Sitting of 26 February 1942

Preamble
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.]

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES FUND ACCOUNTS, 1940.
Accounts ordered,
"of the Civil Contingencies Fund, 1940, showing (1) the Receipts and Payments in connection with the Fund in the year ended 31st March, 1941; (2) the Distribution of the Capital of the Fund at the commencement and close of the year; with a Copy of the Correspondence with the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon." — [Captain Crookshank.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  NATIONAL WAR EFFORT.

    LOWER GRADE MEN.
    Major Lyonsasked the Minister of Labour whether any, and which, persons in Grade III, have been mobilised for appropriate military or other service in their age groups?
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Bevin): Some men who had been placed in Grade III by reason only of defects of vision were called up in 1940, but the vision standards have since been reviewed and these men would now be placed in a higher medical grade. Under present arrangements Grade III men are not in general called up for military service but are considered for transfer to work of national importance if they are not already so employed. Approximately 17,650 men in the medical Grades III and IV had been transferred in this way up to the end of January last.

    PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT (WOMEN).
    Mr. Culverwellasked the Minister of Labour whether he will take steps to secure the part-time employment on munition production of women who, owing to their family and other responsibilities, are unable to accept full-time employment?
    Mr. Bevin: Yes, Sir, with the co-operation of both sides of industry I am pressing on employers both in munitions and in other industries the adoption of schemes for part-time employment. I am informed that where these have been introduced they are working successfully, and I shall continue to urge their introduction to the utmost possible extent.
    Mr. Culverwell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a great number of women—I have had letters from several—who are only too anxious to undertake some form of war service but are precluded from doing so by the fact that manufacturers do not seem anxious to fit them in; and will he take more comprehensive and active steps to secure that this waste is prevented?
    Mr. Bevin: I am pressing it all the time, but the education of employers is very difficult.

    WORKS COUNCILS.
    Mr. Lipsonasked the Minister of Labour whether it is his policy to encourage production inquiry committees to be set up as sub-committees of works councils?
    Mr. Bevin: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply I gave on this subject to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent (Mr. Ellis Smith) on 19th February. Those who set up works councils are the best judges as to which of their functions, if any, can be most appropriately performed by sub-committees.
    Mr. Lipson: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he has discussed this matter with representatives of employers' organisations and with the T.U.C., and whether he is satisfied with the response he has received from both bodies?
    Mr. Bevin: I have discussed it with both sides, but I must point out that most of these negotiations are not conducted with the T.U.C. The arrangements have to be made direct between the unions responsible for the wage negotiations and the industry concerned.
    Mr. George Griffiths: Will the Minister see that when these production committees are set up the men's side have at least as much power as the other side, because the other people have the idea that the men's place ought to be under the table?
    Mr. Manderasked the Minister of Labour whether, in connection with the setting up of joint consultative machinery in the form of works councils, it is the policy of the Government that these should be based on trade union membership in all cases?
    Mr. Bevin: The policy of the Government in this matter is to encourage the most effective methods of joint consultation. In my view, the question of the precise form of machinery to be set up to ensure that consultation, is best left to the representatives of employers and workers to decide by mutual agreement.
    Mr. Mander: In cases where, unfortunately, the men are not in a union, or where only a portion of them are in a union, what steps are taken? I am asking only for information.
    Mr. Bevin: I know of very few industries now in which some of the men are not in a union. It has to be remembered, and I would emphasise the point, that if these shop committees are to be effective, then they must have some discipline through executives of unions, or they may cut right across a general agreement and cause industrial disputes.
    Mr. Mander: Do I understand that it is not intended that these committees should be set up in non-union works?
    Mr. Bevin: I have not suggested that.

    NURSING SERVICES.
    Mr. Brookeasked the Minister of Labour whether, in view of the shortage of nurses, his interviewing staff have specific instructions to encourage and advise women who, when called for interview, appear to be generally suitable for this work, about undertaking nursing training as a full-time form of war service?
    Mr. Bevin: My officers are instructed to give full information about the nursing profession to any persons coming to local offices who appear to be suitable, and nursing is one of the services for which women who are interviewed under the Registration for Employment Order are encouraged to volunteer.

    NIGHT WORK (WOMEN).
    Mr. Douglasasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that 200
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    women have recently left an engineering works, the name of which has been supplied to him, owing to the work being organised on the basis of two shifts of 12 hours each; and whether he will endeavour to avoid such a method of organisation in industries where women's labour is needed?
    Mr. Bevin: I understand that a system of day and night shifts was recently instituted in place of two day-shifts, about 250 out of 700 of the women being put on the shift system, with five nights in alternate weeks, and the remainder on day work only. A number of married women objected to night work on the ground of domestic responsibilities, and some of the workers have been allowed to leave, though my information does not confirm the figure of 200. I am making further inquiry into this particular case.

    BOYS (HOURS OF WORK).
    Mr. Kenneth Lindsayasked the Minister of Labour what steps he is taking to restrict the hours of labour for boys between the ages of 14 years and 18 years, so that they can take advantage of the schemes of National Youth Service?
    Mr. Bevin: I am desirous of assisting the National Youth Service scheme in every possible way, but in present circumstances I should not be justified in doing so by reducing the hours of work below those which are legally permissible and are reasonably practicable in the particular establishment.
    Mr. Lindsay: Is my right hon. Friend aware that of six boys whom I interviewed last night under the National Registration Scheme one was working 77 hours a week, one 68 and one 66½—that is, 50 per cent. of the boys whom I actually saw; and while I admit that not one of them objected to helping the national effort in this way, is it the policy of the Department to agree to such hours?
    Mr. Bevin: Not to such hours as those. If my hon. Friend will give me particulars, I will go into the case. I cannot, of course, be aware of what happened in the case of the boys he interviewed last night.

    SUNDAY WORK, NORTH SCOTLAND.
    Mr. Woodburnasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that some workers in the North of Scotland are suffering loss and hardship in doing work of national importance by the refusal of local inhabitants to provide them with lodgings if they work on Sunday; and what steps he proposes to take to convince the people concerned that this is work of necessity?
    Mr. Bevin: No such cases have come to my knowledge. If my hon. Friend will give me particulars of the cases he has in mind, I will make inquiries.

    DOCKYARD WORKERS (PRESS STATEMENT).
    Major Sir Jocelyn Lucasasked the Minister of Labour whether, in view of the publicity given to the fining of 10 dockyard workers by their trade union for having worked overtime on unloading a ship, he will make a statement to clarify the position and to allay public anxiety?
    Mr. Bevin: The men concerned were not fined for working overtime but for doing work appropriate to another gang, thus infringing a long-established rule of their union providing for the equal distribution of work. I regret very much that public anxiety should have been caused by inaccurate and misleading reports on this subject in the Press.

    BANK STAFFS.
    Mr. Glenvil Hallasked the Minister of Labour what steps the bankers' committee has taken to ensure the efficient use of man-power in banks and the greatest possible release of bank men and women for employment elsewhere; whether consultations have taken place; and whether the Bank Officers' Guild has been invited to co-operate in this?
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. McCorquodale): As a result of consultations which have taken place between the Treasury, my Department, and a committee representing the Clearing House banks, arrangements have been made for the release of a large number of men for the Forces resulting in a retention by the Clearing House banks of approximately 45 per cent. of their total pre-war male clerical staff. Men in other banks, including the Bank of England, are called
    328
    up for the Forces subject to deferment being granted on the recommendation of the Treasury to those who are indispensable. In addition, arrangements have been made for all banks to release women employees in the 20–21 age groups except certain women with special qualifications. The Bank Officers' Guild have been kept informed of these arrangements at all stages.
    Mr. Hall: Why has this Guild not been taken into consultation, in view of the fact that it is ready to help in the release of these people?
    Mr. McCorquodale: I understand that the arrangements have been working very satisfactorily.
    Mr. Higgs: Can the hon. Gentleman say the average hours worked by bank clerks?
    Mr. McCorquodale: That is another question.

  MILITARY SERVICE.

    ENTERTAINMENTS NATIONAL SERVICE COMMITTEE.
    Major Lyonsasked the Minister of Labour the names, occupations and ages of the members of the Entertainments National Service Committee; the date of its establishment and by whom the members were selected; when, and at whose request it sits to hear applications for deferment or exemption from military service of music hall or theatrical artists, and to what review is it subject; the number of such persons who have received deferment or exemption through or after consideration by this committee; and whether any other, and which, committees exist to deal with these or similar requests from such persons?
    Mr. Bevin: As the reply is of considerable length; I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Major Lyons: While thanking my right hon. Friend, may I ask whether he himself will keep an eye upon this and similar bodies?
    Mr. Bevin: Yes, Sir, both eyes.
    Following is the reply:
    The following is a list of the members of the Entertainments National Service Committee:

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    Mr. Percival M. Selby (Chairman)—Theatrical Managers Association.

    Mr. S. E. Linnitt—Theatrical Managers Association and Society of West End Managers.

    Mr. Firth Shephard—Society of West End Managers.

    Mr. R. H. Gillespie—Entertainment Protection Association (Variety).

    Mr. Lee Ephraim—Association of Touring and Producing Managers and Theatrical Managers Association.

    Mr. Louis Casson—Association of Touring and Producing Managers and Theatrical Managers Association.

    Mr. Llewellyn Rees—Actors (British) Equity Association.

    Captain J. Russell Pickering—Theatrical Managers Association and Circus Proprietors.

    Mr. J. Christie—Provincial Entertainment and Producing Managers Association (Manchester).

    Mr. F. Dambman—General Secretary of Musicians Union.

    Mr. T. O'Brien—General Secretary of National Association of Theatre and Kine Employees.

    Mr. Horace Collins—Society of West End Managers (Secretary of Committee).

    I have no record of the ages of members of the Committee.
    The Committee was established in June, 1940, by the Entertainments Industry itself to act as a central body through which applications for the deferment of calling up of individuals should be forwarded to the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The Committee does not give decisions on the applications but only makes recommendations which are not necessarily accepted. At my request the right hon. the Earl of Lytton has now accepted the chairmanship of this Committee which, in future, will deal with applications in respect of women who are liable to be called up as well as men. The Committee. meets fortnightly. Their recommendations are reviewed by the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The number of men at present deferred on the recommendation of the Committee is 199.
    The only other Committee dealing with music hail or theatrical artists makes recommendations on applications for the deferment of employees of the Entertainments National Service Association. This Committee consists of the right hon. the Lord May (Chairman), Sir Robert Wood (Board of Education), and Mr. F. W. H. Smith (Ministry of Labour and National Service). The persons with
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    whom this Committee deals are engaged in providing entertainment for the Forces and for munition workers.

    E.N.S.A. ARTISTES.
    Mr. Crowderasked the Minister of Labour the number of men of military age who are employed by Entertainments National Service Association?
    Mr. Bevin: The information is not immediately available. I am having inquiries made and will communicate with my hon. Friend as soon as possible.
    Mr. Crowder: Does not the Minister think that it would be much more satisfactory if these men went into the Army and were then used, when fully trained, to entertain the troops; and is he further aware that in many cases the troops do prefer soldier concert parties to performances by E.N.S.A.?
    Mr. Bevin: There has been a good deal of controversy over this matter, probably raised on insufficient information, or inaccurate information, and in view of the unsettlement that has been caused, both in the factories and outside, I propose to consult my right hon. Friends in order that we may look into the whole question.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of these men are doing most valuable work in the Home Guard?
    Mr. Bellenger: When the right hon. Gentleman gets his information will he publish it in the OFFICIAL REPORT, so that other Members can see it as well as the hon. Member for Finchley (Mr. Crowder)?
    Mr. Evelyn Walkden: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the subject raised in this House last week had nothing to do with E.N.S.A., and that none of the persons concerned worked for E.N.S.A.?
    Mr. Buchanan: May I ask that the right hon. Gentleman should not interfere with civilians entertaining the troops, which they can do very acceptably?
    Mr. Bevin: I do not propose to interfere with anybody, but I am aware that the controversy has raised disquiet in the Forces and also raised great disquiet outside, and I think that entertainment plays such an important part in maintaining the morale of the people that it is better to get things on a proper footing, and for that reason I think that inquiries ought to be made.

    PROSECUTION, LIVERPOOL.
    Mr. Thorneasked the Minister of Labour whether he can give any information in connection with the seven men accused of conspiracy, to enable men to evade military service, that came before the Liverpool police court on 18th February; whether he is aware that one of the men was a Labour Ministry clerk; and what action was taken in the matter?
    Mr. Bevin: I have no statement to make in amplification of the reports which have appeared in the Press. Two temporary officers of my Department were concerned and were convicted. One of these officers resigned from the service of the Department immediately on his arrest, and the other has been dismissed.

  EDUCATION.

    ORIENTAL LANGUAGE SCHOLARSHIPS.
    Mr. Thorneasked the President of the Board of Education whether he can give any information in connection with the 50 scholarships, valued £2,000 a year, to be awarded to selected boys in secondary and public schools to enable them to study Japanese, Chinese, Turkish or Persian; how are the boys to be selected; and from which schools?
    The President of the Board of Education (Mr. Butler): I am sending the hon. Member a copy of the administrative memorandum dealing with the award of Scholarships in Oriental Languages. Candidates for these scholarships will be drawn from among boys at secondary and public schools in England, Wales and Scotland, who have the necessary qualifications in the school certificate and are recommended by their headmaster. The final selection will be made by an interviewing board.
    Mr. Sorensen: What proportion of them will be allocated to public schools?
    Mr. Butler: I hope that the principle of the best boy getting the rewards will prevail in the future, in the educational world of this country.

    TEACHERS (RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING).
    Mr. Lindsayasked the President of the Board of Education, whether he has any statement to make about the training of teachers?
    Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir. I propose to appoint a small body of persons to advise me on the sources of supply, the methods of recruitment and the training of teachers and youth leaders. I am not yet in a position to make any more detailed announcement.
    Mr. Lipson: Will this committee be able to consider whether it is desirable to abolish separate and isolated training colleges for teachers, and to link up with the universities?
    Mr. Butler: That is just the sort of problem with which this body has been asked to deal.

    YOUTH SERVICE WORK.
    Mr. Lindsayasked the President of the Board of Education what steps he is taking, together with the Service Departments, to provide leaders for youth organisations whose numbers will be considerably increased by the scheme of registration?
    Mr. Butler: I would refer the hon. Member to the replies given to the hon. and gallant Member for Holland-with-Boston (Lieutenant Butcher) by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary on 21st January and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service on 22nd January, copies of which I am sending him. So far as military requirements permit, the military authorities co-operate with my Department by releasing, or deferring the calling up of, physical training instructors, or by allowing instructors serving with the Forces to give such help as they can. The provision of officers for pre-service training organisations is the responsibility of the Service Department concerned.
    Mr. Lindsay: While thanking my right hon. Friend for his answer, may I ask whether part-time services of Civil Defence workers will be used?
    Mr. Butler: We must be ready to use the services of anybody who is ready to co-operate with the voluntary organisations, if their services are suitable.

    PUBLIC ASSISTANCE.
    Mr. Martinasked the Minister of Health whether, in view of the rise in the cost of living during the past two years, he will consider granting to pensioners

    333
    and others, whose incomes are demonstrably below a certain limit, necessaries in kind in order to relieve the strain on their resources?
    The Minister of Health (Mr. Ernest Brown): Old age pensioners and certain other classes of persons are eligible to apply to the Assistance Board for supplementary pensions or other allowances if they are in need. The remainder of the community if in need can obtain assistance from the public assistance authorities. Assistance may be given in kind in certain circumstances, but I think that as a general rule the recipients prefer to receive it in money.
    Mr. Martin: Does the Minister realise that many people have gone on to public assistance who would not otherwise be there, and can he do anything about it?
    Mr. Brown: As the hon. Member knows, the subject was carefully considered when the last Act was passed, and my recollection of the Debates is that the House was reluctant to extend relief in kind.
    Sir Smedley Crookeasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that the British Legion has instituted what is known as a Prince of Wales' Pension of 10s. per week to needy prematurely aged ex-Service men, and that some public assistance committees on being advised that this is in issue, reduce the amount of their allowance; and whether he will issue instructions to the public assistance committees that these pensions be placed in the same category as disablement pensions, where the first 20s. of the pension is ignored, and not taken into account?
    Mr. Brown: I am aware of the facts stated, but I have no power to issue such instructions as my hon. Friend suggests. The disregarding of Disablement Pensions to the extent mentioned in the question is authorised by the Poor Law Act, 1934.
    Sir Smedley Crooke: Does the Minister not realise that the Legion pensions are only given in cases of special hardship and that if public assistance committees reduce their allowances this will lead to State grants being subsidised by Legion funds?
    Mr. Brown: If my hon. Friend will look at the admirable little booklet pub-
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    lished on the subject, he will find that that matter has been kept carefully in mind.
    Sir Smedley Crooke: Will the Minister give further consideration to this matter? Will he allow me to see him about it?
    Mr. Brown: I will very gladly see my hon. Friend, but the question raises the whole principle of disregards and reconsideration of the Poor Law Acts.

    ARMED FORCES (PENSIONS AND GRANTS).
    Mr. Kennedyasked the Minister of Pensions whether steps are now being taken, or are likely to be taken, to include sufferers from shell-shock or psycho-neurosis, invalided out of the Services, in the Service pension system?
    The Minister of Pensions (Sir Walter Womersley):Provision is made by my Department for the treatment in special neurological centres under the Emergency Medical Service of the Ministry of Health of men discharged from the Services suffering from a condition of neurosis provided they are likely to benefit by such treatment. This treatment is granted whether the condition is attributable to war service or not. If the condition is accepted by the Ministry as attributable to service and disablement cannot be removed by treatment pension is awarded.
    Mr. Rhys Davies: Does the Ministry of Pensions adopt the same system in respect of ex-Service men who are certified as lunatics?
    Sir W. Womersley: I should require notice of that Question.
    Mr. David Adamsasked the Minister of Pensions the amount paid in pensions and allowances during the years 1939, 1940 and 1941, respectively?
    Sir W. Womersley: The expenditure by my Department on pensions and allowances, including war service grants, for the financial years 1939–40 and 1940–41 amounted to £36,920,000 and £40,560,000 respectively. As regards the financial year 1941–42 the expenditure was £34,510,000 for the nine months ended 31st December last.
    Major Milnerasked the Minister of Pensions whether he will give comparative

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    figures for great war and present war pensions to privates with 100 per cent. disablement, including allowances for wives and children, and to the widows of privates killed, with the allowances for their children; and whether he will show in the table the cost of living figures on which both sets of rates are based?
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions (Mr. Paling): As the reply to this Question includes a number of figures, I am circulating it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Major Milner: While I thank my hon. Friend for his reply, would he say whether it is not a fact that present war pensions are less than those paid in respect of the last war?
    Mr. Paling: They are based on the cost of living figures.
    Major Milner: Is it not a fact that they are less than those paid in the last war?
    Mr. Paling: Yes, Sir.
    Following is the reply:

    Great War Warrant—1919.

    Present War Cmd.

    Cost of living figure

    215

    200

    s.

    d.

    s.

    d.

    Private disabled 100℅

    40

    0

    37

    6

    Allowance for wife

    10

    0

    9

    2

    Allowance for wife 1st child

    7

    6

    7

    1

    Allowance for wife each other child

    6

    0

    5

    5

    Pension to Private's widow with children

    26

    8

    25

    0

    Allowance for 1st child

    10

    0

    9

    6

    Allowance for wife 2nd child

    7

    6

    7

    0

    Allowance for wife each other child

    6

    0

    5

    6

    LOCAL AUTHORITIES (MAIN TENANCE WORK).
    Sir John Mellorasked the Minister of Health, whether he will take steps to empower local authorities to establish out of rate income reserve funds designed to meet the cost of maintenance work which has been postponed owing to the war?
    Mr. E. Brown: I have received no representations on this matter from the associations of local authorities, and as
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    at present advised I do not contemplate the introduction of legislation.
    Sir J. Mellor: Is not the underlying financial position of local authorities growing more and more unhealthy?
    Mr. Brown: I should very much hesitate to accept that statement as generally true. If my hon. Friend desires to discuss any particular case that has come to his knowledge, I shall be very glad to meet him.

    INDIA (CONSTITUTION).
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any further statement to make respecting the proposals made by Sir Tej Sapru; whether any recent steps have been taken to ascertain the views of Mr. Nehru on this matter; and what representations respecting Sino-Indian relationships and common aspirations have been received by His Majesty's Government?
    The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery): The answer to the first two parts of the Question is in the negative. The recent visit of Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek to India has enabled a full exchange of views to take place between him and the Viceroy. The hon. Member has no doubt seen in the Press the text of the very cordial messages exchanged between the Generalissimo and the Viceroy on the former's departure from India.
    Mr. Sorensen: Does the right hon. Gentleman feel it would be of some value to communicate with both Sir Tej Sapru and Mr. Nehru on such matters? When are we likely to debate these and similar matters in the House?
    Mr. Amery: All these matters will shortly be debated.
    Mr. Sorensen: Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to answer the first part of my supplementary question?
    Mr. Amery: Mr. Nehru's views have been very freely made public.
    Mr. Gallacher: Would the right hon. Gentleman consider inviting Mr. Nehru to form a Government for the defence of India?
    Wing-Commander Jamesasked the Secretary of State for India whether he will give an assurance that in any con-

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    sideration for political adjustment in India, due weight will be given to safeguarding the interests of the primitive tribes, as defined in Order in Council, No. 166, of 1936, made under Chapter V, Clauses 91 and 92 of the Government of India Act of 1935, relating to the excluded and partially excluded areas?
    Mr. Amery: I can give my hon. and gallant Friend an assurance that His Majesty's Government will be at pains to secure that the interests of the primitive tribes are not overlooked when the time comes for consideration of any modification in the present constitutional arrangements in India.
    Wing-Commander James: Would the right hon. Gentleman always bear in mind that, when the appropriate Clauses and Schedules of the India Bill were under discussion, anxiety was expressed from all parts of the House that the interests of the primitive tribes might be specially safeguarded?
    Mr. Amery: Yes, Sir.

    BURMA (POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES).
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for Burma whether he is considering under present circumstances extending an amnesty to any Burmese political prisoners or detainees similar to the amnesty extended to certain Indians; and whether he is aware of the observations of the present Burman Premier respecting political prisoners and detainees?
    The Secretary of State for Burma (Mr. Amery): No, Sir. There is no similarity in the circumstances, and in any case the matter is one which, in the present situation, I am prepared to leave to the discretion of the Governor. The answer to the second part of the Question is in the negative.
    Mr. Sorensen: Are we to take it from that answer that the alleged crimes of these Burmese political prisoners are much greater than those for which the Indians were accused but were later released?
    Mr. Amery: The Indians who were released had committed purely technical offences, but in Burma the detentions are for more serious offences.
    Mr. Sorensen: Can we have a specific description of the alleged crimes of these Burmese prisoners?
    Mr. Amery: No, Sir.

    TAXI-CAB FARES.
    Mr. Garro Jonesasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that petrol, tyres and other costs of running taximeter cabs have increased; that the cost of living has also increased; that petrol for taximeter cabs is restricted; that taximeter cab-drivers have carried out their vocation in arduous war-time conditions with courage and diligence; and whether, in these circumstances he will authorise an increase in fares?
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Herbert Morrison): I am of course aware of the considerations mentioned by my hon. Friend, but the information at present in my possession does not suggest that there is need for a change. So far as London is concerned, one result of war time conditions is that taxi-cabs are much more continuously employed. In provincial towns the scale of fares is fixed by by-laws made by the local authority and confirmed by the Minister of Health.

    BLACK MARKET OPERATORS (PENALTIES).
    Sir T. Mooreasked the Home Secretary whether he will consider introducing legislation whereby the courts can inflict flogging in the case of people found guilty of dealing in the black market?
    Mr. H. Morrison: I hope to find more effective methods of dealing with these offenders than a method of which experience suggests that it may be more effective in provoking controversy than in deterring offenders.
    Sir T. Moore: Since neither fines nor imprisonment have tended to curb these activities, does not my right hon. Friend think that he must evolve some punishment which will hurt them very much more?
    Mr. Morrison: I entirely agree that the matter must be looked into, and indeed it is already being examined by my Department and other Departments concerned. I can assure the House that I am anxious to take the most effective steps in this matter.
    Mr. Rhys Davies: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that flogging never achieves the object the floggers have in mind?
    Sir J. Lucasasked the Home Secretary whether he has considered the resolution passed by the Jewish Board of Deputies to co-operate with the Government in stamping out black market offences; and, in view of the fresh evidence of public indignation at these activities, will he take steps to increase maximum penalties and impose minimum penalties in all systematic cases coming before the courts?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Although the particular resolution to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers has not yet reached me, I have prominently in mind the importance of effective measures for searching out and bringing to stern justice the offenders to whom he refers, and the subject is receiving close and urgent consideration.
    Sir J. Lucas: Will the Minister say when he hopes to be able to make a statement?
    Mr. Morrison: I cannot say definitely, but I will keep in touch with my hon. Friend and advise him.
    Rear-Admiral Beamish: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when that resolution was passed there was no unanimity, but a great deal of discussion and many abstentions, and could he not extend the 18B Regulation so as to shut up these people?
    Mr. Morrison: My hon. and gallant Friend was complaining last week that I was shutting up too many people, and this week he wants me to shut up more. I am afraid I have no further information without notice.
    Mr. Lipson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the lack of unanimity was due to the fact that a false impression had been created that Jews were largely responsible, and can we be assured that there was no lack of willingness on the part of all concerned to co-operate to stamp out this dreadful traffic?

  CIVIL DEFENCE.

    NATIONAL FIRE SERVICE (MOTOR-CARS).
    Mr. Pearsonasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that much con-
    340
    cern is felt as to the number of motor-cars used by officers of the National Fire Service; whether a proper check is maintained to avoid unnecessary and improper journeys; and whether he will investigate the possibility of reducing the number of motor-cars without interfering with the efficiency of the service?
    Mr. H. Morrison: I am fully alive to the need for economy in the use of cars by the National Fire Service. I have already brought the matter specially to the notice of the Regional Commissioners and have issued detailed instructions governing the control of petrol. I am about to issue instructions laying down maximum establishments, and setting out rules of practice governing the actual use of cars. I should not, however, like my hon. Friend to gain the impression from this that there has necessarily been extravagance in the past.
    Mr. Pearson: Would not a tightening up of the requisition of petrol have a beneficial effect?
    Mr. Morrison: I do not follow that point.
    Mr. E. Walkden: Would the right hon. Gentleman associate in that circular all other Civil Defence officers or persons employed by local government bodies on Civil Defence work, and would he check up on that aspect of the matter at the same time?
    Mr. Morrison: I think that has already been done, but I will certainly look into it. If there are specific complaints, I shall be glad to examine them.

    SHELTERS (HOMELESS PEOPLE).
    Mr. Cecil Wilsonasked the Minister of Health how many shelters there are for homeless people in the London area similar to the Hungerford Club, other than those provided by public authorities; what is the accommodation provided; and what are the average nightly numbers occupying such shelters?
    Mr. E. Brown: The Hungerford Club, which was provided by a local authority and in connection with which a number of voluntary workers are doing excellent work, was established as an ordinary public shelter but now meets a special need. So far as I am aware there are no counterparts elsewhere.

    DETAINEE (CENSORED CORRESPONDENCE).
    Commander Bowerasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that on Tuesday, 3rd February, 1942, Mr. C. E. Allchurch, a detainee in Camp M, Isle of Man, was requested to attend the M.I.5. department in order to receive a parcel; that on arrival he was interrogated in an inner room concerning the contents of a letter received by him from the hon. Member for Cleveland, which it was suggested had reached him uncensored; that Mr. Allchurch produced the envelope of the letter bearing the postmark Kendal, Westmorland, 2.30 p.m., 9th December, 1941, the counterfoil of Examiner 6826, and the Metropolitan police receiving stamp, dated Peel, 9th December, 1941; and whether he will cause inquiry to be made into the matter?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Such inquiries as I have been able to make in the time available indicate that Mr. Allchurch was questioned about a letter which he received from my hon. and gallant Friend dated 8th December last, because the Postal Censor had reported that he could not find any record of this letter having passed through the Censorship, but, as stated, Mr. Allchurch was able to produce evidence that it had.
    Commander Bower: Will my right hon. Friend take some action to ensure that in cases like this, where a Member of Parliament exercises his right to communicate with detainees through the proper channel, no suggestion is made by M.1.5 or any other organisation that improper means of communication are being used?
    Mr. Morrison: It is the case that if a detainee writes to a Member of Parliament his letter is not censored at the camp, but all letters to and from the camps pass through postal censorship. In the case of incoming letters the censors do not know whether they come from a Member of Parliament or not.

    EXIT PERMITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND.
    Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Allenasked the Home Secretary whether he will consider the hardship caused to Northern Ireland teachers and others in
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    Great Britain by the present regulation that permits for travel home are only granted once in six months, which precludes travelling in both the August and Christmas holidays; and will he amend the regulation so as to enable them to travel twice in the 12 months, giving those concerned the privilege of selection?
    Mr. H. Morrison: This question has been frequently and sympathetically considered, but I regret that I can hold out no prospect of modifying the decision which I have explained in answer to previous Questions.
    Professor Savory: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that this is a question of pounds, shillings and pence to these very deserving teachers? They cannot afford to spend their holidays in this expensive country, whereas at home in Ulster they get free board and lodging with their parents.

    BEDDING (FUMIGATION).
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Home Secretary whether he will arrange for all bedding used by fire-watchers and kindred services to be fumigated periodically?
    Mr. H. Morrison: So far as concerns fire prevention and other Civil Defence services that are the direct responsibility of local authorities, I think it may reasonably be assumed that the authorities are alive to the importance of suitable preventive measures of the kind which the hon. Member has in mind. So far as concerns persons engaged on fire prevention duties at business premises, the Fire Prevention (Business Premises) Order places an obligation on the occupier of the premises to provide and maintain proper bedding, and the enforcement of this obligation is a matter for the appropriate authority under the Order.
    Mr. Davies: Would my right hon. Friend be good enough to call the attention of the local authorities to this problem, so that bedding may be fumigated, to prevent the spread of scabies and other disease?
    Mr. Morrison: I will consider that point, but my hon. Friend may be comforted by the fact that fire watchers are very active in making complaints if anything is wrong, and I, of course, look into their complaints.

  CIVIL DEFENCE PERSONNEL.

    PAY INCREASE AND POST-WAR CREDIT.
    Mr. Ammonasked the Home Secretary whether it is intended, in view of the recent additional financial provision for members of His Majesty's Forces and their dependants, to make any corresponding improvement in the pay of Civil Defence personnel?
    Mr. H. Morrison: Yes, Sir. I am glad to say that after consultation with the trades union representatives on the Joint Consultative Committee it has been decided to increase as from the 2nd March the basic pay of whole-time members of the Civil Defence Services recruited for the period of the emergency. The increases will be 4s. weekly for men and 5s. for women, aged 20 years of age and over. The increase for women includes an improvement in their scale which has been under consideration for some time. The details are about to be announced. In addition to the increase in pay, I propose to apply to whole-time members of the same services similarly recruited a post-war credit scheme on lines similar to that announced recently for His Majesty's Forces. Particulars of the scheme, and of the classes to which it will apply, will be announced later. I may add that these arrangements will apply also to the Police Auxiliaries.
    Mr. Ammon: While the right hon. Gentleman's statement will give great satisfaction to a good body of men, am I to understand that the categories concerned will be announced in the further statement he has in mind?
    Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir. I am much obliged to my hon. Friend, and further details will be supplied in the near future.
    Mr. Denman: Can the right hon. gentleman give the estimated cost of these changes?
    Mr. Morrison: No, Sir.
    Mr. Mander: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the reason for this sex discrimination and penalisation of men?
    Mr. Morrison: The women had a wage of £2 7s. per week and the men £3 10s. I took the view that that was rather a severe discrimination and that it was
    344
    wrong. I have therefore taken the opportunity of improving the relative position of the women, which I think is justified by the circumstances.

    INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT.
    Mr. Dolandasked the Home Secretary whether he has any further statement to make with regard to the employment of Civil Defence personnel at their depots on productive work for the war effort?
    Mr. H. Morrison: As the answer is rather long, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, read it at the end of Questions.
    Later—
    Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir. Members of the Civil Defence Services are themselves most anxious to play a more active part in the war effort and I have plans in active preparation for enabling them to do so, though, as I will explain, the matter goes a good deal beyond employment at the depots. The overriding requirement is that the Civil Defence services must be sufficient in numbers, adequately trained and immediately available in case of need. Hence there can be no wholesale and unconditional release of whole-time Civil Defence personnel. There is, however, a great deal that can be done by careful and detailed organisation to make the services of this personnel available for other work without conflicting with this requirement.
    Under existing arrangements members of the Civil Defence services may under specified conditions be employed on certain kinds of constructional work at the Depots or they may, with the consent of the employing authority, be released for approved industrial employment, subject usually to the requirement that they must return immediately to their Civil Defence duties in case of emergency. The provision of work at the Depots is necessarily restricted in scope owing to the structural limitations of the premises and the small numbers employed in each. Schemes are, however, already in operation and I am examining further plans for providing various suitable forms of work for those who must necessarily remain on stand-by duty.
    The main line of advance must be by the method of releasing Civil Defence workers for approved industrial employ-

    345
    meat away from the depots and I am making arrangements in consultation with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service for developing this method to the utmost extent which is consistent with the requirements of the Civil Defence services. I contemplate that except in cases in which unconditional releases are possible the persons released should remain under obligation to perform part-time Civil Defence duties in accordance with the normal rules (including any further training that may be necessary) and should be liable to recall at short notice in case of emergency and their new employment must therefore usually be local and such as to make these conditions practicable. I am confident that with the good will of all concerned real progress can be made on these lines. The original conception of Civil Defence as primarily a part-time service, so faithfully observed in many parts of the country, remains. Where it has not been sufficiently applied, it must be expanded, subject to the requirements of particular services such as the National Fire Service. It will not be in the public interest to give full details of the proposed new arrangements, but I shall hope to keep the House generally informed of the proposed new dispositions.
    Mr. R. C. Morrison: Does all this mean simply that if full-time Civil Defence workers can find employment in their own locality, they will be released, subject to an obligation to return if necessity arises?
    Mr. H. Morrison: It means more than that. It means that steps are being taken by the appropriate State Departments.
    Sir Irving Albery: Will local Civil Defence workers be able, under this scheme, to take part-time employment outside, and, if so, can the right hon. Gentleman say how their remuneration will be affected?
    Mr. Morrison: There are obvious complications. That is a possibility which is under consideration. I cannot exclude that.
    Mr. Doland: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when there will be an announcement to local authorities?
    Mr. Morrison: As soon as possible. There will be no delay.
    Sir Harold Webbe: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that Civil Defence workers are placed at the disposal of the local authorities under which they work for any suitable kind of work that the local authority may have for them to do?
    Mr. Morrison: I think that the basis for the arrangement must obviously be that in the case of a new enemy attack on a large scale this machine must function properly. I think, therefore, that if a man is released, subject to any arrangement between local authorities and us, he must have the obligation to continue part-time service under his local authority at present and to return to full-time service as and when required. That is one of the reasons I do not think he can be allowed to work full-time too far away from where he is engaged on Civil Defence.
    Sir H. Webbe: If the local authority require him for work, will he be allowed to work for them?

    SICK LEAVE AND INJURY ALLOWANCES.
    Mr. Saltasked the Home Secretary whether he can announce any improvements in the sick-leave pay and injury allowances of Civil Defence workers?
    Mr. H. Morrison: I am glad to state that, after consultation with the trades union representatives on the Joint Consultative Committee, alterations in the present scheme are being made which, so far as conditions and circumstances are comparable, will go far to assimilate the treatment of persons employed on a whole-time basis in the National Fire Service and the Local Authority Civil Defence (General) Services to those of sick or injured members of the Armed Forces of the Crown. Details of the new scheme, which is necessarily complicated, will be given in a leaflet, now in course of preparation, for which I am arranging a sufficient circulation to ensure that whole-time members of the Civil Defence Services are informed of the further improvements of the original conditions of service. The arrangements will also apply to whole-time Police Auxiliaries.
    Mr. Salt: Will the leaflet be published in the near future?
    Mr. Morrison: Yes, Sir

    WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Home Secretary whether he will introduce legislation to provide that compensation for death or injury suffered through working on munitions, whether in a Government establishment or otherwise, shall be approximately equivalent to the pensions paid for death or injury due to military service?
    Mr. H. Morrison: I do not see how it would be possible to justify a distinction being drawn in the sphere of Workmen's Compensation between workmen employed on munitions and workmen engaged in other classes of work, as, for example, the transport and agricultural industries: and the proposal would involve a departure from the principles of the Act, under which compensation is given for loss of wage-earning capacity and is not based on the degree of physical disability as under the Services Warrant.
    Mr. Sorensen: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that the widow of a man who has been blown up inside a Government works receives a far less rate of compensation than if he had been working outside as a Civil Defence worker; and in view of the discrepancy between the two rates of compensation, which causes a good deal of disturbance and hardship among the civilian population, would he not at least consider the matter from that angle?
    Mr. Morrison: My hon. Friend should remember the word "repercussions," which I have to remember. If he puts that argument, what can I say to the bus driver who is blown up while driving his bus, or any other citizens who may be killed by enemy action while doing useful work?
    Mr. Sorensen: It really means that there should be one rate of compensation for all kinds of workers.
    Mr. Isaacsasked the Home Secretary whether he is now in a position to state the result of his conferring with employers' associations and insurance companies, relating to the question of injured workers' rights at Common Law being barred by the practice of obtaining signatures for payment, as having been made under the Workmen's Compensation
    348
    Act; and, if legislation is necessary, will he consider taking such steps to end that practice at an early date?
    Mr. Morrison: The discussions are proceeding, and I hope to be in a position to make a statement on the question at an early date.

    CHINESE TROOPS, BURMA.
    Mr. Rileyasked the Prime Minister whether the offer of the Chinese Government to send troops to Burma to fight side by side with Allied troops, has been accepted?
    The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): Yes, Sir. The offer has been gratefully accepted. Chinese troops have already moved into Burma, and it is reported that some of them have been in action.
    Mr. Riley: Arising out of that reply, is my right hon. Friend aware that last week widespread statements were made that the offer by the Chinese to send troops had been refused by His Majesty's Government?
    Mr. Attlee: If that is so, those statements were incorrect. I cannot be held responsible for what is put in the Press.
    Mr. Thorne: I take it that you are giving the Chinese all the war material they require?

    PEACE AIMS (DECLARATION).
    Mr. Rhys Daviesasked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government have been approached by the Washington Government on the subject of a declaration of peace aims to be termed the Pacific Charter being made by the Allied nations?
    Mr. Attlee: No, Sir.
    Mr. Davies: In view of the fact that this country was deeply involved in the drawing up of the Atlantic Charter, would His Majesty's Government consider taking the initiative with a view to getting such a declaration covering the Pacific?
    Captain McEwen: Ought there not to be a limit to the number of charters that we have?

    POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION.
    Sir Henry Morris-Jonesasked the Prime Minister whether the Department of the Minister without Portfolio, dealing with post-war reconstruction, will be kept functioning pending a decision as to its ultimate organisation, and to whom are Questions concerning its past and present work to be addressed?
    Mr. Attlee: I can at present add nothing to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said on Tuesday last in the course of his statement, and I hope that Questions may be postponed until the scheme has been submitted.
    Sir H. Morris-Jones: Could my right hon. Friend give an assurance that the schemes which have been prepared by my right hon. Friend the late Minister, some of which were of special interest, will not be allowed to lapse, and can he further give an assurance to the House that this important work will not be relegated to a subsidiary department of the Ministry of Works and Buildings, but that a Minister especially responsible for the work will be appointed?
    Mr. Attlee: My hon. Friend will observe that I said that I could not add anything to the statement which the Prime Minister has already made. That statement, I think, covers some of the points raised by the hon. Member.
    Sir H. Morris-Jones rose—
    Mr. Speaker: The Minister has said he can say nothing more.
    Sir H. Morris-Jones: I only wanted to ask a small question.

  AGRICULTURE.

    UNFIT HORSES (DISPOSAL).
    Sir J. Mellorasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he will now empower county war agricultural executive committees to require the disposal of horses which are too old or infirm to serve any useful purpose?
    The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. R. S. Hudson): My inquiries into this problem are not yet complete, but I will communicate with my hon. Friend as soon as a decision is reached.

    PRICES
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in connection with the recent announcement on the adjustment of farm prices and, in view of the substantial time lag which has taken place, he will consider making the increased cattle prices retrospective to 1st January, 1942.
    Mr. Hudson: No, Sir. My hon. Friend's proposal would not be justified, and would, in any case, be administratively impracticable.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the time lag would not have occurred if it had not been for wrangling by the Treasury, and that that has caused unnecessary worry, delay and loss at a time when shipping space is so valuable? Why does the Treasury go on in this way?
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in view of the inadequate increases in wheat and oats which have been recently announced in connection with the increased farm prices, he will consider amending the schedule so as to give a more reasonable return to the home growers?
    Mr. Hudson: No, Sir. The prices for wheat and oats of the 1942 crop were fixed after a full examination of all relevant considerations.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in spite of these developments, there are many producers who cannot produce at these prices? I am sorry to have to say it, but the question will have to be gone into further.
    Mr. De la Bèreasked the Minister of Agriculture the total cost to the Government, for a full 12 months, of the increase in farm prices recently announced?
    Mr. Hudson: The cost to the Government of the increases in farm prices recently announced depends upon a number of factors the full effect of which cannot be determined with accuracy at the present time.
    Mr. De la Bère: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is food we want, not paper?
    Mr. Evelyn Walkden: Were the representatives of the horticulturists asked to take part in these deliberations and to

    351
    assist in reaching final conclusions about minimum prices?
    Mr. Hudson: The prices of vegetables are not, generally speaking, controlled. Therefore, I did not ask the horticulturists.
    Mr. Walkden: Are there likely to be any negotiations with them about the spring crops?
    Mr. De la Dère: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these negotiations are farcical?

  NATIONAL FINANCE.

    BRITISH SUBJECTS, UNITED STATES (TAXATION).
    Sir T. Mooreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can now define his arrangements whereby British subjects residing in the United States of America and not officially employed or engaged in our war effort will be compelled to pay British Income and Super Tax to the British Treasury?
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Kingsley Wood): So far as Income Tax and Surtax are concerned, I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the replies I gave on 7th October to my hon. Friend the Member for Clackmannan and Eastern (Mr. Woodburn) and on 30th September to my hon. Friend the Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander). Step have been taken, under the Amendment to the Defence (Finance) Regulations of 11th November, 1941, to block bank accounts of certain British nationals who were resident in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the war and are now outside the sterling area. I have also under consideration the possibility of taking further powers to prevent certain abuses in relation to British subjects living permanently abroad.
    Sir T. Moore: What about British subjects who are drawing interest from capital investment in America? Why should they not contribute materially to our war effort?
    Sir K. Wood: Perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will study the answers I have already given.
    Mr. Mander: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a number of wealthy British people in the United States? Will
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    he take active steps to deal with these people, and not go on saying that the matter is under consideration?
    Sir K. Wood: My hon. Friend knows that it is not a matter of my not desiring to do it; but there are difficulties.
    Mr. Mander: May I point out that there are no real difficulties?
    Sir K. Wood: My hon. Friend often does that.

    PERSONAL SAVINGS.
    Sir T. Mooreasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his information shows that last year the improvement in genuine savings, as distinct from the transfer of investments, was appreciably greater than in 1940?
    Sir K. Wood: I have no estimates immediately available for 1939, but I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that personal savings during 1941 showed a considerable increase over the previous year.

    OFFICERS' RETIRED PAY.
    Mr. Lipsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the grievance felt by retired Naval and Army officers, who served in the last war, at a cut in their pay made in 1935; that these men and their dependants are in the present war suffering financial hardship; and, as the restoration of this cut would cost only £482,000 now, rising to about £780,000 at the end of the war, will he take the necessary steps to bring this about?
    Sir K. Wood: I cannot add anything to the reply on this subject which was given to my hon. Friend on 18th February by my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office.
    Mr. Lipson: What would it cost to meet all the obligations, in my right hon. Friend's opinion, after all adjustments have been made?
    Sir K. Wood: I think my hon. Friend in his Question gave the figure. Of course, I have taken everything into account.
    Mr. Lipson: I asked what it would cost to take all those other matters into account.
    Mr. Shinwell: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate the severe hard-

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    ship to which these people are exposed? If there was a cut in 1935 and the cost of removing it is not large, would it not be desirable to remove it?
    Sir K. Wood: I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but, in fact, there was no cut in 1935. Officers' retired pay had previously fluctuated with the cost of living. In 1935 it was stabilised in common with the rates for the Fighting Services.

    AIR MINISTRY (CIVILIAN STAFFS).
    Mr. David Adamsasked the Secretary of State for Air how many of each of the undermentioned categories of civilian staffs are employed in Air

    Grade.

    Approximate numbers enmployed at Air Ministry outstations.

    Works Directorate.

    Maintenance Units.

    R.A.F. Stations.

    Air Service Clerks, Grade I

    …

    …

    …

    33*

    90

    6

    Air Service Clerks, Grade III

    …

    …

    …

    119

    410

    82

    Air Service Asst. Clerks, Estab.

    …

    …

    …

    36

    178†

    226

    Air Service Asst. Clerks, Unest.

    …

    …

    …

    6

    42

    Air Service Asst. Clerks, Temp.

    …

    …

    …

    35

    151

    224

    Temporary Clerks, Grade II, Male

    …

    …

    …

    28

    240

    82

    Temporary Clerks, Grade II, Female

    …

    …

    …

    14

    132

    8

    Temporary Clerks, Grade III, Male

    …

    …

    …

    388

    1,098

    832

    Temporary Clerks, Grade III, Female

    …

    …

    …

    567

    2,998

    684

    Shorthand Typists, Estab.

    …

    …

    …

    27

    5

    13

    Shorthand Typists, Temp.

    …

    …

    …

    228

    160

    378

    Copying Typists, Estab.

    …

    …

    …

    10

    38

    7

    Copying-Typists, Temp.

    …

    …

    …

    71

    342

    89

    Teleprinter Operators, Male

    …

    …

    …

    83

    46

    Teleprinter Operators, Female

    …

    …

    …

    119

    12

    * 15 other posts for Air Service Clerks, Grade I are filled by Civil Accountants, temporary.

    † No details readily available of number who are unestablished.

    The above numbers do not include staff now serving with His Majesty's Forces, nor, in the case of overseas stations, staff entered locally.

    AMERICAN CITIZENS, PENANG (EVACUATION ARRANGEMENTS).
    Rear-Admiral Beamishasked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement concerning the evacuation of civilians from Penang, with special reference to the question of American citizens?
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    Ministry outstations at works directorate offices, maintenance units, and Royal Air Force stations, respectively; Air Service clerks, grade I, grade III; Air Service assistant clerks, established, unestablished, temporary; temporary clerks, grade II, male, female; temporary clerks, grade III, male, female; shorthand typists, established, temporary; copying typists, established, temporary, and teleprinter operators, male, female?
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Air (Captain Harold Balfour): As the information asked for can most readily be presented in tabular form, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the information:
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Harold Macmillan): According to information received from the Governor of the Straits Settlements, the evacuation of civilians from the Island of Penang was carried out on the nights of 13th, 15th and 16th December, beginning with women and children who wished to leave, and ending on the 16th with persons who had been engaged on duty in essential services. The arrangements were limited by the shipping available, by the heavy destruction from air attacks on the city, and by the need for

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    speed and secrecy in carrying out the evacuation. I am happy to inform the House that certain serious charges made by an American citizen, which were given wide publicity in the Press, as to failure of the authorities to afford the same opportunities to American citizens as to others, have now been fully and frankly withdrawn by the gentleman in question. Wide publicity to this retraction has been given in the American Press.
    Rear-Admiral Beamish: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his statement will give great satisfaction and help to dispel a most unfortunate impression?
    Mr. Creech Jones: When the right hon. Gentleman refers to civilians, has he in mind merely European and American civilians, or all civilians?
    Mr. Macmillan: No discrimination of any kind was made in connection with opportunities for evacuation.

  BRITISH ARMY.

    DEMOBILISATION (PRIORITIES).
    Mr. Manderasked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will give an assurance that, at the end of the war, sympathetic consideration will be given to the early discharge of soldiers who desire to return as soon as possible to the control of their businesses?
    The Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. Sandys): The point raised by my hon. Friend will be borne in mind when the time comes to decide priorities of demobilisation.
    Mr. Bellenger: In view of the statement of the Prime Minister the other day, that the war might end more quickly than the Government expected, might not schemes be drawn up to meet this emergency when it comes, and not leave it until the time arrives as was done in the last war?
    Mr. Sandys: An inter-departmental committee is now sitting on this question. It would be, in spite of what the hon. Member says, a little premature now to announce our demobilisation plans.

    OVER-AGE STAFF OFFICERS.
    Mr. David Adamsasked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the policy with regard to the employment of elderly senior staff officers is being carried out uniformly?
    Mr. Sandys: In view of the marked shortage of senior staff officers in the early stages of the war, it was necessary to reemploy a number of retired officers, and to retain others, who had passed the prescribed age-limits. With the progress of the war the number of officers possessing the necessary staff training and experience has steadily increased. This has made it possible periodically to review the list of over-aged officers and to replace many of them with somewhat younger and fitter men. In deciding whether any such officer shall be retired his individual qualifications and experience are carefully considered.
    Mr. Adams: Is the Minister aware that the continued employment of senior staff officers is debarring younger and more active officers from engagement?
    Mr. Sandys: That is not the fact.
    Mr. Glenvil Hall: Does this also apply to the Home Guard, and is the hon. Gentleman aware that a certain number of officers in the Home Guard have been retired at 65 and that others have been left? Why should there be this distinction?
    Mr. Sandys: That is a different question. Perhaps the hon. Member will put it down.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: Can the Lord Privy Seal state the Business for the next Sitting Days?
The Lord Privy Seal (Sir Stafford Cripps): The Business for the next Sitting Days will be as follows:
First Sitting Day—Committee stage of the Civil and Revenue Departments' Vote on Account. A Debate on the Ministry of Food will take place.
Second Sitting Day—It is proposed to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on going into Committee of Supply on the Air Estimates, 1942, and consider Votes A and I and Air Supplementary Estimate in Committee.
Third Sitting Day—Report stage of the Civil Vote on Account. A Debate on Woman-Power will take place.
Mr. Shinwell: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he is aware that recently, on the publication of the White Paper on

357
production which has now been withdrawn, suggestions were made for a Debate on production? May I ask whether that Debate will take place on the return of his right hon. Friend from Cairo, how soon will he return, and what arrangements are being made to discuss this matter?
Sir S. Cripps: I think it will be more convenient to await the return of the Minister of State from Cairo. I cannot state when he will return, as that would be a matter which would affect his security.
Mr. Shinwell: Can the Lord Privy Seal say whether he will return shortly—I am not asking for details—and whether the question of co-ordination in production is now being considered?
Sir S. Cripps: The latter question is being considered, but it cannot be finally considered until the Minister of State returns, and it is hoped that he will be back within a very short time.
Mr. G. Griffiths: Is it possible for the Debate on production to take place before the Minister of State returns, because, whether certain Members of the House know it or not, there is a great deal of unrest among the workers, especially in the mining industry from which I come; and is the Lord Privy Seal aware that we are desirous of putting the case across the Floor of this House, because the position is alarming?
Sir S. Cripps: I appreciate the desire of the House to debate this question, but it would be very unfortunate if the Minister of State could not be back in time to hear that Debate if he is to undertake the task of co-ordinating production.
Mr. Rhys Davies: Will the Debate on the Ministry of Food cover the question of the relationship between the distributor and the consumer?
Sir S. Cripps: I think it will cover any question which concerns the distribution of food, and obviously that is one of the questions.
Rear-Admiral Beamish: Can the Lord Privy Seal say what are the prospects of the early issue of the report by Mr. Justice Bucknill, and will he make representations to the Prime Minister to permit that
358
report to be debated in this House, if necessary in Secret Session?
Sir S. Cripps: I cannot give the hon. and gallant Member any information of the date when the Government are likely to receive that report. As stated by the Prime Minister, it will be a secret report, and it may or may not be possible to debate it in Secret Session.
Mr. Granville: Will there be an early opportunity to discuss the question of agriculture, particularly the new prices recently announced by the Minister of Agriculture?
Sir S. Cripps: There will be opportunities to discuss such questions on the Supply days, and a note will be taken of the desire of the House to discuss agricultural questions.
Mr. Buchanan: In these days one must always be discussing the war, but even at this time would the Lord Privy Seal consult with his colleagues again about the treatment of the old people of this country and the amount of their pensions, particularly of those who are at the lowest level; and will he make representations and go into this question again, which is serious, with a view to seeing whether in these days of high cost of living some increases can be given?
Sir S. Cripps: I think that what my hon. Friend has just said hardly arises on the question of Business of the House.
Mr. Buchanan: It applies just as much as other things, and I do not see why I should be ruled out.
Sir S. Cripps: It is a question which can be debated on the Adjournment some day, and, if hon. Gentlemen wish it, I could convey the effect of that Debate to the War Cabinet.
Mr. Mander: Will the Lord Privy Seal bear in mind that it was intended to have a Debate on the work of the Department of the Minister without Portfolio and, as soon as the necessary changes and arrangements have been made, will he consider the possibility of allowing such a Debate to take place?
Sir S. Cripps: As soon as a statement is made by the Government of how that is to be dealt with, it may be that the House will be so satisfied that they will not desire to discuss it.
Mr. Mander: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that nobody knows anything about the work of the Minister without Portfolio?
Sir S. Cripps: If a discussion is required, it can be considered, with other matters, on the Adjournment.
Mr. Barr: Is the Lord Privy Seal aware that in regard to the matter which has been raised by the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan), there was issued lately a determination of needs report in its application to unemployment and to supplementation, and that that statement contains an account of what has taken place and gives a very low average of increase, and does it not call for an early discussion?
Sir S. Cripps: There would be an opportunity, no doubt, at an early date to discuss the matter, as I suggested, and if the hon. Gentleman wished to take part in it, there is no doubt that he would have an opportunity.
Mr. Ness Edwards: Surely a report issued by the Department and promised to the House should be the subject of a special Debate and cannot be adequately debated on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House at the end of the day?
Sir S. Cripps: It depends upon how much time is available. There are occasions when there is a considerable amount of time available.

NATIONAL EXPENDITURE.
Fifth Report from the Select Committee brought up, and read; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed [No. 58].

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Ordered,
That the Proceedings on Government Business be exempted at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House). —[Sir S. Cripps.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  SUPPLY.

    NAVY ESTIMATES, 1942.
    Order for Committee read.
    Mr. A. V. ALEXANDER'S STATEMENT.
    The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
    The House meets to-day to review the work of the Royal Navy and its administration in the midst of a battle for sea
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    power now being conducted in every ocean and almost every sea in the world. Never has the fundamental need of this nation of adequate sea power been more fully or painfully demonstrated. For two and a half years the Navy has been fighting every day and every night, with heavy casualties. I am reminded of the lines:
    "We have fed our sea for a thousand years,
    And she calls us still unfed;
    Though there's never a wave in all her waves,
    But marks our English dead.
    If this be the price of Admiralty,
    Lord God we ha' paid in full."
    And so I would like to begin my narrative to-day with a tribute to the work of our personnel at sea. Never in our history have British sea traditions been more worthily exemplified than in the gallant, loyal and dogged endurance of the officers and men of the Royal Navy. This is in spite of the fact that the expanded manning of the Fleet during the last two years and a half by as much as three or four times its peace strength, has called into sea service hundreds of thousands of young civilians from all sections of the nation. This has been a more rapid expansion than in any previous war. The variety of dangers to be met has been far greater, yet so keen has been the desire of our manhood to serve in the Fleet, that thousands who wished to join have had to be disappointed. In every class and category of naval service, great work has been done. Thousands of our men have proved themselves as fine as ever our race produced. In the battleships and carriers, in the cruisers and destroyers, in the submarines and the corvettes, in the minesweepers—and, lest I forget, I would like to say what a magnificent job the minesweepers have done in face of new and deadly forms of mines; they have swept thousands of mines although at the cost of casualties to themselves—and in the armed trawlers, the new varieties of motorcraft and auxiliary vessels, and in the Fleet Air Arm, we have, without exception, the same record of faithful, unswerving performance of duty in face of all hazards. Whatever criticisms, therefore, may be uttered with regard to the present state of the war at sea, I feel sure I shall carry the House with me when I say that there is nowhere any desire to do anything but honour the self-sacrificing work of the officers and men of the Navy. What I have said in regard to the Royal Navy will, I believe,

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    in every respect, find an echo in all our hearts when we think of their brother seamen in the Merchant Navy. Of course, Members of the House have said, as the Press have said, that judgment must be by results. That submission is well understood, and in every sphere accepted. On that, however, I would make a further submission, and that is that before you pass judgment you must, in all fairness, assess the nature and the breadth and the weight of the task which was undertaken, the forces and the dispositions of the forces arrayed against you, and the forces with which you are equipped to meet them.
    Certainly the task of the Fleet has been enormous. Since the defeat of France, and the defection of the French Fleet, which was the second largest in Europe, accompanied by the entry of the Italian Fleet into the war against us, it has been one of continuous strain. First and foremost, our defensive task was to protect vast sea lines all over the world, without which we could not maintain our Island fortress here, and indeed would be powerless to wage war at all. The combined length of our shipping routes runs into many tens of thousands of miles on the broad oceans, where the great distances and the volume of traffic necessarily limit the protection which can be afforded. At no time have we fewer than about 2,000 ships at risk upon the oceans, sailing, in the main, to and from the relatively restricted number of ports which can handle traffic of these dimensions. The German and Italian navies, on the other hand, have to protect nothing but a relatively insignificant coasting trade, varied only by the short sea route across the Mediterranean on which their Army in North Africa must rely. Except for isolated blockade runners, Axis trade has no need to depart more than a few miles from its own or a neutral coast. It can remain in waters which can be completely covered by enemy air forces, where anti-submarine measures and protective mining can readily be organised with great intensity and where the freedom of manœuvre of attacking warships is dangerously cramped. These are, of course, all known facts to people who understand Naval warfare, but they are nevertheless fundamentals which must be thoroughly understood if we are to appraise our own efforts and achievements.
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    Let us now examine, as closely as the time permits, the comparative performances of the Royal Navy and the enemy in the main spheres. I take, first, trade protection. The Battle of the Atlantic, which was our principal preoccupation for the greater part of the year, has now developed into what I may call the Battle of the Seven Seas. Both in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans a new threat to the trade of the British Commonwealth and its Allies has arisen. The year 1941 opened with losses running at a heavy rate. Enemy submarines employing the new pack technique were taking a heavy toll, enemy aircraft operating both in coastal waters and far out to sea, seemed at one time likely to prove an almost greater menace than the U-boats. In addition, the surface forces of the Germans were sweeping out from time to time and reaping relatively large hauls, whilst every night their aircraft sowed new forms of mines round our coasts and in our estuaries. This unfavourable tendency continued until April, when losses reached their peak owing to the large amount of tonnage lost in the Greek and Cretan campaigns, though obviously all of this was not then available for the general carrying trade of the Allies. In May, however, losses on the broad ocean lifelines began to fall, and they continued to do so more or less steadily until December, when a new phase of the war at sea opened.
    As to the fall in our losses at that time, Hitler has recently endeavoured to explain away the relative failure of his ever-growing U-boat fleet in the latter half of last year, but in fact there were a number of important and significant reasons for the results. First, the improvements in escort organisation and in anti-submarine methods constantly being introduced as a result of constant thought, planning, research and experiment. Secondly, the growing skill and experience of officers and crews, and, of course, the increasing number of convoy escorts flowing from the large construction programmes which were put in hand on or shortly after the outbreak of war. Thirdly, from a date in September, we commenced to receive American assistance with convoys, for which we are duly grateful. In addition, and by no means the least important, was the help given by the anti-submarine patrols of the Royal Air Force, whose

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    Coastal Command passed under the operational control of the Admiralty at the end of 1940. These aerial sweeps have proved of great value, not merely in the protection of individual convoys, but in harassing and hampering the U-boats in the Western Approaches to these Islands. On top of these air patrols directed against the submarines themselves, we took practical and effective measures to counter the air attack on shipping and the air reconnaissances far out to sea on which the U-boats have clearly proved they depend so considerably for the detection of their prey. Not only has air escort been provided on a higher scale within the limits possible from shore bases, but we have also begun in some measure—and by various methods—to provide ship-borne fighter protection with the convoys. Great efforts have been made too, to improve the anti-aircraft protection of the merchant ships themselves. The post of Inspector of Merchant Navy Gunnery was created, and the Inspector, Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer, by his thoroughness and with the co-operation of crews, masters and owners, has already brought the general standard of efficiency to a high level. In this, as in all operations of war, training and instant readiness are essential for success. At the same time, we have gone on building up the general scale of the anti-aircraft armament in both British and Allied merchant shipping. During the year 1941 there were fitted in merchant ships no fewer than 12,988 anti-aircraft guns of one kind and another and 4,843 ships were fitted with anti-aircraft devices other than guns. Merchant and fishing vessels alone have now shot down 76 enemy planes, probably destroyed another 40, and damaged 89.
    By these means we had by the autumn reduced losses to a level far lower than it had seemed legitimate to hope for in the early part of the year, and this success was reflected in a steadily rising trend of imports, so that by the end of last year the Navy were able to reap a tangible reward for their efforts in the fact that the estimate of imports for the twelve months was exceeded and the programme, which at one time seemed likely to be on the optimistic side, was fully achieved. In assessing this result, we must be careful not to under-estimate the great efforts being put into the U-boat campaign.
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    U-boat construction is undoubtedly on an unprecedented scale, and the U-boat fleet expands month by month. The U-boat fleet have, as before, shown, and continue to show, ingenuity and organising skill in their operations and great flexibility in their tactics. They have tried operating in the Middle Western Atlantic, they have moved to the South Atlantic, they have operated in the Gibraltar area, and they have been in strength in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, although since the beginning of the war, the total number of ships convoyed is very large indeed, losses in convoy are still just under one-half of one per cent.
    Mr. Ammon: I wonder whether my right hon. Friend could put that percentage into actual figures?
    Mr. Alexander: I could say this—[HON. MEMBERS "No."]. Very well, I accept the sentiment of the House. The steadily improving prospect which I have described was at once clouded by the entry of Japan into the war. With her large submarine fleet and her powerful air forces trained for operations against ships, it was clear that vast new dangerous areas for allied shipping would be created. The losses sustained in the Far East and Pacific up to the present have been considerable, but a proportion of the ships lost out there were designed solely for the local trade of the China coast and would not have been of great value in the transoceanic traffic of the Allies. At the same time, enemy U-boats have also concentrated off the Eastern seaboard of North America in order to take such profit as they could from a sudden incursion into waters which had hitherto been immune and against shipping much of which had been at peace. These tactics have had a measure of success which has seriously affected the trend of losses in an adverse direction. Yet there is ground for hoping that these unfavourable developments will not be of indefinite duration. In the Pacific the treacherous method which the Japanese chose for entry into the war naturally gave them certain special advantages for operations against trade, but from the start precautions were put into force, and we are doing all we can to keep losses down. As Allied naval strength in the Pacific recovers from the blows suffered in the

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    first few days of the war with Japan, the power of the Japanese Navy for evil in that area should diminish, though naturally at this stage I do not wish to indulge in any prophecy on the fortunes of war in that area. Similarly as regards the North American coast our Allies are putting measures in hand which will make the task of the U-boats more difficult.
    I come now to commerce raiders. The past year has been better than we had at first expected. In the first few months converted merchantmen and the German battle cruisers had a period of fruitful activity. But after seeking refuge in Brest last March the battle cruisers, thanks to the sustained efforts of the R.A.F. against one of the best defended bases in the world, remained immobile until their recent rush to their home ports. The German navy made a determined effort in May to send another force out on to the trade routes, but the Royal Navy and the Fleet Air Arm frustrated this attempt and sank the "Bismarck," without any merchant ships being lost, though not without loss to themselves. For nearly a year, therefore, there were no mercantile losses at all from German warship raiders. The converted merchant raiders have continued to operate spasmodically but with little success. During 1941 22 such raiders and their supply ships were put where they could do no more harm. To this record of achievement I must add the warning that we may now be near the beginning of a new period of raider activity, both German and Japanese. These possibilities are naturally under close study, and we must make such plans and dispositions as lie within our power to restrict and defeat such threats.
    So much for the protection of our own trade. How have the enemy protected theirs? I would remind the House once again that the enemy have virtually nothing but coastal trade to protect. Yet our aircraft, submarines and surface warships in 1941 captured, sank or seriously damaged no less than 2,500,000 tons of German and Italian shipping and other shipping under Axis control. This figure takes no account of the substantial losses inflicted by our Russian allies. Of the few enemy vessels which attempted to run the blockade, with the whole of the Western seaboard of France and the
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    French West African Colonies open to them, very nearly half were intercepted, notwithstanding the preoccupation of the Navy with the more immediate and vital task of protecting our own supplies and convoying our troops.
    I come now to the second part of the Navy's task. It has more to guard even than the essential flow of food and raw materials to these Islands. I wonder whether it is generally appreciated in the country how great and widespread are its duties in support of the Army and R.A.F. We have done our part in building up and maintaining an Army of 750,000 in the Middle East. We have kept Malta supplied under the very noses of the enemy. We have sent reinforcements to the Far East, and we have taken, in very difficult winter weather, very large supplies to Russia. We have covered troop convoys to this country, to Iceland and to Northern Ireland, as well as providing protection for a great number of smaller movements all over the world. When one considers the great distances involved and the volume and complexity of the equipment which modern armies need, this is obviously an achievement which cannot be overlooked, in that we have provided for the security of all this sea traffic on which our Forces depend, out of the limited strength of the Navy under the strain at sea. I may, perhaps, be permitted to illustrate it still further by giving the House a comparison of the losses sustained by ourselves and by the enemy in maintaining our respective armies in North Africa. From Sicily to Tripoli in a direct line is about 240 miles and even by the roundabout routes which the enemy ships may choose to follow in an attempt to evade attack, the distance can still be numbered in hundreds of miles. From the United Kingdom round to Suez via the Cape, the distance is some 11,000 miles. Yet according to our calculations, in 1941 the Axis lost nearly twice as much shipping employed in the maintenance of their North African front as we did out of the tonnage engaged on a like purpose in the interests of our Middle East armies.
    Apart from these movements on what one may term the plane of higher strategy, the Navy has been called upon, during the last year, to undertake on several occasions the more hazardous business of close co-operation with forward troops. In the operations for the

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    defence of Crete the Navy drowned 5,000 German troops and rescued 16,500 British troops, but they did it at great cost to themselves. Think also of the part which the Navy played in maintaining our garrison at Tobruk for eight long months. During the siege many thousands of men were moved by sea either into or out of the beleaguered town, and in addition 7,000 prisoners of war. Vast quantities of stores amounting to tens of thousands of tons were moved into the beleaguered town, with an endless variety of other cargoes, ranging from tanks to sheep. These operations, sustained over such a long period, past a coast in the possession of the enemy with strong air forces within easy striking distance, naturally exacted their toll and called for great endurance. In all, 50o men of the Royal and Merchant Navies lost their lives in this service. These and similar operations, proportionately more expensive than most of the protective duties of the Navy, have, it should be noted, practically no counterpart in the tasks performed by the Axis fleets.
    While I am on that part of our operations, perhaps the House will allow me to say that I have received this morning a message that the work of our submarines goes on. I have just received a message that one of our submarines obtained three hits two or three days ago on the last Italian convoy going to Africa. I should also like to pay a special tribute at this point to the Royal Marines, who have done so much in the Mediterranean. In most of the naval operations the Royal Marines have continued to give the high standard of service which has always been expected of them, in addition to which they have done continuous and useful work in mounting land batteries, both coast defence and anti-aircraft. Royal Marines, who had been mounting such batteries and searchlights, turned themselves into infantry, and shared with the Australians and New Zealanders the duty of conducting the rearguard action in Crete last May, and it goes without saying that they did so with great distinction.
    So much for the task we have been facing. What of our resources? From the beginning of June, 1940, to September last the naval forces of the British Commonwealth stood alone, with the exception of
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    the small but gallant naval contingents of our Continental Allies whose countries had been overrun. We were opposed by the German and Italian fleets, which from their late dates of construction, possessed a relatively high proportion of modern ships. In the stress and strain both of maintaining our ocean life-lines, and of supporting the Army in their operations, heavy casualties were incurred in all categories of ships. To be frank with the House, it is to me an amazing thing that during that period the Naval Staff, always having to try and obtain the use of about four quarts from a pint cup, so disposed our forces that we have been able to maintain the flow of food and raw materials to this country to secure the high standard of life which persists here well after two and a half years of war, and at the same time to have carried out the tasks in support of the Army and the Air Force which I have already indicated.
    The House knows, I am certain, how many fewer cruisers we had at the beginning of the war compared to the last war, when we were in alliance with four other powerful fleets, and how heavy our losses have been, especially in such operations as that in the seas around Crete, at times without sufficient air cover. The magnificent work of our destroyers in this war has been done with a Force far too small for the numberless duties to be performed. I need only remind the House of the contrast between our position now in this category and that of the last war, at the end of which the Allied Navies had between them over 900 destroyers whilst facing only one hostile navy. What would the Navy have given for a Force relatively as strong for the task which they now have to face?
    A rather brighter side to that picture, however, has been the proved success of the corvette policy. These ships were able to be built at a much greater rate than any others which could have been provided for their task, and they have been splendidly operated. I think the House would like to know that more than 80 per cent. of these ships are commanded by reserve officers, with great credit to themselves and the Navy. I must remind the House too that we have had to labour under the handicap of possessing far less productive capacity in shipbuilding than during the last war, with fewer yards, many fewer berths, and with a smaller labour force. Nevertheless, a very great

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    deal has been achieved. The labour force has been expanded by nearly 100 per cent. since the war began, and continued to expand during the last twelve months.
    I submit that it is remarkable that, in spite of the capacity handicap I have referred to, casualties to the Fleet have been and are being well replaced. The total of naval tonnage delivered in 1941 was not so very far below that of 1916, although the output of merchant tonnage last year was very much greater than in 1916. This has been in spite of the fact of the burden of repairs occasioned by the heavier steaming demands upon our ships, in addition to the larger superficial damage and under-water damage that we sustained in this war compared with the last from aircraft attack. We now have in hand bigger programmes than we had in the last war, and a larger number of building berths are in operation than we found available at the beginning of the war. There has been, from time to time, expression of some uneasiness occasioned by the loss of heavy ships, as to whether our building and construction of naval ships were standing up to the modern strain of naval warfare.
    There are two points which I would mention in this connection. First, that comparisons I have seen made with the "Bismarck" should take into account the fact that we had adhered to Treaty limits and the Germans had not. Nevertheless, it is true to say that a large number of our heavy ships have sustained major damage during this war and yet have been safely brought into harbour, repaired and put into service again. The "Barham" which was subsequently lost, was mined, brought in and repaired. The "Nelson" has twice sustained heavy under-water damage and has been brought in and repaired, and the "Resolution", the "Malaya", the "Illustrious" and the "Formidable," all heavy ships, were all very heavily damaged, but all stood up to it and were brought safely to port and repaired. At the same time, as always, the Admiralty makes a careful study of war experience and constantly strives to meet new factors. The Admiralty has arranged in fact for a special investigation to be made into the evidence concerning the losses of capital and other heavy ships since the war began, in order to make certain that
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    there should be no question of missing any lesson, large or small, which ought to be learned and acted upon.
    The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Prof. A. V. Hill) referred on Tuesday last to the work of the Scientific Advisory Panel which I announced last year would be assisting the Admiralty. I have received a number of reports on investigations by the Panel. Some of these reports have been very favourable as to the work of the Admiralty technical departments. In other cases where recommendations have been made for improvement, these have been most carefully considered with a. view to introducing every possible improvement. A number of them have already been put into effect.
    Perhaps the House may find it convenient if here I say a word on the question of man-power in relation to the Service and the Report submitted by the Beveridge Committee, a subject in which hon. Members have shown great interest. I think the House will have noticed that the remarks of that Committee were distinctly favourable towards the arrangements in force in the Navy for ensuring that the best possible value is obtained from its skilled men. The Committee suggested that there might be some skill among our reservists which was not being fully used. We are doing what we can to make improvements in this direction, but I am certain that Members who have come into contact with their constituents will not forget that a considerable proportion of our naval reservists are entered under special engagement entitling them to serve in the particular branch of their choice and that in such cases a transfer can be made only if the men consent to the change.
    I have referred to some of the losses that we have suffered in the past year. The House will probably expect me to refer briefly to the loss of His Majesty's ships "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" in the Far East. There is no attempt to minimise the serious blow that this has been to the Navy and to our cause. The events which led up to the despatch of the ships to the Far East have already been communicated to the House by the Prime Minister, and the matter has been discussed both in open and in Secret Session. The House will understand how tremendously the situation was changed

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    in Far Eastern waters by the Japanese, who, while still negotiating for peace, attacked the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbour. This meant, of course, that it was impossible to follow the plans which has been devised. The news flashed to Singapore simultaneously of the crippling of the United States Fleet, and the threatened landing of Japanese at Singora left the Commander-in-Chief with a most difficult decision to take as to what action to follow, and on that I have nothing to acid to what the Prime Minister said on 11th December. [An HON. MEMBER: "Is the inquiry proceeding?"] There was no special inquiry. There was a careful investigation on the spot to marshal all the facts which could be obtained, and the report of this is now being examined in the Admiralty from every point of view.
    Mr. Shinwell: There is a little doubt about this matter. I was under the impression that the Prime Minister conveyed to the House a suggestion that an inquiry of a departmental character was being undertaken and that at some stage the Prime Minister would decide whether in his discretion it was advisable to communicate certain facts to the House. Are we to understand that nothing further is to be done and that nothing further can be said?
    Mr. Alexander: I did not say that. What I said was that the Commanderin-Chief had to make a difficult decision in the circumstances which I have put to the House, and that on that issue I have nothing to add to what the Prime Minister said on 11th December.
    Sir Percy Harris: Is there not always a court-martial on the loss of a ship?
    Mr. Alexander: That point has already been dealt with several times. A court-martial does not take place automatically in every case of the loss of a ship.
    Rear-Admiral Beamish: What has become of the ships' companies that were saved? Are they at Singapore?
    Mr. Alexander: I do not know that I ought to answer that question.
    Rear-Admiral Beamish: There is great anxiety about it.
    Mr. Alexander: Many of them served at once in most useful spheres after they
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    arrived at Singapore. With regard to individual cases, I should like to have notice of inquiry about individuals and what has happend to them.
    Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Sueter: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House any details of the torpedo-dropping aircraft used by the Japanese? Did they have twin torpedoes, what is the size of them, and why have not we weapons like that?
    Mr. Alexander: I was commencing to say a word about the torpedo bombing attack. The heavy weight of the torpedo bombing attack by the Japanese is a matter of great importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that the initiative in torpedo bombing attacks against ships has lain with the British Fleet and that heavy and severe punishment has been inflicted upon the enemy on numerous occasions and has resulted in the victories at Taranto and Matapan and in bringing the "Bismarck" to book. But the experience in the case of the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" points to the fact that every possible drive has to be put into further equipping ourselves for the development of this form of attack. I have strong views on the question.
    Mr. Hore-Belisha: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse," will he say what is the result of the inquiry? Are we not to have a consecutive narrative of what has happened, so that we can form a proper judgment of these events? I think everyone understood that that was to be the case, and the Debate was suspended upon this incident on that understanding.
    Mr. Alexander: I do not know whether I am permitted to refer to proceedings in a Session which was not open. [Interruption.] I will, however, certainly look into the point and see whether anything remains due to the House which they may have understood would be given to them. My impression is in fact that they have had the narrative asked for by the right hon. Gentleman.
    To come back to the work of the light forces in that area since the loss of those two ships, they have done splendid work. As has already been indicated to the House, no fewer than nine convoys were escorted into Singapore, and the House

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    already knows of the sharp and brilliant action fought by the "Vampire" and "Thanet" against a superior Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers. This superior force was engaged and pursued, and one Japanese destroyer was sunk and another damaged. We lost H.M.S. "Thanet," but the Australian destroyer "Vampire" returned undamaged. May I say here also that our Forces have stood up well against the bombing attacks of the enemy while escorting convoys and have also attacked Japanese submarines with some success? We have all been filled with admiration at the very courageous and able work done against the enemy in the Far East by the Dutch Naval Forces. None of us would desire to withhold from them their need of praise.
    I turn to another matter which has greatly exercised the mind of the House and large sections of the public, and that is the abandonment of their refuge at Brest by the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" with the "Prinz Eugen" and their journey as rapidly as they could to German ports, under the cover of the German Air Force and poor visibility. As the secret inquiry under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Bucknill has not yet completed its sittings, it would not be right for me to make any comment, except to say that the inference which the German statements were designed to convey, that these vessels arrived in Germany scatheless, is not true. Reliable reports have been received that both German battle cruisers received severe damage when on passage from Brest. Photographs show that one battle cruiser was in dry dock at Kiel, while the other has been located in the dockyard at Wilhelmshaven. Thus we have confirmation of the statement made by the Prime Minister on 17th February. I would add one thing further. His Majesty's submarine "Trident" subsequently attacked a cruiser of the "Prinz Eugen" class off the coast of Norway on 23rd February and obtained a hit. Aerial reconnaisance subsequently showed that a ship of the "Prinz Eugen" class was at Trondjheim in tow of tugs and damaged aft. In view of the date when this attack took place it is probable that the ship was the "Prinz Eugen," in which case all the ships which escaped from Brest have been damaged.
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    I would only add that we appreciate very much the tributes that have been paid in the House to the gallantry of the officers and men of our Forces which attacked the enemy. Criticisms have been uttered in the House this week of the fact that only six Swordfish attacked the enemy during the recent channel battle. I would remind the House that this was not the only air-borne torpedo attack which was launched—there was a much larger number of torpedo bombers of the Coastal Command which also attacked the enemy.
    The review I have to give to the House to-day would not be complete without a reference to the work of the Fleet in the Mediterranean. The position has, of course, been extremely difficult since the campaigns in Greece and Crete, leaving the whole of the North flank in the hands of the enemy with power to launch his air attacks from numerous bases on that side as well as from Tripolitania. The Prime Minister, in his speeches to the House, has painted the picture in better terms than I could hope to do, but there can be no doubt of the gallant work which the Fleet has done in supplying our armies in Cyrenaica and in Malta. It has also engaged in a number of brilliant actions. The destruction of two Italian cruisers by a division of destroyers was a remarkable feat, and the exploit of Captain Agnew and his small squadron in annihilating a complete convoy of Italian transports, was an outstanding achievement.
    Our submarines in circumstances far more difficult than those encountered by the German U-boats attacking numerous targets in the wide ocean, have been most successful in reducing the weight of reinforcements which would otherwise have reached General Rommel's army. In this, of course, they have been daily assisted by pilots of the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force. It might be convenient to mention here that during the war, since September, 1939, our comparatively small fleet of submarines has sunk or damaged no fewer than 326 ships, 64 of which were warships of one kind or another, whilst the Fleet Air Arm, also since the beginning of the war, has carried out 120 attacks on warships and convoys at sea, 200 attacks on warships and ships in harbour, 260 raids on shore objectives, and 600 air combats. They have shot down, or severely damaged 270 enemy aircraft

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    over the sea; they have sunk or seriously damaged 45 enemy warships of all kinds, and 335,000 tons of enemy shipping. Considering the resources at the disposal of the Fleet Air Arm I consider this a remarkable achievement.
    After this brief survey of the achievements—and setbacks—of the past, the House will expect me to take stock of our present situation, so far as it is possible to do so in public. There was a time—but eighteen months ago—when all that stood between us and immediate defeat in these islands were the remnants of our army, our then small number of squadrons, and our Navy with its light forces sadly depleted for the time being. I have told the House of the number of destroyers lost off the Dutch and French coasts, and immediately after, before we had any corvettes. 73 of our destroyers were then laid up in dock. Indeed in those desperate days many of our shore defences, including sometimes even the men, were provided from naval sources. For a year we bore on our shoulders alone the whole burden of the fight for human freedom in every quarter of the globe except the Far East, where it was sustained by the enduring courage of China. The spirit of the British and Chinese peoples was all that remained to hold open the door of human hope against the blasts of Axis fury. All we have done since, all we have suffered since must be viewed against that background.
    During those 12 months, the British Navies of the Commonwealth preserved and sustained this vital bastion against the Axis and kept supplies and in being the only enduring front against Italy and Germany in the Middle East. It may also be pointed out that at the same time, by preserving the freedom of the seas they kept open the only remaining supply route to China. In this fearful task, in which failure meant almost certainly irretrievable disaster, we were encouraged and fortified by the Dominion Navies, and by those small Allied contingents I have previously referred to, and always by the flow of seamen from all parts of the British Commonwealth. We must not, and shall not, forget the contribution from Australian and New Zealand cruisers and destroyers, from Canadian destroyers and corvettes, from South African minesweepers, Indian sloops and patrol vessels, and from the men who have come from Newfoundland, the Crown Colonies and
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    elsewhere to help man vessels of the Royal Navy. We are similarly grateful for all the work of shipbuilding and of equipping, which has been done in the Dominions and India, and certain Colonies.
    The naval help of our European Allies has also been of the greatest value, and has gone on increasing steadily. The Dutch, with their cruisers and their destroyers, and especially their submarines, have added a new page to their naval history ranking with those of the seventeenth century. The other navies which have been recruited from countries overrun by the enemy have loyally supported us, and whenever possible we have supplied them with ships and equipment. We are also deeply grateful for the help received from the Merchant Navies of these Allies, especially the Dutch, Norwegians and Greeks.
    In the last six months, the picture of the struggle has completely changed. When the Germans attacked Russia, they brought into the fray against them not merely the mighty Russian Army and Air Force, but also a considerable Fleet. By its constitution and the geographical situation of its bases, the Russian Navy is not designed nor readily able to operate extensively in the broad oceans. Nevertheless we must recognise the part it has played in local offensive and defensive operations in conjunction with the Russian Army, and the blows which it has struck against the enemy's supply lines within range of its large submarine flotillas. Its spirit is exemplified by the submarine which went right into the hostile harbour of Petsam itself, in order to find its target.
    A much greater change still, however, occurred on 7th December last, when the American and Japanese navies of the world were plunged into the conflict. Thanks to the surprise which they were able by treachery to achieve at Pearl Harbour, and to their skill and good fortune in their encounter with the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse," the Japanese were able, in a matter of days, as I have said, to falsify all the bases on which the existing strategical plans had been founded. The onward march of their armies has added steadily to the gravity of the position and we must squarely face the situation that with the main forward base on which we had relied now in the hands of the enemy, he possesses freedom

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    of entry so far as raids are concerned into the Indian Ocean.
    These are great and grievous threats. But it is not the custom of the Navy nor of our people to weaken in adversity. On the contrary, we must and shall heighten our resolve and magnify our effort to the measure of these new strains and perils. The successes of the Japanese have been great but have not been gained without some cost. They have already suffered substantial losses in warships and transports at the hand of the Dutch, American and the British Navies and Air Forces. The British and American Navies are recovering from the heavy blows they suffered, and with the great programmes of construction being pressed forward they should go on expanding until they surpass all-in-all the strength which they could muster when Japan rushed headlong into the war. By those means we must labour to restore the sea power in that area which is essential to victory. On the shipping side, an equally vital factor, the considerably higher rate of Allied losses which has obtained since December 7th, even if it should persist—which I trust will not be the case as we are able to deal with it better—should be more than off-set by the vast programme in the United States and the not inconsiderable effort in this country. The House has recognised that shipping is a most vital issue not only to us here, but for supplies to Russia, and the movement of troops and supplies to all the theatres of war.
    Mr. Benjamin Smith: Is it the intention of the right hon. Gentleman to give the House any figures of merchant shipbuilding?
    Mr. Alexander: The House is in possession of the figures. I am sorry if the hon. Member did not happen to be present when they were given. I do not wish to give them to-day.
    Mr. Shinwell: In possession of what figures? I know the occasion to which my right hon. Friend refers. Is he referring to British replacements or to the actual figures of American construction?
    Mr. Alexander: Figures on all those points are in the possession of the House. They were given freely and frankly. I am surprised the hon. Member did not know about it.
    Mr. Shinwell: Oh, I know about it, but I do not accept it.
    Mr. Alexander: Let me end this review of this vital question of shipping. Shipping is essential to American reinforcements, it is essential to our own reinforcements, it is essential to the maintenance of our own war effort here and in the Dominions, and it is of the greatest importance that everything should be done to bridge the most dangerous period of the shipping crisis, and that is the year 1942. On that I would say that we were able to exceed our programme of building last year, that the volume of repairs, in particular repairs to ships which were immobilised while under repair—in dock—was greatly reduced, and that we are doing all we can to make the maximum use of our shipping in this difficult year as well as to urge upon all who are in the industry or engaged upon the organisation of it further to expand their efforts. Such a time as we are passing through calls for the loyalty and the energy and the undivided purpose of us all to achieve, in face of what has undoubtedly been in certain areas a disaster, a recovery which will take us through to the end and to the victory which we all desire.
    Mr. Ammon: The House has listened with interest to a very interesting review of a Service which is vital to all of us at all times, and particularly in time of war, and everyone will want to join in the tribute that has been paid to the gallantry, the bravery and the endurance of the officers and men of the Royal Navy. I am also particularly glad that the right hon. Gentleman said a word for the man who is "soldier and sailor too" the Marine, who has such a very splendid record of service. But interesting and exhilarating in some respects as the First Lord's statement has been, I believe there is a little feeling of disappointment that in regard to some of the matters in which we are particularly interested and on which we wanted further information it has not been thought proper to reveal it to the House, though on the other hand some things which I thought might not have been included have been touched upon. Having said that, I think the first thing I ought to do is to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the fact that his Department appears to have escaped the storm that has swept some other Departments. So far from his having

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    suffered any losses he has gained another junior Minister, now giving him three, and I trust that that means that we shall see more of the right hon. Gentleman him-self in the House than has been the case for some time past.
    The recent Debate in Secret Session and the many subjects which have been remitted for inquiries do somewhat restrict the discussion of the Vote which we are now considering—I only hope that inquiries are not to be taken as substitutes for victories—but some things will be said by way of criticism or by way of inquiry, and though, of course, it will be understood that the Government may not always find it discreet to give full replies, those matters are being raised in the hope that they will be given full consideration. I want to give some expression to the feeling of considerable disquiet which undoubtedly exists in the country as to the shipping position generally and the many things that have happened to the Royal Navy itself. The right hon. Gentleman gave us a very encouraging retrospect of the manner in which the Navy have been able to deal with the submarine menace in the past, how by various devices they have been able to meet it and overcome it, but all that has been rather upset by the statement made by the Prime Minister in the last day or two, when he said:
    "In the past few months there has been a most serious increase in shipping losses."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th February, 1942; col. 43, Vol. 378.]
    That is the matter with which we are concerned. While our appreciation of what has been done to meet past difficulties is in no way diminished, we are concerned to know what is being done now to meet the present situation, which, so far as we see, is growing to a very alarming extent, so much so that we have been informed by the Prime Minister himself that it is straining our offensive and defensive powers to the very limit. It is on things of that sort that we hope we shall get some enheartenment.
    We must keep in mind when we are discussing the general war situation that this is still primarily a naval war, that it has got to be won primarily at sea, and therefore it is essential that we should have some assurance that the lessons of the past are being learned. For instance, the right hon. Gentleman gave us an account of what happened at Crete and how cover
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    was lacking. Of course, that is a long while ago, and the Navy ought to have had cover there. That was a fundamental mistake at the very commencement, but it has been repeated in more recent times. As regards the tragedy of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" and in other matters, we have still to learn whether any effective steps are being taken in this particular matter. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give us some information as to the connection and the cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy and also the strength, composition and equipment of the Fleet Air Arm. Then came the spread of the war and the bad luck to the United States Navy. These things have thrown additional burdens on the Royal Navy and have increased the difficulties in the way of safe convoy of merchant ships and the flow of essential commodities to this country. The right hon. Gentleman has said that our position might have been much worse. One hesitates to think what it might have been but for the gallant assistance given by the Dutch Navy in the Far East.
    I do not propose to consider our shipping and shipbuilding position, and matters germane thereto. In a former Debate it was pointed out by the Prime Minister that we had added 1,000,000 men to our munitions industry more than we had at the end of the last war. That is not the position with regard to the Royal Navy and the building and repair of ships. We are still down very considerably in those respects. I hope that the First Lord, or whoever will speak later, will tell the House frankly what difficulties he may be facing, so that we may give what help and take whatever steps may be necessary to meet the situation. Are there any difficulties in regard to the labour situation or in regard to organisations in that respect? Are all the shipyards fully occupied—even the limited number that we have? We know that numbers of them were swept away by Shipping Securities, Ltd. Again and again we have drawn attention to the loss of shipping, and this has now been underlined by the Prime Minister. We want to know whether that loss is being overhauled. We have every reason to think that we may be facing a dead loss. Is it possible to tell the country what the difficulties are? It may be that greater risks are run by fearing to give information to

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    the enemy than by disclosing to the House and the country the real position.
    Mr. Alexander: That is a rather important statement. I have already indicated to the House what the American shipbuilding programme is as well as our own, in order to show how we intend to try and recoup our losses.
    Mr. Ammon: Up to now we have not had a lot of encouragement from the flow of shipping from the United States. We should be pleased to have information as to the nature and kind of shipping being sent to us. We are left in some doubt, when pictures are conjured up and hopes are stirred up, and when, a few months later, we find there has been no basis for them. The reaction is much worse than it might have been if the full facts had been given to us earlier. I have already asked whether the First Lord will let the House and the country—and I am not so concerned about the House—know what the difficulties are, if there are any, in regard to the supply of labour. Are there difficulties in getting on with repairs as fast as we can? It is no use communicating the facts privately to hon. Members who are not in a position to make use of them in the quarters that are desired. I will leave that aspect of the matter. I can see that there is a delicate position to handle, and that the First Lord may be placed in a delicate position in this respect.
    In a former Debate I asked whether there was any co-ordination of war strategy. That question was met, but only in a measure, by a statement given by the Dominions Secretary, who said that the necessary steps had been or were being taken to concert military plans among the major Allied Powers. We must, of course, accept that statement, but we are concerned to know what steps are being taken to concert our own different arms, so that they may co-operate together in the most advantageous manner. Is there any such co-operation between our own arms? Is there a joint operational staff? Obviously there could not have been when the three German ships escaped from Brest. Every mark of divided control was displayed. Matters like that arouse very strong feelings of unrest and dissatisfaction. This does not mean that our people are nervous or
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    afraid, but they want to know whether our arms are being used as efficiently and as co-operatively as they should be.
    We now look back over a period in which there has been a series of disasters in the Royal Navy, and many of them still await explanation to this House. We still have the right to ask whether the persons responsible for those disasters are still in positions where they can repeat those blunders or whether disciplinary action has been taken against them. We have never had an answer to such questions, although they have been asked ever since the loss of the "Royal Oak." The First Lord admitted that somebody was to blame, but we never knew whether anybody had been brought to account for it. The same observation applies to a series of other incidents, down to the escape of the ships from Brest. Was it part of the plan that six Swordfish planes should be the first to engage three enemy ships equipped with powerful anti-aircraft armament, overhead protection to serve as a screen, and everything tuned up to meet the expected attack? The First Lord said in a speech the other day:
    "I hear criticism in regard to the fact that two or three ships got through the English Channel the other day."
    I do not think that was the proper way in which to refer to that kind of event.
    Mr. Alexander: It is also unfair to take one sentence from its context of the whole speech.
    Mr. Ammon: I happened to be at the gathering which was addressed by Mr. Harriman, and I found myself seated beside the wife of one of the most distinguished representatives of one of the Governments now taking refuge here. She asked me if I had read the First Lord's speech, and I had to admit that I had not, but I read it when I got home, and then I. understood. He had referred to three great battleships, first-class ships, as "two or three ships," and thereby aroused a feeling which ought not to have been aroused. I would like to suggest, with great respect, to the First Lord that it would be very much better if he did not run about all over the country so much to secondary meetings. One orator in the Government is quite enough. The position of the Navy as the "silent Service" was much better, and he lays himself open to much criticism by reason

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    of his frequent absences addressing Warship Week gatherings and that sort of thing when other people could do it quite as well in the circumstances.
    Mr. Alexander: I might ask the Members of the House not to ask me to go.
    Mr. Ammon: It would be possible for the right hon. Gentleman to say "No." There are other things which can be said in this connection. The way in which these disasters and setbacks have been handled by the Government has annoyed the House and the country. I thought it was extraordinary when the Prime Minister tried to tell us that it was to our advantage that those ships had got out of Brest and had rejoined their base. It was one of the most amazing utterances that I could possibly imagine on the subject of an incident which was humiliating to our own Fleet. The German ships had been able to carry out a very daring and brilliant piece of seamanship. It was very much on the lines the Prime Minister has followed in times gone by, of trying to bulldoze this House, when we have had a very serious reverse, that it was really a victory. That sort of thing will not do. The reaction in the country is very bad indeed. I notice that a very distinguished admiral in another place paid particular attention to this and pointed nut exactly what an absurd thing it was to say when the enemy navy had been able to unite its forces.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Dennis Herbert): I must remind the hon. Member about the Rule concerning quotations from speeches in another place.
    Mr. Ammon: I will say no more about that, except to say that it raises the question of the equipment of our own Fleet Air Arm. The only torpedo bombers the Navy seems to possess are these old Swordfish machines, with a speed when loaded of about 100 miles an hour, carrying one small 18 in torpedo incapable of inflicting vital damage on a modern battleship unless it is fortunate enough to hit the propeller, as happened in the case of the "Bismarck." The only thing one can say regarding the attack of the Swordfish is that, like the charge of the Light Brigade, it was splendid, but it was not war. It put us in a very difficult position. I freely admit that the disaster which befell the American Navy added tre-
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    mendously to our burden. It has made the duty of convoying more difficult for our Fleet. These criticisms are no reflection whatever on the gallantry and skill of the men engaged, but it is the duty of the House to inquire whether these people who are carrying out their duties on the high seas are receiving from the higher command that protection, help and guidance to which they have every right.
    There are one or two other points I want to put to the right hon. Gentleman in the hope that answers will be made to them. A good deal of anxiety is being felt regarding the design of our ships. Whether it is by accident or otherwise, we have to notice that our ships have gone down very much more quickly in action than have the ships of the Germans. They seem to have sunk more easily. The "Ark Royal," the "Hood," the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" all went down quickly, whereas we remember what a number of hits were necessary to sink the "Bismarck" and others of our enemy's ships. No doubt there is a large element of luck in the matter, but nevertheless it is a question which is being discussed again and again. I hope we may have some assurance that the question of design is being given keen consideration.
    I would also like to ask whether there is any prospect of the Fleet Air Arm getting suitable machines at an early date to replace the somewhat obsolete ones. Also, what about torpedoes? The torpedoes we use seem to be a very great deal behind in power and efficiency compared with those used against us. Our 18 inch torpedoes seem very ineffective compared with the enemy's 21 inch torpedoes. That seems to indicate a lack of foresight. It is no use talking about the quantity of any weapon if its power and calibre are less than are being used against us. We have a right to receive answers in regard to this sort of thing. The results obtained from our motor torpedo boats are so far disappointing. Can we not be told what is wrong? If there is anything which the right hon. Gentleman wants which the House can give him, it will be given to him gladly. There will not be the slightest trouble about that, but we have the right to ask what the difficulties are and to ask further that they shall be brought to the House

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    so that we may have the opportunity of reviewing them.
    There is one further suggestion which I wish to make and which has already been made again and again by my hon. Friend the Member for Seaham (Mr. Shinwell), namely, that we should do everything possible to reduce the work of our Merchant Navy by taking more vigorous action to cut down unnecessary imports. I was glad to see that yesterday the Lord Privy Seal made a statement which seemed to indicate that something might be done in that direction. But this point has been hammered at for 18 months; it has taken all that time to come to a decision, and then only because of the Lord Privy Seal, who has been away for a couple of years and has heard what is going on outside, so that he comes back with a fresh point of view. Even so, I saw in one of the papers to-day that he did not mean what he said and that nothing is to happen. But the cutting down of dog-racing and so forth means, after all, a reduction in petrol consumption and in the quantities of other things which have to be conveyed from overseas. Rationing should be put on a uniform system for all of us, and greater encouragement should be given to increasing home production, both here and in the Colonies. Everything possible should be done to reduce the demands on shipping space and to reduce convoying work, so that the Navy can attend to its other duties more than it does at the present time. I hope attention will be given to the question of providing faster vessels, particularly for the Merchant Navy. I understand that some of the convoys can hardly be seen to move. That is alarming, and one only wonders that our casualties have not been even greater. We should like some information on these points.
    Mr. Alexander: That information has been given to the House.
    Mr. Ammon: We get statements, but they are never implemented. The First Lord himself has said, over this Table, that he wholly agreed about rationing and all the other suggestions I have made, but it was only yesterday that we got the announcement. It is no good Ministers saying that they quite agree if nothing is done, and if in twelve months' time we are in the same position. I have had handed to me a statement about the re-
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    vised subsistence allowances to certain naval officers. A request was made that the allowance of 18s. 9d. a day for lieutenant-commanders, when they go away on official duties, should be increased. They have gained the magnificient increase of 1s. 3d. a day, bringing the allowance up to £1. I understand that that allowance, in view of their position as officers, is far from adequate to meet their expenses. They have to do more travelling than commanders, but the commanders get 25s. a day. The First Lord might see whether they could be placed on an equality. The First Lord was subject to interruptions, but we have been too long associated for it to be suggested that there was anything personal intended. We have a duty, however, to bring forward our criticisms forcefully and plainly. It is no reflection on the personnel. We simply desire to ease the burden on the very gallant officers and men who are engaged on this dangerous work on the high seas, and to provide them with better ships.
    I came up the other day from Liverpool in a railway carriage full of naval ratings. To hear what they said about the Government was most astonishing. I was the only civilian there, and they did not concern themselves about me. What they said about this Government would have been an education to the First Lord had he heard it; and that is the best test of what the men think. They have a feeling that they have not had proper consideration, and that the Government have not done the necessary planning. I bring these matters to the notice of the House in the hope that something will be done. Above all, I ask that the results of the inquiries now going on may be communicated to the House. It is no good fobbing hon. Members off with the statement that there is to be an inquiry, in the hope that as time passes the matter will drop. We want to know whether the same people who have been responsible for the undoubted blunders are still there to commit more. After all, a serious situation has been created by the appointment of the new Secretary of State for War. The First Lord does not know now how far he may be let down by the man immediately under him, in the hope of succeeding him. If only for that reason, the First Lord might have a good look round, to see if all is well in his Department.
    Rear-Admiral Beamish: The First Lord opened his speech with a remark which gave us cause to think of the burden of Admiralty. I will quote something which describes the spirit animating the Navy, which I am sure the House will appreciate, and so will the First Lord. What I am going to read came from the pen and the heart of Lord Baldwin, when he was Prime Minister. He said:
    "Courage, hazard and hardship can give a quality of human happiness undreamed of by those who sit secure and at ease in Zion."
    That is the spirit of happiness which pervades the Navy. I am not sure where Zion really is, but is certainly includes the hotels in Park Lane, the benches of this House, the dog-racing tracks, and a large number, if not all, of the cinemas up and down the country. I do not think that even now our people appreciate what the British Navy has done for them and for the world. I am sure, judging from the letters I get, that they do not. The first thing I want to mention in this connection is the enormous importance of giving the Admiralty the utmost priority. I believe they have not had anything like the measure of priority which the situation demands—I mean priority not only for warships, but for merchant ships, and certainly for the necessary aircraft without which the Admiralty cannot hope to function efficiently. To support that, if it is necessary to support such a statement, which to my mind is self-evident, I would just remind the House—the First Lord touched on it—that never in any period of history has the Navy had so much to do, in such tremendous circumstances, and if I were to base my criticisms, as so many do, on naval failures and my natural fears and anxieties there would hardly be an end to my criticism.
    I have no intention, however, of basing my criticism on my fears and anxieties. Instead of that I say, let us and let the people of this country thank God that this House can meet to-day and survey the situation, and that our population is better fed and better clothed than any in Europe, Asia, Africa and America, with the single possible exception of the United States. But I would say that the Admiralty is desperately and dangerously shackled and is handicapped very severely in certain basic respects. It has
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    been said and published that the Admiralty think that the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen are better in German ports than at Brest. I beg leave to doubt whether they ever said any such thing unless it was loyally to support a wholly wrong and disastrous policy forced upon them, namely, divided control of sea power. That is the whole evil which lies at the root of that disaster in the Channel.
    I see in the newspaper to-day, as one sees constantly, that aircraft of Bomber Command—and may I say in passing that the term "Bomber Command" is not only an anachronism but an anomaly —have been laying mines. They can only have been laying mines on behalf of the Admiralty. Coastal Command have been doing something else. This seems to me, and I have thought so for years, to indicate that the Admiralty have had to ask the Air Ministry to do some of their work. The Admiralty ask, presumably, because they have not the weapons or the aircraft with which to do it. That, to my mind, is a most serious, grave and fundamental issue. In speaking of what I call the anomaly of the term "Bomber Command"—and it affects the Navy too—I would say that one might just as well speak of the Submarine Command or the Destroyer Command. That would be as bad for the efficiency of the Navy as it is to speak of the "Bomber Command."
    In connection with what I call the disaster in the Channel I am perfectly certain that however sorry and anxious and even depressed I may be, there is not a soul on the Board of Admiralty who is not deeply sorry and humiliated that it should have happened. I see the First Lord here, and I frankly commiserate with him in the feelings that must have passed through his mind when he heard that those craft he had been longing to destroy for so many months were all but through the English Channel, and that nothing had been done either to report or check them. One could talk about it and compare it with naval disasters that have occurred in the past, but I say that is a waste of time now. It will be a very proper thing to do at some future time and no doubt it will be done. I have however had certain considerations forced on my attention, whether I liked it or not. I do not go about asking for evidence which will

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    enable me to make critical speeches and attack the Front Bench, but for one reason and another certain points come to my notice, and I am going to put them as politely as I can to the First Lord.
    First, we have heard something about these half-dozen Swordfish planes. That is bad enough but I hope the present arrangement is in process of rectification. I hear that the Admiralty had to rely on the Air Ministry for seaplanes carrying torpedoes with which to attack those German ships going up Channel. That, in itself, is fundamentally wrong. I am also told that the crews of the planes in question had never made an operational flight, and that they had had barely any practice at dropping torpedoes. Further, I am told that it was as late as three o'clock in the afternoon when these tremendously-wanted seaplanes carrying torpedoes left a mid-Channel Port, and we know that the report of these ships moving up Channel came through somewhere about 11 a.m., or towards midday. I am told that that mid-Channel Port was—I will put it mildly—150 miles astern of the escaping ships; further, that the information conveyed to the crews was to the effect that a convoy was passing up Channel and that it was to be attacked. This is conveyed to me by someone who says: "I can assure you that my information is founded on perfect truth and perfect honesty." That is how he puts it. I am not prepared to say that that was what occurred but I am prepared to say that something of that sort did happen. Not only were these crews told merely that there was to be a convoy attacked; I would say that, in general, the reports on and information in regard to these escaping ships were incomplete and too late. As we know, they were entirely disastrous in their consequences. I must ask the House to forgive me for feeling very deeply the humiliation we have had to suffer in this disastrous event.
    I wish to say a few words about the fall of Singapore and to support by every means I possess the point of view put forward by the First Lord. It is another disaster, but it cannot be said too often that Singapore was a fortified base which could only hope to remain undefeated and untaken if we were able to exercise sea-power for its protection. I am constantly questioned by people about the fortifica-
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    tions and so on. I say, quite frankly, that if it had ever been suggested in this House or on any public platform in the country that we were to organise land protection for the Malayan Peninsula it would have been laughed to scorn at any time in the last 15 years. Therefore, I congratulate the Government and the Board of Admiralty on having kept Japan out of the war in some way or another, for as long as they did. Once Japan came into the war, it seemed to me that the fall of Singapore was practically inevitable and its retention, as I said, depended, and must depend in any similar circumstances, on command of the sea, with adequate air support.
    Another point to which I would like to draw attention and one which is conveniently forgotten is that Singapore never would have fallen, nor would we have got into that position if it had not been for the defeat and defection of France. That leads me, not very happily but truthfully, to point out that the position in the Mediterranean—the focus of the war from which we cannot detach any of our power without the gravest risks of losing Egypt and the oil and everything else which is so important—is a very serious one indeed. Again, this is due to the most unhappy and unfortunate defeat and defection of France. I refer in this connection to the fate of Malta. Malta may fall. I do not know—I can only read between the lines in the Press, look at my map and think of what I have learned from history. After all the attacks on Malta the British public might just as well begin to think about the possibility of Malta falling. If it is possible for German ships to pass up Channel as they did recently, it ought to be possible, if the First Lord receives all the support he wants and his powers are not diverted, depleted and watered down, by demands from other parts of the world, to prevent Malta from falling. With adequate sea power and an adequate number of surface ships and aircraft, I see no reason why Malta should fall, but unless that tremendous pressure and power can be provided, there is a great possibility that Malta may fall.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Camberwell, North (Mr. Ammon) was very critical, and, after all, he is entitled to be critical. We all feel critical and sorry about what is happening. He said some-

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    thing about the First Lord going around the country and making admirable speeches—many of which I have heard—on the subject of warship weeks and so forth. I have to do the same, and I am sure that I do not reduce the power of the Navy or of the Admiralty by my efforts in that respect. I do my best to explain to the people the enormous importance of sea power and how grateful they should be to the Royal Navy. I want to say, in connection with the First Lord's travels, that in undertaking them he pays a high compliment to the First Sea Lord, because he has to be away for a good many hours at very critical times. Tremendous events happen at five minutes' notice, and although I have heard and have often had pressed upon me the suggestion that the First Sea Lord should be replaced, the First Lord must have the greatest confidence in him if he feels safe and in a position to go away and make those very admirable speeches in the country. I say that, because it is desirable that the hints which are so constantly dropped about the growing incapacity of members of the Board of Admiralty should be checked.
    There are two or three other things, important but minor by comparison with the tremendous events that surround us, to which I would refer. They concern pay and pensions and so on, and I want to record them in order that the Admiralty may give consideration to them. A system of post-war credits has been introduced in the country and I believe it now applies to the men of the Navy. I want to know whether it would not be a good idea to popularise the post-war credits and establish a system of such credits on behalf of the officers of the Navy. That is just a suggestion.
    I want to clear up another matter. The country has lost a number of senior, officers in command of convoys—retired officers of great experience, courage, bravery and zeal. Some 11 or 12 of them have laid down their lives. They had been recalled, having reached the rank perhaps of vice-admiral or admiral. These officers are recalled—or they offer their services; I am not sure whether that is a distinction—and they have to take up the rank of commodore or commander, Royal Naval Reserve, or some lower rank than that which they had acquired by 30 or 40 years' service in the Royal Navy. If they are killed in action the pensions for
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    their wives should be based upon the rank which they reached while they were serving in the Navy rather than upon the lower rank in which they were serving when they lost their lives. The question is complicated and I could not hope to be dogmatic about it, but the Admiralty ought to be more sympathetic. I realise the difficulties, but it really is time, in view of all the Questions that are asked in the House, that a Departmental committee should be set up, if there is not a Standing Committee in existence for that purpose, to consider the pay, pensions and allowances of the officers of the three Fighting Services. I do not wish it to be thought that I am not considering the point of view of the men. I consider it very much indeed, but, at the moment, my impression is that this question has rather passed out of the minds of the heads of the three Fighting Services, and I ask, therefore, that the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty shall give the matter consideration.
    During the last war three great ships, which I knew very well indeed, were destroyed completely by the deterioration of the cordite for their guns—the "Bulwark," the "Vanguard" and the "Natal." It is possible that there were other cases. This was largely due to the fact that the Admiralty, at least during the last war, did not retain full control over the supply and inspection of their armaments, and particularly of their explosives. I hope that such a thing is not likely to happen again in this war, and I ask the First Lord whether, when a reply is made, the representative of the Admiralty will give some consolation or information on this subject in the hope that similar disasters may not happen as those which occurred in the last war.
    I want to say a word on the subject of the serious increase in shipping losses in the last two months. Nothing could exceed the brilliance of the service, courage and zeal of all those who are protecting the shipping lanes and lines and the convoys, but it is rather an extroordinary thing that these heavy losses should suddenly have come about since the entry into the war of the United States of America. Far be it from me even to attempt to put my finger on the right spot—I do not know what is the cause—but I cannot help feeling that it may be because the urgency of the war,

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    as it appears to the United States, has possibly resulted in a reduction of the admirable convoy protection which they provided up to the date of their entry into the war. I hope that I am not unjustified in asking the First Lord to be good enough to let us have a word of explanation in that connection.
    Something was said about the Beveridge Committee. In the course of my work as a Member of Parliament I receive, like every other hon. Member, a great many letters. Very often these letters come from people who want to join the Navy, and who say, "I am an internal combustion engineer. I am this, that, or the other"—something rather special. They ask me whether I will insist upon the Admiralty finding a square hole in which they may place their services, which are square. I have discussed this matter with many of these people. I have told them that I could hold out no guarantee, and that I thought it was entirely wrong for people to expect to find a perfect niche in one or other of the Services simply because their own peace-time job had come to an end. Recently, in conversation with a young man in a reserved occupation, I was told by him, "Admiral, you ought to be able to find a place for all these people. What is the Navy going to do with an economist?" I said, "I do not want to cast any slurs on economists, but it seems to me it is the economist's job to fit himself for the Navy and not for the Navy to fit the Service to the economist." That is what I think about that matter, and it is there that I think the Beveridge Committee are at fault. I think they have not been entirely practical in their consideration of these matters.
    I want now to say a word or two concerning the reliability of our ships, their unsinkability, or whatever you like to call it. Desperate disasters occurred during the last war because of faulty design, and I was delighted to hear my right hon. Friend the First Lord say that the most stringent steps are being taken to impress upon the designers of ships the necessity for making ships as nearly unsinkable as possible. In this connection, I would like to mention a rumour—it is nothing more than a rumour. The other day somebody said to me, "Didn't you know that they were never able to
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    sink the 'Bismarck'? The 'Bismarck's' crew knew that they could not go on fighting, steaming, or escaping, and they were determined that the ship should not fall into the hands of the British because she was torpedo-proof, and therefore, they opened the seacocks and sank her." I am not prepared to support that assertion, because I really do not know.
    In conclusion, I want to remind the House of the great possibilities of the future. I can foresee—I should hate to see it happen—the fall of Trincomalee and even the possibility of the occupation of Calcutta. I end my remarks on the same note as I started. Whatever we may think, whatever we may hope, and however much we may admire the Army and the Royal Air Force, it is wholly wrong to suppose that either one of those Services alone, or the two Services in combination, can win the war. The surest way of winning the war is to provide the utmost possible strength of sea-power in all its forms and aspects; if that is done, we can look forward with confidence, hope, and certainty to victory.
    Squadron-Leader Donner: I want to begin by paying a tribute to the officers and men of the Royal Navy. I was glad to hear the First Lord's generous tribute to these officers and men who have had to run the gauntlet of torpedo and mine, shell and bomb. It is one thing to face acute danger for a short time; quite another order of courage is required to carry on month after month under conditions of extreme danger and physical discomfort. I think that our hearts go out particularly to the men in the trawlers and minesweepers, many of them from the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. I believe that too many people outside the House fail to realise that the men of the Royal Navy, alone of the three Services, are in constant danger. In this war the soldier's battles have been short and sharp. The airman, when he returns, returns to his aerodrome and to a warm bed—although perhaps not so warm, as some of us know from personal experience—at any rate, he returns to his mess and to comfort. But the sailor is in danger during the whole 24 hours of the day. Even when he returns to harbour, he is in danger of being bombed while his wife perhaps lives beside a neighbour who is married to a man working in industry and whose pay

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    is many times greater than that of her own husband.
    The First Lord referred to the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Seven Seas. I should prefer the expression "Campaign" of the Atlantic and "Campaign" of the Seven Seas, for that would be more accurate terminology. Arising out of the Battle of the Atlantic, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Rear-Admiral Beamish) referred to the passage of the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" and "Prinz Eugen" up the Channel, and spoke of that as being a disaster. I dissent from that interpretation of the event. It is very understandable that a great many people felt emotional on the subject. The passage of these ships appeared to be an affront perpetrated on our very doorstep. It seemed a sad naval reverse, following upon many other reverses in the Far East. It savoured almost of the occasion when the Dutch, in the time of Charles II, sailed up the Thames with broomsticks attached to their masts.
    What, in fact, does the event prove? Surely, it proves that capital ships, provided they are given full air support, a full air umbrella, can operate in narrow waters. It proves only what our Mediterranean Fleet has proved again and again during many months in the Mediterranean. Given that air support, capital ships can so operate. Suppose the boot had been on the other leg, suppose we had had a spectacular success in the Channel, suppose we had sunk two of the ships, and that a third had limped home to a German base mauled and battered. I believe the House and the country would have rejoiced for a very short time, for that temporary, spectacular success would have brought with it the implication that great capital ships could no longer, even with air support, operate in narrow waters. Surely, that implication, for our Island Empire, dependent as it is on the seas, would have been an implication of the most grave and grievous consequence. Therefore, although it was a great disappointment to us that those ships were not sunk, that they did not sustain even greater damage than they did, I think we can find some consolation in the fact that they were damaged, even though they were not sunk.
    My submission is that this event proves that in this war no single Service can act successfully on its own. We must
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    have the closest possible co-operation between the three Services. While the inquiry which has been instituted is going on, I hope that the First Lord will go into one particular point. A great number of people are wondering whether in fact our torpedoes are as effective as those of Germany and Japan. I know nothing about it, but I think it is a matter which would be worthy of immediate investigation. There is a feeling too that a great deal of our productive effort has gone into making heavy bombers and the Navy and the Army have had to make do with what is left. Surely the time has come when we should consider the position and ascertain whether in fact the Navy is receiving the numbers and types of aircraft it requires.
    This Channel affair raises one other question, and that is the question of the future use of the assembled German fleet at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. Obviously the Germans are bound to try and intercept our supplies to Russia; they can creep up that long coast of Norway and threaten the supplies. In any case they will menace them in a very real way, but that will give us an opportunity to destroy their ships, and I only hope that the Board of Admiralty will see to it that that is done. There are various other points in this connection which are worthy of attention but which are not suitable for Public Session, and I wonder whether the First Lord will consider giving the House an opportunity to debate these matters in secret. There is the whole question of future construction which should be discussed in secret. We have lost command of the sea in the Pacific, and our position has been aggravated there by weakness in the air. The only way to wrest back our command is by the use of our battle fleet in conjunction with the American battle fleet, but the support which we can send to the Far East is limited by the remnants of the German and Italian navies, and the perpetual uncertainty of the future use of the French navy. Therefore we come to this question of construction, and whether in fact battleship building to-day is being given the priority it requires. I think that the House would appreciate an assurance on that point. After all, we started this war with only 15 capital ships. We have lost five, the "Royal Oak," the "Hood," the "Repulse," the "Prince of Wales," and the "Barham," which

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    leaves us with 10. We have added the "King George V" and the "Duke of York," but the ships which we have include five old "Royal Sovereigns." I think that the House should be told in Secret Session not only what is happening to the "Anson," the "Howe," the "Lion" and the "Temeraire," but above all whether any further capital ships are being laid down. A study of the rate at which our new battleships are being commissioned leads, I think, to the conclusion that the Prime Minister when he was First Lord of the Admiralty in the first winter of this war slowed down the rate of battleship building. I do not criticise him for that, because the conditions which appertained at that time were quite different from those which exist now. At that time there was an overwhelming need for escort ships, destroyers and small ships of all kinds, whereas to-day, after the loss of Singapore, the need is for a greater number of capital ships. The House would appreciate therefore if necessary in Secret Session further information on what we are doing in this regard.
    It was said in the last war that Jellicoe was the only man who could lose the war in half an hour; I believe that we can lose this war if we squander our battle fleet piecemeal. That leads me to the point which the First Lord made on the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse." We know that these ships were sent out as a political move and in the hope that they would act as a deterrent on Japan.

  ROYAL ASSENT.
  Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.
  The House went; and, having returned—
  Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

  1. Education (Scotland) Act, 1942.

  2. Patents and Designs Act, 1942.

  3. India (Federal Court Judges) Act, 1942.

  4. War Orphans Act, 1942.

  5. Restoration of Pre-War Trade Practices Act, 1942.

  6. Securities (Validation) Act, 1942.

  7. Ministers of the Crown and House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1942.

  SUPPLY.

    NAVY ESTIMATES.
    Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
    Squadron-Leader Donner: I was saying that we have been told by the Government that the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" were sent to Singapore as a deterrent, but the fact remains that they were sent out unescorted, and therefore did not prove so much a deterrent as an invitation to attack, since their presence, vulnerable as they were, presented an opportunity to the Japanese to attack the battle fleet piecemeal. We have been told why no aircraft carrier was sent to accompany them, but no spokesman of the Government has yet stated why no anti-aircraft cruisers were sent with them. Are we to be told that no anti-aircraft cruisers were available? If so, surely the event proves that they could not have been used to better purpose in any other part of the world. If they were not available, what has happened to our anti-aircraft destroyers? Why were none sent in escort? If the Government do not feel that this is information which can properly be given in Public Session, again I hope the First Lord will arrange to give the House information in private.
    It is difficult to see, in the light of what has happened, how the First Lord can divest himself of some of the responsibility for sending these ships unescorted. The loss of them is the cause of all the reverses that we have sustained in the Far East, and it is difficult to understand how he could have sanctioned the sending of them without proper escort or, if they were so sent, how they could have been sent without giving Admiral Phillips when he left this country, specific orders to keep them as a Fleet in being at Singapore. If he had been ordered to treat them as a Fleet in being, as the Italians have used their Fleet in the Mediterranean in this war and the Germans their high seas fleet in the North Sea in the last war, he would have contained a larger force of Japanese ships within striking distance of our aircraft, and they would have become vulnerable to attack by us. I was glad to hear the Prime Minister defending Admiral Phillips, because I believe he had no choice in the matter. Once there, at Singapore, if he had not been given orders

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    to treat the ships as a Fleet in being he had no option but to act as he did.
    What is the lesson of all this—the lesson of the consequences of the loss of sea power? The First Lord said that we had only limited cruiser strength, but why is that strength limited? He spoke of the handicap this imposes, but how came it to be imposed? Let us at least learn the lesson: let us never again sign another London Naval Treaty, because that Treaty, signed in 1930, is the cause of our troubles and the fundamental reason why to-day we are in so difficult a position. That Treaty reduced our cruiser strength from 70 to 50. The First Lord said that we had a small cruiser strength when we entered this war, but it was that Treaty which cut those cruisers down. It was that Treaty which prevented our rebuilding of the battle fleet before January, 1937, and which prevented our laying down a single aircraft carrier before that date. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 established a 10 years' naval holiday, and between 1931 and 1937 we were due to build 10 battleships. What a different picture would not the Pacific represent to-day if we had those 10 great battleships in commission. It was that Treaty which wiped them out with a stroke of the pen.
    Therefore, I say, let this country at least learn the lesson never again to tie our hands with any Treaty and never again to sign such a document. I believe that history provides no greater example of an attempt to cripple, mangle and mutilate the naval power of a great Empire than the London Naval Treaty of 1930. When things go wrong it is surely wise to ask whether all is well with the direction at the Admiralty. I have heard it said in many parts of the country that the Naval Staff is overworked. I therefore made inquiries, and I am informed that the Naval Staff at the Admiralty work seven days a week. They thus work on Saturdays and Sundays. Fifty-two Sundays and half Saturdays equal 78 days, and if at the end of a year the Naval Staff are given a week Or a fortnight's leave, it is plain that it bears no relation to the amount of work they have done. during those 78 days when they ought to have been on leave. Not only that, but the Naval Staff are required to work in the small hours of the night. We can understand the principle that we should work the Naval Staff to 100 per cent. of
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    their capacity until they are worn out and that then they should be replaced by others. We should bear in mind, however, that these men, when they are tired and before they are replaced, are required to take great decisions of far-reaching consequence. The Government will do well to consider whether it is wise to overwork the Naval Staff as they are being overworked to-day.
    I should like to raise the question of aircraft carriers. There is some feeling in the country that the Japanese have employed them to great advantage, and the question has arisen whether it would not be wise to build smaller aircraft carriers in addition to those we already possess. I believe our large aircraft carriers have been justified. Not only can they carry a greater proportion of aircraft and aircraft of heavier types, but they can be defended by armour. The bombing of the "Illustrious" showed how valuable that armour was. Had it been the old "Ark Royal" and not the "Illustrious" which was bombed at Malta, she would have suffered much more severe damage, for she carried no deck armour as smaller carriers could not carry armour either. The House will probably wish to have the Admiralty view on this subject, and I shall be glad if the First Lord will give some indication of its policy in regard to building further aircraft carriers of a smaller size.
    When the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" were lost a report was published that although Japanese aircraft were in the vicinity they did not machine-gun our sailors who were swimming in the water. If that be true, it is a remarkable fact. The Germans have never hesitated to machine-gun our men in the water. The Germans are a Continental military Power, and I have been wondering whether the Japanese, who have proved themselves so barbarous in other ways, did not do so because they already had a naval tradition which prevents their acting in this way. If that be so, their failure to machine-gun our men in the water is not only significant but perhaps ominous. I hope that in the future we shall not again under-estimate the Japanese in the Far East. We are told that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was treacherous. Of course it was, but it was efficient. If, therefore—to come back to my previous point—

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    Admiral Phillips had been given orders, which I believe he should have been given, to treat his fleet as a fleet in being, he could have used his light vessels and smaller craft to feel his way to discover the strength of the Japanese at sea, keeping his big ships in reserve. How valuable would that experience have been to us now.
    We have many Micawbers in this country, many people who are always hoping that something or somebody will come along and get us out of our troubles. Only by our own exertions, however, can we possibly be saved. There are people who say that we need not worry because the Russians will deal with Germany and the United States Navy will deal with the Japanese navy. The American Navy is a one-ocean navy which has to deal with a two-ocean war. We are told that there are people in this country, in America and in Canada who are disappointed that the Americans have not been able to give us greater naval assistance in the Pacific than they have. These people sometimes forget that America has to function navally in two great oceans, and she cannot afford to lose too many small and light vessels for when her battleships have been repaired she would not then have sufficient escorts. It would be more than human nature to expect the United States not to take precautions to prevent the bombardment of San Francisco. Therefore, we come back to the fact that we must rely upon ourselves. We must look to ourselves and not to others to save us. Only the other day a distinguished admiral, Admiral Tyrwhitt, said in public that Britannia no longer rules the waves. Well, we rule some of the waves. I am told his audience became angry. Is it not time, however, that we faced facts and realities and realised that at long last we are fighting this war for survival? When we were up against it in the days of Queen Elizabeth, Francis Drake said:
    "I must have the gentlemen to hale and draw with the mariners and the mariners with the gentlemen."
    Let us look forward in that spirit, because only in that spirit can we win.
    Mr. McLean Watson: My hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon) ended his speech by mentioning that he had travelled from Liverpool to London in a
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    train that was full of naval ratings, and that he wished the First Lord had been with him so that he might have heard their opinions of the Government. 1 travel as much as anyone in this House. Every week I spend 24 hours in trains getting to and from this House, so that I have a good opportunity of hearing what naval ratings, soldiers and airmen have to say. It is quite true that they express their opinions about this Government, just as they express them about other things. I suppose they are entitled to enjoy the democratic right of expressing their opinions about this Government or any other Government, and sometimes their language is, like the language of Bret Harte's "Truthful James," that is "frequent and painful and free." It is as free about this Government, as it is about other things, but, behind it all, there is a determination on the part of these men to do their duty by this country, and I was pleased indeed to hear the First Lord pay the tribute which he rightly paid to the naval service. I am not sure that I have not much greater admiration for the Navy than for the two other Services. I do not wish to decry them or to make comparisons, but I have a prejudice in favour of the Navy. We have always looked upon the Navy as our first arm of defence, and the Navy has never let us down. Even with all their difficulties and all the adverse circumstances in which they find themselves, they are always able to keep on top.
    We have just had a two days' Debate upon matters pertaining to the war in which naval strategy was discussed as much as it is being discussed to-day. Two things have struck me about these Debates. The first is how wise everybody can be after the event. After things have gone wrong we see quite clearly how they could have been kept right. Another thing which has struck me is the impression there seems to be in the minds of some people that we ought to be strong in every quarter of the globe—in the Atlantic, in the North Sea, in the English Channel, in the Mediterranean, in the South Atlantic and in the Pacific. If that had been our intention we ought to have made greater preparations in the past. The hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Squadron-Leader Donner) referred to the Treaty of London as having cut down naval armaments, but if we wish to get to the roots of our present trouble we have

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    to go back further still, to the Treaty of Versailles. It was that Treaty which laid the foundations of our present trouble. If we meant the things we said in that Treaty we ought to have stood by them. We had not only a right to try to enforce what was in that Treaty, but to stand by the obligations which we ourselves had undertaken under it. If we decided upon a measure of disarmament we had a right to carry it out, and if we did attempt to carry it out and find ourselves in difficulties to-day we have only ourselves to blame.
    I wish to pay my tribute to the Royal Navy. I consider that they have done amazingly good work during the war. They have kept us with a higher standard of living than many of us expected to enjoy after 2½ years of war, and they are entitled to the credit for that. They have accompanied our convoys across the Atlantic and have convoyed our ships to various other parts of the world. We have not only been able to maintain a very high standard of living here, but to send supplies practically to all the ends of the earth. It is true that when this war began we were not prepared as we ought to have been even for the war against Germany, and, as the First Lord reminded us to to-day, when we were robbed of the assistance of the second largest Navy in Europe the country found itself in a terrible position, and the way the country has carried on and the way the Navy has carried on must excite the admiration not only of the people of this country but of the world as well. That does not mean that no blunders have been made, it does not mean that things have happened which ought not to have happened, but it is always easy to be wise after the event. I do not know who was responsible for the decision that those two great capital ships should be sent to the Far East. I daresay they were sent there with the best intentions and it is possible that if the purpose which they were intended to accomplish had been successful we should have been priding ourselves on the strategy that sent the ships there, but the manœuvre that we had intended failed and those two great ships were lost.
    I have a great deal of sympathy with those who have the responsibility of carrying on our great Services, on which we rely for the defence of this country, but I wish to join with those who have
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    expressed the opinion that they cannot see what particular advantage has been gained by the escape of the three German ships from Brest. It may be that the Admiralty are satisfied that the ships are better where they are than they would have been at Brest. I suppose we do not require to carry on our bombing operations at Brest any longer, so far as those are concerned. I hope that the Admiralty will keep their eyes not only on those three ships but upon others that are either in Kiel Canal or elsewhere. I hope we shall not soon find those ships out in the North Atlantic, and that, before long, the day may come when we shall have an opportunity of meeting them with Forces of equal size. I have not the slightest doubt that they will fare much worse than they did in their passage up the Channel. The Admiralty have a case for the advantages resulting from the escape of those three vessels. I am not inclined to blame the Admiralty too much, but I expect it will not be very long before we hear of those ships again. I hope that we shall have better results next time.
    Something has been said about the Fleet Air Arm. When last the Naval Estimates were before the House, I spoke on the subject. I believe that the Navy ought to have its own suitable aircraft for carrying out any work required in connection with naval operations. The Navy ought to be able to plan for the carrying on of its operations not only in regard to ships but in regard to the air protection which is now so necessary. There ought to be closely associated with the Navy and under the control of the Navy, a sufficient number of aircraft for all purposes the Admiralty may have in view. Had more aircraft been at the disposal of the Admiralty, the disasters which we deplore to-day would not have taken place. If the Fleet Air Arm is not strong enough at this moment to do what it ought, we have ourselves to blame. There has always been a conflict between the Royal Air Force and the Navy as to who should have the absolute control of the air. Only very reluctantly has this House agreed to aircraft being associated with the operations of the Navy.
    However, we are learning lessons day by day. We have learned many lessons from this war, and I hope that we shall be much wiser in future than we have been in the past. I am not prepared to dissociate myself from those who, in by-

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    gone years, have been strong advocates of disarmament and peace because those are the conditions I would like to see, but even those who have believed in those things in bygone years have to recognise hard facts. We are up against hard facts now, and we are likely to be up against them for many years to come. I hope that the lessons which have been taught us during this war will not be neglected.
    Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes: I was fortunate enough to draw third place in the Ballot, and I proposed to move that the Navy should have complete control of all the air-craft—
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonel Clifton Brown): The hon. and gallant Member did not have first place in the Ballot.
    Sir R. Keyes: I said, Sir, that I had drawn third place in the Ballot and that as I was not being called, I was free to speak on other subjects as well. That was the point I was raising. There are other matters in connection with the conduct of the war to which I would like to draw attention. I hope no one will think there is any sinister motive in my coming here to-day in uniform. It is a matter of convenience to me to do so, because I have to leave directly after the Debate to attend a Warships Week affair. These Warships Weeks are the only active things I am allowed to do now towards the war effort. It is a very great disappointment to me that I am not able to continue to direct combined operations against the enemy, but the leisure I enjoy has given me a lot of useful experience. I have been North, South, East and West all over the country, and I have been shocked to find how very far the whole attitude of the country is from the 100 per cent. endeavour. That 100 per cent. endeavour is absolutely essential if we are to achieve a speedy victory and not prolong the agony.
    The First Lord of the Admiralty expressed a great deal of complacency about what is happening in the dockyards and shipyards. I would advise him to go more among them, if that is his opinion. I have been among them, and I can say that there is nowhere near 100 per cent. work going on in the shipyards. I can say this from first-hand experience. Officers and men of the Royal Navy come
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    in to have their ships repaired and are absolutely disgusted with the slow progress of the work on their ships. They see men idling, and men drawing out their work on board ships to get overtime and draw very high wages—far higher wages than anything they could possibly earn themselves. This is building up a frightful feeling, just as it did in the last war, a feeling that will cause great trouble when the war comes to an end. But it is no good talking about after the war; we have to win the war first, and we can win it only by an effort of 100 per cent., and that applies right to the centre. It is high time that the country woke up to the necessity of putting everything into its effort.
    For the last three years I have tried hard to get someone to take an interest in real national service. The nation is at war. I said in September, 1939—and this has reference to work in the dockyards:
    "Equality of sacrifice in relation to wages is a very difficult but not an insoluble question, and I suggest that under a real system of national service basic payment should be made at the same rate for each grade of employment during the war and that there should be family and rent allowances, and arrangements to meet any contractual obligations undertaken prior to the war, so that those who have been thrifty and provident in peace-time should not be penalised by their war service."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th September, 1939; col. 1584, Vol. 351.]
    If we could do something of that sort now we should have the whole nation in. I listened to many speeches yesterday with which I was in full agreement, but I did not try to intervene in the Debate because I did not think I could say anything of value in Public Session. I have brought to the notice of the First Lord matters which I hope he will take to heart, because I have a great deal of practical experience in the prosecution of war, which has been denied to those on whom he relies for advice.
    I was interested in the remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Squadron-Leader Donner) about the London Naval Treaty, because I have been speaking about that in this House for eight years. My maiden speech was on that subject. The man who was largely responsible for forcing the London Naval Treaty upon the country was not in the House at the time, but is sitting now on the Front Bench representing the Navy. The hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke has shown how that

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    Treaty is really responsible for our troubles to-day. I have often heard the First Lord defend it, but to-day he has told us of the frightful difficulties under which the Navy started the war and the tremendous burden it has had to bear because of the shortage of ships. I think he is a very courageous man to come here and speak like that. I should not have had the courage to do it if I had had so much to do with saddling the country with the London Naval Treaty.
    The First Lord is constitutionally responsible for the advice which the Admiralty gives to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister told us quite definitely on Tuesday of the great power which the Chiefs of Staff exercise and of their freedom from interference. He said that he did not interfere in their deliberations and recommendations, or something to that effect. I will not delay the House by quoting the passage; it is in the. OFFICIAL REPORT. I remember that when he said that there was a sort of ironical groan. But it is true. I have seen it happen. Over and over again the Prime Minister has felt that he must reject his own inclinations in regard to matters on which he had received expert advice because he had to he bound by the advice of his constitutional Service chiefs. He then gave us a list of the various committees, which he said operate flexibly, in his war machine. You cannot make war by committees. You must have someone ready to accept great responsibilities. When a project is put up to these committees—I think he mentioned three of them—even when it has the approval of the Chiefs of Staff, they find out all its difficulties and dangers and persuade the Chiefs of Staff that the odds against success are too heavy. How can the Prime Minister go against the advice of his constitutional advisers under the existing system? I assure you, I have never known him do so in this war, and I cannot recall an occasion in the last war.
    Readiness to accept responsibility is the whole essence of the conduct of war. We hear a great deal about youth and the need for youth, and of course it is a war for youth, and when you find a man who is ready to accept responsibility, he should receive strong support from the Board of Admiralty But how under the present system, with that dreadful thing called wireless, is a young man to exer-
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    cise initiative, when the wireless not only gives him orders, but listens to what he is saying to other people? I have suffered from that. I could give examples if it would interest the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "It would."] You may remember the sinking of the "Aboukir," "Cressy," and "Hogue," an action in which we lost 1,40o men, more than were lost in the Battle of Trafalgar. I happened to be able to go to sea with a force of 20 destroyers and a light cruiser, and I thought it would be a splendid opportunity to hit the enemy back off Ems. I thought that when the people read next morning of this awful loss of life they might be cheered if we could tell them that we had sunk three or four enemy destroyers. I felt that it was no use telling the Admiralty, but thought I ought to let the Commander-in-Chief know. I told him what I was going to do, and he said he would send some cruisers to support me at dawn and told me not to stay too late. My wireless conversation with the Commander-in-Chief was heard at Ipswich, was telephoned to the Admiralty, and I received a peremptory order to return to harbour at once. I am sure that those few enemy destroyers could not have escaped.
    How is an officer to exercise any initiative under such conditions? It happened over and over again in the Norwegian campaign. Ships were actually going to follow the Germans into Bergen, and it was just a matter of seconds whether a wireless message would reach them in time. It reached them in time, and they were recalled, but what a difference it might have made if it had not arrived in time and the German ships there had been destroyed. Think of the liberties the Germans took with us. Take the case of the "Renown." With some destroyers she fought a gallant action against a force superior to her in gun-power. She drove them off and prevented them going into Narvik, and was then going into Narvik to destroy the nine German destroyers which were there. She was stopped at the last minute by wireless. Then a gallant Captain commanding four destroyers was given the option of going in to attack. Of course he did not hesitate to attack a vastly superior force, and lost his life, and we lost two destroyers. Then a day or two later the "Warspite" was sent in with destroyers to do what

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    the "Renown" could have done days before. It is impossible for men to act with initiative if they are ruled by wireless from Whitehall all the time.
    The First Lord has given us a wonderful survey of what our splendid Navy and Mercantile Marine have been doing throughout the war. It fills me with pride, but I am not throwing him any bouquets because he is constitutionally responsible for the bad advice which the Admiralty gives to the Prime Minister. As I have shown, and it is a fact, the Prime Minister acts on that advice. Let us look now at the explanations given regarding the sending-out of the two ships to the Far East. They bear no sort of relation to the exercise of sea power in modem war. Again, look at the explanations—given on the advice of the Naval Staff—of the passage of the three German ships through the Straits, and that they are far better placed in the Baltic than at Brest. That may be right, but one has already heard nasty rumours floating about to the effect that we let them go through because we do not want the Russians to win. Of course it is a lie, but still that is the sort of thing that is being said. I cannot help thinking that the advice to the Prime Minister from the Admiralty in this connection may prove just as unfortunate as the advice he received early in April last year when he announced in this House—I criticised it, and I remember the Lord Privy Seal also criticised it—how greatly advantaged we were by the German attack on Norway. We ought to have been, but we were not because there was not a properly aggressive spirit in the Admiralty.
    I am full of admiration for the way in which the Admiralty carries on its daily task. It is colossal, it is wonderful; but we cannot win the war by passive defence. It is high time that some more vicious, angry, furious, aggressive action was taken. There have been opportunities for carrying out aggressive exploits, I assure you. I know that the Prime Minister wanted to carry them out, but then this chain of committees—which I hope my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal will look into and examine carefully—will find every possible excuse for not doing anything. It is their duty to examine proposals and point out the difficulties and dangers. So it goes
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    on. You cannot make war by committee. I do hope that the Prime Minister will reconsider what he said when he told us that these committees, on which the process of the war machine is based, would proceed exactly as it had been doing without any fundamental change. In the last war again and again things were done which no committee would have dreamt of approving. They were prepared in secret, and the country woke up one morning and found that something surprising had been done which greatly cheered them up. But no committee would have approved in advance of the action taken. I do feel, and I think I am speaking for the country, that when this reconstruction of the Government took place there was a strong feeling that it was about time that there was a shake-up at the Admiralty. After all, the First Lord is responsible for the Admiralty. I hope if he remains there he will shake it up good and hearty and get it out of the committee complex which stifles offensive action.
    I should like to turn to the Amendment which stood in my name. I do not believe that anyone of my generation, certainly in the Navy, has had the opportunity of becoming as air-minded as I am. I started flying with the Royal Naval Air Service in 1912—I was head of the Submarine Service at the time—to see if it was a fact that submarines could be located and destroyed by air power. I continued to do that quite often. In 1918, when I commanded the Dover Patrol I had a magnificent air service, the finest in the world. We were able to train our young men very intensively before we let them loose on the enemy, and they were the admiration of everybody. There was a shore-based part in the Dover Straits which included enormous Handley-Page night bombers. No one else had anything like them. They were coveted by the Royal Flying Corps to carry out long-distance raiding. I had a large number of marines to provide a military force; I had 300 ships and this splendid air force, thus having control over the three Services—land, sea and air—working in close cooperation. When there was a great battle on shore I placed the whole of my organisation at the disposal of the military Commander-in-Chief. I wish to make that point clear. The daily task goes on, and when a battle comes—it may be at long intervals—everything must be flex-

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    ible and ready to go into battle under the man who is conducting it. When the great offensive was started in 1918 I worked in close co-operation with the military Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig.
    I learned in 1918 that there should be no such thing as dual control in war. On 1st April, 1918, this splendid Naval air force was broken up, and placed under the Royal Flying Corps, which became the R.A.F.; Naval Officers and men had to take military ranks. The whole organisation was militarised. We took it all in good part, and though I had operational command there was the dual control. Squadrons were taken away, and I could not make full use of them. Few people know that at that time we had 2,800 Naval aircraft, and 55,000 personnel, all engaged on the sea affair, convoys, etc. When the Royal Air Force was formed, the Navy did riot get a chance of becoming air-minded as it ought to have done. Directly after the war I went to the Battle Fleet. There was a Royal Air Force attached to the squadron. It is almost unbelievable that in these aircraft which were part of the Fleet even the observers had to be Royal Air Force personnel. The Commander-in-Chief said to me that we had to realise there was no such thing as naval air power for us. He said "It is absurd; how can I be responsible for the conduct of the Fleet when I am dependent on some young R.A.F. observer to direct my fire and carry out my reconnaissance?" Shortly afterwards I was at the Admiralty, and from then on I con-tinned to fight for what I knew to he necessary. The Navy must have aircraft to carry out the daily task, and if battle comes within reach of R.A.F. shore-based aircraft the Navy should have the full co-operation of the R.A.F.
    There was a wonderful example of that recently when the German cruisers went through the Channel. The R.A.F. threw their aircraft into the battle. A number of splendid young men lost their lives. The Germans protected their fleet skillfully with a cover of fighter aircraft. Those aircraft working with the German fleet were undoubtedly under the direction of the German commander-in-chief for the operation. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Rear-Admiral Beamish) had a good deal to say about it, so I do not propose to go into it. What he said bears out my contention.
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    It happened that the only aircraft that the Navy could throw into this battle were six old Swordfish, which were at a training station. Most gallantly, the pilots went out to what they knew was certain death. In the same way, pilots of the R.A.F. went with equal gallantry into the action. But those machines were not under the Navy, but under the R.A.F. What sort of comparison is there between these Swordfish and the great four-engined flying destroyers that the Japanese use? Is it folly to think that, if the Navy had had its way, we should have been as well off as the Japanese when we started the war? We started with 268 practically obsolete machines. The Japanese Navy had over 3,000 machines.
    Shortly after I came into this House, I went to America. One of my principal objects was to see what the American naval air force was like. It was 100 per cent. ahead of ours. I flew across America with eight different commercial pilots, five of whom had actually been trained in aircraft carriers and formed a valuable Naval reserve. We had none. We were not even allowed to train our petty officers. Every sort of difficulty was put in the way. This does not mean that there is any sort of feeling between the young men in the Navy and the Royal Air Force. In fact, the whole organisation for working dual control was based on what is known as the Keyes-Trenchard agreement, and it worked fairly well. There has always been great admiration in the Navy for the young men in the R.A.F., and the best of good feeling exists.
    Mr. Austin Hopkinson: I am sure that the hon. and gallant Member does not wish to misrepresent what I said. I said that there was no ill-feeling, but that his action was likely to create it—which is quite different.
    Sir R. Keyes: I think it is much more likely that the hon. Member's action will create ill-feeling. The fact that there is no ill-feeling does not mean that the Air Ministry is right in depriving the Navy of its own air force; but Boards of Admiralty have been exceedingly weak in failing to insist on the Navy having what everybody recognises the Navy must have to-day, namely, as my Amendment puts it:
    "complete control over all the aircraft it requires to fulfil its responsibilities."
    It is going to be very difficult to put it into force now, but I would like to make a

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    suggestion to the First Lord. I am sorry that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) is not here, because he, under the inspiration of the present Prime Minister, then First Lord, built up the Royal Naval Air Service. I would ask the First Lord to set up a committee—much as I hate committees, that is the only way—to form a real Naval Air Service. It is said that we cannot do that in war-time. I think it could be done, with the good will of both Services. In 1918, there was a certain amount of feeling. Naval officers had to adopt military uniform and take military titles. That is not necessary now. The gallant young men who do all the fighting and the flying are the best of friends, and the necessary R.A.F. officers could be seconded to the Naval Air Service. I think that, with the good will which exists between the two Services, a Naval Air Service could be formed. It involves only a fraction of the Air Force that we possess now, but that fraction is essential for the exercise of sea power. Whoever has the responsibility for exercising sea power must have complete control of the air power which is essential for the Navy.
    I wish I had the eloquence of my right hon. Friend who put the case for the Army so well yesterday, but I am sure that everybody realises that I have been steadfast in my political life to one object, of trying to make the Navy as efficient as possible, and strong enough to fulfil the great responsibilities that it has to undertake.
    When I speak at these Warship Weeks I never hesitate to tell people exactly what I think. I never hesitate—I see the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) is not here now, but I would say this just the same if he were here—to ask a Communist what he was doing to help the war effort when Russia had an arrangement with Germany, and Britain was standing alone. I did not hesitate, in a Welsh valley the other night, to tell the miners that I thought it was absolutely rotten of them to strike. I did not know whether it was due to the fault of the management or the workpeople, but I told them what I thought about them striking while sailors and soldiers were dying. I do that freely, and the extraordinary thing is that no one minds, so long as one says these things sincerely and earnestly. If the Prime Minister would
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    listen to me—and I assure hon. Members that he has not done so during the war, and I hope my friends in the Navy will take note of this—I would advise him to go to the microphone and talk about she slackness and to tell people that it has to stop. If he would tell them that, and then introduce some real form of national service, with real equality of sacrifice, on the lines I have suggested, the whole country would be ranged behind him.
    Sir Percy Harris: My excuse for cutting in on a Service debate is that for two years I was chairman of the Select Committee charged with the duty of inquiring into the administration of the Admiralty. As my right hon. Friend the First Lord knows, I had remarkable opportunities of seeing the inner workings of the machine, at Whitehall and at the depots, yards, and factories under the control of the Admiralty. Let me say, right away, that I was immensely impressed with the spirit and enthusiasm of every branch of the Service, their loyalty to the Navy, and their keenness in their work. I also received encouragement from every branch of the Service, accompanied by a readiness to listen to criticism and a quickness to respond to suggestions made in good faith. I can now speak with greater freedom. I am no longer on that Committee, and I look back with immense satisfaction to those two years of happy work and experience gained from enjoying the great confidence of the Navy, of the men "who go down to the sea in ships" and those who are responsible for the organisation. Sometimes I have asked them how could they explain their general efficiency? and the answer I have invariably received has been that they have 300 years of tradition behind them, dating back to the immortal Pepys, and that that tradition still remains, from the Admiral of the Fleet down almost to the junior office boy at the Board of Admiralty. I would like to pay them this tribute. But, inevitably age has its disadvantages. Everything is not necessarily perfect. I made suggestions to the First Lord and our Committee made suggestions—many of which were welcomed—in order to adapt the Admiralty and the Navy to modern conditions of war.
    I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the gallant Admiral the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, North (Sir R. Keyes). He is always apologising to

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    us for his lack of eloquence, but let me assure him that the simplicity of his language and the straightforward way he puts his points are far more impressive than any spate of words. We know that he speaks from knowledge and that he is guided by his heart and his head—a very valuable combination. I think that the House and the country are impressed by the fact that, in spite of what some people say, he has made good his case for the control by the Navy of a strong, powerful air force, the need for which has been shown by the events, not only of Norway, but of the Channel.
    I want to speak not of high strategy,—I do not feel qualified to do that—but of some of my impressions of the administration of the Admiralty itself. I found it efficient, but rather slow and cumbersome. That is the criticism that one can apply to most of the Civil Service. It takes a long time to get to the end of the passage. Sooner or later, some suggestions receive a reply, but it is not a matter of days or weeks, but, only too often, a matter of months. I suggest riot only to the First Lord, but to the heads of every War Department that a real and honest attempt must be made to simplify procedure and speed-up the machine. All these processes, checks and endorsements by various Departments when quick decisions are vital ought to be simplified. There is great room in every Service Department to introduce business experts to overhaul the work. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. Hopkinson) thinks that he is an expert on every possible subject, but I think I am equally justified in saying that we ought to have business experts, thoroughly to overhaul some of the organisation in this Department as well as in every other Service Department.
    I do not decry the Civil Service. On the contrary—certainly as regards the Admiralty—I was very much impressed by their efficiency and ability. What impressed me and all the Members of my Committee was the inferior position of the executive branch. That is a criticism which applies to a great number of Government Departments. There is an impression in the Admiralty—in fact it is recognised by the salary scale—that the executive is something inferior to the administrative branch. The Director of Contracts, the Engineer in Chief, the
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    metallurgists, all the technical experts on whom the running of the ships so vitally depend, are in an inferior status, while the Civil servant can rise to a position carrying a salary of £3,000 a year. The salary of these vital executive officers is generally not more than £1,800 a year. That system wants changing.
    The Admiralty and all the Service Departments ought to draw inside their boards the best experts available and recognise their ability and capacity by putting them on an equal status with the Civil Service grade. That has long been done in most of the great municipal corporations. In the L.C.C., for instance, their architect, engineer and medical officer have the same scale of salary as the Chief Clerk. I put that suggestion forward as something which really requires to be dealt with, and, in doing so, I refer specially to the position of the metallurgist—and here I speak with some knowledge, having had the advantage of some information on the matter—upon whom depends the armour-plate of the ship. Only one metallurgist has recently been appointed, and I understand that his scale of salary is comparatively modest, when you consider that upon him depends the safety of vitally important ships, valuable lives and the effectiveness of the Fleet. That is a matter to which the First Lord might well give his personal attention.
    There has been in recent months very severe criticism of the way some of our ships have stood up to attacks from the air, compared with the apparent invulnerability of German ships of war. The "Bismarck" wanted a lot of killing, but, on the other hand, some of our ships seemed to go down almost after the first hit. I cannot help wondering, in view of my experience of the work of the Admiralty, whether this is not in some measure due to the technical side of the Admiralty always putting their technical experts in such an inferior position and consequently making that branch of the Service unattractive. That is only a criticism of the administration of the Admiralty at headquarters. One of my most interesting experiences has been in visiting His Majesty's dockyards, most of them dating back for 200 or 300 years, with a fine tradition, and the pride and glory of the Navy. But my general impression was that much of what was a

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    fine tradition is to-day essentially out of date, and run on antiquated and old-fashioned lines and badly wants bringing into line with modern practice and to be brought up to the standards of the best private shipyards.
    I know that the Admiralty are very sensitive about this matter, and that they are very touchy when one makes any comparison between naval yards and private yards. All I can say is that in these days one must pool information, ideas, and knowledge, and that the Admiralty would gain if there were a much freer exchange of ideas between the naval yards and the private yards. One of the most cherished traditions of the Navy is that the superintendent of a naval dockyard must always be an executive naval officer. I cannot help thinking that this is an unnecessary adherence to tradition. There is need to draw into the service of the Admiralty some of the highly trained men available in the private yards, for these men could bring more modern practices into the running of these great businesses on which the safety and efficiency of the Navy so much depend. If there must be a naval officer as superintendent of a naval dockyard, I cannot understand why more use cannot be made of engineer admirals. Nowadays they go through the same training and through the same college, but there is still an adherence to Victorian traditions, and however good an engineer officer may be, however able and trained in his job, in a naval dockyard he must always be under an executive officer. I ask the First Lord, who has had great business experience, to sweep away some of these traditions. Nowadays a dockyard is a great business undertaking, a great producer, a mass of machinery, and common sense suggests that the man who is in charge of that machinery and of the workmen in the yard, if he cannot be a man who has had business training, should be, at any rate, a man with engineering knowledge and experience. I am sure that such a change would be to the advantage of the production of the yards.
    The same thing applies to the Board of Admiralty. I am treading on delicate ground when I say that, but to me it is amazing that in 1942, when engineering is so vital in the organisation of the Navy, the Board of Admiralty should hold firmly
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    to the line that on no account can an engineer admiral, however capable he may be, be admitted into the sacred circle. I know that the common answer given to this argument is that one might as well have a paymaster or a marine officer or a medical officer. But the analogy is nonsense. Considering that the famous Admiral Brown has been brought into the Ministry of Supply, considering this recognition of the capacity of engineer officers when production is at issue, that prejudice ought to be broken down and the equality of the engineering side of the Navy, when it is to the advantage of the Navy, be recognised and accepted. Such recognition would result in increased efficiency in the Board of Admiralty. These are matters which the First Lord should decide personally. I fully agree that the responsibility is on the First Lord—I think he accepts his responsibility—and that he cannot take cover behind the advice of the Sea Lords or his technical advisers. I ask the First Lord to follow a policy that will bring the Navy up to modern standards.
    There is only one other matter with which I want to deal, and it is a matter which worried me very much a year ago—namely, the question of contracts with outside yards. In ship repairing the practice that is almost generally applied is to give the contracts on a cost-plus-percentage basis. I have protested about this in the past, and I am satisfied that general adherence to this practice is not really necessary. It is not, of course, the practice in regard to the construction of new ships. It is argued that in the case of repairs, as speed is essential, the line of least resistance is to hand over the ship on the basis of cost-plus-percentage. Only last week there was a revelation in Liverpool of what results from that kind of contract, and what was happening there was discovered only after many months.
    I am assured by shipowners that in the vast majority of cases it would be practicable to get ships repaired on the basis of a fixed price, subject, of course, to variations where alterations have to be made. The advantage would not only be increased protection of the public purse, but a much more favourable impression on the part of the men working in the yards, for there is in the yards an undercurrent of feeling that it is not necessary for men to worry about the cost because

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    the Government will pay, and that the larger the cost the larger the profit to the "boss." I believe that even now, in the third year of the war, the First Lord might well investigate whether it would not be to the advantage of the Admiralty, from the point of view both of time and of cost, to extend the principle of fixed-price contracts to ship repairing, and thus do away with the suspicion which the public has that the nation is being robbed, because the cost-plus-per centage system tends to cause extravagance in the use of labour and eliminates the stimulus for getting the work done speedily, with consequent loss to the nation.
    Mr. Austin Hopkinson: I apologise to the right hon. Baronet the Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris) for the interruption which I made in his speech, but I assure him it was forced from me against my will. He suggested the awful remedy of bringing someone called a business expert into a Government Department, and in spite of myself, I am afraid that in the circumstances I could not suppress a groan, because I know something of business experts from my own experience.
    I have risen for the purpose, first, of answering a few of the points made by the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes). I am sorry he is not present at the moment, but I feel sure that, in due course, he will come back to the Chamber, if he is within the precincts of the House, because nobody can accuse him of refusing to face fire. I am afraid the hon. and gallant Gentleman has altogether missed the fact that this war is a very different matter from the last war, and that experience in the last war is apt to be, I will not say a far from safe guide, but a very dangerous sort of guide to the present war. The hon. and gallant Gentleman's experience of the Fleet Air Arm dates from the days when air power was a very different thing from what it is to-day, and in that connection I should like to draw attention to a certain plan of operations, to which he has referred more than once in the House and referred to to-day, with which, owing to circumstances, I was myself concerned.
    Unfortunately, owing to the Official Secrets Act, I cannot give any details, or any hint as to what the exact operation was, but I was assured that the operation was impracticable and dangerous, and
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    that even if it succeeded, it would not have any favourable strategic effect on the war. It so happened that, owing to a curious concatenation of circumstances, I, a humble "two-wavy striper" in the Navy, was able to put a spoke in the wheel and prevent it from being carried out. I am not entitled to criticise even the tactical operations because as a "two-wavy striper" I am one of the humblest creatures in the Navy. In the technical branch I come in a caste midway between a sweeper and a grass-cutter and I wear two of those squiggly things on my arm, which constantly remind us what worms we really are. I cannot presume to criticise my superior officers in the Navy and the present Naval Staff. Since the outbreak of war, however, I have been intimately concerned with the Fleet Air Arm. The point which strikes me in connection with my hon. and gallant Friend's suggestion is that he has not the faintest realisation of what taking over Coastal Command means in actual practice.
    It so happens that, by good luck, I was once in a position in which even I could help to persuade the Co-ordinator of Defence to make certain changes, whereby sea-borne aircraft, at any rate, were handed over to the Navy. At the beginning of the war, I was at a workshop at one of our air stations and I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that it was not an easy task on the technical side. To take over Coastal Command at the present time would probably involve merely taking over the personnel and putting them into dark blue uniform. We should have to take over the personnel as well as the aircraft because the Navy has not the trained men for the job. Therefore the House will see, in spite of what my hon. and gallant Friend has said, the right policy was to get that degree of control over the operational movements of Coastal Command which would satisfy the requirements of the Navy. As the House ought to know, the Navy have that degree of control. I sec that my hon. and gallant Friend has entered the Chamber. I was referring to the practical difficulties of carrying out the policy which he advocates. I was referring to my own experience at the beginning of the war when the taking over of sea-borne aircraft and air stations was part of my duty. I was pointing out in the very humblest way the immense difficulties in carrying it out. I suggest that

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    to take over Coastal Command at the present time would in actual practice simply involve changing the personnel from light blue into dark blue uniform because the Navy have not got the men to put in their place. My hon. and gallant Friend also referred to the recent operations in the Channel and asked why we sent those Swordfish squadrons into action. We did so because we did not have anything else. We did not have such good torpedo bombers as Coastal Command. What he does not seem to be aware of is that if we had Coastal Command under the complete control of the Navy, we should have been just as short of the proper aircraft as the Royal Air Force.
    Sir R. Keyes: Why? I understand that in July, 1937, Mr. Chamberlain announced that the handing over of Coastal Command was being considered. It was nearly done, but he then went on to say that it had been decided to leave Coastal Command under the complete operational and administrative control of the Royal Air Force.
    Mr. Hopkinson: My hon. and gallant Friend has raised two separate points simultaneously. He is referring to a time when this country was at peace, whereas at the present time this country is at the crux of hostilities. The two things are quite different. To take over Coastal Command in peace would be very different from doing so now.
    I think it only right that the House should know the reason why Coastal Command were insufficiently equipped with proper torpedo-dropping aircraft. It was not the fault of the Air Ministry. It was the fault entirely of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. If there were any serious mistakes in this operation, and I am not going to admit that there were, then I am sorry to say the two Services must share the responsibility. Everyone seems to think that the Navy never makes mistakes and that if there is any trouble it must be the Air Force which is at fault. This attitude of mind may be a good thing in the case of a junior member of the Service but I do protest when an experienced officer adopts that puerile attitude towards these things—the attitude that the Navy can never be guilty of mistakes or blunders and that it must be the other Service
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    which is at fault. As I say, the fault, if fault there be, lies with the Ministry of Aircraft Production, because it was lack of material more than anything else which led to the unfortunate incident in the Channel.
    It is not necessary that a scapegoat should be found on this particular occasion. Let us see what happened in actual practice. It had been anticipated for weeks that these ships would attempt to move towards their own ports and every possible precaution, with the material and the trained crews available, was taken. The procedure of Admiralty operational control over Coastal Command is simply this: if operations are contemplated, the Admiralty or the Naval staff inform Coastal Command what they want done and Coastal Command then makes its dispositions to meet those requirements. The House does not generally know that naval officers are with Coastal Command to watch these dispositions on behalf of the Navy. When agreement has been reached, these operations are put in hand by the A.O.C. and, if they are wrong, I am sorry to say that the Navy is equally responsible. If mistakes are made subsequently, that is another matter, but we have no reason to suppose that the advantages would be any greater if Coastal Command came under the direct control of the Admiralty as regards supply, training and all those other matters since the personnel would be practically the same.
    Mr. Woodburn: It is very interesting to hear the explanation of the hon. Member. No matter if the two Services were fully equipped with bombing and torpedo-carrying aircraft, if the battleships were properly screened by destroyers and other surface craft, would it be possible for them to destroy the battleships in such a case?
    Mr. Hopkinson: I cannot give a full answer to that without giving the House one point on which, I am sorry to say, my own Service, or rather the Admiralty, is to blame, and I am not going to do that. Possibly, when I have been duly cashiered for what I am saying to-day, I shall be able to give the House some further information. The position is that the Navy have to take their share of responsibility and they cannot throw the whole blame on to Coastal Command. The failure was largely a failure of material, and mainly a failure of the Minis-

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    try of Aircraft Production, and I am sorry to say that, on one particular point, the blame for failure of material must be imputed to the Admiralty. Torpedo-dropping aircraft are not provided with weapons which are adequate to modern warfare. As for the Swordfish squadron, even if the Navy had taken over Coastal Command, lock, stock and barrel, no more torpedo-droppers would have been in existence than were in existence on the occasion in question.
    Then, it is said, as Coastal Command had these torpedo bombers, why did not they have greater success against the enemy? To some extent that was due to the unfortunate opening of operations in far waters of the world and the fact that a large number of trained crews—and the training of these crews is a prolonged and difficult process—were wanted elsewhere, and therefore Coastal Command was deprived of their services. Another thing was that a large number of squadrons had been "standing to" for weeks on end and therefore their training was, naturally, impaired. You cannot train squadrons, particularly of that type, while they are "standing to" in imminent expectation of being required immediately for operational purposes. Therefore there is no doubt that the squadrons used on that particular occasion were not nearly so highly trained as we should wish them to be. It may be said that, supposing the Navy had had charge of these operations, all the crews would have been highly trained, but that is not the case. The Fleet Air Arm now is dependent for a considerable part of its training upon the Royal Air Force and there is no reason to suppose that, by taking over Coastal Command, that training difficulty will be solved and that we shall not be even more dependent, because of our greater personnel, upon the training which can be provided by the Royal Air Force.
    For all those reasons, I ventured recently to suggest that those who, at this critical moment in our fortunes, were endeavouring by tooth and nail to get the Navy to demand—not to request but to demand—the handing over of Coastal Command were doing no good service of any sort to either of the two Services concerned. We can get on all right as we are. It is not perfect but the essential thing is there. Admiralty has operational control over Coastal Command.
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    The Admiralty, however, cannot be saddled with the practically insuperable task of taking over, in the middle of hostilities, a whole Service of that sort, initiating new training and all that would be involved in such a taking over. When I referred to people whose motives seemed to be malicious I was obviously not referring to the hon. and gallant Gentleman but to certain politicians who, undoubtedly, are and have been using this for the last 18 months for their own purposes, perhaps to gratify spite against a colleague in the Government. Fortunately, that danger is now over at any rate for the present, but I know the disloyalty and the difficulties placed in the way of one Minister by another in the past. This "stunt," for I can call it nothing else, came to an end with the discovery that the Navy did not want to quarrel with the Air Force and to serve the private purposes of outsiders.
    Commander Bower: My admiration for the "wavy Navy" has always been very deep and was much increased by the speech that I have just heard. It is certainly a speech which no regular naval officer with any amount of knowledge would have the temerity to make. I offer my sincere congratulations to the lion. Member who made it, but he has of course entirely missed the point. All that my hon. arid gallant Friend the Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes)—under whom I have been so proud to serve and to whom I think the Mouse pays too little attention, although perhaps he does not always present his case as well as he might—really meant was that a great many of these disasters would not have occurred had the Navy had the making of its own Air Force. We all know that Coastal Command has now been handed over to the operational control of the Admiralty. I suppose I know it as well as anyone because I was at Coastal Command headquarters for the first 10 months of the war, and I can vouch for it that under Sir Frederick Bowhill, then Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command, the co-operation was 100 per cent. effective. I do not think operations could have taken place any more efficiently if, at that time, Coastal Command had been under the command of the Admiralty. But I know that Coastal Command had not been provided by the Royal Air Force with the machines that it would have had if it had been

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    under the control of the Admiralty before the war.
    It should be known that at the beginning of the war Coastal Command consisted almost entirely of a force of Hudson machines, which are primarily commercial machines used for reconnaissance. They are usable to a certain extent as bombers, but Coastal Command had no striking force. It had no bombers and no fighters and it was just beginning to get some modern torpedo-carrying aircraft. Not only that, but about two years ago—I do not think there is any harm in repeating it now—there was a period of several months when we were getting delivery of no flying boats whatever, because the Air Ministry had decided, before the war, that all such reconnaissance would be carried out by shore-based aircraft; consequently this hiatus occurred in the spring of 1940, when there were no flying boats coming through at all. It seems to me ridiculous to suppose. that had the Admiralty had control of its own Air Force, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would have allowed this very essential arm to fall into such a state as regards material.
    There is no question of jealousy between the Services. I have spent much of my time in the Service in collaboration with the Royal Air Force. I was one of the few naval officers who passed through their staff college. I never found any ill-feeling. Where there were differences of opinion they were upon strategy. You got naval officers who rather sneered at the Air Force, but, on the other hand, you got airman who said that air power was the only thing that mattered and that wars were going to be won by bombing—the old strategic bombing idea which carries too much weight at the present time. All the discussions that took place, however, were friendly and we all realised that only a war could show us who were right. The trouble we are up against in this war is that the war has shown us who is right and we have not applied the lessons. The Japanese have. One lesson became apparent at Taranto. There we inflicted heavy losses on the Italian fleet, and they would have been much heavier had our aircraft been more modern and the torpedoes they carried heavier. That lesson, either from the offensive or the defensive point of view, was not properly learned by us. Otherwise, we should not have sent those two ships the "Prince of
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    Wales" and the "Repulse" out to a practically certain fate in the way that we did. We have been told a little about what happened. One excuse given was that they were relying upon cloudy weather. To anybody who knows that part of the world, that might have been all right in July, but in December it does not hold water at all. However, I do not want to go into details.
    We shall, doubtless, in due course hear more about that unfortunate operation. We shall doubtless hear more about the escape of the "Scharnhost" and the "Gneisenau." I do not want to refer to that except to say one thing to my right hon. Friend the First Lord. I read in the Press a report of a speech of his in which he seemed to take the view that certain critics were criticising the officers and men who took part in the operation—officers and men who had been working up and down the Channel underneath the German aircraft umbrella, and so on. I can assure my right hon. Friend that I have searched the Press with some assiduity and have listened to speeches in this House, and outside of it, and I have found no such criticism. The criticism is directed at him and those whom he represents.
    Mr. Hopkinson: Is my hon. and gallant Friend moving away from the question of material? If so, I want to ask him a question. He referred to Taranto and said that we had ancient aircraft and inadequate weapons. Who is responsible for that? Surely not the Air Ministry?
    Commander Bower: I have devoted the whole of my speech to trying to persuade my hon. Friend that there is no dispute between the two Services. It is he who is trying to make out there is a dispute. It does not matter who is responsible, the Admiralty or the Air Ministry. What I say is that had the Admiralty had control of its own Air Force, as it had in the last war, naturally the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would have insisted, with all the great prestige that the Admiralty carries, on having the types of aircraft they wanted in the same way as they insist on having destroyers, submarines, or anything else.
    Mr. Hopkinson: The whole point is whether they have their own supply. If they are dependent on another Ministry for supply, the problem is different.
    Commander Bower: I am not as familiar with intimate details of Supply as my hon. Friend is. I was saying that there was no question of criticising the officers and men who took part in this operation, but there was criticism, in many quarters, of my right hon. Friend the First Lord and those whose responsibility he shoulders in this House. I will not go further into that now because the matter is awaiting the decision of the Bucknill inquiry. I hope that, as far as possible, the result of that inquiry will be made public. There has been too little publicity. It is hard to balance in time of war how much one should say and how much one should not, but in this war, certainly in this period of the war, we have been told too little, as I think my right hon. Friend the First Lord will agree if he recalls his own speech in a Debate in May, 1940, on the Norwegian affair, when he asked a long list of questions of the present Prime Minister, who showed no resentment whatever.
    I want to emphasise that this question of the control by the Navy of the Air Force connected with the Navy is one of vital importance, which must be settled. I sent to the Prime Minister when he was First Lord, a memorandum on the subject in December, 1939. He referred me to the Fifth Sea Lord, whom I saw. I spent the whole afternoon with him, and he said, "This matter must be settled now." It has not been settled yet. I am beginning to lose all hope that it will be settled. Co-operation, splendid as it is, can never be the same as integration. I have had a good deal of experience working with the Air Force, and perhaps the worst aspect of the whole thing is the sharp division of functions between the three main parts of the Royal Air Force—Bomber Command, Fighter Command and Coastal Command. When I was at Coastal Command there was more lack of liaison and more difficulty between Bomber Command and Coastal Command than between the Navy and the Army. It is as if you had in the Air Force three different Services, and one of the great faults is that the Air Force is organised in that particular way which prevents co-operation being given to the Navy really effectively from any but Coastal Command. Bomber Command do not co-operate with the Navy because they do not know how to do so. The pilots are
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    not trained in navigation over the sea, cannot recognise naval targets, and so on. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, Coastal Command had no striking force of bombers and no striking force of fighters. The Navy must have a force of all arms of the Air Force, and that cannot be got under the present organisation of the Royal Air Force and the present system of liaison between the two Services.
    The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Captain Austin Hudson): I think it would be for the convenience of the House if I spoke now and tried to answer some of the questions which have been put by hon. Members That will not, of course, close the Debate. There is an interesting Amendment on the position in the shipyards to be moved shortly, and that will be replied to by my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, who is particularly charged with that side of our activities in the Admiralty. The hon. Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon), who opened the Debate, put some questions about merchant shipbuilding which I shall leave to the Financial Secretary to answer. He did, however, touch slightly on the question of the Royal Dockyards, and, as he knows from having been in the Admiralty, they are the particular responsibility of the Civil Lord.
    Ever since the war began the numbers of men in the Royal Dockyards have increased week by week, that is, men employed on warship repair and, to a smaller degree, on warship building. We used to issue at first a weekly return, now a fortnightly return, of the workmen in these Royal Dockyards, because we feel it is so important to keep those numbers up and to see that they are properly balanced numbers, so that work is not impeded in any way. While mentioning that fact I think I might deal with the point about the Royal Dockyards made by the right hon. Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris). He said that many of the Royal Dockyards are antiquated, having been built many years ago. That is true, but since the very heavy enemy attacks which have been made from the air opportunity has been taken to modernise them when we have been putting right the damage that has been done, and in various places to which these have been dispersed we have endeavoured to make use of more modern

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    practice. One point I would make here is that more than once we have done our best to compare the costs in the Royal Dockyards with those prevailing in private yards, and I think I am right in saying that in every case the costs are as low as or lower than in the private yards. We look upon that as a matter of great importance.
    The hon. Member who opened the Debate and a number of others have dealt with the question of co-ordination between the Services, particularly between the Royal Air Force and the Admiralty. I can assure him that that is a matter which is being very carefully considered at the moment. He will not expect me to deal with a subject which is at the moment before the Bucknill Committee. As announced by the Prime Minister, that committee, which is now sitting and is carrying out its deliberations as quickly as possible, is dealing with certain aspects of the movement through the Channel of the three German warships. One of the most important aspects of the matter with which they are dealing is whether the co-ordination between the two Services is as perfect as it might be. Obviously, if that committee finds that there is something wrong, then the whole matter will have to be considered not only by the Board of Admiralty and the Air Ministry but by the War Cabinet as a whole.
    The hon. Member for North Camberwell and other Members have asked about the strength and equipment of the Fleet Air Arm. We have been asked why six rather aged aircraft were sent on that important operation in the Channel. I am afraid I find it not possible to make an answer in open Session. That is always the difficult position in which a Minister finds himself when answering for a Service department in war-time. If I were to go into the question of what aircraft we had, what improvements there were, the type of torpedo, where our aircraft carriers were and what they had on them, it would, unfortunately, give a lot of information to the enemy. Therefore, I am sure the House will acquit me of any desire to evade the question if I say that in public Session it is impossible without the danger of, unwittingly perhaps, giving something away, to give the information for which many hon. Members have asked.
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    Another point which has been raised by more than one Member is that of the vulnerability of our warships; whether the construction of the ships which have been sunk, like the "Prince of Wales," "Repulse" and "Barham," was as good as it could have been, and whether our ships are more vulnerable to attack, either from the air or by submarine, than German warships. As my right hon. Friend said in his opening statement, he has agreed to set up an independent committee to go into all those questions. That does not mean to say they have not been considered before. I can assure the House that the Board of Admiralty has most carefully considered those questions. My right hon. Friend is particularly anxious not only that the general public, but our officers and men who serve in these ships, should have confidence in the material which is provided for them. For that reason he has agreed that a committee should be set up to deal with this very vital problem, and I think it will deal also with the size and type of torpedo. Needless to say, in considering the question of vulnerability of our ships you have also to consider the size and type of torpedo which can sink those vessels.
    Mr. J. J. Davidson: Has any decision been arrived at with regard to the composition of the committee; and will any communication on the subject be made to the House?
    Captain Hudson: It is an Admiralty inquiry and it is doubtful whether the composition will be announced.
    Mr. Davidson: Does that mean that the committee will be composed of people who are at present serving in the Admiralty or will it be an independent committee selected from outside? The Minister said it was to be an independent committee.
    Captain Hudson: There will be an independent chairman and an independent shipbuilder on it. That is the whole point of it. It is not merely an inquiry held within the Department in the Admiralty. The hon. Member for North Camberwell asked about subsistence allowances for lieut.-commanders and commanders. I hope that he will allow me to go into this matter and let him know later on. We had a very pleasant speech from the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Rear-Admiral Beamish) who also talked on the question of

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    divided control. Since then, we have had a number of speeches on the subject of the control of Coastal Command and many questions were asked. Coastal Command is now under the operational control of the Admiralty, and the liaison is very much closer now than it was at the beginning of the war.
    I was asked about pensions relating to officers serving now in a lower rank. As the House knows, a large number of distinguished officers of the rank of admiral are doing a grand job of work as commanders of convoys. The answer is that the widow of an officer killed on active service receives double the pension of the rank in which the man was employed, or the pension of his proper rank, whichever is the greater. Such a widow therefore would never receive less than she would if the officer had died a natural death. I think that is a clear answer to the question. The hon. Member also asked me whether, owing to certain tragedies which had occurred in the last war, the Admiralty controlled, and arranged regular inspection, of its cordite. I can assure him that such an inspection is made by the Admiralty.
    An interesting speech was made by the hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Squadron-Leader Donner). All I can say about it is that his request for a Secret Session on the building programme will be passed to the proper quarter, although I very much doubt whether it would be wise, even in Secret Session, to discuss the building programme of capital ships, etc., in view of the great importance such information would be to the enemy if, by any chance whatever, it leaked out.
    Squadron-Leader Donner: May I have the assurance for which I asked, that battleship construction will be given every possible priority over everything else in the present circumstances?
    Captain Hudson: I think I can give an assurance of that kind. Very careful priority machinery has been set up, and although we may have been disappointed on certain occasions I think that on the whole the Admiralty have a pull which is very satisfactory.
    The hon. Member for Dunfermline (Mr. Watson) made a helpful speech on the general aspects of the war. I think the House will excuse me if I do not deal at great length with the speech made by
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    my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes), because much of what he said was really directed to the Prime Minister rather than to the First Lord of the Admiralty. He says, as he has said again and again, that he does not like committees, and he thinks the Prime Minister is overruled by committees so that the work of the Navy suffers in consequence. It is scarcely for the Admiralty to reply to that. I was, however, particularly interested in his opening remarks, when he said that the dockyards are not at present working 100 per cent. I think my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary will have something to say on that matter. I know the Royal Dockyards very well, having to visit them frequently, and it is true that more work could be done, but I think there should not be over-emphasis the other way. Very good work is being done in very difficult circumstances, and although, by means of Whitley Committees and other means, we are doing all we can to increase production, at the same time absenteeism and so forth is only a small percentage. As has been said in this House many times before, it is a small minority of men who are causing the trouble in this respect.
    I do not think I can go into the whole question as to how far Coastal Command and other parts of the Royal Air Force should be under the control of the Admiralty. Some answer was given by my hon. Friend the Member for Mossley (Mr. Hopkinson). It is a most complicated question, which I have heard discussed in this House on more than one occasion. We did hope that some solution, perhaps final, had been come to when the Fleet Air Arm was returned to the Admiralty. I would, however, agree with what has been said by practically every speaker to the effect that there is no ill-feeling between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. Both services are working together in the greatest harmony.
    One more word about the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Bethnal Green. He said that he was speaking as chairman of one of the sub-committees of a Committee of this House, and, having examined the Admiralty thoroughly, he wished to simplify procedure and speed up the machine. May I say to him that I am heartily in agreement with him. He and I have had many discussions on this very point. He also said that he thought that

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    higly-skilled technical people in the Admiralty should be more highly paid, and, there again, I think he and I do not differ very much.
    We have noted several of his valuable suggestions which, as I say, he has made as a former chairman of a sub-committee which deals particularly with the Navy and with the Admiralty. I have noted also his remarks on the question of engineer officers. One thing I would like to say is about the cost-plus-percentage contracts. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I think the House is in agreement here, that cost-plus-percentage contracts should, if possible, be avoided altogether. I have always said so and have tried to avoid them on the side of the Admiralty with which I am particularly connected. There are occasions when it is dreadfully difficult to avoid them. There are difficult and complicated repair jobs where you cannot tell what the job will be until you open it up, or some form of construction, such as the setting of a secret weapon where until you make some progress with the work you cannot really tell what it will involve. I am talking now of the works programme which is my particular responsibility. But a case reported in the newspapers the other day shows how undesirable such contracts are. In the Admiralty, we do our best to see that careful checks are kept to avoid this. I wish the House to know that I am in agreement—and I speak for the whole of the Admiralty—with the view that if it can be wholly avoided, and where it can be avoided, the cost-plus-percentage system should not be employed.
    Sir P. Harris: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has been kind in his references to what I said and I am reluctant to interrupt him. May I put this point? The Admiralty has taken the line for some time now that you cannot apply the principle of a fixed price to ship repairs, and it is in ship repairs that the greatest abuses take place. I put forward the contention that in the majority of ship repairing cases—there are exceptions—it is still possible to have fixed prices.
    Captain Hudson: As regards ship repairing, I shall ask my hon. Friend and new colleague the Financial Secretary to investigate that question with a fresh mind. I have been worried about this. I am thinking particularly now of the
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    works services, which are the responsibility of the Civil Lord. However hard you try to avoid them, there are cases in which it does not seem possible to avoid this form of contract, but the matter will be looked into.
    Mr. Woodburn: There is complaint of the inspection in regard to cost-plus-percentage contracts as being superficial. It is stated for example that merely a paper examination is sufficient to justify any number of hours or men being charged for certain jobs and that there is no sufficient check to see that those men are actually working on the job in respect of which they are charged. That causes great discontent among the men. They think the employers are getting money ad lib. It causes great loss of conscientiousness among the men if they feel that the thing is not being tightly supervised. I suggest an inspection staff of a rather stricter nature.
    Captain Hudson: There is an inspection staff now, but, as I said, that matter is to be overhauled and looked into by the Financial Secretary. I think I have answered all the questions I can that have been put in the Debate so far. The Debate is not now closed, but I hope that with my brief speech and with the very full statement made by my right hon. Friend the First Lord, the House will feel that we may perhaps pass to the Amendment.

    SHIPYARD CONDITIONS.
    Major Lloyd: I beg to move, to leave out from the word "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
    "greater attention should be paid to conditions in the shipyards with a view to the acceleration of shipbuilding and improving the arrangements for repairs."
    We have been hearing to-day, from the First Lord and others, about the heavy price we are paving for Admiralty. The Battle of the Atlantic, the war of the submarines on our shipping lanes, was bad enough in the months gone by, for the heavy toll that it took of our ships. Now that Japan has entered the war, we must, I fear, look forward to greater difficulties and greater troubles, and possibly greater losses of ships. No subject could be of more vital importance than that of replacement of these ships by new construction, and the whole question of repairs. That is why, when I drew first

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    place in the Ballot—the only raffle I have ever won—I was impelled to raise this subject. It will be generally agreed that if we have an Achilles heel to our war effort, it may prove to be shipping and the whole question of how quickly we can replace our lost ships.
    I do not want to exaggerate, or to belittle those to whom tribute should be paid. There has, undoubtedly, been a steady improvement in output and in the repairing of ships, ever since the war began. To all concerned, from the Admiralty down to the most junior worker in the shipyards, we must pay our tribute for a really remarkable effort, considering the situation when the war began. Naturally, I speak most about conditions on the Clyde, where I live and where my constituency is situated. I recognise that conditions may not be identical in other parts of the country; I know that they vary from shipyard to shipyard on the Clyde itself; but I feel that a great deal of what I say will apply not only to the Clyde, but to shipyards in other parts of the country.
    We cannot see the present picture clearly unless we realise something of the picture which existed prior to the war. The House does not need to be told much about them, for we are only too conscious of the troubles and evils of the years that the locusts have eaten. We did not start this war with happy or efficient conditions in the shipyards. But we must recognise the really remarkable achievements in output and in production, in organisation and in the arrangement for repairs, which have brought about a very large acceleration in our shipyard programme. As for present conditions, with which the House is most concerned, it is, in my judgment, the tempo which is wrong. It is too slow. There is not enough acceleration. The engine is ticking over. It is fairly well-tuned in places, but there is no real acceleration. I admit that that is, perhaps, too general a statement and that in particular yards the situation is definitely better than in others, but one must to some extent, on such a wide subject as this, make statements of a comparatively general character.
    I want to turn for a moment to a matter which has been exercising the minds of many people who have been interested in shipbuilding, and that is the
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    question of the design of our merchant ships and their speed. Both these factors are very closely wrapped up with the question of the condition of the shipyards and the speed at which the ships can be turned out. We have, on the whole, not followed the policy of building fast ships. There has been great consideration of the matter, but I understand that if we were to build faster ships than it has been our policy to build since the war, we should not have been able to turn out those ships continually or quickly. To build a faster ship involves a great deal of construction in the form of marine engines, which are slow and difficult to build if they are of the faster type and supercharged, and, in addition to that, the whole arrangement of the hull and other technical details involves substantial delays. It was therefore decided, for better or for worse—and it has had effects in both directions—to adopt a policy of not attempting to go in for anything too fast.
    Captain Plugge: As my hon. and gallant Friend seems to be very familiar with the subject, can he tell the House why, before the war, Japan built a large number of fast merchant ships?
    Major Lloyd: I am only talking about the last two years. I cannot go back further into the pre-war years. If we had started earlier enough, and if my hon. and gallant Friend is correct, he could have had his faster ships, but many of us did not anticipate the war and it is very easy to be wise after the event. I am discussing the policy of the Government and the Admiralty and the reason for that policy. I feel that, in all the circumstances, although there is a good deal to be said for both sides of the case, the powers-that-be were wise to decide upon adopting a moderate speed rather than in attempting to adopt a higher speed. But one must also bear in mind that the slower ship is a vulnerable ship. I have no doubt that many of our ships have been lost because they were not fast enough, and from the point of view of convoy work, I am told by my naval. friends that a slow ship is, definitely, a big responsibility for them.
    I now turn to the question of standardisation. Here, too, there has been much discussion and controversy. If you were able to build a standard type of merchant ship on a mass production basis, such as America, I understand, is

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    attempting to do in connection with its huge shipbuilding programme, there is no doubt that you could build ships very much faster than you can under our present policy, of building ships in accordance with the size and design of the various yards who have been building-them in the past. That, generally speaking, is the policy to-day—to let each yard build, within certain reasonable limits, the type of ship that it has been used to building, because its skilled men, workers and management, understand that type of ship.
    The whole lay-out of the yard is for that type of ship, and to have broken away at short notice when the war began and to have turned on to the mass production of a standard type of ship would, it is felt, have been a very considerable disadvantage to production. But it must be remembered always that a standard ship means, of course, a more rapidly-produced ship. On the other hand, it would not be true to say that we are not building standard ships, for we are building quite a number of them, but mostly in the tanker and tramp line of shipping, rather than larger cargo vessels and merchant ships.
    Before I leave the question of speed and design, there is something I feel I must say, although I do not like having to say it. I want to ask the hon. Gentleman who is to reply whether he and the Admiralty are really satisfied with the administration of the Advisory Committee in the Ministry of War Transport upon whom the Admiralty must, under the present Regulations, depend so much for their advice in connection with the building and designing of merchant ships, and other important matters. It has come to my ears from various sources—and I think it cannot be entirely unknown in the House—that there is a suggestion that it would be a good thing to change the chairmanship of that Advisory Committee of the Minister of War Transport and bring in fresh blood to the chairmanship and possibly more energetic action into the Committee, which would bring more confidence into the shipping world and perhaps the Admiralty itself.
    Mr. Davidson: Who is the chairman?
    Major Lloyd: I understand the chairman of the Committee is Sir Vernon Thomson. I would like that point to be
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    considered by the Admiralty, because I believe it to be in the public interest.
    I pass now to the question of repairs. I believe that—in spite of the excellent achievement which has been brought about in all the yards of the country in connection with repairs, in spite of the tremendous burden which repairs have been to the yards of the country owing to the Battle of the Atlantic and the storm and stress of bad weather, in spite of the fact that many of our ships were old at the start—a considerably greater acceleration could be brought about in the matter of repairs. Great work has been done, but much remains to be done still. The chief difficulty is that these repairs are holding up new construction. We all know that, to some extent, it is impossible to prevent that, and that an urgent repair must have priority over new construction, but owing to the circumstances of the war it means, and has meant, that in certain shipyards new construction has been seriously held up and interfered with. In spite of all that has been done, I urge the Admiralty to move heaven and earth to solve this problem in so far as it can be solved, and to expedite repairs in every possible way, so that the ships can be got back in the water again and new construction not be held up. There have been serious delays in this respect, and I hope the Admiralty will not hesitate to do all they can if there has been any inefficiency or any unnecessary slackness in the matter of repairs.
    I could speak for some time on the whole question of bottlenecks in priorities, but there is not time to do so. The question of priorities is, of course, of fundamental importance to the shipyards, and bottlenecks are holding up production. There is not time now to examine all the details of the various items of construction and delays which we call bottlenecks, but they exist, and the question of priorities is one of fundamental importance. I urge the Admiralty to see to it that, as far as is possible, a very substantial improvement takes place in the future with regard to bottlenecks. The men get wild about bottlenecks, they do not understand the meaning of them, they are not told the meaning of them, and they have to hang about and get fed up because they believe there is no serious effort to put things right. I am convinced that the

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    bottlenecks have a very big effect on any bad feeling there may be in the shipyards.
    There is another small point I want to mention while on this subject. I have had many complaints from shipyards, especially on the Clyde—I have no doubt things are the same elsewhere, to some extent—that there is insufficient coordination between the designers of the ships and the operations officer who, in uniform, represents the Admiralty and supervises the work of construction in the yards. There does not seem to be enough co-ordination. Designers are completely out of touch, and, when the work is about half-way completed, the operation officers often say, "This will not do. I do not want this. I cannot approve of that. I want this here and not there." Subsequently there begins a long argument by correspondence with the Admiralty in accordance with the true bureaucratic routine. Considerable time is lost. There is great delay, inconvenience and irritation to all concerned, and no less to the management of the ship-building concern.
    I turn now to a question about which we are all deeply interested and about which some of us feel considerable concern. That is the question of work in the shipyards and the relationship between the managements and the men. It cannot be denied that here, too, the situation varies materially from yard to yard, and depends very much on the personalities of the management, and to a considerable extent upon past relationships between the managements and the men. There are yards to-day where there is excellent feeling between the management and the men, and there are yards where there is just the reverse and always has been. It depends so much upon the personalities of those concerned and the spirit of good will. In many yards there is still a feeling of mistrust. The feeling is too general and is quite unjustified by the war situation. I hesitate to use the word "apathy," although I believe it to be the right term to use. There is no sense of urgency among many sections both of managements and of men; they are just moving along through the ordinary routine. There is a definite sense of apathy and even of mistrust. The question of absenteeism has often been raised. I believe that absenteeism in normal working hours is nothing like so bad as some people
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    try to make out. Absenteeism in normal hours has been very greatly exaggerated. There is a fundamental difference between absenteeism during normal hours, which I think is disgraceful, and absenteeism during overtime. Men are liable to be thoroughly tired and exhausted when they have been working long overtime for weeks and months. The men themselves have told me that they get tired and done in, and I believe that absenteeism during overtime is due to this fact. It does not excuse the fact, however, that there is also absenteeism during overtime because of slackness, but I am convinced, from my observations, that the majority of workers are pulling their weight and doing their best under very exhausting conditions, especially in the summer months.
    I wish to present the case for both sides. I think it is only fair that it should be stated in this House. The men say there are difficulties and troubles over the relationships between employers and employees. They say that it is a legacy from the past, and we know it is true. They blame the managements for many of the delays, and they say that the managements are often unwilling to cooperate with them and will not take the trouble or interest to investigate all their complaints. They say the managements are unwilling to work with the yard committees which are being set up. I would emphasise that it is not all the workers who make these accusations. On the whole, many are fairly satisfied and do not repeat these complaints, but I think it only fair, as I represent all sections in my constituency, to state that a good many workers feel that way.
    Then there is the management side. The House has listened very patiently to my representation of the men's case, and I hope hon. Members will listen with the same patience when I state the attitude of the employers. They say that output would go up if the men would only pull their weight properly. They say that output, on the Clyde at any rate, could go up between 15 and 20 per cent. They say there is no real effort among quite a large section of the workers and, although they admit it is a minority, they suggest that it is a considerably larger minority than I myself am prepared to agree to. They admit that there is a great shortage of skilled men. That is a serious handicap

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    which the Press and others who have paid attention to the matter have not emphasised. Many of the men are not really skilled. They are learning. They are new to the game, and it is not an easy game to learn. The effect of dilution on production has been considerable. It is also said that there is a certain amount of lack of discipline, and I am afraid that is true; also that the Essential Work Order took away the disciplinary powers that existed under the economic stress of pre-war days, when punishment for anything at all of a misdemeanour was the sack and unemployment. Those powers no longer exist, thank God, but it is said that the Order which took them away—and certainly provides through the tribunals and to the National Service officers a means of exercising discipline—is not, in effect, being carried out in as efficient a manner as it should be. The employers say there is a good deal of slackness in the administration of the Order, and, not only great delays in investigation of cases reported, but also great delays in dealing with those cases. Over and over again it is said the men are given first, second and third chances, which the employers consider is not a good example from the point of view of discipline.
    One of the bugbears of managements is the yard committees. On the other hand, the management admit that there are some yard committees with whom they are working in perfectly good harmony. It entirely depends on the personnel the men elect and the personality of the management. The managers say the men sometimes unwisely elect representatives who are just playing at politics, whose only concern is to talk political stuff in the time that the employers pay for, and the employers resent having to listen to this kind of thing. They frankly admit that often useful suggestions are brought forward and they say they give fair consideration to them. On the other hand, the workers have not yet appreciated, generally, the possibility for good of the yard committees. If only these yard committees consisted of the wisest men, of sensible fellows, instead of wild politicians who talk so much and get elected in consequence, there would, it is said, be much happier relations than exist to-day.
    I feel convinced that the real trouble is that 1bere is no sense of urgency. We
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    have for so long had assurances of victory. Although it is true that we have never lost, and must not lose, our faith in victory, it has had this disadvantage, that on a certain type of mind it has a soporific effect. I think we ought to change the tune and tell people in the shipyards that we may lose the war unless everyone pulls up his socks and works to the maximum extent. Let us worry the people and create a sense of urgency and tell them that victory is not assured unless we deserve to win.
    Mr. Storey: I beg to second the Amendment.
    I should like to congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend not only on the able manner in which he has handled this subject, but on being instrumental in raising this discussion at a time when the heavy increases in our shipping losses reported to the House by the Prime Minister only the day before yesterday, make it more than ever essential that the shipyards should produce to their maximum possible tonnage. The town which I represent has no reason to be ashamed of the contribution it has made in new tonnage to our national effort. Indeed, if I were in a position to quote the figures, I could prove that its record is one of which we can rightly be proud. I believe that is largely due to the enterprise of certain firms who, even through the great depression of 1931–35, maintained their efficiency and their initiative in design of engines and hulls and were ready to meet the need when it came. I believe it is due, too, to the fact that the management is still largely in the hands of men with long family connections with their yards and their workmen and to the mutual trust which exists between the management and the men.
    Good though the record of the industry is, far be it from me to say that it could not be improved upon. I believe that if the Government fulfil the assurances which the Lord Privy Seal gave to the House yesterday, if they let nothing stand between this country and victory and do not shrink from calling for any sacrifices from whomsoever it be, and do not tolerate any hindrance in our national effort, the country will be galvanised into a sense of greater urgency, which, in the shipbuilding section of the community, would be translated into increased tonnage. Let me be quite frank. On the

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    employers' side, I believe there is still room for improvement in the organisation and use of skilled labour.
    I believe that executive supervision might be tightened up with good effect, and that more could be done to take men into the confidence of the management and explain the causes of difficulties and delays which, if unexplained, are misunderstood and irritate men who are anxious to do their best for the country. In some yards there seems to be a disposition to discourage some of the best workers by putting them on to time instead of piece-work. It has been suggested to me that production could be increased if more and better service in preparatory work was given to pieceworkers. Too many men in their prime are put on to time work and waste time in doing their own preparatory work. Production would be increased if the older men were put on to do the preparatory work and the piece-workers were given a clear run.
    On the other side, I shall be equally frank. I believe that good money—and no one who has witnessed the long years of shipyard depression will grudge good money to those who have experienced it—is too easily come by, for the maximum effort to be forthcoming. Therefore, such habits, though they be the habits of a lifetime, as that of being at the gates instead of leaving work at 5 o'clock, should be given up during wartime. Then, too, some men work better under strict supervision which, with the shortage of skilled men, is difficult to obtain, particularly on repair work, and as the same shortage of labour has brought into employment some men—and they are only a small percentage—who need disciplinary action, there is a need for a fuller use of disciplinary powers. I know the men's leaders are doing much to enforce discipline, but I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend that it is essential that the Ministry of Labour should give more evidence than it has done in the past that it will use the disciplinary powers that are vested in it under the Essential Work Order.
    Then there are some ways in which there is room for improvement from above. Control in war time is a necessity, but there are some grounds for thinking that there could be some simplification in the number of controls. There is some
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    failure to co-ordinate the Ministry of War Transport shipping plans with the work of builders and repairers. Here I should like to interpose that I hope the First Lord will pay due regard to what my hon. and gallant Friend said about the Ministry of War Transport shipping advisers. Then, too, there seems to be some lack of co-ordination between that part of the repair section of the Admiralty which deals with Admiralty repairs and that part which deals with merchant repairs. Then, again, I think that the Minister of Labour might pay more regard to the value of essential clerical workers, and what we might describe as the skilled workers in unskilled industries, both of which categories can play a very large part in increased production.
    There is also one point to which I hope the First Lord will call the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I do not think there is any real objection to paying Income Tax except amongst a small minority of the men who refuse to work overtime rather than pay Income Tax and I believe that even with that minority we could get away from the trouble if our propaganda about Income Tax were more up to date. The shipbuilding industry is one of the worst hit by the time-honoured methods unimaginatively applied to the collection of Income Tax from a new class of taxpayers. It is an industry which earns big money during the long Summer days and good weather. It earns small money in the short Winter days and bad weather. Here let me say that it seems to me a pity that in the past we have not looked into, and perhaps adopted, the practice of Continental shipyards in covering their slipways, because by such a means it would be possible to even out the amount of work which can be done in the shipyards during the Winter months. But to return to the question of Income Tax. It is hard upon these men to be asked to pay the tax upon their high Summer earnings out of their low Winter wages. The Inland Revenue may say there is nothing to prevent the money being put aside in Summer, but how much better it would be if the Inland Revenue recognised human nature for what it is and woke up and collected the tax upon the money as it was earned.
    One hears much criticism of the delays caused by modifications. No doubt some are caused by the idiosyncrasies of individuals who demand alterations to suit

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    their personal tastes and convenience. These are probably very small in their results, but they cause irritation and discouragement to the men working on the ships, and they should be strictly discouraged. On the whole, it appears that most of the modifications which cause delay are due to experience gained under war conditions, but there is one class, that caused by the constantly varying type of guns which are fitted. That seems to me one thing which, at this stage of the war, ought to be capable of solution. Standardisation is another matter still capable of improvement. We do not want a standardisation which, if carried too far, will slow down the better-equipped yards to the capabilities of the less well-equipped yards, but a standardisation which would concentrate in each yard upon a particular type, so that familiarity would increase output. One other remark upon standardisation: I hope it will never be lost sight of that we must have a standardisation of speed at the highest possible level.
    I hope Members who represent dockyard constituencies will allow one who represents only the Fourth Estate in a dockyard town to say a few words on the question of dockyards. If I understand the position rightly, the main function of a dockyard in war-time is to deal with emergency repairs. That necessitates a large reservoir of skilled labour and presents the problem of their full employment between jobs. This problem has been aggravated by the dispersal of work on account of the liability to air attack. Is everything being done that can be done to solve this problem? I fear that it is not. Surely it is possible to lay down in the dockyards small craft of types urgently needed by the Navy, not as part of the regular programme but as an additional programme, which if completed would be a welcome addition to the Fleet, but if delayed in completion by the transfer of men to emergency repairs would give rise to no vital handicap. In the same way, is it not possible to utilise the labour of these skilled workers upon additional programmes of tanks or armoured vehicles? I believe that such a plan is feasible and that if the dockyards were given anti-aircraft defences of the character we found at Brest, there would be a reasonable chance that these
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    programmes would make a real contribution to our national effort.
    Though I have offered some criticisms and suggestions for the improvement of our shipbuilding output, I must conclude by paying a justly due tribute to all concerned in the very fine performance achieved in the production of ships in this country. It is a performance that compares favourably with any other branch of our national effort. I hope and trust that never again in peace-time will we allow, as we did in the past, this fine industry to languish, but that we shall always regard it as one of the keystones of our national existence. The First Lord referred this morning to the reduced building capacity we had at the outbreak of the war, and raised cheers from the benches which had always attacked the scrapping of redundant yards. I never agreed with that attack. I believe that that scrapping was a first step in the direction of the concentration of industry. Where we failed—and we did fail—was in not keeping the remaining yards up to the highest degree of efficiency, with additional slips in reserve, and in not finding the means of making good the dearth of skilled labour due to no apprentices being trained during the great depression. Never again must we allow ourselves to be in that position. American construction, welcome though it is, may not always come to our assistance. It is upon our own resources now and in the future that we must rely.
    Mr. Graham White: I rise only for a moment or two, and that for the limited purpose of touching upon one or two points which have been raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Renfrew (Major Lloyd) and the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey). I think my hon. and gallant Friend has rendered a service by raising this discussion at this time, because although, as he said, the shipyards of this country have a fine record of output and performance—its quality and quantity would compare with that of many other industries in the country—the problem now is to bring the general standard throughout the industry as a whole up to the practice of the best yards. There is machinery by which the experience of the best-equipped yards could be shared throughout the whole country if the organisation that exists in connection with the Admiralty and the Supply Departments was exercised to the

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    full. The question is, How is the standard to be raised as high as possible? In the long run that can only be done when every individual, whether he is a manager or whatever his position, is satisfied of the urgency of the need and is putting everything he knows into the job. As has already been said, there are things which are hindering here and there.
    In my judgment, too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the necessity for everybody concerned in the production of ships to feel that they are in the job together. There must be complete confidence and complete sharing of knowledge. Ship repairing is probably the most complicated, the most difficult and the most unexpected task which industry can be called upon to perform. I suppose that no two ship repairing problems are the same, and many things happen which call for explanation. It is within my knowledge that considerable heart-burning was caused in a certain yard when a vessel on which repair work had recently been carried out, and was still going on, was suddenly ordered from the port to proceed to another port in a different part of the country. The men engaged in the work felt frustrated. They were quite bewildered as to why decisions of that kind should be made. In point of fact, there was a perfectly good and satisfactory explanation. The ship was in fact capable of proceeding under its own steam to another port, whereas two accidents of an important character had occurred to two ships which were coming into the port and which could not proceed under their own steam. It was of the utmost consequence that those two ships should be repaired quickly; there were no other berths available, and so the first ship was ordered to leave. If that had been explained fully at the time to those engaged in the work, the difficulties and the sense of frustration and bewilderment would not have arisen. My hon. and gallant Friend said that in some yards there was a handicap caused by a legacy from the past. I venture to say that the relationships of management and men throughout the shipyards of this country are better to-day than at any other time in its history. What I hope is that during the war, when we arc engaged in a common task, a spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence shall so develop that we can forget about the legacy of the past, and that when the
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    war is over there will be better relationships and better industrial machinery in connection with those relationships than we have ever had at any time.
    I pass for one moment to the question of Income Tax. There is much heart-burning and actual distress. I sincerely hope that the Board of Inland Revenue are going into this matter in detail. I will not burden the House by bringing up specific instances—they have been stated in broad outline already—but there is one thing which I think should be done at the earliest possible moment. Some sort of certificate, some sort of script, should be issued in respect of the deferred payment which is to be made at the end of the war. At the present moment this is something quite nebulous, some far distant prospect in which the majority of people hardly believe. I believe if there was some tangible asset in hand, it would go a long way towards satisfaction in that particular respect. The point mentioned by the hon. Member for Sunderland about the hardship arising from deductions now, when earnings are not so high, of Income Tax at a high rate, is one which calls for very careful consideration and action at the earliest possible moment. There are a great many varieties of ways in which workers are hit by the particular incidence of this tax. One I might mention is where men have been called to the Forces, and firms have been making up their pay. Many firms are now called upon to deduct from the allowances they are making the full amount of Income Tax, so that it may result in an allowance of something like 2S. 6d., with the result that payments for rent, etc., are in jeopardy. I have perhaps said enough on that point. It is something which has an effect on the enthusiasm of the workers. It was not explained fully in advance; it is not known fully what Income Tax is for. It is desirable that the purposes for which Income Tax is devoted should be made known to everyone who is called upon to pay it. If these things were done, that adverse effect could be done away with.
    It is imperative that priority of labour should be secured for both shipbuilding and ship repairing. If the steps laid down by the Minister of National Service for relating the man to the job are carried out efficiently that is the best possible plan, but I am bound to say that I cannot disguise from myself what goes on

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    under my eyes—that the machinery of the Ministry of National Service for carrying out the relation of the man to the job is not working in the way that is required. I do not altogether blame the Ministry for that, because when war broke out they had not the machinery for that job. They had to reorganise hurriedly and are far from perfect at the present time.
    The clerical worker has been referred to by one hon. Member. The clerical worker is considered to be fair game, but in a shipyard the calling-up of the clerical worker means that the whole system of costings falls into arrears, that the whole system of building up the accounts for cash payments falls months and months into arrears, with the result that the financial difficulties of the firm are exaggerated, and the work in general is hindered. But it is a fact that, here and there, so-called unskilled labour is being taken from the shipyards. There should be no doubt left that that should not be done. Unskilled men are considered fair game by the Ministry of National Service, but there are very few unskilled men in the shipyards. The ordinary labourer in a shipyard is very often performing important tasks. I return to the sentence with which I began, that the price of victory in this matter is that every man, whether he belongs to the management or to the workers, should be doing the uttermost he can, up to the limits of his strength and capacity.
    Mr. McNeil: I should like to preface what I have to say by wishing my colleague the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty every success in his most difficult job, and to assure him of the confidence of the House. Deferentially, as a very junior Member, I should like to say that the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for East Renfrew (Major Lloyd) was a temperate and most thoughtful contribution, and that he was ably followed by his seconder. I agree almost completely with the case of the hon. and gallant Member, and, without reservation, I agree that there is lacking throughout the industry this sense of urgency. I hope to be able to show why that is, and to suggest methods by which the position might be remedied. I completely agree that the Government, perhaps through quite clearly understood timidity, have
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    failed to represent to the country the urgency of the position. There are figures by which the gravity of the situation can be gauged. The First Lord to-day called the shipyard problem a most vital factor. In my opinion, it is the most vital factor. It will not matter if our men are legion and if their arms, eventually, are terrible, if we lack the tonnage to project them to any sector of the perimeter where our enemies may be weak or our Allies need strengthening.
    Last time the Prime Minister spoke in this House on this subject, he gave figures which are worth noting. When our losses were at their greatest for four months, they averaged 480,000 tons per month. That is a high figure. The Prime Minister, continuing this topic, told us that this country could launch monthly 80,000 tons. There is a bridge between these two figures. America pledges herself to give us 350,000 tons a month when her industry is harnessed. I had the good fortune to talk to-day with an Admiralty expert who has come back from close touch with the Maritime Commission and who tells me that he is satisfied that America will be able to match and overtake its pledge of such tremendous figures. Even if we assume that by now or by the light months our output will have grown to 100,000 tons per month, and even if we remember the not unsubstantial production to which the First Lord paid generous tribute that we can expect from our Dominions, particularly from Canada and Australia, more must be laid in this country if we are to be satisfied that, if the worst again should overtake us, the situation will be in hand. And worse may very well happen. It is true that we have made tremendous advances in combating submarine warfare in the Western Ocean. The First Lord addressed himself to this problem too, but it should be emphasised that there are now these three battleships which may at any time dart out to attack and inflict great damage upon our lines to our Russian Ally. If we are realists, we shall admit that we cannot yet estimate what damage surface raiding may bring to us in the Pacific, and in seas even nearer than the Pacific, from our Japanese enemy. If we are to achieve this safety margin and are at any time to be in a position to strike, we have to step-up our tonnage by at least 20 percent. in this country. It will have to come up to something like 120,000 tons

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    as the monthly average, and that is not impossible. In 1918 we launched in this country an average of 112,000 tons, or roughly a figure of 1,348,000 for that year.
    What contributions can we make? I submit most deferentially that the Financial Secretary must read carefully what the mover of this Amendment said about a closer approximation to a standard ship. I do not know, and I have not had the time to consider, the technical plans by which the Americans hope to reach this gigantic total, but it must be clear that they are based upon a standard ship. We must be prepared to sacrifice some of the less consequential changes in design which we would want to acquire if there were no other factors conditioning the problem. Even now we must consider that greater speed must be given to the semi-standard freighters. I understand that the figure now is something between 10 and 12 knots. The hon. and gallant Member for East Renfrew and the hon. Member for Sunderland pointed to the additional defence margin that would come from increasing the speed. Frankly, I am not very much impressed by what difference in defence an additional two knots would make, but it is clear that if we can raise the speed by 5 per cent, then we add one extra ship to every twenty that we have undertaking the job on the seven seas now.
    I think I ought to make some slight reference to the remarks made by the hon. and gallant Member for East Renfrew about conditions in the shipyards. The hon. Member for Sunderland associated himself with those remarks when he talked of there being too much easy money. I must remind the House that as everyone knows—and both the hon. Members have associations with shipyards—there is no one engaged in the actual hull construction, from keel to deck, who is working on any other conditions than piece rates. I am prepared to give figures from the Clyde to show that these men earn every halfpenny that goes into their pay packets. I want to suggest to the hon. and gallant Member for East Renfrew, who said that the employers are dissatisfied with the restriction of their powers under the Essential Work Order—there are men who tend to want to have their cake and also to eat it—that it is unrealistic for employers to say, "The Essential Work Order has taken away my disciplinary
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    power, and I cannot handle the men." The truth is that, without that Order, the men would not wait to be sacked, but would walk out and get a job next door, and the men, quite properly, have said that if the movement of their labour is to be restricted, then so must the powers of the employers be curtailed.
    I have raised this matter because I want to say something that will not be at all popular, and which I find it most difficult to say. There is still—we all know it—a lack of urgency in the yards, and even worse than that, distinct friction. Speaking for the Clyde, I think we might do a great deal to remove that friction if the present Director of Shipbuilding and Repairs, Sir James Lithgow, were removed from his job. I should be dishonest, unjust and ungenerous if I did not say that Sir James Lithgow, both in peace-time and in war-time, has shown a supreme organising ability in this business, and that no one doubts his concern for the country, but I know that in the minds of the men there exists grave suspicion about Sir James Lithgow. They think of him as a bad and hard employer, and they think of him as being unwilling to meet and move with them in these matters, and I am told that some employers doubt Sir James Lithgow's good intentions in all matters touching their industry just now. But it does not matter whether I am right or wrong about Sir James Lithgow, or whether they are. The point is that something more than ability is needed to get the best out of this industry now. What is needed is good will. Therefore, you must either remove from the minds of the men their impressions of Sir James Lithgow or be prepared to remove Sir James Lithgow. I add once more that I say that most regretfully, but I think it is factual and must be said.
    In conclusion, I would draw attention to one aspect of the matter which is well known to the House. When we rationalised our shipbuilding industry we threw out into the streets 50,000 skilled men. These men have not forgotten it, and on Clydeside they would not allow their sons to go into the industry. If the Government can give a pledge to the industry that the men will not be pitched out again and their skill allowed to rot and their tools to rust, then I think we shall put an end to what the mover described as the "ticking-over" process

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    and get the punch from this industry which we need to survive.
    Captain Plugge: My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey) who seconded this Amendment kindly referred to right hon. and hon. Members who represent dockyard constituencies. As my constituency contains the largest and the oldest Royal naval dockyard in the country, I should like to reply to the suggestions he made and say that so far as my knowledge goes his suggestions are being carried out in the dockyard in my constituency. To remind my hon. Friend, he first suggested that Royal naval dockyards should be adequately protected against aircraft attack. I can assure him that so far as my constituency is concerned enemy planes invariably make a detour and that further in the Chatham dockyard under the able direction of the Admiral Superintendent, Admiral Sir Clinton Danby, new constructions are carried out as well as urgent repairs. May I also take this opportunity of supporting the reference which has been made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil) to the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eastern Renfrew (Major Lloyd). His speech made one of those contributions which in a Debate such as this are so greatly appreciated by the House. My hon. and gallant Friend referred to the question of speed of ships. He mentioned that there was a great delay in building ships if they were to be capable of greater speed. I should like to point out how important speed is in any method of transport. It is much better, I think, to describe distances by the time it takes to get there than to refer to the distance by the number of miles.
    It might interest the House to know that two flying boats of 50 tons each, such as those which are constructed at Short Bros., of Rochester, in my constituency, can carry to America and back as large a tonnage of cargo as one cargo boat of 600 tons capable only of doing eight knots. With their greater speed the flying boats can make so many more journeys. Twelve 50–ton flying boats are equivalent to a 5–knot merchant ship of 5,000 tons. During the past 10 years Japan has made a great point of building very fast merchant ships. She has now a large fleet of merchant ships capable of travel
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    ling between 18 and 22 knots. These ships cannot only be used in transporting troops by being able to form a suitable and economical convoy such as is required when convoyed by fast naval craft but can also easily be converted into armed raiders. When Japan entered the war I shuddered at the thought of the great number of high-speed merchant ships she owned which could be very rapidly transformed into armed raiders and sailed into various parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, much to our disadvantage. There is another suggestion I should like to make to the First Lord in regard to the building of fast cargo ships. It has been said that larger engines are needed, that the building of larger engines takes much longer and is a more difficult job and that this holds up completion. Would it not be possible to use double or triple screw ships, using several smaller engines, to lay down such ships which need only be fitted with one of their engines and could be sent temporarily to sea as slow merchant ships, and that the second or third engine could be incorporated later when the ship returns back to port and when the second or third engine becomes available?
    Mr. Buchanan: I think the speech of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for East Renfrew (Major Lloyd) was on the whole fair and reasonable, if I may say so as an old Member who is inclined to talk to people in a schoolmasterly fashion. I do not represent a purely shipbuilding Division, although any Glasgow Division must contain a large proportion of shipbuilding workers. The union of which I am chairman is not purely a shipbuilding but is an engineering union largely employed in shipbuilding. On the Clyde the engine shop and the shipbuilding yard are for the most part the same industry. They are so much alike. The First Lord said the employers complained bitterly of absenteeism and said the National Service officers were not taking the necessary action against alleged wrongdoers, who were given chance after chance, and that in the end nothing was done. I hope he will not pursue that line too far. I worked in shipyards throughout the last war, and before that I worked in shipyards in Belfast. If there is one thing that raises a dull, deep resentment it is the punishment of a man. You may gain by it for a time, but in the long run

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    you will lose. Anyone who knows the Clyde knows that stoppages are in no way comparable with what they were in the last war. There is often in this absenteeism a whole host of reasons. Shipyard workers and men like myself are not like the average Member of the House of Commons. Most Members are sober, staid people who never have any domestic unhappiness.
    The rest of the community have things that ruffle their lives occasionally. A man may have been off work, and there is terrible domestic unhappiness in the background which he would not tell to his employers, and when the man comes before the National Service officer there are no doubt certain things for which the employer says he ought to be punished, but if the man's background were examined there would be found to be every defence for him. I happen to have some knowledge of shipbuilding from a good many angles. I have negotiated with the employers for many years, I know the men, I know their unions, and I know their National Service officers. The Ministry of Labour has in Scotland one of the ablest civil servants. I am not going to say that he will not do his duty, but I know that he will not be stampeded by employers or anybody else in prosecutions that in the long run may do far more damage than good. I trust that in these matters the Ministry of Labour will not be rushed into needless and stupid prosecutions.
    I would like to refer to the question of Income Tax payments. You may like it or not, but there is deep resentment about the Income Tax. I do not think the system is practical, unless perhaps with overtime. If it can be shown to me to be practical, I am prepared to look at it, but this much I know, that for the shipyard worker, with his general average of wage and his costs, the present limit of £78 is far too low. One of the things the Government will have to do is to raise the minimum exemption figure for Income Tax.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Dennis Herbert): I would warn the hon. Member not to get out of Order. This question can properly be referred to, but it is not a question that can be dealt with by the Admiralty.
    Mr. Buchanan: But if the Admiralty find that production is hindered because
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    of the Income Tax payments, they can make representations in the matter. There is nothing in some ways having a worse effect in the shipyards than this question of the incidence of the Income Tax. An hon. Member referred to the summer and winter differences in wages, but there is another difference. A man may be on piece-work earning comparatively big wages, and the Minister of Labour may come along and willy-nilly transfer him from a highly paid piece-work job to a time-work job on a much lower wage. Then the man has to start out of the low wage to pay tax on a wage earned in a different period. There is no use highfalutin' people like the Chancellor saying that the men should save. If we all did the things we should do, we should be living in Paradise, but I would rather live with human beings who make mistakes than in a perfect world. The Admiralty would be well advised to look into this problem in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because if there could be some easing of the situation, it might help them.
    Two other small matters which I wish to raise are peculiar, I think, to my district. I am still very much concerned about the lack of canteens. The hon. Member who moved the Amendment tried to be balanced. I am not as good at balancing. I must take sides. I cannot find myself supporting both the employers and the workmen at the same time. The Clyde employers have a terrible record as regards the provision of canteens. Before the war canteens were practically nonexistent on the Clyde, and indeed, after the present First Lord of the Admiralty took office, which was nearly 12 months after the war had started, and the Minister of Labour and others intervened, there was a feeling among employers that they were interfering in a way they had no right to do. I think canteens were necessary before the war, because the days when workers lived near the shipyards have gone. Now the workers have to travel to get to work, and if canteens were needed before the war, now, since the war, with all our food and transport difficulties, they are more urgently needed still. I ask the First Lord to see whether the provision of canteens is as good as it might be in my part of the world.
    The other point I wish to raise concerns men who are late at work. Usually men are due to start at five minutes to eight

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    in the morning, and they work until half-past five in the evening, which is a 47-hour week. Frequently—perhaps not frequently, but often—they are late, and do not arrive at the gate until five or ten minutes past eight. Anyone who is acquainted with present-day travelling conditions knows that it is difficult to arrive anywhere exactly to time. Frequently the men who are late are sent home, to come back at dinner time. If ever there was waste, that is an example of it. Take it that the men are wrong—although I am for a moment admitting that they are wrong—what would be the business thing to do? It would be to let them go to their work. If they are in the wrong, there is machinery to deal with them. To send them home is mad, stupid, but it is done. Then there is the question of prosecutions. If the law is to be good, it ought to have for its purpose equality of treatment. You can argue with the Clyde workmen as much as you like, but they feel there is no equality of treatment under the National Service Acts as between workmen and employers. What employer on the Clyde has ever been prosecuted? Not one. What manager has been prosecuted? Not one. What foreman has been prosecuted? Not one. But workmen have been prosecuted. And yet the hon. Member opposite said there were faults on both sides. There is this difference, that the employer has at his disposal all the evidence with which to prosecute the man, whereas the man has no chance of getting evidence against the employer. That is the difference. Who can tell? If I am working at a shipyard and I decide not to go to my work on a particular morning, but to play golf, my absence is known. It is known that I am not in. Suppose one of the managers, or an owner, says that he will not go in, but he goes away; who knows that he is not in? The result is that prosecutions are loaded against the workers. Frankly, so long as the present system exists, I cannot see any remedy, and that is one of the reasons why prosecutions should be proceeded with only in the very last extremity.
    One of the reasons why I feel a certain amount of difficulty is that I do not hold the views about the war held by most other people. I cannot accept the popular view about it. I cannot get myself worked
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    up into enthusiasm about the things that other men get worked up about, concerning going into war. To do so, you have to get the urge and the belief that you are right in all the things that attach to war. An hon. Gentleman who spoke not long ago referred to aerial attack during the last war and in this war. There is a marked difference, and there is no real comparison. Air attack upon vessels was almost unknown in the last war. It was hardly ever done, whereas in this war it is extremely common. I hope I give away no secrets—and if I am doing so I will not proceed, as I have no wish to give away secrets—but I am told that the chief effect of air attack upon our shipping is not sinking but damaging. If Ministers think I am doing wrong in saying this—
    Mr. Alexander: I have already said that superficial and under-water damage are very common.
    Mr. Buchanan: The trouble about our ships is that we have a lot of cast iron. A hit on the water line, and cast iron snaps and breaks. The result is that when the ship comes in for repair you have to supplement the cast iron with steel, because, as we say in Scotland, steel is sharper, and it is not easily broken. The result is that ship repairing has gone up by a tremendous amount and does not allow you to concentrate as in the last war, practically entirely upon new construction.
    The First Lord of the Admiralty referred to new firms engaging in ship repair work. I should like to give him an illustration, one of many, from my own division. I do not want to boast about it. The people concerned are just honest to-goodness patriotic people. They were shopfitters, young, capable fellows. The war came, and they saw their first-class business going west. They had brains, and they thought it was a pity to see their business disappearing. It is difficult to convince other people that you are as clever as they are; in fact, it is nearly impossible. These young fellows, after terrible arguments with the Ministry of Shipping, ultimately did convince the Ministry that, although they had never been on a ship or done a piece of work there before, they could repair ships. The Ministry agreed to give them work. Today, that firm employs, I should say, nearly 500 people. Their offices and

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    workshops are at least two or three miles from the docks, but there they are, one clay converting an ordinary ship into a rescue ship, another day fitting out a ship to be a troop ship, making extra accommodation for stores and other things They are doing it effectively, although before the war they were entirely a building firm.
    In these days, demarcations have had to be swept aside. I am not going to believe that only shipbuilding employees can repair ships. There is a reservoir of labour for repairs outside the shipbuilding industry. The illustration I have quoted from my own division could be applied up and down the country in many respects. The First Lord has the advantage of having had a connection with the movement. He has carried out a lot of experiments, some of which were good, some not so good and some bad, but which on the whole were a great success. Let him try the experiment of expanding on the repair side of the work. Some of it may not succeed, but I believe the balance may tend to success. My last word to him shall be a word of warning. I beg him to think once, twice and many times before he puts his hand to the prosecution or repression of men who, on the whole, are trying to do their best.
    Mr. Leslie: My remarks will be very brief indeed, because I only wish to refer to one phase of the Debate, namely, the question of overtime. We have listened to-day with interest to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes) because of his undoubted knowledge of naval affairs, but in the course of his remarks he made reference to what has been done in the shipyards, and I think his allegations certainly demand an inquiry. There have been far too many charges of slackening in shipyards. I happen to have one in my constituency—one of the most important shipyards in the country. It was alleged that men were spinning out work in order to work overtime. If that be the case, it may mean a lack of efficient management, or, on the other hand, it may be that the cost-plus method operates in those shipyards, a method which has been condemned by the trade union movement. The trade union movement have always opposed overtime, and that is the reason why they have always endeavoured to make it costly. They realise that it is a big strain
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    on the workers. It is, as we all know, very detrimental to health, and may I remind the Ministers of what happened in the last war? Medical returns gave cause for alarm at the great increase in the sickness ratio caused by long hours, and the Government of that time took action accordingly. It was proved conclusively that after a certain number of hours production actually diminished. The very first thing which the United States did on entering the war was to introduce a 48-hour week for works, shipyards and factories engaged on war work. I therefore hope that the Government will be careful to do everything to discourage overtime instead of encouraging it.
    Mr. David Adams: We are very much indebted to the Mover of this Amendment for the opportunity it gives us of expressing our views upon the shipping position. The whole House will agree, and the country agrees, that the question of naval and merchant production is the first, second, and third consideration before us to-day, and if any steps can be taken to step up and to expedite it or to remove difficulties, then it is the business of all concerned so to do. I have just had an illustration that all things are not well at the moment. Before entering the House I was advised to be prepared to meet next week a deputation of skilled engineers who had certain grievances to put before certain Members of this House. The engineers concerned happen to be employed at a factory which was originally a Royal Ordnance factory. It was taken over some months ago by a private firm. I have heard that from the time that factory was taken out of the hands of the Government and placed in private hands there has been a simmering of discontent, and those concerned are fully aware of the form of this discontent. If that be so with regard to this particular factory, one is entitled to conclude that it must prevail in certain other factories. There is yet time between now and next week to get into touch with the disputants or the aggrieved persons to see whether the impeding of production by the bringing of men from their employment, or in other ways affecting that production, cannot be avoided.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonel Clifton Brown): The hon. Member talked about a factory. The Amendment deals with shipyards. Is this concern of which he is speaking a shipyard?
    Mr. Adams: I was dealing with the question of engineering production.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Amendment is concerned with shipyards.
    Mr. Adams: There is an undoubted urgency for skilled workers in our shipyards. I can assert that quite definitely so far as the Tyne is concerned. I am not at all satisfied from inquiries that one has been able to make that there is not quite a number of skilled ex-shipyard workers in other jobs. The view is held by many shipyard workers and shipyard owners that the Ministry of Labour are not yet satisfied and adequately convinced of the imperious urgency of ship repairs. We all know—it has been given to the House relatively recently—of the very large volume of tonnage which is immobilised at the present time, and although our shipyards are doing their utmost to put this into the water at the earliest possible time, they are dissatisfied with the progress that has yet been made. In that connection I am bound to say that I feel a measure of discontent that of the yards which were closed in the days when Shipyards Security ravaged the country only two-thirds have yet been opened. Surely this is a matter which should have consideration. If there are ex-shipyards immobilised in that way, there ought to be a specific attempt made to have them brought once more into use.
    The question has been raised of abolishing the system of payment by percentage upon cost for shipyard repairs. I can say, with full knowledge, that it is quite impossible, in 90 cases out of 100, to estimate the cost of repairs. It is a matter of estimating the time and the materials that will be required. With regard to the proposal to have faster ships, I am certain that that matter has been considered by the experts associated with the Admiralty and, more particularly, with the merchant ship side, and opinion is against taking the longer time that would be required to produce such ships. The damage that we suffer, from submarines and from other causes, is not proportionately heavier for the slower convoys.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We are not discussing convoys; we are discussing conditions in the shipyards and the acceleration of shipbuilding.
    Mr. Adams: But the question has been raised of whether we should not do better to produce faster tonnage.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Possibly in the general Debate but it is not in Order on this Amendment.
    Mr. Adams: Very well, I shall have to leave that alone. On this vexed question of Income Tax charges upon workmen, there is, in the opinion of the workers, a genuine grievance. Some, not only in this industry but elsewhere, feel so strongly that they decline to work overtime. The feeling that they have a grievance is adverse to the war effort. Much greater propaganda should have been indulged in, through the B.B.C., by posters in our shipyards and elsewhere, and in other ways, to illuminate the darkness of those opposed to paying their legitimate share of the taxation of this country. A proposal has been made by a leading trade unionist that the £4,000,000 which is involved up to date might be written off, with substantial advantage to all concerned. I cannot say that I share that view, but it is worth considering whether a proportion of this amount could not be so dealt with.
    Another matter which has been mentioned to me on several occasions relates to shipyard workers who have perforce to travel long distances to work. They feel that, as many other tradesmen are assisted to meet high travelling changes, shipyard workers should be similarly treated. Another question is, whether there are sufficient buses available. Bus times are being adjusted to meet the urgent, and, in many cases, new, demands of the shipyard workers. I feel that the Debate will have cleared the air in certain directions; and if it has stimulated those concerned to get rid of the grievances of the shipyard workers and of the stumbling blocks to production, it will certainly have proved of value.
    Mr. J. J. Davidson: I rise, as one coming from the Clydeside, to stress one or two points made by my hon. Friends the Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil) and the Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan), in order that the Financial Secretary, whom we welcome to his new post because of his past successes, may have a complete knowledge of some of the conditions concerning the Clydeside and be in a much better position to deal with some of the com-

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    plaints, difficulties, and obstacles that have been outlined to-day. I want to deal with the question of the control exercised by Sir James Lithgow. I do so not in any spirit of personal animosity. I do not know Sir James Lithgow myself, but I want my hon. Friend to understand that, if a person has, because of his past activities, created a tremendous resentment in the minds of an important section of the community engaged on war work, the fact must be taken fully into account when we are discussing the question of production. I want my hon. Friend to understand that, for many years, on the Clydeside a ruthless and financially successful system of closing yards was adopted, lowering the standard of life of thousands of shipyard workers and their womenfolk and children. That system was exercised and controlled by Sir James Lithgow—so much so that, for years, in shipyards throughout the Clydeside area, there were writings, curses and poems that could not be described here, to be seen on the walls, referring to this particular person. Therefore, the deep-seated hatred of this individual, installed in the minds of men who suffered bitterly, because of his particular activities—due to a profit-making incentive—must be taken fully into consideration when considering the whole question of shipbuilding production.
    There are other factors affecting the shipbuilding industries on the Clyde. The question of Income Tax has been stressed by various hon. Members, and I want my hon. Friend to understand the position of a man who, after many years of privation and of competition in order to get even a miserable wage in the shipyards on Clydeside, is to-day making a relatively high and decent wage and is able to buy, as far as rationing permits, certain little extras. This man is working on piece-work and aiming at obtaining as high a wage as possible. In accordance with the piece-work system he is giving of his best to obtain that higher rate and he is asked to work three, four or five hours overtime, and sometimes more. It all depends upon the urgency of the job. He has done his day's work; he has earned his wages. He has admitted fairly, if grumblingly, that he ought to pay Income Tax on the standard wage. Because he is working overtime he has to provide extra food, he has to give up a certain amount of his social life, he has to risk delay in
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    getting home and even extra payments arising from that delay. He is then told, after all these things, "We shall step in and take from you, practically speaking, 10s. in the £." This is a serious matter, and has caused considerable resentment among the workmen in the Clyde shipyards. There is no support for this system from any influential section of the trade union or political movements, Conservative, Liberal or Labour, in Scotland. The matter is one that must be taken fully into consideration.
    In shipyard production, with the animosities of the old days and with the background of closed shipyards, there is a great deal to overcome. In the old "squad" system, even the question of different religions entered into the production of various shipyards, and those difficulties exist in a minor degree to-day. I expect that the Admiralty receive fairly regular returns of the productive capacity of the shipyards and the production that takes place. I hope they do, and it they do, I suggest to them that they should send to the difficult areas representatives from the Department who would have a certain amount of executive authority to deal with both sides in the shipyards and try to obtain a much greater degree of co-operation than has been obtained in the past.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Gorbals referred to shipyards where, if a man is five minutes late, he is told to go home until dinner time. It will be recognised by my hon. Friend that if one man goes away from his work, it means very often that a complete squad is kept idle. At the present time, in Glasgow, where many of the shipyard workers have had their homes bombed and have been removed to districts outside, if a man misses the one 'bus that will take him to work in time at his shipyard, he does not bother to go on the next 'bus, but goes home, because he knows that if he goes to the shipyard he will be stopped at the gates and turned away. We have had very great difficulty over this matter in Glasgow. The ex-Lord Provost, trade union officials, and representatives of the City Council have made representations about it. I say that no shipyard ought to take that attitude, and that the shipyards ought to come into line with other industries where a time-clock or some other method is used, and that a worker who is late should not be paid for that time, but equally should not be

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    penalised to such an extent that he is debarred from taking part in production for a whole morning.
    The last point I want to make i an important one for the shipyard workers of the country. It applies not only to Clydeside but to shipyard workers all over the country. The Ministry of Shipping and other Departments will have to get down to the question of providing adequate food rations for these men. Shipyard work is an arduous job and requires a great amount of vitality. It is a job which requires a great amount of physical endurance, particularly in bad weather. I wish my hon. Friend could see the shipyard workers who come to me and say
    "We are asked to work until 8 o'clock to-night and here is my lunch of bread and margarine." Some of them have the luxury of a little jam and a little cheese, but it would amaze hon. Members if they could see the lunch boxes these men used to take to work before the war. Something will have to be done for them, and some arrangements will have to be made. The co-operation of the Ministry of Food should be sought, and some concession should be granted whereby the workers in this heavy industry can obtain the necessary food supplies through an efficient canteen service in the shipyards.
    I do not want it to be thought that all shipowners and shipyard managers have failed to realise their duty in this respect. Certain shipyards have established very fine canteen services, but I want to see their example followed, and efficient canteen services compulsorily provided where necessary. I am confident that my hon. Friend would obtain much better results if he adopted such a scheme, because the men are not being fed for the job. I do not wish to make any assertions, but I have heard certain rumours, and I should like to ask whether the co-operation is satisfactory in regard to repairing damaged ships of our Allies. I wish to know whether the same facilities are granted to them, or whether obstacles have been encountered, and, if so, what steps are being taken to overcome these obstacles.
    The Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. George Hall): Like all my hon. Friends who have spoken on this Amendment, I wish to extend my congratulations and thanks to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Renfrew
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    (Major Lloyd) for the very fair statement of the case which he has put to the House. I would also add that all the speeches delivered on the Amendment, which is now before the House, have been of the same character. It is very proper that this very important matter should be dealt. with on the same day that we discuss the Naval Estimates. Merchant shipping, like the Royal Navy, must play a vital part in the present conflict. Either branch may be the key to victory. The battle of the shipyards is of the greatest importance and ranks as such among the many varied efforts of the United Nations at this stage of the war. In my view, the whole future conduct of the war hinges, not only on the success of the millions of men rendering such valuable service in the fighting forces and battling in all parts of the world, but also upon the men and women employed in various industries, such as mining, iron and steel foundries, production factories of all kinds, engineering, railways and, no less important, those engaged in building and repairing ships in the shipyards of this country.
    Of course, we must not forget the contribution of those who man the ships, to whom a well-deserved tribute has been paid by my right hon. Friend. To wage this war successfully the work of each person is indispensable to the other. The war could be lost if any one industry failed to make its contribution, and, to our island fortress, shipping is as vital a contribution as that of any other service or industry. I am pleased that there has not been a general condemnation of those employed in the shipyards, as I find there is an increasing tendency among a number of people to cast doubts upon the efforts of many who are employed in various industries and many innuendoes as to what is happening, particularly in the shipbuilding industry.
    I have been charged by my right hon. Friend and the Prime Minister with a great responsibility. I have been asked to do what I can to assist in increasing production in the shipyards. No one realises more than I do the importance of this task. During the few weeks in which I have been engaged on it, I have received many statements as to what is happening, but they have all dealt with condemnation in general terms without specific instances into which one could make inquiries. I have seen figures of production and of the work done in the ship-

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    yards and they do not bear out the statements that the majority of the workers are slackers. No one has contended that there is not room for improvement. In this matter we must not be complacent. My right hon. Friend and I will not be satisfied with less than 100 per cent. production. I am satisfied that a large proportion of those employed in the industry are doing their best towards this end, but there is a minority in this and other industries which is not pulling its weight, and many of the complaints deal with this fact. One thing that I am concerned about when this general condemnation is made is that it might lead to the discouragement of those who are doing their best. I would ask that in future when complaints are made they should be specific and should state the yard at which the happenings take place, so that an, inquiry can be made. It is my intention to make myself as fully acquainted as possible with conditions which prevail in the yards. My right hon. Friend and my colleagues at the Admiralty, owing to their prepossession with other important duties, were not able to do it and my right hon. Friend has asked me to undertake that task.
    In dealing with this industry, I propose to look back for a short time in order to give what confidence I can to the country and to my colleagues in the House by showing that a vast improvement has been made. If we take the amount of shipbuilding, naval and mercantile, and new conversions and repairs for naval purposes which was done in 1941, we find that there has been an increase of between 40 and 50 times as compared with the worst year of the depression. Then the industry was down and out. It did not appear to have a future. Many of the skilled men were dispersed into other industries and, indeed, into other countries. Many young men who would have been sent into the industry did not go because there was a lack of security. As one who has been connected for some years with an industry which has suffered depression—although I cannot say such a deep depression as that of the shipbuilding and repairing industry—I think a tribute should be paid to the industry and those who have been responsible for organising it so as to enable it to fulfil its functions in this war. No industry has suffered such a contraction and then been called
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    upon to expand so enormously and rapidly. Mercantile shipping repairs are keeping full pace with the demands, and it can be said that no damaged ship is waiting outside a shipyard to be repaired.
    That brings me to the point put by my hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon). He asked a question about the large shipping losses of the last two months which were referred to by the Prime Minister. Those losses include the losses on the American coast. Our Allies during that period did not have their convoy system going, and that has resulted in the losses to which reference has been made. It also includes those losses which my right hon. Friend the First Lord referred to in his speech to-day. As to construction and repairs generally, the House will understand that it is not in the public interest for me to disclose what has been done in every branch of this Service. If I made such a disclosure and explained all that has been done in relation to the labour strength and to shipbuilding berths available, it would not reflect discredit on either the majority of the workers in the industry, the managements or the control.
    I think it would be as well if I gave a picture of the organisation which deals with shipbuilding and repair work in this country. There is a controller, to whom reference has already been made. Under him—there is a controller of course for the Navy and a controller for shipbuilding and repairs—there are separate directors of merchant shipping and merchant repairs, backed up by a strong regional organisation. There is no doubt that great economy of effort in speeding up our production has resulted from the organisation. Common bottlenecks of material, of productive plant capacity and labour have been settled jointly by naval and merchant departments which are in daily consultation. This intimate contact is perhaps even more important in solving ship repairs than in solving shipbuilding problems. The growing congestion of repair facilities at the end of last winter could not have been so swiftly reduced had not the responsibility for all shipbuilding and repairs, whether naval or merchant, been vested in this one Department or two departments. This enabled priority of treatment to be given to merchant repairs, possible at the expense of

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    new construction. The principal officers in the shipyard districts are also the district shipyard controllers responsible for both naval and merchant programmes. As such, they are chairmen of local controls charged with responsibility for local priorities, allocation of work and interchange of labour. On these controls there are representatives of the naval and merchant shipbuilding and repair departments of the Admiralty as well as the local shipyard labour supply officer. Those officers are assisted by technical officers and by local committees representing both sides of the industry.
    Much has been said with regard to the relationship between the employers and workpeople in the shipbuilding industry. Personally, I regret that at this stage of the war many small or large differences cannot be settled between one section and the other. In many shipbuilding yards shipyard committees have been set up on the lines of the Joint Memorandum prepared by the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation and the Federation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. In many of these areas these committees are functioning with very good effect. Unfortunately in other areas—even in the same areas as where we have these shipyard committees functioning and assisting in every possible way—there are some shipyards where there is a considerable amount of difficulty, and, indeed, so great is the difficulty that these committees are not functioning at all. It must give rise to a considerable amount of difficulty unless there are local organisations functioning to act as intermediaries between one side and the other. I hope it will be possible by such committees that confidence can be not only introduced, but can grow, between one side of the industry and the other. Take many of the complaints such as those mentioned by the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan). He referred to the fact that if a worker presented himself at a shipyard a few minutes after five to eight in the morning, he was turned away until dinner-time. That is a matter for a local committee, such as the shipyard committee, to deal with. There are the questions of transport and transport difficulties. There are questions such as feeding and the provision of food for the canteens.
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    An industry which I know very much better than the shipbuilding industry is the coalmining industry. If I had been asked eight or ten years ago whether it was possible to obtain such a complete feeling of unity as now exists in some parts of the coalfield of this country, I should have said it would be impossible. The other day in South Wales, the President of the South Wales Miners' Federation and the Secretary of the Coalowners' Association addressed a delegate conference of South Wales miners, with the President of the Mining Association of Great Britain in the chair.
    Mr. McNeil: Anything can happen in South Wales.
    Mr. Hall: It is evident that that feeling for co-operation was present which will enable a valuable product to be produced, without which the war effort, cannot be prosecuted to the full. It may be possible on the Clyde to see Sir James Lithgow, and my hon. Friend the Member for Gorbals addressing a meeting of shipyard workers, with the hon. Member for Maryhill (Mr. Davidson) taking the chair.
    Mr. Buchanan: We have sunk far enough, but not to that distance.
    Mr. Hall: Someone would be required to propose a resolution, and I was thinking of the hon. Member for that purpose. Putting humour aside, I think it must appear a tragedy that, at a time like this, there should be lack of co-operation between one section of the community and the other. I hope it will be possible when I visit the Clyde to endeavour, at any rate, to bring both sides of the industry together—and not only on the Clyde. I am not suggesting that the Clyde is any worse than any other shipbuilding area in this country.
    We have to increase production. I have heard it suggested that, if the relationship between both sides of the industry could be improved, output could be increased by from 15 to 20 per cent. That is not my figure; it was given here to-day. Last year, the number of days lost through industrial disputes in this country was less than any year in history, but, unfortunately, in those industries connected with shipbuilding, and on the shipbuilding side, three times as many days were lost in industrial disputes in 1941 compared with 1940. On the

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    engineering side, four times as many days were lost as in 1940. Working out the man-days lost and translating them into the labour which could have been provided, it appears that sufficient man-days were lost to provide full employment for 1,250 workers all the year round.
    If that number of workmen had been made up of all the grades required in the shipbuilding industry, it would have provided something like 50,000 tons of additional shipping. What a contribution that would make. I am not charging either one side or the other with responsibility for causing these stoppages, but the fact that a stoppage can take place in such a vital industry at a time like this is an indication that relationships are not what they ought to be. I am afraid also that the work of conciliation has not been carried out quite as it ought to have been. (An hon. Member: "Whose fault is that?") I am not going to apportion blame; I have not been on the Clyde, and it will be one of my jobs to try and obviate some of the difficulties which have arisen.
    The question of standardisation has been raised by almost every speaker who has taken part in the Debate. So far as tankers and cargo tramp steamers are concerned, standardisation is being carried out to a very great degree. I would like to make it clear that any statement that shipbuilders have been left to build what they please and what is thought most convenient to them is erroneous. The principle which has been adopted is that they should build the type of ships needed for war purposes, and that they should have a certain amount of latitude in adopting dimensions and structural details for which their yards and plants are best adapted and which they and their workmen best understand. From the outset of the war there has been much standardisation in engines, boilers and equipment, and there are in fact many instances of standard ships extending over various yards. The question of the speed of steamers in convoy has been raised. The House will not expect me to go into this matter very fully, because an occasion presented itself—
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must rule that out of Order. The Amendment is not concerned with speed.
    Mr. Hall: I apologise, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. for mentioning that matter.
    Mr. Cocks: Surely, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the speed of vessels has something to do with convoy work?
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question of the speed of the convoy system has nothing to do with the Amendment which is before the House.
    Mr. Davidson: I think it is within the recollection of the House, and of yourself, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, when he was addressing the House, stated that certain points had been raised during the previous Debate which he would leave the Financial Secretary to answer.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Whatever the Civil Lord said, I cannot see that the speed of ships has anything to do with conditions in the shipyards.
    Mr. McNeil: On the point of Order. May I submit, because the point has been introduced in this Debate, that there is a relation between the acceleration of shipbuilding, which is in the terms of this Amendment, and the actual design of the ships? It is a question of the power of their engines.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I think that that would be opening the Amendment to a very wide discussion. It deals with shipyards first of all, and I think it is more or less limited to that.
    Mr. Hall: A question was put by my hon. Friend concerning the Shipping Advisory Committee, and particularly its chairman. My hon. Friend will understand that this is a matter which concerns my right hon. Friend the Minister of War Transport and Shipping, and all I can do is to convey what has been said to him. Then, questions have been put regarding keeping workpeople in the shipyards informed with regard to changes which take place. District shipyard controllers have been asked to see that the reasons for delays or changes of plans are explained to the men when it is possible to do so, and I believe that that is being followed up.
    A question was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey) concerning piece-work. I inquired some few days ago about the percentage of piece-work. I was informed that almost 40 or 50 per cent. of the total work done is piece-work, and that piece-work is on

    483
    the increase, but of course is dependent, to a very large extent, upon that confidence which we hope to have in all these shipyards as between masters and men. Unless you have that confidence, there is always a difficulty in regard to an agreement on prices. I am pleased to say that piece-work is on the increase.
    Mr. Davidson: What about the engineering side?
    Mr. Hall: I am not sure about that, but I will make inquiries and let my hon. Friend know. Again, I will have to tread very warily but will, in the terms of the hon. Member for Gorbals, call the attention of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what has been said about the collection of Income Tax. I leave the matter there.
    Mr. Buchanan: I want my hon. Friend to be serious on this matter, which is really a serious one.
    Mr. Hall: Yes, Sir. I am not unmindful of the fact that other industries, apart from shipbuilding, are taking up this matter. I think I am right in saying that the General Council of the T.U.C. is also dealing with this matter. Another question was raised as to whether there is equality of treatment for Allied ships requiring repairs. The hon. Member for Maryhill put that point. I can tell him that there is equality of treatment for Allied ships in the ship repairing yards in this country. One other point put by my hon. Friends the Member for Gorbals and the Member for Maryhill, was the question of canteens. I quite agree with them, and I am sure my right hon. Friend the First Lord agrees, that it is absolutely necessary that men doing arduous work such as ship repairers and ship builders are called upon to do, should be properly fed. I think the canteen method is by far the best method to adopt. A point has been raised with regard to canteens on Clydeside. I might say that of the 28 principal shipbuilding firms 15 have permanent canteens.
    Mr. Davidson: Since when?
    Mr. Hall: The information I have received is, that at the present time 15 have permanent canteens. At 11, temporary facilities are in operation while permanent canteens are under construction. Most of the other Scottish yards possess
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    suitable canteens. On the North-East coast, of the 30 principal firms, 17 have adequate permanent canteens, and eight others have them under consideration. I can assure my hon. Friends that no one is more anxious than my right hon. Friend the First Lord and myself to give every encouragement to the establishing of permanent canteens, not only on the Clyde but also in other shipyards.
    Mr. Davidson: Will my hon. Friend permit me to say that it is not only a question of the establishment of canteens. It is no use setting up the structure if you have not the goods inside. I am asking him and the First Lord to cooperate and make representations to the Ministry of Food so that adequate food supplies will be given to these canteens.
    Mr. Hall: That, again, is very largely a matter which can be arranged by the local committees. Where canteens have been established, we have experienced little difficulty in getting the Ministry of Food to see that stocks of food are sent to them. I am speaking from experience of canteens in some other industries; but if there is any difficulty steps will be taken to see that canteens are not just shells, but are used for the purpose for which they were erected. Other questions have been raised. I am afraid it would take too long to deal fully with them; but note will be taken of them. This Debate has been very useful. I can say, with the consent of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, that we shall not ask the House to divide against the Amendment. We are indebted to my hon. and gallant Friend for putting it on the Order Paper and for moving it in such terms.
    The battle of the shipyards may not have the poignant drama of the Battle of the Atlantic, but in the strategy of the Allies, the struggle for output of tanks, aeroplanes, and munitions of all kinds, the feeding of the civilian population and of the men in the Services, the transport of troops and of equipment of all kinds, are all based on the carrying power of the Merchant Navy. This is an aspect of the war which sometimes we are inclined to overlook. The workers and employers in the shipbuilding and ship-repairing industries should realise that their work is absolutely indispensable to the war effort. A day, an hour, or even a minute lost on this work results in with

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    holding from the nation a service without which the war cannot be won.
    Mr. Storey: Will the hon. Member say a word about the question to which I referred—the question of providing additional work for the large reservoir of skilled labour available?
    Mr. Hall: We cannot admit that there is a large reservoir of labour with no work provided for it. If my hon. Friend will see me or the First Lord, and explain in what yards there is this reservoir of labour available, we shall be prepared to take action.
    Major Lloyd: In view of what the Parliamentary Secretary has said, which I appreciate, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
    Dr. Russell Thomas: I must apologise for detaining hon. Members at this late hour. I am sure they feel tired: I myself am a little jaded; but I would like to add my thanks to those of other hon. Members to the brave sailors of the Royal Navy and of the Merchant Service who have done so much to provide our country with the raw materials of the sinews of war and to keep our people alive. We are especially thankful for the bravery of those sailors who rushed in when the German ships went through the Narrows the other day, and who did their best, at peril to themselves, to hinder the movement of the German Fleet. I want to ask a question which I believe has not been put in this Debate. I am deeply concerned about the dispositions of our Fleet. Are they all that they should be? We have been told, over and over again, that the Royal Navy is thinly spread over the Seven Seas. We are a maritime Power, built up by maritime strength and by the genius of the sailors of our race. Are we utilising our Navy to the best advantage? Many times in our history we have been low in naval strength, many times have we engaged enemies far bigger than ourselves in number; but have we, during this present war, utilised our naval strength to the best advantage?
    At the present time naval strategy is centred in the Admiralty. The high direction of the war and the advice given
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    to the Minister of Defence and to the War Cabinet come from the Admiralty. There was a time in our history when the strategy of the war was decided by the commanders at sea. They did it because they could not get into contact with the Admiralty and the governing powers of this country. I do not think that central direction is a bad point altogether. It is essential in the strategy of a war like this to envisage the whole. The commander in the Pacific cannot know at once of the whole need of our Empire. Nelson himself admitted this point when he was chasing Villeneuve from the West Indies. He detached a brig because he had no other method of letting the Admiralty know. He detached the "Curieux" from his fleet and sent it on to inform the Admiralty. Barham was the First Sea Lord responsible for our naval strategy and he so altered the disposition of the Fleet that it led to the defeat of the French by Calder off Finisterre and led to Napoleon giving up his idea of invasion, and eventually resulted in the destruction of the Allied Fleet at Trafalgar. But there were giants ashore and afloat in those days.
    In these days of wireless telegraphy more and more the disposition of the Fleet gets into the hands of those responsible for the direction of the war. I personally am not satisfied. I do not want to adumbrate all our disasters, but I am not satisfied that the disposition of the whole of the Fleet has been undertaken in a manner which is in the great traditions of the Royal Navy. I am not asking why we did not at this juncture protect our battleships at Singapore. But why did we send our battleships there at all? At Singapore we had a great base, and I am convinced that something must have happened. Either the naval officials must have been completely stupid, or there must have been some political reason why the battleships were sent there at all.
    Let me say a word about these battleships, these gun carriages that float across the seas. I can best explain it by indulging very shortly in a little history. In olden times naval engagements were very chaotic affairs. In those days naval wars were fought in galleys. They were indeed a mass of confusion. Every man, every captain and every small ship went out as an officer—wrongly—wrote about Trafalgar "to take his bird." One can imagine the confusion that ensued. With

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    the introduction of sail as motive power and the universal use of the gun the whole of naval tactics changed, and they became obvious in the Dutch wars. In those days it was clear that the only way in which a fleet could engage the enemy was by lying in a line. Lord Torrington made this observation when he was court-martialled by an ungrateful country after the Battle at Beachy Head which saved the country from invasion. He remarked that he had so many ships "fit to lie in a line." They have been known since then as capital ships, or ships of the line, or battleships. It was quite clear that ships of the line must be the strongest ships. There was no room in the line for small ships.
    Mr. McKie: The hon. Gentleman referred to the battle of Beachy Head. Which battle of Beachy Head?
    Dr. Thomas: The one referred to as an English defeat.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I think that if the hon. Member would return to the Navy Estimates, it might be better than diving into past history.
    Mr. Cocks: Surely, in a discussion on the value of battleships, it is in Order to explain, in a historical way, how battleships were developed.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is quite in order, but there is a way of doing it and a way of not doing it.
    Dr. Thomas: My purpose is to show what a battleship should be used for, and why we sent battleships to Singapore. I have said that these ships are ships "fit to lie in a line," and, in fact, they cannot be used safely for any other purpose. Why then did we send battleships to Singapore? Let us consider the dangers at Singapore. I am convinced that the Japanese navy would not have engaged in a first-class naval action, for the simple reason that they must maintain their fleet in being. My hon. Friend mentioned the Battle of Beachy Head, and anyone who has read the history of that time knows how the Fleet was maintained in being in spite of the pressure by the Government of the day and how this country was thereby preserved from invasion. This fact holds to-day as then. It was clear to anyone who had any knowledge of the fundamen-
    488
    tals of naval strategy that the Japanese could not have exposed their fleet to a first-class naval action, because if they did, and should their fleet be depleted, their islands would have been exposed to invasion.
    The battleships which we sent out would have been quite incapable of lying in a line with any hope of success against such a superior force of them. The Japanese navy was an enormous navy, which probably would have dealt with them in detail, and we should have been exactly where we were in the Pacific and worse off generally. Nor was it necessary to send battleships to defend the base at Singapore, which was well equipped with the finest type of guns. Indeed, battleships at a naval base would have been a liability, because no Japanese fleet would possibly have taken the risk of attacking the base at Singapore. One of the most risky naval engagements that can be undertaken is for floating vessels to attack a shore fortress armed with the biggest calibre guns. Battleships sent to Singapore for that reason would have become simply fortress battleships, in the same way as the Russian fleet was a fortress fleet at Port Arthur. I think I have shown the futility of sending battleships to Singapore to be dealt with one by one and sent to the bottom of the sea. with a consequent weakening of our relative naval strength.
    The Japanese had occupied Indo-China, owing to the treachery of the Vichy French, and anybody who has studied the map must have known that the Japanese intended to make attacks upon the neighbouring possessions of our Empire at some time suitable to themselves. We have heard a good deal about the Japanese treachery at Pearl Harbour, but personally I do not attach much to an excuse of that sort, because we had the example of the Japanese attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, when they did a similar sort of thing. As I have said, it was clear that the Japanese would make an attack somewhere or other in their own time. The most dangerous adventure for any Power to undertake, unless it has a preponderating command of the sea, is an invasion. Indeed, naval history does not show anywhere where an invasion against a Power holding a great degree of command of the sea has ever been really successful. There have been one or two excep-

    489
    tions, one of which is the classic example when Caesar crossed the Adriatic after Pompey. But that on examination will be found to come within the rule. Napoleon occupied Egypt in spite of the British Fleet. But what happened? He was defeated in the Battle of the Nile, and his troops were left in the desert, where they would have starved or died of thirst if they had not been brought home in British transports. The first requisite of invasion is that the enemy should have a preponderance of naval strength, and not merely some degree of command of the seas as we usually know it. The Japanese had that preponderance of naval strength. So let us see what happened in Malaya. The enemy sent transports, which are cumbersome things, to invade the country, and these transports were accompanied by great naval strength. But transports are an enormous hindrance to an enemy, and are liable to become easy prey for attack by small craft. However powerful might be the Japanese navy, their ships which accompanied the transports would be hampered in their movements, and their fighting capacity reduced very considerably. To meet this our spearhead of attack should have been cruisers and destroyers based on Singapore. That is the kind of armament we should have used against the enemy. In fact, the most brilliant episode was that of the Dutch submarine which lay in seven fathoms of water, picked off three or four transports, and then slipped away. If we had employed similar tactics, I do not believe this calamity would have come upon us.
    I pass now to the loss of the "Barham," a ship bearing a great name, one of the greatest in the naval history of this country. I should like to know why this great vessel, a ship of the line, was not used for its real purpose, and kept in readiness until the enemy's fleet came out. Why were not other vessels used? Then there was the escape of the German squadron. There is an inquiry into all these matters, but nevertheless the German squadron of two battleships and a heavy cruiser, with a huge air umbrella, passed through the Straits a short time ago—a great insult to our country. We all know that these vessels sailed 300 miles before they were detected. But what did we find in regard to the dispositions of our Fleet? We found that a
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    destroyer flotilla was the only part of our Navy thereabouts, and that flotilla engaged the German ships for a short time with the nobility and the courage we expect from our Navy.
    All these things are very grievous matters indeed, and we are entitled to say that our Island was in peril for the length of time it would take to have mobilised the Fleet. Who are responsible for giving the Government this advice? That is what I want to know. Let us face the matter. We have a great and glorious history, and we have built up a great Empire because we have realised what sea power means. No one else on the Continent has ever really fathomed its meaning. Are we now Continental minded? Are we conceiving our war strategy on a wrong basis? We have had a re-shuffle of the Government, and one or two new bloods have been brought in. We require a reshuffle of the advisers of the Government, those who have the safety of this country and the Empire in their hands.
    Mr. Cocks: A thing which has puzzled me and a great many other people is that when the Prime Minister announced the despatch of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" to the Far East he said they would be accompanied by all ancillary vessels. That is the expression that he used. After they arrived at Singapore we had despatches in the Press saying that it was a complete Fleet, from which the ordinary reader would understand that there were cruisers, destroyers and submarines. A few days afterwards the Japanese began to land forces from transports, which was just the opportunity for our submarines, if we had any, to attack them. But nothing happened. Where were the smaller craft?
    Mr. Alexander: I would appeal to the House, after the long Debate that we have had, to come to a decision. It is difficult to reply to the points made by the hon. Member for Southampton (Dr. Russell Thomas) in open Session, but I think I could prove pretty conclusively that many of his assumptions as to what may have happened and who may have been responsible for advice are quite wrong. I am certainly not going to say in open Session all that would be required to answer his point completely. As to my hon. Friend opposite, the extent to

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    which the Navy has been stretched in its task, which I was at some pains to explain, is very largely the answer to the questions he has put to me. There were, of course, light vessels in the neighbourhood. Some of them were with the battleship and cruiser when they were sunk and were responsible for a very large number of rescues. Afterwards they had to perform the urgent and immediate task that they did of getting in most valuable convoys through the enemy attacks. I cannot add to that statement at the moment.
    Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair", put, and agreed to.
    Supply accordingly considered in Committee.
    [Colonel CLIFTON BROWN in the Chair.]

  NAVY ESTIMATES, 1942.

    NUMBERS.
    Resolved,
    "That such numbers of Officers, Seamen, Boys and Royal Marines and of Royal Marine Police, as His Majesty may deem necessary, be borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943."

    WAGES, ETC., OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL MARINES, AND OF CERTAIN OTHER PERSONNEL SERVING WITH THE FLEET.
    Resolved,
    "That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Wages, etc., of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, and of certain other personnel serving with the Fleet, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1943."

    NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1941.
    Resolved,
    "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10 be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1942, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Navy Services for the year."

    Schedule.

    Sums not exceeding

    Supply Grants.

    Appropriations in Aid.

    Vote.

    £

    £

    1. Wages, &c., of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, and of certain other personnel serving with the fleet.

    10

    16,000,000

    Resolutions to be reported upon the next Sitting Day; Committee to sit again upon the next Sitting Day.

    SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932.
    Resolved,
    "That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, extending Section 1 of the Act to the Shanklin Ward of the Urban District of Sandown-Shanklin, a copy of which was presented to this House on 24th February, be approved."—[Mayor Sir James Edmondson.]

    ELECTRICITY (SUPPLY) ACT, 1919.
    Resolved,
    "That the Order, made by the Electricity Commissioners and confirmed by the Board of Trade under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, entitled the East Midlands Electricity District (Amendment) Order 1942, a copy of which was presented to this House on 3rd February be approved."—[Captain Waterhouse.]
    The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
    It being after the hour appointed for the Adjournment of the House, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

  WOMEN MAGISTRATES.
  WOMEN MAGISTRATES.
CIVIL DEFENCE.
  EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE.
  EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE.
  PERSONAL INJURIES (CIVILIANS) SCHEME.
  PERSONAL INJURIES (CIVILIANS) SCHEME.
AGRICULTURE.
  WAGES AND PRICES.
  WAGES AND PRICES.
  HILL CATTLE (SUBSIDY).
  HILL CATTLE (SUBSIDY).
  PERFORMING ANIMALS.
  PERFORMING ANIMALS.
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.
  MINISTRY OF HEALTH (OVERTIME).
  MINISTRY OF HEALTH (OVERTIME).
  TREASURY (OVERTIME).
  TREASURY (OVERTIME).
  PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICERS.
  PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICERS.
  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT (DURHAM COUNTY).
  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT (DURHAM COUNTY).
  UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS (REFUND).
  UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS (REFUND).
NATIONAL WAR EFFORT.
  FOOD DISTRIBUTION.
  FOOD DISTRIBUTION.
  POST-WOMEN.
  POST-WOMEN.
  EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN ORDER.
  EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN ORDER.
  DAIRYMAIDS.
  DAIRYMAIDS.
  TRAINING CENTRES.
  TRAINING CENTRES.
MILITARY SERVICE.
  AIR TRAINING CADETS (ENLISTMENT IN ARMY).
  AIR TRAINING CADETS (ENLISTMENT IN ARMY).
  SADDLERS.
  SADDLERS.
  TREASURY DEPOSIT RECEIPTS.
  TREASURY DEPOSIT RECEIPTS.
  PARCELS POST (ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS).
  PARCELS POST (ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS).
  RAILINGS, REMOVAL (DAMAGE).
  RAILINGS, REMOVAL (DAMAGE).
Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

ROYAL COMMISSION.
The Royal Assent was given to the following Bills:

Education (Scotland),

Patents and Designs,

India (Federal Court Judges),

War Orphans,

Restoration of Pre-War Trade Practices,

Securities (Validation),

Ministers of the Crown and House of Commons Disqualification,

WAR SITUATION.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved by Lord Addison on Tuesday last—namely, That there be laid before the House Papers relating to the situation in the Far East, to the passage of German ships through the Channel, and to matters affecting the conduct of the war.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, we are indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Addison, for initiating a debate in your Lordships' House dealing with matters in which the nation and the Empire are so deeply interested at this moment, and giving us the opportunity of discussing those matters at the same time as they are being discussed in another place. Any remarks which we have the privilege of making in your Lordships' House are naturally in the nature of suggestions, and I should like to say at once that I do not feel competent to make criticisms, because in that word there is always the suggestion of something adverse, and perhaps even hostile, in the comments. First of all perhaps you will allow me to pay my tribute to the noble Viscount who now leads this House. He follows a great and honoured tradition. I am sure that in the position which he now occupies he will add to what he has already done, and that his career will be a very successful one. Your Lordships, I know, certainly wish him that. And that does not prevent me from saying
78
how much I regret that my old friend Lord Moyne has laid down a post which, your Lordships will agree with me, he has held with great distinction, with great credit to himself, and also with great value to your Lordships.
We all feel that the new proposals which have been put forward by the Government have been received with great satisfaction on all sides. They have also shown very clearly that the Prime Minister, to whom we owe so much, is receptive of all those ideas and suggestions which the duly accredited representatives in another place and also your Lordships may make to him when they feel it right to do so. And I do most certainly feel that these debates show the tremendous strength inherent in this country and in the system for which we are fighting. No debate of this description could take place in any of those countries with which we are at war, because, first of all, it would not be permitted, and, if it were, it would be completely valueless. But, as I have said, in the suggestions that we may make there is not intended to be a note of criticism; we simply make them with the idea that they may be of some constructive help to the Government in the tremendous task imposed on their shoulders.
Sometimes when we read the newspapers we see letters which suggest that any criticism, or even any suggestion, shows an attempt to discredit the Government. Although that opinion receives expression in the public Press, I think it is held by very few people. There is, I am certain, a remarkable unity, not only in this country but also in the Empire, in the desire to do everything we can to assist the Government in the task they have before them. Moreover, I am sure that the Prime Minister of all people is the last person who would seek to stifle debate. He has had a long experience of democratic government, and he will take everything that is said in the knowledge that its object is to assist him in carrying the burden which now rests upon his shoulders. Speaking for myself, I cannot but feel great satisfaction and great pleasure in the establishment of what is called the War Cabinet. It is easy to say that during a war any Cabinet is a War Cabinet, but I feel that in the establishment of the War Cabinet there is a difference from the

79
policy which has been pursued up till now. The principle of a War Cabinet is a small body of eminent men concerned continually with the problems of the conduct of the war, and each one of its members should be untrammelled with the responsibilities of a Department. Of the War Cabinet of the last war, to which we owe a great deal—I would go so far as to say it was one of the important factors that eventually brought about our success—it would not be true to say that its members were all untrammelled with the responsibilities of a Department.
It is even in this case to-day impossible to apply a rigid rule. Mr. Attlee, representing as he does a great office, has been appointed Deputy Prime Minister for a certain definite purpose. He may be occupying a somewhat anomalous position at this moment in relation to the Leader of the House of Commons, but we do understand that his position has been determined by the Prime Minister on account of the very definite desire of Mr. Churchill to associate the Dominions with the War Cabinet. This is a vital point, and one which we cannot over-emphasize. The war which was waged against Napoleon over one hundred years ago was fought by Great Britain against France with whatever Allies we were able to collect, and there is no doubt that, even as at one stage in this war, we waged that war by ourselves. This Alliance, such as it was, defeated Napoleon eventually at the Battle of Waterloo. In this war we are fighting as the British Empire—as what is called the British Commonwealth of Nations—and I am not sure that this fact is fully appreciated by everyone.
There is still a sort of idea that there is a difference of outlook in the Commonwealth of Nations, but your Lordships will agree that the outlook is really identical not only in this country but throughout the whole broad expanse of the Commonwealth. Australia is now definitely in the war zone and is threatened by the fact that the mastery of the Pacific has, for the time being, passed to the Japanese. Nevertheless the Australian people, who have conscription for home service, and have made tremendous contributions to our war effort in the Middle East and the Far East, do not, in my judgment, receive the full
80
measure of recognition which they undoubtedly deserve. No stone should be left unturned to show the full appreciation that we feel for the efforts they have made. This certainly applies to our other Dominions also, and I should hope that the Administration of this country will never lose an opportunity of assisting the great Dominions in our common cause and of seeking their invaluable advice in the tremendous problems we are called upon to solve. It is not an extravagant suggestion to put forward that, perhaps sooner than we think, from a base constituted in Australia, and with the assistance of that development of strength that we see increasing day by day, we shall be able to regain our position in the Pacific and drive the Japanese out of those countries which have been invaded.
To return to the principle of the War Cabinet, I should like to see in it, as I have said, as few Ministers as possible trammelled with the duties of Departments. We have always to except the Foreign Secretary, because his duties deal mainly with the problem of the conduct of the war; but I am wondering why we have the Minister of Labour in the War Cabinet. Mr. Bevin, to whom we are deeply indebted for all he has done, and for the efforts he has personally put forward, is occupied, day in and day out, with so many problems of such vast magnitude that I do not feel he is capable of bringing to bear on that War Cabinet the necessary support and assistance required for the day-in, day-out conduct of the war. I believe that in expressing my satisfaction that a War Cabinet has been established I am expressing the views of all and sundry in this country. We do admire the Prime Minister for all he has done. We admire his courage and we welcome his stimulating and invigorating addresses, but it is quite impossible for one man, however gifted he may be, to carry on single-handed and without the co-ordinated support of a War Cabinet, the great burden which rests on his shoulders. We all naturally recognize the magnitude of his task.
I would venture to say that the whole conduct of this war up till now has shown to a very large extent a lack of appreciation of the magnitude of the issues that are involved, and I feel that one can say there has also been a lack of planning and of foresight. One very definite

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reason for saying this is the unprepared-ness in which we found ourselves at the beginning of this war. We know quite well that it is very difficult to switch over from one system of progression to another, but after all, we have been at war for two and a half years, and one must still feel that there is not that coordination, that unity of effort and of direction at which we must arrive if this war is not to go on for a very considerable time. We are still on the defensive. I certainly do not lose sight of the great exploits which have been performed in Libya or of the offensive which the Royal Air Force are continually carrying out in the bombing of the enemy; and in making any suggestions—perhaps we are presumptuous to do so—we know our limitations because we are not aware of the facts. Any suggestions that I bring forward are, as I have said, put forward with the idea of assisting and helping the Government in the great efforts with which they are faced.
There has existed an anxiety which I feel to a certain extent has been allayed by the proposals which have been put forward. This anxiety not only existed here, it has existed all over the Dominion?. It was certainly balanced to a very large extent by the great confidence which we have in our leader, the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister in fighting phrases has defined our attitude. He foresees our difficulties, and he does not minimize them, but he does suggest to us that in the future—and I hope he means the near future—by the development of our potential strength, we shall see great changes and shall find, perhaps sooner than we think, a change in the whole situation. Instead of being on the defensive we shall be able to take the offensive, and bring our enemies to their knees. But these statements and addresses that the Prime Minister has given to the world have been accompanied by a sequence of disasters, some of which, perhaps, have been mitigated by certain facts that have come to our knowledge.
First of all, we placed our reliance entirely on France. Reliance on France amounted to what I would call almost an obsession with the Government. We faced Dunkirk, we faced Norway. Both those big disasters were relieved solely by the heroism and the sacrifice of our fighting men. Later there was Hong Kong, and
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some of us wonder why we held on to Hong Kong, why the view could not be taken, which seems to me to have been obvious, that Hong Kong could not be held. Later on we came to Singapore, and I have no doubt we shall hear more about that fateful incident, if we can call a battle of that kind an incident. But we must remember that that disaster has entailed the surrender of no fewer than 60,000 men. One does feel that by some prescience, by some looking forward, those disasters might not only have been mitigated but might have been obviated altogether. I wonder whether in this country we are still not too much in the habit of taking things for granted. The mastery of the Pacific has passed from us. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, on Tuesday, told us that the reason for that was that the French had failed us in Indo-China. I wonder whether, when we have considered our Allies and the assistance that we might be able to count on, we have not trusted too much to luck, too much to the value of that assistance, and have not gone into all those details which I feel would have shown us the pie-carious position in which Singapore remained, and in which so much of our Empire, that it is our duty to defend, was placed by a lack of foresight and by a lack of definite policy.
I say all this to emphasize the importance of the establishment of a War Cabinet, because I believe, if we have a body of men who can consider all these points from day to day with the Prime Minister, he would receive that assistance in the direction of the war to which we all attach so much importance. The Prime Minister, as I have said, never minces matters, and he has told us we have to look forward to further blows. That, of course, is inevitable, and we naturally expect them, but I think we shall find that when the country is aware that there is a body of men sitting solely concerned with the conduct of the war, we shall be able to receive those blows as they come and to know also that they are being dealt with in a proper manner.
Another question to which I would like to refer briefly is that of the Minister of Defence. I think your Lordships will agree that there is no person who can possibly fulfil the duties of Minister of Defence other than the Prime Minister. In a debate some long time ago in your

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Lordships' House, in which I had to express the views of the Government with regard to a Ministry of Defence, I ventured to lay down the proposition that the only person who could properly fulfil those duties was the Prime Minister. On account of the fact that the new proposals will relieve the Prime Minister of certain duties, I have some amount of confidence that he will be able to turn his valuable and instructed attention to presiding over the defence proposals and interests of the country. By reason of the position which the Prime Minister, holds as head of the War Cabinet and also as Minister of Defence, I think that we can have a certain confidence that the conduct of the war will be carried on under most valuable and most searching scrutiny. I sincerely hope that the Prime Minister, who said in terms that could not be mistaken that he was proposing to maintain his position as Minister of Defence, will maintain that attitude. I am glad to think that the suggestion that he should have a deputy, or that somebody should act for him, has been put on one side altogether.
My noble friend Viscount Swinton, in a striking phrase, expressed the real necessity of the case. We want what my noble friend called a Great General Staff. Having been a Service member myself, like my noble friend, I think we want a Staff which can occupy itself entirely with the co-ordination of forces in the war effort. I think your Lordships will agree with me when I say that many of our difficulties and many of our disasters, and the position in which we find ourselves at the present moment, are due to a lack of co-ordination which not only exists in our Armed Forces but also in the whole administration of this country. I feel that what is required is to establish that coordination. No one paid a more eloquent tribute to the suggestion than my noble friend the Earl of Cork. It seems to me very unfortunate that in the last seven years—I have not been actively engaged in this matter for the last seven years—more co-ordination between the three Services was not brought about when we were threatened, as obviously we were threatened and as we all know we were threatened, with the tremendous dangers in which we find ourselves at present. It is right that the Services should be autonomous, but we know quite well that it
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is impossible in this war to do without co-ordination of the three Services, and I am sure your Lordships will agree that the fact that Courts of Inquiry are sitting at this moment shows that there is still a lack of co-ordination. Instead of there being a policy of co-ordinated administration there are still questions to be asked as to why one particular Service did not fulfil this requirement, or why another particular Service appeared to fail in what it should have done.
There is one word I would say about organization. I think your Lordships will agree that our war effort and the direction of organization are by no means perfect. I would not like to over-emphasize the element of complacency that exists in this country among people who, I am sure, are not anxious to be complacent but who do not really know how they can contribute those services which would be useful to the country. It is true, as I have said, that it is difficult to switch over from one system to another, but I would suggest that one of our difficulties is the element of centralization which, instead of decreasing, appears to be increasing. There is centralization in Whitehall, where we see increases of organization and increases of staffs which do not give one that confidence which one would like to feel. We have established regions in the country, but it seems that every official has to come to London to try to obtain a decision which he finds it very difficult to get. He usually returns to the country having been put off with phrases but with no satisfaction of the demands he had been making. Although I am not in favour of Committees—I have had too much experience of Committees in my public life—I hope that the Government can find some means of looking into this question of organization on which so much depends.
We read articles in the newspapers and we read letters expressing dissatisfaction. We have endless stories of our own. Some of them may probably be exaggerated; yet they show that there is an inherent difficulty in this country in reaching decisions. If in our organization of administration we could hasten decisions, I think a great step would be taken towards achieving that success which we all desire. It would seem that most of these Departments are at war with each other. There seems to be no understanding between different Departments. They seem to be

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hampering each other's efforts. It is usual and customary, as it was in peacetime, to blame the Treasury, and I do feel that if the Treasury could relieve the general public in every direction of those innumerable forms that take up most of the time of the working staff of any business and reduce them to some manageable proportions, it would be an advance. Then there; are the vexatious imposts put on the people of the country. There is the lack of a wage policy, there are various inequalities which one feels it would be quite easy to remove. It is due to these things that so much of the attention of the people of this country, instead of being directed to the war effort, is diverted to these vexations, these inconveniences which realty are of very small importance but which do hinder us in the great efforts which we are seeking to put forward.
There is one word I would say on another subject in regard to which I know the difficulty of the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, and of the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, who is going to wind up this debate. I should like to take this opportunity of saying how deeply grieved I am that the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, to whose maiden speech here as a Minister we were looking forward, is unable to be present, and I am sure we all deeply deplore the cause. What I want to say a word about is the position in Ireland, although I quite understand the reticence which is exercised over that question. The fact is that there is a German Legation in Dublin and there is an Italian Legation in Dublin, and we know quite well that the staffs of both have manufactured a network of spies and agents all over the country. I view these matters, and I know that the majority of your Lordships do too, in terms of the lives of our gallant fighting men, and I feel that by reason of the fact, which your Lordships know, that the ports are not in our hands a great loss of life and shipping has accrued. And this is by reason of the action of a people who claim to have so many of the ideas which are in our minds, who claim to be a civilized nation anxious to move along the pathway of progress. When we consider it in these definite terms, which mean so much not only to us but to the relatives and the dependants of these people, I feel that something should be done, that
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perhaps something in the nature of a definite strong appeal to that country should continue to be made.
As your Lordships are no doubt aware, the newspapers are forbidden to publish the weather reports. And yet we know that the wireless station installed in the German Ministry conveys all the weather reports and many other details besides, details of what goes on in this country and in Ireland, daily to Berlin, with consequences which we have been able to see. There is that sinister phrase which your Lordships have read so often: "Sunk off the north-west coast of Ireland." Every one of us knows exactly what that means. I do not wish to pursue this subject, but I-want to urge upon the Government in whatever way they think best to try to make a change in the system which is being carried on, and which I feel is a drawback and a danger to our own war effort. I thank your Lordships for your kind indulgence in listening to me to-day. I would only add that I rely upon the War Cabinet as a new departure, and I look to its success with every confidence.
LORD DENMAN: My Lords, I am sure we have all listened with interest to the speech which the noble Marquess has just made. As a former Secretary of State for Air he is entitled to give his opinion on the conduct of the war, and his views merit the consideration of your Lordships. I was particularly glad to hear what he had to say about the Dominions and about Australia and New Zealand. I think myself that they have hardly been sufficiently considered in the conduct of this war and I hope, as does the noble Marquess, that these two countries may presently become bases for operations against Japanese invasion.
Now I propose to say a few words about the changes in the Government which have recently taken place. I think the Prime Minister is to-be congratulated on these changes. It seems to me that they are certainly a step in the right direction. Many of us felt that the Prime Minister was carrying too heavy a burden on his own shoulders, and he himself has admitted that he found the task of leading the House of Commons, and at the same time carrying on the duties of Minister of Defence, was too heavy to be borne. Well, the war has now assumed gigantic proportions. I am not quite sure that I

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agree with the noble Marquess in one thing, and that is that there should not be a Deputy Minister of Defence. That may not be necessary now, but I think that as time goes on it may be found that the Prime Minister may require some assistance in the duties of this great office.
In this House we are naturally interested in the changes that have taken place here, the most important being the appointment of the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, as Leader of the House. I think it happens that I am one of the few members of this House who were here in the time of the late Lord Salisbury. As your Lordships will recollect, with the Leadership of this House he combined the office of Prime Minister and also that of Foreign Secretary. He was the last member of this House to hold the office of Prime Minister. Yes, I think the late Lord Salisbury came after the late Lord Rose-bery, and I think it very unlikely that any member of this House in the future will hold the office of Prime Minister. Judged by any standard, the late Lord Salisbury was a great man and his greatness does not wane with the passing of the years. I have been a fairly regular attendant at the sittings of this House during the time the present Lord Salisbury was its Leader, and though, like some others of us in this quarter of the House, I was opposed to him in politics, I have very pleasant recollections of his ability as Leader and of the unfailing kindliness which he always showed to his political opponents. I think we all join in congratulating the noble Marquess on the success which his son has achieved. If I may say so I think the noble Viscount has shown what one may term an hereditary aptitude for the duties of Leadership of this House. I noted that on Tuesday last another grandson of the late Lord Salisbury, Lord Wolmer, took his scat on the Government Bench, and like the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, I am very sorry indeed to hear of the cause of his absence to-day.
I would like to say one word about the office of Secretary of State for the Dominions. The last time I spoke in this House, about a month ago, I ventured to express satisfaction that this office was held by the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne. I see no reason to alter the opinion that I then expressed. For one thing I have observed that our kinsmen from overseas—frequently, as your
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Lordships are aware, sturdy democrats and forthright men—do not as a rule object to the society of members of this House, nor are they averse from hobnobbing with bearers of historic names. But what I regard as more important than that is that the noble Lord has established excellent relations with the High Commissioners and with representatives of the Dominions and has become well acquainted with the work of his office. It is true that the new Secretary of State is a member of the War Cabinet and that, no doubt, will be approved of in the Dominions. I think, however, that that change should have been made two years ago. I should have thought it better for the Dominions and for this country if the noble Lord had remained at the Dominions Office and had been included in the War Cabinet. That would certainly have been a better arrangement for this House, and I agree with other speakers in this debate who have expressed the view that the War Cabinet should be directly represented in your Lordships' House. After all, in the times in which we live, debates such as this, on the conduct of the war, are of some importance. It so happens that we have in this House men who have spent their lives in the Services—for example, Lord Cork, Lord Trenchard, Lord Milne and Lord Chatfield, to mention only a few—and I think it would be fitting that some member of the War Cabinet should be here to reply to these debates. Before I depart from the subject of the alterations made in this House, I should like to associate myself with what other speakers have said about the noble Lord, Lord Moyne. In difficult times he has proved a very capable Leader of this House, and we are all indebted to him for the courtesy which he has shown to all those with whom he has been brought in contact.
I referred just now to the late Lord Salisbury. I remember very well the indifference—I might almost say the contempt—with which he was wont to express himself with regard to another place; he seemed to think that this House was superior to the House of Commons, and I do not think, therefore, that he had a very high opinion of the House of Commons. I doubt whether the present Prime Minister has a very high opinion of the House of Lords. That may perhaps be attributable to the part which he took some thirty years ago in the campaign

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against this House; it may be that the recollection of "old, unhappy far-off things and battles long ago" may influence his mind in that direction. At any rate, I have observed that, when a Government post is vacant in this House, it is always filled by a former member of the House of Commons, or by a Peer who has served for some years in. the House of Common?, or by a person of distinction in some other walk of life. In only one instance since Mr. Churchill took office has a Ministerial post been filled by an hereditary Peer who has not served in the House of Commons. I think I am right in saying that, under the Constitution, one Secretary of State must be a member of this House.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Two Secretaries of State.
LORD DENMAN: Two? I think that at the moment we have only one, and in that case another Secretary of State should be appointed here. That, however, does not affect my argument. We live in an age of records, and this House has row assumed record dimensions; there are now no fewer than 792 members of this House. It may appear, therefore, that the odds against a member of this House becoming a Secretary of State would be about 800 to T, but as a matter of fact I think that they are much longer. In normal times there is a better chance of becoming an Under-Secretary of State; I would put the chances at 200 to 1. Since Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister, however, the odds against an Under-Secretary of State have lengthened to about 800 to I, and the odds against an hereditary Peer without House of Commons experience becoming a Secretary of State are any price you like to name. It is perhaps interesting to note that a good many new Peers have been created since the present Prime Minister took office. There have been twenty-five up to date, and, with the reconstruction of the Government which has lately taken place, there will shortly be another batch of recruits.
I admit, however, that this is a matter of domestic concern, and of very secondary importance compared with the great issues which we have been discussing in this debate, and I will turn for a few minutes to some of the more pressing matters which have been raised. I find myself in agreement with much that I
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was said by the noble Lord, Lord Addison, when he opened the debate, and in particular I agree with him that the policy of long-range bombing requires revision. If France had not fallen, and if Germany had not conquered most of Europe, thus enabling her to transfer war factories to places where we could not get at them, I have no doubt that bombing might have had a tremendous effect. As it is, the distances are very great, the Germans have developed considerably their measures of defence, and the net result has been far short of what we had hoped. I think it has been an eye-opener to this country that the German warships could sail up the Channel at twenty to thirty knots after some 4,000 tons of bombs had been dropped in their neighbourhood, many precious lives lost and many of our planes destroyed. If revision is carried out—and I think, from what Sir Stafford Cripps said in another place yesterday, that something of the kind is under review—I suggest that some of our bombers could be usefully employed by Coastal Command, acting in close co-operation with the Navy.
There is another point which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Addison, and which has been referred to by several speakers in the debate. That point is the need for greater co-operation between the three Services. That matter was dwelt on ay the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, by the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork, by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry. All these noble Lords spoke with far greater knowledge of this matter than I do myself. First of all, I should like to;ay that I have a tremendous admiration or the Royal Air Force and for what they have done. More particularly in the Battle of Britain their conduct was magnificent, and by what they did in that battle they saved the country. Since then they have been doing great work in helping o guard our country from invasion. I appreciate that it would be unwise to do anything which would damp the ardour or impair the esprit de corps of this fine fighting Force; at the same time, I do lot think it reasonable for the Royal Air force to claim that they alone of the three Services have a completely independent role to play.
I should like to refer to a statement lade in the very interesting speech by

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the noble Earl, Lord Cork. He advocated a Combined General Staff for operational purposes, and he said:
"All our efforts should be directed to one common end, and we shall be nearer attaining that end if we have one authority giving directions."
With that I cordially agree, and I would ask your Lordships to consider what has been done in the Far East with regard to the appointment of General Wavell. General Wavell has under his command the three different Services of our own, the three different Services of the Dutch Empire, and also the American Naval and Air Services. I think that that has been an excellent arrangement. I cannot see why such a system of unified control cannot be applied to other theatres of war.
In Libya General Rommel has operational control of a considerable section of the German Air Force. In Germany, so I am informed, the Luftwaffe is a separate Force, but it is under the High Command as regards operational control. In Libya, as far as we can tell, our system of co-operation appears to work pretty well. Perhaps that is partly because it is so far removed from Whitehall, and the nearer you get to Whitehall the more chances there are of Departmental friction becoming acute. Even in Libya, however, I think that the opinion is held by some people that it would be better if there were unified control of the Services. After all, in the kind of warfare that is fought in Libya, and indeed I think in all modern battles, it is the case that bombing planes are indispensable. Bombing planes, and especially short-range bombers, can I think be rightly described as flying artillery, and on the battlefield, it seems to me, they should be used accordingly.
I am going to quote again from the speech made on Tuesday by the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork. Speaking of the three Services, he said this:
"We do not really belong to different Services; we belong to three branches of the same Service, the Fighting. Service of the Empire."
To weld these three Services closer together seems to me to be the pressing need of the moment, and now that he is set free from other duties I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to turn his attention to this matter, for I am sure
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that in so doing he will tighten up the war machinery of this country.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I ask your Lordships' leave to say a few words in this debate, and I can assure you I am not going to detain you at any length. But I must begin by thanking the noble Lord who has just sat down for his extremely courteous references to myself and my connexions from one generation to another. I am very much obliged to him. I can only hope that you will not have too much of the family. Of course, I feel very strongly, most especially strongly, what nearly every noble Lord who has addressed us has said in this debate, of our gratitude and obligation to the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, who has so recently ceased to be Leader of the House. To his courtesy and his consideration we can all bear witness. What penetrated him was his knowledge of the spirit and atmosphere of your Lordships' House—that imponderable quality which all of us know very well in practice but which is very difficult to describe.
With regard to Lord Moyne's successor, I am rather hampered in making any observations. I will say this, that I am quite sure that he fully appreciates the quality of Lord Moyne's leadership which I have described, and also I think I may mention one other point. Your Lordships are well aware of what the Prime Minister has said over and over again—the importance of not minimizing the difficulties in which this country stands, of not trying to represent that they are less than they really are. He is imbued with a sense of what The Times, in a remarkable article yesterday, called "the stark reality of things." I am quite sure I may say this much, that the noble Lord who now leads your Lordships' House will never minimize the stark reality of things, and I think he showed that in the speech which he made on Tuesday.
I would like to say one word upon the reconstruction of the Government. I do not propose to dwell upon the point which the noble Lord, Lord Denman, has mentioned, the want of representation in the Government of members of your Lordships' House—not that I desire to differ from him, but because in these days it does not seem to me that we ought to dwell upon these personal matters. We are in such a position that we require to

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have the best we can get wherever they can be found. As I look round I recognize that there are many members of your Lordships' House who belong to the very best, and the more they can be employed the better it is for the country. But it is not a question of whether they are in the Lords or Commons, or indeed come from outside either House of Parliament. Let us in these days have the best we can find. That is the feeling I have.
But the principal aspect of the reconstruction which has taken place, and to which I would like to draw your Lordships' attention, is that which was dwelt on so very well by my noble friend who sits besides me in his speech just now. The noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, spoke of the relief in the burden on the Prime Minister. What a burden it is! There was a speech made on Tuesday by a noble Lord, who I think is not present at this moment, to whom we always listen with great respect, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Lord Ponsonby spoke of the eloquence of the Prime Minister. He said, what is perfectly true, that he stands head and shoulders above his contemporaries. But he seemed to think that that was the sum total of the Prime Minister's claims upon the country. I do not think he really thought so, but that was the sort of impression left upon one's mind. That is very far from the truth. As I cast my mind back upon the last two years, I confess that I am lost in admiration of what the Prime Minister has accomplished.
Just think of the events which he had to control. Just think of the position in which this country stood upon the collapse of France, how he held us together, how he held together all those who were prepared to resist Germany. I think he showed a moral courage which is almost unequalled. In the same way in dealing with what is called the Battle of the Atlantic, in saving this country from the attack on our food supplies, which might have been fatal—all that required a stability of mind and a moral courage for which we ought to be profoundly grateful. And then in the acts of statesmanship for which he has been responsible—the creation of the second front in Libya as a great strategic move, the welcome of Russia at the critical moment, and, above all, the great policy of common action with America. Those are three things—
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they are not exhaustive. I might, if I had time and your Lordships had patience, go much further; but those are sufficient to place Mr. Churchill in the front rank of the statesmen of this country, not only of the present day but of many generations. I must say that to speak of him as a mere rhetorician, although he stands very high, is a complete misunderstanding of what we owe to him in this country.
I welcome, as did my noble friend Lord Londonderry, and I think the noble Lord who has just sat down, the reconstruction of the Government from the point of view of efficiency. I think the collection together in the War Cabinet of a few Ministers wholly, or nearly wholly, devoted to the conduct of the war, is a very important improvement. It must be a tremendous relief to the Prime Minister to hand over the leadership of the House of Commons to another eminent statesman. To have this division of the various Departments of the Government in blocks subject as it were to a superior Minister, is a great improvement. It is an evolution in the right direction. To separate various things like the Home Front, production, and labour, all subdividing the office of the Prime Minister, so that they may all have proper attention—that is an evolution that ought to have taken place a long time ago. It does not in itself belong to this war. For a long time back the office of Prime Minister ought to have been subdivided, as it were. There ought to have been Deputy Prime Ministers to take great provinces of the work out of the hands of the Prime Minister and relieve him of part of his burden. That appears to be a very great improvement. There remains, of course—what both noble Lords who have addressed your Lordships this afternoon mentioned—the Ministry of Defence. That, by itself, is a very heavy burden. When you think of the multifarious problems connected with it, I hope the Prime Minister will be able to bear it. Certainly he has a much better chance of bearing it when he has been able to lay aside the immediate obligations of the Home Front, labour, and production.
I should like to say one more word. As one watches this evolution, one cannot help a feeling of dismay that it should have taken us so long to bring it about. I wonder whether we shall ever, as a country, get out of the habit of being taken

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by surprise. Just think how we entered into this war, this colossal crisis. Some noble Lord just now said we had been expecting it for twenty years. We may have been expecting it, but we did hardly anything to prevent its consequences or its operations—not at all. We entered into the war almost naked of many of the things which are essential. We had no armaments to speak of, we had no military intelligence. At the end of the last war we stood ahead of every country in our military intelligence. When this war broke out there appears to have been nothing. I may be wrong.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: Who has been hanged?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: If we can only find the right man, I would not say I should join my noble friend in hanging him, but I should be very glad if someone were punished for our want of preparation at the beginning of this war. Just as we were short of armaments and short of intelligence, so we were short of an efficient organization. We seem almost to have forgotten the experience of the last war. We started, if I may use a colloquial phrase, almost from scratch to learn again all the lessons which we ought to have appreciated and digested in the last war. So here we are, after two and a half years in a tremendous struggle, back to the situation which we reached with infinite toil at the end of the last war. I cannot but be terribly afraid that one of these days we shall not be able to get back. This time, with all the opportunities which we still have, and the immense courage and resources of our people, I am, to the last degree, sanguine of the result, but I earnestly hope that we shall leave nothing more to chance.
Some noble Lord used the adjective "ruthless." Let us be ruthless in those whom we employ. Let us get rid of every inefficient person. Do not let us be hampered by political interests and Parliamentary devices and all sort of things which in peace-time we Englishmen—and Scotsmen too!—rejoice in. Let us get nothing but what is first-rate. All the inefficient people in public offices and through the Services—let us get rid of every one of them. Ruthlessness is the only thing we can practise in the situation in which we stand, and I welcome the reconstruction of the Government because
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it seems to be a very long step in the right direction.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, this debate is taking place mainly because of the reconstruction of the Government. For many months past we have been constantly assured that the composition and machinery of the late Government were all that could be desired, and. that there was no intention whatever of making any changes. Events in Malaya and at Singapore have revealed, on the contrary, that both the composition and the machinery of the late Government were very faulty, and the extremely far-reaching nature of the changes which have been made are evidence of how very faulty they were. In fact the reconstruction which has taken place might be described as a "major operation." In the familiar words of the communiqué, "From this operation all but six of our Ministers returned safely." The next-of-kin of casualties have no doubt been informed!
If six Ministers have left the Government, it would be logical to suppose that they are the six responsible for the events in Malaya which led to the reconstruction of the Government. If we examine who these Ministers are, it might, perhaps, be just possible that the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, and the late Secretary of State for War, Captain Margesson, from the nature of the offices they held, might be considered to be responsible in some degree. I myself do not make that suggestion for one moment. But the other four Ministers—Mr. Greenwood, Colonel Moore-Brabazon, Lord Reith, and Lord Beaverbrook—in what way can it be suggested that they were primarily, or even partly, responsible for what has taken place? Moreover, the prime responsibility for the conduct of the war is a charge upon the War Cabinet, so we can reduce the matter still further and say that of those Ministers who have left the Government those primarily responsible must have been Mr. Arthur Greenwood and Lord Beaverbrook, which, as Euclid used to say, is absurd. Therefore we are led inevitably to the conclusion that those who were responsible, as they have not been ejected, must still be in the Government. If that is so, to what purpose has this reconstruction been? It seems to me we have burnt down the house without even having roasted the pig, and to tell

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the truth I think both in Parliament, in the Press, and in public opinion, the changes arouse only very tepid enthusiasm.
This is, however, dealing in personalities, and the men in the Government exist to evolve policies and to initiate ideas and action. Our difficulties are not going to be solved by replacing Mr. Brown by Mr. Jones, while Mr. Jones replaces Mr. Robinson and so on. In this connexion may I say that the wanderings of some of our Ministers certainly give a feeling of lack of confidence? They appear to be deprived of that steady reliance which should be placed in them. One starts at the Ministry of Aircraft Production, he then proceeds to the Ministry of War Transport, from there he goes to the Board of Trade, and he has hardly had time to hang his coat up at the Board of Trade before he is back at the Ministry of Aircraft Production again. Then we have a Minister who starts at the Board of Trade, he is very quickly moved to the Ministry of Supply, equally quickly he returns to the Board of Trade, and then he is moved back again to the Ministry of Supply.
Among the Ministers who have been brought in from outside political ranks Mr. Oliver Lyttelton was brought in and appointed to the Board of Trade. We are told he is a man, as undoubtedly he is, of great: business experience and ability, and he was singularly well placed at the Board of Trade where he was to be charged with carrying out the rationalization of industry and business. Hardly has he arrived at the Board of Trade before he is sent to the Middle East as Minister of State on some rather vague, not very clearly defined mission. Now that spring is near, we are assured by the experts that the storm is likely to break in the Middle East very soon; and that is the moment which is selected for bringing Mr. Lyttelton home—at the time when he must, by now, have gained a great deal of extremely valuable experience which would probably stand the country in good stead when the storm does break in the Middle East. This is the moment when he is brought home to assume certain rather vague and unspecified duties in connexion with production. I do not know if it is intended to send another Minister to the Middle East to take over Mr. Lyttelton's duties, but if so it is quite clear that that Minister, whoever he may be, will have very little
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time in which to acquire any experience of the situation out there before he may find himself confronted with very stern days indeed.
But, my Lords, changes of personnel unaccompanied by changes of ideas or machinery give no promise of better things. It has been the higher policy and the higher strategical direction of the war which has been at fault, and changes of personnel without changes of ideas and machinery will not remedy that. The country has been led to admire one set of Ministers after another which has been presented to it, and I think the country's capacity for that type of admiration is almost exhausted. The country is looking this particular gift horse very carefully in the mouth, because now it is very generally realized that one thing is certain about the war, and that is that you can no more win a war by losing every battle than you can win a round of golf by losing every hole, and there are only eighteen holes. It is results alone which are going to convince the public that better things are to come from this change of Government.
There are two matters which I should like to mention to your Lordships in connexion with the Ministry of Defence. Having regard to the personality of the Prime Minister, his great study and great knowledge of the arts of war, it seems to me that it is inevitable that he must combine the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence; but there may be some misapprehension on one particular point in the minds of the public. I think it is sometimes felt that the influence of the Minister of Defence is such that perhaps the members of the War Cabinet do not enjoy all that access to—or shall I say advice from?—the Chiefs of Staff and the Service Ministers which would be advisable to enable them to decide upon the great matters brought before them. The noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, in a recent speech in your Lordships' House, if I remember aright, advised, or seemed to be inclined to advise, that the Service Ministers should be brought back into the War Cabinet. I believe that to be a complete misapprehension. My own belief is that the members of the War Cabinet have full and unrestricted access to the Chiefs of Staff and to the Service. Ministers and have every opportunity of consultation with them and of receiving their advice. But if a misapprehension

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does exist upon that point, I think it would be very much in the public interest to have that fully cleared up.
As to the idea of a Ministry of Defence—and it was an idea which I myself joined in advocating before the war, but we learn as we go along, some of us—it seems to me that perhaps an essential weakness in the conception of the idea of a Ministry of Defence is this. As I understand it, in Germany the three fighting forces are combined into some entity called the Wehrmacht. I regret I do not know the structure or the organization of the Wehrmacht as well as I should like, but I understand that while the three Services are autonomous they are combined into this entity called the Wehrmacht. It seems to me the Wehrmacht is the essential complement of a Ministry of Defence. If you have a Ministry of Defence it is essential to have this other conception of the combination of the three forces composing the military might of the nation.
Some reference was made in the debate on Tuesday to the desirability of having a Combined General Staff. However desirable that may be, it seems to me quite clear that you could not suddenly introduce that in the middle of a war, because such a Staff obviously would require very long and careful organization, and would take a great deal of time in order finally to work together and settle down. The idea of a Combined General Staff would follow automatically from what I am compelled, for want of knowledge of an English equivalent, to describe as the Wehrmacht, and I think that probably the proper set-up for a Ministry of Defence is such a Ministry with the Wehrmacht and the Combined General Staff which follows from that organization. Perhaps the difficulties we have been encountering with regard to a Ministry of Defence are due to the fact that that organization has not been adopted. We have adopted one thing and not the other two.
There is a further point. I noticed the Prime Minister said quite recently that he enjoys no powers as Minister of Defence that he is not able to exercise as Prime Minister. I think there are people who would ask, if he is not able to do anything as Minister of Defence which he cannot do as Prime Minister, what is the point of his being called Minister of Defence, I do think that it may cause
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certain misapprehensions in the public mind, particularly as regards the Service Ministers. Let us take, for instance, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The First Lord of the Admiralty makes statements upon the Naval Estimates. He is making one to-day. Those statements have an admirable effect upon public opinion. They support and sustain public opinion. But in between these statements upon the Naval Estimates the public only hear of the First Lord as opening warship weeks, or broadcasting perhaps an appeal for some naval charity, or speaking at some public function or banquet. When a naval event takes place which very much perturbs the public mind, like the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" or the escape of the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau," the First Lord of the Admiralty is silent. The matter is dealt with by the Minister of Defence. One can well imagine that if interrogation of the Prime Minister is pushed beyond a certain point it very rapidly becomes a matter of confidence, whereas interrogation of one of the Service Ministers can proceed further without any question of confidence becoming involved.
Though I am bound to refer to two naval reverses, I should like to say that we should remember that the Navy frequently has great successes as well as great reverses. I think it would be a great satisfaction to the Navy to hear its own political head announcing successes as well as taking the brunt of any reverses which may have been en-countered. There is just one word I would like to say about the escape of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau." The matter, of course, is subject to inquiry at the present moment and therefore it would be improper to say very much, but I deprecate any idea that this affair is going to be used to stir up ill-feeling between the Air Force and the Navy. I think probably that idea has been exaggerated, and I am sure there can be no wish on the part of anyone concerned to do such a reprehensible and deplorable thing.
But there are two other points about it that I would like to mention. There was a speech made at the week-end when that affair happened which may have been made with some official encouragement, in which it was said that when the full story came to be known we should all

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glory in the courage and the heroism displayed by the officers who carried out the attacks. My Lords, I think it is in doubtful taste to try to gloze over a matter which has roused great perturbation in the public mind by riding off on the courage and the heroism of men, some of whom, it may be found, sacrificed their lives in a hopeless endeavour. There was another speech the following week-end with regard to this matter, in which it was suggested that the public ought to be saying "Well done" to the Navy. I think that is very astonishing indeed. The public have a soft corner in their hearts for the Navy and will be very ready to say "Well done" when in fact they have done well, but that was a very strange moment to suggest that "Well done" should be said to the Navy.
Then the noble Lord, Lord Cecil, in dealing with this matter on Tuesday, quoted a statement attributed to the Naval Staff that in some respects it is rather better to have these ships where they are than at Brest, and that the situation in the Atlantic has been rather eased by the movement. I remember that when the occupation of Norway took place, it was stated then that it was the considered view of the Admiralty that we had greatly gained by what had occurred in Norwegian waters in a strategic and military sense. Putting together those two statements attributed to the Staff, I can only say that the gallant sailors who constitute the Naval Staff have got a most remarkable facility for seeing a silver lining where the layman can only see a very dark cloud indeed. It may be as well that they have that spirit, but there it is.
Now, if I may, I would turn for a moment to events at Singapore, the events which have led to the reconstruction of the Government. Very far-reaching lessons are to be drawn from those events. I speak of them in no spirit of recrimination, but because the most important thing about a defeat or about a reverse is to draw the proper lessons from it to enable you to avoid a similar event again. I read, as many of your Lordships must have done, with the greatest sadness a most painful article published in The Times on this matter, an article which I think must have required great courage on the part of the editor of The Times to publish. If what is said in that article is true, there is a
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great lesson to be drawn from it. The writer said:
"… lack of dynamism, of aggressive energy, characterized the upper ranks of the civilian administration."
He also said:
"The Government has no roots in the life of the people of the country … the bulk of the Asiatic population remained spectators from start to finish."
And the writer of the article went on to say:
"One good push has sent the structure crashing to the ground."
I think there is one great lesson to be drawn from those statements. When Napoleon was overrunning Europe his Armies carried with them great liberating ideas. He was not merely a conqueror; he was not merely overrunning Europe, his Armies carried great liberating ideas with them wherever they went. To-day Germany is overrunning Europe, but her Armies take no liberating ideas with them. In the Far East the position is different, for wherever the Japanese Armies go they take with them what is a liberating idea in the Far East—the idea of liberating the coloured races from the white—and it will be as well to bear that in mind, that they do take that great liberating idea with them.
That is a lesson that we have to learn and it is a severe reflection upon the past history of our Colonial policy. I cannot but reflect that until recently the Colonial Secretaryship has never been one of the great prizes in a Government. Since it was held by Joseph Chamberlain it has never been held by a man of supreme international or domestic repute. Debates have taken place, perhaps once or twice a year, in a somewhat thinly-attended House upon Colonial questions. Now we have a new Colonial Secretary in the person of the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne. He gives us great hope. He has always shown great courage. He has great independence of mind, immense application to a task. But there is a higher quality than those required—the ability to conceive and to frame and to drive through a new Colonial policy based upon new conceptions. If he does this we shall conserve on a basis of justice what has been won for us in the past by great explorers and Generals and Admirals, and consolidated for us by a great race of administrators; but otherwise it will slip from the nerveless grasp of men unworthy of such forbears.

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May I, in conclusion, say one won about one aspect of the Home Front and that is production; production upon which victory depends? We have only recently had the lamentable story of the White Paper, and a debate in your Lordships House which turns out to have been a completely farcical procedure. What is the position at this moment? Here is this matter of production for which prewar Governments and pre-war member: of those Governments cannot be blamed The organization of production is a matter which we have had in our own hands since the outbreak of the war. The Prime Minister inherited a legacy of neglect and lack of foresight in so man) other respects, but production is something which we have had the power to handle ourselves. Spring is at hand. Germany has not been idle during the winter. The inhabitants of the conquered countries and the industries of those countries have all been pressed into the service of their German masters. German production has been proceeding at a rate such as has never before been achieved. When the storm is about to break, we here in this country have still got our production unorganized. We produced a Ministry in February; it lasted only a few hours, and now we are going to bring home a new Minister, charged with vague and unspecified duties in regard to this question, who will hardly have time to grasp the business in hand before the storm is upon us. The position is most unsatisfactory, and it is our own fault.
This question of production is intimately linked with the question of morale. Morale of the Home Front gives you a direct key to the figures of your production. This war has taught us one great lesson: that people will fight for an idea. So often when I look at the whole panorama of this war I feel that it is divided into professionals and amateurs. The Germans, the Japanese and the Russians are fighting like professionals. The Italians and ourselves are fighting too, but like amateurs. And it is a question of ideas. Rightly or wrongly the Germans feel that they have a great idea; that they have a great destiny in Europe. The Japanese similarly feel that they have a great destiny in the Far East and that they are fighting for a great idea. And the Russians also feel that they have an
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idea, that they are fighting for a country which they have made and which belongs to them; and when people have an idea like that to fight for they fight like tigers. We have yet, in this country, to create and to give to our people an idea of that nature for which they will fight as do those other countries. Unity and resolution we have. Let our Government convince our people of the urgency of time and give them the idea that they are looking for, and then we shall generate an irresistible force.
If I have uttered any words of criticism, my Lords, it has been to me an ungrateful task to do so. I am not one of those who wishes to find, in the words of the Prime Minister, "his war work in criticism." I realize the immense burdens upon the Government. Much of the criticism of the Prime Minister has been very captious. He has been struggling with the very things against which he warned the nation. He is an immense international figure. All great men have the defects of their qualities. We have to take them as they are. You cannot clip or prune a man of the stature of the Prime Minister into the shape you want him, as you can a box tree or a yew hedge. Well, he has met criticism in a truly democratic spirit by reconstructing his Government in deference to what has been said on that subject, and if an advance can now be made along certain lines, some of which I have ventured to indicate, he can count upon the nation's response when he calls to the nation to bend to the oar, to drive the road and bridge the ford in a spirit of true self-sacrifice and resolution which will carry us through to victory.
LORD CHATFIELD: My Lords, we have just listened to a very able speech from the noble Lord, Lord Winster. The only remark I wish to make about it is that I am afraid I cannot agree with what he said at the end of his speech, that the people of this country would not fight so well as the Germans and the Japanese until we had a proper idea of what we were fighting for to give us the necessary inspiration. I hope that I did rot misinterpret the noble Lord, but surely we have the greatest inspiration and incentive that we can possibly have. We are fighting for our own self-preservation and for all those things which we hold dear in our national and imperial

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life. I do not think that the noble Lord did justice to his countrymen by that expression of opinion.
The debate that we are engaged in is, in effect, very much the second part of the debate on the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Denman, three weeks ago. On that occasion I made a speech which, perhaps, was, in some respects, of a slightly challenging nature, and I was unfortunately unable to be present when I received some castigation the next day. The reasons for my absence were entirely beyond my control. If I rise to speak to-day it is partly because I should like to remark on the criticisms which were made. This I feel it is my duty to the House to do. Since that last debate three important events have occurred. We have lost Singapore, the German battle cruisers have escaped, and the Cabinet has been reconstructed. As regards the reconstruction of the Cabinet I am like the rest of us, for we all feel that the new Cabinet must be given a fair trial. We can only hope that they will bring us, and themselves, more fortune than their predecessors were able to command—in both our interests. It would be dishonest for me, however, to say that I feel that this reshuffle of the pack is really going to get us over the strategical weaknesses in our administration. We all know that a National Cabinet is absolutely essential for the prosecution of the war; we must have a Cabinet composed of men of all Parties, whose names are known in the country and who have the necessary ability to keep us together, to maintain unity, to prevent the political Parties from indulging in strife, and to prevent the strife which inevitably ensues from those Parties in the country.
At the same time, if you have to form a Cabinet which is constituted mainly with that home administrative purpose in view, it will be exceedingly unlikely that such a body will also be constituted as the best possible means of conducting our military affairs. Take, for example, the Deputy Prime Minister, the new Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. If anything happened—temporarily, shall we say—to the Prime Minister—which God forbid!—as I understand it, the Deputy Prime Minister would take over his duties as Minister of Defence. If I am wrong I hope that I shall be corrected, but I believe that that is the case. Would any of us really feel confident that
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the Deputy Prime Minister, with all the ability which he has in political affairs, and with the great name which he has made for himself in the country, is a man to whom we should look, perhaps for a month or two, with confidence to take over the tremendous responsibilities that the Prime Minister now holds in his hands? I do not think that it is possible to believe it.
I criticized the other day the duties which the Prime Minister undertakes. The noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, whom, particularly as he has now become Leader of our House, I must treat with due respect, said that I had attacked the Prime Minister, but I do not think that that is a fair expression of opinion on what I said. I yield to none—not even to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury—in my admiration for the Prime Minister; I agree with all that has been said as to the immense debt which the country owes him for his courage and for the stimulation which he has given to the whole Empire in the conduct of the war. I can regard nothing as more disastrous than that he should leave his post, and I only hope that I shall see him one day leading the country to victory. In view of what Lord Cranborne said, I take consolation from what was said by the Prime Minister himself in another place last week. The Prime Minister said that if Parliament thought that it could make arrangements that would lead to the better conduct of the war, it was not only its right but its duty to do so. I am sure that we all feel that it is right for us, if we feel that we ought to do so, to criticize not individuals but their work and the organization which is set up; equally, we should never forgive ourselves if we had not the courage to say what we thought until it was too late. After all, Parliament is a safety-valve, and what we are doing now is to lift it a little.
I still hold the view which I expressed before with regard to the organization which has been set up, and I am sure that it is a great mistake for the Prime Minister to be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is a purely military body, which the Prime Minister described very well in his recent speech in another place. The great value of that Committee is that it can give purely military advice. In 1936, When a Minister for the Co-ordination of

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Defence was to be appointed, I was Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and I particularly asked that he should not be made our Chairman, as was originally intended; and so the instructions for the Minister were altered, and he attended as Chairman only when asked to do so or when he thought that he could convey the political mentality of the Government to the Chiefs of Staff before they had to solve some difficult military problem.
If the Prime Minister takes the chair of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in effect it brings the impact of the political mind on to military considerations too soon. The Chiefs of Staff can give purely military advice, and that advice can be accepted or rejected by the War Cabinet according to political or other considerations. If the sole decision of questions of strategy lay with the Prime Minister—if, in effect, he himself constituted the War Cabinet so far as strategy is concerned—it would be quite possible for him to preside over the Chiefs of Staff Committee; but the Prime Minister has told us that, so far from that being the case, the conduct of the war lies with the War Cabinet and not with himself alone. If a separate Minister or Vice-Minister of Defence is not to be appointed, then the strategical considerations and the conduct of the war should be vested in the War Cabinet itself, and the Ministry of Defence should be vested in the War Cabinet and not in any individual, or, better still, in some specially selected members—very few—of the War Cabinet, who would deal solely with strategical affairs, with, of course, the Prime Minister in the chair.
I think that the Chiefs of Staff are kept a great deal too much in the background. The majority of people in this country do not even know their names. I did not, as the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, imagines that I did, say the other day that they are badgered into submission by the Prime Minister. I did not say anything of the sort; if he had that idea in his mind, he must have got it from somewhere else beforehand. I certainly never suggested that the Prime Minister badgers the Chiefs of Staff. I do not think that he does, but I do not know. It is undoubtedly a fact, however, that, under the umbrella of one-man responsibility, one does not know whether the Chiefs of Staff give good
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advice which is rejected or whether they give bad advice which leads to disasters. When we have disasters, there is no way in which the country can know whether it is the fault of the political heads of the State or whether it is due to their advisers giving bad advice. Equally, if we have successes we do not know whether credit is due to the experts. I think that that is a great pity. There is always a tendency, if the public is uncertain on those points, to try to look for scapegoats.
I do not believe in looking for scapegoats. In a long administrative experience of thirty years in command of ships and Fleets and at the Admiralty, I formed the opinion, and acted on it, that if a man makes a mistake, or one or two mistakes, from inexperience, as opposed to negligence or lack of judgment, it is much better to leave him where he is to profit by the experience which he has gained rather than to make a scapegoat of him and to put a new man in his place who has not got his experience and who will very likely only repeat the same mistake in a few months time. It is exacty the same surely in Ministerial life as well. Can it be considered to be a successful method of conducting the war when you have five Secretaries of State for War in a period of thirty months? It is really the negation of democratic Government. We all know, if Secretaries of State are any use at all, which we must presume they are, that no one can go to a great Department of State without taking at least six months really to get the hang of all the problems that are going to concern him, and to get to know not only the people in his own buildings but the people outside over whom he has control. It is not until after that that he really can bring such administrative ability as he has to bear upon that Department of State. How, then, can you have efficiency in government when Ministers are changed about in the way they are?
One feels sorry when one looks at the Government Bench to think of the Sword of Damocles that is hanging over their heads. One day one of them comes and addresses us here and tells us how, after eighteen months' hard toil, he has decided on certain important measures in order to rebuild our cities; and the next day he is gone. The Minister of Production comes and tells us of all

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the plans he has for really producing aeroplanes and tanks in vast numbers, with an enthusiasm which inspires us, and he also disappears. I cannot believe that that is really a very wise state of affairs. I am afraid it brings us into ridicule both abroad and with our Allies.
There is one personal reference I should like to make, a reference to what the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, accused me of in the last debate. He said:
"Your Lordships will remember that Lord Chatfield, in effect, said there was no defence against Japan, and that is why he thought it such a great mistake to bring to an end the Japanese alliance. That is why. in effect, he really favoured a policy of appeasement of Japan."
Well, those are the most extraordinary statements that I ever heard. Actually I said nothing of the kind, nor could anyone really read into what I said any such interpretation. What I did say was that if we had to determine the Japanese alliance, which might have been quite unavoidable, we had created a new enemy ten thousand miles away, and it war, our duty to watch and prepare to fight him. That is what I said, and it is very different from what the noble Lord accused me of saying.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): I most willingly withdraw if I said that.
LORD CHATFIELD: Thank you very much; it is very kind. I accept that with the greatest good will. After all, we must remember that the Government have told us themselves that we had to accept great humiliations in the last two years to avoid precipitating Japan into the conflict, and if anyone thought that that, which was appeasement, was wrong, he should have said so before. Anyhow, if anyone thought it was a mistake in the last two years to appease Japan, he must be enjoying the fighting now going on.
Now I should like to fire a broadside at the noble Lord, Lord Addison. He fired some exceedingly unpleasant torpedoes at the Services, and particularly singled out, in the speech he made the day before yesterday, the leaders of the Army. I think that was very unfair. What he said was:
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"I am afraid there are many men in Commands who are very much hide-bound and hampered by old traditions.… It is not in keeping with the British character … that we should look to our enemies for new and ingenious methods of warfare and for the effective use of the different Services."
I think that is a very unjust statement. It is astonishing how short memories are, and how people forget that, after all, it was not till six months before the war that anybody in this country wanted an Army at all, and that we started this war with the smallest Army in the world for our great responsibilities, and by far the smallest Army in Europe. How can the noble Lord imagine that you can produce out of a very small Army such as we had the experience that is necessary to produce leaders equal to the great military leaders of the Continent? It is obviously quite impossible to do so.
Those great military leaders of the Continent are produced by handling in peacetime enormous forces, by testing them in innumerable exercises, in finding out what they can do and what they cannot do, what it will be too risky to effect, and what is a safe risk to take. And so they test not only their minds and their personnel, but they test their machines, and those machines they are able to alter from year to year in preparing for war. But we had none of those things. Anyone who entered the War Office might have looked up at the portal to see the words, "Abandon hope all ye who enter here," because the Army was not wanted. And then the moment the war starts what do we find? Everybody blames the Army because we have not got Clausewitzes and Napoleons to command it. I think the Army have been wonderful, considering the scandalous way that they were treated by their countrymen in the last ten years.
Having said that about the sister Service with great pleasure, I should like to say something about what the noble Lord said in the previous debate about my own Service. He made two remarks, neither of which I think was justified. The first was about the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse." He said:
"It depends on what cover was sent with them; but surely the disaster was due to the use of the ships after they had got there."
Now that, I feel, is an unfair reflection on the Admiral who was in command. After all, we have not had an investigation of that disaster, a Court Martial. We

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do not really know the facts, but I cannot imagine any Admiral who could have been placed in a more terrible position than Admiral Phillips was placed in when the Japanese advanced on Malaya on that unfortunate morning. You can imagine the request of his military and air comrades to go out and do something, because they were going to be in for it. I do not believe there is any Admiral in history or in the present day who would not have gone out, who would have sat in port and said, "No 1 am going to remain at anchor." It was not his fault that he lost his ships, as far as I can see.
If it were necessary for political reasons, as the Prime Minister has told us now, that the ships should be sent out to try and stop the Japanese from coming into the war, I am afraid it had the opposite effect. If it was necessary to send those two ships unescorted, unprotected, then they might perfectly well have been ordered to remain a force in being and to stay in harbour and take no risks. They would thus have acted in exactly the same way as the German Fleet acted in the last war when, by remaining in port, they retained the Grand Fleet for four years in the Firth of Forth, thereby immensely hampering our production and other efforts. If they had been ordered to go out there and remain in being, it would have been a perfectly practicable step, and the Admiral would have been ordered not to risk the ships on any account. That has happened in history on many occasions. He could not have had these orders, otherwise he would not have disobeyed them. When you put the Admiral in that unfortunate position, I do not think it is fair for the noble Lord to place the blame on his shoulders in the way he did.
LORD ADDISON: I should like to correct the noble and gallant Lord. I deliberately did not put the blame on the Admiral. I did not say he was responsible for taking the ships out without adequate air protection, and if he will re-read my speech I think he will see that.
LORD CHATFIELD: I am very glad to hear that the noble Lord did not mean to impute blame to the Admiral, but I could read nothing else into his words. I naturally accept his statement, and I
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presume he does place the blame on somebody else out there who is unnamed. The other statement made by the noble Lord to which I take exception was:
"One lesson seems to me to emerge from this painful experience, and that is that the Japanese Naval Staff were really ahead of us in the widespread utilization of aircraft carriers. They seem to have had a great many more in comparison with us. and to have foreseen their utility much better than we did. I hope we shall learn from that."
These are not the facts of the case at all. The aircraft carrier was invented by the British Navy after the last war, and the only reason why we had not more aircraft carriers was that we were not given the money to build them and because of the London Naval Treaty. Despite that fact we had, when the war started, the "Ark Royal"—that is one new aircraft carrier—and four old ones—five altogether—and five new ones building, which I personally laid down as soon as the London Treaty came to an end in 1937. We had ten aircraft carriers built or building, and the Japanese had not more than half that number at most, if half. Therefore it was not the case that the Japanese Naval Staff were more intelligent than the British Naval Staff. The British Navy have a very great idea of the importance of the air in naval warfare, and have always shown it. One of the things they did was to struggle to get aircraft carriers. I had to fight very hard for the aircraft carriers I have mentioned, because most people thought they were too vulnerable and would be easily sunk at the beginning of the war. The old ones, unfortunately, have been sunk. We have lost three or four of them, but the ones that remain are better and more modern ships.
I said we were handicapped in the matter of aircraft carriers by the London and Washington Treaties. I should like to refer to what was said by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, in the previous debate. He said that he disagreed with me that the Naval Treaties had been a handicap to this country. He thought they were a far greater handicap to Japan. He forgets that when the ratio—10: 10: 6—was decided on at the Washington Conference it was based on the existing strengths of the United States, British and Japanese Fleets, Therefore, in effect, this ratio was no more unfair to one nation than to another. Why the Japanese objected to the ratio was not

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because it was an unfair balance of strength, but because it affected their prestige. It is prestige that has been at the bottom of the whole trouble about quantitative disarmament in the past. The worst of the Washington Treaty, which I do not blame very severely, was that it started the disarmament landslide. That disarmament landslide started the ten years' holiday and all the other rules which were brought in. It was notorious that it atrophied the rearmament firms and led to a change in the administrative treatment of the Fighting Services compared to what ought to have been there in every respect. The Washington Treaty had one very great safeguard. It provided that when the ten years came to an end the United States and Great Britain were each to lay down ten capital ships between the years 1931 and 1937. During that period Japan was to lay down six. By the London Treaty the whole of that was swept away by the signature of a. few pens. What would we not give now if these twenty ships for the United States and our own Navy were in existence over and above what we have to the Japanese six If we had had that superiority in numbers the war with Japan might never have started.
The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, was not right—I speak with great respect—in saying that the Japanese were anxious to get out of the Treaty at the end. The Japanese did not withdraw from the 1935 Conference because they were dissatisfied with the proposals that were made about ratios so much as because they wanted to introduce a system which was called the Common Upper Limit, which was a system that laid down, as the noble Viscount on the Woolsack will so well remember, that there was to be a limit above which no nation could build ships, but up to which anybody could build regardless of their imperial or national responsibilities.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: May I say that that point was incidental? My main point was that the whole of the noble and gallant Lord's speech relating to the Washington Treaty indicated that the Treaty imposed restrictions upon our building. He did not even mention that there was any corresponding restriction on anyone else. If he reads his speech through again he will see that he gave a wrong impression of what was a measure
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for preventing a race for armaments in general.
LORD CHATFIELD: I am sorry if I gave a wrong impression, but, in view of what has passed between the noble Viscount and myself, the House will now have been put in full knowledge of the facts. I must not keep the House longer, but I must say a word about the escape of the German battle cruisers. I should like first of all to say how greatly I admire the magnificent effort that was made by the Royal Air Force during the last year to keep these ships in port, which they absolutely succeeded in doing, and to destroy them altogether, which I know nobody could be more disappointed than they that they were not able to do. Few people understand how difficult it is to prevent ships escaping from port. There is nothing easier than for a fleet to get out of harbour, undetected, in the dark or in bad or misty weather though you have air reconnaissance to help you. Those who have clone exercises at sea will know that you cannot see for any great distance, even with aircraft. I have been able to see aircraft at greater distances than the aircraft could see me in my ship.
What we have got to realize, although the matter is sub judice and we cannot discuss it, is that the Germans learnt the lessons we taught them. We taught them lessons in the Mediterranean which were never believed before the war, but which we always held in the Admiralty, that we could pass convoys through the narrow Sicilian Straits provided we had proper air protection and provided we had proper escorting vessels. We have been able to do that in this war with enormous success and on most important occasions. They also learnt that when you try to do the other thing, and move your ships against land aircraft without proper air protection, you will probably lose them. So, profiting by these two lessons, they moved these ships up the Channel with an immense umbrella of aircraft over them and destroyers and motor torpedo boats escorting them. That we should be able to stop that force merely by air attack was improbable, and we failed. The conditions may have been difficult for our gallant airmen—I think they were—but I do not think, myself, we had a really good chance of stopping these ships in the circumstances.

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The lesson I learnt—and I learnt it a long time ago—is this: If you are operating under certain conditions at sea—that is to say if you have against you a force composed of certain units, battleships, with air protection, cruisers and destroyers—you can only meet that force on a proper footing by having a similarly composed force of your own. The only way you could have stopped for certain those two battle cruisers reaching Wilhelmshaven would have been for the Admiralty, had it been possible, on the particular day to assemble a similar force of capital ships, of air cover, of destroyers and motor torpedo boats to meet them. That was the only chance you had in the circumstances if you wished to stop those ships getting through and carrying out what they intended to do.
I must say I disagree with what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, said the other day, that air dominates strategy. I think that is a dangerous expression, if I may say so with all respect to my noble friend. The Army and Navy, he said, in narrow waters could not light without air cover, without air support and without air superiority. That is perfectly true, but neither could the Air Force fight without naval support to bring them their fuel, their munitions and their personnel, and without Army support to protect the aerodromes from which they are operating. It is not a question of dominating. That is a mistake. I might easily say that with our island Empire the sea must dominate our strategy, but I would not say that. I say that what we want is that all three Services must dominate strategy. After all, is the air dominating the strategy in the Russian campaign going on at the present time? Is the air dominating the strategy in the Atlantic battle at the present moment, or even in the Pacific? It cannot be so. What you want is that all three Services should combine, and it is the greatest mistake to imagine that one Service can do more than others.
Unity is what we want. I fought for it in the Service for years, and I have always been happy if I could pay a tribute to the sister Services even more than to my own. I am sure that is the spirit in which those of us who are too old to fight want to operate during this war. I am afraid that the word "dominate" also brings in those unfortunate feelings
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expressed in the oratorical and literary conflict that we see going on in the newspapers. It has already started. I am sorry to hear there is going to be an agitation to try and get the Navy to have more command of the Air Force. I would not support that myself. I consider that the organization as it at present exists is a good one. I do not say it is perfect. I fought for the Fleet Air Arm for three years. Eventually I got it, and I do not think the country would wish the Navy to lose it again. I also tried to get the Coastal Command, but that was refused. When the war started the Navy got operational control of the Coastal Command, which is the really important thing. The original view was that to have operational control you should also have control of the maintenance and supply of your aircraft. That can only be done by putting the Coastal airmen into dark blue uniform, and to do that in the middle of a war would be to my mind highly dangerous and undesirable. Therefore I hope this agitation will die down.
I will not detain your Lordships much longer for I have been too long. I only desire to add this. It is not a question nowadays of ships or aircraft, but of ships and aircraft. Our great danger lies on the sea. What is our naval production? Surely we should know something about it. We have great naval dangers. The German battle cruisers will be out sooner or later. The new German battleships are very big ships, bigger than our own because they were built beyond the limits allowed, and they are highly modern. If those ships get out into the Atlantic they can either combine or separate. Nothing will be more difficult than to bring them to book with our depleted Navy, with many ships already sunk. I feel that people do not realize that the only way we can lose the war in a day or in a week is through the Navy. We may want tanks and aircraft to win victory, but you can lose the war by not having enough ships. What, then, is the programme? What is the present state of our naval programme? I feel we should be told something about it. We are often told we are building so many tanks and so many aircraft; we hear many expressions of satisfaction about these programmes; but about our naval programme we hear hardly anything at all.
Possibly, even if we have to have a Secret Session, we should be told something

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about our battleship construction. I left three and a half years ago seven battleships under construction and five aircraft carriers. What is the state of those ships to-day? So far as I know only three are completed. Where are the other two that were laid down or ordered in 1939? All these matters were put in the Navy Estimates and they are not secret. What is the state of affairs today? Surely we should be told so that the country can have some confidence in our naval position, and see when there will be an opportunity to regain our position in the Pacific. I will not detain your Lordships any longer as there are other noble Lords who want to speak. I thank you for the attention you have given me.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I must apologize for addressing your Lordships' House again on this question of the air, but force of circumstances has brought it about. I am the only senior officer in the Air Force in your Lordships' House. Many of your Lordships perhaps in your younger days have had great experience in the Army and the Navy, but there is no one in this House who has had long experience in the Air Service. I apologize for taking up your time once more. Before I begin to deal with the Motion I want to say one word about a statement of the noble Lord who put that Motion down. I want first to say as publicly as I can, before I make any further remarks on the air, that I have never said that the Air Force can win the war by itself. I have never said that. I have never said that the war could be won without the Navy and the Army also.
The noble Lord who has just spoken disagrees with me about the use of the word "dominate" in relation to strategy. To dominate strategy is a very different thing from winning the war. I do feel that the Air Force does dominate strategy because it has got something which nothing can alter, which the Army and the Navy have not got, and that is gravity. I have found myself well supported in that view whenever I have put it forward, but that does not mean that I think that the Air Force can win the war alone. I read the other day in a pamphlet, issued apparently by the Ministry of Information, that strategical bombing cannot win the war. It also said in this pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Information, without any signature, that the war cannot
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be won without it. It was interesting to come upon that pamphlet.
I will come now to the statement made by the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, who put down the Motion which we are now debating. I will not follow the noble Lord in his research among speeches, in which he cuts out sentences, leaving out the context, instead of giving his attention to the crossword puzzles that the noble Lord used to study in The Times, or perhaps I should say the Daily Herald. He has now given up his time in the train in order to find a point in a speech of mine, and he has taken out a sentence from that speech and left out the whole context.
LORD ADDISON: I read the whole sentence complete from full stop to full stop.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: You cannot stop at a full stop. If the noble Lord had read the whole paragraph of the speech he would have seen that I said that what happened at foreign aerodromes had no relation to the defence of aerodromes at home. However, I feel certain that in this sort of argument the noble Lord will always win. I will come to the main point of his speech. I hope the noble Lord will correct me if I misinterpret him. I understood from his speech that he is advocating that the Coastal Command of shore-based aircraft be definitely turned over to the Navy, but I would like to tell your Lordships that I know that Coastal Command is, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, said, definitely under, and has been for a long time under, the operational control of the Admiralty. All plans made in emergency are, I imagine, concerted, agreed and approved by the Admiralty at all stages. I think at every stage in the chain of Command naval officers sit with their Royal Air Force opposite numbers. There are Combined Headquarters. But this apparently does not satisfy the noble Lord. He still wants closer co-operation.
I have heard that expression used hundreds of times in your Lordships' House, in another place and elsewhere. Always the cry is for closer co-operation, and that implies that co-operation is not close. What ground has the noble Lord for saying that. I agree that co-operation cannot be too close, but what grounds are

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there for saying it is not close? Is it because of some of the setbacks we have had? I feel from the general tone of his speech that he wants to break up the Air Force and hand over the Coastal Command to the Navy. Probably he would agree with the statement made only yesterday that the Army should have their own Air Force and would agree with one of the numerous late Secretaries of State for War that he had pressed for this when in office. I heard a statement made yesterday by an ex-Secretary of State for War that he pressed hard for the Army to have its own Air Force before this war. Would it not have been better if he had spent his energy in providing the tanks and the equipment for the Army that, as we know, went overseas so badly equipped, instead of attacking another Ministry? To return to the Coastal Command, I say that if Coastal Command was put under the direct complete control of the Navy and separated from the Air Force, good relations and co-operation would be much harder to maintain between the two Services. You would deprive Coastal Command of the experience of the officer commanding this Force and of his staff, and you would knock out the linch-pin of that co-operation which exists to-day through Coastal Command between the Air Force and the Navy.
I will try to explain what I mean. I have been to many aerodromes and I have seen on one aerodrome a fighter squadron under Fighter Command, a bomber squadron under Bomber Command, a Coastal Command squadron under Coastal Command and an Army Co-operation squadron under the Army Co-operation Command. They were all on one aerodrome for geographical reasons, to suit the geographical situation of this island and its difficulties. If Coastal Command sent out machines to attack a German convoy going up the Dutch coast and more assistance was wanted from the main force it would be easy for Bomber Command on its own aerodrome to help. Or suppose one of our convoys going up our side of the Channel was attacked by the German Air Force and Coastal Command wanted more help from the Fighter Command, they could call on Fighter Command. If you had them as separate Services you would have separatism run mad. The whole thing would break down. I have tried—not very well, I
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am afraid—to explain this rather difficult point.
The noble Lord, in his speech on Tuesday, said that our recent experience showed that Service separatism had gone too far. The noble Lord quoted as an illustration the attack on a convoy which passed through the Sicilian Straits. Perhaps I had better quote his exact words. He said:
May I take one or two illustrations? The attack on the convoy which passed through the Sicilian Straits when the 'Illustrious' was damaged and the 'Southampton' was sunk, was mainly due to insufficient air protection. We heard a good deal in the bulletins which were issued in subsequent days about the bombing of Sicilian aerodromes by the Royal Air Force, but I suggest that it might have been more serviceable to the convoy if those aerodromes had been bombed beforehand instead of afterwards. That is to say, there was not the co-operation there ought to have been."
With regard to that particular case in the Sicilian Straits I am quite certain that this operation was planned and worked out by the Navy, and it might well be—though I have no information from the Navy—that the Navy thought that the aerodrome should not be bombed beforehand, because that might have alarmed the enemy and have drawn the attention of the enemy to something that was going to happen. Yet it is said that this is want of co-operation—that vague statement that everybody makes. I say cooperation is close and that such acts are not due to want of it.
In his second instance the noble Lord implied that it was want of Air Ministry co-operation that provided the Navy with out-of-date Swordfish. What has the Air Ministry to do with this? It is well known that the question of equipment of the Fleet Air Arm has been a matter in which the Admiralty for many years has been consulted. It was laid down back in my time before the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, got the Fleet Air Arm back entirely as a naval service, that types of machines should be suggested by the Admiralty.
LORD ADDISON: But not priority.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: That is done by the Ministry of Aircraft Production. It is of no use thinking in these days that the Navy can be completely self-contained with its Fleet machine, its torpedo machines, its bombing machines, its long-distance reconnaissance machines,

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and its local air forces, in sufficient quantities that there would be no need to call on the Air Force for assistance from its fighters or bombers. Also it is no use thinking that the Army can be a self-contained Service with its own ships, with its own Army fighter machines, bomber machines and reconnaissance machines. Nor can the Air Force be self-contained with its carriers, its protecting ships and so on. In war there will be for many years to come, if not for all time, opinions given on how the different Services should be used, on how the various arms in the different Services should be used and with what numbers of personnel and arms the different Services should be provided—whether they be bomber machines, or torpedo machines, or fighters; whether big ships should be built or small craft, big carriers, or small carriers, or more submarines; whether tanks or cavalry. I would like to say that these discussions make for efficiency These questions and arguments in the Services and in the Government make for efficiency. There are bound to be these arguments, and you would lose a lot of this efficiency if you tried to make each of the three Services self-contained. It is impossible.
Later on the noble Lord repeats: "Separatism has been carried too far." Yet the logical conclusion, if the noble Lord had his way, would not be a question of separatism being carried too far: it would be a question of complete separatism. I feel very strongly on this point. We are moving in very grave clays, and I feel that these attempts to sow controversy by people outside the Government and outside the Services, who have not full information, are liable, if not kept to the broadest lines, to do a great disservice to all. In this connexion I am referring particularly to the continuous attacks made upon the autonomous organization and on the bombing policy of the Royal Air Force. It will be a bad day for this country if anything is done—because of the setbacks and disasters which we have survived—to sever the existing co-operation between the Army and the Navy and the Air Force by splitting up the Royal Air Force.
I would like to say that nothing but harm can come from the continuance of this controversy in such parlous fashion as it is appearing in what is called the popular Press. I would like to emphasize this
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a little. Owing to the shortage of paper, the newspapers cannot publish the speeches of everyone or even the full speeches of a few. Even the Prime Minister's speeches have to be cut in the popular Press, and for this very reason it seems more than a pity that his great speeches in Parliament cannot be broadcast to the nation and to the world. Certain newspapers like The Times, the Telegraph, the Manchester Guardian and the Scotsman, which have more space, do try to publish more than one point of view, but the popular Press, which has a great circulation and less space, only publishes one side of this question and that side appears always to be the critical side. The result is that all the Services, with the millions of men in the Navy and the Army and the Air Force and their relations, see continuous paragraphs of criticism of the higher direction of the war.
They certainly see praise of individual fighting men, but, speaking as I can, I think, for a certain number of officers and men in the Services, I would say that the majority of the men do not want to see so much personal praise. They would rather see recognition of work well done by a unit as a whole or a Service as a whole. They would rather read that a squadron or a regiment, a Fleet or a Service, as a whole has done great work and has been of great use to the country in winning a great victory or saving a great defeat. How seldom do we see that. How much more often do we see great prominence given to statements, such as those which were made recently: "Our bombing attacks upon Brest had been useless." I did not notice that equally great prominence was given to the statement made by Ministers and others that the ships had been detained in Brest for over nine months. I think that the Service men do not want to read so much praise of individual deeds of gallantry, and then to read at the same time bitter criticisms of the organization of their Service and the implied criticism of their leaders with regard to organization and policy.
Though individuals in the Royal Air Force are praised, the Service men feel much more that their Service is blamed as a Service for every setback and defeat we have had, from Norway down to Malaya and Singapore. They do not so much resent it, but they feel it very much. The

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Air Force did great work in 1940. They did great work only yesterday. They have been doing great work day after day as a Service; and the organization has done great work. But they have been criticized, as being responsible for every disaster which I have mentioned. This continual criticism of the higher direction of the war will undermine the morale of the Services and of the people. No amount of personal praise for actions of individual courage will counteract the damage done in continually hitting at those at the top. It seems to me that everyone in the most junior ranks of the Services is praised, and everyone above those junior ranks is criticized.
When I go round and talk to pilots and I have to congratulate them when they have had their first honour given them, the D.S.O. or the D.F.C., I commiserate with them. I say to them, "I suppose I ought to congratulate you. You were a hero before you got your honour, you are a hero now you have got your medal (or may be two medals), but when you begin to add more medals, or have a step up in rank, or even two steps, and still more medals, apparently you will be more criticized." With each promotion they get more and more criticism, and so they come down from being heroes. We have got into the way of praising only the juniors, and the older ones in the Services want as much help as they can get. Recently that great man who won back Abyssinia for the Abyssinians and brought about the destruction of the Italian Army there, who in fact carried out a most successful campaign, has returned to this country. But what has been said and done? I have not seen great headlines in the popular Press relating to that General. I sometimes wonder how you can ever get the lower ranks to have confidence in the higher ranks.
But I am taking up too much of your Lordships' time and there is another subject upon I wish to touch for a few moments. That is the German Air Force. It has been repeatedly said that the Germans do not have the same system of organization for the Luftwaffe as we have for the Royal Air Force. I wrote in the newspapers the other day that the German system of organization was practically the same as our own only, if
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anything, more autonomous. Since then I have received proof of this in the German official communiqué issued after the escape of the German warships from Brest. This shows that the German Air Force on that occasion was not under the command of the Navy. This is what the German official communiqué of February 14 says:
"On February 12, German Naval Forces were in action against British Forces in the course of operations in the Channel as well as in the Western North Sea."
It goes on to refer to the command of the Naval Forces under Vice-Admiral Ciliaz, and then continues:
"The operations of our Naval Forces were supported by strong units of the Luftwaffe under Field-Marshal Sperle."
A similar communiqué was issued with regard to the fighting in North Africa, in which it was stated that Field-Marshal Kesselring was in command of the Air Force in the Mediterranean area.
I should like to repeat, therefore, that in many respects the German Air Force is modelled on our own organization, but that it is, if anything, more autonomous than our own. The only flying units allotted to the German Army are of a reconnaissance character. One short-range tactical reconnaissance unit is allotted per Army Corps or Armoured Division, and one long-range unit may be allotted to an Army. When affording close support to the Army, long-range bombers, dive bombers and fighter units always work under Air Force Command; in no campaign has the Luftwaffe been placed under the command of a General or an Admiral.
I now turn to the question of bombing. Time does not permit me in this debate to go into all the various problems involved, but I hope that one of your Lordships will put down on the Order Paper a Motion which will enable us to debate the subject, "Is bombing worth while?", so that others like myself, who believe that it is, can give their views. The noble Lord, Lord Denman, said he thought that bombing was no good.
LORD DENMAN: I did not say that bombing was no good. I said that it had not led to such results as we had hoped for, which is a very different thing.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: I accept the correction; I misinterpreted what the noble Lord said. The point that I am

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trying to make, however, is that the bombing of Germany has not been carried out with intensity, relentlessness and determination. I admit that. It has been diverted. Why? The Government led us to believe that it was going to be carried out with great intensity, but up to the present we have not used the Bomber Force to the extent to which I hoped to see it used. I think that probably more than half of the relatively small Bomber Force—relatively small compared with the whole of the Air Force—has been used, I do not say unjustifiably, to help the Navy in mine-laying, in attacking ships and in attacking ports none of which hits the German nation or their power to sustain the battle against Russia or in Libya. This very large percentage has been used for purposes which have nothing to do with the bombing of Germany.
I read the great speech made by President Roosevelt in America the other day. He said:
"Look at your map, look at the vast area of China … look at the vast area of Russia … look at the British Isles. Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch Indies, India, the Near East and the Continent of Africa. Look at North America, Central America and South America"
Those words should be studied, because they are the key of the situation. Here is Russia fighting this terrific fight, and succeeding more than anybody ever thought possible, against the vast machine of the enemy that we have got to beat—Germany. We have to help Russia. We try to send our supplies to Russia through the perils of the sea, and it may be that we may lose ships, aircraft, tanks and so on on their way to Russia. Could not we help "Russia more, and would not our help be of greater value to them than even these supplies of materials, if we relentlessly, determinedly, regardless of cost, continuously hit Germany behind the German Armies which are lighting the Russian Army, hitting their supplies and interrupting the life of the nation? The whole Air Force know that they can do it, and are pining to do it. Let us hit the Germans behind the German Armies which are fighting against Russia now, so that the great German Army has to face the Russian Army attacking in front and our bomber force attacking relentlessly in the rear. It is the sole weapon that can get to the heart of Germany; there is no other weapon that can do so.
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There is another point to be borne in mind in this connexion. Shipping is one of the keys of the situation for supplying all the theatres of war with goods and reinforcements, in order that they may take part in the war. Shipping is very scarce, as we all know. The bombing of Germany requires no shipping; it is the only offensive operation which does not require ships. Think of the enormous advantage of that, and think of the man-power saved in making those ships! Moreover, do not let us forget the moral effect. Every writer who has come from Germany, and every report that has come from Germany, show that the Germans do not like it when we do it, and, if we did it consistently and relentlessly, they would like it less. It has been said "Bombing here did us no harm; we did not feel it." It is ten months since we were bombed, and memories are short. I would ask any of you who were in it to remember the bombing. Although it did not affect our morale one little bit, the German mentality is different from ours. But, as I have said, this question of bombing requires a great deal more attention than the few words I have been able to speak on it. There arc many other reasons why it could still succeed in helping the Navy, the Army and all our Allies to win the final victory.
There is one further point that I wish to make. When the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, and the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, spoke about a Combined General Staff, I agree with a great deal of what they said. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, spoke as an ex-Secretary of State for Air, and Lord Cork and Orrery as a naval officer. I feel, however, that it is too widely and loosely assumed that no such Staff is in existence. The system of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet, initiated by Lord Salisbury's Committee on National and Imperial Defence nearly twenty years ago, and extended by others, provides a large nucleus of a very good Combined Staff of the three Services, working permanently together not only with each other but with representatives of other Government Departments concerned in the conduct of the war. Much that I have read convinces me that it is not generally recognized that that Combined Staff exists at all. Moreover, the present system embodies a principle of

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essential importance, in that it does not attempt to divide the responsibility of planning from the responsibility of execution. I would emphasize that point most strongly. Some noble Lords—Lord Strabolgi, I think, for one—want to separate them, but I think that it would be fatal to do so. What some people seem to wish us to do is to set up a little Brains Trust, insulated from hard realities and direct responsibility, like that which surrounded the unfortunate French General Gamelin before the fall of France.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: You do not suggest that that was my plan?
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: No.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: I have always insisted that the Great General Staff must be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff acting in their corporate capacity; I have always flatly refused to accept any divorce between planning and responsibility for action. The two must be together.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I have said that they cannot be divided. I was referring only to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and I agree with the noble Viscount on this matter. The man who makes the plans must have the responsibility for putting them into effect, and that is the noble Viscount's point. I agree that at the present time the system is not perfect, nor has it always been properly used in this war, as far as I can gather. The system of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet, which was initiated by Lord Salisbury's Committee on National and Imperial Defence nearly twenty years ago and extended by others, provides a very good Combined Staff of the three Services working permanently together.
One of the points I feel is that once the plans of the Planning Committee are approved their execution sometimes is liable to proceed in watertight compartments. Operations move so fast nowadays, whether in the air or at sea or on land, that the day-to-day—sometimes even the hour-to-hour—decisions that are essential cannot be made by the heads of the three Services unless they, or their responsible representatives, the Operational Staff Directors, have a common Battle Headquarters, a Battle Headquarters where all the latest information
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is readily available, and where the situation can be discussed and agreed decisions arrived at, without all the delays that are inevitable if the operations of the three Services are being directed from three different buildings connected by the telephone. The principle is in operation already at the various combined Area Headquarters which are shared by the Navy and Air Force commanders responsible for operations over the sea round the coasts. It is merely a matter of extending it to the centre.
In the event of invasion I cannot see how operations could be centrally controlled without a common Battle Headquarters. I seem to remember that some time after the crisis of September, 1938, it was originally intended to have a combined Battle Headquarters for the three Services. Its original design was based on the old Admiralty War Room in the last war, but has it been fully developed in this? It may be that the organization for the collection of information exists, but does the executive part in the Battle Room or War Room operate? As I have already said, the Directors of Plans of the three Services constantly meet in conference and have their whole-time staffs, I believe, permanently living and working together. But do the Directors of Operations ever meet as a team to direct jointly the operations of the three Services? This is the direction in which we can move.
I have taken too much of your Lordships' time. I feel very strongly that the bombing policy is the one thing that is absolutely necessary to carry on the war. The one thing to help the Russians is to bomb behind the lines in Germany, and not to waste so much effort on laying mines and other diversions which are continually called for. The other thing I feel very strongly is that if you break the Services and make the Services more self-contained you will separate them still more, and you will have still more arguments. Away at the head is the common direction, and I think even the noble Lord who moved this Motion will agree that there is much more co-operation than anybody thinks. You see them sitting in the Headquarters day after day, and hour after hour, and talking things over. The talk of disasters from Norway to Malaya is really done from outside, and not by the senior people who know the working of it.
LORD HAILEY: My Lords, there is one noticeable feature in the debates in this House and another place which, though it perhaps does not touch on the major issues of organization for the war, is yet of great interest to those whose main concern is with Imperial policy. Speakers have not failed to comment on the naval and military disasters which have put such an unfavourable complexion on affairs in the East. Again and again they have referred also to the shortcomings of our civil policy. Why is it, it has been asked, that we hear so much of the gallant resistance of the Filipinos against the Japanese. and so little of the fighting or general resistance on the part of the people of Malaya? Is it—I am quoting words which have been used a good deal lately—is it because our Government has "no roots in the life of the country"?
Again, it has been suggested—it was suggested in another place only yesterday—that the general attitude of the people of Burma seemed to show that they had no very great interest whether they were ruled over by us or whether another rule was substituted for ours. These are serious questions. I know that they cannot be answered by any purely dialectical treatment. It would not be an answer if I were to point out that, while we are told on the one hand—your Lordships will remember the occasion—that the people of Malaya would readily have fought for us if we had armed them, we are told on the other hand that they have so little interest in our rule, they are so little impressed by what we have done for them, that they had no concern in supporting us. That is a purely dialectical treatment of what is a very serious question.
The real point is, it has been suggested, that the whole of our policy as applied to these territories needs a new outlook and a radical change. It may be true that there has been a failure in our military policy in not utilizing the services of these populations for recruitment in local forces. There is no doubt in Malaya, among the original inhabitants and also among the Chinese immigrants, good material for recruitment, but this is a failure, if it is a failure, of military policy. It is a failure of that policy which concentrated its attention entirely on the defence of Singapore by sea or by air, and overlooked the fact that it might be invaded by land. The responsibility there lies
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entirely with the major strategy of the Empire, in the hands of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It is unreasonable, it is more than unreasonable, to suggest that any civil administration, however well accepted by the people—or however personally popular it may be—could improvise a defence at the last minute against a situation so extreme as that with which the civil administration of Malaya was faced. It was no mere question of meeting chance raiders or large-scale brigandage. They had, all unforeseen, to face an invading Army strong enough, well enough equipped and well enough organized to secure the surrender of a defended place and of 75,000 men. It would only be reasonable to say there had been a failure of the civil administration there if it could be shown—it has yet to be shown—that they had shown resistance to any demands made on them for recruiting local forces, or if they had shown apathy in executing those instructions. So much for the military aspects of it.
May I turn now to the purely civil side? Is it indeed true that our Colonial policy has so failed to impress itself on the people of these regions that they feel no identity at all with our interests? Those who make that suggestion are not, I know, thinking merely in terms of acquiescence in our policy or even appreciation of it. They may say that there is an acquiescence in our policy. They may even go so far as to say that there is an appreciation of it on the part of the people of the country. No, they are thinking of it in terms of the resistance of the Chinese peasant to the Japanese invasion, in terms of the heroic resistance of the Greek population at large to the Axis Powers, or in terms of the magnificent total resistance of the Russian people. Can we apply standards such as these, or standards even approaching these, to the attitude of the population in these areas? Let me suggest that it is more reasonable to apply standards drawn from our own experience and the experience of other Colonial Powers in dealing with Asiatic or African populations.
Where you have elements which have a military tradition or aptitude for military service you can secure their recruitment and, having secured their recruitment, you may be confident that if you yourselves have the necessary characteristics, you will secure ample

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loyalty from them. That is our own experience. It is a heartening experience for us, just as it is creditable to those whom we have admitted as our comrades-in-arms. I make no comparison with what other people have done in the same direction, but they also have had their successes. If I mention one, it is in no way to derogate from our successes, but by way of giving credit to the African population. Even the Germans were able to secure from Askaris in the last war unswerving loyalty in the midst of circumstances which would have daunted many other people and deterred them from their duty. But the service that you can secure, the type of loyalty that you can secure, from military forces recruited from selected elements of the population is something entirely different from what critics of our Colonial policy are thinking of. It does not fall within the standards they have applied. It is something entirely different from the instinctive rise of a population to defend its Government or its institutions, something different from the willingness to go to that extremity of sacrifice that we have seen shown by some peoples, particularly by those whom I have quoted.
After all, the attitude of people such as I have described must be regulated by the fact that their rulers are alien. They may sympathize with them, they may appreciate them, they may be willing, in support of their cause, to undergo additional taxation, they may willingly subscribe to objects which they think will assist them, but they will not necessarily make those wholesale sacrifices on which the energies of the whole mass of the population are engaged. There is only one cause that will produce sacrifices of that nature. It is the cause of the maintenance of national pride and the preservation of national existence. It must be long before such a sense of pride or nationality can evolve in Malaya. The indigenous population resides, for the most part, in a number of States to which they owe primary allegiance. A large part of the population consists of immigrant Chinese and other nationalities, and it must be difficult to encourage any sense of nationality among elements so diverse as these. Everyone with a long-range view of Colonial policy must agree that it is our duty not to thwart the rise of
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consciousness of that nature Every institution we create, all our administrative procedures, must look forward ultimately to that end. But let me say that we at least have shown ourselves as fully conscious of that necessity as any other Colonial Power. We may at times have been anxious not to hurry the tempo of that advance. We may even at times have been unduly aware of the embarrassment an advance of that nature may cause us, but it is a living part of our tradition, and it is not in the same sense a part of the tradition and policy of any other Colonial Power.
If there is any lesson we have to learn from events in Malaya it is this. There may be many other aspects in which we may have to show a new spirit, many other ways in which we may have to reform our administration—I will not deny that—but the lesson I learn is that we must continually have before us the necessity of encouraging a sense of nationality, national pride, and national unity among these people, and in everything we do we must attempt to give practical effect to that aspiration. I venture to apply also to Burma what I have said in the case of Malaya. We have there the additional obstacle that, while in certain parts of Burma there is a population with a military tradition, there is also over the greater part of the country a population which has so far shown very little desire to take part in the Fighting Services. Indeed, it has—and I do not speak of it in any sense with disrespect—some of the characteristics we have seen in Thailand and Indo-China. We have still to know how far Burma's ambition for political nationality will show itself in a practical desire to maintain its own nationality by making the necessary sacrifices for it.
I shall conclude with one word about India, which has also largely formed part of the discussions both here and in another place in the last few days. It need only be a short word, partly because we debated the subject a few days ago and partly because we heard yesterday that it was possible that His Majesty's Government might be putting forward a scheme which they hope will constitute some solution of the present political situation. One may recognize that nothing but a sense of the gravity of the situation would have induced His Majesty's Government to put forward at this time, contrary to their

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previous decisions and contrary to that sense of hesitation which some of us share, a scheme for constitutional changes. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance which that scheme may have, but it is permitted, perhaps, to make two observations as to features which it must now possess.
It must be a definite scheme under which communities whose interests are at present conflicting may feel they are able to adjust these differences. No mere declaration of our intentions or of our objective, however restated or on however high an authority it may issue, will have any effect now. There is a second point. Any scheme put forward must recognize our obligations to the great minorities. That is not merely a question of moral justice, it is a question of political necessity, for if a minority has to come now into negotiation under any feeling of compulsion then the mischief that results may be even more grave, more injurious to our war effort than the continuance of present political differences. If His Majesty's Government are able to devise a. scheme—it is not impossible—under which the minorities feel that they can come into negotiation as free parties and under no form of majority compulsion, then that scheme may succeed, and we shall be justified in overlooking and putting aside some of the hazards, some of the anomalies that it must necessarily involve.
We must break away from constitutional orthodoxy, and we may have to realize that the political organization of India may, as a result, take a shape that we have not hitherto envisaged. But if we have to face that necessity—and we may have to face it—then our justification will lie in the compelling necessity of the present situation, and the events will justify us if we commence to bring about this, that Indians at large shall not only think, as we believe they do think, alike with us on the menace which now confronts them, but shall be ready to act with us wholeheartedly and march with us without reserve along that arduous and difficult path which we must travel before we can achieve our final purpose.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: My Lords, I would like to begin my remarks by expressing my thanks to my noble friend Lord Moyne for all his kindnesses to me during the time he so
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splendidly led your Lordships' House. I would also like to congratulate the new Leader of your Lordships' House, and to express the certain hope that he will lead it with the same eloquence and charm as his father did. I confess to having a confused mind after listening to all the speeches that have been made this afternoon. I venture to think that if I had not listened to them perhaps I would have been able to expound the views I wish to put forward more clearly. I hold the view that in the very grave situation in which our country finds itself, we are justified in criticizing where we think criticism should be directed. It is all very well to say do not criticize this, and do not criticize that, because you will interfere with the war effort. If you have just criticism to make, criticism that is well-founded on experience and facts, then by making it you may induce a change in certain aspects of the conduct of the war, in our organization, that will produce the results which, as we know, were produced in the last war after continued criticism.
With those preliminary remarks I want to state that with regard to the escape of the German ships up the Channel I have nothing to say, because I know nothing about it, and there is a Court of Inquiry sitting on it. But when I come to refer to what has been happening in Singapore and Hong Kong there I am on ground which I know something about. What has happened there beats me altogether. I know for a fact the War Office were informed before the war that no suitable defence on the landward side of Malaya existed. An officer came home from the Staff in Malaya and put those facts before the War Office. Memoranda were written by myself and others on this particular subject, yet so far as I can make out from reports, very vague reports that I have got, nothing was done. It may well be said by those in authority: "Of course, we always expected to defend Singapore from the sea." Surely it is always the unexpected that happens, and if we had taken note of the previous tactics of the Japanese when they attacked Port Arthur, we would have known perfectly well that the route they would take would be a land route. There were much more disturbing signs showing that was the line they were likely to take, for we discovered all down the coast that

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many of the Japanese fishermen were ex-naval ratings who were obviously there for one purpose. How is it that the defenceless state of Malaya should exist when those facts were known? Have we no General Staff, or what has happened to it? It disturbs a mind like mine that has been accustomed to the higher training of war, to think that these things should be.
Then, when the retreat took place from the mainland of Malaya into Singapore itself, surely an appreciation of the situation there must have told military commanders that they could not possibly hold that place, unless they had suitable air support and air bases from which to operate that air support. If that was so, why were troops not evacuated from that place? Why were not stores, and valuable stores, taken away from it? Why was the 18th Division sent in at the last minute when what was wanted was not troops but aeroplanes, and aeroplane bases to work from? Was it not known, and well known, to the authorities at home that white troops cannot do navvy's work under the conditions in Malaya and Singapore? With temperatures of 83 and 85 it is physically impossible. The ordinary Malayan labourer disappeared, and the only labourers the military could lay their hands on were a few Chinese. The result was, as I have heard, that there were cases where troops had been worn out doing work which they could not physically do under the conditions of the climate out there. Surely that must have been foreseen. Why an appreciation of the situation was not arrived at in time I cannot conceive. I only hope that a thorough and expert inquiry will take place into the facts, and there should be a proper method of dealing with those who were to blame.
I am not saying for a moment that Singapore could have been defended because, as long ago as 1923, in another place, we pointed out to the Government of the day that it could not be defended, and we divided the House twice on the subject. I remember Mr. George Lambert, who was long associated with the Admiralty and therefore had the Admiralty point of view, made a very strong speech on that point, saying that if a sudden attack was carried out by Japan Singapore could not be held because of the long distance over which re-
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inforcements must be sent. That being the case, surely some better arrangement should have been made for defence if it was the intention to defend Singapore. Something is wrong there and people want to know what has happened.
Then again, ought not Hong Kong to have been evacuated? I do not know what happens in modern war, but in my, days we had plans to meet eventualities all over the world. Those plans made it clear that you could not defend a certain place unless you had certain conditions. If you lost part of the hinterland you could not defend Hong Kong. Then why was not an effort made to remove the troops, who would have been of such great value elsewhere? I just cannot understand it. I will not talk of Burma and India, because they will be dealt with in due course, but I should like to say in passing that I hope that the splendid speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, particularly the last part of it, will be very carefully studied by His Majesty's Government.
There is a point about Malaya which applies to all Colonial possessions, although of course Malaya is not a Colony but a Federation of Independent States. I want to ask whether our Colonial Government out there are suitable for the preparation of defensive measures. How far for years have they refused to do what they have been asked to do? It seems to me the buck has been passed from Malaya to London and back from London to Malaya. If you are going to defend a territory there must be only one commander. If you have a dual command, one command for civilians and another for military personnel, you cannot do what you want to do. When there is a state of war you must appoint a Military Governor. I cannot help thinking that if that had been done in Malaya it would have been of great advantage to the defence.
Now I turn to a subject which, for years, ever since the last war, I have been bringing forward, with, I am sorry to say, very little support, although the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, when he was in another place, used to support me. I refer to the question of a Grand General Staff combined with a Ministry of Defence. In 1928 in the other House, in 1934, 1936 and 1939 in this House, I tried to press the point. Who is the Minister of Defence? Is it an office, or what

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is it? The Prime Minister does not kiss the King's hand on appointment. It seems to me a sort of description of the duties of the Prime Minister. I think it is right that only the Prime Minister can be the Minister of Defence, but is the help he is getting on the technical side from the Committee of Chiefs of Staff good enough? When the Chiefs of Staff sit together, who presides?
LORD CHATFIELD: I do not wish to interrupt the noble Lord but perhaps he would allow me to explain. The Chiefs of Staff are selected by the Prime Minister and the Chairman is selected by the Prime Minister periodically. He presides for quite a long period and when he goes he is succeeded by someone from another Service. The Services take it in turn.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: I well remember that Sir William Robertson used to complain of the burden it was to go along every morning to the War Cabinet and report there. If the Prime Minister is going to have a considered view of the strategical movement of troops or ships and make up his mind what orders he is going to issue to the various Services, he ought to have a Staff to work out problems, with a Chief of the Staff to give him advice as to what he ought to do. You must remember that you may not always have a man so efficient in that way as the present Prime Minister, and you certainly want machinery of this kind. Moreover, if you had such an office the Chiefs of Staff would be relieved of a good deal of work that they ought not to have to do. They could then look after their own affairs in their own Services.
There is one other small point I would like to mention which is interesting. There is such a thing as the patent of Admiralty. I always understood that the Board of Admiralty was subject in regard to the Fleet to the King and not to any Prime Minister. Possibly in war time they may have to work under the Prime Minister. At any rate, it is not so very long ago that in your Lordships' House we again begged the Government—I think it was in March, 1939—to have an organization set up to assist the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence in coming to decisions on strategical problems. I was interested to hear that when the
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noble Earl, Lord Cork, lectured to the Imperial Staff College, he had a good many supporters for the idea. He was more lucky than I was., I lectured to the Imperial Staff College for three-quarters of an hour, and when I asked if anyone agreed only one hand was held up. I was also interested to note that the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, had slightly altered his opinion since the days when he was Leader of your Lordships' House.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: If my noble friend will read the speeches I have made on the subject of the Ministry of Defence, he will find that I have been perfectly consistent in everything I have said.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: At any rate we have more supporters now for the view that we ought to have a Grand General Staff. It is only in that way, I believe, that you can get real coordination of the three Services. I was rather amused at the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, when he said why cannot we get away from always being surprised. He asked if we had forgotten all the lessons of the last war. Have we, somehow or other, just thrown everything aside and started de novo from the very bottom? And it seems that, in fact, in some cases that has been done. The other day it was announced that personnel in the Army had been badly placed according to their capacity, and it was decided to set up trade testing boards and things like that, to get various people into their proper places. Goodness gracious, at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 we worked out a most elaborate scheme for trade testing every recruit that came into the Army. We had five million cards filed. Every man was trade tested. We knew where all the experienced, fine electrical workmen and every other kind of workmen were to be found. As I say, the testing was carried out when the men were recruited. Why could it not have been done at the beginning of this war?
The Americans adopted our scheme and improved upon it in 1918 under Major-General McCain, the Adjutant-General of the Army in Washington at that time. He adopted our scheme and brought in Professor Swan and Professor Scott to help him. They worked out a most elaborate scheme for trade testing recruits. This matter was regarded over there as so important that it was later taken from

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the hands of the Adjutant-General and put under the Chief of the General Staff. They said it was not merely a matter of administration but of construction. I cannot believe that the records of all the facts and all the arrangements which were left behind in the War Office do not exist to this day. And yet they seem not to have been dug out and acted upon. It is only now, after two and a half years of war, that a start all over again is being made in connexion with this matter.
VISCOUNT COBHAM: Does the noble Lord forget that it is not the War Office that is responsible for recruiting but the Ministry of Labour?
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: I am obliged to the noble Viscount. Now I want to touch upon another controversial point and that deals with what they call the Independent Air Force, whether it ought to be part of the Army or allocated to the Army or how should it be dealt with. I feel, on that subject, that you cannot change a system in the middle of the war. The Air Force, as at present constituted and trained, has, I think, done Wonderfully well. A force has been produced which could never have been produced if it had not had the driving force of its own commanders and everything else. I believe what is happening now is that the allocation of air to the Army is being carried out with the closest co-operation, provided always that existing air grounds and aerodromes are available. After all, the Air Arm has got to come to the ground; it cannot stay in the air for ever, and that is one point that the public seem to be misled about. The question has been repeatedly asked why our Forces on certain occasions did not have adequate air support. In many cases—in Crete and in Singapore for example—they had not any aerodromes to operate from. To say that you ought to change your system because of that is, I think, stupid. Therefore I hope that the Government will leave the air alone and press this close co-operation of the three Services by means of a Grand General Staff. If we start to fall out about it now we shall get a worse result than we have got to-day.
The last matter with which I wish to deal relates to the War Cabinet. I have often discussed the former War Cabinet
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with the gentleman who was Prime Minister in the last war, and I have read about it as much as I could from the writings of people who knew. If my noble friend Lord Hankey were here, he would probably, if he were allowed, be able to tell a very great deal about it. But the fact remains that the present War Cabinet is not the same at all as the War Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George. The reason is perfectly clear. It is partly a delegate War Cabinet, in other words it represents Parties. That disadvantage did not exist before, and I think that is one of the reasons why the War Cabinet to-day consists of seven. It is too large a body. Nevertheless, I think that the present War Cabinet is a great advance over the one that it succeeds.
The personnel includes some notable figures, and I think that these are quite able to give the necessary statement of what it is proposed to do, and to decide what should be done. At any rate we have got to give the new War Cabinet a run and see what they can do. We only hope that the Prime Minister will—and I am sure that he will—do everything he can to lighten the burden upon his own shoulders, because he has got to direct most of his effort towards the handling of the war and if he is going to mix himself up in other questions—well, I say he simply cannot do it. I am rather afraid, too, that Mr. Bevin, although he has done wonderful work for Labour, is too heavily burdened really to have the time to dig into and delve into the various papers that are bound to come before the War Cabinet. I hope that before long the War Cabinet will produce good results.
My next remarks are on another topic. We had, not very long ago a statement from Lord Beaverbrook on the question of production. I am very sorry that he has left the Government, but he may yet be able to do a good job in synchronizing work in America and bringing it over here. The production of tanks, guns, aeroplanes and everything else is really no good unless you can put that production into the right place at the right time. It is no good having troops with arms unless they use those arms. I think that a vigorous offensive spirit ought, if possible, to be generated amongst all our troops. There is a tendency for them to become bored. If some system could be evolved by which

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they could use their arms, either across the Channel or elsewhere, it would brighten up the Army, put the desire to fight into their hearts, and be of advantage in every way. To do that, however, we must have ships and yet more ships, and not only for the Navy but for the Mercantile Marine. There seems to be some difficulty about the allocation of shipyards in this country. Only the Ministry of Shipping can say what the problem is, but it is one of the production problems which face us today, and it may be that we shall have to build more yards, as we did in the last war. At all events, that question demands very close study by experts.
The last word that I have to say is this. I think those in authority have attached too much importance to youth. Youth is certainly desirable for action in the field, but there are brains in some of the older men who have had experience which ought to be used. In working out the problems of what to do, where to put troops, and where to fight, we can make use of the older men, who are quite fit to do that work, whereas the younger ones can carry out their work in the field. We have been paying too much importance to youth, and it has led us to drive away many useful people who could do as well as, if not better than, some of these younger officers and men.
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, let me begin by joining my voice with that of those who have expressed their appreciation of the many courtesies of the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, as Leader of this House, and their congratulations to his successor. The noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, spoke with a good deal of emphasis, and I think with some justifiable emotion, about the way in which the Staff and senior officers of the Air Force in particular—but his remarks were, I think, of application to the Forces generally—had been overlooked in public appreciation, He said that the outward and visible signs of glory and popular approval had been bestowed rather upon the junior than upon the senior officers. I think that there is much truth in that, and that up to a point it is a grave matter. It is a failure in our layout for the war, and in relation to national morale in connexion with the war, that so little is known about, and consequently so little enthusiasm is felt
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for, the rather amorphous and anonymous General Staffs of the three Forces and our principal leaders in the field. What is the reason? The reason is that their names are scarcely known. In the newspapers and on the wireless the names of officers of the Royal Air Force who have performed gallant deeds are reported, and they become rapidly familiar to large numbers of the public, but with the senior officers it is otherwise.
It is a grave matter, for this reason. Of course people are sustained in their spirit by loyalty to an idea; of course they fight for a flag; but they are equally sustained by loyalty to individuals, and, so far as the Armed Forces at home are concerned, there is no name in any of the three Forces that is conspicuously known to the people, whether within or without the Armed Forces. Your Lordships, of course, are familiar with the names of the Chiefs of the Staffs of the three Forces; but go out into Parliament Street and ask the casual passer-by the name of any one of the Chiefs of Staff, and you will find that not one in ten thousand will be able to tell you. Go into the Services Clubs to-day, where men and women of the three Forces assemble, and ask them casually who is the Chief of Staff of the Navy, and in most cases you will find that they do not know. Ask them who is the Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, and you will find that the name is utterly unfamiliar to the public and to members of the Forces. Go to men—I have done it myself—who are actually serving in the Army in this country, and ask them who is Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, responsible for the defence of these islands in the event of invasion, and not one in a thousand will be able to tell you; and, whilst the proportion among officers is not so small, it is still lamentably low. I have asked Commanding Officers "Should I be correct in saying that not one in a thousand men know the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces?", and they have said "You will be correct if you say not one in ten thousand."
It is imperative that these names should be made better known, that the names of Sir Alan Brooke, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Dudley Pound and Sir Bernard Paget should be well known to the general public and to the Forces which they lead. Their

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names are at present entirely unknown. Many of your Lordships will remember that at the time of the Boer War many of us who were youngsters used to wear buttons bearing the name and photograph of Redvers Buller, Roberts or Methuen. They stir a chord in me even at this moment. In the last war, the names of Haig, French, Rawlinson and Home were familiar to everyone in this country, even the youngest. The name of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, was familiar to all classes of the community, old and young alike, in the last war. There is no one who has taken their place in the esteem of the population now, and it is a matter of real importance that these personal loyalties should be established, so that youngsters in particular, who go far to create an opinion in the homes of the people at large, may feel that they have a personal interest in those who are entrusted with the actual conduct of the war. I wonder how many casual passers-by, asked the question outside within the next half hour by any of your Lordships, could say who was Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet; yet the name of Jellicoe was a household word in the last war. That is not the theme on which I had proposed to seek the indulgence of your Lordships, but my mind has been directed to the subject, which is one about which I had long intended to speak, because of the remarks of the noble and gallant Viscount.
We have had a good many substantial successes in the last two years. A catalogue of successes could in fact be prepared, although that fact is too often overlooked by reason of more recent failures. We have long been warned that we shall have to suffer further discomfitures here and there. The people of this country can be trusted to face the malignities of fortune with calmness, provided that they feel that the machine of government is compact, that it is in firm hands, and that those in power are pursuing, together with our Allies, a planned and' concerted strategy. The Prime Minister has, in my belief, by his reconstruction of the Government, ensured that essential support, and I believe it to be now generally felt that the machine itself and the method of its working, as explained by the Minister, are well designed for their purpose. I have little to say on the reconstruction of the Government
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except that to have combined the representation in the Cabinet of the Dominions with the second post in the Cabinet seems to me to have been a real masterstroke of statesmanship.
I want to say a word with regard to the position of the Prime Minister. It seems to me that any Prime Minister, and this Prime Minister in particular, must inevitably hold at the same time as the office of Prime Minister that of Minister of Defence. But I submit that it would be in keeping with the rightly and admirably pugnacious character of the Prime Minister, and would keep to the forefront the spirit of aggression which we must cultivate if we are to win this war, if, instead of the rather passive title of Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister should adopt the more active and more resonant name of Minister of War. That would be more in keeping with the spirit of the times. I think the Prime Minister is mistaken if he has thought that, as far as the generality of the people are concerned, he has at any time enjoyed less than their whole support, but it is important that he should not only have that support but should be known to have it, and known not only here but everywhere. I believe the result of the debates both in this House and in another place will have given to the world overt evidence of the unambiguous and unqualified support that the Prime Minister and his Government now enjoy. And if these debates serve no other purpose but that, they will have been very well worth while.
The people have chosen the Prime Minister for their hero. This is much the same line of thought as that to which I addressed myself previously in regard to those commanding in the field. In times of war every people needs a hero. It would be ill-service to the national cause if anything were done to undermine this confidence or, what is perhaps equally important, the confidence of the Prime Minister in himself; for no man can go tiger hunting if he feels that he has to be looking over his shoulder all the time. The Prime Minister need not fear that. I am led to these observations by a speech which some of your Lordships heard yesterday by a distinguished American, Mr. Averell Harriman, when, speaking as a distinguished citizen of the United States, and with the knowledge gained by him in journeyings in many parts of the world during the war, in conversation

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with people drawn from many countries, he made it clear that the name and personality of Mr. Churchill mean much more to the war effort than the name and personality of the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It was the name and personality merely of an almost legendary hero, as he put it. And even in Germany it was becoming clear that among the non-Nazis "Churchill" means hope. We must do nothing to dim that hope; it is a prime duty that we have in this country to keep that hope bright.
Had the hour been earlier, I should have liked to address some inquiry to the noble Viscount opposite as to the view which he takes in his capacity as Secretary of State for the Colonies as to what Colonial policy should be in the world which we now have to face. It is a matter to which he probably has had but little time to give attention. I could scarcely have expected the answer to-day in any case, so I will not even to-day put the question. I had also hoped, though there are others far better qualified than myself to speak upon the subject, to have asked what the Government's intentions were with regard to India; but it is understood, from a statement made yesterday by Sir Stafford Cripps, that His Majesty's Government will shortly make a pronouncement upon that subject. That will suit your Lordships' convenience better, and it may indeed in the public interest be safer that no more should be said about that until the statement of the Government is ready to be made public.
I wish to draw attention to the absence from the Cabinet of any Minister to perform the functions formerly fulfilled by the Minister without Portfolio. While we-are speaking, and rightly, about the situation as it may arise in India and in the Colonial territories of the Crown, it would be ironic if our minds and energies were directed to the improvement of conditions elsewhere while remaining inert as to the situation in this country itself. The functions of the Minister without Portfolio were not, it is true, related, strictly and directly, to the conduct of the war, but rather to the situation that would arise after the war or, as I prefer to put it, after the cessation of hostilities, for there is, at least in the view of some, a difference between the two. People here at home want to feel that the Government
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are thinking of their future, that steps are being taken to ensure that injustices and maladjustments that existed in the past are really going to be ironed out for the future, that the Government are thinking and working out plans now for the smooth transition from war to peace; for, believe me, the transition from war to peace will be no less difficult and will create no fewer dislocations than the transition, hard as it has been, from peace to war.
I have heard men of vast experience in government and administration declare indeed that our troubles will only begin when the "Cease fire" sounds. It is essential that some place be found in the Government for a Department—I am not now speaking of the War Cabinet—which will be working on, and, what is equally important, be known to be working on, those vastly difficult problems of national welfare, rehabilitation and resettlement with which we shall be confronted immediately hostilities cease. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will be in a position to make any intimation upon this subject to-day, but I trust that, without any long interval, some definite statement can be made to show the people of the country that those important functions will be entrusted to some Minister of the Crown.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, after this long debate, opened on Tuesday by the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition and continued to a late hour to-day, I may safely claim that the discussion has been one which is worthy of the House and which shows that this Chamber can maintain its great historical traditions. Speeches have been made of the greatest weight and importance, and if now I deal but briefly with the matter, I know that will be excused both because of the hour and because it is my unhappy lot to take the place, at the last moment, of my noble friend and colleague the Minister for Economic Warfare (Viscount Wolmer), who is kept away, as your Lordships know, by grave anxiety for his father.
I said that the debate had been worthy of your Lordships' House, and my noble friend Lord Denman, who spoke earlier in the afternoon, made some observations on the part which this House, and some of its members, now took in the actual and immediate functions of executive government. I had better mention in

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passing an error into which he, not unnaturally, fell. It is not the case today that there is a constitutional provision that two Secretaries of State should be members of the House of Lords. In fact, that never was the form of the provision. Constitutional provision has been made in different forms that there should not sit in the House of Commons more than a certain number of Ministers of particular sorts, and, as in so many things connected with our Constitution, without its being said, it followed as a practical matter that there was a balance left that had to be supplied from the membership of this House. But in the year 1937, as your Lordships will recall, there was passed an Act called the Ministers of the Crown Act, which slightly changed the arrangement, though not to the disadvantage of this House.
The old rule applied solely to Secretaries of State. That really was a very artificial distinction. This House might contain the First Lord of the Admiralty, but he would not count for this purpose at all. The new provision is that the House of Commons must not contain more than 15 of a list of Ministers of the first order who are set out in a Schedule to the Act. Though that is not the same thing as saying that the number of Secretaries of State is distributed between the two Houses, the new arrangement is, on the whole, an advantage. It has done your Lordships no harm, and while I share fully the feelings of noble Lords who have spoken, and would like to see here a larger representation of the Government—and it may be a member of the War Cabinet—still it is right to make that correction so that there should not be any misunderstanding. No constitutional rule or practice has been broken in this matter by the Prime Minister at all.
I shall not attempt to deal—and I do not think I shall be expected to deal now—with a number of the very important points which have been raised. There is, for example, the point just mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Nathan. I do not think he would expect me to undertake to make a statement at this moment as to: the provision which will be made for the future after the war. It has been already t intimated—in any case it may be safely assumed—that a statement on this sub-
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ject will be made by the Prime Minister at a very early date. In the same way, deeply interested as I am in the subject, I must not offer any observations on future plans for India. Lord Hailey—not for the first time in this House—has made a contribution of the greatest weight and authority, and I should like to assure him that those who have to decide this matter pay close attention to his words. Lord Chatfield, in that most remarkable and informing speech that he made to-day, which must have impressed all your Lordships, made one request at the end of his remarks which I do not think he really could have expected any representative Minister to comply with. He asked what was the present situation in regard to our naval building programme. There are a good many people outside this House, and in another country, who might like to know that, and I certainly have not a single word to say here in public on that subject.
Then my noble friend Lord Hutchison, in his most interesting speech, in common with others of your Lordships, made some observations, criticisms, and inquiries regarding Singapore. It is very natural that he should do so, and I suppose there are others who very much desire further information on that subject. The only proper course for me is to follow the example which the Prime Minister set the other day. I shall not commit the enormity, in your Lordships' House, of quoting the words used in another place, but, for greater accuracy, I have provided myself with a copy, and I gather that the general effect of the Prime Minister's observation was that he, at any rate, for the moment, would not attempt to pass judgment, that this would be an unseasonable moment, and a very ungracious task, when our information was not complete, and that we had more urgent work to do because, whatever may be said about the recent past, we have to face the situation resulting from the great loss of that base, of the troops, and the equipment of a whole Army. We have to face the situation that results from that and from the great new Japanese war which has burst upon us. If anybody has the curiosity to compare the words I have just used with the language of the Prime Minister—which of course I must not quote—I trust they will not find any material difference between the two.

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In the few minutes that I shall occupy I think I shall best serve the general purpose of the House, and best discharge this impromptu duty of mine, if I say a word about the new War Cabinet and a word about the Minister of Defence. Both subjects are of very great interest to me, and I have in my own way endeavoured to make a study, for some time past, of both topics. As regards the War Cabinet, it is of course quite true, as has been pointed out by more than one of your Lordships, that this new War Cabinet is not composed exclusively of Ministers who are free from Departmental duties. My noble friend Lord Londonderry made that point perfectly clearly at the beginning of the debate to-day. But with great respect, the fact is that there has never been a War Cabinet which consisted exclusively of Ministers free from Departmental responsibility.
Even if you take the case which is most commonly quoted, the first War Cabinet under Mr. Lloyd George, it contained Mr. Bonar Law, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I can assure your Lordships, whatever else may be said, that the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer is not one which is free of departmental responsibility. Mr. Balfour, if I may for this purpose call him by that name, was in fact never an actual member of the War Cabinet in the last war, but he attended so constantly and took so important and influential a part that it would be a mere technicality to treat him as separate from it. He, of course, during the time of which I am speaking, was Foreign Secretary. I am very glad to hear the universal approval which has been expressed in this debate of the arrangement by which the Minister who holds the office of Dominion Secretary should be in the War Cabinet. It is a very significant fact in our constitutional development, and, I hope, is a very firm assurance of the nature of the comradeship which exists between the different communities that fight under the sovereignty of the same King.
I think, therefore, that what has now been arranged is generally recognized by the country as being a great improvement, as one which the country as a whole is very willing to see work, and to which it extends nothing but good wishes. I do not quite agree with the remark made by my noble friend lord Winster, in one small passage of his speech, when he
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said that the War Cabinet has experienced a very tepid reception. Well, it all depends upon your notions of temperature. I think myself that public opinion is not thus truly described. I think, in particular, that the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps, not only as a member of the War Cabinet but as Leader of the House of Commons, is one of those bold strokes of judgment and imagination which have had an immense effect upon the confidence of the country. I think that anybody who read the speech which Sir Stafford Cripps made yesterday in the House of Commons will only find his confidence confirmed. So much for that.
Now I come to the only other point on which I would venture to say a word, and it is on the very difficult and highly debatable subiect—it must be highly debatable because it has been so much debated—connected with the Minister of Defence. It seems to me very necessary on that subject to keep clearly in mind the distinction between two quite different questions. One question is, who should be the Minister of Defence, and the other question is, should there be a Ministry of Defence; and those two things are, far from being the same. I confess that I think the phrase "Minister of Defence" does not indicate so much a separate department of government as a description of ultimate responsibility which in time of war must attach to the Prime Minister and cannot attach to anybody else. That I think was very much the view expressed on Tuesday by my noble friend Lord Swinton. It has been repeated in different forms by several spokesmen to-day.
I noticed that the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons the other day, described this as a "title," and that is what it is. I am not discussing what ought to be, or whether there should be a different, or some more elaborate, organization, but the fact of the matter at the moment is that the "Minister of Defence" is what I have endeavoured to describe. There is no separate appointment, as my noble friend Lord Hutchison pointed out, there is no separate seal, there is no separate oath, there is no separate departmental office, and I regard it as a self-evident proposition, which a sensible man should arrive at even without much experience but which in the light of our experience is incapable of challenge, that

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the man who is Prime Minister must take ultimate responsibility, and must answer to Parliament and to the people for the discharge of that responsibility. He did it in the last war and he is doing it in this war.
I might perhaps be allowed for a moment to refer to what I think actually happened at a critical moment in the last war. When in December, 1916, the difficulties arose which were ended by Mr. Lloyd George becoming Prime Minister in place of Mr. Asquith, one proposal which was mooted before that change was made in the course of what you may call the negotiations, was that Mr. Asquith should remain Prime Minister, and even titular head of the organization which was running the war, but that another Minister should be responsible for the immediate conduct of the war as far as that responsibility attaches to Ministers and not to technical officials. That was considered as a possible adjustment. Mr. Asquith rejected, and in my judgment he rightly rejected, that proposal, not on any personal grounds at all, but on the constitutional and practical ground that the Prime Minister, whoever he is, and nobody else, must himself accept and discharge full responsibility for such a situation. I believe that to be beyond any question both the correct constitutional position and the only practical solution. This matter was very acutely analyzed, if I may say so, in the speech this afternoon by Lord Winster.
Now there is a second question which is quite separate from this, which is the question whether there ought to be created a full-fledged and separate Ministry of Defence. As your Lordships know, before the war—and there is still to some extent in some quarters—there was a school of thought which was supported by very distinguished and influential names which would seek to throw together the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry into a single Department—to fuse them and give them one single administrative head. There may be smaller countries and smaller wars in which such an arrangement is feasible, but for my part I thought before the war—and I often heard discussions on the subject—and I certainly think now, that having regard to the enormous and inevitable complications in the administration of
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these three great Services, having regard to the fact that the war is world-wide, an idea of this kind, of a single man taking such a vast range of responsibility upon his single shoulders, is quite fantastic. I notice that the very people who urge that the Prime Minister must be separate from the Ministry of Defence, do not go on to suggest who this hitherto concealed individual is who would be able to undertake so colossal a burden.
It is not that form of forced unity that is really the need, and the speeches this afternoon have made very clear that that is not really the direction in which some intelligent public-spirited minds are tempted to move. The question is how can you get the best co-operation between these Services. I quite agree with the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork, that they really arc all performing one overwhelming function of fighting for the country, but what is the arrangement which will secure the best effective cooperation between the Services? An over-centralization is not necessarily the same thing as the most effective co-operation. My noble friend Viscount Trenchard just now made the acute observation that you must be careful, at a time when we are all labouring under the blows of ill-fortune and setbacks, not to translate that very natural sentiment into an unfounded attack upon the extent of the real cooperation which exists.
I must be allowed to add one other criticism—I am sorry he is not here—addressed to the speech delivered this afternoon by my noble friend the Marquess of Salisbury. He expressed in his pungent way the sense of frustration and shortcoming which I suppose everybody feels in reference to preparations before the war. But the noble Marquess is really—with great respect to him—quite wrong in saying that nothing had been done in these matters before the war. When the books come to be opened very much may be found to have been unwise, much may be found to be deficient, but I am sure anyone who inquires into, for instance, the work done by my noble friend Lord Hankey, and all the planning that was arranged in the years before the war, will certainly not subscribe to the proposition that we started with blank minds and a clear sheet of paper. I hope your Lordships will bear with me for a few minutes while I endeavour to

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state in such clearness of language as I can command, what in fact is the outline of the present arrangements. Before I do so I would like to say most firmly and sincerely, that I do not give this account with any idea that I am describing the perfect and final machine. Things grow. Experience shows that they ought to be altered, and I should think very poorly of the attitude of anybody with responsibilities at this time who treated everything that now existed as a sealed pattern which in no circumstances could be improved as the result of informed criticism or further experience.
But let us see what are the actual arrangements. There is a machinery necessarily elaborate, but a very complete machinery for co-ordinating the work of the three Services. It is not an improvisation since the war started. It has been built up over many years. Improvements have been made in it, modifications have been introduced to suit the better appreciation of the situation to be dealt with. It is convenient to state the matter under these three heads: the framing of policy, the planning, and the conduct of operations, Take these in turn. First as regards policy. The whole structure is built up throughout as a. joint conception with officers of the three Services forming part of the Chiefs of Staff organization. The three Chiefs of Staff have a joint responsibility for devising all defence policy and all important questions are thrashed out. by them. No single phase of the war effort of course nowadays can be regarded as the concern of one Service only.
Take a very simple example, well known to noble friends whom I see sitting below the gangway—the employment of bomber squadrons of the R.A.F. It is necessary to consider first of all the amount of effort that is to be and can be devoted to the different theatres of war; the question of distribution. That is a decision which springs from the strategy of the war in its widest sense, though it is largely governed, too, by the extent of available supplies. Next it is necessary to decide the type of target against which home-based bombers should operate. We have heard again from my noble friend Viscount Trenchard his strong and considered view on that subject. That involves, of course, consideration of the economic position of the enemy; it involves the consideration of the general
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naval situation, as well as a multitude of technical air considerations. Under the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff all these matters are worked out in detail by the Joint Planning Staffs of the three Services, it may be in consultation with experts from other Ministries like the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Finally, the best scheme and policy is drawn up and is submitted for approval by supreme Ministerial authority.
Here I would make this observation more especially with reference to a highly critical part of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield. I can well under stand that great servants of this country, who have devoted their lives, their brains, their skill and their courage to a great fighting Service, may sometimes feel impatient at the fact that the best of their plans none the less have to run the gauntlet of political and Ministerial criticism and judgment. It does not happen, I believe, in Japan, but you must make up your mind whether you want to live under the system of Parliamentary democracy with all its strength and influence, with its power of gathering into a focus the whole sentiment of the country and giving it renewed force and direction, or whether, recognizing that your adversary is a great expert, you will abandon this well-tried method and leave what may well be the finest technical judgment a larger and more final part in direction. It really is a constitutional question, and I think myself—
LORD CHATFIELD: As the noble and learned Viscount has referred to me, would he allow me to say that I entirely agree with his conception of how things should be conducted as regards military and political guidance? I have never said anything which would oppose the idea that you must have final political judgment applied to military advice.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am very glad. I know my noble friend from of old and I know how loyally he has worked in combination with his colleagues. I did not mean to speak critically, but rather sympathetically, because I do most thoroughly understand how a man with great expert knowledge may find it a clog on his clear judgment to know that it has to pass to others much less well instructed on the technical side than himself. I say therefore that it must be for Ministers, for the War

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Cabinet, to decide, and especially it must be so when other than purely military considerations have to be taken into account.
Secondly, there is the matter of planning, and I will be very brief about this. When the general policy or particular operation in connexion with the conduct of the war has been settled as I have tried to describe, then it becomes necessary to plan; not only to plan specific operations but to plan the appropriate distribution of forces, and the provision of resources at the right time and the right place. In fact, there are special sections of the Chiefs of Staff organization, again composed of officers of the three Services, who carry out these tasks up to the point where it is necessary for Commanders in the field to be appointed. There is a point—there may be some dispute as to just where it is to be found—where you pass from the field of planning operations to the field of operations itself. Although I do not claim to speak as being the least bit in the world an expert on this subject, I have, in fact, taken a very close interest in studying it, and I must say that I believe that a conception to which colour is sometimes given, that the present system sometimes leads to rivalries or disagreements between the different Services, is wholly unfounded. I believe that, whatever may be said in criticism of the system, it does produce what everybody wishes to see, unity and informed judgment by experts of the three Services, rather than jockeying for position by one Service as against the other.
Lastly, operations. All operations, whether at home or abroad, are conducted and must be conducted by Commanders. As the House knows, arrangements are not, in all cases, the same; they depend upon circumstances. In the case of a large and independent theatre of war like the Middle East the general system is to appoint a Commander for each of the three Services. They work in cooperation in furtherance of a general policy laid down by the Government. But there is no hard-and-fast rule about that. If it is thought best to appoint one Commander who will be supreme over more than one Service such a Commander is appointed. The instance which, of course, is in everybody's mind is the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief,
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South-West Pacific, to exercise supreme control over land and Air Forces in that theatre; and there have been other instances on a smaller scale where a single Commander has been appointed. Up to the present, in the Middle East, the system is what I have described.
The home theatre—if I may add this without delaying your Lordships too much—has always presented special features—the size of the area of operations, extending as it does, of course, many miles beyond our coast in all directions, the fact that a very highly developed defence organization has to be built up alongside ever-increasing air operations, and specialized problems connected with the movements of our own shipping. These things have made it desirable to avoid over-centralization in the system of control. But there is complete co-operation. It has been secured and it is working. As I think Lord Chat-field said in his speech just now, Coastal Command R.A.F. works under the operational control of the Admiralty, and I am sure your Lordships will have been very pleased to hear two most distinguished authorities, Lord Chatfield and Lord Trenchard, naturally approaching the subject with the knowledge of their special Services, say that they felt that, though that might not be a very logical arrangement, it was working, and it would be the greatest of all possible mistakes to begin pulling up this plant by the roots to ascertain how it is growing. The truth is that different circumstances demand different forms of co-operation. The essential thing is that the system of command and co-operation should be flexible and capable of adjustment.
As I have indicated, what is quite certain, I think, is that the idea that any one Service to-day is working on its own account for the furtherance of its own ends, rather than for the common good, is quite unfounded, and, indeed, is quite absurd. If I am correctly informed, our system is in many respects similar to that adopted by Germany. At times the German Air Force has co-operated with the Army in furtherance of the land battle in the same way as ours is now doing in Libya. At other times it has operated independently, as in the air bombardment of the British Isles. At times it has cooperated with forces at sea, as, for example, in the Mediterranean at the

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present time. I doubt whether, when these things are ultimately examined, there will be found to be such a great distinction. I would ask those who have contributed so usefully to this debate, and who have been, as it is right that they should be, bold and fearless in their criticism, fully to weigh the arguments which have appealed to many independent and skilled minds for the substance of our present system, and, above all, to remember what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, that you cannot change a system fundamentally in the middle of a war.
I will, if I may, mention one other thing to which, I think, Lord Trenchard referred. The day-to-day operations of the various Commanders-in-Chief at home are governed by directives issued to them in accordance with the policy that has been laid down Ministerially on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. I think a daily meeting is held at the Admiralty to discuss current operational matters. This is always attended by the Director of Naval Co-operation from the Air Ministry, and by a liaison officer from the War Office. Naval Commanders at home have, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, has told us, Combined Headquarters, at which representatives of the Royal Air Force and Military Commands are present, and it is those Combined Headquarters which direct the action of the naval and military Forces in the area and of the local formations of Coastal Command.
My object has been to give, perfectly objectively, a statement of what I understand the present arrangements to be, and I finish this part of the matter by saying, as I said when I began, that I do not for a moment claim—I am very ill qualified to-make such a claim—that this is necessarily to be judged as the best of all systems. But let us at least be sure that we give full credit to the system as it exists. It is not some hasty improvisation dictated by some volcanic genius; it has been the result of a vast amount of technical study, highly-specialized consideration and work for many years; and I think that we owe a great debt of gratitude to those before the war who, although they may not have provided us with all that is necessary to fight, at any rate provided us with a very carefully worked
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out scheme by which fighting might be done.
I shall not detain your Lordships much longer, but I should like in conclusion to make one general observation. I should like to make an observation on the true relations between the misfortunes and the disasters which have overtaken British arms and the ultimate outcome of the war which we are all resolutely determined to secure. It is sometimes pointed out—I have seen it in the reports of speeches at war weapons weeks, and the like—that in our history the final victory of Britain has often been preceded by battles and campaigns in which we have had the worst of it. Historically that is true. It was so in the Seven Years' War. Our ancestors who rejoiced over the successes of 1759 had been cast into the depths of despair by a series of misfortunes only a few years before. It was so in the Napoleonic War. It was so in the Crimean War. It was so, as some of us remember, in the South African War; and it was certainly so in the Great War of twenty-five years ago. All the same, my Lords, to my way of thinking it would be a very dangerous and misleading attitude of mind to treat the setbacks which we have had to endure as the inevitable and logical march of events, or to regard them as a mere illustration of the French phrase that it is sometimes wise reculer pour mieux sauter.
We have come through great trials, but, as the noble Lord who spoke last truly said—and it was a useful contribution—in the other scale we have to put substantial successes which we have had in the last two years. We can afford to face the stark reality. The setbacks seem to me to be very serious events in the present case, and all the more so because our purpose is not merely to recover the ground which has been lost but to secure, with our Allies, the positive overthrow of the foul Nazi and Fascist system which is threatening the free life of men and women all over the world. It will take prolonged, strenuous, united effort, exceeding anything which we have yet attained, before the situation will improve as we should wish. We know well the fibre and the doggedness of our fellow-countrymen, which will stand the strain. All that our fellow-countrymen demand is that the administration of the war should be equal to their own unshakable resolve.

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I was very glad to hear the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in his speech this afternoon, point out how foolish and unjust and short in memory it would be to let these recent disappointments cause us to forget the incomparable qualities of leadership and courage which the Prime Minister has shown, and what he did for the country in connexion with the Battle of Britain, the downfall of France and the Battle of the Atlantic, what he did—perhaps the greatest stroke of pure statesmanship in our time—in his instant recognition, within an hour, of the importance of Russia's resistance, and what he did a few weeks ago to cement the comradeship between the United States and ourselves. These things are not lightly to be overlain by any sense of misfortune to-day. The Prime Minister warned us that further blows arc coming, but he carries the whole country with him when he points out that the overwhelming power which this country and the United States and Russia and China can ultimately develop between them will be more than enough to secure our purpose, and when he calls afresh for unrelenting effort to achieve our incomparable resolve. The contribution that Parliament will make is not doubtful. Let us give him, therefore, our trust and support, and let every one of us do what he can until the day when victory comes.
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Addison, I ask leave to withdraw the Motion standing in his name.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

SINKING OF THE "STRUMA."
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I wish to ask the question standing in my name on the Paper.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, whether they will permit the entry into Palestine of the 800 refugee Jews now stranded in the Sea of Marmora, or still confine the permission to some fifty children between eleven and sixteen years of age.]
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord, I would
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say that I understand that the "Struma" was a converted yacht of about 200 tons, and that it left Constanza in October with some 750 Jews on board with the object of effecting their entry illegally into Palestine. The ship was flying the Panamanian flag. She was reported to have reached Istanbul about the middle of December, and thereafter considerable engine repairs had to be effected. The vessel was described as a mere hulk and badly overcrowded. Since putting this question on the Paper, the noble Lord will have seen the report in yesterday's Press that this vessel sank in the Black Sea on February 24 after an explosión. Clearly, therefore, for a reason which we all deeply regret, this question no longer arises. At the moment I have no further information than what has appeared in the Press as to the cause of the sinking, but His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara has been asked for an immediate report by telegraph. In the meantime, I should like to say how deeply His Majesty's Government deplore the tragic loss of life which has occurred.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, may I ask one supplementary question? When all hope was lost, the Jewish garrison at Masaba, rather than hand their wives and children over to the Romans, slew them all and fell on their swords. About a year ago, a ship similar to the "Struma" was refused permission to land those on board in Palestine, and blew up in Haifa harbour, when over a hundred were drowned. May I ask the noble Lord whether he is not as sure as I am that the bomb which destroyed the "Struma" was the last hope of the unfortunate refugees to save them from being handed back to Hitler? And may I ask him whether he does not think that the blood of these people is on our hands?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I deeply sympathize with the noble Lord's emotion; indeed this happening is such a terrible one that we must all sympathize. I think he would be, if I may say so, premature in assuming what he does assume. There have been suggestions that it was a mine; there have been suggestions of various kinds. All I can say at the present moment is that we have sent an urgent message to our Ambassador in Ankara to try to find out the facts of this very dreadful event.

PRODUCER GAS REPORT.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Barnby, I beg to ask the question standing in his name.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, when the Report of the Henley Committee on producer gas propulsion will be issued; and what immediate steps are being taken to encourage the adaptation of civil and commercial vehicles to the use of producer gas in order to conserve supplies of oil and petrol.]
LORD SNELL: My Lords, you will recall that the Committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Henley was appointed as recently as last November. Their examination of the available sources of fuel for producer gas vehicles has entailed the collection of a mass of detailed information. None the less, their work has advanced rapidly and I under-
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stand that they will be presenting their Report to the Secretary for Mines within a month or six weeks. The trials in commercial service of new types of producers and filters, which are being supervised by Mr. Shearman's Committee, together with Lord Henley's Committee's Report, will give the Government full and accurate information on the present state of this alternative form of transport. It will then be possible to assess the savings of imported petrol that could be made by conversion, up to the limits of the amounts of solid fuel available, of vehicles to run on producer gas. Your Lordships will appreciate that, with the heavy and still increasing demands of the war industries, there is at present no surplus of coal. Therefore it is not easy to decide on the extent to which producer gas traction might be adopted, but the matter is receiving the closest attention of the Government.
House adjourned.