliability, speed and armour. I am not an expert on guns, but I understand that the British 2-pounder and the German 4½-pounder are both high velocity weapons, and that the 75 mm. of the General Grant is not a high velocity gun. I am also given to understand that for piercing and efficient destruction of armour you must have a high velocity gun. The comparison, therefore, which was made that we had a 2½-pounder backed by a 75 mm. gun which was heavier than the German 4½-pounder is rather misleading.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: May I be allowed to interrupt to say that the striking power of the 75 mm. gun is about the same as the striking power of the 6-pounder?
THE EARL OF DENBIGH: I am grateful for the noble Lord's assurance and I am sure that other noble Lords will also be grateful. The other point I wish to make is that the 75 mm. gun of the General Grant is fixed and that to manœuvre your gun you have to manœuvre your tank, which is not always a very easy task. Then there is the question of reliability. Reliability and speed are inter-dependent to a great extent at the present moment. The Valentines and the Matildas, as far as my information goes, are very reliable machines. These machines use well-tried commercial engines and components. The Crusader, on the other hand, has an engine which was designed originally in 1917 as an air engine. From a supply point of view I have no doubt it was the only engine that was available in quantity for that vehicle, but I cannot help thinking that very great strides must have been made in engine design since 1917 both as regards power output for size and reliability.
There is a word also about the reliability of the General Grants which I feel I must say. My information is that this vehicle will carry on under very trying conditions with nothing more done to it than filling up with petrol, oil and water; and it will go on without proper maintenance for several days. If that is a fact I think the Americans have definitely got
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something that is worth having and that we should try and get it ourselves. On the subject of speed, difficulties arose owing to having to use the commercial power units which were readily available. That particularly applies to the Matildas and the Valentines. The Crusader fitted with the ex-air engine is faster and, owing to its greater speed I presume, less heavily armed. It relies on speed and manoeuvring to make it a difficult target. When you have mixed units of fast and slow vehicles I think I am right in saying the speed of your unit is governed by the speed of the slowest vehicle. Therefore the Crusader was at once at a very serious disadvantage because it could not make use of its additional speed and got into rather serious trouble. I do not know very much about armour. As I have said, the Crusader owing to its speed had less armour, but I hope that the new tanks will have greater armour.
I have put these points before your Lordships—not so well, I am afraid, as they might have been put—because I feel that in point of technical design we are inferior to the enemy. If they are given equality in quantity and quality of equipment, the fighting men of the United Nations can easily conquer the Axis. We must therefore not be satisfied with present policy. We have the ability, the brains and the capacity to produce better material. We must always be one step ahead of the enemy and not, as we have been so far, two steps behind. Therefore, on behalf of the fighting men and in particular the men of our armoured forces, I must express the hope that before this debate closes His Majesty's Government will give an assurance in your Lordships' House that these points in design and equipment are receiving proper attention and that in equipment our men will be at least on an equal footing with, if not definitely ahead of, our enemies.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I should like to congratulate the noble Earl who has just spoken not only on the manner in which he went through the ordeal which all of us have to face, but also on the substance of his remarks. I thought his first observation about communiqués was particularly pertinent, and I hope that he will not hesitate to speak frequently in your Lordships' House and give us more suggestions. I think the reasons for our reverses in Libya can be definitely divided under two headings—the immediate and

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local reasons and the root causes. I suppose the first immediate reason is the tactical reason. I am with those who hold that we have not the information to criticize the local Command in any way. I prefer the view of the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, that it has been touch and go, and that there were times when we were very near a big victory. Moreover, the High Command seems to me to have done a very good piece of work in keeping the troops in good fettle. We hear nothing but good reports of their morale—as we expect of British soldiers—so that we can admire the tenacity of their resistance and of their counter attacks.
I want to thank the noble Viscount not only for his persuasive speech yesterday, but also for anticipating a point of which I had given him notice. I thought it very desirable that we should be clear about responsibility for the defence of Tobruk. The noble Viscount made it quite clear that the Government and the High Command in Libya were at one in this matter. That disposes finally of an unpleasant rumour. I am satisfied, too, that the Government have not lost sight of the importance of Egypt and Libya, and they have done their very best throughout to keep the Eighth Army supplied with the best they had, having regard to shipping limitations, to which I shall return in a few minutes.
I suppose the next local reason—it is not entirely a local reason—is the quality of our material. In spite of the forceful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beaver-brook yesterday, I am afraid it is undeniable that the Germans are still a lap ahead of us in the matter of tanks and anti-tank guns. If I were in a controversial mood, I could say a good deal about that question—partly favourable and partly not so favourable—but as the matter concerns the past and not the future I shall refrain. Besides, I agree whole-heartedly with the final observation of the noble Lord that we should give confidence to those who are concerned in the question of design and development in the Supply Ministry and to the manufacturing community throughout the country.
So I leave this subject, merely saying that I accept the description used, in passing, by the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, when he described
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it as "a sad story." For the future, I, myself, have great confidence in the present Minister of Supply and in the Secretary of State for War. But I would like to make one or two suggestions. The first is that in developing future tanks we should, if possible, always have two models constructed of the specification aimed at, and have them produced by different firms. I believe that that is done sometimes—the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, knows this better than I do—in the construction of aircraft. Then if one fails the other may do better. I believe that if that plan had been adopted in the case of the unfortunate Churchill tank it would have made a great difference—not perhaps to the tank itself, but to the time factor in obtaining a successor. My second suggestion is that the Ministry of Supply even now—it is rather a late hour—should consult those who were concerned with the production of tanks in the last war, and who have been, not completely, but very largely ignored. I believe that if they had been consulted a great many technical mistakes would have been avoided. Some would have been avoided, and in other cases the problems would have become simpler in relation to many technical matters such as ventilation, cooling, armaments—even tanks of the last war had 6-pounder guns—the question of gun carriers, where the Germans seem to have got ahead of us, and other technical matters.
My third suggestion is one which has already been made by the noble Lord, Lord Denman, and that is that scientists should be employed on the lines suggested by Mr. A. V. Hill in his letter. I am quite sure that advantage would be obtained by using not individual scientists so much as teams of scientists for the development of these novel weapons. My only other suggestion is that if possible the Government should try to avoid giving so much information about coming developments in these debates. I confess that I felt rather worried when the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, made his reference to the 6-pounder gun on February 12 last. I felt that that was giving the enemy useful information. I was not surprised, therefore, when on the next day a very high tank expert said to me that it had given the enemy six months' notice to prepare. I do not know whether it was due to that or not that the enemy has produced a very novel weapon, or

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rather has adapted an old weapon, the 88 mm. gun. I should not have mentioned this matter but for the fact that it happened again yesterday when the Minister of Supply did give particulars—well, did not give particulars but announced that long ago far heavier tanks and far more powerful anti-tank weapons were being developed and would shortly come into production, also that dive bombers had already reached one theatre of war and others were on their way.
I felt how valuable we should feel it if the enemy would make reliable statements of that kind. But I suppose it is one of the prices we have to pay for our system which has many compensating advantages. Although I regret that the enemy shares the information about dive bombers, I confess that I myself felt considerable satisfaction when I learnt that dive bombers were shortly to arrive. They are quite invaluable for naval action and as an anti-invasion weapon. I cannot believe—this view, I understand, has been already expressed, I am not sure—that the Germans would go on using this weapon in connexion with land operations unless they found it very valuable. My information is that in Crete it was almost decisive at some stages. The battle of Libya was bound to turn largely on the question of sea communications. Ours were long; the enemy's were short but vulnerable. After the sinking of the "Barham" on November 25 last and some damage to other ships, it became perfectly clear that in the Eastern Mediterranean surface ships were not sufficient to deal with the enemy's communications. The dangers were too great; the losses were too heavy. Sufficient submarines, also, were not available for the purpose.
It was plain that increased hitting power was required, and long-range bombers of a heavy type appeared to be the best weapons for attacking the enemy's transports and the enemy's embarkation and disembarkation ports. Winter had not proved a particularly favourable time for bombing Germany. Out of 181 nights, bombing was only possible against Germany on 82 nights. That was between September and February, and many of the raids were of small importance. In the Mediterranean, I believe that heavy bombers were of decisive importance. I shall be glad, therefore,
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if my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, in his reply, would tell us whether more heavy bombers were asked for officially by the Middle East High Command, and—whether they were asked for or not—why they were not sent months before the battle. It seemed to be an obvious step which might make the difference between victory and defeat. When I say this I am not being wise after the event.
I now come to the fundamental causes. I feel that Libya, Malaya, Burma, the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse," Crete, Greece, Dakar and Norway, as well as the shipping situation, to which I am coming in a moment, are like symptoms of a disease which spreads over the body, cropping up first in one part and then in another, and that the wise physician seeks the root causes. One of those root causes has already been mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett—namely, that the Government are a Coalition Government, not a National Government. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, I have some experience of this matter, but from a very much humbler point of outlook. I have seen enough to know, however, that the constant balancing of Party considerations, especially in the matter of appointments, is a tremendous handicap to efficiency. I feel that what we want is a replica of Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet rather than of Mr. Asquith's Coalition Government.
Then there are those changes which in earlier debates we discussed with all discretion, hoping that the Government would find their own solution. I think that advantages have come from those debates; their influence has spread gradually, but I do not think that it has gone quite far enough, and I agree very strongly with the noble Lords, Lord Addison and Lord Mottistone, that the office and name of Minister of Defence should be abolished. I have strongly urged in the past that that should be done. I agree especially with the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, that the name is really open to reprobation in these days, when we do not talk about defence at all. I very warmly welcome that remark. I believe that to drop the name would remove a great deal of prejudice. I need not add to what others have said on this point, and I have already said in earlier speeches all that I want to say on the subject.

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I should like to say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in regard to the Master-General of Ordnance. Lord Mottistone's case was really quite overwhelming; but, as that belongs a little to my official past, I shall not go into it. I also agree with the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that it would be very desirable to have some official Chief of a Joint General Staff, some very high personality to preside over the Chiefs of Staff Committee and to take charge of the whole organization and, while keeping in touch with the Prime Minister, to report to the War Cabinet as a whole. I believe that, properly used, that would be a very great help to the Prime Minister. It would also be invaluable, when the Prime Minister is away, to have someone here who knows the whole story. The Prime Minister has to go away from time to time, and we all admire his courage and devotion to duty in taking these long, hazardous and frequent journeys; but crises often arise here in his absence, and he cannot be in two places at once. I believe that the noble Viscount's proposal would prove invaluable to the Prime Minister's deputy when the Prime Minister is away.
I come now to what I believe to be by far the most fundamental cause of our troubles in Libya and everywhere else, and it is again one to which the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, has drawn attention—namely, the question of cur merchant shipping. Some Press correspondents in Libya, I notice, have pointed out that the shipping shortage is one of the principal causes of our troubles in Libya. I do not see how it could be otherwise; clearly the size of the Force which can be sent there and maintained there depends mainly on the amount of shipping which is available for the terribly long journey to which several noble Lords have drawn attention. Here we come to one of the root causes of difficulty in the wider matter referred to in the Motion, a Motion which I think covers the whole control of the war, although with special reference to Libya. The latest pronouncement on the subject is contained in the joint Anglo-American statement issued on June 27, after the Washington Conference, and it deserves your Lordships' attention. This part of the statement begins with the satisfactory declaration that
"… transportation of the Fighting Forces, together with the transportation of munitions
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of war and supplies, still constitutes the major problem of the United Nations."
You will note the word "still." That statement is the more welcome to me because I do not think that I have heard that admission from the Government before, although, of course, I may have missed it.
It is quite true that, on May 19, Mr. Attlee told the House of Commons that sea transport was "a constant anxiety" and described it as "a tender spot," and later in the same debate, on May 20, Sir Stafford Cripps said that the Government were aware of the critical need of doing their utmost to cope with the situation. These statements, however, seem to me to fall a good deal short of the affirmation that shipping "constitutes the major problem of the United Nations," and, as I shall show in a few moments, the Government's actions do not altogether bear out the view that they thought so. The next sentence in the Washington Declaration admits that submarine warfare "continues to take a heavy toll of cargo ships." That seems to be rather a modest description, compared with President Roosevelt's own recent statement that "the battle of distribution is at a critical stage," or compared with the American figure of losses. Whether it is correct I do not know, but that figure was that between January 11 and the end of May 269 ships were sunk off the Atlantic Coast of America alone, and that was without reckoning other theatres where heavy losses have occurred, such as the Arctic route, the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
The statement goes on to say that the production of new tonnage is greatly increasing month by month. That, of course, is most satisfactory, and Mr. Oliver Lyttelton has been able to give a good account of the position. I have seen some good figures published to-day; but it does not throw much light on the recent statement reported to have been made by Rear-Admiral Vickery, Vice-Chairman of the American Maritime Commission, that twice as much shipping as is now available is needed. Our need for tonnage will become greater as the spate of new production increases. If losses continue at the present rate, how long with our growing needs will it take to replace this gigantic deficit? There is no suggestion yet that replacement is

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equal to losses. I should hope it was either equal or very near it.
Well, it is obvious that protection is much more important even than replacement. Every ship saved is a ship built. Commenting on the losses in April, 1917, the worst month of the last war, the Official History of Seaborne Trade said:
" This could not go on. At this rate the margin of safety would soon disappear beyond all possibility of recovery by accelerated construction or economy in employment. The question of protection had become an overmastering preoccupation, beside which all other problems faded."
That is pretty well the condition to-day. Mr. Lloyd George, writing in his Memoirs, of the U-boat war said:
"It is a horrifying thought that it very nearly achieved the destruction of British sea-power, with all that such a disaster would have meant to the fortunes of the Alliance and of humanity."
It seems to me that that really is the vital issue to-day. And this is how the statement deals with it:
"It is hoped that as a result of the steps planned at this Conference our respective Navies will further reduce the toll of merchant shipping."
Does that statement give your Lordships the impression of that "new and fiercer effort" which The Times called for in its admirable leading article on "The Hidden Battle" on June 19?
I confess it fills me with some misgiving. There is not a single word about the air, which is the clue, I believe, to the whole problem. The Navy, as always, is doing a grand job of work, but it is heavily strained, and I expect the same is true of the American Navy. The big reserve of force available for this purpose is in the air, and I do not speak without knowledge when I declare that an increased number of aeroplanes, fitted with scientific apparatus of proved efficiency, but not involving, I believe, huge numbers, which would dislocate the other plans of the Government, is the only means by which reasonably early results can be obtained. I have been assured by people engaged in this work that it is very effective, and we have heard that round our own coasts the losses are inconsiderable. Machines of longer range are required to push it out further into the Atlantic and to operate from both sides, and I dare say from Iceland as well, to hunt down and destroy these pests in mid-ocean.
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Of course there are other ways of promoting the destruction of U-boats and I am all for them. There is bombing of the ports where they are assembled, and of the factories scattered all over Germany where the parts are made. That does not produce very quick results, and it does not kill the crews, and I suppose U-boats can be, probably are being, assembled at very distant ports. I think the direct use of long-range aircraft overseas is indispensable. It seems to me to stare us in the face, as the convoy system stared us in the face in 1917. I have been forced to raise this question here. I was very reluctant to do so, but I have tried every other means that I know to try and get this thing done, but such information as I have is that it has not been done yet. What we want is first priority for sea power. By "sea power" I mean the air side of it—air power just as much as sea power. Mr. Lloyd George, who is a very far-sighted statesman, in considering the very difficult man-power problem in December, 1917, gave absolute priority over all other Services to the requirements of the Navy, because, to quote his own Memoirs, "if it failed, overwhelming disasters to the Allied cause were inevitable," and with it he bracketed the Air Force. He gave second priority to the Mercantile Marine, including shipbuilding and ship repairing, as well as ship manning. That is what I ask for to-day.
I hope therefore that your Lordships will support me in asking the Government spokesman to say whether the Government do or do not agree to the following propositions of which I have given notice: (1) that the first and principal object of a maritime Power or of a group of maritime Powers, such as the United Nations, dependent for transportation of supplies on sea communications, is to obtain the command of the sea, whether exercised by ships or aircraft—and I should like to add "or both"; (2) in present circumstances the protection of our sea communications no less than shipbuilding must receive first priority in the distribution of our resources; (3) that this first priority should extend to the immediate allocation of aircraft of proper types and with the scientific equipment required for their fullest efficiency against U-boats.
Now in asking for this I have no axe to grind. I have no motive except an overwhelming conviction that the re-creation

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of our sea power by the latest means is absolutely essential for the safety of the country and of the Empire and for victory in the war. If it is neglected I am certain we shall not win the war—I cannot conceive that; if it is not neglected, then I am ever so much more certain and confident of our ultimate victory. The Leader of the House, towards the end of his admirable speech yesterday, remarked that the critics ought to say whether they trust this Government or whether they do not. To my mind the touchstone to the answer to that is what is done in this question of the maintenance of our sea power. No Government which neglected sea power, on which the existence of the Empire depends, deserves the confidence or support of the nation, and I believe enormous numbers of people—almost all thinking people in this country—hold this view. I therefore attach the utmost importance to the reply which my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will give to my questions.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: My Lords, I know that many of us here are extremely anxious about the events that have happened in Libya. We have our near relations, and many families in the country no doubt have representatives out there. We have old regiments serving out there. When news of the serious reverse in Libya came along, everyone I am sure was moved to say: "What is wrong in Libya? What upset the whole of what we anticipated was going to be a really very fine feat of arms?" I would like to preface my remarks straight away by saying that nothing I shall say is intended as any form of attack on the Prime Minister. As a man he has shown marvellous ability and has earned our deep gratitude for the way in which he rallied the people, inspired the people, and is leading the people. But I do say that in the past he has been reluctant to accept criticism, especially criticism which is given with the best intention of improving matters. That to-day is my purpose. Anything I may say is said with the intention of trying to improve the situation and to get away from the disasters of the past. We have seen Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Crete, second Libya, and now Libya again, and we begin to say to ourselves, "Are we never, after three years of war, going to learn our lesson? "
I do not speak on these matters as one who is wise after the event. For years,
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both in the House of Commons and here, some of us have preached the doctrine that we must have a professional head of our Forces in the field. In other words, we must have proper direction, proper strategic distribution, both of men and material before we can possibly hope to get success. I believe that our high leading—that is the distribution of our Forces both in men and material—has been faulty right from the beginning of the war. The only way to get over that is to have a first-class brain as the head of all our Forces, to advise the Prime Minister, put forward his plans, and see he has the necessary means, material, and transport to carry out these plans. It is then a separate department altogether for the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet to give their approval. It is that planning, that executive control of the Fighting Forces, that this country lacks to-day.
You will immediately say, "There is not such a man." I only turn to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, yesterday, when he asked, "Where is General Wavell?" I speak with some knowledge of General Wavell. He was in my batch at the Staff College for two years. He was with me in France at the beginning of the last war. When he lost an eye in action, I had a hand in getting him back to France after the War Office refused to send him back. It was there that he got in touch with the great Allenby and went on with him to the Middle East. His history now is well known. There is no finer brain in any of the Services to-day. He has every quality that I know ought to be possessed by a great leader—brain power, courage, tenacity, secrecy, everything that you can want. He has also got health and a very stout physical frame. I say to the Prime Minister to-day: "You would be well served if you brought Wavell back, and put him into the position of Commander-in-Chief, or whatever you like to call him, in this country so that he can direct with intelligence the various operations in the field abroad."
The next thing I would like to say is this: What went wrong in Libya? What caused the sudden reversal of fortune all in a day? What happened on the 13th of June? What happened on that day was that mobile heavy artillery, masked by tanks, suddenly caught our tanks at very close range and blasted them away.

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Why have we not got that class of gun in the Desert? It has been proved again and again that fixed defences in the Desert, with no flank to rest upon, are not so reliable as we thought. It is the mobile heavy artillery that causes the destruction of the enemy's equipment in that theatre. I see my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook here, and I say that this country owes him a very deep debt of gratitude for what he did at the Ministry of Supply—how he pushed along with his tremendous energy all the development of new factories, tanks, and everything else, how he went to America and to Russia, how he cheered up everybody to get along with the work. I think he did a very fine stroke of work, and I hope, seeing him looking so well as he does, he will take another hand in it. But I can never understand why it is that our artillery, especially our heavier artillery, has always adopted the old last war practice of trailing along behind trailers. Why cannot it be fixed on to platforms? Why cannot we have tank platforms, with guns fixed on them, moving behind the tank screen and suddenly coming into action when required? It seems to me that this business of tank warfare demands the sudden use of powerful artillery behind the tank screen. From the short reports which I have got so far, it is that lack of heavy artillery, close up behind the tank, which has been one of the causes of our undoing in this campaign.
But the campaign is not over. Our men are fighting, as we know they will fight, and I am convinced that next time we sit in your Lordships' House we shall have a more cheerful aspect to review. We have faith in these fine officers and men, but we ought to give, and we must give, them the very finest and best equipment we can. It is all very well to say that all this production takes a long time, that designs have to be worked out, shipping space arranged, and the material taken out to the war front. That is true. But I think—and perhaps my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook will not agree—there has been far too wide a gap between the General Staff at the War Office and the Ministry of Supply. The General concerned with the Ministry of Supply has been living inside the Ministry.
For years we have advocated that the M.G.O. Department, which I was glad to see Lord Mottistone describe so well yesterday,
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should be part of the General Staff. It is being done to some extent through General Weeks coming in as Deputy Chief of Staff, but I doubt if that is sufficient. The General Staff have to do all the planning, see to the provision of the men and the placing of men in the various theatres. At the same time they have to see that the men have got the right arms, that they are the arms that are going to defeat the enemy, and that the technical advance of these various arms is proceeding while preparing for the next possible plan and the next possible place of warfare. It seems to me that the breach there has not been properly closed, and the sooner the Ministry of Supply and the War Office come much closer together the better it will be for the armament, at least of the Army.
There is another point in relation to material in the field. I do not know how far it has been carried out, but I think the very closest touch ought to be kept between the producers of armaments and the users of armaments. We should not rely only on the hearsay written in reports which do not always convey all the truth, but should have a proper liaison with the battle front. In that way we should find out exactly the weaknesses of machines and guns and ammunition; we should know what those who are fighting with the weapons really think of them, and what kind of weapons they want. I believe a closer liaison with the battle front on these matters would greatly help our fighting soldiers.
An aspect of this Libyan campaign to which I cannot refrain from referring is the question of the sudden surrender at Tobruk. It is quite clear that it was intended to hold Tobruk when the Force fell back. In doing so the Commander must undoubtedly have made up his mind as to the size of Force that was necessary to hold that area. Yet all at once the garrison is crushed. We want to know what happened. It appears from the scanty reports that we do get that it was due chiefly to two causes: first, that the weakest sector towards the east was the one attacked; and, second, that a very powerful, heavy artillery barrage was suddenly mounted and brought to bear upon the Forces. Again that shows the value of mobile heavy artillery being quickly got into position for the purpose. There was a third cause—the dive

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bombers. This is where the dive bomber is of value. When you get a force suddenly driven back into a position without time to consolidate, when the ordinary air protection has been removed owing to the fact that forward aerodromes are being overrun, and the Air Force has to go further back for a base, the dive bomber really has a very high psychological and moral effect on very tired soldiers. I think that these three things combined probably caused the disaster that happened. At any rate what happened shows that in desert warfare fixed armament is of much smaller value than really fine mobile armament. It also shows that defence is certainly not so valuable in the warfare out there as attack, on account of the surprise and the collection of power in the form of machines and guns on any one point by the attack.
There is one other matter I wish to touch on. Very many points have been referred to by noble Lords and I do not want to repeat them, if I can help it. This one is the question of shipping. We know the distance that our ships have to go round the Cape in order to deliver stores from this country to that theatre of war. Have the Government not considered any other means of getting stores and munitions and other things there? We have seen positions on the Russian front refuelled and remunitioned by air carriers. Is it possible from a West African port to fly a series of air carriers and so lessen the long time which a ship takes to turn round on going round the Cape. Surely with modem aeroplane construction that is a possibility, and I should have thought that that system of supply would have been adopted. It has value not only from the point of view of supply, but from the point of view of getting personnel there. I was surprised when I read the speech of the Leader of the House yesterday when he said that the only means of supply was round the Cape. This shipping business is really getting very serious, and I venture to suggest that our next debate in this House should be on shipping.
Why is it that a merchant ship can be constructed in American yards to-day in sixty days when it takes six months in this country? It is a question I have asked various people who are interested in shipbuilding. It is due, perhaps, to a
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lack of standardization or to our constructive methods. I do not know. But it is apparent that we shall have to rely very largely on the United States for building our new merchant ships and perhaps use our own yards for the repair of ships near our own waters. At any rate the shipping business is certainly going to give the Government a sore head and will want very careful looking into before they can find a way out of the difficulties.
The last thing I wish to say is this, and I say it with all seriousness to the Government and to the Prime Minister. Give up that load of the double job—the Prime Minister trying to direct the Forces of the nation. Bring in a professional man, put what strings you like on him, but put him so that he can plan and give the necessary executive orders. There may be other men besides Wavell, but if I had the choice I would bring him back and put him in that position to-morrow.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: My Lords, I hope we shall not have any more debates while great battles arc raging, but I must say, having listened to most of this debate, I do not think your Lordships' House can be blamed for anything that has been said within these walls which could be construed as demoralizing to our troops. It is a difficult position for anybody to be put into to make speeches criticizing the Government while great battles are in progress, and I would have been loath to intervene myself but for the remarks made by the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Addison, with regard to dive bombers. He seized on an apparent inconsistency which I must say I think it is due to him should be cleared up.
If I may quote my words in another place in 1941, they were:
" It may be that dive bombers will be wanted, but up to the present I have not been asked to supply them."
Dive bombers had been ordered the year before from America, but the debate I was taking part in was really concerned with English production, and I looked upon dive bombers ordered from America as, so to speak, a closed book. They were something which would arrive at a certain time, but relative to the English industry I had not been asked to interrupt the general flow of machines going through by the introduction of dive bombers. After

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hearing that explanation I think my noble friend will see that everything follows suit pretty obviously. My noble friend Lord Beaverbrook told your Lordships that both he and I were in favour of dive bombers. On that particular point I want to make quite clear what was the position of anybody in the Government like myself who was Minister of Aircraft Production. There is, after all, only one Cabinet, the War Cabinet. They decide policy, having related it, no doubt, to the demands of this Service or that Service. When they have decided what they want built it is for the Minister in charge of production of aircraft to get on with that job. It would be a ridiculous and impossible position if, because I happened to favour dive bombers, I should make a machine which the Services did not want made in priority. Therefore I think your Lordships can see how the position is reconciled. We were both in favour of the dive bomber, but it was not in our province to impose it on those we were supplying.
While I am talking about the policy of the Government relative to air, I think it might be helpful to explore the exact position as we find it. The policy of the Air Ministry and of the Government was two-fold. It was in the first place to make this island secure against all forms of invasion by the most efficient fighting aircraft it was possible to build. Nobody will pretend that they did not do that job 100 per cent. That was one of the most astounding victories and a most amazing piece of organization for which the Air Ministry must take entire credit. The development of these very efficient machines stretches back into the past. What was the second policy? The second policy was rather a curious one. It was laid down when there were no other great theatres of war. It was that by building heavy bombers the Air Force were to win the war by themselves.
LORD ADDISON: Do I understand that was a Cabinet decision, or was it the idea of the Air Ministry?
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: I was not a member of the Cabinet and obviously I am not able to answer that question, but it was well known as the policy of the Air Ministry—which, I take it, is the policy of the Government—that the best -way they could contribute was to make
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heavy bombers and win the war, so to speak, on their own. But that was a very long affair. You cannot make new heavy bombers in a year. The building of these heavy bombers stretches back to before the war. Now they are coming through. If I may be allowed to be critical I want to say this about that particular form of policy. There may come a time when you have got such striking force that you can do in fact what is the ideal, that is win the war by punishing Germany by heavy bombers. The only point to be decided is when you can do it. That is the question. My answer to that is that you can never do it until you have satisfied every demand in all the theatres of operations. It is along these lines that we are at fault to-day. It is quite true you can get to Germany and destroy a town with great psychological effect, but that is discounted by a reverse in the Desert. When two things happened in regard to this country, when we lost Singapore and when Exeter was bombed, the one was a nuisance and the other a disaster. Consequently I say when you are trying to deal on the psychological side with the Germans wait until you can do it properly and the bombing can be done without there being a reverse on the other side.
There is a lack of elasticity in air policy and a lack of imagination. The other day I was bold enough to say in a lecture to the Royal Aeronautical Society about the organization of the Air Force in relation to the Army:
" The situation in the Army is that they have no policy at all, no equipment and no technicians. They work on the charity of the Air Force who co-operate with them. Nobly do they rally round. But in that the Army do not think in terms of the application of air power to new tactical operations, so no new weapons are produced. Such weapons are long overdue, but who is to inspire them and get them built, I do not know."
That came from me, speaking as late Minister of Aircraft Production. I think that is a most extraordinary form of organization to have in this country today. It is the same thing relative to the Navy. Air Ministry mentality is much too narrow. They have never seen the vast power that is in their hands, but they have gone along these narrow lines forgetting to help the Army out of its troubles and, instead of going far ahead of the Navy in the developments they could achieve for destroying ships, they have

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waited until they are positively egged on by the Navy who never possibly could do so well as the Air Force if the Air Force realized the tremendous power in their hands.
Lately there have been two of the most outstanding naval battles in history with great casualties on either side. Where were the Fleets? They were 140 miles away from each other. Not one single shot was fired by one Fleet against the other. Yet these vast casualties took place. On that particular point I want to draw attention to this. It may be true to say that in Libya the air power was more or less equal, or probably we had an ascendancy. But, as the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, pointed out in his admirable speech yesterday, enemy ships with reinforcements only had to go one thousand miles whereas ours had to go twelve thousand miles. Each ship operated by the enemy was equal to twelve of our own ships. Now what was, therefore, essential? It was the complete domination of the Central European theatre of war against reinforcement. Can your Lordships say that the effort made to stop reinforcements getting to Libya was equal to the bombing that we gave Germany at that time? Which should have been regarded as being of the greater importance?
I do ask your Lordships to try to impress on the Government—I hope that the noble and learned Lord Chancellor will do it—that we cannot allow each Service to run the war as it likes. On that particular point there should have been investigation by the Staffs into the employment of what, after all, is our possession, the Air Force, quantitatively. There should have been investigation to see what was, so to speak, the bag per sortie of aeroplanes in the Mediterranean relative to the bag per sortie of the aeroplanes which went from England against Germany. I know that if you had gone into that you would have found the bag per sortie in the Mediterranean infinitely more than it can be at the present moment from going over Germany. My noble friend Lord Hankey has pointed out the other side of the question—that relating to the destruction of submarines.
LORD HANKEY: Both sides.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: As I say we want this investigation done quantitatively.
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It is not done that way to-day and until you look at these whole operations from one point of view you will fail all along the line. Now I will say this from the point of view of reassurance. At one time I was, I must confess, an opponent of the heavy big bomber, because I, took the view that we had not the time to get them into production. Mercifully, we have been spared from destruction until that time has arrived. We are now producing. Things like dive bombers are types of machines that have been ordered from America. They will come in. I want to assure the House of this because I think noble Lords are nervous about equipment—we have been talking about equipment in other branches. The long-range heavy bomber, as we have designed it and as it is coming over in large quantities from America, will be an ideal machine for our job and will do what my noble friend Lord Hankey asks. It has a long range and it carries great weight. It will deal with submarines from over the deep waters and it will bomb effectively in every military operation.
Let me say this in conclusion. These big bombers are coming now in an endless flow which nothing will stop. This flow will build itself up and gather strength until it becomes an overwhelming force. Then, when you have satisfied all your demands and given them satisfaction in every theatre of war, launch your big air attack against Germany and give them such a pounding as will destroy them and win the war.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, the noble. Lord who has just sat down has made, as he always does, a very interesting speech. I do not pretend that I would not fain follow him in a great deal that he has said. I fully agree with a great deal of what he has told us, but there are some other matters on which I might join issue with him. But I have not risen with a view to raising any controversial matter. I think that the occasion is far too serious, and I feel that we are deeply indebted to my noble friend Lord Addison for having raised this debate in your Lordships' House. It is our inherent right to draw attention to all those matters about which we are anxious, and we are naturally constrained and restricted by the manner in which we deal with all these matters. We have to be careful what we say. Our advice has to be helpful and

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not harmful. We know that owing to our freedom and independence words spoken in our Legislative Assemblies go far beyond the confines of this House. They go to our own nation and to our Allies; they go also to our enemies and to the world at large. Therefore, in any debate in which we venture to take part we have to keep these considerations very clearly in mind.
This debate has served a very useful purpose, and I think I am right in saying that the purpose it has served has been more useful than the purpose served by the debate in another place. Most of us may regret the form in which Parliamentary customs have ordered the debate which has taken place in another place. It will go out that there is some sort of lack of confidence in our Prime Minister; but for that there has been no sort of foundation in anything which has been said in your Lordships' House. I should like, above all things, to emphasize the point, as arising from your Lordships' debate, that we have full confidence in the Prime Minister; that we have selected him as our leader, and that that selection has received the full concurrence of the country and of our Allies. I should like it also to go out from this debate that, while we have raised certain points and expressed certain misgivings which are in our minds, notwithstanding all the details given, some of which perhaps were wider than details, we have full confidence in the Prime Minister, whom we are determined to support through thick and thin, and we hope that in perhaps a shorter time than, possibly, many people expect, he will lead us to a successful end of the struggle with which we are now confronted.
There would be nothing easier on this occasion than to make a critical speech and to take up a great many of the points which have been raised in the debate. That is not the object with which I have risen. I have risen to make the point which I have ventured to put before your Lordships and with which I believe your Lordships will agree. I have no intention of going back over the past or of indulging in recriminations relating to those shortcomings which are so apparent now. I feel that it is necessary to look forward and to do all in our power to preserve that unity which I am sure exists in this country and will exist. But the publication
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and narration of misgivings has created a certain amount of anxiety throughout the country and also abroad. I would say that criticisms are very useful in the family circle, but when they go beyond the family circle and the manner in which they may be couched there, they can be canvassed by our enemies so as to create the impression abroad that we are a disunited nation, which is very far from the truth.
Your Lordships listened with great interest, I am sure, to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, yesterday. The noble Lord was defending the great position which he occupied and he certainly had every right to do it. I should like to say, as one who had the privilege of coming under his jurisdiction in a very small way, that I can testify to the drive and the energy which he brought to bear on all his duties. I know, from my own experience in a very humble capacity, that Lord Beaverbrook's energy and drive were very helpful to us in endeavouring, as I was then and am still doing, to manufacture aircraft. If this were a debating society, which. I am glad it is not, it would be quite easy to counter much that the noble Lord said, but I am not proposing to do that, because I feel that no one could have tried to carry out his duties with greater efficiency than the noble Lord, and he carried them out to the best of his ability. He is quite entitled to get up in your Lordships' House and ask who could have accomplished more than he did, or who could have done the work better than he did. It is very easy after the event to say what ought to have been done, but I for one am not prepared to say that, if I had been in the noble Lord's place, I should have acted very differently.
I think that we are all forced to the reluctant conclusion that our military preparations for this war really began after Dunkirk, and that, after two years, we are beginning to realize the practical difficulties which militate against the success and the rapidity of mass production. I know that a great many of your Lordships are fully aware of the facts, but those of us who have been engaged in production in one form or another know the long space of time which elapses between blue-print prototypes and eventual mass production. I feel that so much of our equipment has been the

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result of the work of the last two years that really a remarkable amount has been done. In my opening remarks I said that I should not indulge in recrimination. Therefore I shall merely express my hope and my feeling that the mass production which is going on now will be accelerated wherever possible, and that, instead of being always two steps behind the enemy, as one noble Lord put it, we shall find ourselves before long a step in front of him.
I think that we are still steeped in peace-time administration. Endless Committees are sitting at the present moment. I believe that a large number of those Committees could be eliminated immediately without any detriment whatever to the war effort. Our executive authority in all parts of the country leaves much to be desired, and there is a lack of co-ordination still to be observed, at a time when that coordination ought to be much better than it is. Every one of your Lordships will be familiar with the difficulty which we have in getting a reply to our communications, and there are complaints from innumerable people throughout the country who never receive any reply at all. If a reply is received, we all know the time which elapses before anything is done. All this seems to be detrimental to the efforts which we are trying to make. We ourselves can naturally deal only with matters which are comparatively small, but, from our own experience and from the complaints which we see in the newspapers, we feel that there is some lack of precision and of what I would call "routine rapidity" all over the country. If that exists also in regard to matters of great importance, one cannot help feeling that the administration of these great matters should be looked into and tightened up wherever possible.
I should like to refer to two points which were made by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, and to one point which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. Lord Bennett mentioned two very important matters. The first related to the need for a really National Government. I entirely agree with him that all considerations relating to the numerical strength of Party representation should be put on one side by the Prime Minister, and that he should select the best men for the positions available no matter to what Party they belong.
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The other point which the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, mentioned relates to General Wavell. I feel that this is really a national matter. General Wavell has experience of mechanical armament, and he has had a full and long experience of Egypt. Yet, at a time which is crucial in the history of this war, his services are not, so far as we know, being used. I do not want to say more than that.
The other point to which I should like particularly to refer is one which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, with regard to the Minister of Defence. This is a subject which has been before your Lordships on more than one occasion, and yet we feel that all the representations we have made have borne no fruit whatever. I think it is vitally necessary that there should be someone of eminence—I am not prepared to say who it should be; the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison of Montrose, named General Wavell, but I am not doing that—who would be able to co-ordinate the different opinions of the General Staffs and who would be able to bring that co-ordinated information before the War Cabinet. I do not believe that this would be a long process; I believe that it could be done with that precision and that celerity with which decisions are arrived at at the present time. We look on the Prime Minister as our Minister of Defence. It is his duty to co-ordinate the opinions which are expressed by the Chiefs of Staff, but I feel that this duty, amongst all the multifarious ones which he has to perform, should not rest on his shoulders.
I am going to have the audacity to say something which has not been mentioned in your Lordships' House before, but it has been in all our minds and in the minds of a great many people in the country. There is an impression—it is only an impression, and I do not say that it is a correct impression—that the Prime Minister interferes with the decisions which are arrived at by the Chiefs of Staff. I have put in plain words what has been in everybody's mind, although it has not actually been said. Speaking for myself, I do not believe that the Prime Minister actually interferes with the decisions arrived at by the General Staff; but we do know that the Prime Minister is a very dominating personality, and those of us who know him personally, and even those who do not, are well aware of the fact that it is very difficult to stand up to the

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Prime Minister when he has one opinion in his mind and you have another. I feel that the appointment of a Minister of Defence would help the Prime Minister, in view of that disability which he does possess, and that such a Minister of Defence would be able to co-ordinate the opinions of the General Staffs on all matters of defence where at present a certain difficulty may exist. That is all I desire to say to your Lordships, but I should like it to go out from this House—it will be decided by a Division in another place—that we have full confidence in the prime Minister, and are determined to see him through to the end in this struggle.
LORD AILWYN: My Lords, I intervene with considerable diffidence in this debate, particularly after listening to the very informative and interesting speeches which have been made.. I can only promise that I shall intrude upon your Lordships' time for a few moments only. The main purpose of this debate has been to elicit the facts regarding, and to investigate the causes of, our defeat in Libya. Those causes may very well lie in the paucity and the poverty in quality of our weapons and equipment; they may lie in part in errors of judgment and miscalculations on the part of those directing our operations; they may lie in Field-Marshal Rommel's genius and mastery of desert warfare, whereby we were outgeneralled. Some or all of these may be contributory factors to our reverse. But there is one other aspect of the matter which I have not yet heard mentioned, either here or in another place. I refer to the matter of the exhaustion of our troops.
Your Lordships will remember that the following passage occurred in General Auchinleck's report, which was read by the Deputy Prime Minister in another place and by the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, here on June 23:
" This was probably a crucial moment in the battle. The enemy was exhausted… Had we been able to take advantage of the enemy's condition we might have turned the scale. In point of fact, however, we were equally exhausted, and this was impossible."
It is perhaps permissible to speculate and to ponder somewhat on the statement that the enemy was exhausted. We do not know what the grounds were on which that conclusion was reached, but what we do
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know is that if the enemy was exhausted he appears to have recovered remarkably quickly, as the tale and speed of his subsequent achievements very clearly show. But be that as it may, we are told that in any case our own troops were exhausted, and it is on this matter that I wish to say a very few words, if I may have your Lordships' indulgence.
Has anything been done really to investigate and counter this matter of exhaustion; and is the very best medical opinion obtainable being brought to bear on this subject? Have any real steps been taken to cope with and counter this condition of exhaustion which, in the gruelling conditions of modern warfare in a climate like that of Libya, is bound to play a serious part in affecting fighting efficiency? Has full use been made of the discoveries and the present knowledge of modern science? I believe these to be very, very important matters, the investigation of which, if not already made, should be undertaken without delay. I need not stress the obvious when I say that I am no doctor or physiologist; I lay claim to no knowledge whatever in the realms of biology or the results of present day scientific research, but I have spoken with men who have spent their lives studying the subject, and I learnt from them and from a book that has just been published, called Nutrition and Victory, where the whole subject is very clearly and convincingly dealt with, that exhaustion and fatigue are very largely due to salt retention and to a lack of certain things like potassium, glycogen and phosphorus. I am told that it is an established fact that ever since the beginning of the war German troops have been given a preparation which has the effect of increasing muscular efficiency, vigour and endurance, and increasing those things that I mentioned—the potassium, glycogen and phosphorus contents in the tissues.
Certain high medical authorities have done their utmost again and again to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to this matter. I understand that the investigator of this particular preparation which is given to the German troops is now actually living in this country. Before I go further may I say that my remarks have nothing whatever to do with the somewhat tall and fantastic stories we have heard of the German troops being drugged before they go into

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battle? What I am seeking is information as to whether there exists a thoughtfully and intelligently composed diet for our troops, with special reference to those who have to live and fight in the trying conditions obtaining in the Middle East, and the specific question I wish to ask—and I have given notice that I would raise this question in the present debate—is this: how many units of Vitamin B1 have been given daily to our troops in Libya, and what has been the daily supply of phosphorus, glucose and potassium? The exhaustion of our troops is, I understand, almost certainly caused by a lack of these minerals and vitamins, which arc indispensable if resistance and efficiency are to be increased, particularly, as I say, in the exacting conditions obtaining in Libya. To what extent our defeats may have been due to inequality of weapons and equipment we know not, but it is perfectly clear to me, and of course equally clear to your Lordships, that it is no possible use providing our troops with the best and latest and most deadly weapons in the world if, in the event, our troops are so exhausted that they are unable to use them.
There may be those who will say, "What on earth is this new fangled nonsense? Our troops are to-day, as they have always been, the finest and toughest troops in the world. They have won victories all down the centuries, very often against great odds, without artificial aids of this sort. They have wanted none in the past; why should they want them to-day?" If those there be who think along those lines, I would only venture to say to them this. If modern science places ready to your hand a weapon the use of which is expected largely to overcome a condition which gravely impairs the efficacy of troops in the field, a weapon, moreover, the value of which the enemy has fully recognized and which is in daily use by him, is it fair to deprive your own troops of the benefits to be derived from such a weapon? Is it sensible to ignore the march of scientific progress, and not to take advantage of the fruits of many years' labour and research into these matters?
Many times have I heard it deplored in your Lordships' House that more use is not made of the scientist in the many complex problems which continually confront us, both in war and peace. I
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strongly share those views. I look forward to the day when the scientist will no longer be shut out from the counsels and deliberations of national and international assemblies, but will take his place alongside the political, military and religious leaders of the world, and give mankind the benefit of his knowledge and experience, to the immense advantage of the world at large. I hope very much that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack will be able to give your Lordships some information on this subject. On one thing I am sure we are all agreed, and that is that no line of approach, no possible remedial measure, that the wit of man can devise should be neglected in order to lighten the hardships, relieve the sufferings, and generally fortify our gallant troops in the field.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, as usual I shall be extremely short. I have not listened, I am afraid, to the whole of this debate, but so far as I know the particular point that I wish to raise has not been mentioned yet. We are all naturally very perturbed at what has taken place. We are all aware that we have lost an enormous amount of material. We are all aware that the shipping position is very grave. I feel very strongly that people throughout the country want more information about the real position. We as a race, if we are in a jam, always stand up to it magnificently. Undoubtedly, as far as I can see, we shall require a greater effort to overcome our present difficulties.
I am quite certain that if the people of the country generally are told far more than they are being told to-day, that effort Will be forthcoming. I shall very likely be told that that would not be in the public interest, that the enemy would get hold of it, and that it would not be a good thing. We know perfectly well the enemy knows most things, and I feel very strongly indeed that we should do much more in the direction of publishing our real position than has been done in the past. All of us are guessing as to what happened here and there, and we get rather vague statements which have the appearance of an attempt to soothe us. I should like to accentuate that. I am quite certain that if we tell the people more they will respond more, because I believe a great many of them do not realize the serious position in which we are at the present time. That is really

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all I have got to say. It is something that has been very evident to me, and I hope my noble friend on the Woolsack will be able to "put that over" to the Government so that it will be seriously considered—tell all of us a great deal more.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, this debate has ranged over a very wide field, and I want for a few moments to allude to a matter that has not been touched upon up to now. Some time ago I and other members of your Lordships' House called attention to the position in Palestine, and appealed to the Government to utilize to the full the services of the Jewish community there in our united effort against the common enemy. My reason for intervening now is to point out that, owing to recent events in the Middle East, the Jewish community in Palestine may be exposed to attacks from the enemy. Therefore I wish to renew the appeal which we made to the Government some time ago to do every tiling possible to give the Jews in Palestine the arms and munitions in order to defend themselves should this attack be made upon them.
This is a matter of great urgency. It is not necessary for me to remind your Lordships of the offers which have been repeatedly made by the Jews, especially by the Jewish Agency, to render every possible assistance and place all their resources at the disposal of the Government. They are prepared to do this, as your Lordships will remember, not only in Palestine amongst the Jews there—to recruit them for the British Army there—but also in other parts of the world, and to furnish contingents which would be willing to fight in any theatre of war. I cannot help feeling that if these offers had been accepted some time ago—after all, this war has been going on for nearly three years—instead of 12,000 Jews fighting in the British Army, we should have a force of 40,000 or 50,000 fully equipped and fighting alongside our battalions and brigades in Egypt and elsewhere. I have not risen to reproach the Government, because obviously this is not the time to reproach them, for omissions in the past. One has to clear away a misconception which has been fostered in the minds of some people that these Jewish units are not prepared to fight except in Palestine itself. That, I understand, is quite
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untrue. They have already fought in Crete, in Syria, in Libya, and in other theatres of war, and they have volunteered to join the British Army and fight with it wherever they may be wanted. They are also very anxious to be recruited not only in the Pioneer and ancillary Services, but especially in the fighting Services. They want to be in the thick of the battle and play their part in defeating Hitler, who has been their great enemy in the past.
As I say, I have not risen to reproach the Government for what I regard as past errors of omission, because the position to-day is so very critical, and obviously no time should be lost. The question we ask ourselves is, what can be done? If we are not able to protect Palestine, can we at least give some measure of support to the Jews in order that they may be able to protect themselves? It may well be that Palestine will have to be evacuated. If that unfortunate contingency occurs, the position of the Jews will obviously be a tragic one. It will mean not only that the country will be overrun, that they will be transferred from one jurisdiction to another, but in their case it will mean absolute annihilation and extermination. For that reason we shall all agree it is our bounden duty, as far as may be possible and practicable, to help them to secure all the weapons they can in order to defend themselves, to supply them with all the arms and munitions possible in order that they may be able to defend their hearths and homes.
As I understand it, the present position is that there are at least 20,000 gallant Jews who arc prepared to volunteer for service in the British Army. There are also what are called the Settlement Police, of which I believe there are about 6,000 who are already armed; there arc the Special Police who arc not fully armed, and also—and this is a point I want to emphasize—50,000 able-bodied men who are working on farms and in industries who have already volunteered to join a Home Guard in Palestine in order to defend their hearths and homes. I understand that no conditions arc now made by the Jewish Agency in regard to any action which His Majesty's Government, and the War Office especially, may think lit to take in order to arm the people of the country; but, of course, they would like to be allowed to have a fighting Force of their own as they had in the last war,

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the Jewish Legion, under the command of a very able and distinguished officer, Colonel Patterson. They would naturally-like to have a Force that would be part of the British Army in order to encourage their esprit de corps and give them a sense of cohesion, which is one of the most essential things in war.
It may be said, "Where are the arms that can be given to them?" I know that is the difficulty, for the War Office are pressed for arms and munitions in the different theatres, but perhaps the noble Lord who speaks for the War Office in this House will tell us what has become of the Italian rifles and the thousands of rounds of ammunition which were captured in the early days of the Libyan campaign, and whether it is not possible to send them the kind of equipment that we have given out of the Home Guard in this country. Nobody asks for tanks or heavy guns or anything of that sort. All we suggest is that these men shall be equipped in such a way that they can tarry on guerrilla warfare if necessary in their country and defend their hearths and homes. I do not think I need say any more except once again to dead with the Government, even at the eleventh hour, to do everything they can to equip these Jews in order that they may be in a position to defend and protect themselves should the emergency arise. I am sure my noble friend opposite, Lord Croft, and his colleagues in the War Office are already seized of the vital importance of this matter, and I sincerely hope he can give us an assurance that everything possible will be done even now to enable these people we have put into the country, and who have always been loyal to us and the British Empire, to possess the elementary right of defending themselves against their cruel and barbarous enemy.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, this debate is taking place in the shadow of some of the gravest events which have ever confronted our country, events of which the results would indeed be incalculable were they to go amiss. Therefore I feel that the first thought of anyone taking part in the debate must be of our Army whose tasks have been so clearly indicated in the inspiring Order of the Day issued by General Auchinleck. I feel that whatever comes from Parliament at this juncture should aim at sustaining the Army, and should speak of the admiration
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and the gratitude and confidence which we feel for them. Therefore, for my part, I would not indulge in any criticism of the generalship while the battle is on, and indeed if it is the fact that the training of troops and of junior officers has not been what it should have been in the past, if there has been a failure to make the Army machine-minded, if there has been a failure to supply adequate and up-to-date arms, no General on the spot can remedy those deficiencies. If those things are indeed so, then it indicates that the causes of defeat lie nearer at home than in Libya.
But I would like to say something about a point which has been already touched upon in what I think the very important speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey. The main reason for our defeat in Libya has been the ability of the Axis to pass unlimited supplies and reinforcements into Tripoli in comparative safety in twenty-four hours, while our own ships have to run far greater risks in taking supplies and reinforcements and take two months at least in doing so. The Mediterranean is practically closed to us. Surface ships cannot risk raiding Axis communications because of the damage which is inflicted upon them by Axis dive bombers and torpedo planes. Our submarines do all that is possible, and indeed they do magnificently, but there is a limit to what they can do. This lesson was taught us in Norway two years ago when the Admiralty declined to allow surface ships to go into the Skagerrak to attack German communications, a necessary decision but one which sealed the fate of Norway, and it has been confirmed since.
The control of narrow waters such as the English Channel and the Central Mediterranean has passed to shore-based dive bombers and torpedo planes. High level bombing is practically useless against ships, and carrier-borne planes are of little use because the torpedoes which they carry are too small and the carriers themselves are so vulnerable. These facts have been pointed out repeatedly by officers, but they have fallen on deaf ears at the Admiralty and at the Air Ministry, so that we have no dive bombers and very few torpedo planes. Three or four hundred planes of the right type in Libya, with specially trained crews, could have prevented the reinforcements and the supplies passing to Rommel.
LORD TRENCHARD: Planes of a suitable type.
LORD WINSTER: I agree. The heavy bombers, I know, have provided what is described as "extended support," which means in fact that they have bombed Naples and Messina and Crete in the dark from a height of 10,000 feet; and what accuracy would be possible under such circumstances? I am at a loss to understand why the Admiralty, which is responsible for the defence of communications and for the attack upon enemy communications, has not insisted upon suitable planes.
LORD TRENCHARD: I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord but he will remember the short-range fighter. What passed in the Mediterranean is the cause of stopping our bombing by day in those waters.
LORD WINSTER: I think that is what I have indicated; I said "in the dark." It was certainly not the fault of our present Fifth Sea Lord, but the responsibility lies on those who very obstinately refused to learn lessons, upon men who in my opinion should have resigned if they found themselves unable to get what was essential. But unfortunately the Admiralty has not been very air-minded in the past. We have concentrated upon these thousand machine raids which have been our policy instead of making sea power the objective. As the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, said, we have squandered our sea power because the only means of preserving it in the Mediterranean was the prevision of bombers of the right type.
If we are examining the causes of defeat let us remember that the issue of defeat or victory must always turn very largely upon the question of production. We have had two speeches on that, one by the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, and the other by the Minister of Production in another place. I thought the speech of the noble Lord a most consummate performance, and I thought it was an extraordinary reflection upon the central direction of our war effort that the noble Lord is no longer a member of the Government. So far as I have been able to follow events, what he was asked to do he always did do and what he was asked to supply he always did supply. It also seems to me that he alone in the Government, with the exception of the Prime
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Minister, possessed that sense of time and urgency which is essential in the conduct of war. I have only one comment to make on the noble Lord's speech. If everything was so perfect, why were there constant defeats? It is very hard to understand when everything was done so well.
I was specially interested in what he said about dive bombers. We have had three statements on that, one by the Minister of Production, one by the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, and one by the Secretary of State for War. The Minister of Production and the noble Lord seemed very precise in what they said, but the Secretary of State for War, although he said he believed conversations were going on between the War Office and the Air Ministry, did not appear to know what stage the conversations had reached. He hoped that good progress was being made with them. The Ministry of Production is a Department we have always pressed for but which was very reluctantly conceded. The Minister has been to the United States and I think it is obvious he had a very satisfactory visit, but I wonder if he has adequate powers with which to implement the agreement which he has come to in the United States of America. It still seems to me that the relations between the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of Production are rather a muddle, and it also seems to me that tanks and guns are objectives of themselves which ought not to be linked up with the immense ramifications of raw materials and controls which are common services to the Ministry of Production. In my opinion the Ministry of Supply is far too large and unwieldy. It has in fact bitten off more than it can chew, and the time has come to consider some decentralization of the work committed to the Ministry of Supply.
May I now come to what I regard as the main root of our troubles, that is the question of the Minister of Defence? That is now really a thorn in the flesh which is poisoning public confidence. I think it would be very helpful if those who defend the Ministry or the Minister of Defence would explain exactly what purpose is served by the Prime Minister holding that office. I ask that question because the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, said in your Lordships' House that he had held that office under Mr. Chamberlain

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and had resigned it because he could not find any purpose in the office. The Prime Minister himself has told us that he does nothing as Minister of Defence which he could not do as Prime Minister. Therefore I have to ask myself what is the purpose of this title, what is the purpose of this office, and I think it would help to clear our minds very much if we were given an explanation of what purpose exactly is served by the Prime Minister holding the office of Minister of Defence since he has told us he does nothing as Minister of Defence that he cannot do as Prime Minister.
The noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, touched upon a very sore point when he referred to the fact that the Prime Minister is supposed to dominate and overrule his professional advisers and the members of the War Cabinet. There is a general reluctance to believe that he does not do that. We have had very categorical statements that he does not, but nevertheless the belief that he does so persists throughout the country. I will endeavour to put forward a few facts which I think explain the reason for uneasiness. They lie in the genesis of the office. When the Prime Minister was First Lord of the Admiralty, while Mr. Chamberlain was still Prime "Minister, there were conferred upon him very exceptional powers indeed. On April 11, 1940, Mr. Chamberlain made an announcement to the effect that the First Lord would normally preside over the Ministerial Committee on Military Co-ordination. That was followed by a still more remarkable announcement on May 7 that Mr. Churchill as First Lord was
" authorized by the Cabinet to give guidance and direction to the Chiefs of Staff Committee who will prepare plans to carry out the objectives which are given to them by him."
Mr. Chamberlain went on to say:
" My right honourable friend will have a special responsibility for the supervision of military operations day by day."
The First Lord was empowered to give directions to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who were to prepare plans to carry out what was submitted to them by him.
That was the position when Mr. Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty under Mr. Chamberlain. Are we really to believe that when Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister and assumed the office of Minister of Defence, he divested himself of any of the powers which had been conferred
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upon him when he was First Lord of the Admiralty by the previous Prime Minister? I think that anyone who knows the Prime Minister will feel that that was very unlikely indeed, and that he himself certainly retained those powers, preserved them and possibly added to them. By the Patent of Admiralty the First Lord is charged with responsibility to Parliament for all naval business. He is also charged with the allocation of business inside the Admiralty, so that everybody in the Admiralty is responsible to him for transaction of naval business and he in turn is responsible to Parliament. But we know from statements made by the Prime Minister that all major decisions of the Board of Admiralty have now to be submitted to the Minister of Defence. Therefore the responsibility which is thrown upon the First Lord of the Admiralty by the Patent is in fact abrogated by this fact that the decisions of the Board have now to be submitted to the Minister of Defence.
I do not know how much further it goes, but I notice that the other day the late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, in a speech which he made to his constituents, informed them that when he ceased to hold the office of Civil Lord of the Admiralty he received the usual letter from the Prime Minister and subsequently found the First Lord had not been told, If the Prime Minister removes the Civil Lord without informing the First Lord, will he hesitate to move Fleets and ships when he wishes to do so? When the Naval Staff wishes to move ships in accordance with strategical requirements the First Sea Lord says the permission of the Minister of Defence must be obtained. There is the further fact that announcements relating to the Navy are made in another place not by the First Lord of the Admiralty, but by the Minister of Defence. In such circumstances it is inevitable that the feeling must prevail that it is the Minister of Defence and not the First Lord of the Admiralty who is primarily responsible for the transaction of naval business and for operational matters. It is no wonder that there is a feeling that the Minister of Defence does overrule and interfere with operational matters. And as a matter of fact, it is freely said that operational telegrams are sent by the Minister of Defence on his own responsibility and over his own name. If that is not the case I think it is high time that it was most emphatically

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contradicted. The impression that it is the case is very widely spread indeed.
Well, my Lords, those are some of the reasons why this general uneasiness is felt about this combination of the offices of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Another matter which gives rise to considerable uneasiness is that in respect of many of the defeats and reverses which we have suffered the question arises whether they spring from that reluctance to face facts or to be guided by the lessons of the war which has always been such a very strong characteristic of the present Prime Minister. In the last war we had the episode of the Dardanelles campaign. Admiral Mahan, who is quite an authority on naval matters, long ago said that ships cannot engage land forts. But the First Lord of the Admiralty said: ''They can if I order them to do so," and that enterprise in the Dardanelles was set on foot, although we know that Mr. Churchill overrode his professional advisers. We know that the First Sea Lord was overridden; that Admiral Lord Fisher was most reluctant and strongly opposed the opening of that campaign. Nevertheless it was opened, and when all the smoke and thunder had died away and the lives had been lost and the treasure spent and the time and effort wasted, we came back to a realization of the truth of the simple statement of Mahan that ships cannot engage land forts.
Again, we know that in this war it has been bitterly apparent that Armies cannot operate under certain conditions until they have proper air cover. What happened in Greece? Troops were sent into Greece—I do not know the figures but I have been told that 45,000 troops were sent with fifteen aircraft. And the result again was catastrophe. When it was all over the simple lesson remained that troops cannot operate without air cover. Again, we have learnt the lesson in this war that ships cannot operate without air cover in certain circumstances. Nevertheless the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" were sent to do it, and within twelve days they were at the bottom of the sea. Again we were left with the simple lesson still staring us in the face that ships cannot operate without air cover. Are we to believe that in all these instances all these steps were taken, all these operations embarked upon, with
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the full advice and concurrence of the expert advisers? If so, it seems to me that there is something very wrong about the expert advisers when they so frequently—if it is so—counsel operations which fly in the teeth of the lessons of this war and always have such unfortunate and disastrous results.
I have mentioned Greece. Let me say that in my opinion that decision to divert troops from Libya into Greece has been the major strategical error of this war. In reading the history of the last war I can find no record of any strategical error of such importance having been committed unless, possibly, it was the Dardanelles campaign. From that disastrous decision to send those troops into Greece have followed, in inevitable sequence, our reverses, defeats and disasters, and, in the long run, what advantage could it possibly have been to Greece? The hopes of Greece were bound up in an early victory by us. And there was prospect of early victory, but it has been disastrously delayed by that decision to send troops into Greece. Was that decision taken by General Wavell or with his advice and consent, or was it taken in opposition to his advice? I only know that after that General Wavell started upon his remarkable Odyssey to India, to Burma and Java and back again to India. On whose advice was that decision to send those troops into Greece taken?
There is only one other recommendation I should like to make in addition to this suggestion that the Ministry of Defence serves no purpose, and should be abolished. I think that we might consider having a very much smaller Government. I think that we now have a bloated and unwieldy Government. There has been an extraordinary proliferation of Ministers to such an extent that really the Ministerial coinage has been debased. There is a great number of Ministers whose work and offices appear to bear no apparent relation to the war effort. I think there is great room for compression, for the telescoping of certain Ministries, and, in fact, for the suppression of certain others. Then there is also this immense litter of Committees, which has already been referred to. Committees unfortunately are like rabbits—they breed at a tremendous pace. The institution of one always leads to several more. I suggest that there should be a smaller War

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Cabinet every Minister in which has some relation to cur war effort. That I think is the second great requirement at this moment. More changes must be made. It is impossible for us to go on as we are doing at the present moment. The noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack, referring to a speech which I made in this place, made mention of the putter. He asked whether I wished to change the putter. I think there was some little ambiguity there. I would remind the noble and learned Lord Chancellor that the word "putter" may be applied both to the instrument of the game and to the person using it.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): Which do you mean?
LORD WINSTER: May I in my turn ask the noble and learned Viscount a question following out the golf analogy? I would ask him if he has ever heard of anyone winning a game of golf by the process of losing every hole? It cannot be done. No more can you win a war by the process of losing every battle. We have got to have change. Things cannot go on as they are doing. It is impossible for the Prime Minister to go out into the country now and say: "I have got my vote of confidence, and I will change nothing." That will not do. Great calls are going to be made on our people—greater calls than any which have yet been made. They will respond if they know that the house is being set in order. If yon will do that and reconstruct on the basis of a smaller Government in which the members are chosen on the basis of the best man for the job, and no other basis—certainly not upon any Party basis—then you can ask the country for a supreme effort.
The noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, closed his speech yesterday with a quotation from Cromwell. It was a well-known quotation which breathes a very familiar spirit indeed—namely, that as you are English you just go on and stick it and everything is all right. I am a pragmatist, and my strongest theological belief is that faith without works is of no avail whatever. At this juncture I infinitely prefer to the quotation from Cromwell a quotation from William Morris which, with 3'our Lordships' permission, I will read:
" Meanwhile, if these hours be dark, at least do not let us sit deedless, like fools, and
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beaten by the muddle, but rather let us work like good fellows to set our workshop ready against to-morrow's daylight."
I feel that to be a message for to-day—to clear up the muddle, to set our workshop in order; and, believe me, we must do it whilst there is yet time—and perhaps there is not much time—for, if we do not clear up the muddle and set our workshop in order, we shall never win through this long winter of our discontent to the daylight and the sunlight and the victory.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I shall try not at this hour to keep your Lordships very long, but many matters have been raised and, as to some of them, I should like briefly and clearly to reply. As to other matters—valuable suggestions and criticisms—I would wish to assure the House that they shall not be overlooked or neglected. Important Government advisers have been present, listening to the debate and taking due note. The whole debate will, of course, be most carefully scanned by all concerned. I agree, if I may say so, with my noble friend Lord Londonderry, that in dealing with this very sombre situation this House shows to advantage. I would even make so bold as to say that possibly, as Lord Londonderry suggested, we do these things better than they do them in the House of Commons.
This is admittedly a time of the most, terrible strain and anxiety, and we should not be Englishmen if that sense of strain and anxiety did not show itself in this. British institution. As I have listened to the debate, I have thought once or twice of a passage which some of your Lordships may know, one of the most splendid passages in the writings of antiquity, where Thucydides described how, as the great sea fight was being fought out just off Syracuse, the Greek Army on land watched every fluctuation of the struggle until, as he says, their bodies "swayed in their anguish" almost as it were like the wind passing over the heads of a field of corn. There is not a man or a woman who does not feel in their very fibre the immense anxieties of such a time.
Constructive criticism—and there has been much of it in this debate—and reasonable inquity—and there has been a great deal of it in this debate—are surely the natural outcome. I do not quite agree with my noble friend Lord Latham in an observation which he made

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when commenting upon the closing part of the very moving address which my noble friend Lord Cranborne gave us at the last sitting. My noble friend Lord Cranborne, the Leader of the House, did not complain of criticism. There is no question of resenting criticism at all; this is no time to be as small-minded as that. The observation which my noble friend made, and which I must say I thought was appropriate and very powerfully expressed, was that we should aim, in conducting a discussion like this, at not creating a sense of distrust; for, if we do not believe in ourselves and in our country and its Government, then we cannot expect other people to believe in us either. That is what he said. He said: "Do not keep the Government in office, if that is the view which you hold; but, whatever you do, do not give the impression here and abroad that, while they are kept in office, they are not to be trusted." That seems to me, speaking with very great respect and I hope with not too much partisanship, to be very wise and sound advice; and I would acknowledge most freely and most sincerely, if I may be allowed to do so at the end of the debate, that that has been in substance the course which has been taken in the debate.
If there are some questions which I shall not attempt to answer, although I might do so, it is because I think that we have also to take into account constantly the well-known advice which my noble friend Lord Hankey repeated: "Do not give too much information about things that are happening, still less about things that are going to happen." It may well be that our open Parliamentary system of challenge and counter-challenge leads us, as a matter of practice, to do that; but we cannot afford to give anything away at this critical time; and, even if I could answer with precision—and I think that I could, from the information given to me—as to the extent to which heavy bombers may be going to Africa, and how far such forces are likely shortly to be increased, I would not give the answer, because I think it would be obviously a matter helpful to the enemy, however satisfactory to myself.
Let me at once pay the tribute of respectful congratulation to the noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, whose maiden speech had the two qualities which endear
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every maiden speaker to an ancient assembly; it was a modest speech, and it was a well-informed speech. Let me offer to him what may be regarded in some degree as the result of his effort, or at any rate a gratifying answer to his inquiry. He pointed out, what I think has been pointed out before, that there are disadvantages in having separate communiqués from a field of operations where all our Forces are engaged. There is always at least the risk that some-designing person may set one against another, whereas what interests us is to know from the responsible authorities, in one consolidated communiqué, how the battle is going. The noble Earl will be glad to know that the first joint communiqué from Africa was issued yesterday, and that it is intended, I understand, to continue the practice which he recommends, and that there will not be, in the circumstances with which we are now dealing, a continuation of these triplicated communiqués. It is not always that a maiden speaker is able to gather his sheaves so quickly as on this occasion.
Then there were two very important questions, special questions connected with bombers, on each of which your Lordships will expect me to say a word, and I will deal with them in turn. One of them, I think, has been cleared up partly as the result of the extremely informing statement made yesterday by my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook and partly by the addition that was made to it by my noble friend Lord Brabazon this afternoon. The story of the dive bomber is really completely clear. I suppose there is no occupation more satisfactory to oneself and more easy to pursue than looking back on serious events after you know how they have actually developed and explaining how certain you are that if you had been in control of them at the time you would have done something better and different. But in the case of the dive bomber I do not think anybody could really have that retrospective sense of personal satisfaction.
The position, as Lord Beaverbrook explained it, appeared to me to be quite unassailable. He pointed out that in May and June, 1940, in the desperate condition in which we found ourselves after Dunkirk, we were in effect denuded of aircraft, that the situation was one which required the replenishing and the multiplying of machines at the maximum possible

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speed at ail events and at all costs. For my part I am very glad that the noble Lord was there to do it. He told us that instead of continuing to produce a variety of well-established types—thirty-one I think he said—which were in actual production, he remorselessly cut those down and the orders were given that at least for the time being everybody should be turned on to the business of producing five essential and well-established types of aircraft—bombers and fighters. There cannot be the slightest question—everybody must see it, although he has no more claim to be an expert than I have—that that was the quickest way of getting what was absolutely essential. And if the Archangel Gabriel at that moment had descended and informed us that what we ought to do was to design and make a model of, and ultimately produce, an experimental type and then get it through its teething troubles in order to produce a new kind of thing called a dive bomber, then he would have been repudiated by the universal judgment of the country. What was done was that, as it was known that there was such a machine to be produced in America, a heavy order was at once placed, there. Though it be true, as the noble Lord, Lord Beaver-brook, explained to us, without casting blame on anybody—indeed I gather-partly because of alterations from this side—the supply was slower than might have been expected, at any rate that is a complete answer to the suggestion that there was some serious fault of good sense or good management in the manner of producing dive bombers.
Then there is another point which the noble Lord, Lord Addison, raised in the debate yesterday and asked that it might be dealt with by the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, when he spoke. Lord Cranborne, exercising the privilege which attaches always to the Leader of the House, proceeded to explain that this was one of the matters that I would deal with to-day. I cannot say how much gratified I was to be informed of the confidence that was thus placed in me. I have made independent inquiries and have ascertained the facts, but the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, has been good enough—and very usefully and with much greater authority—to interpose and explain the whole thing. The passage which Lord Addison quoted from the Secretary of State for War, speaking two days
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ago, appeared, I believe, in a supplementary answer and it was of course quite correctly quoted by my noble friend. It ran:
" Discussions on the general subject have been going on between the two Departments. They are in a very advanced stage and I hope that very shortly they will be concluded satisfactorily."
But I have learnt from the Secretary of State himself that that passage has not to do with dive bombers. It may be that read in the Official Report it had that appearance.
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON indicated dissent.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Well, I can only say I am told so most positively. I am assured by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War that the actual question to which he was referring was the general subject of Air Co-operation with the Army which is constantly, of course, a matter of arrangement between the Departments, and he tells me that he believes that very shortly there may be some more specific statement to be made.
LORD ADDISON: I very much regret to interrupt the Lord Chancellor. I am quite sure that the statement he has made to the House just now is strictly according to Departmental information that has been conveyed to him. But I am equally sure that if anybody reads the record in the Official Report of the proceedings in the House of Commons it is beyond a shadow of doubt that the answer of the Secretary of State for War referred to dive bombers and to nothing else.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: What an advantage it is that we live under the system of a bicameral Legislature ! The noble Lord referred to Departmental information as though it was some inferior sort of second-hand backstairs gossip. I must make it quite plain that my information comes from Sir James Grigg himself personally—spoken to me and taken in by my ears; and it will not be the first time that the written word, even if it quite correctly records the reply to a supplementary question, has led to misunderstanding. I hope that my noble friend Lord Addison will now realize that there is nothing at all in this very considerable mare's nest.
The other point had to do, not with dive bombers, but with heavy bombers, and a very powerful and very emphatic part

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of Lord Addison's speech dealt with that. In particular, as these long-distance machines had been used, admittedly with great effect, on a limited number of occasions over German towns, Cologne, Bremen and so on—why was it, he said, that instead of that they had not been operating in Libya where, I think he observed, half the damage done to Cologne would have been of invaluable help to men of ours who were hard placed there. Let me preface what I am about to say by observing that nobody knows better than I do how entirely independent my noble friend is, and I do not suspect him of having got the argument from anybody else; but I am just going to read one or two passages and ask the House whether they do not see, as it happens, a certain familiarity.
Here is something which was said on June 17:
"It looks once again as if our convoys were not given sufficient air support. Meanwhile the major weight of the R.A.F.'s strength is being kept at home for use in bombing Germany, and the military value of such operations cannot compare with that of the battle in Libya and in the Mediterranean. Yet our men have often had cause to complain in the past that the R.A.F. were never where they were most needed. When they are urgently required in decisive battles, Churchill dissipates the R.A.F. for bombing the Continent. He reserves them for making propaganda."
The House may be interested to know where that passage—and I have others of the same sort—comes from. It comes from the German broadcasting station pouring in the English language into this country propaganda by means of which they hope to remove the pressure of our heavy bombers from German towns. Here is another one:
" If these planes that mass-attacked Cologne had been sent to Libya, very different news would be coming from Cairo to-day. General opinion is veering round to this view. It has been authoritatively stated that no repetition of the thousand-bomber raids should be expected; the R.A.F. cannot afford them—having more than they can manage to do as it is. It is having to send strong reinforcements to the Middle Fast at once. If these planes had not been wasted on Churchill's propaganda stunts, there would not now be this hurried dispatch of planes to save the situation in Egypt."
It distresses me to tell your Lordships that this is not the language of a single-souled patriot whom we can recognize and welcome as a brother, but is the carefully-designed language of the German propaganda
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agency, and was dispatched by the "New British Broadcasting Station" on June 25.
LORD ADDISON: Is the noble Viscount suggesting I knew anything about that? It is not quite good enough. I want to know if the noble Viscount is suggesting I knew anything about that stuff or was influenced by it?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not think the noble Lord has done me the justice of listening to what I said before I read these extracts.
LORD ADDISON: I did.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: What I said was that I knew perfectly well—we all know—the noble Lord has been giving his own views, his own single judgment. I appeal to the recollection of the House.
LORD ADDISON: I regard it as a gross affront. I consider it nothing less. You admit I knew nothing about these matters. I never heard about it in my life, and I regard it therefore as an affront. The noble Viscount prefaced it by white-washing me, and then proceeded to read some emanation of Goebbels as though it were mine. I think it is a most shocking affront.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sorry my noble friend should even temporarily lose control of himself. I did everything the House would think was reasonable and proper. I was most careful to guard him from the even momentary supposition that I attributed anything of the kind to him. What I pointed out was that the observation in his speech is exactly the observation made on the German wireless, and though of course he makes it entirely in the interest of this country, it is a matter for observation that apparently those in Germany, who certainly do not wish to serve the interests of this country, think it a most desirable thing to remove our bombers from German territory. If my noble friend will reflect, as I am sure he will, with his usual fairness, on what I have said, he will find nothing whatever to complain of. I have no reflection to make on him whatever. I do think, however—I do not know whether your Lordships do—that the similarity of view goes to show that my noble friend's view may not be right. It seems tome just possible that there may

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be more to be said for bombing Germany than he thinks. At least the Germans think so, and on that subject they probably are very good witnesses, because they know what it means. I am extremely sorry if any word of mine should have caused my noble friend an even temporary ruffling.
I have one or two other matters to deal with. I do not wish to revive the question of whether the Prime Minister should also be Minister of Defence. It is an argument we have had many times. I was glad to hear my noble friend Lord Londonderry speak so warmly as he did about the Prime Minister, and I would remind him that he has expressed the view that the Minister of Defence must be the Prime Minister. But I am not on this question of organization for the moment. If anybody wants the latest evidence which seems to be available as to the part which the Prime Minister plays in interfering with strategic or tactical questions, it was provided as recently as yesterday. I would invite my noble friend Lord Winster to add this bead to his rosary, because some of the earlier examples we have heard about before. It is very good evidence, because it is the evidence of somebody who certainly knows. It is not speculation or inference, it is fact.
Sir Roger Keyes, in the debate in another place yesterday, (taking a line which seemed to me very different from the line of the proposer, but none the less complaining of the same thing), thought that the higher direction of the war was at fault, but it turned out that the higher direction was at fault according to him because Mr. Winston Churchill followed the advice of his professional advisers. That was his point. Sir Roger Keyes took Norway as an example. He had a great deal of interest to say, because he told Parliament, as we know is the fact, that he was himself closely associated with these matters, and that he was quite unable to persuade the Prime Minister to adopt a course with reference to Norway which was different from that recommended by his professional advisers. He thought that was one of the proofs that the higher direction of the war was defective. That is the worst of these general expressions. They mean different things in the mouths of different people.
Some people, when they talk about the higher direction of the war being defective,
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seem to imagine the Prime Minister interferes at every moment. There was the question, for instance, which was asked in the speech of my noble friend Lord Winster. It is a difficult form of statement to deal with, but I will do my best. He said, dealing with naval operations, that it is freely said that operational orders have gone out in the Prime Minister's own name. I have not had much time to inquire, but there happens to be a very experienced member of the General Staff available who knows this matter well, and he sends me this answer:
" This is not true. The Prime Minister does not send operational signals."
Though the noble Lord was only asking a question, I am sure he will be glad to get so definite an answer in respect of his own Service.
As to the speech of my noble friend Lord Ailwyn, I shall perhaps be excused if I do not give him a detailed answer to his extremely important question on the supply of vitamins to the troops under the conditions in Libya. He was good enough to give notice that he would raise this question, and I have had from the Department a detailed answer of a very technical character indeed, containing some expressions and formulæ which I do not profess myself completely to understand. Perhaps my noble friend will allow me to send him some detailed information; I can say this—because I have studied it sufficiently—that he will be glad to know that, in fact, steps are taken to secure that in the ration which is served in Libya, provision is made for sufficient supplies of these vitamins and other special substances—phosphorus and others—which undoubtedly medical science advises us are essential if we are to keep troops in proper fighting condition under such strenuous circumstances. The matter is by no means overlooked and, if I may, I shall send my noble friend a detailed answer.
Then there was one other question relating to the bombers which was put by the last speaker. On all these technical matters I must say I speak with great hesitation, because there are a hundred things the experts know that the rest of us can hardly know at all, but if I understood Lord Winster rightly he was really making a very surprising suggestion. His suggestion, as I understand it, was that

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long-distance bombers should be sent out in order to break the line of Rommel's supplies across the Mediterranean, that that was the way to stop the supplies which Germany was getting to Libya. He added that this operation was to take place in the day time, and I think also said that in the same way there should be used torpedo-carrying aircraft. Approaching it not as a highly expert problem, which I am incapable of judging, but from a much more elementary point of view, I ask myself: "Well, in the day time, are these large bombers to be protected by fighter aircraft?" If they are not, I should fear that their fate would be sealed, but if they are to be protected by fighter aircraft, where are the fighter aircraft to come from? These are considerations so elementary that possibly they only occur to the uninformed mind, but I do not know the answer to them. If one or two of your Lordships can correct me now and say that that is all wrong—I see my noble friend Lord Trenchard there—I would most willingly give way, but I believe it to be quite right. I think I now hear my noble friend Lord Trenchard say it is quite right. It shows how much easier it is to make suggestions than it is to carry them out.
There was the suggestion by Lord Winster made at the end of his speech with which I most thoroughly agree. He seemed to me to strike a true note when he said, coming to the end of the debate, that our duty was a duty first and above all to sustain the Army in Africa. That is what it is, that is the thing which makes a Parliamentary and democratic assembly an advantage to a country that can exercise the virtues of courage and self-control. Have your Lordships reflected that, as far as things have gone, there are, I suppose, six men in connexion with this vital world-wide struggle whose names will be written for ever on the scroll of history. There is Roosevelt, there is Stalin, there is Chiang Kai-shek, there are those two on the enemy side whom Milton would call "bad eminencies," Hitler and perhaps Mussolini, and there is Churchill. Now all their six countries since the war started have had to receive very bad news—Pearl Harbour, the Germans at the gates of Moscow, Japan overrunning province after province of China and cutting the Burma road, and on the enemy side the utter
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failure of the Battle of Britain, the heroic resistance of Russia, the loss of the Italian Empire. And yet this is the only country out of the six in which there is a free Parliamentary debate, where every critic has his say and is listened to with respect and attention, where a vote of censure can be moved on the head of the Government and can be rejected by a vast majority.
These are tremendously proud reflections for every one of us. It seems to me, my Lords, it is this situation which calls upon us to be worthy of our Parliamentary heritage. There has been nothing said here in this House to-day or yesterday for which anybody need be reproached. This has been a real Council of State in which everybody has contributed of his best. But now let us finish, as Lord Denman so finely said in his speech earlier in the day, with a message to the Army in Egypt. Let us tell them that they may have confidence in the determination of their fellow-countrymen here in Parliament and out of it to supply the best weapons that we possibly can, that we will rival their own constancy and endeavour to equal their own courage, that we will never allow ourselves to be dismayed by misfortune and that in that spirit one day they and we will welcome the victory together.
LORD DAVIES: Would the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack give me an assurance that everything will be done to deal with the position in Palestine?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I had a difficulty in replying on that matter as the noble Lord will understand, but I will report what he has said to the proper quarters.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I am sure you will all agree that this two-days' debate has been entirely worthy of this House, and indeed I think perhaps it may stand out hereafter as being a debate which will have shown up in a conspicuous degree the large variety of talent which this Houses possesses. I have only one or two comments to make, as is the privilege of the mover of a Motion, without extending the sphere of the debate. I was glad to hear the announcement of the Lord Chancellor that we have heard the last of separate Service communiqués. It was a subject which I took the liberty

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myself of protesting against in somewhat strong language, because I felt strongly, yesterday.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not know whether I might interpose because I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. What I did say had reference to Libya and Egypt. Of course, if there was a naval engagement it might very well be that there would be a particular announcement on a particular topic.
LORD ADDISONS: I quite understand that in the nature of the case that must be so. I am thinking of where the Services are acting in common as has been the case in Libya. I will not be vain enough to think that what was said here by myself and supported by others yesterday has anything to do with it, but it may have added its minute quota towards the balance of the scale on one side. Anyhow it is all to the good and I am sure it will have a very wholesome effect. They are brothers in arms every one of them in the air, on the sea, and on the land. One set of communiqués is enough.
All I can say is that if the Lord Chancellor is satisfied with the story of the dive bombers he is very easily satisfied. I make no further comment on that. It speaks for itself. I do, however, take serious exception 1o the way the Lord Chancellor approached what I said about big bombing raids. What I actually said in discussing the influence of big bombing on the progress of the war—interrupted for a considerable time in the month of June, in fine weather—was:
" Half a Cologne raid would have reduced Benghazi to smithereens."
That is true. It is not based on anything Mr. Goebbels said, it is based on sensible observation of the situation and on a very strong feeling held by many men in the Service. I believe it is true. It was supported by what the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, suggested in other respects and by what the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, said, and I think myself, whatever may be the system adopted in the Law Courts, it is not fair and not right that my argument should be prejudiced as it clearly was by the suggestion that it is an argument which is convenient to our enemies. I think it was the right thing to have done and so do many others just as patriotic as anybody else.
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One point which emerges from the extraordinarily interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, is that it would be very interesting some time in a convenient way to have a little more light on the rapidity with which ideas of new designs can be translated into manufacturing realities. That is one of the crucial difficulties I know full well, but I am not satisfied even from what the noble Lord said that we are as expeditious as we might be. At all events, I think it will be a suitable subject for discussion.
Before I close I should like to express a hope that the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, will reconsider the decision which he took some time ago, no doubt on advice from his colleagues, that the proposed debate on merchant shipping should be held in secret. I hope that some time in the near future that subject may be debated, perhaps in amended form, in public sitting. I feel quite sure it could be advantageously debated without giving the enemy any information he docs not possess. I will take the opportunity of communicating with the noble Viscount through the usual channels, but I should like publicly to express the hope that it will be possible to have a debate in Open Session in the near future. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

  INTERNMENT CAMPS.
  INTERNMENT CAMPS.
  CHILD LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE.
  CHILD LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE.