Sitting of 8 January 1942

Preamble
The House—after the Adjournment, on 19 th December, 1941, for the Christmas Recess—met, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

DEATH OF A MEMBER.
Mr. SPEAKER made the following communication to the House:
I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Frank Lee, Esquire, Member for the County of Derby (North-Eastern Division), and I desire, on behalf of the House, to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the hon. Member.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

  PRIVATE BILL PETITIONS.
  Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table, Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the Petitions for the following Bills the Standing Orders have been complied with, namely—

  Bilston Corporation;

  Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway;

  Mid-Wessex Water.

  PRIVATE BILLS [Lords].
  Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table, Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in respect of the Bills comprised in the List reported
  2
  by the Chairman of Ways and Means as intended to originate in the House of Lords, they have certified that the Standing Orders have been complied with in the following cases, namely—

  Coventry Corporation;

  Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks;

  Pembrokeshire County Council.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  MILITARY SERVICE.

    SKILLED MEN.
    Sir Irving Alberyasked the Minister of Labour when it is proposed to publish the report of the Committee on Skilled Men in the Services under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge; on what date this report was made; and whether action has been taken on it?
    Mr. Graham Whiteasked the Minister of Labour when it is proposed to issue the report of Sir William Beveridge's Committee on Skilled Labour in the Forces?
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The report was made on 31st October last and has, since that date, been under detailed consideration. I am not yet in a position to say when it will be published.
    Sir I. Albery: I could not hear some of the Answer given by the right hon. Gentleman. Can he give me the date once again?
    Mr. Bevin: I said that the report was made on 31st October last, and that since that time it has been under detailed consideration. I am not yet in a position to state when it will be published.
    Sir I. Albery: Is any action likely to be taken on this important matter in the near future?
    Mr. Bevin: Certainly, Sir. Action is being taken but the problem affects other Departments as well as my own Department.
    Mr. White: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that the report is published as soon as possible, having regard to the fact that Members still receive a number of letters on this matter?

    NATIONAL FIRE SERVICE.
    Sir Herbert Williamsasked the Minister of Labour, whether it is proposed to call up for the Fighting Services men between the ages of 19 and 30 at present in the National Fire Service, with a view to their being replaced by older men and by women?
    Mr. Bevin: I have no present intention of taking this course, but I am in constant touch with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Home Security on this subject.

    MEDICAL EXAMINATION.
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Minister of Labour, whether he intends to implement the recommendation of the Select Committee on National Expenditure that the medical records of approved societies shall be made available to medical boards when examining recruits for the Forces; and, if so, whether he will consult with the appropriate Departments so as to ensure that this shall be the practice even in peace time?
    Mr. Bevin: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to his Question on this matter on 7th August last, to which I have nothing to add.
    Mr. Davies: Does my right hon. Friend remember that he told me he would not do this? Now that the Select Committee on National Expenditure have recommended it, will he reconsider the matter?
    Mr. Bevin: A report on this matter, in the terms of the reply given on 7th August, has been sent to the Select Committee on National Expenditure, and it will be for them to consider whether they will publish the reply.

  NATIONAL WAR EFFORT.

    BILLETING (DOMESTIC HELP).
    Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrewasked the Minister of Labour whether he will take steps to supply domestic help to householders who have people billeted on them and are without help to do the necessary domestic duties?
    Mr. Bevin: Vacancies for essential domestic help in these circumstances, notified to local offices of my Department, will be met to the best of our ability, from amongst women who are not available for full-time employment on war production or for the women's Services.
    Sir C. MacAndrew: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, particularly in the case of elderly householders, the problem is urgent, because such people Cannot carry on?
    Sir Henry Morris-Jones: Will my right hon. Friend consider setting up a national domestic service, in unform, for these women?
    Mr. Bevin: Women who have to spend their time in domestic service must be allowed to determine whether they will wear uniform. The problem is a very difficult one. I recognise its urgency, but in questions of man-power everything is urgent.

    MEDICAL WOMEN.
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour whether in view of the wide use of woman-power in the war effort, and the desirability of obtaining the co-operation of women in all spheres of Departmental work, consideration will be given to the desirability of appointing a medical woman to the Ministry of Labour staff?
    Mr. Bevin: The medical inspectorate of factories attached to this Ministry already includes women, and further appointments of medical women to the Ministry will be made if necessary.
    Miss Ward: Will my right hon. Friend consider the appointment of medical women to advise, along with the medical department, in relation to the recruitment and medical examination a of women, in connection with conscription and registration?
    Mr. Bevin: The medical services that we have at our disposal—the medical boards, the Ministry of Health and other branches of medical service now available—are, I think, adequate.
    Miss Ward: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Women's Medical Federation would like a women's representative upon the staff of the Ministry of Labour? Would he sometimes give consideration to the desires of women?

    WORK DIRECTION (PROSECUTIONS).
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Minister of Labour the number, up to date, of men and women, respectively, prosecuted for not carrying out the instructions and directions of his Department under the several Rules and Regulations in force since the outbreak of war?
    Mr. Bevin: The number of individuals so prosecuted up to date is 146 men and 5 women, in addition to 14 firms.
    Mr. Davies: Will my right hon. Friend give serious consideration to prosecuting and sending to prison ex-miners, because they do not produce coal in prison?

    DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES.
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Minister of Labour the number of males and females, respectively, employed in the distributive trades at September, 1939, and at the last available date?
    Mr. Bevin: I regret that these statistics are not available.

  HOUSING (STATISTICS).
  Mr. Thorneasked the Minister of Health the total capital expenditure on subsidised houses built by local authorities and by private enterprise; the number of houses built by local authorities and by private enterprise; and the amount of loans sanctioned for 1939 and 1940?
  The Minister of Health (Mr. Ernest Brown): The total capital expenditure on subsidised housing in England and Wales since 1919, up to 31st March, 1941, was approximately £836,000,000, of which it is estimated that £578,000,000 was in respect of building by local authorities and £258,000,000 by private enterprise. The number of houses built in the same period was 1,178,011 by local authorities and 3,055,691 by private enterprise, of which 433,980 were built with State assistance. During the years ended 31st March, 1940, and 31st March, 1941, loans for the provision of new housing accommodation by
  6
  local authorities were sanctioned to the extent of £11,661,982 and £2,101,548 respectively.

  CIVIL DEFENCE.

    BILLETING ALLOWANCES.
    Sir John Wardlaw-Milneasked the Minister of Health, whether he has considered a communication from the Bromsgrove Urban District Council, dated 15th December, in regard to the necessity for a review of the present billeting allowances; and what action he is taking in the matter, particularly in view of his promise in this House on 9th July that he would have the matter under review?
    Mr. E. Brown: Yes, Sir, and the matter is now under immediate consideration.
    Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: While thanking my right hon. Friend for his answer, may I ask whether he will see that the disadvantages and hardships are removed?
    Mr. Brown: We have this matter under constant review, as I have stated in my answer.

    FIRE SERVICE.
    Sir H. Williamsasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the National Fire Service is still recruiting men between the ages of 19 and 30?
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Herbert Morrison): Recruitment of whole-time firemen is substantially confined to men posted under the machinery of the National Service Act, 1941; in general, only those who had attained the age of 25 on registration are posted.

    DETAINEES (SIR OSWALD AND LADY MOSLEY).
    Squadron Leader Hulbertasked the Home Secretary what are the conditions under which two Fascist internees, Sir Oswald and Lady Mosley, occupy a self-contained flat at His Majesty's prison, Holloway; and whether similar facilities and accommodation are available to other internees?
    Mr. H. Morrison: As detention under Regulation 18B is for custodial purposes only and not for punitive purposes, I have always had it in mind that married couples detained under Defence Regulation 18B should be allowed to live together if suitable arrangements could be

    7
    made. It has now become practicable to allow selected married couples detained under this Regulation to live together in the mixed camp in the Isle of Man. As regards other married couples, who cannot be allowed to go to the Isle of Man, it is not practicable to make arrangements so favourable as those afforded by the camp in the Isle of Man, but it has been arranged that these persons, including Sir Oswald and Lady Mosley, shall be accommodated in a separate block at Holloway Prison which has been set apart for this purpose. This accommodation consists of cells, but there is also a kitchen, where the detainees may cook the rations supplied to them, and two other rooms which may be used as a sitting room and dining room.
    Squadron Leader Hulbert: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether these internees are allowed to have other prisoners wait upon them, and whether they are allowed to have any food they like brought into prison? Do they have to do any work?
    Mr. Morrison: The House will know that these detainees have never been treated as ordinary prisoners convicted by the courts, and that fundamental point must be kept in mind all the time. I think it is the case that they can make arrangements with other detainees to assist them in household work. That is a domestic matter on which we can give facilities. I think they have the right, within certain limitations, of buying food from outside. All that we have done is to make arrangements in prison whereby married couples can live together. There is nothing luxurious about it, but I think it is a fair and humane thing.
    Mr. Thorne: If they are allowed to buy food outside, and they get food inside, are they not getting rations to which they are not entitled?
    Mr. Morrison: That point should be put to the Minister of Food.
    Mr. Silverman: When my right hon. Friend talks about selected married couples, what is the principle of selection? Is it capacity to pay for the accommodation?
    Mr. Morrison: I am surprised at that point being put by my hon. Friend. There is no privilege about this. They
    8
    are not paying a rent. I cannot see why people detained in prison should be required to pay a rent for the cells they occupy.
    Mr. Silverman: I do not think that my right hon. Friend has appreciated my point. In his original Answer he said that these arrangements were made in respect of selected married couples. I asked him what was the principle of selection?
    Mr. Morrison: We must retain the right of selection, because in particular cases security considerations might arise. In fact, there are, in all, 15 married couples detained under Defence Regulations. Of these, four couples are at Holloway and eight couples are in a mixed camp in the Isle of Man. As for the other three couples, there were particular reasons of a physical character why these arrangements could not be made in one case, and in two cases the couples hive refused the opportunity of living together.

    PERSONNEL (PART-TIME WORK).
    Major Sir Jocelyn Lucasasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the desire expressed by members of the Auxiliary Fire Service and air-raid precautions services to be allowed to do munition or other useful work in their spare time, both when off duty and when standing by with nothing to do; and what steps are being taken to tap this reservoir of skilled and partly-skilled labour for part-time work?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Arrangements have been made, and are about to be announced to local authorities and others concerned,-under which use will be made during a part of their working hours not devoted to training and exercises, of the skill and labour of a considerable number of Civil Defence personnel. The work upon which they will be engaged will be for Civil Defence purposes, notably, the construction of static water dams, necessary improvements of stations and service depots and of public shelters. The details of the scheme will be announced shortly. As the hon. Baronet is aware, many of the men do obtain useful employment when off duty and there is no objection to this, provided that it does not prejudice the proper performance of their primary functions as members of Civil Defence services. In addition, an experiment has just begun for the employment on war

    9
    work of Civil Defence personnel released for longer periods conditionally on their returning to Civil Defence duties in case of need. On the result of this and other experiments which are contemplated, I shall be able to consider whether a scheme of a more ambitious character is compatible with the essential purpose of a Civil Defence organisation, namely, to be available for its primary duties as and when required.

    "JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES."
    Sir Waldron Smithersasked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the impeding of the war effort done by an organisation known as "Jehovah's Witnesses," he will make inquiries with a view to suitable action?
    Mr. H. Morrison: No occasion for action in regard to this organisation has yet arisen, but a watch is, of course, kept upon its activities.
    Mr. Sorensen: Is an equal watch being kept on other denominations, including the Church of England?

    INVASION (DEFENCE MEASURES).
    Sir J. Mellorasked the Home Secretary what training is being given to fire and other Civil Defence services for organised destruction under military control in the event of invasion?
    Mr. H. Morrison: The necessary steps are taken to instruct those concerned in the denial of resources to the enemy. It would not be in the public interest to give fuller information.

    ENGLAND AND WALES.

    County and Borough Mental Hospitals.

    Year.

    Deaths from Tuberculosis (all forms).

    Number of deaths.

    Rate per 1,000 patients resident.

    Males.

    Females.

    Total.

    Males.

    Females.

    Total.

    1938

    …

    …

    290

    210

    500

    4·9

    2·9

    3·8

    1939

    …

    …

    316

    225

    541

    5·3

    3·0

    4·0

    1940

    …

    …

    439

    312

    751

    7·5

    4·2

    5·6

    INJURED PERSONS (REHABILITATION).
    Mr. Henry Straussasked the Minister of Health whether all necessary steps are being taken under the Emergency
  PUBLIC HEALTH.

    UNSOUND MEAT (COLLECTION, HULL).
    Mr. Muffasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that an inspector attached to the Ministry of Food has instructed the health department of the Hull Corporation that, in future, unsound meat must be collected at the Same time, and, in the same conveyances, as edible fats, dripping and bones; and, in view of the probable danger to health owing to contamination, whether he will take steps to ensure that the corporation shall continue the separate collection of unsound meat?
    Mr. E. Brown: I have received certain reports from the corporation on this subject and am in communication with my right hon. and Noble Friend the Minister of Food with regard to it.

    TUBERCULOSIS.
    Mr. Parkerasked the Minister of Health the number of deaths from tuberculosis, and the death rate based on number of residents, in the county and borough mental hospitals of England and Wales in 1938, 1939 and 1940, giving figures for males and females separately?
    Mr. E. Brown: As the reply involves a tabular statement, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Rhys Davies: Would my right hon. Friend be kind enough to publish the figures in the annual report of his Department?
    Mr. Brown: There is another Question on that subject.
    Following is the statement:
    Hospital Scheme to insure the proper rehabilitation of injured persons in addition to their surgical treatment, in order to give them the best prospect of returning to normal life and employment?
    Mr. E. Brown: It is one of the first considerations of the scheme to ensure that the injured person is as fully restored to normal function as his injury allows, before discharge from hospital. To that end the scheme includes a widespread organisation of special treatment centres for fracture and orthopaedic cases, providing as part of remedial treatment the most up-to-date methods of rehabilitation—including massage and physio-therapy, exercises, games and recreations, light workshop and other handicrafts and other forms of occupational therapy. This organisation works mainly through 21 special orthopaedic centres and 56 special fracture departments, apart from special centres for other types of injury and arrangements at numerous hospitals and clinics for short stay cases and out-patient treatment. It has as its purpose general rehabilitation up to the point at which the patient is ready to resume his normal life or to undergo vocational training or any other special preparation for employment that may be necessary. To ensure a proper link between the latter type of training or preparation and hospital treatment, it has been arranged for a local officer of the Ministry of Labour to interview the patient while he is still in hospital and to advise, in consultation with his medical attendant, on the course best suited to his case after discharge from hospital.
    Sir Francis Fremantle: Does the rehabilitation include cases of speech therapy?
    Mr. Brown: I would like special notice of that Question, but I think it does.

    VITAL STATISTICS.
    Sir F. Fremantleasked the Minister of Health whether he will state the main vital statistics for England and Wales in the years 1939 and 1940?
    Mr. E. Brown: In the years 1939 and 1940 respectively, the birth-rates per 1,000 of the population were 14.9 and 14.6; the death-rates were 12.1 and 14.0. Maternal mortality was 2.82 and 2.61 per 1,000 total live births; infant mortality was 50 and 56 per 1,000 births. For 1940 the birth-rate and death-rates (with the exception of infant and maternal mortality) have been calculated on an estimated population which excludes non-civilians. The above information will be expanded in the summmarized report on the work of my Department which I hope to publish shortly.
    Sir F. Fremantle: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is giving serious attention to the constant decline in the birth-rate and to the problems to which this gives rise?
    Mr. Brown: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Rhys Davies: When is it proposed to issue the Annual Report of the Ministry of Health?
    Mr. Brown: It will not be long now. The House will realise the difficulties in connection with printing.

  CHILD WELFARE (CO-ORDINATION).
  Major Petoasked the Minister of Health whether he will consider appointing an inter-departmental committee, representing all the Ministries concerned, with co-opted competent people from the outside, to co-ordinate and develop the nursery and after-care of young children In time of war?
  Mr. E. Brown: The President of the Board of Education and I have already appointed an executive committee of officers of the two Departments, under the chairmanship of Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer of the two Departments: consultation with the Ministry of Labour and the Supply Departments has been maintained by regular meetings of officials of the Department. A contact circle between officers of the Ministry and the Board and women experienced in the problems of child care was established at the outset of this work, and regular meetings have been held.
  Miss Cazalet: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied with the speed, in this matter?
  Mr. Brown: I am never satisfied.

  TYPHUS (RUSSIAN FRONT).
  Sir F. Fremantleasked the Minister of Health whether he will take steps to get a report on the prevalence of typhus, or spotted, fever on the Russian front?
  Mr. E. Brown: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will endeavour to obtain such a report.

  ARMED FORCES AND CIVILIANS (PENSIONS AND GRANTS).
  Mr. Henderson Stewartasked the Minister of Pensions whether he has reconsidered the claim of the British Legion, Scotland, for the setting up of appeal tribunals similar to those established after the last war?
  The Minister of Pensions (Sir Walter Womersley): As I have previously stated, appeal tribunals will be set up as soon as possible, but the practical difficulties which prevent immediate steps being taken have in no way lessened since my previous reply to my hon. Friend on 31st July.
  Mr. Stewart: May I take it that my right hon. Friend is in touch with the representatives of the British Legion and is carefully considering their representations?
  Sir W. Womersley: I am dealing with this matter at the next meeting of my Advisory Committee.
  Mr. Manderasked the Minister of Pensions whether his attention has been called to the statement in a recent issue of "The Midnight Watch," the wall sheet of Britain's fire-guard and Civil Defence workers, issued by the Ministry of Home Security, to the effect that women do the same patrols as men, lose the same amount of sleep, etc., and only receive four-fifths of a man's compensation when hurt; and whether he will rectify this position by giving equal compensation to both sexes?
  Sir W. Womersley: I have already made full statements to the House on the subject of the difference in the rates of compensation for men and women under the Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme. For the reasons which I have already given His Majesty's Government do not propose to amend the Scheme in this respect.
  Mr. Mander: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that this policy is advocated in the journal issued by the Minister of Home Security, and will he not give more attention and sympathetic consideration to a policy put out by one of his colleagues in the Government?
  Sir W. Womersley: I have had the pleasure of reading the document which my hon. Friend has just flourished, and all I can say is that my right hon. Friend
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  the Home Secretary is indeed a democrat in allowing some person to write an article in his special paper.

  INDIA.

    CONSTITUTION.
    Mr. Gordon Macdonaldasked the Secretary of State for India whether he has given consideration to the sending out of a good-will mission to India to discuss with representatives of Indian opinion, ways and means of improving the position throughout India: and with what result?
    The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery): I have considered this suggestion from time to time, in consultation, of course, with the Viceroy; but as yet we have seen no good prospect of such a mission achieving fruitful results.
    Mr. Macdonald: May I ask whether my right hon. Friend is satisfied, in view of the present disturbed position in India, that some such machinery would not help to bring about a better state of affairs over there?
    Mr. Amery: That is covered, in substance, by my Answer.
    Mr. Macdonaldasked the Secretary of State for India what action is being taken by His Majesty's Government to secure the restoration of the popularly elected Governments in the different Provinces throughout India?
    Mr. Amery: The hon. Member will be aware that Ministerial Government was resumed in Orissa on 23rd November. I am not aware of any immediate prospect of its resumption in the other Provinces in which the normal working of the Constitution has been suspended, but Governors are ready to welcome any such measure of co-operation among the political parties in their Provinces as will lead to the constitution of Ministries willing to undertake the responsibilities of office in present circumstances.
    Mr. Macdonald: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that this passive attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government is the best? He says they are willing to do certain things, but are they taking any action of their own to try and bring them about?
    Mr. Amery: We are always ready to do so.
    Mr. Stephen: Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise the importance of giving immediate freedom to the peoples of India?
    Mr. Graham Whiteasked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any statement to make with regard to the present political situation in India?
    Major Milnerasked the Secretary of State for India, whether he will make a statement on recent developments in India?
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any further statement to make respecting the present political position in India; whether he appreciates the desire of Mr. Nehru and the Indian Nationalist movement to co-operate on a basis of equal status with Great Britain and Allied Powers; and whether, in view of the present situation, His Majesty's Government intend taking any further action to remove the impression caused by the restrictive interpretation of the Atlantic Charter and to mobilise politically conscious Indian opinion in the interest of world freedom and democracy?
    Mr. Amery: I have noted the resolutions passed by the leading political parties in India towards the end of December and the various statements made by political leaders in connection therewith, but regret that I cannot discover in them any satisfactory response to the Viceroy's recent appeal for unity and co-operation in face of the common danger. His Majesty's Government will not abate their efforts to promote that measure of agreement which is essential to the fulfilment of their pledges to India, pledges which are in no sense restrictive of the Atlantic Charter but only give precision to the general principle affirmed in that declaration.
    Mr. White: Having regard to the growing desire and anxiety in India and in this country, and in order to take advantage of the more fluid state of affairs in India, will not my right hon. Friend do something on the return of the Prime Minister to see whether some step cannot be taken at this stage which will lead to the removal of the confusion and doubt which now exist?
    Mr. Amery: The Government are only too anxious to take any opportunity afforded by any real willingness to co-operate.
    Major Milner: But will not the right hon. Gentleman take some active steps himself, instead of continuing this policy of masterly inactivity?
    Mr. Amery: Steps will be taken when there is some prospect of result.
    Mr. Sorensen: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise the significance of the fact that political leaders of various types in India are unanimous in recognising the present situation as being one which could have a great response from the Government of this country, and, secondly, that the Atlantic Charter, in its interpretation by the Government of this country, does not in any way meet the demand of the Indian peoples for the application of the principles to them in the same way as they are applied in regard to other countries?
    Mr. Amery: I am afraid that, so far from being unanimous, the resolutions from the Moslem League and Congress to which the hon. Member has referred are in direct contradiction to each other.
    Mr. Shinwell: Are we to understand from the right hon. Gentleman's replies to the various questions put, that the Government policy is to rely for the time being at any rate exclusively on the Viceroy's appeal for co-operation? Is that the Government's policy, and have they no more to say on the matter?
    Mr. Amery: We cannot make further progress constitutionally in India until there is some willingness on the part of the leading parties to worn together. We are doing all in our power to bring them together.
    Dr. Haden Guest: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been called to the appeal in the name of the right hon. Srinivasa Sastri and other persons, three of them members of His Majesty's Privy Council, which does indicate a new centre and rallying point in Indian opinion; and in view of that appeal, 'which is backed up by the "Times" this morning—and I believe that is not a revolutionary paper—will he not reconsider his standfast and stonewall attitude, which is doing great

    17
    harm to India and is a danger to the war effort in the Far East?
    Mr. Amery: It will meet with every consideration.
    Sir H. Williams: On a point of Order: As all the questions addressed to the right hon. Gentleman have been from one point of view, could not some opportunity be given to those who hold other points of view to put questions?
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for India in what Provinces have Governors now assumed complete personal responsibility for government; what representations he has received respecting the Government of India from non-Congress and Moslem League sources; and whether these are receiving consideration?
    Mr. Amery: There are seven Provinces in which the administration is at present carried on by Governors in accordance with Proclamations issued by them under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, namely, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, the Central Provinces and Berar, Madras, the North-West Frontier Province and the United Provinces. I have seen summaries of resolutions on constitutional and other matters passed by the Moslem League on 26th and 27th December and by the National Liberal Federation at Madras on 27th and 28th December: These and other suggestions affecting the Indian Constitution continue to receive the full consideration of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.
    Mr. Sorensen: Is the right hon. Gentleman likely either to give a reply to these various representations or to make some statement with a direct bearing upon them?
    Mr. Amery: Yes, Sir, at the appropriate time.
    Sir H. Williams: Has the right hon. Gentleman received any communication from India other than from people who want freedom to exploit others?
    Mr. Gallacher: What are the British doing there?

    POLITICAL PRISONERS AND CIVIL DEFENCE.
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for India how many political prisoners or detainees still remain in custody; what Indian representations he has received on their behalf with a view
    18
    to their release; whether any action has been taken to secure the co-operation of the Indian National Congress or Congress members of Provincial Legislatures and local bodies in Civil Defence; and what steps, respecting Civil Defence, have now been taken?
    Mr. Amery: I understand that the number of persons detained or sentenced to imprisonment under the Defence of India Rules who were not affected by the recent release of civil disobedience prisoners, was a little over 2,000. I have received no actual representations on their behalf, but I have seen the Congress Resolution of 30th December regretting that all prisoners and detainees had not been released. With regard to Civil Defence measures in India, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I made to the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sloan) on 18th December. It has been reported that the Congress Working Committee recently issued instructions to Congressmen regarding their conduct in air raids, and I have no doubt that the authorities will welcome and encourage the co-operation of all sections of the population in the tasks of Civil Defence.
    Mr. Sorensen: Are any further steps, other than those announced, being taken to secure at least a measure of co-operation with political leaders in India in regard to this important matter, and, further, when are other prisoners likely to be released, and why are they not being released?
    Mr. Amery: I cannot agree that there should be any general release of people who have advocated violence in opposition to the war effort or aiming at the overthrow of the constitutional government.
    Mr. Sorensen: Will the right hon. Gentleman reply to the other part of my Supplementary Question?

  WELSH CHURCH COMMISSION (PAYMENTS TO UNIVERSITY OF WALES).
  Sir Robert Birdasked the Home Secretary whether he will state the details of the interim payments, aggregating £100,000 in cash, recently made by the Welsh Church Commissioners to the University of Wales?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Details of interim pay-merits to date, as agreed with the University of Wales, are: £24,000 on 28th February, 1940; £40,000 on 5th August, 1940; and £36,000 on 31st October, 1940.
  Sir R. Bird: Is the Home Secretary aware that interim distributions to the University of Wales by the Welsh Commissioners now aggregate to over £220,000, and include the transfer of the whole of the land, property, and real estate, to which the University is entitled, and that none of the other 17 beneficiaries has received any interim distribution whatever?
  Mr. Morrison: I am afraid I cannot say without notice.

  CHELTENHAM RACES (ATTENDANCE AND MOTOR CARS).
  Sir W. Smithersasked the Home Secretary (1) what was the number of people, approximately, who attended Cheltenham Races on 13th and 27th December, respectively;
  (2) whether he can inform the House, approximately, of the number of motor cars present at Cheltenham Races on Saturdays, 13th and 27th December, respectively?
  Mr. H. Morrison: I am informed that the number of cars present at Cheltenham Races on 13th and 27th December respectively was 893 and 1,270, and that the number of people who attended these two meetings is estimated at approximately 3,150 and 4,000.
  Sir W. Smithers: Does the Home Secretary consider, regarding the number of people attending, that that is consistent with the policy of total effort laid down by the Prime Minister? In regard to the number of cars, is he aware that the Minister of War Transport is making an appeal for more lorries and for the saving of petrol, both as regards waste in this country and shipping space? Will he take steps to stop these activities?
  Mr. Morrison: I cannot answer for the Ministry of War Transport or for the petrol administration. The only question for me is whether these types of recreation should be prohibited or not. I do not think it is right that my personal opinion about that should influence my decision.
  20
  We have taken the view that there must be, within reasonable limitation, recreation for the people. I do not think that we had better too readily or extensively adopt the philosophy or policy of progressive misery.
  Mr. Shinwell: Does my right hon. Friend or the Government pretend that the presence of over 1,000 cars at a race meeting is consistent with total effort? Is that Government policy?
  Mr. Morrison: That is not a question for the Home Secretary.

  CHAIN LETTERS.
  Mr. Isaacsasked the Home Secretary whether his attention Las been called to the so-called chain letter schemes, which induce the public to participate by holding out the chance of large financial rewards in return for a small initial outlay; and whether, in view of the mischief and the possibility of fraudulent practices to which they may give rise, he will take action to prohibit such schemes?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Yes, Sir; and I entirely agree that such schemes, of which some purport to be designed to assist a patriotic or charitable cause, are both foolish and harmful. Quite apart from any action which the authorities responsible for prosecutions may take when they are satisfied that a particular scheme contravenes the law, I think it right that public attention should be called to the fact that such schemes—which are at the best delusive—provide wide scope for the exploitation of the credulous by the fraudulent.

  ELECTORAL REGISTRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION (COMMITTEE).
  Mr. Bowerasked the Home Secretary whether he can make a statement on the constitution and terms of reference of the committee which is to consider certain administrative and technical problems that will arise in connection with the preparation of a new register of electors and possible redistribution of seats?
  Mr. H. Morrison: I will, with permission, circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement giving the constitution and terms of reference of the Committee.
  Mr. Keeling: Would the right hon. Gentleman consider whether any future announcement in the Press can be made in plain English instead of Civil Service jargon?
  Mr. Morrison: The difficulty was between clarity and accuracy. There was some conflict. We did our best to state the purposes of the Committee. I am sure that the Committee will understand their terms of reference.
  Following is the statement:
  Constitution of Committee:
  Sir Sylvanus Percival Vivian, C.B. (Chairman),
  Mr. Charles Craik Cunningham, C.V.O.,
  Sir Rowland Evans,
  Mr. Charles Lee des Forges, C.B.E.,
  Mr. Morgan Garro Jones, M.P.,
  Mr. William Glenvil Hall, M.P.,
  Mr. Sidney West Harris, C.B., C.V.O.,
  Mr. Herbert Holdsworth, M.P.,
  Mr. Raymond Jones,
  Mr. Charles Henry Lockhart,
  Mr. Cecil Oakes, C.B.E.,
  The Right Hon. Sir Robert William Hugh O'Neill, Bart, M.P.,
  Major Goronwy Owen, D.S.O., M.P.,
  Mr. George Robert Shepherd,
  Sir Robert Topping,
  Lieutenant-Commander Charles Williams, M.P.
  Terms of Reference:

  To consider whether for effecting the purposes of the present system of electoral registration improved methods and machinery can be devised, having regard especially to the circumstances likely to obtain in the period following the termination of hostilities;

  and to examine the technical problems involved in any scheme of redistribution of Parliamentary seats by way of preparation for consideration of the principles on which any scheme should be based;

  and to report on both these matters.

  The Joint Secretaries of the Committee are:—Mr. V. P. A. Derrick of the General Register Office (England and Wales), and Mr. K. Macassey, of the Home Office.

  COMMODITIES (OFFENCES).
  Sir John Mellorasked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the amount of crime, especially in relation to goods in short supply, he is satisfied that the police have adequate powers of investigation and arrest?
  Mr. H. Morrison: Yes, Sir. I am not aware of any evidence that the powers of the police are insufficient.

  NATIONAL SERVICE (YOUNG PEOPLE).
  Mr. Harveyasked the President of the Board of Education whether he will make a statement as to the arrangements that are being made with regard to training for National Service of boys and girls between 16 and 18 years of age, and as to the opportunity to be afforded for consultation of the parents of these children as regards the organisations which they are encouraged to join?
  The President of the Board of Education (Mr. Butler): The arrangements for the registration of young people of 16 to 18 years of age are dealt with in the Board's Circular 1577, a copy of which I am sending to the hon. Member. The young people will, no doubt, themselves consult their parents before deciding voluntarily to offer themselves for any particular form of training or service in the light of such information and advice as may be given to them at interview.
  Mr. Harvey: Does my right hon. Friend not think that if the contents of that circular were more widely known, it would remove a great deal of apprehension?
  Mr. Butler: I quite agree. I am taking steps to see that the contents are more widely known.
  Sir Annesley Somerville: Is there not an arrangement—voluntary, of course—between the Board of Admiralty and the Sea Cadets' organisation?
  Mr. Butler: The Sea Cadets' organisation is one of those bodies to which I think boys will choose to go.
  Mr. Sorensen: Can we have an opportunity at an early date to discuss this matter?
  Mr. Butler: That is not a matter for me; but I am always happy to give the fullest possible information.

  OVERSEAS EVACUATION (REMITTANCES).
  Sir Percy Hurdasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will relax the restrictions imposed on the sending of remittances from this country for the benefit of mothers and children evacuated to Canada, the United States of America and other places outside the sterling area?
  Miss Cazaletasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Government have yet decided to make any financial concession to women and children evacuated to America since the outbreak of war?
  Sir K. Wood: Yes, Sir. I have decided that in the light of present circumstances, it would be reasonable to allow limited sums to be transferred to meet out-of-pocket expenses. I am accordingly arranging for permission to be given for the remittance from this country of sums not exceeding £3 a month for any child who was under 16 at the time of departure, and in addition of sums not exceeding £10 per month for any adult who left this country in charge of children and is still shown to be responsible for them. No remittances can be allowed to adults not in charge of children. This concession will begin to operate as from 1st January, 1942, and will be handled from the Children's Overseas Reception Board, who will make a register of all recipients. All correspondence in this matter should be addressed to the organisation at Devonshire House, Mayfair Place, W.1. The concession applies in principle to children evacuated either privately or under the Children's Overseas Reception Board. Modifications may be necessary for remitting funds to children evacuated under the Government scheme and the terms will be announced shortly.
  Mr. White: Does that policy refer also to serving officers?
  Sir K. Wood: That is a question for my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War.

  GOVERNMENT REQUISITIONING.
  Mr. Daggarasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the value of the privately-owned property, such as land, plant, etc., requisitioned by the Government since the commencement of the war.
  The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Kingsley Wood): The number of cases of requisitioning has been very large, and I would refer my hon. Friend to the figures quoted by Mr. John W. Morris, K.C., in his recent report. The War Office alone, for instance, has had some 140,000 cases of requisitioning of land and buildings since the outbreak of war. For purposes of compensation, however, it is
  24
  not, except in the case of goods, necessary to ascertain the capital value, and I regret, therefore, that the information for which my hon. Friend asks is not available.
  Mr. Daggar: In view of the importance attached to statements made by the Lord President of the Council when the National Service (No. 2) Bill was before the House, is it not possible to give that information?
  Sir K. Wood: No, Sir, we do not have to obtain the capital value in most cases. It is a matter of rent. I think my hon. Friend will find more figures besides the one for the War Office in Mr. Morris's report.
  Mr. Daggar: Is it not possible for Members of this House to have that information, without referring to some other authority?
  Sir K. Wood: I have not the information available which my hon. Friend desires about the capital value.
  Sir H. Williams: Could my right hon. Friend furnish a list of the persons, most of them in humble circumstances, who have been gravely injured by this requisitioning?
  Mr. De la Bère: We want all possible information.

  NATIONAL FINANCE.

    EXCESS PROFITS TAX.
    Mr. De la Béreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the hardship which at present exists by reason of it being deemed, for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax, that a new business is commenced on the death or retirement of a member of a partnership firm, thus precluding any right to the continuing partners to claim, in the event of a future deficiency, a repayment of Excess Profits Tax paid in respect of a partner prior to such event; and whether he will take steps to remove this anomaly?
    Sir K. Wood: I am advised by the Board of Inland Revenue that, in the case of a change in the constitution of a partnership, it is their practice to allow to continuing partners appropriate relief in respect of deficiencies arising before or after the change, and instructions to this effect have now been issued.
    Mr. Whiteasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to encourage firms who, while selling their products or services at normal prices, are incurring liability for Excess Profits Tax to reduce their prices to an extent which will extinguish the liability to tax?
    Sir K. Wood: No, Sir. The policy of His Majesty's Government in dealing with essential goods and services is to proceed by the method of price control. In the luxury area there is no case for limiting prices and thereby increasing the purchasing power of consumers at the expense of the Exchequer's Revenue.

    WAR-TIME PURCHASES (METHOD OF PAYMENT).
    Mr. Radfordasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in view of the continuing increase in the volume of Bank of England notes in circulation and of the fact that the use thereof is capable of being made a means of evading taxation, he will take the necessary steps to make it compulsory that all payments above a stipulated amount shall be made by means of crossed cheques drawn on the personal bank account of the payer?
    Sir K. Wood: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave on 15th October last to a somewhat similar Question by my hon. Friend the Member for West Salford (Mr. Emery).
    Mr. Radford: Can my right hon. Friend give me an idea of his reply on that occasion?
    Sir K. Wood: Yes, Sir. I will send it to my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Radford: Apart from the question of the evasion of tax, is it not a fact that the black market would not flourish as it does were it not for the big volume of Bank of England notes in circulation?
    Sir K. Wood: That may be so, but the suggestion of my hon. Friend is not practicable.
    Sir Frank Sanderson: Is the Chancellor of the Exchequer aware that there is a certain type of merchant who goes round to firms throughout the country with his pockets bulging with notes and purchases goods for cash which he sells at a very enhanced profit, and that none of that profit finds its way to the Exchequer?
    Mr. Radford: Is my right hon. Friend aware that endless transactions are not going through the books of individuals and that neither Excess Profits Tax, Purchase Tax nor Income Tax is being borne by them?

    INCOME TAX (DEDUCTIONS FROM WAGES).
    Sir Leonard Lyleasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he can make a statement on the working to date of the system of deduction of Income Tax from the wages of manual workers due to start on 1st January last?
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Captain Crookshank): The scheme for the deduction of Income Tax from salaries and wages has now been in operation for a full year, and has worked well. At the present moment some difficulty has arisen owing to the very large increase in the number of wage earners liable to tax for the current year, which has made it impossible, under existing conditions, to cover the whole field in time for all the deductions to start punctually on the 1st January, but it is expected that practically all cases will have been dealt with before the end of this month. There is no doubt that this method of paying their tax is proving a great convenience to employees in view of the present high rates of taxation, and there is ample evidence that employees as a whole prefer it to the old method of direct payment. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking employers for the ready manner in which they have accepted the duties laid on them by the scheme.
    Sir L. Lyle: Will the Financial Secretary consider the simplification of procedure so that employees and employers may understand exactly where they are, as it is difficult for them to do so at the present time?
    Captain Crookshank: That is another Question, but I think that all who do receive their tax demands understand very well what they are.
    Sir L. Lyle: But they do not understand the form.

  ARMED FORCES.

    PAY AND ALLOWANCES.
    Miss Wardasked the Prime Minister whether he can make a statement on

    27
    the Government's proposals with regard to Service allowances as a result of the examination of the problems raised?
    The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Attlee): This examination is proceeding, and I hope that it may be possible to make a statement at an early date.
    Miss Ward: While thanking my right hon. Friend, might I ask whether if I put down a Question for the next Sitting Day, he will be in a position to answer it?
    Mr. Attlee: If the hon. Member will put down a Question, I will endeavour to answer it.
    Major Lyons: Does my right hon. Friend understand that this is really a pressing matter, on which there is great feeling throughout the country?
    Capt. Anstruther-Grayasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can give any figures which would indicate how the weekly earnings of regular sailors, soldiers and airmen, married and single, respectively, have increased as compared with October, 1938?
    Sir K. Wood: With my hon. Friend's permission, I will circulate the information for which he asks in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the information:
    The minimum rates of pay of Regular sailors, soldiers and airmen in October, 1938, and those in force at the present time are as follow:

    Rank.

    Rate of Pay.

    October, 1938.

    December, 1941.

    s.

    d.

    s.

    d.

    Ordinary Seaman

    *

    *

    Private or Airman

    14

    0 p.w.

    17

    6 p.w.

    including war pay.

    *N.B. These are the rates payable on entry. Additions are made for proficiency, for length of service and on promotion.

    In addition to pay—
    (1) Family Allowances are payable in respect of wives and children of married men—

    October, 1938.

    December, 1941.

    s.

    d.

    s.

    d.

    For a wife

    17

    0 p.w.

    18

    0 p.w.

    For a wife and 1 child

    22

    6 p.w.

    25

    6 p.w.

    For a wife and 2 children

    26

    0 p.w.

    31

    0 p.w.

    For a wife and 3 children

    28

    0 p.w.

    35

    0 p.w.

    For a wife and 4 children

    29

    6 p.w.

    39

    0 p.w.

    increased by 1/- a week for each subsequent child.

    increased by 4/- a week for each subsequent child.

    The above rates of family allowance are supplemented by a minimum allotment of 7s. a week from the man's pay.
    (2) Dependants Allowances are payable in respect of dependants of unmarried or married men (not issuable concurrently with family allowance).
    October, 1938.—Nil.
    December, 1941.—13s. to 25s. a week (inclusive of contribution from the man's pay) according to extent of pre-enlistment support.
    (3) War Service Grants, i.e., supplementary allowances payable by reference to individual circumstances in addition to family or dependants allowance.
    October, 1938.—Nil.
    December, 1941.—Up to £3 a week according to need.
    In addition to the above rates of pay and allowances, sailors, soldiers and airmen are provided with free food, clothing and accommodation, medical and dental treatment and various amenities. They are thus protected to a substantial degree against the effect of increases in the cost of living. The value of their emoluments must therefore be regarded as having been increased since October, 1938, not only by the amount of the increases in pay and family allowances shown above but also by the extent to which the cost of items provided in kind has risen since that date.

    CO-OPERATION.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Mooreasked the Prime Minister what steps he has taken, or proposes to take, in view of recent events, to establish closer co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the other two Fighting Services: and whether it is his intention to place all forces fighting in the same area under one commander for operational purposes?
    Mr. Attlee: Co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the other Services is already very close, and methods of improving it are under continuous study. In regard to the second part of the Question, the decision must depend on the circumstances prevailing in each strategic area, and must be reached in close consultation with our Allies. My hon. and gallant Friend will be aware of the action recently taken regarding the South-Western Pacific area.
    Sir T. Moore: If it has been found feasible to establish a unified command in the Far East, why is it not possible to do the same thing in the Middle East? How many lessons must we have before we learn from them?
    Mr. Attlee: I have already replied to the hon. and gallant Member that it depends on the circumstances.
    Commander Sir Archibald Southby: Have not the lessons of the war shown the desirability of having separate Air Forces for the Navy and the Army, and that until we have, we shall go on making the muddles that we are making at present?

  LOSS OF HIS. MAJESTY'S SHIPS "PRINCE OF WALES" AND "REPULSE."
  Major Stourtonasked the Prime Minister whether he is now in a position to make a further statement regarding the circumstances of the loss of His Majesty's Ships "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse"; and whether, at the time of the sinking of these two ships, they were protected by an adequate escort of seaborne or landbased fighter aircraft?
  Mr. Attlee: I regret that I am not able to add to the statements which have already been made on this subject.
  Major Stourton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is considerable public anxiety on this issue? Will the Government trust the people for once, and tell the whole truth?

  IMPERIAL WAR CABINET.
  Sir T. Mooreasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the critical attitude of the Australian Press and people in regard to the conduct of the war, he will now consider the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet in which the Dominions will be adequately represented?
  Mr. Granvilleasked the Prime Minister (1) whether it is intended to set up an Allied War Council; if so, where it will meet and at what intervals; and whether such a body will deal with questions affecting a unified command on strategy, policy and supplies;
  (2) whether he is aware that there is dissatisfaction in Australia with the present machinery for concerting the war
  30
  effort of the British Commonwealth, particularly in the Pacific; and whether any negotiations have taken place recently with the Australian Government with a view to an Empire War Cabinet, or a more direct voice in discussions on policy and strategy?
  Mr. J. H. Martina asked the Prime Minister whether the setting up of any form of supreme War Council amongst the Allies is in contemplation; and, if so, whether he can give any indication of its nature and location?
  Mr. Attlee: With my hon. Friends' permission, I will deal with the matters referred to in all these Questions in the statement which I shall be making later to-day.

  POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION.
  Mr. A. Edwardsasked the Prime Minister the duties of the Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ministry of Works and Buildings; and whether he has decided upon a Department of Post-War Planning?
  Mr. Attlee: As the House is aware, my right hon. Friend the Minister without Portfolio is in general charge of the study of post-war problems. The relationship between his duties and the duties of my Noble Friend the Minister of Works and Buildings was explained by me in answer to a Question on 20th February last, a copy of which I am sending to my hon. Friend. Further information as to the arrangements which have been made for dealing with post-war planning were given to the House in a statement made by the Government on 17th July of last year. If and when any alteration is made in these arrangements, the House will, of course, be informed.
  Mr. Edwards: Is the Minister aware that the Ministers concerned are still very uncertain about their duties and powers?
  Mr. Mander: Will the Minister without Portfolio take an early opportunity, as he indicated, of explaining to the House what he is doing?
  Mr. Attlee: I have already said that an opportunity with be sought.

  GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA (STAFF TALKS).
  Commander King-Hallasked the Prime Minister whether any staff talks had taken place between the British military authorities in the Far East and General Chiang Kai-shek prior to the declaration of war by Great Britain on Japan?
  Mr. Attlee: Yes, Sir.
  Commander King-Hall: On what date did these conversations begin?
  Mr. Attlee: I do not think it would be in the public interest to disclose that.

  AERODROMES (DEFENCE).
  Mr. Manderasked the Prime Minister whether a decision has now been reached as to the relative responsibility between the Army and the Royal Air Force for the defence of aerodromes at home and overseas?
  Mr. Purbrickasked the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied that the improvements in the defence of aerodromes, both in respect to the actual defence as well as in the organisation, have yet reached the stage where they are as perfect as it is possible to make them?
  Mr. Attlee: Perhaps my hon. Friends will be good enough to await the statement which I propose to make later in the day.

  FRENCH WAR MATERIALS (SUPPLY TO GERMANY).
  Sir William Davisonasked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the fact of the large and increasing number of aeroplanes, military lorries and other war materials which are being manufactured and despatched to Germany from France with the approval of the Vichy Government; and what action is being taken by the British Government in the matter?
  Mr. Attlee: Yes, Sir. His Majesty's Government are aware of this traffic, and take due account of it in framing their policy towards Marshal Petain's Government.
  Sir W. Davison: Is it not high time that we knew exactly where we stand in regard to the Vichy Government, who are
  32
  apparently now an ally of our enemies, and are supplying them with all the military requirements they can? May we be assured that the Government are taking this matter actively in hand?
  Mr. Attlee: Certainly.

  AGRICULTURE.

    DAIRY HERDS.
    Mr. Priceasked the Minister of Agriculture whether there has been a decrease of the number of dairy cattle and calves as a result of the ploughing-up policy; and whether steps are being taken to show that by arable dairy farming the dairy herds of the country will actually be increased?
    The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. R. S. Hudson): The answer to the first part of the Question is, "No, Sir," and to the second, "Yes, Sir."
    Mr. Price: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any steps have been or are to be taken to prevent the slaughter of dairy heifer calves?
    Mr. Hudson: I am glad to say that the marketing of calves is well below, that of the corresponding period of last year.

    SHEEP PASTURES.
    Mr. Priceasked the Minister of Agriculture what steps are being taken to improve rough pastures and upland grazings suitable for sheep; and whether he can give a figure for the acreage thus dealt with?
    Mr. Hudson: The extensive powers delegated to county war agricultural executive committees for increasing the productivity of agricultural land apply, of course, to hill pastures with their special problems. Special measures for the direct improvement of hill land include schemes for the assistance of bracken cutting, upland water supply and drainage, and the application of lime and basic slag. I am unable to give any reliable figure of the acreage of hill land dealt with by these various direct and indirect measures. The Agricultural Improvement Council has the question of hill and upland pastures under consideration.

    PIG AND POULTRY CLUBS (CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES).
    Sir J. Lucasasked the Minister of Agriculture whether special facilities are being provided and encouragement given to members of the Auxliary Fire Service and air-raid precautions services to start pig and poultry clubs; and what facilities are being given for the use of bombed sites in cities and towns for such a purpose?
    Mr. Hudson: The Small Pig Keepers' Council have given much attention to the promotion of co-operative pig clubs among members of the Civil Defence Services, and have registeerd to date 50 A.F.S. clubs, 55 A.R.P. clubs and about 50 police clubs. As regards poultry, it is part of the policy of the Domestic Poultry Keepers' Council to permit co-operative undertakings to obtain an allowance of rationed feeding stuffs for not more than 50 birds in all, and the advice and guidance of the Council are available, through the medium of its Area Organisers, to Civil Defence bodies undertaking such co-operative ventures. The experience of the Small Pig Keepers' Council in particular is that local authorities generally are most helpful in providing facilities for pig keeping by members of the Civil Defence Services at their stations and on bombed sites.

    LIME, SOUTH-WEST ENGLAND.
    Mr. Priceasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that there is evidence to the effect that 25 per cent. less lime has been applied to land in the South-West of England last year than in the previous year; and whether he will consider steps to increase its use?
    Mr. Hudson: My information is that taking the year as a whole 10 per cent. more lime was applied to land in this area than in the previous year, and that in the second half of the year when the Government's liming policy was intensified the amount was 40 per cent. greater than that for the corresponding period of 1940.
    Mr. Price: Is it not a fact that a large number of people have not used lime in the past and are not doing so now, and that in the main the users of lime are those who have used it in the past?
    Mr. Hudson: We are gradually getting those who have not used lime to see the necessity of using lime now.
    Mr. T. Smith: Is the Minister taking any steps to keep up the necessary supply of lime?
    Mr. Hudson: Yes, Sir. That is part of our intensification campaign, and we have devoted a good deal of time to the discovery of additional sources of lime, particularly waste lime and the making of lime available in the shape of ground lime, and we have put up a number of additional plants.
    Mr. Smith: Is the Minister satisfied with the amount of labour available for the production of this extra lime?
    Mr. Hudson: No Sir. Labour is one of the bugbears, especially in the matter of lime.

  CIVIL SERVANTS (CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS).
  Colonel Burtonasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury the conditions under which reports, confidential or otherwise, are made upon civil servants; whether such reports are shown to the persons reported upon; and whether persons reported upon are given the opportunity to reply thereto or be heard upon such report prior to any adverse action being taken?
  Captain Crookshank: The normal procedure is that reports are made annually on the manner in which Civil servants perform their duties. These reports are confidential and are not sent to the officer concerned except when his work has been adversely commented upon. Adverse markings are sent to the officer, who may make any representations he thinks proper. Where a serious disciplinary charge (other than one which may glue rise to criminal proceedings) is brought against an officer he is given a written statement defining the charge and setting out particulars of the facts relied upon to support the charge. He is required to submit a written reply, and where there is a conflict of evidence between the charge and the reply he may represent his case orally. In this event he may have the assistance of a friend or colleague (who may be an Association representative).

  TRADE AND COMMERCE.

    CONCENTRATION OF INDUSTRY.
    Major Lyonsasked the President of the Board of Trade the industries in connection with which a Central Compensation Fund has been established in relation

    35
    to concentration of trading; and the number of occasions, to date, in which from that fund or from private industrial arrangement, respectively, compensation has been, or is to be, paid to firms now merged?
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Captain Waterhouse): Central compensation funds have been established in connection with the following industries:—Certain branches of the cotton and the woollen and worsted industries, pottery, glazed tiles, carpets and steel sheets. I am unable to give the figures asked for in the second part of the Question. Although the Board of Trade examine the compensation schemes submitted by industries so as to assure themselves that those schemes conform with the general principles of the Government's economic policy, the Board are not themselves directly concerned with the operation of the schemes.
    Major Lyons: Can my hon. and gallant Friend say in general terms whether any payment of compensation is made in respect of businesses which up to the date of their merging were on a non-profit basis, or, in other words, losing business?
    Captain Waterhouse: These payments have nothing to do with profitability or unprofitability. They are designed to enable firms to remain in being so that they may restart after the war.
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in connection with the small factories whose premises have been requisitioned by the Government, and who have been instructed or compelled to join forces and form nucleus groups, the position can now be reviewed?
    Captain Waterhouse: All nucleus certificates so far issued have been provisional usually for a period of three months and subject to review before renewal. My right hon. Friend cannot therefore agree to the special review suggested in the Question. I would point out that very small firms have not in general been brought within the concentration arrangements.
    Mr. De la Bère: Does my hon. and gallant Friend realise that this matter
    36
    cannot be lightly dismissed in that way? Perhaps he will be good enough to see me afterwards?

    ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (CO-ORDINATION).
    Major Lyonsasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is satisfied that steps have been taken to ensure that the closest co-ordination exists between all electrical generating and distributive agencies, whether Governmental, municipal or private, so that the industry is in a position to meet any emergency demand the war effort may put on it at the shortest notice?
    Captain Waterhouse: Yes, Sir. The Electricity Commissioners and the Central Electricity Board are in close and constant consultation with the Government Departments and other authorities and undertakings concerned it regard to the national electricity requirements.
    Major Lyons: With reference to the second part of the Question, can my hon. and gallant Friend say whether the machinery is for the co-ordination immediately of all persons mentioned in the Question should emergency arise?
    Captain Waterhouse: There is definitely machinery for co-ordination, and that is in constant operation.

    CLOTHES RATIONING.
    Sir T. Mooreasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will consider withdrawing 50 per cent. of the clothing coupons at present allotted to individuals and households with a net income of £500 a year and over, and redistributing such coupons to those individuals and households with an income below the amount stated?
    Captain Waterhouse: No, Sir. Additional clothing coupons are issued to persons having special needs, such as bombed persons, growing children and certain industrial workers, but there is no simple relation between an individual's need for clothing and his income, such as would justify the adoption of my hon. and gallant Friend's proposal.
    Sir T. Moore: As presumably these people with higher incomes had substantial reserves of serviceable clothing when rationing was brought in, is it not better to carry out my suggestion? It is not additional coupons I am asking for but redistribution.
    Miss Eleanor Rathbone: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that the clothing which the well-to-do can afford to buy lasts two or three times longer than the clothing which poor people can buy?

    TOYS (CHRISTMAS PRICES).
    Mr. G. Straussasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that there was widespread complaint about the profiteering in toys during the period preceding Christmas; and whether any steps are being taken to punish the offenders?
    Captain Waterhouse: Yes, Sir. I understand that some cases of alleged overcharging are already being investigated by local price regulation committees. The Board of Trade will certainly take proceedings in suitable cases.
    Major Lyons: Has the Ministry received any representations about the colossal amount of profiteering?
    Captain Waterhouse: Representations are not made to the Board of Trade but to the Central Price Regulation Committee through local committees.
    Mr. Strauss: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that overcharging was very general and was not confined to just a few cases? There was very serious profiteering.
    Captain Waterhouse: I am aware of that, and no doubt the local price control committees will be sending on their recommendations in due course.

  WAR TRANSPORT.

    LEVEL CROSSING GATES (BLACK-OUT HOURS).
    Captain Stricklandasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether his attention has been drawn to the danger to road transport during black-out hours of indicating closed level-crossing gates by means of a red lamp which gives no guidance as to the complete closing of the whole road width; and what steps he proposes to take to overcome the danger?
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport (Colonel Llewellin): I have no evidence to the effect suggested in the Question, but if my hon. Friend has any particular case in mind. I shall be happy to look into it.

    RAILWAY SLEEPING BERTHS.
    Major Lloydasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport what representations he has received from business and commercial organisations in Glasgow and the West of Scotland protesting against the drastic curtailment of sleeping-berth accommodation between Glasgow and London; and what steps he is proposing to take to alleviate the position?
    Mr. A. Edwardsasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether he is aware that the reduction of sleeping-car accommodation is causing many business men in the North of England and Scotland to spend two days travelling which formerly could be done at night; and whether he will reconsider his decision, in view of the loss of time and production resulting from the reduction of sleeping accommodation?
    Colonel Llewellin: Representations have been received from seven Chambers of Commerce in Scotland and from the Merchants' House of Glasgow to the general effect that, while they recognise the national need which has occasioned the reduction of sleeping car facilities, the claims of business men to a fair share of the berths available should have consideration. My Noble Friend is anxious to ensure a fair distribution of the limited accommodation among all classes of persons necessarily travelling on urgent and important Government business, and he has arranged that any such person may apply to the Government Department concerned in the business, and that Department will, if it supports the application, request the Ministry of War Transport to reserve a berth.
    Sir C. MacAndrew: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend inquire at the Central Station, Glasgow, and find out how many berths which had been booked by Government Departments the night before last, and on previous nights, were not used?
    Colonel Llewellin: We are certainly checking up on that. We do not want to book berths for anybody who does not intend to use them.
    Commander Agnew: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend give an assurance that in any re-arrangement of available berths,

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    there will be kept in mind the position of naval personnel who have to keep watch at sea?
    Colonel Llewellin: We hope to guarantee accommodation for naval personnel who have attained a certain rank, and I regret to observe that my hon. and gallant Friend has not yet attained that rank.
    Major Lloyd: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend say whether this action has been taken with the full approval of the L.M.S. or whether it is not a little arbitrary on the part of the Ministry?
    Mr. A. Edwardsasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether first priority for sleeping-berths on the railways is given to Members of Parliament travelling in connection with their Parliamentary duties; and whether he is aware that in the past Members have been refused berths whilst minor officials have had accommodation allocated?
    Colonel Llewellin: A note was circulated by the Whip's Office to Members on 11th December, and I am sending my hon. Friend a copy in case he has not already received one. I am not aware that, since 15th December last, when the new arrangements came into force, any Member who was entitled to a berth under the arrangements set out in the circular has been passed over in favour of an official, but if my hon. Friend will let me have particulars of any case I will look into it.

    WOMEN RAILWAY CLERICAL WORKERS.
    Mr. Dobbieasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether the rights of women workers in the clerical departments of the railway companies have been safeguarded in regard to their reinstatement after the war and continuity of membership of superannuation fund, when such employees have been on the permanent staff, and have permission from the company to join such forces as the Women's Royal Naval Service, or is there any difference between them and those who have waited for the compulsory call; and, if so, what is the reason for the differentiation in the treatment?
    Colonel Llewellin: The answer to the first part of the Question is "Yes, Sir." The second part does not, therefore, arise.

  MINE ACCIDENTS, BURSLEM AND LEIGH.
  Mr. MacLaren(by Private Notice) asked the Minister for Mines whether, as a result of the inquiry into the disaster at the Sneyd Colliery, in Staffordshire, he had any statement to make?
  The Secretary for Mines (Mr. David Grenfell): I regret to state that an explosion occurred in working in the Banbury seam at Sneyd Colliery, Burslem, just before 8 a.m. on Thursday, 1st January. Of the 61 men who were underground at the time in the area affected, four escaped, but the remaining 57 were overtaken by the explosion. Rescue operations were organised immediately, including steps to restore the ventilation, but the work was greatly impeded by falls on the roadways and other damage caused by the explosion. Twenty of the bodies were recovered by 3rd January. The remaining bodies could not be brought out until the ventilation had been further restored and some of the falls further cleared, but all but one had been recovered by this morning and it is hoped to recover the remaining one to-day. Work was resumed in the other districts of the mine on 5th January.
  I am unable to make any statement as to the cause of the explosion. Full investigations are to be made and I shall tell the hon. Member and the House as soon as possible what form the Inquiry is to take. I wish to express the thanks of the country and the mining community to all those who took part in the rescue operations and laboured unsparingly until the way into the workings had been cleared. And I am sure the House will wish to record also its deep sympathy with all those who have been bereaved by this tragic disaster.
  Mr. T. Smith: Can my hon. Friend tell us whether the district in which the explosion occurred was a machine mining district or whether coal is obtained there by hand? Can he sat what kind of power was used and whether it is true that, according to some newspapers, at least two of the men who were killed were a very long way from the point of ignition?
  Mr. MacLaren: I hope the Minister will say nothing more about this matter at the moment.
  Mr. Grenfell: I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Burslem (Mr. MacLaren) is expressing a very wise wish when he says he hopes we shall not enter into detailed discussion at this moment.
  Mr. Smith: I regret having asked the question; I withdraw it absolutely, knowing that the whole thing will be gone into later.
  Mr. Tinker(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary for Mines whether he has any information with regard to an accident at No. 4 Pit, Plank Lane Colliery, Lancashire; if so, whether he can state the number of killed and injured, the circumstances in which the accident occurred and what steps the Department are taking to find out its cause?
  Mr. Grenfell: I regret to inform the House that at 11.30 p.m. on Monday, 5th January, an explosion occurred at Bickershaw Colliery, Leigh, and resulted in the death of six persons. In connection with an area of the mine which had been sealed off some time ago owing to spontaneous combustion, it became necessary to build a stopping further outbye, and this was being done when the explosion occurred. There was no great violence, but all the ten men concerned were affected by carbon monoxide, six of them fatally. All persons were immediately withdrawn from the mine, and temporary stoppings were built to seal off the affected area. I feel sure the House will wish to associate itself with me in expressing our sympathy with the relatives of the victims. And I am glad to say that the other men who were gassed are well on the way to recovery.

  RAILWAY ACCIDENT, ECCLES.
  Mr. Cary(by Private Notice) asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether he has any information to give to the House about the serious railway accident which took place at Eccles station on Tuesday, 30th December?
  Colonel Llewellin: This unfortunate accident occurred at 8.20 a.m. during a dense fog, when one passenger train came into sidelong collision with another travelling in the opposite direction. I regret to say that 20 passengers were fatally injured and 81 others and two enginemen were detained in hospital. Great assistance
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  was rendered by local rescue parties and I should like to thank them for their prompt help. An Inspecting Officer of Railways has been appointed to hold an inquiry and until his report has been received I am not in a position to make any statement as to the cause. I am sure I am expressing the feelings of the House in conveying our sympathy to the relatives of those who lost their lives and with those who were injured.
  Mr. Cary: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware of the difficult circumstances which attended this accident? It was pitch dark at the time, there was a thick fog, and in some cases operations had to be performed at the side of the track and on the station platform by the light of bonfires, and therefore, my right hon. and gallant Friend's reference to the work of the local services, particularly the A.R.P. services, will be much appreciated. In addition, may I ask my right hon. and gallant Friend whether he can say when the inquiry is likely to be completed?
  Colonel Llewellin: I am afraid I cannot say when it will be completed, but I would like to endorse what my hon. Friend said about the work of both the railway staff and the A.R.P. personnel, who so promptly came and gave such valuable help.
  Mr. Benjamin Smith: Was automatic signalling in operation, or was there the old hand system?
  Colonel Llewellin: I cannot say without notice.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he has any statement to make with regard to to-day's Business?
Mr. Attlee: The House will recollect that we are meeting at the request of a number of hon. Members who desired that we should meet earlier than the Government originally proposed. The Government are always ready to fall in with the wishes of the House. At this Sitting, it is proposed that the Adjournment should be moved and that I should make a statement on the general war situation, and that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should speak later in the Debate. Before moving the Adjournment, I propose to ask the

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House to agree to go into Secret Session for a short time in order that I may make a statement relating to future arrangements which the Government think it is undesirable to make in public. We are prepared to move that the Sitting should be extended to-day if such a course meets with the approval of the House.
Mr. Bellenger: Why is it proposed to go into Secret Session to discuss the date of the resumption of the Sittings of the House? Surely, it cannot be a security matter, because on the last occasion when we discussed the Adjournment of the House, it was done in public, and as the public has a great deal of interest in the Sittings of the House, surely this matter should be discussed in public.
Mr. Attlee: I propose to give the reasons in Secret Session. As the matter is one which the Government think should be kept secret, it is impossible to give the reasons before we go into Secret Session.
Mr. Stokes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a growing feeling in the country that the Government cannot carry on without the Prime Minister? It is not so in the House of Commons, and, therefore, while the right hon. Gentleman may not be able to make any remarks now about future Sittings of the House, may I publicly express the hope that there will be no further Adjournment?
Mr. Granville: At what hour will the Debate end?
Mr. Attlee: We shall move to extend the time of the Sitting, and, therefore, the time of rising will be in the hands of the House.

EAST INDIA (LOANS RAISED IN ENGLAND).
Return presented,—of all Loans raised in England under the provisions of any Acts of Parliament, chargeable on the revenues of India, outstanding at the commencement of the half-year ended 30th September, 1941, with the rates of interest and total amount payable thereon, and the date of the termination of each Loan, the Debt incurred during the half-year, the Moneys raised thereby during the half-year, the Loans paid off or discharged during the half-year, and the Loans outstanding at the close of the half-year [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

SECRET SESSION.
Notice taken, that Strangers were present.
Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 89, put the Question, "That Strangers be ordered to withdraw."
Question agreed to.
Strangers withdrew accordingly.
The House subsequently resumed in Public Session.

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE.
Ordered,
"That the Proceedings on any Motion for the Adjournment of the House that may be moved by a Minister of the Crown at this day's Sitting be exempted from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."—[Mr. Attlee.]

WAR SITUATION.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. James Stuart.]
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Attlee): It is four weeks since the Prime Minister spoke to the House on the war situation, and much has happened since then. I know that the House would have liked at its first Sitting in the new year to have a review of the general position of our affairs by the Prime Minister in his own inimitable style. I am equally certain that the House appreciates the compelling reasons that have taken him across the Atlantic. The entry of the United States of America into the war demanded that, as quickly as possible and as authoritatively as possible, plans should be concerted to bring the greatest possible co-ordination into the efforts of the two great democracies on either side of the Atlantic. In the sphere of strategy and that of supply it was vitally necessary that there should be unity of direction as well as unity of effort, and the visit of the Prime Minister, Lord Beaverbrook and of the

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high staff officers who accompanied them has resulted in achieving a degree of unity and co-operation which, I think, could not possibly have been brought about in any other way than by personal contact.
The House is aware of the main results that have been achieved. There has been, first of all, the joint declaration of the 26 nations, which sets out in plain terms the pledges of the signatories to stand together in support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter against the savage and brutal forces which are seeking to subjugate the world. Secondly, there has been the decision to create, as a result of proposals put forward by the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and of Great Britain a system of unified command in the South-West Pacific Area, whereby all the Forces in that area—air, land and sea—will be under one supreme commander. General Wavell, who has been appointed to this command, will have on his staff officers of the Australian, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States Forces. At the same time, the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the command of all the land and air Forces of the united nations which are now or may be at any time in future operating in the Chinese theatre. These arrangements constitute a considerable achievement in the unification of our war effort in one particular theatre. But the matter will not stop there. These arrangements must in due course form part of a wider plan to ensure the proper co-ordination of the efforts of the Allies everywhere.
Questions have been asked in the House to-day and previously as to the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet—
Mr. Hore-Belisha: Before my right hon. Friend leaves this point, may I ask him a question? I thoroughly approve of the arrangements with which he is dealing. Will he be good enough to say what are the limits of General Wavell's command? Does it include India? Does it include parts of Australia? It is important to know the precise area covered.
Mr. Attlee: Roughly speaking, it covers Burma and, excluding Indo-China, goes up to the North to the Philippines, and then on a line drawn down to the North Coast of Australia and then sweeping round the islands of the Malay Archipelago. It excludes India and Australia.
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Questions were asked about the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet and the creation of a Supreme War Council. It would be premature for me to try and discuss this at the present time, but attention has been given to it. It would be a mistake to assume that exactly the same kind of organisation which was found suitable in 1917 will necessarily suit the conditions of this war. In 1917 the war was practically confined to two theatres of war in Europe and one smaller one in Asia. To-day it embraces every Continent. You have four great Powers geographically separated. I think the House will agree that it would not be proper to enter into this question of further co-ordination in the absence of the Prime Minister, who has been discussing it with the President of the United States and with representatives of other Powers. But, besides those two concrete results, the value of the meeting of the leaders of two great nations engaged as Allies in war comes to something far different from just an adding-up of concrete results. It lies much more in the imponderables, in the understanding between the minds of the Prime Minister and the President, in that close and intimate association in a common task, and also in the consultations of the chief staff officers of the armed forces of both nations. This increased understanding is not being confined to the heads of our nations. Those two great speeches of the Prime Minister, the one addressed to Congress, the other addressed to the Canadian Parliament, were heard and appreciated by tens of millions in Canada and the United States of America, and I know they have drawn from them both inspiration and enthusiasm.
The work of the Prime Minister in the sphere of politics and strategy has been supplemented by the work of Lord Beaverbrook in the field of supply, and that great programme outlined by President Roosevelt in his message to Congress shows that the full power of American industry is going to be harnessed to the war effort. In that fighting speech the President showed that in his mind co-ordination did not stop just at the limited provision for one particular command. He said:
"Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals for co-ordinating co-operative action by all united nations—military action and economic action. There will be a continuation of the conferences and consultations

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among the military staffs, so that the plans and operations of each will fit into a general strategy designed to crush the enemy. We shall not fight isolated wars, each nation going its own way. These 26 nations are united not in a spirit of common determination alone but in the broad conduct of the war in all its phases."
I am quite sure the House is appreciative of the great service which this visit has done to our common cause, and will join with me in gratitude to the Prime Minister and his companions for what they have done. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, accompanied by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Major-General Nye, has just returned from visiting Mr. Stalin, again another example of close personal collaboration, and I hope he will be able to tell the House later in the day something of his visit. When he returned he brought with him representatives of the Russian trade unions, who have been very welcome visitors to this country. As the House knows, General Wavell has paid a visit to General Chiang-Kai-Shek, in order to concert plans with him, and the unstinting support which the generalissimo has promised to the Allies, in spite of the fact that his country has been ravaged and assailed for four years, deserves our profound gratitude. The successes of the Chinese Forces over the Japanese at Chang-sha are a good augury for future success.
In reviewing the events in the various theatres of war during the past four weeks, we have to strike a 'balance of loss and gain. In Libya, General Auchinleck has continued to strike heavy blows at the Axis forces. When the Prime Minister addressed the House the disengagement of Tobruk had just been effected, but the enemy was still standing strongly on a line running from Gazala southwards into the desert, a little to the west of the fortress of Tobruk, while in Bardia, in Sollum and in Halfaya strong pockets of the enemy were still holding out. In the following week, despite heavy counter attacks, General Rommell found himself unable to hold his position owing to our armoured forces outflanking him. The vigorous pressure of our forces prevented him from standing again on any north and south line there. Some attempt was made to hold the line Mekeli-Derna, but he was turned out of that. A quick outflanking movement hurried him back. The pursuit continued relentlessly along
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the Derna-Benghazi road, and along the desert route from Mekeli, until on Christmas Eve Benghazi was captured. Large numbers of prisoners and much material were captured. Meanwhile, away to the south, light detachments have been moving, cutting off the desert road back to Tripoli.
Our operations have been handicapped frequently by very bad weather. At the present time General Rommell has concentrated his forces in Jedabaya and heavy tank battles have taken place. As the House knows, the enemy force at Bardia surrendered, yielding over 8,000 prisoners and much material, and the remaining pockets at Halfaya and Sollum are very closely invested. That is where the position stands in Libya.
Throughout the whole of this campaign there has been magnificent co-operation by our naval, military and air forces. I think we ought to realise the responsibilities of the Navy in this campaign. They are threefold. First of all there is the maintenance of supplies for our own forces. Secondly, the interruption of supplies to the enemy forces. Thirdly, the bombardment of shore targets to assist the Army's advance. All those duties they have shared with the Royal Air Force. Then, on that long sea route round the Cape, the convoys continue to travel safely, and while some casualties have been caused by submarine attack on the convoys along the Libya coast, they have been comparatively light, and many of the attackers have paid the penalty. Enemy supplies have been continually attacked by air, by submarines and by surface ships, and a heavy toll has been taken. One of the most successful of these operations was the sinking of two cruisers off the coast of Tunis by our destroyers. The R.A.F., besides co-operating in those attacks, have rendered signal service to the Army throughout the campaign. The Army have been loud in praise of the unfailing support they have received and the system of command and co-operation has proved most successful. There had been criticisms formerly of the lack of co-operation. This campaign has been an example of most successful co-operation.
It is not very easy to appreciate the scale of this battle in North Africa. One sees in the papers a small map, a kind of small semi-circle of territory, but our Forces

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are operating 600 miles from their starting point, and although the disengagement of Tobruk, and the capture of Derna and Benghazi will, in time, give some relief, everyone must realise the enormous difficulties of supply across those miles of desert; and the valour and endurance of our troops—British, Dominion, Indian and Allied troops—who have taken part in a most exacting campaign, is beyond all braise. I cannot leave the story of the Middle East without mentioning the steadfastness and gallantry of the garrison and people of Malta, under the inspiring leadership of General Dobbie. Both in attack and defence they have played a great part and the enemy have paid them the compliment of directing very heavy attacks upon them.
Meanwhile, as always, the Battle of the Atlantic continues, a battle which at this time of year is not only against the enemy but against the forces of the elements. The satisfactory decline in our shipping losses which the Prime Minister referred to in his last statement has continued, but it would be a very great mistake not to realise the strain which the extension of the war in the Far East has put both on our Royal Navy and on our Merchant Navy.
The other great gain on the credit side which we can speak of to-day is the steady progress of the Russian offensive. In the air, and over wide sectors of the front, the initiative has definitely passed to the Russians. There is hardly even a pretence by the German Command that all these retreats are in accordance with plan. Those frantic appeals for warm clothing by Dr. Goebbels show, more clearly than anything else, that there has been a complete upset in Hitler's plan, which could never have contemplated that the Germany army would have to spend the winter out in the open—a Russian winter. If they had been snugly housed in Moscow and Leningrad, gorged with the loot of two great cities, the German army might have passed a very different winter. Whether the assumption of the supreme command by Herr Hitler, and his dependence on his intuitions instead of military science, are likely to comfort the soldiers in their distress, I will leave to those who have better knowledge of German mentality than I can claim.
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It is satisfactory to us to know that the tanks and aeroplanes that we sent from this country have borne their part in these great achievements by the Russians, just as Hitler's need for retaining air forces in Germany and the Middle East have not been without their effect on the balance of air power on the Eastern front. Before leaving the campaign in Europe, it must be noted that throughout this period, so far as weather conditions allowed, our bombers have continued to operate against targets in Germany and German-occupied countries and have played their great part in the Battle of the Atlantic.
I turn now to the Far East. The Prime Minister warned the House of the gravity of the events in the Far East and the power of our new antagonist. He said it might well be that we should have to suffer considerable punishment and that we should defend ourselves everywhere with the utmost vigour, in close co-operation with the United States of America and the Netherlands. Events have borne out his warning. Before giving an account of what is happening in the Far Eastern theatre, it is well to consider the broad facts of the strategic situation. It is obvious that, in war, the British Commonwealth and Empire, composed of so many units separated by huge stretches of ocean, offers a great number of favourable points for attack. So long as Germany was our only enemy, our overseas Empire and Commonwealth, suffered few attacks, except perhaps from occasional raiders. The main danger which faced us was the attack on our commerce and the possibility of the development from the Continent of an attack on these Islands. When Italy came into the war, the Mediterranean ceased to be just a safe highway between our lands in the East and the West and became a major war zone. Finally, when Japan came into the war, the hitherto peaceful pacific ceased to live up to its name and also became a war zone, in which Japan, with a most powerful fleet in those waters, a very strong army and a strong air force, was in a position at once to assail all our scattered possessions in that area. The fact that the United States entered the war on our side determines the ultimate result of the war beyond a shadow of doubt, but does not offset the immediate advantage of Japan by reason of her strategic position

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and the initiative which she seized by a treacherous attack on two nations, one pre-occupied elsewhere and the other unsuspecting and at peace with all the world.
The fact that, at the outbreak of war, Japan found our territories in the Far East less strongly garrisoned and equipped than we should have wished them to be, springs not from any lack of prevision but from the fundamental fact that it is beyond our resources to be strong everywhere. Here again, it is difficult to appreciate just what the scale of the war is in the Far East. We generally see a small-scale map on which the Malay Peninsula appears to be just a small appendage. Actually, its size is comparable with that of Great Britain. In relation to Singapore, Khota Baru is as Edinburgh is to London, and that Eastern coast which is exposed to the danger of attacks from Japan is broadly equal to our whole East coast. Similarly, the Dutch possessions in the East Indies are not small places but are great islands, equalling in size and population many of the larger European States. With this background, we can turn to the narrative of events.
Our Northern outpost, Hong Kong, was attacked on 8th December by greatly superior forces which began to penetrate into Kowloon on the mainland. On 11th December, in accordance with a longstanding plan, the mainland brigade was withdrawn to the island. After six days of shelling and bombing, the enemy were able to effect landings at two points, and to nourish their lodgements continually. Our forces, though outnumbered and experiencing very great difficulties in getting supplies of munitions, food and water—not because those supplies were not there originally, but because they had been cut off—held out gallantly in three isolated areas until 25th December, when, after having rejected three previous demands to surrender, the Governor had no option but to accept the advice of his naval and military commanders that further resistance was impossible. The Hong Kong defenders held up important enemy forces and inflicted heavy losses on them, and set a very fine example of courage and tenacity against heavy odds. Nor should we forget the gallant attempt to relieve Hong Kong made by our Chinese Allies, at the express order of General Chiang Kai-shek.
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In Malaya, the battle is still raging, and the House will not expect me to carry the account beyond the opening stages of the campaign. On 8th December, the Japanese effected considerable landings at Singgora and Patani in Southern Thailand. These were unopposed by the Thais, and there is every reason to believe that stores and fuel had been accumulated for their benefit there in advance. Simultaneously, the Japanese, after initial failures, managed to land at Khota Baru, in Northern Malaya. They considerably outnumbered our forward troops and started a series of enveloping movements. Our troops succeeded in cutting their way out, heavy casualties being incurred, but also inflicted on the enemy. Our aerodromes and communications were destroyed as we withdrew. At the present time, our Northern Forces have fallen back to a position 60 miles North of Kuala Lumpur, and our garrisons of the East and North East have been drawn back to conform. As the House knows, Burma, and in particular Rangoon, is now well within the war zone. The first raid on Rangoon took place on 23rd December. It was made by 60 bombers escorted by fighters, and 10 enemy aircraft were destroyed. On 25th December the Japanese attacked again, with 80 bombers escorted by about 20 fighters. This time they lost 27 machines. In neither of these raids was any substantial material damage done, but I regret to say that in the first there was a large number of casualties in personnel because people had not learnt to take cover. The casualties in the second raid were light.
There are two points which I should like to make. The first is as to the adequacy of our defence preparations. It is quite unfair to blame the commanders on the spot for the fact that we had not as strong forces by land, sea and air as we could wish. The demands on our resources in men, arms and transport have been very heavy. In addition to providing what was essential for our home defence and what was required in the Middle East and elsewhere, we have also sent planes and tanks to Russia, and in deciding how to allocate our resources the Government must take into account not what is desirable but what is possible. They must meet the most urgent needs first of all. We were, of course, aware of the possibility of a sudden attack by Japan, and, believe me, that possibility

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has been present in the minds of the Government ever since we took office. There was always the chance of their coming in, but the danger seemed, and proved for a long period less imminent than attacks in other quarters. What would hon. Members have said if we had excused ourselves for having insufficient forces in the Middle East on the plea that we had locked up large forces in Singapore, which at that time seemed most unlikely to be attacked, or at least on which an attack was purely problematical? Similarly, when there seemed a serious possibility of the German attack on Russia, particularly towards the Caucasus, succeeding, we did not hesitate to send tanks and planes to Russia; what would hon. Members have said if we had pleaded that we could not help in that vital sector because we had to retain the arms in another sector where the need was less urgent?
During the war we have sent what reinforcements we could spare to the Far East, but it is idle to suppose that even if we had increased our production to the utmost extent imagined to be possible by some hon. Members we could, after providing for our own defence and within the margin of time available, have produced and transported enough arms and personnel to equal the forces of a great military power such as Japan.
Captain Cunningham-Reid: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves that point. He says that the commanders in the Far East are not to blame. Could he possibly tell the House who is to blame?
Mr. Attlee: The Government take full responsibility, and if the hon. Member had been listening to me, he would, I think, have understood that it was not possible for us to provide the arms which it was desirable to provide for the whole of the scattered British Empire, exactly in the same way as after Dunkirk we had not enough arms in this country to go round. The hon. Member can put the blame where he likes. He can put the blame back as many years as he likes. My point was that it was unfair to blame local commanders for deficiencies for which they are not responsible.
Dr. Haden Guest: Would the right hon. Gentleman say what arrangements have been made in Malaya
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for enlisting the armed co-operation of the Malays?
Mr. Attlee: I am afraid that that is a detailed question which I cannot answer without notice. The hon. Member asked me what arrangements had been made. It is quite obvious that I cannot give a statement like that off-hand, nor can I state what are our forces in Malaya while the battle is going on.
Dr. Guest: Can he say whether there is any considerable body of Malays enlisted and fighting on our side?
Mr. Attlee: I cannot answer that offhand. I am not prepared to give details of the numbers of the Forces available.
Mr. Molson: Before my right hon. Friend leaves this point. I am sure hon. Members will agree about the unfairness to the local commanders. Can he say something about what has been done in the way of destroying communications and especially the railway along the Eastern side? That I think is the gist of most of the criticisms that have been made.
Mr. Attlee: My information is that in a country of great distances, with a limited personnel at their disposal, everything possible had been done to hinder the enemy by destroying everything that could give them assistance, such as railways, power plants and supplies as well. I think there was a Question on the Order Paper about some of those points.
The second point I wish to deal with concerns aerodromes. There are some 15 aerodromes in Malaya, but in no case was there any attack from the rear or by parachute or air-borne troops. They were lost because of the loss of the area in which they were situated, exactly as when General Rommel was driven back in Libya he lost the aerodromes in Cyrenaica. While it is true that aerodromes are important strategetic points and should be defended, it is ridiculous to think that they could be held in isolation when superior enemy forces caused the whole area to be abandoned. It would be another matter if those aerodromes had been taken by landings made from the rear by parachute troops, or because there was insufficient preparation. That was not the case. The aerodromes were lost because a strategic retirement had to take place, and nothing could

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have been more futile, in a country such as Malaya, where the mobility of troops must be the first consideration, than to lock up little pockets of troops for the defence of aerodromes for a few extra hours or days. Wherever aerodromes have been evacuated they have, as far as possible, been rendered unserviceable. What has happened in Malaya is very different from what might happen in this country.
This brings me to the last matter which I wish to bring to the attention of the House to-day. That is the defence of aerodromes. As a result of a careful study of campaigns overseas and of the conditions which are likely to occur during an attempted invasion of this country, we have carried into effect during some months a considerable development of our plans for defending our aerodromes. We have tested these plans, which are of course secret, by holding exercises and trials, and in particular we have studied the rapid reinforcement or relief of aerodromes that may be attacked. Great progress has been made during the past six months, with the full co-operation and assistance of the War Office and the Army authorities, in arming and training a large number of the R.A.F. technical, maintenance and other personnel of aerodromes so that they can take their proper and considerable share in the defence of their own stations. As a result of these experiences, lasting over a number of months, a further decision of far-reaching importance has recently been taken, but before announcing it I should like to give a brief indication of the nature of the problem, so that hon. Members can see better as to how it should be met.
The Air Force has now a vital part to play in all forms of war, and air forces are dependent, like naval forces, on the possession of secure bases. Therefore, the capture of these bases has become a major object round which a plan of war may well be built. The defence of aerodromes cannot be regarded as a problem isolated from the defence of the areas in which they are located. The point I made in regard to Malaya applies here. This defence, except against very light raiding forces, cannot be conducted solely or even mainly from the aerodromes themselves. The outcome of a land battle miles away may seal the fate of aerodromes upon which no direct attack has been made. Depth of defence, room for
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manoeuvre, perhaps considerable military and air forces, may be necessary to hold an aerodrome, and perhaps the biggest single factor in the defence of aerodromes is the gaining and retention of air supremacy. This can only be effected by fighter aircraft. The area surrounding an aerodrome may thus become a battlefield in which a major engagement is fought, the aerodrome itself being a tactical feature in that area. The function of aerodrome defence is therefore to ensure that the personnel of the aerodromes are so commanded, organised, armed, trained and provided with defence works that they can take their part to the fullest effect at the aerodrome in the battle for the defence of the area which contains it if a major attack by the enemy is staged, and to ensure, too, that they could, by themselves, successfully defeat an attempt at a coup de main. For this reason, aerodrome defence is essentially part of the general land defence and must be the task and responsibility of the military commander. In this task the R.A.F. on the aerodrome must be able to assist to the fullest extent. The R.A.F. ground staff are, however, under the control of the Station Commander, as are also all the material resources of the aerodrome, and the Station Commander is himself under the command of his R.A.F. superiors. If the regular garrison of the aerodrome is made up of Regular soldiers under the control of the military authorities there will be divided responsibility with all its attendant dangers. That is one of the main problems which have had to be solved.
After very careful consideration, and on the unanimous advice of all the Service authorities concerned, it has been decided that, while Army responsibility for ground defence as a whole must be maintained, the R.A.F. shall, as the Army's agent and, under military direction, undertake the entire local defence arrangements at its aerodromes in this country. As a majority of Royal Air Force personnel on the aerodromes is to have personal weapons and to take part in its defence, it is right that the regular garrison should be composed, not as now of soldiers under the control of the military authorities, but of personnel forming part of the Royal Air Force. Therefore, a corps of aerodrome defence troops under the executive and administrative control of the Air Council will be formed for that

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purpose. The corps which will be called the "Royal Air Force Regiment," will be organised, trained and equipped for the particular task of local aerodrome defence, and its units will possess a number of armoured fighting vehicles and artillery weapons as well as the normal infantry arms. Major-General C. F. Liardet, who was until recently the Inspector of Aerodrome Defences, has been appointed Director-General of Ground Defence in the Air Ministry; and as the senior officer of the Regiment, although not exercising operational control, he will be given the title of Commandant. He will be assisted by a number of other Army officers, many of senior rank and high qualifications, who are being lent to the Royal Air Force for this purpose. Under this new system the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, who is responsible, under the War Office, for the land defence of the British Isles, will decide the strength and location of the aerodrome garrisons provided by units of the Royal Air Force Regiment and will indicate to the Air Ministry the nature of the tactical methods of defence he wishes to be adopted. He will also have the right to satisfy himself, through his representatives, that proper measures to implement general policy are being taken and are effective.
At the same time, each R.A.F. Station Commander will, under the direction, and with the assistance, of his R.A.F. superiors, be responsible for the local defence of his station, and will exercise full executive control over the whole-time garrison troops of the Royal Air Force Regiment as well as over the ordinary R.A.F. personnel who have been armed and trained to fight in an emergency. In the event of active land operations against the enemy in the vicinity of his aerodrome, the Station Commander will, for the purpose of defence, come under the operational control of the local military commander, with whom he will have previously concerted plans for the relief of the station should this become necessary. I should add that Ministry of Aircraft Production aerodromes will be included in the scope of the scheme and will have appropriate garrison units provided by the Royal Air Force Regiment. The Admiralty are taking similar action for the naval air stations. The Government are satisfied that the new scheme which
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I have outlined will achieve a marked improvement in the arrangements for the defence of aerodromes and at the same time enable the most economical use to be made of the available resources in man-power. By ending a system of divided control over the actual defence measures at individual aerodromes, and by placing the responsibility for such matters on the aerodrome users, while at the same time maintaining the essential military control over land defence as a whole, including the defence of aerodromes, many difficulties and potential sources of weakness will be removed. The House will see that it has been a difficult problem and I hope that Members will examine this scheme, which has the approval of the Chiefs of Staff of all the three Services.
Mr. Loftus: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves that point, could he inform the House by what date the Royal Air Force Regiment will be fully trained and equipped for this work?
Mr. Attlee: I must necessarily have notice of that question.
Mr. Garro Jones: There is one very crucial aspect of this new and rather complex arrangement on which the right hon. Gentleman has not touched. Who will decide on the apportionment of the weapons to the new Force, particularly with regard to the allocation of armoured vehicles?
Mr. Attlee: Clearly that is a matter for the Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Muff: Is it not possible to recruit the personnel from the Army which is at present defending some of these aerodromes, and incorporate them in this new Royal Air Force Regiment so that there will be no additional delay?
Mr. Attlee: There is a difference between the static defence of aerodromes and active defence. At present we have units stationed at aerodromes which might be more usefully employed on active defence outside.
Squadron-Leader Hulbert: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us from what sources this Force will be recruited?
Mr. Attlee: We have a large number already. We are going to supplement them by ordinary methods of recruiting.
Mr. Molson: There is the anti-aircraft defence of aerodromes. I understand the right hon. Gentleman to refer to land defence. In the case of anti-aircraft defence will that be divided between Anti-Aircraft Command in the case of large guns and the Royal Air Force in the case of Lewis guns?
Mr. Attlee: I understand that the position there will be substantially the same as it is now, but the hon. Member will realise that I am not in charge of the Department concerned with this. I could not give answers on all these details, though I know the general plan. Perhaps the hon. Member will put a point later.
Mr. Muff: Those of us who have visited these places officially and unofficially have seen numbers of the Army being trained, they have the equipment, and they can do the job. The difficulty has been the falling down on the dual command. I do impress upon the Departments concerned that we must not have undue delay in this matter. You have the nucleus with those men who have been trained for a year or two in field training.
Mr. Attlee: That is rather a different matter of the allocation of personnel. Although they may have been trained, it does not necessarily follow that the best use of their services will be at the aerodromes.
Mr. Simmonds: I gather from what the right hon. Gentleman says that this arrangement is to apply only in this country. Are we to infer that the present unsatisfactory arrangements are to continue for some considerable time, at any rate, overseas, or is this arrangement likely to apply overseas at any date?
Mr. Attlee: That is another question. I was dealing with aerodrome defence in this country.
Mr. Simmonds: The right hon. Gentleman dealt with Malaya. It arises very much there.
Mr. Attlee: If the hon. Member had listened to what I said, he would have heard that it was a rather different problem there.
Sir George Schuster: I wish to ask for an assurance as to the question of the co-operation of the Home Guard
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in the defence of aerodromes. Was that fully considered, or will it be considered? They are static troops, permanently in the neighbourhood of an aerodrome.
Mr. Attlee: Yes, certainly.
Squadron-Leader Hulbert: It is very important that when this Force is obtained, it shall be equipped. When will that be done?
Mr. Attlee: As soon as possible; but there is bound to be a hiatus.
I have endeavoured to give the House some information on that particular subject, and also a general account of the war situation as it is to-day. I have tried to give a balanced picture, without emphasising unduly either the lights or the shadows. One has to remember that at no time during this war have we been without very urgent anxieties. At no time have we been complacent, but we have never allowed particulars events, whether favourable or unfavourable, to obscure the fundamental facts of the situation. We can look at those fundamental facts today. We have entered on the year 1942 under very different conditions from those of 1941. We have, it is true, a new enemy, with power to do us harm for a time, and our old enemy, despite his reverses, is still very strong. But we have, in the United States, Russia, and China, great new allies in the fight against tyranny. We have effective unity to-day. We are concerting unity of action between the united nations. Great efforts will be needed to change potential strength into actual power. There is no excuse for any relaxation in our striving, but I do say that we can go forward in this new year with a sober and well-grounded confidence in the ultimate success of our cause.
Sir Edward Campbell: I know that my right hon. Friend has not been able to include everything, but does he not agree that the Allies have every reason to be grateful for the assistance of the Navy and the Air Force of the Netherlands in the Far East?
Mr. Attlee: I can strongly endorse what my hon. Friend says, and I am sure there will be many further opportunities of loyal co-operation between us and that country.
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: The House has listened with interest to my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, who has given us an exhaus-

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ttive picture of what is happening at the present time. In the course of his discourse, he has put a girdle around the world and has endeavoured to follow the war into all the continents and seas where it has been raging. Towards the end of his speech, he announced the Government's decision on a matter on which the House and the country as a whole have been greatly exercised for a long time.
Before I come to that part of his speech, I am sure the House would wish me to express my congratulations to the Prime Minister on his decision to visit Washington and then to go to Ottawa, to get into direct contact with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada. We who often sit under the spell of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister in this House can well appreciate the effect that his recent speeches in Washington and in Ottawa must have had on those who listened to him in America. But I am sure that we shall all agree that, important as was the effect on his hearers in those two countries, still more important were the decisions taken between him and the President with regard to the conduct of the war. The unification of command which has been decided upon by those two statesmen may well have a very important and lasting effect on the war.
It would be inappropriate for me to ask, and still more inappropriate for my right hon. Friend to reply, as to when the campaign in the Far East is going to change from the defensive, which has been the unfortunate beginning, to the offensive, which alone can bring it to a successful issue. Quite clearly, that is not a matter which can be dealt with in public, but I think we are entitled to say that the country expects Sir Archibald Wavell to turn the defensive into an offensive at the earliest possible moment, and we hope that the opportunity will arise very soon. While we are congratulating the Prime Minister on what he has done in the West, we also desire to express to the Foreign Secretary our pleasure at the result of his visit to the Soviet Union, and at the successful talk that he evidently had with Mr. Stalin. We hope to hear later on to-day—I think it has been already decided—a statement from the Foreign Secretary which will carry a little further what we have already heard from him on the broadcast, perhaps giving some details.
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Having said that on the general aspects of the war, I would like to turn to the important pronouncement which the Lord Privy Seal has made with regard to aerodromes. I say frankly for my part that, before expressing any opinion, I should like to read what he has said and to think about it. There is no doubt that the country and this House have been somewhat alarmed at the dual control which has existed up to now. It is not only that, but the country has not felt fully satisfied that the equipment of the aerodromes was adequate in all respects for their defence. The events in the Far East have, of course, brought this question into immediate prominence. I confess that I was not quite clear, from what the Lord Privy Seal said, how far what happened at Khota Baru was accounted for by his explanation. As I understand his statement, aerodromes were lost because the forces at our disposal were not holding the surrounding terrain; but—speaking subject to correction—I thought that the effective use of the aerodrome at Khota Baru was lost in the first few hours, if not the first few minutes, after the Japanese had made their onslaught. I was under the impression that one of the difficulties was that our ships were not supported from the air, because the effective use of the aerodromes had been lost from the beginning. That was the impression that I formed.
Mr. Attlee: The landings were made at Khota Baru. The enemy were able to infiltrate and to drive off our troops, and therefore the aerodrome fell. It did not fall because there was not a very protective defence in that area. It was not a case of the aerodrome being surprised behind.
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: I confess that I do not fully understand that. What I understand happened was that it was not a question of hours or days and forces landing and carrying things out. I thought it happened within a few minutes, and the explanation that the Lord Privy Seal has given now seems, I will not say to conflict, but to be something new. I have not heard it put forward in earlier statements, and perhaps at a later stage we may get the full information, because it is of supreme importance and is certainly exercising the minds of the country. I am bound to tell the Lord Privy Seal

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that up till now the explanation that has been given in Parliament and elsewhere with regard to the aerodromes in the Far East has not fully allayed—I will not put it higher than that—the feeling that has been aroused in the country. There has been a feeling that, not necessarily in the Government but that somewhere or other there were shortcomings and that the support which was expected from the aerodromes by the Air Force to the ships somehow did not arrive. The House and the country as a whole recognise that we have not an unlimited amount of arms and of aeroplanes and that necessarily therefore we cannot do all that we would like, but there is a feeling that over and above that there was some shortcoming which prevented the best use being made of what we had.
That brings me to the last point with regard to the whole aerodrome question. I do not feel competent without a great deal more study to express an opinion whether the solution which the Government profess to have found meets the whole problem. There is certainly a good deal to recommend it. I take it that the proposal is in regard to the Air Force to create some sort of body of men comparable to the Marines with regard to the Navy. It may be that that is the best solution of the problem, but there are a great many things to be thought out. Whatever be the actual solution adopted, even if the one which the Government are proposing proves the success which we all hope it may be, nothing will take away the absolute necessity of eternal vigilance, because this war is not fought by the slow methods in which wars have been fought in the days gone by. Things happen within a matter of hours or of minutes, and therefore I hope that no idea will get abroad that any aerodrome can at any moment, day or night, relax vigilance, which can alone provide security.
There are several other matters which have arisen during the Recess which I hope at the appropriate time will be explained. There was the intervention of Mr. Curtin, from Australia, and I gather—and I hope that it is true—that the trouble that was expressed there has now been satisfactorily settled. But at some time or other the House will be entitled to hear what the trouble was all about. I do not think that there is any harm in plain speaking. It is a proof of the friend-
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ship between ourselves and Australia that there can be plain speaking without any lasting ill-feeling or without any trouble remaining unsolved. I happened to be reading a paper only yesterday, and there was a letter in it from an Australian correspondent, and it seemed so appropriate to this particular situation, though it was written weeks before Mr. Curtin made his utterance, that it seems worth quoting. The writer, speaking of Australian quarrels, says:
"The sun does not go down upon much wrath. Our people's incorrigible habit of shouting their grievances from the housetops in full daylight makes Australia the despair of intriguers who love mystery movements and midnight plots."
I think that that is a very good description of the fact that when the mystery is all cleared up, none of us will feel the worse, and we shall all feel better friends for having had the case before us.
There is another part of the Empire whose contribution to the war effort is of supreme importance, and not only its contribution to the war effort, but its loyal co-operation with us, both now and in the events that will follow the war. I refer to the great sub-continent of India. The entry of the Japanese into the war seems to have brought a new atmosphere into Indian politics and, as I think, made a new approach possible. I notice that in the last few hours a certain number of Indian politicians have addressed a special communication to the Prime Minister with regard to the position of India, and I want to urge upon the Government and, if my voice can reach to the Prime Minister himself, particularly on the Prime Minister, that it will be very unfortunate if at this particular moment, when there is a new atmosphere prevailing in India, the step is not taken by His Majesty's Government, and if possible by the Prime Minister himself, to help to resolve the difficulties that have beset us. The Prime Minister has a special responsibility in this matter. At the time when the House was discussing the Indian question the Prime Minister took his own line. Rightly or wrongly, that line was interpreted in India as one less favourably disposed towards self-government there than that of his colleagues. That may have been a mistake, but that was the interpretation placed upon his attitude by some people, at any rate, in India.

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What is required more than anything else to-day is that the Indian peoples should have confidence that in all influential sections in this House there is the definite intention and purpose to confer self-government upon India after the war, and if the Prime Minister can see his way to make some pronouncement at this time, it may have consequences of vital importance, first of all, to the co-operation which India gives to the prosecution of the war, and afterwards towards making a satisfactory decision in Asia as part of the general settlement of the world. I understand that the purport of this particular communication which was addressed to the Prime Minister is this: It has been felt in India that sometimes the Viceroy and his entourage of Indian advisers come to quite sensible solutions of difficulties which, by constant reference to Whitehall, are—I will not say over-ridden—but whittled down. They do not so much object to government from Delhi but they do object to government from Whitehall. The Prime Minister, in his inimitable way and because of his great mastery of words, can put ideas which prevail in this House into words which carry greater conviction than they would if they were put by anyone else. I suggest that he can perform a service which no one else can render if he will take this matter seriously and will regard it as an important and essential part of the war effort.
Since the House last met we have entered upon a new calendar year. The forces of the Allies all over the world are getting themselves together and building up their resources to strike a shattering blow at the Axis Powers. It may well be that before we can gain complete mastery over the enemy we shall see a long and protracted struggle, and it is quite clear that unless we envisage this we shall not make the efforts which are necessary for obtaining the complete victory which we all desire. Therefore, I welcome the careful statement made by the Prime Minister in his speech in Washington and the words of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal to-day—that this is the supreme hour, that every effort must be put forward, and that we must be prepared to face the conflict, however long it may last. I welcome these careful and prudent statements, but at the same time I hope the Government
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have not altogether shut out from their minds a possible alternative course of events. I hope that it not happen that the outbreak of peace will catch us as unprepared as the approach to war in 1938, the actual outbreak in 1939, the resurgence of the war in the early spring and the entrance of Italy in the later spring of 1940 and, to some extent the actual and immediate entry of Japan into the conflict just recently.
I do not suggest that the Government should ask that the country should direct its attention to that matter—I think the country must get on with the war—but I hope the Government itself has plans for dealing with the peace. It is not merely a question of the kind of things which the Minister without Portfolio has to handle. What I am thinking of largely is Europe. I see the German invasion of Europe like a fetid flood over-running the land and one day, be it early or be it late, that flood will recede and then something very drastic will have to be done, by our Government principally, to control the situation. There will be a tendency for grave disorder to break out over the whole Continent of Europe. There may be a great shortage of food, although I understand that so far as that problem is concerned the Government have already made plans. I hope, however, that they will go beyond the mere storing of food, that they have some definite ideas as to how to distribute it and how to tackle disorder and prevent Europe from becoming a charnel house. The brutality of the German invaders both in the East, West and the North-West may well produce a situation which will get out of control unless the Government take the question thoroughly in hand. I need not pursue that further. I will end on the note on which I began. We have the Foreign Secretary back from the visit to Russia, safe and sound, and we welcome his return. We wish the Prime Minister also a safe and happy return to this country; we shall welcome him with all the greater enthusiasm when he comes back to us in this House.
Mr. Cary: The prophecies which were made by the Prime Minister and others in September of last year as to what might happen in the war on the Eastern front have been fully justified. What has happened there will no doubt remain a mystery to people for a long time as to how it came about that the

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German High Command failed to recognise that in winter conditions in Russia a sheepskin is more important as a weapon of war than the fastest tank or the most accurate machine gun. The world is not deceived by the pleas of ignorance of the conditions on Russia's Western front. Indeed, the Germans have fought over that country on many occasions. The Russian civilian population has imposed a serious burden upon the German army. The Russian soldier has proved himself no less redoubtable than his opponent and, in the cause for which he fights, he is undoubtedly superior.
It seems a far cry from the swift victories which the Germans attained against Poland and Yugoslavia. The German people are bewildered and anxious. The German Chancellor, by the whining tone of his New Year message to the German people, shows clearly that there is something more than the thought of defeat in the German minds. There is, indeed, the anticipation of defeat. What is the truth behind the military situation in Europe? I think it is this. Because of the reluctance of the democracies to face the realities of war, and all that total war entails, the German Army obtained a flying start in equipment, training and tactical initiative. For that reason the German army developed a bogus air of invincibility—a sham invincibility which even the great Armies of France did not take the trouble to challenge. The Russian Armies had no illusions. They knew the falsehood of the German creed of a new order and the brittleness which lay behind her facade of steel. What is now happening on the Eastern front proves conclusively the wisdom of the Russian people in making the German army fight every yard of the way over that 2,000 mile front. The initiative has passed to the Russian Armies. The German soldier is in retreat and is afraid; typhus thins the ranks; badly wounded men are left behind, or worse still, are assisted to die. And never in the long and painful annals of European military history has a more contemptible spectacle been presented to the world's gaze than the retreat of the German army. One can only express the hope that the retreat will not stop until the Russian Armies stand on the German frontiers in East Prussia and Silesia. If that bright moment ever comes, I hope the Russian soldier will not
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forget what the "scorched earth" policy has meant to his own country.
The German Chancellor has asked for the salvation of the German people in 1942. No doubt the German people could have that salvation now under the armistice terms of the British and Russian Governments. But there is no salvation for the German Chancellor, the Nazi leaders, the Nazi party, or the German armed forces. The ultimate objective of the Allies must be the removal of those things from the face of the earth and the restoration in full of German institutions—religious institutions, trades union institutions, and much else. For them it will mean freedom to pray, freedom to talk, freedom to trade, freedom to travel, but never again freedom to fight under the banner of some casual lunatic like Adolf Hitler.
Out of the present fighting two facts emerge clearly. First, it is highly improbable that the German army will again recover its former impetus and morale; certainly, never the prestige which it snatched at a bargain price from the smaller nations of Europe. In face of the growing strength of the Allies, the difficulties of the German High Command would appear great in the extreme. Secondly, the Russian civilian population has shown clearly through guerilla tactics the great part which the peoples of the occupied countries throughout Europe might be able to play in the final overthrow of the German army. The Prime Minister once pictured to us the advantages which accrued to the German Command because they were built up on interior lines. Now those interior lines run out to such great distances, I doubt whether that first appreciation by the Prime Minister remains valid any longer. I think there is generally a realisation of the immense part the civilian populations of the occupied countries will play in the future campaign—arson, sabotage, and the ruthless boycott of everything German.
In any case, I hope British workers will not be distracted by what is happening in other theatres of war. The position between Germany and ourselves remains the great problem of the war, the premier consideration of our Government, and all aid for and full co-operation with Russia our first duty outside our own essential needs. For that reason, the Government are to be congratulated on two things. For months past they have diverted every

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available bomber over German targets. That operation strikes into the heart of Germany and is the centre of our target. Secondly, in spite of popular clamour, the Government have resisted the temptation to throw on to the Army at the present time the immense burden of a continental invasion, in spite of the fact that we possess command of the sea and command of the air to support it. If the opportunity for such an invasion does arise, I am perfectly certain the Government will find a better opportunity in the future. Russia cannot be excluded from the noble sentiments which were expressed by the Prime Minister in his address to the United States Senate. The Russian system did not kill individualism, and internationalism did not prevent its people from being Russians, ready to die for the things free men treasure—native soil, homes, and the right to choose one's own way of life. That was amply confirmed by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in his broadcast on Sunday night, when he said, "There is not one Russian Quisling."
The Lory Privy Seal has dealt at considerable length with the situation in the Far East, and I would like to say a few words about that theatre of war. Japanese ambitions in the Far East do not date from the rise of modern Germany. What is happening there is the outcome of many years of Japanese forethought and planning. Germany and Italy only provided the convenient moment to strike. The collapse of France gave Japan a new strategic alignment on which to base, not new ambitions, but old ambitions. Therefore, Far Eastern waters should have been made, all through the post-Great War years, as important as any other theatre in the consideration of Imperial strategy and defence. To that initial false appreciation by the Committee of Imperial Defence I attribute largely the disaster which has come so suddenly upon us in the Far East. But away from that, perhaps our consent to the Five-Power Naval Treaty years ago was the real initial blunder which has led to our difficulties in the Far East, and every subsequent decision has been tied by that unfortunate agreement in 1923. Looking back to the Imperial Conference of 1937, all of us realise how grossly inadequate was the agenda then considered, and when I hear responsible people in Australia being frank now in this desperate situation, I
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only wish that the Australian delegates to the Imperial Conference in 1937 had been frank then. That was the time to be frank. That was the time not only to wake up this country, but to wake up their own country, too.
Dr. Haden Guest: Was there a Labour Government in Australia then?
Mr. Cary: I cannot recall. In the autumn of 1937, within the knowledge and with the help of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, I paid an unofficial visit to that great base at Singapore. I hate to see the newspaper headlines describing Singapore as a fortress. Forts are no substitute for fleets. The naval base it not a substitute for sea forces. The rôle in war of a base is to improve and increase the mobility of our own great fleet. It would be quite unnecessary for the Japanese to spend thousands of lives and risk many ships in an attempt actually to occupy the island of Singapore. If Singapore is completely isolated, the effect upon our fleet and upon our sea power will be identically the same. Movement is everything in sea strategy. Movement to-day depends upon fuel; it depends upon docking and repairing facilities, and the immense stores of ammunition required by fleets to move with high mobility over the great oceans.
The question which must be in the mind of every Member of the House is, If Singapore is taken or isolated, how can that fact be overcome? It is not for me to say what are the possibilities, but obviously the importance of Ceylon, Simonstown and the Cape become: paramount. Remember that the real defences of Singapore were not to be found upon the Island of Singapore but in the things we have lost—Sarawak, North Borneo and the aerodromes which run from one side of the Kra Isthmus to the other. The outer defences of Ceylon and of Simonstown are equally as important, and I hope that suitable steps will be taken to improve those defences.
There is one aspect of the matter which I think should be considered. The Japanese penetration of the Indian Ocean is a serious possibility, and on the African side of the Indian Ocean is to be found the great Island of Madagascar, which is still under the authority of the Vichy Government. The Vichy Government made substantial concessions to Japan in

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Indo-China, and as a result they lost Indo-China. No doubt, in regard to Madagascar the Vichy Government are in as weak a position as they were in the case of Indo-China. So vital is the strategic position of the great Island of Madagascar that I hope the Foreign Office and the Government are taking suitable steps in regard to it. The position in the Far East will take a long time to restore. How long it will take no one dare prophesy, but I feel that the Japanese will not have it all their own way and that within a reasonable time some part of the position may be restored. The key to the problem is not the defeat of Japan now, but to increase and improve our efforts against Germany.
For that reason, may I say a few words about our contribution to the Allied Command? Tactics are the direct responsibility of the military commanders, and the direction of the war and strategy, being purely civilian functions, are the direct responsibility of the War Cabinet. The structure of our system of government, with its gentle gradients up to the Prime Minister, was never designed nor intended to undertake the terrific tasks facing us to-day. Indeed, it is amazing how little the system has changed from the formalism of pre-war days. Departments have been doubled, many additional clerks have been appointed, and advisory committees have been added. Departments enjoy spending power undreamt of, and in that way the Government becomes almost the sole employer of the nation's capacity to work and produce goods. I constantly ask myself this question: Is that the true path to the winning of this war? If it is, then why have we had so much difficulty during the past five years in producing the means with which to wage war? It may be said that it is now too late to change the system, but if that is so it gives rise to the haunting fear that our failure to change or modify in time an inadequate system for directing a war against a fully armed Germany may influence largely the circumstances of how that war ends. We have staked everything on the outright military defeat of Germany, and we should use every means to thrash out a machinery of government which is superior to anything which the enemy can attain. Both sides have the same basic advantages of man-power, productive
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capacity and science. Superior strategy in the deployment of these things is the real key to the winning of the war. We must cease to grope our way to victory. I hope that a reformed War Cabinet will be brought into existence which will spend its whole time and devote all its energies to the consideration of the broad problem of grand strategy, both economic and military.
We all know the reasons why Germany defeated France. We have no reason to suppose that the defeat of Germany can be brought about in the same way. On the contrary, everything points to the opposite direction. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in his excellent speeches, frequently refers to the day of final victory. In my opinion, we shall have to fight all the way to that objective—in effort, in arms and in suffering. If the Eastern Front has proved nothing else, it at least proves that the Germans still know how to die. There is much talk in this country, prompted, no doubt, by a sentence in the Prime Minister's County Hall speech, that the Germans themselves might overthrow the Nazi regime. I do not believe that there is any short cut to victory in that. Collapse will not take place in Germany until the military pressure which we exert from outside is simultaneously effective. Some months ago the German Chancellor said to Germany, "Remember, if we lose this war, it is the end of the German people." I do not think that anyone would deny, with the possible exception of Bismarck, Adolph Hitler is the most sinister prophet in German history. Broadly, the position is this: Victory will not come to us. The onus is upon ourselves to retrieve it.
Dr. Haden Guest: The whole House listened with very great interest to the Lord Privy Seal's account of the efforts which have been made in Washington to attain a wide-scale plan for the co-ordination of defence, and I am sure that the whole country learned with a feeling of very great relief of the appointment of General Wavell as General Officer in Command of the South-West Pacific. For my part, that is one of the few lights in the darkness of the situation in that part of the world. For some time I have gone about with General Wavell's lectures in my pocket. I regard him as one of the few military authorities who really understands the situation and who

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really understands how to command men. Those Members who have not read his lectures will do very well to do so, and especially to con the first quotation he makes with regard to military affairs, which is from Socrates, and which refers to the provision of food and necessities for the soldiers. When General Wavell gets to work in the Pacific, I believe that we shall have a different story to tell from the rather sorry tale of disasters which have taken place in that part of the world. I do not propose to enter into a study of these disasters—the loss of ships and airfields, and what has been very rightly called in one of the papers "The Shame of Penang"—but on the question of the shame of Penang it would be worth while the Government informing the House why, when we have had the scorched earth policy demonstrated with such devotion by the Russians, we were informed that there were large supplies of tin and rubber and very large numbers of small ships left intact. Are there Quislings in that part of the world or to what is it due? We ought to be told. It seems a perfectly shameful business that that should have happened at this stage in the war.
Reference has been made to Mr. Curtin's recent statement with regard to lack of consultation between the authorities here and the Australian Government. When I read it I felt very glad indeed that an Australian had had the courage to speak out very straight on the matter. I think Mr. Curtin was quite right to do so, because there has been a lack of political imagination about our strategy. We need a very far-seeing political outlook and I emphatically do not agree with the hon. Member for Eccles (Mr. Cary). I do not think we can afford to concentrate entirely on the war in Europe and leave the war in the Pacific to look after itself, or to take a subordinate position. It seems to me that the war in the Pacific is undoubtedly of equal importance to anything that is going on in the West. I believe that the blunders that have recently been made are essentially political. The damage, of course, is vitally military. One of the greatest blunders that have been committed recently is failure to appreciate the situation in India and the military importance of that country. India has a population of 380,000,000. We are now rejoicing that
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the United States, with its immense capital and its population of something like 130,000,000, has come into the war. How much more should we rejoice if it were possible to get 380,000,000 of people with a high productive capacity into the war instead of being somewhat Gandhi-ish about it. I see that the Secretary of State dissents, but I have sources of information. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman or anyone else will say that India is wholeheartedly and enthusiastically behind the war effort. Of course it is not, and the reason is that the situation in India has been extremely badly handled by the Government. In the last few days there has been an appeal to the Prime Minister at Washington signed among others by Mr. Srinnastri Shastri, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jazaker, whom many Members in this House must know, and many others, and they have put forward a view to which I think the Government ought to pay very great respect and attention. They ask, not for formal changes at present, but that India be treated on an equality with the Dominions, and I believe that that demand ought to be met by a frank acceptance. What my right hon. Friend who spoke from the Front Opposition Bench said with regard to the Prime Minister's past connection with the Indian situation ought to be very carefully considered by the Government. He has changed his views about the Soviet. He once used language about it stronger than anything he has said about India. He has now shown that it is possible to be in the closest touch and association with them. I hope he will find it possible, if necessary, to change the expression of his views with regard to India and send a warm and encouraging message promising them Dominion status and asking for their frank and full co-operation in the war effort.
The hon. Member for Eccles raised the question of the possibility of the fall of Singapore. I hope there is no possibility that that may happen, but anyone who considers that our Eastern possessions are immune from attack is indulging in very optimistic and wishful thinking. I feel that it is essential that we should enlist with us against the Fascist Powers the very great material and spiritual resources of India, which ought to be more frankly

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appreciated in this country. One of the Indian leaders on the Congress side, Mr. Rajagopalacharia, whom I knew when he was a young man, has advanced to a position where I feel confident that it is possible that a franker exchange of opinions with him and other Congress leaders, and the Liberal leaders, would enable a modus vivendi to be arrived at and would enable the Indian tangle to be escaped from.
Earl Winterton: I think the hon. Member's speech will do great harm in India. He does not include Mr. Jinnah, the leader of the Moslem party?
Dr. Guest: I had him in my mind because the statements which have recently been made provide a platform on which the Indian Liberals and others may meet, and it is precisely because of that that I attach so very much value to this initiative by Mr. Shastri and the other gentlemen whom I have mentioned and other Indian communities and sections of opinion. There has undoubtedly been a very serious blunder with regard to India, and there was a very serious blunder recently with regard to Burma. The Prime Minister of Burma came here offering and hoping to get full co-operation from this Government. It is no secret that he went away very troubled indeed in his mind and that the people in Burma are now beginning to talk about an Eastern Ireland. It is most unfortunate at this time, when the principles of the Atlantic Charter have been proclaimed with the authority of President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister behind them, that the application of those principles to India and Burma should be hedged around by all kinds of limiting conditions and withdrawals and hesitations, so as to give those people the feeling that they are not wanted and that at some future time matters may be attended to but that this is not the right moment. It is suggested that you cannot make great changes in war-time, and I do not suggest that we should now make the great constitutional changes which will finally have to be made. It is not true that in war-time we cannot make great changes. We have already made great changes in the Near East with regard to Syria and the Lebanon and we are making great changes with regard to Abyssinia.
This lack of insight into the political
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situation in the East and the lack of imagination in regard to the Japanese suggest to my mind the urgent necessity of meeting the proposal made from the Dominions by Sir Earle Page yesterday that there should be a Dominions War Council in which all the Dominions would have an opportunity of expressing their opinions on an equality and of obtaining information. I believe that it would be advisable to extend that council to the Allied Nations and it would be essential to have on it the co-operation of India and Burma on equal terms. I do not want to suggest that it will be necessary to take even more drastic means to secure changes, but I do feel that we ought to take a long view of the war so as to secure that all who are intimately concerned, all the 26 united nations and those who may join us, should feel that they have an equality of status with regard to decisions, should feel that they really have the opportunity of pulling their weight and that they are not disregarded and overridden by decisions made by others above their heads. It is especially with regard to the East and the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand that this War Council should be established so that we may go forward through what I feel will be a hard year, possibly followed by another hard year in 1943, more united than we are at present and with more political imagination and looking forward not only to the objectives of the immediate war strategy, but to how the peace is to be brought into existence when the times comes for that to break out, as my right hon. Friend said. I do not feel that we can leave other nations out as we are leaving them at the present time. We must have more meetings like the Allied War Council which met some time ago at St. James's Palace. We must bring in all the Dominions, India and Burma. I believe that we can get in that way the concerted war effort of the vast majority of the people and the resources of this planet which will ensure a victory of the kind we wish as well as merely a military victory.
Commander Sir Archibald Southby: History has repeated itself. In the last war it was the magnificent heroism of the Russian Armies which gave to ourselves and to the French that breathing space which enabled us to stem the tide of the German advance. To-day we pay a tribute to what Russia has done and is

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doing. At last the tide seems to have turned upon the Eastern front. It is true that the German rereat to winter quarters has not yet become a rout, but it might become a rout at any time. What it is possible for Russian generalship and courage to do will be done. Hitler's preoccupation is to our advantage, but do not let us under-estimate his will or his ability to strike. Thanks to Russia our war industry has been left in peace for several months. Our industrial centres have had a respite from bombing which I can only hope and pray they have turned to account. Our final triumph in this war is not in doubt, but the date of victory depends on three things. First, wise leadership which, while profiting by past mistakes does not try either to deny or to excuse them. Second, the output of the men and women engaged in the gigantic task of creating war material. Third, although I put it last, it is not because it is the least important point, the skill and courage of the officers and men of the Fighting Services which skill and courage have never for a moment been in doubt.
Events in Libya have taught us the un-wisdom of flamboyant and unduly optimistic prognostications of victory before it has been actually achieved. Now, after weeks of hard fighting, it looks as if victory was once more in sight, but we would do well to remember that until our opponents have been finally beaten it is unwise to crow. No one but a fool expects victory to be easy of achievement. In war there must needs be reverses, but there is no reason why we should be unduly perturbed by reverses unless they are due to incompetence or neglect.
There is however in this country—and there is no reason why one should try to pretend otherwise—considerable perturbation about events in the Far East and the conduct of the war. That does not mean that people are defeatist. Angry they may be, and they may have every reason to be angry, but they are not dismayed. Recent events do not become any less grave because either by speeches in this House or elsewhere the Government try to minimise them. The rejoicing at the Prime Minister's well-deserved and well-staged personal triumphs in Washington and Canada should not be allowed to distract our attention from what is happening in Malaya. Russian successes, however hardly and magnificently they have been
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won, will not save Singapore. General Auchinleck's fine campaign in North Africa does not offset the loss of Guam and Wake and the over-running by the Japanese of the Philippines. How much better it would have been if the Government had encouraged the United States to augment the defences of those vitally important places rather than encourage them to expend time and material in the creation of the new bases which we have leased to them in the West Indies, Bermuda and Newfoundland.
No one appreciates the tremendous drama of this war more than the Prime Minister. He is the central figure on the stage, a great personality playing a great part, but it may well be that sometimes his own part so absorbs his attention that he fails to realise that the audience in this country and throughout the Empire are not altogether satisfied with the actions of some of his fellow actors in the drama or, indeed, the way in which the drama is being played. It may be, too, that his impetuous energy tempts him to try and play parts which should be played by others, both Ministers and chiefs of staffs. Let me remind the House, if reminder be needed, that this Government came into existence owing to the criticisms levelled at their predecessors. One can picture what a howl of criticism would have gone up in connection with recent events in the Far East had the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain been Prime Minister.
If the defences of Singapore have been neglected the Government have nobody but themselves to blame. Singapore is one of the few vitally important key-positions in the whole world. Our possession or non-possession of Singapore affects not only India, Burma, Australia and New Zealand, but the entire course of our conduct of the war and our ability to win it. We had the right, therefore, to expect that it should have lacked none of that material which would enable it to have withstood, or will enable it to withstand, the attacks of the Japanese. To deny to Singapore and to those aerodromes adjacent to it which were vital to its defence, the equipment which would have enabled them to have been held was an act of utter folly. If ever there was a place which should have been under the command of one of our most distinguished soldiers, that place was Singapore, but not until the Japanese storm was about to break was any change made in the office

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of Commander-in-Chief. Did the previous Commander-in-Chief, now the subject of considerable criticism, at any time make representations to the Government with regard to the lack of defence in Singapore? If he did not, why did he not; and if he did make those representations, what happened? What did the Government do about it? Why was nothing done in order to make Singapore impregnable?
Events in the Far East have had a repercussion of which we should do well to take heed. The Government and the people of Australia are both apprehensive and angry. Australia has always stood by the side of the Motherland. In any difficulty into which we have got Australian courage, Australian spirit, everything they possess—they held nothing back—have been placed at our disposal, and they had a right to expect that the safety of Australia, which is bound up with the possession of Singapore and the maintenance of sea and air domination in the Far East, should have been guaranteed to them. Singapore's peril is the peril of Australia and New Zealand. I know the Government are not very fond of criticism in this House. They will have to listen to criticisms from Australia. The "Sydney Daily Telegraph" of 18th October accused Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and other high officers of "fatuous optimism." Let me read what it said:
"In the last three months our leaders have constantly acclaimed the fact that the Empire has air parity with her enemies. Then why do our troops retreat before death from the skies, and cry Where are our fighters? Did all those people really mean what they told the public? If so, they are fools. What mistakes must be made by high officers before they are sacked?"
The "Sydney Daily Mirror" said:
"Australia wants to see planes, not assurances from London."
When Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was replaced by General Sir Henry Pownall, Mr. Hughes, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in Australia, said that there had been a belated awakening to the utter incapacity of men to deal with new and terrible situations. He said, further, and this is worthy of being remembered by this House:
"So far all our defences have gone down like Aunt Sallies in a skittle alley. Hong-Kong, Manilla, British and American battleships have gone. This is a belated recognition
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by those in authority of ineffectiveness and incompetence."
But it was this Government which put those men in those positions. It was this Government which neglected to make suitable provision for the defence of Singapore and the Far East. They cannot shirk the responsibility, which is theirs. They may resent criticism in this House, but they will have to listen to it from Australia. Australian resentment at the present conduct of affairs led to that article, which everyone has seen, written by Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister, in the "Melbourne Herald," and it remains ominous and significant in spite of the efforts which have been made since it appeared to whittle it down and soften the tone of it, He said:
"Without inhibitions of any kind, I say Australia looks to the United States of America, free of any pangs as to traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom."
What a thing to have said in the middle of the war. Subsequently Mr. Curtin said, what we know to be true:
"There is no part of the Empire more steadfastly determined to maintain its greatness and no people more loyal to the King than Australia."
He added this most significant phrase, which I hope the Government have taken note of:
"Australia is no mere colony and her voice must be heard."
Time after time I have heard my hon. Friend who sits on the other side of the House pressing for an Empire War Cabinet. He did not get much encouragement—not from the Front Bench. In fact, he got on one occasion what is vulgarly termed "a raspberry." But he is going to get what he has asked for, for the pressure of events in the Far East have proved him to be right when the Front Bench was wrong. I pay my tribute to the magnificent speeches made by the Prime Minister both in Washington and in Ottawa—who does not? But in his great speech to the Congress of the United States the Prime Minister said this:
"If people ask me, as they have the right to ask me in England"—
I am glad he told Congress that—
"why is it you have not ample equipment of modern aircraft and weapons of all kinds in Malaya and the East Indies, I can only point to the victories which General Auchinleck has gained in the Libyan campaign. Had we diverted and dispersed our gradually growing resources between Libya and Malaya we should have been found wanting in both spheres."

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Yes, but why was the campaign in Libya necessary at all, with all its expenditure of life and effort? Because early last year we made the tragic mistake of allowing political and sentimental considerations to interfere with military strategy. Unless we could have continued to hold all that General Wavell's brilliant campaign had obtained for us at such trifling cost we should never have embarked on the expeditions to Greece and Crete and thereby lost Libya. The reverses we sustained in those two expeditions cost us not only the lives of officers and men who can ill be spared, but an immense amount of vitally important war material, the lack of which we are now suffering from. That has been brought home most tragically to us at the present time. General Auchinleck is now, great general that he is, at great cost trying to regain all that General Wavell once held. I believe that history, when it comes to be written, will say that had we held on to what we had gained in Northern Africa, and had we used the aerodromes at Benghazi and in Northern Africa to bomb Italy, we should have knocked her out of the war long ago.
Sir Francis Fremantle: Does the hon. and gallant Member suggest that we should not have gone to Greece and Crete?
Sir A. Southby: I suggest exactly what I said just now, that unless we could have continued to hold our Northern African gains we should not have gone to Greece or Crete. We should have helped them from the air and with our sea-power, but unless we could continue to hold what it was vitally necessary for us to hold we should not have embarked upon those expeditions. Mistakes in war have an unpleasant habit of being far-reaching. According to the Prime Minister himself, the security of Malaya had to be hazarded so that material might be sent to Libya. For the sake of Greece we have lost or may lose Singapore. Then it has been said that tanks and aeroplanes which might have gone to Libya have had to be sent to Russia. The loss of the islands in the Pacific and the threat to Singapore gravely impair our command of the sea, and it is our command of the sea which alone enables Russia to receive supplies of all kinds from both ourselves and the United States.
What an extraordinary situation now obtains. We are in difficulty in Singa-
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pore because we have not got aeroplanes, and we have not got the aeroplanes because they have been sent to Russia. We could hit at the Japanese who are trying to get into Singapore by bombing them in Tokyo, and the easiest place from which to do that is Vladivostock, but we cannot do that because our Russian Ally is not fighting the Japanese. Neither the United States nor ourselves can stem the tide of Japanese victory in the Far East unless we hold Singapore. If we lose Singapore we cannot beat the Japanese in the Far East until we regain it. Sea power cannot operate in the Far East unless Singapore is available as a base.
I agree with what was said just now from this side of the House, by the Member who objected to Singapore being referred to as a fortress. It is not a fortress. It is a naval bass before it is a fortress, and its real use is as one of the only places where our Fleet or the American Fleet can re-fuel and refit. Not only have we through our neglect imperilled the security of Singapore for use as a vitally necessary base, but, through the loss of the. "Repulse" and the "Prince of Wales" we have gravely imperilled our sea-power. Our balance of sea-power is not so great that we can afford to lose many more capital ships. The fate of the French Fleet is not yet decided. Italy still possesses large and efficient capital ships, although she may not possess at the moment the will to use them at sea—but Germany may make her think differently. We do not know what Germany is building or has built. What was the point of sending those two ships to Singapore? By themselves they could not fight the Japanese fleet. If we had been able to send a big enough squadron of battleships to Singapore, either by ourselves or in conjunction with the United States, which could have met the Japanese fleet on equal or nearly equal terms, it would have been worth doing, but to send two ships by themselves was to do what Germany never does, namely, to dissipate one's forces. [HON. MEMBERS: "The 'Bismarck.'"]
The last war taught us that you cannot send capital ships to sea unless you protect them by destroyers against submarine attack. This war has taught us that you cannot send capital ships to where they are liable to be attacked from the air, by

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land or sea-based aircraft, unless you provide not only that destroyer escort against submarines, but also a fighter escort as protection against attack from the air. In spite of that, we sent those two ships out to Singapore. We must have known there was not sufficient land-based fighter strength to enable those ships to operate under the umbrella of the air. Why then did we not send an aircraft carrier? I asked in this House whether it was the fact that expert opinion at the Admiralty advised that those ships should not go out unless they could be accompanied by an aircraft carrier. If that was so, then who overruled the recommendation of the expert advisers? If we are told that in view of our commitments we had not an aircraft carrier to spare, why are we short of them? We have never been told the circumstances of the loss of the "Glorious" and the "Courageous." They may have been justifiably hazarded or they may not, but their sinking has had a terrible repercussion in Malaya. If those two ships could not be sent out suitably protected by fighter aircraft they should never have been sent at all. Two units of our battle fleet which might well have been vitally necessary to us in the days to come have been thrown away.
Some time ago, in 1938, a proposal was made to the Committee of Imperial Defence that merchant ships should be so adapted that they might be able to carry a small number of aircraft. Their superstructure would, of course, need to be altered. If the superstructure was not capable of alteration so that aircraft could fly on or off, then, I suggest, catapults could be used to get the aircraft into the air. That suggestion was taken to the Air Ministry, who turned it down as being of no use at all. I happen to know that the suggestion was brought to the notice of the present Prime Minister in 1940 and I understand it was submitted by him to the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. The Air Ministry said that they had nothing to add to their decision of 1938. The Admiralty thanked the man who made the suggestion. Obviously the suggestion has been made use of recently because the loss of the aircraft carrier in the—
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Air (Captain Balfour): I do not want to interrupt my hon. and gallant Friend, but
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the statements which he has made in regard to the Air Ministry are not correct.
Sir A. Southby: Perhaps it would save the time of the House if I showed my right hon. and gallant Friend the copies of the letters from the Air Ministry which I have in my hand.
Hon. Members: Read them.
Sir A. Southby: The proposal was, as I said, that suitable alterations should be made to merchant ships. This was brought to the notice of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and here is a letter from the Air Ministry, London, dated 1st March, 1938, reference 661877/37/S, 8/1266:
"SIR,
I am directed to refer to your letters of 4th January and 12th February, 1938, relating to your suggestion for converting fast mercantile craft into aircraft carriers.
In reply I am to inform you that the suggestion has been fully examined, but the idea is not considered to be of practical utility for the Royal Air Force.
In these circumstances it is regretted that the Department are unable to take any further action in connection with your submission, but I am nevertheless to thank you for the trouble you have taken in bringing the matter to notice."
The suggestion was re-submitted and was brought to the notice of the present Prime Minister in a letter dated 7th May, 1940. It was then apparently submitted again to the Air Ministry, because a letter from the Air Ministry dated 23rd May, 1940, read as follows:
"Sir,
I am directed to refer to your letter of the 7th instant, on the subject of "Air Attack at Distance from Base."
In reply I am to state that your proposal has been re-examined, but it is regretted that it is not found possible to add to our letter of 1st March, 1938.
Nevertheless, I am to thank you for your continued interest."
Captain Balfour: Will the hon. and gallant Member say to whom those letters were addressed?
Sir A. Southby: I do not know why I should say to whom the letters are addressed, but I can say by whom they were signed.
Captain Balfour: Perhaps I might point out that when a good citizen comes forward with some suggestion, we do not always tell him whether in fact we are working on that particular idea or not.
Sir A. Southby: I understood my right hon. and gallant Friend to say, when I made this suggestion, that what I said was incorrect. I leave the House to judge whether it was incorrect or not. Obviously, something has been done in this connection, because the reported loss of H.M.S. "Audacity" showed that at long last we have taken some steps to convert merchant ships into small aircraft carriers. If this had been done two or three years ago we should have been able to send badly-needed aircraft out to the Pacific. It is essential to have large numbers of both small and large aircraft carriers.
Singapore is primarily a great naval base. It should have been provided with proper air protection. By all accounts, the action of the Army in Libya might have been more successful and easier had they been able to operate their own aircraft. Had the Navy been able to have control of its own air bases in Singapore and Malaya the history of Malaya might have been different. I ask this question; when will the Government learn the lesson of this war, and indeed of the last war, that you cannot have divided control? Where flying has to do with military operations, it must come under the direct control of the military command; where it has to do with naval operations, it must come under the direct control of the naval officer concerned. I raised this matter in the House of Commons on 19th December.
Captain Duncan: Has anything shown recently that co-operation between the Army and Air Force in the Libyan campaign was not very good?
Sir A. Southby: I did not say that. I said that had the Army had its own Air Force, operated by itself, events in Libya might have been different. The Army might have had a very much easier task than it has had. Of course, there is co-operation; we all know that. I raised this matter in the House on 19th December, 1940, and I asked that the Admiralty should be given sufficient aerodromes and aircraft under its sole control to enable it to carry out its duties. I ventured to say that, in my opinion, it was a matter of plain sense and of simple naval strategy, and that if the present system of compromise was allowed to continue, we risked losing the war. In a brief, and not
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very friendly or enthusiastic, reply from the Lord Privy Seal, I was accused of blowing on the embers of an old controversy. What does it matter what embers you blow on so long as we win the war? The Lord Privy Seal said:
"I think it is unfortunate that a discussion should be raised now that the working arrangements have been agreed by both Departments. They are working satisfactorily, and I think it is entirely unnecessary to raise this controversy, which can only impair efficiency by dividing where there should be unity."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1940; col. 1430, vol.367.]
It is idle to blind our eyes to the fact that there has been criticism of the work of the R.A.F. both from Libya and from naval sources. I pay my tribute to the way Coastal Command has operated, but if we had had naval aerodromes in Singapore, and in Malaya, the whole story of what is going on there now might have been different. Before it is too late I do beg the Government earnestly to consider whether it is not possible to give to the Army control of Army aircraft and aerodromes and to the Navy control of aircraft and aerodromes for use in naval operations. Our Empire has been built up on sea power. Three times in history have we stood in the path of an individual set upon the domination of the entire world. On each occasion his dreams have been brought to nought because of British sea power. If we continue to preserve our sea power, it will bring down Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, and everyone else who stands against us. If through foolishness or neglect we make it impossible for us to exercise sea power in any theatre of war in the world, we put our chances of winning in great jeopardy. Only by being beaten at sea and in the air can we be made to lose this war. Only through sea and air power can we win it. May I quote, in conclusion, the words of the great Bacon. He said:
"This much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will."
Sir Percy Harris: We have listened to a very stimulating and well reasoned speech by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, who has raised a number of controversial points. We have had a series of most interesting speeches which seemed to justify the special meeting of the House to-day instead of our reassembling at a later date. Seeing that the House had asked for the

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occasion, the attendance might have been better. I would like to take this early opportunity, an opportunity taken by the right hon. Gentleman who spoke from the Front Bench, to express our approval, on the first opportunity the House of Commons has had, of the Prime Minister's visit to America and also of the Foreign Secretary's great adventure in Russia. Neither of these journeys was without risk. That particularly applies to the perils of the Atlantic Ocean. It required courage and imagination, in the middle of a great war, and at a critical time like this, for the Prime Minister himself to go to Washington. It has struck the imagination of the whole world. The action has been immortalised by the brilliant speech at Washington, which, I venture to say, will prove a landmark in the history of the relations between the United States and ourselves. But, as the Lord Privy Seal pointed out, these journeys of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister are symbolic of the conviction of the Government that unity, both in strategy and in production, are essential to victory.
It may seem an unfair thing to say, but we have missed the Prime Minister. We have missed him to-day. He leaves a gap which it is impossible to fill. We recognise that it is impossible for a man to be in two places at the same time; but when the Lord Chancellor goes abroad, the Great Seal is put into commission; when the Prime Minister goes abroad, the situation does not lend itself to the same kind of procedure. The remaining members of the War Cabinet are all excellent in their own ways, but none of them has the potentials of a War Minister to fill the Prime Minister's place. I think the country would like to know what exactly is the position. Is the Premiership in commission; or is the Lord Privy Seal acting Prime Minister; or have important decisions, in the absence of the Prime Minister abroad, to be referred to him by cable or telephone? The situation is changing from day to day, and certainly during the absence of the Prime Minister things have not been easy.
I will not say that the nation is alarmed at the position in the Pacific. For one thing, the Pacific is some way off, and, for another, the nation has been hardened by two and a half years' experience of the horrors of war. But the situation of which the hon. and gallant Member for Epsom (Sir A. Southby) and the hon. Member
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above the Gangway—both of whom, by the way, have gone out of the House—have spoken does require a good deal of explanation. The Japanese attack came as no surprise. On the contrary, for years we have been spending millions on Singapore, not because of a phantom danger but because of our knowledge of the real position in the Pacific. Ever since Manchukuo was occupied by the Japanese, there has been tension between this country and Japan. In the phrase of the Lord Privy Seal, and as was pointed out by the Prime Minister, "It is impossible to be strong everywhere." But the country was led, by inspired paragraphs in the Press, to believe that our position both at Hong Kong and at Singapore was more or less impregnable. Inspired paragraphs about the A.B.C.D. Powers and how co-ordinated they were seemed to indicate that our position was secure.
I was very glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Sir E. Campbell) pointed out how remarkably for the moment the "D." Power, the Dutch, have acquitted themselves. Little country as they are, with their whole State in the hands of the enemy, they have already put up a very gallant fight. But there seems to have been an absence of co-ordinated planning there. I recognise the position of the United States and their natural desire not to precipitate matters. My impression, and I think that of the nation, is that plans had not been carefully thought out in advance. Malaya is a vital source of supply of essential raw materials, rubber, tin and other raw materials, which, as has already been pointed out, are now in the hands of the enemy. There is an inclination now—it did not exist before war broke out with Japan—to suggest that the Pacific is a secondary theatre of war and that we have to concentrate only on Germany, and that when the time comes it will be easy to make mincemeat of our other enemy. Unfortunately, Japan can do irreparable damage, not only material damage but, what is more important, damage to our prestige in the East, and, what is in my view even more serious, to our relations with the Dominions.
The Dominions came to our help in our darkest hour, both with men and materials. Their blood has reddened the desert sands, and their gallant fight in

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Crete will take its place as an epoch-making battle. I know that the House realises, and certainly the Dominions do, that Dominion man-power is strictly limited. Australia has a vast coast. It is a Continent disposed to attack. As the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Epsom pointed out, the Australian Prime Minister has spoken in most scathing terms. Perhaps public men in the Dominions do not take such care of their language as we do and do not stick to what we call Parliamentary forms. They are accustomed to call a spade a spade, but I believe that the Australian Prime Minister and the Deputy-Leader of their Opposition, Mr. Hughes, are speaking the mind of the Australian people. Very unkind things were said about Air-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who has been referred to in this House. I have never quite understood why he was appointed to the position of Supreme Commander in the East. He was on the retired list and had become a Governor and has gone more or less into civil life. He was brought back into the Services to deal with this most difficult and serious position.
I am not surprised entirely that in the Dominions, where they are realists and not so polite as we are, they felt that they had had a raw deal. As long ago as 20th August, 1940, I put in a plea for a Dominion Prime Minister or statesman being in the War Cabinet, and I have reiterated that plea on more than one occasion, and I supported my hon. Friend the Member for the Eye Division (Mr. Granville). I appreciate the difficulties. They are great. I think that all the Prime Ministers have their own delicate home situation with which to deal. Obviously, General Smuts would be the ideal man, but he is fully occupied in dealing with a difficult opposition. The same applies to the Australian Prime Minister. He has not the blessing of a national government, representative of all parties; he is in a very delicate position, with no real majority at all, and I understand that Mr. Mackenzie King finds his hands full in dealing with Canada's domestic problems. Still, the fact remains that at a time like this, when the very life of the British Commonwealth is at stake, it would be a splendid thing if the Government could find some distinguished Dominion statesman, Australian, Cana-
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dian or New Zealand, to provide a symbol that this is not a British Dr a European war but a world war in which the Dominions are fighting.
It was important in the last war to have Dominion statesmen in the Government. Surely it is 10 times more important in this war, which threatens the very life and economic and political independence of the Dominions themselves. I think something should be done. The Lord Privy Seal made reference to an Imperial War Cabinet. In the last war, in addition to the War Cabinet, there was an Imperial War Cabinet in session for the last 18 months. There would be a strong case for a Cabinet of that kind, particularly if it were possible to include representatives of India.
References have been made to India. War now approaches her shores; Burma has been bombed. India is not now outside the war arena. The Indian people must have become more war conscious. Japan must be more of a reality to the Indian people than any other Continent could possibly be. With her immense resources in men and material, it would be a pity if those resources were not exploited. They can be exploited only if we can get the good will of the Indian people, as represented by Congress and through other channels. The position is full of difficulties, and we do not want to underrate them. The Secretary of State for India has been pressed to make a gesture, and from what I know of him he is only too willing to make a gesture if he could be satisfied that it would meet with success. But I realise, as every realist must realise, that the approach must come from both ends—from the Government and the Indian people. There is presented an unequalled opportunity, now that India is faced with war at her very door, to do something that will react successfully in India. It may be worth while considering that if you created an Imperial War Cabinet, in addition to the Inner Cabinet, with representatives of all the Dominions, it would give a chance to take the Indian people into equal partnership in our war effort. There was a representative of India in the Imperial War Cabinet during the last war. Perhaps this will provide a bridge towards bringing the two people together in their common effort of facing an appalling danger.

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There has been criticism to-day—healthy criticism. I will not say that the war is not going better than it was. The victories of Russia, the coming in of the United States of America, and our successes in Libya are things which we never anticipated 12 months ago. It is our duty as Members of Parliament to point out the weak spots, and I hope that now the Government are facing the problem of the Pacific in such a way as will not only satisfy the people of this country, but have the approval of our Dominions across the seas, as well as the acceptance of the people of India.
Mr. Loftus: For some 12 months past I have been trying to catch the eye of the Chair in order to participate in a Debate on the war situation, but I confess I have always felt a certain amount of relief when I was not called, because I was diffident about participating in these Debates, for three reasons. In the first place, I recognise that even the most inconspicuous Back-bench Member, speaking within these walls, may use an unfortunate phrase which may be taken up outside, possibly distorted, and used by enemy propaganda. Indeed, I think it is the exact reverse of the old Latin tag we learnt at school—
"Parturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus."
Here a ridiculous and insignificant person may labour at a speech and a mountain of trouble be born outside. The second reason I hesitated was that I recognise, as we all must, that any ordinary Member of Parliament, speaking during this war, above all in a critical way, must speak as one lacking information and criticising those who have full information. That criticism may, therefore, be quite unjustified, and, further, a full reply may not be able to be made by Members of the Government for reasons of State.
The third reason I had for hesitation was that I felt that any criticism one makes here may be regarded as an attack upon the Prime Minister. I deprecate that attitude. I recognise, as we all do, the enormous debt of gratitude that this House, this nation, and the whole world, owe to the Prime Minister. During those extremely dark times after Dunkirk, probably the most dangerous in all our long history, the Prime Minister rallied the nation and inspired it to resist to the utmost, and to be ready to go down fight-
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ing in final ruin rather than compromise with evil. I remember in my school days reading that the Roman Senate after the disaster of Cannae thanked the Consul that he did not despair of the safety of the Republic. So, indeed, we thank the Prime Minister that in the darkest hours he did not despair of the safety of our State. But criticism is a function of this House, and during a war such as this, when such vast issues are at stake, it is the duty of a Member of Parliament, if he feels sincerely on certain aspects, to express his feelings. Criticism is not an attack either on the Government or on the Prime Minister. No Government and no individual is infallible. Even the greatest leaders in war, Napoleon and Nelson, made mistakes, and the greatest national leader we had up to the present, comparable with the Prime Minister, the great Pitt, made mistakes, naturally enough, in the long war against Napoleon. Therefore one's duty is, I think, to criticise, but a Member should, if possible, criticise in a constructive manner, certainly in a moderate manner, and not use the occasion to make any kind of disparaging, vague attacks either upon an individual or upon the Government. My reason for taking part in these Debates has been to put forward certain ideas which I hold, rightly or wrongly, as to priorities—priorities for men and material, and priorities in regard to strategy.
Firstly, let me refer to priorities in regard to men and material. I consider that our first priority must be ships and shipbuilding—ships for the Royal Navy and ships for the Mercantile Marine. We are an island people who have been dependent upon the seas throughout our history, and, therefore, whatever sacrifices we have to make, we must build up the Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine. Shipping is the yardstick which controls our war effort. Our shipping capacity measures the amount of our imports of food, or in other words the health of our people, and it also affects our imports of materials and munitions. Our shipping capacity controls our imports of finished munitions, as well as the number of men we can send overseas to various parts of the Empire and to the various theatres of war overseas. It controls the amount of munitions and food we can send overseas, and the amount of aid

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which we can send to our Allies, and, above all, to our Russian Allies. Here let us note that the entry of Russia into the war has imposed an enormously increased strain upon the shipping resources of this country. All the supplies of food and munitions which we send to Russia have to go by a round-about route, along a difficult and dangerous sea passage, and have to be landed at ports which are inadequately equipped to deal with the large increase in traffic. I recognise that there is a joint priority, in that ships must have adequate air support. Ships must have air support, especially in our coastal waters and in narrow seas within range of attack by bombers based on land aerodromes. Ships must, of course, have protection while loading and unloading in ports. Therefore, there is an equal priority for providing adequate aeroplane support. In this connection I would point out that the building of heavy bombers comes lower down in the scale of priorities. First priority should be given to aeroplanes to protect your shipping and your ports. Bombers to attack the enemy come a good deal lower down in the scale. I sometimes wonder whether at a time like this, when there is an urgent demand for tanks—and we all know how desperate the demand is—it is possible that we have ever retarded our shipbuilding programme, both for the Navy and the Mercantile Marine, in order to provide materials and skilled men for making tanks. Have we in any way sacrificed, even for the time being, our shipbuilding programme? I recognise the enormous importance of providing tanks, but destroyers must take precedence of tanks. We have an urgent need for both, but on destroyers we depend absolutely for our life. They are essential. While both are urgently necessary, we must have precedence for ships.
Then, are we giving sufficient precedence to the right types of aircraft? I submit that the types that we require are fighter aircraft, light bombers and torpedo-carrying aircraft. Torpedo-carrying aircraft have proved their enormous power during recent months. They proved their power in the attack on the "Bismarck" and, to our sad loss, in the successful attack on the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse." I wonder whether we are providing enough of these
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to protect our shipping and to attack that of the enemy, or are we diverting too much of our skill, our labour and our materials to building these gigantic bombers. I believe one giant bomber takes 80,000 to 100,000 man-hours of labour to make. Are we overdoing the time and energy spent in building these big bombers and not building enough torpedo-carrying planes, and so on? I cannot help thinking that perhaps, if we had spent less in constructing these giant bombers and more on constructing the light bombers and torpedo-carrying planes, our position to-day in Malaya might be very much better and our position in the Mediterranean very much stronger. I know there is a school that believes that we shall win the war by the night bombing of Germany, but it is a diminishing school. The defence against the night bomber is getting more and more efficient, and the opinion is arising that large-scale night bombing attacks on well-defended cities will become so expensive that they will gradually peter out.
Now I should like to turn to discuss priority as to strategy. It is obvious that the first priority is to defend this island base of Great Britain. I recognise that we are liable to an invasion. I am not one of those who hold that the threat of an invasion is merely a scare. I think it probable that before Germany collapses and if Hitler sees German morale breaking, his last desperate try to save the situation may be an attempt at the invasion of this country. Our second general strategic principle is the same today as it has been for the last 300 years, to guard the great sea lines of our communications with foreign countries, the British Dominions, India and the British Colonies. The first priority is to defend the life-line to America, our communications across the Atlantic. We are gratified to hear that the Battle of the Atlantic is going so well, but I would make this suggestion. We have seen our enemies in this war on several occasions achieve feats which the military mind at the beginning of the war would have said were impossible. We have seen them accomplish the apparently impossible. I hope that the Admiralty are working and thinking not entirely on old-fashioned lines and that they conceive it possible that our enemies may contemplate ideas and strokes which a few years ago might

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have been regarded as utterly impossible. While the Battle of the Atlantic is going well, do not let us rule out as entirely impossible the participation of Japanese ships in this battle.
The second great strategic line of communication is, of course, past the Spanish Peninsula, down the West coast of Africa to the Cape, then up to the Red Sea and through the Persian Gulf and on to India, Malaya and Australasia. That is the second line that we must hold at all costs. Unfortunately, we have lost for the time being the command of the seas between Eastern India and Australasia, and I fear that we have lost to a large extent the use of our great naval base at Singapore, or, if its use is not yet lost, it is threatened. I do not say that Singapore is in danger of capture. We have all heard with immense relief the assurance given by the Prime Minister that Singapore is not in danger of that. We want to maintain Singapore, however, not as a fortress, but as a naval base. That is the essential thing. If the Japanese can establish themselves in aerodromes within fighter range of Singapore, it will be very difficult to use it as a naval base. I cannot help thinking that many people in this country, as they read day after day of Japanese troops disembarking on both sides of the Malayan Peninsula, some of them on the Western side from barges and ships captured at Penang, as they read of those ships and barges, some of them anchored and ideal targets for any bombers, and realise that not a British bomb is dropped anywhere near, rightly or wrongly many of them cannot help having feelings of intense frustration and, I would add, of humiliation. As night after night in my home on the East Coast I hear masses of heavy bombers going overseas to bomb Germany and the occupied countries, I ask myself whether some of the immense effort which has created those machines might not have been diverted to create lighter machines, in greater numbers, to be sent out to defend this vital naval base of the British Empire. We are told that we are short of aeroplanes, bombers and fighters, at Singapore, yet we know that we have built up an immense Air Force, and were assured recently that it was at least as big as Germany's and of better quality.
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Could we not have spared more aeroplanes to defend this base?
It is said that we cannot be strong everywhere, and if that is so surely the thing we must do is to concentrate our strength on essential points and not scatter it. I submit that we have scattered it. I submit that the defence of Hong-Kong was a dissipation of strength, of the limited, insufficient amount of strength in the Far East, which should have been concentrated. When I am told that the defence of Hong-Kong saved time, I want to know what time. I listened to the Lord Privy Seal saying that it occupied the forces of the enemy, but we know that during the attack on Hong-Kong the enemy were landing troops by the hundreds of thousands in the Philippines and in Malaya and I cannot see that the defence of Hong-Kong saved us in that respect. We are told that the shortage of equipment at Singapore was due to the demands of home defence in the first place, secondly to the sending of supplies to Russia, and thirdly, to sending supplies to Libya. Help to Russia is a priority that takes first place, I agree. We know that we must, even at appalling sacrifice, help Russia to maintain her great counter-offensive. But regarding Libya I am not quite so sure. The Libyan campaign is not yet over. Just as when Russia was invaded by Napoleon our armies in the Peninsula were a running sore to Napoleon—I think those were his own words—because they drained France of the man-power which he badly wanted in Russia, so we may hope that in Libya to-day our Armies may be draining Germany of the man-power which she so badly requires in her Russian campaign.
Libya is not finished. We hope that it will lead to the occupation of the whole of Libya, including Tripoli. If it does, it will be a great victory, but if the campaign does not get the whole of Libya and succeeds only in occupying and holding the province of Cyrenaica, the military historian of the future may say that it was an ill exchange if in order to get Cyrenaica we had to risk the safety of the great naval base of the British Empire in the East, Singapore. The third strategical line of communication is through the Mediterranean, and that has been lost. We hope it may be restored. It would save our shipping to an enormous degree. I believe that some 60 per cent. of the

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goods entering this country in peace-time came through the Mediterranean. We can restore the use of that route only if we destroy the possibility of Germany occupying bomber bases within easy reach of the Suez Canal, such as in Crete. The time may come when we shall be able to achieve that position.
Although to-day the outlook is in some ways dark, yet, looking back to a year ago, and still more to 18 months ago, the position is vastly improved. After Dunkirk it seemed as though the end of things had come and that this country would be unable to defend itself. If this country had then fallen, with the fall of the base here the British Empire would have fallen. We know that we have now made this country secure and that, even if the impossible were to happen and we were successfully invaded, the war would go on, and Germany would be defeated. We have given time for America to commence and to get into gear for the first beginnings of her colossal rearmament. We have Russia as an Ally. We have organised for war. Looking back to that desperate time, I feel that we have much to be thankful for—for the help of the men in the Armed Forces and the men in the factories, of our military leaders and of our Prime Minister for his great leadership in those dark days; but do not let us disguise from ourselves the fact that while we have made the base secure here in Britain, the Empire in the East has never been in greater peril. In the coming weeks and months we may face not only times of difficulty but even disasters, yet we know that our people are supported by the overwhelming resources of the United States and Russia. However dark the times through which we may pass during the few months that lie ahead, ultimate victory is assured to us, and freedom will be preserved in the world.
Mr. Granville: I am sure that we have all listened with the greatest interest to the thoughtful and constructive speech of the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Loftus). I find myself in agreement with much that he said. The difficult question of allocating priorities is the kind of question which must be left to the War Cabinet, which is in possession of all the facts, both as regards our own strategy and the information it receives of enemy strategy. It all comes down to the ques-
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tion of production and supply. We are still having to pay the price of lack of preparation in the past, and so long as we are strategically on the defensive we shall, from time to time, have to meet the difficulty of deciding where to send the aircraft or the ships or which priority to make A1. The declaration from Washington gives us some hope that one day we shall be able to plan grand strategy because we have grand supplies.
Before the Recess the Government made some attempt to get rid of the House of Commons for a long Adjournment. The attempt was frustrated by the authority of Parliament, and I think it was frustrated because there is in the House of Commons a growing feeling of anxiety about the general state of affairs. Before the Recess the House was in a critical mood. I have listened to most of these Debates for some time, and I have listened to the Debate to-day, and I think the House is still in a critical mood. At any rate the House has, at long last, exercised its authority, and in my judgment the Debate to-day has been well worth the while of the Government to call us back at an earlier date. I listened to the speech of the Lord Privy Seal, and it seems that according to the military spokesman in Cairo, we have made considerable progress in Libya. But as my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft said in a moving part of his speech, grave things are happening in Malaya and the Pacific. We have had the Washington Declaration, which has been welcomed by the Press and in this House by Parliament, but let us face the fact that in the world of deeds it is the Russian cockerel which has saved the necks of a few chickens.
In the last few weeks there has been in this country a Press and wireless campaign of political propaganda such as has never been known by the Press or public opinion. In the newspapers the leaders all tell the same story. In the feature articles the same story is always being told of the imminent collapse of Hitlerian Germany. We read also almost every day of the end of the Luftwaffe. I pay my tribute to the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Information for his remarkable influence upon the Press of this country, but I warn him at the same time that although there is much to be said for this, he must beware that he does not create complacency.

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I want to refer to the question of Empire co-operation, which has also been ventilated to a considerable extent in the newspapers during the Recess. Whenever it has been raised in the House of Commons by various hon. Members, we have nearly always had a half-hearted reply from the Government. But as has been said in this Debate by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir A. Southby) and the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Liberal party on this side of the House, there have been grumblings from Australia. There has been from the Australian Press, and from Australian statesmen, very considerable criticism, and it is quite clear that "Down under" they have been dissatisfied for some time with regard to the question of air support for Crete, and Greece, and Libya, and now for Malaya. On 19th December I asked the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Privy Seal, in view of the criticism in the Dominion Press of the shortage of aircraft in Malaya, whether the Commonwealth of Australia was consulted before the appointment of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to his present position in Singapore, and whether Australia agreed to that appointment. I asked him again whether the Commonwealth was consulted before that appointment was made. I never had a very satisfactory answer from the right hon. Gentleman. I would like to ask that question to-day of him or whoever is to reply for the Government.
I would also like to ask the Foreign Secretary, who, I believe, is to reply for the Government, whether Australia, a member of the Commonwealth of British Nations, was consulted before the appointment was made of the present Minister of State in Cairo. On 18th December I again asked the Lord Privy Seal a Question, in which I said that certain discussions were going on with the object of concerting Allied war plans, and whether he could say whether the Dominion representatives were present at those discussions. The reply I received from the Lord Privy Seal was:
"We have constantly under consideration the best methods. That does not mean that the Committee is sitting. We are in constant consultation on these matters with the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 18th December, 1941; col. 2085; Vol. 376.]
It is important for us in the House of Commons to know what consultations
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have been going on, what discussions have been taking place, because of the serious complaints that are being made, and have been made, by the Press in Australia and, most recently, by the Prime Minister of Australia himself. The hon. and gallant Member for Epsom read extracts from statements made by the Prime Minister of Australia in the Australian Press. I shall quote very briefly one or two of those statements. In the "Melbourne Herald,"not a journalist or a political correspondent, but the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, which is facing the present situation with regard to the Pacific, wrote that they would exert their energies towards shaping a plan which would give that country some confidence of being able to hold out until the battle swept against the enemy. Their policy would be shaped towards working out, with the United States as the major factor, a plan of specific strategy along with British, Dutch and the Chinese forces.
He went on, in another paragraph of great importance to this country and the Empire:
"When Russia was being assailed by the Axis Powers, the Australian Government put forward a proposal that a reciprocal agreement between Russia and Britain should be negotiated to meet any act of aggression by Japan. The suggestion was then regarded—wrongly, as time has proved—as premature."
Mr. Curtin said at the same time:
"Australia was never satisfied with the position. The representations we have made in the last few days have been restatements of those we made over a lengthy period. The answer facing all the Allies is production."
I was given an assurance before we parted for the Recess that there were adequate methods of consultation between, the member States of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I observe that the Foreign Secretary is not on the Front Bench; I hope that he is going to reply to the Debate, and not give us a rehash of his wireless talk. He is a Member of the War Cabinet. Several Members of this House have paid high and glowing tributes to the magnificent contributions in men, material, and courage made by the Australian troops where they have fought as storm troops, and I think the House of Commons is entitled to a public statement from the right hon. Gentleman, for public consumption, in reply to the serious suggestions which have been made.

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by the Prime Minister of Australia. Those of us who pressed for the House of Commons to continue in session while these great events were taking place in the Pacific—
Lieut.-Colonel Macnamara: I think the remark that my hon. Friend has just made might be very widely misinterpreted if allowed to stand—I mean his remark that the Australians have been used as storm troops. It would be resented by the nation in general if it were felt that the Australians were used as our storm troops.
Mr. Granville: I am an old member of the Australian Forces which acted as storm troops at Gallipoli; and I know that Australia is prepared, if the country is in danger, to spare nothing that is required, and to allow its troops to be used as storm troops. But this great nation is entitled to a full share in the conduct of the war. This nation has a grievance; it has been stated in public, and there has been no reply as to the attitude of the War Cabinet to Mr. Curtin's allegation. The Prime Minister of Australia had to make representations direct to Washington. I do not know whether his representations were communicated to the Dominions Office here. We seldom see anything of the Dominions Office at present. I do not know whether the War Cabinet received a similar communication at the same time, but Mr. Curtin found it necessary to make a direct representation, I believe, to the President of the United States, and to the Prime Minister while he was in Washington. The Government do not seem to have been in touch with Dominion opinion in the last few months. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend says, "the last few years." He has been there since I have, and I accept his version. We have sent a Member of this House to Canberra as High Commissioner, for the sole purpose of keeping the Australian Government informed, and the Australian Government have appointed Sir Earle Page as their Minister in London, for the sole purpose of keeping the War Cabinet informed of public opinion in Australia. Surely the War Cabinet cannot dismiss this matter at the first meeting of the House of Commons after the Recess and say that all the criticism which has been made in the Press is not to be answered and there is not to be some sort of explanation given.
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In Australia, they are quite obviously dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs in the Pacific, but they are also dissatisfied in not having an adequate voice in the direction of the war effort of the British Commonwealth of Nations as a whole. Therefore, I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to give us a statement on behalf of the War Cabinet which will answer these fears and anxieties.
I have advocated for a long time an Empire War Cabinet, and I am convinced that we shall have that Empire War Cabinet. I know the arguments against it. They have been put up from time to time. Nobody suggests that you should have a War Cabinet of all Dominion Prime Ministers here as a great Commonwealth Cabinet. We know the political records of the last war, but it is no good arguing that because South Africa or Canada may or may not be satisfied with the present machinery all is well. It is no good saying that, if you have an Empire War Cabinet here, it takes away from the authority of the Prime Ministers in the Dominions. We had to come to this in 1917 after a long discussion. What is needed is that the Dominion mind should be represented in the War Cabinet here. Whatever machinery you may use under the Statute of Westminster—and there seems to be a number of minds in this country which still regard the British Empire as noblesse oblige and white ducks—constant new decisions must be made here in London which affect the war effort, policy, strategy and operations of the whole Commonwealth. The Prime Minister could change all this to-morrow. He could ask the Dominion Prime Ministers if they would nominate statesmen of War Cabinet stature who had the confidence of the governments and of public opinion in the Dominions to sit in the War Cabinet over here. By this method the Dominion Prime Ministers would have direct access to the War Cabinet through their own representatives in the War Cabinet.
Mr. Mander: Does not my hon. Friend think that it would be of great assistance in carrying out the policy that he now advocating if Australia were to form a National Government herself?
Mr. Granville: I do not pretend to speak for Australian politics but we do not seem to understand that Australia as a member

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State is concerned with the whole Commonwealth. She is a principal in the Commonwealth of British Nations. I do not know whether it would be suggested that they could appoint the Minister of Labour or the Chancellor of the Exchequer as a member of the War Cabinet. That might or might not be, but they produce a particular kind of statesman. They are very much in touch with the new world, and I believe they have a great contribution to make to the future of the British Empire. By this method of Dominion Prime Ministers nominating their own representatives for the War Cabinet, I believe you would get over many of the difficulties.
I want briefly to refer to an article that was written by Sir Keith Murdoch, who was Minister of Information in Mr. Menzies' Government in Australia. He said—and he used more direct language than we use in the House of Commons—
"I believe that should we be swept out of Singapore the Government will change. I believe that in any case some change in the control of war efforts should be forced by the Dominions or should be initiated in Britain by Mr. Churchill, with Dominion knowledge."
He said in the same article, which was published a few days ago:
"I believe, however, that Australia should request immediate entrance into the War Cabinet and a place for her experts on the Council of Defence."
That was written in the "Daily Mail" a few days ago. Perhaps some hon. Gentleman might prefer to see it in the "Times." Well, he wrote a letter to the "Times," in which he said:
"I believe that this country"—
meaning Great Britain—and this is very much the gist of the whole problem—
"has been taking a tremendous responsibility, unwise in any event but shattering in its effect if things go wrong, in deciding strategy and policy alone for all British everywhere. … The entry of stout Dominions minds into the war council and of our overseas Service men and business men into the Army, Navy and Air Supply Councils has thus become of great importance for the two reasons that the Dominions will not stand grave decisions going against them unless they are in those decisions and that something must be done to improve the war management."
Mr. Benjamin Smith: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether that statement has or has not been repudiated from Australia?
Mr. Granville: This article was written in the "Daily Mail" by Sir Keith Murdoch, who was, I believe, the Minister of Information in the last Australian Government, as was the letter in the "Times." If they have been repudiated, I have not seen the repudiation. There is also the question of whether or not—and this must be faced—you are to have the Dominions each with their own separate representative on any Allied War Council which may be formed as the result of the Washington discussions. I listened to the speech of the Lord Privy Seal, and I could not gather whether it is intended to set up a permanent Allied War Council or even an Allied High Command, but I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary, who is to reply to this Debate, whether it is intended, if an Allied War Council is to be set up, to have one single representative or British delegation on that Council or whether the Dominions will be given their own individual and separate representation? I have been raising these questions for 18 months, and I am convinced that they are of tremendous importance. The Foreign Secretary is one of the younger members of the War Cabinet. There are many people in the British Commonwealth of Nations who criticise the old country because they think they are afraid to dispense when necessary with some of their old traditions. Here is a chance for the right hon. Gentleman to convince the youth of the British Empire which is fighting this war for us that the Government are keeping abreast of the times and that they are prepared to tackle the matter in a realistic way and to assist the Dominions in proper war representation.
I, personally, cannot see any future for civilisation except through the British Commonwealth of Nations. I read somewhere the other day:
"We may have to choose between whether in this island we shall be one of the Western outposts of a totalitarian Europe or an Eastern outpost of an American controlled civilisation."
There is no future for the 46,000,000 peoples with their present standard of living unless we can get on that front bench men who see the British Commonwealth of Nations as one great alliance. It has worked at Geneva. If we are to build up security, let us build it up against war and poverty by a new, better, wiser

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and bolder conception of the future of the Commonwealth of British Nations.
General Sir George Jeffreys: If I ask permission to make a very brief survey of the general situation of the war, it is because it must be taken as one great whole, and I think there is a tendency in various quarters to look at one part of the war, perhaps that which is attracting most attention, rather than at the war as a whole. Germany is still the great enemy. If Germany falls, we shall have gone a tremendously long way towards ending the war victoriously from our own point of view. If she stands, the war will go on. Undoubtedly, Germany has miscalculated the Russian situation. She was under the impression that she could dispose of Russia before winter came. Now she finds herself confronted by winter, that Russian winter of which a Russian Emperor of the past was speaking when he said that he had not yet used his two best generals, who were in reserve, and their names were General January and General February. If we accept the Germans' own statement, which is that they are voluntarily breaking off their series of engagements on the Russian front—if we accept that for the moment as a basis of argument—then there occurs the undoubted fact that it takes two to break off an engagement, and as the Russians are not desisting from their attacks, and are, in fact, following up and hitting at the enemy as he goes, it is obvious that the Germans are in a very much Worse way than they themselves make out.
I think we should make a great mistake if we were to over-rate the plight of the Germans, at any rate in laying our own plans and making our own appreciation of the situation. The Germans are now retreating, and what is more important, they are being hunted back by the Russians. What will be the effect on their morale? There is no doubt that good troops—the Germans undoubtedly are good troops—even if they are tired and hungry and cold, will go on as long as they feel that they are winning, but when they are going back—and the Germans have gone back and may have to go back much further yet—how long will their morale stand, how long will it be before they realise that they are frozen, famished and ill-clad? When that time comes, I think that the German morale will be well
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on the way to cracking. It seems to me that at the very best there must be considerable doubt whether these German armies, even assuming that they make a more or less successful withdrawal now, can be fit for much for many months to come, until they have been reinforced and rested, refitted and reclothed. There must be a very high proportion, under the conditions in which they are now serving, who will be, if not in hospitals, at any rate very far from fit.
It is a question of whether the Germans can go on without making heavy drafts upon such troops which they have scattered throughout Europe in occupied countries in order to make good their losses. The fact that their forces are scattered throughout Europe is to our advantage, because they cannot be concentrated except after a considerable interval of time. The Luftwaffe can undoubtedly be assembled fairly quickly, although its fitness is another matter. Both physically and geographically it is impossible to concentrate these troops without an interval of a few weeks, and in our plans this factor ought to be taken into, consideration. We may, I think, look hopefully to the condition of the German armies, which will be far from what their leaders would wish when the spring comes.
The Libyan position undoubtedly looks good. After all, one of the great objects of the campaign is to free communications through the Mediterranean. This is a matter of great importance to us, and it is sometimes forgotten what a tremendous factor communications are in war and how much depends upon them. If we can get the Mediterranean communications comparatively free, we shall be in an infinitely better position for any further operations which we may undertake in the Mediterranean, in the Far East or elsewhere. Have the Government any information as to the numbers and efficiency of the Axis troops? Very much depends on this. Have they any reliable information as to the position of the Luftwaffe? The public certainly has not this information. Then there is the Battle of the Atlantic, where the position is better than at any other time. Is it still going as well, and what is our naval position in the Mediterranean? Information on these points is necessary if we are to form a correct appreciation of the position in Europe and in the Middle East. It is also

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important because it shows whether we can spare any further air or sea forces for the Far East.
We have heard a certain amount about the necessity for sending reinforcements, especially air reinforcements, to the Far East. I think that it would be well to bear in mind that it is one thing to talk about sending them, and it is another thing to get them there. They cannot be sent by the waving of a magician's wand; it takes time to get air and sea forces to the Far East, together with the necessary ground organisations to keep the aeroplanes in the air. There has been a tendency in the country to underrate the power of Japan. I have heard reasonably well-informed people saying that they cannot understand how Japan can dare to challenge the might of America. These people forget that Japan is a very highly organised first-class Power, with a first-class fleet and with a first-class and numerous army, whereas America, with all her population and resources, is not as yet highly organised in regard to either her land or air forces, while her navy has been surprised both strategically and tactically. It has been strategically surprised because, instead of being at Hawaii, it ought to have been on the opposite side of the Pacific. There was only one place for it when war was imminent, and that was in the neighbourhood of Singapore.
The Japanese have most unfortunately gained command of the sea, and that means a tremendous thing to the British Empire, because for the first time for many years we find ourselves committed to an important campaign overseas without having command of the sea. It is not easy to see how the Americans can get their fleet across the Pacific, because they have no base to get to, perhaps not even to aim at, with Singapore in the position in which it is now, but unless they can get a superior fleet there, it is certain that we shall not have command of the sea, and we shall have our communications interrupted by raiders, if not by hostile fleets, for many months to come. The Japanese can not only prey on our commerce, but can land forces and reinforce them when and where they please. They can prevent us from reinforcing or supplying to a great extent Malaya, Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, and so forth. It seems to me that we must face the un-
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pleasant prospect of further losses at sea and on land. I hope we shall not have them, but there is every indication that they are possible, if not probable. We have to face that prospect unless and until the American fleet can establish command of the Far Eastern seas. As it is, it is damaged for one thing, and, as far as we know, it is on the wrong side of the Pacific for another. The seaward defences of Singapore are very strong indeed, and the Malaya approaches through jungle and swamp are difficult, but the naval base may be made unoccupiable by air attack, and that is one of the principal dangers that we have to face now. As far as uninformed judgment can tell, knowing no more than appears in the newspapers, and having seen Singapore not so many years ago, the fortress should be able to hold out, but whether the naval base will be occupiable or not is another matter.
As regards Hong Kong, the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Loftus) suggested that it ought not to have been held. I would only ask what would be the judgment of this House, of the British Empire and of the world if we had not tried to hold it. I think it would have been rightly regarded as a disgrace if we had attempted to withdraw and let that prosperous, well organised Colony go by default. One point about Hong Kong occurred to me as a possibility, and that was whether we ought to have allowed the landing, which took place at night so far as we can gather from the accounts, to take place. It is obvious that Kowloon had to go against enemy attack on land; it was indefensible, and once Kowloon had gone, the only airfield in Hong Kong had gone too, and that had a very great bearing on the general situation, but as far as the landing which gained a footing on the beaches of Hong Kong and drove the defenders to the hills is concerned, I wonder whether we were not, like the Americans at Hawaii, caught napping and whether it ought to have happened.
It has been asked who is to blame for things going wrong in the Far East. I suggest that those hon. Members who were Members of the House in the early days after the last war and at the time of the Washington Treaty, who not merely acquiesced in but urged the reduction of our armaments and who practically left it certain that in the event of war we should have no naval strength worth talking

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about in the Pacific, are more to blame than anybody else, if anybody is to blame. His Majesty's Services have to be silent in these matters, but if hon. Members had heard some of the comments made in instructed circles of the Services at that time, they might not have been flattered. In the meantime, I would venture one or two suggestions. The first is that, although speedy action is undoubtedly desirable, we should not undertake any large action until we have assembled sufficient forces to render success reasonably probable. That must take time. To atempt to reinforce with inadequate forces in a hurry is only to court disaster. There are, of course, certain other counter-measures that may be taken, and although they are pretty obvious and would probably occur to the enemy, I will not venture to mention them, because I do not wish even to appear to hint at action that we might take. I would only suggest again that it is impossible to assemble troops by, as it were, the wave of a wand.
The next suggestion that I want to make is that our own requirements should have first call on our resources. We have already gone seriously short of certain materials to the extent of our aid to Russia. We have given Russia a pledge that we will give her certain quantities of materials, and we are bound to honour that pledge, but I suggest that we cannot send, for instance, tanks, guns and aircraft which we urgently need ourselves to China, however much we may sympathise with them. I say that because I have seen suggestions that we must at once aid China. Of course, it is desirable to do so, but our resources are not unlimited; further, I greatly doubt whether the Chinese are sufficiently organised and trained to make adequate use of such munitions and so forth if we were to send them. There should be a careful overhaul of the higher direction of the war, both in regard to the War Cabinet and possibly to the Service chiefs. Have we the best system? Ought we not to have something in the nature of an Imperial War Cabinet on which the Dominions would be represented? We have heard that suggested already to-day, and I merely add my small voice in support of it and suggest that at least it should be seriously considered whether there ought not to be an Imperial War Cabinet.
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Is the co-operation of the Air Force with the Army as satisfactory as it ought to be? I believe that the majority of officers of the Army are far from satisfied on that subject. Army co-operation is apt to be treated in the Air Force as relatively unimportant. It is immensely important. There are certain types of operation, as our enemies have demonstrated in the most conclusive way, which demand the very best airmen and aircraft and the closest type of co-operation. I feel that the Army should have its own Air Arm, in the same way as the Navy, and I believe there is a growing feeling to that effect in the Army itself. Incidentally, the Russians and the Germans both, I believe I am right in saying, have aircraft operating with the Army under Army command. Is the present position due to the old idea, because there was such an old idea, of inter-Service jealousy? I hope not, because I do not believe there is such a thing to-day.
What I do feel is that our aircraft with the Army should be under the general officer commanding-in-chief. The system whereby an army commander-in-chief has to go, so to speak, hat in hand to an independent air commander-in-chief, who is his equal in rank, to ask for the aircraft he needs for any particular operation or series of operations, seems to me to be wrong and to cry aloud for amendment. The position of the air officer commanding-in-chief in the Middle East at the time of the operations in Greece, Libya, and so forth was undoubtedly unenviable, because he had, with a very limited number of aircraft, to decide where they should be sent, with urgent calls coming from Libya, from Greece, from Iraq, from Abyssinia—to begin with—and later from Syria.
We have heard a good deal to-day about the protection of aerodromes, and undoubtedly, in the opinion of many people, this has undoubtedly been a weak spot in our defensive arrangements. I hope that the arrangement which was outlined by the Lord Privy Seal will be found effective, and provided that a considerable number of those at present engaged on the defence of aerodromes are transferred to this new Air Force Regiment it does seem to me that it might be reasonably expected to work, and I hope that it will.
I would venture to appeal to the Government to take the House a little more into their confidence as regards

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information. I am quite aware that information cannot be given in open Debate which might be of use to the enemy, but I feel that at any rate in Secret Session much more information might be given to the House than actually is given and that if such information were given, the criticism which might follow would be less destructive and more instructive than it sometimes has been in the past. Lastly, there is the question of co-operation with our Allies. Ought we not to have a Supreme War Council for our direction of the war? At the end of the last war it was found necessary to have a Supreme War Council sitting at Versailles. I know that it would be more difficult in this particular case, because the war is far more widespread about the world, and the location of the War Council might be difficult to settle. But I hope that the Government will, in conjunction with our Allies, consider very seriously whether a Supreme War Council might not be of very great use.
Then there is the question of putting British Armies and Fleets under foreign army or fleet commanders. I venture to think that in this matter we have in the past made some very serious mistakes. It seems to me that two things are necessary if there is to be a foreign commander-in-chief. The first is that such a generalissimo must be not a commander-in-chief of a foreign army, and, secondly, that he must be outstanding and marked out by ability and reputation for the position. Marshal Foch was a good example. He was not, as is often supposed, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army. On the contrary, he was superimposed over General Pétain, who was commanding the French Army, and over Sir Douglas Haig, who was commanding the British Army, as generalissimo for the direction and co-ordination of strategy. That is a very different position from putting British Armies under commanders of foreign armies. The commander of a foreign army will naturally, and perhaps instinctively, always think of his own army first and the armies of other nations and countries very much second.
We repeated that mistake of putting the British Expeditionary Force under a French general. He was not a generalissimo but the commander of the French Army, and he had very little regard for the efficiency or safety of the British Army. Far from being of outstanding
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merit and reputation, he turned out to be a failure as a commander. That was a mistake. At the beginning of the last war, the British Commander-in-Chief was independent of the French Commander-in-Chief but was ordered to conform to his strategy. We repeated the mistake in Greece last year. The British Force which landed in Greece was put, lock stock and barrel, under the Greek High Command. That was as wrong as it could be. We had no adequate voice, as we ought to have had. We ought to have gone to Greece as Allies, conforming as far as possible to Greek strategy but with very definite orders to insist upon strategy which we considered sound and adequate. As it was, the Greek strategy was as bad as it could be. Positions far too advanced were taken up which could not possibly be held. The Greek Army in Eastern Macedonia was a gift from the beginning; the Greek Commander-in-Chief placed far too high a value on the possibilities of Serbian resistance. We all know the result.
There is one other point in this placing of British Armies under foreign commanders. I greatly hope that it will not happen again. I refer to the constitutional position. That mistake was very nearly made in 1917. We were very nearly put under that most unsuccessful General, Nivelle. I have always understood that one of the causes of that scheme breaking down was that the constitutional position would have been impossible. The question was asked to whom this Commander of the British Army was to be responsible. The only possible answer was that it would be to the President and Government of the French Republic. Whatever may have been the feelings of this House and the British Government on the subject, I have always understood that those who objected most strongly and most decidedly were the Dominion Governments, and that it was very largely on that account that that most ill-judged proposal was dropped.
As regards the General Wavell position, I think we all agree that he is of outstanding reputation and merit and that his selection was admirable, but his position will be very difficult indeed. Although his command may include the Philippines and such American troops as are in them, he will be completely cut off, because of our lack of command of

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the sea. The influence he will be able to exercise over those troops will be very nebulous indeed. Similarly, he must undoubtedly have very considerable difficulties, for communication reasons, in exercising effective command both over our own troops and over Dutch troops in the Far East.
One other point has been made which I confess seemed to me to be possibly an unnecessary one, and that was that the Commander of the American Fleet should be the Commander over our Fleet in the Far East. The American Fleet has not begun this war very well, and further the American Navy, although it has undoubtedly good material in ships and no doubt good material in personnel, has no experience of modern war whatever. It took no part in any fighting in the last war, and I greatly doubt whether any American admiral is nearly as knowledgeable or as experienced as are the admirals of the British Navy. I merely put that forward as the feeling of one British subject. I do not know how others feel about it, but I cannot help feeling that there will be considerable doubt. It is certain that the British soldier does not like serving under a foreigner, and I doubt very much whether the British seaman likes serving under foreign command any better than his brother in the Army. I have ventured to put forward these considerations on the present position, and particularly I would urge His Majesty's Government not to be in a hurry with measures for the relief of Singapore until they have concentrated and have available adequate forces. I urge them not to undertake any relief operations with forces which are too weak or too scattered to have their effect.
Mr. Stokes: Perhaps I have been somewhat luckier than my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Loftus) who in opening his remarks referred to the fact that he had waited for nearly a year before being fortunate enough to catch Mr. Speaker's eye in a war Debate. My time has been somewhat shorter; it has only been six months. I am not complaining, and I mention the fact only because I have sat through practically all of the war Debates. I have tried to speak on many occasions during the last six months, without any luck, and it might perhaps appear somewhat chur-
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lish if, after the Prime Minister's great success in America, I should venture to criticise in his absence that part of the war with which he is most intimately connected, namely, the conduct and the strategy of the military activity of the war. I do so, however, for two reasons; first, because I think this is far too important a matter to allow of any delay, and secondly because I find myself in the awkward position that I may be out of the country by the time the right hon. Gentleman comes back.
I comfort myself with the reflection that surely the Prime Minister had an opportunity on 11th December to allow us to debate the statement which he made on that day and which, I think, was wrongly made at the end of Questions instead of on the Adjournment, when we should have had an opportunity of expressing our views. I do not accuse him for a single moment of treating the House with any disrespect, but surely one would not be accused of being unduly suspicious if one were to say that he was probably aware when he made that statement on 11th December that he was going to America. Looking through what he said on that day it seems a pity that, when some hon. Members challenged the wisdom or not making the statement on the Adjournment, he should have become so irritable about it, even to the length of saying that after all he need not have come to the House at all but might have addressed us through the B.B.C. I feel that whatever I may be going to say—and I do not in the least wish to be personal—can be excused on those grounds.
We find ourselves in the position of having the Prime Minister in the United States with most of the Chiefs of Staff, and that does seem to me to illustrate the disadvantage of having a Prime Minister who is also Minister of Defence. I leave it at that with these two observations. I, myself, hate to think of the military centre of control shifting to Washington for reasons into which I need not go. Secondly, it strengthens a nasty feeling, which I have had for many months, indeed I might almost say for many years, that we may find ourselves reduced to occupying what I term the position of America's Heligoland off the coast of Europe. The Prime Minister's speech of 11th December has never been dealt with and I want, first, to review what has happened since this Government took

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over. I am not going to waste the time of the House by going into a large amount of detail, but in order to give force to my argument it is essential that I should cover the main points. I do so particularly as one who has fought in a war, who had experience of the tragic effect of the amateur strategy of politicians in the last war, and who is determined to do whatever is possible in existing circumstances, on behalf of those people, many of them in the House now, who are called upon to go out and do the actual fighting to see that that sort of thing does not happen again.
I do not want to be offensive but I find myself angry at the complacency with which old men of the Cabinet who have had no real experience of fighting a war, who have never indulged in the filthy business of killing—and any one who has killed a man knows it is filthy; I know what it is like—just letting things drift on, and assuming that all will come right in the end, and sending cheery words and messages from the proximity of dugouts costing £750,000. The questions I want answered are concerned with a long series of blunders which must be attributed either to the Chiefs of Staff, whom we are not allowed to criticise, or to the Minister of Defence, who is not in a position to be here to-day, or to the War Cabinet. Therefore, I address my remarks to the War Cabinet, and I am glad to see the Foreign Secretary in his place. With all respect to him, knowing him as a busy man, I do think it a pity that on rare occasions of this kind, when we have a Debate on the war, the Minister who is to reply does not spend more time with us.—[Interruption.]—The right hon. Gentleman says he has been here. I want to say to him that neither the House nor the country will be well content unless he answers the Debate instead of indulging in a rehash of his broadcast speech made the other day.
I want to go back to the beginning. Most of us have, or we should have, made some study of Lord Gort's Despatches. It is no use avoiding the issue. The War Cabinet are responsible for the strategy of the war and the conduct of affairs. One question I want to ask the Foreign Secretary is this. It is made perfectly clear in Lord Gort's Despatches that he was instructed during the period of 21st-26th May to carry out a movement which, in
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his opinion, would be disastrous and utterly impossible. Who insisted that he should attack to the south when he said it was impossible to succeed? The second thing of which I wish to remind the House, because it does seem to me to have a bearing on the conduct of our affairs at sea today, is the ill-fated expedition into Norway. The House will recollect that on 11th April, 1940, the Prime Minister made these two utterances in his speech:
"For myself, I consider that Hitler's action in invading Scandinavia is as great a strategic and political error as that committed by Napoleon in 1807 or 1808, when he invaded Spain."
He also said:
"All German ships in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat will be sunk, and by night all ships will be sunk as opportunity serves."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th April, 1940; cols. 747–8, Vol. 359.]
There we have the Minister of Defence telling us exactly what is to be done. I want to ask the Foreign Secretary, who stopped him from doing it? The third matter is one about which I feel great concern, and I am sure many others do—the sinking of the aircraft carrier "Glorious." I once raised the matter in an Adjournment Debate in this House, and the First Lord of the Admiralty evaded every question I put to him. He rode the whole thing off on a personal issue with another hon. Member. I want to remind the House that the officer in command of Coastal Control was not told of the movement of that ship; I believe that the officer commanding the Home Fleet was not told; and certainly the officer commanding submarines was not told. Consequently, when it was attacked and sunk, as two smaller ships were, by the German ships, the men were left to float about on rafts, and nobody went to look for them. Only a handful of men were picked up.
Commander Agnew: How does the hon. Member know?
Mr. Stokes: Know what?
Commander Agnew: What he is trying to tell this House—that nobody went to look for them.
Mr. Stokes: Who could go? The Coastal Command did not know. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will reply on this point. The opinion of high serving officers is that if the proper routine had been followed a great number of those

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men would have been saved. I want to know who gave the instruction that "Glorious" was to go home without it going through the proper channels? The next disaster was Dakar.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I want to understand what I have to answer. When the hon. Member says, "without it going through the proper channels," what does he mean—that it did not go through the officer commanding Coastal Command?
Mr. Stokes: Both the officer commanding Coastal Command and the officer commanding submarines ought to have known. Everybody knows that those people were floating about in Arctic waters for 48 hours. Everybody knows that—
Mr. Eden: "Everybody knows" is not a complete answer. Is the charge that the order in connection with "Glorious" was given in some irregular manner?
Mr. Stokes: My suspicion is—[Interruption.] How do I know? [Interruption.] I do make the charge. Is the right hon. Gentleman going to tell me that if the order had gone through the ordinary channels the officer commanding Coastal Command, the officer commanding the Home Fleet, and the officer commanding submarines would not have known. If they did, my case falls to the ground. But it would seem to me an extraordinary state of affairs, if that was the case, because the ship was inadequately escorted. My point is that there was something wrong with the control. The matter was never adequately answered by the First Lord when he dealt with it in Debate.
I have been some time on this point; and, with deference to the House, I will skip across to Greece. In spite of the opinion which has been expressed in this House, I think that the historians, when they write about the expedition to Greece, will say that it was crazy. We lost land materials that we could not afford, and, even as recently as 1st January, 1942, the "Daily Telegraph" made this remark:
"We are still paying a heavy price for our great losses in Greece."
We lost a great deal of shipping there—something of the order of 300,000 or 400,000 tons. It is within the bounds of
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possibility that had not that expedition been undertaken, we might not have lost Libya after General Wavell captured it. The question I want to put on naval strategy is whether we are satisfied that the control at the top is sufficiently alive and active, and whether the men in the ships are being properly supported in the way that they have every right to be and deserve to be supported.
Now I turn to the land issue in Libya, and here, having criticised adversely, please do not let anybody think for a moment that I do not recognise the terrific efforts made by all officers and men everywhere and the magnificent and brave show they put up in the various theatres of war in which they are engaged. But my anxiety is whether they are really getting a square deal. I take Libya particularly. The Prime Minister, when speaking on 11th December, backed the military spokesman in Cairo as having made a reasonable anticipation of what was going to happen and said that, on the whole, he thought he was right. But does not the House recollect that within the last few days there has been a report in the newspapers to the effect that General Cunningham, just before the attack started, said that the fight would be hazardous and that, while it might end quickly, it would be a very risky proceeding having regard to the forces which he knew would be against him. It is an astonishing thing that, after having given that warning, General Cunningham is apparently now at home ostensibly because he is sick, though I did not seem to notice any particular frailty about him when I saw him walking about the other day. The point I want to put to the House out of fairness to the soldiers in Libya is: What might anybody expect from what was said in this country about the Libya offensive?
A message was sent on 28th November, and this point is somewhat puzzling to me. I cannot make out why it was not sent by His Majesty the King or the Commander-in-Chief. It was sent by the Prime Minister, and I do not know why that should have been the case. The message said that for the first time British and Empire troops would meet the Germans with ample equipment in modern weapons of all kinds. In this House on 20th November, the Prime Minister said that, as in the sea battle, all might be settled one way or the other in the course

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of perhaps a few hours. What was the conclusion that an average Member like myself gathered from those two remarks? First, that the battle very probably would be over quickly. I heard hon. Members on their way to the smoke-room saying: "It will all be done by tea time." I heard hon. Members say—and they had a right to think so—that we really had got equipment at least equal to that of the Germans, and if that is so, it does not take a heaven-sent genius to deduce that, because we have braver and more efficiently trained people with equal equipment, they certainly ought to walk away with it. The Prime Minister emphasised the point about equipment when he said that:
"This is the first time we have met the Germans at least equally well-armed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th November, 1941; col. 476, Vol. 376.]
Was this really the case? I do not believe it. I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary—and this would not be giving information away to the enemy, because Rommel knows exactly what he has against him in Libya—whether he can really tell us whether we had a single tank or any tanks capable, both in armour and in gun-power and range, of standing up to German tanks then in operation in that area? I do not think that we had. The German tanks, as far as I know them, have 77 millimetre guns, and we have not anything like that, though I am bound to admit that I do not know the exact calibre of the guns on our tanks there. I am quite certain that they have nothing like a calibre of 77 millimetres. May I digress for a moment to say that you cannot "kid" people into believing they have better equipment simply by changing its name? I refer to the fact that the Minister of Supply, when he first took over, started the stunt of tacking names on to everything. He called one particular tank "Churchill" which I think was an outrage on the Prime Minister because, as far as I understand it, and with great respect to my right hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) the "Churchill" was laid down while my right hon. Friend was at the War Office. People have been led to believe that it was laid down very much later. I happen to know the works in which the first one was made.
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I find myself in some difficulty because I cannot make out what we really ought to expect in Libya. First of all we were told that it would be a quick battle but there was as usual a qualifying clause round the corner. Then there was the statement that we were equal to the enemy in Libya and in the same breath we were told that we were numerically unequal but technically superior. Then, to cap it all, we told the world that we were so heavily engaged in Libya that Malaya had to go short. I will deal with the question of Malaya going short in a moment or two. I cannot for the life of me make out what an ordinary sensible person is expected to gather from such extraordinarily vague and contradictory statements in the same speech. We were told that Rommel would be surrounded and annihilated, but that has not come off. I heard one hon. Member say to-day that we have driven him where we want him, but I suggest that we have driven him where we do not want him—where he can get reinforcements from across the water and where he has strong flank defences. The newspapers have had reports, presumably passed by the Ministry of Information, that reinforcements of a substantial nature were sent across. If there is any doubt in anybody's mind about the standard of equipment and whether we have or have not equal equipment let me quote from a "Daily Mail" article of 6th January by Terence Atherton, from Cairo. He said:
"Rommel put up a brilliant fight by all military standards, though he had heavier armoured tanks which could and did, outshoot ours. …"
There is a categorical statement that the armour and gun-power of his tanks were greater than ours, so that it seems perfectly preposterous that the House and the country should be misled in that way.
I want to say a word or two now about Hong Kong. I disagree with those who think we did right in staying in Hong Kong. I never had the good fortune to go there, but I was very near and I always understood that we could not hold Hong Kong unless we had adequate sea power—which we had not. So there was really no sense in losing the 6,000 to 7,000 men that we did lose there. The Japanese also claim to have sunk nine destroyers—I do not believe that is true—but there was no sense in losing those forces whatever they were. Would it not have been much more to the point had

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they been transferred to Malaya where they would have been of paramount importance in defending and protecting the important port of Singapore? I thought a remark which the Lord Privy Seal made, that a tremendous amount of damage had been done to the Japanese was, perhaps, a little bit of an overstatement. I am not saying that our men did not fight gallantly, but if the figures are correct, it does not seem to me that the odd 2,000 casualties which the Japanese suffered were worth the exchange we made. I cannot see what delay there was in holding Hong Kong or how it benefited the general war situation. I recall to hon. Members that on 20th December, in a leading article on Hong Kong in the "Times," it was stated:
"The impression was given that it was capable of holding out for months against any force the Japanese could bring against it; and only the other day we were rejoicing over the arrival of a strong and well-equipped Canadian force to reinforce a garrison already confident of its ability to beat off any attack."
That is entirely contrary to everything that has ever been told me by any military strategist since the last war about the possibilities of holding Hong Kong. As to Malaya, I was dumbfounded when I heard the Lord Privy Seal excuse the position there by saying that we cannot be strong at all points all the time. Of course, we know that; but surely, we know where are the important points, and it is ridiculous to suggest that the combined output capacities of the British Empire and the United States of America are, between them, incapable of supplying enough to beat up a miserably small force of 150,000 troops in Libya, mostly Italians, and at the same time provide for what surely is the next major strategic point, Singapore. On 8th December the Prime Minister said:
"The House and the Empire will notice that some of the finest ships in the Royal Navy have reached their stations in the Far East at a very convenient moment. Every preparation in our power has been made."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th December, 1941; cols. 1372–3, Vol. 376.]
What preparation? There does not seem to me to have been any preparation. We lost Penang without a fight. Why was it not protected? I am told that the petrol and tin were left intact. There was then the tragic loss of the ships, which I am not a sufficient expert to deal with, but it seems to me that something careless
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happened. Airfields were unguarded. Japanese transports were lying at anchor unmolested, landing their troops at will on the coast of Malaya. Some questions ought to be asked about the right hon. Gentleman who was appointed with Cabinet rank and sent to the Far East some time ago. Why was he sent? Will the Foreign Secretary tell us whether the right hon. Gentleman made any report, and if so, whether it was acted on? Either he made a report and it was not acted on, or he has simply been put into a job which he is not fully capable of carrying out, and it is not fair to him to allow any doubt as to which of the two answers is the correct one. The Lord Privy Seal then made a remark with which everybody will agree; he told us that we must not blame the people on the spot. Then why was Sir Robert Brooke-Popham sacked? Let us recollect what was said by him on 22nd December in Singapore, as reported in the "Times" the next day. In addressing a meeting of the leaders of the various communities, he said that the authorities responsible for war supplies accurately assessed the requirements of the various fronts, and supplies which might have come to Malaya went to Russia and Libya. Surely, we were not so stupid as to leave Singapore completely bare, in order to fulfil other demands that were not so immediate, whatever anybody may say; for whatever Ministers may say about supplies reaching Russia, it is obvious to anybody who knows about transport difficulties that one cannot get vast quantities of tanks and heavy equipment there in next to no time. It would be ridiculous to leave Singapore inadequately protected in order to have a great conglomeration of machinery floating about the ocean, or half-way through Iran, without any particular object except in relation to a battle to be fought in Russia some time in the middle of this year.
I want to conclude by saying that I think we have a wrong impression of what it is we are trying to do. I suggest we cannot expect to have the strongest and best Navy, the strongest and best Air Force, the strongest and best Army, the strongest and best Merchant Marine, and be the largest arsenal in the world all at the same time, with the population that we have. We should turn away alto-

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gether from the idea of huge armies rolling across Europe. What we should do is turn to what has always been our safeguard, to the sea, to the building of ships, more ships, and still more ships. What do we find now? Anybody who knows about priorities knows that ships are not at the top of the list. They ought to be. The sooner that that part of our strategy is altered the better that will be for all of us. I wish before I sit down to say one word more about the speech made by the Prime Minister on 11th December. He concluded that speech by saying:
"I said the other day that four-fifths of the human race were on our side. It may well be an under-estimate. Just these gangs and cliques of wicked men and their military or party organisations have been able to bring these hideous evils upon mankind."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, nth December, 1941; col. 1709, Vol. 376.]
I hope that the Prime Minister therein recognises there are vast numbers of people in Germany and in Italy who are reasonable and sane. Surely, at a time when we think there are difficulties within Germany—and Hitler's action in taking over command is possibly one of the signs—we should make some appeal by direct propaganda to these people and give them something upon which they can hang their hopes. We have the Atlantic Charter, but if I were a German its effect upon me would be to make me rally more than ever behind Hitler. It must but confirm in their hearts the melancholy thought that Hitler is right; that they must all support him to the last ounce of their strength and the last drop of their blood in defeating us, otherwise they will have another and a worse Versailles. I listened the other day to an admirable speech by the hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. Hopkinson) in which he pointed out that the Nazis had a terrific crusade in support of what he termed their filthy creed. We know that in Russia the people have a burning idea of what they are fighting for in their own territory. Surely it is time that our Government started a rallying cry to which all reasonable people all over the world can respond. It is only then that we can expect things to begin to disintegrate behind Hitler and his regime and then perhaps this devastating war may be brought to an end sooner than at the present time seems likely.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I will do my best to
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meet the wishes of the House in my reply, by covering as many as possible of the individual questions which have been raised. If my hon. Friends will allow me, there are one or two observations which I should also like to make in regard to my visit to Russia, which, I hope, will not be regarded as merely a rehash of what I stated in my broadcast. Perhaps I might start by saying that had the House been in Session when I came back, I should, of course, have wanted to make my report at once to this House, but in view of the circumstances and of the obvious public desire to have some information upon what were my impressions, I think hon. Members will understand my speaking first on the wireless on Sunday night.
A very wide range of criticism has been indulged in, about which the Government do not complain, and, indeed, it would be surprising if it had been otherwise, because we know perfectly well the anxiety through which we are now passing. I shall start by answering individual points which have been raised. I must say to the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) that I find some of his complaints rather difficult to get into their context. He said, and we all know it is true, that he has had experience in war, and we all know his very gallant record in the last war. He said that there were in the War Cabinet a lot of old men who knew nothing about the war, who issued all sorts of orders from the bowels of the earth. I do not know to whom he was referring. We all know that few people have had greater experience of war in one way or another than the Prime Minister. There has hardly been a campaign in which he has not been engaged in some form or other. The hon. Member spoke about a number of speeches which the Prime Minister has made and which he criticised. I am bound to say that I feel sympathy for the Prime Minister there. There is nothing that I dislike more than having to make speeches in war-time on the progress of the war. I defy anyone to get through entirely successfully, and I am going to explain an error which I made on Sunday when I come to my Russian talk. I am the last person to say that you can always make these statements without any error.
Mr. Stokes: The right hon. Gentleman is not representing me fairly. What I complained about was three contradictory statements in the same speech.
Mr. Eden: I hope the hon. Member will never be guilty of anything of that kind himself. If he is not, he will have a very remarkable political record. With regard to the Prime Minister's speech about the Libyan campaign, if I remember aright, what my right hon. Friend said broadly was that this was the first time we were meeting our German opponents when our armaments were about equal to theirs. I think that is a perfectly fair and just statement. It may be true that the German tanks had a bigger gun, but it may be true that we had certain other advantages which had not been mentioned or made public, and which I do not propose to mention or make public now, in respect to our aircraft and other matters. The Prime Minister's statement broadly was that in armaments we were approximately equal, and I think that has proved true. At any rate, it would be perfectly proper for the Prime Minister to be challenged on the subject when he can answer it, but I should say that his statement was correct.
Then the hon. Member made some charges about the orders to the "Glorious," which very much surprised me. I had no notice that he was going to raise this, but he says I must answer it to the best of my ability. He was not altogether clear, but his complaint was that orders had been issued irregularly and not in a normal manner. In the very short time available I have made such inquiries as I could at the Admiralty, and the answer I had is that no special orders of any kind were given. There is no question of some political head, or sinister person, having intervened—which is the impression he created—in order to affect the movements of that ship. I can assure him that that is not so. The operational orders were given by the officer in charge on the spot on account of the fuel position. I can tell the hon. Member also that the mystery about the Coastal Command, of which he made a great deal, is explained by the fact that the scene of operations was at that time outside the range of Coastal Command. That explains some of these mysteries. If I had been told beforehand that the hon. Member was going to raise this question of the "Glorious" in detail, I would have
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done my best to give him more information than that, but the suspicion of some interference, I presume he meant by some politician, in the issuing of the operational orders, is not justified, and nothing of the kind took place.
The hon. Member talked a lot about Norway. There again, is there any Member of the House who can lay his hand on his heart and say, "In the estimates that I have made of what was going to happen in this war I have never been wrong"? Fortunately, most of us, including, by the grace of God, the Foreign Secretary, do not very often have to make speeches on these subjects. If we did, we should be more often on record as having misjudged the strategical situation. If we are to strike a balance-sheet of the Prime Minister's speeches, the hon. Gentleman might well have put in the scale against the speech about Norway the two remarkable speeches which have been made in the American Continent within the last few days. Not one mention of any sort or kind was made of them by him.
I want to come to one or two other speeches and try to take the Debate in its chapters as far as I can. I should like to thank the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) and the right hon. Gentleman the member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris) for the references they made to the visits that the Prime Minister and in a lesser degree myself have been paying. The right hon. Member for South-West Bethnal Green rightly referred to the physical difficulties created by those journeys, and in particular by the absence of the Prime Minister as head of the Government. Of course, he is perfectly right. That is what you have to set against the actual advantages of personal contact, and it is an embarrassment to the functioning of government when Ministers with grave responsibilities are away. Of that there is no doubt. The right hon. Gentleman asked whether there was an acting Prime Minister. The answer is that the Lord Privy Seal acts as Prime Minister in his absence. As regards decisions, it is open to the War Cabinet to take decisions in the absence of the Prime Minister, or, if they judge the matter to be of such importance, to refer them to the Prime Minister. That is within their discretion.

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That is in practice how it works at the present time.
I come from the question of Cabinet responsibility here to the remarks which my hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Granville) made about Dominion representation. I agree with him entirely as to the importance of this question. I was some months at the Dominions Office and had some experience of the working of this thing. My hon. Friend was rather inclined to over-simplify the problems. He talked as though all the Dominions were agreed that a certain course of action was the right course to follow and that the difficulty was only in the attitude of the Government here. That is not by any means the problem. In point of fact, the Dominions take quite divergent views on this problem. My hon. Friend asked whether we were satisfied with the present working of Dominion consultation. He probably remembers that the Canadian Prime Minister, when he was here in the summer, made an emphatic speech in which he said that he was satisfied with the present situation and did not want a change. A rather similar statement was made later by the Prime Minister of New Zealand. A different view has been taken by Australia. I only put this to the House, not in order to say that the present system is sacrosanct and cannot by any means be modified or improved. That is not at all the Government's attitude. It may be, and probably is so, that improvements and modifications are possible. All I want to put to the House is that it is not a simple problem or merely a problem between us and the Dominions collectively. In addressing our minds to this problem, we cannot fairly divorce the problem of a responsible Minister from that of the body to whom he is responsible. That is one of the difficulties in the situation. A Dominion statesman coming over here is, in fact, responsible to a Dominion Parliament just as we are responsible to the House of Commons.
Mr. Granville: When Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, said that the present machinery was satisfactory to him, did he say that he had any objection to Dominion representatives taking a seat in the War Cabinet?
Mr. Eden: I am not going to quote Mr. Mackenzie King from memory. The point I make is that both Canada and South Africa have shown that they have differ-
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ent views on the problem of an Imperial War Cabinet from Australia. Of that there is no doubt, and that is one of the questions we have to face. Another specific question which he asked was whether there were any consultations with the Dominions about post-war problems. The answer is, Yes, about every phase of them. While I was in Moscow full information was passed on to the Dominions of what was going on in my conversations with M. Stalin, and that is normal.
Then my hon. Friend asked about the appointment of Cabinet Ministers to their present positions in Cairo and Singapore. In both cases information was given well in advance to the Dominions and, if my memory serves me right, when they received the information they all concurred in the intention.
Mr. Granville: Another question I asked was whether the Dominions are to be represented on the Allied War Council.
Mr. Eden: I must allow a full statement of that plan to be made by the Prime Minister, who is handling it. I do not want to start giving interpretations of it. I have been in Moscow, and he has been in Washington.
May I now take some of the criticisms which have been made about the Far Eastern situation? I should like to start by welcoming the statement made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Sir E. Campbell) about collaboration with the Netherlands East Indies. I am very glad he made that interjection, because when we remember what has happened in Holland itself, which has been overrun by the German Army, the stalwart courage shown by our Dutch Allies has been most remarkable and is deserving of the warmest tributes.
Many questions have been asked and many criticisms have been made and no doubt a good deal could be said in reply. For instance, the hon. Member for Ipswich said the Government ought not to argue that our action in sending munitions to Russia when we did should be weighed against the sending of materials to Singapore. I do not know; I would not accept that. I think, indeed I know, that the munitions which we sent to Russia have played a very valuable part in the Russian military effort, as our Allies would be the first to admit. The hon. Member seemed to indicate that the Government ought to have had enough intelligence to

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see at that time that the situation in the Far East was such that instead of sending those materials to Russia we should have sent them to the Far East. I do not know whether he took that view then.
Mr. Stokes indicated assent.
Mr. Eden: He did. Then I congratulate him; but I have a shrewd suspicion that had we not sent materials to Russia and had sent them instead to Singapore he would have taken quite a different view.
Mr. Stokes: Will not my right hon. Friend admit that if we had transferred the Forces from Hong Kong, which was what I suggested—you must fake the two together—and sent a reasonable amount of stuff to Singapore, it really would not have militated against the success of our Allies in Russia, while securing Singapore?
Mr. Eden: I am dealing with the actual statement made by the hon. Gentleman that in his view we were wrong in supplying so much material to Russia and that it would have been very much better to have sent it to Singapore.
Now I come to the question of the position there. There are a lot of things which I should like to say but which perhaps it would be better not to say in public at this stage. There are certain things, however, which should be said. For the decision which has been taken in the Far East the Government take full responsibility. It is their burden and their responsibility, of that there can be no question, and it is not only desirable but I think essential that as soon as it can be done the fullest account should be given to the House of why that decision was taken. Then the House would be justified in assessing the responsibility. The only thing which I hope the House will not do is to ask for statements about things in detail, such as why this brigade was here, or that battalion there, or why this or the other thing was not done, because to explain that would be most unwise while fighting is still going on.
Let me deal with the criticism of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir A. Southby) in regard to reinforcing Singapore. The decisions in that respect were not taken out of neglect. We did consider this. I know, because I had been at these discussions in the Defence Committee. We considered the
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claims of Malaya at each stage, when we were sending reinforcements to the Middle East or to Russia. It is not that we just neglected or forgot Singapore. If we were wrong in that decision which we took, it was a deliberate decision and not one based upon neglect.
The question was asked what we had been doing since this Government came into power in regard to reinforcements in the Far East. It is not true to say that we did nothing. The Forces in Malaya have been reinforced many times since 1939. They may not be as large as we could wish, but that is a statement of fact. In regard to the change of command, the decision was taken before hostilities broke out. It was taken, as it was thought, in the national interest at the time. I would like to say just this further word about the general Far Eastern situation. The Government will, at the earliest opportunity—I know that in this I am expressing the mind of the Prime Minister—invite the fullest discussion of the House. I think the Noble Lord was right in suggesting that that discussion, when it takes place, should occupy more than one day.
Earl Winterton: There is rather a delicate point about this matter. My right hon. Friend nearly fell into error. May I put the point? I suggested a full dress Debate of two or three days.
Mr. Eden: Obviously, I cannot pledge the Prime Minister in his absence. I understood the point of my Noble Friend to be that the House should have the fullest information and the fullest chance of expressing its opinion as soon as that could be done.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Epsom said that he Government did not like criticism at all. He certainly did his best to cure us of that failure, because his speech was one long criticism of our many misdeeds. There is a point on which I must take him up. He referred to our despatch of troops to Greece and said he regarded that as a political and sentimental decision. He said that it was a very wrong decision. A further word or two about that. It is arguable, and will probably be arguable for an extremely long time, whether that decision was right or wrong, but it certainly was not a political and sentimental decision, as my colleagues are very well aware. It was taken

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with the full advice and concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff and the commanders concerned. Whatever else the decision was, it was not political and it was not sentimental.
Sir A. Southby: Does my right hon. Friend mean by that reply that General Wavell, after having achieved the success he did in Libya, advised that it should be given up in order to fight in Greece?
Mr. Eden: I do not propose to put words into the mouths of commanders. What I am saying is that the decision was taken with the full advice of the military and technical advisers of the Government, and by that statement I stand absolutely. I would like to add that I think my hon. and gallant Friend took no account of the balance-sheet at all, when he condemned the error, as he called it, of sending troops to Greece. There is another side of the balance-sheet. There is the fact that there was a coup d'état in Yugoslavia, which was not unrelated to the fact that we had troops in Greece. That cannot be ignored.
Mr. Cocks indicated dissent.
Mr. Eden: My information is quite as good as that of the hon. Gentleman, and I am telling my hon. and gallant Friend that he omitted to take account of the fact that the Yugoslav position was greatly influenced by the fact that we had troops in Greece. Now I will go a stage further. The Yugoslav coup d'état also resulted in a Yugoslav-Russian rapprochement which was also of very great importance, and finally the resistance of Yugoslavia and Greece did delay by at least six weeks the breaking of the main attack upon Russia. That also, I may say, was of the very greatest importance, of which I assure you our Allies are very well aware. I put these points to the House because I think they should be borne in mind.
Mr. Cocks: Would the Foreign Secretary deny that Hitler chose 22nd June for his attack on Russia because it was exactly the same day as Napoleon's attack on Russia?
Mr. Eden: Certainly I would deny it. I have not the least doubt, from the information at our disposal, that the resistance of Yugoslavia delayed the attack on Russia.
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Now, if the House will allow me, I should like to make one or two observations on my visit to Russia, even though I cannot add very much to what was said in the communiqués that were published. First of all, let me say something about the broadcast that I made on Sunday night and about one sentence in it. I have to stand in a white sheet about that, because I did not express myself very well. The sentence which I wish to modify was one in which I said that the trouble with Hitler is not that he is a Nazi at home but that he will not stay at home. There is in that sentence an over-simplification. I fully realise that it can be taken to mean that the Nazi is the kind of animal who might, in some circumstances, stay at home. He is not, and that is the fundamental trouble, not only with the Nazis but with the Germans. It is part of their creed that they will not stay at home, and I wish to say that in using that sentence I did not mean that the Nazi might be a non-aggressive animal. The essence of the breed, and the essence of German practice for the last 100 years, is that they are aggressive animals, and that is why we are at war with them. I only wish to correct what might have been a misunderstanding.
When we were in Moscow, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov were good enough to give us a very full share of their time, and our discussions covered a very wide range of subjects—in fact, after some experience of international meetings, I do not remember an occasion where the subjects covered were so numerous in the time. Mr. Stalin is a man with a very clear mind and with a very decisive grasp of the details of any subject he deals with, be it political or military. He does not waste words, so that we exchanged views with, I believe, useful results for the conduct of the war, on almost every aspect of the war. Here I would like to be allowed to pay a tribute to our interpreter, the Soviet Ambassador, who discharged this most difficult task without flagging and without fault during many long sessions. Some of my hon. Friends who have had experience of international conferences will know how many mistakes can be made through faulty interpretations and what troubles can come about through people thinking they know a foreign language. I do not know whether the Ambassador has ever thought of himself as an interpreter, but if ever he wished to set up in that rôle,

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I would very gladly give him a first-class certificate.
Mr. J. J. Davidson: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the Ministry of Information that?
Mr. Eden: I was also very fortunate in my collaborators. Our Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, has worked with exemplary patience and success for the betterment of Anglo-Soviet relations. His presence throughout the talks, not only the official ones, but the informal ones, was of the utmost value to us. Sir Alexander Cadogan's experience and balanced judgment were very valuable, and the military part of our delegation, very ably led by General Nye, was able to make contacts which, I think, should bear very good fruit in due course. Quite apart from the official conversations, there were a number of informal meetings, notably at the dinner,—dinners are sometimes rather long in Russia—which Mr. Stalin was good enough to give for us. Nothing could exceed Russian hospitality. The only difficulty is to bear up against it sometimes. At that dinner I met a number of Soviet leaders, military leaders, naval and air force leaders, including Marshal Timoshenko, just back from his brilliant successes in the Donetz Basin, and Marshal Voroshilov. General Nye had useful conversations with Marshal Shaposhnikov, the very able Chief of Staff of the Red Army. The House will not expect me to give revelations about these aspects of our work. The results will, I hope, speak for themselves in due course, and in these matters results are certainly better than any speech I could hope to make.
I can say that our supplies to Russia are arriving satisfactorily. What I want to give the House just for a moment or two, if I may, is the impression which we all of us formed while we were in Russia. We saw something of the commanders, something of the leaders of the nation and of the troops in the field. Everywhere we found a steady note of confidence and resolution. A visitor is conscious of this in every sphere and whoever he is speaking to. I think it is due to the fact that there can be few if any examples in all history of an army which has carried out so long and arduous a retreat as the Red Army did during the summer months and which yet maintained
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its morale so well that it was able to turn upon the enemy with triumphant success over a wide front. It is a far greater achievement even than that of 1812, and every man in Russia, I believe, feels that. I read somewhere of a statement of one of Napoleon's marshals—a warning he gave him before he advanced into Russia. He warned him to beware of Russian fanaticism. If for that you substitute Russian fanatical patriotism, Russian love of the soil, I think you are very near the explanation of this great resistance. The Russian soldier has the power of endurance, and he has the power of adaptability which is bred in him, and which the German invader can never hope to equal.
I should like to give the House one example of what that endurance means in climatic conditions such as I mentioned in my broadcast. On our journey to Moscow we were rather near the Finnish frontier. Our Russian hosts had taken elaborate precautions. Among other things they attached to our train some open wagons on which were placed anti-aircraft guns and their crews. I told in my broadcast on Sunday something of the temperatures through which we had to pass. On one day there were at midday 54 degrees of frost. The House can picture what it means to be in open wagons moving day and night in that temperature. Of course, the men were relieved but they could only endure it because in the first place they were amazingly well clad. In addition to sheepskin coats, they had enormous great fur coats and gloves. You could not see the shape of the men. The general impression was like something in a dream. They are so used to those conditions that they could handle their guns and fire them, while for our people, unused to these conditions, and the Germans too, it would be enough to do to keep the guns in running order without having to fire them. Those are the conditions which exist there with which the Germans have to deal.
I think we should make a great mistake if we supposed that what has happened in Russia in the last few weeks has been to any extent due to chance. It has not at all. The turn of the tide is the outcome of many factors. First, the Russians throughout the summer and early autumn fought a fighting retreat. That was the

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first phase. They took a toll of the enemy at every opportunity, and wore him down at every opportunity. The second factor was the scorched earth policy, which created enormous difficulties for the Germans, difficulties which will increase as the winter goes on. Thirdly, there were the guerillas and the counterpart of our own Home Guard, which harassed the enemy continually behind his own lines. Fourthly, there is the winter. Those are four elements which played their part. But that is not quite all. During the summer, when they were retreating, the Russians were beginning to build up their new Armies, well behind the lines. It is those new Armies which are now coming into action. The divisions which are now fighting and driving the Germans back from before Moscow are fresh divisions, not the divisions which were in the retreat during the summer. That has resulted in the turn of the tide. That, at any rate, is my analysis of the situation. That does not mean that the Soviet leaders would pretend—they would not for a moment—that there can be any guarantee against further setbacks in the future. Nor does it mean that the German army is not still strong. Of course it is very strong. But it means that the German army in Russia to-day is not the army of 22nd June. That is a matter of the greatest importance to us all.
Let me say one word on the political side. I thought it useful while in Moscow to ask our representatives at Teheran and Angora for consultation, and the Soviet Government were good enough to make the necessary arrangements. I did that because I thought, so far as our Ambassador to Turkey was concerned, that it was not improbable that the Germans would try to make mischief out of my visit to Moscow—and in that expectation I was not disappointed. I asked our Ambassador to come, in order that I might give him a first-hand account of our conversations so far as they affected Turkey. Our Ambassador has gone back. In due course he will report to the Turkish Ministers, and give them my message. The references to Turkey in our conversations were in all respects friendly, and such as the Turkish Government themselves would have been glad to hear. Turkey has nothing to fear from an
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Allied victory. Her territorial integrity is in no way menaced from that quarter, and the Anglo-Soviet pledges that we gave to Turkey last autumn will be fully honoured. Both the Soviet Union and ourselves—I say that deliberately, after these conversations—wish to see Turkey strong and prosperous. It was a cardinal principle of the policy of modern Turkey, as laid down by Ataturk, the great leader of modern Turkey, that there should be close understanding between Russia and Turkey. The wisdom of that policy becomes daily more apparent amid the vicissitudes of war.
There is another aspect of my visit. As a preface to my visit to Moscow, the Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, had paid a most useful visit to the Soviet capital. Any steps which lead to closer understanding between Poland and the Soviet Union will be always welcomed by His Majesty's Government. General Sikorski showed a wise and courageous statesmanship in going to Moscow at that time. He had paid a visit to Polish forces who had been fighting so gallantly at Tobruk. I know that his visit was highly valued by the Soviet Government, and he has made yet another contribution to the attainment of inter-Allied solidarity. We all join in welcoming him back to this country.
One final sentence or two. We spoke in Moscow of the peace settlement and of post-war organisation. I regard these conversations as of the highest importance for the future, but they constitute, of course, only a beginning, and their importance will lie in the follow-up. That is what we have to do now—to follow-up the beginning which we made in Moscow. Anglo-Soviet relations have had a pretty chequered past. I believe that the march of events is bringing our nations together. It is the task of statesmanship to ensure that the future is a happy one for the peoples of both countries, a victorious one for the Allied war effort, and an enduring one for the peace of the world. It is because I believe that to some small extent our conversations contributed to that great cause that I have been glad to play my part in the conversations at Moscow.
Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.

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Preamble
Reassembling after the Christmas Recess, the House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Shuttleworth—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his brother.

THE WAR SITUATION.
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON rose to call attention to the war situation, and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are meeting, as your Lordships are aware, earlier in the New Year perhaps than some of us once thought we should be meeting; but I think it is impossible at the outset to avoid remembering that, with all our anxieties and with full knowledge of the labours and dangers to come, the prospect is very different from what it was a year ago. We had then survived the peril of the threatened invasion, but our cities, including this great City, had been subjected for months to nightly bombardments, and the alternating sounds of sirens and All Clears were our daily experience. We have to feel great relief, I am sure, that, for the time being anyhow, that is not our experience now. And, worse still, a year ago we were alone. Now how different it is!
We should wish, I am sure, in the first instance to pay a tribute to the distinguished service which the Prime Minister has undoubtedly rendered in his visit to the United States and Canada. How much he will have accomplished by his personality and vision only time will reveal, but it is manifest that it has consolidated the military alliance between the British Empire and the United States, and brought into a practical working relationship our great Allies Russia and China, and we can only wish that the arrangements—clearly in the early stages at present—will develop into an effective working direction of our military effort in all parts of the world. I believe, too, that every one of us was glad when we were informed that General Wavell had been appointed to the Chief Command in the Far East. Since then we have had the
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heartening news of the great programme that President Roosevelt has placed before the United States industries, in figures which can only be described as of astronomical dimensions. And behind it all there is the hope which we must all feel that, however long postponed victory may be, it is undoubtedly certain that this great association of nations will provide at the beginning an effective and powerful instrument that will secure peace for the world after the war, and it is impossible not to think that the unity of purpose of the British Empire, the United States, the Soviet Union and China cannot fail to be affective. I only pray, as I am sure we all pray, that the same inspiration and guidance as those from which we are benefiting at present will be available in those years.
We are comforted, too, I am sure, by the progress which, despite unfavourable weather, has been made in Libya. It looks as if it is only a question of time before a more effective cleaning-up even than last time will be achieved in that area. We can quite rightly comfort ourselves with these great assurances which have developed so much even since we last met. But it is not right that we should fail to take note of some disappointments and deficiencies. So far the experience of the war with Japan has been one succession of disappointments. That is not unusual in British history at the openings of wars, and we are all familiar with the saying that it is the last victory that counts. We may be fully assured that in time, when the powers of the united nations are mobilized effectively in the Pacific, the tide will turn, and perhaps turn very quickly; but for all that we are warranted in asking His Majesty's Government—I believe it is an unnecessary request—to make certain inquiries into the causes and circumstances of the defects which have been unmistakable in the conduct of operations in Malaya.
One remembers that when we had an expedition to Norway we were unable to make good our ground largely because of two circumstances—the Germans had superiority in the air, and they had command of such railways as there were. With these two conditions against us, we were unable to maintain our foothold. Now, in the situation as it presented itself at the beginning of the Japanese invasion

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of Malaya, the converse conditions applied. We had there a very valuable aerodrome, which seemed to be taken quite easily. We had control, not far off from Victoria Point in Burma, of the only line of railway which could be used for supply by invading forces down Malaya. Yet nothing effective, as far as I can see, was even attempted. An ordinary amateur like myself very naturally asks himself the question, what is the good of having a magnificent aerodrome as there was there, and also at Victoria Point, if you do not defend it when you have got it? Otherwise one is making a present to the enemy, as was done in this case, of splendid facilities. The Japanese seem to have marched from one point to another, taking first one aerodrome and then another, without any effective resistance. They are now in occupation of a large extent of the most important tin and rubber areas in the Malayan Peninsula.
I hope that the Government also will inquire as to who was responsible for the management of the defences in Penang. It appears now that a large amount of valuable stores, and even, I believe, some shipping, of a minor kind anyhow, were left behind undamaged. This evidently has been extraordinarily useful to the Japanese. It is difficult to parallel this series of misfortunes, but, of course, our usual British phlegm was undoubtedly displayed. At the same time, I notice that Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who was Commander-in-Chief in that area, is stated to have said more than a year ago with respect to Hong Kong that any idea that Hong Kong could be captured in a few days or a few weeks was erroneous Then, four months ago, he said in regard to conditions in the Far East: "We are fully prepared, come what may." And on the very day that Japan struck at the United States Pleet in Hawaii he is reported to have said: "We had plenty of warning and our preparations are made and tested." Well, I hope the Government will inquire into how it came about that this officer in a responsible position could make statements so grievously out of accord with what was actually the fact. The only comfort I have got—and I really do not apologize for the language—is that I am very glad that a nincompoop of that kind was promptly removed from command, and that in General Wavell we have got a man of proved capacity whom we trust.
This whole case brings up another which I would ask the House to think of for a few minutes, one that I, amongst others, have brought up on at least three occasions in this House—namely, the defective arrangements so far devised for the defence of aerodromes. We see how grievous are the results of that in Malay. More than a year ago some of us described the medley of arrangements which had up to then been devised in this country for the defence of aerodromes, and so far as I know—anyhow I hope the noble Lord will be able to give us some further information on this—no very effective defence system has been devised, certainly has not been put into operation, in this country. There appear to be certain inter-Service rivalries, if I may so describe them without using the word in an unpleasant sense, between, say, the War Office and the Air Ministry as to who is to do the job and who is to be responsible.
A NOBLE LORD: And the Home Office.
LORD ADDISON: I do not include the Home Office; I do not regard them as a combatant body. But I see that in recent manœuvres which took place in the Eastern and Midland counties some very remarkable facts emerged so far as they have been made public. It appears that the invading forces in the Eastern counties, by their surprise or whatever method they adopted, captured 25 per cent. of the aerodromes in the area and put a considerable number of others out of action, at all events for a time—a most disconcerting experience. I was only too thankful that at all events the lessons have been revealed. It was said by one important officer, I gather, that the Army is very much alive to the importance of defending aerodromes, but they eat up men in an amazing manner. That I can rightly understand. It depends, of course, upon the system that is adopted.
I have been able to obtain some detailed information as to the methods that are being adopted, at any rate in some areas, and I shall say nothing which will give any useful information to the enemy. There are, of course, the Home Defence battalions, which in many places detail platoons to be responsible for helping in the defence of aerodromes. Then there are the ground staffs of the Air Forces on the aerodromes and, in the background, potentially and frequently actually, a

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small mobile platoon attached to the Area Commander. (I am not sure whether he is called the Area or District Commander.) I have heard that in some cases, the mechanical staffs which are there necessarily for the maintenance of the aeroplanes, for looking after the efficiency of the machines and keeping them in the air and doing a thousand and one other services which are necessary, have not even been trained to use a rifle. You cannot expect these men to be fully trained in that respect, for, of course, that is not their job. They are engineers, fitters, electricians and all sorts of other craftsmen of that kind; but it is not much to expect that they should, at all events, have received such training and equipment as will enable them to be of great service in the defence of the aerodromes. They have a certain amount of equipment, but they have not had the necessary training; that is quite certain in a large number of cases.
Then the platoons from the Home Defence battalions which are in the district clearly should be properly equipped for the defence, or for helping in the defence, of the aerodromes. I shall not mention the details of their equipment, but in some cases it certainly is not efficient enough. The so-called mobile platoon is in some cases only mobile by the aid of push bicycles. That is not good enough. I think that this matter, which to my knowledge has been in dispute for more than a year, should be dealt with effectively and put under a single Commander. It is quite clear that it would dissipate the Army personnel in an entirely unnecessary manner if we were to have complete units for each aerodrome. They would be multiplied, as many of us know, like leaves in Vallambrosa all over the country, and it would be a needless depletion of the effective forces of the trained Army. That, however, is not to say that it would not be a good thing to have highly efficient and properly equipped groups of forces which would be mobile, which would be available effectively to assist in the defence of aerodromes in support of the local forces and be equipped with proper transport and guns. Whatever may be the way of dealing with the matter, it is quite evident that it cannot be dealt with by two sets of people. It should be under the command of an officer, or a group of officers, who
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would have control of the whole business and be capable of dealing effectively with threats as they might arise.
It is quite evident that those responsible in Malaya had not thought out any effective method of defending our aerodromes, and I think our experiences during the Recess have brought into greater significance than ever the necessity of effective forces and effective organization for the adequate defence of the growing number of aerodromes in this country. I hope that the noble Lord in his reply will be able to give us some comfort on this very vital matter. I have not introduced these two subjects with any other purpose than that of using the platform of Parliament, as it is our duty to do, to call attention to such defects as appear in our defensive and offensive organization, and in the hope that the Government—whether they reveal what they intend to do or not is of course for them to decide—will effectively create the right kind of organization and not be deterred by any inter-Service rivalries, because the present situation in this respect, anyhow, is undoubtedly alarming. I hope it will not be thought that in calling attention to these two defects I in any way lack appreciation of the services of our heroic forces—one only wants them to be able to operate to the best advantage. I would like in conclusion to refer to the subject with which I opened my speech—namely, our heartfelt gratitude for the services of the Prime Minister and our anxious and sincere hope that we shall see him actively and soon amongst us again.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, my noble friend the Marquess of Crewe regrets that a slight indisposition prevents him from being in your Lordships' House to-day, and he has asked me to make some observations at this stage on behalf of noble Lords on these Benches. Since your Lordships' House adjourned events have been moving fast. Outstanding have been the heavy German defeats in Russia. The victories achieved by our Allies there can hardly fail to have a profound effect upon the immediate course of the war. Almost the whole of Cyrenaica has been reconquered. The great achievements there would perhaps have had fuller recognition and been received with greater enthusiasm if excessive expectations of immediate sweeping victory had not been

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aroused at the outset. Forecasts are of minor importance; it is events that count; and perhaps in the future official spokesmen will be more chary of venturing upon military prophecies. The Japanese successes in the first onrush of an unprovoked aggression have had repercussions all round the Pacific and beyond. The United States have been stirred to intense activity and the resolute spirit of the President now seems to permeate the whole of that great nation. China, finding herself united with great Allies, has been stirred to fresh efforts and has lately won a notable victory in the field. She is offering to us welcome aid in the defence of Burma. The Dutch East Indies, occupying a strategic position of great importance, are meeting the situation with forethought and with valour.
In Australia much concern has been expressed on a matter which indeed profoundly concerns us all, the reverses that we have unhappily suffered in Malaya. Voices have been raised there asking for a larger share in arriving at vital strategic decisions. Undoubtedly if Tie Dominions asserted a claim for continued representation each of them in the Imperial War Cabinet, I imagine no one in this country would wish to deny it, although it would make the Cabinet, with four representatives of the great Dominions, and one necessarily of India, a very much larger body than has been desired for a War Cabinet. Furthermore, such a system might involve more delay rather than less, since it might be necessary for Dominion representatives to be continually in consultation with their home Governments. Nor is such a development desired by the Governments of Canada or South Africa. But it seems to be clear that some better method of regional co-ordination, especially in the Pacific, is desired, and it is to be hoped that arrangements may be made which will satisfy public opinion in Australasia that their voice is fully and adequately heard in the protection of the Empire in the Pacific.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, the Leader of the House, will be able to make any statement on that subject today. Possibly the Washington Conference may have consequences in that direction. That Conference has already evoked an historic declaration signed by four of the great Powers and by twenty-two of the smaller ones, endorsing the
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Atlantic Charter and pledging the whole of the twenty-six united nations to the devotion of the whole of their forces and resources unremittingly to secure complete victory. I am sure all your Lordships will endorse what was said by the noble Lord who has just spoken in appreciation of the efforts made by the Prime Minister, and also I would add by the Foreign Secretary, in undertaking the fatigues and facing the risks, of long journeys under war conditions. Their action, I am sure, is fully appreciated by all their fellow countrymen.
Not least important of the effects of the Japanese aggression, and the initial success that it has won, is to be seen in India. At last, and very belatedly, the political Parties there seem to have gained a greater sense of the realities of the world situation. I have been for many years a friend, and, in many respects, an admirer of Mr. Gandhi, but I am constrained to say that in the present juncture his withdrawal from the Congress leadership is an advantage to the cause of the freedom and peace of the world and also of India, which cannot be isolated from the travails of the world. The uncompromising pacifist, however little he may intend it, is, in effect, the accomplice of the aggressor. Nevertheless, India has been playing a great part in the war through her material resources and through her immense man-power, and the valour of the Indian Forces in the field, in many of the campaigns, has aroused the admiration of us all. Yet India, through lack of political unity, has hitherto been doing less than her duty to the world in this great crisis of our times.
I have felt it my duty, during recent years, on several previous occasions, when affairs relating to India have been debated in this House, to say that, in my view, the whole situation has not been happily handled by the Imperial Government here in Westminster. It has been said at the outset, and has been repeatedly declared, that it was obvious that no great constitutional changes could be made in India during the course of a great war, and that has been very widely accepted. I venture to submit that so far from it being obvious such a conclusion was wholly unjustified, and that at all events important preparatory steps might be taken in spite of the fact that the attention of the Empire must be mainly devoted to the conduct of the

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war. The continuous repetition of phrases, well-worn during the last decade and more, about "India's goal" and "'India's manifest destiny" merely irritated Indian political opinion, and those who voice it have urged that something very different and more effective is needed. The repetition of phrases about "ultimate Dominion status" is regarded as a form of procrastination.
But to-day, at this moment, there has been undoubtedly a considerable change, and the immediate situation is, I venture to think, more hopeful than it has been at any time during the course of the war. The release of the political prisoners; the notable change in the constitution of the Viceroy's Council; the withdrawal of Mr. Gandhi with his uncompromising Pacifism from the leadership of the Congress Party; the emergence in the forefront of that very wise Indian statesman, the late Premier of Madras, Mr. Rajagopalachariar, and the appeal recently by thirteen distinguished leaders of Indian opinion who are not members of either of the contending Parties, including three members of His Majesty's Privy Council and that leading figure in present day Indian thought, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan—all these things create a fresh situation of which I hope His Majesty's Government will not be slow to take full advantage. This is not the occasion on which to consider in detail the specific proposals which have lately been put forward, and I should be sorry to pledge myself in advance to support them in every particular, but I earnestly trust that the Government will give to these proposals not only respectful consideration, for that will be assured, but also sympathetic attention, in the hope of arriving at a provisional solution of the problem of securing united Indian effort in a cause that is supremely great.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I hope that the two noble Lords who have already addressed your Lordships will forgive me if I do not follow them in referring to the two most important matters they have just raised, and that they will allow me, for a few minutes, to deal with one subject—the situation in the Pacific. I am sure that all your Lordships feel most keenly for our fellow subjects, both Asiatic and European, in Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya and else-
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where who have done so much to build up the prosperity, peace, happiness and progress of these great British Colonies. Two noble Lords I know, my noble friend the Earl of Cork and my noble friend Lord Chatfield, will remember the great kindness and courtesy which we always received from our fellow subjects who were temporarily exiled in Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong and elsewhere. Those people upheld British traditions and were a credit to the whole Empire.
I gave notice to the noble Lord the Leader of the House, as Colonial Secretary, of certain questions which I proposed to ask—one or two of them have already been put forward by Lord Addison—with reference to recent events in the Western Pacific and South China and what occurred at Hong Kong. I gather that lately, and for some years past, it has been the view in higher circles that Hong Kong was isolated and could not be held against determined attack without outside help, and this we were not in a position to give when Japan attacked. We had to face the Japanese alone there, a great part of the American Fleet being temporarily immobilized in the Western Pacific. It has been suggested that in the circumstances Hong Kong was untenable. I venture to say that that was an error. It could have been held, and not only held but made into an invaluable bridgehead for further operations towards the territory of Kowloon. The territory of Kowloon is defended by a perimeter of hills, and these hills during the last two and a half years—I will not now talk about the time before the war; I will come later to reasons why more was not done—could have been strongly fortified. There was ample labour available. The same people who built the Burma Road could have put up almost impregnable fortifications.
Of course to hold the Kowloon mainland as well as the island of Hong Kong with a couple of brigades of British, Canadian and Indian troops was impossible. The Japanese brought up six divisions. But if we had pursued the proper policy during the preceding two and a half years, and had recruited our Chinese fellow citizens in Hong Kong to be soldiers, we could have had six divisions. The noble Lord the Leader of the House will say, "Ah, yes, but what about munitions?" Well, you might

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have had munitions made there. There is a big engineering industry in Hong Kong with ample skilled labour and it could have provided a very great deal of equipment. That would have had to be done preferably in collaboration with the Chinese National Government. I was very disappointed indeed to see that General Wavell made his most valuable journey to Chungking to consult with the Chinese General Staff only after Hong Kong was under siege. A little prevision, especially when the Japanese went info Indo-China, and when everybody knew, or should have known, what was most likely to happen, would have led to these consultations being arranged for months before the trouble began. I should also like to ask, in connexion with Kowloon, a similar question to that which has been asked with regard to Malaya: how far did we go, before evacuating the Kowloon territory, in destroying the very valuable docks there, and the engineering installations and workshops?
With regard to the defence of Malaya, I had the privilege of being shown over Singapore, and was also in Penang, in the year of the war, 1939. When I returned, I made a detailed report, as far as I could, to the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, who is now our distinguished High Commissioner in Canada, and to my noble friend Lord Chatfield, who was then Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, in the latter case with regard to certain aspects of the subject only I ventured to point out that not in my opinion, but in the opinion of everyone to whom I spoke out there—men in responsible positions, men whom I used to know as young planters, and with whom I played football, but who are now leaders of commerce, members of the Legislative Council, and so on, men who have devoted their lives to building up our interests in Malaya, as well as the Service people—there were certain defects, which I brought, as I thought it was right to do, to the notice of the appropriate authorities here. I am sure that a great deal has been done since then to improve matters. First of all, however, I wish to pay a great tribute to the then General Officer Commanding, General Dobbie, who is now in Malta. He was undoubtedly a great loss to Singapore. Everybody had the greatest confidence in him; but the people did not have the same confidence in cer-
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tain other high personages holding most responsible positions in the Colony and in the Federated States. There were certain defects of character and of temperament which I thought it right to point out, of which I knew not from my own observation but from the information of people who could be trusted; and I am not surprised that there was a chaotic position when the trouble began, because the same people retained high office.
With regard to the defence of Malaya, there again we had an opportunity which was lost. There are in the Malay States two million Chinese, who are, for the most part, British subjects. They hate the Japanese like poison. They raised large sums of money at that time and subsequently for the support of the Government of Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking. We could have raised an Army from these two million Chinese, supported by a much larger Army raised from among the Malays—I will come to that in a moment—which would have eaten the Japanese who came into Malaya. The vaunted invincibility of the Japanese is sheer nonsense. They have storm troops who no doubt are very good, but man for man in the fighting of the last four and a half years in China the Chinese soldiers have been the equal and the superior of the Japanese, and, when they have had anything like the same equipment, they have defeated them again and again; all the world knows that.
It was obvious that the fortress of Singapore was very strong, but the defence of the hinterland demanded a much larger field Army than we had available, and the obvious thing was to recruit from our Chinese fellow-citizens. I was told, "Yes, we know, but unfortunately there is trouble between the Powers That Be and the leaders of the Kuomintang." It is to that Party that the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Wellington Koo, and the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, belong; it is the National Party of the present Government of China, and probably the majority of the Chinese in Malaya are members of it. There was, however, some friction there, and I understand that the leader of the Kuomintang, a very respectable and respected Chinese citizen, was deported from the Colony and has now had to be brought back.
With regard to the Malays, the account that we have had of the tiny State forces

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of Malays—in one of the great States they numbered only one hundred, maintained for the dignity of the Sultan—is that they behaved admirably; but why were there so few of them? The population of the Malay States would support a very large Army: why was it not raised? His Majesty's Government will say, "You could raise them, but you would not have the equipment for them." In Singapore, however, a local arms-making industry could have been built up, because there is a very large engineering industry there now, and much skilled labour. I venture to ask for some explanation of this point from His Majesty's Government.
With regard to the general lack of preparation of the civil population, and the lack of proper civil defence arrangements, I do not want to emphasize the position, which has been described in the newspapers, but it is obvious that a great deal was lacking, and that a great deal of preparation was required. I should like to ask who is responsible out there for the broad scheme of defence, and particularly of civil defence. A very distinguished British statesman, Mr. Duff Cooper, who has held high and important offices here, is out there as a direct representative of the War Cabinet. Is he really in a position of authority there now, and can he resolve the conflicting interests which are apparently holding up certain very essential preparations? My noble friend Lord Addison asked about the destruction of plant and stores at Penang. I should like to amplify that, and in particular to ask the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, whether it is a fact that the wireless station was allowed to fall intact into Japanese hands. I understand that the Japanese used it very shortly afterwards for their usual poisonous propaganda to the local population. It is also stated in the Press that in Penang the Japanese captured 1,000 motor cars, 1,000 tons of copper, 2,000 tons of rubber, 500 barrels of petroleum, and so on. In a dispatch of January 4 last appearing in the Daily Mail, and describing the Japanese landing which has caused so much trouble on the west coast of Malaya—the guarded side—it is stated that the landing was effected by soldiers from barges towed by two steamers from Penang. There must have been something very wrong there if those ships were allowed to fall into enemy hands. Those are just a few questions
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which I really think should be answered, and the reason I put them forward is, as my noble friend Lord Addison has said, that by attention to these matters we may hope to get some remedy for the future.
Referring generally to the defence of the British and Allied possessions round the South China Seas, what is the present responsibility of the Committee of Imperial Defence? Does it exist any more? Has it functioned during the war? My noble friend Lord Chatfield shakes his head. Before the war, what was the Committee's responsibility? Surely the duty of the Committee of Imperial Defence was to keep a very close eye on the developments in the Far East, and particularly on the defence preparations which we were making. We have to-day the responsibility of the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Defence Committee, but my noble friend Lord Moyne—who himself, I am glad to remember, has an intimate and wide knowledge of the part of the world which I am discussing—will be the last man to divest himself of his responsibilities as Colonial Secretary. We shall not find him dropping his office of Colonial Secretary as a sort of chrysalis skin and appearing only as the glittering butterfly the Leader of your Lordships' House. He will not shirk his responsibilities. I am afraid that the Colonial Office will have a great deal to answer for in the future with regard to this part of the world.
While we are talking of these matters I must also draw attention to a topic touched on by my noble friend Lord Addison, and that is the very disquieting event of the cabling direct from Canberra of the Australian Prime Minister to President Roosevelt and our own Prime Minister in Washington on matters of strategy. I know the valuable work that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in His Majesty's Government does, but there must be some lack of consultation and information to make it necessary for the Prime Minister of Australia to have to cable direct to our own Prime Minister and to the President of the United States in Washington on matters of the highest importance regarding the defence of the Pacific and of Australia.
May I ask the Leader of the House a question about the Intelligence Service? I do not know whose responsibility the Intelligence Service in Malaya is. I do

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not know what Department it comes under, but it seems not to have provided the necessary information. For example, what reports did we get of the attitude of the Thais? We were led to suppose that they would resist Japanese aggression, that they would fight for their independance. Well, everything seems to have been well prepared in advance for the Japanese, and they did nothing of the kind. What Intelligence Service have we functioning in Thailand, and what information did it provide?
With regard to the whole question of strategy generally, if your Lordships will permit me just to make this remark, I can see a danger in these new arrangements that we are making for joint planning and control of the various theatres of war. The danger I see is that we are not separating the planning departments, the thinking departments which prepare our future plans, from the bodies which are engaged in the day-to-day strategy. The same body cannot do both. You must have your planning committee of the best experts you can get, who have access to all the information and intelligence from all sources. It ought to be a joint international body, with access to intelligence reports from America, China, Russia, the British Empire, and so on. It must have the fullest information as to our material resources in the future, and it must make plans for the future, which is not a simple matter in modern conditions, when you have to co-ordinate three different Fighting Forces and the action of twenty-six nations engaged. That body cannot possibly also conduct the day-to-day strategy and administration, and the danger I see is that you are not separating those two bodies.
There are two policies with regard to strategy in the future. One is the policy of Mr. Micawher. We have seen it in action for two and a half years. It was the Franco-British policy during the first period of the war, the policy of sitting down behind the Maginot Line and waiting for something to turn up. It was our policy in the second period, when we were waiting for the Germans to invade us. Then, when something does turn up, such as the German invasion of Russia or America's entry into the war, we are not ready to take advantage of our good luck. That is the attitude of Mr. Micawber. The other policy is to prepare in advance.
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You have an excellent example of that in the present Libyan campaign, prepared six months beforehand in most careful detail. That is a strategy, that is a policy, and its preparation in advance in all its details is a matter that is carried out very efficiently by our two principal enemies. Both the Germans and the Japanese are very good at it; they make all their preparations well in advance, and perhaps in too great detail.
I said just now that we were not ready with plans when the United States entered the war. Curiously enough, we were not ready last time; we had an ad hoc strategy then. I should have thought the chance of America being drawn into the war was so obvious that we would have had three plans ready, and that they would have been discussed in advance, the first envisaging the United States being at war with Japan only, the second their being at war with Germany only—that was a possibility; the Japanese might have kept out altogether—and the third contemplating a war with the whole Axis. Those are the three master plans that could have been prepared in advance, and I can find no evidence that they were seriously considered. What we did was to go on planning for the United States continuing as a non-belligerent. It was equally urgent to make plans for co-operation with Russia in certain eventualities.
Now there was a certain amount of local preparation made in what were called the A.B.C.D. talks in the Western Pacific with the Dutch, the Americans and the Chinese, and may I echo what has been said by my noble friend about the magnificent help we have had from the Dutch East Indies and the far-sighted Dutch Commanders in Asia in their preparations for this eventuality? If there had been a thinking department functioning with American representatives such as I have been trying to describe, and if these plans had been made in advance, the American Pacific Fleet and its aircraft would not have been at Hawaii at all, they would have been at Manila, or, better still, at Singapore; and the time to have moved the Pacific Fleet and its supply ships there was when the Japanese walked into Indo-China. That was the danger signal; that was the time when we should have taken action. If that had been done, I venture to say there was a possibility that the Japanese might have kept out altogether. But I only cite

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this as an example of the need of the most expert and competent planning body you can find, which you must separate from your day-to-day administration and strategy.
Just one word about the Japanese propaganda of Asia for the Asiatics. It is very dangerous unless it can be countered, and it can be countered. It was already at work when I was out there two and a half years ago. The Chinese and the Malays laughed at it; they said it only means "Asia for the Japanese." "Asia for the Asiatics" is the policy of His Majesty's Government—of successive Governments of His Majesty for two decades. The late Duke of Devonshire laid down the whole policy of trusteeship with regard to our Colonies, which I believe on the whole we have tried to follow out. That really is Asia for the Asiatics, at least Asia for the Asiatics in our own Dominions and territories. If we plan on those lines and encourage these peoples in the control of their own affairs and the defence of their own territories I am certain we shall have the right response, and the Japanese propaganda will fall on stony ground.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD MOYNE): My Lords, the scope of to-day's debate reflects the enormous extension of the war which has unfolded itself during the last month, and it is impossible in the time during which I should feel justified in claiming the attention of your Lordships to do more than touch very briefly on some of the more important questions which have been asked. I had better begin, I think, with the matter of defence of home aerodromes which was raised by the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition. I know that this matter has caused very deep anxiety in many quarters, and it has been the subject of long and careful consideration by our military advisers. The difficulty is obvious. It is a problem which affects the join-up between the Air Force and the Army, and in this problem of co-operation we had to find a solution which will avoid the danger of divided responsibility. The loss of aerodromes in Crete brought home to us the vital need of some solution which will avoid these dangers at home. In Crete we had command of the sea but hot of the air. Malaya is perhaps hardly in point in comparison with this country, because
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we lost the aerodromes in Malaya not from lack of local defence, but because the whole line went back. In the case of Malaya also we had command neither of the sea nor of the air.
These experiences have taught many lessons as to the necessary tactics and equipment for local aerodrome defence. In the Battle of Britain we had superiority both on land and sea, and we have every intention and expectation of keeping this in both respects. To-day we are much stronger than we were a year ago, but our aerodromes are likely to be the first objective in case of invasion. The first lines of defence will be on the sea and in the air, and our superiority there will deal with surface invasion. Air superiority will strike at air-borne attack, and frustrate attempts to attack aerodromes from the coast. But even if our main defences hold, successful raids on our aerodromes might well result in very grave consequences. Though local aerodrome defence is the last line behind the Navy, the Air Force, and the first line Home Forces, it must be a vital part of our organization. The new arrangements will cover not only Royal Air Force aerodromes, but also the naval aerodromes and those of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
It is evident that local defence strategy must dovetail in with the operations of the mobile Army, and far more coordination with the mobile and static defence must be a primary responsibility of the military commander in planning our land defences. The Royal Air Force on an aerodrome possess a large fund of disciplined man-power, primarily for serviceing aeroplanes but also of very great value, when armed and trained, for local defence in an emergency. This ground staff is necessarily under the control of the Station Commander and the problem consists in avoiding divided responsibility between him and the local Army Command. After careful examination by all three Services, it has been decided that, while Army responsibility for ground defence as a whole must be maintained, the Royal Air Force under military direction and as agent for the Army shall undertake the entire local defence arrangements at its aerodromes. A corps of aerodrome defence troops called the Royal Air Force Regiment under the executive and administrative control of the Air

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Council will be formed for that purpose. Major-General Liardet, until recently Inspector of Aerodrome Defence, has been appointed Director-General of Ground Defence in the Air Ministry, and as the senior officer of the Regiment, although not exercising operational control, he will be given the title of Commander.
LORD ADDISON: May I ask my noble friend what he means by "operational control"?
LORD MOYNE: Operational control will be in the hands of the local aerodrome commander carrying out the plans which have been concerted with the local Army Command. The Director-General will have a staff of other Army officers of all ranks and high qualifications and experience, who will be seconded to the Royal Air Force for that purpose. The corps will be equipped for its special task not only with ordinary infantry arms, but with artillery and armoured fighting vehicles. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces will decide the disposition of aerodrome garrisons, and will indicate to the Air Ministry the necessary methods of defence. At the same time each Royal Air Force Station Commander will, under the direction of the Royal Air Force, be responsible for the local defence of the station, and exercise full executive control not only over the ground staff auxiliaries, but also over the whole-time garrison troops of the Royal Air Force Regiment. In the event of active army operations near an aerodrome, the Station Commander, for purposes of defence, comes under the operational control of the local military Commander, with whom he will previously have concerted plans for combined defence. This scheme is the result of prolonged and careful examination by the three Services, and we believe that it is the best that can possibly be developed to prevent the confusion of divided responsioility.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: May I ask whether these arrangements are limited to Great Britain or whether they will apply to other parts of the Empire?
LORD MOYNE: I cannot, at this moment, give any indication as to future developments outside this country. It will clearly take considerable time to build up this new force, and for the moment there is no definite decision as to how far it will be available for service in other
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theatres. That matter is still under consideration.
LORD GIFFORD: May I ask the noble Lord whether what he has said applies to naval aerodromes?
LORD MOYNE: The naval aerodromes and the aerodromes of the Ministry of Aircraft Production come into the scheme parallel with the Royal Air Force aerodromes. Now, I would like to come to the wider field. Most of the discussion to-day has dealt with the situation in the Far East after a month of war. We have to remember that Japan started with a great strategic advantage of interior lines, which have enabled her to concentrate overwhelming force in the shortest possible time at any selected point. She seems to be staking everything on quick results, and on the dispersal of her forces which, collectively, are incomparably stronger in man-power and resources. Prompt measures have been taken to counter this initial advantage.
Of outstanding importance are the meetings of the Prime Minister with President Roosevelt. They have in four weeks brought about against Japan that unity of command which it took nearly four years to achieve against Germany in the last war. The indomitable General Chiang Kai-shek gave a heartening lead by his message: at the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, when he stated that all the Chinese man-power, armed forces and resources were unreservedly at Allied disposal. We welcome the invaluable advantage of General Chiang Kai-sheks experience. I also would like to re-echo what the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, said of the wonderful tenacity and courage of the Chinese Army, and the splendid qualities it has shown during these years of war with inferior equipment and with everything against it. The war cannot, of course, be divided into compartments, and the next step after securing unity of command in the Pacific will be to solve the problems of co-ordination on a world scale. We were told on Tuesday by President Roosevelt, in effect, that American resources are also being pooled with ours for the war on Germany. The Foreign Secretary's Mission to Moscow has also been a very important step towards world-wide unity of control and the best use of our resources within the great alliance, not, I

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hope, only in war but also in post-war re-settlement. There is, of course, no historical precedent to guide us in the problem of strategic control of a world war, and it would be premature for His Majesty's Government to embark at this stage on public discussion of the problem and its possible solution.
To come back to the theatre of war where unity of command has already been arranged, the Battle of the Pacific began with two naval disasters, and the balance has for the moment been still further tilted in favour of Japan by the surrender of invaluable bases in Indo-China by the Vichy Government for the attack on Malaya. Japan no doubt timed her treachery to suit the interests of the Axis. The Nazis remind one of an old fox with the hounds close to his brush who is lucky enough to kick up a fresh fox and who, with crafty cunning, must be hoping that the pack will go off on the new scent. The Prime Minister is far too good a huntsman to allow such a diversion. In this war first things must come first. Germany is the main enemy, and we must never forget it. We have got to look at our commitments as a whole, and keep our perspective against the huge background of the world war. Taking these earlier commitments, Malta has shown that a small island inhabited by a gallant people, and led by the indomitable General Dobbie, can stand up in a way which has certainly defeated Nazi expectations from their incessant bombing. We surely cannot lessen the defence which the Air Force is able to give them, and which has helped them to face these heavy odds. The long-drawn battle of Cyrenaica has shown that in that theatre, too, we did not overestimate our needs in aeroplanes and tanks to secure the defeat of Rommel.
The prodigious change of fortunes in Russia is a great encouragement to her Allies and to the enslaved and tortured nations under the Axis yoke. We know that Russia is inflicting deadly wounds on Germany, and that our material help in fighter aeroplanes and tanks is a vital contribution to the full exploitation of her success. It clearly would not be right for me to disclose the vast scale of that help which we have been able to send at the time of Russia's emergency owing to the removal of her original war
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factories, but when those figures are disclosed I think it will surprise the world that, in our own difficulties, it has been possible to organize and to transport such a great contribution to the reorganization of the Russian lines. I ought, perhaps, to mention that the Foreign Secretary saw Russian troops in the field and was able to judge their wonderful morale. They have performed an astounding feat of arms by turning, after a long retirement, upon their aggressors with newly-organized Armies, and they have driven back the invaders in a way which may well prove more disastrous to the Nazis than the retreat of Napoleon. But I would remind your Lordships that there was a long road between Napoleon's retreat and his final overthrow. We must not base on this marvellous performance of Russia any complacent view of the task which still awaits us; but with all that reservation we cannot but be heartened by the evidences of distress which this has caused in Germany. The frantic appeals of Dr. Goebbels for fur coats and one glove at a time show that this retirement of the Nazis was not, to use the well-worn phrase, according to plan.
In the Far East our needs are of course very heavy on sea power, but they must not induce us to take any risks in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Our sea power in the West is cutting deep into the Nazis with a two edged weapon, first destroying their submarines and protecting our convoys, and with its second edge drawing away the life blood of our enemies by the dislocation of their supplies. Our forces in the Far East have had to take their place among these other urgent claims. The overwhelming resources of this country and the United States have been speedily mobilized to deal effectively with the Pacific war, but we have to reckon with the inevitable delays caused by time and space. Your Lordships will perhaps forgive me for saying that I think some of the suggestions which have been made would apply rather to a war fought in a vacuum than to the present Far Eastern war, which is being fought by the Allies not in a vacuum but subject to very heavy previous pressures. Before the Japanese attack we were straining every nerve to catch up Germany in man-power and resources. The war in the Pacific can only take its place as part of the Allied

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war effort as a whole, and no one ignorant of the resources available and of our previous commitments can judge whether the best possible measures have indeed been taken to organize victory.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked a question about the Committee of Imperial Defence, and clearly it was in his mind to discover whether far-sighted plans for the Far Eastern problems had been worked out in this country. The Committee of Imperial Defence was a peacetime organization and it was part of its function to advise the Government of the day and the Service Departments as to preparations for war emergencies. That Committee, as was planned and as took place in 1914, was dissolved at the outbreak of war. It was a purely advisory Committee and it would hare been a very cumbrous method to keep this advisory Committee advising the Cabinet and the results of the decisions going out through executive channels. Therefore at the outbreak of war the previous Government set up, as was intended, a War Cabinet and under that War Cabinet there was organized a Defence Committee which has delegated to it from the War Cabinet certain executive functions in connexion with the carrying out of plans which are worked out by the Services. The noble Lord need have no fear that the dissolution of the peace-time Committee of Imperial Defence has in any way been the cause of lessening responsibility for far-sighted plans.
On the details of the recent fighting in Malaya I would like to clear up one or two misapprehensions. Reference has been made to the loss of aerodromes. I think the noble Lord probably had in mind the aerodrome at Kota. Bahru. Undoubtedly its capture meant a great deal to the Japanese, but no amount of static and local ground defence would have saved that aerodrome nor the other ten or fifteen aerodromes which have fallen into Japanese hands owing to the whole line going back. Static defence cannot secure an aerodrome as an island in the midst of conquered territory. The static garrison cannot stand like Casabianca on the burning deck. They have got to be part of the defence while the territory round them is occupied by the mobile Army.
LORD ADDISON: I am sorry to interrupt and I hope the noble Lord will not
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think me discourteous, but the anxiety in my mind when discussing this point was due to the fact that these aerodromes were abandoned practically uninjured and were made a present in an efficient form to the enemy. They could easily have been destroyed.
LORD MOYNE: I understand that heavy destruction did take place, and that only a very small number of these aerodromes are actually in Japanese use. The noble Lord is well aware of the difficulty of the whole destruction of aerodromes. The blowing of craters is only a temporary measure, but we have evidence that the orders for maximum total destruction were carried out. I am afraid it is inevitable that the advantages of flat ground will again be used and the craters will be filled up. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked many questions about Hong Kong, of which he has close personal knowledge. He will understand that we have few details as to what actually took place, and he probably knows just as much as we do from the statements which have appeared in the Press from the members of the garrison who made their way into Chinese territory. We do know, however, that the plan for creating a strong defensive line had been carried out on the mainland. That line was about fifteen miles in length covered by pill boxes in depth and sited about six or seven miles from Kowloon on very favourable hilly ground. It was never intended that the main line of defence should be on the mainland. The plan always was that this line should be held long enough to allow the evacuation of Kowloon and the destruction of the great docks and engineering establishments which existed in Kowloon. We have every reason to believe that that plan was carried out, and that demolitions were effected before evacuation took place.
The noble Lord suggested that we ought to have taken greater advantage of local man-power. I am afraid that, although he dismissed it very cursorily, the difficulty of equipment is a very real one, and the same problem exists throughout many of our territories. We are doing everything we can to produce equipment wherever there is available plant and manpower. As the noble Lord well knows, the Chinese are excellent workers, and a great deal of military equipment has actually been produced in the Colony of

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Hong Kong. I can only give the numbers of the forces engaged in round figures, but there was a local force of about 6,000 apart from the armed police, and they are to be added to some 4,000 British, about 2,000 Canadians and about 2,000 Indians.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, may I ask if the 6,000 to whom the noble Leader of the House refers, were Chinese troops?
LORD MOYNE: My Lords, I am afraid I have not got the full details. That was the local force but the men in it were by no means all Chinese.
LORD STRABOLGI: It would include European volunteers, who are a very valuable force, I know, would it not?
LORD MOYNE: Yes, it would; there was no racial discrimination in this force, but, as I say, I have not got the full details. We do not yet know how the Japanese were able unexpectedly to effect a landing on the island, but once this had been achieved reinforcements of overwhelming strength crossed the narrow straits, and it was then clear that it could be only a matter of time before the height and the water supply were in the hands of the enemy. After a phase of hand-to-hand fighting in the streets, all further effective resistance became impossible. I think it will be obvious to any one who has been to Hong Kong that once the high ground and the water supply were lost the garrison could only fight on, as they did, to exact the highest possible price from the swarms of attackers who so greatly outnumbered them. Evacuation of Hong Kong in advance of attack has been suggested from various quarters, though not by any of your Lordships to-day. I would point out in regard to this matter that it would have been a very great military advantage if we could have retained Hong Kong because if the Chinese had been able to effect a junction with us it would have given them a new, and far shorter, line of seaborne supply than the supply line they possess in the Burma Road.
The noble Lord, Lord Addison, and other speakers, have made inquiries as to the alleged failure of the scorched earth policy in Malaya and elsewhere, and have asked on whom must be thrown the responsibility. The stories of failure to destroy essential equipment of value to
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the enemy at Penang are at present the subject of inquiry, and I can only make a very provisional statement on the information which has reached the Colonial Office. I hope that the House will bear that reservation in mind, and will understand that I cannot be sure that the picture is complete. The account which has reached us of the destruction in Penang suggests that there has been considerable exaggeration as to the alleged failure of the policy of destruction. In Penang the problem of destroying commodities was much complicated by the need for speed and secrecy, which were essential for successful evacuation. The destruction had, accordingly, to be effected by other means than by explosion or fire. By various methods, the Army rendered the fixed defences useless except as scrap iron, but the embargo on fire is said to have made it impossible to destroy a considerable amount of commodities which thereby fell into the hands of the enemy. I have made inquiries about the wireless station, but I have not been able to get any definite information either way.
As to shipping, all vessels were successfully evacuated except about fifty small craft, the largest of which were six vessels, none of them exceeding 75 tons. It was impossible to remove these in the short time available owing to the effect of the series of heavy bombing attacks which had caused the disappearance of their Indian crews. The absence of air defence and fighter aircraft to which the noble Lord alluded was due to lack of resources and to the loss of the forward aerodromes and many of the aeroplanes. As to Thailand, full reports were received over the whole period preceding the Japanese war from our British Minister, and he had a Military Attaché on his staff. The probable attitude of the Thailand Government was accurately appreciated, and no effort was spared in a prolonged attempt to promote a spirit of independence and resistance to Japanese aggression which was so clearly threatened by reason of their taking over bases from the Vichy Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked about the responsibility of the Minister who has been in Malaya, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. I am afraid that I cannot say anything definite at this moment. As your Lordships will realize, reorganization is in progress, and I do not know exactly how the Singapore com-

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mands will be arranged under the Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell. On the smaller problem of civil defence, the arrangements are controlled by the Government, while the Army and Air Defence are under the Commander-in-Chief. There has been the fullest co-ordination by means of a War Council, as to the future of which I am afraid that at the present time I can give no definite forecast.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Before the noble Lord leaves that question of the defence of Singapore, may I ask whether the military Commander-in-Chief, if I may so call him, is satisfied with the arrangements which have been made? With the Japanese knocking at the door, is he satisfied that Singapore should not be under Martial Law?
LORD MOYNE: It is under Martial Law. We have had considerable discussion as to exactly how Martial Law was to be legally founded, and it is actually in force. Our Colonial outposts have so far borne the brunt of the attack. It has clearly been impossible to defend all our Dependencies, many of which, such as Borneo, are of great area. The chief prize in Biitish Borneo consists of the oilfields in Sarawak and Brunei. A scheme for their complete destruction and for the demolition of refineries, pipe-lines and other plant was worked out by experts specially sent out by the Petroleum Department. A telegram was dispatched to complete the scheme even before the outbreak of war, and we have received a report to the effect that it has been fully carried out. There can therefore be no foundation for the reports that the Japanese are obtaining any oil, because this must be impossible until they have sunk new wells and erected new refineries and pipe-lines. Russia has shown the importance of this policy of "scorched earth," and of course, the developed resources of Malaya are far richer than those of Borneo. The scorched-earth policy will be ruthlessly applied. The War Council at Singapore have given instructions that all stocks of rubber, copra, refined metals, oil and other commodities of value to the enemy, and also mining plant and transpont, are to be denied to him by ruthless destruction.
There is a peculiar practice known in the Far East as "running amok"—a state of murderous frenzy where his own
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life seems as nothing to the aggressor. There is something of this spirit in the ferocious exploitation of their opportunities by the Japanese. Undoubtedly we have anxious weeks and months ahead; but the vast resources in shipping and munitions announced by President Roosevelt show that, once we have settled with our main enemy in Europe, it will be impossible for a nation with the limited man-power and small productive resources of Japan to escape the overthrow which she has challenged.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I understand that other noble Lords who had thought of speaking have decided not to intervene. I would therefore thank the noble Lord for his statement. But I am bound to say that in some respects it increases the misgiving which I previously felt. I am sorry to have to say that. With regard to the proposals which the noble Lord announced for the defence of aerodromes, various questions immediately occur to one's mind, but I think the matter is so grave and so important "that we ought to have time to consider it. I should like the noble Lord to know, however, that I feel that it would be right to have a full discussion of that important matter as soon as possible and, if need be, in secret. On that, of course, I can confer with him as to his wishes', but I am sure that the matter should be discussed. My mind is left extremely dissatisfied.
I heard what the noble Lord said about Malaya, and about what was done with regard to the scorched-earth policy in Penang. It does not make me feel any happier. The whole thing speaks of indecision and feeble direction, and without a doubt he must know that as well as I do. I only hope and pray, as we all do, that the new arrangements will have abolished that sort of thing, and that under General Wavell's direction we shall have a clear-sighted, ruthless war policy. I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

SECRET SESSION.
LORD MOYNE: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now sit in Secret Session.
Moved, That the House do now sit in Secret Session.—(Lord Moyne.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
The Official Reporter then withdrew.
House in Secret Session.
House resumed in Open Session.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have been complied with:

Bilston Corporation;

Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway;

Coventry Corporation;

Mid-Wessex Water;

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Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks;

Pembrokeshire County Council.

The same was ordered to lie on the Table.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932.
Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Act to the County Borough of Dudley:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for affirmative Resolution and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned.